Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 20-1132

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

CHARLIE D. VICK,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. William E. Smith, U.S. District Judge] 

Before

Thompson, Boudin, and Barron,

Circuit Judges.

Edward J. Romano, Esq., on brief for appellant.

Aaron L. Weisman, United States Attorney, and Lauren S. 

Zurier, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.

April 13, 2021
- 2 -

BOUDIN, Circuit Judge. Charlie Vick pled guilty to 

possessing ammunition, being a convicted felon,1 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1), and now appeals his sentence. Vick's Guidelines 

Sentencing Range ("GSR") was twenty-one to twenty-seven months,

and the district court varied upward to impose a sentence of 

thirty-six months in prison followed by three years of supervised 

release. Vick's unpreserved complaints are reviewed for plain 

error, United States v. Ortíz-Mercado, 919 F.3d 686, 689 (1st Cir. 

2019), and his preserved complaints for abuse of discretion, see

United States v. García-Mojica, 955 F.3d 187, 192, 194 (1st Cir. 

2020).

Vick first argues the sentencing judge gave too much 

weight to his previous arrests that did not result in convictions. 

Although a sentencing court may not rely on a defendant's mere 

arrest record, United States v. Santa-Soler, 985 F.3d 93, 96 (1st 

Cir. 2021) (citing United States v. Marrero-Pérez, 914 F.3d 20, 22 

(1st Cir. 2019)), "[i]n certain perhaps rare cases [not present 

here], a reasonable person might in particular circumstances 

assign some weight to a collection of arrests." Marrero, 914 F.3d 

at 22. At bottom, a sentencing court must not "equate arrest with 

1 Vick had prior adult convictions for forgery of a check and 

related charges, carrying a dangerous weapon, attempting to commit 

a crime (breaking and entering), threatening to commit a crime 

(kill), unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle, possession of a 

large capacity weapon, and knowingly receiving stolen property.
- 3 -

guilt." Id. at 23; see also United States v. Díaz-Rivera, 957 

F.3d 20, 26-27 (1st Cir. 2020).

The district court noted all "three parts" of Vick's 

long criminal history: convictions, arrests, and civil abuse 

prevention orders. As of sentencing, Vick had at least seven 

convictions, had been arrested twenty-eight times, had three 

pending criminal cases, and had eight civil abuse prevention orders 

issued against him. When discussing Vick's prior arrests, the 

district court properly emphasized that "a lot" of arrests resulted 

in dismissals and, unlike convictions, the arrests "can't count . 

. . as criminal history" and "don't get points." Thus, the 

district court made clear it "can't treat [arrests] like 

convictions." Instead, the district court properly compared 

Vick's arrest record to other sections of his presentence report 

("PSR"), such as his employment history and family situation, 

noting that each such aspect of Vick's circumstances helped "paint 

a picture of the defendant." The district court concluded that 

while arrests "are worth paying some attention to," it did not 

"put the same weight on those that [it] put[s] on to the criminal 

history where you receive convictions" because convictions "get a 

lot more weight and . . . certain criminal history points."

While the district court's last statement regarding the 

relative weight afforded to arrests would have been better left 

unsaid, the court's reference does not show that it equated arrests 
- 4 -

with guilt. In ultimately announcing the decision to vary upwards, 

the court focused on two aspects of Vick's conduct: "threatening, 

assaultive, violent behavior" and "an obsession of some sort, with 

firearms," which, in turn, motivated concerns for public safety 

and recidivism. These insights were properly gleaned from the 

full complement of reliable information available to the court, 

including Vick's previous convictions and the circumstances of the 

instant arrest. See Díaz-Rivera, 957 F.3d at 27-28.

Vick says that the sentencing judge gave too much weight 

to his alleged involvement in a shootout the morning of his arrest. 

Initially, Vick's PSR included a sentencing enhancement based on 

the government's argument that Vick had been involved in a shooting 

the morning he bought the ammunition. Later, the government 

requested a sentencing enhancement because Vick had gone to a 

shooting range after purchasing the ammunition and used a gun 

there.2 The judge refused to apply an enhancement but concluded 

that Vick likely bought the ammunition for violent purposes, saying 

that "[s]omething's going on, and we don't know exactly what it 

2 Both possessing ammunition and possessing a firearm are 

criminal offenses if the possessor is a convicted felon. See 18 

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The government's argument under both theories 

relied on U.S.S.G § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), which requires a sentencing 

enhancement if the ammunition Vick bought was possessed in 

connection with another offense. As Vick was a convicted felon, 

possessing a firearm would violate 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and thus 

would constitute another offense. 
- 5 -

is, but it says to me that there's a serious public safety risk 

here with what you're up to."

The judge's inference was that when Vick bought 

ammunition, he planned to use it to shoot a gun. This was a 

reasonable inference based on Vick's history. See United States

v. Montañez-Quiñones, 911 F.3d 59, 67-68 (1st Cir. 2018).

Vick next argues that the district court's mention of 

his previous convictions during the explanation of his sentence 

was error because the convictions were already accounted for in 

his GSR. See United States v. Zapete-Garcia, 447 F.3d 57, 60 (1st 

Cir. 2006). Vick's convictions were indeed accounted for in his 

GSR through the criminal history calculation, but the criminal 

history calculation did not account for the pattern of violent 

behavior and the "obsession" with firearms revealed by his 

convictions.

Vick also argues the criminal history calculation 

overrepresented the seriousness of his previous convictions 

because he believes he received too many points for minor offenses. 

Vick cites no authority for this attack, nor could he; there is no 

error in using a correctly calculated GSR in sentencing. To the 

extent Vick argues his criminal history was incorrectly 

calculated, he waived this argument by failing to present any 

support for his assertion. See, e.g., United States v. TancoPizarro, 892 F.3d 472, 483 n.7 (1st Cir. 2018).
- 6 -

Vick additionally argues his sentence was unreasonably 

long, but the sentence rested on a "plausible rationale" and 

produced a "defensible result." United States v. FloresMachicote, 706 F.3d 16, 25 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting United States

v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 96 (1st Cir. 2008)); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 

3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A)-(C).

Finally, Vick argues the district court "gave short 

shrift" to other relevant sentencing factors such as his age, 

physical health, substance abuse, social and family history, 

education, and employment. But the weighing of relevant sentencing 

factors "is largely within the court's informed discretion." 

United States v. Santiago-Rivera, 744 F.3d 229, 232 (1st Cir. 2014) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The record shows 

the district court properly considered all the relevant sentencing 

factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). It specifically emphasized the 

nature and circumstances of the offense, Vick's history and 

characteristics, deterrence, and public protection. The court's 

decision to focus on these factors over others "does not undermine 

the 'significant weight' we afford a court's statements regarding 

the factors and information it considered at sentencing." United 

States v. Frederickson, No. 20-1033, 2021 WL 567440, at *11 (1st 

Cir. Feb. 16, 2021) (quoting United States v. Márquez-García, 862 

F.3d 143, 145 (1st Cir. 2017)).

Affirmed.