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1 

41–815 

" ! COMMITTEE PRINT 110TH CONGRESS

1st Session 

2008

110–1 

REPORT OF THE DEMOCRATIC MEMBERS 

OF THE SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON 

ETHICS ENFORCEMENT 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

DECEMBER 2007 

Printed for the use of the Special Task Force on Ethics 

Available via World Wide Web: 

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 


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SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON ETHICS ENFORCEMENT 

Rep. MICHAEL E. CAPUANO (D–MA), Chair 

Rep. LAMAR S. SMITH (R–TX), Ranking Member 

Rep. DAVID E. PRICE (D–NC)* 

Rep. ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT (D–VA) 

Rep. BETTY L. MCCOLLUM (D–MN) 

Rep. DAVID L. CAMP (R–MI) 

Rep. DAVID L. HOBSON (R–OH) 

Rep. TODD TIAHRT (R–KS) 

*Rep. Price was appointed to the Task Force in July 2007 to replace Rep. Martin T. Meehan, 

who resigned from Congress July 1, 2007. 


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FORMATION

The Special Task Force on Ethics Enforcement was established 

on January 31, 2007. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and 

House Republican Leader John Boehner appointed Representatives 

Michael E. Capuano and Lamar S. Smith as Chair and Ranking 

Member, respectively. Speaker Pelosi also appointed the following 

Democratic Members of Congress to serve on the Task Force: Martin T. Meehan, Robert C. ‘‘Bobby’’ Scott, and Betty L. McCollum. 

Republican Leader Boehner appointed the following Republican 

Members of Congress to serve on the Task Force: David L. Camp, 

David L. Hobson, and Todd Tiahrt. Rep. Meehan resigned from 

Congress in July 2007, and Rep. David E. Price was appointed to 

fill the vacancy on the Task Force. None currently serve on the 

House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct (commonly 

known as the ‘‘Ethics Committee’’), though some have served on 

this committee in the past. 

A number of staff members greatly assisted the work of the Task 

Force in the course of its duration: Christina Tsafoulias, Legislative 

Assistant to Rep. Capuano; Paul Taylor, Chief Republican Counsel 

to the House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil 

Rights, and Civil Liberties; Bernard Raimo, Counsel to the Speaker; Ed Cassidy, Senior Advisor & Floor Assistant to the Republican 

Leader; and Robert F. Weinhagen, Jr., Senior Counsel in the Office 

of Legislative Counsel. In addition, the following staff aided Members of the Task Force: Jean Louise Beard, Chief of Staff, and Kate 

Roetzer, Legislative Assistant to Rep. Price; Allison Havourd and 

Rob Guido, Legislative Assistants to Rep. Camp; Christopher 

Hickling, Legislative Director to Rep. Meehan; Ben Taylor, Legislative Assistant to Rep. Hobson; Carla Murrell-Hargrove, Staff Assistant, and Rashage Green, Legislative Assistant to Rep. Scott; 

Jeff Kahrs, Chief of Staff to Rep. Tiahrt; and Emily Lawrence, Legislative Director to Rep. McCollum. The Task Force would also like 

to thank the offices of the Parliamentarian and General Counsel, 

the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, and the Congressional Research Service for their assistance. 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Over the past eleven months, the Task Force has considered the 

questions of whether to create an independent ethics enforcement 

entity within the House of Representatives and how best to increase transparency and accountability within the ethics process. 

As a result of months of study and discussion among Task Force 

members and stakeholders, the Task Force proposes the creation of 

an Office of Congressional Ethics as an independent office within 

the House. The office will be composed of six board members, jointly appointed by the Speaker and Minority Leader, and a staff. It 

will be the responsibility of the board to review information on alleVerDate Aug 31 2005 04:51 Aug 23, 2008 Jkt 041815 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\A815.XXX A815

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gations of misconduct by Members, officers, and employees of the 

House and make recommendations to the Committee on Standards 

of Official Conduct for the Committee’s official consideration and 

action. 

Two board members may initiate a review by notifying all other 

board members in writing. The board will then have 30 calendar 

days to consider the matter in a preliminary phase and may vote 

to either terminate the review or progress to a second-phase review. Once in the second phase, the board has 45 calendar days 

(with a possible one-time extension of 14 days) to complete consideration of the matter and refer it to the Standards Committee with 

a recommendation for dismissal, further review, or as unresolved 

due to a tie vote. The board’s referral may not contain any conclusions regarding the validity of the allegations upon which it is 

based or the guilt or innocence of the individual who is the subject 

of the review. All matters that enter into a second-phase review 

must be referred to the Standards Committee. 

Once the Standards Committee receives a matter through this 

process, it will have 45 calendar days (with one possible extension 

of the same duration) to deliberate and decide on a course of action. 

All final authority and responsibility to either dismiss a case or 

empanel an investigative subcommittee continues to lie with the 

Standards Committee. In most cases, the Committee will publicly 

announce its disposition on the matter at the end of the applicable 

time period, along with a report and findings from the board. However, no public announcements are required when neither the 

board nor the Ethics Committee has found substantial wrongdoing. 

Through the implementation of these recommendations, the Task 

Force expects to significantly increase transparency in the process 

through greater reporting on a timely basis and to provide for an 

independent element of consideration by individuals who are not 

current Members of the House of Representatives. 

PURPOSE

During the 109th Congress, several Members were involved in 

controversies ranging from improper use of their office to inappropriate contact with participants in the House Page Program. In response to these well-documented incidents, one of the first actions 

of the 110th Congress was to pass changes to the U.S. House of 

Representatives Code of Official Conduct and other Rules of the 

House. In follow up to strengthening the rules governing the conduct of Members, Speaker Pelosi and Republican Leader Boehner 

announced that they would establish a Task Force to study enforcement of ethics rules. The Special Task Force on Ethics Enforcement 

was charged with determining whether the House should establish 

an independent ethics entity to serve as part of the ethics enforcement process. Currently, the Standards Committee is the sole ethics entity within the House, overseeing the receipt of all complaints, inquiries, investigations, and adjudication. 

Many Members of Congress and constitutional scholars have expressed concerns regarding the constitutionality of establishing an 

independent entity to supplement the existing House ethics process. The two commonly cited passages are as follows: 


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1 Financial Ethics (H. Doc. No. 95–73). 2 Ethics Reform Act of 1989 (Public Law No. 101–194). 3 H. Res. 168—To implement the recommendations of the bipartisan House Ethics Reform 

Task Force (105th Congress). 

• Article I, section 5, clause 2 of the United States Constitution: ‘‘Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish 

its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence 

of two thirds, expel a Member.’’ • Article I, section 6, clause 1 of the United States Constitution: ‘‘Senators and Representatives . . . for any Speech or Debate in either House, . . . shall not be questioned in any other place.’’ Task Force members were cognizant of these issues as they considered policy recommendations, and were careful to ensure that 

any proposal strictly adhere to constitutional precepts. 

BACKGROUND

Ethics reform in the House has been an ongoing process since 

the creation of the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct in 

1967. On average, the House has adopted significant ethics reforms, usually at the recommendation of a special task force, once 

a decade. Such reforms occurred after significant study of the ethics process, generally coupled with heightened public concern due 

to contemporaneous scandal. 

In 1977, the House adopted changes to the ethics process as proposed by the House Commission on Administrative Review. This 

Commission was led by Representatives David R. Obey (D–WI) and 

William E. Frenzel (R–MN), and charged with reviewing the administrative structure of the House. A number of reforms were implemented as a result of this initiative, including increased financial disclosure obligations for Members, limits on Members’ outside 

earned income, and the abolition of ‘‘unofficial’’ office accounts 

which Members often used to supplement official monies.1

In 1989, the House Bipartisan Leadership Task Force on Ethics 

convened, co-chaired by Representatives Vic Fazio (D–CA) and 

Lynn Martin (R–IL). This Task Force’s work culminated in the passage of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, which banned honoraria, instituted a one-year post-employment waiting period before lobbying, tightened gift rules, established the Office of Advice and 

Education, and provided for bifurcation between the investigative 

and adjudicatory duties of the Standards Committee.2

Finally, in 1997, the House established the Ethics Reform Task 

Force. This group was co-chaired by Representatives Robert L. Livingston (R–LA) and Benjamin L. Cardin (D–MD). A number of recommendations were implemented, including the first creation of a 

supplemental pool of Members from which to draw for investigative 

subcommittees, restrictions on the filing of complaints, limits to 

Members’ service on the Standards Committee, and the adoption of 

a rule providing for professional, nonpartisan Committee staff.3

In light of the fact that Congress worked for 178 years without 

formal rules on ethics or ethics procedures, the Task Force believes 

that Congress has come a long way in the 40 years since the establishment of the Standards Committee in 1967. Members of the 

Task Force also recognize that such matters are constantly in need 

of review and updating. 


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PROCESS

The Special Task Force on Ethics Enforcement met with current 

and former Members of Congress, advocacy and reform groups, 

scholars, current and former Standards Committee staff, and other 

stakeholders. The purpose of the exchanges was to familiarize Task 

Force members with varying viewpoints on the ethics process in 

the House of Representatives, as well as with proposals for reform 

of the current system. Throughout this process, the Task Force focused solely on the central question of whether to create an independent ethics enforcement entity. Numerous preliminary meetings 

took place in executive session in order to facilitate frank discussion among Task Force members and those asked to share their 

views. 

Members met in executive session on February 9, 2007 and 

March 1, 2007 to discuss matters relating to process, scheduling, 

and research. 

Members met in executive session on March 6, 2007, with Ken 

Kellner, Senior Counsel to the House Committee on Standards of 

Official Conduct. 

Members met in executive session on March 8, 2007, with Thomas Mann, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and Norman 

Ornstein, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. 

Members met in executive session on March 13, 2007, with Meredith McGehee, Policy Director for the Campaign Legal Center and 

Fred Wertheimer, President and CEO of Democracy 21. Both represent a larger coalition that supports the establishment of an Office of Public Integrity. 

Members met in executive session on March 15, 2007, with 

former Representatives Robert Livingston, who served as co-chair 

of the 1997 House Ethics Task Force, and Louis Stokes, a former 

Chairman of the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct. 

Members met in executive session on March 20, 2007 with Tom 

Fitton, President of Judicial Watch and Melanie Sloan, Executive 

Director of Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington 

(CREW). 

Members met in executive session on March 22, 2007, with Senator Ben Cardin, Co-Chair of the 1997 House Ethics Task Force, 

and Don Wolfensberger, Director of the Congress Project at the 

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 

Members met in executive session on March 27, 2007, with 

Sarah Dufendach, Chief of Legislative Affairs for Common Cause, 

Gary Kalman, Democracy Advocate for U.S. PIRG, and Lloyd Leonard, Senior Director of Advocacy for the League of Women Voters. 

Members met in executive session on March 29, 2007 with Patricia Harned, President of the Ethics Resource Center, Bradley 

Smith, former Federal Elections Commission Chairman, and Judge 

Anthony Wilhoit, Executive Director of the Kentucky Legislative 

Ethics Commission. 

Members met in executive session on April 17, 2007 with Rob 

Walker, Chief Counsel and Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee on Ethics and former Chief Counsel and Staff Director of 

the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct. 


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The Special Task Force on Ethics Enforcement held a public 

hearing on Thursday, April 19, 2007. The following individuals appeared as witnesses to offer testimony: Tom Fitton, President of 

Judicial Watch; Meredith McGehee, Policy Director for the Campaign Legal Center; Fred Wertheimer, President and CEO of Democracy 21; and Don Wolfensberger, Director of the Congress 

Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 

Mr. Fitton, Ms. McGehee, and Mr. Wertheimer all testified in support of the general concept of an independent ethics enforcement 

entity though some proposal details differed. Mr. Wolfensberger offered his perspective on this process based on years of service as 

an employee of the U.S. House of Representatives, and stated his 

opposition to the creation of an independent entity. Task Force 

members had the opportunity to pose follow-up questions to witnesses at the conclusion of their testimony. The Task Force hearing 

was open to all interested parties and a full transcript of the hearing was produced. The transcript is available on Rep. Capuano’s 

website at http://www.house.gov/capuano/. 

Members met again in executive session on April 24, 2007, to 

begin substantive discussion of Task Force proposals and recommendations. 

Members continued to meet in executive session to expand on 

those internal discussions and deliberate matters further on the 

following dates: April 26, 2007; May 1, 2007; May 2, 2007; May 3, 

2007; May 10, 2007; May 22, 2007; June 6, 2007; June 7, 2007; 

September 27, 2007; October 4, 2007; October 10, 2007; October 30, 

2007; November 1, 2007; November 8, 2007; November 14, 2007; 

November 15, 2007; December 4, 2007; and December 19, 2007. 

In addition, the Chair and Ranking Member of the Task Force 

held six meetings early in the process with many of those named 

above, as well as with Craig Holman, Legislative Representative 

for Public Citizen; Jack Maskell, Legislative Attorney for the Congressional Research Service; and R. Eric Petersen, Analyst in 

American National Government for the Congressional Research 

Service. 

In June 2007, the Task Force developed a proposal for an independent entity that would accept submissions from the general 

public regarding alleged ethics violations and, after an initial inquiry, refer them (with recommendations) to the Committee on 

Standards of Official Conduct for final action. This proposal was 

crafted based on a number of discussions of historical concerns 

with the ethics process in the House, and incorporated many suggestions given to the Task Force over the course of its meetings. 

Two main elements of the initial plan became problematic due to 

opposing concerns of some Members of Congress and ethics reform 

groups: the acceptance of ‘‘outside’’ submissions from the general 

public, and the requirement that any group filing a submission (or 

significantly aiding in the filing of a submission) disclose financial 

donors over a certain threshold. In deference to the concerns of 

both Members and various ethics reform groups, the Task Force decided to withhold its proposal at that time and to develop a new 

proposal. Regardless, the Task Force has always maintained its 

focus on accountability and transparency in the ethics process. 


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RECOMMENDATIONS

The following section contains the Special Task Force on Ethics 

Enforcement’s recommendations based on months of study, meetings, and discussion among members. The entity described below 

is created within the House of Representatives, to be established 

through a House resolution. The proposed resolution is included as 

Attachment A in this report. The Task Force recommends that an 

Office of Congressional Ethics (OCE) supplement the House ethics 

process by providing an independent review of alleged violations of 

standards of conduct by Members, officers, and employees—thereby 

reassuring Members of Congress and the general public that a 

clear ethics system is in place and will respond to possible ethics 

violations. Among the goals the Task Force hopes to accomplish are 

to introduce an independent review element by non-Members and 

significantly increase transparency of the process. The formation, 

procedure, and ancillary details of the OCE are described below. 

General overview 

The Task Force recommends that an entity named the Office of 

Congressional Ethics be established as an independent office within the House of Representatives to provide a review of alleged ethics violations. The OCE will be composed of six board members. 

The board will then appoint a staff to carry out the daily work of 

the office. 

The new Office of Congressional Ethics will act as an origination 

point for independent review of possible violations of standards of 

conduct, but will not prevent the Standards Committee from accepting complaints filed by Members. Any two OCE board members 

will be able to initiate a preliminary review of any matter by the 

board in order to better assess its validity. The board will then vote 

to either terminate the preliminary review or proceed to a secondphase review of the matter. By the end of a mandated time period, 

the OCE must refer all matters under second-phase review to the 

House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct—with a recommendation for dismissal, for further inquiry, or as unresolved 

due to a tie vote—for official Committee action. The Standards 

Committee will then consider the referral according to current 

Committee rules, but, for the first time in history, will be required 

to make a public announcement of its disposition for most referrals 

within a specified time period. The Standards Committee may dismiss or further investigate a matter as it sees fit once it has received the referral from the OCE. 

This new, independent office will open up the ethics process by 

allowing the OCE to self-initiate reviews of alleged violations, providing an avenue for both preliminary and second-phase reviews, 

and triggering a procedure by which official public comment is required within a specified time frame. 

Entity 

The Office of Congressional Ethics is to be established by resolution as an independent office of the House of Representatives consisting of board members and a staff. Board members are to be appointed jointly by the Speaker and Minority Leader to ensure biVerDate Aug 31 2005 02:55 Aug 23, 2008 Jkt 041815 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A815.XXX A815

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partisan balance. Vacancies on the board will be filled for the remainder of the unexpired term by the process delineated below. 

Once established, the board shall appoint a nonpartisan, professional staff to carry out the daily duties of the OCE. The staff 

members are to be employees of the House of Representatives and 

subject to all applicable rules and standards for such employees. 

During Task Force meetings, some ethics reform groups suggested that the Task Force create an ‘‘outside’’ entity which would 

be separate from the House. Its staff would not be considered 

House employees, nor would its director (or board members) or 

rules operate under House control. Some proposals included provisions to allow this outside entity to receive complaints, dismiss 

complaints as appropriate, conduct its own investigations, and recommend sanctions of Members. The Task Force recognized that the 

establishment of this type of entity would require a vote of both the 

House and Senate, and the signature of the President, and could 

also run afoul of constitutional responsibilities. Many outside 

groups and scholars with whom the Task Force consulted agreed 

with this assessment and proposed models for an entity within the 

House that would act as an independent office much like the Office 

of the Inspector General or the Office of the Chief Administrative 

Officer. The Task Force approved of such an approach for an office 

within the Legislative Branch as the most feasible. 

The OCE will be established by a resolution which must be readopted at the start of each new Congress to remain in effect. 

Given that the Rules of the House, which the resolution in part 

amends, are traditionally carried over from one Congress to the 

next, the Task Force anticipates that the continued existence and 

effectiveness of the OCE will be given due respect and consideration. 

Board 

The board members of the OCE will be charged with initiating 

reviews, assessing all matters under review, and referring secondphase reviews to the Standards Committee for action. They must 

make a decision whether to recommend (in the case of a secondphase review) that the Committee dismiss a matter or that the 

matter requires further inquiry. The board will be able to independently initiate ethics reviews and, for this reason, must be comprised of individuals of distinction and high qualification. As the 

OCE is to be an independent entity within the House, it is clear 

that no current Members of Congress may serve on its board. Rather, OCE board members shall be private citizens with extensive experience with one or more of the following fields: legislative, judicial, regulatory, professional ethics, business, legal, and academic. 

This list is not exhaustive and is meant to provide examples of the 

background and qualities the Speaker of the House and Minority 

Leader may take into account when considering individuals to appoint to the board. In addition, Task Force members believe it 

would be appropriate to consider former Members of Congress, 

former Congressional staff, former state legislators, former judges, 

etc. No current registered lobbyists may serve on the board. 

Former Members of Congress to be considered for the board must 

be out of office for at least one year prior to their appointment. 


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It is the intention of the Task Force that the OCE should run 

as smoothly as possible following its establishment within the 

House. Board members will each serve presumptive four year 

terms and may be reappointed for one additional term. The Speaker and Minority Leader will jointly appoint board members to ensure bipartisanship in the operation of the OCE. If, after 90 days, 

a board position has not been filled by joint appointment, then the 

position will be filled by either the Speaker or Minority Leader, as 

appropriate, acting alone. The Task Force encourages the two leaders to work cooperatively to appoint a full board; however, in the 

event that they are unable to agree on a full complement, the Task 

Force believes it is essential that the OCE proceed to conduct its 

business in a timely manner and should therefore have a system 

in place to account for such a possibility. In a practical sense, the 

Speaker and Minority Leader will most likely appoint two board 

members at a time, to guarantee that any slots remaining open 

after the 90-day period (mentioned above) exist in even numbers 

for potential partition along majority-minority lines. 

To ensure continuity of OCE functions, the terms will be staggered so that the Speaker and Minority Leader will appoint or reappoint at least two board members at the start of a new Congress. 

At the establishment of the OCE, the Speaker and Minority Leader 

will appoint four board members to serve through the remainder 

of the 110th Congress and two board members presumed to serve 

through the 111th Congress. Accordingly, at the start of the 111th 

Congress, the leaders must make four new board appointments 

through the duration of the 112th Congress. 

OCE board members shall be paid for their service on a per diem 

basis at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the minimum rate 

of basic pay payable for GS–15 of the General Schedule. As of December 26, 2006, this rate equaled $93,063 per year. Board members shall also be reimbursed for reasonable and customary expenses associated with travel, lodging, and meals necessary to 

carry out their official duties. To provide for full participation, however, the Task Force anticipates that the board may, when necessary and appropriate, and pursuant to its rules, conduct meetings via telephone conference call. The board will draw up a code 

of conduct to which its members must adhere that addresses conflict of interest and other concerns. The Task Force expects that 

board members will be professional and responsible men and 

women who, though working part-time on a per diem basis, will account for their duties in a conscientious manner. Board members 

shall only be paid for days in which substantive OCE work is done. 

At no time shall board members engage in ex parte communications with any Member, officer, or employee of the House who is 

the subject of a review by the OCE, or any other interested party. 

In order to ensure that the OCE is as protected as possible from 

politics and political campaigns, no board members shall be allowed to seek federal office and each must agree not to do so within 

three years of service. The Task Force looks unfavorably on any individual who would capitalize on a position with the OCE for personal political gain. 

Removal of board members for cause at any point prior to the 

completion of their appointment will require the agreement of both 


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4See Standards Committee Rule 6(d) and (e). 

the Speaker and Minority Leader to ensure that such action is rare 

and taken only when necessary. 

The Task Force would like to address one point that discussion 

with ethics reform groups yielded relative to the OCE board: the 

suggestion that a new ethics entity be created with its own professional staff and be overseen by one director rather than a board. 

It was argued that such an arrangement would provide for greater 

accountability within the entity and of the entity to the House. 

This concept proved dubious for a number of reasons. The primary concern is the amount of power vested in one individual to 

oversee the process. While such a Director would no doubt be vetted by both parties and, by necessity, approved by both parties’

leadership, the distinct potential exists for an individual in this position to overreach his or her authority. The Task Force encountered instances in the history of the ethics process where, for example, special counsel was hired, either by the Standards Committee 

or some other Congressional entity, who was widely seen as having 

overstepped the appropriate extent of his or her authority. Concerns were raised about investigations that stray from the original 

allegations of misconduct, and about individuals who use such 

unique positions of power to lay the foundation for their own future 

careers. The Task Force does not approve of the use of the ethics 

process for partisan or personal gain and believes the amount of 

power given to a sole director of the entity would pose significant 

potential for abuse. 

In addition, a board composed of an equal number of members 

appointed jointly encourages bipartisan cooperation and reduces 

concerns of partisan prosecution or protection. Each party must 

take seriously its responsibility to act conscientiously with respect 

to the appointment and comity of board members. 

Staff 

The staff of the OCE will be hired and overseen by OCE board 

members, and will be full-time employees of the House of Representatives. 

Staff members shall be hired by the board for the duration of a 

Congress and may be retained by a vote of the OCE board. A majority of the board (i.e. four members) must vote affirmatively to 

hire staff and, in such a case where it becomes necessary, to terminate staff prior to the end of a Congress. 

It is essential that the Office of Congressional Ethics remain 

nonpartisan in design and function. All staff must be professional 

and conduct themselves in a strictly nonpartisan manner. Consequently, the Task Force recommends that restrictions similar to 

those placed on the political and outside activities of Standards 

Committee staff be implemented for OCE staff as well. These include requiring that no staff ‘‘engage in any partisan political activity directly affecting any congressional or presidential election’’ and 

that no staff ‘‘accept public speaking engagements or write for publication on any subject that is in any way related to his or her employment or duties.’’ 4


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Prospective consideration 

Reviews undertaken by the OCE may only pertain to acts alleged 

to have occurred on or after the date of adoption of the resolution. 

The Task Force wishes to allow for a smooth establishment of the 

OCE in which it will not be overburdened by a backlog of matters 

from previous Congresses. The OCE is intended to supplement and 

open up the ethics process in the House by moving forward. The 

customary Standards Committee process will remain available to 

accept complaints—according to its existing rules as adopted on 

February 16th, 2007—for any conduct taking place in any of the 

three preceding Congresses. The Standards Committee shall retain 

such authority as granted under House rule XI. 

In order to allow adequate time for appointments, hiring of staff, 

office placement, and other such matters, the OCE is given 120 

days from the date of adoption of the resolution before it is expected to commence any review. 

Authority and duties of the OCE 

As the OCE is designed to enhance and supplement the House 

ethics process by allowing for independent initial consideration of 

possible ethics violations, it will exist to initiate and conduct reviews, gather information, and advise the Standards Committee as 

to board members’ recommendations regarding alleged violations. 

Any final action to dismiss or establish an investigative subcommittee to further examine alleged violations must be taken by 

the Standards Committee itself, pursuant to its Committee rules. 

The staff and board of the OCE are empowered to gather information regarding potential violations, as stated above. The purpose 

of this review of each allegation is to help board members decide 

which matters to refer, and how best to refer them, to the Standards Committee. Through fact-gathering, the board and staff 

should be able to establish which allegations lack merit or are de 

minimis and thus do not necessitate second-phase review by the 

OCE or referral to the Committee for consideration. The Task 

Force envisions certain circumstances under which the board may 

seek to interview individuals believed to have further information 

regarding an alleged violation and ask to see documents presumed 

to be connected to the case. However, should the board feel it has 

not been able to gather accurate information due to lack of cooperation with its initial inquiry or unavailability of requested information, it shall state so in its referral of a given matter to the Standards Committee. The Committee is encouraged to take such factors 

into consideration during deliberations. 

At no time shall any board member or staff member of the OCE 

comment publicly on any matter within its jurisdiction, unless requested to do so by the Standards Committee in order to participate in a public proceeding of that Committee. To ensure confidentiality and responsibility in the opening steps of the ethics process, 

the OCE will conduct all its proceedings and deliberations in executive session. 

The Task Force also recommends that the OCE produce a yearly 

statistical report detailing, without name or subject attribution, the 

work of the office. The report should give the public an understanding as to how many matters were reviewed both in the preVerDate Aug 31 2005 02:55 Aug 23, 2008 Jkt 041815 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A815.XXX A815

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liminary and second-phase stages, along with the number of meetings of the board and other related activities. 

The above section describes the authority and duties delegated to 

the OCE at this time. Current rules require Members and certain 

House staff to file financial disclosure forms and travel reports 

with the Office of the Clerk. The Clerk also receives Lobbying Disclosure Act filings. In the discourse of ethics reform, it was suggested to the Task Force that the independent entity be responsible 

for overseeing and receiving such filings as part of its mandate. It 

is, however, the desire of the Task Force that the entity be initially 

charged only with the responsibilities outlined in its recommendations. The creation of a new element within the system will require 

certain adjustments and a period of time to become fully operational. The entity should not be overloaded at its implementation. 

This speaks to one reason why the Task Force later recommends 

a continuing review of the ethics process while such changes are 

realized. 

Review process 

The Task Force feels strongly that part of any reform to the ethics process must include a more transparent system that contains 

recognizable and predictable timeframes, along with an independent review of alleged ethics violations by individuals who are 

not Members of Congress. The process detailed below adheres to 

strict timelines and guarantees public comment by the Standards 

Committee in most cases once a second-phase review is initiated. 

The public, as well as Members of Congress, have a right to know 

that the process is working and that pressing matters are being reviewed by the OCE and Standards Committee. It is with this goal 

in mind that the Task Force lays out the following review process 

for the OCE. 

Once two board members of the OCE jointly initiate a preliminary review by notifying all other board members in writing, board 

members shall have 30 calendar days or 5 legislative days, whichever is later, to conduct the preliminary review. This phase is intended to provide an opportunity to explore any alleged ethics violations in order to establish whether further review is merited. 

Within 7 business days of the start of a preliminary review, the 

OCE must transmit notification to both the subject of the review 

and the Standards Committee, along with a statement of the nature of the review. The names of the board members initiating the 

preliminary review shall never be made public. 

By the close of the preliminary review phase, the board must 

vote on whether to terminate the review or commence a secondphase review of the matter, though such a vote may occur at any 

point in the preliminary phase. The OCE must notify both the subject of the review and the Standards Committee of the vote’s result, 

but not the names of board members indicating which member 

voted a particular way. A preliminary review may only be terminated by an affirmative vote of four or more board members. If the 

review is terminated, all OCE inquiries into the matter shall cease 

and it is considered closed. The OCE is not required to transmit 

any further information regarding a terminated matter to the 


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5 18 U.S.C. § 1001. 

Standards Committee; however, the board may vote at its discretion to transmit any information it sees fit. 

If the board does not terminate a preliminary review, then the 

OCE will proceed to a second-phase review of the matter. During 

the second phase, the board will have 45 calendar days or 5 legislative days, whichever is later, to gather information, obtain witness 

testimony, examine documents, and generally probe the alleged violation. The board may vote to grant a one-time extension of 14 calendar days in the second-phase review. At the close of the secondphase review process, the board of the OCE must refer the matter 

to the Standards Committee with its report and findings. 

Any Member, officer, or employee of the House who is the subject 

of an OCE review has the right to present to the board, verbally 

or in writing (at the board’s discretion), a statement responding to 

allegations prior to the board’s referral and recommendations to 

the Standards Committee. 

During the review (preliminary or second-phase) of a given matter, the OCE may collect relevant documents and interview individuals who may have knowledge of the alleged violation. In the 

course of such inquiries and interviews, the OCE shall make any 

individuals providing information verbally or in writing aware of 

federal criminal statutes concerning false statements made to Congress,5 the penalty for violation of which carries a fine and/or imprisonment. Those individuals will be asked to sign a statement attesting that they understand the law and will comply with it. The 

OCE will be directed to develop its own set of rules to govern Office 

functions beyond what is set forth in the accompanying resolution. 

Among those rules will be one stating that all witnesses must sign 

the above statement. The Task Force expects the OCE, in addition, 

to develop guidelines for OCE action if a witness refuses to sign the 

statement, which should include, but not be limited to, incorporating information to that effect within the board’s findings of 

fact. 

If OCE staff and board members have reason to believe that 

statements made in the course of its reviews are false, or that requested information or documents have been withheld, the board 

may take this into consideration during its deliberations and note 

this among materials submitted as ‘‘backup documents’’ to the 

Standards Committee for its consideration. The Committee is expected and encouraged to make note of such information and take 

it into consideration during its deliberations. 

The end product of the second-phase OCE process is to be the referral of a matter from the OCE to the Standards Committee. Each 

matter under second-phase review by the OCE must be referred to 

the Committee for a final decision by Standards Committee Members. Matters may be referred with a recommendation to dismiss 

(as de minimis, insignificantly substantiated, or for some other reason), a recommendation for further review, or as unresolved due to 

a tie vote. Board members, based on the information gathered by 

themselves and staff, shall issue materials to accompany each referral. These materials will include: 


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1. Report: A short written Report stating only that the board recommends the matter be dismissed, recommends that the matter requires further review, or refers the matter as unresolved; delineating the vote of board members (e.g. 6–0, 4–2, etc.), but no board 

member names; and including a statement of the nature of the review and the name of the individual who is the subject of the review. 

2. Findings: Preliminary factual Findings based on the information available to the board at the time of its inquiry, if any. Such 

findings shall not contain any conclusory statements regarding the 

validity of the allegations upon which the review is based or the 

guilt or innocence of the individual who is the subject of the review. 

The findings may contain statements as to what necessary information was unavailable at the time, including, but not limited to, a 

list of potential witnesses the OCE was unable to interview or of 

requested documents it was unable to obtain. In addition, the 

board may include recommendations for the issuance of subpoenas 

where members feel it is appropriate. Finally, the Findings shall 

contain citations of any relevant laws, rules, regulations, or standards of conduct. 

3. Other materials forwarded to the Committee may consist of ‘‘backup’’ or supporting documents such as records, testimony, research, staff notes, and commentary detailing either why a dismissal is recommended or why a matter is referred for further inquiry. Cooperative witnesses, who will not be named by the board 

within the Findings in order to preserve confidentiality, should be 

listed within the supporting documents for the Committee’s information. These materials shall not be published unless the Standards Committee deems it necessary and appropriate. 

Nothing in these recommendations shall preclude a second review by the board of the OCE of any given matter. The Task Force 

foresees certain uncommon circumstances in which the board may 

have terminated a preliminary review of a specific matter, or recommended dismissal of a matter to the Standards Committee, only 

to come across new evidence in the future which suggests the allegations merit another review. There will be no ‘‘double jeopardy’’

considerations preventing subsequent reviews. 

Complaints offered by Members of Congress shall continue to be 

submitted directly to the Standards Committee for consideration 

under the existing process. 

Subpoena Power 

During the course of discussions amongst Members of the Task 

Force and with stakeholders outside Congress, it was suggested 

that the OCE be given either direct or ‘‘indirect’’ subpoena power 

(‘‘indirect’’ meaning access through requests to the Standards Committee that subpoenas be issued returnable to the OCE). Task 

Force members discussed these options vigorously and debated 

their feasibility. The final decision to exclude subpoena power was 

based on a number of factors. 

The professional opinions of the House Parliamentarian, General 

Counsel, and Congressional Research Service were sought so that 

the Task Force could better assess the legality of delegating such 

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cated that while it might be possible to do so, a subpoena issued 

by such a method would almost certainly be subject to a court challenge unless it was backed by some statutory authority. Consequently, as a statute would require both passage by the Senate 

and the signature of the President, Task Force members decided 

against attempting to pass a bill that was likely to be held up in 

the legislative process. It is the hope of the Task Force that its recommendations be implemented through a swift legislative process 

and that the establishment of the OCE take place equally quickly, 

so as to commence the improvement of the ethics process as soon 

as possible. 

Members of the Task Force believe that the timeline requirements instituted by the new process are critical: matters will spend 

at most three months under consideration by the board of the OCE 

before being referred to the Standards Committee for resolution. 

Due to the fast-paced nature of any OCE review, the Task Force 

feels subpoenas issued during that stage would not constitute successful leverage, as any court challenge to a subpoena would almost 

certainly carry on past the OCE deadline for referral to the Committee. In practice, subpoenas would not be able to be utilized effectively by the board and may unnecessarily complicate and delay 

the ethics process at that juncture. 

Most importantly, the Task Force proposal envisions significant 

communication of information from the OCE to the Standards 

Committee, including explicit wording recommending the Committee issue a specific subpoena in its review of a matter referred 

by the OCE. The Task Force believes that this inclusion within the 

findings transmitted by the OCE to the Committee strikes at the 

heart of the issue of compelling testimony or documents—the 

threat of a subpoena is likely to compel a witness to cooperate almost as much as the subpoena itself. When this fact is considered 

in light of the long period of time it takes to issue and enforce a 

subpoena, and the desire to move the process along at a reasonable 

pace, the Task Force believes it becomes clear why there is no true 

value added by issuing subpoenas at this stage in the process. The 

Task Force encourages the OCE to make witnesses providing testimony or those asked to produce documents aware that the board 

may recommend a subpoena be issued by the Standards Committee 

later in the process. 

The degree to which witnesses cooperate with the OCE in its reviews will play an important role in the decision of the board 

whether to recommend the Standards Committee issue a subpoena. 

Should the board feel that any witness asked to provide testimony 

or documents during the process has not been cooperative, it may 

reasonably determine that the Committee should obtain sworn testimony from that individual and recommend use of a subpoena to 

compel the sharing of pertinent information. The Committee is also 

expected to properly note such situations during its deliberations. 

Referral to the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct 

After completion of the OCE’s second-phase review, and at or before the time limit specified above, the OCE will refer all matters 

to the Standards Committee for official disposition. The Committee 

must treat all matters referred by the OCE as properly received 


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and must, upon receipt, commence consideration according to 

Standards Committee rule 16, subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e). 

Under such provisions, the Committee shall determine what action 

is warranted, including, but not limited to: agreement with any recommendations transmitted from the OCE, dismissal of the matter, 

further investigation through the request for one extension of the 

time period for consideration, or establishment of an investigative 

subcommittee. Any referral received from the OCE will automatically bypass the provision outlined in Committee rule 16(a), which 

allows the Committee’s Chairman and Ranking Member 14 calendar days or 5 legislative days to jointly determine whether information offered as a complaint constitutes a complaint according to 

Committee requirements. 

In the case of referrals made by the OCE to the Standards Committee within the 60 days before an applicable election, the Committee may not accept referrals of matters in which the subject of 

the review is a candidate for election. The process will halt temporarily and proceed the day after the election. In addition, any reporting requirements placed on the Committee by this proposal 

that would occur within the 60-day blackout period shall be deferred unless the Committee votes otherwise. The Task Force expects that, in most cases, the Committee will choose not to disclose 

any information within the blackout period; however, should the 

Committee feel an announcement of any sort would be in the best 

interest of the institution and the public, it may publicize any information it wishes. Pursuant to its current rules, the Committee 

may publicize any information it sees fit within this window, 

though it has typically chosen to not to communicate with the public in the two months prior to an election. 

The Standards Committee may request that a board or staff 

member of the OCE ‘‘present’’ a matter that has been referred to 

the Committee. In such circumstances, one member of the OCE 

shall be designated to present in person the report and findings of 

the board to the Committee and be available to answer any questions Committee members may have relative to the matter under 

consideration. No presentation of the board’s disposition and findings may take place without a request from the Standards Committee. 

Under existing Standards Committee rules, the Committee has a 

45 calendar day or 5 legislative day period, whichever is later, in 

which to determine necessary action as outlined above. At the end 

of that period, or upon making a determination, whichever occurs 

first, the Committee must issue its own public statement regarding 

its action on the matter referred by the OCE and delineating the 

vote of the Standards Committee, and a copy of the OCE board’s 

report and findings. 

The exception to the above is a case where the board recommends dismissal of a matter and the Committee concurs, or 

where the board refers a matter as unresolved due to a tie vote and 

the Committee dismisses it. Under such circumstances, the Committee is not obligated to release the OCE report and findings, 

though it may vote to do so at its discretion. 

The Committee may, either by joint decision of the Chair and 

Ranking Member or by vote of the Committee, extend the initial 


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6See Standards Committee rule 15(f). 

period of consideration by one additional period of 45 calendar days 

or 5 legislative days. If the Committee so extends a matter referred 

by the board with a recommendation for further review, it must, 

on the day of such decision, make a public statement announcing 

the extension of the given matter. If the Committee extends a matter referred by the board with a recommendation to dismiss or as 

unresolved due to a tie board vote, the Committee is not required 

to publicly announce the extension. 

If the Committee deadlocks on a matter, the Committee must 

publicly release the board’s report and findings but may otherwise 

adhere to its existing rules. This action will allow the public some 

cognizance of the facts of the matter even if the Committee is unable to resolve it officially. 

Should the Committee empanel an investigative subcommittee 

regarding a matter referred by the board, it must publicly announce that fact upon creation of the subcommittee, but otherwise 

shall not make public the report and findings of the board until the 

completion of the subcommittee process. If that process is not completed after one year from the date of referral, the Committee shall 

publicly release the report of the board. And if, at the close of the 

Congress in which the report was released, the investigative subcommittee has not completed its process, then the Committee shall 

publicly release the findings of the board. 

The Standards Committee maintains its current ability to resolve 

matters with private or public letters as it so chooses. Any sanction 

it may currently impose according to Committee rules will not be 

precluded by the Task Force’s recommended proposal. In fact, 

members of the Task Force anticipate matters that may be best 

dismissed by the Committee as a de minimis technical violation but 

may also necessitate a private letter to a Member outlining obligatory future compliance with rules. Such situations are certain to 

arise and should be dealt with in a manner appropriate to their 

scope and significance. 

The Standards Committee, according to its current rules,6 may 

defer action on a complaint when requested by appropriate law enforcement or regulatory authorities. The Committee may continue 

this practice with respect to matters referred by the OCE as well. 

If the Committee does defer action on a matter at the request of 

such authorities, it shall make a public statement to that effect 

within one day of agreeing to the deferral. In the case of a matter 

referred by the OCE for further review, the Committee must also 

release the report of the board. If, one year after the deferral to law 

enforcement or regulatory authorities, the Committee has not acted 

on the matter, the Committee must make a new public statement 

announcing that it is still deferring taking action on the matter 

and must renew this statement each year as applicable. 

The Task Force recognizes that this addition to the ethics process 

may increase the workload of the Standards Committee beyond the 

capacity of its current staff. Task Force members encourage and expect the House to respond as necessary and appropriate to provide 

sufficient staff to allow the Committee to meet its new obligations 

under this resolution. 


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The process outlined above guarantees a public statement on 

nearly every matter that is reviewed in the second phase by the 

OCE. While a few matters will necessitate further, more expansive 

investigation by an investigative subcommittee of the Standards 

Committee, it is the goal of the Task Force to ensure that the public is made aware of information concerning each significant alleged 

violation in a timely fashion. As such, Members of Congress and 

the general public can be assured that the OCE and Standards 

Committee are aware of certain allegations and that the process for 

consideration of those matters has been triggered. 

The Task Force has included an attachment to this report which 

delineates the various steps associated with the OCE process and 

the possible outcomes (Attachment B). 

Cooperation with the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct 

The Task Force intends the OCE and the Standards Committee 

to work cooperatively to ensure that allegations of misconduct are 

dealt with properly. The Standards Committee will be notified 

early in the process of all matters under review by the OCE and 

will be kept abreast of the status at each subsequent step. 

After receiving notification that the OCE is reviewing a given 

matter, the Standards Committee may, if it is already investigating 

that matter, request that the OCE cease its investigation and refer 

the matter directly to the Committee. The Task Force envisions 

certain cases where a matter may already be the subject of an undisclosed Standards Committee investigation in which the OCE 

may wish to avoid interference. In addition, it is possible that the 

Standards Committee may possess more complete information than 

the OCE regarding an alleged violation and may be better equipped 

to handle the matter. 

The board of the OCE must cooperate with such requests from 

the Standards Committee at any point in the process. Along with 

the early referral of the matter at hand, the board must transmit 

a Report stating simply that the matter is referred to the Standards Committee at the request of that Committee. The board will 

not transmit any findings, as board members will not yet have 

reached that stage in the process regarding the relevant matter. 

Such a referral shall be treated as any other from the OCE to the 

Standards Committee and will commence the 45 calendar day or 5 

legislative day period in which the Committee may consider the 

matter before releasing a statement on the committee’s disposition, 

along with the board’s report. The Committee must follow all reporting requirements in such cases, including a release of the 

board’s report at the end of the applicable time period, even if the 

matter is dismissed or remains unresolved. 

If the Committee has not reached a final resolution, or properly 

deferred its review at the request of an appropriate law enforcement entity, by the end of the applicable time period (either after 

the Committee’s initial 45 calendar day or 5 legislative day period 

or after an extension), then the Committee must so notify the 

board of the OCE, which will then commence an automatic secondphase review of the matter (or recommence its suspended secondphase review, as applicable). For the purposes of this provision, 

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mittee requested early from the OCE, establishment of an investigative subcommittee regarding the matter, or a conclusion or action which clearly indicates that the matter will no longer be considered by the Committee. In circumstances where the Committee 

notifies the board of the OCE that it has not reached a final resolution in such a matter, the OCE will follow its regular procedure 

from the second-phase review forward—by collecting evidence, 

interviewing witnesses, establishing a set of findings, and referring 

the matter to the Committee for its disposition. Once a matter that 

had been requested early by the Committee is returned to the OCE 

for an automatic second-phase review as detailed above, the Committee may not request another early referral. The matter must 

proceed through the regular process from that point forward. 

Nothing in this proposal shall prohibit general communication 

between OCE board members and the Standards Committee not relating to specific matters under review by either entity. The Task 

Force believes that board members should be able to convey certain 

ideas and advice to the Committee regarding, for example, recommendations as to which policies it might be helpful to outline for 

Members in ‘‘pink sheets’’ or guidance memoranda. Such communication would be both acceptable and useful to the process. 

The Task Force has been informed and believes that the accompanying resolution is joint and severable. Should any provision be 

found in the normal course of events to be invalid or unconstitutional, the remainder of the resolution will stand. 

OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS

This section details a number of issues that, while not directly 

within the purview of the Task Force, were discussed at multiple 

points in Task Force sessions and were consistently considered to 

be relevant to the work at hand. Task Force members formulated 

thoughts based on their observations of the Standards Committee 

process, and would like to offer the following informal commentary 

in addition to the formal recommendations detailed above. 

General transparency of Standards Committee work 

During the course of Task Force meetings, it became clear that 

members, none of whom currently serve on the Standards Committee, did not feel they had sufficient quantitative information on 

the day-to-day work of that Committee. Members frequently commented that they did not know whether the Committee was investigating certain cases presently being highlighted in news reports. 

This lack of transparency, discernable even to current Members of 

Congress, presents barriers to comprehension of, and trust in, the 

Committee’s execution of its duties. 

The Task Force recognizes that the rules governing Standards 

Committee confidentiality and reporting were first created along 

with the establishment of the Committee in 1967, and have been 

refined by subsequent ethics reform efforts. As a consequence, 

many of the confidentiality provisions were put in place to protect 

Members’ reputations from false claims in an age when such reputations could be protected. The media and public interest groups 

operated under a different set of standards than they do now, and 

information was not as readily available to the public as it is now 


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7 Ibid. 

with the advent of weblogs (or ‘‘blogs’’), which often operate with 

few or no standards. Constant allegations and press conferences 

announcing alleged unethical behavior were not de rigueur. Presently, however, it is common for allegations to appear in the media 

before an ethics investigation has concluded and often before it is 

known whether, in fact, a matter is being investigated. While the 

Committee may not comment publicly on any complaints it has accepted, the public is made aware of ethics allegations through other 

sources and can reasonably expect that the Standards Committee 

should consider or investigate those cases. 

In addition, both Members of Congress and the general public 

should be presented with information evidencing the work of the 

Standards Committee, even if that work is confidential, so that 

they may know the ethics process has not broken down. The Task 

Force believes that increased transparency in the statements and 

reporting of the Standards Committee will not be unduly burdensome, and will instead serve to inform interested parties of successful application of the ethics process. 

Coordination with law enforcement and regulatory authorities 

Standards Committee rules provide for the ability to ‘‘defer action on a complaint . . . when . . . the Committee has reason to 

believe [it] is being reviewed by appropriate law enforcement or 

regulatory authorities. . . .’’ 7 This situation most commonly arises 

when an ethics complaint corresponds to alleged criminal conduct 

on the part of a Member, officer, or employee of the House. Frequently, authorities such as the U.S. Department of Justice will request that the Committee defer its review or investigation so as not 

to interfere with an ongoing criminal (or regulatory) investigation. 

The Committee usually abides by such requests to avoid jeopardizing the authorities’ work. 

The Task Force is comfortable allowing the Committee to decide 

whether to defer to other authorities when asked. However, Task 

Force members have observed general displeasure with the lack of 

transparency at this step in the ethics process. It is often unclear 

to Members and the public if the Committee has undertaken a review of well-known ethics charges when no public statement is 

made by the Committee. 

Therefore, the Task Force believes that the Standards Committee 

should publicly state, as standard procedure, that a matter before 

the Committee is deferred at the request of law enforcement or regulatory authorities. This proposal recommends many actions to increase transparency. Nonetheless, the Task Force encourages the 

Standards Committee to review its own procedure and rules, regardless of the suggestions in this proposal, to shed as much light 

on their process and workings as possible in order to increase respect for its work and faith in Congressional processes in general. 

Reporting of Standards Committee activities 

After the close of each Congress, the Standards Committee publishes a ‘‘Summary of Activities’’ which provides information on 

Committee work from that Congress. Included in the report are 


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lists of Committee publications, briefings offered, advisory opinion 

letters, markups of legislation, hearings, and some investigations. 

The material offered regarding investigations is only that which 

has been made public and pertains to a select number of cases. The 

committee does not include confidential information on investigations, nor does it include more general statistics on its work. 

Task Force members, during the course of their meetings, expressed interest in obtaining further statistical information from 

the Standards Committee. For example, members asked to see reporting regarding the number of instances where information was 

offered as a complaint (from Members and non-Members), the number of accepted complaints, the number of complaints dismissed as 

frivolous or de minimis, the number of investigative subcommittees 

empanelled, and the number of complaints resulting in sanctions. 

The Task Force understands that much of the substance of the 

Standards Committee’s proceedings is, by necessity, confidential. 

However, statistical reporting—furnished without identifying characteristics which would tie it to specific Members—would help to 

assure Members and the public of the continued diligence of the 

Committee in overseeing the ethics process. 

The Task Force suggests that the Standards Committee work to 

increase the transparency of its work through greater disclosure of 

statistical information in its annual report. 

Transparency in the Standards Committee’s investigative process 

The Task Force was not charged with studying and proposing 

changes to the Standards Committee’s process, only with considering the creation of an independent enforcement entity to supplement the process. While Task Force members understand that such 

study of Committee process is not strictly within their purview, 

they did observe that some cases appear to linger for prolonged periods of time. Given that the duration of any investigation is difficult to predict at its outset, Committee rules do not specify a 

timeframe in which certain actions must be taken, benchmarks 

achieved, or reports be issued. During these prolonged periods, the 

House and general public may be left with the belief that nothing 

is happening and that the process has broken down. This situation 

feeds further public distrust in the House ethics process. 

The Task Force suggests that issues of reporting, transparency, 

and finalization in the Standards Committee’s process be considered during future ethics process deliberations. 

Attorneys’ fees 

The Task Force discussed the issue of reimbursement for attorneys’ fees for those individuals who are the subject of an OCE review that is ultimately dismissed by the Standards Committee. 

Members agree that in those instances where the matter is dismissed, the Member, officer or employee of the House named in the 

review should not be penalized for seeking legal counsel. It would 

be useful to have, within reason, a certain recourse through which 

reimbursement could be obtained. However, the Task Force decided 

against the inclusion of the concept in this proposal so as not to 

overload the OCE and the process from the outset. 


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The notion of granting reimbursement for attorneys’ fees deserves further study to consider whether such an approach is feasible and capable of being implemented. Such a power would most 

likely require statutory authority and would perhaps best be vested 

in the Standards Committee. The Task Force finds that the concept 

has merit and believes that it should be considered in depth to supplement the ethics process in the future. 

Continuing review of ethics process 

The Task Force recommends that the House establish a panel of 

Members to conduct an ongoing review of the ethics process during 

the 110th Congress and perhaps beyond. 

Since the start of the 110th Congress, significant changes to the 

Rules of the House were approved which aim to clarify acceptable 

conduct for Members in the exercise of official duties. These new 

provisions include a ban on gifts from lobbyists, a ban on travel 

provided for by entities that employ lobbyists, increased disclosure 

requirements, and strict prohibitions on Members’ partisan influence in the employment decisions of private entities. These modifications were agreed to in broad, bipartisan fashion in order to ensure a more ethical Congress. However, it is both understandable 

and clear that implementation of those reforms leads to procedural 

difficulties. If the recommendations from this Task Force are adopted, it is certainly reasonable to expect that unforeseen adjustments 

will have to be made for the same reason. Furthermore, it is possible that the House may seek to expand the role of the OCE in 

the future to encompass duties such as overseeing Members’ and 

staff’s financial disclosure reports, travel forms, and lobbying disclosure forms. 

In addition, as stated above, there are Standards Committee 

rules and processes that, while they may warrant improvement, 

were not within the scope of the Task Force. Standards Committee 

rules with respect to timelines for action and decision-making 

merit further study and possible revision, with the goal of ensuring 

a timely consideration and resolution of matters before the Committee. Such further consideration would benefit the process by allowing for discussion of outstanding issues the Task Force was not 

able to address. 

It is for these reasons that the Task Force believes a continued 

presence in the review of ethics processes is desirable. Task Force 

members understand that they cannot foresee every potential scenario, and that they cannot account for every question that may be 

asked regarding the implementation of the above recommendations. In light of the evolving nature of the ethics process this historic session, it would be prudent to oversee implementation of all 

new rules and procedures with the goal of making further recommendations, if necessary, to ensure that the reforms intended 

are, in fact, achieved. 

CONCLUSION

The Special Task Force on Ethics Enforcement understands that 

continuous review and improvement of the House ethics process is 

necessary to ensure a high standard of ethical behavior for Members of Congress and its employees, and to guarantee a practical 


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and functional enforcement of that standard. Congress must constantly work to maintain public trust in the institution through 

oversight of the ethics process. The proposals outlined above will 

likely serve as the basis for improvements that the Task Force 

hopes will be ongoing, as Members learn to navigate an enhanced 

system that allows for increased transparency and accountability. 

The Task Force does not intend its recommendations to be punitive 

or unduly cumbersome. Modifications enumerated within this report endeavor to benefit both Members and the public by allowing 

for increased confidence in the process and measurable timeframes 

under which discernable action shall occur. The continued cooperation of all Members, regardless of party affiliation or partisanship, 

is essential in order to guarantee a successful and effective ethics 

process within the U.S. House of Representatives. 


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The chart included below is intended to aid in comprehension of 

the OCE process as envisioned by the Task Force. The steps enumerate the many possible actions to be taken by both the OCE and 

the Standards Committee according to the Task Force’s proposal 

and illustrate the associated outcomes at the end of the process. 


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ATTACHMENT C—ADDENDUM TO THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL TASK

FORCE ON ETHICS ENFORCEMENT

H. Res. 895 was introduced in the House of Representatives on 

December 19, 2007 in order to give Members an opportunity to review the Task Force proposal and offer feedback. The Task Force 

Report was issued the same day. In February 2008, the proposal 

was scheduled for consideration in the House Committee on Rules, 

with consideration on the floor of the House expected to follow. By 

that point, many Members had raised concerns about certain aspects of the Task Force’s recommendations that they felt could 

jeopardize the intended bipartisan nature of the proposal. 

Specifically, Members called attention to: the concern that the 

make up of the OCE board might encourage partisanship, the provision that would allow two OCE board members appointed by the 

same party leader to initiate a review in a potentially partisan 

manner, and the process by which only an affirmative vote of four 

OCE board members could terminate a preliminary review once 

begun. In addition, Members asked that provisions prohibiting disclosure of confidential information and requiring a strictly non-partisan OCE staff be strengthened. Task Force members wished to be 

responsive to the thoughtful concerns of their colleagues, and they 

thus amended the proposal to reflect a stronger call for bipartisanship and a professional process. 

Joint appointments 

As originally proposed, H. Res. 895 provided for OCE board appointments to be made jointly by the Speaker and Minority Leader 

for up to 90 days. If a full complement of board members was not 

appointed within that timeframe, the proposal then called for the 

Speaker and Minority leader to separately appoint board members 

to fill the remaining vacancies. 

Members of Congress expressed concern that such an appointment process could lead to an unwanted element of partisanship on 

the OCE board. If any board members were appointed separately 

by either party leader, there could, in a worst case scenario, be an 

incentive to place those with partisan motivations on the board. 

The consensus among Members was that it would be preferable 

and result in a better functioning ethics process if board members 

were only appointed jointly by the Speaker and Minority Leader. 

H. Res. 895 was therefore altered to reflect this change. All appointments to the OCE board must be made jointly with no time 

limit. The Speaker shall nominate three board members, subject to 

the concurrence of the Minority Leader. Likewise, the Minority 

Leader shall nominate three board members subject to the concurrence of the Speaker. This process will encourage both leaders to 

nominate responsible, professional, and judicious individuals who 

will readily be approved on the basis of strong professional credentials. 

The Task Force recognizes that excessive partisanship could result in no joint appointments if one or both party leaders refuse to 

take their responsibilities seriously. Nonetheless, we also believe 

that such recalcitrance will be so obvious that the leader responsible for excessive partisanship will be known to the general public 


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and his/her party will be subjected to public scorn. If public pressure is not sufficient, then no power on earth can restore public 

confidence in our process. If this is the fate of this endeavor, it 

should be known early in the process. 

In addition, the Speaker and Minority Leader shall each nominate at least one alternate member of the OCE board subject to the 

concurrence of the other leader. Alternate members are intended to 

ensure that the board functions smoothly during periods of transition. Any vacancy that occurs on the board shall be temporarily 

filled by the most senior alternate board member nominated by the 

same leader who nominated the person vacating the position. The 

alternate shall serve until a permanent replacement is selected. If 

no permanent appointment is made within 90 days, the alternate 

shall be deemed to have been appointed for the remainder of the 

term, and the appropriate leader shall nominate a new alternate 

subject to the concurrence of the other leader. 

Initiation of preliminary reviews 

H. Res. 895, as introduced, called for the initiation of preliminary 

reviews in the OCE at the written request of any two board members. This provision would have presented the possibility that two 

board members could initiate a review based on partisan motivations, targeting a Member or staff of the other party. Members of 

Congress considered that scenario harmful to the governance of the 

institution, and asked that it be changed to ensure that no partisan 

‘‘witch hunts’’ could be undertaken by the OCE board. 

The proposal was amended to require that any preliminary review be initiated only by a bipartisan request from two board members—one requesting member nominated by the Speaker, the other 

nominated by the Minority Leader. This change codifies the bipartisan working relationship that members of the board must adhere 

to in order to effectively execute their duties to the OCE. It also 

directly responds to concerns that partisan attacks could be 

launched within the OCE by blocking any potential for such action. 

Advancement from preliminary to second-phase review 

In addition, OCE procedures regarding the advancement of a review from the preliminary stage to the second-phase came under 

scrutiny. In the original proposal, a preliminary review could only 

be terminated by the affirmative vote of at least 4 board members. 

In effect, this meant that preliminary reviews, once initiated, could 

only be stopped from progressing to the second phase by a substantial effort of board members. All other reviews (not terminated) 

were to move forward automatically to the second-phase review, at 

which point their referral to the Standards Committee is compulsory. 

In order to ensure that a certain threshold of credibility is met 

in each review, the proposal was altered to require 3 board members to vote affirmatively in favor of advancing a preliminary review to the second-phase. Essentially, the original two, jointly-appointed, bipartisan members must convince at least one more jointly-appointed member that more information is needed to in order 

to make a thoughtful decision on an allegation. This change effectively enforces that threshold while also making it impossible to 


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use partisan stonewalling to thwart a reasonable review once it has 

begun. 

Other amendments 

The Task Force wished to properly respond to a number of other 

general concerns that were raised regarding confidentiality of information and communications, as well as professionalism of OCE 

staff members. Language on these provisions was strengthened to 

reflect a commitment to the integrity and competence of the OCE 

and its processes. 

H. Res. 895 was amended to clarify the following aspects: 

• House Members and staff are prohibited from inappropriately 

communicating with OCE board members or staff about a case that 

may be before the OCE. 

• The ban on ex parte communications applies to OCE staff as 

well as board members. 

• Board members and staff of the OCE will be required to sign 

the same pledge of confidentiality as currently required for Standards Committee staff. 

• Board members and staff of the OCE will be clearly prohibited 

from leaking information pursuant to the same limitations that 

apply to Standards Committee Members and staff. 

• OCE staff, as well as OCE board members, are subject to the 

three-year pledge not to seek federal elective office. 

• OCE staff are subject to the same restrictions as Ethics Committee staff relative to non-partisanship, prohibition on political activity, etc. 

Conclusion 

The redrafted version of H. Res. 895 is included in this report as 

Attachment D. It was adopted by the House on March 11, 2008, by 

a vote of 229–182 (see Roll Call 122 of 2008). 


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