IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Matthew Haverstick, : 

Petitioner :

: No. 1213 C.D. 2020

 v. : Argued: December 13, 2021 

:

Pennsylvania Office :

of Attorney General, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION 

BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: April 12, 2022

Matthew Haverstick (Requester) petitions for review of the October 30, 

2020 final determination of a Right-to-Know Law (RTKL)1 Appeals Officer of the 

Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General (OAG), which affirmed the decision of an 

OAG Open Records Officer to grant in part and deny in part his RTKL request.2 

Requester presently challenges the withholding of certain ex parte communications 

1 Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 65 P.S. §§67.101-67.3104.

2 This matter was argued seriately with two other appeals concerning RTKL requests made 

by this same Requester. See Haverstick v. Pennsylvania State Police (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1042 C.D. 

2020, filed April 12, 2022) (unreported) (Haverstick I); Haverstick v. Pennsylvania State Police (Pa. 

Cmwlth., No. 1214 C.D. 2020, filed April 12, 2022) (unreported) (Haverstick II). Although the 

underlying RTKL requests in Haverstick I and II related to similar matters as in the instant appeal, 

the legal issues presented here do not overlap with those at issue in those appeals.
2

between members of the OAG and the OAG Appeals Officer. Upon review, we reverse 

the final determination of the OAG Appeals Officer.

Background

On June 23, 2020, the OAG received a RTKL request from Requester, 

seeking:

From March 12, 2020[,] onward, any and all emails, text 

messages, or other communications about any Right to Know 

request, or any response thereto from this Request[e]r, 

including but not limited to, Request No. 2020-051.

(OAG Appeals Officer Determination at 1.)

On August 6, 2020, the OAG Open Records Officer issued a final 

response letter, which granted in part and denied in part Requester’s request. The Open 

Records Officer informed Requester that certain records would be produced upon 

receipt of all applicable fees. A number of records, however, would be withheld 

pursuant to exemptions from disclosure listed in the RTKL, specifically: (1) the 

personal identification information exemption; (2) the predecisional deliberation 

exemption3; and (3) the attorney-work product doctrine.

On August 20, 2020, Requester paid the applicable fees. On August 31, 

2020, having not yet received the requested records from the OAG, Requester filed an 

3 The internal, predecisional deliberation exception provides, in relevant part, that the 

following are exempt from disclosure:

The internal, predecisional deliberations of an agency, its members, employees or 

officials or predecisional deliberations between agency members, employees or 

officials and members, employees or officials of another agency, including 

predecisional deliberations relating to a budget recommendation, legislative proposal, 

legislative amendment, contemplated or proposed policy or course of action or any 

research, memos or other documents used in the predecisional deliberations.

Section 708(b)(10)(i)(A) of the RTKL, 65 P.S. §67.708(b)(10)(i)(A).
3

appeal to the OAG, in which he asserted that he could not evaluate the merits of the 

OAG’s response because he had not received the documents. He further contended 

that the exemptions cited by the Open Records Officer were not adequately supported 

by an affidavit.

The Appeals Officer for OAG acknowledged receipt of Requester’s 

appeal via a letter dated September 8, 2020, and then set a schedule for the submission 

of additional documentation. On September 14, 2020, the Open Records Officer 

submitted a response to the appeal, including an affidavit from the Open Records 

Officer in support of the redactions and withholdings. On September 21, 2020, 

Requester submitted a supplemental position statement and included the OAG’s full 

production, including the redacted documents. Requester asserted that the RTKL 

Officer’s affidavit was insufficient to support the OAG’s claimed exemptions. 

Requester requested that the Appeals Officer order the Open Records Officer to 

produce a privilege log and to review the materials in camera. The Appeals Officer 

agreed and, by letter dated September 28, 2020, informed the parties that in camera 

review of the documents would be necessary to render a final determination on the 

appeal. 

On September 29, 2020, the Open Records Officer provided the Appeals 

Officer with the relevant documents—those withheld in their entirety and the 

unredacted versions of those which had been disclosed in redacted form. On September 

30, 2020, the Appeals Officer requested that the Open Records Officer submit a 

privilege log of the redacted and withheld documents. On October 7, 2020, the Open 

Records Officer provided the Appeals Officer with two privilege logs—one for the 

redacted documents and one for the withheld documents.
4

On October 14, 2020, Requester provided a supplemental submission 

(entitled “Reply Brief”), in which he raised concerns about apparent ex parte 

communications between the Appeals Officer and members of the OAG.

The Appeals Officer ultimately denied Requester’s appeal. The Appeals 

Officer first rejected Requester’s argument regarding the sufficiency of the supporting 

affidavit, noting that she performed an in camera review of the relevant documents, 

thus rendering the sufficiency of the affidavit immaterial. With regard to the 

documents that were redacted, the Appeals Officer observed that the redacted 

information consisted of personal identification information, namely personal 

telephone numbers and email addresses. Those redactions were thus proper.

Turning to the 98 documents withheld in their entirety, the Appeals 

Officer concluded that the Open Records Officer correctly determined that each 

document reflected internal, predecisional deliberations, and was thus exempt from 

disclosure under section 708(b)(10)(i)(A) of the RTKL. Each document contained 

“communications that were made for the purpose of considering all available legal 

strategies and options for responding to Request No. 2020-051 and its appeal, including 

documents/communications regarding the best course of action in responding” to that 

request and appeal. (OAG Appeals Officer Determination at 5.) The Appeals Officer 

stated that her in camera review of the documents confirmed this characterization of 

the records. The Appeals Officer further identified six documents that were not listed 

on the privilege log for the withheld documents, but likewise reflected internal, 

predecisional deliberations. The Appeals Officer concluded that this omission was an 

error. Moreover, the Appeals Officer concluded that 10 of the withheld documents 

were protected by the attorney-work product doctrine because her in camera review 

revealed that each document contained draft documents, such as affidavits or legal 
5

responses, written by an OAG attorney and circulated to other OAG attorneys. Id. at 

6-7. Thus, the Appeals Officer found no error in the RTKL Officer’s conclusion that 

each withheld document was exempt from disclosure.

With regard to the issue currently before the Court, the Appeals Officer 

noted Requester’s contention that Document Nos. 2, 4, 6, 9, and 24-27 on the withheld 

log must be produced because they reflect ex parte communications between the 

Appeals Officer and members of the OAG. The privilege log stated that these 

documents contain correspondence between the Appeals Officer and either Karen 

Romano, the attorney who submitted the OAG’s verification in the underlying appeal 

relating to Request No. 2020-051, or Sharon Maitland, the Open Records Officer in the 

instant case. None of those communications included Requester or his counsel. 

The Appeals Officer repeated her conclusion that the referenced 

documents were properly withheld under the predecisional deliberation exception, and 

“contain communications between OAG staff regarding administrative logistics 

relating to the appeal of Request No. 2020-051.” (OAG Appeals Officer Determination 

at 7.) The Appeals Officer further cited Kaplin v. Lower Merion Township, 19 A.3d 

1209, 1215-16 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011), for the proposition that a concern over ex parte 

communications does not negate the application of the predecisional deliberation 

exemption. Thus, the Appeals Officer concluded, the fact that certain documents 

contain ex parte communications does not necessitate their production.

Requester then sought review in this Court, specifically regarding the 

Appeals Officer’s conclusion vis-à-vis the withholding of the ex parte communications 

contained within the responsive records.

4

4 As discussed infra, the procedures relating to RTKL requests submitted to the OAG differ 

from those applicable to most other agencies. However, as in other RTKL appeals, our standard of 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
6

Arguments

Requester contends that any ex parte communication between a RTKL 

appeals officer and one party’s counsel is inappropriate and, therefore, forbidden. 

Requester cites Colosimo v. Pennsylvania Electric Company, 518 A.2d 1206, 1210-11 

(Pa. 1986), for the general proposition that ex parte communications are improper, but 

in the RTKL context, the only authority that he cites is Chester Community Charter 

School v. Hardy, 38 A.3d 1079, 1084 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012), vacated on other grounds, 

74 A.3d 118 (Pa. 2013). (Requester’s Br. at 16.) Hardy expressed disapproval of ex 

parte communications between an Office of Open Records (OOR) appeals officer and 

a requester, which concerned a deadline extension. However, the Hardy Court did not 

find that the ex parte communication deprived the opposing party of due process, and 

it did not reverse the OOR’s final determination.

Requester takes issue with the Appeals Officer’s reliance upon Kaplin. 

Although Kaplin concluded that communications between township board of 

commissioner members could be subject to the predecisional deliberation exemption, 

Requester notes that the communications at issue in Kaplin were between respondents, 

not between a party and a RTKL appeals officer. (Requester’s Br. at 17.) Where ex 

parte communications are between a party and the appeals officer, Requester opines 

that the opposing party cannot be confident that the communications were for a proper 

purpose. 

Further, Requester argues that ex parte communications between a RTKL 

appeals officer and agency members cannot constitute “internal” predecisional 

review remains de novo. See Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General v. Philadelphia Inquirer, 127 

A.3d 57, 60 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (citing Meguerian v. Office of the Attorney General, 86 A.3d 924, 

927 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013)) (“This Court exercises de novo review of appeals officers’ decisions 

under the RTKL pertaining to Commonwealth agencies.”).
7

deliberations under section 708(b)(10)(i)(A) of the RTKL, because the appeals officer, 

according to Requester, is an “external” officer. The exception applies only to 

“internal, predecisional deliberations” that are between agency “members, employees, 

officials” or “between agency members, employees or officials and members, 

employees or officials of another agency.” (Requester’s Br. at 19 (quoting 65 P.S. 

§67.708(b)(10)(i)(A)).) The key element, Requester maintains, is that the 

communications be “internal.” And according to Requester, the agency’s RTKL 

appeals officer is “external” and “neutral,” and, therefore, cannot engage in internal, 

predecisional deliberations with members of the agency. (Requester’s Br. at 20.)

The OAG, for its part, first suggests that the communications at issue were 

merely “logistical in nature and do not contain any discussion regarding the merits of 

Requester’s appeal or even the general subject matter of his appeal.” (OAG’s Br. at 

12.) Thus, the OAG opines, there was nothing improper in the ex parte 

communications and none of them would be of particular interest to Requester. Even 

assuming that they were improper ex parte communications, moreover, the OAG 

argues that this would not remove those communications from the scope of the 

predecisional deliberation exception.

The OAG reiterates the Appeals Officer’s reliance upon Kaplin, and 

highlights the following passage:

We believe that, even if there was a violation of the 

separation of powers within the [t]ownship staff, the staff’s 

advice to the [b]oard regarding the logistics of issuing a 

decision is still an internal, predecisional communication. 

However, as shown by the above statutory language, even if 

the alleged separation of powers problem required the 

[t]ownship staff to be considered as a separate agency from 

the [b]oard, the communication could be considered to be 

predecisional deliberations between agency members and 

employees of another agency.
8

Id. at 13 (quoting Kaplin, 19 A.3d at 1216) (OAG’s emphasis). Although Requester

contends that Kaplin is distinguishable because it did not involve ex parte 

communications with a RTKL appeals officer, the OAG notes that, in Kaplin, the 

communications were between township staff and the township board of 

commissioners, the latter of which was the adjudicator for a conditional land use 

application to which the township staff was opposed. 

The OAG analogizes its Appeals Officer to the board of commissioners 

in Kaplin, as she was an employee of the OAG serving as an adjudicator on a matter 

involving OAG staff. In this regard, because the Appeals Officer is an employee of the 

OAG, the OAG disputes Requester’s characterization of the Appeals Officer as an 

“external” entity. But even if the Appeals Officer was deemed “external,” the OAG 

argues, this would not defeat the application of the predecisional deliberation

exception, because that exception also applies to communications between agency 

officials and employees of another agency. (OAG’s Br. at 14 (quoting Kaplin, 19 A.3d 

at 1216 (“[E]ven if the alleged separation of powers problem required the [t]ownship 

staff to be considered as a separate agency from the [b]oard, the communication could 

be considered to be predecisional deliberations between agency members and 

employees of another agency.”)).)

Notably, in reply, Requester suggests that the OAG’s characterization of 

the documents as merely “clerical” or “logistical” in nature defeats its invocation of the 

predecisional deliberation exception, because communications subject to that 

exemption must be “deliberative” in character. (Reply Br. at 2 (citing McGowan v. 

Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, 103 A.3d 374, 381 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2014)).) Based upon the OAG’s description of the documents at issue, 
9

Requester contends that the “deliberative” aspect is missing, and that the 

communications must therefore be disclosed.

Discussion

At the outset, we note that the precise legal issue in dispute is not squarely 

resolved by the precedents upon which the parties focus. The parties primarily discuss 

the Kaplin case, as noted above. As Requester stresses, however, Kaplin did not 

involve ex parte communications between a RTKL appeals officer and a party to the 

RTKL proceedings. Rather, Kaplin involved a request for communications of a 

township board of commissioners regarding a conditional use application, and the 

relevant records consisted of communications between that board and other township 

staff, which were alleged to constitute predecisional deliberations. See Kaplin, 19 A.3d 

at 1215. There was no issue in Kaplin relating to ex parte communications with the 

OOR appeals officer—the participant who would be most analogous to the OAG 

Appeals Officer here. Accordingly, Requester is correct that the instant case is readily 

distinguishable from Kaplin.

The only relevant precedent that Requester cites is Hardy, and that case 

does concern an ex parte communication between a party and an OOR appeals officer. 

However, the communication at issue in Hardy consisted merely of the OOR appeals 

officer asking the requester for a deadline extension. The opposing party contended 

that the deadline extended through the ex parte communication was invalid, and that it 

violated that party’s due process rights. This Court disagreed, but nonetheless 

expressed concern about the ex parte communication. We noted that “[e]x parte 

communications between a hearing officer and one party, or one party’s counsel, are 

problematic because the excluded party has no reason to be confident that the 

communication was limited to the simple procedural request of the hearing officer for 
10

an extension.” Hardy, 38 A.3d at 1084 (citing Colosimo, 518 A.2d at 1210-11). We 

further noted that the easiest way for the appeals officer to avoid such ex parte 

communications is to send an email that includes all of the parties. Id. at 1084 n.8. 

Nonetheless, we did not find that the communication deprived the complaining party 

of due process, and we did not reverse the OOR’s determination. We noted that OOR 

proceedings are not subject to the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. §§501-08. 

Hardy, 38 A.3d at 1084. Further, the complaining party would not have been permitted 

to object to the requester’s grant of a deadline extension. Moreover, we stated that any 

“taint or procedural irregularity caused by the appeals officer’s ex parte communication 

was cured” by the subsequent hearing before a court of common pleas. Id. at 1084-85.

Thus, although Requester is correct that this Court in Hardy expressed 

disapproval of ex parte communications in the RTKL context, the communication in 

that case was not a defect that warranted reversal. Moreover, the relevance of Hardy 

is diminished by the fact that the predecisional deliberation exception was not at issue 

in that case. We are left with no directly relevant precedent relating to ex parte 

communications during RTKL appeals, and whether such communications may 

constitute predecisional deliberations under section 708(b)(10)(i)(A) of the RTKL.

The instant case further implicates a unique feature of the RTKL, the 

significance of which is not addressed by the parties. Requester places great emphasis 

upon his assertion that the OAG Appeals Officer is an “external” entity, and that, 

categorically, she may not participate in “internal” predecisional deliberations. 

Requester, however, does not cite any authority for this proposition or support his 

suggestion with anything beyond bare assertion. Notably, the OAG is one of the small 

number of agencies listed in the RTKL for which appeals officers are not designated 

by the OOR, and which instead select their own appeals officers from within the 
11

agency. See section 503(d)(1) of the RTKL, 65 P.S. §67.503(d)(1) (“The Attorney 

General, State Treasurer and Auditor General shall each designate an appeals officer 

to hear appeals under Chapter 11.”) (emphasis added); see also Bowling v. Office of 

Open Records, 75 A.3d 453, 457 (Pa. 2013) (“[J]udicial agencies, legislative agencies, 

the Attorney General, State Treasurer, and Auditor General . . . shall designate their 

own appeals officers to hear appeals from the respective agency’s 

determinations. . . . Thus, appeals from final determinations of these . . . agencies are 

not heard by the OOR.”) (emphasis added). Accordingly, it is not apparent that the 

OAG Appeals Officer is in any manner an “external” entity, as Requester would have 

us conclude. Quite to the contrary, the RTKL specifies that the OAG is one of the few 

agencies whose appeals officers are distinctly internal. Unfortunately, the OAG does 

not discuss the significance, if any, of the statutory distinction between its appeals 

officers and those designated by the OOR.

The difficulty is that the distinction (or lack thereof) between the OAG 

Appeals Officer and the OOR conceivably could bear upon the character of the appeal 

proceedings. This Court has repeatedly observed that the OOR is a “quasi-judicial” 

tribunal. See Arneson v. Wolf, 117 A.3d 374, 386 (Pa. Cmwlth.) (en banc), aff’d &

adopted, 124 A.3d 1225 (Pa. 2015) (“Based upon the OOR’s essential nature and 

express statutory duties, the courts of this Commonwealth have already held that the 

OOR is a quasi-judicial tribunal.”). If the OAG Appeals Officer likewise engages in a 

“quasi-judicial” function under the RTKL, then this conclusion would appear to 

support Requester’s position, inasmuch as ex parte communications between a party 

and a judicial body are improper. See Colosimo, 518 A.2d at 1210-11.

5

5 Notably, section 1102 of the RTKL, 65 P.S. §67.1102, concerns the duties of RTKL appeals 

officers and the procedures that they are to employ. Subsection (a)(3) of section 1102 provides that 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
12

Even though OAG appeals officers are selected from within the agency, 

the nature of their task in considering RTKL appeals remains quasi-judicial. Just as 

courts must refrain from ex parte communications with parties, the same concerns arise 

in this context. As this Court stated in Hardy: “Ex parte communications between a 

hearing officer and one party, or one party’s counsel, are problematic because the 

excluded party has no reason to be confident that the communication was limited to the 

simple procedural request of the hearing officer for an extension.” Hardy, 38 A.3d at 

1084 (citing Colosimo, 518 A.2d at 1210-11). Thus, we equally emphasize here the 

problematic nature of these ex parte communications. Although OAG appeals officers 

are selected from within the agency, they are nonetheless required to perform their 

“quasi-judicial” duties in an impartial manner. Accordingly, the OAG is cautioned to 

refrain from inappropriate ex parte communications when considering similar requests 

in the future.

The ultimate disposition of this matter, however, is made possible because 

the record and the briefing in this case reveal another, significantly clearer basis upon 

which to conclude that Requester is entitled to the communications sought. As 

Requester notes in his Reply Brief, the OAG’s Brief relates several characterizations 

of the records at issue, which belie the conclusion that the communications contained 

therein fall within the predecisional deliberation exception. To establish the 

predecisional deliberation exception, an agency is required to show that: “(1) the 

information is internal to the agency; (2) the information is deliberative in character; 

and (3) the information is prior to a related decision, and thus ‘predecisional.’” 

appeals officers shall “[c]onsult with agency counsel as appropriate.” 65 P.S. §67.1102(a)(3). While 

the statutory language does not elaborate upon the nature of an “appropriate” consultation with agency 

counsel, on its face, this language at least plausibly suggests that the legislature envisioned the 

possibility of ex parte communications between RTKL appeals officers and attorneys for an agency. 
13

McGowan, 103 A.3d at 381 (quoting Carey v. Department of Corrections, 61 A.3d 

367, 379 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013)) (emphasis added). Moreover, “[i]n order to demonstrate 

that the withheld documents are deliberative in character, an agency must ‘submit 

evidence of specific facts showing how the information relates to deliberation of a 

particular decision.’” Id. at 383 (quoting Carey, 61 A.3d at 379).

In its brief, the OAG describes the documents as follows:

[T]hese documents consist of the same or similar e-mail 

chains relating to providing the Appeals Officer with the 

appeal documents submitted by [Requester], assigning the 

appeal to the Appeals Officer, designating which OAG 

personnel would be assisting the Appeals Officer, and 

making sure that other individuals who had conflicts in this 

case did not have communications with the Appeals Officer 

regarding this case.

(OAG’s Br. at 12.)6 The OAG further summarizes that the communications “are 

logistical in nature and do not contain any discussion regarding the merits of 

[Requester’s] appeal or even the general subject matter of his appeal.” Id. (emphasis 

added). As Requester notes in his Reply Brief, this description is inconsistent with the 

conclusion that the communications were “deliberative” in nature. If the 

communications are purely “logistical” and do not even concern the “general subject 

matter” of the RTKL request, then it is difficult to see how those communications could 

relate to the “deliberation of a particular decision.” McGowan, 103 A.3d at 383.

As such, we conclude that, while it appears that the ex parte 

communications in question were improper, the communications at issue simply do not 

fall within the definition of predecisional deliberations for purposes of section 

708(b)(10)(i)(A) of the RTKL.

6 This Court has reviewed the relevant documents in the Sealed Certified Supplemental 

Record, and the OAG’s description of the communications is accurate.
14

Accordingly, the final determination of the OAG Appeals Officer is 

reversed.

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Matthew Haverstick, : 

Petitioner :

: No. 1213 C.D. 2020

 v. :

:

Pennsylvania Office :

of Attorney General, :

Respondent :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 12th day of April 2022, the October 30, 2020 final 

determination of the Right-to-Know Law Appeals Officer of the Pennsylvania 

Office of Attorney General is REVERSED.

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge