aviation

Runway Overrun During Landing

Pinnacle Airlines Flight 4712

Bombardier/Canadair Regional Jet CL600-2B19, N8905F

Traverse City, Michigan

April 12, 2007

ACCIDENT REPORT

NTSB/AAR-08/02

PB2008-910402

National

Transportation

Safety Board

490 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20594

Aircraft Accident Report

Runway Overrun During Landing

Pinnacle Airlines Flight 4712

Bombardier/Canadair Regional Jet CL600-2B19, N8905F

Traverse City, Michigan

April 12, 2007

NTSB/AAR-08/02

PB2008-910402

Notation 8015A

Adopted June 10, 2008
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Board reports related to an incident or accident in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report.

National Transportation Safety Board. 2008. Runway Overrun During Landing, Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., 

Flight 4712, Bombardier/Canadair Regional Jet CL600-2B19, N8905F, Traverse City, Michigan, April 12, 

2007. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-08/02. Washington, DC.

Abstract: This report explains the accident involving a Bombardier/Canadair Regional Jet 

CL-600-2B19, N8905F, operated by Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., which ran off the departure end of 

runway 28 after landing at Cherry Capital Airport, Traverse City, Michigan. The safety issues 

discussed in this report include the pilots’ actions and decision-making during the approach, 

landing, and landing roll; pilot fatigue and line check airman duty time regulations; weather and 

field condition information and ground operations personnel communications; and criteria for 

runway closures in snow and ice conditions. Safety recommendations concerning these issues 

are addressed to the Federal Aviation Administration.
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Contents

Abbreviations and Acronyms....................................................................................... v

Executive Summary ....................................................................................................... ix

1. Factual Information.....................................................................................................1

1.1 History of Flight.............................................................................................................................. 1

1.2 Injuries to Persons........................................................................................................................... 5

1.3 Damage to Airplane ....................................................................................................................... 5

1.4 Other Damage ................................................................................................................................. 5

1.5 Personnel Information ................................................................................................................... 6

1.5.1 The Captain ............................................................................................................................. 6

1.5.2 The First Officer...................................................................................................................... 8

1.6 Airplane Information ..................................................................................................................... 9

1.6.1 General..................................................................................................................................... 9

1.6.2 Airplane Deceleration Device Information ...................................................................... 10

1.7 Meteorological Information ....................................................................................................... 10

1.7.1 Cherry Capital Airport Weather Forecast/Predispatch Information .......................... 10

1.7.2 Dispatch Weather Information........................................................................................... 12

1.7.3 Updated Cherry Capital Airport Weather/Airport Information.................................. 12

1.8 Aids to Navigation ....................................................................................................................... 13

1.9 Communications........................................................................................................................... 14

1.10 Airport Information.................................................................................................................... 14

1.10.1 Cherry Capital Airport Closed Tower Operations........................................................ 14

1.10.2 Radio Phraseology Guidance and Training Requirements.......................................... 15

1.10.3 Cherry Capital Airport Winter Operations .................................................................... 16

1.10.4 Cherry Capital Airport Winter Operations the Night of the Accident ...................... 17

1.11 Flight Recorders .......................................................................................................................... 18

1.11.1 Cockpit Voice Recorder..................................................................................................... 18

1.11.2 Flight Data Recorder.......................................................................................................... 18

1.12 Wreckage and Impact Information .......................................................................................... 18

1.13 Medical and Pathological Information.................................................................................... 19

1.14 Fire ................................................................................................................................................ 19

1.15 Survival Aspects ......................................................................................................................... 19

1.15.1 Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting Response .................................................................... 19

1.15.2 Airplane Egress................................................................................................................... 20

1.16 Tests and Research...................................................................................................................... 21

1.16.1 Airplane Simulation and Study of Airplane Performance During

the Accident Sequence .......................................................................................................................... 21

1.16.2 Airplane Simulations for Various Vref Speed Additives and Thrust Reverser 

Landing Scenarios ................................................................................................................................. 23

1.16.3 Use of Braking Systems During Landing Roll .............................................................. 24

1.17 Organizational and Management Information ...................................................................... 24

1.17.1 Pinnacle Airlines’ Landing Distance Assessment Guidance (Operations 

Specification C382) ................................................................................................................................ 25

1.17.2 Pinnacle Airlines Guidance for Landing and Thrust Reverser Usage ....................... 27

1.17.3 Pinnacle Airlines Expeditious Deplaning Guidance.................................................... 28
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1.17.4 Recent Pinnacle Airlines Safety-Related Actions........................................................... 28

1.17.4.1 Postaccident Procedural/Operational Changes ...................................................... 29

1.17.4.2 Postaccident Staffing/Scheduling/Training Changes ........................................... 30

1.18 Additional Information.............................................................................................................. 30

1.18.1 Fatigue-Related Information............................................................................................. 30

1.18.2 Previously Issued Safety Recommendations ................................................................. 33

1.18.2.1 Landing Distance Assessment.................................................................................... 33

1.18.2.2 Standardized Phraseology........................................................................................... 35

1.18.2.3 Crash Detection and Location Technology............................................................... 35

2. Analysis.......................................................................................................................37

2.1 General ........................................................................................................................................... 37

2.1.1 Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting Crash Detection........................................................... 38

2.1.2 Postaccident Alcohol Testing.............................................................................................. 39

2.2 Pilot Performance, Actions, and Decision-Making During the Flight.................................. 39

2.2.1 Pilot Actions and Decision-Making During the Approach............................................ 40

2.2.1.1 Landing Distance Assessments .................................................................................... 40

2.2.1.1.1 Landing Distance Assessment Training .................................................................. 42

2.2.1.2 “Nil” Braking Reports.................................................................................................... 43

2.2.2 Pilot Actions During the Landing and Landing Roll...................................................... 44

2.3 Pilot Fatigue Issues ....................................................................................................................... 45

2.3.1 Accident Pilot Fatigue.......................................................................................................... 46

2.3.2 Line Check Airman Fatigue Issues .................................................................................... 48

2.4 Dissemination of Weather and Field Condition Reports........................................................ 49

2.4.1 Weather Information Available to the Flight Crew......................................................... 49

2.4.2 Airport and Runway Condition Reports and Ground Personnel Phraseology ......... 50

2.4.3 Runway Closure Procedures in Snow and Ice Conditions ............................................ 52

3. Conclusions ................................................................................................................53

3.1 Findings.......................................................................................................................................... 53

3.2 Probable Cause.............................................................................................................................. 55

4. Recommendations.....................................................................................................56

4.1 New Recommendations............................................................................................................... 56

4.2 Previously Issued Recommendations Reiterated in This Report .......................................... 56

5. Appendixes.................................................................................................................59

A: Investigation and Public Hearing ................................................................................................ 59

B: Cockpit Voice Recorder Transcript .............................................................................................. 60

C: Pinnacle’s Operations Specification C382 (Landing Distance Assessment)......................... 200
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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AC advisory circular

ACARS aircraft communications addressing and reporting system

AFD airport facility directory

agl above ground level

AIM Aeronautical Information Manual

ALPA Airline Pilots Association

ARC aviation rulemaking committee

ARFF aircraft rescue and firefighting

ARTCC air route traffic control center

ASAP aviation safety action program

ASOS automated surface observing system

ATC air traffic control

ATCT air traffic control tower

ATIS automatic terminal information service 

°C degrees Celsius 
Abbreviations and Acronyms

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CAMI Civil Aerospace Medical Institute

CDT central daylight time

CFM company flight manual 

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

cg center of gravity

CLE Cleveland-Hopkins International Airport

CRJ Bombardier/Canadair Regional Jet

CTAF common traffic advisory frequency

CVR cockpit voice recorder

DOT Department of Transportation

DSM Des Moines International Airport

DTW Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport 

°F degrees Fahrenheit

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FCTM flight crew training manual

FDR flight data recorder

FLIR forward-looking infrared device
Abbreviations and Acronyms

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FOM flight operations manual

FOQA flight operational quality assurance

GE General Electric

Hg mercury 

IFR instrument flight rules

ILS instrument landing system 

KIAS knots indicated airspeed

MAC mean aerodynamic chord

MDW Chicago Midway International Airport

MEM Memphis International Airport

METAR meteorological aerodrome report

MLG main landing gear

MSP Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport

MU coefficient of friction

N1 engine fan speed 

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NOTAM notice to airmen
Abbreviations and Acronyms

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NWA Northwest Airlines

NWS National Weather Service

OE operating experience

OpSpec operations specification

POI principal operations inspector

RVR runway visual range

S/N serial number

SAFO safety alert for operators

SOC system operations control

SPECI special weather observation

TAF terminal aerodrome forecast

TR thrust reverser

TVC Cherry Capital Airport

Vapp approach landing speed (Vref + 5 knots)

Vref reference landing speed 

WSFO National Weather Service forecast office 
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Executive Summary

On April 12, 2007, about 0043 eastern daylight time, a Bombardier/Canadair 

Regional Jet (CRJ) CL600-2B19, N8905F, operated as Pinnacle Airlines flight 4712, ran off 

the departure end of runway 28 after landing at Cherry Capital Airport (TVC), Traverse 

City, Michigan. There were no injuries among the 49 passengers (including 3 lap-held 

infants) and 3 crewmembers, and the aircraft was substantially damaged. Weather was 

reported as snowing. The airplane was being operated under the provisions of 14 Code of 

Federal Regulations Part 121 and had departed from Minneapolis-St. Paul International 

(Wold-Chamberlain) Airport, Minneapolis, Minnesota, about 2153 central daylight time. 

Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident flight, which 

operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of 

this accident was the pilots’ decision to land at TVC without performing a landing distance 

assessment, which was required by company policy because of runway contamination 

initially reported by TVC ground operations personnel and continuing reports of 

deteriorating weather and runway conditions during the approach. This poor decisionmaking likely reflected the effects of fatigue produced by a long, demanding duty day, 

and, for the captain, the duties associated with check airman functions. Contributing 

to the accident were 1) the Federal Aviation Administration pilot flight and duty time 

regulations that permitted the pilots’ long, demanding duty day and 2) the TVC operations 

supervisor’s use of ambiguous and unspecific radio phraseology in providing runway 

braking information.

The safety issues discussed in this report include the pilots’ actions and 

decision-making during the approach, landing, and landing roll; pilot fatigue and line 

check airman duty time regulations; weather and field condition information and ground 

operations personnel communications; and criteria for runway closures in snow and ice 

conditions.
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1. Factual Information

1.1 History of Flight

On April 12, 2007, about 0043 eastern daylight time,1 a Bombardier/Canadair 

Regional Jet (CRJ) CL600-2B19, N8905F, operated as Pinnacle Airlines flight 4712, ran off 

the departure end of runway 28 after landing at Cherry Capital Airport (TVC), Traverse 

City, Michigan. There were no injuries among the 49 passengers (including 3 lap-held 

infants) and 3 crewmembers, and the aircraft was substantially damaged. Weather was 

reported as snowing. The airplane was being operated under the provisions of 14 Code of 

Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 and had departed from Minneapolis-St. Paul International 

(Wold-Chamberlain) Airport (MSP), Minneapolis, Minnesota, about 2153 central daylight 

time (CDT). Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident 

flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan.

The accident occurred on the fifth and final scheduled flight segment on the first 

day of a scheduled 4-day trip for the flight crew. The flight was scheduled to depart MSP 

about 2030 CDT for a scheduled arrival time at TVC of 2251. However, when the pilots 

arrived at the gate for the accident flight, the gate agent advised them that the flight 

release paperwork was not available and that the flight might be cancelled. About 2022 

CDT (about 8 minutes before the accident flight was originally scheduled to depart), the 

Pinnacle dispatcher provided the captain with details, indicating that the flight could not 

be dispatched to TVC because the forecast winds at TVC resulted in a tailwind component 

that exceeded the CRJ’s 10-knot landing tailwind component limitation. However, about 

22 minutes later, the dispatcher advised the captain that the flight could be dispatched 

because a new forecast predicted a smaller tailwind component for the landing at TVC. 

Postaccident interviews indicate that Pinnacle’s system operations control (SOC) duty 

manager had reviewed the observed conditions and forecast for TVC (from Northwest 

Airline’s [NWA] meteorology department) and approved the release. 

The flight’s dispatch documentation, which listed Detroit Metropolitan Wayne 

County Airport (DTW) as a destination alternate airport, was subsequently issued about 

2043 CDT. However, because the flight was delayed, an update of the airplane’s flight 

management system database software was required before the airplane could depart. 

After installation of this software, the airplane was pushed back from the gate at MSP 

about 2144 CDT. The pilots taxied the airplane to the runway 30R deice pad, where it was 

deiced and the departure clearance was issued. About 2153 CDT, an MSP air traffic control 

tower (ATCT) controller issued a takeoff clearance, and the accident flight departed for 

TVC. 

Postaccident crew interviews and review of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) 

transcript indicated that the departure, climb, and en route portion of the flight from MSP 

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all times are eastern daylight time, based on a 24-hour clock. 
Factual Information

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to TVC was routine. The captain/check airman was the flying pilot and was overseeing 

the first officer’s initial operating experience (OE)2; the first officer performed the duties 

of the monitoring pilot. The CVR recorded several instances during the accident flight 

in which the pilots indicated that they were tired. For example, the CVR recorded the 

following statements on the captain’s channel: 1) about 2332:12, “yeah, just tired. Too late 

for this...;” 2) about 2341:53, “aw I’m tired dude, just (expletive) worn out;” and 3) about 

0018:43 “...a wet dog ready to go to sleep tonight dude.” Additionally, about 0020:41, 

the CVR recorded the first officer stating, “jeez, I’m tired.” Further, several yawns were 

recorded on the captain’s channel (about 2340:00, 0001:06, 0004:00, and 0009:47). 

Because the TVC ATCT had closed at 2200 the night of the accident (consistent 

with its normal operations), the captain briefed the first officer regarding landing at TVC 

at night, after the tower closed, in snowy windy weather conditions. Records indicate 

that the Pinnacle dispatch personnel who were providing flight-following services for the 

accident flight occasionally provided the pilots with updated TVC weather information 

during earlier portions of the flight. Specifically, the aircraft communications addressing 

and reporting system (ACARS) log showed that about 2354, dispatch personnel sent 

weather updates to the accident airplane indicating IFR conditions with restricted 

visibility in light snow. After reviewing the weather information (about 2357), the captain 

made a public address statement advising the passengers that the winds at TVC were 

“dying down significantly...so it looks like we’re gonna have no problems gettin’ in this 

evening.” 

About 0010, the pilots listened to the TVC automated surface observation system 

(ASOS) for updated airport weather information, which indicated, in part, that winds 

were out of 040o at 7 knots and visibility of 1 1/2 miles in light snow. About 0021, the MSP 

Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) controller confirmed that the accident pilots 

had received the current TVC weather and began to issue radar vectors for the instrument 

landing system (ILS) approach to runway 28 at TVC.3 About 0025, the captain sent a 

message to dispatch indicating that the TVC weather looked good for the approach, citing 

winds out of 040 degrees at 8 knots. Company dispatch personnel responded, stating, 

“[w]e show that too, looks like we should be good.” 

The weather data subsequently recorded by the TVC’s ASOS showed that the 

conditions at TVC began to deteriorate rapidly after 0025, with visibility of 1/2 mile in 

moderate snow, sky obscured, and vertical visibility of 400 feet. The pilots did not listen 

to the ASOS again as they continued to follow air traffic control (ATC)-provided radar 

vectors for the ILS approach to TVC; however, they did obtain information regarding 

runway conditions from TVC airport operations personnel. For example, beginning about 

0025, the CVR recorded a radio conversation between the captain and the TVC airport 

2 The first officer was hired by Pinnacle on January 3, 2007, and successfully completed his CRJ ground 

training and proficiency check in February and March 2007, respectively. For additional information, see 

section 1.5.2. 

3 The ILS approach to runway 28, with minimums of a 200-foot decision height and 1/2-mile visibility, 

was the only precision approach at TVC. Nonprecision approaches, with higher minimum requirements, 

were available to runway 36 (which was closed). Only circling approaches (which were also nonprecision 

approaches with higher minimum requirements) were available to runway 10.
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operations supervisor regarding the runway condition and ongoing snow removal 

operations. The airport operations supervisor indicated that he had “multiple pieces of 

[snow removal] equipment” on runway 28 and that he was “running numbers for you as 

we speak.” The captain indicated that they would be landing in about 13 minutes. 

According to the CVR, about 0026:56, the airport operations supervisor radioed 

the pilots, advising that the braking action on runway 28 was “40 plus,”4 with “thin wet 

snow [over] patchy thin ice...give us about [5 to 8] minutes to clear the runway...when 

you’re ready to land.” About 0029:10, the CVR recorded the captain stating, “there’s snow 

removal on the field yet they’re showing forty or better sounds like a contaminated...

runway to me.” During the next 4+ minutes, the CVR recorded additional conversation 

between the pilots, TVC operations, and MSP ARTCC personnel regarding the status 

of the snow removal equipment on the runway and the timing of the approach. About 

0032:16 (about 6 minutes before the captain’s estimated arrival time), the airport operations 

supervisor contacted the pilots to indicate that the last snow plow was off the runway. 

The captain responded, advising that the accident flight would be turning inbound and 

requesting additional airport traffic advisories if applicable. 

About 0033, the captain advised the MSP ARTCC controller that the TVC runway 

was clear of snow removal equipment; the controller advised him that it would “be about 

another...2 minutes ‘til I get you out far enough to turn you back onto the ILS.” The 

pilots then discussed the length of the landing runway, and, about 0033:46, the captain 

stated, “...and at night it’ll feel short too...with contaminant...more than likely.” About 

0034, the airport operations supervisor contacted the accident pilots again regarding their 

proximity to the airport. The captain replied that they expected an inbound turn clearance 

from the controller in about 1 minute, and the airport operations supervisor responded, 

“okay, roger that...it’s comin’ down pretty good here so ahhh (guess) I’ll see you on the 

ground here.” About 1 minute later, the airport operations supervisor queried the pilots 

about their progress, indicating “it’s comin’ down pretty good guys, just to give you a 

heads up.” About 7 seconds later (about 0035:42), the controller issued the first of a series 

of heading changes, vectoring the accident pilots towards the approach to runway 28. 

About 0036:19, the captain commented to the first officer, “...says it’s comin’ down 

good, which means its snowing...and we probably won’t see the runway, so be ready for 

the missed [approach].” About 1 minute later, the airport operations supervisor contacted 

the pilots, stating “I need to know if [you] guys are gonna be landing soon ‘cause I gotta...

this is fillin’ in pretty quick down here...so, ah, how far are you guys out?” The captain 

replied that they were intercepting the approach course inbound and anticipated landing 

in “4 1/2, 5 minutes at the most.” 

According to the CVR, at 0038:03.2, the airport operations supervisor stated, “...I 

don’t know what the ah conditions [are] like...the runway, but I’m gonna call braking 

4 The “40 plus” braking report was based on the runway coefficient of friction values (.40+) obtained 

by ground personnel using an electronic recording decelerometer. Federal Aviation Administration guidance 

indicates that an airplane’s braking performance starts to deteriorate and directional control begins to be less 

responsive at MU values of .40 or less.
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action nil now.[5] ‘Cause it’s fillin’ in real hard.” However, during that transmission, 

beginning at 0038:04.3, the controller also contacted the pilots, issuing another heading 

change for the approach. CVR information and postaccident interviews indicated that the 

pilots did not recognize or acknowledge the airport operations supervisor’s nil braking 

action report. About 0038:30, the controller cleared the pilots for the ILS runway 28 

approach at TVC. Postaccident evaluation of the CVR revealed that the first officer was 

initially monitoring both the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) and MSP ARTCC 

frequencies but turned down the volume on the CTAF to hear the ATC assignment. The 

captain acknowledged the approach clearance, and the pilots continued toward the airport. 

About 0039:21, the CVR recorded the captain saying, “I mean, what kind of report’s that, 

it’s fillin in? Ya know doesn’t tell me good, bad, fair, poor.” About 24 seconds later, the 

controller advised the pilots, “...show you joining the [approach course], radar services 

terminated, change to advisory frequency approved.”

About 0040:46, the CVR recorded the captain advising TVC traffic on the CTAF that 

the flight was inbound from the final approach fix and about 2 minutes from the airport. 

The airport operations supervisor responded that all equipment was clear of the runway, 

adding, “...and again ah brakin’ actions probably nil on the runway.” About 0040:57, the 

captain asked, “Are you saying it’s nil?” and the airport operations supervisor responded, 

“...haven’t been out there to do a field report and it’s been ah 5, 10 minutes, so I don’t 

know what it’s doin’ now.” About 0041:05, the captain replied, “ok,” and then said to the 

first officer, “He’s not reporting it nil, he’s like he’s sayin’ it’s nil. Heh.” 

Beginning about 0041:15, the pilots performed the before landing checklist, 

confirming appropriate landing gear, flap, and thrust reverser settings. About 0041:31, as 

the airplane descended through about 1,000 feet above ground level (agl) on the approach, 

the captain asked TVC airport operations “how deep of a [contaminant] would you say 

it is?” and airport personnel responded, “...I’d say it’s probably close to half inch now.” 

The captain responded, “okay, that’s not bad, thank you” and explained to the first officer, 

“We’re allowed 3 inches[6]...if it looks ugly when we’re comin’ in I’ll go around...half 

inch is nothin’.” As the approach descent continued, about 0042:05, the captain continued 

to discuss issues relevant to a possible go-around with the first officer. About 0042:42, 

the captain announced that the runway was in sight and that they would continue to a 

landing. 

At 0042:42.9, about 1 second after the captain saw the runway, the CVR recorded 

an electronic voice stating, “minimums.” The airplane touched down at 0043:03.7. 

Review of flight data recorder (FDR) data indicated that the accident airplane crossed 

5 TVC ground operations personnel are qualified to judge runway surface conditions based on ground 

vehicle handling characteristics as well as runway friction measuring equipment. During postaccident 

interviews, the TVC airport operations supervisor stated that, because he did not have time to do a full field 

condition measurement and report before the accident airplane arrived, he based his nil braking action reports 

on tests he conducted with his vehicle on runway 28, during which he perceived “minimal to nonexistent” 

braking action and “uncertain” directional control.

6 According to the CRJ airplane flight manual, operations on runways with up to 3.75 inches of loose 

snow contaminant are permitted if all other operational criteria (for example, runway length) are met. The CRJ 

flight manual included more restrictive limitations for other contaminant categories, including compacted snow, 

standing water/slush, and ice.
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the approach threshold of runway 28 at an airspeed of about 148 knots7 and touched 

down on the runway about 2,400 feet from the threshold at an airspeed of 123 knots. The 

FDR data showed that the brakes were applied and the spoilers deployed immediately 

after the airplane touched down and that the thrust reversers were fully deployed within 

4 seconds after touchdown. FDR information further showed that the thrust reversers 

were deployed and stowed twice during the landing roll. The first deployment occurred 

when the airplane was about 3,000 feet from the departure end of the runway, and the 

second deployment occurred when the airplane was about 1,100 feet from the departure 

end of the runway.

The airplane ran off the end of runway 28 at a ground speed of about 47 knots, on 

a heading of about 254°. It came to a stop on a heading of about 250°, about 100 feet west 

of the end of the 200-foot-long, 190-foot-wide blast pad pavement located off the end of 

runway 28.

1.2 Injuries to Persons

Table 1. Injury chart.

Injuries Flight Crew Cabin Crew Passengers Other Total

Fatal 0 0 0 0 0

Serious 0 0 0 0 0

Minor 0 0 0 0 0

None 2 1 49 0 52

Total 2 1 49 0 52

Note: Title 14 CFR 830.2 defines a serious injury as any injury that (1) requires hospitalization for more than 48 hours, 

starting within 7 days from the date that the injury was received; (2) results in a fracture of any bone, except simple fractures 

of fingers, toes, or the nose; (3) causes severe hemorrhages or nerve, muscle, or tendon damage; (4) involves any internal 

organ; or (5) involves second- or third-degree burns or any burns affecting more than 5 percent of the body surface. A minor 

injury is any injury that does not qualify as a fatal or serious injury.

1.3 Damage to Airplane

The airplane had substantial, but repairable, damage, primarily to the forward 

lower fuselage, including the nose gear well area.

1.4 Other Damage

No other damage was reported. 

7 Based on the airplane’s estimated landing weight of 46,473 pounds, the pilots decided to use the more 

conservative landing card information, which indicated a landing reference speed (Vref) of 142 knots (with up 

to 5 knots added for gusty winds) for a landing weight of 47,000 pounds.
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1.5 Personnel Information

1.5.1 The Captain

The captain, age 27, was hired as a first officer by Pinnacle on May 11, 2001. He 

was upgraded to captain in April 2004 and to line check airman status in August 2006.

The captain held a multiengine airline transport pilot certificate with a type rating in the 

CRJ. The captain held a first-class Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airman medical 

certificate, dated February 14, 2007, with the limitation that he “must wear corrective 

lenses.” During postaccident interviews, the captain stated that he was wearing contact 

lenses at the time of the accident. 

The captain told investigators that he started flying in 1997, received his private 

pilot certificate in 1998, and his commercial pilot certificate, flight instructor certificates, 

instrument rating, and multiengine rating in 1999. He stated that he worked as a flight 

instructor at Henderson State University, Henderson, Arkansas, for about 2 years and 

also flew under contract with Arkansas Game and Fish Commission before he was hired 

by Pinnacle.

According to the captain’s Pinnacle employment and flight records, he had flown 

about 5,600 hours total flight time, including about 4,200 hours in CRJs, of which about 

2,500 hours were flown as CRJ captain. He had flown about 220, 54, 28, and 8 hours in 

the 90, 30, and 7 days and 24 hours, respectively, before the accident. Company records 

showed that the captain obtained his initial CRJ type rating in March 2004. His most recent 

line check occurred in April 2006, and his most recent CRJ proficiency check and recurrent 

ground training occurred in March 2007. A search of FAA records revealed no accident 

or incident history or enforcement actions for the captain. A search of the National Driver 

Register found no record of driver’s license suspension or revocation. 

The captain was based at Memphis International Airport (MEM), Memphis, 

Tennessee, and commuted from his home near Pensacola, Florida. He was married, and, 

6 months before the accident, his wife had given birth to their first child. According to 

the captain, his personal and financial situations changed with the birth of his son and 

his wife quitting work. The captain characterized his health as good and indicated that 

there were no major health changes during the previous 6 months. The captain stated 

that when he was home without work demands, he typically went to bed about 2130 

and awakened about 0730. However, he further stated that when he was home his sleep 

could be interrupted because he tried to provide relief for his wife during the night by 

responding when his son awakened. 

About 2040 on April 6, the captain and the first officer completed a 2‐day OE 

training trip.8 The captain commuted home from Minneapolis to Pensacola on April 7. He 

8 The captain told investigators that he initially tried to find another check airman to conduct the first 

officer’s OE because the accident pilots were personal friends. However, no other check airman was available. 

The captain stated that he attempted to perform the OE with the same strictness he would for any other 

candidate. 
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told investigators that he followed normal activities at home on April 8 and 9, although 

his sleep was interrupted at night by his son. The captain was initially scheduled to be 

off duty on April 10 but instead was rescheduled (on 3-day notice) to fly that day. He 

stated that he awoke about 0305 on April 10 and performed a checkride on a flight from 

Pensacola to MEM and then conducted captain line training during a trip from MEM to 

MSP. Upon arrival at MSP, the captain learned that the scheduling office had assigned 

him a flight extension (that is, a round trip flight to Louisville, Kentucky). The captain 

stated that he was prepared to accept the flight extension (because company policies 

permit pilots to refuse only one extension per month), but another captain was assigned 

in his place. The accident captain returned to the crew lounge and, about 1645 CDT, met 

the accident first officer for dinner. The captain stated that he drank alcohol with dinner 

but, consistent with company requirements, ceased alcohol consumption at least 12 hours 

before his scheduled reporting time for duty. He went to the hotel about 2200 to 2230 CDT 

and said he slept soundly through the night. 

On April 11, the captain awoke about 0700 CDT and ate breakfast at the hotel. He 

and the accident first officer caught a shuttle to the airport about 0800 CDT and checked 

in for their day about 0900 CDT. (The pilots caught an earlier airport shuttle than they 

needed for their scheduled 0940 report time because they anticipated weather-related 

shuttle delays.) The pilots’ trip sequence began with a round trip from MSP to ClevelandHopkins International Airport (CLE), Cleveland, Ohio, with a 28-minute turnaround at 

CLE. During the 1-hour, 41-minute layover at MSP before their next flight, the captain 

ate lunch at an airport fast food outlet. The pilots then flew a round trip from MSP to Des 

Moines International Airport (DSM), Des Moines, Iowa, with a 22-minute turnaround 

at DSM. The pilots had a scheduled 30-minute turnaround at MSP before they were 

to depart for TVC, and the captain stated that he planned to eat a quick dinner during 

that time because he knew that all restaurants in Traverse City would be closed when 

they arrived. However, the flight from DSM to MSP arrived about 15 minutes later than 

scheduled. Upon the pilots’ arrival, Pinnacle ground personnel advised the captain that 

their departure for TVC was delayed and that the flight would likely be canceled because 

of forecast wind conditions at TVC. (For additional information regarding the weather 

at TVC and the flight’s dispatch, see section 1.7.) The captain stated that he was not sure 

when or if the flight to TVC would be released and was receiving updated information 

from Pinnacle dispatch, which resulted in a “rolling delay.” He and the first officer stopped 

briefly for a beverage at an MSP coffee shop but did not eat dinner at the airport.

The captain stated that it was snowing and windy in MSP all day and that the trip 

sequence made them work. The first officer flew the legs from MSP to CLE and DSM, 

where the weather was better; the captain flew the return legs to MSP and landed in 

difficult crosswinds. The captain told investigators that, when they were en route to TVC, 

he realized that it had been a long day and that he was more tired than he had realized 

before the flight departed. 
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Company pilots who had flown with the captain9 described him as professional, 

knowledgeable, approachable, and polite. The accident first officer described the captain 

as a good pilot with strong teaching abilities and a willingness to help.

1.5.2 The First Officer

The first officer, age 28, was hired as a first officer by Pinnacle on January 3, 2007. 

He held a commercial pilot certificate with a single-engine rating, issued in April 2000, 

a flight instructor certificate issued in July 2001, and a commercial pilot certificate with 

a multiengine rating issued in March 2002. Between April 2001 and his hire date with 

Pinnacle, the first officer was employed in various flight instructor and 14 CFR Part 135 

freight and charter pilot positions. The first officer held a first-class FAA airman medical 

certificate, dated November 3, 2006, with the limitation that he “must wear corrective 

lenses.” During postaccident interviews, the first officer stated that he was wearing glasses 

at the time of the accident. According to the first officer’s Pinnacle employment and flight 

records, he had flown about 2,600 hours total flight time, including 22 hours in CRJs. He 

had flown about 22, 22, 15, and 8 hours in the 90, 30, and 7 days, and 24 hours, respectively, 

before the accident. Company records showed that the first officer obtained his initial 

CRJ ground training and proficiency check in February and March 2007, respectively, 

and was accomplishing his OE training at the time of the accident.10 A search of FAA 

records revealed no accident or incident history or enforcement actions for the first officer. 

A search of the National Driver Register found no record of driver’s license suspension or 

revocation. 

The first officer was based at MEM and resided in the area, having relocated from 

California after he was hired by Pinnacle. The first officer was single and told investigators 

that his personal situation had changed when his mother died in November 2006. He 

reported that his financial situation had also changed and that he was having difficulty 

paying his bills because he was in training and earning a low starting salary at Pinnacle. 

The first officer characterized his health as good and indicated that there were no major 

health changes during the previous 6 months. The first officer told investigators that, when 

he did not have work demands, he typically went to bed about 2200 and awakened about 

0800; however, he described his schedule as “crazy” and indicated that he sometimes 

slept until noon. 

After the captain and the accident first officer completed their 2-day OE training 

trip on April 6, the first officer was off duty for several days, during which he visited 

relatives in San Diego, California. The first officer stated he went to bed about 2200 on 

April 9 and awakened between 0400 and 0430 on April 10 to catch a flight to MSP. The first 

officer told investigators that he arrived at MSP about midday, drank juice at an airport 

9 Five pilots were interviewed, including two first officers, a captain/check airman who had recently 

flown normal line trips with the captain, a captain who had completed a recent checkride administered by the 

accident captain, and the acting chief pilot, who had administered previous checkrides. 

10 Pinnacle records indicate that the first officer completed about 44 hours of CRJ simulator time and 

about 22 hours (of the minimum required 25 hours) of OE, consistent with the company’s standard new‐hire 

first officer training. 
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shop, then met with the accident captain to review the flight paperwork for the April 

11 trip sequence. The first officer stated that after reviewing the paperwork, he and the 

captain ate dinner together and socialized until about 2145 CDT. The first officer indicated 

that he had a beer with dinner and went to sleep that night at the hotel about 2200 CDT. 

He awakened on April 11 about 0630 CDT, and he and the captain caught the shuttle to 

the airport and checked in for the day. 

The first officer stated that he and the captain had fast food at MSP for lunch when 

they returned from CLE, then flew the round trip to DSM. The first officer indicated that 

the pilots were scheduled to have a 30-minute turnaround upon their return to MSP before 

departing for TVC. However, he stated that the MSP-TVC flight release was delayed, and 

the flight’s departure was further delayed because of deicing. The first officer stated that 

he was a little tired during the accident flight but felt okay. 

The first officer was described favorably by two company simulator instructors as 

a pleasant person and dedicated student with flying skills commensurate with his flight 

time. The accident captain described the first officer as progressing normally toward OE 

approval, with above average airplane handling skills but below average skills on airplane 

systems and company procedures.

1.6 Airplane Information

1.6.1 General

The accident airplane, serial number (S/N) 7905, was manufactured by 

Bombardier and received its FAA airworthiness certificate in December 2003. According 

to the manufacturer, the CRJ was designed for use in regional airline operations and 

has swept-back wings with winglets and a T-tail.11 The airplane was equipped with two 

tail‐mounted General Electric (GE) CF34-3B1 turbofan engines, which were installed 

new in December 2003. At the time of the accident, the airplane had accumulated about 

8,219 total flight hours and 6,462 cycles.12

According to flight dispatch information, the airplane’s actual takeoff weight 

for the accident flight was 49,473 pounds; the estimated TVC landing weight was 

46,473 pounds. Airplane documentation indicates that the maximum structural takeoff 

and landing weights are 53,000 and 47,000 pounds, respectively. The calculated landing 

center of gravity (cg) was 13.7 percent mean aerodynamic chord (MAC), and the airplane’s 

cg range extended from 9 to 35 percent MAC.

11 A T-tail is a design in which the airplane’s horizontal tail surfaces are mounted to the top of the vertical 

tail surfaces above the fuselage.

12 An airplane cycle is one complete takeoff and landing sequence.
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1.6.2 Airplane Deceleration Device Information 

Each main landing gear (MLG) wheel assembly is equipped with inboard and 

outboard hydraulic disc brake assemblies. The brakes are applied when the pilot(s) apply 

pressure to the brake pedals, resulting in mechanical inputs to the dual brake control 

valves through the brake control push/pull mechanism. Resultant hydraulic pressure to 

the brake assemblies is modulated by the airplane’s antiskid control system, which is 

designed to provide optimum braking efficiency under all runway surface conditions. 

Pneumatically operated thrust reversers on the airplane’s engines are also used 

to slow the airplane after landing. When the thrust reversers are deployed, blocker doors 

change the direction of the engine fan air, moving it outward and forward to create reverse 

thrust. The thrust reversers are operated by levers located on the forward side of the thrust 

levers on the throttle quadrant.

The National Transportation Safety Board’s postaccident examination of related 

FDR data and testing and examination of associated system components revealed 

no evidence of preimpact fault or anomaly in the braking, antiskid, or thrust reverser 

systems.

1.7 Meteorological Information 

1.7.1 Cherry Capital Airport Weather Forecast/Predispatch 

Information 

According to National Weather Service (NWS) weather charts, on the day of the 

accident, a low pressure system and associated occluded front13 were approaching TVC 

from the south-southwest. The weather charts showed an extensive area of IFR conditions14

extending throughout most of the Great Lakes region, including northern Michigan. Across 

the state of Michigan, the charts showed winds from the east-northeast about 15 knots, 

temperatures in the mid to low 30s (°Fahrenheit [F]), snow and freezing rain across the 

central and northern portions of the state, and rain over southern Michigan. 

About 1540 on April 11, the Gaylord, Michigan, NWS Forecast Office (WSFO) 

issued a winter weather message warning that a rapidly developing low pressure system 

would result in heavy snow across northern Michigan, with total snowfall accumulations 

of 6 to 8 inches and possible strong winds. 

About 1645 on April 11, the NWS Hydrometeorological Prediction Center Heavy 

Snow Discussion update/advisory highlighted the upper Great Lakes and northeastern 

United States (an area that included the accident region) for potential heavy snow and 

13 An occluded front is formed when a cold front overtakes a warm front.

14 IFR conditions are defined as a ceiling or lowest layer of clouds reported as broken or overcast, 

or vertical visibility into a surface-based obscuration of less than 1,000 feet agl, and/or visibility less than 

3 statute miles.
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icing conditions. This advisory indicated that a major low pressure system producing an 

area of heavy wet snow15 was moving into the northern Great Lakes region (including 

northern Michigan) and was expected to produce continuous, frequently heavy snowfall 

in the area before gradually dissipating during the subsequent 24 hours. About 2337 on 

April 11, the Gaylord WSFO issued a short-term forecast for the northern Michigan region 

(including the TVC area) that warned that a winter storm warning was in effect for snow, 

which was expected to be heavy at times, and strong winds out of the northeast through 

early morning April 12.

The NWS terminal aerodrome forecast (TAF)16 that was issued for TVC about 1929 

on April 11 predicted wind from 080o at 19 knots gusting to 30 knots, visibility 2 miles 

in light and blowing snow, and ceiling overcast at 2,500 feet; between 2000 and 0000, 

temporary conditions of visibility 3/4 mile in light and blowing snow, and ceiling overcast 

at 500 feet. From 0000 to 0600, the TVC TAF predicted wind from 040o at 18 knots gusting 

to 26 knots, visibility 1/2 mile in moderate and blowing snow, and sky obscured with a 

vertical visibility of 800 feet.

Pinnacle dispatch personnel were not able to release the accident flight based on 

the NWS TAF because the winds at TVC exceeded the CRJ tailwind landing limitation 

of 10 knots. Dispatch personnel advised the company SOC of this dispatch problem. 

Upon review of updated weather information, the SOC contacted NWA’s meteorology 

department17 to request review and possible revision of the TVC forecast. About 2130 

on April 11, NWA meteorologists issued an amended TAF for TVC that predicted wind 

from 050o at 10 knots, winds gusting to 18 knots, visibility of 4 miles in light snow, ceiling 

overcast at 2,500 feet agl, with temporary conditions of visibility of 1 mile in light and 

blowing snow, and ceiling overcast at 1,000 feet agl. 

About 1 hour later, based on new weather satellite information, the NWS issued an 

amended forecast for TVC that predicted the following: 

Until 0200 on April 12: winds from 080 degrees at 11 knots, winds gusting 

to 20 knots; visibility 4 miles in light snow, ceiling overcast at 2,500 feet agl, 

with temporary conditions of visibility 1 mile in light snow, blowing snow, 

and ceiling overcast at 1,500 feet agl valid. 

The NWS amended TVC weather forecast was issued about the time the airplane 

was pushed back from the gate at MSP and was not included in the pilot’s dispatch 

information.

15 According to meteorologists, snow is considered to be wet when it has a high liquid water content, and 

typically occurs at temperatures above 28° F. On surfaces, wet snow produces slush and rapidly deteriorating 

braking conditions.

16 According to FAA Order 7110.10, TAFs are scheduled to be prepared and issued four times a day 

(about 1930, 0130, 0730, and 1330 eastern daylight time).

17 The NWA meteorology department is an FAA-approved Enhanced Weather Information System 

provider that provides weather-related services to Pinnacle under contract. Its personnel continuously monitor 

applicable weather trends and are authorized to issue forecasts and advisories at any time as deemed 

appropriate. 
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1.7.2 Dispatch Weather Information

The weather information provided in the airplane’s dispatch release paperwork 

was based on information obtained from the NWA Worldflight system, which provided 

meteorological aerodrome reports (METARs),18 TAFs, pilot reports, notices to airmen 

(NOTAM), and NWA adverse weather advisories.

About 2146, the dispatcher issued the flight’s dispatch documentation, which 

included the previously discussed NWA-amended TVC weather forecast information 

and 3 hours of alternate airport (DTW) weather observations. The 3 hours of DTW 

observations indicated strong easterly winds gusting to 26 knots, visibility of 1 1/4 to 

1 1/2 miles in light-to-moderate rain and mist, with ceilings between 600 and 800 feet. 

Published minimums for ILS approaches to DTW’s easterly runways were ceilings of 

200 feet and visibility of 1/2 mile.19

1.7.3 Updated Cherry Capital Airport Weather/Airport Information

While the flight was en route, the pilots had several possible sources of information 

regarding the TVC weather and airport/runway surface condition, including: 1) Pinnacle 

dispatch/flight-following personnel; 2) MSP ARTCC; 3) TVC ASOS; and 4) TVC ground 

operations personnel reports. Records showed that a Pinnacle dispatcher provided the 

pilots with updated TVC ASOS weather information at 2354 and 0023; on both occasions 

the information indicated winds within acceptable landing limits and visibility as low as 

1 1/2 miles in light snow. Additionally, the MSP ARTCC controller advised the pilots that 

he observed weather radar returns consistent with a snow squall in the TVC area on his 

en route radar display when the airplane was descending for the approach.

Surface weather observations at TVC are made every minute by the ASOS, which 

is located near the glideslope antenna for runway 28. After the TVC ATCT closes, these 

ASOS weather observations are broadcast continuously over the automated terminal 

information system (ATIS) frequency and were, therefore, available to the pilots during the 

airplane’s descent, approach, and landing. CVR evidence shows that the pilots accessed 

the TVC ASOS weather information once during the accident flight, more than 30 minutes 

before the airplane landed. At that time, the ASOS broadcast indicated winds out of 040o 

at 7 knots and visibility of 1 1/2 miles in light snow.

The ASOS system is augmented by FAA-contracted, NWS-certified weather 

observers located at the general aviation terminal north of runway 28. The METARs and 

special weather observations (SPECI) issued by the NWS around the time of the accident 

indicated the following conditions: 

18 METARs are generated by the airport’s ASOS and subsequently amended/augmented as needed by 

NWS observers. 

19 Subsequent DTW weather observations also showed conditions consistently above approach/landing 

minimums; however, technically, Pinnacle dispatch should have included a second alternate destination and 

corresponding additional fuel in the dispatch release.
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SPECI at 0030: wind from 040 degrees at 8 knots, visibility 1/2 mile in 

light[20] snow, sky obscured vertical visibility 400 feet, temperature 0° C, 

dew point temperature minus 1° C, altimeter 29.52 inches Hg [mercury]. 

Remarks...hourly precipitation since 2353 at 0.03 inches.

SPECI at 0045: wind from 020 degrees at 8 knots, visibility 1/4 mile in 

heavy snow, sky obscured vertical visibility 200 feet, temperature 0° C, 

dewpoint temperature minus 1° C, altimeter 29.52 inches Hg. Remarks...

hourly precipitation since 2353 at 0.07 inches.

METAR at 0053: wind from 020 degrees at 8 knots, visibility 1/4 mile in 

moderate snow,[21] sky obscured vertical visibility 200 feet, temperature 0° C, 

dewpoint temperature minus 1° C, altimeter 29.51 inches Hg. Remarks... 

hourly precipitation since 2353 at 0.08 inches.

The pilots received some updated TVC weather (and runway surface condition) 

information during their radio communications with TVC ground operations personnel 

as they approached TVC. For example, about 18 minutes before the airplane landed, the 

pilots contacted TVC ground operations personnel and were advised that snow removal 

equipment was on the runway. About 2 minutes later, the TVC airport operations 

supervisor advised the pilots that the measured braking action on runway 28 was .40+ 

with “thin wet snow [over] patchy thin ice.” During the next few minutes, the CVR 

recorded additional communications between the pilots and TVC ground personnel 

regarding the snow removal progress and runway condition. Then, about 9 minutes 

before the airplane landed, the TVC airport operations supervisor contacted the pilots 

for an updated position and told them, “it’s comin’ down pretty good here.” Less than 

2 minutes later, after the pilots advised that they were about 5 minutes from touchdown, 

the TVC airport operations supervisor stated, “...it’s comin’ down pretty good...just to 

give you a heads up.”22 The pilots did not listen to the ASOS 5-minute observation that was 

logged by the system about 3 minutes before the accident, which showed 1/4 mile visibility 

in heavy snow with sky-obscured vertical visibility of 200 feet. 

1.8 Aids to Navigation

No problems with any navigational aids were reported. 

20 According to NWS guidance and the ASOS augmentation supervisor, the light snow reported in this 

SPECI should have been identified as moderate. The accident pilots did not obtain the erroneous snow 

intensity report. 

21 According to NWS guidance and the ASOS augmentation supervisor, the moderate snow reported in 

this weather observation should have been identified as heavy.

22 Observations for TVC the morning after the accident indicated that a total of 4 inches of new wet snow 

fell overnight.
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1.9 Communications

No technical communications problems were reported. 

1.10 Airport Information

TVC is located about 2 miles south of Traverse City, Michigan, at an elevation 

of about 624 feet. The airport has two asphalt runways (10/28 and 18/36). Runway 28, 

the active runway at the time of the accident, is 6,501 feet long by 150 feet wide, with 

a 200-foot-long by 190-foot-wide blast pad, and is equipped with an ILS approach.23

(Runway 18/36 was closed at the time of the accident.) All four TVC runway ends had 

standard, 500-foot-wide runway safety areas that extended 1,000 feet beyond the runway 

ends. 

The Safety Board examined the FAA’s airport certification inspection records for 

TVC from the years 2004, 2005, and 2006 and did not note any unresolved deficiencies 

related to winter operations.

1.10.1 Cherry Capital Airport Closed Tower Operations

According to FAA Order 7110.65, Air Traffic Control, “The primary purpose of the 

ATC system is to prevent a collision between aircraft operating in the system and to organize 

and expedite the flow of traffic.... In addition to its primary function, the ATC system 

has the capability to provide (within certain limitations) additional services.” Because the 

TVC ATCT was closed during the accident flight’s approach to the airport, the primary 

provider of ATC services for this flight was the MSP ARTCC. TVC airport diagrams and 

approach charts showed ASOS and airport ground/traffic contact information available 

for use when the TVC ATCT was not in operation. 

FAA policies dictate that the operating hours of ATCT facilities are determined 

based on the amount of traffic at the airport, specifically the number of flight operations 

per hour. Based on the FAA’s criteria, the published hours of operation for the TVC ATCT 

are 0700 to 2200. (The accident flight was originally scheduled to arrive at TVC about 2251, 

after the TVC ATCT was closed.) According to TVC policies, the ATCT will remain open 

longer than the designated hours if an inbound or outbound flight crew requests such 

staffing. The FAA indicated that such requests were not common, and no such request 

was made the night of the accident. 

FAA Order 7110.65 also states that, when ATC towers are open, controllers are 

required to provide arriving pilots with “airport traffic control service based only upon 

23 As previously mentioned, the ILS approach to runway 28 is the only precision approach at TVC.
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observed or known traffic and airport conditions.”24 The order states that controllers 

should provide pilots with useful airport and landing area conditions and braking action 

reports and advisories in a timely manner. 

According to published airport documents, when the TVC ATCT is closed, pilots 

are able to obtain current weather information through the TVC ASOS. TVC records 

indicate that, as part of the closing tower checklist on the night of the accident, the TVC 

ATCT controller turned off the ATIS recording then activated a switch transferring the TVC 

ASOS recorded weather information to be broadcast on the ATIS frequency. Additionally, 

current weather and runway surface condition information may be obtained from airport 

ground operations personnel over the CTAF. The accident pilots were in contact with 

ground operations personnel for about 18 minutes before landing and received weather 

and runway surface condition information from them. 

1.10.2 Radio Phraseology Guidance and Training Requirements

When an airport’s ATCT is closed, direct communications between arriving 

pilots and airport ground operations personnel may be necessary. Information related to 

procedures and phraseology used by pilots when operating at an airport after its ATCT 

is closed is available in the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM). Additional pertinent 

radio communication information is published and available to pilots in applicable airport 

facility directories (AFD) and airport instrument approach charts. Records showed that 

both pilots had experience operating at airports without operating control towers, and, 

during postaccident interviews, both pilots stated that they were aware of the procedures 

and communications required for such operations.

According to Federal airport certification regulations (14 CFR Part 139, 

“Certification of Airports”), airport operations personnel are required to receive 

initial and annual recurrent training on airport communications that addresses radio 

communications with the ATCT during the tower’s hours of operation, communications 

on the CTAF when the ATCT is not operating, and procedures for reporting unsafe airport 

conditions. The FAA recommends that airports consult the AIM chapter titled, “Radio 

Communications, Phraseology, and Techniques,” (which emphasizes the importance of 

precision, conciseness, and proper radio technique in successful radio communication 

and provides examples of proper phraseology and technique) to develop their airport 

personnel training programs. Airport operators can also find information on the content 

and delivery of airfield condition reports in the AIM and in Advisory Circular (AC) 

150/5200-28C, “Notices to Airmen (NOTAMS) for Airport Operators.”

TVC personnel stated that they referred to radio communication guidance in 

the AIM in the development of their airport operations personnel training and that all 

24 Records indicate that there was no other traffic operating around TVC when the accident airplane 

arrived. The most recent passenger-carrying air carrier flight (NWA Airlink/Mesaba flight 3721, a SF-34 

turboprop) arrived at 1441 on April 11. According to NWA representatives, two NWA flights that were scheduled 

to arrive at TVC later that day were cancelled because the predicted tailwind component at TVC exceeded the 

limitations in the company’s winter operations guidance. Two air carrier airplane-positioning flights landed at 

TVC later on April 11, the latest of which arrived about 2045. 
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operations personnel working the night of the accident had completed the required 

training. In addition, the operations supervisor was also a licensed pilot and was therefore 

familiar with airport/ATC communications from a pilot’s perspective.

1.10.3 Cherry Capital Airport Winter Operations

AC 150/5200-30A, “Airport Winter Safety and Operations,” dated October 1, 1991, 

provides airport operators with guidance for the development of a snow and ice control 

plan, procedures for conducting and reporting the results of runway friction surveys and 

for snow removal and control. According to the AC, the guidance and standards provided 

“are recommended by the [FAA] for winter operations at all civil airports.” Therefore, 

the AC identifies “triggers” that an airport might use to begin snow removal operations, 

such as snow type and depth and runway surface condition reports. The AC does not 

identify thresholds that an airport might use to close a runway because of observed type 

and depth of contamination, adverse friction measurements, or limited braking action on 

that surface.25

The TVC airport certification manual contains a section titled “Cherry Capital 

Airport Snow Plan,” which outlines the airport’s snow and ice removal procedures, 

consistent with the FAA’s guidance, for airport employees and tenants. The snow plan 

specifies that the airport is responsible for the following: 

• determining when snow removal operations begin; 

• making visual and mechanical checks of snow, ice, slush...bank height, and 

friction measurements26 on airport operational surfaces; 

• completing field condition reports after each check; and 

• disseminating related information as needed. 

TVC’s snow plan also specifies that snow removal operations are to be conducted 

from runway end to runway end to a minimum clearance width of 150 feet and should 

begin before about 2 inches of dry snow or 1/2 inch of wet snow has fallen. The latest 

revision of the TVC snow plan, issued in April 2006, differs from the previous version 

in that it reflects an increase in pertinent personnel and snow removal equipment and 

contains revised contact information.

In November 2005, the FAA Office of Airports for the Great Lakes Region sent a 

letter to all Part 139 airport operators in the region reminding them of requirements for 

operations during snow and ice conditions. This letter stated, in part: 

25 Type and depth of contamination reports are based on visual observations made by ground personnel; 

runway friction measurements are taken by ground personnel using measurement equipment and reported in 

MU values; and runway braking action reports are based on subjective pilot reports (good, fair, poor, or nil). 

26 According to FAA guidance, airport personnel should conduct friction measurements on runways 

covered with compacted snow and/or ice to quantify the slipperiness of pavement surfaces. 
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The airport must implement a standard operating procedure to close any 

pavement available to air carriers when braking action/friction values 

reach an equivalent level of nil braking based on the air carrier aircraft 

utilizing the airport. The airport can obtain the threshold for nil braking 

action by referencing aircraft operating manuals or contacting the airlines 

for an aircraft or airline specific correlation table. 

According to the TVC airport assistant manager, airport personnel discussed the 

content of the FAA’s letter at a snow plan meeting held September 22, 2006. The airport 

then contacted each air carrier operating into TVC and requested the necessary airplane 

operating criteria; however, at the time of the accident, no air carrier had provided the 

required information. Therefore, the TVC airport’s snow plan did not specify a type 

and/or depth of runway contaminant or coefficient of friction (MU) value27 that would 

automatically result in airport closure.28 According to a December 20, 2007, letter from 

the FAA airport certification inspector to the TVC airport director, no violation of 14 CFR 

Part 139 was noted during the investigation of this accident. 

1.10.4 Cherry Capital Airport Winter Operations the Night of the 

Accident

On the night of the accident, TVC airport operations personnel coordinated with 

Pinnacle Airlines dispatch personnel and were advised to expect the arrival of flight 4712 

about 0037. About 2135, a TVC field condition report recorded no snow or ice on the 

runway and MU values of .40+ on all segments of the runway.29 Snow began to fall at 

TVC about 20 minutes after this report, and, about 0006, a TVC field condition report for 

runway 28 indicated “thin wet snow over patchy thin ice, MU values of .40/.37/.39.”30

Snow removal operations were initiated shortly thereafter in preparation for the airplane’s 

arrival. TVC crews had cleared the full length and width of runway 28 by about 0029, and 

a TVC field condition report indicated “thin wet snow on runway 28, over patchy thin ice” 

and friction measurements resulting in MU values of .40+/.40+/.40+.31 A TVC field report 

entered about 0055 indicated that postaccident runway friction measurements taken on 

runway 28 indicated MU values of .17/.17/.17.

27 MU values are obtained from runway friction measuring devices and reported in a range from 0.0 to 

1.0, where 0.0 is the lowest friction value, and 1.0 is the theoretical best friction value available. (Runway 

friction measurements are also sometimes reported in a range from 0 to 100.)

28 After the accident, TVC received operational criteria information from the air carriers operating into the 

airport; as a result, the airport now restricts air carrier operations when MU values of .27 or less are measured 

or when nil braking action is reported by pilots or TVC ground operations personnel.

29 Although this report indicated “no snow or ice on the runway,” runway friction surveys are only 

performed when there is contamination on airport surfaces. Friction testing devices provide MU values for the 

first, second, and third segments of a runway.

30 A NOTAM was not issued for this MU reading because TVC ground personnel were not able to reach 

the nearest FAA automated flight service station when they tried to report it.

31 Although FAA guidance indicates that an airplane’s braking performance starts to deteriorate and 

directional control begins to be less responsive at MU values of .40 or less, the FAA does not recognize a 

correlation between MU values and the descriptive terms (such as good, fair, poor, or nil) that are used in pilot 

braking action reports.
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1.11 Flight Recorders

1.11.1 Cockpit Voice Recorder

The accident airplane was equipped with an L-3 Communications Model FA 

2100-1020 CVR, S/N 263068. The CVR showed no signs of damage and was sent to the Safety 

Board’s laboratory in Washington, D.C., for readout and evaluation. The CVR was played 

back normally and without difficulty and contained good quality32 audio information. The 

recording started at 2252:01.3 and continued uninterrupted until 0055:44.8, when the pilots 

shut off electrical power on the airplane. A partial transcript was prepared for the 2-hour, 

4-minute, 8-second recording (see appendix B). 

1.11.2 Flight Data Recorder

The accident airplane was equipped with an L-3 Communications Fairchild Model 

FA2100 solid-state FDR, S/N 000228080. The FDR was sent to the Safety Board’s laboratory 

for readout and evaluation; it was received in good condition, and the data were extracted 

normally from the recorder. The FDR recorded about 375 parameters of airplane flight 

information, including altitude, air and ground speed, heading, wind direction and speed, 

control wheel and column position, elevator/aileron/rudder position, engine fan speed, 

thrust reverser status (arm advisory/deployed/unlocked), acceleration (vertical, lateral, 

and longitudinal), spoiler and antiskid status, landing-gear weight on wheels, and brake 

pedal application and pressure. 

1.12 Wreckage and Impact Information

The airplane came to rest on a southwesterly heading about 100 feet west of the 

end of the blast pad surface located off of runway 28 at TVC. Three tracks were found 

in the snow and ground, extending between the end of the runway and the airplane’s 

landing gear. The airplane was resting, right wing low, on the forward lower fuselage and 

the main landing gear; the nose landing gear was found separated from the fuselage. Most 

of the airplane damage observed was in the lower forward fuselage area. Specifically, 

the aft bulkhead of the nose gear bay, which is part of the airplane’s pressure bulkhead, 

exhibited substantial damage. Postaccident examination of the engine controls and the 

throttle quadrant (including the thrust levers) in the flight deck area, associated linkages 

below the cockpit floor level, and the powerplants and thrust reversers revealed no 

evidence of pre- or postimpact anomalies. 

32 The Safety Board uses the following categories to classify the levels of CVR recording quality: excellent, 

good, fair, poor, and unusable. A good quality recording is one in which most of the flight crew conversations 

could be accurately and easily understood.
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1.13 Medical and Pathological Information

In accordance with Federal regulations, Pinnacle conducted postaccident drug 

testing on urine specimens obtained from the captain and first officer within 4 hours of 

the accident.33 The test results were negative. Required postaccident alcohol testing was 

not conducted. Pinnacle reported that this omission occurred because company officials 

initially believed that the event was classified as an incident (in which case such testing 

was not required by Federal regulation) rather than an accident. Title 14 CFR Part 121 

Appendix J, Section B1 states that a decision to forgo the administration of a postaccident 

alcohol test “shall be based on the employer’s determination, using the best available 

information at the time of the determination, that the covered employee’s performance 

could not have contributed to the accident.” Appendix J further states, “if a test required 

by this section is not administered within 2 hours following the accident, the employer 

shall prepare and maintain on file a record stating the reasons the test was not promptly 

administered...records shall be submitted to the FAA upon request of the Administrator 

or his or her designee.” A Pinnacle representative indicated that such a record was neither 

prepared nor requested by an FAA representative.

1.14 Fire

No evidence of an in-flight fire was found, and a postcrash fire did not occur.

1.15 Survival Aspects

1.15.1 Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting Response

According to postaccident interviews, the TVC operations supervisor saw the 

airplane go off the end of the runway and telephoned the 911 central dispatch operator 

to initiate the emergency response. The 911 central dispatch operator then activated 

the crash alarm at the TVC aircraft rescue and firefighting (ARFF) station34 and notified 

other (off-airport) Traverse City fire stations and police via radio. Postaccident interviews 

indicated that the first responding TVC ARFF firefighter35 was delayed slightly in reaching 

the airplane because he was unsure of the airplane’s exact location on the airport. The 

firefighter could not see the accident airplane because of reduced visibility in falling snow 

and initially was unable to make radio contact with TVC operations personnel to get more 

information because of congestion on radio frequencies. During postaccident interviews, 

33 As required by the National Institute for Drug Abuse, the specimens were tested for the following 

drugs: marijuana, cocaine, opiates, phencyclidine, and amphetamines.

34 TVC ARFF station personnel respond to the crash alarm and do not receive a verbal initial 

notification.

35 The TVC ARFF schedule resulted in one on-duty airport firefighter between 2300 and 0700 the night 

of the accident. Off-airport firefighting personnel also responded to the accident site and arrived around the 

same time as the TVC firefighter.
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the TVC firefighter told investigators that he heard several references to runway 10 on the 

radio but that such references could refer to anywhere along the length of the runway; 

he did not know where the accident was until he heard a radio transmission indicating 

“we’re on the numbers of 10.”

According to the TVC assistant airport manager, this communication difficulty 

likely occurred because the ARFF truck radio was set to automatically scan several 

frequencies, including city, airport, fire department, and police frequencies, and an offairport multiple fire alarm occurred about the time of the accident. The assistant airport 

manager stated that the scan feature on the ARFF truck has been disabled since the 

accident so that the radio remains on the TVC fire frequency unless manually switched. 

TVC also revised its airport emergency plan, adding a requirement for verification of 

communication between ARFF and TVC operations personnel when an emergency occurs 

while the TVC ATCT is closed. 

In accordance with current FAA guidance (contained in AC 150/5200-10B), the 

TVC ARFF vehicle was equipped with a forward-looking infrared (FLIR) device that was 

designed to help drivers steer the vehicle at night and in fog and to detect warm objects 

under those conditions. The ARFF firefighter stated that he used the FLIR during the 

accident response but reported that it did not help him locate the airplane because of the 

heavy snowfall and because there was no fire (heat source) to detect.

1.15.2 Airplane Egress

Postaccident interviews with the flight crew indicated that the pilots promptly 

evaluated the condition of the airplane; the captain examined the cabin and checked 

for passenger/flight attendant injuries while the first officer inspected the outside of 

the airplane. Upon examination, the pilots determined that the fuselage was intact and 

that there were no injuries. The first officer reported that he did not smell any leaking 

fuel.36 The captain told investigators that because the airplane seemed secure with no 

apparent risk of fire and because of the severe winter weather conditions (including 

heavy blowing snow) outside the airplane, he decided to follow Pinnacle’s “expeditious 

deplaning” procedures37 for deplaning. He kept the passengers on board the airplane 

until the emergency responders arrived. After the first emergency responders arrived at 

the airplane, they coordinated with the pilots and assisted with the subsequent deplaning 

and passenger transportation to the airport terminal. 

All airplane occupants exited through the left front cabin door and stairs. The 

captain and first officer stood at the bottom of the airstairs to oversee and assist with 

the egress, while the flight attendant assisted in the cabin. Postaccident interviews with 

36 A small fuel leak from the bottom of the right wing was later detected and successfully stopped by 

emergency personnel. 

37 Pinnacle’s guidance concerning expeditious deplaning states, in part, “Some emergencies or abnormal 

situations may arise that are not... ‘life-or-death’ in nature....In these situations, an ‘expeditious deplaning’ is 

conducted. Passengers and crew would exit the aircraft in an orderly manner through the normal cabin exit.” 

See section 1.17.3 for more information about these procedures.
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the flight and cabin crewmembers and emergency response personnel indicated that the 

passengers deplaned in an orderly manner and were shuttled to the airport terminal in 

police cars and ambulances. 

1.16 Tests and Research

1.16.1 Airplane Simulation and Study of Airplane Performance 

During the Accident Sequence

The Safety Board reviewed available FDR, CVR, air route surveillance radar, and 

meteorological data to study the airplane’s performance during the approach to landing 

and landing roll. The airplane’s touchdown point and location of critical FDR events 

during the landing roll were determined, and an engineering simulation was conducted 

to estimate the airplane’s braking ability (braking coefficient).38 The performance study 

showed that the accident airplane’s braking ability was more than four times worse than 

that of a normal dry runway.

The Safety Board’s study showed that, after a stabilized approach to runway 28, 

the airplane crossed the runway threshold at an airspeed of about 148 knots. The airplane 

subsequently touched down at an airspeed of 123 knots about 2,400 feet from the runway’s 

approach threshold. The calculated winds at touchdown were between 7 and 8 knots from 

030o to 035o, resulting in a calculated tailwind component of 3 knots. FDR data showed that, 

immediately after mainwheel touchdown, the spoilers deployed, and then—at nosewheel 

touchdown—the brake pressure was applied followed by thrust reverser deployment. 

As stated previously, the thrust reversers were deployed and stowed twice during 

the landing roll. The initial deployment occurred just after touchdown; after the reversers 

deployed, the engine fan speed increased from idle speed to about 45 percent. As the 

airplane decelerated through about 90 knots (with about 2,100 feet of landing distance 

remaining), the pilots stowed the thrust reversers and the engine fan speed reduced to 

idle. About 6 seconds after the pilots first stowed the thrust reversers, and as the airplane 

was decelerating with about 1,100 feet of landing distance remaining, the thrust reversers 

were again deployed. The engine fan speed rapidly increased to about 80 percent before 

the pilots stowed the reversers again. The airplane ran off the end of the runway, with 

thrust reversers stowed, at a ground speed of about 47 knots and reached the end of the 

200-foot-long runway 28 overrun pavement at a ground speed of about 45 knots.

The FDR data showed that after the initial thrust reverser deployment, the airplane 

heading changed, moving about 3° airplane nose right, relative to the runway heading. A 

left rudder deflection was then recorded, and the airplane heading realigned with the 

38 Airplane braking coefficient is defined as the ratio of the retarding force due to braking relative to 

the normal force (that is, weight minus lift) acting on the airplane. The estimated airplane braking coefficient 

incorporates the effects of the runway surface, runway contaminants, and the condition of the airplane’s 

braking system (such as antiskid system efficiency, tire pressure, and brake wear).
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runway heading. The airplane heading changed again after the second thrust reverser 

deployment, moving about 7° airplane nose right, relative to the runway heading. The 

FDR recorded another left rudder deflection, and the airplane heading moved back nose 

left. As the airplane continued to decelerate and its heading moved farther nose left, the 

FDR recorded a maximum right rudder input and subsequent deflection. However, the 

airplane heading continued to move nose left, reaching about 25° nose left of the runway 

heading as it reached the end of the runway. (After it ran off the runway, the airplane 

reached a maximum deviation from the runway heading of about 55° nose left.) 

In a December 11, 2007, memorandum to the Safety Board, Bombardier, the 

airplane manufacturer, stated that its review of the accident FDR data was consistent with 

the Safety Board’s. Bombardier’s memorandum also stated that the data showed that, 

after the thrust reversers were deployed the second time and engine fan speed increased 

to about 80 percent, “the aircraft began to turn...(to the left)...the pilot reversed the rudder 

(to the right) as the...aircraft nose left yaw increased, full right rudder eventually being 

applied, but the aircraft continued to yaw left.” According to Bombardier, “[t]his aircraft 

response would be typical of a loss of directional stability and rudder effectiveness due to 

reverser deployment [on a contaminated/slippery runway] at low airspeed in a crosswind 

from the right.”

The Bombardier memorandum further stated the following:

...techniques used by the pilot during the landing are broadly consistent 

with the advice...for landing on possibly contaminated runways; 

specifically, the pilot did restrict the use of the thrust reversers at higher 

speeds to prioritize maintaining directional control...and maintained the 

use of the thrust reversers on the second deployment below the normal 

stow speed of 60 knots as advised for an emergency...The [behavior] of the 

aircraft in these circumstances was consistent with...expectation. 

Bombardier’s memorandum concluded, in part, the following:

...above 60 knots...the aircraft can generally be controlled with aerodynamic 

controls [vertical fin and rudder] alone. Below 60 knots the rudder alone is 

generally insufficient for directional control and some differential braking 

is normally required for steering. The current aircraft limitations and 

advice to flight crews are based upon these characteristics, and when these 

are followed no handling difficulties are expected.

According to the Safety Board’s airplane performance study, an airplane similarly 

configured and landing with conditions, touchdown point, and deceleration efforts 

similar to those of the accident flight would have required an additional 1,146 feet of 

unobstructed runway to stop. 

Pinnacle’s CRJ company flight manual (CFM) contained contaminated landing 

runway length charts that are based on Bombardier-provided landing data for four types/

levels of runway contaminants: compacted snow, loose snow, standing water/slush, and 
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ice. For these charts, the landing distance was considered the distance from crossing the 

runway threshold at 50 feet agl to the point at which the airplane comes to a full stop 

under the given conditions. These conditions included the airplane’s weight and speed 

and wind conditions and assumed that both thrust reversers are operating normally. 

The Pinnacle CRJ CFM stated that the landing distance charts were based on a standard 

touchdown point within the first 1,500 feet of the runway and incorporated the 15-percent 

safety margin recommended in Safety Alert For Operators (SAFO) 06012, “Landing 

Performance Assessments at the Time of Arrival (Turbojets)” (issued August 31, 2006).

Based on the contaminated landing runway length charts in Pinnacle’s CRJ CFM, 

the Safety Board calculated the distances required for the accident airplane to come to 

a complete stop with an added 15-percent safety margin and runway contamination 

conditions of compacted snow, loose snow, standing water/slush, or ice. (Pinnacle 

Operations Specification [OpSpec] C382 requires pilots to perform a landing distance 

assessment incorporating a 15-percent safety margin when landing on a contaminated 

runway. These issues are further discussed in section 1.17.1.) Table 2 shows the calculated 

stopping margins for a Vref of 140 knots plus an 8-knot speed additive,39 a 3-knot tailwind, 

and a 15-percent safety margin, for the following runway surface contaminants: compacted 

snow, loose snow, standing water/slush, and ice. 

Table 2. Calculated stopping margins for a Vref of 140 knots plus an 8-knot speed additive, a 

3-knot tailwind, and an 15 percent safety margin, for the following runway surface contaminants: 

compacted snow, loose snow, standing water/slush, and ice.

Type of Contaminant Stopping margin relative to the runway end, with 

added 15-percent safety margin 

Compacted snow 257 feet

Loose snow -851 feet

Standing water/slush -966 feet

Ice -3,003 feet

Note: negative numbers = distance beyond the end of the runway.

The airplane performance study calculations indicated that the accident flight 

would have had a positive stopping margin with the added 15-percent safety margin for 

only the compacted snow conditions. 

1.16.2 Airplane Simulations for Various Vref Speed Additives and 

Thrust Reverser Landing Scenarios

The Safety Board conducted additional simulations to calculate hypothetical 

landing distances for alternative landing scenarios involving various Vref speed additives 

39 The contaminated runway length charts for various runway contaminants (that is, slush, compacted 

snow, etc.) allow pilots to add a landing distance penalty to increase the landing runway length required for 

each knot over the Vref speed. Each chart’s speed additive is unique. For the accident flight, the chart Vref was 

142 knots (with up to 5 knots added for gusty winds), and the airplane’s actual speed was 148 knots.
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and thrust reverser usage.40 All test cases assumed that directional control was maintained 

throughout the landing roll and assumed the accident runway conditions.41

The simulations showed that if the pilots landed using normal flight operations 

manual (FOM) procedures at the accident touchdown point and using deceleration 

devices as recorded by the accident FDR, the airplane would run off the departure end of 

the runway for all tested landing speeds. The simulations also showed that, if the airplane 

touched down within the 1,500-foot, company-designated standard touchdown zone, it 

would likely have not stopped before the end of the runway for the accident conditions. 

Likewise, the simulations showed that, if the pilots had applied and maintained full 

thrust reverser (at least 80 percent engine fan speed) deployment from touchdown until 

the airplane came to a stop (a practice permitted by Pinnacle in an emergency situation), 

and maintained directional control, the airplane would likely have stopped before the end 

of the runway for all tested landing speeds. 

1.16.3 Use of Braking Systems During Landing Roll 

The Safety Board examined FDR data from the accident landing and the previous 

landing (at MSP) to determine whether the accident pilots applied adequate brake pedal 

forces to obtain optimal braking pressures from the airplane’s braking/antiskid systems. 

The data showed that the pilots applied similar brake pedal forces during both landings. 

However, the resultant brake pressures were higher on the previous landing, which was 

made on an uncontaminated runway, than on the accident landing. Further, when the 

first officer applied additional force to the brake pedals late in the accident landing roll, 

the brake pressures did not increase. As previously discussed, the brake/antiskid system 

is designed such that the system modulates pressure to the wheel brakes in response to 

adverse runway conditions to ensure maximum braking effectiveness. 

1.17 Organizational and Management Information

Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., is based in Memphis, Tennessee. The airline was established 

in 1985 as Express Airlines I. Between 1985 and 2000, Express Airlines I operated turboprop 

airplanes only. In 2001, Express Airlines I began integrating CRJ turbojet airplanes into 

its fleet and, in 2002, changed its name to Pinnacle Airlines. By 2003, Pinnacle had phased 

out turboprop airplanes from its operations and operated CRJ turbojet airplanes only. 

At the time of the accident, Pinnacle, operating as Northwest Airlink,42 flew more than 

700 flights daily to more than 100 cities in the United States and Canada; the company 

operated a fleet of 139 CRJs and employed more than 3,700 personnel. 

40 For specific information regarding these scenarios, see “Addendum 1 to Aircraft Performance Study” 

in the docket for this accident.

41 Examination of the airplane’s FDR data and the accident runway conditions indicated that directional 

control was not assured during the accident landing.

42 At the time of the accident, Pinnacle had an agreement with NWA to operate 123 CRJs as a Northwest 

Airlink carrier. Pinnacle was also gearing up for an agreement with Delta Airlines (announced April 30, 2007) 

to operate 16 CRJs as a Delta Connection carrier. 
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1.17.1 Pinnacle Airlines’ Landing Distance Assessment Guidance 

(Operations Specification C382)

On August 31, 2006, the FAA issued SAFO 06012, which urged operators of 

turbojet airplanes to develop procedures for flight crews to assess landing distances 

based on the actual conditions at the time of arrival, and to add a safety margin of at 

least 15 percent to that distance. The nonmandatory SAFO was issued as a result of an 

urgent recommendation issued by the Safety Board in January 2006,43 and was intended 

to ensure adequate safety margins for landings on contaminated runways while the FAA 

pursued formal rulemaking addressing these areas. (These issues are further discussed in 

section 1.18.2.) 

In December 2006, Pinnacle incorporated procedures consistent with the FAA’s 

SAFO guidance on contaminated runway calculations into its OpSpec C382.44 The 

procedures outlined in OpSpec C382 stated that Pinnacle pilots were to “assess the 

landing performance at time of arrival” accounting for, among other things, the “most 

adverse expected conditions” for the landing runway. OpSpec C382 specified that this 

landing distance assessment must be accomplished “...as close as practicable to the 

time of arrival consistent with the ability to obtain the most current meteorological and 

runway conditions considering pilot workload and traffic surveillance, but no later than 

the commencement of the approach procedure or visual approach pattern” and that all 

arrival landing distances will be increased by at least an additional 15 percent for all 

runway conditions.

SAFO 06012, Section 3g also provides the following guidance for training flight 

crews on landing distance assessment procedures, stating that all flight crewmembers 

should be made aware of the procedures:

...in a manner consistent with the operator’s methods for conveying 

similar knowledge to flight operations personnel. It may be conducted 

via operations/training bulletins or extended learning systems...all flight 

crewmembers should have hands on training and validate proficiency in 

these procedures during their next flight training event.

According to Pinnacle’s CRJ program manager, in conjunction with the 

incorporation of OpSpec C382, the company provided its CRJ pilots with landing distance 

calculation charts in revisions to the CRJ CFM and guidance regarding the use of those 

43 SAFO 06012 was issued in response to Safety Recommendation A-06-16, which was issued as a 

result of the Safety Board’s investigation of the December 2005 accident involving Southwest Airlines flight 

1248, a 737 that ran off the end of a snow-contaminated runway. For additional information, see National 

Transportation Safety Board, Runway Overrun and Collision, Southwest Airlines Flight 1248, Boeing 737-7H4, 

N471WN, Chicago, Illinois, December 8, 2005, Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-07/06 (Washington, DC: 

NTSB, 2007).

44 Pinnacle’s OpSpec C382 is attached in appendix C to this report.
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charts. In response to postaccident questions from the Safety Board, the CRJ program 

manager stated the following, in part: 

Pinnacle Airlines crews perform a runway assessment prior to every 

landing. Runway landing numbers for the conditions expected are always 

requested before initiating an approach. Crews are taught to use the SAFO 

charts provided as a tool in [their] decision process whenever there is a 

contaminant on a runway. The presence of a MU value reinforces the fact 

that there is some [contaminant] on a runway. The MU value given will give 

a crew additional information on which to base [a] landing decision. I have 

recently been made aware of a belief among some pilots/dispatchers that 

40+ MU equates to a clean runway. This is not taught....pilots are taught to 

evaluate all available information and use the charts accordingly. 

...Pilots must always apply their experience and judgment to their 

surroundings. The type of contaminant and any braking action reports will 

play into the pilot-in-command’s decision.

Although Pinnacle had incorporated an arrival landing distance assessment 

requirement consistent with SAFO 06012 into its procedures about 4 months before the 

accident, the accident pilots did not perform an arrival landing distance assessment before 

the accident landing. The captain told investigators that he reviewed Pinnacle’s landing 

distance assessment procedures with the first officer during an earlier leg of the trip 

sequence but did not perform landing distance calculations before the approach to TVC. 

During postaccident interviews, the captain told investigators that he obtained 

landing data from the company but did not refer to the landing distance charts to do a 

landing distance calculation.45 He stated that he believed the runway conditions were okay 

based on the contamination depth, and he indicated that because he had been based at 

MSP for 3 1/2 years, he had landed on snowy runways many times. The captain estimated 

that, based on a planned touchdown zone of 1,000 to 1,500 feet down the runway and 

an expected 2,500-to-3,000-foot stopping distance on the runway, the airplane could be 

stopped using about 3,500 to 4,500 feet of the available 6,501-foot-long runway. The first 

officer stated that he thought that pilots were required to (and should) check landing 

distances with a contaminated runway. He said that he believed 4,000 feet was the required 

landing distance, but he stated that they did not check the landing distance charts before 

the approach to TVC. 

45 The captain told investigators that Pinnacle’s policies called for both ACARS transmission of landing 

data based on expected field conditions and pilot performance of manual chart calculations “when you receive 

a contaminated report.” He stated that during the flight between DSM and MSP on the day of the accident he 

showed the first officer how to use the contaminated landing and takeoff charts. However, he indicated that 

they did not perform pertinent landing distance calculations because “all legs [that day] had very light snow 

and all braking action reports made that day, including TVC, were 40 MU or better.” 
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1.17.2 Pinnacle Airlines Guidance for Landing and Thrust Reverser 

Usage 

According to Pinnacle’s CRJ CFM, chapter 10, “Maneuvers and Profiles,” the 

CRJ should be configured with 45° of flaps and landing gear extended as the airplane 

approaches the runway. The airplane should cross the runway’s approach threshold at 

50 feet agl at the appropriate Vref for its weight (based on charts) and touchdown within 

1,000 to 1,500 feet of that threshold. Chapter 8 of Pinnacle’s FOM, “Flight Operations,” 

further states, “Normally, all landings touch down within the first 1,500 feet of available 

runway...[i]f a touchdown cannot be made within the Runway Touchdown Zone” (first 

3,000 feet or first third of available runway, whichever is less) a go-around is normally 

executed.” In the event of gusty winds, company guidance allowed pilots to add up to 

5 knots of additional airspeed to the Vref speed. Chapter 10 of the CFM further states: 

At touchdown, the ground spoilers should deploy automatically...The 

nose wheel is gently lowered onto the runway and thrust reversers are 

deployed. Wheel braking is to be smoothly applied by steadily increasing 

pedal pressure, adjusting for runway conditions and length available.

Note: Do not wait for thrust reverser deployment before braking.

Reverse thrust reduces the airplane stopping distance more efficiently than 

using brakes alone and is most effective at high speeds. 

Raise the thrust levers to the interlock/deploy position...after reverser 

interlocks release...the reverse levers can be raised as required.

At 80 knots, start reducing reverse thrust. Idle reverse power is established 

by 60 knots. 

Note: During landing, application of maximum reverse thrust is not 

permitted...below 60 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS). Below 60 KIAS, 

reverse thrust must be reduced to idle (not above 30 [percent] N1). If reverse 

thrust above idle reverse is used at speeds less than 60 KIAS, foreign object 

damage to the engines may occur.

Pinnacle’s CRJ CFM, chapter 7, “Adverse Weather,” states that thrust reversers 

are most effective at high speed; however, when landing in a crosswind, directional 

control may be degraded when using full thrust reversers especially on a contaminated 

runway. (Bombardier, the CRJ manufacturer, also cautions about thrust reverser use on 

contaminated runways and/or in crosswind conditions.46) Pinnacle’s guidance also states 

that skidding and hydroplaning should be anticipated and pilots should be prepared to 

“reduce reverse thrust to idle reverse and, if necessary...to idle forward thrust” to recover 

46 Similar thrust reverser information was included in McDonnell Douglas DC-9/MD-82 manuals, as 

discussed in the Safety Board’s report on the June 1999 accident at Little Rock, Arkansas. For additional 

information, see National Transportation Safety Board, Runway Overrun During Landing, American Airlines 

Flight 1420, McDonnell Douglas MD-82, N215AA, Little Rock, Arkansas, June 1, 1999, Aircraft Accident 

Report NTSB/AAR-01/02 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 2001).
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from a skid. Pinnacle’s CRJ CFM further states that maximum reverse thrust may be used 

to a complete stop in an emergency situation. 

According to Pinnacle’s CRJ CFM, chapter 3, “Limitations,” the maximum depth 

of contaminant for landing on a runway with wet snow covering an appreciable part of 

the runway surface is 1 1/2 inches. Also, Pinnacle’s CRJ CFM states that the maximum 

tailwind component approved for landing is 10 knots and the maximum allowable 

crosswind component for landings on a contaminated runway is 15 knots.

Pinnacle’s guidance further states that pilots should request a current runway or 

braking action report any time the weather conditions might be conducive to deteriorated 

braking performance/runway surface conditions, allowing at least 15 minutes for airport/

ground officials to gather and report the requested information. Further, according to 

Pinnacle’s guidance, whenever braking action is reported as nil by a 14 CFR Part 121 air 

carrier, airport operations vehicle, or company vehicle, all operations should be suspended 

on that surface (unless a greater emergency exists).47

1.17.3 Pinnacle Airlines Expeditious Deplaning Guidance

Pinnacle’s FOM and flight attendant manuals contain guidance regarding a 

procedural alternative to emergency evacuation known as “expeditious deplaning.” This 

guidance states the following: 

Some emergencies or abnormal situations may arise that are not time-critical, 

“life-or-death” in nature....In these situations, an “expeditious deplaning” 

is conducted. Passengers and crew would exit the aircraft in an orderly 

manner through the normal cabin exit. In this case, the pilot-in-command 

would do the normal shutdown checklist. An emergency evacuation 

checklist would not be accomplished since you are not “evacuating.” After 

deplaning, gather the passengers together at a common location away from 

the aircraft.

In considering if an expeditious deplaning is warranted, the crews evaluate 

all aspects including weather, outside temperature, location on the airfield, 

etc. Remember, removing the passengers from the aircraft may impose 

greater hazards on them than allowing them to remain on board. 

1.17.4 Recent Pinnacle Airlines Safety-Related Actions

In 2004, Pinnacle Airlines experienced a fatal accident for which the Safety Board 

determined that the probable cause included “the pilots’ unprofessional behavior, 

47 This guidance was consistent with information contained in SAFO 06012. For example, one SAFO 

note stated, “[c]onditions specified as ‘nil’ braking action are not considered safe, therefore operations under 

conditions specified as such should not be conducted. Do not attempt to operate on surfaces reported or 

expected to have nil braking action.” Also, one table in the SAFO indicates that “landing is prohibited” when 

nil braking action is evident.
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deviation from standard operating procedures, and poor airmanship, which resulted in 

an in-flight emergency from which they were unable to recover, in part because of the 

pilots’ inadequate training.”48 In partial response to that accident (and consistent with 

Safety Board recommendations), Pinnacle subsequently instituted an aviation safety 

action program (ASAP) and flight operational quality assurance (FOQA) program to 

monitor and address in-flight safety issues. According to the company vice president of 

safety, Pinnacle Airlines was one of only two regional carriers in the United States to have 

implemented both ASAP and FOQA programs at the time of the TVC accident. 

Pinnacle Airlines had also hired a new senior management team in the 2 years 

before this accident that had instituted programs to increase safety and improve pilot 

morale. The company safety department, whose director reported directly to the company 

chief executive officer, had recently instituted FOQA, ASAP, internal evaluation programs, 

and risk management processes. The FAA principal operations inspector (POI) assigned 

to Pinnacle indicated that relations between the company and the FAA were positive and 

had improved dramatically with the hiring of the new management team.

1.17.4.1 Postaccident Procedural/Operational Changes 

As a result of the TVC accident, Pinnacle revised its operational procedures, 

guidance, and training for pilots and dispatchers as follows: 

• Amended the landing technique outlined in the CFM to specify that pilots 

should fly the approach from a point at least 3 miles out to the runway threshold 

at Vref. Pinnacle’s FOM requires all airplanes to be fully configured for landing, 

at the proper speed, and on the required flight track for landing by 1,000 feet 

agl. 

• Retained existing FOM guidance reflecting Pinnacle’s standard touchdown 

zone (within the first 1,000 to 1,500 feet of the runway) and added FOM 

guidance indicating that if a touchdown cannot be made within the first 1,000 

to 1,500 feet of the runway, pilots should go-around.

• Increased pilot training regarding landing distance assessments, use of 

performance charts incorporating an extra 15-percent safety margin, and most 

effective use of brakes and thrust reversers for stopping the CRJ. 

• Established a policy limiting check airmen performing OE training to 14-hour 

duty days. 

• Developed new winter airport operations procedures to mitigate the risks 

involved in landing at airports that were identified by the company as having 

more potential hazards during winter operations (based on runway length, 

climate, snowfall amount, airport elevation, and accident/incident history). 

48 For more information, see National Transportation Safety Board, Aviation Accident Report, Crash of 

Pinnacle Airlines Flight 3701, Bombardier CL-600-2B19, N8396A, Jefferson City, Missouri, October 14, 2004,

Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-07/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 2007).
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The new procedures established the following constraints for landings on 

contaminated runways: 

No tailwind landings allowed;

Vertical guidance required for the approach;

Thrust reversers and other ground lift dumping devices must be 

operational;

Captains perform all landings;

Crew must have runway friction or braking action reports that reflect 

existing conditions; and 

Reports must reflect at least fair braking action. 

1.17.4.2 Postaccident Staffing/Scheduling/Training Changes 

Pinnacle representatives indicated that, at the time of the TVC accident, the 

company was experiencing difficulties related to pilot turnover and staffing issues. They 

reported that the company was losing about one pilot per day and was hiring younger 

pilots with less experience than in the past. Pinnacle was addressing these difficulties by: 

1) developing cooperative programs with pilot training centers; 2) adapting the company’s 

training procedures to less experienced pilots; and 3) initiating procedures to help address 

scheduling pressure. 

Additionally, Pinnacle representatives told investigators that the company was 

evaluating methods of reducing the potential for pilot fatigue49 and for providing food 

to pilots who miss regular meals because of operational issues. In addition, Pinnacle’s 

subsequent submission on this accident stated, “Pinnacle continues to look for ways to help 

reduce the possibility of fatigue” and reemphasized that check airmen performing OE are 

limited to 14-hour duty days. Subsequent correspondence from Pinnacle representatives 

indicates that check airmen performing OE are now also limited to 8 hours of “actual,” not 

“scheduled,” flight time per day. 

1.18 Additional Information

1.18.1 Fatigue-Related Information50

Research has shown that long duty days can be associated with pilot fatigue and 

degraded performance. Aviation accident data show that human-performance-related 

49 When asked whether pilot fatigue was a problem at Pinnacle, the FAA POI estimated that 60 to 

70 percent of Pinnacle pilots who voluntarily submitted event reports through the company’s ASAP cited 

fatigue as a factor in the events. In addition, several of the company pilots interviewed during this investigation 

indicated that company schedules could be exhausting.

50 The Safety Board has long been concerned about operator fatigue in transportation and has issued 

115 human fatigue-related safety recommendations for all modes of transportation since 1972. Additionally, 

the Board has included human fatigue in transport operations on its annual Most Wanted List of Transportation 

Safety Improvements since the list’s inception in 1990.
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airline accidents are more likely to happen when pilots work long days. The Board’s 

1994 study of flight-crew-related major aviation accidents51 found that captains who had 

been awake for more than about 12 hours made significantly more errors than those who 

had been awake for fewer than 12 hours. Such errors included failing to recognize and 

discontinue a flawed approach; pilots often exhibited a tendency to continue the approach 

despite increasing evidence that it should be discontinued. Additionally, accident 

data showed that pilots flying schedules that involved 13 or more hours of duty time 

had accident rates several times higher than pilots flying schedules with shorter duty 

days.52 Research and accident history also show that fatigue can cause pilots to make 

risky, impulsive decisions; become fixated on one aspect of a situation; and react slowly 

to warnings or signs—any of which can result in an approach being continued despite 

evidence that it should be discontinued.53 Additionally, research shows that people who 

are fatigued become less able to consider options and are more likely to become fixated on 

a course of action or a desired outcome.54

According to current FAA regulations, a two-person flight crew engaged in 

scheduled, domestic operations (such as the accident flight crew) would be limited to 

8 scheduled flight hours between required rest periods. (At the time of the accident, the 

pilots had flown 8.35 hours; however, Federal regulations permit, within limits, flight 

times that exceed the flight hour cap because of “circumstances beyond the [operator’s] 

control...such as adverse weather conditions.”) However, these regulations do not take 

into consideration the starting time of day, the length of the duty day, the number of flight 

segments, weather conditions, or other factors that might affect a pilot’s workload or the 

pilot’s fatigue.

The Safety Board has previously noted that the aviation regulatory authorities of 

Great Britain have adopted flight and duty time regulations that take into consideration a 

pilot’s starting time and number of flight legs, as well as the total duty time.55 Despite the 

51 For additional information, see National Transportation Safety Board, A Review of Flightcrew-Involved 

Major Accidents of U.S. Carriers, 1978 through 1990. Safety Study NTSB/SS-94/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 

1994).

52 See J.H. Goode, 2003, “Are Pilots at Risk of Accidents Due to Fatigue?” Journal of Safety Research, 

34, pp. 309-313.

53 See M. R. Rosekind, K. B. Gregory, D. L. Miller, E. L. Co, J. V. Lebacqz, M. Brenner paper. 2005. 

Evaluating Fatigue Factors in Accident Investigations: Description and Application of a Structured Approach.

Special Supplement of Aviation, Space Environmental Medicine, in preparation. For additional fatigue-related 

information, see a) National Transportation Safety Board, Evaluation of U.S. Department of Transportation 

Efforts in the 1990s to Address Operator Fatigue, Safety Report NTSB/SR-99/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 

1999); b) National Transportation Safety Board, Uncontrolled Collision With Terrain, American International 

Airways Flight 808, Douglas DC-8-61, N814CK, U.S. Naval Air Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, August 18, 

1993, Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-94/04 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 1994); c) National Transportation 

Safety Board, Controlled Flight into Terrain, Korean Air Flight 801, Boeing 747-300, HL7468, Nimitz Hill, Guam, 

August 6, 1997, Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-00/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 2000); and d) National 

Transportation Safety Board, Runway Overrun During Landing, American Airlines Flight 1420, McDonnell 

Douglas MD-82, N215AA, Little Rock, Arkansas, June 1, 1999, Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-01/02 

(Washington, DC: NTSB, 2001).

54 J.A. Caldwell, 1997. “Fatigue in the aviation environment: an overview of the causes and effect as well 

as recommended countermeasures.” Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, 68, pp. 932-938. 

55 See Civil Aviation Authority of Great Britain (2004), The Avoidance of Fatigue in Aircrews: Guide to 

Requirements. Gatwick, England, CAP 371 (Section B, page 9).
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Board’s repeated efforts urging the FAA to revise and update the established Federal pilot 

flight and duty time regulations to reflect more recent research findings in fatigue and 

sleep issues, there have been no significant changes to those regulations since the Federal 

Aviation Regulations were recodified in 1964. 

The FAA has participated with other transportation modal administrations in a 

Department of Transportation (DOT) Human Factors Coordinating Committee, which was 

established in 1991, which led the DOT’s Operator Fatigue Management Program effort to 

develop practical tools for use by individuals and industries to better maintain vigilance 

and alertness on the job. This effort has resulted in several products that could potentially 

help companies and individuals to reduce fatigue-related problems in transportation, 

including: 1) a practical guide addressing fatigue management and countermeasure usage; 

2) fatigue modeling software tailored for transportation applications; and 3) work schedule 

representation and analysis software to aid managers and schedulers in evaluating and 

designing work schedules. According to DOT and industry personnel, although the 

Federal Railroad Administration has tested and incorporated some of these tools in the 

railroad industry,56 the FAA has not yet applied them in the aviation industry.

In its 2008 annual report to Congress regarding the Safety Board’s Most Wanted 

List of Transportation Safety Improvements, the DOT indicated that the FAA is currently 

considering amendments to existing 14 CFR Part 135 pilot flight and duty time regulations. 

Additionally, the FAA is working with the International Civil Aviation Organization to 

develop a fatigue risk management system to regulate flight and duty time management 

to improve flight crew alertness. 

Because the FAA had not taken acceptable action regarding this issue, the Safety 

Board issued Safety Recommendation A-06-10 in February 2006 in connection with its 

investigation of the October 19, 2004, accident involving Corporate Airlines flight 5966.57

Safety Recommendation A-06-10 superseded Safety Recommendation A-99-4558 (then 

classified, “Open—Unacceptable Response”) and asked the FAA to do the following:

Modify and simplify the flight crew hours-of-service regulations to take into 

consideration factors such as length of duty day, starting time, workload, 

and other factors shown by recent research, scientific evidence, and current 

industry experience to affect crew alertness.

56 For additional information, see Federal Railroad Administration, Validation and Calibration of a Fatigue 

Assessment Tool for Railroad Work Schedules, Summary Report DOT/FRA/ORD-06/21 (Washington, DC: 

DOT, 2006).

57 The Board also issued Safety Recommendation A-06-11 as a result of this accident. Safety 

Recommendation A-06-11 asked the FAA to require Part 121 and 135 operators to incorporate fatigue-related 

information similar to that being developed by the Department of Transportation Operator Fatigue Management 

Program into their initial and recurrent training programs; such training should address the detrimental effects 

of fatigue and include strategies for avoiding fatigue and countering its effects. For additional information, see 

National Transportation Safety Board, Collision with Trees and Crash Short of the Runway, Corporate Airlines 

Flight 5966, BAE Systems BAE-J3201, N875JX, Kirksville, Missouri, October 19, 2004, Aircraft Accident 

Report NTSB/AAR-06/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 2006).

58 Safety Recommendation A-99-45 asked the FAA to “establish within 2 years scientifically based hoursof-service regulations that set limits on hours of service, provide predictable work and rest schedules, and 

consider circadian rhythms and human sleep and rest requirements.”
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The FAA’s May 31, 2006, response to this recommendation did not describe any 

plans for addressing flight hours-of-service and fatigue issues in Part 121 operations; 

therefore, in November 2006, the Safety Board classified Safety Recommendation A-06-10 

as “Open—Unacceptable Response.” 

Although the Safety Board considers hours-of-service regulations to be essential, 

the Board also recognizes that the development and implementation of fatigue risk 

management systems is useful in mitigating fatigue-related events. The Board issued two 

related safety recommendations on June 10, 2008. Safety Recommendations A-08-44 and 

-45 asked the FAA to do the following: 

Develop guidance, based on empirical and scientific evidence, for operators 

to establish fatigue management systems, including information about the 

content and implementation of these systems. (A-08-44)59

Develop and use a methodology that will continually assess the effectiveness 

of fatigue management systems implemented by operators, including their 

ability to improve sleep and alertness, mitigate performance errors, and 

prevent incidents and accidents. (A-08-45)

The FAA has scheduled a forum on the subject of fatigue for June 17 to 19, 2008.

1.18.2 Previously Issued Safety Recommendations 

1.18.2.1 Landing Distance Assessment

Among the recommendations issued as a result of the Safety Board’s investigation 

of the Southwest Airlines flight 1248 accident60 were Safety Recommendations A-07-57 

and -61. Safety Recommendation A-07-61 was issued on October 16, 2007, and asked the 

FAA to do the following: 

Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K[61] 

operators to accomplish arrival landing distance assessments before 

every landing based on a standardized methodology involving approved 

performance data, actual arrival conditions, a means of correlating the 

airplane’s braking ability with runway surface conditions using the most 

conservative interpretation available, and including a minimum safety 

margin of 15 percent. 

59 Safety Recommendation A-08-44 superseded Safety Recommendation A-06-11, which was 

classified “Closed—Acceptable Action/Superseded.” For further information, see <http://www.ntsb.gov/

Recs/letters/2008/A08_44_45.pdf> on the Safety Board’s website.

60 For additional information, see National Transportation Safety Board, Runway Overrun and Collision, 

Southwest Airlines Flight 1248, Boeing 737-7H4, N471WN, Chicago, Illinois, December 8, 2005, Aircraft 

Accident Report NTSB/AAR-07/06 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 2007).

61 Title 14 CFR Part 91 subpart K applies to fractional ownership operations. 
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The Safety Board recognized that the standardized methodology recommended 

in Safety Recommendation A-07-61 would take time to develop and issued Safety 

Recommendation A-07-57 as an urgent action, asking the FAA to do the following until 

such a standardized methodology could be developed: 

Immediately require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91 

subpart K operators to conduct arrival landing distance assessments before 

every landing based on existing performance data, actual conditions, and 

incorporating a minimum safety margin of 15 percent. (Urgent)

Because the intent of this recommendation was to restore safety margins for landing 

on contaminated runways, similar to urgent Safety Recommendation A-06-16 (which was 

issued on January 27, 2006, and was classified “Open—Unacceptable Response” on May 8, 

2007),62 the Safety Board classified A-06-16 “Closed—Unacceptable Action/Superseded.” 

Safety Recommendation A-07-57 maintained the previous recommendation’s classification 

of “Open—Unacceptable Response” because the Safety Board believed that the FAA has 

had adequate time to require landing distance assessments and implement a landing 

distance safety margin but had not yet done so. In November 2007, the Safety Board 

added the need for landing distance assessments with an adequate safety margin for 

every landing to its Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements. 

The FAA responded to Safety Recommendation A-07-57 on December 17, 2007, 

and A-07-61 on January 8, 2008. For both recommendations, the FAA stated that a survey 

of Part 121 operators indicated that 92 percent of U.S. airline passengers are now being 

carried by air carriers in full or partial compliance with the practices recommended in 

SAFO 06012. The FAA also stated that its POIs would continue to encourage their assigned 

air carriers to incorporate the SAFO elements in their procedures but did not describe 

the actions that it would take to encourage those operators that have not complied with 

the SAFO (as was noted during the investigation of the February 2007 Shuttle America 

accident at Cleveland, Ohio63) to do so. Because all operators have not fully complied with 

SAFO 06012 and rulemaking that requires arrival landing distance assessments with a 

15-percent minimum safety margin has not been implemented, Safety Recommendation 

A-07-57 (Urgent) remains classified “Open—Unacceptable Response.” 

The FAA further indicated that, on December 6, 2007, it announced the formation 

of an aviation rulemaking committee (ARC) to review regulations affecting certification 

and operation of airplanes and airports for airplane takeoff and landing operations on 

contaminated runways. The ARC kickoff meetings occurred on March 27 to 28, 2008. ARC 

subgroups are to provide their recommendations to the FAA by March 1, 2009. Pending 

the prompt completion of the aviation rulemaking committee’s work and the FAA’s 

62 Urgent Safety Recommendation A-06-16 asked the FAA to “immediately prohibit all 14 Code of Federal 

Regulations Part 121 operators from using the reverse thrust credit in landing performance calculations.”

63 For additional information, see National Transportation Safety Board, Runway Overrun During 

Landing, Shuttle America, Inc., doing business as Delta Connection Flight 6448, Embraer ERJ-170, N862RW, 

Cleveland, Ohio, February 18, 2007, Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-08/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 

2008).
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timely action in response to the committee’s recommendations, the Board classified Safety 

Recommendation A-07-61 “Open—Acceptable Response” in April 2008.

1.18.2.2 Standardized Phraseology

Also as a result of the Southwest Airlines flight 1248 accident, the Safety Board 

issued Safety Recommendation A-07-62, which asked the FAA to do the following: 

Develop and issue formal guidance regarding standards and guidelines for 

the development, delivery, and interpretation of runway surface condition 

reports.

The FAA responded to Safety Recommendation A-07-62 on January 8, 2008, stating 

that the ARC (development of which was announced by the FAA on December 6, 2007) 

would also provide the FAA with advice and recommendations regarding “establishment 

of standards for runway surface condition reporting and minimum surface conditions 

for continued operations.” Pending the FAA taking the recommended actions, the Safety 

Board classified Safety Recommendation A-07-62 “Open—Acceptable Response” on 

June 12, 2008.

1.18.2.3 Crash Detection and Location Technology

As a result of the June 1, 1999, accident at Little Rock, Arkansas, the Safety Board 

issued Safety Recommendation A-01-66, which asked the FAA to do the following: 

Evaluate crash detection and location technologies, select the most 

promising candidate(s) for ensuring that emergency responders could 

expeditiously arrive at an accident scene, and implement a requirement to 

install and use the equipment. 

The FAA’s February 19, 2002, response letter to the Safety Board cited guidance 

contained in AC 150/5220-10B, “Guide Specification for Water/Foam Aircraft Rescue 

and Firefighting Vehicles,” which dictates that “all new vehicles carrying 1,000 gallons 

or more of water and purchased with Federal funds” be equipped with FLIR equipment 

to allow ARFF vehicle drivers to maneuver in reduced visibility and “to locate, within 

certain limits, a specific object like an aircraft.” The FAA Administrator further stated the 

following: 

...between the [FLIR] system capabilities and the emergency response 

coordination with tower controllers, emergency responders are able 

to respond quickly to virtually every recent on-airport accident or 

incident. I believe that the FAA has addressed the full intent of this safety 

recommendation, and I consider the FAA’s action to be complete.

In its October 17, 2002, response, the Safety Board stated that the intent of 

its recommendation was broader than the FAA’s interpretation, indicating that the 

recommendation asks the FAA to evaluate technology that would aid ARFF personnel 
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in “detecting and locating a crashed airplane in situations regardless of the weather or 

visibility.” The Board acknowledged that installation of FLIR devices was a positive step; 

however, the Board cited several accidents in which it believed that “FLIR would have 

been of little value in speeding the emergency response.” The Board again asked the 

FAA to evaluate crash detection and location technology; pending such an evaluation 

and implementation of a requirement for such equipment, the Board classified Safety 

Recommendation A-01-66 “Open—Unacceptable Response.” 
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2. Analysis

2.1 General

The pilots were properly certificated and qualified under Federal regulations and 

Pinnacle Airlines training requirements. No evidence indicated any medical conditions 

that might have adversely affected the pilots’ performance during the accident flight.

The accident airplane was properly certificated and was equipped and maintained 

in accordance with industry practices and was within weight and center of gravity 

limits. 

The investigation revealed no evidence of any failure or anomaly of the airplane’s 

powerplants, structures, or systems (including the airplane’s deceleration devices, such 

as brakes, antiskid devices, and thrust reversers) that would have affected the airplane’s 

performance during the accident landing. Although the airplane performance study 

showed that the airplane’s braking during the accident landing was less effective than 

during previous landings, the investigation indicated that the reduced effectiveness was 

likely the result of the antiskid system’s normal modulation of the output brake force 

on the contaminated runway. Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that, based on the 

system designs and runway conditions, it is likely that the airplane’s braking and antiskid 

systems were performing to their maximum effectiveness.

Although, at its original departure time, Pinnacle dispatchers could not dispatch 

the accident flight because of strong winds in the TVC forecast, an amended forecast 

issued by NWA’s meteorology department (and reflected in a subsequent NWS-issued 

forecast) predicted more favorable wind conditions (as well as higher ceilings and 

improved visibility in light snow) at TVC and thus met the required criteria for the flight’s 

dispatch. 

The services provided by MSP ARTCC were in accordance with all FAA directives. 

Separation, instrument approach vectoring and clearance, and additional services were 

all complete and correct. The flight arrived after the TVC ATCT had closed for the night; 

however, the pilots required no ATC traffic information or separation services because 

there was no other traffic in the area at the time of arrival (records indicate that the most 

recent traffic in the area was about 3 hours earlier). The Safety Board concludes that the 

services provided by the ATC system did not affect the outcome of the flight. Information 

commonly provided by ATC (for example, weather and runway surface condition reports) 

was available to the flight crew, and its availability was unaffected by the ATCT’s closure 

before the flight’s arrival at TVC.

TVC airport operations personnel performed and completed snow removal and 

deicing operations based on the accident airplane’s revised estimated arrival time of 0037. 

Friction measurements completed on runway 28 after those operations (about 15 minutes 
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before the airplane touched down, as prescribed in the airport snow removal plan) were 

better than .40 MU. However, moderate-to-heavy snow fell after the snow removal 

operations were completed, and the runway conditions deteriorated. Ground personnel 

estimated that the snow depth had increased to nearly 1/2 inch before the airplane landed. 

Based on the airport’s snow and ice control plan, this depth of accumulation nearly, but did 

not quite, reach the 1/2-inch level needed to trigger additional snow removal activities. 

Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that TVC’s snow removal operations and runway 

surface condition assessment activities were conducted in accordance with the airport’s 

FAA-approved snow and ice control plan. 

Postaccident interviews and documentation indicated that after the airplane 

came to a stop, the captain evaluated its condition and considered various methods of 

deplaning the passengers. The captain recognized that if he commanded an immediate 

emergency evacuation, the passengers would be safely away from the airplane; however, 

they would have been exposed to severe winter weather conditions at night. Because the 

pilots’ postaccident evaluation of the airplane (which included an external inspection) 

revealed no indication of fire risk, the captain elected to follow Pinnacle’s “expeditious 

deplaning” procedures. He kept the passengers on board the airplane until emergency 

response/transport personnel arrived at the airplane. Postaccident reports indicate that 

the resultant egress through the left front cabin door and stairs was orderly; there were no 

injuries reported. The Safety Board concludes that, considering the severe winter weather 

and the relatively intact condition of the airplane, the captain’s decision to deplane the 

passengers using Pinnacle’s “expeditious deplaning” procedures was appropriate. 

2.1.1 Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting Crash Detection

The TVC ARFF responder reported that, although he heard that the accident 

site was somewhere along runway 10/28, he initially had difficulty determining the 

airplane’s location along the length of that runway, despite his use of FLIR equipment, 

in part because of snow-restricted visibilities. Additionally, the ARFF vehicle radio was 

set to scan emergency radio frequencies, and transmissions about a concurrent, unrelated 

off-airport fire resulted in congestion on those radio frequencies, making it difficult for 

the ARFF responder to obtain clarifying information. (The investigation revealed that 

TVC personnel promptly addressed this frequency congestion issue after the accident.) 

The ARFF responder was able to drive directly to the accident site after he heard a radio 

transmission stating, “we’re on the numbers of 10,” and arrived at the site about 7 minutes 

after he was alerted to the accident. The Safety Board concludes that, although there were 

no reported injuries resulting from this accident, had a postaccident fire occurred, the 

delay in ARFF response could have adversely affected the safety of passengers after the 

accident. The Safety Board further concludes that the FLIR equipment installed in the 

ARFF vehicle did not help the firefighter locate the accident airplane; however, improved 

crash detection and location equipment would likely have facilitated a more timely ARFF 

response. Therefore, the Safety Board reiterates Safety Recommendation A-01-66. 
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2.1.2 Postaccident Alcohol Testing

Title 14 CFR Part 121 Appendix J, Section B1 states that a decision to forgo 

the administration of a postaccident alcohol test “shall be based on the employer’s 

determination, using the best available information at the time of the determination, that 

the covered employee’s performance could not have contributed to the accident.” The 

Safety Board is not aware of any information at the time of the accident that would have 

precluded alcohol testing. Pinnacle did conduct drug tests for the pilots 3 hours after the 

accident and both pilots tested negative for illicit drugs, but the pilots were not tested 

for alcohol. Although there is no reason to believe their performance was affected by 

alcohol, the failure of the airline to perform required postaccident alcohol tests prevents a 

definitive statement on the issue. Even though there was some uncertainty as to whether 

the runway overrun was an accident or an incident, it would have been prudent for 

Pinnacle to comply with the drug and alcohol testing regulations as if the overrun were 

to be classified as an accident.

After another recent accident,64 pilots tested negative for alcohol and drugs. 

However, the alcohol testing was delayed until about 3 hours after the accident and 

no records stating the reasons for the delay were prepared by the air carrier—Shuttle 

America—(as required by 14 CFR Part 121 Appendix J) nor were such records requested 

by an FAA representative. 

Timely testing for alcohol after an accident is necessary to evaluate any safety 

factors related to alcohol impairment or to eliminate them from further consideration. 

Although there was no evidence that alcohol was a factor in either recent accident, it 

cannot be conclusively ruled out; further, there is evidence that administration of required 

testing was not conducted or enforced strictly. Therefore, the Safety Board believes that 

the FAA should emphasize with POIs the importance of conducting timely postaccident 

drug and alcohol testing.

The safety issues discussed in this analysis include the pilots’ actions and decisionmaking during the approach, landing, and landing roll; pilot fatigue and line check airman 

duty time regulations; weather and field condition information and ground operations 

personnel communications; and criteria for runway closures in snow and ice conditions.

2.2 Pilot Performance, Actions, and Decision-Making 

During the Flight

During its investigation, the Safety Board evaluated the pilots’ actions and decisions 

during the flight, including their decision to land at TVC, their awareness of/attention 

to the weather conditions at TVC, and their actions during the landing roll. The Safety 

Board’s review of CVR evidence indicated that, consistent with the captain’s performing 

64 National Transportation Safety Board, Runway Overrun During Landing, Shuttle America, Inc., doing 

business as Delta Connection Flight 6448, Embraer ERJ-170, N862RW, Cleveland, Ohio, February 18, 2007,

Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-08/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 2008).
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OE duties, the pilots’ conversation during the flight largely focused on operational and 

procedural issues, including the inclement weather (snow and strong winds). Postaccident 

interviews and CVR evidence showed that the pilots had been operating in inclement 

weather conditions with snow, wind, and turbulence all day and expected to encounter 

similar weather conditions at TVC. The pilots received updated weather information from 

the company via ACARS about 45 minutes before landing. This updated information 

indicated that the winds at TVC were still favorable for landing, and the captain advised 

the passengers that “it looks like we’re gonna have no problems gettin’ in [to TVC] this 

evening.” 

2.2.1 Pilot Actions and Decision-Making During the Approach

2.2.1.1 Landing Distance Assessments

CVR and postaccident interview evidence indicated that the pilots’ concerns 

during the flight appeared to be primarily related to the TVC wind conditions, perhaps 

because that was the critical factor in the airplane’s dispatch. Although the CVR recorded 

the captain mentioning the possibility of diverting to DTW late in the approach (about 

1 minute before touchdown), the pilots exhibited limited concern regarding the runway 

surface condition.

About 37 minutes before they landed, the pilots listened to the TVC ASOS broadcast 

for updated weather information and runway surface condition information. This ASOS 

information indicated winds out of 040o at 7 knots and visibilities of 11/2miles in light snow. 

This was the only TVC ASOS broadcast the pilots listened to before their arrival at TVC. 

However, TVC ground operations personnel provided the pilots with updated weather 

and runway surface condition information on several occasions as the airplane neared 

the airport. Evidence indicates that the runway surface conditions at TVC deteriorated 

further because of increasing snowfall during the last 15 minutes of the accident flight. 

The TVC airport operations supervisor provided runway surface condition information 

to the accident pilots both before (“forty plus MU”65 with “thin wet snow over patchy thin 

ice”) and during the vectoring stages of the approach (for example, “it’s comin’ down 

pretty good,” “this is fillin’ in pretty quick,” and “it’s fillin’ in real hard”). Consistent with 

this information, the CVR recorded the captain commenting that he expected to land on 

a contaminated runway. For example, the captain stated: “there’s snow removal on the 

field yet they’re showing forty or better sounds like a contaminated...runway to me” 

at 0029:10.5; “with contaminant, more than likely” at 0033:50.9; and “snowing hard” at 

0034:09.3. (ASOS reports, which the pilots had not obtained, also showed that light snow 

increased to moderate snow about 0030; then, about 0040, increased to heavy snow with 

visibility of 1/4 mile.)

In December 2006, Pinnacle incorporated procedures into the company’s OpSpecs 

requiring its pilots to perform landing distance assessment procedures consistent with 

guidance contained in the FAA’s SAFO 06012. These procedures, which were in effect at 

65 Runway friction surveys are not conducted on uncontaminated runways; thus, no MU values would be 

obtained or reported for those surfaces. 
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the time of the accident, required Pinnacle pilots to obtain the most current meteorological 

and runway surface condition estimates as close to landing as possible and perform landing 

distance assessments to determine whether adequate runway length was available before 

beginning an approach to a contaminated runway. 

However, CVR evidence revealed that the pilots did not perform such an 

assessment, and, during postaccident interviews, both pilots told investigators that they 

did not perform a landing distance assessment. The captain told investigators that he had 

landed on snowy runways many times and that he believed the runway conditions were 

okay based on the contamination depth. The first officer stated that he thought that pilots 

were required to (and should) check landing distances with a contaminated runway. He 

said that he believed 4,000 feet was the required landing distance but indicated that they 

did not check the landing distance charts. 

The Safety Board’s review of Pinnacle’s landing distance charts, based on the 

accident conditions and reports indicating that wet snow was on the runway, indicated 

that the airplane’s landing distance would exceed the available runway length. Further, the 

pilots had adequate information available to indicate that the runway was contaminated 

and that a landing distance assessment was required. To the company’s credit, Pinnacle 

voluntarily incorporated the procedures outlined in SAFO 06012; yet the pilots still did 

not perform the required landing distance assessment before this accident. The captain 

stated that he believed the runway was freshly plowed and that the conditions were such 

that a landing distance assessment was not required. The Safety Board concludes that the 

pilots failed to perform the landing distance assessment that was required by Pinnacle’s 

OpSpecs; had they done so, using current weather information, the results would have 

shown that the runway length was inadequate for the contaminated runway conditions 

described. This accident reinforces the need for pilots to perform landing distance 

assessments before every landing, taking into account conditions at the time of arrival and 

adding a safety margin of at least 15 percent to calculated landing distances. Therefore, 

the Safety Board reiterates Safety Recommendation A-07-57. 

Later in the approach, when advised by the TVC airport operations supervisor 

that snow had accumulated to nearly 1/2 inch, the captain told the first officer, “[w]e’re 

allowed 3 inches...half inch is nothing.” The captain’s comments indicated that he believed 

that company policies allowed them to land under any circumstances with up to 3 inches 

of contaminant on the runway.66 However, the captain ignored the company requirement 

for performance of a landing distance assessment demonstrating that sufficient runway 

exists for a safe landing in contaminated runway conditions regardless of contaminant 

depth. The TVC ground operations supervisor’s comments (including “it’s filling in” and 

his estimate that the snow was 1/2 inch deep) provided the pilots with ample information 

to recognize at least that the runway was contaminated and that a landing distance 

assessment should have been performed. Nonetheless, on the basis of the information 

provided by the TVC ground operations supervisor, the captain appeared satisfied that 

the ground cover was within Pinnacle’s limitations and continued the approach without 

performing a landing distance assessment. The Safety Board concludes that because the 

66 Pinnacle policies only permitted landings on runways with wet snow depths of 1 1/2 inches or less.
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pilots had ample evidence that wet snow was accumulating rapidly on the runway at 

TVC, they should have anticipated a landing on a contaminated runway and performed a 

landing distance assessment as required by the company’s OpSpec.

The Safety Board’s review of ATC and CVR data and postaccident pilot statements 

indicated that as the approach continued, the pilots could have reassessed their decision 

and performed a landing distance assessment as they received additional information 

regarding TVC weather and runway conditions; their workload was relatively light during 

the approach to TVC. Further, if the pilots were concerned about the time and workload 

involved in conducting a landing distance assessment during the approach, they could 

have requested either a delayed turn-in for the approach or holding pattern instructions 

from MSP ARTCC. 

2.2.1.1.1 Landing Distance Assessment Training 

SAFO 06012, Section 3g also provides the following guidance for training flight 

crews on the landing distance assessment procedures, stating that all flight crewmembers 

should be made aware of the procedures: 

....in a manner consistent with the operator’s methods for conveying 

similar knowledge to flight operations personnel. It may be conducted 

via operations/training bulletins or extended learning systems...all flight 

crewmembers should have hands on training and validate proficiency in 

these procedures during their next flight training event.

Pinnacle Airlines voluntarily adopted the guidance in SAFO 06012 and incorporated 

mandatory landing distance assessments for contaminated runways into both its flight 

manual and operations specifications, informing pilots via a revision to the flight manual, 

and teaching the procedure in ground school. The FAA POI indicated that he was satisfied 

with the company’s adoption of this SAFO. However, provisions for hands-on training 

and validation of proficiency were not put into place. 

Although both the captain and the first officer were familiar with the landing 

distance assessment procedure (in fact, as part of the first officer’s operating experience, 

the captain reviewed the landing distance assessment procedures during a previous 

flight), neither recognized the need to accomplish this procedure when they were briefed 

on the contaminated runway conditions at TVC. This deficiency may be explained by 

fatigue impairment, but more thorough training on the rationale behind conducting a 

landing distance assessment may have made the crew more cognizant of the need for 

such an assessment and of the benefits of conducting the assessment for contaminated 

runways before landing. After the accident, Pinnacle voluntarily increased its training 

on the landing distance assessment by providing pilots with an additional review of the 

charts and their proper use during semiannual training events, annual ground school 

training, and annual pilot check flights. 

When adopting new operational procedures, it is important to ensure that those who 

will be using the procedures have a thorough understanding of not only how to perform 
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the procedure, but when to perform it. Because dispatch must perform a landing distance 

calculation before departure to ensure that the airplane can land at the destination airport 

within weight limits and in the available landing distance, pilots may not recognize the 

criticality of performing a landing distance assessment just before landing. The assessment 

is particularly critical when runway conditions may have changed over the length of the 

flight, as was the case at TVC. The primary purpose of conducting a landing distance 

assessment is to account for current runway conditions. The Safety Board is concerned that 

the introduction of a landing distance assessment in a manner similar to other, possibly 

less essential procedures followed by training up to 6 months later may not sufficiently 

communicate to pilots the importance of conducting a landing distance assessment before 

landing on a contaminated runway.

The Safety Board supports the guidance of SAFO 06012 and recognizes that 

Pinnacle Airlines voluntarily adopted this procedure and enhanced its training after the 

accident. The Safety Board concludes that initial training for pilots on the rationale for and 

criticality of conducting a landing distance assessment before landing on a contaminated 

runway would reinforce the need to conduct such an assessment. The FAA’s Takeoff/

Landing Performance Assessment Aviation Rulemaking Committee, convened to discuss 

the landing distance assessment methods provided in SAFO 06012, provides an ideal 

forum to address the training that is necessary for the implementation of landing distance 

assessment procedures. Therefore, the Safety Board believes that the FAA should, as 

part of the Takeoff/Landing Performance Assessment Aviation Rulemaking Committee, 

address the need for initial training on the rationale for and criticality of conducting 

landing distance assessments before landing on contaminated runways. 

2.2.1.2 “Nil” Braking Reports

During the last 15 minutes of the flight, the TVC airport operations supervisor 

used the term “nil” twice describing the runway braking action in radio transmissions 

to the accident pilots. Review of ATC and CVR evidence indicated that the TVC airport 

operations supervisor’s first “nil” braking report (“...I’m gonna call braking action nil 

now...’cause it’s fillin’ in real hard”) was issued about the same time that the controller 

assigned the pilots a new heading and approved a frequency change to the TVC CTAF. 

The radio transmissions began about 0038:03 and 0038:04, respectively, and the pilots 

were monitoring both the TVC CTAF and MSP ARTCC radio frequencies as they neared 

TVC. CVR evidence shows that the first officer turned down the volume on the TVC CTAF 

to hear the heading and frequency instructions provided by the controller. The captain’s 

subsequent comment about the TVC airport operations supervisor’s transmission (“I mean, 

what kind of report’s that, ‘it’s filling in’...doesn’t tell me good bad fair poor”) indicated 

that he had not heard the nil braking report portion of that transmission. Therefore, the 

Safety Board concludes that it is likely that neither pilot heard the TVC airport operations 

supervisor’s first nil braking report because that transmission occurred simultaneously 

with critical approach instructions issued by the controller.

The TVC airport operations supervisor used the term “nil” a second time in a 

transmission less than 3 minutes later (about 0040:53), when he stated, “...again...brakin’ 

action’s probably nil on the runway.” This “probably nil” statement from the TVC airport 
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operations supervisor was not definitive, nor was it standard phraseology for reporting 

runway conditions. The captain promptly requested clarification, asking, “are you saying 

it’s nil?” The TVC airport supervisor’s response to this question, however, was even more 

ambiguous than his “probably nil” statement; he stated that he had not been “out there to 

do a field report and it’s been 5, 10 minutes, so I don’t know what it’s doin’ now.” (The TVC 

airport operations supervisor stated during postaccident interviews that this assessment 

of the runway condition was based on tests he conducted in his vehicle on runway 28, 

during which he perceived “minimal to nonexistent” braking action and “uncertain” 

directional control; however, he did not provide the pilots with this detailed description 

of conditions.) The Safety Board concludes that, although Pinnacle procedures prohibit 

landing when runway braking action is reported as “nil,” the TVC airport operations 

supervisor’s description of “probably nil” (a term that has no clearly defined meaning 

with regard to runway braking action) and his subsequent failure to confirm a nil braking 

report when questioned further by the pilots likely led the pilots to believe that the runway 

braking action was not actually nil and therefore did not directly prohibit the landing. 

During subsequent communications, the captain further queried the airport 

operations supervisor about runway conditions, specifically asking about the depth of snow 

covering the runway, and the airport operations supervisor responded, estimating nearly 

1/2 inch of snow. When presented with ambiguous information, it is not unreasonable to 

expect the captain to request more information so that he can make a decision whether or 

not to land; that decision is ultimately the captain’s. While the subsequent information the 

captain received indicated that the snow depth was within the limits established by the 

company, he still did not perform a landing distance assessment, which was required for 

landing with the contamination on the runway. 

2.2.2 Pilot Actions During the Landing and Landing Roll

The Safety Board evaluated the pilots’ actions during the touchdown and landing 

roll to determine whether those actions were a factor in the overrun. FDR data showed 

that the pilots flew the approach and crossed the runway 28 threshold at an airspeed of 

about 148 knots. This was consistent with existing Pinnacle guidance indicating that an 

airplane at the accident airplane’s landing weight and configuration should have flown 

the approach and crossed the threshold at the reference landing speed (Vref) plus up to 

5 additional knots for gusty wind conditions. FDR data showed that the airplane was 

decelerating as it crossed the runway’s approach threshold and touched down on the 

landing runway at a speed of 123 knots, about 2,400 feet beyond that threshold. Pinnacle 

guidance dictates that the normal touchdown zone on a runway is 1,000 to 1,500 feet beyond 

the runway’s approach threshold and calls for a go-around if an airplane cannot land in 

the first 3,000 feet or the first third of the runway, whichever is less. Therefore, based on 

its review of FDR data and Pinnacle landing guidance, the Safety Board concludes that the 

accident airplane landed farther down the runway than the 1,500-foot touchdown point 

assumed by the landing distance calculations; however, even if the airplane had touched 

down within the 1,500-foot, company-designated standard touchdown zone, it would 

likely not have stopped before the end of the runway given the accident conditions. 
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An airplane’s deceleration during the landing roll is a function of the runway 

surface condition and the application/use of deceleration mechanisms, including spoiler 

and thrust reverser deployment and associated engine fan speed setting and wheel 

brake/antiskid systems. According to the Safety Board’s airplane performance study and 

review of the FDR data, immediately after the airplane touched down, brake pressure was 

applied and the spoilers and thrust reversers were deployed. (The thrust reversers were 

deployed and then stowed twice during the landing roll.) The FDR recorded airplane 

heading changes during each thrust reverser deployment. During the first thrust reverser 

deployment, FDR data showed a 3° nose-right heading change that the pilots were able 

to compensate for with left rudder input. During the second thrust reverser deployment 

(which was initiated at a slower speed), FDR data showed a 7° nose-right heading change, 

followed by a left rudder input. The airplane heading then veered left to a maximum 25° 

nose-left-of-runway heading, despite the pilots’ attempts to counter with right rudder 

input, as the airplane ran off the end of the runway. 

These heading changes, which were simultaneous with thrust reverser 

deployment, were apparently consistent with Pinnacle and Bombardier guidance 

indicating that directional control/rudder effectiveness might be compromised when 

using thrust reversers while landing on contaminated runways and/or in crosswind 

conditions. (Pinnacle procedures prohibited the use of reverse thrust on contaminated 

surfaces at speeds of less than 60 knots, although company pilots were permitted to use 

maximum reverse thrust to a complete stop in emergency situations.) During postaccident 

interviews, the captain indicated that he did not immediately recognize the need for more 

aggressive thrust reverser application because the reduced visibility and the contaminated 

runway made it difficult to determine the airplane’s location along the runway. However, 

he stated that he was concerned about keeping the airplane aligned with the runway 

centerline during the landing roll. Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that the pilots’ 

use of the thrust reversers during the landing roll was not inconsistent with company and 

manufacturer guidance related to thrust reverser usage in adverse weather conditions 

and company policies prohibiting thrust reverser use at speeds less than 60 knots except 

in emergency circumstances.

2.3 Pilot Fatigue Issues

When asked whether pilot fatigue was a problem at Pinnacle, the FAA POI estimated 

that 60 to 70 percent of Pinnacle pilots who voluntarily submitted event reports through 

the company’s ASAP cited fatigue as a factor in the event. In addition, several of the 

company pilots interviewed during this investigation indicated that company schedules 

could be exhausting. The Safety Board examined the pilots’ hours of rest, waking time, 

length of duty day, workload, personal sleep histories, and performance deficiencies to 

determine whether fatigue was a factor in the pilots’ performance and decision-making 

during the accident flight. In addition, the Board examined line check airman issues.
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2.3.1 Accident Pilot Fatigue

The accident occurred well after midnight at the end of a demanding day during 

which the pilots had flown 8.35 hours,67 made five landings, been on duty more than 

14 hours, and been awake more than 16 hours.68 During the accident flight, the CVR 

recorded numerous yawns and comments that indicate that the pilots were fatigued. 

Specifically, the accident CVR recorded the captain yawning four times (at 2340:00.3, 

0001:06.6, 0004:00.4, and 0009:47.1). Additionally, the captain made references to being 

tired at 2332:12, 2341:53, and 0018:43, and the first officer stated, “jeez, I’m tired” at 0020:41. 

Additionally, the pilots’ high workload (flying in inclement weather conditions, and in 

the captain’s case, providing OE for the first officer) during their long day likely increased 

their fatigue. 

The Safety Board’s 1994 study of flight crew-related major aviation accidents 

indicated that fatigue related to lengthy periods of wakefulness can contribute to 

accidents. Specifically, the Board’s study found that captains who had been awake for 

more than about 12 hours made significantly more errors (including failure to recognize 

and discontinue an ill-advised or flawed approach) than those who had been awake for 

less than 12 hours. 

Accident data further show that long duty days significantly increase the likelihood 

of human factors-related accidents. Pilots who flew schedules involving 13 or more 

hours of duty time had accident rates several times higher than pilots who flew shorter 

schedules. In its investigations of two accidents in which fatigue was cited and the pilots 

continued an ill-advised and/or flawed approach (the June 1999 accident at Little Rock, 

Arkansas, and the October 2004 accident at Kirksville, Missouri),69 the Safety Board noted 

that the pilots had been continuously awake for at least 15 to 16 hours (as had the pilots in 

this accident). In addition, several other accidents have involved fatigued pilots, subject 

to long continuous wakefulness and late hours, who attempted to land despite evidence 

67 Although the pilots’ 8.35 hours of flight time exceeded the flight time cap, Federal regulations do allow 

for such exceedences when they are the result of “circumstances beyond the [operator’s] control...such as 

adverse weather conditions.”

68 The captain stated that although he was off duty during the days before the accident, his sleep during 

that time was interrupted, in part because of a newborn child. He awoke about 0700 CDT on the day of the 

accident. The first officer was also off duty in the days before the accident, during which he made a personal 

trip to California. He awoke about 0630 CDT on the day of the accident.

69 See National Transportation Safety Board, Runway Overrun During Landing, American Airlines 

Flight 1420, McDonnell Douglas MD-82, N215AA, Little Rock, Arkansas, June 1, 1999, Aircraft Accident Report 

NTSB/AAR-01/02 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 2001) and National Transportation Safety Board, Collision with 

Trees and Crash Short of the Runway, Corporate Airlines Flight 5966, BAE Systems BAE-J3201, N875JX, 

Kirksville, Missouri, October 19, 2004, Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-06/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 

2006).
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that the approach should be discontinued.70 Research also indicates that alertness suffers 

when a working day exceeds 14 to 16 hours.71

Fatigue especially affects decision-making, and people who are fatigued become 

less likely to consider options and more likely to become fixated on a desired outcome. 

Among pilots, this may appear as errors such as failing to discontinue an ill-advised 

approach. In this case, the accident occurred during an instrument approach to a snowand ice-contaminated runway in a snowstorm after the fifth flight segment of the day. The 

pilots had performed four previous landings and flown in challenging (windy, turbulent, 

snowy) weather conditions throughout the day, and it is unlikely that they wanted to 

extend their day further by diverting to an alternate airport. In this case, it is likely that 

fatigue and a desire to end the trip (and their day) influenced the pilots’ continuation of 

the approach despite evidence that they should either delay the approach or divert to an 

alternate airport. 

The Safety Board concludes that the poor decision-making shown by the accident 

pilots, including their failure to account for the changing weather and runway conditions 

during the approach; their failure to perform a landing distance calculation; and their 

failure to reassess or discontinue the approach accordingly, likely reflected the effects of 

fatigue. 

Scientific literature indicates that people typically underestimate their level of 

fatigue,72 especially when they are busy, as the pilots would have been when preparing for 

and departing on the accident flight. During postaccident interviews, both pilots indicated 

that they did not realize how tired they were until they reached cruise altitude during 

the accident flight. This is consistent with CVR evidence, which shows that complaints 

of fatigue and yawning began during this relatively low workload phase of the flight. 

Because the accident trip involved a series of delays because of dispatch, maintenance, 

and deicing issues, the pilots may have felt alert when they committed to the trip but 

found that they were tired as they set up for the approach into TVC (which occurred 

almost 2 hours later than scheduled). Pinnacle had a policy that allowed pilots to remove 

themselves from trips because of fatigue; however, the accident pilots did not elect to 

do so, possibly because they did not recognize their level of fatigue until they were en 

route. 

70 See a) National Transportation Safety Board, Uncontrolled Collision With Terrain, American International 

Airways Flight 808, Douglas DC-8-61, N814CK, U. S. Naval Air Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, August 18, 

1993, Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-94/04 (Washington, DC; NTSB, 1994); b) National Transportation 

Safety Board, Controlled Flight into Terrain, Korean Air Flight 801, Boeing 747-300, HL7468, Nimitz Hill, 

Guam, August 6, 1997, Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-00/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 2000); and c) 

National Transportation Safety Board, Collision With Trees on Final Approach, Federal Express Flight 1478, 

Boeing 727-232, N497FE, Tallahassee, Florida, July 26, 2002, Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-04/02 

(Washington, DC: NTSB, 2004).

71 G.P. Kruger (1989). “Sustained work, fatigue, sleep loss, and performance: a review of the issues.” 

Work and Stress, vol. 3, pp. 129-141.

72 A. Itoi, R. Cilveti, M. Voth, B. Dantz, P. Hyde, A. Gupta, and W. Dement (1993). “Can Drivers Avoid 

Falling Asleep at the Wheel?” Washington, DC: AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety. For more information, see 

<http://www.aaafoundatoin.org/resources/index.cfm?button=asleep>. 
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The pilots’ schedule for the accident sequence was consistent with existing FAA 

flight and duty time regulations. The Safety Board has long urged the FAA to review and 

update the hours-of-service regulations based on current scientific evidence. For example, 

in 2006, the Board issued Safety Recommendation A-06-10, which recommended that 

the FAA “modify and simplify the flight crew hours-of-service regulations to take into 

consideration factors such as length of duty day, starting time, workload, and other factors 

shown by recent research, scientific evidence, and current industry experience to affect 

crew alertness.” Despite this and other fatigue-related recommendations, the FAA has 

not updated or revised its pilot flight and duty time regulations. On the basis of the FAA’s 

continued inaction, in November 2006, the Safety Board classified Safety Recommendation 

A-06-10, “Open—Unacceptable Response.” 

This accident demonstrates again that fatigue-related issues continue to affect 

the safety of airline operations and that the airline industry could greatly benefit from 

hours‐of-service rules that reflect current scientific understanding and industry experience 

to minimize the effects of fatigue on safety. The Safety Board concludes that existing FAA 

pilot flight and duty time regulations permitted the long and demanding day experienced 

by the accident pilots, which resulted in their fatigued condition and degraded pilot 

decision-making. Therefore, the Safety Board reiterates Safety Recommendation A-06-10. 

2.3.2 Line Check Airman Fatigue Issues

Because the accident captain was serving as a line check airman during the accident 

flight, issues related to scheduling of check airmen were addressed in this investigation. 

In addition to regular line pilot duties, check airmen have the added responsibilities 

of providing OE to new hires73 while shouldering additional cockpit duties as needed, 

depending on the experience and competency of the new hire. In this case, the accident 

captain was subject to significant additional workload because of his check airman 

duties. Throughout the day, the captain was flying in challenging conditions without the 

assistance of an experienced colleague, continually monitoring the first officer’s actions 

and performance as the nonflying pilot, and providing guidance to the first officer. (CVR 

evidence showed that the captain actively provided instruction and monitoring of the first 

officer’s actions in support of his initial OE throughout the accident flight.)

These additional responsibilities can result in a workload that is substantially 

more demanding and fatiguing than regular line flying and, in this case, would have 

almost certainly exacerbated the development of fatigue for the captain. Especially during 

a time of pilot shortages and high turnover rates, increased training demands could force 

line check airmen to spend the bulk of their flying time providing OE and flying with 

new pilots with less experience, resulting in greater demands on the check airmen. The 

captain indicated that most of his flying during the weeks before the accident involved 

OE and performing other check airman duties. Federal regulations do not address check 

airman hours of service apart from general flight and duty time limitations, and Pinnacle 

did not apply special duty-time limits to its line check airmen at the time of the accident. 

73 Other check airman duties include performing line and proficiency checks. 
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Subsequent correspondence from Pinnacle representatives indicates that check airmen 

performing OE are now limited to 14 hours of duty and 8 hours of “actual” (rather than 

“scheduled”) flight time per day.

The Safety Board concludes that the additional responsibilities and task demands 

involved in providing OE and performing related check airman functions likely 

aggravated the effects of fatigue for the captain/check airman. The Board recognizes that 

previously reiterated Safety Recommendation A-06-10 encompasses numerous factors 

that the FAA should consider in modifying flight crew flight and duty times and other 

limitations for pilots, including workload. The increased workload involved when a line 

check airman is providing OE and performing related check airman functions is another 

aspect of flight and duty time regulations and other limitations that need to be addressed 

as part of Safety Recommendation A-06-10. Further, on June 10, 2008, the Safety Board 

issued Safety Recommendations A-08-44 and -45 recommending the development and 

evaluation of fatigue management systems; the breadth of issues potentially addressed 

by these systems could include specific factors addressing check airman functions and the 

Safety Board urges the FAA to consider check airman workload in fatigue management 

system development and guidance.

2.4 Dissemination of Weather and Field Condition Reports

The Safety Board evaluated whether critical information regarding local weather 

and airport conditions was available to the flight crew during the approach. Because 

the flight arrived after the scheduled operating hours of the TVC ATCT, information 

was not relayed by the ATCT controller or available through controller-recorded (ATIS) 

transmissions. However, other sources of weather and field condition information, such 

as airport operations equipment and personnel and ASOS transmissions, provided 

information consistent with that which would be provided by ATCT controllers and the 

ATIS during operating hours. The Board evaluated the flight crew’s use of the weather 

information and the pilot/airport operations personnel communications during the 

flight’s approach to TVC. 

2.4.1 Weather Information Available to the Flight Crew

Per standard operating procedure, when the TVC ATCT closed on the night of 

the accident, controllers selected the TVC ASOS weather information for continuous 

broadcast on the airport’s ATIS frequency. This information was updated at 1-minute 

intervals and was available to the pilots continuously—upon access—during the descent, 

approach, and landing. (During tower operating hours, the same ASOS observations 

were the source of weather data for the recorded ATIS broadcast or direct controller-pilot 

weather advisories.) The Safety Board’s review of the ASOS observations indicated that 

they reflected the rapidly deteriorating conditions and increased snowfall at the time of 

the accident. Review of the ASOS data indicated no interruption in the system’s weather 

observation broadcasts during the accident airplane’s approach to TVC.
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Published reference information regarding TVC weather observations in FAA 

and Pinnacle documents clearly indicated that the pilots were required to obtain weather 

information through the ASOS broadcast. Further, postaccident interviews and CVR 

evidence indicated that the pilots were aware of these required procedures. Among other 

OE procedural and operations issues discussed during the flight from MSP to TVC, the 

captain specifically reviewed uncontrolled airport operations and procedures with the 

first officer. However, CVR data showed that the crew monitored the TVC ASOS weather 

information on only one occasion, about 30 minutes before they landed. They did not 

obtain a more current observation as they neared the airport and heard transmissions 

from the airport operations supervisor indicating that the conditions were deteriorating. 

Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that the pilots could have made a more informed 

landing decision if they had monitored the current (updated every minute) and 

unambiguous TVC weather information that was continuously available to them through 

the TVC ASOS broadcast.

2.4.2 Airport and Runway Condition Reports and Ground 

Personnel Phraseology 

In accordance with published procedures, after tower closing time the pilots 

communicated directly with TVC airport operations personnel on the CTAF regarding 

the timing of their arrival, snow removal activities, and the airport/runway conditions. 

The airport operations personnel are the source of runway and field condition reports 

issued by the control tower during operating hours, which are distributed via NOTAMs; 

therefore, the accident flight crew had direct access to equivalent runway and field 

condition information.

The Safety Board notes that early in the airplane’s descent, the TVC airport 

operations supervisor provided the following precise runway condition report to the 

accident captain, “I’ve [.40+ on] runway two eight. I’ve got thin, wet snow [over] patchy 

thin ice.” However, subsequent phraseology used by the TVC airport operations supervisor 

during radio transmissions to the accident pilots was conversational and imprecise (for 

example, the phrases “comin’ down good,” “fillin’ in real hard,” and “probably nil”) and 

therefore subject to possible misinterpretation. 

During the last 20 minutes of the accident flight, the TVC airport operations 

supervisor made several radio transmissions to the accident pilots regarding snow removal 

operations, subsequent snowfall, and accumulation of snow on the landing runway. 

Additionally, about 0040:53, the pilots clearly heard the second of two transmissions 

issued by the TVC airport operations supervisor that described the braking action on 

runway 28 as “probably nil.”74 However, when the captain immediately asked, “are you 

saying it’s nil?” to confirm the nil braking report, the TVC airport operations supervisor 

vacillated and eventually downplayed his nil report, saying he had not performed a field 

report and did not know “what it’s doin’ now.” When queried by the captain, the TVC 

74 As previously stated, the pilots likely did not hear the first nil braking report because of a simultaneous 

radio transmission.
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airport operations supervisor estimated the runway snow depth to be “close to” 1/2 inch. 

CVR-recorded communications between the pilots indicated that the captain was initially 

concerned about the TVC airport operations supervisor’s “probably nil” braking report 

but felt more confident about landing after hearing the contaminant depth estimate of 

1/2 inch. 

The FAA recommends that airports use the AIM chapter titled, “Radio 

Communications, Phraseology, and Techniques” as a source for related airport training 

materials and procedures. This AIM chapter emphasizes the importance of precision, 

conciseness, and proper radio technique in successfully communicating by radio and 

includes examples of proper phraseology and radio techniques. A review of TVC training 

materials for operations personnel regarding communications and airport familiarity 

indicated that the materials were consistent with and referenced the AIM information. 

Further, TVC records indicate that all ground personnel on duty the night of the accident, 

including the airport operations supervisor, had successfully completed the required 

training. 

Because the airport operations supervisor had completed the required training 

and was also familiar with appropriate phraseology from his pilot training, it is not clear 

why he failed to provide specific and decisive information at all times on the night of 

the accident. However, it is likely that TVC airport operations supervisor’s reticence to 

confirm his “probably nil” braking report when the captain tried to confirm it was a factor 

in the pilots’ decision to continue the approach. The Safety Board concludes that the 

TVC airport operations supervisor’s use of ambiguous and unspecific radio phraseology 

when providing braking action information likely affected the captain’s decision to 

continue the approach; an unambiguous runway surface condition report would have 

provided the pilots with more accurate and useful information to factor into their landing 

decision. Therefore, the Safety Board believes that the FAA should issue a CertAlert to 

all 14 CFR Part 139 certificated airports that describes the circumstances of this accident, 

emphasizes the importance of specific and decisive radio communications, and urges 

airports to ensure that those criteria are being met in all airfield radio communications. 

In its report on the Southwest Airlines flight 1248 accident, the Safety Board issued 

Safety Recommendation A-07-62, asking the FAA to do the following: 

Develop and issue formal guidance regarding standards and guidelines for 

the development, delivery, and interpretation of runway surface condition 

reports.

The FAA responded to Safety Recommendation A-07-62 on January 8, 2008, 

stating that the ARC (development of which was announced by the FAA on December 6, 

2007) would also provide the FAA with advice and recommendations regarding 

“establishment of standards for runway surface condition reporting and minimum surface 

conditions for continued operations.” On June 12, 2008, the Safety Board classified Safety 

Recommendation A-07-62 “Open—Acceptable Response.” 
Analysis

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2.4.3 Runway Closure Procedures in Snow and Ice Conditions

In 2005, the FAA Great Lakes Region sent correspondence to all Part 139 airport 

operators in the region regarding operations during snow and ice conditions. This letter 

stated that airports must implement procedures for closing any pavement available to air 

carriers when braking action/friction values reach an unsafe value (the equivalent of nil 

braking action). TVC airport personnel discussed this issue at a snow plan meeting held 

September 22, 2006. However, at the time of the accident, TVC’s snow and ice control plan 

did not specify criteria that would result in airport personnel closing a runway and/or 

the airport. If TVC’s snow and ice control plan had incorporated such criteria, it is likely 

that the TVC airport operations supervisor would have, given his determination that the 

braking action was nil, closed the runway to air carrier operations before the accident 

flight arrived, forcing the pilots to take alternate action. (After the accident, TVC received 

operational criteria information from the air carriers, and the airport now restricts air 

carrier operations when MU values of .27 or less are measured or when nil braking action 

is reported by pilots or TVC ground operations personnel.)

Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that incorporation of minimum safe 

operating limits for runway surface conditions into an airport’s snow and ice control plan 

would ensure that airport operations personnel prohibit air carrier operations on any 

runway if, in their estimation, the braking action on that runway is unsafe. Therefore, 

the Safety Board believes that the FAA should require all 14 CFR Part 139 certificated 

airport operators to include in their airport’s snow and ice control plan absolute criteria 

for type and depth of contamination and runway friction assessments that, when met, 

would trigger immediate closure of the affected runway to air carrier operations. Friction 

assessments should be based on pilot braking action reports, values obtained from ground 

friction measuring equipment, or estimates provided by airport ground personnel. 
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3. Conclusions

3.1 Findings

1. The pilots were properly certificated and qualified under Federal regulations and 

Pinnacle Airlines training requirements. No evidence indicated any medical conditions 

that might have adversely affected the pilots’ performance during the accident flight.

2. The accident airplane was properly certificated and was equipped and maintained 

in accordance with industry practices and was within weight and center of gravity 

limits. 

3. The investigation revealed no evidence of any failure or anomaly of the airplane’s 

powerplants, structures, or systems (including the airplane’s deceleration devices, 

such as brakes, antiskid devices, and thrust reversers) that would have affected the 

airplane’s performance during the accident landing.

4. Based on the system designs and runway conditions, it is likely that the airplane’s 

braking and antiskid systems were performing to their maximum effectiveness.

5. Although, at its original departure, time Pinnacle dispatchers could not dispatch the 

accident flight because of strong winds in the Cherry Capital Airport (TVC) forecast, 

an amended forecast issued by Northwest Airline’s meteorology department (and 

reflected in a subsequent National Weather Service-issued forecast) predicted more 

favorable wind conditions (as well as higher ceilings and improved visibility in light 

snow) at TVC and thus met the required criteria for the flight’s dispatch.

6. The services provided by the air traffic control (ATC) system did not affect the outcome 

of the flight. Information commonly provided by ATC (for example, weather and 

runway surface condition reports) was available to the flight crew, and its availability 

was unaffected by the air traffic control tower’s closure before the flight’s arrival at 

Cherry Capital Airport.

7. Cherry Capital Airport’s snow removal operations and runway surface condition 

assessment activities were conducted in accordance with the airport’s Federal Aviation 

Administration-approved snow and ice control plan. 

8. Considering the severe winter weather and the relatively intact condition of the 

airplane, the captain’s decision to deplane the passengers using Pinnacle’s “expeditious 

deplaning” procedures was appropriate. 

9. Although there were no reported injuries resulting from this accident, had a 

postaccident fire occurred, the delay in aircraft rescue and firefighting response could 

have adversely affected the safety of passengers after the accident.
Conclusions

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10. The forward-looking infrared equipment installed in the aircraft rescue and firefighting 

(ARFF) vehicle did not help the firefighter locate the accident airplane; however, 

improved crash detection and location equipment would likely have facilitated a 

more timely ARFF response. 

11. Although there is no reason to believe the pilots’ performance was affected by alcohol, 

the failure of the airline to perform required postaccident alcohol tests prevents a 

definitive statement on the issue.

12. Even though there was initially some uncertainty as to whether the Cherry Capital 

Airport runway overrun was an accident or an incident, it would have been prudent 

for Pinnacle to comply with the drug and alcohol testing regulations as if the overrun 

were to be classified as an accident.

13. The pilots failed to perform the landing distance assessment that was required by 

Pinnacle’s Operations Specifications; had they done so, using current weather 

information, the results would have shown that the runway length was inadequate 

for the contaminated runway conditions described.

14. Because the pilots had ample evidence that wet snow was accumulating rapidly on 

the runway at Cherry Capital Airport, they should have anticipated a landing on a 

contaminated runway and performed a landing distance assessment as required by 

the company’s Operations Specifications.

15. Initial training for pilots on the rationale for and criticality of conducting a landing 

distance assessment before landing on a contaminated runway would reinforce the 

need to conduct such an assessment.

16. It is likely that neither pilot heard the Cherry Capital Airport operations supervisor’s 

first “nil” braking report because that transmission occurred simultaneously with 

critical approach instructions issued by the controller.

17. Although Pinnacle procedures prohibit landing when runway braking action is 

reported as “nil,” the Cherry Capital Airport operations supervisor’s description of 

“probably nil” (a term that has no clearly defined meaning with regard to runway 

braking action) and his subsequent failure to confirm a nil braking report when 

questioned further by the pilots likely led the pilots to believe that the runway braking 

action was not actually nil and therefore did not directly prohibit the landing.

18. The accident airplane landed farther down the runway than the 1,500-foot touchdown 

point assumed by the landing distance calculations; however, even if the airplane had 

touched down within the 1,500-foot, company-designated standard touchdown zone, 

it would likely not have stopped before the end of the runway given the accident 

conditions. 

19. The pilots’ use of the thrust reversers during the landing roll was not inconsistent 

with company and manufacturer guidance related to thrust reverser usage in adverse 
Conclusions

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weather conditions and company policies prohibiting thrust reverser use at speeds 

less than 60 knots except in emergency circumstances.

20. The poor decision-making shown by the accident pilots, including their failure 

to account for the changing weather and runway conditions during the approach; 

their failure to perform a landing distance calculation; and their failure to reassess or 

discontinue the approach accordingly, likely reflected the effects of fatigue.

21. Existing Federal Aviation Administration pilot flight and duty time regulations 

permitted the long and demanding day experienced by the accident pilots, which 

resulted in their fatigued condition and degraded pilot decision-making.

22. The additional responsibilities and task demands involved in providing operating 

experience and performing related check airman functions likely aggravated the 

effects of fatigue for the captain/check airman.

23. The pilots could have made a more informed landing decision if they had monitored 

the current (updated every minute) and unambiguous Cherry Capital Airport (TVC) 

weather information that was continuously available to them through the TVC 

automated surface observing system broadcast.

24. The Cherry Capital Airport operations supervisor’s use of ambiguous and unspecific 

radio phraseology when providing braking action information likely affected the 

captain’s decision to continue the approach; an unambiguous runway surface condition 

report would have provided the pilots with more accurate and useful information to 

factor into their landing decision.

25. Incorporation of minimum safe operating limits for runway surface conditions into 

an airport’s snow and ice control plan would ensure that airport operations personnel 

prohibit air carrier operations on any runway if, in their estimation, the braking action 

on that runway is unsafe. 

3.2 Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of 

this accident was the pilots’ decision to land at Cherry Capital Airport (TVC), Traverse 

City, Michigan, without performing a landing distance assessment, which was required 

by company policy because of runway contamination initially reported by TVC ground 

operations personnel and continuing reports of deteriorating weather and runway 

conditions during the approach. This poor decision-making likely reflected the effects 

of fatigue produced by a long, demanding duty day and, for the captain, the duties 

associated with check airman functions. Contributing to the accident were 1) the Federal 

Aviation Administration pilot flight and duty time regulations that permitted the pilots’ 

long, demanding duty day and 2) the TVC operations supervisor’s use of ambiguous and 

unspecific radio phraseology in providing runway braking information.
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4. Recommendations

4.1 New Recommendations

As a result of this investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board makes 

the following recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration:

Emphasize with principal operations inspectors the importance of 

conducting timely postaccident drug and alcohol testing. (A-08-40)

As part of the Takeoff/Landing Performance Assessment Aviation 

Rulemaking Committee, address the need for initial training on the 

rationale for and criticality of conducting landing distance assessments 

before landing on contaminated runways. (A-08-41)

Issue a CertAlert to all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 139 certificated 

airports that describes the circumstances of this accident, emphasizes 

the importance of specific and decisive radio communications, and 

urges airports to ensure that those criteria are being met in all airfield 

radio communications. (A‐08-42)

Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 139 certificated airport 

operators to include in their airport’s snow and ice control plan 

absolute criteria for type and depth of contamination and runway 

friction assessments that, when met, would trigger immediate closure 

of the affected runway to air carrier operations. Friction assessments 

should be based on pilot braking action reports, values obtained from 

ground friction measuring equipment, or estimates provided by airport 

ground personnel. (A-08-43)

4.2 Previously Issued Recommendations Reiterated in 

This Report

The Safety Board reiterates the following recommendations to the Federal Aviation 

Administration:

Evaluate crash detection and location technologies, select the most 

promising candidate(s) for ensuring that emergency responders could 

expeditiously arrive at an accident scene, and implement a requirement 

to install and use the equipment. (A-01-66) 
Recommendations

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Immediately require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 

91 subpart K operators to conduct arrival landing distance assessments 

before every landing based on existing performance data, actual 

conditions, and incorporating a minimum safety margin of 15 percent. 

(A-07-57) (Urgent)

Modify and simplify the flight crew hours-of-service regulations to 

take into consideration factors such as length of duty day, starting 

time, workload, and other factors shown by recent research, scientific 

evidence, and current industry experience to affect crew alertness. 

(A-06-10)

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Mark V. Rosenker Deborah A. P. Hersman

Chairman Member

Robert L. Sumwalt Kathryn O’leary Higgins

Vice Chairman Member

 Steven R. Chealander

 Member

Adopted: June 10, 2008

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5. Appendixes

Appendix A

Investigation and Public Hearing

Investigation

The National Transportation Safety Board was notified about the accident on 

April 12, 2007, shortly after it occurred. A partial go-team was launched from headquarters 

with an Investigator-in-Charge and specialists in Operations, Human Performance, and 

Airworthiness. 

The following investigative groups were formed during the course of this 

investigation: Airworthiness, Air Traffic Control, Meteorology, Operations, Human 

Performance, Airport/Survival Factors, Airplane Performance, Flight Data Recorder, and 

Cockpit Voice Recorder. 

In accordance with Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, an 

accredited representative from the Transportation Safety Board of Canada and advisors 

from Transport Canada and Bombardier Aerospace participated in this investigation. 

Parties to the investigation were the Federal Aviation Administration; Pinnacle 

Airlines (Pinnacle); Airline Pilots Association (ALPA); Northwest Airlines (NWA); 

Northwest Regional Airport Commission/Cherry Capital Airport, Traverse City, 

Michigan; and General Electric Aviation (GE). The Safety Board received submissions 

on this accident from Pinnacle, ALPA, NWA, Cherry Capital Airport (Traverse City, 

Michigan), and GE. 

Public Hearing

No public hearing was held for this accident.
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Appendix B

Cockpit Voice Recorder Transcript

The following is a transcript of the L-3 Communications model FA 2100-1020 

cockpit voice recorder (CVR) installed on Pinnacle Airlines flight 4712, a Bombardier 

Regional Jet CL600-2B19, N8905F, which ran off the departure end of runway 28 after 

landing at Cherry Capital Airport, Traverse City, Michigan, on April 12, 2007. 

Transcript of a L-3 Communications FA 2100-1020 solid-state cockpit voice 

recorder, serial number 263068, installed on an Pinnacle Airlines CRJ-200 

(N8905F), which crashed after overran the runway while landing at Cherry Capital 

Airport in Traverse City, MI. 

LEgEND

APT-5 Radio transmission from airport fire/rescue 

CAM Cockpit area microphone voice or sound source 

CTR Radio transmission from Minneapolis center controller 

HOT Flight crew audio panel voice or sound source 

INT Intercom audio panel voice or sound source 

OPS Radio transmission from Traverse City Airport Operations Supervisor 

PA Public address system audio panel voice or sound source 

RDO Radio transmissions from 

-1 Voice identified as the captain (CAPT) 

-2 Voice identified as the first officer (FO) 

-3 Voice identified as the flight attendant (FA) 

-4 Voice identified as ground personnel 

-? Voice unidentified 

* Unintelligible word 

# Expletive

@ Non-pertinent word 

& Proper name 

( ) Questionable insertion 

[ ] Editorial insertion

Note 1: Times are expressed in universal coordinated time (UTC). 

Note 2: Generally, only radio transmissions to and from the accident aircraft were transcribed. 

Note 3: Words shown with excess vowels, letters, or drawn out syllables are a phonetic representation of the words 

as spoken. 

Note 4: A non-pertinent word, where noted, refers to a word not directly related to the operation, control or condition 

of the aircraft. 
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INTRA-COCKPIT COMMUNICATION AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATION

TIME and SOURCE CONTENT

TIME and SOURCE CONTENT

DCA07FA037 

CVR Factual Report, Page 12-9 

02:52:01.3[start of recording] Start of Transcript 03:31:54.1HOT-1 ah what kinda winds are we poppin' I can't even 

remember any more. they're not light (weight) either I can't find a sock with a light on it. ahh there's one.

03:32:01.6HOT-2 and there's over- I can't tell where that's goin' 

thought.

03:32:03.4HOT-1 I can tell yeah.03:32:07.4HOT-1 fun #.03:32:10.9HOT-2 you you all right?03:32:12.3HOT-1 yeah just tired. too late for this #. act of & to get 

this airplane outta here. you know what I mean?

03:32:23.6HOT-2 yeah.
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62INTRA-COCKPIT COMMUNICATION AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATION

TIME and SOURCE CONTENT

TIME and SOURCE CONTENT

DCA07FA037 

CVR Factual Report, Page 12-10 

03:32:24.3HOT-1 #.03:32:26.4HOT-1 by the time you get done doin' everyone else’s job 

you don't have time to do your own. that' a problem with this airline. when I power up ah turn the wings on.

03:32:35.9HOT-2 okay.03:32:38.5HOT-1 when I start doin' missed just go click, and I'll say 

set thrust you need * * * *.

03:32:43.8HOT-2 okay.03:32:46.1HOT-1 we're waiting for parallel traffic that's why he said 

nobody on final position and hold clear.

03:32:51.8HOT-2 okay.03:32:52.4HOT-1 get yeah we're at thirteen minutes right now * *. if I 

went to very light which this is very light now we'd be legal. yeah.
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INTRA-COCKPIT COMMUNICATION AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATION

TIME and SOURCE CONTENT

TIME and SOURCE CONTENT

DCA07FA037 

CVR Factual Report, Page 12-11 

03:33:00.4HOT-2 okay.03:33:00.8HOT-1 on type one *.03:33:02.7HOT-2 I see what you're sayin'.03:33:03.9HOT-1 if we were empty like we were the other night I'd 

done type one 'cause we were number one for departure.

03:33:14.6HOT-1 this really a short runway for a major airport. 03:33:16.9HOT-2 this one?03:33:17.5HOT-1 yeah you know for one of the long ones.03:33:18.4HOT-2 * (well how long is it?) it's nine thousand feet 

long?

03:33:21.4HOT-1 eight thousand.03:33:22.1HOT-2 eight thousand.
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TIME and SOURCE CONTENT

TIME and SOURCE CONTENT

DCA07FA037 

CVR Factual Report, Page 12-12 

03:33:22.8HOT-1 yeah.03:33:25.9HOT-1 you know for bein'-.

03:33:26.3

TWR and forty seven twelve caution wake turbulence 

have a DC eight departed off of runway four two minutes ago wind three six zero at one two runway three zero right heading of three one zero cleared for takeoff.

03:33:32.0CAM [sound of increasing background noise].

03:33:36.7

RDO-2 alright three one zero cleared for takeoff Flagship 

ah forty seven twelve. 

03:33:39.7HOT-1 set thrust.03:33:42.6HOT-2 thrust set.03:33:43.4HOT-1 alright.03:33:45.1HOT-1 three one zero on the heading.
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INTRA-COCKPIT COMMUNICATION AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATION

TIME and SOURCE CONTENT

TIME and SOURCE CONTENT

DCA07FA037 

CVR Factual Report, Page 12-13 

03:33:46.3HOT-2 three one zero03:33:47.3HOT-1 thanks.03:33:48.2HOT-1 ha ha (I'm gonna) * (all these up).03:33:51.0HOT-2 eighty knots.03:33:51.5HOT-1 checks.03:34:01.1HOT-2 V one, rotate.03:34:04.2HOT-2 V two.03:34:06.1HOT-2 positive rate.03:34:07.2HOT-1 gear up.03:34:09.7HOT-1 speed mode.03:34:16.9CAM [sound of decreasing background noise].
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TIME and SOURCE CONTENT

TIME and SOURCE CONTENT

DCA07FA037 

CVR Factual Report, Page 12-14 

03:34:19.4HOT-1 heading mode.03:34:22.9HOT-1 heading's active.03:34:24.1HOT-2 okay.

03:34:26.2

TWR Flagship forty seven twelve turn right heading of 

three six zero and contact departure good night.

03:34:31.3

RDO-2 roger three six zero (over to) departure Flagship 

forty seven twelve. 

03:34:34.5HOT-1 bug two hundred flaps up. 03:34:41.3HOT-1 excellent * *.

03:34:55.3

RDO-2 and Minneapolis departure Flagship forty seven 

twelve is turning heading three six zero through two thousand seven hundred for seven thousand. 

03:35:02.0

DEP Flagship forty seven twelve Minneapolis departure 

radar contact.
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INTRA-COCKPIT COMMUNICATION AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATION

TIME and SOURCE CONTENT

TIME and SOURCE CONTENT

DCA07FA037 

CVR Factual Report, Page 12-15 

03:35:05.5

RDO-2 roger.

03:35:06.1HOT-1 hah. yeah. great.03:35:07.3HOT-2 #.

03:35:07.9

RDO-2 thanks.

03:35:10.6HOT-1 this plane didn't want to speed up, did it?03:35:16.7HOT-1 took (that) long to get to two hundred knots. and 

being way below the flight director, don't know what the deal is with that.

03:35:24.0HOT-2 (I don't know).03:35:26.5HOT-1 alright two fifty go ahead and thrust climb checks. 03:35:27.1HOT-2 * *.03:35:31.2HOT-1 alright two fifty.
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TIME and SOURCE CONTENT

TIME and SOURCE CONTENT

DCA07FA037 

CVR Factual Report, Page 12-16 

03:35:32.1

DEP Flagship forty seven twelve climb maintain one 

seven thousand.

03:35:34.0HOT-2 no. oh two fifty.03:35:35.5HOT-1 one seven seventeen thousand.

03:35:38.3

RDO-1 one seven seventeen thousand Flagship forty seven 

twelve.

03:35:42.5HOT-2 #.03:35:45.2HOT-1 *.03:35:49.4HOT-1 you keep (going) into this box trying to get climb 

thrust and you won't get # for flying (though) seventeen because the APUs runnin'.

03:35:55.9HOT-2 okay.03:35:56.6HOT-1 alright.
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INTRA-COCKPIT COMMUNICATION AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATION

TIME and SOURCE CONTENT

TIME and SOURCE CONTENT

DCA07FA037 

CVR Factual Report, Page 12-17 

03:35:59.1HOT-2 ignition off. or actually never mind. continuous 

ignition.

03:36:00.9HOT-1 yeah do your flow.03:36:02.6HOT-2 *?03:36:02.6HOT-1 sure do your flow.03:36:04.0HOT-2 okay.03:36:05.8HOT-1 probably turn the autopilot on so I can (watch) 

check this. good much better # I'm not gonna turn it on.

03:36:10.9HOT-2 'kay continuous ignition off.03:36:12.6HOT-1 yeah.03:36:13.2HOT-2 'kay.03:36:13.6HOT-1 alright.
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TIME and SOURCE CONTENT

TIME and SOURCE CONTENT

DCA07FA037 

CVR Factual Report, Page 12-18 

03:36:15.1HOT-1 don't stop up here, right here? over here.03:36:17.9HOT-2 n'kay.03:36:18.3HOT-1 down here. 03:36:20.8HOT-1 alright? I don't know what flow you were doin' in 

the sim but it's.

03:36:21.7HOT-2 alright.03:36:26.9HOT-1 fuel.03:36:28.3HOT-1

APU. lights. thrust reversers. box. check your ECS pages. and (box) it up * * * you know what I'm sayin' just do it. you can turn my wing off if you 

would we're good. 

03:36:43.1HOT-2 alright. * Think so?03:36:49.5HOT-? * * * * (armed) .
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INTRA-COCKPIT COMMUNICATION AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATION

TIME and SOURCE CONTENT

TIME and SOURCE CONTENT

DCA07FA037 

CVR Factual Report, Page 12-19 

03:36:53.1HOT-2 okay climb check complete.03:36:54.3HOT-1 alright.03:36:57.6HOT-1 better you're not depressurizing the airplane, you 

know so.

03:37:02.8HOT-1 it's partially my fault 'cause I make you guys fly so 

much.

03:37:06.0HOT-1 you haven't done non-flying but like two times. (in 

the airplane). from takeoff, you know. 

03:37:12.1HOT-2 yeah right okay.03:37:12.9HOT-1 right.03:37:18.2HOT-1 (havin' trouble) piece a #.03:37:39.4HOT-1 this is the hardest day, rest days are cake, you 

know, easier. tomorrow's four legs and we got two legs and three legs.
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TIME and SOURCE CONTENT

TIME and SOURCE CONTENT

DCA07FA037 

CVR Factual Report, Page 12-20 

03:37:47.9HOT-2 alright.03:37:48.4HOT-1 you you know what I mean?03:37:50.0HOT-1 alright.03:37:51.1HOT-2 ten thousand.03:37:51.5HOT-1 bug two ninety. box (items).03:37:55.0HOT-2 * *.03:37:57.1HOT-1 you keep spinnin' those knobs the wrong way 

when did that start?

03:37:59.8HOT-2 aho *.03:38:00.3HOT-1 aha every # knob you grab today is like goin' the 

wrong way. [sound of chuckle]. that's why my flight director went # jerked up on the speed (mode) trying to get me to V two.
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INTRA-COCKPIT COMMUNICATION AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATION

TIME and SOURCE CONTENT

TIME and SOURCE CONTENT

DCA07FA037 

CVR Factual Report, Page 12-21 

03:38:10.2HOT-2 [sound of chuckle].

03:38:11.0

DEP Flagship forty seven twelve cleared direct STEIN 

resume Wellstone One departure.

03:38:14.6

RDO-2 alright direct SNINE ah WLSTN One Flagship forty 

seven twelve.

03:38:16.4HOT-1 Wellstone One.

03:38:19.2

DEP roger.

03:38:20.1HOT-? * * * * * *.03:38:24.3HOT-1 legs page, legs page, legs, (SNINE).03:38:30.1HOT-2 *.03:38:31.2HOT-1 execute, execute. 03:38:31.5HOT-2 *? (execute). 
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TIME and SOURCE CONTENT

TIME and SOURCE CONTENT

DCA07FA037 

CVR Factual Report, Page 12-22 

03:38:34.0HOT-1 nav mode. [sound of chuckle]. * * *. [sound of 

chuckle]. * * *.

03:38:34.8HOT-2 *.03:38:44.8HOT-2 and seatbelt sign.03:38:51.0HOT-1 no * no I don't wanna turn it off. * let 'em sleep. 03:38:54.7HOT-2 alright.03:38:55.2HOT-1 check see if we're still in the clouds yeah a little 

bit.

03:39:01.0HOT-1 ah there's-.

03:39:01.5

DEP Flagship forty seven twelve contact Minneapolis 

center one three three point seven.

03:39:06.0

RDO-2 one three three point seven for F- Flagship forty 

seven twelve.
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INTRA-COCKPIT COMMUNICATION AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATION

TIME and SOURCE CONTENT

TIME and SOURCE CONTENT

DCA07FA037 

CVR Factual Report, Page 12-23 

03:39:26.0

RDO-2 Minneapolis departure Flagship forty seven twelve 

through ah twelve thousand for seventeen.

03:39:31.6

CTR Flagship forty seven twelve Minneapolis center 

roger climb and maintain flight level two three zero. 

03:39:36.0

RDO-2 roger two three zero Flagship forty seven twelve.

03:39:41.6HOT-1 (truly) gonna kick your #.03:39:41.8HOT-2 & I did it again.03:39:44.1HOT-1 that's (gonna) # somebody up, spin it 

aggressively when you're below the altitude that this guys climbin' too.

03:39:49.5HOT-2 okay.03:39:50.0HOT-1 [sound of chuckle].03:39:51.2HOT-1 twenty three yeah twenty three.
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CVR Factual Report, Page 12-24 

03:39:51.4HOT-2 (I) two three zero. two three zero. 03:40:00.3HOT-1 [sounds similar to sigh and yawn] ah #.03:40:05.2HOT-2 heading bug.03:40:06.8HOT-1 you can set it again if you'd like, yeah. 03:40:11.8HOT-1 this plane smells like # # I'll bet she's got like old 

lady # or something you smell that? comes in from up here you can feel the air. so you know when 

the stink stays it wasn't the pilot that # you 'cause the pilots farts come up underneath and go out of the way.

03:40:25.8HOT-2 [sound of chuckle]. 03:40:34.6HOT-1 * just started today, I don't know what your doing 

there, all you knobs are goin' the wrong way, time to go to sleep when.

03:40:39.3HOT-2 [sound of chuckle].
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03:40:51.9HOT-1 * * * (can't tell what she get?)

03:40:53.3CTR Flagship forty seven twelve cleared direct Traverse 

City.

03:40:56.5RDO-1 roger direct Traverse City Flagship forty seven 

twelve.

03:40:59.9HOT-2 Traverse City the VOR?03:41:02.6HOT-1 I usually ask we we got both but ah what's the 

distance difference? 

03:41:04.6HOT-2 ahhh.03:41:08.1HOT-1 five miles why don't we the tr- VOR, when in doubt 

do the VOR, so, the VOR, oh you got okay execute. 

03:41:11.9HOT-2 alright there it is, (that's right?), confirm?03:41:19.1HOT-1 (let's) say what vertical speed autopilot on.
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03:41:20.0HOT-2 *.03:41:21.8HOT-2 "kay vertical speed. autopilot on. 03:41:23.0HOT-1 fishin' all over the place * *. alright03:41:23.8HOT-2 autopilot on.03:41:26.2HOT-1 and autopliot engaged your side. that's what I 

usually say when I kick *.

03:41:29.4HOT-2 oh yeah okay.03:41:30.3HOT-1 you see it go green? your side is (red).03:41:30.6HOT-2 * autopilot on your side alright.03:41:33.8HOT-1 most guys *. alright if I keep it in speed mode and 

say autopilot on it'd say two ninety five right now [sound of chuckle] 'cause I'm not on speed. know what I mean?
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03:41:41.4HOT-2 okay.03:41:43.4HOT-1 and it might do some of that #. we're out of the 

clouds right now, still not. alright. 

03:41:52.5HOT-1 aw I'm tired dude, just # worn out.03:41:57.4HOT-1 (just) not in the mood to have the the # match that 

that coulda turned into with dispatch. ya know?

03:42:02.7HOT-2 yeah.03:42:03.9HOT-1 I'm gonna find out about the legalities of peak 

wind versus base wind.

03:42:09.0HOT-2 yeah ah what is that is it peak wind or the base 

wind, (like gust)?

03:42:09.4HOT-1 I'm gonna check in the *.
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CVR Factual Report, Page 12-28 

03:42:13.9HOT-1 yeah I I think he's gonna be right 'cause that's just 

too out there for them to come up with on their own, I think it's Northwest engineering that gave that to 'em. 

03:42:20.7HOT-2 yeah I mean what.03:42:21.5HOT-1 so.03:42:22.0HOT-2 you would think it would be gust.03:42:23.6HOT-1 ahh well it's kinda like main body and temporary. 

you know what I mean but.

03:42:28.0HOT-2 yeah.03:42:28.5HOT-1 I can't legally start the approach 'cause a gust 

would exceed my tailwind component. 

03:42:32.6HOT-2 right but if at the main body-
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03:42:33.3

CTR Flagship forty seven twelve contact Minneapolis 

center one three three point seven five have a good night.

03:42:38.6

RDO-2 alright three three seven five you too Flagship forty 

seven twelve.

03:42:45.7

RDO-2 Minneapolis center Flagship forty seven twelve 

through flight level one eight zero for flight level two three zero.

03:42:51.5

CTR Flagship forty seven twelve Minneapolis center 

climb and maintain flight level two seven zero.

03:42:55.7

RDO-2 ah flight level two seven zero Flagship forty seven 

twelve.

03:42:59.2HOT-2 two seven zero.03:43:02.6HOT-1 *.03:43:07.4HOT-2 two seven zero?
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03:43:08.1HOT-1 two seven zero.03:43:08.9HOT-2 okay and a eighteen hundred transition.03:43:12.1HOT-1 eighteen transition when you're callin' through 

eighteen.

03:43:13.8HOT-2 right yeah.03:43:15.6HOT-1 and altitude. should be a big clue to hit the.03:43:18.5HOT-2 oh okay.03:43:18.9HOT-1 so that you can get on the right altitude. 03:43:21.4HOT-1 [sound of laughter] the eight hundred or a 

thousand foot different altitude. you know what I mean?

03:43:24.8HOT-2 okay.03:43:26.4HOT-1 they know why your altitude's not matchin'.
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03:43:35.9HOT-1 [sound of inhalation] oh #.03:43:41.2HOT-1 tomorrow your gonna be thrown into a more 

stressful situation with Detroit 'cause you just 

haven't been there before. but I want you to be more relaxed in the airplane.

03:43:49.9HOT-2 alright.03:43:50.1HOT-1 It's another five leg day so now it's been a third of 

your flyin' today.

03:43:53.6HOT-2 tomorrow's a five leg?03:43:54.6HOT-1 no today was.03:43:56.0HOT-1 so this is been a third of all the flying you've done 

in the airplane. you should feel more comfortable with all this crap on the ground. 

03:44:02.7HOT-2 alright.03:44:03.3HOT-1 good to you?
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03:44:05.5HOT-2 there're something’s that don't (know).03:44:07.2HOT-1 * * you you get a list of question * tomorrow 

morning *.

03:44:08.7HOT-2 (right).03:44:12.0HOT-1 the ah.03:44:13.9HOT-1 like what?03:44:16.4HOT-2 ah like ah when you have to amend it. a little bit, 

like.

03:44:19.7HOT-1 okay, we do that on the ground.03:44:21.3HOT-2 okay.03:44:21.9HOT-1 we'll talk about it it. see that MCDU? 03:44:25.3HOT-1 little message? hit MCDU see what pops up. 
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03:44:25.3HOT-2 yes.03:44:27.9HOT-2 do MCDU? 03:44:29.6HOT-1 yeah then watch what happens.03:44:30.6HOT-2 yeah?03:44:30.9HOT-1 yeah.03:44:31.8HOT-2 'kay.03:44:32.7HOT-1 now hit ACARS.03:44:35.4HOT-1 check it out it popped right up to you en-route 

page. pretty cool, eh?

03:44:40.5HOT-2 that is cool.03:44:44.1HOT-1 now the MCDU went away [sound of chuckle]. 
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03:44:56.2HOT-1 probably gonna do a DME arc to this approach, 

the arcs are built funny in the box, it's built off the radial so it pretty much says.

03:45:07.8HOT-1 X Y Z radial I'll show you how to build it, if you 

instead of taking vectors you have to take the ryou know DME arc.

03:45:14.4HOT-2 what's her name?03:45:15.6HOT-1 &.03:45:16.3HOT-2 &?03:45:16.6HOT-1 aw # I don't know it's on the carbon copy of the 

one before.

03:45:20.0HOT-2 okay.03:45:20.9HOT-1 [sound of chuckle].03:45:21.8HOT-2 oh alright.
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03:45:24.6HOT-1 I couldn't think of that # mechanics name I think 

it's &.

03:45:27.5HOT-2 K O V A R (F).03:45:30.1HOT-1 [sound of chuckle].03:45:40.5HOT-1 so you and I need to sit down at about noon for a 

two o'clock shuttle. you know? * maybe we should eat breakfast together like nine or ten in the morning you know?

03:45:49.6HOT-2 alright.03:45:50.2HOT-1 we'll find out when their breakfast stops, we'll go 

down there and we'll eat breakfast. I'm gonna try to work out if they got a workout room sometime, then we'll meet at noon.

03:46:00.6HOT-1 then we'll go through amendments. if they're 

gonna go through this flow # ('cause it's still) you 

still doin' goofy #. you know. 
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03:46:10.2HOT-1 I just don't want you to # a guy by setting the 

wrong altitude and you guys are * off of (five) and, towers trying to call you for ten # minutes while your sittin' on ground and ground comes up and 

goes Flagship blah blah you still with me? you know what I mean. you miss four or five departure slots. [sound of chuckle].

03:46:25.7HOT-2 yeah.03:46:30.2HOT-1 ah. I don't want you trying to start an engine we 

got an (ITT) of two hundred C, # like that.

03:47:02.6HOT-2 it took us forty five minutes to get off.03:47:05.7HOT-1 ** (it) * take, ('cause we got a) [sound of chuckle]. 03:47:07.4HOT-2 yeah.03:47:14.6HOT-1 so on that page besides the (book) what else do 

we do?

03:47:20.8HOT-2 (do) * an in range.
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03:47:22.6HOT-1 no on on just this page we're still en-route here, 

we got some things to do on that page, what are they? ah read it see if there is anything you wanna put in there.

03:47:34.2HOT-2 * gate return, gate hold, gate request, ah 

estimated.

03:47:39.3HOT-1 gate request. and you can just.03:47:42.1HOT-2 just hit edit?03:47:43.0HOT-1 yeah.03:47:43.8HOT-2 alright.03:47:44.4HOT-1 gives you the gate, flags yes or no, and you’re 

good to takeoff * * *. so *. those are the three things your doing and actually four if you count the book. takeoff landing ID.

03:47:53.9HOT-2 okay.
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03:47:56.7HOT-2 alright.03:47:57.5HOT-1 select it.03:47:59.4HOT-1 *, cool.03:47:59.4HOT-2 alright.03:48:03.2HOT-1 '* * gate two you got a new terminal building in 

Traverse City, I remember watchin' it get built so I have an idea where it is, but I've never parked at and they say on their NOTAMS that all the ah 

markings for the parking spots aren't there so we have to line-up with the guys hips. 

03:48:17.5HOT-2 okay.03:48:18.8HOT-1 so my understanding is we used to park here 

under the control tower and that's the new 

terminal over there.

03:48:29.5HOT-1 and so two eight be a left turn off probably at the 

complete # end.
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03:48:38.0HOT-1 well we know what runway we're doin. [sound of 

chuckle].

03:48:39.8HOT-2 [sound of chuckle].03:48:40.5HOT-1 where we're goin' missed so you can go ahead 

prepare for twenty eight.

03:48:43.2HOT-2 alright.03:48:44.3HOT-1 [sound of chuckle].03:48:46.8HOT-2 twenty five minutes out, okay.03:48:52.1HOT-2 ILS two eight.03:48:53.2HOT-1 yup.03:48:54.9HOT-1 when you select it I would do. 03:48:56.7HOT-2 vectors?
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03:48:58.0HOT-1 ah # I wonder what arc we're gonna do. we're 

gonna have to re-select that why don't keep it on vectors right now. 

03:49:03.9HOT-2 what's the what's the ah?03:49:06.6HOT-1 alright?03:49:07.0HOT-2 hours you think?03:49:07.9HOT-1 we're so late that the tower's not open I guarantee 

it.

03:49:11.2HOT-2 alright.03:49:11.6HOT-1 alright.03:49:12.6HOT-1 so without a tower center's gonna transition us 

either on the north arc or south arc.

03:49:15.8

CTR (Flagship) forty seven twelve contact Minneapolis 

center one two three point seven two.
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03:49:21.0

RDO-2 Minneapolis center one two three point seven two 

forty seven twelve. *. 

03:49:25.6HOT-2 two three.

03:49:32.1

AWOS [Hartwell AWOS report]. 

03:49:36.5HOT-1 well that's obviously the wrong frequency. that's 

obviously the, well we'll leave it up. 

03:49:43.9HOT-2 it was *.03:49:51.4HOT-1 maybe he was readin' it to a pilot, sounded like 

AWOS but.

03:49:54.7HOT-2 yeah it did.03:49:55.5HOT-1 s' give 'em a shot.

03:49:56.3

RDO-2 and Minneapolis center Flagship forty seven twelve 

through ah flight level two five zero to ah flight level two seven zero.
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03:50:02.5HOT-1 it's drivin' me nuts.

03:50:02.9

CTR Flagship forty seven twelve Minneapolis center 

roger.

03:50:06.2HOT-1 alright your at seven hundred feet above two five 

oh.

03:50:09.2HOT-2 okay.03:50:10.1HOT-1 two five eight two six oh but not two five.03:50:12.3HOT-2 okay.03:50:13.2HOT-2 two five sev- alright.03:50:13.7HOT-1 so flight level two five eight for two seven zero. 03:50:16.6HOT-2 alright.03:50:17.4HOT-1 *.
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03:50:20.0HOT-1 so if you gonna round it to the next thousand 

round it to one that your closest too, I been doin' that alot but I like, everyone out here * two six oh. two six one two six two for two seven oh.

03:50:30.1HOT-2 * * two seven zero. *.03:50:30.5HOT-1 two seven zero * alright.03:50:32.8HOT-2 alright.03:50:34.2CAM [sound of altitude warning tone].03:50:34.3HOT-1 so that's the radio etiquette. twenty six for twenty 

seven.

03:50:37.9HOT-2 twenty six for twenty seven.03:50:41.4HOT-2 alright you wanna do vectors or you just don't 

know03:50:43.7

HOT-1 let's do vectors.
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03:50:44.5HOT-1 ahm I'm trying to show you something though if 

they give us- * ah you selected it so # it [sound of chuckle].

03:50:51.4HOT-2 (I thought you said vector) *. 03:50:52.4HOT-1 yeah but I a don't you don't have to select vectors. 03:50:54.8HOT-2 alright. *.03:50:55.2HOT-1 * * *, a you don't have to select it 'cause it 

automatically does it. but.

03:50:58.7HOT-2 alright.03:50:59.7HOT-1 here's twenty eight. I was trying to show you that's 

the arc for the ah the * south arc 'cause it's arcin' 

off the one eight zero radial. see that?

03:51:00.8HOT-2 alright.03:51:12.2HOT-2 *. alright wait where is it?
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03:51:17.0HOT-1 alright ** alright why don't we do this I'm I'll do this 

I'm gonna go to plane view alright.

03:51:22.2HOT-2 okay.03:51:23.1HOT-1 if I can get the right, alright. alright. ahh if I if I can 

get down to a scale that alright check this out, I'm 

gonna select this arc.

03:51:35.6HOT-2 okay.03:51:35.9HOT-1 see the south arc the one eighty eight zero radial? 03:51:37.1HOT-2 oh wow yes.03:51:39.0HOT-1 okay I'm gonna cancel mod. we go ILS two eight 

and I'm gonna do this arc. that's not the arc that's the procedure turn. see the procedure turn pop up?

03:51:49.7HOT-2 procedure turn.
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03:51:50.4HOT-1 so guess what if we get the fifteen DME arc, the 

north arc, that is not in this database.

03:51:56.9HOT-1 you see that okay so if he gives the north arc 

we're goin' green needles. or I'm building an arc in the database

03:51:56.9HOT-2 got 'em yes.03:52:03.6HOT-2 'kay.03:52:04.1HOT-1 I can zero three five zero two five. I'm sorry zero 

four five zero five five. zero six five very short arc isn't it?

03:52:10.2HOT-2 okay.03:52:13.9HOT-1 shorter'n it looks 'cause that's the lead-in radial at 

zero six five. 

03:52:17.0HOT-2 thirty five * five. 
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03:52:17.6HOT-1 well I’m just showin' ya but since we don't know 

what we're gettin'.

03:52:20.8HOT-2 fifteen DME.03:52:21.5HOT-1 just select two eight you don't have to select 

vectors, when you selected vectors all this went away, it's already selected.

03:52:21.6HOT-2 okay.03:52:29.4HOT-1 so if I go into legs right now Traverse City I gotta 

put my airport back in 'cause it always drops it when you have a runway that you pass the airport come back.

03:52:39.9HOT-2 okay.03:52:40.3HOT-2 alright my airports back in two eight's there it is 

vectors right? 

03:52:44.2HOT-2 alright.
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CVR Factual Report, Page 12-48 

03:52:44.8HOT-1 I didn’t have to select it and confirm and execute. 

see it on my plane view.

03:52:48.8HOT-2 alright.03:52:49.7HOT-1 cool, okay. but that’s how a DME arc works. 

Helena Montana, doesn't have a ah database for the arc that we always use. 

03:52:55.0HOT-2 * *.03:53:00.5HOT-2 okay.03:53:01.1HOT-1 so you have to either build it or fly it green needles 

and when gettin' checked out the first time as a captain.

03:53:06.5HOT-2 right.03:53:07.0HOT-1 ah you have to do it ah green needles we have to 

check you out green needles. * *.
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03:53:11.9HOT-1 so I to teach you how to do the white needles let 

your FO watch how good your doin' development I'm not gonna make guys do green needles that's the place I refuse to go in and give an (OE) to or do a check out till I've been there the other day last week.

03:53:16.3HOT-2 [sound of chuckle] *.03:53:26.6HOT-1 okay.03:53:27.3HOT-2 alright.03:53:28.2HOT-1 so we're done with that and we got two eight in 

there.

03:53:30.6HOT-2 thirty minutes out so we can do a.03:53:32.3HOT-1 we're forty four still (no it not) so we got some 

time.

03:53:33.5HOT-2 alright. alright.
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03:53:35.6HOT-1 chill out relax shoot something if you want to eat 

you # doughnut whatever [sound of chuckle] I'm gonna eat this bad #.

03:53:35.7HOT-2 * *.03:53:41.9HOT-2 I totally forgot about my doughnut man. 03:53:43.7HOT-1 aww.03:53:56.0HOT-1 eh turned my cowls off finally.03:53:57.7HOT-2 (name at) last meal.03:54:03.6HOT-1 I'm getting nine E weather.03:54:06.3HOT-2 okay alright. 03:54:18.3HOT-1 this is funny since towers closed.03:54:24.0HOT-2 alright.
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03:54:24.5HOT-1 the weather that we get won't be from tower It'll be 

from Northwest so I guarantee ya the weathers gonna be legal.

03:54:28.9HOT-2 [sound of chuckle] oh my &.03:54:32.0HOT-1 that's # up.03:54:32.9HOT-2 isn't that?03:54:35.1HOT-1 that is so # up. on a sixty five hundred foot runway 

dude no less.

03:54:39.2HOT-2 who request weather?03:54:40.3HOT-1 I just did (messages) comin'.03:54:42.1HOT-2 is that Northwest weather or is that METAR?03:54:44.0HOT-2 yea a METAR.03:54:45.0HOT-1 It's a METAR but Northwest generates it.
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03:54:47.5HOT-2 okay.03:54:48.6HOT-1 yeah the weather observer over at Traverse City 

it's a Northwest meteorological station, keeps the 

government from having to pay for it let's Northwest do # like this.

03:54:53.2HOT selcal, selcal. [electronic voice].03:54:59.4HOT-1 (it's at) zero four zero at eight. less of a tailwind 

'cause they got ten more degrees off.

03:55:04.9HOT-2 alright.03:55:06.0HOT-1 or actually we'll see.03:55:08.5HOT-2 zero four zero?03:55:10.9HOT [sound of single short electronic tone].03:55:12.6HOT-2 check it real quick?
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03:55:13.7HOT-1 yeah I'm trying to think of degrees (does) **.03:55:21.7HOT-2 or.03:55:28.6HOT-1 I don't know, I can't do my math. well two eight 

zero is only ten off of # west so hah that'd be a one hundred runway, right? so.

03:55:33.3HOT-2 see what it is.03:55:39.4HOT-1 sixty degree instead of a fifty degree now it's sixty 

degrees which lowers * the tailwind component also.

03:55:41.9HOT-2 right. right.03:55:46.0HOT-1 so mile and a half light snow eighteen hundred so 

we're gettin' in there.

03:55:51.8HOT-1 I'll let the flight attendant know.03:55:56.4HOT-1 so she d' have to worry 'bout it anymore.
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03:55:59.9HOT-2 eighty, eighty plus forty. it's a hundred twenty 

degrees.

03:56:07.3FA yeah.03:56:07.7INT-1 hey hey.03:56:08.7FA hey hey.03:56:09.0INT-1 how ya doin' ah the weather the winds have dyin' 

down a little bit the later we get here so we're good to get into Traverse City I just wanted to let you know so you didn't have to worry about it. 

03:56:17.7FA terrific.03:56:18.6INT-1 alright we're about ah forty minutes out. 03:56:21.3FA okay good.03:56:22.3INT-1 awesome.
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03:56:23.1FA thank you very much.03:56:23.5INT-1 alright talk to you little bit. alright.03:56:24.8FA yup.03:56:38.5HOT-2 * in the runway forty. 03:56:40.3HOT-1 tell ya what I hate wakin' people up but, I'm gonna 

talk to these people we've already # delayed the # out of 'em, it’s a smooth ride, I want them to know that we're gettin' into Traverse City 'cause alot of them overheard us talkin' about Detroit, ya know? 

03:56:53.9HOT-2 alright just yeah make it like short sweet.03:56:55.1HOT [sound of single short electronic tone].
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03:56:56.7PA-1 a ladies and gentlemen from the ah flight deck 

welcome once again we do apologize for the delays gettin' out and the delays on the ground ah good news is the winds are dying down significantly in ah Traverse City so it's looks like we're gonna have no problems gettin' in this evening. ah weather right now is mile and a half visibility light snow overcast skies, ah winds out of the northeast at ten miles per hour right now, turned the seatbelt sign off remain seated * seatbelt fasted we're showing about ah thirty minutes left en-route * * *.

03:57:02.9HOT-2 * * * * * * *.03:57:40.1HOT-2 like twenty degrees.03:57:42.1HOT-1 well its only off the tail, it's a one hundred runway 

it's a zero four zero so that's sixty degrees.

03:57:50.1HOT-2 alright I though it was a hundred twenty degrees.03:57:51.9HOT-1 well from the other way it is, but it's a from tail. 03:57:54.1HOT-2 alright.
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03:57:56.7HOT-2 right.03:57:57.1HOT-1 your relative wind is forty degrees this angle right 

here is forty degrees.

03:58:00.8HOT-2 okay03:58:01.3HOT-1 see what I mean?03:58:02.2HOT-2 right.03:58:02.6HOT-1 er I'm a sorry sixty not forty sixty.03:58:04.6HOT-2 alright so you'd go you'd go to sixty degrees?03:58:06.6HOT-1 so I'd come yeah its says come out and then wind 

velocity.

03:58:09.1HOT-2 * right here? and it's eight knots?
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03:58:11.1HOT-1 it's only eight which obviously can't have a ten 

knot tailwind component. so it's like six knot tailwind.

03:58:17.1HOT-2 alright.03:58:18.0HOT-1 that's (funny) so I'll be on the bottom of the (bug). 03:58:22.6HOT-2 it's not too *.03:58:22.8HOT-1 yeah it won't be too bumpy down there, there's a 

pretty good hill out there man there's a pretty good a piece a terrain. hah.

03:58:29.5HOT-2 terrain is not good?03:58:30.9HOT-1 it's not bad it just when your on a visual if you out 

far enough.

03:58:34.7HOT-2 yeah.
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03:58:35.6HOT-1 airport eleven's ah six forty but look at that tower 

out there two thousand feet. that's fourteen hundred foot difference on the arc you see on thearc highest terrain?

03:58:37.3HOT-2 oh shoot **?03:58:47.2HOT-1 there you gonna see that arrow look how high the 

highest terrain is right there, fourteen hundred feet above airport elevation so if your doing a base to final on a visual at night into Traverse City you become very familiar with that hah tower 'cause pattern altitude if you just add fifteen hundred feet, to airport elevation's only twenty one hundred, fifty feet higher than that tower so you you wanna pick a different pattern altitude when you come in here at night, doing base to final #.

03:58:58.6HOT-2 yeah.03:59:15.6HOT-2 alright.
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03:59:16.2HOT-1 ah non-controlled environment we'll probably do 

the south arc, he'll give us a heading to join the ah * fly heading one five zero join the fifteen DME arc cleared ILS runway two eight change to advisory frequency approved notify me on the ground this frequency or missed approach blah blah blah, yeah. and on CTAF give him some iams- IFR to joint the fifteen DME arc but also tell 'em that we're east south east of the field we're a regional 

jet they don't know what a Flagship is we'll be 

landing runway two eight any other traffic in the area please advise, so we'll have CA- CTAF on one and we'll listening to center on two when he hands us over so that we always have radio contact whenever the # hits the fan.

04:00:06.0HOT-2 where the where this yeah I'm looking for the 

CTAF right now.

04:00:06.2HOT-2 where at.04:00:09.0HOT-1 tower frequency.04:00:10.6HOT-2 alright.04:00:13.9HOT-1 says CTAF.
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04:00:15.3HOT-2 yeah.04:00:15.5HOT-1 twenty four two.04:00:23.4HOT-1 alright dude. * you have the radios just have fun 

with nobodies listening to you (anyhow it's too) late at night they're on eastern time so it's twelve 

o'clock there already and we're.

04:00:38.2HOT-1 * two eight but that's what were doin' weather we 

like it or not, ahm there's no arrival procedure we'll 

plan our descent (on and on) so I'd like to have thirty out at the VOR ah eleven thousand feet when you get a chance.

04:00:51.6HOT-2 okay.04:00:52.5HOT-1 ah I'll tell ya what you do it now and we'll just drag 

(it out) the VOR * thirty out at eleven.

04:01:00.0HOT-2 okay.
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04:01:06.6HOT-1 [sound similar to yawn] your back's gonna be sore 

from being in that seat leaning over to type hah shorter you are the worse it is.

04:01:14.6HOT-2 confir- ah confirm?04:01:15.4HOT-1 ah put put my eleven thousand in there then we'll 

execute it. put your eleven thousand over. 

04:01:21.1HOT-2 oh eleven thousand.04:01:22.3HOT-1 yup that how I get my descent planning.04:01:24.4HOT-2 alright.04:01:25.4HOT-1 without that I got no VNAV.04:01:30.8HOT-1 execute. 04:01:31.5HOT-2 alright * execute.
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04:01:34.3HOT-1 alright so that's our descent ah two Jan oh June 

oh six what do you have on your chart? It's eleven dash one.

04:01:43.8HOT-2 *.04:01:46.9HOT-2 eleven dash one t- January second, yup. I concur. 04:01:50.1HOT-1 alright ah good, ILS two eight (ten) seven almost 

set twice. set twice. two seventy nine's inbound twenty five forty nine over GWENN. you wanna pop that in there also? twenty five forty nine over GWENN. eight twenty is decision height ah eight seventeen sorry eight twenty in the window.

04:02:03.7HOT-2 alright * * * twenty nine forty nine.04:02:15.4HOT-1 if we have to go missed its climb to eleven 

hundred before we turn then we turn left to three thousand direct to the VOR so that's cake. alright it'll be white needles auto tune you know what I mean? so heading sync heading mode * to four hundred feet autopilot on.

04:02:29.6HOT-2 alright.
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04:02:30.3HOT-1 yada yada yada. alright and that's a teardrop 

entry. that requires half mile visibility right now we have it. not by much but we have it.

04:02:41.1HOT-2 alright.04:02:41.5HOT-1 alright any equipment goes out we're lookin' at 

three quarters of a mile anything else goes bad we're goin' to # Detroit.

04:02:47.7HOT-2 [sound of chuckle].04:02:49.3HOT-1 ah we'll take one look at it if it's nasty we're you 

know if we go missed we're going Detroit unless it's my fault and we got fuel for it.

04:02:55.6HOT-2 alright.04:02:56.5HOT-1 ah it's a left turn off at the end sixty five hundred 

feet * gonna tell ya what better look at what I got on that. I got ah HIRLS MASLR and no VASI at all that is some #.

04:03:11.6HOT-2 no # VASI? 
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04:03:12.5HOT-1 no just HIRL MASLR that's great. just gets better. 04:03:16.9HOT-2 got MALSR though.04:03:18.3HOT-1 yeah ya got MALSR.04:03:19.9HOT-2 no VASI though.04:03:20.9HOT-1 no VASI so hundred and fifty feet wide sixty five 

hundred feet long. cha ching. any questions? 

04:03:30.8HOT-2 [sound similar to sigh] no questions.04:03:33.3HOT-1 * approach ah complete you can execute that I 

don't know what well what'd ya do wait a minute.

04:03:34.9HOT-2 (off) okay. 04:03:40.6HOT-1 yeah okay that’s right execute, and I'll tell ya what 

you ah execute.

04:03:42.4HOT-2 *.
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04:03:44.4HOT-2 eh ah twenty five forty nine?04:03:46.2HOT-1 yeah something’s not right on that.04:03:47.4HOT-2 twenty five forty nine.04:03:48.4HOT-1 yeah twenty five forty nine.04:03:51.6HOT-1 [sound of chuckle] * * * * *.04:03:55.9HOT-2 and alright and ah let's se I'm gonna get the 

landing weight and the numbers.

04:04:00.4HOT-1 'kay you go ahead and execute that though so we 

don't get another caution * so twenty eight ten twenty five forty nine execute. [sound similar to prolonged yawn while speaking].

04:04:05.3HOT-2 'kay.04:04:06.2HOT-1 yep.
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04:04:06.6HOT-2 alright. execute. alright.04:04:07.8HOT-1 'kay. now you can figure out your weights.04:04:09.8HOT-2 alright.04:04:16.5HOT-1 yeah we give up four hundred pounds # around 

with that. good thing he gave me all that gas.

04:04:22.3HOT-2 let see * forty one.04:04:28.7HOT-2 let's how much gas we gonna land with here.04:04:33.8HOT-1 your not guessin' you know.04:04:35.6HOT-2 alright.04:04:36.0HOT-1 forty one six is your (zero) fuel weight. 04:04:38.6HOT-2 okay.
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04:04:39.6HOT-1 forty six six. I'm comin' up with forty six two if you 

round their way it's forty six three.

04:04:46.4HOT-2 forty six three it's not forty seven (thou-)?04:04:48.3HOT-1 yup.04:04:49.0HOT-2 'kay04:04:51.4HOT-1 good, short runway night snow tailwind heavy 

airplane, love it. [sound of laughter] ya know?

04:05:02.8HOT-1 the public's in good hands with Allstate you know 

what I mean?

04:05:07.2HOT-2 the way it's always is.04:05:08.5HOT-1 it is. it is by the time you get done doin' everyone 

else’s job you don't have time for your own. and 

you'll f- know what I'm talkin' about when you getgoin' you know what I mean? 

04:05:09.1HOT-2 one forty seven [sound of chuckle].
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04:05:17.3HOT-1 you'll make a stupid # mistake that almost cost 

you your life and when you look at it it's gonna be 

because you were doin' somebody else’s fixin' somebody else’s mistake.

04:05:27.5HOT-1 I'm not talkin' about as a check airmen I'm talkin' 

about dispatches mistake, load controls mistake, rampers not showin' up. you know?

04:05:37.2HOT-1 temperature drops like five to ten degrees below 

zero at Mini and they have a forty percent sick call rate. hah. so.

04:05:50.4HOT-2 alright speeds are set.04:05:51.9HOT-1 alright.04:05:53.2HOT-2 alright do an in-range?04:05:54.2HOT-1 alright so what'd you edit out there?04:05:56.8HOT-2 one forty.
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04:05:58.4HOT-1 alright * * display hanging like this *. * * set it on 

the runway * *.

04:05:59.8HOT-2 *.04:06:02.4HOT-2 alright forty seven on the runway? 04:06:04.0HOT-1 execute. 04:06:04.6HOT-2 alright.04:06:05.2HOT-1 don't leave the box hanging guys look down and 

go what the # d'ya do?

04:06:07.9HOT-2 okay.04:06:08.4HOT-1 [sound of chuckle] and then he won't believe that 

you did what you did so hit cancel mod make you do it again. you know what I mean?

04:06:14.4HOT-1 alright so ATIS is we tried to get ATIS its ah.
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04:06:18.3

CTR Flagship forty seven twelve change to my frequency 

one three two point niner.

04:06:22.3HOT-1 watch this don't answer.04:06:25.4HOT-1 now answer we're on your frequency thirty two 

niner.

04:06:28.6

RDO-2 roger forty seven twelve with you forty ah thirty two 

niner.

04:06:32.2HOT-1 theyup.

04:06:32.7

CTR Flagship forty seven twelve Minneapolis center 

Traverse City altimeter is two niner five five. descend pilots discretion maintain one one thousand.

04:06:38.5HOT-1 (excellent).04:06:44.0HOT-1 PD eleven.04:06:44.7HOT-2 two niner niner five?
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04:06:45.8HOT-1 yup.

04:06:47.1

RDO-2 alright pilots discretion down to ah one one 

thousand two niner niner five for Flagship ah forty seven twelve.

04:06:52.6

CTR roger.

04:06:54.2HOT-1 alright so PD to eleven right?04:06:55.9HOT-2 alright.04:06:56.3HOT-1 pilots discretion. 04:06:57.6HOT-2 so.04:06:59.9HOT-2 okay.04:07:00.6HOT-1 thank you, * * * (choice) till you set it.04:07:03.4HOT-2 alright.
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04:07:04.1HOT-1 so I'm * * my top of descent. that's why I set it. 04:07:06.1HOT-2 okay.04:07:08.0HOT-1 see why we do that thirty out? awesome. eleven.04:07:14.6HOT-1 say it when you set it.04:07:15.5HOT-2 oh ahw eleven thousand (set confirm).04:07:15.8HOT-1 eleven, set checks.04:07:18.2HOT-2 *.04:07:18.9HOT-1 (that it?)04:07:20.0HOT-2 alright.04:07:22.1HOT-1 might wanna rock and roll * we'll be on the ground 

in about.

04:07:25.2HOT-2 have to get landing data and all that but.
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04:07:26.8HOT-1 yup.04:07:28.8HOT-2 my *.04:07:32.4HOT-1 love that arrival page it's not it's not active till the 

door opens but you love to look at it. 

04:07:38.6HOT-1 [sound of chuckle].04:07:42.0HOT-1 ah we do need to do that so we we need 

something in there yeah. alright.

04:07:42.5HOT-2 * * * * er range.04:07:47.3HOT-1 shouldn't have any specials but we.04:07:48.6HOT-2 and the time is gonna be?04:07:51.4HOT-1 thirty eight oh four thirty eight.04:07:53.0HOT-2 (four is ah) * * *?
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04:07:54.2HOT-1 I'll talk to * about that but right now I just want you 

to throw a number in it you know what I mean? I'm happy if you remember to do it.

04:08:00.7HOT-1 alright.04:08:01.0HOT-1 then we'll talk about what & was talkin' about * * *. 04:08:02.8HOT-2 any any no we're not doin' that. (ah I missed the 

night page). * * *? no. 

04:08:05.2HOT-1 no we're not doin' any more flyin' today. no. 04:08:10.1HOT-2 any wheelchairs anything? 04:08:11.4HOT-1 not a thing. just hit send.04:08:14.3HOT-2 alright. * *.04:08:22.7HOT selcal, selcal [electronic voice].
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04:08:23.8HOT-1 'kay wait on that don't even look at (so doesn't) * * 

* go (9E) request.

04:08:28.2HOT-2 alright.04:08:29.2HOT-1 landing two eight. that way we don't have to (listen 

to) the selcal twice now hit send. you can actually watch it (in) message come in, see here's our inrange watch's it pop up and then you'll know. see how we didn't get a selcal your ears don't hurt.

04:08:45.0HOT-2 ahuh.04:08:50.0HOT-1 * * would take this # out. and it was gate two forty 

seven max landing flaps eight go around.

04:08:57.3HOT-2 alright.04:08:57.8HOT-1 thirty two degrees OPS forty seven (card) that's 

what they said that agreed agreed with us right?

04:09:04.4HOT-1 so he told me PD to eleven when I start this 

descent you need to report that descent * * two seven zero for eleven.
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04:09:12.8HOT-2 okay.04:09:13.5HOT-1 alright. it's.04:09:16.5HOT-2 two seven zero for eleven.04:09:17.7HOT-1 yup say we're s- starting down whatever you 

wanna say leavin' two seven zero for eleven. hey thanks. keeps 'em heads up a what we're doin' how we doin' our descent planning. 

04:09:25.7HOT-2 alright.04:09:26.6HOT-1 alright alright so, we've got ATIS kinda, almost.04:09:31.6HOT-2 alright.04:09:32.4HOT-1 we gettin' it? see what's our ATIS it's a nineteen 

seventeen.

04:09:37.5HOT-2 nineteen seventeen. alright. want me to get it over 

here?
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04:09:47.1HOT-1 [sound similar to yawn] oh shyot.

04:09:52.0

AWOS Traverse City (Cherry Capital) airport automated 

weather observation04:09:52.9

HOT-1 * * * log overnight to a average overnight [sound 

of chuckle]

04:09:56.8

AWOS zero four zero04:09:58.0

HOT-2 * * .

04:09:58.4

AWOS * *-

04:09:59.0HOT-1 no.

04:09:59.2

AWOS wind zero four zero at zero seven, visibility04:10:03.8

HOT-1 *.
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04:10:04.3

AWOS one and one half light snow sky condition (two) 

niner hundred broken one thousand five hundred overcast two thousand two hundred temperature zero zero Celsius dewpoint minus zero one Celsius altimeter two niner five four remarks.

04:10:28.5HOT-1 two niner five four?

04:10:29.8

AWOS hours of operation are seven AM local time till ten 

PM local time the frequency for * * *- 

04:10:34.1HOT-1 way off what he gave us.

04:10:35.2

AWOS one niner point one seven five common * advisory 

frequency is one two four point two pilot operator approach lighting is available on one two four point two for IFR services contact Minneapolis center on one three two point niner for additional services contact (Lansing) radio on one two two point (two) or one two two point six five.

04:10:54.4HOT-1 alright, good?04:10:55.6HOT-2 yup.
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04:10:56.2HOT-1 okay couple things that are different about this 

airport, nobody's gonna tell you cleared to land.

04:11:02.1HOT-2 right.04:11:02.5HOT-1 so these need to come on when you know your 

gonna land.

04:11:06.0HOT-2 alright.04:11:06.3HOT-1 alright.04:11:07.2HOT-1 if it's nasty gnarly out don't turn 'em on you'll just 

blind yourself in the clouds.

04:11:12.4HOT-2 alright.04:11:12.9HOT-1 you know use just your recog maybe just your 

nose light. you know. just these no nose feel out see what you see better with.

04:11:19.5HOT-2 alright.
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04:11:19.7HOT-1 they reflect right back in your face.04:11:21.3HOT-2 alright.04:11:21.9HOT-1 alright.04:11:22.7HOT-1 ahm CTAF controlled lighting it's just like Hot 

Spring if we don't key up the lights. we're not 

seein' the runway 'cause they're gonna be on at all.

04:11:30.0HOT-2 shh really? oh my &.04:11:31.9HOT-1 alright?04:11:32.0HOT-2 got it, yeah.04:11:33.6HOT-1 CTAF calls we already talked about tell 'em who 

you are where you are what you are they don't know what a Flagship is. big difference between an CRJ comin' around an arc and a one fifty. one fifty take ten minutes do it we'll it about a minute and a half. [sound of chuckle] ** you know.
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04:11:48.5HOT-2 okay.04:11:49.0HOT-1 so.04:11:49.9HOT-2 why don't why we have the arc up?04:11:54.8HOT-1 I don't know if we're gonna get it yet I know what 

kinda * coverage he has but I'm gonna ask him some things here in a second 'cause he reported what we read back we read back two niner seven five for an altimeter and they're reporting two niner five five. somebody else is two niner five six so I think the current's two niner five six. but he he'll give us another one when he gives us lower. if he gives us anything that diff- grossly different we want to check it again right now I'm gonna set five five 'cause that's what ATIS has and I've heard give some other ones that were five six five five. 

04:12:27.0HOT-2 alright.04:12:29.8HOT-1 oh I'm gonna say goodbye to the folks then we'll 

start descending.
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04:12:36.5PA-1 ah ladies and gentlemen from the ah flight deck 

short flight as promised once airborne we gonna be a begin our descent here in about two minutes 

seatbelt signs comin' back on be on the ground about fifteen minutes and we do apologize once again for the delays today ah park at gate two the weather hasn't changed must since talked to you last ah winds still out of the northeast tens miles per hour temperatures ah just above freezing right now thirty ah three degrees Fahrenheit thank you once again for choosing Northwest Northwest Airlink as your carrier have a good night.

04:12:44.2HOT [sound of single electronic chime].04:13:10.3HOT-1 ya ya, alright.04:13:14.6HOT-1 couldn't remember the # temperature, told 'em it 

was just above freezing.

04:13:23.8HOT-2 ah since we have radar why can't they they can 

vector onto the approach can't they?
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04:13:28.5HOT-1 I don't that they have radar coverage if the tower 

is a visual tower anyhow. I don't know where their radar coverage stops they got terrain at two thousand feet and arc at thirty somethin' hundred feet. thirty five hundred foot arc and terrain at two 

thousand I doubt they have very good radar coverage.

04:13:45.0HOT-2 okay.04:13:45.3HOT-1 so I don't know that's why I'm puttin' in if he can 

vector us and ha- we don't get below his minimum vectoring altitude then he can give us the clearance, ya know?

04:13:54.8HOT-2 ya right.04:13:55.1HOT-1 he may even be able to give us the fifteen DME 

fix. 

04:14:00.9HOT-1 yeah.
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04:14:05.0HOT-1 but we'll see or he may say ah a procedure turn 

[sound of chuckle]. we may * have do the Traverse City and go do the GWENN go out and do a procedure turn.

04:14:18.8HOT-2 alright.04:14:19.5HOT-1 you know if we do that we'll be we'll at two 

hundred knots when we hit Traverse City VOR so it keeps the radius close and tight.

04:14:26.9HOT-2 okay.04:14:28.6HOT-1 it fly’s actual map it doesn't do timing like when we 

used to hack timing out it fly’s an actual map so you don't get outside of your protected airspace.

04:14:38.1HOT-2 okay.04:14:49.2HOT-1 but yeah be ready to have to build the box no big 

deal.

04:14:53.4HOT-2 see we got all the data for everything?
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04:14:56.1HOT-1 we're ready to rock.04:14:57.1HOT-2 * ready to rock.04:14:57.8HOT-1 yeah we've already briefed it.04:14:59.6HOT-2 'kay.04:15:01.2HOT-1 you still you got forty seven (cards) and that 

speeds are all set.

04:15:06.0HOT-2 alright.04:15:08.0HOT-1 I'm gonna start down.04:15:10.4HOT-2 okay.04:15:16.3HOT-1 just go ahead and tell 'em we're leav04:15:16.5HOT-2 *.
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04:15:17.4HOT-1 naw just tell 'em we're leavin' two seven zero for 

eleven.

04:15:22.1HOT-1 ah give 'em a second aw he just went missed hah. 04:15:25.4HOT-2 outta where?04:15:26.0HOT-1 I don't know he said say intentions so he just went 

missed.

04:15:30.2HOT-1 (that's great) * give 'em give 'em a second.04:15:37.2HOT-1 [sound of chuckle].04:15:39.1HOT-1 guess his intentions were to go back shoot 

another approach [sound of laughter]. ouch.

04:15:46.4HOT-1 oh a thirty seven.04:15:46.7HOT-2 ah yeah.
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04:15:49.6HOT-1 just tell 'em hey for- center Flagship forty seven 

twelve's starting down.

04:15:54.1

RDO-2 and Minneapolis center forty seven twelve starting 

down.

04:15:59.0HOT-1 * *.04:16:04.6HOT-1 ah so we'll transition to two ninety 'cause we're 

descendin'. 

04:16:08.1HOT-2 'kay.04:16:18.4HOT-2 your right my back does hurt man.04:16:20.4HOT-1 yup. throwin' bags around bendin' over for ACARS 

doin' walkarounds lookin' up in wheel wells and pullin' hatches and. so it * a wonder how (&) and some of these * these old FOs do it.

04:16:32.8

CTR Flagship forty seven twelve descend pilot's 

discretion maintain five thousand.
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04:16:38.0

RDO-2 pilot's discretion down to five thousand Flagship 

forty seven twelve. 

04:16:43.1

RDO-1 ah I knew you gave it to us once could you ah recheck our altimeter to Traverse City for forty seven 

twelve.

04:16:48.5

CTR certainly can the Traverse City altimeter is, two 

niner five five.

04:16:54.6

RDO-1 I appreciate it two niner five five for forty seven 

twelve.

04:16:57.7HOT-2 five thousand set.04:16:59.0HOT-1 five thousand set.04:17:04.8HOT-1 alright, so as a flying pilot right now you gotta be 

real careful you don't blow through ten thousand doin' two hundred ninety knots. right.

04:17:13.5HOT-2 right
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04:17:13.6HOT-1 with the altitude set we're in a vertical mode this is 

when guys do it. now I think we're back in the clouds and we're below forty again.

04:17:21.3HOT-2 'kay.04:17:21.9HOT-1 piece of crap. [sound of chuckle] it's hard at night 

you know all these reflections look like stars so it's hard to tell. eleven hundred left turn three thousand to the VOR that's easy enough.

04:17:33.5HOT-2 alright left turn direct to the VOR.04:17:35.3HOT-1 yeah. after eleven hundred feet which eleven 

hundred feet's about five hundred AGL so right after (having gone) we'll start turning. 

04:17:44.1HOT-1 * *.

04:17:58.4

CTR and Flagship forty seven twelve do you have the 

current weather for Traverse City?

04:18:02.1

RDO-2 that's affirmative Flagship forty seven twelve.
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04:18:14.3HOT-1 I usually tell 'em then you know that's affirmative 

we * like to land two eight? you know there's no it's a VOR Alpha we could do but (our assured to land) a thousand and three, I don't think last time 

we checked we had that right what's the ceiling at?

04:18:29.1HOT-2 it's a broken at ah04:18:32.2HOT-1 we don't have a three.04:18:33.1HOT-2 nine hundred.04:18:34.1HOT-1 okay yeah we don't have that either. alright. but he 

knows, he's (further near) Traverse City * * # it.

04:18:42.4HOT-2 alright.04:18:43.4HOT-1 'kay these are pieces of #. I * * a wet dog ready to 

go to sleep tonight dude. (I'm ready).

04:18:56.4HOT-2 not bad.
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04:19:05.0HOT-1 you're not gonna be a rock star when you get on 

line that's what six hundred eight hundred hours of flyin's for. know what I mean?

04:19:11.7HOT-2 alright.04:19:12.7HOT-1 you're not gonna be a rock star.04:19:17.8HOT-1 but I just wanna make sure your Jackin' people 

you know. so you're gettin' closer and closer to that. I don't like this trend of flyin' worse instead of flyin' better. you know what I mean. and we'll, eh tomorrow we'll have you hand flyin' I'm not gonna fly any more legs. so * Detroit's got big runways and it's gonna be a little windy 'cause this'll still be pushin' out * * shorts * kick your #. * descent check.

04:19:48.9HOT-2 descent check.04:20:09.2HOT-2 alright seatbelt signs?04:20:10.7HOT-1 on.
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04:20:11.7HOT-2 alright pressurization?04:20:12.7HOT-1 set.04:20:13.4HOT-2 fuel?04:20:13.8HOT-1 check.04:20:14.9HOT-2 and check.04:20:15.9HOT-2 altimeters?04:20:17.6HOT-1 ah two niner five five left is there showin' 

seventeen two.

04:20:20.9HOT-2 and two niner five five seventeen two * * landing 

data?

04:20:25.7HOT-2 set right.04:20:26.4HOT-1 set left.
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04:20:28.2HOT-2 CAS check. 04:20:30.2HOT-1 clear.04:20:41.1HOT-2 # I'm tired. approach briefing.04:20:43.4HOT-1 complete.04:20:44.0HOT-2 descent check complete.04:20:45.1HOT-1 ah I just looked in here for somethin' whaddya 

think I was lookin' for?

04:20:52.4HOT-1 thirty fifty five, OPS frequency.04:20:55.2HOT-2 alright.04:20:55.2HOT-1 ah reason I'm doin' this * is I'm gonna get ah field 

conditions from 'em 'cause they're actually legally responsible for it.
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04:21:04.2

RDO-1 ah Traverse City operations Flagship forty seven 

twelve.

04:21:18.9HOT-1 nobodies home nobodies home [in a singsong 

voice]. make sure I read it right. * * read * our alternates or somethin'. nope.

04:21:32.3HOT-1 probably not even there * decided to go home.04:21:36.4HOT-2 *.

04:21:36.9

RDO-1 Traverse City operations Flagship forty seven 

twelve.

04:22:04.0

CTR Flagship forty seven twelve I'm sorry did you say 

you had the weather at Traverse City?

04:22:08.5HOT-1 yeah. landing two eight, like to land.

04:22:09.8

RDO-2 that's affirmative ah F- Flagship a twenty or forty 

seven twelve landing two eight.
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04:22:16.1

CTR Flagship forty seven twelve roger fly present 

heading radar vectors ILS final approach course Traverse City say the heading.

04:22:21.4HOT-? *.04:22:22.9HOT-1 heading's is now one oh five or one hundred.

04:22:25.0

RDO-2 roger heading's one oh five radar vectors ah for the 

ILS ah two eight for Flagship forty seven twelve.

04:22:30.2

CTR roger.

04:22:31.2HOT-2 alright.04:22:31.7HOT-1 alright.04:22:33.4HOT-1 ah present heading so final heading so final NAV 

is set up this side this side.

04:22:34.3HOT-2 sweet.
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04:22:36.8HOT-2 alright.04:22:40.1HOT-2 I can drive 'em over though. drive 'em over [in a 

singsong voice]. put in the pink and make it big?

04:22:46.0HOT-1 okay let's do that. just don't go green till ya have it 

in final NAV.

04:22:47.3HOT-2 alright, alright.04:22:50.5HOT-1 alright.04:22:53.2HOT-2 alright CF two eight? what's a CF two eight? I'm s04:22:58.8HOT-1 twenty eight mile centerline fix.04:23:00.4HOT-2 alright should I hit this?04:23:01.2HOT-1 for runway two eight centerline fix, well you drove 

it right?

04:23:04.1HOT-2 no I haven't driven it yet.
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04:23:04.7HOT-1 okay don't hit that.04:23:05.8HOT-1 centerline fix for two eight it's not a twenty eight 

mile final it would be if it was on visual.

04:23:08.0HOT-2 alright (this).04:23:13.3HOT-1 * page *.04:23:14.3HOT-2 there ya go.04:23:16.1HOT-2 *?04:23:17.5HOT-1 make it big.04:23:18.4HOT-2 alright.04:23:20.0HOT-1 execute. 04:23:20.0HOT-2 confirm?
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04:23:22.4HOT-1 good he does have coverage and we're * over ten 

seven.

04:23:25.8HOT-2 ten seven?04:23:26.8HOT-1 alright.04:23:28.2HOT-2 okay.04:23:28.8HOT-1 just to # and giggle me go ahead and put ah 

Traverse City fourteen six in the standby.

04:23:34.4HOT-1 you gotta no let's set both of ours * * *. that's 

alright.

04:23:34.6HOT-1 selcal, selcal [electronic voice].04:23:38.2HOT-2 got it.04:23:40.7HOT-1 * *.04:24:00.1HOT-1 good work champ.
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04:24:07.7HOT-1 you can go ahead and do an approach check give 

her a little extra time.

04:24:12.5HOT-2 okay.04:24:13.0HOT-1 blue green. 04:24:16.9HOT-1 and we’ll do that with a APU also 'cause of the 

conditions.

04:24:24.2CAM [sound of electronic double chime]. 04:24:28.0HOT-2 turn APU on?04:24:28.9HOT-1 yeah.04:24:29.5HOT-2 alright.04:24:47.2HOT-1 alright and here's what I would do right now I'm 

gonna try OPS one more time but.

04:24:50.1HOT-2 'kay.
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04:24:51.8

RDO-1 operations Traverse City Flagship forty seven 

twelve ya up?

04:24:56.2HOT-2 approach check complete. 04:25:00.3HOT-1 ahh last time we'll try that, alright.04:25:02.7HOT-1 CTAF is what twenty four two?04:25:05.4HOT-1 yeah.04:25:05.6HOT-2 twenty four two.04:25:07.1HOT-1 (yeah).04:25:07.5HOT-2 I have it set.04:25:08.4HOT-2 yeah.
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04:25:09.4

RDO-1 Traverse City traffic ah Flagship forty seven twelve's 

regional jet we're ah to the west about twenty five miles be landing runway two eight any other traffic in please the area please advise Traverse City. 

04:25:14.3HOT-2 got blue needles.

04:25:22.3

OPS hey fla- Flagship forty seven twelve this is airport 

operations how do you copy. 

04:25:26.6

RDO-1 copy loud and clear.

04:25:28.8HOT-2 I don't hear anybody. nobody's in the pattern 

today.

04:25:28.8

OPS I've got multiple pieces of equipment on the airfield 

here on two eight and I'm running numbers for you as we speak I'll call you back in two minutes.

04:25:32.3HOT-1 *.04:25:36.8HOT-1 okay we're about a ahh probably thirteen minutes 

out ah at ah -
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04:25:43.6HOT-1 he's got equipment on the runway this gets better. 

04:25:45.1

OPS (other) that standby for my number I got 'em up for 

ya just just second here. 

04:25:49.0HOT-1 thank you sir.04:25:50.1HOT-2 numbers? what what I'm I'm not - alright. what 

numbers is he talkin' 'bout?

04:25:51.3

RDO-1 thank you sir.

04:25:55.6HOT-1 ah runway conditions mu they mu readings I don't 

know if you * that in in your FOM. ah so he's got a truck driving up down the # taxiways see how our braking's gonna be.

04:25:56.4HOT-2 never mind.04:25:59.7HOT-2 okay.04:26:08.8HOT-2 alright. sound good.
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04:26:09.3HOT-1 that works for me.04:26:15.2HOT-1 hey they could be out there with # wind meters. 

[sound similar to chuckle.].

04:26:17.6HOT-2 [sound similar to chuckle.].04:26:18.6HOT-1 just to keep Northwest from lyin'.04:26:22.0HOT-1 alright well it's been two two minutes so you go 

transfer bleeds.

04:26:24.8HOT-2 alright.04:26:28.8HOT-1 cool. I didn't expect OPS to call up but that's why 

we do that I guess.

04:26:33.3HOT-2 n' alright.04:26:33.8HOT-1 sure suck to land on a backhoe or some #. [sound 

of chuckle] check this out, star wars.
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04:26:38.9HOT-2 boy better- * * alright doesn't even feel like we're 

movin'.

04:26:44.9HOT-1 yeah heh well look look sideways. hey you should 

(flip) the strobes (on).

04:26:49.9

OPS Flagship forty seven twelve airport operations 

04:26:52.9HOT-1 now on two.04:26:53.8HOT-2 'kay.

04:26:54.6

RDO-1 yeah forty seven twelve go.

04:26:56.5

OPS yeah I've forty plus runway two eight I've got thin 

wet snow or patchy thin ice ah give us about ah five eight minutes to clear the runway ah when you're ready to land here give us a call. 

04:26:58.6HOT-1 that's mu.
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04:27:09.8

RDO-1 ah you need five to eight minutes ah we're twelve 

minutes out we copied the ah forty mu or better on two eight thank you.

04:27:17.7

OPS yeah okay we're gonna have these ah vehicles 

cleared off the second pass here and ah just keep us advised where you're at. 

04:27:19.5

CTR (the) SAAB *** turn left heading one one zero.

04:27:23.8

RDO-1 ah right now we're ah fifteen miles west of the field 

at ah *.

04:27:26.8

RDO-2 forty seven twelve one one zero. 

04:27:30.1

OPS okay and ah just a we'll we’ll I'll call you when we're 

clear.

04:27:30.2

CTR ah Flagship forty seven twelve negative that's for 

another aircraft.

04:27:35.7HOT-1 [sound of chuckle] alright.
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04:27:37.3HOT-2 I got.

04:27:45.4

RDO-1 ah Center's forty seven twelve do you kinda keep 

contact with a airport ops in ah Traverse City when we come in here?

04:27:52.3

CTR ahhh no I do not keep ah in contact with airport ops. 

04:27:56.7

RDO-1 alright we just called in range and apparently 

they've got some mu equipment on the runway for the next five to eight minutes so anywhere you wanna put us?

04:28:04.8

CTR okay we'll just vector you out ah long here on the 

ILS and ah when you feel comfortable you let me know we'll turn you back in. 

04:28:11.6

RDO-1 okay we'll do that thank you.

04:28:15.1HOT-2 alright.04:28:15.7HOT-1

Ahh I don't wanna be stuck (in this) go around just 

'cause there's equipment on the runway, ya know?
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04:28:20.9HOT-2 approach04:28:21.6

OPS Traverse City Traffic snow removal equipment on all 

surfaces any aircraft in the area please advise Traverse City.

04:28:29.1

RDO-1 and ah as previously reported Flagship forty seven 

twelve's regional jet ah we're still about ten miles west of the field we're plannin' on a long downwind to ah give you guys some time just advise when clear.

04:28:32.9CAM [sound similar to altitude alert chime].

04:28:42.1

OPS roger that forty seven twelve I'll call when we're 

clear here.

04:28:44.7

RDO-1 thank you sirra.

04:28:47.5HOT-1 alright six for five. 
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04:28:48.9

CTR and Flagship forty seven twelve show light ahhh 

precipitation 'bout ah twelve o'clock and three miles. and extending out to about fifty miles east of the 

field.

04:28:49.9HOT-1 * (quit).04:28:56.0HOT-1 yup.04:29:00.6HOT-1 thanks.

04:29:01.3

RDO-2 ah roger that thanks for for Flagship forty seven 

twelve.

04:29:05.9HOT-1 alright.04:29:09.7HOT-2 'kay.04:29:10.5HOT-1 there's snow removal on the field yet they're 

showing forty or better sounds like a contaminated # runway to me.
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04:29:17.1HOT-1 you don't put snow equipment on a runway, this 

the same place that drove one # snow truck down centerline, they took it off so we could land. sounds alot that that gettin' ready to go on again.

04:29:26.2HOT-1 ALTs cap.04:29:26.3HOT-2 ahuh.04:29:27.9HOT-1 so I'll tell what I'll do is ah we'll bug two hundred, 

we'll just slow 'cause all we're trying to do is buy time right now. 

04:29:28.7HOT-2 ALTs cap.04:29:33.7HOT-2 sure.04:29:35.4HOT-1 ahh fuel's good at four point seven. gonna' turn 

the wing on here a second.

04:29:40.9HOT-2 check.
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04:29:47.5HOT-1 I mean if they're running a full gauntlet it's gonna 

take them ten minutes to just go down to the (mile), 'cause they got s- they got trucks that -

04:30:02.2HOT-1 alright wings on please.04:30:09.4HOT-1 let's put GWENN in there too.

04:30:11.1

CTR and Flagship forty seven twelve what's the current 

heading?

04:30:15.0HOT-1 one oh five.

04:30:16.0

OPS and ah Flagship forty seven twelve airport ops how 

out are you now?

04:30:16.1

RDO-2 ah heading one oh five Flagship forty seven twelve. 

04:30:18.4

CTR Flagship forty seven twelve let's turn right to a 

heading of one one five.

04:30:23.2

RDO-2 turn to right one one five * Flagship forty seven 

twelve.
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04:30:24.6

RDO-1 we could be on the ground in ah five minutes or ah 

we can extend this out for a ah ten or fifteen 

minutes. what do you need?

04:30:32.7

OPS 'kay I'm gonna get my va- vehicles off the runway 

right now and then ah then I can you can land at your discretion here I just got call get my plows off.

04:30:40.7

RDO-1 okay ah no hurries.

04:30:45.6HOT-1 I don't like that #.04:30:50.3HOT-1 one one five on the heading (SWEARIG) is that 

all; *

04:30:52.4HOT-2 yep one one one one five.04:30:54.3HOT-1 it's getting dicey on the radio. it's not you're fault 

that's this is weird as #. this is what happened to me at Pinnacle (&). but instead of our APU start he was savin' 'em money and trying to start it at the marker close and then failed. [sound of chuckle]. oh we had a lot of # goin' on.
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04:30:55.9HOT-2 I know.04:31:16.5HOT-1 I was goin' off your heading. because we first 

reported one oh five off of your heading and we 

never changed our heading.

04:31:23.4HOT-2 alright.

04:31:24.0

OPS and forty seven twelve just second here I gotta get 

my last plow off the runway for ya. 

04:31:24.3HOT-1 * *.

04:31:28.3

RDO-1 Wilco appreciate the help forty seven twelve. 

04:31:32.3HOT-1 alright. I'm gonna talk to them * *.04:31:44.1HOT-1 I wanna hear him say the truck's off before we 

actually get a (clearance) but. 

04:31:49.0HOT-1 I'm thinkin' two to three miles past GWENN come 

back in let these boys do their thing.
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04:31:54.2HOT-2 alright.04:31:55.4HOT-1 at the speed we're doin'. you know I hope they 

didn’t leave trail marks. s' ya know.

04:32:04.6HOT-1 # me once shame on you # me twice shame on 

me. right?

04:32:09.0HOT-2 right.04:32:09.9HOT-1 this same airport same # I bet we get down there 

and see a three foot snow bank go off-road.

04:32:16.4

OPS and forty seven twelve all vehicles are clear of a 

runway two eight Traverse City.

04:32:20.9

RDO-1 excellent thank you very much ah we'll go ahead 

and turn in and Traverse City traffic Flagship forty seven twelve's regional jet I'll be doing the ILS 'bout two miles short of (CLINT) any traffic in the area please advise thanks guys. 

04:32:34.0

RDO-1 ah forty seven twelve OPS advises all the vehicles 

are cleared.
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04:32:51.2HOT-1 hoh. we just flagged the localizer off and on see 

how that goes.

04:32:58.7

CTR and Flagship forty seven twelve say again. 

04:33:02.1

RDO-1 yeah operations advises all vehicle clear of the 

runway we'll be ready for an approach when you are.

04:33:07.2

CTR okay be about another ahh two minutes 'till I get you 

out far enough to turn you back in onto the ILS.

04:33:12.4

RDO-1 excellent thanks for the help.

04:33:14.9HOT-1 ahhh.04:33:15.1HOT-2 sweet.04:33:18.5HOT-1 [sound similar to sigh].04:33:20.5HOT-1 dude * * can't win from losing today.
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04:33:24.4HOT-2 jeeze.04:33:24.8HOT-1 you know?04:33:25.3HOT-2 yeah.04:33:25.7HOT-1 just wanted a little somewhat standard flight for ya 

kinda let ya get your # up.

04:33:35.1HOT-1 feel like it was stopping on a dime have we done 

any short runways I guess Pensacola was sixty five for ya? 

04:33:40.4HOT-2 lets go with * * * *.04:33:40.5HOT-1 or seven thousand what was it seven or eight 

seven I guess.

04:33:40.5HOT-2 Pensacola sixty five.04:33:45.3HOT-2 yeah this is gonna be short. (I don't care).
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04:33:46.5HOT-1 yeah and at night it'll feel short too.04:33:50.9HOT-1 with contaminant. more than likely.

04:33:53.1

OPS * forty seven twelve you guys * * yet? 

04:33:56.7

RDO-1 I'm sorry the other radio's going what's that?

04:33:59.3

OPS you guys inside GWENN yet?

04:34:01.5

RDO-1 ahh the Center wouldn't let us turn yet so we're 

about one minute prior to the turn.

04:34:06.7

OPS okay roger that it's comin' down pretty good here so 

ahhh (guess) I'll see you on the ground here. 

04:34:09.5HOT-1 hah snowing hard.

04:34:11.7

RDO-1 excellent thanks for the help tonight.

04:34:15.3

CTR Flagship forty seven twelve descend pilot's 

discretion maintain three thousand five hundred.
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04:34:21.3

RDO-2 three thousand five hundred Flagship forty seven 

twelve.

04:34:23.3HOT-1 I'll set it for you thirty five alright. 04:34:24.3HOT-2 alright thirty five set alright. 04:34:29.5HOT-1 ah go double chime her to set her down.04:34:31.8HOT-2 double chime her.04:34:32.4HOT-1 thanks.04:34:34.8CAM [sound of single warning chime].04:34:34.9HOT [sound of electronic chime].04:34:35.5HOT-1 flaps eight.04:34:39.2HOT-2 ’kay.04:34:47.2HOT-2 why is the PA on?
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04:34:48.3HOT-1 (cause) she's telling them to sit the # down we've 

been cleared for the approach. put you seat backs in the upright position tray tables.

04:34:50.0CAM [sound of single warning chime].04:34:55.8HOT-2 what you want me to do that?04:34:57.4HOT-1 no that's what she's doing you asked why the PA 

light's on. she's making her announcement which when you double chime her she has to do it.

04:34:59.6HOT-2 oh she's doing that.04:35:03.8HOT-1 pretty cool huh?

04:35:07.6

RDO-1 Traverse City traffic Flagship forty seven twelve 

regional jet be turnin' about a ah fifteen mile final any other traffic please advise Traverse City.

04:35:17.9HOT-1 alt's cap.04:35:19.6HOT-2 alt's cap.
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04:35:20.5HOT-1 he's about (to) turn us is why I made that call.

04:35:22.4

OPS forty seven twelve how many minutes is that? fifteen 

miles out?

04:35:26.7

RDO-1 I wish he'd a turned us sooner but we're about five 

minutes from ah touchdown.

04:35:30.9

OPS okay I'll stay clear it's comin' down pretty good guys 

just to give ya a heads up.

04:35:35.1

RDO-1 ah how are the winds doin' fine?

04:35:38.0

OPS I'm not sure what the winds are doing I know they're 

out of the east.

04:35:40.7

RDO-1 thank you.

04:35:42.7

CTR Flagship forty seven twelve turn left to a heading of 

zero seven zero.

04:35:46.3

RDO-2 zero seven zero Flagship forty seven twelve. 
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04:35:49.4HOT-1 I guess that's all he's gonna give me eh? why 

don't we go ah flaps twenty bug one eighty.

04:35:59.3HOT-1 got a forty eight knot tailwind on this approach, 

see that?

04:36:05.3HOT-2 that's not good.04:36:06.5HOT-1 that's gonna be fun. that's why I'm slowin' the # 

down. our groundspeed gonna be like I'm doin' two fifty at the marker.

04:36:19.7HOT-1 says it comin' down good which means its 

snowing like a # and we probably won't see the runway. so be ready for the missed if it is we're going to Detroit that's all we got.

04:36:24.2HOT-2 alright.04:36:30.1HOT-1 come on center lets roll with this shot. (who 

knows) what these winds are doin' turns us turns 

us too sharp we'll miss the course. we'll miss the final approach fix.
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04:36:51.9HOT-1 I don't know what his concern is about the.04:36:54.0HOT-2 did (I) do final nav? yea well I am sure we did. 

04:36:57.2HOT-1 you did.04:36:58.2HOT-2 we did? yeah we did.04:36:58.8HOT-1 we did. * green needles (auto) tune.

04:37:01.2HOT-2 (okay).04:37:02.0HOT-1 don't touch a nothin'.04:37:02.9HOT-2 no I'm not.04:37:05.0HOT-1 come on dude I don't wanna go out into lala land 

let's go.

04:37:23.2HOT-1 ahhh # eh.
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04:37:25.4

CTR Flagship forty seven twelve turn left to ah heading of 

three four five.

04:37:27.7

OPS forty seven twelve airport ops.

04:37:30.7

RDO-2 say heading one more time forty seven twelve.

04:37:32.6

CTR Flagship forty seven twelve turn left heading three 

five five.

04:37:33.4

RDO-1 standby.

04:37:36.1

RDO-2 three five five Flagship forty seven twelve. 

04:37:39.1

RDO-1 ah what's ya got guys.

04:37:40.5

OPS I need to know if guys are gonna be landing soon 

'cause I gotta this its fillin' n pretty quick down here so ah how far are you guys out?

04:37:49.3

RDO-1 yeah we're intercepting the localizer right now so ah 

four and a half five minutes at the most.
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04:37:54.4

OPS who’s that?

04:37:55.9

RDO-1 got some funky winds up here it's ah tailwind of fifty 

knots on the approach and we're supposed to be shearing to an east wind so.

04:38:03.2

OPS yeah I'm gonna I don't know what the ah conditions 

like * down the runway but I'm gonna call braking action NIL now. cause' it's fillin in real hard. 

04:38:04.3

CTR Flagship forty seven twelve turn left to a heading of 

three one zero.

04:38:08.4

RDO-2 three one zero Flagship forty seven twelve.

04:38:10.3

RDO-1 okay, (thanks).

04:38:12.7HOT-1 three one zero. so he sayin' it's a # runway's what 

he's tellin' me.

04:38:13.6HOT-2 three one zero.04:38:16.0HOT-2 alright.
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04:38:16.7HOT-1 (yeah).04:38:18.0HOT-1 no our approach clearance yet? 04:38:19.5HOT-2 no approach clearance. 04:38:21.4HOT-1 see it will be like four minutes feel that 

groundspeed? feel that groundspeed go #.

04:38:25.8HOT-2 *.04:38:27.4HOT-2 forty five knots.04:38:28.5HOT-1 yeah. GWENNs the marker.

04:38:29.7

CTR Flagship forty seven twelve maintain two thousand 

seven hundred until established on the localizer you're eight miles east of GWENN cleared ILS approach to the Traverse City airport fly heading three one zero to join the localizer. 
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04:38:43.0

RDO-2 cleared and maintain two thousand feet and turn 

heading ah three one zero join localizer Flagship forty seven twelve. 

04:38:48.9HOT-1 two thousand seven hundred.

04:38:49.8

CTR Flagship forty seven twelve I misheard the readback 

three ah two thousand seven hundred until established on the ah localizer. 

04:38:55.6

RDO-2 (under) two thousand seven hundred until 

established ah Flagship forty seven twelve

04:38:58.8HOT-1 ah loc one glideslope armed twenty seven 

hundred set she's seated.

04:39:05.5HOT-2 alright.04:39:08.8HOT-1 he's saying it's fillin' in so his runway's a foot deep 

of snow is what's he's tellin' me. so we're gonna be very careful on the thrust reversers we're gonna keep this # straight.

04:39:18.8HOT-2 'kay.
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04:39:21.7HOT-1 I mean what kind of report's that it's filling in ya 

know doesn't tell me good bad fair poor. 

04:39:31.6HOT-1 I went down so that we'd be below the glideslope 

when we catch. alt's cap. 

04:39:36.6HOT-2 alt's cap.04:39:37.6HOT-1 localizer's alive.04:39:39.8HOT-2 loc two's armed. yeah.04:39:41.3HOT-1 loc's alive it's comin' in. 04:39:43.0HOT-2 'kay.04:39:44.3HOT-1 lo- ah eh.

04:39:44.9

CTR Flagship forty seven twelve show you joining the 

localizer radar services terminated change to advisory frequency approved cancellation arrival time this frequency.
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04:39:54.8

RDO-2 roger cancel with you ah Flagship forty seven 

twelve.

04:39:57.5HOT-1 change to advisory approved.

04:39:58.6

RDO-2 and change to advisory approved Flagship forty

seven twelve.

04:40:00.8HOT-1 so lets put thirty two nine on two and we'll put 

twenty four two on one I got you cleared to land lights.

04:40:06.6HOT-2 thirty two nine on two. 04:40:08.5HOT-1 yeah.04:40:09.4HOT-1 that's center so we can listen to 'em. put CTAF on 

one.

04:40:16.2HOT-2 alright on one.04:40:18.7HOT-1 eh gear down flaps thirty bug one sixty.
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04:40:19.4HOT-2 gear down. 04:40:21.9CAM [sound of increased background noise].04:40:23.6HOT [sound similar to flap overspeed clacker].04:40:24.4HOT-1 that’s alright it's within five knots makes it does it 

do it. bug one sixty.

04:40:25.4HOT-2 flaps thirty.04:40:29.5HOT-1 glideslope's alive I don't know if I said that or not. 04:40:34.9HOT-1 eleven hundred feet first then left turn to three 

thousand is what we're gonna be doin'. flaps forty five ref plus factor before landing checklist. glideslope's active. 

04:40:43.8HOT-2 'kay flaps forty five.

04:40:46.1

RDO-1 Traverse City traffic forty seven twelve's GWENN 

inbound.
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04:40:51.2

RDO-1 it's about two minutes for you guys.

04:40:53.1

OPS yeah we're all clear of the runway for ya and again 

ah brakin' actions probably NIL on the runway.

04:40:57.4

RDO-1 are you saying it's NIL?

04:40:59.3

OPS (oh I) haven't been out there to do a field report and 

it's been ah five ten minutes so I don't know what it's doin' now. 

04:41:04.7

RDO-1 okay.

04:41:07.3HOT-1 he's not reporting it NIL he's like he's sayin' its 

NIL. heh.

04:41:14.8HOT-2 all right landing gear down three green?04:41:16.1HOT-1 down three green.04:41:16.8HOT-2 alright flaps? 
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04:41:18.3HOT-1 ahh forty five indicated.04:41:19.8HOT-2 forty five indicated. thrust reversers? 

04:41:20.5HOT-1 that's you.04:41:21.2HOT-1 alright.04:41:21.9HOT-2 (now).04:41:23.1HOT-2 are armed.04:41:24.4HOT-2 flight attendant is notified we already dinged her 

before landing check complete.

04:41:31.3

RDO-1 about how deep of a contaminate would you say it 

is?

04:41:33.9HOT one thousand [electronic voice].

04:41:34.7

OPS I'd ah forty seven twelve I'd say it's probably close 

to half inch now.
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04:41:38.9RDO-1 okay that's not bad thank you.

04:41:39.0HOT-2 'kay.04:41:40.8HOT-2 good.04:41:41.2HOT-1 * we're allowed three inches. alright. and set my 

missed please three thousand we might need it if it looks ugly when we're comin' in I'll go around. (you know what I mean). made this mistake before. as long as there's no shovel you know marks and # half inch is nothin'. alright our decision height's eight twenty call me at nine twenty a hundred above. 

04:41:42.6HOT-2 'kay.04:41:50.0HOT-2 alright.04:41:54.8HOT-2 alright.04:42:04.2HOT-2 alright.
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04:42:05.2HOT-1 if we go around just listen to what I'm sayin' what 

I'm callin' for 'cause there's a hill right off the twelve o'clock nose see that?

04:42:12.4HOT-2 okay.04:42:12.8HOT-1 alright kinda a little hilly around here so don't 

forget to call my positive rate don't forget to get my gear up when I call for it flaps will go to eight not flaps twenty.

04:42:15.3HOT five hundred [electronic voice].04:42:19.1HOT-2 alright.04:42:22.1HOT-2 gotcha.04:42:24.3HOT-1 and definitely not flaps up. let's heading sync that 

#. alright here we go. (now to get) this runway. 

04:42:29.5HOT-2 okay.04:42:31.7HOT-2 alright.
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04:42:35.2HOT-2 got a hundred feet.04:42:36.7HOT-1 alright.04:42:39.2HOT-1 approach lights in sight.04:42:42.0HOT-1 continuing. (runway) in sight. landing.04:42:42.9HOT [sound of autopilot disconnect cavalry charge] 

minimums [electronic voice].

04:42:44.7HOT-2 run ah runway in sight.04:42:49.1HOT one hundred [electronic voice].04:42:52.5HOT fifty [electronic voice].04:42:53.5HOT forty [electronic voice].04:42:54.3HOT thirty [electronic voice].04:42:55.5HOT twenty [electronic voice].
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04:42:57.4HOT ten [electronic voice]. 04:43:02.3CAM [sound of muted thump].04:43:03.7CAM [sound of muted thump followed by increased 

background noise consistent with an aircraft on landing rollout].

04:43:04.4HOT-1 #. [sotto voce]. 04:43:05.7HOT-2 spoilers green.04:43:06.6HOT [sound of click].04:43:06.9HOT-1 very easy very easy. [sotto voce]. 

04:43:12.6HOT-2 #. [sotto voce]. 04:43:12.8HOT [sound of click].04:43:14.2HOT-1 alright [sotto voce].
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04:43:15.8HOT-2 eighty knots.04:43:16.4HOT-1 checks [sotto voce].04:43:17.7HOT-1 very easy. #. #. #. #. #. #. #. #. [sotto voce]. 04:43:24.4HOT-2 # sixty knots.04:43:27.6HOT-1 ahh we're goin' off.

04:43:27.7

OPS * * he's off the runway guys holy # he's off.

04:43:33.8HOT [sound of banging].04:43:35.2HOT [sound of repeating single chime]. 04:43:35.7HOT-1 alright.04:43:37.2HOT gear disagree [repeating electronic voice]. 04:43:38.9HOT-2 #. [sotto voce]. 
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04:43:40.6HOT-1 evacuation checklist.04:43:44.1HOT-1 my checklist.04:43:44.8HOT-1 call the flight attendant. call the flight attendant. 

call the flight attendant.

04:43:49.0HOT-2 call.04:43:49.8HOT-1 'kay get out and help her.04:43:58.1CAM-1 get out and help her get out of the (checklist).04:44:06.3CAM [sound similar to cockpit door banging].04:44:07.3CAM-3 (you in) there.04:44:08.1CAM-2 alright?04:44:14.0CAM-2 everyone okay?04:44:16.3CAM-3 are you okay?
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04:44:17.1CAM-2 * okay **?04:44:18.5CAM-3 yeah ***.04:44:19.9CAM [sound of two single chimes].04:44:21.8CAM-1 alright hey a uhm & start evacuate the aircraft. 

alright?

04:44:27.2CAM-3 okay.04:44:31.9CAM [sound of triple chime].04:44:34.0CAM config the brakes [repeating electronic voice] 

04:44:40.9

RDO-1 and center forty seven twelve.

04:44:47.4

RDO-1 center forty seven twelve.

04:45:33.8CAM [sound similar to complex single 600 Hz tone].
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04:45:45.5CAM-1 okay I don't want shut all this off to be honest with 

you. so.

04:46:32.3PA-1 well ladies and gentlemen from the ah flight deck 

obviously the ah runway conditions are ah not the 

best. the aircraft ah overran the runway ahm and we're gonna have to coordinate with ground try to 

get you guys off the aircraft so please ah leave your personal items on-board and ah just give us about a minute or two figure out how we'll figure out how we pull everybody off.

04:47:00.1

RDO-1 operations forty seven twelve are you there?

04:47:03.6CAM-2 contact clearance wanna tell 'em?

04:47:06.9

RDO-1 operations forty seven twelve are you there?

04:47:15.2

RDO-1 operations forty seven twelve are you here?

04:47:18.4

OPS yeah I I'm with ya forty seven twelve I'm comin' right 

for ya.

04:47:21.6

RDO-1 thank ya.
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04:47:28.2

OPS I dialed nine one one guys.

04:47:39.1CAM-2 APU still on.04:48:02.9CAM-4 everybody's been doin' alright no one no one's 

injured?

04:48:06.7CAM-4 okay.04:49:35.0CAM-1 * *.04:49:36.2CAM-2 ah #.04:49:37.1CAM-1 there goes my career.04:49:38.4CAM-? folks I know the weather's bad but (we want to get 

you) off the plane okay (we're going to) go outside and got vehicles coming ****.

04:49:47.8CAM [ground crew discussion concerning vehicle 

positioning]. 
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04:50:01.1CAM [sound similar to cell phone chime]. 

04:50:08.7

RDO-1 Minneapolis center forty seven twelve. 

04:50:12.1

CTR Flagship forty seven twelve go.

04:50:14.0

RDO-1 yeah we overran the runway here in Traverse City 

we're off the end.

04:50:18.4

CTR you overran the runway at Traverse City ahh roger. 

04:50:22.3

RDO-1 local OPS is ah notified we just need to get some 

assistance out here.

04:50:26.5

CTR okay I'll tell my supervisor. 

04:50:35.8CAM-1 I'm happy with the configuration right now.04:50:37.7CAM-2 you're happy okay.04:50:38.6CAM-1 okay but I'd you to **.
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04:50:39.6CAM-2 whaddya want me to do? 04:50:41.9CAM-1 I wanna get everybody off and into a vehicle of 

some kind.

04:50:45.0CAM-2 **.04:50:46.3CAM-1 'cause I don't know * we're leakin' fuel. I don't 

know if we have any other problems.

04:50:47.8CAM-2 (sure).04:50:50.8CAM-2 alright then we need to get these people off.04:50:51.2CAM-1 * *.04:50:52.5CAM-2 'kay you wanna get the babies off first? on this 

van right here?

04:50:56.9CAM-1 ah yeah get the BIA's.04:50:58.5CAM-2 the BIA's?
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04:50:59.3CAM-1 one at a time get 'em in the vehicle. 04:51:02.8CAM-? [conversation about off loading the babies from 

the aircraft].

04:51:11.4CAM-1 &, & & forty seven twelve. 04:51:14.2CAM-1 we just ran off the end of the runway in Traverse 

City.

04:51:14.3CAM-? ***.04:51:18.4CAM-1 there's no braking action at all on two eight and 

the airplane just didn’t stop, so. everybody on the airplane's okay but we're sittin' off about a hundred feet off the end of the runway.

04:51:31.8CAM-1 yeah we got OPS out here and we're trying to 

coordinate with everybody. yeah.

04:51:35.2

APT-5 airport five to CFR on frequency.

04:51:38.4CAM-? [unintelligible conversation].
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04:52:08.9

CTR ah Flagship forty seven twelve understand you 

notified OPS you don't need us notify anybody?

04:52:09.4

APT-5 airport five to CFR on frequency.

04:52:30.3CAM-1 hello oh yeah, yeah, yeah it's, it's, and ** (left) one 

of the mains is off the ground it's by it's right wheel er a right wing and ah we've got the air stairs we got a lot of operations out here to help us there's no injuries to the passengers, ahm I'm just trying to ah manage gettin' everybody off the aircraft right now. yeah I mean we're at a a pretty good we're about a now at twenty degree angle to the end to the runway heading off the end of the runway. ah yeah but I'm gonna have to get goin' here a second to keep assisting with this. thank you.

04:53:20.6CAM-1 hey & come here. & come here can you do me a 

favor.

04:53:24.3CAM-2 yeah.
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04:53:29.3CAM-1 sorry. everybody’s okay but the aircraft is 

definitely a loss you know I mean it's ah I don't know what else to do, I'm trying to get everybody off the plane as safely as possible 'cause right now I'm not sure of the configuration of the airplane you know what I mean? so I'm trying to get everybody, it's snowin' like crazy but I'd like to get 'em off the aircraft on to some type of transportation. they weren't answering on the inrange and ahm I got OPS on it I've notified ATC when to give them the buzz real quick and see if they answer no. standby.

04:53:47.6

CTR Flagship forty seven twelve Minneapolis.

04:54:05.0

RDO-1 operations forty seven twelve you up?

04:54:08.3CAM-? okay.

04:54:09.4

OPS forty seven twelve go ahead.

04:54:11.6

RDO-1 yeah we don- went off the end of the runway we're 

gonna need assistance off the end here to help offload ah passengers. 
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04:54:16.9

OPS ah guys we are ah in ah the works on on try to 

figure that at this ah moment we'll get right back with ya.

04:54:23.4

RDO-1 alright thanks.

04:54:24.1CAM-1 ah I guess ah yeah my cell phone's [pilot recites a 

ten digit number] and I guess I I'm gonna want some advice on from you right now * are you more comfortable keeping people on this aircraft or do you want me to get 'em off away from the aircraft? 

04:54:46.2CAM-1 I get 'em out it's snowing like crazy it's cold but I 

don't know the condition of the aircraft as far as from the outside, ya know what I mean? we have the door open I've kinda done a walkaround it appears to be safe.

04:55:00.9CAM-1 doesn't appear to be but like I said you know we're 

off the runway so and the main's not (on) the aircraft.

04:55:15.6CAM-1 okay hey I gotta go I gotta go alright alright.
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04:55:20.6CAM-? *** still got five thousand pounds of fuel on (on 

board).

04:55:25.5CAM-1 okay, alright.04:55:28.0CAM-? * want me to power down * * *?04:55:31.9CAM [sound similar to clanking].04:55:43.7CAM [sound of single chime]. End of Transcript 04:55:44.8[end of recording]
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Appendix C

Pinnacle’s Operations Specification C382 (Landing Distance

Assessment)
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