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38–849 PDF 2009

S. Hrg. 110–676 

ONE YEAR LATER: A PROGRESS REPORT ON 

THE SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR 

EVERY (SAFE) PORT ACT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

OCTOBER 16, 2007 

Available via http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

JASON M. YANUSSI, Professional Staff Member 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

ROBERT L. STRAYER, Minority Director for Homeland Security Affairs 

STEPHEN M. MIDAS, Minority USCG Detailee 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 1 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 4 

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 12 

Senator Coleman .............................................................................................. 14 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 33 

WITNESSES 

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 2007 

Hon. Stewart A. Baker, Assistant Secretary for Policy, U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security ............................................................................................... 6 

Reginald I. Lloyd, U.S. Attorney, District of South Carolina, U.S. Department 

of Justice ............................................................................................................... 20 

Stephen L. Caldwell, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, U.S. 

Government Accountability Office ...................................................................... 22 

Captain Jeffrey W. Monroe, Director, Department of Ports and Transportation, City of Portland, Maine ........................................................................... 25 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Baker, Hon. Stewart A.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 37 

Caldwell, Stephen L.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 22 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 53 

Lloyd, Reginald I.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 20 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 46 

Monroe, Captain Jeffrey W.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 25 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 102 

APPENDIX 

Posters submitted for the Record from Mr. Baker ................................................ 106 

Letter dated October 1, 2007, from Ryozo Kato, Ambassador of Japan, submitted for the Record from Senator Lieberman ................................................ 111 

Responses to Questions for the Record from: 

Mr. Lloyd ........................................................................................................... 113 

Mr. Caldwell ..................................................................................................... 114 

Captain Monroe ................................................................................................ 115 

Mr. Baker .......................................................................................................... 116 

(1) 

ONE YEAR LATER: A PROGRESS REPORT ON 

THE SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR 

EVERY (SAFE) PORT ACT 

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 2007 

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in Room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman, Akaka, Carper, Collins, and Coleman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good morning, and thanks to everyone for 

coming to our hearing. We are here in our Committee’s traditional 

role of oversight of government to evaluate the state of the Nation’s 

port security 1 year after Congress passed, and the President 

signed into law, the bipartisan SAFE Port Act. We are here both 

in terms of our traditional Homeland Security and Governmental 

Affairs Committee’s role of oversight, but also obviously as part of 

our responsibility to protect the security of the American people 

here at home. 

In that regard, it is very satisfying to be able to say—and I believe our witnesses will corroborate—that implementation of the 

SAFE Port Act over the past 12 months has brought not just focus 

and energy to the mission of building a robust security regime domestically and abroad, but also a demonstrable improvement in 

port security. That is very important to our overall homeland security. 

In August, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) rated 

the progress with which the Department of Homeland Security was 

fulfilling its core missions. I suppose as the old joke goes, there was 

bad news and good news here. GAO did report that the Department had made ‘‘substantial’’ progress in just one of the 14 categories they mentioned, though there was some progress in some 

of the others. But the good news this morning is that the one area 

in which GAO reported substantial progress was maritime security. 

And there can be no doubt—there certainly is not in my mind— 

that the SAFE Port Act contributed to that high ranking. The GAO 

evaluation was especially good news given the challenges of securing our ports and the critical importance of doing so. 

2 

Since aviation security was dramatically improved after September 11, 2001, the experts have told us that terrorists may turn 

to the more vulnerable maritime sector to smuggle people into the 

United States or, obviously, to bring weapons into this country. 

Ninety-five percent of our international trade flows through the 

ports. In the post-September 11, 2001, era, we must provide sufficient security without interrupting what has been our normal emphasis with regard to the ports, which is the smooth flow of commerce. The GAO report, I think, relieves some of the concerns that 

we have had about this with regard to the ports. So it is good news. 

Now, does this mean we can step back and relax? Obviously not. 

Twenty-one thousand containers enter American ports every day. 

We are still physically inspecting just 5 or 6 percent of them, and 

there are other threats from the sea that we are only beginning to 

think about. For example, the Department of Homeland Security 

recently began a pilot project to detect radiation from small vessels 

entering our vast coastal waters outside of the major flow of commerce through established ports. 

From my perspective, I think we have to continue to pay particular attention to five key areas as we go forward from the higher 

plateau we have achieved for port security to improve our maritime 

security overall. And, briefly, those five are: 

First, the Secure Freight Initiative—the pilot program that was 

set up at three major foreign ports to test the feasibility of 100-percent scanning of cargo headed for the United States. Now, I want 

to clarify something because the terminology here can be confusing. 

I said earlier that only 5 to 6 percent of the containers coming in 

are inspected. Scanning uses imaging technology to identify the 

contents of the container. So the goal of the Secure Freight Initiative was to test the feasibility of doing 100-percent imaging of all 

containers, 100 percent, to identify their contents. 

The program was established by legislation, I am proud to say, 

that emanated from this Committee on which Senator Collins 

played a leading role. It has been implemented over the past year, 

and I think we can begin to draw some conclusions about its effectiveness. So today we will want to ask: Are foreign ports capable 

of this kind of blanket scanning? How is the requirement affecting 

the flow of commerce and at what cost? What are its limitations? 

Who conducts the scanning? And what checks are in place to ensure it is, in fact, a secure operation? 

Just this August, Congress enacted the second phase of our postSepember 11, 2001, reforms, again, based on legislation that we reported out of this Committee. The bill includes a provision calling 

for 100-percent cargo scanning by 2012, that is, of all cargo. We 

need to know if we are on the right track to achieve that, and the 

pilot programs and evaluations required by the SAFE Port Act will 

certainly help steer the Department toward achieving that goal. 

Second, it is time to assess the effectiveness of the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against 

Terrorism (C–TPAT). These two programs were established by the 

Department of Homeland Security in 2002 to screen—that is, to examine the paperwork describing the cargo—high-risk containers at 

overseas ports and, in concert with the private sector, to track containers as they traverse the oceans toward our ports. Three years 

3 

later, we need to determine whether these two programs have, in 

fact, helped to ensure the global supply chain is secure and create 

an expedited shipping process—or so-called GreenLane—into the 

United States. 

Third is the TWIC program, which stands for Transportation 

Worker Identification Credential—which is critically important to 

the security of our ports. The development of a Federal credential 

for all U.S. port workers, which would seem to be a natural, fundamental requirement for security, just as we have tried to impose 

in other areas of transportation, has been frustrated by technological and logistical problems. Approximately three-quarters of a 

million port workers need to be credentialed by a September 2008 

implementation deadline. So we all want to know if this program, 

including an adequate appeals process, will be able to process all 

those individuals by then and still keep our ports running. 

Fourth, we need to ensure that we are on schedule to create 

interagency operations centers at our major ports as required by 

the SAFE Port Act. These centers are designed to improve the collection and sharing of maritime security information at local ports 

as well as to coordinate among Federal, State, and local partners. 

So far, actual centers have been set up in Charleston, South Carolina; San Diego, California; and Miami, Florida; and a virtual center exists at the port of New York. I will report that my staff has 

toured the operation center in Charleston and was impressed by 

the information sharing and coordination going on among the Department of Homeland Security personnel, Department of Justice 

personnel, and State and local officials. But I will have some questions about that program. 

Fifth, and finally, I want to draw attention to the work of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), which was created by 

President Bush in 2005 and formally authorized by Congress under 

the SAFE Port Act. DNDO’s purpose is a critical one, which is to 

develop, test, evaluate, and deploy a nuclear radiation detection architecture across this Nation, including at our major ports, in order 

to prevent the nightmare scenario of a smuggled nuclear or 

radiobiological device—a so-called dirty bomb. Secretary Chertoff 

has said that the prevention of a nuclear or dirty bomb detonation 

is, in his opinion, the Department of Homeland Security’s number 

one priority, which means that successful deployment of the radiation detection monitors must be the single most important immediate task that the Department of Homeland Security has. 

We have been conducting, and will continue to conduct, careful 

oversight of this project because these radiation portal monitors absolutely must work. Success obviously will depend upon the effectiveness of the technology, but DNDO must also work closely with 

Customs and Border Patrol to ensure that there is a seamless 

hand-off from one agency to the other. 

Bottom line, both the GAO report on maritime security, which 

had a lot of good news about progress made, and even these five 

areas in which I and other Members of the Committee will have 

questions nonetheless showed that there has been an enormous 

amount of activity that has gone on since September 11, 2001, to 

secure our ports and the rest of our homeland from a potential terrorist attack. And it is why we say with some confidence that 

4 

America is a lot more secure today than it was on September 11, 

2001, although we all agree that we are not as secure as we want 

to be. The fact that there has not been, thank God, another terrorist attack on the United States is, of course, in part good fortune, but it is also because we have raised our guard, both through 

the Department and through the reform of our national intelligence 

agencies. 

So it is in that combined sense of gratitude and shared understanding that we have a lot of work to do that I welcome the witnesses today, particularly Assistant Secretary Stewart Baker, who 

has worked very closely with this Committee and who has been a 

key figure in determining the direction of a number of the port security programs that we will discuss today. 

I cannot resist saying, Secretary Baker, that I look forward to 

the day, hopefully not too far away, when I can greet you as the 

Under Secretary for Policy, not just the Assistant Secretary. As you 

know, we remain supportive of the efforts of the Department to elevate your position to that level of Under Secretary, and I will continue to do all I can to assist in that endeavor. Thank you. 

Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

holding this important hearing today. 

Just a year ago, the SAFE Port Act was signed into law. As the 

Chairman indicated, I was the co-author of this legislation, along 

with the Chairman, Senator Murray, and Senator Coleman, who 

did extensive work on this issue as well in his capacity as Chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. 

This law was a necessary response to our heightened security 

concerns. As the Chairman indicated, about 95 percent of our foreign trade enters the United States through our seaports, including 

more than 11 million containers a year. Ports are tempting targets 

for those trying to move explosives, biological and chemical toxins, 

radiological and nuclear weapons, or even terrorists themselves 

into our country. In fact, each of these containers has the potential 

to be the Trojan Horse of the 21st Century. An attack on one of 

our ports could cause tremendous loss of life and damage to critical 

infrastructure. It also could have a devastating effect on our entire 

economy—disrupting commodity shipments, material for manufacturers, and products headed to market. The SAFE Port Act addresses these vulnerabilities. 

Soon after the Act’s signing, the Department of Homeland Security began implementing its port security enhancements. The Act 

strengthened two important programs: The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C–TPAT) program and the Container 

Security Initiative (CSI). 

C–TPAT requires importers to adopt security enhancements in 

exchange for fewer inspections and, when warranted, prioritized inspections. A recent survey of C–TPAT members demonstrated that 

after joining the program, they doubled their average expenditures 

on supply-chain security. This is clear evidence that this program 

is working. 

5 

CSI places U.S. Customs inspectors in foreign ports to target 

high-risk cargo and to ensure that it is inspected before heading to 

the United States. In the last year, DHS has continued to expand 

that program strategically and now has inspectors in 58 foreign 

ports that account for 85 percent of cargo shipped to the United 

States. 

Here on American soil, DHS also has installed more than 1,000 

radiation portal monitors at critical seaports and land ports of 

entry to detect radiation before containers are allowed to enter the 

domestic supply chain. As required by the Act, by the end of this 

year, DHS will scan at least 98 percent of cargo for radiation at 

our major seaports. 

DHS has also established the Secure Freight Initiative to develop 

and test integrated scanning systems that combine radiation-detection equipment and non-intrusive X-ray machines in seven foreign 

ports. Three of these ports—in Honduras, Pakistan, and England— 

will scan 100 percent of their U.S.-bound cargo, which will allow 

us to evaluate the technological and other challenges. This will fulfill the law’s requirement for pilot projects in three foreign ports. 

Beyond that statutory requirement, limited operational testing 

will take place in four other foreign ports. This testing will provide 

us with important information to help address the technical and 

logistical challenges associated with larger and more complex ports. 

Until this technology is proven through these pilot projects, I continue to believe that requiring the scanning of all cargo bound for 

the United States at every foreign port is misguided. It is contrary 

to the whole risk-based, layered system of security that was established by the SAFE Port Act, which required a focus on high-risk 

cargo and implemented a requirement for 100-percent scanning of 

all cargo designated as high risk. The SAFE Port Act also authorized $400 million in port security grants for 5 years, totaling $2 billion. As we will hear this morning 

from Captain Jeff Monroe, the Director of Ports and Transportation 

in Portland, Maine, this funding has already produced significant 

improvements to the security of our ports. It is important that Congress took this multi-year approach because it will allow our ports 

to pursue multi-year security projects. 

I am also pleased that DHS met the July deadline for issuing a 

Strategy for Enhancing International Supply Chain Security. This 

strategy document addresses all aspects of container security, from 

the packing at a foreign plant, to the arrival at a U.S. port, to the 

entrance into the national transportation system, to its destination 

at a retail business or manufacturing plant. 

I am, however, concerned and share the concerns of the Chairman that there is a key aspect missing from this strategy, and that 

is that it does not detail how the private sector will be involved in 

responding to and recovering from a port security incident. Since 

port terminals and the relevant recovery equipment are almost entirely in the hands of the private sector, I believe this is a significant omission. 

Another area where I am concerned that DHS has not made the 

progress we would like is in the area of the TWIC card, as the 

Chairman has indicated. It is obviously critical that we know who 

is gaining access to secure areas of our ports, and many deadlines 

6 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Baker appears in the Appendix on page 37. 

have been missed with regard to the TWIC program. Ten ports 

were supposed to be online by July of this year. That deadline obviously has not been met. And the first enrollment center for TWIC 

cards has only been open today, in Wilmington, Delaware. Although DHS has announced that 12 enrollment centers will be 

operational this year, the Department will almost certainly miss 

the January 2008 deadline for TWIC implementation at another 40 

ports. 

This also raises very practical questions for those serving in the 

merchant marine, for those working at our ports, as far as how 

they are going to be able to comply with the mandates in the law 

requiring their enrollment if DHS does not yet have the infrastructure up and running. 

Nevertheless, I certainly agree with the GAO, with the Chairman, and with other experts that the Department has made significant progress in improving security at our Nation’s seaports and at 

foreign ports as well. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Collins. Thanks for 

that very thoughtful statement. 

I want to thank our colleagues Senator Akaka and Senator Coleman for being here. We will now go to Mr. Baker. 

Mr. Baker, thanks for being here. You have had quite a distinguished career in public service, most recently in this position since 

October 7, 2005. We appreciate that you are here today, and we 

look forward to your testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. STEWART A. BAKER,1 ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. BAKER. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman and Ranking Member Collins, Senator Akaka, and Senator Coleman. It really is a 

pleasure to be here on the anniversary of the SAFE Port Act, particularly because this is an Act that is so typical of this Committee’s work—bipartisan, overwhelmingly approved, a doable set of 

challenging but achievable goals set, and something that we have 

been implementing with enthusiasm since the SAFE Port Act 

passed. 

Overall, I would say, as the Chairman said, we have done relatively well in implementing the Act, though there are plenty of 

challenges ahead. By our count, there were over 100 mandates in 

the SAFE Port Act. Almost 50 of them are now completed, again, 

by our count. And of the remainder, the overwhelming majority are 

on track, on schedule, and we expect to be able to complete them. 

The kinds of things that we have managed to do, you touched on 

some of them. The Secure Freight Initiative pilots are up and running, and we are gathering information today about how to actually 

implement a 100-percent scanning and a 100-percent radiation 

monitoring check on all of the freight bound for the United States. 

That is going to teach us a great deal about the much bigger challenge that we have ahead as we expand that to other ports. 

7 

Our foreign port assessments, security assessments, are now 

being performed on a 2-year schedule. We have caught up and expect to be able to do all of our foreign port assessments on the 

schedule that the statute mandates. Ninety-eight percent of the 

containers that now come into our ports will be put through radiation portal monitors. And as Senator Collins said, we have put out 

a national strategy for the supply chain security, and I will be glad 

to talk shortly about the resumption of trade protocols. 

All that said, there are some challenges that we face and deadlines that we have not met, and I would not want to open this testimony without acknowledging those difficulties. Before I talk 

about the specifics, I would like to put one image in your head. 

Imagine the entire Mall from here to the Lincoln Memorial covered 

in containers two or three stories deep. Every day in this country, 

we have to fill them all two or three times over and then empty 

it again and fill it up the next day and empty it again. That is the 

number of containers that come into the country each day. We have 

to make sure that those containers continue to flow to meet the essential demands of our commerce. That is the first thing that we 

have to deal with. 

The other two issues that I think have influenced our ability to 

get done everything that we wanted to get done is the fact that, 

as I think I said in the testimony, there are a couple of things you 

cannot rush. Technology, especially if you are trying cutting-edge 

technology, needs to be implemented step by step, and you have to 

recognize that from time to time you have to take a step back or 

two in order to meet the requirements of the technology and to 

make sure that it actually functions as is necessary, particularly in 

contexts where people’s livelihoods, their ability to meet contracts, 

depend on the smooth flow of traffic. 

And the other thing that cannot be rushed is diplomacy. Not 

every country puts the same priority we do on checking cargo. Not 

every participant in the trade has the same enthusiasm for additional security measures that we have. And we need to be able to 

persuade shippers and importers and foreign governments that it 

is in their interest to cooperate with our security measures. We 

have made great progress in doing that, but at every step of the 

way, we have to make that case, and sometimes it takes longer to 

make that case than we would like. 

Briefly, I will talk about some of the areas where I think we still 

have work to do. As you said, the Transportation Worker Identification Credential is a very complex undertaking that is behind 

schedule by some months. It is probably the most sophisticated biometric credential that anyone has tried to introduce in the entire 

industry. These cards have to be capable of being read not just at 

one port but at many ports. Unpredictably, people may move from 

one port to another. They all have to be able to get into the port 

quickly and smoothly. 

We pioneered some standards in constructing the TWIC system, 

and in a few cases, we pioneered what turned out to be the Beta 

videotape system, which slowed us down a little, but we are now 

implementing under a standard that is supported by the National 

Institute of Standards and Technology and which we think will be 

a very effective mechanism for identifying people as they enter on 

8 

our ports. And as both Senators I think indicated, we have begun 

enrolling people at the first port of Wilmington today, and we will 

be moving on to begin enrollment at Corpus Christi and then 

Baton Rouge, Honolulu, Oakland, Tacoma, Beaumont, and port 

after port. 

We do believe that we can get everyone enrolled by September, 

and while that will be a challenge, so far things have gone smoothly, and we believe that the system we have in place will produce 

enrollments and the issuance of cards in that period of time. 

We still have work to do to get the readers up and running. We 

have begun pilots to make sure that those readers are actually 

functioning in some very demanding environments—New York, 

Long Beach, Los Angeles. And, again, we are proceeding step by 

step. In a few cases, we have had to take a step or two back in 

order to make further progress. But I see no show stoppers in our 

rollout of TWIC. We may have to slow down if we encounter problems. I am always aware that for three-quarters of a million people 

or more, the most important thing in their life after their families 

is getting up and going to work at a port. And we cannot get in 

the way of their ability to earn a livelihood unless they actually 

pose a security risk. So we are bearing that in mind. It is a constant concern. 

Two other challenges, and, again, you have touched on both of 

them. Our pilot programs to test 100-percent scanning are up and 

running. We are learning a lot, and the lessons for that are going 

to be enormously valuable as we try to meet the statutory requirement of achieving 100-percent scanning. 

I, too, am daunted by the prospect of 100-percent scanning in 

every port. We will pursue that aggressively. It is a statutory mandate, and we believe that we can make a big dent in that and perhaps achieve it if everything goes right. But there are many unknowns there, and our pilots are showing us how complex the challenge is, even as they show us some successes. 

And, finally, the container security device issue is something that 

we are looking at quite closely. We have been slow to release a requirement for the adoption of container security devices, either as 

a requirement generally or as a requirement for membership in the 

top tier of C–TPAT. They are a very interesting technology. They 

tell us something important. They tell us whether the doors have 

been opened in the traditional way. They do not tell us whether a 

container’s security has been breached because there are many 

ways to breach the security of the container. But they do tell us 

when the doors have been opened, and they have value in particular in areas where we know the container was secure at Point 

A, and it has now been moved to Point B, and we want to know 

whether the doors have been opened. If there was no reason for 

those doors to be opened, then the container security device can tell 

us something very valuable. 

We are still trying to determine what part of the trade, what 

part of the supply chain it makes most sense to use that particular 

technology in. And we are working on standards and also coming 

up with scenarios and places where we can test those container security devices. And I expect to have that done in the next few 

9 

months so that we can actually begin some testing in the real 

world of these container security devices. 

I want to thank the Committee. All of these challenges are going 

to be difficult ones, but this is a Committee that has been supportive and understanding as well as demanding as we have tried 

to meet those requirements. And I look forward to talking to you 

as we continue to do that. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Secretary Baker. We 

will do 7-minute rounds of questioning. 

Let me begin with a baseline question to you and ask for a relatively brief response because you could go on all morning. 

We are asking you to do a lot to secure our ports. We are asking 

private sector participants to spend a lot of money, as has been 

said this morning, to better secure our ports. Is it worth it? In 

other words, have we made a correct judgment or is this, as every 

now and then I hear somebody suggest, an overreaction to September 11, 2001? 

Mr. BAKER. I think it has been worth it so far. We faced the prospect on September 12, 2001, that someone who had a nuclear 

weapon or a serious weapon of any sort could simply use our supply chain to deliver it within a block of where they wanted it to 

go off and do so from virtually any country in the world. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. BAKER. It is very difficult for that to happen. No terrorist organization can have confidence that they can use our supply chain 

against us now. And that is a very important step forward. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I appreciate the answer. Of course, I 

agree with it. And also, as I mentioned in my opening statement, 

I appreciate that the Department is now beginning to not only 

think about but deploy detection devices aimed at stopping both 

terrorists and weapons from coming into areas of our coastal waters that are not really ports. We are blessed with a large country 

with enormous coastal areas, and so there is a natural way—this 

is the old question that the 9/11 Commission talked about—a failure of imagination before September 11, 2001, to imagine that people could do this. 

So as we close and secure our ports, there is a temptation for a 

terrorist to try to bring devices in elsewhere. And I appreciate very 

much that the Department has moved to that area as well. 

I want to go to the SAFE Port Act, which, as you have indicated, 

required the Department to implement a pilot program to scan all 

cargo containers within a year. Just this past Friday, DHS announced that the Secure Freight Initiative pilot begun last December is now fully operational, scanning 100 percent of the containers 

at the three main ports selected as required by law. They are 

Southampton Container Terminal in the United Kingdom, Port 

Qasim in Pakistan, and Port Cortes in Honduras. I know that you 

are working on an additional pilot program at four additional ports, 

though in a more limited capacity. 

The initial report to Congress evaluating lessons derived from 

the pilot program is not due for another 6 months, but I want to 

ask you this morning if you or the Department has already been 

able to learn some things from the pilot since the scanning at the 

three ports has been going on for several weeks now. So that is my 

10 

1The poster referenced by Mr. Baker appears in the Appendix on page 106. 

question. What, if anything, can you say are the lessons learned 

thus far from the pilot? 

Mr. BAKER. I would be glad to address that. If you would give 

me a little bit of time, I can actually do a show-and-tell, because 

I think one of the most useful things that we have encountered is 

that we have actually begun to bring back integrated data that 

pulls together the information that we are getting from the trade 

about the container and the scan and the radiation portal monitor 

so that we can display them in one place for analysts to say, looking at this entire package, am I concerned enough to stop them and 

ask for further security measures. I put up on the easel—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. This was not pre-rehearsed. 

Mr. BAKER. No, it was not. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. OK. 

Mr. BAKER. But when I saw what we were getting, I said that 

the Senators would want to see this. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Are these at terminals at the ports or 

back here in Washington? 

Mr. BAKER. Both. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Both? Great. 

Mr. BAKER. So this is actually what is seen by an analyst here 

in our National Targeting Center in Virginia for a shipment from 

Qasim to the United States.1 And I cannot resist using my laser, 

but this is the X-ray, the scan of the contents of the container. 

Over here you can see the description—you cannot read it, I do 

not think, but—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. We have copies up here. 

Mr. BAKER. OK. So you see that there is a description of the container, it is sheets, and—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Pillowcases. 

Mr. BAKER. Yes. So if we saw one big, large, dark object in the 

scan, we would say, ‘‘Well, that does not look like a sheet or a pillowcase to me.’’ And then below you can see the results of the radiation scan, which does not get above a level that would lead to an 

alarm. And all of this is available, plus additional information on 

the additional tabs that you can see along the top here that the analysts can call on to further investigate if there is something that 

leads them to want to know, Well, what could that object be that 

I am seeing on the scan? 

So it is a very effective IT integration program that is already 

in operation, and I am actually quite pleased. IT integration always 

sounds like a great idea, and it often is much harder to do than 

you expect. And the fact that we have been able to do it as quickly 

as this I think makes us feel more comfortable about our ability to 

do this more generally as we move to broader scanning. There are 

other successes. I think traffic is moving fairly well, but I would 

suggest that we wait until we have had a longer period of evaluation to say that we think we can move the traffic smoothly. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thus far, any unexpected advantages or 

unanticipated negative consequences or challenges? 

Mr. BAKER. One of the interesting questions is how do people 

who are actually shipping goods feel about this, and I think very 

11 

early reads suggest a wide variety of reactions. In Pakistan, there 

are apparently shippers who prefer now to ship from Qasim, where 

we have this facility, as a way of reducing the likelihood that they 

will be stopped in the United States. But in Cortes, we have heard 

reports that some people are moving their shipment to other ports 

because there is a charge that goes with this and they want to 

avoid the charge. So I think that suggests that this is going to be 

a very complex set of effects when we begin rolling this out more 

broadly. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks. My time is up. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Secretary Baker, I want to follow up on the issues with the 

TWIC card. In his testimony later this morning, Captain Monroe, 

the Director of Ports for Portland, Maine, will make the point that 

the aviation system was able to clear and credential hundreds of 

thousands of workers in a relatively short time. And that was a 

point that was made to me by a group of airport directors from 

around the country. 

Now it appears that we are going to two separate systems for 

aviation versus our ports, and 6 years after the attacks on our 

country, in contrast to the aviation system, we still do not have the 

TWIC card in place. 

Why not look at piggybacking onto the system that has been 

used successfully by our airports? And why not have one system so 

that individuals do not have to get multiple credentials? 

Mr. BAKER. I think those are fair observations, and we have 

looked at the possibility and I think will look if we run into trouble 

again at the possibility of changing our approach now. 

Our general belief in this circumstance has been that, first, the 

amount of cross traffic between the airports and ports has been relatively limited. The port problem turns out to be much more complicated in many respects than the airport problem because in most 

cases airport workers work at one airport, whereas with ports you 

have truck drivers, in particular, and sometimes longshoremen who 

will move from port to port, who will do work at different ports, 

and who need to be credentialed to what amount to very decentralized systems. One port does not have to have an infrastructure connection to another port. But we need to be able to credential people 

in ways that allow them to be admitted to one port relatively easily 

if they happen to move from another. 

That has accounted for some of the differences in approach and, 

I have to say, some of the complexity of the credentialing task— 

that plus the fact that we are doing a fairly elaborate set of biometrics in an environment that is less controlled and more hostile. 

There is more humidity and more salt in the air at our ports, and 

we are trying to get more people through with many fewer of our 

white-collar workers than in an airport context. 

I think those account for the differences. That is not to say that 

in the long run we would not want to bring the programs closer together, or if we have bad luck with the program, which we currently believe is on track, we would go back and look at it. But at 

this point, we have a rollout strategy. We have a set of technology 

standards. People are enrolling and building the cards. I think it 

would set us back if we tried to switch gears again. 

12 

Senator COLLINS. I am very concerned not only about the homeland security aspects of dangerous materials coming into this country, but also about the impact on consumers. All of us are very 

aware of the recalls of dangerous toys from China and other products that have made the news recently. And it seems to me that 

the Department of Homeland Security has an important role to 

play in protecting consumers from dangerous products as well as 

protecting all citizens from possible terrorist attacks. 

For more than a year, the Department has stated its intention 

to issue a rule that would require importers to provide additional 

information before products are loaded onto vessels overseas. And 

DHS already uses some of that information as part of its automated targeting system. But one of the pieces of information that 

would be required under the proposed rule is the manufacturer’s 

name and address, and I am concerned about the vulnerability 

posed by the delay in requiring that information, not only because 

of its impact for helping you to target high-risk cargo, but also because it would allow Customs and Border Protection to target untested manufacturers who may be shipping potentially dangerous 

consumer products, including children’s toys. It would allow CBP 

to do additional safety screening if it knew that it was dealing with 

either unknown manufacturers that are not trusted yet or those 

with a history of violations. 

Could you tell the Committee when you expect that this rule, 

which is referred to as the ‘‘Advanced Trade Data Element Rule,’’ 

which will require more information about the manufacturer, will 

be published? 

Mr. BAKER. Thank you, Senator. Let me start by saying I completely agree with you about the importance of this rule. It is a valuable part of our effort to push our borders out and to try to catch 

suspect cargo before it gets close to our ports. And having this kind 

of information, some of which we get now but which we are not 

guaranteed to get, in a way we can count on is an enormously valuable part of our strategy. 

At the same time, it is a new regulatory burden on importers and 

shippers, and it requires them to make changes in their information technology systems and to get the information to us. And so 

as I said at the start, it is important for us to do our diplomacy 

and to make sure that we have persuaded people that this is a reasonable requirement. We have been working with the trade for 

some time, and I think that generally the trade has acknowledged 

that of all of the security measures that we are working on now, 

this is probably the least expensive and the most valuable to us. 

We currently expect to get that rule to the Office of Management 

and Budget within 2 weeks. That is our target. It is one of our top 

10 priority regulations to get done in the next year because of its 

value for a screening program that will allow us to do 100-percent 

screening in an effective way. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. Senator Akaka. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to 

commend you and the Ranking Member for working to improve our 

13 

port security in our country and in other countries as well. I cannot 

emphasize enough that Hawaii’s port system is critical to the economic life and health of my State, as you know. We depend entirely 

on the ocean shipping industry to import essential commodities. 

Any interruption in commerce, of course, would certainly hurt Hawaii. So I welcome this opportunity to hear your testimony and to 

ask you questions about our port security act. 

Mr. Baker, we have heard today about the progress made by 

DHS in implementation of provisions of the SAFE Port Act. Last 

week, the Commerce Committee heard similar things. However, I 

am concerned that a number of important policy issues have not 

been adequately discussed or decided yet. These policy issues have 

held up progress in many fronts, and I am glad you mentioned the 

workforce. 

With regard to TWIC, it is my understanding that the manufacturers of card readers do not have access to actual TWIC cards. 

They will only be available to maritime industry employees. If they 

do not have access to those cards, they clearly cannot test the readers. 

Mr. Baker, will DHS make TWIC cards available to the card 

reader manufacturers so that they can properly implement their 

testing? 

Mr. BAKER. I am not familiar with that concern, but I frankly 

share your puzzlement. We are in the process of enrolling people 

today. We will then begin issuing cards very shortly thereafter so 

that there will be cards available to workers within a month. And 

there should not be any reason why we cannot test the readers 

with real cards. 

So I am not familiar with any reports that would suggest that 

the reader manufacturers are not able to test the cards now because the cards are going to be in production momentarily. 

Senator AKAKA. I see. And the importance of that, of course, is 

the Transportation Worker Identification Credentials. 

Mr. BAKER. Absolutely. 

Senator AKAKA. An important issue is whether or not the Coast 

Guard also, Mr. Baker, will require a 100-percent biometric identification rate. Many in the industry have emphasized the need to 

use biometric identification all the time because if someone loses 

his or her TWIC card, anyone can pick it up and use it since there 

will no longer be guards physically present to verify the picture or 

the card. Right now, the Coast Guard policy is to use biometric 

identification only at high-risk ports or when there is an elevated 

MARSEC level. In addition, these systems are also costly to the 

ports. If they are not used 100 percent of the time, it would be difficult for the ports to justify spending the money to build the infrastructure when they could be using it for something else. 

So can you tell me the rationale for not using biometric identification 100 percent of the time? 

Mr. BAKER. We certainly have designed the cards so that biometrics are the standard, and it is possible to use the cards with 

a biometric at all times. And it would be my expectation that would 

be the norm. I am always wary of saying anything will be 100 percent because you have to account for unusual circumstances, and, 

again, we do not want to be in a position of saying no one works 

14 

today because the biometric system is down, particularly if you 

have got back-ups that include such things as PIN numbers that 

would allow people to verify that they actually have unique knowledge that cannot be obtained by someone just picking up a card on 

the ground. 

So I am cautious about saying it should be 100 percent, but it 

is our expectation that the norm will be biometrics. 

Senator AKAKA. An outstanding policy that DHS has not yet 

made is related to the use of positive access control. The use of 

positive access control could have implications for the cruise industry as well, a big part of Hawaii’s tourism sector. Cruise terminal 

porters must move passengers’ bags in and out of secured areas 

quickly. The need to scan them into and out of secured areas could 

impact how quickly and how efficiently they can do their jobs. In 

fact, the aviation industry, also a very high-risk transportation sector, does not require positive access control. Instead, they use a visual challenge program instead. 

With this in mind, Mr. Baker, when do you expect DHS to make 

a decision regarding the use of positive access control at the ports? 

Mr. BAKER. Well, I think this ties back to my earlier suggestion 

that it is always dangerous to say this will be 100 percent. There 

may well be circumstances where you need to be able to make an 

accommodation so that people can move quickly back and forth 

across the line and not have to stop and do the biometrics at every 

stage. We would not say we have rejected that out of hand. There 

may be circumstances where that will be necessary to do. But I do 

not want to prejudge that. That is the sort of thing that ought to 

be decided with the captain of the port as part of a security plan 

for the entire port. 

Senator AKAKA. You mentioned that on scanning containers you 

have already come to 98 percent. What is the 2 percent? 

Mr. BAKER. The 2 percent, generally, is ports that are so small 

that containers rarely come through and it does not make sense to 

have a portal sitting there like the Maytag repairman waiting for 

somebody to go through. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Akaka. And, of course, 

that 98 percent is for radiation. 

Mr. BAKER. It is. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. Senator Coleman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLEMAN 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would also 

like to associate myself with the preliminary comments of the 

Ranking Member, particularly in regard to the pilot programs and 

the prospect of 100-percent screening. We all want to get there. We 

want to get a system that works. I think as you said, you cannot 

rush implementation and new technology. We need to rush, but it 

does need to work. I am very interested in looking at the results 

from the pilot projects, but I just want to put myself on record as 

being in accord with the Ranking Member. 

On the pilot programs, have we been experiencing any bottlenecks, any slow-ups in any of what we have seen to date? 

15 

Mr. BAKER. In general, we have not had too many slow-ups. We 

have had weather-related surprises. It gets very hot in Pakistan, 

well over 110 degrees, and that has caused some surprises with the 

gear. We have had cloudbursts in Honduras that have caused difficulties with the scanning machines. So we have certainly had surprises. But on the whole, the layouts, while they have been different in every port, have allowed us to move people pretty well. 

Senator COLEMAN. Do you anticipate if we move to higher-volume ports that we would have the same kind of results on the 

issues here? 

Mr. BAKER. No. As people in the Coast Guard keep reminding 

me, if you have seen one port, you have seen one port. [Laughter.] 

The layouts are completely different at every one of these ports, 

and how they have squeezed in all of the equipment varies from 

place to place. And in some cases, it is an elaborate ballet that you 

have to perform to get your goods through the lanes. 

As soon as you go from one lane to multiple lanes—and some of 

the ports have 40 or more lanes—it becomes much more complex 

to do the scanning and the portal monitor checks. And even more 

difficult is transshipment because in some cases you have cranes 

just picking the container up and moving it directly from one ship 

to another. It is not clear where you are going to do your scanning 

and your screening on those containers. 

So I think we are going to encounter a lot of complexity as we 

move to bigger ports, and we are trying one lane in a few of these 

big, complex ports, but trying to move to a full coverage for a port 

like Hong Kong is going to be very difficult. 

Senator COLEMAN. I believe the original ISIS program in Hong 

Kong had a very small number of lanes. 

Mr. BAKER. Yes, that is correct. And, again, in Hong Kong, to 

show you the sorts of surprises you can encounter, we discovered 

the cement that they were using to pave the port gave off enough 

natural radiation that it was setting off the alarm regularly. So 

there are 100 problems that we will have to solve port by port. 

Senator COLEMAN. I would like at some point to discuss this further, but are there technological bases that you need, infrastructure bases? I want to get an overall sense as you go beyond the 

pilot project and kind of analyze that and understand what we 

have to deal with. 

Talking about technology changes. I saw this technology a number of years ago, and it moves quickly. How adaptable are the pilots that we have and as we look to the future to ship with new 

technology? Or are we wedded to a particular technology? Are we 

open to technological shifts? And how easily can they be accommodated? 

Mr. BAKER. I think we have tried to build that in. And, of course, 

you never know for sure, but we have tried to build in the possibility of changes in the technology. For example, the radiation portal monitors that we have used abroad have been relatively 

undiscriminating in the kinds of radiation that they detect. And 

there is a second generation that is much better at identifying the 

kinds of radiation we are most worried about. We can install that 

in general in places that currently use the old technology, or we 

can add it as an add-on for particular checks. 

16 

The scanning equipment, I would say the most promising new 

technologies there are in software that can identify anomalies, and 

then, again, I think we can use the existing infrastructure and 

then just make the software better. 

Senator COLEMAN. I want to get to a micro focus on the TWIC 

issue, but just one other question. Does the scanning help us to 

identify whether there are shielded materials? The concern I have 

with some of the radiological materials, if they are shielded, even 

the best equipment we have does not have the capacity to detect 

that, at least as I understand it. 

Mr. BAKER. The equipment that would say is there radiation 

coming from this container, no, it can be shielded so that you cannot do that. But then that picture that we are looking at here, 

there would be a big black spot. And so the combination—— 

Senator COLEMAN. The combined systems give us an edge that 

we have not had before. The TWIC program, I was talking to a 

fishing guide in northern Minnesota; they need TWIC cards. Here 

we are talking about implementing a system, and this is a guy that 

is taking vacationers to fish for walleye up in Warroad, Minnesota. 

I also talk to barge operators talking about the size of their operations and some of the issues that they have—student workers who 

work for 2 or 3 months, and it takes 2 or 3 months to get a card. 

Clearly, we are looking at the major ports. 

Can you talk a little bit about how we do not get bogged down 

in dealing with small-boat operators, the tugboat industry, and student workers? Is somebody working on that stuff? 

Mr. BAKER. Yes. Obviously, our biggest job is to get the people 

who regularly work there through the process, and that is a big job 

and takes time. Once we are there, we are only talking about the 

new hires that have to go through the process, and there is nothing 

about the process that inherently takes months. We are giving people months now because it is a big new job for everybody to line 

up and enroll. We can do this much more quickly for new hires 

once we are through with the great bulk of the work. 

There is a hard line that you have to draw. People who only occasionally come on to a port can be escorted by someone with a TWIC 

card, and I do not think that will change. Is there going to be a 

class of people who say, ‘‘I want to be able to go regularly on the 

port, but I do not want to have to’’—— 

Senator COLEMAN. If I may interrupt, the problem is we have an 

image of a port, the port of L.A., or the port of New York. If you 

are a guide in Minnesota, technically we have international borders 

there, but there really is not a port. You are taking a fishing boat 

out of a dock and taking somebody fishing, and you have to have 

a TWIC card. 

Mr. BAKER. That is a fair question, and let me look at that. I am 

not familiar with how far down we go in our definition of ‘‘port.’’ 

I cannot believe we cover canoes, but—— 

Senator COLEMAN. You just may, is the concern. I can tell you 

that for these folks, they are going to travel a couple of hours to 

Duluth to the main area to go pick up a card to be able to take 

somebody fishing on a lake between Minnesota and Canada. Big 

Government sometimes forgets about the impact on that little guy, 

and we talk to those little guys. 

17 

Mr. BAKER. I appreciate your bringing that to my attention. Let 

me take a look at that. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Secretary Baker. I have a lot 

more questions I would like to ask. I think I would like to ask one 

more and submit the rest to you in writing. 

I wanted to ask you to talk a little bit more about the Domestic 

Nuclear Detection Office, to which, as I said earlier, Secretary 

Chertoff gives great priority, and I agree with him, and just to 

point out this is a detection program of nuclear devices coming into 

America by terrorists, potentially, that goes beyond the ports, but 

the ports are involved. 

First, I know you are testing the technology. How soon do you 

think you will be able to report to Congress on how that is going? 

Second, this has to involve integration of different organizations, 

some that protect land entrance, some Federal agencies that take 

care of the ports, and then obviously if we are looking at major cities, for instance, we will be dealing with State and local law enforcers. So if you could give a short answer to both parts of that question. 

Mr. BAKER. OK. First, I would like to say the same thing that 

the Secretary has said. This is one of our worst nightmares. DNDO 

has been enormously effective in identifying that as the problem 

and asking how are our solutions. And as you said, we have a number of solutions in place for containers and commercial shipping, 

and that ought to then be the benchmark in which we say do we 

have the same level of protection for small boats, for general aviation, for all the other ways in which terrorists might bring nuclear 

weapons into the country. And DNDO, with its focus, has been single-minded in asking questions that do not fall into one organizational responsibility to say, OK, well, let us think like a terrorist: 

What is our response? How do we prevent people from bringing it 

in this way or that way? So they have been enormously helpful in 

broadening out the focus of our components. 

They have been doing testing, as you know, already, and we are 

about to begin actual testing in place. So I do not know what our 

current schedule is for getting you a report on the actual implementation testing. But I will get you an answer to that in writing. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Fine. 

Mr. BAKER. Organizationally, as I say, I think their focus has 

been research, procurement, and making sure people are thinking 

about the threat in a coherent way. And in all those respects, they 

have done an excellent job. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And you believe that they are integrating 

the different agencies that have overlapping responsibility? 

Mr. BAKER. Yes. For example, in some of our general aviation 

work and in our small boats initiatives, in both cases they were 

able to bring together TSA, CBP, and Coast Guard initiatives to 

say how do we build the best possible defenses against a nuclear 

weapon, and no one agency could have done that. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Fine. When you get back to us with the 

information about the test data, obviously part of it is when the 

GAO can begin to review it on our behalf. Thanks very much. 

18 

ANSWER FROM MR. BAKER TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION FROM 

SENATOR LIEBERMAN 

Question: Regarding DNDO testing of nuclear detection capability, what is the 

schedule for getting Congress a report on how the testing is progressing? 

Answer: On May 25, 2007, DNDO briefed your office on the classified results of 

the ASP Phase 1 testing. The Phase 3 Test Report, which will also be classified, 

is currently in final review within the Department, and the Blind Test Report is 

presently being prepared. DNDO would be happy to provide you with a status briefing on how the testing is progressing. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Secretary Baker, one of the most 

important provisions of the SAFE Port Act required the Department to develop protocols and a plan for restarting our ports in the 

event of an incident. We know from the West Coast dock strike of 

a few years back, which was an event that was both peaceful and 

anticipated, that the closure of ports can have enormous economic 

consequences. And if there were an attack on one of our ports, most 

likely for a time all ports would be shut down. And that is why we 

felt so strongly that we needed to have the Department engage in 

this plan, and the Department has done so. 

But as I referred to in my opening statement, the private sector 

entities have come to us to express concerns that there is not sufficient detail in the plan about the role that would be played by port 

authorities, by first responders, by those in the private sector, 

which, after all, own most of the emergency equipment as well as 

control our ports. 

What is the Department doing, having made a good first step in 

this area, to fill in the gaps and come up with a strategy that will 

ensure that we have a safe, logical, planned procedure for reopening our parts in the event of an attack? 

Mr. BAKER. That is an excellent question, and we are quite 

aware of the concern on the part of the trade about this. A couple 

of basic principles I think have governed what we have done so far, 

and we are at work on some more detailed documents that will give 

some further guidance. 

First, we do not want to do what the private trade should do. We 

are not going to be telling people, well go to this port, go to that 

port. In most circumstances, they have dispatchers who are much 

more capable of making those judgments than the government. 

The second principle I would say is that we have to be flexible 

about our plan, and here I think there is some inevitable frustration on the part of the trade. They would like nothing better than 

a guarantee that says within 3 days, if you are not the port that 

is attacked and you meet certain criteria, we will let you in without 

any change in procedures. The difficulty with that is that we do not 

know what kind of attack we are going to be recovering from, and 

if it is a simple explosion in a container, that is a different sort of 

attack than a nuclear weapon found in a container, or a biological 

weapon. So we cannot know for sure how we will reconstitute trade 

until we know what we are reconstituting from. So we cannot give 

them guarantees. 

We do think that—and this is what we are working on now—a 

critical element is for everyone in the trade to know what the communication chain is going to look like, that we will be reaching out 

and getting information from them about what they’re experiencing 

19 

as they try to make deliveries, and to give them all the guidance 

that we can to make sure that everyone gets news as quickly as 

possible about what we can say. If we can say certain ports are 

open and we are accepting cargo in those ports, then everyone 

should get that information quickly. If we are restricting certain 

kinds of cargo or cargo from certain destinations, then we need to 

get that information out. 

So what we will be building as a resumption of trade protocol 

will focus on the communications lines and some basic principles 

of the sort that I have been talking about. I hope that will make 

the trade more comfortable, but I think there is probably an inevitable divergence because the trade would like guarantees that we 

cannot responsibly give to them. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Collins. Senator Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

A lot of stuff comes into this country in a non-containerized form: 

Automobiles, petroleum products, and dry bulk goods. Is CBP considering a CSI-like program for non-containerized forms of maritime cargo? 

Mr. BAKER. We have a variety of programs for those products. It 

is harder to have a single program because it varies so much. If 

it is scrap steel, it has one profile, and if it is petroleum, it is a 

completely different profile. And so we have had to work individually with shippers of particular products to determine that the 

supply chain is such that we are comfortable with it. 

It is a little less likely that someone would sneak a weapon into 

some of these shipments, but you cannot rule it out for certain 

kinds of shipments where the handling is gentle enough that a 

weapon could reasonably be expected to get through. But with 

those sorts of products, we have to very substantially vary our security measures according to the nature of the cargo. 

Senator COLEMAN. I appreciate it. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Coleman. 

Secretary Baker, thanks for your testimony. Very thoughtful. I 

always have the feeling when I hear you again this morning that 

you are on top of things, and just hearing the way in which we are 

talking about some of these scenarios, including the discussion of 

potential nuclear attack on the United States via weapons smuggled in by terrorists, it is unsettling, of course, in one sense. It also, 

I think, reassures us that people in important positions like your 

own are not going to be guilty of another failure of imagination. 

That is, to imagine the extremes that our enemies might go to inflict damage on us personally and our country. 

So I thank you for that. This is, as I say, good news. We appreciate what you have done so far. We are going to keep the pressure 

on. Most of all, we all have a common interest in seeing this work, 

and it is in that spirit that this Committee looks forward to continuing to work with you and everybody at the Department of 

Homeland Security. Thank you very much. 

Mr. BAKER. Thank you. 

20 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Lloyd appears in the Appendix on page 46. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The second panel, please. As you are coming up, I will introduce the panel members. We have two representatives from other offices of the Federal Government and a representative of local government. 

Reginald Lloyd is the U.S. Attorney for the District of South 

Carolina, whose office has been charged with coordinating the efforts at Project SeaHawk at the Port of Charleston, South Carolina. 

Stephen Caldwell is the Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues at the Government Accountability Office, and he has 

been responsible for conducting reviews of virtually every port security program the Department of Homeland Security has implemented. His work has been very important to this Committee. 

Captain Jeffrey Monroe is the Director of the Department of 

Ports and Transportation of the city of Portland, Maine. He has 

had a long and distinguished academic and professional career in 

the maritime and transportation sectors. 

We are grateful that you are all here. We look forward to your 

testimony now. I want to tell you, Mr. Lloyd, that I am sure I 

speak for Senator Collins and Senator Coleman, we know you have 

a big job being U.S. Attorney in South Carolina where Lindsey 

Graham resides, but we feel that you can take care of that and 

handle that effectively. 

To become more serious, he is our good friend and has a good 

sense of humor and shares our interest in homeland security. 

We welcome your testimony at this time. Mr. Lloyd. 

TESTIMONY OF REGINALD I. LLOYD,1 U.S. ATTORNEY, DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Mr. LLOYD. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Collins, 

Senator Coleman, Members of the Committee, it is an honor to appear before you today to talk about a port security initiative in 

Charleston, South Carolina, called ‘‘SeaHawk.’’ 

When I first became U.S. Attorney in South Carolina and 

learned about SeaHawk, the first question that I kept asking was: 

What value does SeaHawk bring to the port that did not exist before? What I learned is that while each Federal agency responsible 

for maritime security has a core mission at the port, there is no national standard to coordinate resources, operations, or intelligence 

with Federal agencies or with our State and local jurisdictions. 

This leads to potential gaps that may be exploitable by criminals 

or extremists. SeaHawk seeks to seal the seams between Federal, 

State, and local port security activities. It does not replace the good 

work of the Federal agencies at the port. Rather, it enhances their 

missions by integrating them through co-location, unity of command, innovative development of technology, and information sharing. 

I am proud to tell you, Members of the Committee, that since its 

establishment, Project SeaHawk has achieved many of its goals 

and objectives. We have established a full-time, multi-agency, colocated task force of Federal, State, and local law enforcement 

using a Unified Command structure for decisionmaking that helps 

21 

to promote cooperation and enhance information sharing and investigative resources. 

We have developed an intelligence section to provide support to 

law enforcement operations and investigations. We have created an 

Operations Center that provides situational awareness and resource coordination. We have developed and integrated and linked 

radiological detection and monitoring architecture. And we operate 

a proactive security mission to identify and deter criminal or extremist-related illicit activities. 

None of these accomplishments would have happened without 

the strong partnerships established among the agencies that secure 

our maritime borders. Full-time commitments to SeaHawk have 

been made from the U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Defense Criminal Investigative Service, the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division, 

and every State and local municipality around the port. 

SeaHawk’s mission is enhanced by its co-location and strong relationship with the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, as well as its 

integration with our South Carolina Fusion Center. We operate 

through a Unified Command structure where each agency brings 

unique resources that support SeaHawk’s operations. We also created a SeaHawk Executive Steering Committee to focus on longterm strategic goals that includes myself, the captain of the port, 

the port’s director, the chief of our State Law Enforcement Division, the FBI SAC, the resident ASAC for ICE, the Transportation 

Security Administration’s Federal Security Director, and all of the 

sheriffs and chiefs of police who have personnel dedicated to 

SeaHawk. 

One of the challenges was to create a screening process that 

would help the Unified Command to make decisions and allocate 

resources. This has been addressed through the development of a 

data capture process in which maritime information is collected 

and filtered through a data logic model comprised of a variety of 

indicators of suspect activity. Federal agents are augmented with 

task force officers from all of the surrounding local municipalities 

and jurisdictions. The real value of SeaHawk is the ability to pool 

limited resources and then apply them against a risk-based ranking of all identified security issues. 

The SeaHawk intelligence team screens all vessels and crew 

bound to the Port of Charleston and provides the results to the 

Unified Command on a daily basis so they can plan their actions. 

The intelligence team also provides information and analysis on 

the global war on terrorism and its specific implications to South 

Carolina. 

SeaHawk has an Operations Center that serves as a central hub 

for the South Carolina ports. Ships are followed with radar and 

video as they enter and leave the harbor area. This allows 

SeaHawk to keep apprised of ongoing events that may affect the 

security of the port. 

SeaHawk has used its resources to improve capabilities across 

four broad areas, including voice and data communications, law enforcement investigative and intelligence tools, information technology, and sensor programs. One cutting-edge program is a mobile 

22 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Caldwell appears in the Appendix on page 53. 

radiological detection program that deploys a sensitive radiological 

sensor in a vehicle and a boat. 

Project SeaHawk, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Collins, 

is truly a successful example of Federal, State, and local agencies 

working together very effectively to secure the ports of South Carolina and to serve as a national model of innovation to enhance our 

Nation’s port security. 

I want to thank you very much for inviting me here today to participate in this discussion with you, and I am very happy to answer 

any questions you may have. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Mr. Lloyd, for that excellent testimony. I appreciate the question with which you started, 

which was is this going to add anything to the status quo, and I 

am encouraged by your answer, which is that it has. 

Mr. Caldwell, thanks for being here. I just want to repeat that 

you have been really invaluable to this Committee in our oversight 

responsibilities, and I thank you for everything you have done and 

welcome you this morning. 

TESTIMONY OF STEPHEN L. CALDWELL,1 DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT 

ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. CALDWELL. Thank you very much, Chairman Lieberman and 

Senator Collins, and thank you for inviting me to speak on this important topic of the SAFE Port Act. Given the breadth of the Act 

and the already lengthy written statement that I submitted, as 

well as some of the comments by other witnesses, I will focus my 

comments on container security because that has come up again 

and again in the hearing. 

To some extent, the supply chain programs that we have are at 

a crossroads, and I will get to that at the end. As you know, we 

currently have a layered strategy of various different programs to 

provide supply chain security. These are run by CBP as well as 

other agencies, both within DHS and other departments such as 

DOE. These include things we have already talked about: The 24- 

hour rule, ATS, inspections at domestic ports, radiation screening 

at domestic ports, CSI, Megaports, and C–TPAT. And as we have 

noted in our reports, a lot of progress has been made. We were very 

happy that a lot of the recommendations that we had made to DHS 

and its components had been incorporated into the SAFE Port Act, 

and DHS has made progress in implementing many of these. Some 

examples include improved strategic planning and better utilization of human capital. 

Despite the progress made, we still are reviewing two of the programs right now for this Committee, both CSI and C–TPAT, and 

we will be providing you more details on that early next year with 

our full reports. But some of our preliminary findings are in the 

written statement that I provided. 

One area where CBP is still challenged is the area of actually 

measuring outcomes as opposed to activities. This is a problem that 

is endemic to any agency involved in homeland security. But that 

23 

is an area where we are still hoping they can make some more 

progress. 

Perhaps one of the most important areas of progress in supply 

chain security are the partnerships that CBP has formed. Assistant 

Secretary Baker also emphasized this point in his statement—at 

least his written statement—and the partnerships are with many 

groups, but there are at least three groups that I want to emphasize. 

First, the partnerships are with foreign nations. These are the 

nations that have agreed to be our partners in CSI or are negotiating with us on ‘‘mutual recognition,’’ which I will get to later. 

Second, there have been partnerships with the private sector. 

Companies have decided to join C–TPAT, provide information on 

their security, obviously provide resources, as was mentioned, to 

provide for their security. And CBP is also consulting with COAC, 

ISO, and other private groups. 

The third partnership I would like to mention is with international and regional organizations. There has been an international framework developed with U.S. participation and leadership called the ‘‘Safe Framework’’ by the World Customs Organization. In addition, there are a couple of joint cooperation forums now 

with both the European Union and with APEC. 

As one indication of the progress of these partnerships, other nations and international organizations have adopted programs that 

are very similar to CSI and C–TPAT. These partnerships are critical because, as we know, the Federal Government cannot do it all 

by itself. To push out our security envelope and to deal with things 

that are nongovernmental, we need to reach out to others and develop good relationships with these partners. But there are some 

signs that some of these critical partnerships are starting to fray. 

As I said, these critical relationships are partnerships, so other nations have volunteered to join CSI. The United States worked 

through international organizations. Companies decided to volunteer to join the C–TPAT program or, in some cases, to go beyond 

that and to meet ISO standards. In summary, our partners decided 

to be our partners. It was a mutually beneficial relationship. 

Now, CBP, somewhat on its own initiative and somewhat mandated by legislation, is adding or proposing new layers to this layered strategy. These include container security devices, ‘‘Ten Plus 

Two’’ data requirements, the Global Information Exchange, the Secure Freight Initiative, and 100-percent scanning. In some cases 

these are voluntary, and in some cases they are not. But some of 

our partners are starting to ask: Does the United States have a 

layered strategy or a strategy of layers, with new layers being 

added continually and unilaterally? In the meantime, foreign nations and private company partners are asking what is in it for 

them. Where is the promised green lane that is talked about in 

concept but is not really implemented in a way that can be determined? 

Foreign governments are certainly willing to help us in terms of 

scanning things overseas as part of CSI, but they do want some assurances that these containers will not be scanned one or more 

times when they get to the United States. And private companies 

have increased their resources to improve security, but again, they 

24 

are hoping to get some benefit in terms of expedited scrutiny of 

their shipments. 

One of the biggest concerns of these partners at large is the 100- 

percent scanning of all U.S.-bound containers. This Committee, as 

well as DHS, has received letters from these partners expressing 

some of their concerns about this new requirement. While we have 

not done a detailed review of SFI—it only went operational 3 days 

ago, according to the Assistant Secretary’s statement—we have visited two of the pilot ports as they were getting ready for SFI. The 

topics of 100-percent scanning and SFI came up frequently in the 

discussions that we had with foreign governments. 

Based on these discussions, we have identified six challenges involved in the 100-percent scanning requirement. Assistant Secretary Baker already previewed some of these challenges in his 

statement where he noted that neither technology nor diplomacy 

reacts well to being rushed. 

The first challenge is that the 100-percent scanning approach is 

counter to the risk management approach that GAO has pushed, 

Congress has pushed, the 9/11 Commission has pushed, and CBP 

has really incorporated into almost all of the other programs that 

it has and the United States has agreed to in the World Customs 

Organization SAFE Framework. This is our largest concern because the 100-percent scanning in some ways could reduce our security rather than enhance it. 

The reason a risk management approach is important is that it 

forces you to prioritize your limited resources. If you are focusing 

attention on all of the containers, you are not focusing your attention on any one container. 

Here are the remainders of some of the challenges we have identified, and I will just summarize these briefly because we have 

more details in our report. The second challenge is that the United 

States could probably not reciprocate if other countries adopted the 

same requirement. 

Third, the logistical feasibility is unknown and may vary by port. 

Fourth, the maturity of the technology is still not proven. 

Fifth, the resource requirements and who would pay them is not 

determined at this point. 

And finally, sixth, the use and ownership of the scanned data is 

not fully determined. 

So as I said at the beginning, these programs are at a crossroad. 

We have come a long way to build these programs, and our various 

partners have come a long way with us. What began as U.S. unilateral programs after September 11, 2001, have not only been accepted but have been internationalized. A risk management approach 

has been adopted by foreign governments, international organizations, and private companies as a logical way to increase security 

but keep the flow of commerce moving. 

We were in a position of moving to leverage our own limited 

resources by developing mutual recognition with some of our partners, and that process goes on. Under mutual recognition, two nations would understand, verify, and trust each other’s customs security regime so that a C–TPAT member in one country would be 

trusted in the equivalent program of the other country by their customs officials. And when mutual recognition is developed among a 

25 

1The prepared statement of Captain Monroe appears in the Appendix on page 102. 

number of nations, each nation’s resources are, in effect, being leveraged to help the others, increasing the worldwide level of security. 

With some of the latest proposals, though, the partnerships that 

we have relied on may be at risk. I am not saying they are severely 

at risk, but they are starting to fray. Regarding other nations, they 

may be reluctant to join CSI or stay in CSI if there is already a 

unilateral requirement on them that they scan 100 percent of all 

U.S.-bound cargo. In accordance with the agreements that we have 

already signed with them, they may ask for reciprocity, which CBP 

would be hard pressed to provide; the United States would have to 

scan 100 percent of our containers before they are outbound for the 

other countries. 

Regarding the private sector, companies may be reluctant to join 

or continue in C–TPAT if 100 percent of their containers are going 

to be scanned anyway. 

In closing, I hope I have provided some useful perspectives on 

supply chain security for you. I am also ready to answer questions 

on the whole area of the SAFE Port Act. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Caldwell. You have supplied 

useful answers to us, and we will have questions. Thanks. 

Captain Monroe, welcome back. Good to see you. 

TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN JEFFREY W. MONROE,1 DIRECTOR, 

DEPARTMENT OF PORTS AND TRANSPORTATION, CITY OF 

PORTLAND, MAINE 

Captain MONROE. Good to see you. Thank you very much for inviting me this morning, and it is a pleasure to be here, as always. 

I always like to start off by talking about our little port of Portland, 

which happens to be not only the largest port in New England and 

the largest port in the State of Maine, but also the largest foreign 

inbound tonnage transit port in the United States, and I know the 

Senator loves all the adjectives I add to that. 

One of the things that is unique about Portland is we are a very 

diverse port. It was one of the reasons that the U.S. Coast Guard, 

in doing their first assessments of ports, looked at Portland, Maine, 

because of the diverse economic mix and the many operations that 

went on there. And we are happy to see that the SAFE Port Act, 

when it was put together, contained many of the critical provisions 

that looked at supply chain security. And I use supply chain security as a very definitive term because one of the things that we 

need to understand is that container security and port security are 

not necessarily synonymous. 

We deal particularly in Portland with millions of tons of oil, dry 

bulk cargo, petrochemicals, other ports near us deal with automobiles, we all deal with hazmat and certainly project cargoes, and 

we have to understand in this mix that if we are talking about port 

security, it is all elements of different types of cargoes, all different 

types of operations, all different types of vessels. 

The SAFE Port Act was a very big step. Overall, progress is good 

but certainly not as fast as it needs to be. And Senator Collins 

26 

mentioned the TWIC card before, and this has been sort of a source 

of concern for us up in Portland, as well as in the industry. 

These are my credentials. Kind of interesting. We carry quite a 

few of them. This is my airport credential. The one thing that is 

interesting about our organization is we operate the airport, the 

seaport, and coordinate all the surface transportation system. I required a very definitive background check to get this. This is my 

merchant mariner’s document. I also required a very definitive 

background check to get this. This merchant mariner’s document 

was not acceptable as a document to get this airport credential. 

This is my port document. We have no standards for that as yet. 

And while I recognize what DHS has said in many cases about 

aviation and the maritime world being very different from each 

other, no question about that. But the quintessential common area 

here is the background check, and most of us in the port industry 

recognize at this time, no matter what standard TWIC winds up 

coming out with, we are going to wind up issuing our own cards 

anyway because the reality is that is the best way to maintain 

tight control in our various ports. So one card fits all might be 

great for at least getting the issuance, but may not be best for all 

of the access. 

I am happy to report I have been through four separate background checks to get my credentials. They have not found anything 

yet, which I am very happy to see. 

Programs like C–TPAT are a good standard. We are working toward that, and that is expanding. That needs to continue. So does 

CSI, our radiation scanning program, and the high-risk scans. And 

I agree with Senator Collins that certainly scanning every container is counterproductive and does not work that well. But the 

focus of this is to push out the borders, and that is really what we 

need to do. 

All of these things have to occur in foreign ports. And we are 

worried that cargo and port security sometimes lags within the Department of Homeland Security, may be low profile, and I fear 

sometimes that it is low priority. 

I think the Office of Cargo Security, as defined within the SAFE 

Port Act, was a good concept. Last year, Senator Collins proposed 

legislation that called for a much higher level of policy decisionmaking area that looked at all of the aspects of cargo, and I think 

that is really where we need to go. That needs to occur as effectively as possible. 

Cargo is a critical element, it is a critical threat, and if we look 

at all aspects of cargo, not just container, we begin to realize that 

the priority of this has to move up much higher within DHS. And 

once that occurs, I think that is going to speed up progress on 

many of the things that we are doing. 

There are some bright spots. I do not like to be all doom and 

gloom. Many of the public officials and port professionals certainly 

in our area are working together very well. Public officials and our 

port and terminal operators understand the complexities of working together. The Incident Command System, I think that has 

worked out well. 

We are very happy to see that our municipality, not waiting for 

the national standard of operations center, developed through 

27 

Homeland Security money our own operations center led by our dynamic fire chief, who approached the entire thing from a holistic 

view, not only the transportation system but the entire community, 

and developed an emergency operations center, which we have 

used on multiple occasions to look at all of the systems that are 

going on, all of the activities, all of the threats. And we have had 

some practical applications, unfortunately, such as last year’s Patriots’ Day storm, which allowed us to respond quickly to a lot of 

damage and loss of power and threats to citizens from just natural 

disaster. 

We have used the port security grant money very effectively. We 

are certainly not spendthrifts, but it has helped us put up fencing 

to access control, develop informational platforms which have allowed us to communicate with each other and to share data and 

information. Ultimately, someday we think that we will be able to 

flip a switch and you will be able to see everything that is going 

on in Portland, Maine, right here in Washington, DC. 

But this money has allowed us to ramp up quickly, and it is as 

important to have this money available to smaller ports as it is the 

major mega ports, which certainly need the money, but also have 

the resources in many cases to do this. 

When we approach port security, when we approach transportation security, it has to be done in a systematic approach, not in 

a modal approach. And the unfortunate thing is that we have lived 

too long with the modal approach in transportation, which I think 

sometimes is working its way into homeland security, where we 

think of aviation or ports or even the surface transportation system 

as different from each other. Wings, wheels, or propellers, the system needs to work together. And one size in many cases can fit all, 

even with the differences in these various systems. High-level coordination is certainly critical, and that will be key if we ever have 

an incident. 

The restoration of the marine transportation system is only one 

element of the restoration of the entire transportation system, and 

that even though industry seems concerned sometimes, I think the 

reality is not looking for definitive answers, but just looking for definitive standards so that someone in DHS understands what every 

facility is capable of and is able to immediately restore the system, 

redirect cargo. 

If we had an emergency, for example, up in Maine in the middle 

of February, by heavens, we would be trying to think of ways to 

get oil up there to meet the needs of our homes and our factories 

and our communities. And the bottom line is unless somebody has 

a holistic picture of that and clearly and definitively directs it, it 

is not going to work effectively. It cannot be just a series of communications. It has to be some very definitive direction. 

We saw that on September 11, 2001, with the confusion that was 

going on, and that needs to be looked at and corrected. This restoration trade is a very significant issue. We noticed that right before Hurricane Katrina. The maritime industry was able to direct 

its cargo. It anticipated the problems. But that is something that 

needs to occur on a national level. 

The one thing we need to keep in mind is that cargo does not 

vote, so it is the responsibility of our agencies, the responsibility of 

28 

our elected officials to look at this very critical supply chain and 

all of the elements attached to it and make sure that not only is 

it safe and secure, but that it can be restored quickly. 

For right now, we are not quite getting the job done. We are certainly much better than we were. There is no question we have 

made an enormous amount of progress through the sheer will of a 

lot of good people working on the ground in the trenches like myself, and certainly the direction of the Department of Homeland Security has worked well. But all of this needs to come together much 

closer. There needs to be much more definitive leadership out of 

the Department of Homeland Security. We need to worry less about 

our various Federal agency directives and think about it in a more 

holistic standard. And we also need to look at our entire transportation system in a holistic, systematic fashion as opposed to just 

looking at the various elements of different parts of security where 

we think are threats. 

Thank you very much, and thank you for the time to speak with 

you today, and I will be happy to answer any questions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Captain. You are a 

good witness. It is good to hear your report from the ground. I was 

a little disappointed to hear that the cargo will not be voting in the 

Maine election—— [Laughter.] 

Next year because I know, based on all that Senator Collins has 

done to make the cargo safe, that they would be voting for her. 

Senator CARPER. We are familiar in Delaware with the term 

‘‘cargo preference.’’ It would probably have application in Maine as 

well. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Exactly. OK. Senator Carper, welcome. 

On this very day, the TWIC program has begun to enroll port 

workers in Wilmington, Delaware, so we appreciate that you are 

here today. 

Let me begin, Mr. Caldwell, with you, and as I said earlier, you 

have tremendous expertise in this area. Step back, if you would, 

and give us your overall rating of the Department’s progress in 

maritime security in the year since the passage of the SAFE Port 

Act. If you were giving them a grade, what would it be? 

Mr. CALDWELL. I think ‘‘incomplete’’ is the term I used in the last 

hearing we had. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is true. 

Mr. CALDWELL. So I need to stay consistent here. But I would 

like to point out something fairly important. We did a very large 

effort for the Committee here on a progress report of DHS, and the 

cut-off on that was October 2006. We actually did not use the 

SAFE Port Act in setting the expectations that we then used to 

rate the Department on. And so the assessment I have now is updated from that earlier progress report assessment. 

As my written statement demonstrates, there is continued substantial progress in many of the requirements of the SAFE Port 

Act. I would have to agree with Assistant Secretary Baker that the 

components look like they have made it already or they are in line 

to make it. 

There are four areas that we pointed out in that earlier report, 

and these are the four areas where we still think there are some 

challenges. I can just go over those again real quickly. 

29 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Why don’t you highlight them? That is 

the ‘‘incomplete’’ part of it. 

Mr. CALDWELL. Yes. There is developing port-specific plans for 

recovery. I would agree with—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Recovery meaning what here? 

Mr. CALDWELL. Recovery after an incident. We need to think of 

incidents as being beyond the initial security response to include 

recovery from environmental incidents or natural disasters and 

things like that. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Sure. 

Mr. CALDWELL. When you ask what the Department is doing, the 

components are going to use their International Supply Chain Security Plan. They also have something called the Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan, which is also a national plan. Now they 

have to bring that level of planning down to the individual port levels. That is where they are incomplete. They need to rewrite all the 

area maritime security plans to add in that recovery portion. 

The other incomplete area is implementing national access control. TWIC is underway. They are certainly making progress compared to where they were a couple of years ago. The next incomplete area is long-range tracking systems to improve maritime domain awareness. We are currently doing some work to look at both 

the classified as well as the unclassified tracking systems, and so 

we may find out they made more progress there than we had initially reported. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. OK. 

Mr. CALDWELL. And then, finally, in terms of developing programs to screen cargo for radiation, that is another program where 

we thought they needed to make more progress than indicated. We 

have reported in several recent reports about the testing that was 

done in terms of the new technology for radiation scanning. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks. We will obviously count on you 

to keep an eye on those four areas particularly, and we will continue to work with you and your colleagues at GAO. 

Mr. CALDWELL. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Lloyd, I appreciate the good report on 

Project SeaHawk. I love the combination of the Federal, State, and 

local officials for a common purpose, including the Joint Terrorism 

Task Force. This is exactly the kind of work that was not really occurring prior to September 11, 2001. 

I wonder if you think that State and local law enforcement agencies will continue to participate in programs like Project SeaHawk 

if they are unable to receive Federal assistance, which was one of 

the things that is being contemplated. 

Mr. LLOYD. Thank you, Senator, and I would likewise agree that 

the Department has for a long time held the view that our partnerships with State and local particularly law enforcement agencies 

are key to us getting our mission done. 

The issue of what happens after the pilot project with SeaHawk 

ends as far as it relates to our State and local partners down there 

is our biggest question. Those issues I think will be worked out in 

a little more detail and with some more concrete specificity once 

DHS is finished going through its process of identifying exactly 

how the project will be transitioned, i.e., which component, if any, 

30 

of DHS will take over SeaHawk, or will the Department itself sort 

of step into the role that DOJ is currently undertaking. 

Obviously, our State and local partners feel a lot of pressure from 

other priorities that they face, and what we hear on our end is that 

the issue of funding for them or reimbursement for them is key, as 

well as how soon they are going to know about the transition that 

is going to occur. 

What we have done is with rebudgeting, we have been able to 

extend the project life to the end of fiscal year 2009. That has allowed them some more time at the local and State level to be able 

to hopefully identify funds or grants that may allow them to continue their participation. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Excellent. Thanks. 

Just a quick question, Captain Monroe. As you know, we established a Port Security Grant Program, which Senator Collins and 

I and all the Members of the Committee worked on. And these 

grants have been used to make much needed improvements in the 

physical safety of our ports and waterways. The SAFE Port Act authorized $400 million annually for the program. 

The Department of Homeland Security recently announced that 

it intends to make implementing the requirements of the TWIC 

program a primary purpose of the overall Port Security Grant Program, and obviously, we all understand the importance of TWIC 

with the comments that you have added. Are you concerned that 

this may make it more difficult for you and other local port administrators to get funding for other critical port security improvements, like surveillance equipment or equipment to detect underwater explosive devices? 

Captain MONROE. Well, over the course of time, many of us have 

already ramped up to that location. We have already looked at the 

aspect of surveillance, so we are sort of in the second tier of this. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Captain MONROE. The bottom line is that we do not have a 

standard really that works for TWIC. Things like document readers 

and biometric readers and all the other technology that they are 

talking about, in some cases they do not even exist. So nobody has 

really any idea what the cost is going to be or the long-term implications or, in many cases, even the use for this thing. 

I think the bottom line is that as every year goes on, you begin 

to see where the holes potentially are. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Captain MONROE. And, of course, we have all of the rules and 

regulations that call for multiple assessments. So we find ourselves 

in the position of always continually trying to apply for money that 

we need. We do not try to do excess. We just try to do what we 

think is essential. And we have gone a long way with many of the 

things that we have done, but we are a smaller port. The challenge 

is in some of the bigger ports that are much more diverse. And I 

think ultimately, if you talk to some of my colleagues, they will tell 

you that in many cases port security grant money needs to be expanded because there are certainly many more challenges. 

The other side of that is that many of the bigger ports also have 

the resources to be able to meet these needs, where in our parVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:53 Jan 07, 2009 Jkt 038849 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\38849.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
31 

ticular case, the citizens of the city of Portland would have had to 

have borne the cost of these mandated fundings. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Understood. Thanks. My time is up. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Captain Monroe, to follow up on the funding issue that the 

Chairman just raised, he and I have had to fight so hard to secure 

funding for port security grants. The Administration, as you know, 

year after year has proposed folding port security grants into a 

general homeland security grant program, whereas we have advocated for dedicated funding. 

Could you speak to the importance of being able to rely on dedicated funding for port security grants and also on the importance 

of having multi-year funding? It seems to me from seeing the 

projects that you have underway in Portland that many of them 

are multi-year projects that are going to require additional investments. But if you could comment on those two issues. 

Captain MONROE. Well, homogeneous funding programs are very 

difficult because one of the things that happens is you begin to lose 

the expertise necessary to properly evaluate what is necessary. I 

would find it particularly difficult if I had to go up against aviation 

funding because the needs are very different. There is no question 

about that. We have been able to use our multi-level funding and 

our multi-year funding to really step out not only with our new facilities and put in surveillance and all of the access control and all 

the other things that we have needed, but we are one of the first 

ports now to start looking at TSA-style screening for cruise line 

passengers and the international ferry. So that multi-year funding 

is very critical because one of the things that it is changing over 

the course of time are the regulations and the assessments. And as 

new intelligence becomes available, we begin to look at new 

threats. 

So I think the reality is that this is very specific. Right now we 

have a great evaluation program on the maritime side, on the aviation side. There is not a very good system in place for the surface 

transportation, and they are really groping around trying to figure 

out what they need to do. But the reality is, I think, if you try to 

put it all into one place, like the Administration says, you are going 

to lose an enormous amount of good evaluation capability, and then 

it is just going to become a matter of competition, and needs may 

not be met in that circumstance. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. I certainly agree with that assessment. 

Mr. Caldwell, you stated in your testimony that 100-percent 

scanning could actually reduce security rather than enhance it. 

And since I agree with that assessment, I was very happy to hear 

you say that for the record. 

Is it fair to say that requiring 100-percent scanning, regardless 

of the impact on trade, regardless of cost, regardless of the risk of 

the cargo at hand, is inconsistent with basic risk management principles? 

Mr. CALDWELL. I would agree with that. If I could just give an 

example? 

Senator COLLINS. Yes. Thank you. 

32 

1The chart submitted by Mr. Baker appears in the Appendix on page 106. 

Mr. CALDWELL. Could we get the chart back up that Assistant 

Secretary Baker used in his presentation? 1 You have three things 

shown on this chart that are valuable: You have the NII, which is 

the imagery screen; you have the radiation screen as well; and then 

you have the ATS score. These are three very important things. 

But from Mr. Baker’s description, it sounded like you need to have 

a person at the National Targeting Center look at all three factors. 

How many thousands of people are we going to need, either overseas or here, to look at that? I just do not know what kind of resource level would be needed to make these 100-percent scanning 

images useful. If you are just taking the scans and storing them, 

you are not improving security. 

Senator COLLINS. And isn’t that what is happening in Hong 

Kong? We hear a lot about the Hong Kong project, but, in fact, unless there has been a change recently, it is my understanding that 

while images are being captured, no one is looking at the images. 

And if no one is reviewing the results of the scan, you are no further ahead, and, in fact, it may produce a false sense of security 

to have the scan done. But if no one is analyzing the results, there 

really is no progress. 

Mr. CALDWELL. I was in Hong Kong in 2004, and I got the demonstration of their system. I cannot say I audited it, so I do not 

know how well it works. It was pretty impressive how they are trying to combine these different technologies. But, again, what I do 

not know is what was being done with those images. 

One of the most promising areas—and, again, Assistant Secretary Baker brought this up—is potential improvements in software. What if you could have a software program that would tell 

us that, based on the manifest and this type of item, the item 

should have this kind of radiation signature, and it should have 

this kind of density. And then the software would combine all those 

things through an algorithm to indicate that an item seems within 

the normal deviations and that we should not worry about it. At 

that point, it is not too different than the ATS system currently 

being used. 

Senator COLLINS. Right. That is essentially a targeted system. 

Mr. CALDWELL. Correct, it identifies the containers that need 

extra scrutiny. 

Senator COLLINS. Exactly. 

Mr. CALDWELL. And that may be where they are going in the 

long run, but I am not sure. As I said, SFI has been fully operational only for 3 days now, so we need to be careful making premature judgments. When we were in Honduras, or when we were 

in Busan 6 to 12 months ago, they were just laying the plans to 

install SFI. Many of these questions had not been worked out in 

terms of who is going to own the images, who is going to review 

them, how do you store them, and who is paying for it. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Mr. Lloyd, it is my understanding that there is talk of 

transitioning the project that you have described from the Department of Justice to the Department of Homeland Security. And, indeed, I think that it was housed in the Department of Justice to 

33 

start with because it was an earmarked project. And it is a good 

example of an earmark that has produced very valuable information and a pilot that we may want to replicate elsewhere. But do 

you have concerns about the transition from DOJ to DHS? 

Mr. LLOYD. Thank you, Senator. It was actually started, obviously, as a special pilot project before the creation of DHS, and 

what we have seen is that it has been a wonderful program and 

it has done, I think, the type of things that needed to be done in 

terms of bringing varying agencies together into a unified command at a port. 

Our concern would be that you would in a transition, obviously, 

lose some of the effectiveness of that unified command, that you 

would lose the presence of the State and local partners, who we 

think are very valuable. But ultimately I think that is something 

that DHS would have to evaluate as to which components programwise of SeaHawk they would want to keep, replicate around the 

country, or move to a different model. But what we have found 

right now is that all of our participating components find all of 

those programs that we are currently operating there to be very 

useful in terms of augmenting their missions. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. 

I was interested in the discussion with Senator Collins and Mr. 

Caldwell, and those are important questions about the personnel 

required for the 100-percent scanning. I visited the port in Hong 

Kong during August, and I suppose the most significant thing is 

that the system, the integrated system, both radiation monitoring 

and imaging works, and it works in a way that does not, to my eye, 

and I guess to those looking at it, unnecessarily burden the flow 

of commerce. What is required to then use the information that 

technology provides us with? And I am informed that they are beginning both in Hong Kong and in Singapore, in addition to the 

three other ports we mentioned more fully, to try to make judgments about that. 

I suppose the thing to say—it may be obvious but worth saying— 

is that modern technology gives us a capacity to even contemplate 

100-percent scanning without unnecessarily interfering with the 

flow of commerce, which would have been unimaginable not so long 

ago. So we will work on that. 

Senator Carper, the bell goes off, but that means we have enough 

time for a good solid round of questions. 

Senator CARPER. Great. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. By the bell, I mean not to call us into the 

center of the ring, but to take us over to the Senate because there 

is a rollcall vote just starting. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for joining us today and for your testimony and for your responses to our questions. As the Chairman alluded to earlier in our hearing, and I suspect you all discussed it 

on the previous panel, the TWIC program is actually getting implemented, up and running in the port of Wilmington today, which is 

about 5 or 6 miles from where I live. I have been out to the port 

34 

a lot. When I was governor, we were very much involved. The State 

of Delaware took over the port from the city of Wilmington and 

spent a lot of time, energy, and money to try to bring them into 

the 21st Century. So it is something that we care about and have 

thought a lot about and know a lot of the folks who work out there. 

A lot of the people who work out there, not all but a lot of them, 

are folks who have had scrapes with the law in their past, and my 

suspicion is if you go around to major ports around the country, 

you would find some of the folks who are doing a lot of the work 

at ports—a lot of it is back-breaking work, a lot of physical labor— 

are people who have had in some cases brushes with the law, in 

some cases rather serious ones. 

As we bring TWIC up and running, there are some folks at our 

port who are concerned that they may lose their jobs, pretty goodpaying jobs, considering in some cases the degree of education they 

have and their criminal record. Captain Monroe, are you concerned 

about the impact that the TWIC card could have on port operations? 

Captain MONROE. Well, I am not, really, and the reason being is 

that we had the same issues when we implemented the background 

screening for aviation. There are a lot of folks who felt that because 

of whatever the issue, something might knock them out. 

I think the reality is that all of these background checks are directed toward people who may be a potential threat, and I think 

that certainly does not encompass the vast majority of folks. 

Now, if you do have a violent offender, somebody who has been 

arrested for something fairly significant—— 

Senator CARPER. Like terroristic threatening? 

Captain MONROE. Yes, terroristic threatening or even murder, or 

anything like that, certainly I think I, as a port director, would 

have a lot of questions about having them working on my port to 

begin with. But I think what we realized is that no matter what 

the fear was, when we implemented the aviation program, most of 

the people did not have issues, even those people who did have 

some sort of issues or background problems or even misdemeanors 

or some arrests. It didn’t necessarily knock them out. 

So I think that is a fear in many cases that is overblown by folks 

because of the uncertainty of the program. 

Senator CARPER. How do we strike the right balance to make 

sure that folks who do not pose a threat, given at least their behavior in the past, but who have made mistakes, how do we find the 

right balance so that the folks who pose the threat maybe are not 

invited back for a continued engagement and those who do not, 

have the opportunity to continue to prove themselves? 

Captain MONROE. Well, I think the simple way to do that, Senator, is basically take people on a case-by-case basis. You are only 

going to find a small percentage of these folks, I think, that are 

going to be identified, and then take the time to review those individual backgrounds, assist them in trying to find out what the circumstance was, do an investigation, and get it over with. And the 

reality is those standards have already been suggested as part of 

the Coast Guard program, and I think they are pretty good standards. 

35 

Senator CARPER. OK. Any other comments from anyone, please, 

on this? 

Mr. CALDWELL. There are two things. First, it is a statutory criteria as to what crimes disqualify them. Second, there is an appeals process. But what I am not sure about is whether the appeals 

process will allow them to take somebody who committed one of 

those crimes 20 years ago and allow him to still have the TWIC 

card. 

Senator CARPER. I believe there is a process—we call it a ‘‘waiver 

process’’—where people can seek a waiver, and I think in some 

cases, a person could seek and receive a waiver even if the offense 

was one of these that are stipulated in the guidelines. 

Mr. Lloyd, do you want to add anything? If not, I have another 

TWIC-related question. 

Mr. LLOYD. Senator, I would just say briefly that one of the 

things that we do at Project SeaHawk is almost on a continuous 

basis with all of the task force agencies that we have there is go 

through and check and make sure that those individuals who are 

working at the port and on the docks in particular do meet those 

statutory requirements. Occasionally, you do find individuals with 

ties to ongoing criminal activity, and that is what we see as much 

of a threat to port security as the terrorists. If our port is vulnerable to that kind of ongoing criminal activity, then we feel like it 

is vulnerable to potential terrorist intrusion at that point. 

Senator CARPER. Alright. Good. One other question. Again, it is 

TWIC-related. But maybe, Mr. Caldwell, you would be best at this. 

When we first conceived of this idea and said we want to put together a program and increase our port security, do you recall 

when we said we wanted to get it underway? Was there an early 

target date? 

Mr. CALDWELL. It was included in the Maritime Transportation 

Security Act, and I believe that was passed in November 2002. But 

I do not know if it had an implementation milestone associated 

with it. 

Senator CARPER. Anybody recall? Captain Monroe. 

Captain MONROE. Yes. When Congress first talked about the 

TWIC program, they were looking at that point as a broad-based 

transportation worker program across all aspects. And this came 

through right after September 11, 2001, because it was one of the 

first things that people recognized needed to be addressed. And 

what happened is, come 2002, 2003, it began to go off in different 

directions. 

Senator CARPER. Alright. Given the long run-up to actually being 

able to launch the program today in one port, and some other ports 

are in line next, when do you think we can reasonably expect to 

have the program pretty well up and running, not just in a handful 

of ports but throughout the country? 

Captain MONROE. Well, right now the Coast Guard has a program that they are rolling out, so we are looking at some very definitive deadlines. So within the next year to 18 months, the TWIC 

program, as currently envisioned, should be fairly well in place in 

most places. And I have to credit the port of Wilmington because 

they did a lot of good work as part of the pilot program. We had 

a chance to meet with them and talk with them, and I think they 

36 

did a great job looking at a lot of uncertainties and sort of reining 

it in for us a little bit. But I think within 18 months we will see 

a pretty substantive accomplishment there. 

Senator CARPER. Well, good. I was at the port not long ago, and 

they said, ‘‘Who is Jeff Monroe?’’ [Laughter.] 

I said, ‘‘I think he is from Portland, Oregon.’’ No, I did not say 

that. I am sure he is from Maine. Thank you all very much. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Carper. 

Attorney Lloyd, Mr. Caldwell, Captain Monroe, thanks very 

much for being here, for what you are doing every day to improve 

our homeland security, and for the testimony that you have given 

today. We appreciate it very much. 

The record of the hearing will be held open for the customary 15 

days for Members to submit additional questions to you or for you 

to add to your testimony. But please know that you have our 

thanks. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:09 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

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