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S. HRG. 110–691 

A NEW STRATEGY FOR ENHANCED 

PARTNERSHIP WITH PAKISTAN 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JUNE 25, 2008 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: 

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator From Delaware ................................... 1 

Boucher, Hon. Richard, Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian 

Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC ................................................. 5 

Prepared statement ...................................................................................... 8 

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator From Maryland ................................... 41 

Casey, Hon. Robert P., Jr., U.S. Senator From Pennsylvania ............................. 32 

Chamberlin, Hon. Wendy, President, The Middle East Institute, Washington, 

DC .......................................................................................................................... 47

Prepared statement ...................................................................................... 51 

Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator From Wisconsin .................................... 35 

Hagel, Hon. Chuck, U.S. Senator From Nebraska ............................................... 29 

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator From Indiana ........................................... 4 

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey .................................... 38 

Nelson, Hon. Bill, U.S. Senator From Florida ....................................................... 26 

Shivers, Mitchell, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asian and Pacific 

Security Affairs, Office of The Secretary of Defense, The Pentagon, Washington, DC ............................................................................................................. 9 

Prepared statement ...................................................................................... 11 

Ward, Mark, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for Asia, U.S. Agency 

for International Development, Washington, DC .............................................. 15 

Prepared statement ...................................................................................... 17 

Zinni, General Anthony C., USMC (Ret.), Former Commander, Central Command, Falls Church, VA ...................................................................................... 44 

Prepared statement ...................................................................................... 45 

(III)

(1) 

A NEW STRATEGY FOR ENHANCED 

PARTNERSHIP WITH PAKISTAN 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 25, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in Room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Biden, Feingold, Bill Nelson, Menendez, 

Cardin, Casey, Lugar, and Hagel. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., 

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. Now that Senator Hagel is here, we can begin. As General Zinni knows, we don’t 

do a thing without Hagel, in this committee. 

All kidding aside, thank you all so much for being here, this is 

an important hearing, at least we believe it is, and I hope you do, 

as well. 

For far too long, the United States-Pakistani relationship has 

been—in my view—in desperate need of serious overhaul. For too 

many years, through too many administrations, not just one, it has 

been an unsteady balancing act, and one of the most turbulent 

spots on earth, that—in the last year alone—has seen a Taliban resurgence, a state of emergency, the assassination of Prime Ministerial candidate and former Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, the return of a democratic government, and now, a political stalemate in 

that country. 

The core of the problem, in my view, is this: The relationship 

between the United States and Pakistan has, for the past several 

decades, been largely transactional. And this transaction isn’t 

working, in my view, for either party. 

From the American perspective, we spend billions of dollars, and 

we’ve gotten far too little to show for it. From the Pakistani perspective, America is an unreliable ally, that will abandon Pakistan 

the moment it is convenient to do so, and whose support, to date, 

has done little more than bolster unrepresentative rulers, both in 

and out of uniform. 

We believe we are paying too much and getting too little. The 

Pakistanis believe exactly the opposite, and both sides feel the 

costs of the relationship may soon outweigh the benefits; the status 

quo is unsustainable. 

2 

We’ve got to move from this transactional relationship, in my 

view, the exchange of aid for services, to a type of normal, functional relationship we enjoy with all of our other military allies and 

friendly nations. 

Like any major shift—any major policy shift—to gain long-term 

benefits, we have to shoulder transitional costs. Here, as I see it, 

are the central elements of what should be our new plan. 

Triple the nonsecurity aid to $1.5 billion annually, and make this 

a long-term commitment, a long-term commitment over 10 years. 

This aid would be unconditioned, it’s our pledge to the Pakistani 

people. Instead of funding military hardware, it would build 

schools, clinics, roads, and help develop the Federally Administered 

Tribal Areas, which Senator Hagel and I recently were on the border of and spent time speaking with Pakistanis as well as Afghanis 

about. Where extremism is taking even deeper root, in my view, 

than it had in the past. 

We should tie security aid to performance. We’re spending a billion dollars annually, and it’s not clear we’re getting our money’s 

worth. We should be willing to spend more if we get better returns, 

and less—less—if we don’t. 

We should help Pakistan enjoy a democracy dividend. Back in 

November, I called for $1 billion in the first year of Pakistan’s return to democratic rule. The supplemental now before the Senate 

contains a downpayment on this democracy dividend of $150 million. This money would help moderate, secular, political leaders 

show the Pakistani people that they can deliver the goods, as well 

as the generals. 

We should engage the Pakistani people—not just the rulers—we 

need a broad-based engagement, not just a government-to-government, that gets to the issues that matter to the Pakistani people 

most—not just the ones that only matter to us. 

The plan I propose would fundamentally change the dynamic between the United States and Pakistan, and here’s why I think it 

would. 

First, a significant increase in nonmilitary, and nonsecurity aid, 

guaranteed for a long period, would help persuade the Pakistani 

populace that America is not a fair-weather friend, but an allweather friend. But also help persuade the Pakistani leaders that 

America is an ally that can be relied upon. 

Pakistanis suspect that our support is tactical and temporary. 

They point to the aid cutoff that followed the fall of the Soviet 

Union, to our refusal to either deliver or refund purchased jets 

throughout the nineties, and to our blossoming relationship with 

rival India—something I support. 

Many Pakistanis believe that the moment Osama bin Laden is 

gone, the United States interest will be gone. So, Pakistani policymakers hedge their bets, and many Pakistani citizens see the 

United States in a hostile light. 

When U.S. aid makes a real difference in people’s lives, the results are immediate and lasting. After the devastating earthquake 

in 2005, American Chinooks delivering relief aid accomplished far 

more to improve our standing with the Pakistani people than any 

amount of arms sales or debt rescheduling we have done. 

3 

Second, tying security aid, now about three-quarters of the package, to results would push the Pakistani military to finally crush 

al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Our best shot of locating bin Laden and 

his crew, and of shutting down the Taliban and the next generation 

of terrorist outfits, lies in the committed partnership of the Pakistani Security Services who, as some would point out, need to be 

better trained. They now have a military that’s designed to deal 

with a land war with India, and they do not have a counterinsurgency capability, in my view. 

Their performance, to date, has been decidedly mixed. We’ve 

caught more terrorists in Pakistan than any other country, but 

Pakistan remains the central base for al-Qaeda operations. To put things in perspective, the $11 billion we spent in Pakistan 

in the last 6 years is less than we spend in Iraq in 6 weeks. The 

Pakistani Security Services will be vital players for the foreseeable 

future. We can’t simply insist that they combat the Taliban and alQaeda. We’ve got to help them develop the capacity to do so. 

Our relationship with the army intelligence agency, unlike our 

relationship with the nation as a whole, will always have a strong 

transactional element, but we’ve got to make sure we’re striking a 

much better bargain than we have now, in my view. 

Third, a democracy dividend would empower the Pakistani moderate mainstream. Ever since the start of the Bush administration 

we’ve had a Musharraf policy, in my view, rather than a Pakistani 

policy. The democracy dividend will help secular, democratic, civilian political leaderships to establish their credibility with the Pakistani public. They must prove that they—more so than the generals of the radical Islamists—can bring real, measurable improvement to the lives of their constituents. 

Last, by engaging the Pakistani people, not just the rulers, on 

issues important to them, we’re much more likely to secure their 

support on important issues to us. On a host of topics—Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, Kashmir, the list goes on—Pakistanis want a 

respectful hearing. 

Ask any ordinary Pakistani to list the top items of concern about 

our country, and you may get some answers unrelated to international grand strategy: Our visa policy, our textile quotas, our 

harassment of Muslims in America—in their view. Ask any Pakistani about Abu Ghraib, or Gitmo, or about water boarding or torture. Pakistanis don’t see these as mere issues. They see these 

things as a moralstain on the very soul of our Nation, and in my 

opinion, so should we. 

History may describe today’s Pakistan as a place akin to 1979 

Iran, or 2001 Afghanistan. The world’s second-largest Muslim nation could become a failed state with an arsenal of nuclear weapons, and a population larger than those of Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, 

and North Korea combined. We’re far from that point, but it’s a 

possibility. 

On the other hand, a stable democratic and secular Pakistan, 

could be a bridge between the West and the global Islamic community. The broad mass of the Pakistani people still want a lasting 

friendship with America. 

Which future unfolds will be strongly influenced, although certainly not determined by, the actions of the United States. The 

4 

current transition in Pakistan provides us, in my view, with an opportunity to make this historic leap to a positive future. 

Today, we have two distinguished panels of witnesses. The administration’s position will be spelled out by the Assistant Secretary of State—Richard Boucher, by the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, 

Mitchell Shivers, and Deputy Assistant USAID Administrator, 

Mark Ward. 

Our private panel consists of two witnesses with deep, on-theground experience in Pakistan. General Anthony Zinni served as 

CENTCOM commander during the period that included the IndiaPakistani nuclear test, the Kargil conflict, and Musharraf’s coup 

d’etat. Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin took up her post in 

Islamabad less than 2 months before 9/11 and served through a 

time when nobody knew which direction Pakistan would go. 

Both General Zinni and Ambassador Chamberlin helped prevent 

the relationship from running adrift in some very dangerous times. 

But we can’t keep jumping from crisis to crisis, relying on exceptional diplomats and military officers who save us from disaster. 

We need a new strategy, and to set the relationship on a stable 

course, and I hope that’s what we’ll discuss today. 

Now, I yield to my colleague, Senator Lugar. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I 

thank you for continuing this important series of hearings on Pakistan. It’s given members an opportunity to review the dynamic political and security situation in Pakistan, as well as United States 

policy options, and the resources required to pursue them. 

We’ve examined a number of critical issues, including the size 

and purpose of our foreign assistance mechanism in Pakistan, the 

terrorist threat emanating from the Federally Administered Tribal 

Areas, and the prospects for democracy and stability. 

This is our fifth hearing on Pakistan in the last year, and we are 

better equipped to consider new directions for United States policy 

today. 

The United States has an intense strategic interest in the events 

and conditions in Pakistan and the surrounding region. Among 

other goals, we seek strong cooperation from the Pakistan Government in combating terrorist forces, the continued improvement in 

Indo-Pak relations, that maintain peace between these powerful 

neighbors, the development of Afghanistan as a free and stable 

country, governed by the rule of law, the secure management of 

Pakistan’s nuclear program, and continued economic opportunity 

and development in the region. 

Shortly after the momentous Pakistan general election in February, we held a hearing to discuss the outcome. Deputy Secretary 

of State John Negroponte provided the American public with a 

sense of the optimism that successful elections often engender. 

However, he also provided a sobering comment on the potential 

for political backsliding and brinksmanship that such situations 

sometimes reveal. Nonetheless, his testimony reinforced congressional interest in seizing the historical opportunity, revitalizing our 

5 

relationship. Inevitably, this leads us to ask whether more can be 

achieved through United States assistance programs. 

Last December, we reviewed the size and purpose of our various 

assistance mechanisms. Testimony helped Senators better grasp 

the difficulties our diplomats and development experts encounter, 

ineffectively implementing and monitoring U.S. assistance. 

The discussion also touched on the challenge of effectively modulating our assistance to achieve certain ends. Acting Deputy Administrator of USAID, Jim Kunder, recounted the impact of the 

Pressler amendment, which effectively halted U.S. cooperation with 

Pakistan in 1990, and this decision still confounds Pakistanis in 

discussions today. 

Chairman Biden has put forward a proposal for dramatic adjustments to United States foreign assistance to Pakistan, which has 

given our committee an important model for discussion. We should 

carefully consider both the amounts that we are providing, and the 

goals we are hoping to achieve. 

Establishing Reconstruction Opportunity Zones in frontier regions, continued investment in important sectors, such as education, and efforts to restructure our military assistance to 

Pakistan, are all steps in the right direction. 

The United States should make clear to the people of Pakistan 

that our interests are focused, not on supporting a particular leader 

or party, but on democracy, pluralism, stability, and the fight 

against violence and extremism, and these are values supported by 

a large majority of the Pakistani people. 

If Pakistan is to break its debilitating cycle of instability, it will 

need to achieve progress on fighting corruption, delivering government services, promoting broad-based economic growth. 

The international community and the United States should support reforms, and contribute to the strengthening of Pakistani civilian institutions. 

I commend Deputy Secretary Negroponte and the administration 

for sustaining their commitment to work with our committee, on a 

bipartisan basis, to explore ways to improve our assistance to Pakistan. Our administration panel today reflects that continued cooperation, and I look forward to their testimony, as we consider the 

scope and prospect of substantially increasing long-term economic 

assistance to Pakistan, alongside our continued security assistance. 

I welcome all of the distinguished witnesses, and thank the 

Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, again, welcome, and Mr. Secretary, Secretary Boucher, why don’t you begin? 

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BOUCHER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. BOUCHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I’m very 

pleased to be here today, and thank you for hosting this important 

hearing, I’m glad to be here with colleagues from the Department 

of Defense and the Agency of International Development. The three 

of us sit together just about every day to talk about Pakistan in 

6 

one shape—one form of meeting or another. So, hopefully you’ll 

find us in harmony, or at least interesting. 

Before I go into the substance, I want to pay special tribute to 

you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, and other members of the committee who’ve really paid sustained and, I think, important attention and leadership on the subject of Pakistan—you’ve all traveled 

out there, some of you were out there to help ensure the election 

was a good election, some of you have been there more than several 

times, and I think it’s a very, very important factor for all of us, 

that we have a cooperation between the legislative and executive 

branch and between the different parties, in showing the broad 

United States support for Pakistan and the goals that we have are 

shared goals that are endorsed by the Congress and the American 

people. 

You all, certainly, know why Pakistan is important to the United 

States and how important it is. Pakistan is the second-most populous Muslim nation in the world, it’s on the front lines of the fight 

against extremism and terrorism, it’s located in a very strategically 

important region with new strategic opportunities, and important 

neighbors like Afghanistan, India, Iran, and China. 

The safety and security of the United States is inextricably 

linked to the success, the security and the stability of a democratic 

Pakistan. 

On February 18 of this year, the Pakistani people went to the 

polls and elected moderate leaders who set a path for Pakistan into 

the future. We want to see this new government succeed, because 

it represents the desires of the Pakistani people, and because we 

believe that a moderate government with a democratic mandate is 

the most effective partner in the fight against terrorists and violent 

extremism. 

Successful elections earlier this year were an important moment 

for Pakistan and its democratic development, but a number of very 

difficult challenges remain for the new civilian government, from 

facing down extremism to stimulating economic growth and dealing 

with energy and food shortages. 

Our support in these efforts is critical to the success and stability 

of Pakistan as a nation, and therefore, we will continue to pursue 

a long-term comprehensive partnership with Pakistan that seeks to 

address their most important needs and strengthens our relationship as democratic allies and partners. 

The new government is at the core of our strategy for working 

with Pakistan. We want to help the new leaders modernize the nation in all its aspects—modernize its democratic institutions; modernize the economy to provide jobs to the citizens; modernize the 

education system; modernize the security services, so that they can 

effectively fight terrorists; and bring arrangements for the tribal 

areas of Pakistan up to date, so that the writ of government prevails throughout the nation. 

With a new Pakistani Government, we’re already working to do 

these things that we hope can strengthen democratic and civilian 

institutions, promote good governance, enhance counterterrorism 

cooperation, so that we can all work to eliminate the social and economic conditions that allow extremism to flourish. 

7 

And I would note, sir, there’s a statement coming out today that 

we understand is coming out from the Prime Minister’s office in 

Pakistan, that involves the—all the political and military and appointed leaders of Pakistan who are dealing with the crisis in the 

tribal areas that brings them together on a common approach 

against terrorism, states the principles under which they intend to 

operate, and we see this is a very important development—it 

brings together all of the proper players, it states a very clear, 

multipronged approach, it states very clearly the goals of ending 

the violent extremism, ending the cross-border activity and expelling the foreign fighters, and it states very clearly, the goal of 

working with the tribes to develop and stabilize the area. So, I 

think that’s a very important development today, and we’ll look forward to working with them to implement that statement that’s 

coming out. 

Over the past year, we in the U.S. Government have been developing a strategy intended to reinforce our existing commitment to 

the kind of long-term partnership that we’re all talking about. This 

strategy addresses Pakistan’s needs in education, strengthen democratic institutions, economic growth, and adequate health care. 

We’re pleased that Senator Biden, you sir, are proposing just 

such a commitment in new legislation, and we want to work with 

you on that legislation, even if we don’t agree with you on every 

point of the current version. 

But we welcome the initiative, we feel strongly that a new bipartisan commitment to partnership with Pakistan is crucial, and we 

will continue to work in a bipartisan manner, as Senator Lugar 

said, our Deputy Secretary Negroponte has pledged to work with 

you, together, to try to move forward. 

A sustained and integrated commitment to developing Pakistan’s 

economy and social infrastructure cannot be separated from our 

key strategic objectives in the war on terror. There are a number 

of very important initiatives that we’re taking in this vein. My colleagues and I would be happy to talk to you about them. I would 

like to highlight just one, and that’s the Reconstruction Opportunity Zones. 

Certain goods produced in the border, and earthquake-affected 

areas of Pakistan—and indeed in all of Afghanistan—would be eligible for duty-free treatment on entry into the United States. These 

zones can help counter extremism by stimulating sustainable development and providing alternatives to extremism, narcotics trafficking, and other illicit activities. 

Reconstruction Opportunity Zone legislation is expected to be introduced in the House of Representatives very shortly, and I hope 

that we will see your support for the Cantwell bill that’s already 

been introduced in the Senate. 

Mr. Chairman, I’m going to be traveling to Pakistan next week 

to talk with the new government about how we can best face the 

challenges ahead, together. My message will be simple and consistently delivered to political, military, and civil society leaders, and 

here’s what I’m going to say. 

The United States welcomes and supports the democratically 

elected Government of Pakistan. We believe firmly that now is the 

time for everyone to get past political maneuvering, and focus on 

8 

the issues that are important for the Pakistani people. We will 

work with you to support the modernization of Pakistan in all 

areas. We will work with you to support local leadership and oppose militants, because terrorism is our common enemy, and we 

will work together to determine how we can best focus our assistance in areas that matter most to the people of Pakistan. 

And I think when I convey that message, I can say that that is 

a basic message that’s understood by Members of the Congress, 

Members of the Senate, as well as the American people. 

Looking ahead, for our commitment to Pakistan to be successful, 

it must be a long-term partnership, and it must be based upon a 

bipartisan consensus. We hope that together the Congress and the 

administration can establish a new framework for economic and security assistance, that can support Pakistan’s democracy, counter 

its terrorism threats and strengthen its development. 

So, thank you very much for the chance to appear today, and I’d 

be happy to take any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Boucher follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BOUCHER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR

SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for inviting me. I’m 

pleased to be here with my colleagues from the Department of Defense and from 

the U.S. Agency for International Development. We three, and others, sit together 

frequently to discuss the topic you’ve asked us to talk about here today: U.S. strategy towards Pakistan. 

Before delving into substance, I want to first thank the committee members for 

their interest, continued engagement and leadership on U.S. policy in Pakistan. The 

chairman and Senator Lugar in particular have demonstrated exemplary leadership 

and bipartisan cooperation in forging a strong, sustained partnership between the 

United States and Pakistan. 

You all know how important Pakistan is to the United States, and I believe you 

know the reasons why. Pakistan is the second most populous Muslim nation in the 

world, at the front line in the fight against extremism and terrorism, in a strategically important region, with other important neighbors like Afghanistan, India, 

Iran, and China. The safety and security of the United States is inextricably linked 

to the success, security, and stability of a democratic Pakistan. 

On February 18 of this year, the Pakistani people went to the polls and elected 

moderate leaders who will set the path for Pakistan into the future. We want to 

see this new government succeed, because it represents the desires of the Pakistani 

people and because we believe that a moderate government with a democratic 

mandate is the most effective partner in the fight against terrorists and violent 

extremism. 

The successful elections earlier this year were an important moment for Pakistan 

and its democratic development, but a number of difficult challenges remain for the 

new civilian government, from facing down extremism to stimulating economic 

growth and dealing with energy and food shortages. Our support in these efforts is 

critical to the success and stability of Pakistan as a nation. Therefore we will continue to pursue a long-term, comprehensive partnership with Pakistan that seeks 

to address their most important needs and strengthens our relationship as democratic allies and partners. 

The new government is at the core of our strategy for working with Pakistan. We 

want to help the new leaders modernize the nation in all its aspects. Modernize 

democratic institutions. Modernize an economy that can provide jobs to its citizens. 

Modernize the education system. Modernize the security services so that they can 

effectively fight terrorists. And, bring the arrangements for the Tribal Areas up to 

date so that the writ of government prevails throughout the nation. With the new 

Pakistani Government, we are already working to do these things that we hope can 

strengthen democratic, civilian institutions, promote good governance, enhance 

counterterrorism cooperation and that we hope can eliminate the social and economic conditions that allow extremism to flourish. 

Over the past year, we in the U.S. Government have been developing a strategy 

intended to reinforce our existing commitment to the kind of long-term partnership 

9 

I just described. This strategy addresses Pakistan’s needs in education, strengthened democratic institutions, economic growth and adequate health care. We are 

pleased that Senator Biden is proposing just such a commitment in new legislation. 

While we do not agree on every point in the current version of the proposed legislation, we welcome this initiative and feel strongly that a new, bipartisan commitment 

to partnership with Pakistan is crucial. We look forward to working closely with this 

committee to see this initiative through. 

A sustained and integrated commitment to developing Pakistan’s economy and social infrastructure cannot be separated from our key strategic objectives there in the 

war on terror. There are a number of important initiatives in this vein, but I would 

particularly like to highlight one: Reconstruction Opportunity Zones. Certain goods 

produced in zones in the border and earthquake-affected areas of Pakistan (and all 

of Afghanistan) would be eligible for duty-free treatment on entry into the United 

States. These zones will help to counter extremism by stimulating sustainable development and provide alternatives to extremism, narcotics trafficking, and other illicit 

activities. Reconstruction Opportunity Zone legislation is expected to be introduced 

in the House of Representatives very shortly and I hope we will have your support 

for the Cantwell bill in the Senate. 

I will be traveling to Pakistan next week to talk with the new government about 

how we can best face the challenges ahead together. My messages will be simple 

and consistently delivered to political, military, and civil society leaders. I intend 

to say clearly: The United States welcomes and supports the democratically elected 

Government of Pakistan. We believe firmly that now is the time for everyone to get 

past political maneuvering and focus on the issues that are important for the Pakistani people. We will work with you to support the modernization of Pakistan 

in all areas. We will work with you to support local leadership and oppose militants, 

because terrorism is our common enemy. And, we will work together to determine 

how we can focus our assistance in the areas that matter most to the people of 

Pakistan. 

Looking ahead, for our commitment to Pakistan to be successful, it must be a 

long-term partnership and it must be based upon a bipartisan consensus. We hope 

that together, Congress and the administration can establish a new framework for 

economic and security assistance that can support Pakistan’s democracy, counter its 

terrorism threats, and strengthen its development. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 

I want to make it clear that the legislation that I reference, I’ve 

been working very closely with Senator Lugar, and the hope is, 

whatever is introduced, will be introduced in a bipartisan fashion. 

And other members of the committee also have been working very 

hard on it, as well. 

Let me hear from the Defense Department. 

STATEMENT OF MITCHELL SHIVERS, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY 

AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, THE 

PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. SHIVERS. Good morning. Chairman Biden, Ranking Member 

Lugar, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity 

to discuss the new strategy for an enhanced relationship with Pakistan. I’ve prepared a written statement, which I would ask to be 

inserted into the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Your entire statement will be place in this 

record. 

Mr. SHIVERS. I would like to use this brief introductory statement to summarize my written testimony which focuses on the 

United States security assistance relationship with Pakistan, and 

as requested, provides an understanding of why the Department of 

Defense (DoD) considers the United States effective, long-term, constructive engagement with this important ally so essential to U.S. 

interests. 

10 

First, Pakistan is the second most populous Muslim state, the 

sixth most populous country in the world, and is located at the geopolitical crossroads of South and Central Asia. 

Second, Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons, and has already 

fought three conventional wars with another nuclear nation next 

door—India. 

Third, Pakistan has a large, growing middle class, striving for 

democracy. 

Fourth, elements of extremism and terrorism are at work within 

Pakistan. 

Fifth, the wholehearted assistance of the Pakistani people and 

their government will help the United States achieve its national 

security objectives in Afghanistan. 

Sixth, and most importantly, militants and terrorists within the 

border region of Pakistan constitute a direct threat to the United 

States homeland. More than ever, U.S. national security is linked 

to the success, security, and stability of a democratic Pakistan. 

While Pakistan has made important strides toward democracy 

and stability, much remains to be done. The February elections 

were an important step, but Pakistan is now facing severe budgetary and economic issues at the very time that the government 

must act decisively to eliminate the al-Qaeda and Taliban safe havens in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the FATA, and 

North-West Frontier Province, the NWFP. 

The new coalition government has a difficult road to navigate, 

and requires the United States steadfast support. Pakistan is a key 

partner in the war on terror, and plays a major role in long-term 

efforts to build a stable Afghanistan. Without U.S. assistance and 

support, Pakistan could not afford to deploy and maintain 100,000 

military and paramilitary forces in the FATA. 

Since 2001, the Pakistani Army has conducted 91 major, and 

countless small operations, in support of the war on terror, and it 

has captured or killed more al-Qaeda or Taliban extremists than 

any other coalition partner. 

The security of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan 

has been the subject of increasing concern. The FATA border region 

has been identified as a safe haven where Taliban and al-Qaeda 

forces recruit, train, and equip fighters to infiltrate into 

Afghanistan. 

This area has always had a special constitutional status in Pakistan and is governed only loosely under the provision of the century-old Frontier Crimes Regulations. Operating in the FATA is 

challenging even for the Pakistanis, who are generally considered 

to be outsiders and interlopers by the fiercely independent Pashtun 

tribesman there. 

The Government of Pakistan must develop localized engagement 

strategies that can earn the support of border inhabitants while 

achieving the government’s aims. It is only by working with local 

security elements in the Pakistan military, that security is possible 

in the FATA and NWFP. 

Helping to ensure that Pakistan has capable, professional security forces will better align the security objectives of our two nations. Without effective security forces, Pakistan’s efforts will fail. 

11 

DOD appreciates this committee’s consideration of the new possibilities with Pakistan and the tools that will be necessary to yield 

the desired results. We are committed to enhancing Pakistan military’s effectiveness, via training and equipping programs, for their 

Special Operations Forces and paramilitary personnel. 

But, despite our commitment, we are not well-armed with regard 

to funding. The Security Development Plan is funded using a 

patchwork of authorities. It does not have a dedicated source of 

funding that is as flexible and adaptable as the enemy. 

While we recognize the committee’s interest in ensuring that our 

security assistance and reimbursement programs advance U.S. national security interests, we feel that such concerns are best dealt 

with via the day-to-day interactions between our governments, and 

not as a litmus test of the commitment of either country to fight 

against the adversaries we face together. 

In conclusion, the Department of Defense strongly endorses the 

administration’s interagency efforts to implement a truly comprehensive strategy to ensure our overall relationship with the people of Pakistan succeeds. The American and Pakistani peoples can 

greatly benefit from a strategic dialogue, built upon a foundation 

of mutual trust and commitment. To do so, we must be good allies, 

with long-term perspectives. 

Of immediate concern, our success in protecting our homeland 

and achieving our goals in Afghanistan will require Pakistan’s success in addressing the various security-related needs in the FATA 

and the North-West Frontier Province. 

Sufficient, flexible, and legislatively unconditioned U.S. security 

assistance, therefore, is critical to our eventual success in Afghanistan and the war on terror. 

Thank you, Chairman, I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shivers follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MITCHELL SHIVERS, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ASIAN & PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS, THE PENTAGON, 

WASHINGTON, DC 

Chairman Biden, ranking member Lugar, members of the committee, thank you 

for the opportunity to discuss the ‘‘New Strategy for an Enhanced Relationship with 

Pakistan.’’ This morning I would like to discuss our United States security assistance relationship with Pakistan and, as requested, provide the public with an understanding of why the Department of Defense considers the United States effective, 

long-term constructive engagement with this important ally so essential to U.S. 

interests. 

First, Pakistan is the second most populous Muslim state, the sixth most populous 

country in the world, and is located at the geopolitical crossroads of South and Central Asia. Second, Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons and has already fought three 

conventional wars with another nuclear nation next door—India. Third, Pakistan 

has a large, growing moderate middle class striving for democracy. Fourth, elements 

of extremism and terrorism are at work within Pakistan. Fifth, the whole-hearted 

assistance of the Pakistani people and their government will help the United States 

achieve its national security objectives in Afghanistan. Sixth, and most importantly, 

militants and terrorists within the border region of Pakistan constitute a direct 

threat to the United States Homeland. More than ever, U.S. national security is 

linked to the success, security, and stability of a democratic Pakistan. Pakistan has 

made important strides toward democracy and stability in the past several months, 

though much remains to be done. Pakistan’s elections in February 2008 were an important step for Pakistan; we applaud the return of civilian leadership and remain 

committed to helping the people of Pakistan achieve their democratic goals. But 

Pakistan is now facing severe budgetary and economic issues at the very time when 

the government must act decisively to eliminate the al-Qaeda and Taliban safe 

12 

havens in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and North West Frontier 

Province (NWFP). The new coalition government has a difficult road to navigate, 

and requires the United States steadfast support. 

IMPORTANCE OF PAKISTAN TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

Following the tragic events of September 11, 2001, Pakistan became a member 

of the coalition formed to defeat al-Qaeda and the Taliban Government of Afghanistan. At the request of the United States, during the early phases of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Pakistan offered the use of its airspace, four airfields, and 

a seaport; and fuel, water, and utilities at those locations; deployed large numbers 

of its armed forces to protect deployed U.S. personnel; and later permitted the establishment of air and ground lines of communication through Pakistan into Afghanistan. Today, much of the fuel and dry cargo required to support U.S. and NATO 

military operations in Afghanistan transit Pakistan, and because of our cooperative 

relationship with Pakistan’s armed forces, coalition forces lose very little of the supplies to insurgent activity, despite the close proximity of these lines of communication to areas al-Qaeda and the Taliban frequent. 

At the request of the United States in 2001, Pakistan deployed its Army for the 

first time in its history into the tribal agencies of the FATA along the border with 

Afghanistan to assist U.S. operations in Afghanistan by capturing al-Qaeda and 

Taliban fighters fleeing Tora Bora. The Pakistan Army captured and turned over 

to U.S. custody several hundred of these fighters. For example, Pakistani forces captured Abu Zubaydah, a senior al-Qaeda operative and Osama bin Laden confidant. 

During a raid on a residence in Rawalpindi, Pakistani forces arrested al-Qaeda senior leader Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, the alleged mastermind behind the September 

11 attacks who was also wanted by the U.S. for his involvement in the 2002 murder 

of U.S. journalist Daniel Pearl. 

Pakistan is a key partner in the war on terror (WOT) and plays a major role in 

long-term efforts to build a stable Afghanistan. Without U.S. assistance and support 

Pakistan could not afford to deploy and maintain 100,000 military and paramilitary 

forces in the FATA. Since 2001, the Pakistan Army has conducted 91 major and 

countless small operations in support of the WOT, and it has captured or killed 

more al-Qaeda and Taliban extremists than any other coalition partner. Following 

Pakistan’s decision in July 2007 to remove by force a group of religious extremists 

that had seized the Red Mosque in Islamabad, the number of retaliatory suicide 

bombings and ambushes of Pakistani military and police personnel increased dramatically. This was a watershed moment for Pakistan in some respects. Liberating 

the Red Mosque occurred at the same time Pakistan abandoned the failed 

Waziristan peace agreements and moved a substantial amount of new soldiers and 

paramilitary forces into the FATA, NWFP, and parts of Baluchistan. In the past 5 

years, Pakistani soldiers have sustained more than 1,400 combat deaths—700 just 

since July 2007—and more than 2,400 wounded in action. Accordingly, the degree 

to which senior Government of Pakistan and military officials understand that extremism is a domestic threat reached a new high. 

THE FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS (FATA)

The security of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan has been the subject of increasing interest and concern to the administration, Congress, and the 

international community. The FATA border region with Afghanistan is now and has 

historically been a largely ungoverned space. This area—approximately the size of 

Maryland—was identified in the July 2007 ‘‘National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on 

the Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland’’ and the ‘‘Country Reports on Terrorism 

2007’’ as a safe haven where Taliban and al-Qaeda forces recruit, train, and equip 

fighters and infiltrate them into Afghanistan. The FATA has always had a special 

constitutional status in Pakistan. Federal and provincial laws do not apply, and the 

area is governed only loosely under the provisions of the century-old Frontier 

Crimes Regulations. Operating in the FATA is challenging even for the Pakistanis 

who are generally considered to be outsiders and interlopers by the fiercely independent Pashtun tribesman. The tribes of the FATA have a long history of military 

resistance and success in preventing alien armies from entering, conquering, or imposing their will on these tribal areas. 

These areas along the border with Afghanistan have challenged generations of 

would-be external governors. Today’s border inhabitants will not meekly yield their 

strongly embraced customs and traditions to outsiders who seek to alter their way 

of life. Accordingly, the Government of Pakistan must develop localized engagement 

strategies that can earn the support of border inhabitants while achieving the government’s aims. 

13 

It is only by working with local security elements and the Pakistan military that 

security is possible in the FATA and NWFP. Neither the Government of Pakistan 

(GOP) nor a meaningful percentage of Pakistan’s citizens support a U.S. force presence in the country. Of course, the Pakistani people’s support is essential to both 

our short-term and long-term bilateral objectives. Consequently, the U.S. is assisting Pakistan by equipping and training indigenous security forces such as the Frontier Corps along with supporting specialized Pakistan military units, like the Special Services Group (SSG), and by supporting the government’s broader frontier development strategy. These initiatives will take time to succeed and the United 

States must, as good allies, have appropriate patience while awaiting the benefits 

of our current investments. 

Helping to ensure Pakistan has capable, professional security forces will better 

align the security objectives of our two nations. Capable forces, and their leaders, 

are much more likely to directly confront difficult security challenges—ones like 

those that occur along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Ridding the mountainous, 

rugged FATA and NWFP of anticoalition militants, terrorists, and extremists will 

demand both highly professional troops with specialized counterinsurgency (COIN) 

skills and reliable indigenous local security forces that can hold territory and earn 

the support of local tribes. Without effective security forces Pakistan’s efforts will 

fail. 

UNITED STATES COUNTERINSURGENCY INITIATIVE

In response to a request from Pakistan for assistance, the U.S. Government has 

developed a COIN strategy for Pakistan’s western border region. This area encompasses the FATA, parts of NWFP, and parts of Baluchistan. One of the assumptions 

of COIN doctrine is that security is a means to an end, not the end itself. In this 

instance, the U.S. and Pakistan realize that securing the border with Afghanistan 

and curtailing safe haven protection for extremists cannot be accomplished with 

force alone. It will only work if we can change the environment for the resident population and that means an approach that embraces security, infrastructure improvements, overall development, and enhancements to the governance mechanisms of 

the region. 

Our colleagues at the Department of State and USAID are helping the Government of Pakistan implement development and governance projects in the FATA and 

NWFP. DOD is beginning work to enhance the ability of Pakistan’s military to engage in counterinsurgency operations. 

United States security assistance efforts are designed to enhance the ability of the 

Pakistan Army’s special operations forces to conduct targeted counterterrorism raids 

against extremist targets in the border region. The U.S. is working with Afghan, 

Pakistani, and ISAF colleagues to establish a network of Border Coordination Centers (BCCs) along the border to enhance the ability of liaison officers from all of the 

forces to see a common view of the area. Finally, the United States is also working 

with Pakistan’s paramilitary Frontier Corps to train and equip this force and enhance its ability to capitalize on the unique skills, access, and abilities that it has 

in the border area. The Frontier Corps’ status as a locally raised Pashtun force 

allows it access and acceptability amongst the indigenous population that even the 

Pakistani Army does not have. 

These efforts will take time to bear fiuit. Pakistan has been struggling with the 

degree to which its writ of governance extends into the FATA since its inception. 

The U.S. COIN strategy mirrors Pakistan’s own FATA Sustainable Development 

Plan—a 9-year effort focused largely on development and the reform of governance 

institutions. Security assistance targeted at the FATA is delayed by the availability 

of funds and the work that must be done to build infrastructure, acquire equipment, 

and commit trainers. 

Let me say a word about Pakistan’s current round of peace negotiations. The 

United States is deeply concerned about reports of cease-fire negotiations and agreements in South Waziristan and other locations in the FATA and NWFP. Previous 

attempts by the GOP to negotiate cease-fires and other agreements with the tribes 

in the FATA and NWFP were deeply flawed. After the Government of Pakistan 

signed similar agreements in 2005 and 2006, cross-border operations by extremist 

groups against the Afghan, U.S., and NATO forces increased substantially, due in 

part, we believe, to the provisions of the agreements. The United States recognizes 

that there is no purely military solution to insurgency, but has made it clear to the 

GOP that any agreement should be enforceable and backed up by the credible threat 

of force. Also, any agreement should include a commitment to deny a safe haven 

to foreign terrorists and prevent attacks against U.S., coalition, Afghan, or Pakistani forces in either Afghanistan or Pakistan. Finally, it is equally important that 

14 

Pakistan’s military forces remain in the FATA and NWFP in order to enforce agreements. This message has been delivered to all levels of Pakistan’s Government over 

the past 2 months, and the Government of Pakistan has told us it will not approve 

any agreement that does not contain all of these conditions. 

THE TOOLS AVAILABLE

DOD appreciates this committee’s consideration of the new possibilities with Pakistan and the tools that will be necessary to yield the desired results. The Department of Defense ambitions are high, but they match the urgency of the situation. 

The administration is committed to working with this sovereign nation—a key ally 

in the WoT—to help Pakistan reorient its military toward the doctrine and capabilities necessary for an effective COIN-focused strategy. DOD is committed to enhancing the Pakistan military’s effectiveness via training and equipping programs for 

their special operations forces and paramilitary personnel. DOD is committed to creating mechanisms—such as the BCCs—that put actionable intelligence into the 

hands of those who need to use it. We also understand the importance of continuing 

to build capabilities in the Pakistan military’s regular forces, including air mobility 

(helo) and other key enablers. 

But despite our commitment, we are not well armed with regard to funding. The 

Security Development Plan, which encompasses each of these program elements, is 

funded using a patchwork of authorities. It does not yet have a dedicated source of 

funding that is as flexible and adaptable as the enemy. Foreign Military Financing 

(FMF) is a useful authority and has played a major role in our effort to enhance 

and reform Pakistan’s military. Section 1206 funding is useful for emergent needs, 

but not intended for programs that require continuity beyond a given fiscal year. 

The special $75M authority Congress created for the Frontier Corps is an effective 

tool to aid U.S. efforts, but it too has its limitations—specifically, that it cannot be 

used for any other nonmilitary force (which excludes, for example, the Frontier Constabulary, etc.). Indeed, Defense will provide a staff briefing to this committee on 

the Frontier Corps program later this afternoon and hopes that the committee, after 

consideration, will release its hold on this funding so it might get the field to 

support this important initiative. International Military Education and Training 

(IMET) funds are also an important element of our engagement strategy. While generally requiring the commitment of fewer resources per instance than FMF, IMET 

funds allow us to connect with Pakistan in a uniquely personal way—establishing 

relationships with rising career military personnel and exposing them to our practices relating to ethics, civilian oversight, and human rights. The expansion of our 

IMET program with Pakistan is a priority for DOD. 

Both the economy and security situation in Pakistan need U.S. support. The concept of a ‘‘democracy dividend’’ should not come at the expense of that nation’s 

legitimate defense needs. Pakistan’s ability to maintain security and the needs of 

its population should not be an ‘‘either/or’’ proposition. 

The Department of Defense strongly supports a long-term commitment to Pakistan. But DOD opposes introducing legislated conditional language on the security 

assistance we give to Pakistan. Doing so undermines the trust relationship with 

Pakistan at a time when it is most critical. Imposing legislated conditions on our 

support leaves our ally with a mixed impression of American interests and commitment. The legacy of perceived abandonment after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan ended and, later, the imposition of sanctions related to Pakistan’s development 

of a nuclear capability—continue to negatively affect our relations with elements of 

Pakistan’s military, civilian government, and population. Indeed, despite our assistance and engagement, the U.S. is sometimes viewed as an inconsistent ally. While 

we recognize the committee’s interest in ensuring that our security assistance and 

reimbursement programs advance U.S. national security interests, we feel that such 

concerns are best dealt with via the day-to-day interactions between our governments and not as a litmus test of the commitment of either country to the fight 

against the adversaries we face together. 

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Department of Defense strongly endorses the administration’s 

interagency efforts to implement a truly comprehensive strategy to ensure our overall relationship with the people of Pakistan succeeds. The American and Pakistani 

peoples can greatly benefit from a strategic dialogue built upon a foundation of mutual trust and commitment. To do so we must be good allies with long-term perspectives. Of immediate concern, our success in protecting our Homeland and achieving 

our goals in Afghanistan will require Pakistan’s success in addressing the various 

security-related needs in the FATA and NWFP. 

15 

The new civilian government in Islamabad is currently struggling to balance the 

requirement to alleviate poverty and illiteracy; deal with nationwide shortages of 

food, fuel, and energy; contain the spread of religious extremism; and maintain large 

military forces along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Sufficient, flexible, and legislatively unconditioned U.S. security assistance, therefore, is critical to our eventual 

success in Afghanistan and the WOT. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Deputy Administrator Ward. 

STATEMENT OF MARK WARD, SENIOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR ASIA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL 

DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. WARD. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lugar, and other 

members of the committee, thanks very much for having USAID 

along today, as well. 

I’ve spent much of my foreign service career working in, or on, 

Pakistan. 

Senator Lugar, you talked about the Pressler amendment. I lived 

there when it came into effect in the nineties, and I moved back 

when we reopened in 2002, so I particularly welcome the committee’s interest. 

I read your letter, very carefully, Mr. Chairman, and I’d like to 

respond to each of the questions that you put to me in the letter. 

You asked about the current assistance environment in Pakistan. 

When we went back—and I was the first one back—in 2002, the 

security environment had changed for the worse since we left in 

1995. So, we faced a real challenge: Keeping our footprint small, 

but standing up a very visible program, fast. 

So, we focused on four sectors, the ones that you’ve mentioned: 

Education, health, economic growth, and democracy in governance, 

and after consulting with the government, and the other donors, we 

decided to focus, in particular, on Sindh and Balochistan, because 

it seemed that those two provinces were getting the least attention 

from the other donors. 

Now, over the past 6 years, since our return, we’ve added more 

staff—mostly Pakistani professionals—but for the most part, we’ve 

stayed focused on those four sectors in the settled areas in the 

country, and then we’ve expanded our program geographically into 

Azad Kashmir, after the devastating earthquake that you’ve already referenced, in October 2005, and of course into the tribal 

areas. 

Going forward, we hope to expand into the Swat Valley in the 

North-West Frontier, Southern Punjab, and Northern Sindh, where 

we see growing extremist threats to the government. And if we receive additional resources in the future, we hope that we can consider new programs, in addition to the sectors that we’ve been engaged in, and that you’ve mentioned, we’d also like to take a look 

at agriculture, energy, and additional jobs programs, with the private sector in the lead. 

The assistance environment in the Frontier is, of course, the 

least permissive. There, we face a number of challenges—extreme 

poverty, illiteracy, poor governance, tribal insurgency, and as my 

colleagues have said, distrust of anything, and anybody, foreign. 

We’ve adopted new approaches, in the face of these challenges. 

The sectors that we’re working in, in the tribal areas may sound 

16 

familiar: Maternal and child health, education, jobs programs, 

capacity-building for local government officials, but our approaches 

have changed. 

We’re taking the time in the tribal areas to bring local communities into the discussion—we’re letting the communities set the 

priorities, weigh the options, and make the decisions with local officials. 

Is it fast? No. But in some communities this will mean a new 

road, in some communities it will mean a well, or an irrigation 

canal, but in all communities, it will mean giving people a stake 

in their future, positive interaction with their local officials, for the 

first time. 

You asked about opportunities. In any other country, I don’t 

know how we could manage such a large assistance program with 

so few Foreign Service Officers, and if I may, I doff my cap to 

them—all of them out there—who are working so hard under difficult conditions. 

Thankfully, in Pakistan, we have a very strong private sector 

and civil society that we can—and have—turned to, to help us 

manage our programs. Functions that we might perform with 

Foreign Service Officers in other countries, where security is less 

of an issue, such as project oversight, are well within the expertise 

of Pakistani accounting firms, engineers, think tanks and 

universities. 

We’re also committed to using more Pakistani contractors and 

grantees to implement our projects. They know the country very 

well, they speak the language, they don’t require the added security costs that an expatriate firm would, to ensure that the assistance dollars that you entrust to us, go further. 

The recent national elections—as both of my colleagues have 

said—also created opportunities, particularly in the Frontier. One 

very hopeful example in the federal government is the new Minister of Education, who’s spoken publicly about the need to increase 

incentives for teachers, which we think is a critical missing element in any long-term plan to reform education in Pakistan. We 

don’t want to disrupt or delay our ongoing programs, but we look 

forward to engaging with the new leadership, to be certain that 

what we’re doing is completely responsive to their priorities. 

You asked about obstacles. Security, security, security. It’s a real 

and serious concern, and it can impede implementation of our programs. We have to ensure the safety of our staff, and that can affect our monitoring. 

For example, unlike my first tour there in the early nineties, our 

staff now finds it difficult to get outside of the Embassy, or the consulate in Peshawar, to the detriment of our project management responsibilities. This is particularly acute in the tribal areas, but 

we’re always looking for new ways to manage our programs. 

As I said a minute ago, we’re relying much more on Pakistani 

professionals to perform some of the oversight. For the tribal areas, 

we’ve established a new office in Peshawar, to be closer to the action, and created a second deputy director position there, to lead 

our efforts in the Frontier. And we’ve also built a very strong relationship with the political agents that work in those agencies, who 

17 

come into the settled areas regularly to report to us on progress 

and impediments. 

You asked how the Pakistanis would view an increase in our assistance. Well, they would welcome that increase, but as my colleagues have said, what they would welcome the most—and you 

have said—is a long-term commitment from the United States, a 

commitment that would reassure the Pakistani people that we will 

be their partner for many years to come. 

You asked in the letter if USAID would be able to handle additional resources. Well, we’ve already handled a pretty significant 

increase since we returned in 2002. When I went back in 2002, we 

had about $15 million. We’re over $400 million now, that we’re 

managing each year. We’re staffing up in Islamabad, I told you 

that we’ve opened an office in Peshawar, to oversee our programs 

in the Frontier. 

Now, our capacity to manage additional resources is not infinite, 

but as long as we have your support, to use new mechanisms for 

delivering our assistance and monitoring progress, we’re confident 

that we could manage more. 

And finally, you asked about interagency and cross-border cooperation with Afghanistan. We have a very strong country team 

in Islamabad and in Peshawar, an excellent collaboration, as Assistant Secretary Boucher said, among the three organizations represented at the witness table, and then personally among the three 

of us. 

There’s a real commitment in the field, to eliminate duplication 

and build complementary programs between agencies, particularly 

civil-military cooperation. 

One of my hopes, going forward, is that we can show the Pakistanis how civil-military cooperation works. You talked about the 

earthquake—they did a terrific job in the earthquake, their army, 

working with their NGOs. I think we can help them bring that experience to bear in the tribal areas, as well, to help ensure that 

their very large investment in the tribal areas is more effective. 

We are working more closely, now, with our colleagues in Afghanistan, as we build up our assistance programs on the Pakistan 

side of the border. Interventions across the border should, more or 

less, mirror each other, especially where members of the same tribe 

live on both sides of the border. 

One proposed component that we’ve talked about is the Reconstruction Opportunity Zones, which could provide a relatively lowcost way to promote sustainable development in economically challenged areas of both countries. 

Mr. Chairman, members, thanks so much for having us, I look 

forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ward follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARK S. WARD, SENIOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINIS- TRATOR, BUREAU FOR ASIA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC 

Chairman Biden, Ranking Member Lugar, other distinguished members of the 

committee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you. Today’s hearing topic— 

New Strategy for Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan—is important. I welcome the 

opportunity to discuss USAID’s development challenges and successes and our plans 

to continue building our partnership with Pakistan to support the country’s democratization, stabilization, and economic growth. 

18 

I have a brief statement to present to the committee today. It highlights our current assistance program and partnership in Pakistan, the cooperative relationships 

across agencies, our plan looking ahead and, of course, the challenges we face implementing assistance programs in the unpredictable environment of Pakistan, particularly in the border areas with Afghanistan. 

CURRENT ASSISTANCE

When the United States returned to Pakistan in 2002, we focused on four key sectors: Education, health, democracy, and economic growth, in accordance with the 

Government of Pakistan’s (GOP) request. Over the past 6 years, USAID has deepened that mandate, but in view of high female illiteracy and the need for workforce 

skills development, education remains our largest program. In all these sectors, the 

Government of Pakistan has the lead and we target our assistance programs to support and enhance programs and priorities the GOP identifies. 

Current funding will allow USAID to expand these ongoing, successful programs 

to new areas, such as the Swat Valley in the North-West Frontier Province, as well 

as southern Punjab, northern Sindh. Similarly, we will extend efforts in earthquakeaffected areas of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, where we were not present until the 

2005 earthquake occurred. This work has deepened our partnership with Pakistan 

and extended the writ of the government, as people have seen how these benefit 

their lives. We appreciate the support of Congress in making this possible. The overall FY 2009 request includes $150 million for the Frontier, the third year in a 5- 

year $750 million U.S. commitment to support the Pakistani 9-year $2 billion FATA 

Sustainable Development Plan. 

The Government of Pakistan faces a number of challenges in Pakistan—extreme 

poverty, illiteracy, lack of good governance and tribal insurgency. These problems 

are most severe on the borders with Afghanistan. The U.S. Frontier strategy expands on-going maternal and child health and education programs, introduces job 

creation efforts, and builds the capacity of local government to provide better services to the people. In some communities this means a new road, a well or an irrigation canal. In all communities, it means giving people a stake in their future development, and that of the GOP, for the first time. 

OPPORTUNITIES

The presence of a strong private sector, well-educated urban population, and civil 

society in Pakistan allow USAID to do its work more efficiently and effectively with 

a smaller mission staff that relies on local capacity to support our work. These 

strengths enabled USAID to increase use of local firms, NGOs, and think tanks, to 

support development. Similarly, USAID is committed to increasing the involvement 

of local contractors in supporting Pakistan’s development. It is also important to 

note that results of the national elections opened up new opportunities in the Frontier for working with local leaders, municipal governments, civil society organizations, and moderate political parties. Finally, the successful corporate CEO Partnership for Earthquake Reconstruction had long-lasting effects on northern Pakistan’s 

development and created an overwhelmingly positive image of the United States. 

USAID will continue to make the most of these and other opportunities in implementing a dynamic program that meets changing needs. 

OBSTACLES

The security situation in Pakistan is a real and serious concern, and can impede 

implementation of programs. We must ensure the safety of our staff and, too often, 

that limits how we are able to monitor programs. In recent years, our staff find it 

difficult to leave the Embassy or consulate. These impediments especially affect 

work in the FATA. We’ve established an office in Peshawar and a second Deputy 

Mission Director to lead our efforts there. This will support our efforts to implement 

and monitor programs as effectively as possible. 

HOW WOULD PAKISTAN VIEW AN INCREASE IN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE?

Pakistanis are acutely aware of the hiatus that occurred when USAID left the 

country in the early 1990s, a departure that created a significant loss of trust between the U.S. and Pakistan that remains today. Pakistanis would welcome increased assistance. What they would value more than increased assistance is a longterm commitment from the United States, a commitment that would reassure the 

Pakistanis that we will be their partner for many years to come. 

19 

WOULD USAID BE ABLE TO HANDLE SUCH RESOURCES?

USAID has already successfully handled the significant but incremental increase 

in assistance that has occurred since 2002, when we returned to Pakistan. We are 

staffing up our mission in Islamabad now, and, as I mentioned above, we are building up our presence in Peshawar, as an in-country regional office, to oversee the 

FATA program. 

INTERAGENCY AND MISSION COORDINATION

I appreciate appearing today with my two colleagues from the Departments of 

State and Defense. This is indicative of the close interagency coordination in Pakistan, that is, in fact, the best I’ve ever seen anywhere. We have a strong country 

team and excellent collaboration among the officials of these two Departments as 

well as other U.S. Government Agencies, and with other donors as well. 

We work closely with our colleagues in Afghanistan. We also recognize the benefits of increasing coordination between the two USAID missions. This will be particularly important as we continue our assistance programs in the tribal areas along 

the Frontier region in the FATA, NWFP, and Baluchistan. We think that interventions in these areas should more or less mirror each other, especially where members of the same tribe live on both sides of the border. We are still developing ideas 

on how we can improve this, but one proposed component is the Reconstruction 

Opportunity Zones (ROZs), which could provide a relatively low-cost way to promote 

sustainable development in economically challenged areas of Afghanistan and 

Pakistan. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, we have a very good 

panel, and I hope Ambassador Chamberlin and General Zinni 

will—I know they’ll listen—because a lot of the things that I’m 

going to ask are questions I’ve asked before, because I’d like to 

know about it from your experience, if I may. 

Look, I think each of us in this committee—by the way, before 

the clock starts, Senator Kerry, who’s keenly interested in this, recently was on a trip with Senator Hagel, and myself—had to go 

chair another hearing. But his absence is not a lack of interest, he’s 

been deeply involved in this, and things as we do and you do that 

this is—if we can ever pick one place in the world we’d better get 

it right, it’s here. 

So, I have a lot of questions, and obviously in 7 minutes, I’m not 

going to be able to get to them. I hope I can narrow them to give 

you an opportunity to answer them relatively quickly, and expand 

on them in writing if you’d like, and maybe, if we have time, in 

light of the number of people we have, without trespassing too 

much on our second panel, maybe have a second round, if that opportunity presents itself. 

Let me start with you, Mr. Ward. Speaking only for myself, I 

think your—from my standpoint, I want to see you—I want to see 

USAID be more innovative. There is a significant middle class, 

there’s a significant infrastructure that exists within Pakistan, 

we’re not talking about Afghanistan, we’re not talking about other 

countries where you are up to your knees in trying to deal with development aid, and the—one of the things that I’d like to ask, very 

pointedly, is you’re in Balochistan, and Sindh, is that right? 

Mr. WARD. Those are the two provinces where we’re focusing. 

The CHAIRMAN. Right. You said you have security concerns, from 

whence does the threat to your workers come? What—how do you 

identify, whether it’s there or the tribal areas—the tribal areas it’s 

kind of self-evident. But other than the tribal areas, the FATA, 

where does the threat to your workers come from? Where does it 

emanate from? 

20 

Mr. WARD. Let me describe the process. 

The CHAIRMAN. Only if you can do it in a minute or so. 

Mr. WARD. When we want to go out and check on a project—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 

Mr. WARD. We check with security, Pakistani security there. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, yes, right. 

Mr. WARD. If they’ve identified a threat in that area, to us—and 

they do in certain parts of the country more than others, certainly 

in Balochistan—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Right. 

Mr. WARD. Certainly in Karachi. 

The CHAIRMAN. Right. 

Mr. WARD. It makes it very difficult for us to go out and—— 

The CHAIRMAN. No, no; I’m not doubting that. I mean, I know, 

look, we’ve lost as many civilians, people not in uniform—almost, 

not as many—but we’ve lost a considerable number. And people 

vastly underestimate the price that Foreign Service Officers and 

aid workers pay for trying to enforce—or not enforce, but—follow 

through with American foreign policy. 

I’m just asking, is the threat from disparate groups, are you worried about al-Qaeda in the region, are you worried about, you 

know, certain parts of the Taliban, are you worried about opposition parties? I mean, who do they—when they say it’s too dangerous to go here, do they identify for you why it’s too dangerous? 

Mr. WARD. Senator, it’s basically the same people who are 

threatening us in the tribal areas. Some of the radical madrassas 

are in Karachi, we’ve probably picked up more al-Qaeda Taliban 

militants down there than we have in the tribal areas—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that explains it. I just want to make sure 

for the record we—now, second, I’d like very quickly and—I’m 

going to submit some questions in writing to you, Mr. Ward, if I 

may. 

What I’d like to do is ask the Defense Department—we, I came 

away after skirting the FATA, I think that’s the best way we can 

say it—and meeting the Interservices Intelligence (ISI) for some extended period of time, and meeting with each of the opposition— 

each of the contestants in the last general election, because we 

were there for the election. 

I came away with several impressions that relate to the military 

side of this equation, I’d like to just reference them, and ask you 

if you would be willing to comment on them. 

First of all, I came away, not at all reassured by the ISI, that 

they had their act together, and they viewed ‘‘the enemy’’ in the 

FATA as being the same enemy we viewed as the enemy, number 

one. That is, it seemed to me a great deal more concern—and I’m 

not making a judgment here, on Mahsud and the traditional resistance in the FATA, than from the Taliban, and virtually no interest 

in—I shouldn’t say no—little interest in al-Qaeda. 

Second, I found that even where there was a will on the part of 

the Pakistani military—brave fighters, very, very competent military—that it did not possess the capacity—it wasn’t organized in 

a way that it could very efficiently compete militarily in the FATA. 

They, as much as, said that themselves. 

21 

Third, I found that there was this—and I should have known 

this, my staff, Jonah Blank, has been telling me this for 5 years— 

that there is a real resistance on the part of the Pakistani military 

to be trained, or take orders from, a sergeant, or another NCO 

ranking lower than they are in teaching them about 

counterinsurgency and training, which has been difficult. 

And last, I found that the big problem in the FATA is infrastructure. That you build a road that connects—you have some reason 

to connect that part of the world to Islamabad. Right now, much 

of that part of the world, within Pakistan, has no connection to— 

I mean, what goes on in Islamabad is irrelevant. 

And you saw what recently happened in, in what, in Swat, which 

was a, you know, a beautiful area that was essentially one of the 

places that attracted tourists and was doing well. 

So, my question—having stated those three things for you, is— 

from a military standpoint, what are the priorities from the Defense Department, in terms of dealing with—how do you think 

about approaching? Increasing the capacity, the willingness, the cooperation, for—with the Pakistani military to deal with what we 

look at as the problem, which is primarily a resurging Taliban in 

Afghanistan, out of the Pashtun tribe, and al-Qaeda. 

So, A, Do they view the same enemy—are they the same priorities? What’s one man’s terrorist may not be another man’s. Do 

they have the same priorities? Do they have the capacity? And 

what is the thing that can help them the most, in dealing with 

both of those issues? 

Mr. SHIVERS. Well, Mr. Chairman, you asked the 64-million-dollar question. 

Addressing the security needs in the FATA and the North-West 

Frontier Province are amongst our greatest priorities at the Department of Defense. 

I’m curious about the representations that ISI officials made to 

you during your visit. Indeed, it’s often thought that the Pakistanis 

have paid more attention to al-Qaeda, at our request, than they 

have to traditional militants in the tribal areas, and the Taliban. 

So, the fact that they were paying so much attention to the 

Taliban, I think, is encouraging. 

The CHAIRMAN. I misspoke, if—that’s what I thought I said— 

they’re much more concerned about Mahsud, then they are—I came 

away with the impression—than they are about the Taliban, or 

then they are about al-Qaeda. 

In other words, the threat to Islamabad emanates more from insurgents in that region who have no interest in Afghanistan, but 

have as their target, Islamabad. As their target, the military—the 

Pakistani military. 

Yet our interest is—we keep pushing them, which we should, in 

my view, to deal with the Taliban that they created—with our 

help—and al-Qaeda. And that seems clear, to me, to be a second 

priority. 

Again, I’m not passing judgment about it from their perspective. 

I’d like to know as unvarnished an assessment you have, What do 

you think their major concern is? The ISI’s as well as the Pakistani 

military, and in what capacity do you have to help them build to 

22 

get them to view things, at least, somewhat more consistently with 

us? 

Mr. SHIVERS. Without going into matters that I think would better be addressed in closed session, I would say that we do have 

concerns from time to time as to whether the authorities in Pakistan have the same degree of interest that we have in preventing 

anticoalition militants from transiting across the border into 

Afghanistan. 

This is an uneven exercise, and I suspect, perhaps, the preoccupation they had with Baitullah Mahsud while you were there, 

had to do with the proximity to the event against Benazir Bhutto, 

and he’s the presumed assassin. 

The CHAIRMAN. There, my—again, my impression is they wonder 

why we don’t have more interest in the things they have an interest in. In other words, we talk to them only about—not only 

about—primarily about, the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and they say, 

‘‘We’ve got other problems, in addition to that.’’ 

Mr. SHIVERS. Well, indeed, I think that’s an important element, 

Senator, of expanding this relationship, so that it’s not seen just in 

terms of the essential security needs and requirements that we 

have in the FATA and the North-West Frontier Province, but is 

seen against a much broader spectrum of issues that exists bilaterally between the two governments. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I’m over my time, let me just ask you 

this—how important, from the standpoint of the United States 

military is the work that AID and State is doing in trying to build 

infrastructure in the FATA, as well as in other parts of Pakistan? 

Is it viewed as a necessary element to be able to allow Islamabad 

to gain control of an, in turn, begin to corral the influence of the 

Taliban and al-Qaeda in the region, or is it viewed as a nice thing 

that will help the people, but doesn’t—isn’t going to make a whole 

heck of a lot of difference about whether or not Mullah Omar operates with impunity, and bin Laden is the cock of the walk in that 

area? 

We know where they live—they ain’t living in Iraq. They are in 

Pakistan. So, tell me about the development piece from the perspective of a military man? 

Mr. SHIVERS. Well, let me echo the words of Secretary Gates 

when he made the—presented the ideas of utilizing all of the elements of national power at our disposal—especially soft power. We 

view this as essential. You can not prevail in the FATA, or the 

North-West Frontier Province—Pakistan will not prevail there— 

without essential development and assistance to the people. So, 

we’ve got to take their minds off of terrorism and extremism, and 

put their minds into productive use about how their children are 

going to be educated, and how development will take place in their 

communities. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Secretary, I’d like to take you up on 

your offer, maybe when we get back from recess, to have—not necessarily a hearing—but maybe you, or whomever you would suggest, could come up and brief us on the parts that we, understandably, or should be not in public, about the military component, 

training and the rest. 

23 

I’ve now gone—I apologize, gentlemen, 5 minutes over my time. 

If we go to a second round, I will not take one. 

Senator Lugar. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I’d like to pursue with you, the general proposition that was really posed by an article in the New York Times yesterday by Carlotta 

Gall. She wrote, essentially, of a leadership void seen in Pakistan, 

and she goes on to point out that this is not altogether surprising, 

that during 8 years of military rule, the bureaucracies and a significant portion of the civilian government atrophied, they were 

less effective, and currently it is surprising to the Parliament to be 

having a discussion of the military budget, as some comment, after 

40 years. Having no idea what the military budget might be. 

I mention these anecdotal circumstances along with the court in 

Pakistan ruling that Mr. Sharif isn’t eligible to run for Parliament. 

He, of course, is head of a junior partner in a major coalition, and 

points out that this will have severe ramifications with regard to 

the coalition and its effectiveness. 

My point in raising all of this is that, to say the least, government in Pakistan is complex, but your situations in dealing with 

such government are more complex. I’m just simply wondering— 

even if we were to come forward with programs that are sufficient 

in terms of staff and money, with less emphasis on the people, and 

on a broader view of education, and so forth, is there sufficient effectiveness in the Government of Pakistan at this point, to be able 

to administer these programs, and to satisfy the American Congress, or taxpayers, or press, as the case may be, that we have a 

sufficient idea how the money is being spent? 

One story after another, I know, comes to your attention, of reports in which it’s not very clear where the money went. And as 

the chairman has said, this has led to a transactional idea, that 

we’re paying money to the military in Pakistan to get the job done 

with regard to terrorists or al-Qaeda in the border area, but at the 

same time we are witnessing a debate in which the government 

itself—the military, for that matter—is trying to determine its status with regard to the central government, quite apart from the 

population in the FATA area. 

How do we approach such a situation, and give some degree of 

confidence that—whatever policies we adopt, or discuss today— 

might have some degree of effectiveness? 

Would you like to start with that, Mr. Boucher? 

Mr. BOUCHER. Sir, I’m inclined to say yes, and leave it at that. 

I think you have put your finger on a real problem, but one that, 

I think, we see plenty of signs as being taken care of. 

The—I—we’ve talked to a lot of the political parties, our Ambassador keeps in touch with coalition partners, as well as people in 

other parties, and there seems to be a very broad consensus on 

some of the issues that are facing the nation. First, dealing with 

the immediate crisis of food and energy, and the approach to terrorism. 

And that’s—for all of the reasons you cite—I think that’s one of 

the reasons why their statement today about their approach to 

terrorism is very important, it brings together all of the political 

24 

leaders, it brings together the military, the President’s appointees 

and others, in a very clear statement of responsibility and goals, 

including goals of development, but also goals of ending cross-border activity and the presence of foreign fighters. So, I think that’s 

a very positive development. 

They’ve been able to bring together consensus and support for a 

budget that includes, for the first time, a publicly stated military 

budget. 

So, it’s always difficult working with coalitions, whatever country 

it is. Particularly when they, themselves, have issues between the 

coalition partners. 

But, I think on the issues that are really important to us, the 

issues of modernizing the nation, fighting extremism, modernizing 

the economy, providing jobs to young people, providing education to 

young people—there’s a very strong national consensus. And as Mr. 

Ward noted, there are, I think, more and more capabilities in Pakistan in the bureaucracy—but also outside the bureaucracy—to 

spend, audit, control, create, and build from the money that we put 

out there. 

So, I think, if organized properly, with some understanding of 

the political environment, we can get these things done. 

Senator LUGAR. Let me just follow with a question in terms of 

our own organization of affairs—describe the cooperation or coordination between our Embassy in Pakistan, and our Embassy in Afghanistan. You know, clearly we have goals there that are coincident in many ways, are we in touch with each other? 

Mr. BOUCHER. They—they’re in touch with each other at all levels, from the Ambassadors on down, they work together closely. 

We recently decided we needed some people who actually specialized in cross-border issues, and so we have—in my Bureau at the 

State Department now, one of our most capable officers who’s assigned to follow cross-border issues, potential for cooperation, you 

know, where the roads go, how are we approaching the extension 

of government on both sides. And we will have similarly charged 

people both at our Embassy in Afghanistan and in our mission in 

Pakistan. And that will create a small network of people who spend 

their whole time thinking about the relations between the two 

sides, and how we can help them work together. 

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Ward, in previous hearings, we’ve heard emphasis on the fact that the Pakistan school system is—as far as 

public education—nonexistent for, perhaps, a majority of young 

people after a certain age, and this has led to much more of an emphasis on religious instruction, and difficulties of that sort. 

But, this is a monumental problem—how does our aid fit, is it 

changing the educational status of youth in Pakistan? What sort of 

efforts are they likely to make? Or, can you give us any promise 

of the future in that direction? 

Mr. WARD. Our goal, Senator, is to restore confidence in parents 

that they can send their kids to the local public school, and that 

their kids will get a decent education. The public school is probably 

there, the teacher may or may not show up. The facilities inside 

the school are probably grim. So, given that choice—if you’re the 

parents—between this very poor public school, and a madrassah in 

the same area, where some course of education is offered—it’s 

25 

probably not going to matter a whole lot to the parents, because 

they may be illiterate themselves—and maybe they offer boarding, 

and certainly food—it’s understandable why parents in many communities opt for the religious schools. 

So, our effort—and we focused on districts in Sindh and 

Balochistan to test these models—is to not build schools, but to improve the existing public schools, so that, No. 1, the teachers in 

those schools understand some modern methods of teaching that 

get the children involved in the classroom, rather than have the 

children sit there and memorize, and be talked to. Build playground equipment, build latrines, make these public schools more 

attractive places for parents to send their children. 

The concern about building lots of new schools based on the history of all of the donors in Pakistan, is if we build them, are there 

teachers for them? There are too many, what we call, ‘‘ghost 

schools’’ in Pakistan. I call them ‘‘goat schools,’’ because in fact 

they, some of them, contain goats. But they’re not used as schools. 

They were built decades ago, not recently. That’s what we want to 

avoid, so we have to be careful that—and this is where we need 

the commitment from the Government of Pakistan—that they 

make the resources available to hire the teachers, to put more public schools out there to offer a good alternative to the religious 

schools in as many communities as we can. 

Senator LUGAR. Let me just ask, you view the press by that, the 

larger question—not just the written press, but the television and 

radio in Pakistan—is there some recognition of our efforts? In other 

words, we all talk about the public diplomacy, about the fight for 

hearts and minds, but is there any evidence that the people of 

Pakistan have some idea of what we are doing? 

Mr. SHIVERS. I think a lot of the people do, but the mass of the 

people don’t. They did—and still have—a very strong impression of 

what we did in earthquake relief. You know, kids were drawing 

pictures of Chinooks dropping food for people, and that is certainly 

well-publicized, and well-acknowledged, and well-received. 

But the ordinary, sort of, building roads, vocational training, 

building schools, promoting health care—I think most Pakistanis 

that benefit from those services don’t always know that it was us 

that made it happen. 

Senator LUGAR. This gets to the heart of the question—or many 

questions—the chairman was raising, in terms of our dedication to 

efforts that, of the people of Pakistan, and a recognition of an alliance there, so that—we’re not ready to talk about this today, and 

this may be beyond the hearing—but how do we broadcast better 

what we’re doing? Why we care? That anybody does care? In other 

words, if all this happens in a relative vacuum, then the strategic 

situation we’re talking about today is not very well enhanced. 

Mr. WARD. It’s a very good question, Senator, and there’s always 

a debate within our agencies about how many resources to put into 

the communications effort, as opposed to fixing up another school. 

We have tried very hard to come up with uniform branding for 

what we do so that when you see the message it always the same, 

so that if people see it enough, they remember it—the hand clasp, 

the ‘‘from the American people’’ in Urdu or Pashtu, but clearly we 

can do more. We have some good examples from the Middle East, 

26 

of where we have done more robust advertising campaigns, and it 

seems to stick. People—we notice in the polling—they recognize 

more assistance coming from the United States. So, this is clearly 

an area where we need to do more. 

The only thing I would add to what Assistant Secretary Boucher 

said is that, if you go into one of the districts where we have focused, there is more of a recognition. Like the earthquake area— 

when they see us a lot, when they see the results—but you go into 

a mass urban area like Karachi? No. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that that 

shouldn’t come out of your budget, that should be a public diplomacy budget, but that’s another issue for State. 

If you noticed, I changed the time to 10 minutes apiece, to equalize it out, a little bit. 

So, the Senator from Florida, Senator Nelson. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA 

Senator NELSON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I’m interested to hear 

Ambassador Chamberlin’s response about the effort of education, 

getting down to the schools and whether or not it is, in fact, happening. Because when she was Ambassador, that was one of her 

greatest frustrations, was that the aid was not getting down there. 

And therefore, it wasn’t offering an alternative to the madrassahs. 

So, I look forward to that testimony. 

I have about 7 questions, and I’m going to rush you all through, 

and I just wanted to quote from yesterday’s Christian Science Monitor, ‘‘NATO forces are stepping up attacks inside Pakistan, causing 

friction with Pakistan’s new government, which hopes to negotiate 

peace with the militants. For more than a year, Taliban militants 

have regrouped along Pakistan’s border region, where the Pakistani state’s presence is weak, and used it as a staging ground to 

launch attacks against both U.S. and Allied troops in Afghanistan,’’ 

and so forth. 

Now, the Pakistani military has insisted that the Frontier Corps, 

which is about 85,000 paramilitary force of local tribesman from 

the FATA region, they insist that that’s the best group to patrol 

and control the border. What say you? 

Mr. SHIVERS. Well, sir, you correctly described the Frontier 

Corps, and we know, presently, that they’re ill-equipped and illtrained to carry on that mission. Certainly that’s the reason why 

the Frontier Corps is a key element of our Security Development 

Plan, going forward. 

I would describe the Frontier Corps as capable of performing 

some critical counterinsurgency missions. I would think those 

would include the ability to hold areas—that is, not necessarily 

take areas that are in conflict—but the ability to hold them once 

they’re taken. 

I would expect that they would be able to perform an effective 

policing mechanism. After all, the Frontier Corps—during times of 

peace—is under the Ministry of Interior in Pakistan. It’s only 

chopped over to the Ministry of Defense during emergency periods, 

as has existed since 2001. 

27 

Senator NELSON of Florida. So, you think they are best to be a 

holding force, rather than a fighting force? 

Mr. SHIVERS. It is not an ideal force from a point of view of interdicting anticoalition militia—militants—who are attempting to 

transit the border. It’s not an ideal force for that. 

Senator NELSON of Florida. OK. 

Mr. SHIVERS. But they can provide surveillance, they have a very 

valuable role in intelligence—— 

Senator NELSON of Florida. Now, given what you have testified, 

I’ve got to hurry you along. 

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir. 

Senator NELSON of Florida. What, then, is the status of the discussions between our Government and the Pakistani Government 

on the counterterrorism training and operations? 

Mr. SHIVERS. Well, as I mentioned, the Frontier Corps is an element of our Security Development Plan, we’re also engaging with 

the Pakistan military and providing counterinsurgency assistance 

and training, and equipping the Special Services Group, which is 

their Special Forces equivalent, and a quick reaction force, air mobile capability, as well. 

So, combined, long term, we’re helping the Pakistan military 

shift away from an eastern border orientation in a conventional defense against threats that they perceive from the east, to a 

counterinsurgency mode, and recognizing the domestic threats that 

exist from terrorists and extremists. 

Senator NELSON of Florida. I need to get you, specifically, here. 

What you’ve testified, here, is the Frontier Corps, more as a holding force, and you said you’re giving training to the Pakistani military—— 

Mr. SHIVERS. If I may, sir—I would add one other element to my 

description for Frontier Corps, which is, in due course, a modest 

interdiction capability. 

Senator NELSON of Florida. OK, now, is that going to give us the 

necessary leverage that we need? Or are we going to have to get 

the Pakistanis to embrace the use of the U.S. Special Operations 

Forces? 

Mr. SHIVERS. Sir, I would say that our programs and our plans 

right now are devoted to enabling Pakistan military and localized 

security forces to carry out the security missions in the FATA and 

the North-West Frontier Province. Those are the best forces, actually, to engage the enemies there. 

It would be extremely difficult to introduce, for any length of 

time, U.S. forces into that area. 

Senator NELSON of Florida. I understand that that’s what you 

have to say. But do you really think that what you’ve described, 

between the paramilitary force of the Frontier Corps, and the existing Pakistani military, that it’s going to solve the problem in those 

wild regions, like the FATA? 

Mr. SHIVERS. Sir, I’m not sure if our current plans in place will 

absolutely ensure success with the goals that we have in the FATA 

and the North-West Frontier Province, but I will promise you rapid 

adjustment, as time goes on, to ensure that our homeland is protected, and that militants are not using the FATA and North-West 

28 

Frontier Province on a continued basis, as a safe haven to attack 

Afghanistan. 

Senator NELSON of Florida. Well, of course, that’s the problem 

that we run into right now, is that, in fact, they are attacking U.S. 

troops, over in Afghanistan, across the border. 

Let me ask you, I understand that you can only go so far, but 

I’m trying to put the cross-hairs on the problem, here. And we’ve 

really had a problem in that area with our U.S. military being vulnerable, because Pakistan is not doing its part. 

All right, now you’ve heard a lot about these peace deals being 

negotiated. You want to tell us whether or not the civilian government of Pakistan is negotiating these deals, or is it the military? 

Mr. SHIVERS. I believe it’s fair to say that these—I’m not sure 

how I would characterize—I know at present, it’s the civilian part 

of the government. 

As Assistant Secretary Boucher just said, the Prime Minister has 

made an important announcement today, we’re reviewing what the 

implications are of that announcement, I defer to Secretary Boucher for that—— 

Senator NELSON of Florida. I’ve only got 2 minutes left, here, tell 

me, Mr. Secretary, what is the quid pro quo in these negotiations? 

Mr. BOUCHER. I guess the answer to your previous question is, 

people talk about the politicians, say we have a policy of negotiating with the tribes, not the militants. And yet, what we’ve seen 

is negotiations with Sufi Muhammad in Swat, and Baitullah 

Mahsud in Waziristan, so we’re trying to reconcile that, and I think 

to some extent their statement today will try to do that. 

The quid pro quo is, they say they want to negotiate with the 

tribes. If the tribes impose security, stop the militancy, kick out the 

foreign fighters, stop the cross-border, the tribes will then benefit 

from inclusion in the national system of government, and will benefit from the economic development, and other things that can be 

done for them. 

Senator NELSON of Florida. Do you think that’s real? 

Mr. BOUCHER. I think that’s real. I think that’s their—— 

Senator NELSON of Florida. Even though General McNeil, the 

head of the NATO forces, has said publicly, that he thinks that the 

cease-fires with the militants have contributed to the increased violence along the Afghan side of the border? 

Mr. BOUCHER. I think we have all been very concerned—there 

was the deal that negotiated in September 2006, resulted in increased cross-border activity, and increased violence, increased 

planning, and operations by al-Qaeda in this region. We don’t want 

to see that repeated. We think people have to be extraordinarily 

careful in negotiating with anybody up there. But certainly, the approach of saying we will work with the tribes to kick out the militants is a better approach than going to directly negotiate with the 

militants, and that seems to be the approach they are adopting, not 

one that they have implemented successfully, yet. 

Senator NELSON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I’ve finished with 17 

seconds left. 

The CHAIRMAN. I’m genuinely impressed, thank you. Good questions. 

Senator Hagel, you have an extra 17 seconds. 

29 

STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA 

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the hearing, and 

the work that you and Senator Lugar have been involved in, in trying to focus on an integrated strategy on this issue. 

Let me ask our two secretaries, because each has noted, in your 

testimony and in the discussion here this morning, about—as you 

have said it, Mr. Shivers, in your testimony, in referencing the 

United States counterinsurgency initiative, COIN. 

Now, you both are aware that in April of this year, the Government Accountability Office criticized the lack of an integrated 

United States government strategy, and you have both touched on 

a new effort, with a new government, with new leadership, to harness and integrate, organize, structure focus, resources of common 

interest both for the Pakistanis and for the United States. 

My first question in this area is, Who coordinates this? Who directs this? Is it the State Department? Is it the White House? Who 

is in charge of directing this new counterinsurgency strategy? 

Secretary Boucher. 

Mr. BOUCHER. It’s basically the State Department, the interagency groups that have worked on this have been cochaired, I 

think, by the State Department and the NSC reps. It’s a cooperative effort, but going through the usual interagency committees, 

but ultimately, I think we’ve got the responsibility for making it fit 

together, and carrying it out through our Embassy. 

Senator HAGEL. Well, let me follow up on what you said—you 

said, ‘‘basically,’’ and ‘‘I think.’’ What does that mean? Are you in 

charge, or not? 

Mr. BOUCHER. Yes. 

Senator HAGEL. Secretary Shivers, would you like to respond? 

Mr. SHIVERS. Sir, there are two principal mechanisms that we 

discuss the interagency process towards Pakistan. One is the weekly meetings, which Secretary Boucher chairs at the State Department. These have been going on for a very long period of time and 

they are very active engagements on a weekly basis. 

All of the major Departments of the Government that have a particular interest with Pakistan and our security interests there, as 

well as the broader bilateral relationships, are represented. 

Additionally, of course, we have the national security process. 

And in that, the State Department is cochairing a series of meetings at one level, and then, of course, it goes up to the Deputies 

Committee and Principals Committee, chaired by the staff of the 

National Security Council. 

Senator HAGEL. Well, you put some focus on this point in your 

testimony, of course, as you know. What has changed? What’s new? 

What’s different? 

Mr. WARD. Senator Hagel, may I jump in here? 

Senator HAGEL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WARD. I think it’s also important to notice what’s changed 

in the field. There’s a process now, in Peshawar, that is chaired by 

somebody who works for us, our principal officer there, who works 

for our Ambassador in Islamabad, who is getting the key assistance 

players around the table, to make sure that we’re not duplicating, 

and to make sure that USAID’s programs, and Deputy Secretary 

30 

Shivers’ programs, are complementing each other. We didn’t do 

that before. 

Senator HAGEL. So, excuse me, I want to make sure I understand 

this. So, USAID is doing this? 

Mr. WARD. We are, right. 

Senator HAGEL. And that’s the, what you would consider a significant change in what has happened prior to this point? 

Mr. WARD. The agencies that are carrying out U.S. Government 

assistance programs—whether it’s civil or military—are sitting 

around the table and devising their strategies together, focusing on 

those areas in the tribal areas that are particularly strategic for us, 

thinking about what’s going on across the border, in Afghanistan, 

and then deciding, all right, who has the best capacity to respond 

to that? 

Senator HAGEL. Excuse me, because I’m limited in time, here—— 

Mr. WARD. Sorry. 

Senator HAGEL. We did not do that before? 

Mr. WARD. We didn’t do it, to that extent, around one table, before. 

Senator HAGEL. Did you do it around two tables? [Laughter.] 

Mr. WARD. Before, sir, we had a pretty small program. 

Senator HAGEL. Let me—we had a lot of money, though? A lot 

of money went into it, in fact, there’s a significant amount of 

money, $5.8 billion in U.S. assistance, directors had fought on the 

military and the ratios, and so on. 

But, I’m just trying to understand why this new program is different, why do you believe it’s going to work? What’s significant 

about it? 

Let me go back to Secretary Boucher. 

Mr. BOUCHER. May I, sir? 

Since I’ve been doing this job or the last 2, 21⁄2 years, since 2006, 

we have had coordinated interagency plans on how to approach 

Pakistan. They have involved economic development, stabilization, 

as well as counterterrorism support. 

What’s changed is, we have a new government in Pakistan, we 

have a democratically elected civilian government in Pakistan. As 

your colleagues have noted that, to some extent, that makes the 

working environment a little more complicated, but it provides a 

more solid base for a long-term effort against extremism. 

And so, we have gone back, gotten together on an interagency 

basis, said, ‘‘What’s the opportunity, here?’’ Yes; we need to continue our work on education, health care, and other areas, can we 

expand that? What’s the opportunity to build democratic institutions, in a way that we haven’t been able to do before? What’s the 

opportunity to come together with them? 

Senator HAGEL. No; I got that. 

Mr. BOUCHER. A lot has changed in that process—— 

Senator HAGEL. How are we doing that? How are you doing it? 

I understand what your goals are, objectives, and they’re important, and I don’t disagree with anything the three of you have said 

and what you’re attempting to do, but how are you doing this differently than before? Mr. Ward said, we’re around one table now, 

we’re actually coordinating and assigning responsibilities. But how 

is this changing? How is this going to make a difference? 

31 

Mr. BOUCHER. It’s essentially the process that Senator Biden, 

Senator Lugar, you guys and your staff have followed. What’s different? How do we dealwith it? 

Senator HAGEL. The implementation. 

Mr. BOUCHER. And how are we—what are we going to need for 

money to do it? 

Senator HAGEL. Not the strategy, not the objective, but the implementation of what is referred to in the testimony, United States 

Counterinsurgency Initiative. You talked about, the new government makes it easier. Well, why is that the case, that the new government makes it easier, but give me also, an understanding, a 

better understanding of the implementation of this money, of our 

focus, of our strategy? 

Mr. BOUCHER. I think, to some extent, it’s the people that I 

talked about, the cross-border people, the people that specialize in 

this area, the people that Mark Ward talked about, in Peshawar, 

and in our—staffing up our Embassy to better implement, directly, 

projects. 

Late last year, we decided we wouldn’t do budgetary support in 

these areas, we’d carry out education, health and in a number of 

other things directly, through contracts that AID will administer. 

And then, as we work here in Washington to define what we can 

do in the next stage, with the opportunity, we’re going to have to 

turn that into budget requests and probably more staffing and effort in the field, to carry it out. 

Senator HAGEL. Thank you, let me ask you, Secretary Boucher, 

how would you characterize the coordination between the new government, which you noted, with some degree of new hope, how 

would you coordinate, or characterize the coordination between the 

new government and the military? Better, about the same? Wary? 

Tension? What? And then I’m going to ask you, Mr. Shivers. 

Mr. BOUCHER. I guess the answer is, it’s developing. And I think 

it’s—— 

Senator HAGEL. I’m sorry, it’s developing? 

Mr. BOUCHER. It’s developing, and there’s some new hope. Their 

military has been very careful to brief the civilian leadership on 

their activities and their programs. We’ve seen the Defense budget 

become part of the national budget in a public way, so there’s these 

signs of coordination, but I don’t think they’re quite there, yet, in 

terms of integrated approaches, but this statement today is probably a big step in that direction. 

Senator HAGEL. OK, thank you. 

Mr. Shivers. 

Mr. SHIVERS. Before he presented his credentials, I had a brief 

meeting with Ambassador Hussain Haqqani, who is now currently 

the Ambassador to the United States from Pakistan. And he went 

at great length to describe the civilian government’s commitment 

to their military, to the national security interest of Pakistan, and 

their intention to fully cooperate with the military, so as to ensure 

that these objectives in the FATA and the North-West Frontier 

Province are addressed, but also the broader, bilateral mil-to-mil 

relationship that we have with Pakistan. 

So, that is the intent, it remains to be seen how that materializes, but so far, we think that there’s good progress on that. 

32 

Senator HAGEL. So, you agree with Secretary Boucher that it’s 

developing, it’s hopeful, and we’ll see. 

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir. 

Senator HAGEL. Thank you. I’ll yield back 13 seconds. 

The CHAIRMAN. Since it’s 13 seconds, do you have more than one 

table in more than one geographic location? You described one 

table, it’s a big country, how many tables do you have? 

Mr. WARD. What I was referring to, Senator, is our much larger 

program in the tribal areas. 

The CHAIRMAN. I got that. 

Mr. WARD. Right. 

The CHAIRMAN. How about the other areas? 

Mr. WARD. The interagency coordination that goes on for the settled areas of the country goes on, on a daily basis, in a country 

team meeting in Islamabad, chaired by the Ambassador, with policy guidance in Washington. That’s been there since USAID returned in 2002. 

What I was describing was this renewed effort, now, that we’ve 

plussed up so much, in the tribal areas. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Feingold. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Senator, if you don’t mind, I think Senator 

Casey has to go to the floor, and I’d be happy to defer to him, with 

your permission. 

The CHAIRMAN. I refuse. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, than I’ll proceed. [Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. No, no; Senator Casey. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I had the good fortune to be with Senator 

Casey in India just recently, and he was also in Pakistan, so—— 

The CHAIRMAN. If you really want to enjoy Senator Casey, go to 

Scranton with him. 

Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., 

U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA 

Senator CASEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I want to thank 

you for convening this hearing, and the Ranking Member Lugar, as 

well. And especially to my colleagues for doing what doesn’t happen 

very often, both Senator Feingold, Senator Cardin have given me 

the opportunity in a limited period of time—I’m not going to take 

the 10 minutes. 

But, I wanted to do two things, one was to—really—to focus on 

just two areas, I have about 5, and I have to cut it back. And again, 

I want to thank the panel today for your testimony today, and for 

your public service. I know that Mr. Shivers and I had a chance 

to meet in India, and we’re grateful for your presence here today. 

The second area—and I think I only have time for one—so Secretary Boucher, with regard to the nuclear command and control 

within the Pakistani Government—what is your sense of that now, 

generally, but in particular, do you think with the advent of this 

new government and the developments just in the last couple of 

months—has that command and control, and can you assure us 

today—that that command and control system that’s in place, has 

that been compromised, has it deteriorated, or is it as strong as 

33 

you, I think, testified to in previous testimony before this committee? 

Mr. BOUCHER. Sir, our understanding is that it has not changed, 

and we still have a high confidence that they’re under good command and control. 

Senator CASEY. And that would include both nuclear and fissile 

material, as well. 

Mr. BOUCHER. Yes, sir. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you. 

Second, in a broader question about the resurgence of al-Qaeda, 

it appears to me, and I think to a lot of people, that al-Qaeda’s increasing its influence among all of these Islamist military groups, 

it’s operating along the border, which we spend a good deal of time 

today talking about, and part of that, I think, and you may disagree, but I think part of that is due to the—the poor counterinsurgency capabilities of the Pakistani military. 

And, we know that in 2008, our Director of National Intelligence, 

stated that al-Qaeda is now using the tribal areas—the Federally 

Administered Tribal Areas—to put into place the last elements necessary to launch another attack against the United States. 

When we hear that language, and I think we heard that language from Admiral Mullen earlier this year, I think it was, saying 

that the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan is, ‘‘the 

site of planning for the next attack on the United States,’’ and then 

when you juxtapose that with, Mr. Shivers, what you said earlier, 

this is on page 4 of your testimony, the July 2007 NIE, on the terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland, and the country reports from 

2007 about the safe haven where Taliban and al-Qaeda forces recruit, train, and equip fighters. 

When I see all that, I’m worried about a couple of things. No. 1 

is, Does our military, in that region, have all of the tools necessary, 

and all of the resources necessary, to do what it must do to succeed 

in that mission? That’s one question. 

And then the second question is, When you juxtapose what the 

NIE has said, what Mr. Shivers, what you have said in your testimony, what Admiral Mullen has said, why do we—why don’t we 

see the juxtaposition of those statements in President Bush’s repeated statements that the central front in the war on terror is in 

Iraq? It doesn’t make any sense to me, when you juxtapose those 

statements, and the threat posed in that region. So, could you comment on both, Does our military have what they need? and second, 

How do you explain the apparent contradiction, or conflict, between 

those two administration statements? 

Mr. SHIVERS. With respect to the first question, whether our 

forces have all of the resources that they need, certainly for the 

mission within the confines of Afghanistan, they do. They are welltrained and equipped, and highly motivated and admirably performing their tasks in Afghanistan. 

There is a continuing shortfall of forces in that country, and the 

NATO commander has identified a shortage of forces. Some of that 

shortage would be applied against the border with Pakistan, to increase the interdiction capabilities of our forces there against the 

anticoalition militants coming across the border. 

34 

So, obviously, there are some troop shortages within NATO that 

need to be addressed, and our Secretary, our President, all members of our national leadership have spoken out on that. 

With respect to the threat in the FATA and North-West Frontier 

Province from al-Qaeda, it is real, it is significant. All of us at this 

table see intel, as do you, that addresses that. Obviously, we can’t 

go into great detail in an open setting like this. Suffice it to say, 

that we’re doing everything within our control to mitigate those 

risks as best possible. 

This is a rugged area, this is an area that doesn’t have a ready 

access for U.S. forces, international forces, or Pak military forces, 

so it presents a tremendous number of challenges. 

Juxtaposing it against statements made about Iraq—there were, 

earlier, and I think less today—earlier there were significant alQaeda Iraq elements in Iraq, and that posed a very significant 

threat to the United States, as well. And you’ll note, in the unclassified portion of the NIE, that al-Qaeda elements in Iraq were the 

only affiliate of Central al-Qaeda, which had publicly professed a 

direct threat to the United States homeland. 

So, the United States is more than capable of confronting threats 

in various locations, and I’m sure that—— 

Senator CASEY. We’re probably going to disagree on the juxtaposition, because I think the President has made that statement 

repeatedly, and I don’t think the temporal nature of it, as to when 

he makes it, I don’t think changes the conflict or the contradiction. 

But, we can disagree about that. 

I want to make one more point, because I know my time is up. 

When I was in Pakistan with Senator Levin, we met with Mr. 

Zardari, we met with the Prime Minister, we met with President 

Musharraf, General Kiyani, and we came back and said, ‘‘Look, before we go, unconditionally, to give them the support that we’ve 

promised, in terms of what we can in the Frontier, we ought to condition that, based upon their,’’ for lack of a better word, ‘‘demonstrable proof that they’re going to enforce these agreements with 

the—in the tribal areas.’’ 

I get from your testimony that the administration does not agree 

with that. You don’t think that aid, the $75 million, I guess it is, 

should be conditioned in any way, is that correct? 

Mr. SHIVERS. No, sir. Obviously, we’d like to see demonstrated 

performance from allies. I think the point we were making is to 

codify, or legislate it, put restrictions on the day-to-day discussions 

with a major non-NATO ally of the United States, and we’d prefer 

to discuss those conditions, and what our expectations are, in the 

privacy of bilateral diplomacy, rather than through legislation. 

But, we understand and fully appreciate this committee’s interest in ensuring that there is a demonstrated performance on the 

part of Pakistan. 

Senator CASEY. I’m out of time, but thank you so much, and I 

appreciate your willingness. 

And thanks to my colleagues. 

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Boucher, based on that answer Mr. 

Shivers qualifies for the State Department. 

Senator Feingold. 

35 

STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN 

Senator FEINGOLD. Why, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding 

this very important hearing. United States-Pakistan relations are 

at a critical juncture as the recently elected civilian government 

provides an opportunity to develop a sound and comprehensive bilateral relationship that serves the needs and principles of both 

countries, while also ensuring our national security—and theirs— 

over the long term. 

As I just mentioned, about a month ago, I and other Senators 

traveled to Pakistan, because as the intelligence community has 

confirmed again and again, Pakistan is the central front in the 

fight against al-Qaeda. 

Confronting this threat, which includes addressing the al-Qaeda 

safe haven in the FATA, must be our top national security priority. 

That means hunting down Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda 

operatives while collaborating with the Pakistani Government to 

neutralize forces before they plot or carry out attacks against 

Americans. 

It also means taking a strong stand against deals with al-Qaeda 

or the Taliban so our friends in Pakistan understand that such 

measures are unacceptable. 

But this cannot be our only goal, as this struggle is more than 

a manhunt. If we’re to be serious about fighting al-Qaeda and preventing another generation of bin Ladens from emerging, we must 

also recognize the needs of the Pakistani people, and expand our 

support for development initiatives, in a country where poverty is 

pervasive, and as I certainly confirmed, anti-American attitudes 

are widespread. 

In order to make this shift, we need a new approach to our 

relationship with Pakistan, one that defends our national security 

interests while also acknowledging that the emergence of a democratically-elected civilian Government in Pakistan is vital to our 

strategic interests. 

We must abandon previous policies that were overly reliant on 

individuals and paid lip service to democracy, by expanding our relationships and supporting basic democratic institutions. A more 

inclusive policy will allow our counterterrorism partnership to, 

hopefully, withstand the turbulence of Pakistan’s domestic politics, 

and help mitigate already high levels of anti-American sentiment. 

The extraordinary and antidemocratic measures President 

Musharraf took since his coup in 1999 were inconsistent with basic 

American values and did nothing to limit the presence of extremist 

groups in that country. I’d like to ask all three of you to address 

how the administration is seeking to reverse the negative impact 

of our overreliance on President Musharraf. What steps are we taking to ensure that the new government not only reigns in its military, but also makes tangible headway on reforming other institutions in order to strengthen democracy in Pakistan? 

Mr. Boucher. 

Mr. BOUCHER. I think the first thing to note is that we were a 

very important part of the transition to an elected, democratic government. We worked very hard at it all last year, we were very 

critical when President Musharraf did things that we felt were 

36 

clear mistakes, we were quite outspoken about that, and we were 

quite supportive of the elements that led to a good election, and 

I’ve had many people on the democratic side of Pakistani politics 

thank us for all of the effort we put into that. This is what we 

wanted, and we helped get it. 

So, I think we are in a good position to work with a new government, there are new opportunities. You don’t drop health care in 

order to build the Election Commission, or strengthen a judiciary, 

once they agree on how to organize it. So, we see an opportunity, 

I think, to expand our programs into building democratic institutions—which is one of their priorities—to expand our programs in 

support of the media or the judicial system or other aspects of a 

new society. 

And, as you said, not just to fight terrorism, but to bring all of 

the parts of the country under government control—particularly to 

bring the tribal areas under government control. We’ve had a Security Development Plan to transform the security arrangements 

there, we’ve worked out a sustainable development plan, to work 

on infrastructure and schools, training, electricity for people who 

live up there. 

The thing the new government adds is the prospect of a different 

political arrangement for those areas, a different way of integrating 

them politically into the life of the nation, and that’s something, I 

think, that we also see as an opportunity that we can support. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I’ll just follow up Mr. Boucher, for a minute, 

then I’ll go to the other two witnesses. 

Mr. Boucher, would you agree that the rule of law and an independent judiciary are two fundamental principles of a strong democracy? 

Mr. BOUCHER. Absolutely. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Why, then, hasn’t the administration made 

any comments regarding the reinstatement of the deposed Chief 

Justice and other judges, I mean, even if the issue has been politicized in Pakistan. 

I’ve concluded, and I spent a lot of time on this when I was in 

Pakistan, met with the Chief Justice, heard the views of political 

parties on this—I’ve concluded that it is really a simple rule-of-law 

issue that requires a statement of principle from the United States. 

Mr. BOUCHER. Sir, the restoration of justice and the building of 

an independent judiciary is certainly something that we have 

strongly supported and we all agree upon. How that is to be done 

is a partisan issue where the fundamentally different Pakistani political parties disagree. 

Before the election, we said, ‘‘This is something the politicians 

need to work out after the election.’’ That’s what they’re doing, 

that’s what they’re still trying to do, and I think, it is really is 

something fundamentally for them to figure out how they want to 

do it. But the fundamental principle of building an independent judiciary is something we absolutely agree with, and we’ve made very 

clear we will support that. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, to be clear on the record, this is not an 

issue to be solved by compromises between political parties, it’s a 

simple rule-of-law issue. These justices, and the Chief Justice, were 

removed from office unlawfully. I asked every single person in that 

37 

country, Was there any reason for them to be removed? Nobody 

said there was a reason for them to be removed. All I’m saying is 

that the fundamental principle that we, and this administration, 

should assert, is they should simply be reinstated. It shouldn’t be 

part of a political deal. But, I’ll let Mr. Shivers respond to the underlying question. 

Mr. SHIVERS. Sir, I would agree with Secretary Boucher, with respect to his discussion, or his reply to your question on reliance on 

President Musharraf. From our point of view, he was the head of 

state of the government, and the head of the army. So, it—of necessity—required our meeting with him, and discussing programs between the two countries. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Ward. 

Mr. WARD. Senator Feingold, for USAID, I mean, we would not 

have a whole lot of interaction with the Presidency in the country. 

What we look for, going forward, and we’re seeing it, and we’re 

very pleased to see it, is that political commitment to bringing development to the tribal areas. 

The United States is making a large investment there, the Government of Pakistan is making a large investment there, as it 

should. And we have been looking for a continued interest, a continued commitment as the government has changed, and the kinds 

of announcements that we’re seeing today, coming out of the Prime 

Minister’s office, give us confidence that their commitment to 

bringing real change to the people living in the tribal areas, is 

going to be sustained over time. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Shivers, one of our main points of influence in trying to combat extremism is the billions of dollars in Coalition Support Funds that the United States has provided to the 

Pakistani Government. Just yesterday, a GAO report found that 

the assistance may not have always been used as intended, and 

may have been, in some cases, duplicative. 

I think this is troublesome news, and it comes at an important 

time, as we seek to reevaluate our counterterrorism and overall relationship with Pakistan. Outside of the assistance we provide to 

Pakistan for allowing us access to Afghanistan, why, Mr. Shivers, 

will we not decrease coalition support funds until we saw an improvement in the counterterrorism activities in the FATA region? 

Mr. SHIVERS. Well, sir, let me first say that the entire senior 

leadership of the Department of Defense takes very seriously its 

oversight responsibilities with respect to Coalition Support Funds. 

With respect to conditionality on Coalition Support Funds, the 

legislation as intended, and as enacted in 2002 was meant as a reimbursement mechanism rather than a security assistance program. As a reimbursement mechanism, we determined that it was 

in the United States interest—the Congress determined—that it 

was in the United States interest to make funds available to partners in the war on terror, who were conducting activities that were 

in direct support of the United States. And, indeed, this plays a 

critical role as mentioned by the GAO in its report, that this is a 

critical program, and enabling—given the wherewithal to the Pakistan Government—to provide up to 100,000, and indeed at times 

they’ve had 120,000 forces in the FATA and the North-West Frontier Province. 

38 

We do get results, we don’t get the degree of results that, obviously, we desire. We’d like to have an end to Osama bin Laden, but 

that has not happened. We’d like to have no al-Qaeda in the border 

regions of Pakistan, but that has not happened, and we’d like to 

see an end to the Taliban, and certainly any coalition militants 

that transit the border, but that has not happened. 

There are good things happening, nevertheless, and there are 

reasons to continue support for the program. 

In terms of the fidelity of the program, I would note that over 

the last 18 months or 20 months, that we’ve—through discussions 

with Pakistanis, and through guidance from Washington and from 

discussions in the field, and particularly at the Embassy—we’ve applied much more strenuous tests to the documentation and the 

claims that are being provided by the Pakistanis. 

Senator FEINGOLD. My time’s up, but let me just say that as valuable as this kind of relationship is, there’s nothing more important to the American people than progress in stopping these folks 

that are trying to kill us, and trying to kill our troops. And I think 

this issue should be one the table of how aid and this ability to stop 

these terrorists are combined. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Menendez. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for your testimony. 

Let me ask you, Mr. Shivers, I’m one of those who asked for the 

GAO report, and I have a real difficulty understanding the Department of Defense’s very limited comments on the report, where it 

says that DOD believes that the draft of the report fails to give sufficient weight to the context in which the Coalition Support Funds 

evolve, the significant contributions to the Global War on Terror 

that Pakistan has made, and that those funds enabled, and that 

the required flexibility and guidance of process for a contingency 

environment. That’s one of your limited answers to the GAO report. 

I don’t understand—and no one doubts that this relationship is 

important, no one doubts that it’s significant—but I have a problem. You look at the report; so much of the money was spent without actually even making sure that Pakistan was doing what it 

said it would. 

Two hundred million dollars for an air defense radar, even 

though al-Qaeda has no known air-strike capabilities? Forty-five 

million for roads and bunkers, we’re unsure that they were even 

built, no verification, yet. Nineteen thousand dollars per month, 

per vehicle—$19,000 per month, per vehicle—for a Pakistani Navy 

fleet of 20 passenger vehicles—that’s just to start off with. And, so 

that—and so much more—are all acceptable under the guise that 

we need flexibility? 

Mr. SHIVERS. No, sir. We do need flexibility, but we haven’t absolved ourselves of any oversight responsibility for this task. So, indeed, this is a—as you appreciate—this is a multistage validation 

39 

process that starts at the Embassy, is conducted by a two-star general that’s resident in Islamabad, who discusses the claims that are 

submitted in quite significant detail in many cases, but not in all 

cases. 

The operations that are referenced by the Pakistani, particularly 

where this is insufficient receipt or documentation, those operations are verified by Central Command. It then comes up to the 

Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller’s Office, which again, evaluates, and reviews, and looks at the possibilities for receipts and 

documentation. Attempts to—has numerous conversations with the 

two-star general in Pakistan, has numerous conversations with 

CENTCOM, meets and takes several months to review the process, 

the package that has been presented. 

It then comes to my office, where we look at whether the provision of this funding provides any change in the balance of power 

in the region, or interferes with any of national security objectives. 

It goes on to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, whose office reviews 

it. It then comes to Congress, and is provided to Congress for 15 

days for comment. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I don’t mean to interrupt you—I appreciate 

the whole procedural process, it’s a procedural process that, notwithstanding your description, is clearly fundamentally flawed. 

We’re talking about $5.5 billion dollars of American taxpayer moneys to reimburse the Pakistani military since September 11, and, 

you know, we see the testimony and the statements of many that 

al-Qaeda has reconstituted itself in pre-September 11th strength 

along this region, that in fact, Osama bin Laden is still at large, 

we see the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Michael Mullen, 

saying, ‘‘I believe, fundamentally, if the United States is going to 

get hit, it’s going to come out of the planning at the leadership that 

the FATA is generating, their planning and direction.’’ Referring to 

Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas and he goes onto 

say, he says, ‘‘I’m not saying it’s guaranteed it’s going to happen, 

or that it’s imminent, but clearly we know the planning is taking 

place there.’’ 

So, $5.5 billion later, a whole lack is, in my mind, of accountability, you know, not necessarily, you have to spend $5.5 billion 

to achieve the goal of engagement with Pakistan, and then—and 

the results notwithstanding the administration’s constant statements is that we have a stronger al-Qaeda in this region. 

I find it difficult to understand how, in fact, you can come before 

the committee and basically not take a greater ownership of a system that is flawed, in terms of how you are spending the taxpayers’ 

money. 

Mr. SHIVERS. Sir, I don’t think I have tried to absolve myself of 

responsibility in any way, shape, or form, nor has the Defense Department. We provided 17 pages of informal responses to the GAO 

on this, and as I began my reply to your question, I would say that 

the entire senior leadership of the Defense Department is on this. 

We care about it, we care about how we steward the American people’s money, and we’re very serious about obtaining the results 

that—— 

40 

Senator MENENDEZ. I would simply say that the three points in 

which you’re listed officially in the response are far from acceptable 

from my point of view, in terms of how we’re spending our money. 

Let me turn to, as we move forward, at this point, we’re in the process of a $750 million, 5-year program for development in the 

FATA region. These funds presumably would go to reach the communities and populations where the very people who are participating in the planning that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff has talked about, are currently based. 

How is the planning strategy for your development programming 

through AID different in a counterinsurgency environment from a 

more typical developing country context? 

Mr. WARD. Let me mention two ways, Senator. One is that in deciding where we’re going to work in the tribal areas, we’re doing 

a lot more than just talking to—let’s start with education, for example, we’re going to talk to a lot more people than education officials. We’re also going to talk to our military, we’re going to talk 

to the intelligence community, we’re going to find out, what are 

those areas in the tribal areas where an education intervention will 

be most effective in terms of winning hearts and minds in a 

counterinsurgency strategy. 

If you were to look at how we make a decision, just to contrast 

that with, say, the settled areas in Pakistan, or in another country 

in which we might be working in the region, our discussion would 

probably be limited to the government ministry responsible for education, we wouldn’t have those broader discussions. So, that’s one 

way it’s different. 

And then another way that it’s different, that I mentioned in my 

opening remarks, which slows us down, but I think is terribly important in an area like the tribal areas where illiteracy is so high, 

and where communities have not been connected to their government since they’ve been Pakistan, and that is by planning community interventions at the community level—taking the time to get 

villages together, to get communities together and ask them what 

they need. 

And then discussing with them the tradeoffs of what they’ve said 

they need, for example, most communities, when you ask them, 

will say, ‘‘We need a school.’’ Well, maybe school isn’t the best 

thing, maybe it is. But they need to be thinking about operating 

and maintaining that school, where will the teachers come from, 

where will the textbooks come from? And having that kind of a discussion with a community to help them set priorities—they’ve 

never had those discussions before. 

And so, this is also a hallmark of our new program, it will make 

it a little slower. But what we’re doing, in addition then, to meeting 

their needs, is we’re building their capacity to participate in governance. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I would think that to some degree any 

of our development assistance would engage the entities that we 

are trying to help, and so I appreciate that. But how does that 

work in the context of a counterinsurgency situation? 

For example, I understand that there is a significant lack of coordination between the civilian and military elements of the Pakistani Government, and that is a critical road block for progress. I 

41 

mean, how does that play into your equation? Because otherwise, 

what I hear is, we’re pursuing a development assistance as if we 

were pursuing development assistance anywhere in the world. The 

difference is that we are talking about a region in which planning 

is taking place for attacks upon the United States, and locals are 

often either giving cover to those entities, are afraid of those entities, are engaged with those entities. I wouldd hate to see our development dollars go in a way that doesn’t pursue our ultimate 

goal, and I don’t see a differentiation in your answer. 

Mr. WARD. What I was describing is what is the United States 

Government doing. Clearly, there is room for improvement on understanding a counterinsurgency approach in the Pakistani Government, and as I said in my opening remarks, we’re very hopeful 

that how we’ve learned to do civil-military cooperation, we can 

start teaching the Pakistanis. 

They learned some terrific lessons, sir, after the earthquake. 

They saw—because they had to—that they could work with the civilians, and they did a very good job. We need to show them how 

to bring that to bear in the tribal areas, as well, as you’re suggesting. 

We think we’re getting better at it, all the time, but we need to 

start teaching them how to do it, as well. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to 

exploring this, maybe, at the subcommittee at a future date. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Thank you for your patience, Senator Cardin. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this hearing. 

One of our major responsibilities is to assure that the funds that 

are made available through the U.S. taxpayers are being properly 

spent. And I appreciate the concern that has been expressed here 

in the working relationship between the United States and Pakistan, and the concerns on the conditionality of U.S. funds. 

There are substantial dollars being made available by the United 

States to Pakistan, whether it’s counterterrorism dollars, economic 

development dollars, funds for the tribal areas. And as it has been 

pointed out, there’s serious question as to whether these funds 

have been used appropriately by the Pakistani officials over the 

last several years. 

So, I have a question for you. We have a responsibility to make 

sure that these funds are being spent appropriately. You have a 

concern about conditionality as it relates to the working relationship between the United States and Pakistan. Do you have any 

specific recommendations for how Congress can carry out its independent responsibility to the taxpayers of this country, to make 

sure that these funds are being spent for its appropriate purposes? 

Mr. BOUCHER. Sir, if I can take that on. 

I think, you know, the things that Chairman Biden cited at the 

beginning—the need to make very clear that we’re long-term 

friends, and not short-term acquaintances, the need to support fundamental change and not just be seen as focused on one particular 

42 

area, the need to avoid any impression that if we, you know, finish 

the fight against terrorism, we’re going to walk away. You know, 

those are very strong, very important things for all of us, and we 

need to work out, how do you do that? And I think we basically 

think that if you, you know, you say you have to do this or that 

or the other, it makes this or that or the other the absolute criteria, 

and reinforces the impression—— 

Senator CARDIN. I agree with what Senator Biden said. My question is, Do you have suggestions to make sure that the dollars we 

are appropriating are appropriated in rather specific categories: 

Counterterrorism, economic development, tribal issues on national 

security—how do we make sure that those funds are being properly 

spent, if we don’t have conditionalities, looking at the prior history? 

Mr. BOUCHER. I think there’s two things—one is you make sure 

that we have responsible systems for making sure the money is 

spent well, and is spent for the purposes that it’s destined. 

And the second is, to identify the enabling environment that the 

Pakistanis need to provide. So, if you spend money on education, 

the teachers are going to be there. So, that if you spend money on 

economic reform, that they’re undertaking the budgetary measures 

and the fiscal measures to make sure that it can be effective. 

So, specific, sort of, line-item conditionality, I think, is something 

we object to, but we do want to make sure that the Pakistanis are 

creating the right enabling environment to make the money successful and effective. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, I understand your concern. Our problem 

is that when we just go down that path, and the spotlight’s turned 

off, a lot of times the moneys get spent in a way that’s not consistent with congressional intent. And I think that’s been the concern of many of us here. 

Let me go on to a separate issue. Over the history of the United 

States aid to other countries there have been different views as to 

whether the visibility of U.S. help is helpful, or not. Can you just 

bring us up to date as to the current circumstances in Pakistan, 

is it a good idea to have USAID labeled on the assistance that 

we’re giving? Or is this an issue that we have to be a little bit more 

circumventive about? 

Mr. WARD. Certainly; it’s our general position that the people 

need to know that the people of the United States are helping, absolutely. And there’s no better example of where that helps than 

after the earthquake. It’s why Assistant Secretary Boucher and I 

are so committed that we never leave Kashmir. We had the opportunity that the earthquake offered us to take our assistance programs there. We were not there before. And I hope we don’t have 

to leave for a very long time. We’re still very welcome and the people see us there. They saw us there with our military after the disaster struck, they’ve seen us there month after month after month, 

rebuilding schools in extremely difficult places up to seismic standards that parents can trust when they decide to send their kids 

back to school. 

There are exceptions to the general proposition, and we have to 

be particularly careful in the tribal areas, both out of concern for 

the safety of people carrying out our programs, and also because 

it’s very important for us that the Government of Pakistan be seen 

43 

as providing services to the people in the tribal areas. So, in that 

small area of the country, there is a big program, but we are taking 

a different approach on how we talk about the fact that it’s from 

the United States. 

Senator CARDIN. So, this is an issue that you actively work on, 

as to how visible our partnership with the Pakistani Government 

is viewed by the people of Pakistan? It’s a strategy? 

Mr. WARD. It’s something we talk about a lot. We try not to have 

one approach fits all. In Afghanistan, for example, we try to talk 

about what both countries are doing together. That’s a different 

approach. 

Senator CARDIN. Secretary Boucher, I want to get to the relationship with the United States, the new civilian government, and our 

previous support for the President, what impact that is having on 

our ability to forge the proper partnership with the current civilian 

government. 

You mentioned the most recent announcements, in regards to the 

tribal areas. If you could be a little bit more specific as to how you 

see the relationship today, and the strengths, the weaknesses, and 

what we need to do to improve our partnership with the new civilian government? 

Mr. BOUCHER. I think—I think first of all, we just have a very 

good relationship with the new leaders. The President has met the 

Prime Minister and talked to him several times. The Secretary had 

a meeting with the Foreign Minister in Paris last week. We’ve had 

visits back and forth with politicians. I’ll be out there next week, 

as I think you will, as well. So, we have a very active relationship. 

Where it needs to be strengthened, I think, is for us to understand a bit more clearly the program that the new government 

wants to undertake. There have been a lot of political distractions 

in the coalition. And as they have started to focus more now on 

their counterterrorism policy, but also on food and energy, some of 

the crucial areas. What are they going to do in education? We are 

going to have to work with them to adjust our programs and make 

sure we’re supporting the civilian government’s program, but that’s 

something we’re committed to doing. And we hope that they can actually, sort of, get that focus sooner rather than later. 

Senator CARDIN. There have been a lot of press accounts about 

the effectiveness of the current government, as well as the support 

for the United States within Pakistan. You seem to minimize those 

concerns, or at least giving a very optimistic forecast about our relationships. 

Mr. BOUCHER. I think—I think we’re off to a good start with the 

politicians. I think we still have an enormous deficit with the public at large. 

Senator CARDIN. Let me ask one last question, and that deals 

with a point that Senator Casey raised on the nuclear controls 

within Pakistan. And I want to expand that a little bit. This initially became a concern for the United States because of a race between India and Pakistan for nuclear weapon capacity. How would 

you characterize the current relationship between India and Pakistan, as it relates to nuclear nonproliferation, and our concerns as 

to whether we have a potential problem when there’s a change in 

leadership in one of these countries? 

44 

Mr. BOUCHER. Over the last couple years, they’ve taken some 

steps, specifically in the area of confidence-building measures on 

security matters, and we’ve welcomed those and supported those 

steps. The two sides have now reengaged since the new government came in Pakistan, on this sort of overall reduction of tensions, 

trying to build new economic ties, trying to do some things, maybe 

that haven’t been done before. We certainly want that process to 

continue, we want process on Kashmir to continue, process— 

progress on some of the specifics involved with that issue, to 

continue. 

I guess my reading of it currently, is that they’ve worked on the 

economic and political sides of improving their relationship, both 

put a lot of emphasis on going that way. I don’t think I’ve seen any 

new developments yet on the, sort of, military-confidence building 

side yet. 

Senator CARDIN. I take it this a high interest though, to try to 

encourage these discussions? 

Mr. BOUCHER. Very much, it’s part and parcel of every discussion 

we have with the Pakistanis and with the Indians, to make sure 

that they know full—fully of our strong support for reduction of 

tensions and really making some progress in resolving fundamental 

issues. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. Thank you very much. Do 

you have any further questions to present? 

Senator CARDIN. No. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for your time. 

Mr. Shivers, I look forward to us working out a time when you 

can brief the committee of some of the things we’re not able to talk 

about today. 

Gentleman, thank you. 

Our next panel is our former Ambassador, as well as our former 

CENTCOM Commander. We invite them to the table. 

Folks, welcome. Thank you for your patience. 

General Zinni, why don’t we begin with your testimony? 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL ANTHONY C. ZINNI, USMC (RET.), 

FORMER COMMANDER, CENTRAL COMMAND, FALLS 

CHURCH, VA 

General ZINNI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar. 

First of all, sir, I have a statement that I would like to submit 

for the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Your entire statement will be placed in the 

record. 

General ZINNI. I would just like to say briefly, that first of all, 

I enthusiastically support this proposed legislation. It’s a long time 

in coming, and way overdue. I think that the whole concept of us 

looking at this in a comprehensive, strategic, long-term, and balanced way is what we’ve needed. 

Many of the issues I’ve heard discussed here with the first panel 

and the concerns we have, I think we will find ways to better address these because of this approach. I think you’ve discovered 

what we’ve all believed, and I know both of you have believed, that 

45 

the center of gravity in this business, if it’s an insurgency or anything like it, is the people. 

And I appeared last before this committee representing 52 retired generals and admirals, saying that we needed more resources 

and more structure and more emphasis on the nonmilitary pieces. 

That’s what’s going to win this in the long run, that’s what’s going 

to build the trust and the credibility amongst the Pakistani people, 

particularly in the tribal areas, to be willing to support the 

things—the areas where we have mutual interest, particularly security interests. 

I really appreciated your comments about, in the past, this has 

been transactional. We—and it’s basically been just addressing security issues, and primarily security issues that were of our concern. I went through a long period with the Pakistanis for over 16 

years, and trying to build a relationship that was more than just 

a thin thread of military-to-military relationship, and usually it 

was just a thin thread of a personal relationship between the Commander of CENTCOM and the Chief of the Military in Pakistan. 

I think as we look at each of these issues, it’s important to—to 

remember that the Pakistani, by latest surveys, do want a positive 

relationship with the United States and do see that if we look at 

these nonmilitary issues, and address them in the long term, that 

they see there can be common ground that we can find, and that’s 

encouraging. 

Obviously, what’s discouraging is the different views we have on 

the threat and how to address them. Obviously, it is an insurgency 

in nature. Insurgents want fear, apathy, or support from the people, and we’re trying to get courage, commitment, and rejection. 

And the only way we’re going to win that battle is both us and the 

government of Pakistan really paying attention to the people and 

their needs, and showing them there is a better way. 

So again, for you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, I really appreciate this bipartisan effort. It’s a breath of fresh air and it’s been 

long needed. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General Zinni follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN ANTHONY ZINNI, USMC (RET.), FORMER

COMMANDER, CENTRAL COMMAND, FALLS CHURCH, VA 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, as always it is a great 

honor and my pleasure to be before you again, and I truly appreciate the opportunity to discuss U.S.-Pakistan Relations. I believe that this relationship is absolutely critical to the national security of the United States, and I know that you and 

the members of this committee share that view. In that spirit, I thank you for the 

critical thinking and effort that have gone into developing your comprehensive strategy for an enhanced partnership with Pakistan. 

Things are tense in Pakistan today, and I believe it is safe to say that the U.S.- 

Pakistan relationship is similarly under stress. I just reviewed the recently released 

poll by Terror Free Tomorrow, and I was surprised and disturbed by many of the 

findings. Specifically, half of all Pakistanis want their government to negotiate with 

al-Qaeda rather than fight. Seventy-four percent oppose U.S. military action against 

al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and 52 percent believe that the United States is most 

responsible for the violence that is occurring in Pakistan today. How did we get to 

this? How can the people of this country—a country that has lost thousands of soldiers and citizens to violent extremists; a country that saw one of its great political 

leaders assassinated by terrorists; a country whose citizens are clearly on the 

frontlines in the war on terror—believe that the United States is responsible for the 

violence they face? 

46 

Results such as these require an urgent and comprehensive evaluation of our policy, and more importantly, a prescription to put our relationship on surer footing 

for our mutual benefit. Despite the disturbing aspects of this poll, it also provided 

insight into what hope remains for our relationship. There is a silver lining to be 

found. According to the poll results, the Pakistani people remain eager to have a 

strong and vibrant relationship with the United States, and they identify very specific actions that we can take to make a difference. According to the poll, two-thirds 

of Pakistanis said that increased American business investment, free trade, and 

U.S. assistance in education, disaster relief, and medical care and training would 

significantly improve their image of the United States. We should not seek to improve our image for the sake of improving our image; improving our image is valuable insofar as it creates a climate that fosters greater cooperation in the areas that 

are important to both countries. An atmosphere of resentment, suspicion, and ill 

will makes it difficult for many Pakistanis to see the many common interests our 

two countries have. Changing this climate will allow us to work together. 

I have reviewed the legislation that this committee is considering, and I believe 

that it provides a framework for just such a positive change. Specifically, the increased financial assistance would provide for the expanded programs that are 

needed to return our relationship to a more sound footing. More significantly, the 

legislation recognizes that money and programs alone will not move the U.S.-Pakistan relationship from where it is today to where it needs to be in order to improve 

the security of both countries. That is why I was particularly pleased to see that 

your legislation included operating expenses for an increased U.S. diplomatic and 

development presence in Pakistan, and that nonmilitary tools designed to improve 

and highlight additional facets of our relationship were included. 

Mr. Chairman, as you know, I am the cochairman of the National Security Advisory Council at the U.S. Center for Global Engagement. Our council, which includes 

more than 50 retired flag officers, endorses exactly this kind of Smart Power. I believe we could use this legislation to endorse other ‘‘Smart’’ initiatives, such as the 

Reconstruction Opportunity Zones concept, agricultural initiatives, energy proposals, 

and efforts to increase access to health care. I urge you to explore and endorse all 

of these. 

Smart Power alone is not enough, of course; our robust engagement with the 

Pakistan military and security services is, and will remain, vitally important. While 

the draft legislation I reviewed includes a discussion of security assistance, it outlines a number of ‘‘security benchmarks’’ that will undoubtedly cause more tensions 

in Islamabad and Rawalpindi. Security assistance is critically important today and 

will remain so, and I recommend that you authorize a robust package of support. 

Moreover, while I recognize and support the goals of your security benchmarks, I 

believe that at this time we would be better served to have these important discussions in private—military to military, diplomat to diplomat, Senator to Member of 

Parliament. 

In addition, on the security side, Pakistani security forces still lack ‘‘force multipliers’’ such as night vision and other capabilities that alter the battle space. 

Restrictions in the Foreign Assistance Act make it virtually impossible for us to 

provide those capabilities. Even they have a chilling effect on the actual use of some 

equipment because of extensive end-use monitoring requirements. I hope that this 

committee will look to streamline those sections of the Foreign Assistance Act that 

deal with arms transfers in order to truly enable the Pakistani military to have the 

kind of advantage that will build their security and ours and encourage them into 

a more fruitful and trusting relationship with the United States. 

There is much the United States can do to help address the most critical security, 

economic, and development needs of Pakistan. Pakistan will continue to be one of 

the most strategically important nations in the world for a good time to come, and 

our safety and security will continue to depend on its stability. I hope that this administration, the next administration, and the Congress will make it their priority 

to work together to increase U.S. engagement with Pakistan across the board. There 

is almost no task more important to our future, and I, and many others outside the 

Government, stand ready to help. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to discuss this vital relationship and to comment on the important work that you and this committee are undertaking. I look 

forward to answering your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say, General, I’m sure I need not speak 

for Senator Lugar, but I’m sure we both would acknowledge that 

your endorsement of this is a big deal. You’re greatly respected, 

47 

and I appreciate the endorsement. Hopefully, we can actually get 

something moving here. 

Madame Ambassador. 

STATEMENT OF HON. WENDY CHAMBERLIN, PRESIDENT, THE 

MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador CHAMBERLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Lugar. 

General Zinni, I certainly would like to agree with everything 

that you’ve said. 

And, Mr. Chairman, with your remarks, as well. It’s an honor to 

appear before the committee, particularly to endorse, with enthusiasm, this proposed legislation. 

I’ll try to keep my remarks brief. I really have three key points 

and many of them have already been made, including by yourself, 

sir. This legislation recognizes the enduring linkage between the 

United States and Pakistan’s security, and our interests in the long 

term. 

Second, it’s sufficiently bold and comprehensive in scope to address a lot of the current problems that we’ve been talking about 

this morning. And finally, it focuses assistance, I believe, on the 

right place, and that is on the welfare of the people of Pakistan. 

Let me try to see if I’m nimble enough to skip over some of the 

parts in my statement and submit it also for the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. The entire statement will placed in the record, 

and take your time, you waited. 

Ambassador CHAMBERLIN. Well, thank you. I may have to adjust 

some of the statistics to bring them up to date after hearing what 

the panel before us had said. 

But, on the first point, the terrorist attack on our soil on September 11, 2001, was a stark example of how global ization has 

compressed our world for both good and ill. It’s a shrinking world, 

and this means that what is happening in Pakistani communities 

and villages thousands of miles away, is vital to protection of our 

own homeland. 

When tribal leaders provide protection and hospitality to alQaeda fighters in remote regions beyond the writ of law, it’s no 

longer just a local problem for Pakistanis. When terrorists disappear into those teeming urban slums of Karachi, it becomes an 

urgent issue for Americans. So, Mr. Chairman, my first point is 

that this legislation is right to identify Pakistan as a frontline state 

that deserves our attention. 

For too long I think our focus has been distracted, and our efforts 

have been diluted in Pakistan. We’ve launched a war extensively 

against al-Qaeda in Iraq, and in doing so we created some of the 

varied conditions for it to flourish there. We’ve deployed, I believe, 

too few forces in Afghanistan to create stable conditions for 

reconstruction. And to the point of this legislation, we viewed the 

security effort in Pakistan from a very limited lens of the Afghan 

frontier. 

The value, I believe, of this legislation, is that for the first time 

since 9/11, it focuses our efforts on the right place: The entire country of Pakistan. It recognizes that our relationship with Pakistan 

is for the long term, with the whole country. 

48 

Mr. Chairman, I believe that by confronting challenges and the 

economic needs of the Pakistani people, the legislation also contributes to the protection of American people from those foreign terrorist threats. 

You know, the media often refers to Pakistan as the most dangerous country in the world, and I think this is partly true and 

partly a bit of an overstatement, because it diminishes a lot of the 

core values that we do share with Pakistan. 

An Indian friend of mine told me recently that Pakistanis and 

Indians share the same DNA. Like India, Pakistan was founded on 

the principles of a democratic state. It had several military dictatorships, to be sure, but this election last February, brought Pakistan back to the vision of its founding father by installing a democratically elected civilian government. Well, we’re on a good footing 

here. 

Throughout the decades, Pakistan has been a close security ally 

of the United States. It’s been a Central Pact member to contain 

the Soviet threat, and it helped us drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan. We all also appreciate the alacrity with which President 

Musharraf reversed entrenched Pakistan Army policy of support 

for the Taliban when we asked him to do so immediately following 

September 11. 

So, in short, the stability and well-being of Pakistan is in our interest. We share common values and we have a history of cooperation. This legislation is commendable because it articulates a comprehensive strategy for Pakistan well into the future. 

My second point is that the legislation offers a bold and innovative solution that thoughtfully addresses problems in our relationship with Pakistan that we’ve seen over the years. It incorporates 

and it builds on lessons of the past. 

To be fair to the previous panel, we have made progress in our 

relations with Pakistan since I first arrived there as Ambassador 

in August 2001. Since 2002, we have provided substantial assistance, both military and in development aid, but it hasn’t been balanced. It’s been too skewed, frankly, to security and militarily aid, 

and not enough, in my view, to development aid and humanitarian 

aid that reaches the Pakistani people. 

It’s simply not enough. We have not provided enough development aid to the Pakistani people, to affect the perceptions of the 

population. This gets to several of the questions that were raised 

this morning. 

So, in summary on this point, our current aid program is, at 

best, having minimal impact on the people and at worse, it’s breeding resentment among the Pakistani population, that we favor one 

institution, the Army, over the interests of the civilians. 

This legislation is a stark departure from that status quo, and 

I commend it. It is sufficiently bold enough in scope to be effective, 

and I believe that only with an aid effort on the scale and ambition 

presented in this legislation will we be able affect the deeply skeptical Pakistani population. Our aid must be transformative. 

It’s a common weakness in aid programs—and this gets to another question that was raised this morning—that we often refer 

in our aid programs to the amount we spend. We allocated $10 million on education projects. We allocated $8 million on child health. 

49 

It becomes an accounting issue when it ought to be an accountability issue. 

With this legislation, we must build in efforts to measure the 

programs and our assistance by the impact it has on the lives of 

Pakistanis. I’d rather know that 10 million children were literate 

because of our education programs, not how much money we spent 

on it. I’d rather know that a million new jobs were created, rather 

than the money that we spent on job creation programs. The measure is to impact people’s lives, and we should measure our aid in 

terms of results. 

Now, this isn’t easy. If we hope to impact a population as large 

as Pakistan’s—and many have pointed out that it is the second 

largest Muslim country in the world, with 160 million people—it’s 

going to require a significant investment. We ought to know this 

right up front. This legislation admirably makes that commitment. 

I honestly believe that anything short of the $1.5 billion proposed, 

annually, runs the risk of failure. 

Another critically important element of this legislation, and one 

that distinguishes it from past practice and strengthens its chance 

for success, is its timeline. It’s over the long term. A 10-year commitment for development aid would go a long way towards overcoming a widespread perception that the United States is a fickle 

friend, as you mentioned yourself, Mr. Chairman. 

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, when Congress moved swiftly to lift sanctions and resume our assistance, I was Ambassador 

there and encountered some fierce and deeply rooted conviction 

among the general population, intellectuals, and Pakistani officials 

that we were just setting Pakistan up for another fall. They lamented that the United States had dropped Pakistan abruptly 

after they’d helped us drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan. A careful review of history, would show them why sanctions were imposed: Because of our legitimate concerns about their development 

of a nuclear weapons program. It didn’t matter; they weren’t listening. It’s hard to do. To them, there was one notion, that we abandoned them. 

So, I honestly believe that unconditional aid over a 10-year period, that you’re proposing here, will help disabuse the public of 

this false notion that we had abandoned them. Public support in 

Pakistan and buy-in for our aid program is going to be essential 

to its success. This gets us over the threshold. 

Another strength of the legislation is that it focuses on transparency and accountability to the people. Now, my remarks here 

really get to the question that we had in the earlier panel about 

conditionality. 

In a poll taken in December 2007, I think we only had an approval rating of 15 percent. One of the reasons it’s so low is that 

the people think that we’re pursuing our own interests in Pakistan, 

those being counterterrorism and only along the border, and that 

we really are not concerned about what matters to them and their 

lives and their families. 

You know, this doesn’t have to be. As several people pointed out 

this morning, we have evidence that when we do provide generous 

assistance efficiently and directly to the neediest people of Pakistan—as we did right after the earthquake—things change, attiVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:54 Jan 16, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\46262.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
50 

tudes change. In fact, right after the earthquake, U.S. approval ratings spiked to 45 percent. It’s now down at 15, but it had been at 

45, as a result of the way we delivered our assistance directly to 

the neediest people. 

So my comment here is that our current aid program is structured in a way that draws criticism, and draws criticism from 

many of our own observers, as well. We saw that in the GAO report. The charge that we’ve seen is that it’s had little impact on 

our counterterrorism effort, that al-Qaeda camps have reconstituted in Pakistan, Taliban extremists attack United States and 

NATO forces across the border from safe havens inside Pakistan, 

and that the Pakistani Army has made too little inroads into stopping that. 

But, to be fair, Pakistani communities are also victims of this internal terrorism. They want what we want. They want to be able 

to send their daughters to the market without fear of a suicide 

bomber. They are also interested in effective action against extremists that are, as we learned in Anbar, affecting their communities 

as well. We saw this in the election in this last election when the 

Pakistani voters voted in the Awami National Party, a secular 

Pashtun party, because it was a reaction to the extremists letting 

off bombs in local marketplaces. 

My point here is that both Pakistani people and Americans want 

better results along the frontier against the extremists. So, this legislation is right to tie security to performance. And it won’t be easy; 

conditioning is a neuralgic point in Pakistan. They historically see 

conditioned aid as a colonial practice that belittles the recipient. 

That’s certainly not what we want. We do not intend to put any 

aid recipient through a cumbersome, bureaucratic exercise, but 

what we really want is to ensure that funds are used in a way that 

meets the intended objective. We want impact, and so do Pakistanis. 

Along with impact, the Pakistani people want transparency. So 

do we. And I think this legislation and the provisioning and the 

conditioning provision accounts for that. These funds are meant to 

provide greater security for our populations, and so it stands to 

reason that the people should be able to see how it’s used. Their 

officials should be accountable for budgets, even if those funds are 

provided through our assistance procedures. And ultimately, the 

people must feel more secure in their communities and in their city 

streets. 

And the final innovative point—because I really like this legislation—and maybe one that I believe is the most important and 

should have mentioned first, is that it focuses on the people of 

Pakistan. The legislation provides a significant increase in aid for 

education, health, market roads, job creation, and not just for 

FATA, but for all of Pakistan. 

The strength of this legislation is that it greatly increases our 

nonsecurity aid. It’s directed at the civilian population. 

Mr. Chairman, Pakistan is an extremely complicated society, as 

you point out. It is indeed fragile, and it is indeed one of the most 

dangerous places on the earth. But we can be successful there; we 

can build on our positive history of cooperation, common values, 

and our concern for the citizen of Pakistan. We can find solutions. 

51 

I believe that this legislation has thoughtfully assessed United 

States-Pakistan relations. It compensates for some of the 

misjudgments and some of the weaknesses in our current approach, and it takes U.S. equities into account to protect our people, as well. It crafts a program that is both in American interests 

and in the interest of the Pakistan people. In short, it’s a win-win. 

And if it’s approved in its entirety, so that the bill’s generosity 

and pragmatism is preserved, then this legislation could have a significant impact on our relations in this most critical country. 

Thank you very much for giving me this opportunity. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Chamberlin follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. WENDY J. CHAMBERLIN, PRESIDENT, 

MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee it is an honor to have the opportunity 

to appear before the committee this morning. It is especially a privilege to be able 

to comment on a piece of proposed legislation that I support with enthusiasm. 

I will be brief in my remarks this morning but would like to make three key 

points. The legislation recognizes the critical linkage between U.S. and Pakistan security interests. It is sufficiently bold and comprehensive in scope to address current 

problems. And, finally, it focuses U.S. assistance on the right place . . . on the welfare of the people of Pakistan. 

Regarding my first point, the terrorist attack on our soil on September 11, 2001, 

was a stark example of how globalization has compressed our world both for good 

and for ill. 

A shrinking world means the well-being of Pakistani communities thousands of 

miles away is vital to the protection of Americans in our homeland. 

When tribal leaders provide protection and hospitality to al-Qaeda fighters in remote regions beyond the writ of law, it is no longer a local problem. 

When terrorists disappear into the teeming urban slums of Karachi, it becomes 

an urgent issue for America. 

Mr. Chairman, my first point is that this legislation is right to identify Pakistan 

as the frontline state that deserves our attention. For too long, America’s focus has 

been distracted, and its efforts diluted. We launched a war ostensibly against alQaeda in Iraq, creating the very conditions for it to flourish. 

We deployed too few forces in Afghanistan to create stable conditions for reconstruction. And, to the point of this legislation, we have viewed the security effort 

in Pakistan from the very limited lens of the Afghan frontier. 

The value of this legislation is that for the first time since 9/11, it focuses our 

efforts in the right place—the entire country of Pakistan. 

Mr. Chairman, I believe that by confronting the challenges and economic needs 

of the Pakistani people, the legislation also contributes to the protection of the 

American people from foreign terrorist threats. 

The media often refers to Pakistan as the ‘‘most dangerous country in the world.’’ 

I personally believe this is an overstatement—one that diminishes core values we 

share with Pakistan. 

An Indian friend recently commented to me ‘‘we share the same DNA as the Pakistanis.’’ Like India, Pakistan was founded on the principles of a democratic state. 

It has had several periods of military rule to be sure, but the election last February 

brought Pakistan back to the vision of its founding father—installing a democratically elected civilian government. 

I hardly need to remind this august body that Pakistan has been a reliable ally 

of the United States throughout the decades. Pakistan became a CENTO pact member to contain the Soviet threat in the 1950s and was instrumental in the successful 

campaign to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan in the 1980s. And we all 

appreciate the alacrity with which President Musharraf reversed an entrenched security policy of support for the Taliban, when we asked him to join us following September 11. 

In short, the stability and well-being of Pakistan is vital to the interests of the 

United States; we share core values and have a history of cooperation. This legislation is a commendable initiative to articulate a comprehensive strategy for Pakistan. 

My second point is the legislation offers a bold and innovative solution that 

thoughtfully addresses problems in our relations with Pakistan. It incorporates and 

builds upon the lessons of the past. 

52 

To be fair, we have made much progress in our relations with Pakistan since I 

first arrived as Ambassador in August 2001. At that time we had placed Pakistan 

under sanctions for its continued development of a nuclear weapons program and 

had suspended all security and development assistance. 

Since the end of 2002 we have provided over $11 billion in aid. Unfortunately, 

it has not been balanced. Over 90 percent of the aid has been delivered to the Pakistani military, largely as compensation for deployments along the border. Our $100 

million in annual developmental aid, which is managed by USAID, was a big jump 

from zero, but it is simply not enough to have an impact on the society or affect 

perceptions of the population. In short, our current aid program is at best having 

little impact, or worse, breeding resentment among the population for U.S. favoritism toward the Army. 

This legislation presents a stark departure from the status quo. 

It is sufficiently bold in scope to be effective. I believe that only with an aid effort 

on the scale and ambition presented in this legislation will we be able to affect the 

deeply skeptical Pakistani population. 

Our aid must be transformative. A common weakness in aid programs is that they 

often are reported in terms of the total sums spent. ‘‘We allocated $10 million on 

education projects, $8 million on child health, etc.’’ 

This time we must measure the program by the impact it has on the lives of people. I would rather know that 100 million children are literate because of American 

aid projects, or that a million new jobs were created. These measures impact people’s lives. We should measure our aid in results. 

This is no easy task. If we hope to sway a population as large as Pakistan’s— 

with over 160 million people—it will require a significant investment. This legislation admirably makes that commitment. Anything short of $1.5 billion annually 

runs the risks failure. 

Another critically important element of this legislation, one that distinguishes it 

from past practice and strengthens its chances for success is its timeline. A 10-year 

commitment for development aid will go a long way toward overcoming the widespread perception that the United States is a fickle friend. 

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 when Congress swiftly lifted sanctions and we 

resumed military and development aid, as Ambassador to Pakistan I encountered 

a fierce and deeply rooted conviction that the U.S. was simply setting up Pakistan 

for another fall. My interlocutors lamented that the U.S. had dropped Pakistan 

abruptly after it had helped us drive out the Soviets from Afghanistan. Careful review of the history had little effect in dissuading educated officials, let alone the 

larger population. To Pakistan, we had abandoned them. 

Unconditional, multiyear aid over a 10-year period will do a great deal to disabuse 

the public of this false notion. Public support and buy-in for the aid program is essential to its success. 

Another strength of this legislation is that it focuses on transparency and accountability to the people. 

One of the reasons why U.S. approval ratings are so low in Pakistan—only 15 percent in December 2007—is that the people believe we are only pursuing our own 

interests and have no care for their concerns. 

They believe we care only for counterterrorism efforts along the Afghan frontier. 

The fact that we provided the lion’s share of aid in Coalition Support Funds to the 

Pakistan Army and only a fraction to civilian programs through USAID is held up 

as evidence. 

We have evidence that aid changes perceptions in Pakistan. American aid in the 

aftermath of the Pakistani earthquake was distributed generously, efficiently and 

directly to the most needy people. Our approval ratings spiked to 45 percent. 

The way our current aid program is structured draws criticism from American observers as well. They charge that we have seen very little impact for our investment 

in the counterterrorism effort. The Pentagon provides $100 million to the Pakistani 

military monthly, yet al-Qaeda camps have reconstituted in Pakistan; Taliban extremists attack U.S. and NATO troops from safe havens in Pakistan, and the Pakistani Army has made few arrests. 

To be fair, Pakistani communities are also victims of internal terrorists. They 

want to be able to send their daughters to the local market without fear of a suicide 

bombing. They have the same complaint. Both the Pakistani people and the Americans want better results. 

This legislation ties security aid to performance. This won’t be easy. Conditioning 

aid is a neuralgic point with Pakistanis. Historically, Pakistan viewed conditioned 

aid as a colonial practice that belittles the recipient. In the case of this legislation, 

however, I believe it is an approach that serves both our interests. 

53 

I am sure the authors of this legislation do not intend to put any aid recipient 

through a cumbersome bureaucratic exercise. What we really want is to ensure that 

funds are used in a way that meets the intended objective. We want impact. So do 

Pakistanis. 

Along with impact, the Pakistani people also want transparency. So do we. 

These funds are meant to provide greater security for both our populations, so it 

stands to reason that the people should be able to see how it is used. Their officials 

should be accountable for budgets, even for those funds provided as foreign aid. Ultimately, the people must feel more secure in their communities and city streets. 

A final innovative point in the proposed legislation—and maybe one that I believe 

is the most important—is that it focuses on the people of Pakistan. The legislation 

provides a significant increase in aid for education, health, market roads, and jobcreation. And not just for those who live in the FATA, but throughout Pakistan. 

The strength of this legislation is that it calls for greatly increased American nonsecurity aid. It is directed at the civilian population. And importantly, it is for all 

of Pakistan, rather than a counterterrorism program focused along a small strip of 

land along the frontier. 

The proposed legislation is a bold departure from previous practice. It recognizes 

that we are failing both the American and Pakistani peoples in our current approach and it presents an innovative solution. 

Mr. Chairman, Pakistan is an extremely complicated society. Pakistan may be a 

fragile and dangerous place, but we can build on our positive history of cooperation, 

common values, and concern for the common citizen in Pakistan to find solutions. 

I believe the proposed legislation has thoughtfully assessed U.S.-Pakistan relations. It compensates for the misjudgments and weaknesses in our current approach. It takes U.S. equities into account and protects U.S. interests. 

It crafts a program that is both in American interests and in the interests of the 

Pakistani people. In short, it is a win-win program. 

If approved in its entirety, so that the bill’s generosity and pragmatism is preserved, then this legislation could have a significant impact on our relations in this 

most critical country. 

This is a practical approach and one that I believe can be successful. We do not 

have to stand in the middle of the road with our eyes locked on the lights of the 

truck bearing down on us. We can do something about it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Madame Ambassador. Thank you for 

that robust endorsement. Endorsement from both of you is very 

much appreciated, and I think will affect our colleagues’ attitudes 

about this. 

General, let me start with you, if I may. You’re known as one of 

the most informed and toughest guys in the Army at the time, not 

many people in the middle of that Kargil conflict would stare down 

the commander of the Pakistani Army, General Musharraf, in the 

midst of a shooting war, you did a heck of a job. 

And I’d like to talk with you, I know your expertise goes beyond 

the military side of the equation, beyond the Pakistani military. 

But, I apologize for focusing on the short time I have, on that piece. 

You have spoken about the need to improve Pakistan’s capacity, 

Pakistan’s military capacity, to help the military develop a genuine 

counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency effectiveness. And I think 

you believe that economic aid impacts on the ability to do that, because it changes the conditions on the ground. 

But tell me, if you could, if it’s appropriate in an open hearing, 

how you believe the Pakistani general staff views what’s in one’s 

hand, I think they know they need—that is, additional training 

and reconfiguration, which is very difficult, to reconfigure any military force, in any country, democracy or otherwise—how do you 

think they view the assistance to do that from us, and what are 

the basic, sort of fault lines we’ve got to be careful about not crossing, in order to accomplish a better-trained, more capable Pakistani 

military, assuming they have the will to move with it, against, terVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:54 Jan 16, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\46262.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
54 

rorists but al-Qaeda, Taliban, and the indigenous groups that are 

causing them great difficulty? 

General ZINNI. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think they face several dilemmas. One, obviously, they need to maintain a strong conventional capability, in their minds, because although conditions are 

better, they still see their primary threat on the opposite border. 

And, at the same time, they don’t like operating in the tribal 

areas. Obviously, we all know why. It’s not the kind of conflict 

they’re used to, it’s not what they’re trained for, their law doesn’t 

apply, they don’t have the tribal affinity or the relationships that 

would make it easier for the—and as you pointed out, they’re not 

really configured for that. 

My feeling is that in order to help them succeed in these areas, 

we should look at capacities that give them edge, for example, 

night vision capability, just as an example. Have we provided them 

the capability where they could operate at night, with a tremendous advantage over the potential enemy? The answer is no. We 

gave them first-generation Cobras, a handful, that barely are operational, and just don’t provide the quality or the technology available. And there are other technical capabilities that could give 

them an edge. 

The CHAIRMAN. They mentioned that—someone with whom I 

spoke mentioned that specific item. That is night-vision capability. 

General ZINNI. And the point being that where there’s an asymmetric edge that they can get, we ought to focus on that as opposed 

to, back up what Ambassador Chamberlin said, we shouldn’t be 

looking at the amounts of money that we provide, but the endstate, the capacity they get, and measure it that way, and then it’s 

easier to see its application where we expect it to be applied. 

Second, and again, you’ve mentioned this, is training. And the 

training isn’t just for the Pakistani military—obviously it has been 

discussed, the Frontier Corps, the levies, the entire security structure that operates out there. The more of the issues and problems 

that can be handled at a lower level, obviously, the better. 

Now, clearly, when they get in over their head, you need twotiered capability in order to react. But they’re woefully lacking in 

the kind of quality training, not only the military themselves, but 

also down to the basic security levels needed to do the fundamental 

policing work, the paramilitary work, and so on. 

The third area, and one I think we haven’t paid enough attention 

to—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you a question on that point, because 

we raised that, as well. Does—General Kiyani, well, would the staff 

of the military view the diversion of funds for security to training 

the local police, the people on the ground, as you point out, they 

are not present, in large numbers in the FATA, but there has been, 

historically, presence in the FATA of some security personnel. They 

tend to be tribal, as I understand it, they tend to be local. 

How, in your view, how would they view, maybe diversion is the 

wrong way of saying it—do they view that, you think, as a priority 

to helping them in the region? To go down that next level? 

Most people think, when we think of the FATA, and I’ll stop, is 

that it only relates to the ability of the Pakistani Army to bring 

55 

any physical security to the region, and that’s not how it’s structured. 

General ZINNI. Right. 

Well, sir, I can tell you, I haven’t had this discussion with General Kiyani—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I know you haven’t. 

General ZINNI. But I have with General Musharraf, actually, 

about a year ago. And this was one of his primary priorities, and 

he was speaking in his military hat, at the time, that he saw this 

as critical—this entire inherited British system of security structure, that’s been allowed to sort of atrophy, in terms of scales, revitalizing it through training and building its capability, and obviously through the equipping and other necessary things. 

So, I think, again, I haven’t spoke to General Kiyani, but I think 

the military would welcome anything that relieves them of a duty 

that finds them in places where they’re not welcome—they’re seen 

as much as outsiders as we would be, or others, to a large degree. 

The third area, which I think should get a lot of attention—and 

maybe we are the only ones who can do this—is a common, mutually supporting border security system. The Afghans and the Pakistanis obviously have issues on border security, they have different 

systems, as far as I can determine, I heard complaints from the 

Pakistanis of biometric cards being ripped up by the Afghan 

guards, this lack of connection or cooperation, it seems to me we 

should be the bridge for insisting—since we deal with both of them, 

and it’s in their interest and we have the relationships, that we 

have to reach a common system of border security—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I agree. 

General ZINNI. And it’s not just the technical aspects—whether 

it’s biometric cards or cameras or whatever it is—not just the technical things that are important to the border security, but again, 

the training for border security, and what’s necessary to make that 

happen. 

If you can effectively control as much of the border as you can, 

leveraging all of the technology and the commonality of systems, 

and then you couple that with local training, then, I think, you go 

a long way to solving some of the issues and problems we’ve had 

here. 

And again, it’s another way of measuring where our dollars go. 

Obviously, we can see it, in function, on the border. 

The CHAIRMAN. Can we ask our friends who are legitimately 

making their point—can you hold the signs down so people behind 

you can see? I don’t mind seeing the signs, but people behind you 

can’t see. So, it’s kind of like in the movie theater, you know? Or 

hold them way, way up, whatever you do, but let people behind you 

see, OK? 

And, please, I’ve been really good to you all, don’t be smart guys, 

OK, or I’ll have you kicked out of the room, OK? 

Now, last point I’d like to raise with you, General, was the point 

raised either by Senator Cardin or Menendez, I’m not sure who it 

was, and that is, is there any doubt in your mind where the central 

front for the war on terror is? 

General ZINNI. No. 

The CHAIRMAN. Where is it? 

56 

General ZINNI. It’s on the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan at this time. 

The CHAIRMAN. And I was going to—I didn’t want to interrupt, 

but I was going to remind our administration panelists who—you 

know, I understand their position—but that’s also the answer that 

our Iraqi Ambassador gave, and that General Petraeus gave when 

they sat before us. When asked, ‘‘You get a chance to wipe out alQaeda Mesopotamia, or al-Qaeda along the Afghan-Pakistani border, what do you choose?’’ There was silence for a minute and they 

said, well that’s—I don’t know the exact phrase—that’s a nobrainer, Afghanistan-Pakistan. I wish we’d get off this diversion 

about—well, anyway. 

So, I thank you. 

Ambassador, I have questions for you, a couple of them I’m going 

to submit in writing in the interest of time, but let me just say to 

you, I remember when you got there. You were dealt a very difficult hand. Within a month or so—within a month after you got 

there, 9/11 occurred, you found yourself in a very tough position, 

you handled yourself admirably. Including when I arrived there, 

shortly thereafter to head into Afghanistan over the objections of 

some of the administration, because I was flying in the U.N. flight, 

they initially wouldn’t let me into Afghanistan, and you were so 

gracious, you had a lunch for me, and then on my return you had 

to explain to General Musharraf why I couldn’t make a meeting, 

because I was grounded in Kabul. 

So, I’m sorry I put you through that, thank you for that hospitality. 

Let me yield to my colleague. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Both 

of you have mentioned the importance of legislation that we are 

talking about today, the scale of it, that I think it was you that 

said, General Zinni, is transformative, potentially, and that would 

have an impact on Pakistanis, generally, that might be perceived 

by the people. 

But you also mentioned there are 160 million people, it’s a very 

large country, and a very diverse country. Let me just ask both of 

you from your experience, the amount of money being suggested in 

legislation, the $1.5 billion a year, is a sizable amount of money, 

the 10-year timeline, which you’ve mentioned, is important, in 

terms of longevity of this, as opposed to an off-again, on-again situation. 

But, given the size of the country, the extraordinary problems 

that we just touched upon in the educational system, for instance, 

with the first panel, quite apart from other services, this is still a 

very small amount of money, with regard to millions of people and 

the services. 

And furthermore, the measurement of the impact, I would agree 

if persons believe that a large number of people have received a 

good level of education, that there have been results in terms of 

human lives and achievement, this is tremendously important. But 

we’re having difficulties in this country with the No Child Left Behind evaluations, as to whether we are making perceptible gains 

with large sectors of the population, in many States, and we’re 

spending a lot of money. There’s no doubt about the commitment 

57 

of the teachers in the classrooms. But, the process of moving on in 

this respect, is extraordinarily difficult. 

Now, you understand that, of course. And all things considered, 

if you were trying to transform Pakistan, you would say you need 

much more money, much more commitment. On the margins—I’m 

just trying to gain some idea of whether—even with this larger 

commitment—the public appearance, or public diplomacy aspect of 

this are likely to change substantially. 

I just threw out, anecdotally, at least one optimistic view. My 

friend, Dr. Peter Armacost, has been head of Foreman College for 

several years, and the advances there have been substantial, in 

terms of hundreds of new students. There is a small contingent of 

Christian students, a very large contingent, obviously, of Muslim 

students, of various parts of that faith, who have, in fact, been 

studying together. Dr. Armacost was President of Eckhardt College 

in Florida, other institutions in our country, prior to his retirement, 

but has gone back, literally, in a missionary effort, and this has 

been recognized by USAID, and given some support. 

So, at least, anecdotally, in my own experience, because I visit 

with my friend who comes back to Washington annually, and has 

visits at the State Department that this is possible. 

But, I also wonder how this transformative effect does occur on 

a sustained basis—quite apart from an earthquake, a flood, a catastrophe, something that certainly centers the attention of the 

population on our participation. Even then, as you’ve both said in 

one way or another, that we also want transparency, and so do the 

Pakistanis. 

And as a matter of fact, though we want to have results that can 

be perceived, but at the same time, the Pakistanis abhor conditionality—that is, some benchmarks, measurements, audits, something 

of that sort—which will have to be as part of this, as diplomatically 

as possible, over a sustained period of time. 

As both of you know, the Congress cannot appropriate money for 

10 years in advance. So, we’re probably going to have several hearings of this committee during each of the 10 years, or some committee, and it may be different people dealing with it in the future. 

People come and go in our politics—some who were there at the beginning, and some didn’t understand how we ever got started with 

this situation. 

So, this is going to have to have some degree of transparency for 

the American people. So, can you give some guidance as to how 

this might work? Why you have some confidence that the billion 

and a half—and that’s not all of the program, but it’s a central 

focus of our thoughts today, because it’s big and it has 10 years associated with it—why this makes a difference? 

General ZINNI. Well, I would make several points, Senator Lugar. 

First of all, I think that the agreed and the requirement for 

transparency is essential. If the funds are provided, the resources 

are provided, and it doesn’t materially impact down where we want 

it, and it should impact, then I think it will actually have a negative effect, it will be seen that we’re just feeding into what may be 

a corrupt system, or a system that doesn’t allow what we want to 

build down there. 

58 

I go back to the point that Ambassador Chamberlin made, that 

we need to focus on the end-state. And insist that what we provide 

is deliverable in the end-state. If it’s school, then the focus is that 

the resources go, in a measured way, to what those schools become, 

and what they are, and how they’re sustained. 

Senator LUGAR. What if democratically elected officials don’t like 

our objectives? That they just say, ‘‘We don’t like your programs, 

and after all, we’re in charge.’’ 

General ZINNI. Well, I would go back to one thing that was said 

in the previous panel about flexibility. I think we ought to look at 

working with them and where, in things that, and obviously—I go 

back to my experience in Vietnam. As a marine, I went into a village one time, and saw these immaculate, beautiful pig sties that 

we had built with aid money. And the people were living in them, 

because they were better than their houses. 

And, you know, I think we’ve got to understand that the Pakistanis should have some obvious input—responsible input—as to 

what’s best for the people, we should work together on this. 

At the same time, it’s our funds and our resources, we need to 

ensure that it goes to where we feel it’s best suited, but I think this 

is a partnership and this is something that we build together. And 

I think there are mechanisms that Ambassador Chamberlin would 

know far better than I, within Pakistan, that could allow us to 

work on these—determine these goals or these end-states, in working together. 

Let me say something else about what I think would be the exponential benefit, beyond just the money. I’ve worked with several 

American companies in the past several years that were interested 

in doing business in Pakistan, but very hesitant, for all kinds of 

reasons. And when I brought them there, and at one time, when 

the economy was improving, and measures were taken to clean up 

some of the corruption and the transparency, the Minister of Finance had an excellent reputation, I began to see more interest— 

not only from American companies, but from other companies. 

In one case a telecommunications contract was being bid on, and 

I saw European, and Middle Eastern companies and others in 

there—I think if we’re working with a long-term objective to stability, and put a marker down for that, and it begins to show some 

progress, you could get this benefit from outside investment, and 

those maybe willing to maybe work and help us from another sector. I think Pakistan’s a viable market, in many ways. 

The third point I would make is we keep focusing on the importance of this strategic design—this masterful one that, I believe, 

you’ve come up with on Pakistan, but let me tell you, because I’ve 

always had a regional perspective for my job—this is going to send 

a message to the rest of the region, that we are not transactional, 

and we’re not one-off on our own needs. We are stepping back and 

taking a broader strategic view. I think that’s going to get the attention beyond Pakistan, may even help with burden- sharing in 

Pakistan from those parts of that region—especially if you go a little further west into the gulf—that have the capital. 

So, I think there’s ways to leverage this for much—even greater 

benefit than what the money amounts may be. 

59 

Ms. CHAMBERLIN. If I might just add a few points to the points 

of General Zinni, who I totally agree with—look, we can’t do it all. 

We can’t come in and hope to completely fix Pakistan—it’s Pakistan who must fix Pakistan. But we can come in, in targeted, very 

focused ways, to assist them in areas where we agree together, we 

can work together on. So, we shouldn’t be all-comprehensive. 

I’d like to recall a—the Gallop poll has just conducted a—spent $20 million, conducted a poll over every Muslim country in the 

world, they covered nearly—they claim to have covered a reach of 

about 90 percent of the people in the Muslim world, and the most 

striking result, observation that they came up with is that Muslims 

throughout the world think that the one thing, the one measure 

that the United States could take that could most dramatically 

change our image in the Muslim world, is to respect Islam. 

We don’t need to go into Pakistan or any place in the world with 

all of the answers. And we do need to go in and say, ‘‘’You’ve got 

to do it this way, or we’re going to cut off our funds.’’ 

We can go in and I think your legislation presages this, and say, 

‘‘Look, we’re going to work with you, we’re going to sit down and 

decide what you need, how to do it together.’’ 

Mark Ward was talking earlier about the community approach, 

I think that’s the right approach, and incidentally, that’s new. AID, 

in the past, had not been doing it that way, so that is a departure, 

and it’s worth building on. 

And we can work with the Pakistanis to develop, but very clearly 

define, what it is, the result that we want to achieve, and not—as 

we had in the past—how much money do we want you to give to 

us? It’s, ‘‘What do we want to achieve with that funding?’’ And if— 

if those, as we—you, this committee, reviews from time to time, the 

program there, if certain programs are not achieving the result 

that we had collectively defined for the Pakistanis, you don’t have 

to cut the funds off, but you can divert it to another project. You 

can divert it to another method of trying to achieve that result. 

That still preserves a commitment for the future, and a commitment for working together, but it allows the flexibility of, ‘‘Look, 

we’re learning as we go, too, if there’s a NGO that is taking too 

large of an overhead bite out of the apple, but is not producing, 

shift to another distributor of the aid assistance, do it another 

way.’’ 

But, you can have some consistency to the program, and that will 

be what’s important to the Pakistanis, and that will show respect. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me—thank you, Senator. 

Let me make a concluding comment, here, and I’ll invite Senator 

Lugar, if he wishes to do the same. 

First of all, thanks again for being here, and thanks for your 

strong support—it makes a difference. 

Quite frankly, when this legislation was drafted, from my perspective, at least, the most important thing was to change the dialogue. To make the number big enough, to make it immediate 

enough, with the democracy dividend, that I found it very interesting. I discussed it with the leaders of the Pakistani People’s 

Party, with the Pakistani Muslim League, and in PML-Q, and it 

was an interesting reaction. 

60 

It wasn’t so much about the number, but the number was big 

enough to get their attention that, ‘‘Maybe you really mean this.’’ 

It’s generated incredible editorial comment throughout Pakistan. I 

think from all sources—correct me if I’m wrong—favorable. I mean, 

warring factions, politically warring factions that, maybe this is a 

change of attitude. 

And so, one of the thoughts I had about the numbers was quite 

frankly less the number than demonstrating, it’s a significant increase, and long term. And I don’t—my hope is that it won’t just 

be generated, the attitude of a large country, as large as Pakistan, 

it’s not going to be generated through AID signs up on walls. My 

hope is that part of it will be generated just by, in the political culture that America has changed its attitude, less with the number, 

but big enough to get their attention. 

The second thing I observed is, with the slowdown in the Pakistani economy, it matters to the incoming coalition that there is actually money to do these things. Because they are finding themselves in more difficulty, in terms of not being—having, they’re 

worried about not being able to deliver. Because one thing, for the 

former Finance Minister, and for awhile there, under Musharraf, 

that was sort of the Faustian bargain, things were getting a little 

bit better, economically. 

And the last point I’ll make is, I hope that it does, is that in my 

discussions, at least, with our friends around the world, that there 

will be—if this attitudinal change occurs, and it’s not going to be 

easy, and it’s not going to be overnight—there is a greater instinct 

on the part—there’s a lot of other countries who have an investment in the stability of Pakistan, starting with our European 

friends, and our Japanese—there’s a real interest in that happening. 

So, I kind of view this, not as the total number, but as a catalyst. 

The number’s big enough, hopefully, to start a catalytic reaction 

here, but you know, I must admit to you, I really don’t know. I’ve 

just been surprised at the degree to which it’s been embraced by 

so many corners, including so many of our colleagues, when Senator Lugar talks about it, when I talk about it, and I think it has 

less to do with the money, than it does the fact that money indicates a seriousness of the underlying purpose of changing the relationship. I hope that’s the case. 

And, but, you know, lots of times our hopes are not realized here, 

and I think Senator Lugar and I have been around long enough to 

be pretty hard-nosed, practical about, even this is no guarantee, by 

any stretch of the imagination. 

But, I thought I’d just state that to you all, at least to speak for 

myself, only, that I’ve come away from my years here, is the worst 

thing to do with any program, whether it’s ‘‘dealing with the drug 

problem,’’ or ‘‘dealing at home,’’ or ‘‘dealing with foreign assistance 

abroad,’’ is to over-promise. So, I don’t—I just hope this is something that generally kick starts a change in attitude, here, and in 

Pakistan, as a consequence, affects private enterprise, investment, 

as well as our friends. 

Speaking of friends, you’ve both been great friends of this committee, we truly appreciate it. I warn you, you have not heard the 

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last of our requests to you, because we respect you so much, so unless—if you have a comment, Senator. 

Senator LUGAR. I just thank the witnesses. 

The CHAIRMAN. We are adjourned, thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

Æ