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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 49250

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

BYRON BUFF REID,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Filed: September 27, 2022

Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Kootenai County. Hon. John T. Mitchell, District Judge. 

Order denying Idaho Criminal Rule 35(b) motion, affirmed.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Justin M. Curtis, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Judge

Byron Buff Reid appeals from the district court’s order denying his Idaho Criminal Rule 

35(b) motion. Reid argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion by 

potentially confusing his case with another case, by not providing him time to supplement the 

motion or holding a hearing, and by basing its decision on an allegedly unsupported factual finding. 

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Reid pleaded guilty to felony driving under the influence of alcohol, Idaho Code §§ 18-

8004, 18-8005(6). The district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with a minimum 

period of incarceration of four years. Reid filed an I.C.R. 35(b) motion in which he requested a 

hearing and stated that “in addition to a written statement and/or testimony from Mr. Reid, other 

evidence may include documentation and testimony from other individuals in support of this 
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request.” Reid provided no new information with the motion, but requested a hearing to present 

oral argument and evidence in support of his I.C.R. 35(b) motion. The district court found “Reid 

entirely fails to state what that testimony might be” and “gives this Court no idea of what his 

relevant evidence at [a] Rule 35 hearing would be.” Further, the court found that “because Reid 

has completely failed to give any indication of any facts that would support his claim, his I.C.R. 35 

motion must be denied due to that failure alone.” The district court denied the I.C.R. 35(b) motion 

and request for a hearing. Reid appeals. 

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for leniency, 

addressed to the sound discretion of the court. State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 319, 144 P.3d 

23, 24 (2006); State v. Allbee, 115 Idaho 845, 846, 771 P.2d 66, 67 (Ct. App. 1989). When a trial 

court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered 

inquiry to determine whether the lower court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; 

(2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards 

applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 

State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).

III.

ANALYSIS

Reid first argues that “to the extent that the court was confusing this case with another case, 

Mr. Reid submits that the district court did not reach its conclusion through an exercise of reason.” 

The sentence at issue from the district court’s denial of Reid’s I.C.R. 35(b) motion is “the Court

has reviewed Vandenberg’s Rule 35 motion, the Court has re-reviewed the minutes of the 

November 18, 2020, sentencing hearing and has re-reviewed the pre-sentence report and all other 

materials reviewed at sentencing.”

To the extent that the court was confusing this case with another case, Mr. Reid submits 

that the district court did not reach its conclusion through an exercise of reason. When viewed in 

context of the district court’s entire order, the above sentence is a typographical error. With the 

exception of the above sentence, the remainder of the district court’s order correctly identifies Reid 

as the defendant, the filing date of his I.C.R. 35(b) motion, the sentence imposed upon Reid, who 

Reid’s assigned attorney was, and that Reid’s motion was devoid of any evidence that would 
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warrant the reduction of his sentence. In this case, the typographical error in the district court’s 

order denying Reid’s I.C.R. 35(b) motion does not indicate the court incorrectly confused Reid’s 

case with another case and, thus, does not constitute an abuse of discretion. 

Reid next argues the district court erred in not granting him a hearing on his I.C.R. 35(b)

motion, despite acknowledging that he did not provide any evidence in support of the motion, did 

not provide an offer of proof, and did not explain why such evidence was not attached to the 

motion. In presenting an I.C.R. 35(b) motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is 

excessive in light of new or additional information provided to the district court in support of the 

motion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). Rule 35(b) authorizes 

the court to consider a motion without the admission of additional testimony and without oral 

argument. However, the court may abuse its discretion if it unreasonably refuses to consider 

relevant evidence or otherwise unduly limits the information considered. State v. Bayles, 131 

Idaho 624, 626-27, 962 P.2d 395, 397-98 (Ct. App. 1998). In conducting our review of the grant 

or denial of an I.C.R. 35(b) motion, we consider the entire record and apply the same criteria used 

for determining the reasonableness of the original sentence. State v. Forde, 113 Idaho 21, 22, 740 

P.2d 63, 64 (Ct. App. 1987). 

Regarding Reid’s request for a hearing, this Court stated in State v. Fortin, 124 Idaho 323, 

328, 859 P.2d 359, 364 (Ct. App. 1993):

A Rule 35 movant wishing to submit additional evidence should make an “offer of 

proof” in the motion itself or by an accompanying affidavit to enable the district 

judge to make a reasoned decision on whether to hold an evidentiary hearing and 

to create a record upon which appellate review may be based.

In Bayles, 131 Idaho at 627, 962 P.2d at 398, we held:

If anticipated evidence is not yet available or if the defendant believes that an 

evidentiary hearing is essential because relevant evidence cannot be adequately 

presented in writing, such circumstances should be explained to the court in the 

motion or an accompanying affidavit.

Reid’s I.C.R. 35(b) motion presented no argument why sentence relief would be 

appropriate nor did it include any supporting evidence. Rather, Reid’s motion merely stated “[i]n 

addition to a written statement and/or testimony from Mr. Reid, other evidence may include 

documentation and testimony from other individuals in support of this request.” Reid did not make 

an offer of proof in the motion itself or by an accompanying affidavit nor did he explain why the 

information was not available at the time of the motion. The purpose of the offer of proof or 
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affidavit is to explain the circumstances to the court so that it can make a reasoned decision on the 

request; Reid did not do so. Reid asserts that based on State v. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho 820, 825, 186 

P.3d 676, 681 (Ct. App. 2008), a district court abuses its discretion if it unduly limits the 

information it considers before ruling on an I.C.R. 35 motion. However, Reid gave no indication 

what information he planned to provide. The motion also failed to explain why the information 

was not available at the time the motion was filed. Reid did not present any basis or justification 

for his request and, therefore, the district court did not unduly limit the information it considered 

because no information or explanation about the lack of information was presented in the motion. 

Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Reid’s request for a hearing. 

Finally, Reid argues the district court denied the I.C.R. 35(b) motion based on an 

unsupported factual finding that Reid committed this offense while on supervised parole. The 

presentence investigation report indicates that Reid was convicted of a felony DUI in 2013 and 

received a ten-year suspended sentence. To the extent that Reid relies on information outside the 

appellate record to contradict that information, we decline to consider it. Consequently, the district 

court’s use of the word “parole” instead of “probation” when describing Reid’s supervision status 

in this case is inconsequential. The district court’s decision denying Reid’s I.C.R. 35(b) motion 

and request for a hearing is supported by substantial and competent evidence. 

III.

CONCLUSION

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Reid’s I.C.R. 35(b) motion. 

Accordingly, the district court’s order denying Reid’s I.C.R. 35(b) motion is affirmed.

Judge GRATTON and Judge BRAILSFORD CONCUR.