23-6097

United States v. Gladle

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER 

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. 

CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS 

PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A 

SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST 

CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH 

THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 

held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the 

City of New York, on the 5th day of April, two thousand twenty-four. 

PRESENT: 

DENNIS JACOBS,

RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,

 EUNICE C. LEE,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 

v. 

No. 23-6097 

THOMAS GLADLE, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

∗

_____________________________________ 

∗ The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official case caption as set forth above.
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For Defendant-Appellant: Melissa A. Tuohey, Assistant Federal 

Public Defender, Office of the Federal 

Public Defender, Syracuse, NY. 

For Appellee: Rajit S. Dosanjh, Assistant United States 

Attorney, for Carla B. Freedman, United 

States Attorney for the Northern District 

of New York, Syracuse, NY. 

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of New York (Glenn T. Suddaby, Judge). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the January 23, 2023 judgment of the district 

court is AFFIRMED in part and VACATED and REMANDED in part.

Thomas Gladle appeals from a judgment following his guilty plea to 

receiving child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A), and 

possessing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), for which 

he received a sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Gladle argues 

that his 120-month term of imprisonment was substantively unreasonable and that 

the district court erred by imposing a special condition of supervised release that 

prohibited him from accessing the internet unless permitted by the court. We 

assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and 

issues on appeal. 
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First, Gladle argues that his 120-month sentence was substantively 

unreasonable because it was “derived from the irrational Guideline found in 

U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2,” and “failed to properly account for [his] serious chronic medical 

conditions.” Gladle Br. at 14–15. We review the substantive reasonableness of a 

district court’s sentence “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” 

United States v. Degroate, 940 F.3d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). We will set aside a district court’s sentence as substantively 

unreasonable “only in exceptional cases where its decision cannot be located 

within the range of permissible decisions.” United States v. Aumais, 656 F.3d 147, 

151 (2d Cir. 2011) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). In other 

words, we will set aside only those sentences that are “so shockingly high, 

shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law that allowing them 

to stand would damage the administration of justice.” United States v. Broxmeyer, 

699 F.3d 265, 289 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

We reject Gladle’s argument that the district court’s 120-month sentence was 

substantively unreasonable. As to Gladle’s first contention, there is nothing in the 

record to suggest that the district court failed to carefully consider the Guidelines 
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in determining Gladle’s Guidelines range.1 Indeed, the district court adopted the 

Guidelines calculation set forth in the presentence investigation report (“PSR”) 

without objection from either party and then varied substantially downward from 

the low end of that range – 151 months – in imposing sentence. See United States 

v. Caraher, 973 F.3d 57, 64–65 (2d Cir. 2020) (explaining that, while “[w]e apply the 

child pornography guidelines with great care in order to prevent the imposition 

of unreasonable sentences,” we do not “require courts to disregard the guidelines 

entirely” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Muzio, 966 F.3d 61, 

64 (2d Cir. 2020) (rejecting the proposition that, under this Court’s precedents, 

“any sentence for child pornography above the mandatory minimum is 

substantively unreasonable”); see also United States v. Salim, 690 F.3d 115, 126 (2d 

Cir. 2012) (explaining that “[w]e have never held that a district court is required to 

reject an applicable Guideline,” and recognizing that a “judge may give a nonGuidelines sentence where []he disagrees with the weight the Guidelines assign to 

a factor”), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in United States v. Leroux, 

36 F.4th 115, 120 (2d Cir. 2022). The record reflects that the district court carefully 

1 Although Gladle argues that the district court “mechanically applied” several enhancements 

that increased his offense level, Gladle Br. at 17, he does not argue that any of these enhancements 

were unsupported by the record or that the district court committed procedural error in applying 

them.
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considered various aggravating aspects of Gladle’s conduct – such as the fact that 

he made the pornography he amassed available for others to download, the 

images and videos he possessed displayed sadistic and masochistic conduct, and 

the images and videos depicted the abuse of very young children – as well as 

several mitigating circumstances – including Gladle’s past substance abuse, 

minimal criminal history, and troubled childhood circumstances – before arriving

at a below-Guidelines sentence that fell squarely within the range of permissible 

decisions. A review of relevant precedents from this Court reveals that the 

sentence imposed was consistent with those imposed for comparable conduct 

under section 2G2.2. See, e.g., United States v. Clarke, 979 F.3d 82, 100–01 (2d Cir. 

2020) (upholding 120-month sentence where defendant was found guilty of 

transporting, receiving, and possessing child pornography); Aumais, 656 F.3d at 

157 (upholding 121-month sentence for transporting and possessing child 

pornography). 

Nor does the record support Gladle’s second contention that the district 

court’s sentence failed to properly account for his chronic medical conditions. At 

sentencing, the district court explicitly confirmed that it considered the 

information set forth in the PSR and Gladle’s sentencing submission, which 
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included information regarding his assorted medical maladies and treatments. In 

the absence of any contrary indication in the record, we presume that the district 

court considered this argument, even if it did not reference it explicitly. See United 

States v. Halvon, 26 F.4th 566, 570 (2d Cir. 2022); see also United States v. Villafuerte, 

502 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2007). Moreover, to the extent Gladle argues that the 

district court failed to give his health conditions due weight under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(2)(D), the law is clear that a mere disagreement with how the district 

court balanced the section 3553(a) factors is not a sufficient ground for finding an 

abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122, 131 (2d Cir. 

2008) (“[T]he weight . . . afforded any [section] 3553(a) factor is a matter firmly 

committed to the discretion of the sentencing judge.” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). We therefore see no basis for questioning the substantive 

reasonableness of the district court’s sentence.

Second, Gladle argues that the district court erred by imposing a special 

condition of supervised release that prohibited him from accessing the internet 

without court approval. Although neither party objected to the imposition of this 

special condition below, on appeal, the government “concedes that its imposition 

was plain error under this Court’s precedents” and asks that “[t]he condition . . . 
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be vacated, without prejudice to it being reinstated if circumstances change.” Gov. 

Br. at 30.

Where, as here, a defendant did not challenge the imposition of a condition 

of supervised release below, we review that challenge for plain error. See United 

States v. Dupes, 513 F.3d 338, 343 (2d Cir. 2008). To demonstrate plain error, a 

defendant must establish that “(1) there is an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious, 

rather than subject to reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected the [defendant]’s 

substantial rights; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity[,] or 

public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Balde, 943 F.3d 73, 96 

(2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

A district court retains “wide latitude in imposing conditions of supervised 

release” and “may order special conditions of supervised release if they are 

reasonably related to the statutory purposes of supervision,” including (1) “the 

nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the 

defendant”; (2) “the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence”; 

(3) “the protection of the public”; and (4) “the rehabilitative and medical[-]care 

needs of the defendant.” United States v. Birkedahl, 973 F.3d 49, 53 (2d Cir. 2020)

(internal quotation marks omitted).
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At the same time, a district court must “state on the record the reason for 

imposing” a special condition of supervised release, and “the failure to do so is 

error” unless “the district court’s reasoning is self-evident in the record.” United 

States v. Betts, 886 F.3d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Where a supervised-release condition implicates a constitutional right – i.e., a 

convicted defendant’s First Amendment right to access the internet – we “conduct 

a more searching review,” United States v. Eaglin, 913 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2019), and 

require that the special condition be “supported by particularized findings that it 

does not constitute a greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary to 

accomplish the goals of sentencing,” United States v. Matta, 777 F.3d 116, 123 (2d 

Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court has specifically held that 

“only highly unusual circumstances will [warrant] a total [i]nternet ban imposed 

as a condition of supervised release.” Eaglin, 913 F.3d at 97; see also United States 

v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2002) (vacating a special condition prohibiting 

defendant from using the internet because it “inflict[ed] a greater deprivation on 

[defendant’s] liberty than [was] reasonably necessary”). 

Here, although the district court explained how an internet ban was 

reasonably related to the purposes of Gladle’s sentencing, it failed to point to any 
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highly unusual circumstances that would justify the condition, and the record 

does not appear to suggest that such facts are present. See, e.g., Sofsky, 287 F.3d at

126 (noting that internet bans were upheld in cases where defendant used the 

internet to distribute child pornography that he had produced and where 

defendant used the internet to contact a minor). Accordingly, we agree with the 

parties that the special condition was not justified, and its imposition constituted 

plain error. Accordingly, we vacate the special condition prohibiting Gladle’s use 

of the internet, and remand to the district court for the limited purpose of 

determining whether any highly unusual circumstances justify the reimposition 

of this condition – or another less restrictive condition – which must be supported 

by particularized findings based on the record. 

We have considered Gladle’s remaining arguments and find them to be 

without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM in part and VACATE in part the 

judgment of the district court, and the case is REMANDED. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court