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1

38–368 2008

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–9]

EXAMINATION OF THE FORCE REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION PROCESS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD

JANUARY 30, 2007

(II)

MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas, Chairman

MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California

NANCY BOYDA, Kansas

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire

JOHN M. McHUGH, New York

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota

THELMA DRAKE, Virginia

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina

JOE WILSON, South Carolina

MICHAEL HIGGINS, Professional Staff Member

JOHN CHAPLA, Professional Staff Member

MARGEE MECKSTROTH, Staff Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2007

Page

HEARING:

Tuesday, January 30, 2007, Examination of the Force Requirements Determination Process .................................................................................................. 1

APPENDIX:

Tuesday, January 30, 2007 ..................................................................................... 35

TUESDAY, JANUARY 30, 2007

EXAMINATION OF THE FORCE REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION

PROCESS

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

McHugh, Hon. John M., a Representative from New York, Ranking Member,

Military Personnel Subcommittee ...................................................................... 2

Snyder, Hon. Vic, a Representative from Arkansas, Chairman, Military Personnel Subcommittee ........................................................................................... 1

WITNESSES

Formica, Maj. Gen. Richard P., Director of Force Management, Deputy Chief

of Staff, G3, Headquarters, U.S. Army; Maj. Gen. Stephen T. Johnson,

Deputy Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, U.S. Marine Corps; Michael F. Applegate, Director, Manpower Plans

and Policy, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Headquarters, U.S. Marine

Corps; Janet A. St. Laurent, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management Team, U.S. Government Accountability Office beginning on ................. 3

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Formica, Maj. Gen. Richard P. ........................................................................ 46

Johnson, Maj. Gen. Stephen T., joint with Michael F. Applegate ................ 52

McHugh, Hon. John M. .................................................................................... 42

Snyder, Hon. Vic ............................................................................................... 39

St. Laurent, Janet A. ........................................................................................ 65

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Chart on the Active Component Deployment Lay-Down .............................. 89

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Mr. Jones ........................................................................................................... 97

Mr. Murphy ....................................................................................................... 98

Dr. Snyder ......................................................................................................... 93

Mr. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 97

(1)

EXAMINATION OF THE FORCE REQUIREMENTS

DETERMINATION PROCESS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Tuesday, January 30, 2007.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:02 p.m., in room

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vic Snyder (chairman

of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VIC SNYDER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY PERSONNEL

SUBCOMMITTEE

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you all for being here. We are going to go

ahead and get started.

In the spirit of brevity, I have decided that I generally look

smarter if I read somebody else’s words, so I am going to read two

things about why we are here today.

One of them was written by Mr. Higgins in this very good document that he gave us here in which you talk about what are the

objectives of the hearing. And he listed three: examine and understand the process by which the active Army and active Marine

Corps determine their force requirements; examine the basis for

the increase in end-strengths that accompanied the President’s proposal to increase troop strengths in Iraq; understand the perspectives of an outside agency about the effectiveness of the force requirements determination processes used by the active Army and

active Marine Corps.

And the reason we are doing that—I am going to lift a paragraph

from our Government Accountability Office (GAO) folks today, who,

on page 15 of their written statement, say, ‘‘In evaluating DOD’s

proposal to permanently increase active Army and Marine Corps

personnel levels by 92,000 over the next 5 years, Congress should

carefully weigh the long-term costs and benefits.

‘‘It is clear that Army and Marine Corps forces are experiencing

a high pace of operations due to both the war in Iraq and broader

demands imposed by the global war on terror that may provide a

basis for DOD to consider permanent increases in military personnel levels. However, it is also clear that increasing personnel levels

will entail significant costs that must be weighed against other priorities.’’

I think those two paragraphs summarize pretty much why we

are here. We can all talk about an increase, as members of this

committee have for several years, about why we think increases

are necessary. There are some benefits to that. But there are also

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costs. And the purpose today is to get at how we arrived at those

numbers.

And, Mr. McHugh, opening statement or comments?

[The prepared statement of Dr. Snyder can be found in the Appendix on page 39.]

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. MCHUGH, A REPRESENTATIVE

FROM NEW YORK, RANKING MEMBER, MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to follow your

lead with brevity. I do have a more verbose——

Dr. SNYDER. We will enter that in the record at your request.

Mr. MCHUGH [continuing]. Written statement. Thank you. I appreciate that.

And let me, first of all, restate something I tried to convey with

probably a decided lack of eloquence in our organizational meeting,

and that is, I wish to congratulate you on assumption of the chair.

I am sorry I don’t have a gavel to give you. I notice we are absent

one. I don’t know if we stole it at the time of the turnover or not.

[Laughter.]

Dr. SNYDER. Oh, here it is.

Mr. MCHUGH. Oh, there you go. But use it in good health.

And, as I said at our previous meeting, I can’t think of an individual who has been more involved, more concerned, and more

proactive and productive on these matters than you. And I hope to

be able to serve you in the role of ranking half as well as you

served all of us in your previous stint. So I wish you the best.

This is an important hearing. As you noted, Mr. Chairman, we

have talked, and have acted actually, on this subcommittee and the

full committee for some time on the question of end-strength. It

cannot be an issue taken in a vacuum. There are costs and benefits

that have to be analyzed.

And, as much as the final number, I would like to think today

we can talk a bit about the process that is used to try to determine

what the proper distribution of end-strength may be.

And so I commend you for calling this hearing, and I look forward to the input of the witnesses.

I welcome them all, thank them for their service and for their

presence here today.

And with that, I would yield back to you and look forward to the

rest of the day.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McHugh can be found in the Appendix on page 42.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. McHugh.

Let us get right to our witnesses.

Our panel today is Major General Richard Formica, the director

of Force Management and deputy chief of staff (G3) for the United

States Army; Major General Stephen Johnson, the deputy commanding general of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command; Mr. Michael Applegate, the director of the Manpower Plans

and Policy, Manpower and Reserve Affairs Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps; and then, what was referred to as the outside agency,

Ms. Janet St. Laurent, director, Defense Capabilities and Management Team, United States GAO.

3

We appreciate you all for being here.

Let us start with you, General Formica, with your opening statements.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. RICHARD P. FORMICA, DIRECTOR

OF FORCE MANAGEMENT, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G3,

HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY; MAJ. GEN. STEPHEN T. JOHNSON, DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE CORPS

COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND, U.S. MARINE CORPS;

MICHAEL F. APPLEGATE, DIRECTOR, MANPOWER PLANS

AND POLICY, MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS; JANET A. ST. LAURENT, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT TEAM,

U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. RICHARD P. FORMICA

General FORMICA. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of

this subcommittee, good afternoon. As introduced, I am Major General Dick Formica, and I am the director of force management on

the Army staff. As such, I am responsible for managing the Army’s

force structure and for supervising the Army’s force-sizing process

to make recommendations to our senior leaders.

On behalf of the secretary of the Army, Dr. Francis Harvey, and

the chief of staff of the Army, General Peter Schoomaker, I welcome the opportunity to meet with you and to discuss our process

to determine Army force requirements and to examine the basis for

the recently proposed increase in the size of the Army.

Before I begin, I would like to express the deep appreciation of

our Army for your sustained support of our soldiers and civilians

and their families.

The chief of staff of the Army has testified that we are in a dangerous and uncertain time and that we face challenges that exceed

the strategy that was envisioned in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

Recent decisions by the President and the Secretary of Defense

to propose growth in the armed forces would allow the Army to increase our capabilities to maintain the Nation’s security and to sustain the all-volunteer force.

The Army’s force-sizing process is dictated by strategy as promulgated in the national security strategy and through various planning documents from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD),

Joint Staff, and including the QDR.

Now, our process is also informed by current operational demands and lessons learned, to include rotational requirements, the

employment of high-demand, low-density capabilities, and combatant commander requirements identified through the global force

management process.

Now, the cornerstone of our force-sizing process is called Total

Army Analysis (TAA). And for your benefit, to my left and your

right, at the front is a chart which describes the Total Army Analysis that you may be able to refer to.

It is normally conducted every other year. And we translate the

required capabilities into force structure across all three components, in the active, in the Army National Guard, and in the

4

United States Army Reserve, for submission in the Army’s Program Objective Memorandum or the POM.

It is conducted in two phases. First, there is a force structure requirements determination phase, and second, a force structure

resourcing phase.

And the requirements phase, as I said, is determined by the

strategy, and as a result of that strategy between the OSD and the

services, we are given a directed number of brigade combat teams.

And then in TAA, through modeling, we determine the total force

structure required to support those brigade combat teams. The

modeling is based on defense planning scenarios and considers requirements for smaller-scale contingencies.

Once those force structure requirements are determined, then we

conduct the force structure resourcing phase. In this phase, we

compare the existing force in all three components against those requirements that we determined. We match capabilities to those requirements.

And, in that way, we identify capabilities that we may no longer

project to need in the future, and we identify new capabilities that

are now required. We then identify opportunities to rebalance our

structure to eliminate capability gaps.

The result is what we call our programmed or resourced force

and is the force structure basis, as I said, for the POM submission.

Next we conduct the feasibility review. The force must be feasible. That is, it must be within our authorized end-strength. We

must be able to man, equip, train, station and sustain that force

over the program.

In QDR 2006, the Army was required to be able to provide 18

to 19 brigade combat teams (BCT) to meet global demands, and to

do so, this required 70 brigade combat teams, 42 in the active and

28 in the Army National Guard. In TAA, we identified an operational force of 790,000—again, across all three components, active,

guard and reserve—which we determined to be sufficient to support the 70 brigade combat teams and to meet global commitments.

This past fall, the Department of Defense (DOD) reassessed the

global strategic brigade combat team requirements needed for the

long war and determined that the Army’s enduring requirement

would be upwards of 23 BCTs to meet global strategic demand. To

meet that enduring requirement, we would need 76 brigade combat

teams.

To grow six brigade combat teams, and the requisite supporting

forces, the Army proposes to grow by 65,000 in the active component and 9,000 in the reserve components. This growth, combined

with our ongoing rebalance initiatives, will build strategic depth,

reduce stress on the all-volunteer force over the long term, and

meet our global strategic requirements for the long war.

Again, I thank you for your support. And I look forward to taking

your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Formica can be found in the

Appendix on page 46.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, General Formica.

General Johnson.

5

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. STEPHEN T. JOHNSON

General JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member McHugh, distinguished

members of the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, thank you for

the opportunity to appear before you this afternoon to discuss the

Marine Corps’s force requirements determination process.

We know that the members of this subcommittee deeply support

our men and women in the military, and we Marines are grateful

to you for the effective efforts that you have made on our behalf.

Your support of our warfighters and their families is vital to our

success and our continued readiness.

Today is a dynamic period in the history of our country and of

your Marine Corps. Currently, Marines are heavily engaged in the

early battles of a long war against terrorism. Moreover, we believe

that in the future, our Nation’s security will be subject to a much

broader range of emerging threats and challenges.

Given the dynamic nature of today’s times and the future demands on the Marines, force requirements determination claims a

significant amount of attention and effort in the Marine Corps.

Careful and timely planning ensures that our heavily committed

forces are effectively organized, trained and equipped to meet the

demands of the current warfight. Similarly, accurate force requirements determinations are extremely important to the Corps to

meet the future force needs of the combatant commanders with

ready, balanced, capable Marine Air-Ground Task Forces

(MAGTF).

The commandant of the Marine Corps determines and manages

his force requirements primarily through the deputy commandant

for Combat Development and the deputy commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. Today, senior executive Mike Applegate

and I, representing those two deputy commandants, are prepared

to review the Marine Corps’s force requirements process with you.

Some of the key aspects of that process I want to hit up front.

First, our force requirements are derived from a top-down strategic guidance and also from bottom-up feed from our commanders

who are eyeball to eyeball with Marines and missions in the operating forces.

Our force requirements are balanced across the Marine AirGround Task Force, ensuring each element—air, ground, logistics,

and command and control—are considered in every force requirement decision.

Our total force structure process specifies clear responsibilities

for planning, coordination and integration of our force requirements. In other words, everybody has input, and things are coordinated across the warfighting functions of the Marine Corps for our

doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, the facilities,

and our personnel.

Our process includes some modeling and computer analysis, but

complements that analytical rigor with subject matter expert examination of our requirements—a Marine in the loop, if you will, to

bring combat experience and operational judgment into the equation.

Our process requires us to formally look at the Marine Corps biennially, but the system and the process is flexible enough to perVerDate 22-MAR-2001 14:30 Oct 31, 2008 Jkt 038368 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-9\030020.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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mit us to address force requirements based on changing guidance,

commander requirements, and changing enemy circumstances. In

reality, our process is continuous.

I don’t have to tell you that the requirements determination process is simply a process. But it is really about the people and the

tools that we need in order to accomplish our missions.

We are prepared to answer your questions about our people,

their role in our process, and how we manage and care for them

to meet the missions before us. We have submitted a statement for

the record, and I request that it be admitted.

Mr. Applegate and I look forward to answering your questions

about this important business.

Thank you.

[The joint prepared statement of General Johnson and Mr. Applegate can be found in the Appendix on page 52.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you. All the written statements will be made

a part of the record.

And, Mr. Applegate, it is my understanding you don’t have a

verbal statement at this time?

Mr. APPLEGATE. That is right, Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Ms. St. Laurent.

STATEMENT OF JANET A. ST. LAURENT

Ms. ST. LAURENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the

committee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO’s observations on (DOD) and service processes for determining force structure and military personnel requirements.

The high pace of military operations in Iraq and elsewhere in the

world have raised questions about whether the Army and Marine

Corps are appropriately sized to meet the demands of the new security environment.

My remarks today are based on a wide range of GAO studies and

will address first the processes used by the Office of the Secretary

of Defense and the services to assess requirements; second, new demands on the services resulting from the new security environment; and third, whether the department provides adequate information to support and explain military personnel requests.

Now I would like to quickly summarize our observations.

First, both OSD and the services play key roles in determining

force structure requirements and managing resources. Decisions

reached by OSD in the Quadrennial Defense Review and in budget

and planning guidance often set the parameters within which the

services can then determine their force requirements.

The Army and Marine Corps have their own processes to assess

force structure, but these generally follow the parameters set by

OSD. For example, the 2006 QDR determined that the Army would

have 42 active combat brigades and about 482,000 active military

personnel. These numbers are a given in the Army’s force structure

biennial review.

A key purpose of the Army’s biennial process is to determine the

number and types of support forces and institutional forces, such

as training units, that the Army needs to support its combat brigades. If total requirements exceed the number of authorized perVerDate 22-MAR-2001 14:30 Oct 31, 2008 Jkt 038368 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-9\030020.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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sonnel, the Army determines which units to resource and where it

may need to accept risk.

Although past Army analyses identified shortfalls ranging from

about 40,000 to 70,000 positions, the Army’s most recent review

completed in 2006 indicated that the Army’s total requirements

and available military personnel in the active and reserve components were about equal.

The Marine Corps also has a process to periodically assess force

structure needs that identifies gaps in its capabilities to perform

new missions, make adjustments in its forces, and determine where

to accept risk if all requirements cannot be fully met.

We have not yet seen any detailed analyses supporting the need

to increase the active Army and Marine Corps. However, we have

discussed the proposed increases with service officials and obtained

their perspectives on why the Secretary of Defense and the service

chiefs are now seeking personnel increases, when recently completed analyses, such as the QDR, concluded that the Army and

Marine Corps force structure was ‘‘about right.’’

Based on our discussions with service officials and our prior

work, it appears that there are a couple of key reasons why the

services’ prior analyses did not identify a significant mismatch between requirements and available personnel.

First, as noted earlier, the services’ prior analyses were completed based on guidance about end-strengths provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and combat forces, as well. They

indicated the number of brigades, for example.

Second, the Army and Marine Corps’s earlier analyses did not

fully consider the extent of real-world demands or the forces that

the services are currently experiencing as a result of operations in

Iraq and Afghanistan. Specifically, the Army’s formal biennial review concluded that the Army would be able to provide about 18

to 19 brigades at any one time, including 14 active and 4 to 5 national guard brigades, while the Army’s actual global demand is

currently about 23 brigades, according to the Army.

Third, the Army’s most recent biennial analysis did not yet fully

consider the impact of converting from a division-based force consisting of 33 active brigades organized around 10 divisions to a new

force consisting of 42 active modular brigades. This represents a

significant transformation, and our prior reports have questioned

whether the Army would be able to fully staff its new modular brigades and achieve planned efficiencies in the institutional forces

within an active end-strength of 482,000 personnel.

Finally, GAO’s prior work has shown that DOD has not always

provided a clear and transparent basis for its military personnel requests that demonstrates how they are linked to the defense strategy. For example, DOD’s annual reports and budget justification

documents have not provided specific information to explain the

basis for requested end-strength levels or particularly when

changes are requested by the Department. Also, DOD’s 2006 QDR

report did not provide significant insight into the basis for its conclusion that the size of today’s force is appropriate to meet current

and projected demands.

Looking forward, we believe it will be increasingly important for

DOD to demonstrate a clearer link between military personnel reVerDate 22-MAR-2001 14:30 Oct 31, 2008 Jkt 038368 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-9\030020.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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quests and the military strategy, particularly as Congress and the

Department need to weigh tradeoffs within the defense budget.

Moreover, with regard to the current proposals to increase the

Army and Marine Corps, we believe that DOD needs to be able to

provide answers to a number of key questions, such as why the increase is needed to implement the defense strategy; what it will

cost in the near-term and longer-term to pay for both personnel,

equipment, training and facilities; and how the services plan to

manage potential challenges in recruiting new personnel and

equipping and training units.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks. I will be happy to respond to any questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. St. Laurent can be found in the

Appendix on page 65.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you all for your opening comments.

Mr. McHugh and I have sat through many hearings by this time

that the opening statements from the chairman and ranking member weren’t even done, so we are doing very well here today.

[Laughter.]

I want to formally welcome our three new members, not only to

this subcommittee but to the Congress.

Ms. Boyda, Mr. Murphy, and Ms. Shea-Porter, we appreciate you

all being here with your experience and ideas, and look forward to

working with you as time goes by.

What I am going to do is ask questions for a few minutes. We

will then go to Mr. McHugh. After that, we will be on the fiveminute clock. And I would anticipate that we will go around more

than one time here this afternoon, depending on the staying power

of the committee members.

I want to ask, to put in perspective, both Secretary Gates when

he was before our committee a couple of weeks ago and then the

President the other night used the number 92,000, specifically talking about a 65,000 increase in the end-strength for the active component of the Army and a 27,000 increase in the active component

end-strength for the Marine Corps.

But in terms of where are we at today, I think when most Americans hear that, they think that means that the number in the

Army and the Marine Corps today is going to go up by a total of

92,000 from where we are at today.

Isn’t it more accurate to say that we are, you know, reasonably

far along with those numbers already? Where are we at today with

regard—of those 92,000, how many are already in the Marine

Corps and the Army on a temporary basis?

General Formica.

General Johnson.

General FORMICA. Sir, I will respond for the Army.

The 65,000 of growth that the President and Secretary referred

to in the active component is measured from the programmed force

of 482,000 that was referred to earlier, and that 65,000, added to

the 482,000, would get you to 547,000 active component endstrength.

Where we are today is currently sitting at about 504,000. As you

know, the chief of staff of the Army had requested a 30,000 increase, and Congress had authorized that. And we have been able

9

to grow the Army given that temporary increase, and we are currently at about 504,000 today, sir.

Dr. SNYDER. It is my understanding that means of that 65,000,

as of today, the faces in uniform, we have about 23,000 of that

65,000 in uniform today?

General FORMICA. That is correct.

Dr. SNYDER. Correct.

General FORMICA. In the Army, in the active component of the

Army. Yes, sir.

Dr. SNYDER. In the active component.

General Johnson, my understanding is the number for you is

about 5,400 Marines in uniform today that are going to be part of

that 27,000. Is that the number you have?

Mr. APPLEGATE. Mr. Chairman, I will take that question.

We ended fiscal year 2006 at about 180,416 end-strength, and we

expected to end fiscal year 2007 at 181,000, before any talk of this

end-strength increase. So our historic point is from the 180,000

that we ended fiscal year 2006.

Part of the other issue is that we are only appropriated for

175,000, so when we see a total of a 22,000 Marine end-strength

increase from 180,000, that we are currently at, to 202,000, and

then until the money catches up, we need the appropriations

amount to come from the 175,000 all the way up finally to the

202,000, sir.

Dr. SNYDER. But just for the sake of repetition, if nothing else.

As of today, you have a little over 5,000 of the 27,000 Marines that

Secretary Gates talked about are already in uniform under a temporary increase in end-strength?

Mr. APPLEGATE. Yes, sir.

Dr. SNYDER. Great, great.

One of the issues that came up—Ms. St. Laurent talked about it

and, of course, Members of Congress have talked about it some. I

would like to hear from General Formica and General Johnson.

What occurred that your approach now is different than it was

for your respective services 12 months ago?

Ms. St. Laurent gave some reasons why she thinks the numbers

are different. Because this is a different picture of end-strength

needs than we heard 12, 18, 24 months ago from both the Army

and the Marine Corps.

General Formica, would you start with that?

General FORMICA. Yes, sir, I will.

As was stated, we came out of the Quadrennial Defense Review

with a recognition that the Army would need to be able to provide

a rotational supply of 18 to 19 brigade combat teams on any given

year. And in order to be able to do that, 70 brigade combat teams,

42 in the active and 28 in the Army National Guard, would enable

you to do that, with about 14 on any given year coming from the

active component and 4 to 5 in the Army National Guard on a rotational basis. And 482,000 active component soldiers and the remaining part of the operating force in the Army National Guard

and the United States Army Reserve was determined by the Army

to be adequate or sufficient to be able to support those 70 brigade

combat teams, coming out of QDR.

10

What changed is, in the fall there was a reassessment within

DOD, initiated by the Joint Staff, as part of the global force management process that recognized an increased enduring requirement of upwards of 23 BCTs on a rotational basis for the Army.

And that increase in BCTs required us to add or to propose the

growth of six active component BCTs to be able to grow and continue rebalancing combat support brigade maneuver enhancement

in the Army National Guard in order to be able to meet the requirements of the 23 BCTs.

Dr. SNYDER. And, General Johnson, if you will briefly answer

that question, we will move to Mr. McHugh.

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

The Marine Corps looked this past fall—or last spring and summer, actually, we had a capabilities assessment session in which

we brought a lot of folks in from across the Marine Corps. And we

looked at what was going to be required to meet the threats of the

future. Particularly, looking at our ability to balance our MAGTFs

not only internally, air-ground logistics and command and control,

but balance them across the Marine Corps.

We also looked at what the combatant commanders were going

to be facing with respect to the irregular warfare in the future and

looked at the guidance contained in the national security strategy,

defense strategy, and so forth, QDR, and looked for ways to recommend to the commandant how we could improve the Corps in

the future.

This fall, when the requests were made for us to identify what

we thought we would need in the future, some of the findings that

we had recommended to the commandant were available to him to

draw on. We looked at primarily our role, our capability to provide

balanced capability to the combatant commanders in the future

and also the desire to take a look at the deployment to dwell ratio

that we currently are experiencing.

Those were the two key things that have changed and enabled

us to go forward and make the recommendation that we did for an

increase of 27,000.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, General Johnson.

We have had several hearings so far this year already on the situation in Iraq and others, and I think hands-down the award for

most insightful questions goes to my partner, Mr. McHugh. [Laughter.]

So, Mr. McHugh.

Mr. MCHUGH. Well, that string will probably end right here, Mr.

Chairman. [Laughter.]

But I appreciate the comment.

I would like to look at the QDR a little bit differently, and numbers are obviously important. But when we come down to the final

analysis, the issue really is how many feet and how many boots do

we have on the ground out there, particularly for you two gentlemen.

But when the Members of Congress and, I think, the general

public talk about QDR and defense strategy, they tend to talk

about missions more than numbers.

Is my recollection correct that when we talked about the 2006

QDR the missions objective was to be able to fight an Operation

11

Enduring Freedom-Operation Iraqi Freedom (OEF–OIF)-type engagement with a near-simultaneous regime change? Is that correct?

General FORMICA. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MCHUGH. Looking at the fact that we are now engaged in

an OEF–OIF engagement, and we are not at the present time engaged in a near-simultaneous regime change, how do we justify

this new plus-up as being adequate to the QDR?

General FORMICA. Sir, our assessment in the Army is that the requirements that we currently are required to meet and anticipate

having to meet in the future, based on our lessons learned during

the OIF and OEF, is that we cannot meet the current dwell times

with the force that we have now, and the projected force that came

out of the TAA and the 70 brigade combat teams that was projected in QDR to be able to meet the mission was inadequate.

Mr. MCHUGH. Once you are through the 7,000-a-year projected

increase to the Army and—I believe the Marine Corps is 5,000?

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MCHUGH. Will you be able to meet the 2006 QDR and meet

dwell times in the United States Army?

General FORMICA. Sir, we believe——

Mr. MCHUGH. Under current projections.

General FORMICA. Under the current projection with 76 brigade

combat teams and growth in combat support brigades maneuver

enhancements in the Army National Guard, it is our projection

that we will be able to get dwell times approaching a 1:2 in the active component BCTs.

Mr. MCHUGH. Approaching?

General FORMICA. Yes, sir.

Mr. MCHUGH. How far are we approaching it?

General FORMICA. I don’t have exact numbers.

Mr. MCHUGH. Ballpark.

General FORMICA. Just short of 1:2. Just short of.

Mr. MCHUGH. Okay.

General Johnson.

General JOHNSON. We believe that the increase, if approved, over

the course of the 5 years would enable us to reach a 1:2 dwell time.

It would give us the capability to have time for our forces to be able

to adequately rest and also train, to be able to focus more on some

of the missions that are not—training that is not being done now

as a result of this constant flow to the counterinsurgency fight.

And we believe that the initial—the way we would lay out the

growth would be so that the units that are most hard-pressed

would be the first in 2007 and 2008 to be the ones that we would

seek to apply forces to.

Mr. MCHUGH. I don’t want to put words in the report or the

mouth of Ms. St. Laurent and the work that GAO did, but I believe

what I heard her say is that, as you go through your process of determining force structure and ultimately end-strength, the guidance from OSD is highly determinative. That is a reality of budget.

I understand that.

As I listened to you respond to the chairman’s question about

what changed, I almost got the impression that the combatant commanders all of a sudden realized something they didn’t realize in

2006.

12

In the new estimates were the combatant commanders’ requests

and projections far greater than what was determinative of the 7,

and then 70, now 76 brigades before that?

General FORMICA. Sir, I——

Mr. MCHUGH. I am trying to understand how determinative OSD

is, and how much the budget plays here, and how much risk we

are buying or not buying actually, I guess.

General FORMICA. Sir, I would like to start by clarifying my last

comment——

Mr. MCHUGH. Sure.

General FORMICA [continuing]. And my previous answer to your

question.

With the addition of combat support brigades in the Army National Guard, we believe we will reach a 1:2 dwell for brigades to

meet that requirement.

Mr. MCHUGH. After five years.

General FORMICA. And I wanted to clarify that answer.

Mr. MCHUGH. Okay. Thank you, General.

General FORMICA. Sir, there was a reassessment done, as I said,

in the fall as part of the global force management process that

identified that the enduring requirement was going to be 23

BCTs——

Mr. MCHUGH. I don’t mean to be rude, but I want to get to my

colleagues, and I have used far too much time.

I understand the process. Well, I am not so sure I do. [Laughter.]

But I recognize the structure of the process. But I am interested

in what the different, if any, calculations were of the combatant

commanders that produced that change.

General FORMICA. Sir, I can’t speak to the assumptions of the

combatant commanders. I can only report that in the global force

management board there was recognition that the requirements on

the Army for brigade combat teams was an enduring requirement

and that assumptions that it was going to be reduced changed.

Mr. MCHUGH. So I just want to make sure I understood you. You

have no information as to what the combatant commander request

was in that process.

General FORMICA. Sir, I know what the total requirement was for

the Army from the combatant commanders, but I did not participate in the process with——

Mr. MCHUGH. Okay. Thanks.

General FORMICA [continuing]. From each combatant commander.

Mr. MCHUGH. I appreciate it.

General.

General JOHNSON. Well, the QDR results put us at an endstrength of 175,000. And we believed at the time that it needed to

be a greater end-strength. And when the opportunity was presented this fall to come back with another assessment, I believe the

assessment was that we could do a better job for the combatant

commanders.

Not that their requirements had changed, because I think those

were fairly well understood. But as some of the 7,500 plan evolved,

as part of the emerging theater security cooperation planning

evolved, we believed that a larger force, more balanced MAGTF

13

could provide them better capability than we had indicated previously.

Mr. MCHUGH. You Marines had a somewhat different starting

point on that I recall, so I appreciate that. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. McHugh.

Mr. Kline.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, gentlemen and lady, for being here.

General Johnson, it is nice to be with somebody who is a graduate of those fine institutions of higher education, Amphibious

Warfare School and the Army War College, so you are starting at

sort of a different plane here.

I am going to get to the Army in just a second, but let me start

with the Marine Corps.

When you are making these plans, we are talking about, in the

case of the Marine Corps, an increase in the end-strength of the active Marine Corps. How much in this force generation did you

count on the participation of the Marine Corps Reserve?

General JOHNSON. The end-strength request that we have made

is focused on the active force, as you know.

Mr. KLINE. Right.

General JOHNSON. And we are looking at the reserve now. The

reserve end-strength is 39,600, and we are looking at it.

We haven’t made recommendations to the commandant yet about

changing the Marine Corps Reserve. Our goal is to have a 1:5 deployment dwell ratio with the reserve. And we feel that they continue to demonstrate that they reinforce and augment our active

forces effectively.

So I don’t have an answer for you, Congressman, as far as where

it will go. We think it is about right, but we are still taking a look

at it.

Mr. KLINE. All right. It is a very different concept than what the

Army uses with the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve

so, if time allows, I may come back. But I want to turn to the Army

now.

When you were doing your force modeling and force projection

and force computations, you purposely and actively included the

Army National Guard. When you start telling us about how many

brigade combat teams we have, we will have, we won’t have in the

active reserve, you have already factored in to the employment of

the United States Army use of the Army National Guard.

General FORMICA. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KLINE. Is that right? And you reached that, at one point it

was 14 and 4, I think——

General FORMICA. Yes, sir, if I may?

Mr. KLINE. Yes, please.

General FORMICA. It is 14 in the active, and that is 1 deployment

and 2 turns back——

Mr. KLINE. Right.

General FORMICA [continuing]. At 42 gets you the 14 per rotation

and the Army National Guard factored at 1 deployment and 5

turns back gets you about 4 to 5 at 28.

14

Mr. KLINE. And 14 and 4, is that the model we are moving to

or that is——

General FORMICA. Sir, that was where we came out of——

Mr. KLINE. All right. So what are we going to now?

General FORMICA. It would be 48 in the active component and 28

in the Army National Guard to get your 76 brigade combat teams,

plus we will continue the rebalance effort that we have in the

Army National Guard with the brigade combat teams to the combat support brigades designed for maneuver enhancement with infantry units assigned. And we will grow those in the Army National Guard, as well.

Mr. KLINE. Okay. Thank you.

Just as a matter of comment and opinion, I still think that the

United States Army is relying too heavily on the reserve component. I think that is a trend that we have seen throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom certainly. And it concerns me a little bit that

we still have what I think is a heavy reliance, programmed right

in, to deployment of the reserve component.

I am happy to see that it is at least a one to five, but I would

argue that really changing the nature of the Army National Guard

and Reserve component by this factoring in automatically national

guard brigade combat teams as we go forward, as part of the force

structure to be actively employed—I understand I am using a little

mixed language here, but you are planning to actively employ

members of the national guard in your mix.

And so, back, if I could, to you, General Johnson.

When you are computing the force structure for the Marine

Corps, how much are you factoring in the active employment, if you

will, of the Marine Corps Reserve, like the Army does? When you

figure out how many MAGTFs we need, how much are you relying

on the Marine Corps Reserve?

General JOHNSON. Well, our reliance on the reserve, as you

know, is to augment and reinforce, and the structure of the reserve

mirrors our active structure. And so we have always had the capability to reinforce and augment kind of on a mirror-image basis.

Mr. KLINE. Right.

General JOHNSON. But we have learned a lot, of course, out of

the current fight. And we want to try to minimize some of the activations of reservists where we possibly can, where they have been

unnecessary—or may have proved to have been unnecessary.

But we pretty much try to stay with a mirror image of our active

forces.

Mr. KLINE. Okay. Thank you.

I see I am about to run out of time, Mr. Chairman.

I think, General Johnson, maybe we can meet offline and talk

about that. I am not sure I am getting—I am probably not phrasing

the question accurately to understand how much the Marine Corps

is relying on activation of the reserves.

So, I am sorry. I yield back.

Dr. SNYDER. No, Mr. Kline. I think it is a good question, and we

will come back to it in our next round.

Ms. Sanchez.

Ms. SANCHEZ. I do think that is a good question, by the way, Mr.

Kline. And as somebody who is from California who has seen a lot

15

of their reservists and national guard people be in the mix, it is an

important question to our people.

Thank you, first of all, for being before us today.

I have a question. I am sorry because I didn’t read all the material, and I usually do. But I am at a little disadvantage, and I

apologize for not having done my homework ahead of time.

Over what time period will this increase take effect, both from

the Army and from the Marines standpoint? That is a quick question.

General FORMICA. Yes, ma’am. We begin the growth immediately, as the chairman already indicated, because some of those

soldiers are already on active duty. And then the growth would be

programmed out through fiscal year 2012, ma’am.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay.

And for the Marines?

Mr. APPLEGATE. Yes, ma’am. The intent for the Marine Corps is

to achieve the 202,000 on the active force by the end of fiscal year

2011.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay.

Mr. APPLEGATE. And we want to do that by trying to hit 184,000

at the end of fiscal year 2007, and then going up by increments of

5 until we top out at 202,000. So in 2008 the goal would be

189,000, then 194,000 in 2009, et cetera.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Now, I am assuming, as you are increasing—I

think before, when we had General Clark, retired at the time, come

before our committee, he mentioned something of a two-to-one factor. Is that still true for this, so the breakdown we would see is a

two-to-one breakdown on these? Or, what types of troops are you

looking at?

General FORMICA. Yes, ma’am. In the Army, the growth is predominantly in the operational force. It is the brigade combat teams

and combat support and combat service support soldiers that provide necessary enablers, and then there is a small amount that will

be about 5,000 that will go to the generating force or the institutional army to sustain a growing force, and the rest of those are

accommodated in what we call our individuals account.

We are going to continue to reduce our institutional Army and

grow our operating force, but about 5,000 of this structure will go

to the institutional Army.

Ms. SANCHEZ. So what you are saying is the marginal troops that

you are bringing in are going to be at less than the 2:1 ratio.

General FORMICA. The bulk——

Ms. SANCHEZ. Two people supporting one person in the field.

General FORMICA. Ma’am, the bulk of the forces we are bringing

in are operational forces, either in the brigade combat teams or the

combat support and combat service support soldiers that are in the

field supporting and fighting with them.

Our percentage of the operating force, the institutional Army,

will stay about the same. It is a roughly about 25 percent institutional Army and about 75 percent operating force. And that will

stay about the same as we grow the force.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. Thank you.

And in the Marines?

16

General JOHNSON. The increase that we are looking at, ma’am,

or the recommended increase that we are looking at was 75 percent

to the operating forces and 25 percent to the supporting establishment.

Ms. SANCHEZ. If that is the indication—you just gave me a ratio,

and you said you would bring in more operational troops than you

would, for whatever intents and purposes, staffing troops or what

have you, how is the existing soldier going to see that? What is the

impact that this is going to have on the services received to the existing soldier?

I mean, in other words, will medical care be affected? Will waits

and whatever be affected, if you are actually bringing in more operational troops, but you are leaving, to a large extent, the same infrastructure, if you will, of the other troops?

General FORMICA. Yes, ma’am. And for the Army, again, about

5,000 of that growth will be applied to that infrastructure, as you

refer to it, in the institutional Army. That will enable us to put

more recruiters, trainers, drill sergeants, instructors, and medical

personnel out in the generating force to provide the support that

you asked for.

Ms. SANCHEZ. So you think, then, an existing soldier will see no

difference?

General FORMICA. I think that we will continue to provide the

quality supports in the institutional Army, ma’am, yes. And we will

continue to fund military-civilian conversions in order to provide

that quality support with both military and civilian personnel.

Ms. SANCHEZ. What about equipping these troops? I mean, today

in The Washington Post, ‘‘Equipment for Added Troops is Lacking.’’

I am sure you saw this article. This is with respect to the troops

that we are sending out to Iraq.

What about being able to equip them over this time period that

you have? Or do you feel strongly that you are going to be able to

equip them correctly?

And given the fact that equipment used to follow the particular

person, and now we changed to equipment is left behind, and new

troops come in and troops are finding no equipment or there is a

lack of equipment in places we are, like in Iraq, for example—and,

oh, by the way, we haven’t figured out, nor do we know the impact

of what we have to replace yet.

How do you all feel about having the right equipment for these

troops if we can get them in?

General FORMICA. Ma’am, of course, first of all, the Army is committed to deploying across the berm into Iraq and Afghanistan only

those units that are manned, trained and equipped to the task for

which they have been assigned.

We currently are experiencing, as you know, equipping challenges that apply mostly in the units back in the training base, in

the reset training phase of our force generation model. And we are

doing a combination of sourcing units with their organic equipment, with equipment provided in theater, with equipment that is

provided to them in the reset, and through some cross-balancing

from other units in order for them to train before they deploy.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

17

And thank you all for being here today.

My predecessor, the late Congressman Floyd Spence, was a

strong supporter of greater end-strength, and so I know he would

be pleased to see the recommendations that are coming forth.

In looking at this, as to recruiting and retention, is there anything that we in Congress need to do to assist—and I have a particular interest at the recruiting school as at Fort Jackson for the

Army. Is there anything that we need to do to assist in terms of

recruiting and retention?

General FORMICA. Sir, first, thank you for your comment and for

your support and for the offer of continued support.

We believe that with aggressive recruiting goals and retention

goals that we will be able to achieve the end-strength that we have

envisioned. As you well know, that will require continued support

from Congress for the incentive packages that we would want to

offer for both recruiting and retention. And we thank you, in advance, for that support.

Ms. ST. LAURENT. I would like to also offer a comment on the recruiting issue, and that is, in addition to just being able to recruit

the aggregate numbers, I think both the Army and the Marine

Corps will potentially have some challenges in trying to recruit individuals with the correct skills.

We have done some reports on recruiting and have found out

that there are some imbalances, where the services have not been

able to fill certain occupational specialties and have overfilled others.

So I think a good management plan to manage the increase, if

approved, would be necessary. And the services will both have to

look at the kinds of incentives, in terms of recruiting and retention

bonuses and incentives that they are providing.

Mr. APPLEGATE. Congressman Wilson, for the——

Mr. WILSON. Yes.

Mr. APPLEGATE [continuing]. Marine Corps, we are looking at a

number of things. One, we are in the process of increasing our recruiter force by 600 nationwide. We will need your continued support for access to high schools. That is going to be an important

part of this.

Our enlistment bonus program is going to need to be funded because we are greatly going to need to increase that, along with our

advertising dollars for our recruiting command, sir.

Mr. WILSON. And I am always impressed at the recruiting because it is so difficult. The number of young people who, due to

health requirements, it is a small percentage actually of those who

apply that can finally be fully recruited and trained.

Additionally, how about the facilities? Do we have sufficient facilities at Fort Jackson, at Parris Island, Pendleton? Do we feel like

the facilities for the recruits is sufficient?

General FORMICA. Again, sir, a great question and one that we

are—our current military construction (MILCON) program which,

when passed, will provide increased capabilities, both in our operational force but also in our recruiting base. And I do believe that

we will have adequate barrack space, not only at Fort Jackson, but

in all of our basic training centers.

Mr. WILSON. Right.

18

Mr. APPLEGATE. And, Congressman, for the Marine Corps, we are

doing a DOTMILPF process, and I am not sure if you are all familiar with that acronym. But that looks at doctrine, organization,

training, material, leadership, personnel and facilities for every aspect of the operating force and the supporting establishment for the

end-strength increase. And for the recruiting command and for our

instructors in our training command, that is all part of this.

So we are looking at, do we need more MILCON or facilities

equipment at the boot camps, throughout the recruiting stations

and at the recruiting school, and those sorts of things. And those

are all being wrapped up into our final assessment on what the

costs are going to be and what the requirements are going to be,

and the timelines, and where the long poles in the tent are for our

ability to achieve the end-strength increase.

Mr. WILSON. And I appreciate Ms. Sanchez bringing up about the

equipment for the active duty. But there was a report yesterday,

and I don’t know if you have jurisdiction, the shortfalls in equipment for national guard units, particularly in the event of a state

call-up.

What is the status on adjusting for that?

General FORMICA. Sir, I don’t have jurisdiction over equipment.

And I would prefer to take that question for the record and have

the right folks come back and provide that response.

Mr. WILSON. Fine.

Ms. ST. LAURENT. I can provide some comments on that. That

report——

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sure.

Ms. ST. LAURENT [continuing]. That you are mentioning is one

that GAO is issuing, will be coming out today publicly.

But we took a look at how the Department of the Army and the

National Guard are trying to manage equipment for both homeland

security and overseas missions, and there are some significant

challenges. We know the Army is aware of those. But because the

national guard has been so heavily engaged overseas, there are

very significant shortfalls in the guard.

The Army is trying now to identify about 300 or so items that

will be useful for homeland security purposes, as well as overseas

missions, and try to manage those. But it is going to be a long process before I think the level of equipping in the guard units is increased significantly. And, for the time being, it is a risk that needs

to be considered.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you.

Dr. SNYDER. Ms. Shea-Porter.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you very much.

And thank you for being here today. I have a couple of questions.

I am very concerned about the role of the national guard, the

way you have projected it. Could you tell me, please, how many national guard troops, again, are you expecting to add in what timeframe?

General FORMICA. Yes, ma’am. In the proposed growth, we would

grow about 8,200 of Army National Guard, again over the same

timeframe; about 1,500 a year.

19

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. I am concerned about some of the problems that they are already facing in the civilian sector when they

leave their jobs for extended periods of time.

Do you have some program to address that with civilian employers? Because I can’t imagine it would be very attractive to, you

know, potential national guard members knowing the difficulties

right now.

General FORMICA. Ma’am, I can’t speak to specific programs with

employers in the communities, but I can tell you that, as you know,

the Secretary of Defense has recently announced a new mobilization policy. The Army embraces that mobilization policy.

And, first of all, we believe it will help in the long run to enable

us with recurrent assured access to the guard and to the reserve.

But it also establishes a 12-month mobilization period.

And so, by increasing pre-mobilization training, we can optimize

the time that they are called on to active duty and guarantee them

a 12-months mobilization time, as opposed to the more extended

periods that they have experienced in the past few years.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. I would suggest that, in order to meet those

recruitment goals, that we are really going to have to coordinate

better, because what I have been hearing out of my district is a

great deal of stress and strain on the families and a reluctance to

enroll at this point because of those problems that haven’t been addressed.

I also wanted to ask you about stop-loss. I know that has recently been changed again, and they are going to try not to use the

stop-loss. But will that be something that you might have to utilize

again if you don’t reach those goals?

General FORMICA. Ma’am, it is my understanding, first of all, we

will, I believe, continue to rely on stop-loss in the near-term, as we

provide trained and ready, cohesive units.

But we did receive guidance from the Secretary of Defense to

look at how we will reduce and eliminate stop-loss in the future,

and the Army is assessing its stop-loss program and has a responsibility to go back to the Secretary some time next month to report

how we are going to do that. So we are looking at that now, ma’am.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. And a couple other questions, please.

Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), does it have a role? Are

you trying to expand that to bring soldiers in?

General FORMICA. We will obviously need to have increased accessions in ROTC. I can’t speak to the specific numbers that we

will need as part of growing the force, but increased accessions in

the officer corps, as well as in the enlisted ranks, will be required

in order to sustain a growth to 547,000 in the active.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. And, once again, I am trying to project

what will happen to these soldiers that come in and then eventually leave the military and become veterans. Is there any kind of

coordination, any long-term plan looking at what their needs will

be after they retire, in terms of the extra costs for the Veterans Administration (VA)?

You know, maybe there isn’t any linkage at all between the agencies, but I think it would be helpful because they will be utilizing

services at the other end. And I think it would help people at the

20

beginning, before they entered the military, if they knew that there

would be a continuation of care after.

General FORMICA. Ma’am, I agree. If there is a direct linkage

that is going on right now today, I am not aware of it. But, of

course, we do appreciate the continued support of the American

people and the benefits that our veterans receive. But I do agree

with you.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. I really would like to see some plan long-term

for that, and I don’t even know—I am not putting it on your shoulders. I just wanted to bring it up as an issue, that I think this is

where we fall down, you know, through taking care of them at the

end.

And my last question is I am very concerned about the training

time, and the stories that we are sending soldiers into the field unprepared. And I wanted you to address that, if you would, please.

My understanding is they are not getting enough training, in particular national guard and reserve units, and they are being put

into battle without enough training time.

General FORMICA. Ma’am, the Army remains absolutely committed to sending into Iraq and Afghanistan, into any theater of operations, soldiers and units who are manned, trained and equipped

for the task for which they are going to perform. We have got an

extensive post-mobilization training program run by our U.S. Army

Forces Command and First Army, and we do extensive post-mobilization training that is geared to the mission that the unit has been

assigned.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. So you are saying that every national guard

unit has had proper training, they have had the equipment to train

with, before they have gone into Iraq and into any kind of——

General FORMICA. Trained, equipped and certified before they deploy.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you.

Ms. ST. LAURENT. I would, if I could, make a comment on that

issue.

I would agree that the units going into Iraq are all certified and

do receive training. But I think there are some challenges that we

have seen as we have looked at the mobilization process, and that

includes units not necessarily getting the equipment at the time

they would like and prefer, so they do experience some delays.

They eventually get most of it at the mobilization station, but

sometimes they get additional equipment in theater and have to

train there.

So ideally one would want to make some improvements to that

process.

Dr. SNYDER. Ms. Davis.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you all for being here.

I wanted to direct my questions, if I may, to you, Ms. St.

Laurent. Am I saying that right? Because I think that some of the

issues that you raise, I wonder if you could give us a little more

background about.

21

You mentioned the transparency and the hope, I think, that the

process would be more transparent in the future and that it would

be based more on reliable data as opposed to individual judgments.

Could you expand on that a little bit and just give us an example

of, in fact, where that transparency has not been obvious to you?

And what drives that? How can we do a better job with that?

Ms. ST. LAURENT. There are a couple of issues from my perspective, and I will—again with the analyses that are done at the DODwide level. One of the principle ones is the Quadrennial Defense

Review, and we think that the study itself has merits. It encourages a review of the defense strategy and new initiatives come forward. But it also makes some decisions about force structure.

Our view is that it does not necessarily provide much insight into

how those conclusions were reached. In fact, in the past we have

recommended that the Department consider providing Congress

with a classified addendum or annex that would better explain the

kinds of assumptions and scenarios that were used to reach the

conclusions about force structure. And we still think that is a good

idea. So there is an area where they could improve.

Also, with the military personnel end-strength requests, we think

that perhaps the Department could create a better display to show

how they are allocating end-strength to their key missions, and

how much of it is in combat forces, how much of it is in support

forces, and how much is it in the institutional, or generating, force

that includes the training base and other things. And then, from

year to year, they could show how they are changing.

The Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps are proposing increases,

but the other services are also proposing to decrease.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Can I ask you, on that first point, is

that a proposal that has been made to the Pentagon, to the DOD

essentially? And has it gone through a process? Have people been

able to weigh in on that? Have any of you heard of that, and would

you have a response to that? How does that filter up or down?

Ms. ST. LAURENT. Certainly. We generally make these suggestions through our reports, by including specific recommendations to

the Secretary of Defense or to the services, where appropriate.

So, in the case of our recommendation about the QDR, we have

made a number of recommendations for improving that process, to

include preparing a classified annex. And DOD has agreed, I think,

in concept, but has not taken specific action to implement it.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. So there is not a formal response to

that.

Ms. ST. LAURENT. They have to respond both to the Congress and

to GAO in a letter responding to our report. And we then do followup to see whether they are making the changes. But, to date, they

have not really implemented some of the recommendations we have

made in the past.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. And is that a proposal for this last

QDR or was that proposal made in the former QDR?

Ms. ST. LAURENT. It was a proposal made based on our study of

the 2001 QDR. We are currently putting together a report that will

be commenting on the 2006 QDR. And we will have some recommendations in that, as well.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Okay. Thank you. I appreciate that.

22

I am not suggesting necessarily that all those recommendations

should be taken. But I think part of our frustration is that we have

been hearing from GAO recently that, you know, there are many

proposals that are made and, generally speaking, they are not necessarily responded to. And so we end up making the same—not

necessarily the same mistake, but we are not really responding to

the real-world situations as best we could.

And I wonder, any thoughts about that? Is there enough of that

that filters to the services? And are you asked to respond and to

weigh in on those issues at all?

General JOHNSON. Well, I can’t speak specifically to these suggestions, whether we—I don’t know if we have been. Certainly, if

we are asked, we will respond.

I think that the request by OSD for us to look at our strength

and come back to them with proposals recently is an indication

that they do listen to us, and that they have opened up that avenue

in this case.

So, in answer to your questions, if GAO asks us for something,

we will respond. And we think that this is an opportunity that we

have had to do so.

Ms. ST. LAURENT. And I would like to add that we have reviewed

the Army’s Total Army Analysis force structure development process several times, in fact, and we have made a number of recommendations. And the Army has been responsive on many of the

recommendations we have made in that area.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Great. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Mr. Applegate, what is the amount of the advertising budget for

recruitment for the Marine Corps?

Mr. APPLEGATE. Sir, I believe the 2007 advertising budget is in

the $120 million range, but I think we will have to get back with

you on the specifics for that. And I am not sure how much more

it is going to go up in the 2008 budget, sir.

Mr. JONES. Major General, how much is the advertising budget

for the Army?

General FORMICA. Sir, I don’t know. If you would permit, I could

ask my colleague to the rear and see if he has brought that with

him. If not, I will take the question for the record.

Mr. JONES. Okay.

General FORMICA. He reports to me that it is about $280 million

in the base budget.

Mr. JONES. Okay. How much is the recruitment bonus for the

Marine Corps and the Army? Is it the same, or is there a difference

in the recruitment bonus?

Mr. APPLEGATE. Sir, in 2007, we have a $54 million enlistment

bonus, and that would be going up substantially in 2008 and out,

sir.

Mr. JONES. Okay. I guess a couple points.

Some of my colleagues on both sides—the national guard in the

state of North Carolina, which I have the privilege to serve the 3rd

District, it really has been so stressed. I guess my question is about

the recruitment, not per se about North Carolina.

23

But I am finding more and more in the guard—and God knows,

they really have done a great job working with the active duty

forces, and they need to be all of them applauded, reserve, guard,

and active duty, for the magnificent job they have done in Afghanistan and Iraq—but I am finding more in the guard to be concerned.

And the gentlelady—and I am sorry, I didn’t bring my glasses.

I couldn’t see the name. I apologize for that.

But the point about the fact that it appears that—I know that

we are trying to increase the end-strength. I know that is an ongoing process. But it seems in the short term that I am finding more

and more guardsmen and reserve, Navy primarily, that are really

beginning to feel the stress family-wise and the stress with their

jobs.

Are you beginning to feel this or to hear this or to sense this?

That there is a stress that seems to be at a level that many in the

guard primarily are saying, ‘‘I don’t know how much more of this

I can take’’? And it has nothing to do with the policy, whether they

are for being in Iraq or not being in Iraq, but it is just the stress

on the family, the individual.

Are you all having to cope with this more now than ever before?

I mean, I am hearing it more now.

General FORMICA. Sir, if I could make a couple comments.

First, I share your observation that we are getting tremendous

service from the soldiers in the active, the Army National Guard,

and the United States Army Reserve. And it is my observation that

we are more integrated today than we have been during any time

in my career. And so we appreciate and depend on the sustained

participation and integration of the United States Army Reserve

and the Army National Guard.

I know that there is increased strain in all three components as

we meet the demands of the global war on terror. And, as you suggest, I am not surprised that you would hear anecdotes of that in

the Army National Guard in your home state.

But it is encouraging that we met our recruiting and retention

goals in the components in fiscal year 2006, and we anticipate continuing to meet those recruiting and retention goals. And so while

there is obviously family and individual strain associated with deployments, the signs are encouraging that the units and the soldiers are able to weather that.

Mr. JONES. General.

General JOHNSON. I can’t certainly speak for the guard, but I can

speak to certainly the Marines. Indicators are that we aren’t having a lot of stress on the force. Some of the key indicators that we

would look at: abuse, divorce, things along those lines. Those are

fairly stable, and our recruiting and retention remains stable.

But we do see some signs of stress on the folks, particularly on

the families. As the commandant gets around to the Marine Corps

and speaks with families and Marines, there are stressors out

there: fathers who have been deployed multiple times and so forth.

There are stresses that are not necessarily visible. But we are concerned about them, and we are watching them very closely.

Mr. JONES. I know recently, Mr. Chairman, I think it was our

subcommittee, Personnel, we had the wife of a colonel and the wife

24

of a gunnery sergeant, and I tell you the truth. And then we had

a staff sergeant, I believe, in the Army who himself who came.

And I will be real quick because my time is up.

I truthfully don’t think we can do enough for the quality of life,

whether it be the reserve or active duty. And not get into the policy, but I continue—we had a hearing today in the full committee,

and I think it was General Cordesman. Is that the way you say his

name? Tony——

Mr. MURPHY. Tony Cordesman, sir——

Mr. JONES. Thank you. I apologize for that.

But, I mean, when you hear the fact that we are in a situation

in Afghanistan that we are going to have to, you know, up-tempo,

increase the numbers, that we in this country and we in this Congress, we have really got to really, I think, make the right decisions

for that family because it does break your heart.

Yesterday, Brian Bilbray and I went to Walter Reed, which every

Member of Congress has done. And I never will forget a lady that

we just happened to see sitting with her—it turned out to be her

daughter. And for some reason, Brian and I just decided we wanted

to go up and introduce ourselves and tell her how much—we didn’t

know about her family, but her daughter was having her leg amputated yesterday.

And so my point is, Mr. Chairman, I thank this committee for

the good that we do. I thank the Congress for what we do. But God

bless you all. That is all I got to say.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I would like to echo Mr. Jones’s comments about what you

do for our country, and I appreciate it.

And, Mr. Applegate, I know you are from Toms River, New Jersey. I was commissioned in the Army with a guy from Toms River,

New Jersey. So thanks for your service to the Marine Corps, and

welcome to the civilian world, like I am, as well.

Mr. APPLEGATE. Thank you, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I would just like to state that I don’t think it is

controversial to say that the force requirement determination process that we talked about today and the budget process is tied together. And I think one of the main themes that we should take

away from this hearing today is that we should be wary of too

much political influence over the process.

And that brings me to my point here. That the troubling effect

of off-budgeting and relying on supplemental appropriations, approaches that are overly political, hamper our ability to recruit and

retain forces, and thus, ultimately hurt our ability to hit our endstrength goals.

So my first question is given what appears to be an in-depth and

deliberative determination about what our force goal should be,

why are we leaving the bulk of recruitment and retention funding

to the supplementals budgets that we have?

General FORMICA. I would defer to Mr. Applegate.

Mr. APPLEGATE. I know in the Marine Corps we are trying to

plow all of the funds into the baseline. I am not sure if that is

going to be in 2008. It is definitely our goal is to get it in by 2009.

25

But our intent is to get all the funding requirements into the

baseline budget as early as possible. Hopefully, that will be 2008.

If it is not, we are definitely trying to get it in for 2009.

General FORMICA. And I would just add, sir, for the Army that

one of the obvious advantages of this recommended permanent

growth is that we would make permanent first that temporary endstrength that has been authorized by the Congress and enable us—

and we are working this into the budget process with OSD—to get

as much into the base budget as possible.

Mr. MURPHY. And your plan is to do that in 2008?

General FORMICA. I am not sure. They are working that now as

part of the budget process, and I am sure that that will become

available once those decisions are made.

Mr. MURPHY. Okay. And I just need to crunch the numbers, and

the chairman made sure that we did our homework, so. You are

looking at the numbers. Fiscal year 2006, the Army active and reserve spent $4.2 billion in recruiting programs.

And, you know, I used to do recruiting when I was a professor

at West Point. Go down along the side for the Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps. Go down at New York colleges and universities,

and that was a proud moment. I was proud to serve in the military.

I still am proud of it. It was the greatest thing I have ever done.

But, you know, you look at overview, and, you know, our job now

is controlling the people’s purse here. And you look at, you know,

at this point, $3.6 billion has been budgeted for recruiting in 2007.

Clearly, the services are relying on—we are looking at $500 million

to $700 million coming from this emerging supplemental, which is

going to come on our plate in a couple months.

And, you know, in fiscal year 2006 the Army spent $1.8 billion

on retention bonuses. But this year, in fiscal year 2007, we are

looking at $1.1 million. So a decreased amount of retention bonuses

that we have that we are planning on.

And, you know, I know you all are hurting, and is there a plan,

you know, with the budget supplementals here, I mean, to really

hit us with the retention bonuses I would assume? Or should we

assume?

General FORMICA. Mr. Murphy, I can’t speak to the specifics of

the budget requirements. I will be happy to take that question for

the record and come back to you.

If I may add, I would like to thank you for your service, and I

may be so bold as to tell you that we would welcome your continued recruiting efforts in your current capacity.

Mr. MURPHY. I will go in any commercial you want me to be on.

[Laughter.]

I didn’t like the fact that we changed it to an Army of one, but

that is beside the point. That is not for this hearing, but——

General FORMICA. Army strong.

Mr. MURPHY. Army strong. That is right. I am glad that we

changed that.

Mr. APPLEGATE. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Mr. APPLEGATE. If I may, for the Marine Corps? I know that we

are plowing the enlistment bonus, selective re-enlistment bonus

into the budget, and again, our goal is to get it in 2008.

26

It is not really up to us, because we got the Department of the

Navy and the Department of Defense who will make the call. But

we are definitely ready to move all of those funds into the baseline.

Mr. MURPHY. And I think, I mean, for the record, I know that

many members of this subcommittee and Armed Services, which I

can’t speak to, but we have showed our wishes that we put this

back into the regular budget process just so we can do our responsibility of the proper oversight, what you need in these programs

if we could help you out, as well, so.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Higgins, start the clock again, and we will head back around

on a five-minute rule.

Folks, I want to play devil’s advocate a little bit and get into this

issue of—I want to talk about your chart. Ms. St. Laurent’s report

talks about DOD needs to provide a better link—their words, or the

GAO’s words—a better link between its defense strategy and military personnel requirements.

When I look at your chart, General Formica, on the left side.

General JOHNSON. Sir, that is our chart.

Dr. SNYDER. That is the Marine Corps chart? Total——

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Dr. SNYDER. Oh, there is that little—all right, I have no excuse.

But we will talk about—see, now, I should just say I know, but I

want General Formica to explain it. [Laughter.]

But I am not going to do that. [Laughter.]

General FORMICA. Can I take that for the record? [Laughter.]

Dr. SNYDER. All right. We will go right below the anchor there.

You know, I have heard people, when we have looked at this

issue over the last few weeks trying to sort this all out, because

this issue has tremendous ramifications both for the military in

achieving your mission, but also on long-range costs in our defense

budget.

And so, Ms. St. Laurent, talks about a better link. But I have

heard this left side of it, what you call the input. And you have got

strategy document on top of strategy document, and then you have

op plans, and you have got commanders’ requests.

I mean, the reality is, if I took all those documents and put them

together, I could find something in there that probably justified any

level of troop strength for the Marine Corps or the Army. I could

justify a 300,000 increase in the Army. I could justify status quo,

I will bet. If you give me those documents, I will find stuff in there

that can back up any level.

And so I will give Ms. St. Laurent’s comment on this. But I have

heard that described—I describe it as it is like an amorphous cloud.

And then I had one of the staff members say, ‘‘Well, no. It is more

like Jell-O.’’ And using your metaphor, Ms. St. Laurent, it is hard

to link into either Jell-O or an amorphous cloud. [Laughter.]

And so, you know, we have gone one whole round here. And I

have read all the written stuff. I still don’t have a sense, okay. How

did we get to 92,000? How did we get to 92,000?

I think that what Mr. Kline, if I understood what he was saying,

I think he said it very well.

27

Somewhere in all that stuff on the left side, whether it is in General Formica’s mind or General Johnson’s chart, somebody made

some assumptions that sent to you all that said, hey, you are going

to rely on the guard for this many of the troops. You know, it is

going to be this many, at this rotation requirement. Then how does

that affect what comes out through your throughput, through your

output, to the other side?

But we are having trouble—I can’t get my hands around, you

know, how do I go back now, when we are at full committee or to

my folks back home in Arkansas, and say I sat through this hearing, and I now understand the Jell-O? And here is why 92,000 is

the correct number. But I haven’t heard anything here today that

helps me understand why that is the correct number, other than

you have assured me that you have the Total Army Analysis process.

And I don’t doubt your integrity on this. I am playing devil’s advocate here. But I don’t see anything to hook that link into. And

Ms. St. Laurent, in her comments, I think, in her report are acknowledging that Mr. Kline and the others are on to something

here.

So would you respond?

Well, let me go to Ms. St. Laurent first, and then we will have

our two services respond.

Ms. ST. LAURENT. I would like to take a stab at trying to explain

why I think now we are seeing the Army and Marine Corps and

the Secretary of Defense supporting a different requirement. And

that is we have looked at force structure planning for probably the

past 15, 20 years.

And the scenarios that the Department uses to do its force structure planning have evolved considerably. And before it used to be,

let us do a detailed analysis of a couple of major combat operations,

and it would all be focused on offensive combat operations. And

that was the way it was done for many, many years.

Over the past ten years, the department has expanded the kinds

of scenarios that get looked at, and that has led us to some different requirements. We look at major war requirements, but they

also look at stability operations and contingency requirements.

They are starting to look at homeland defense requirements.

And there is a couple of ways of looking at this.

The Army, based on my discussions with them, does one set of

analysis that looks at the Army’s worst day. What if we had to do

a number of operations simultaneously, including major wars?

And then, now, though, what has changed, I think, over the past

couple of years for the Department is that all the services are needing to pay more attention to stability operations, regular warfare,

and having to sustain involvement in contingency operations over

a number of years. And that has required all the services to go

back and take a look at their rotation force needs.

What if you have to do something for four, five, six, seven, eight

years and need to provide a constant flow of forces? Now, one can

argue about the size of that. And I think one of the things we have

seen is that the QDR assumptions about the size of those contingency operations may not be the same, and I don’t think they are

28

the same, as the real-world demands that the services are currently facing.

So that is my take on why I think that we are now seeing some

different requirements being articulated.

Dr. SNYDER. Generals.

General FORMICA. Sir, if I may, just to Ms. St. Laurent’s comments.

The strategies that you talked about are translated in our requirements phase through the scenarios that she refers to. And

they are OSD-approved scenarios that we then enter into our modeling portion, where we do analysis on the type and amount of

forces that are required to meet those scenarios.

The scenarios in the particular case of TAA–0813, the most recent TAA we did, were not directly related to Iraq and Afghanistan.

But the scenarios that we have used in the past, and have adjusted

since, are the scenarios that get us to the force that we have today.

To assure you on the 65,000 and the linkage of the 65,000 of

growth in the active component, again, it was based on the need

to grow six brigade combat teams in the active component, the

combat support and combat service support, and enabling requirements that are needed to support those brigade combat teams,

based on our TAA analysis and modeling, that is what—and then

the slight increase, the 5,000, as I said, that we would add to the

generating force, that is what gets us to 65,000 in the active.

Dr. SNYDER. General Johnson.

General JOHNSON. I can’t refute what you said about it being a

Jell-O-like process. I believe that the evolution of the task conditions and standards that we derive from those plans and from the

scenario analysis, there is a great degree of subjectivity to it.

But we believe that those are the kinds of capabilities that we

need to build as a corps—we look for the capabilities that we need

to build as a corps to be able to provide to the combatant commanders to meet those kinds of scenarios and to meet our requirements in the op plans.

We have more gaps than we do solutions for those gaps. So we

are constrained in a number of different ways, not only by endstrength, but our dollars, even by technology, in the sense that

some things that we need don’t even exist.

But the process that we try to go through gets us the capabilities

that we think the combatant commanders will need.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. McHugh.

Mr. MCHUGH. I need to go to LensCrafters. [Laughter.]

My eyesight is not quite what it should be here.

But I assume somewhere in there you are assuming a certain

amount of risk. We can’t buy all eventualities and cover all potentials. Is that true?

General JOHNSON. That is correct.

Mr. MCHUGH. How does this new force structure proposal risk

compare to the 2006 QDR?

General JOHNSON. Well, for the Marine Corps I think that we reduce risk by being able to build a more balanced force. We are able

to build a more balanced MAGTF concept. Right now, we have two

Marine expeditionary forces that are approximately the same size,

29

and one that is a lesser size. And much of this increase will allow

us to build the forces that will balance us across three MAGTFs.

We also believe that we reduce the risk by being able to—that

gives us a greater ability to provide more forces to the combatant

commanders to enable their 7,500 planning, to enable their TSC—

theater security cooperation planning, and also to be able to meet

the requirements of a major combat operation.

So we believe we reduce the risks by increasing the force over

what we were told that we needed to be in the QDR.

General FORMICA. And if I could echo General Johnson’s comments, as we grow brigade combat teams and the combat support

and combat service support, that would provide a greater balance

to our force to enable us to provide strategic depth and reduced

dwell time and to meet the needs of the combatant commanders in

the future.

We also, in this growth, are able to reduce risk by providing

some key enablers and to reduce the amount of high-demand, lowdensity types of units that we have in the Army.

Particularly, we propose growth, for instance, for two Patriot battalions, for increased amount of explosive ordnance detachment soldiers, improved maintenance for our striker systems, small arms

maintainers, more military intelligence, military personnel (MP)

and engineers, and in growing those kinds of capabilities, better

enable us to provide the kind of force we need, not only to meet

the current operational demands of Iraq and Afghanistan, but for

the type of force that we think we need for the future.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you.

General Johnson, you heard a comment earlier, I believe it was

in response to Ms. Sanchez’s question, about the Army’s efforts to

balance its distribution of the forces amongst the various categories

of need. The Marine Corps relies, if not exclusively, very heavily on

Navy personnel for medical.

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MCHUGH. The Navy is the service that is kind of going the

other way in terms of end-strength. They are growing down.

What calculation, if any, has been made into this request for—

obviously, you have more Marines potentially engaged in more theaters of action, more casualties, more wounded. Is there any provision on the Navy side for medical personnel?

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir. We have identified our end-strength

growth to the Navy, and the Navy will take a look at our requirements for corpsmen and doctors and chaplains and will coordinate

a commensurate—will support us in that regard.

Mr. MCHUGH. But it isn’t factored on a numbers basis into your

request? This is all Marine structure.

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir. The end-strength growth request that

we have made is all Marines, active component Marines.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Maybe we can go to

somebody else before——

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Kline.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Johnson, the requirements for Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC), those are completely included in your

end-strength increase?

30

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KLINE. You talked about balancing the Marine Expeditionary

Forces (MEF). As I recall, one of those MEFs is heavily concentrated overseas.

General JOHNSON. That is correct.

Mr. KLINE. And are you anticipating an increase of basing overseas or a part of that MEF going to be state-side? I don’t know if

we are going to step into classification here, but it appears there

wasn’t a whole lot of room over there to grow that MEF in Okinawa and Japan, even with the addition of Guam.

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir. You are correct. We have not gotten

to the point where we are ready to say exactly where all these

units will be. We believe that you can have a MEF in a number

of different locations.

Mr. KLINE. Okay.

General JOHNSON. So it will be spread out——

Mr. KLINE. Okay. Another time I would like to talk about where

they might actually go.

And then, very quickly, I can’t restrain myself, try as I might,

having been in the programming business and the requirements

business for a long time in the Marine Corps, that I just offer the

opinion that the requirements system is pretty badly broken and

lags too much. And this force generation is just an example of it.

It was, if I dare say, intuitively obvious to virtually everybody on

this committee, not just this subcommittee but the Armed Services

Committee, that we needed to grow the end-strength of the active

Army and the active Marine Corps. We were putting too much

stress.

And now it is 2007, and a good four years after we were calling

for this end-strength increase, because it seemed readily apparent

to us that we were overusing the reserve component, particularly

in the case of the Army Guard and Reserve. And now we have got

a requirements process on force generation that kind of catches up

to where we were four or five years ago.

So I am not even going to ask for comment, because we have

been called to vote, but it really concerns me that this model and

the Army model are just lagging too badly. It bothers me that that

has happened to us.

So with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Dr. SNYDER. Ms. Sanchez, I think, would like to yield her time

to Mr. Murphy.

Ms. SANCHEZ. That is correct.

I just want to put in for the record that even though some of us

thought that we were going to have to grow the end-strength, I

mean, we, you know, we kept being told also that we were going

to be out of Iraq by now.

So, you know, I get very worried when we are growing the endstrength now because it is an indication to me that we may be in

Iraq for an even longer time or maybe some other situations that

we don’t really want to be in. So it is a real concern.

Just wanted to put that on the record, and I would like to yield

my time.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Murphy, she has yielded the remainder of her

time.

31

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you.

Dr. SNYDER. You have 4 minutes and 30 seconds.

Mr. MURPHY. Roger. Thank you, Chairman.

I think one of the—during my time on the Armed Services Committee and the Select Intelligence Committee is that right now the

President obviously is asking for the surge, and I am very skeptical

on his requests with that. But I think it is relevant, because when

you look at what the surge—I think this is the first of many

surges. I think the reality of it is the majority, 75 percent, of those

troops are going to Baghdad.

Is it necessary for the Army, and particularly the Army, to start

planning for continued surges beside just Baghdad, in Iraq specifically?

General FORMICA. I think first will be required a determination

from the combatant commander on the ground as to the length and

duration of this surge. The Army, of course, is beginning to anticipate what happens on the back end of this initial surge; what kind

of rotational forces will be required when the surge ends, and when

those soldiers come back home.

Mr. MURPHY. So it is possible that the Pentagon might come

back and ask for even more troops than the 92,000, or is that within the equation?

General FORMICA. Sir, that is not what I said.

The request for 65,000 in the Army, while clearly related to the

global war on terror and enable us to engage in that global war on

terror, is not directly linked to the surge. The surge is an immediate requirement in fiscal year 2007. And the Army will respond

to that surge by providing units that are manned, trained and

equipped.

The growth is really about providing capacity for the Army and

for the Marine Corps to have strategic depth for the long term.

And, as the chief of staff has testified and as many of you have alluded to, this is really the continuation of the growth that began

a few years ago by taking advantage of the 30,000 temporary increase that the chief had asked for and that was authorized by

Congress.

Mr. MURPHY. Even at the last hearing with General Schoomaker,

he indicated that the continued escalation would cause serious

doubt about the ability for our military to go to the 1:2 deployment

ratio.

What do you think about the current up-tempo of both the Army

and the Marine Corps? Can you give me a percentage of what do

you think that would be right now if we continue to——

General FORMICA. I think in the near term the Army is going to

sustain, at least in the active component, an up-tempo of about 1:1,

and it is our intent, and obviously to grow capacity and to get in,

as we continue to build our forces, to implement our Army force

generation model and to take advantage of the recurrent assured

access to the guard and reserve to improve dwell times in all three

components.

Mr. MURPHY. And could I just follow up real quick?

General, you say short term. How short-term? What are we talking about there, 12 months?

32

General FORMICA. No. I think we will be at 1:1 in the Army at

least for another rotation or two, if not longer, for some units.

Mr. MURPHY. Those units, particularly active duty units or——

General FORMICA. Active duty brigade combat teams. When I

talk 1:1, I am talking active component units and not to the guard

and reserve.

General JOHNSON. We have many units that are 1:1, some that

are below 1:1, and some are running somewhere less than 1:2. We

will do whatever is required for the surge, but that will exacerbate

our existing ratio, and——

Mr. MURPHY. Is there a way that we can get a status on when

you talk about some are less, some are more? Could we get a status

of those brigade combat teams? I mean, I can tell you, I mean, I

was in Second Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division in

Iraq the first time, and they are already going—you know, since I

have left——

General FORMICA. Right.

Mr. MURPHY [continuing]. In 2004, they went to Afghanistan.

They went home. Now they are back in Iraq. So this is the third

deployment we are talking in less than three years, so.

General FORMICA. And that is the 1:1. If you would like us to

come back with a specific lay down of brigade combat——

Mr. MURPHY. Of the brigade combat teams. Roger.

General FORMICA. We can provide that.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen. I appreciate

that.

Can I get that for the Marine Corps, sir, as well?

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, sir. I appreciate that.

Thank you, Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Murphy.

Folks, we have just about six minutes left or so on votes, so we

are all going to have to vote and dash.

I wanted to make a couple final closing comments.

Mr. McHugh said he had no further questions.

But first of all, General Johnson, in your written statement you

refer on page seven and eight to, I think you say, ‘‘More and more

we are going to need to outthink our enemies and find our advantages and victories in the human factors. This intimate killing

ground where the enemy has chosen to fight his wars among the

people requires tactical cunning and intangible factors to include

cultural and language skills, plus brilliance in the basics of small

unit soldiering,’’ which I think is a great comment to make.

And I know at least one member of the full committee has great

doubts about this 92,000 and thinks that we should be really focusing on developing those kinds of skills in a lot of the troops we already have. I guess it is the model of what somebody referred to

as the Lawrence of Arabia model; that it is not just a numbers

game, but finding those kinds of language skills and cultural sensitivity.

So I appreciate you making that comment.

I am sorry that we have to go. I would really like to pursue the

Jell-O cloud more. [Laughter.]

Because I don’t think that we have grappled with that.

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And I am not saying that 92,000 is too high a number. I mean,

there have been people for years that have been saying—you know,

Norm Sisisky was talking years ago about that this was not going

to go well for the military. And he has been long deceased now, a

lovely man, a great member of this committee. But he turned out

to be right.

I mean, maybe when we got to the cloud and can sort it all out,

the number ought to be 180,000. I mean, I don’t know. But you

need to prepare the future witnesses coming before this committee

and the full committee.

I think there is going to be members that are going to try to sort

this out because this has big ramifications for both the military but

on budget issues. And we don’t have either the better link that Ms.

St. Laurent has called for or an understanding of this what you all

call input, General Johnson, I am calling the Jell-O cloud. Because

it is really hard to justify right now, based on the information we

have, a strong defense of those specific numbers you all are citing.

But thank you all for your time. We are sorry we don’t have

more time to continue this discussion.

General JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General FORMICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressmen.

[Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

JANUARY 30, 2007

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. SNYDER

Dr. SNYDER. How much of the force requirements determination process is based

on subjective judgments?

General FORMICA. Subjective judgments occur at three key decision points in the

Army’s force generation process. Two of those decision points occur during the development of requirements; the third occurrence is when resource priorities and levels

of risk are decided. The Army uses quantitative and qualitative analysis and the

application of sound doctrine and approved force designs in the generation of force

requirements. These requirements are based upon the Multi-Service Force Deployment (MSFD) scenarios approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)

to support the Analytic Agenda. With guidance from OSD, to include The National

Security Strategy, National Defense and National Military Strategies, Strategic

Planning Guidance and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, subjective judgments

are made to determine which MSFD scenarios should be modeled to address the

needs of the Combatant Commanders and priorities established by the Secretary of

Defense. Additionally, the Army makes subjective judgments concerning the assessments of force requirements to meet Homeland Defense/Homeland Security missions

and to resolve lessons learned from operational requirements that may not be addressed in the analytical modeling results. Finally, subjective judgment is applied

in identifying the mix of capabilities (combat, combat support, and combat service

support), the balance of those capabilities across the Active and Reserve components, as well as levels of acceptable risk within approved resources.

Dr. SNYDER. Have there been any initiatives to increase the role of data driven

analyses in the requirements process and make the process more transparent to the

Congress?

General FORMICA. Quantitative and qualitative data is central to the Army’s force

generation process. A key initiative undertaken by the Army is the adaptation of

its Total Army Analysis (TAA) process to respond to the Global Force Demand and

to improve visibility of its analytical underpinnings. With input from the Office of

the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for warfighting analysis, as well as approved scenarios from the Analytic Agenda, the Army continues to refine its analysis in generating force requirements. In particular, the assessment of operational requirements

on force rotation demands, as well as the needs of Combatant Commanders, generates force capabilities to meet the Global Force Demand strategy. The results of

these assessments are submitted periodically to Congress as part of the President’s

Budget and the Future Year Defense Program. Other publications by the Army that

outline its force generation requirements are annual updates such as The Army Posture Statement and the Army Campaign Plan. Additionally, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducts periodic validation reviews and publishes audit

reports that assess the analytical basis and results of the Army’s force generation

process. The Army continues to improve on these initiatives to ensure timely and

accurate information is available to Congress concerning its force generation process.

Dr. SNYDER. Has the Office of the Secretary of Defense initiated a review to validate the force requirements determination processes used in the Army and the Marine Corps?

General FORMICA. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Joint Staff

have conducted Operational Availability (OA) studies, to include the work during

the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2006, to validate the Services force requirements determination process. Using OSD-approved scenarios, current operational

demands, and realistic deployment timelines, OSD validates the Army’s force generation process during periodic program and budget review cycles. The results are

adjudicated and adjustments are made to ensure Army force requirements comply

with OSD strategy, the needs of the Combatant Commanders, and priorities established by the Secretary of Defense.

Dr. SNYDER. Do you believe the services should be required to include an assessment of military requirements unconstrained by DoD policy and fiscal guidelines?

General FORMICA. Requirements generated by the Army only are constrained by

the National Military Strategy and the Analytic Agenda scenarios approved by the

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Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The force generation process, based on

Army doctrine and approved force designs, is then unconstrained in determining

force capabilities needed to meet that strategy. Once those requirements are approved, constraints are addressed based on fiscal reality and resources available to

man, equip, train, station and sustain those generated forces across all three components. No assessment should be necessary in the requirements phase as long as the

strategic demands are defined. The assessment of risk, as currently provided by the

Services in program and budget review cycles, addresses shortfalls in resources and

time to adequately generate force capabilities to meet that strategy.

Dr. SNYDER. Would an unconstrained requirements process yield a much different

result from the processes currently being used?

General FORMICA. The requirements process used today is based on strategic guidance and policies set to support the Analytic Agenda. It is a disciplined approach

to analyzing force requirements given approved scenarios and requirements of the

Combatant Commanders within the priorities of the National Military Strategy,

Strategic Planning Guidance and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The MultiService Force Deployment (MSFD) scenarios approved by the Office of the Secretary

of Defense (OSD), used as the basis for determining requirements, do set force

sizing constraints based on threat and the concept of operations. Changes in the

timing and duration of these scenarios in modeling force requirements provide differing results while maintaining synchronization across the Services to optimize capabilities and to mitigate risk. Unconstrained limits in determining requirements

could undermine that synchronization and place undue pressure on each Service to

balance its force capabilities within limited resources.

Dr. SNYDER. How would the 2006 QDR been different if the services had been free

to include an assessment of their unfunded manpower requirements?

General FORMICA. The results of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)

would not have changed substantially given the strategic environment known at the

time of its publication and the level of resources programmed in the Army. The 2006

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was based on strategic guidance resulting in

the Army’s plan to resource a 1,037.4k end-strength across all three components

(482.4K in the Active, 350K in the Army National Guard, and 205K in the U.S.

Army Reserve). Additionally, the Army was operating under a temporary 30K endstrength increase to meet operational demands while transforming to a modular

force. Given the level of Global Force Demand anticipated in the 2006 QDR, the

Army had balanced its force capabilities and accepted some level of risk in its combat support and combat service support structure. As the strategic environment

changed after the 2006 QDR report, the Army began to address the impacts on force

capabilities based on the increasing levels of Global Force Demand. The Army provided OSD its assessment of force capability shortfalls and proposed an endstrength growth across all three components to meet the increasing operational demand. The Army will continue to adapt its force generation process to provide timely assessments of force requirements, available resources, and capability shortfalls

as changes in the strategic environment evolve.

Dr. SNYDER. Does DoD prescribe the end-strengths that the services requirements

process must achieve?

General FORMICA. The Army’s end-strength is set and approved by Congress. During the requirements phase of the force generation process, the Department of Defense (DoD) does prescribe force levels for each Service in the development of the

Multi-Service Force Deployment (MSFD) scenarios for the Analytic Agenda. These

approved scenarios are the basis for the Army’s quantitative and qualitative analysis of force requirements. During the resourcing phase of the force generation process, the Army then balances force capabilities across all three components within

the end-strength approved by Congress.

Dr. SNYDER. Can you give examples of other assumptions that DoD requires the

services to consider in their requirements process and how they influence the outcome?

General FORMICA. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint

Staff, with support from the services, utilize an iterative process to develop a set

of Defense Planning Scenarios (DPS) and Multi Service Force Deployment (MSFD)

vignettes. These scenarios and vignettes make up the OSD Analytic Agenda. Also,

DoD and the Joint Staff generate Operational Availability (OA) studies to determine

demand of Service capabilities to meet combinations of the scenarios and vignettes

over time. Additionally, the Army assesses the capability requirements to meet

Homeland Defense/Homeland Security missions and the rotational requirements to

sustain operational demands. The Analytic Agenda scenarios and vignettes, along

with operational demands, are quantitatively transformed into the directed and support force structure requirements in the Army’s Total Army Analysis process. The

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results are used to identify and balance force capabilities across the three components to meet the strategic requirements, provide rotational depth, and man, equip,

train, station, and sustain the force within approved resources.

Dr. SNYDER. Both the Army and the Marine Corps have included assessments of

unfunded manpower requirements in prior force structure requirements processes.

Why did you not include those assessments in the 2006 QDR?

General FORMICA. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) strategic environment was based on a different level of demand than what the Army faces today.

The Army generated force capabilities based on the war fight requirements, Homeland Defense/Homeland Security missions, and operational requirements of the then

approved Global Force Demand. Additionally, the Army was operating under a temporary 30K increase in end-strength to meet those strategic requirements while

transforming to a modular force. Based on the 2006 QDR strategy, the Army did

assume some risk in certain combat support and combat service support structure.

Dr. SNYDER. What portion of the additional end-strength increase will be used to

fill manpower gaps in the existing modular brigades and how much of the additional

end-strength will be used to create new combat capability?

General FORMICA. The 74.2K of end-strength growth (65K in the Active, 8.2K in

the Army National Guard and 1K in the U. S. Army Reserve) will build new capabilities, to include six additional brigade combat teams and thirteen multi-functional

and functional support brigades, to meet the increasing Global Force Demand.

These new brigades will be manned at near 100 percent in the Available and Ready

Phases of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model. Additionally, the Reserve Components will rebalance and right-size Institutional structure and Individuals Accounts to re-invest in combat capabilities (6K in the Army National Guard

and 16K in the U.S. Army Reserve). With the growth, rebalance, and right-sizing

initiatives, the Army’s combat capability in its Operating Force will grow by over

80K (49.4K in the Active, 14.2K in the Army National Guard and 17K in the U.S.

Army Reserve).

Dr. SNYDER. How much of the force requirements determination process is based

on subjective judgments?

General JOHNSON. It is difficult to assign a percentage of subjective versus objective judgments to our Total Force Structure Process (TFSP). The Marine Corps uses

the TFSP to transform strategic guidance, policy constraints, and commander-generated recommendations into the integrated capabilities required to execute Marine

Corps missions. This process relies on a partially subjective, yet detailed, integrated

analysis of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF), ensuring that no aspect of the enterprise is ignored when new

requirements for the Corps are identified—either from the top-down or from the bottom-up.

Assessments regarding small unit activations are much more subjective than assessments associated with the force requirement development necessary to support

major theaters of war. The determination of how many Marines it takes to support

two simultaneous Major Contingency Operations contains a great deal of analytical

rigor, as these requirements are based upon detailed staff work and utilization of

OSD and Joint staff approved planning scenarios and modeling tools.

Dr. SNYDER. Have there been any initiatives to increase the role of data driven

analyses in the requirements process and make the process more transparent to the

Congress?

General JOHNSON. Yes, the current Defense Planning Scenarios development process and planned force sufficiency analyses, based on the new Force Planning Construct, will increase the role of data driven analyses.

In addition to this, Our Commandant recently stated that deployment cycles must

not only support training for irregular warfare, they must also provide sufficient

time for recovery and maintenance as well as training for other contingency missions. Resultantly, we have begun work on the following initiatives:

- Development of a predictive modeling tool that will allow us to determine appropriate structure and manning requirements to meet a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell

ratio for sustained combat operations across the operating forces.

- Examination of our requirements for recruiters, trainers, infrastructure, material and equipment to both support manning at a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ration

and training across the spectrum of warfare.

- Assessment of the impact of a 1:5 deployment-to-dwell ratio for the Reserve

component and how the Total Force can best be employed to support a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio for active forces.

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Dr. SNYDER. Has the Office of the Secretary of Defense initiated a review to validate the force requirements determination processes used in the Army and the Marine Corps?

General JOHNSON. Presently, the Marine Corps is not aware of any initiatives by

the Office of the Secretary of Defense to review or validate the Marine Corps’ requirements determination processes.

Dr. SNYDER. Do you believe the services should be required to include an assessment of military requirements unconstrained by DoD policy and fiscal guidelines?

General JOHNSON. No. Fiscal and policy constraints allow the Services to bound

the requirements, facilitate prioritization of requirements, and introduce the concept

of risk earlier in the process, thereby saving valuable resources (time, money and

manpower).

Dr. SNYDER. Would an unconstrained requirements process yield a much different

result from the processes currently being used?

General JOHNSON. Yes, in an unconstrained process, the force requirement would

be much greater/costlier. In a constrained requirements process, a certain level of

risk is assumed in determining requirements.

Dr. SNYDER. How would the 2006 QDR been different if the services had been free

to include an assessment of their unfunded manpower requirements?

General JOHNSON. All planning is based upon assumptions; a change in an assumption therefore leads to a change in the plan. At the time of the 2006 QDR, the

Marine Corps considered an end-strength increase; however the resulting guidance

stabilized USMC end-strength at 175,000 Active Component and 39,000 Reserve

Component by Fiscal Year 2011. The 2006 QDR initial guidance approved by the

Department of Defense’s senior leadership assumed that while the size of the joint

force was about right, the mix of capabilities within the force needed to change to

address current and emerging national security challenges. Given different starting

assumptions, the results of the 2006 QDR may have been quite different. However,

without an understanding of these assumptions, we cannot adequately predict what

those results would have been.

Dr. SNYDER. Does DoD prescribe the end-strengths that the services requirements

process must achieve?

General JOHNSON. No. The DoD has, in the past, provided the Marine Corps with

end-strength constraints such as during the 2006 QDR; and these constraints have

spurred Total Force Structure exercises such as the 2004 Total Force Structure Review Group or the 2006 Capabilities Assessment Group. However, the Marine Corps

Total Force Structure Process cycle produces total requirements regardless of any

constraints or force caps that result in structure recommendations.

Dr. SNYDER. Can you give examples of other assumptions that DoD requires the

services to consider in their requirements process and how they influence the outcome?

General JOHNSON. Force requirements are based on demands determined by the

DoD. For the 2006 QDR and associated Operational Availability 2006 study, these

demands were provided in the Baseline Security Posture (BSP). The BSP specified

both the frequency and duration of events as well as force caps for each individual

event. Based on historical levels of commitment for Marine Corps units, the BSP

projected lower levels of demand for theater security cooperation and other non-combat commitments. It also projected future force levels for OIF/OEF significantly

below current levels. Since the force demands determine the projected force requirements, it is possible that the constraints imposed by the BSP caused the Marine

Corps force requirements to be underestimated.

Another example is the 2006 QDR replacement of the ‘‘1-4-2-1’’ force planning construct. The ‘‘1-4-2-1’’ construct consisted of the military defending the U.S. homeland; projecting forces to deter conflict in four regions around the globe; swiftly defeating aggression in two overlapping major conflicts; and maintaining a capability

for ‘‘decisive victory’’ in one of the two major conflicts, possibly to include regime

change or occupation. The new guidance is a force-planning construct that puts increased emphasis on defending against terrorist threats which requires less force capacity as well as a different capability set.

Dr. SNYDER. Both the Army and the Marine Corps have included assessments of

unfunded manpower requirements in prior force structure requirements processes.

Why did you not include those assessments in the 2006 QDR?

General JOHNSON. The QDR is a Secretary of Defense document to which the

Services each provide manpower requirement inputs. The Office of the Secretary of

Defense determines the final output and content of the Report. At the time of the

2006 QDR, the Marine Corps considered an end-strength increase. However, the

2006 QDR initial guidance approved by the Department of Defense’s senior leadership assumed that while the size of the joint force was about right, the mix of capaVerDate 22-MAR-2001 14:30 Oct 31, 2008 Jkt 038368 PO 00000 Frm 00100 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\110-9\030020.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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bilities within the force needed to change to address current and emerging national

security challenges, and it included a Marine Corps force cap limitation of 175,000

Marines in the Active Component. All QDR analysis was subsequently based upon

that guidance; therefore, the result was no identified unfunded manpower requirements.

Dr. SNYDER. What portion of the additional end-strength increase will be used to

fill manpower gaps in existing Marine Corps units and how much of the additional

end-strength will be used to create new combat capability?

General JOHNSON. The growth in end-strength from 175K to 180K was used to

fill shortfalls and to establish the Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC).

Additionally, we have used military to civilian conversion structure and other realignments to help mitigate other shortfalls. Some of the increase also went to increase personnel in critical MOSs with shortfalls such as Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and intelligence. The 202,000 end-strength will create additional units

to reduce the deployment to dwell issue and allow for additional training of Marine

Units in our traditional missions across the warfare spectrum of the MAGTF.

The Marine Corps’ 22K increase is divided into 17,000 Marines in the operating

forces and 5,000 in the supporting establishment. The 17,000 Marines in the operating forces all provide new unit capabilities while the 5,000 allocated to the supporting establishment provide additional recruiters (600), instructors (1,200) and transients (injured Marines/patients, Marines in training pipeline, Marines between

duty stations) to support the increase. None of the growth will be used to fill manning shortfalls in current Marine Corps units.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON

Mr. WILSON. I appreciate Ms. Sanchez bringing up about the equipment for the

active duty. But there was a report yesterday, and I don’t know if you have jurisdiction, the shortfalls in equipment for national guard units, particularly in the event

of a state call-up.

What is the status on adjusting for that?

General FORMICA. The Army National Guard (ARNG) is in the process of converting from a Strategic Reserve to an Operational Force. As a Strategic Reserve, the

Army assumed risk when equipping the ARNG because there would be sufficient

lead-time to equip the deploying force. We can no longer afford to take that risk.

We are committed to fully equipping the ARNG to 100% of its requirement. In the

Fiscal Year (FY) 2009–13 Program Objective Memorandum (POM), we are ‘‘fencing

$21 billion as a down payment on fully equipping and modernizing the ARNG.’’ This

effort will require our attention and steadfastness for several years after FY 2013

to properly equip and modernize the ARNG to be fully interoperable and identical

to active component units, having the ability to perform any mission in support of

full spectrum operations.

In the short term, we are fully committed to ensure the ARNG is sufficiently

equipped to perform its Homeland Defense/Defense Support to Civil Authorities

(HLD/DSCA) mission. The ARNG has identified 342 critical dual use items of equipment that are useful for both war and HLD/DSCA. These items were vetted through

the states and the Army and validated as the HLD/DSCA requirement. We, as an

Army, are providing equipment to the hurricane prone states, just as we did last

year. Some new equipment is being diverted to these states; some depot RESET/

Recap equipment is being redirected; some equipment is being loaned to the ARNG;

and the ARNG is cross-leveling some equipment among the states. We are taking

great care to ensure that each state has equipment on hand to respond to state missions and are ready to move equipment into non-hurricane states, if required. The

states have also negotiated Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMAC)

to provide capabilities to each other if requested. Although the Army is strapped for

equipment, in the short term, all components, working in concert, will support the

ARNG in its mission of aiding/assisting the states in responding to natural disasters

or other state missions.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JONES

Mr. JONES. Mr. Applegate, what is the amount of the advertising budget for recruitment for the Marine Corps?

Mr. APPLEGATE. The FY07 budget includes the following funding for recruiting

and advertising included $112.23M ($107.4M in the Operations and Maintenance,

Marine Corps appropriation—OMMC—and $4.8M in the Operations and Maintenance, Marine Corps Reserve appropriation—OMMCR).

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The FY08 request includes $146.67M ($141.38M in OMMC, $5.29M in OMMCR).

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MURPHY

Mr. MURPHY. You look at, you know, at this point, $3.6 billion has been budgeted

for recruiting in 2007. Clearly, the services are relying on—we are looking at $500

million to $700 million coming from this emerging supplemental, which is going to

come on our plate in a couple months.

And, you know, in fiscal year 2006 the Army spent $1.8 billion on retention bonuses. But this year, in fiscal year 2007, we are looking at $1.1 million. So a decreased amount of retention bonuses that we have that we are planning on.

And, you know, I know you all are hurting, and is there a plan, you know, with

the budget supplementals here, I mean, to really hit us with the retention bonuses

I would assume? Or should we assume?

General FORMICA. Retention bonuses went from 1.2B in FY06 to $1B in FY07 including the Supplemental. Below are the details based on the PB08, in thousands

of dollars.

FY06 FY07 FY07 Supp (not PB08)

From PB08

AC SRB: 736,943 181,537 410,516

AC CSRB: 0 0 24,850

AC Officer: 0 0 62,000

ARNG 3yr 40,484 14,282 0

ARNG 6yr 267,470 92,125 153,780

USAR AGR 10,240 5,000 7,440

USAR REUP 129,816 37,951 49,421

USAR AGR CSRB 0 2,405 2,410

USAR UNIT REUP 44,084 425 30,770

Total 1,229,037 333,725 741,187

FY07 Total: 1,074,912

Above data exclude retention bonuses for medical officers, which approximate

$180 million per year.

Mr. MURPHY. Is there a way that we can get a status on when you talk about

some are less, some are more? Could we get a status of those brigade combat teams?

General FORMICA. The attached chart at Tab A depicts the Active Component Brigade Combat Teams that have been deployed or are available for scheduled deployments through Fiscal Year 2007. Sourcing has not been approved by the Secretary

of Defense for Fiscal Year 2008 and beyond, and is not included. Of the Brigade

Combat Teams listed on the attached chart, 15 have deployed once. Many of these

brigades are new builds, or are fulfilling other mission requirements such as Training and Transition Teams. Three have never deployed: 1st Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division is Forward Stationed in Korea; 4th Brigade, 10th Mountain Division has not

deployed as a Brigade Combat Team, but has deployed battalions; and the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division is a new build. Of the Brigade Combat Teams listed

on the chart, seven have deployed with less than 12 months at home between deployments. Twenty seven have deployed with less than 24 months, but more than

12 months between deployments (average of 17.7 months). Two had greater than 24

months between deployments, however they deployed Battalion sized organizations

in the interim. Twenty Brigade Combat Teams are currently deployed.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 89.]

Mr. MURPHY. Is there a way that we can get a status on when you talk about

some are less, some are more? Could we get a status of those brigade combat teams?

General JOHNSON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the

committee files.]

Æ