IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE

IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE 

OF STACY J. RUDDICK,

Appellant,

and

RANDALL H. RUDDICK, III,

Respondent.

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No. 35416-4-III

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

FEARING, J. — Washington law demands that parents pro-ratably share in day care 

expenses and transportation costs of the noncustodial parent’s visits with the couple’s 

children. Stacy Ruddick challenges the superior court’s order requiring her to split costs

incurred by her former husband when visiting their three disabled children in San Diego. 

We agree with Stacy’s contention that the superior court wrongly categorized Randall 

Ruddick’s visitation expenses other than airfare as transportation costs. We remand for 

additional proceedings to determine if other visitation costs might constitute other forms 

of sharable expenses and if Randall may gain relief on other grounds for those expenses. 

FILED

NOVEMBER 1, 2018

In the Office of the Clerk of Court

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
No. 35416-4-III

In re Marriage of Ruddick

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FACTS

Stacy and Randall Ruddick wed and bore three children. The marital couple 

dissolved the marriage in 2011. The parenting plan, on dissolution, granted residential 

placement to Stacy. Both parents then lived in Spokane. An April 2011 child support 

order directed Randall to pay $1,068 per month for support. 

All three children suffer from Angelman Syndrome, a genetic disorder that affects 

the nervous system and causes cognitive and muscular limitations. The disability 

requires considerable care and attention. The children must periodically travel to 

Houston and Boston for treatment. 

In February 2013, Stacy Ruddick filed a petition to modify the parenting plan and 

permit her to relocate with her children to San Diego. In 2013, the children were 

respectively ages eight, six, and four. The trial court granted the modification. The trial 

court determined: 

Although Spokane is a wonderful place it cannot compare with the 

facilities, personnel, care providers, and professionals available in the San 

Diego area [to assist in treatment for Angelman Syndrome]. The weather 

alone would be more conducive to their [the three children’s] needs as they 

are very curious and like to play and explore. The cold weather in Spokane 

makes such activities shorter and less often for safety concerns. 

Additionally, the children are coming of an age that it is important that they 

have available to them more inclusive education, which is available in San 

Diego as well. Finally, their doctors and geneticists, along with national 

studies in San Diego that will help these children, and reduce their air travel 

to such places as Boston or Houston [sic].

. . . .
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. . . There will no doubt be travel costs for the father[.] . . . These 

travel costs, although expensive at times, are not prohibitive. 

Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 2-3. 

When granting Stacy Ruddick’s petition to relocate, the trial court entered a 

parenting plan that accounted for the geographical distance between Stacy and Randall 

Ruddick. The plan allowed Randall to visit the three children in San Diego during the 

last two weeks of each August. Randall could also visit at other times that he traveled to 

southern California. The order reserved for later determination a modification of child 

support because of the relocation and also directed that any modification of Randall’s 

child support obligation reflect visitation transportation costs. 

Stacy Ruddick does not work outside the home in order to care for the children’s 

disabilities. She receives government support as a result of the children’s needs and her 

willingness to care for the needs at home. She does not pay federal income tax on this 

income. 

Randall Ruddick visited his children in San Diego for two weeks in August 2013. 

Receipts for outlays showed that Randall incurred $5,471.90 in expenses during those 

two weeks. 

PROCEDURE

This appeal stems from Randall Ruddick’s April 2014 petition to modify child 

support. A child support work sheet prepared by Randall noted that, based on the 
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respective parties’ income, the child support schedule obliged Randall to pay $984.40 per 

month in support for the three children. The work sheet also noted Randall’s annual 

travel expenses to visit the children to be $9,600.00, or $800.00 per month. To visit the 

children, Randall must pay for roundtrip airfare from Spokane to San Diego. In addition 

to food expenses, Randall must also pay for a condominium to temporarily house the 

three children, since a standard hotel room would not accommodate the needs of the 

children arising from Angelman Syndrome. Randall claimed $6,000.00 in visiting 

expenses in 2013. 

In response to Randall Ruddick’s petition to modify child support, Stacy Ruddick 

argued that Randall grossly inflated the cost of visitation expenses. She also suggested 

that Randall could visit the children in Spokane and only pay $250 per child on round trip 

airfare. She posited that Randall chose to visit the children in San Diego. 

Randall Ruddick did not exercise visitation rights in August 2014. A September 

2014 order found Randall able to visit the children and held Randall in contempt for 

disobeying the visitation order. As a result of Randall’s failure to visit the children, Stacy 

missed a vacation. The same order demanded that Randall exert reasonable efforts to 

visit the children in August 2015. 

In February 2016, Randall Ruddick filed a supplemental declaration in support of 

the petition to modify his child support obligation. He stated that, in 2015, he visited the 

children for one month instead of the originally ordered two weeks, because of his failure 
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to visit in 2014. He declared expenses for the visit of $560.00 in airfare, $3,759.84 in 

housing, $1,041.58 in car rental, $900.00 in food, $400.00 in entertainment, and $500.00

in necessities such as diapers, for a total sum of $7,161.42. He anticipated $6,000.00 in 

visitation expenses annually for the future. He recognized that the expenses would 

decrease in 2016, because he would only visit for two weeks, but claimed the housing 

costs would not decrease much because of a “good deal” he received for housing in 2015. 

CP at 226.

In February 2016, the superior court commissioner entertained argument over the 

amount to credit Randall Ruddick for visitation transportation expenses when modifying 

his child support obligation. Randall asked for a credit of $500 per month, or $6,000 per 

year. Stacy asked that Randall be given a credit of $140 per month, or $1,680 per year. 

In April 2016, the superior court commissioner submitted a written ruling on the 

child support modification hearing. The ruling noted Stacy Ruddick’s net income as 

$5,141.00 a month and Randall’s as $3,804.00. The commissioner observed that hotel 

accommodations would be inadequate for Randall’s August visits: 

Transportation Costs: 

In the Order on Objection to Relocation dated February 15th, 2013, 

the Court specifically directed this Court in the support modification 

hearing to “make sure that transportation costs for the relocation parenting 

plan are considered in that matter.” Based on pleadings and arguments of 

counsel, these costs refer to the 2[-]week periods in which Mr. Ruddick is 

entitled to see his children pursuant to the parenting plan, beginning in 

2013. I will address the previous costs of this transportation below. 

However, the ongoing costs of this transportation, whether Mr. Ruddick 
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elects to have that time in California or bring the children to Spokane, will 

be addressed in the support calculation. 

It is also undisputed that the parties’ children are special needs, and 

require greater than average care when in the care of either party—staying 

in a regular hotel for a two[-]week period, going out to eat for every meal 

does not appear to be an option for these kids. I believe both parties would 

agree that if Mr. Ruddick were to continue visiting in California, he needs 

to obtain a more condominium-like setting, with kitchen facilities and room 

for him and the three children given their special needs. If he ever choses 

to bring them back to Spokane, he will have to carefully assess the 

transportation needs for getting them to/from his home. These needs were 

clearly contemplated in the relocation trial.

CP at 263-64. The commissioner’s letter ruling provided:

Mr. Ruddick has visited the children two times since entry of the 

2013 parenting plan—one 2 week visit in 2013 and after entry of the 2014 

contempt order, one[-]month long visit in 2015, as contemplated in the 

contempt order. Mr. Ruddick has submitted an accounting of his expenses 

from the 2013 and 2015 visits, with some receipts of the major expenses. 

These indicate that in 2013, the total cost of his visit was $5,471.90 for a 

2[-] week period. In 2015, the total cost of his visit for a 1[-] month period 

was $7,165.86 ($3,582.93 averaged for a per 2[-] week period). Taken 

together, the average yearly cost for these visits has been $4,213 for this 

two[-] week visitation period. Based on the fluctuation of travel costs that 

may happen time to time, I am allotting a yearly transportation cost for Mr. 

Ruddick of $4,500, which amounts to a monthly credit to him in the 

worksheet of $375. 

Child Support Calculation: 

The combined net income of the parties is $8,945, and with three 

children under the age of 12 makes the total amount of child support $2,337 

($779 each). Ms. Ruddick’s proportionate share is 0.575 and Mr. 

Ruddick’s is 0.425. Mr. Ruddick receives a monthly credit of $375 for his 

travel expense, as indicated above. With each parties’ proportionate share 

applied to these numbers, Ms. Ruddick’s standard calculation is $1,560, 

and Mr. Ruddick’s standard calculation is $777. I have filed a signed child 

support worksheet that reflects these numbers. 

Effective Start Date and Credit for Previously Paid Travel Expenses: 
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In re Marriage of Ruddick

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The effective start date of the new support order shall be August 1st, 

2013. As the petition for support modification was filed in 2012, and the 

parties modified their parenting plan in February 2013, this support Order 

reflects changes that are consistent with the new parenting plan. I 

understand the great deal of time that has passed due to the highly litigious 

nature of this case, and appreciate the profound financial effect that this will 

have on both of the parties and the children. 

CP at 264-65. Thus, the court commissioner allotted Randall Ruddick yearly 

transportation costs of $4,500, $1,500 less per year than requested by Randall and 

$2,820.00 more than proposed by Stacy. The commissioner thereafter modified 

Randall’s child support obligation to $777 a month. The court commissioner also ruled 

the modification to be retroactive to the date of the relocation of the children to San 

Diego, such that Randall received a credit against some of his future support payments. 

As stated in the letter ruling, the court commissioner completed a standard 

Washington State Child Support Schedule Work sheet. A portion of the 

work sheet reads:

Stacy Randall

11. Day Care and Special Expenses $ $

a. Day Care Expenses $ $

b. Education Expenses $ $

c. Long Distance Transportation Expenses $ $ 375

d. Other Special Expenses (describe) $ $

e. Total Day Care and Special Expenses $ $ 375

CP at 259. 

Stacy Ruddick filed a motion for reconsideration, and a declaration in support of 
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In re Marriage of Ruddick

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the motion. Stacy complained that the court commissioner allowed Randall “vacation” 

costs when visiting the children. CP at 283. Stacy also contended that Randall inflated 

the proposed visitation expenses. Stacy asserted, in her declaration, new information 

regarding her income, which suggested the existence of special expenses not covered by 

regular transportation payments. The declaration also sought relief not previously 

sought. Randall responded with his own declaration that challenged the timeliness of the 

motion, Stacy’s attempt to request relief not sought before the trial court and the 

inclusion of new evidence in her declaration. 

In September 2016, the court commissioner entered an order partially granting and 

partially denying Stacy Ruddick’s motion for reconsideration. The commissioner 

rejected again Stacy’s challenge to the transportation costs, noting “this two[-]week 

period [Randall] has with the children once a year should be a vacation with them, and 

one they look forward to.” CP at 307. The commissioner also affirmed the denial of 

special expenses for the children, but did modify the ruling to reflect a change in Stacy’s 

income. 

LAW AND ANALYSIS

This appeal focuses on the superior court commissioner’s ruling modifying child 

support because of Randall Ruddick’s travel expenses to visit his three children in San 

Diego. In her brief, Stacy Ruddick assigns error to the purported rulings of the court 

commissioner: 
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1. By not considering the facts provided by both parties, especially 

the father’s facts, who admitted he did not take visits every year, when she 

calculated the amount of visitation credits to give him; 

2. By not following the statutes regarding visitation transportation 

costs at RCW 26.19.080(3); 

3. By calculating an erroneous figure for the visitation credit based 

on an admitted doubled visitation amount by the father for these costs; 

4. By failing to include the negative affect of those years that Mr. 

Ruddick failed to visit in the calculation of the visitation credit and/or a 

method to calculate that into the ruling as well; 

5. By showing bias in her opinion by emphasizing that although Mr. 

Ruddick had a fair relocation trial, that it was somehow relevant to the 

determination of child support and visitation costs, that he fought against 

this relocation; 

6. By treating the mother’s request for rearing costs such as diapers, 

etc, for these disabled children, differently than the father’s request for 

reimbursement of those expenses; 

7. By allowing the father unreasonable day to day credits for his 

visitation such as all his food, gas, transportation, diapers, and housing in 

that calculation, auto rental, and even entertainment, even though if he 

visited the children at home in Washington he would have had those same 

costs unreimbursed. 

Opening Br. at 7-8 (emphasis omitted). Stacy Ruddick phrases these assignments of 

error in value-laden language that already assumes an error occurred. The assignments 

overlap. We proceed to review the record to determine if the court commissioner 

breached the strictures of RCW 26.19.080(3). In doing so, we separate the argument that 

some of the expenses afforded Randall Ruddick include more than transportation costs 

from other arguments forwarded by Stacy. 
No. 35416-4-III

In re Marriage of Ruddick

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Long Distance Transportation Costs

We review a trial court’s rulings dealing with the provisions of a parenting plan 

for abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Kovacs, 121 Wn.2d 795, 801, 854 P.2d 629 

(1993); In re Marriage of Zigler and Sidwell, 154 Wn. App. 803, 808, 226 P.3d 202 

(2010). Courts must base child support in parentage actions on the schedules and 

standards found in RCW 26.19. RCW 26.26.130(6). A trial court abuses its discretion if 

it bases a decision outside the applicable legal standard or on untenable grounds. In re 

Marriage of McNaught, 189 Wn. App. 545, 552, 359 P.3d 811 (2015). 

RCW 26.19.080 controls this appeal. Subsections 3 and 4 of the statute declares:

(3) Day care and special child rearing expenses, such as tuition and

long-distance transportation costs to and from the parents for visitation 

purposes, are not included in the economic table. These expenses shall be 

shared by the parents in the same proportion as the basic child support 

obligation. . . . 

(4) The court may exercise its discretion to determine the necessity 

for and the reasonableness of all amounts ordered in excess of the basic 

child support obligation.

(Emphasis added.)

Courts base child support in marital dissolution actions on the schedules and 

standards found in chapter 26.19 RCW. Day care and special child rearing expenses, 

such as tuition and long-distance transportation costs to and from the parents for 

visitation purposes, are not included in the economic table. These expenses shall be 

shared by the parents in the same proportion as the basic support obligation. Under RCW 
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26.19.080(4), the court “may exercise its discretion to determine the necessity for and the 

reasonableness of all amounts ordered in excess of the basic child support obligation.” 

RCW 26.19.080(3) speaks in terms of splitting, between the parents, the cost of 

the child traveling for visitation. Nevertheless, this court extended the statute to the cost 

of the parent traveling to the child’s location for visitation. In re Paternity of Hewitt, 98 

Wn. App. 85, 88-89, 988 P.2d 496 (1999). Many children are too young to travel alone. 

In this appeal, we assume the children’s disability complicates travel. 

Because RCW 26.19.080(3) mandates the cost sharing, the trial court must enforce 

the provision. Murphy v. Miller, 85 Wn. App. 345, 349-50, 932 P.2d 722 (1997). The 

trial court holds discretion only to determine the need for long-distance transportation 

costs and the reasonableness of the costs. Murphy v. Miller, 85 Wn. App. at 349. Once 

the court determines that the costs are necessary and reasonable, the parties must share 

them in the same proportion as the basic support obligation. In re Marriage of Scanlon 

and Witrak, 109 Wn. App. 167, 181, 34 P.3d 877 (2001); In re Paternity of Hewitt, 98 

Wn. App. at 89 (1999); Murphy v. Miller, 85 Wn. App. at 349 (1997). 

Before assessing the need and reasonableness of transportation costs, the court 

must first determine if a claimed expense qualifies as a “transportation” cost. RCW 

26.19.080(3) references “long-distance transportation costs to and from the parents for 

visitation purposes.” Stacy Ruddick contends that a car rental bill, food, condominium 

rent, diapers, and entertainment do not qualify. We agree. 
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This court in Marriage of McNaught addressed the identical question. The trial 

court allowed the mother to relocate with the child from Seattle to Texas, with the father 

visiting the child in Texas. The trial court ordered a proportionate split of airfare alone, 

thereby denying the father’s request that the mother also share in the additional expenses 

of housing, food, and car rental. This court affirmed the denial of costs beyond the 

airfare. This court determined the statute unambiguous particularly since the statute adds 

the words “to and from” the location after “transportation costs.” 189 Wn. App. at 567. 

We quote some business dictionaries and lay dictionaries for the definitions of 

“transportation expenses” and “transport.” 

Transportation expenses are costs incurred by an employee or selfemployed taxpayer while away from home in a travel status for business. 

Transportation expenses are a subset of travel expenses, which are all costs 

associated with business travel, such as taxi fare, fuel, parking fees, 

lodging, meals, tips, and cleaning, shipping and telephone charges that 

employees may incur and claim for reimbursement. Transportation 

expenses are narrower in that they refer only to the use of or cost of 

maintaining a car used for business, or transport by rail, air, bus, taxi or any 

other means of conveyance for business purposes. . . . 

INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/transportationexpenses.asp. 

Another dictionary defines “transportation expenses” as: 

1. Business: A claim for reimbursement made by an employee 

related to the costs of getting to and from a business-related activity. 

BUSINESS DICTIONARY, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/transportationexpenses.html. 
No. 35416-4-III

In re Marriage of Ruddick

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The Merriam-Webster Dictionary partially defines “transportation” as: 

1 : an act, process, or instance of transporting or being transported

2a : means of conveyance or travel from one place to another

b : public conveyance of passengers or goods especially as a 

commercial enterprise. 

MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/transportation. The same dictionary defines “transport” as: 

transitive verb

1 : to transfer or convey from one place to another transporting ions 

across a living membrane

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/transport. All of these definitions coincide 

with the holding in McNaught. One definition explains that the concept of 

“transportation expenses” is narrower than the notion of “travel expenses.” 

We note that, in analyzing RCW 26.19.080(3), some decisions read the statute as 

directing the sharing between parents of “travel expenses.” In re the Marriage of 

McNaught, 189 Wn. App. at 567, (2015); In re Yeamans, 117 Wn. App. 593, 599, 72 

P.3d 775 (2003); In re Paternity of Hewitt, 98 Wn. App. at 85 (1999). These opinions 

impliedly equate “travel expenses” with “transportation expenses.” We consider 

“transportation expenses” to be a subset of “travel expenses” and not entirely 

synonymous. If RCW 26.19.080(3) demanded a sharing of “travel” expenses, we might 

include car rental, lodging, and food during the travel. 
No. 35416-4-III

In re Marriage of Ruddick

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Randall Ruddick astutely notes that RCW 26.19.080(4) does not limit the sharing 

of expenses to transportation costs, but also includes all day care and child-care rearing 

expenses. He then argues that the court commissioner awarded the additional costs of 

food, lodging, and entertainment as day and child-care rearing expenses. We read the 

record to the contrary. In both the child support worksheet and the letter ruling, the court 

commissioner assigned the additional expenses beyond airfare as transportation costs. 

We observe that, because of the unique needs of the Ruddick children, the food, 

lodging, car rental, diapers, and entertainment might fulfill the definitions of the other 

terms such as day care and special child rearing expenses. Since the trial court included 

car rental, lodging, food, and entertainment under the rubric of transportation costs, the 

trial court did not address whether it could order the sharing of costs for these other 

expenses on some other ground. Therefore, we remand to the trial court for further 

proceedings to determine if another ground or other grounds exist to order Stacy Ruddick 

to share in those additional expenses. 

Other Contentions

Stacy Ruddick also objects to the trial court’s grant of the amount of expenses on 

the alleged assumption that the trial court failed to note that Randall’s 2015 expenses 

were based on a visit double in length than ordered visitation because of the failure to 

exercise visitation in 2014. We disagree. The trial court denied Randall an amount equal 
No. 35416-4-III

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to the 2015 expenses, while noting that the 2015 trip lasted four weeks. The trial court 

reasonably established an amount of expenses based on a two-week visit to San Diego. 

Stacy Ruddick also contends the costs claimed by Randall were extravagant. We 

affirm only the ruling demanding that Stacy share in the costs of airfare. Stacy does not 

expressly characterize the airfare as extravagant, so we affirm the sharing of the fare. On 

remand, Stacy may claim anew the excessive nature of any nontransport expenses sought 

by Randall. 

Stacy Ruddick accuses the court commissioner of bias because the commissioner 

referenced that Randall objected to relocation of the children to San Diego and such an 

objection bears no relevance to the amount of expenses that Stacy must divide. We agree 

the court commissioner mentioned Randall’s objection, but do not conclude that the 

commissioner based its decision on the observation. Stacy cites no authority to support 

the argument of bias. We do not consider conclusory arguments that are unsupported by 

citation to authority. Joy v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 170 Wn. App. 614, 629, 285 P.3d 

187 (2012).

Stacy Ruddick next contends the trial court erred in denying her request for some 

reimbursement of rearing costs, such as diapers, when affording Randall partial 

reimbursement for the same costs. We have reversed such costs. Stacy may raise this 

argument again during the remand hearing. 
No. 35416-4-III 

In re Marriage of Ruddick 

CONCLUSION 

We affirm the court commissioner's order requiring Stacy Ruddick to share in 

Randall Ruddick's cost of airfare to visit the children in San Diego. We vacate the court 

commissioner's order requiring Stacy Ruddick to share in other expenses. We remand 

for further determination, consistent with this opinion, as to what, if any, other expenses 

incurred by Randall in visiting the children should be shared by Stacy. 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 

2.06.040. 

Fearing, J. 

WE CONCUR: 

Q_ 

Pennell, A.CJ. 

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