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THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS: 

PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 25, 2008 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Staff Director 

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hagel, Chuck, U.S. Senator from Nebraska, statement ....................................... 4 

Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening statement ..... 1 

Welch, Hon. C. David, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC .......................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Richard 

Lugar .............................................................................................................. 25 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Russell Feingold ................................................................................................................. 29 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator George 

Voinovich ....................................................................................................... 31 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Casey, Hon. Robert P., Jr., U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania, prepared statement ...................................................................................................................... 25 

(III)

(1) 

THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS: 

PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:02 p.m. in room SD– 

419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John Kerry, presiding. 

Present: Senators Kerry, Feingold, and Hagel. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF JOHN F. KERRY, U.S. SENATOR 

FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

Senator KERRY. This hearing will come to order. I appreciate 

everybody being here on time. We’re working a little bit under the 

pressure of the clock and I just want to give everybody a headsup on that. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, Chief of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, are coming in to brief us at 4 o’clock. So we’re going 

to wrap up about 10 of 4. I’m just giving everybody a heads-up, 

though we may well be able to get through most of our questions 

and issues in that time anyway. I never viewed this as a particularly prolonged hearing. 

I do want to thank Secretary Welch for coming here today to discuss this before we break up at some point in the next days for the 

elections and the Congress winds up its work here. I know that the 

Secretary has been in New York for the General Assembly, so we’re 

particularly appreciative for his taking time to come back down 

here because obviously there’s important work to be done up there, 

too. 

I’m grateful to the Secretary. He just introduced me to Ayman 

Nour’s wife. As many of you know, he’s in prison in Egypt and 

someone that we’re deeply concerned about, and we understand 

may be in failing health, and we’re awaiting word on the potential 

of the government, in fact, placing him among those other folks 

who have been released in recent days. So it is a matter of concern 

for our country and I’m appreciative to the Secretary for introducing me to her, and for her taking the time to be here. 

It’s hard to overstate the importance of bringing about a lasting 

peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians. This is important 

to everybody concerned, directly by living in the region or indirectly 

because of their connections to the region and because of our 

mutual security concerns as a consequence. 

The vast majority of the people of Israel and the Palestinian people share the goal of bringing two states living side by side into 

2 

peaceful and secure existence. The question is what we can do to 

help get them there. 

I appreciate that in recent months, the last year and a half perhaps, the administration has been making an effort to move that 

process forward, starting with the hosting of the Annapolis Conference last November and continuing in the months since. Secretary Welch, I recognize you’ve been working particularly hard on 

this issue, including making some 40 trips to the region. 

It is obviously a source of very significant frustration to many of 

us on this committee and in the Congress that for a period of almost 6 years this issue was to some degree ignored and certainly 

on a back burner at best. That has made the problem more difficult 

to solve, particularly in the timeframe left. But we are where we 

are and we need to focus on what these opportunities may be. 

I was in Israel and the West Bank in July. I had the opportunity 

to meet with Prime Minister Olmert, Defense Minister Barak, Mr. 

Nyaho, with Prime Minister Fayad and Saibarakat. At the time 

President Abbas was out of the country. I heard different views 

from each of them as to what had not or what had been accomplished in the negotiations, and maybe that’s a reflection of the extent to which it demonstrated a desire by the negotiators on both 

sides to honor the commitments not to leak the details. 

But it sounded as if some progress had been made on the basic 

contours of a territorial exchange, water rights, security arrangements, and the demilitarized nature of the Palestinian state, if not 

on sone of the most difficult issues, the status of Jerusalem and the 

right of return. As we all know, until there is agreement on everything there is agreement on nothing. 

Now that Prime Minister Olmert has resigned and Minister 

Livni is trying to form a new government, it’s not realistic to expect 

a dramatic breakthrough by the administration’s deadline by the 

end of the year. While we all await the new governments in Israel, 

here at home, and possibly in the Palestinian Authority because of 

Prime Minister Abbas’s term, which is scheduled to end in January, the challenge is very much to make sure that we can build on 

whatever progress has been made and that that serves as a foundation for the future. There’s a lot of uncertainty and certain realities, however, ought to inform our choices. That’s part of what we’d 

like to get at today with the Secretary, as we think about that in 

the next months, which will be months of transition for whichever 

administration is elected. 

First of all, we know that Israel needs a partner for peace that 

can be counted on to deliver for all the Palestinians, including 

those in Gaza. I’ve heard that for years. I know the strategy is to 

move ahead with the negotiations with the Palestinian Authority 

in hopes that the prospect of an agreement will empower the moderates and isolate the extremists. That makes it all the more important to ensure that the Palestinian Authority prevails over 

Hamas in the struggle for the loyalty of the people. 

This tough work of building durable, respected Palestinian institutions may not be as compelling as the peace negotiations themselves, but let me tell you something: It is every bit as crucial to 

achieving our goal. The failure to help Palestinians develop viable 

institutions with the confidence of their people underlies our past 

3 

and it presents difficulties. And I’ll tell you, if it continues it will 

fundamentally undermine chances for peace. 

When I met with Abu Mazen right after he was elected in 2006, 

he looked me in the eye and he said: ‘‘Senator, I know what you 

want me to do,’’ ‘‘you’’ being you the United States, the Western 

world. ‘‘You want me to disarm Hamas. But you tell me how I’m 

supposed to do that? I don’t have any cars, I don’t have any police, 

I don’t have any radios, communications, training, or sufficient 

security forces to do the job.’’ 

Many believe that we have—we collectively, those of us extolling 

the virtues of peace and pushing for it and engaged in the process, 

Quartet or otherwise—have contributed to the deterioration of the 

situation in Gaza by pushing the Palestinians to hold elections 

when they weren’t ready. We’ve all seen the results: Hamas in control, more rockets falling on Israel, and a major new roadblock on 

the path to peace. 

On this point, I was actually very encouraged by a meeting I had 

yesterday with General Dayton, who is in charge of our efforts to 

train Palestinian security forces. He told me that since we had last 

met in July those security forces have increasingly earned the trust 

of the Israelis, enabling them to move ahead with their policy of 

doing less as the Palestinians do more. And I saw first-hand in the 

West Bank our USAID mission and the efforts of Tony Blair, which 

have also brought about some progress in building the economy in 

the West Bank. 

We need to make certain that those initiatives receive all the resources that they need to extend the remarkable progress we have 

seen recently in Jenin to the rest of the West Bank. 

We can’t do this alone. Countries that had made pledges of support must do their part by using their record oil profits to live up 

to their promises. 

We also know that there are enemies of peace who have a history 

of derailing the process, including Iran and Syria, and they continue to support Hamas and Hezbollah. That’s why the Israeli dialogue with Syria through Turkey is so important. If successful, 

those negotiations could remove a historic adversary of Israeli that 

supports terrorist groups, to help to isolate Iran, and create additional leverage for negotiations on the nuclear program, and generate real momentum for the peace process itself. As I’ve said many 

times, the U.S. should be ready to play a direct role in these talks 

if we can help to reach a deal. 

We also know that Israeli’s continued building of new settlements is, as Secretary Rice described it just a day or so ago, not 

helpful to the peace process. I think that’s an understatement. In 

July I heard that there had actually been a dramatic increase in 

the number of new settlement permits approved in the months 

since Annapolis compared with the entire year before. When new 

settlements go up, it makes the Palestinian Authority look weak 

and ineffective, strips them of any of the legitimacy that we are encouraging them to develop, and discourages the Palestinian people 

as a whole, and it undermines the viability of the two-state 

solution. 

We know that any peace deal will require the active support of 

the major players in the region. King Abdullah of Jordan has done 

4 

a remarkable job of trying to move the process forward, but he 

needs more support. The attendance of so many Arab countries at 

the Annapolis Conference was a positive beginning. But we have to 

make sure they remain engaged in a positive way of going forward. 

Finally, we know that successful negotiations are going to require a redoubled commitment to sustained high-level engagement 

by the United States. This must be an absolute top priority for the 

next administration. I’m confident that it will be. 

With that, let me turn to my colleague Senator Hagel for his 

opening remarks, and when he’s finished, Secretary Welch will 

make his opening statement, and then, as I said, we’ll work within 

the parameters of time. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, U.S. SENATOR FROM 

NEBRASKA 

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Welcome, Secretary Welch. I think Chairman Kerry has framed 

the issue pretty well and I would withhold any further comments 

until we hear from the Secretary, and then I will have some questions. Thank you. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel. 

Secretary Welch, thanks a lot again for coming. We appreciate it. 

We appreciate your significant service in the entire region, which 

well equips you to help move this process along. 

STATEMENT OF HON. C. DAVID WELCH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. WELCH. Thank you, sir. With your permission, I’ll make a 

few remarks to summarize my prepared testimony so that we can 

focus then on the issues, some issues that you have raised and 

some that I’d like to cover. 

Annapolis was a path-breaking event and since then we’ve tried 

to work along four tracks to support broadening the Arab-Israeli 

peace, but especially focusing on the Palestinian track. First, the 

most important imperative is to support the negotiations themselves, bilateral negotiations. Second, as you mentioned, building 

the institutions for Palestinian statehood is not a project that has 

to await the inception of a state; it can be started now. Third, conditions on the ground meaningful to both Palestinians and Israelis, 

and there needs to be progress with respect to those. Finally, like 

other diplomatic endeavors, we want to maintain regional and 

international support for this agenda. 

I believe, Senator, we’ve seen advances along each of these 

tracks. There is in this almost a year now since the Annapolis Conference, an environment in which there has been substantial 

progress toward fulfilling the promise of that conference—two 

states, a two-state solution. In effect, sir, these are the first meaningful permanent status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians in nearly a decade. I believe that they are very substantial and that both parties are committed to them. 

The fact that there isn’t much in the way of public statements 

or agreements that have been announced or articulated should not 

be mistaken for a lack of progress. Our engagement on this issue 

5 

is not one that’s based on false hope or a lack of realism in our 

assessment of the obstacles to moving ahead, but our commitment, 

because of the importance of the issue, because we believe that 

both parties are sincerely committed to negotiations, we recognize, 

because we are privy to some of the work they’ve done, that it is 

substantial, and there is the possibility of a genuine breakthrough 

if this negotiating structure is sustained and protected. 

Thank you for recognizing that we’ve devoted a lot of time to it. 

I just came from a meeting between President Bush and President 

Abbas. I asked the White House, in preparation for this testimony, 

how many times President Bush had met with the Israeli and Palestinian leadership and we count more than 30. 

Our object isn’t to interfere. It is to serve the traditional role that 

the United States has served on this important issue, providing 

good offices and support, ideas where we can move things forward. 

Secretary Rice has visited Israel and the Palestinian territories 

22 times. As recently—the most recent was in August. This I think 

is both the level and the intensity of U.S. diplomatic engagement 

that it will take to move this issue along. 

We could look back in history, Senators, and talk about why we 

did things at any given point in time. Sometimes history has surprised us and we may or may not have had some responsibility for 

those events. But you can’t predict everything in this world and 

you deal with the cards you have. 

I think, as we’ve seen in recent weeks in Israel, the political 

dynamics are also very fluid in the region. But the alternative now 

of relaxation in this effort is I don’t believe in our interest or in 

the interest of the parties. 

I believe that the Israeli leadership and the mainstream Israeli 

political life is committed to peace with the Palestinians and a twostate solution. In a sense, we’ve reoriented the political discourse 

on both sides to the acceptance and the desire for a two-state solution. That’s true also on the Palestinian side, though not all groups 

accept that outcome. 

In addition to launching bilateral negotiations, Annapolis was a 

significant step toward bringing together support for and applying 

momentum to a comprehensive peace. As you know, the Arab 

League continues to support its peace initiative, which is for a comprehensive solution, but also a two-state solution on the Palestinian track. Since I was last in front of this committee, Syria and 

Israel have undertaken talks, albeit indirect, facilitated by Turkey, 

an American ally. There’s more stability in Lebanon today with the 

election of a new President there, who also visited the White House 

today. We see some prospect for stability to improve there. President Suleiman is the first Lebanese President in the Oval Office in 

12 years. 

We are focused, of course, on the Palestinian-Israeli track, which 

we believe is the most mature and the most deserving of effort 

right now. But I recognize that these other complementary developments offer an important possibility for broadening the regional 

effort toward peace. 

We’ve tried to marshall international support as well, primarily 

through our activity in the so-called Quartet, which brings together 

the United States, the European Union, the European Commission, 

6 

and Russia, which provides backing for the negotiations process. 

But also it is a normative body which can make some judgments 

about what is right to do. Ever since the election of Hamas to a 

position of a majority in the Legislative Council, the Quartet has 

articulated three principles for any Palestinian Government that 

offer a guide for engagement with the international community: 

Renunciation of violence and terror, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of past agreements negotiated by the parties. Regrettably, 

Hamas has not seen fit to recognize those principles. 

Second, there’s some improvement in conditions on the ground, 

which I believe if expanded offers a chance for further political 

progress. If people on the ground don’t see something good happening, they’re not going to be very supportive of what their politicians are electing to try to do in negotiations. There has been some 

I would say—some progress, albeit modest, in implementing obligations under the roadmap and we believe the parties should redouble their efforts. We’re playing a much more continuous and active 

role in observing and monitoring that. There’s a senior American 

officer, GEN Will Fraser, who’s assigned to that job and who visits 

about every 2 weeks to the area and communicates privately with 

the parties on the steps that we think ought to be taken to encourage further movement. 

Thanks to the support of the American taxpayer and the American Congress, we’ve led the way among donors to the Palestinians, 

including with direct budget support to the Palestinian Authority. 

You’re quite right, it’s been important to encourage support of others, but I believe the fact that we’ve been willing to step up and 

do this has brought others along. Collective European support of 

the Palestinian Authority is very substantial, well over two times 

the amount that we’ve done. And Arab support is coming in, 

though not at the pace we would like and in irregular baskets. I 

can go into that more if you’re interested in the Q and A. 

As you know, Senators, the Palestinian Government is run by 

Prime Minister Salam Fayad, whose record of fiscal probity is to 

be admired, especially these days. We think that he’s increased accountability for these American taxpayer dollars in a significant 

way while trying to get austerity within what has been a difficult 

system to administer. There’s some evidence that he’s had some 

successes there. 

Another important track is to help the security forces. I know 

you heard from General Dayton. It’s been about a year since we 

started putting American taxpayer dollars to work in security 

training and equipping and there are now members of the national 

security forces, the Palestinian National Guard, who’ve come out of 

training with equipment and are moving into garrisons and activities in the West Bank. Just last week another tranche—another 

battalion of these troops—went into Jordan to commence their 

training there. We have very good cooperation with the Jordanians 

and the Egyptians on this effort. 

Of course, they need to be put to work. There the institutional 

deficiency of the Palestinian Authority is something we’re having 

a little bit more trouble addressing. What we call the chain of prevention, the whole law and order structure, has been stressed in 

recent years, particularly in the West Bank, and it’s basically nonVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:57 Jan 15, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\MID-EAST BETTY
7 

existent in Gaza. So that’s taking additional work. The Europeans 

are very helpful in that area, but it’s a place where we need to 

make additional progress. 

We try to concentrate on getting circles of control within the 

West Bank and expanding those outward. There’s work been done 

now in Ramallah, but also in Nablus, and the centerpiece of the 

current effort is Jenin, the most important city in the northernmost 

governorate of the West Bank. 

Security cooperation between the Israelis and Palestinians there 

is better. There is more mobility for Palestinians, too. These are 

positive improvements that are recognized by Israel and its security services. 

In the negotiations, sir, since the United States is a sponsor and 

on occasion sits in trilateral meetings with the parties, we have 

accepted the responsibility of confidentiality in that process, but 

there are some things I can say about it in a public forum. There 

are advances. It’s not a trivial thing to say that the parties have 

common aspirations. I know that sounds like diplospeak, but to define the goal and to think about ways in which to arrive at it is 

the essence of a negotiating process, and this one is real and under 

way. 

They want a comprehensive agreement on all the issues. You 

mentioned the core issues and that is their aspiration, as articulated at Annapolis, to address it comprehensively without exception. 

They have pledged to continue these bilateral, confidential, and 

contentious negotiations until they get their goal. We would like to 

see them realize that goal as soon as possible. I work for this administration, so I would like to see it in this administration. But 

we have a Hippocratic Oath to make sure that we carry it forward 

if that needs to be the case. 

The negotiating structure that is there is effective, productive, 

real, and I believe it will be kept in place because, at least on the 

Israeli side, current Foreign Minister Livni, who may form a government in Israel, is now well schooled in the whole effort and is 

personally committed to it. 

Our President has put out there for the first time from an American President as an articulated goal of U.S. policy that there 

should be a Palestinian state. We believe that would be in the interest of Israel and its security and we believe it would be in the 

interest of the United States and our security, and of course we 

would believe it would be in the interest of Palestinians. 

That’s not going to come in a single dramatic moment, but only 

by methodical effort to do this. We spent a lot of time both building 

to Annapolis and in the virtually 1 year since. I hope you would 

agree that it is a serious effort. This is not because we want an 

accolade or a recognition, but because of the importance of this goal 

of comprehensive peace. I believe that we should stay that course. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Welch follows:] 

8 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. C. DAVID WELCH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Chairman Kerry, Senator Coleman, and members of the subcommittee, thank you 

for giving me the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss our work to promote a just and durable peace between Israel and the Palestinians. 

Since the Annapolis Conference in November 2007, the United States has focused 

its efforts along four tracks: Supporting the bilateral Israeli-Palestinian negotiations; building the institutions of a Palestinian state; improving the conditions on 

the ground; and maintaining international and regional support for the negotiations. 

We have seen significant advances along each of these tracks, and these advances 

have created an environment in which substantial progress has been made, and will 

continue to be made, toward fulfilling the promise of Annapolis: Two states, Israel 

and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security. 

The fact that this environment exists is all the more dramatic given the volatility 

that wracked the region over much of the last 8 years. After the Second Intifada 

exploded in 2000, ultimately costing thousands of Israeli and Palestinian lives, the 

prospects for peace negotiations retreated ever more remotely into the distance. The 

trust and mutual confidence required for meaningful negotiations dissolved, and the 

possibility of a brighter future for Israelis and Palestinians dimmed. Nascent reform 

within the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 2003, including the appointment of 

Mahmoud Abbas as Prime Minister, spurred hope in a positive dynamic, but this 

too collapsed when it was clear that power would remain centralized and decisionmaking would remain opaque. The Palestinian Presidential elections in January 

2005 and the Israeli disengagement from Gaza later that year again provided some 

new opportunity. Yet the Hamas victory in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, followed by the war in Lebanon that summer, later dispelled this hope. 

Throughout this difficult period, President Bush nonetheless upheld his goals of 

fostering the creation of a sovereign, democratic, Palestinian state and of ending the 

conflict. Even as political conditions further deteriorated in the ugly Hamas coup 

in Gaza in June 2007, we began to see the emergence of Israeli and Palestinian 

leaderships committed to peace through two states as the only feasible solution to 

the conflict. Recognizing the United States unique relationship with the parties, 

President Bush seized the opportunity and called an international meeting to support the parties’ efforts toward peace. 

The Annapolis Conference in November 2007 was the first major Middle East 

peace conference since the Madrid Conference in 1991 and the only high-level, multilateral meeting of its kind ever to be held on American soil. Bringing together 50 

countries from all continents, including 14 leading Arab States, Annapolis launched 

the first substantive negotiations in nearly a decade to address the core aspects of 

the conflict. It laid a foundation for Israelis and Palestinians to work together, 

focused the international community’s support, and defined a constructive U.S. role. 

The absence of public agreements or a flurry of press releases should not be mistaken for a lack of progress. Ongoing, high-level U.S. engagement on this issue is 

sustained not by false hope or an unrealistic assessment of the challenges but by 

our belief in the sincerity of the parties’ commitment to the negotiations, by the recognition of the progress they have made, and by the genuine possibility of a breakthrough if the current negotiating structure remains intact. 

Since November, President Bush and Secretary Rice have provided intense personal support and focus to the parties’ bold efforts. The President visited Israel in 

May to share in commemorating its independence day. During the visit, he held a 

series of meetings with the parties—not to interfere in the negotiations, which they 

rightly emphasize should remain bilateral, but to mark the progress they have made 

and to provide any U.S. assistance they requested. Secretary Rice has visited Israel 

and the Palestinian territories on 22 occasions, as recently as late August. In nearmonthly trilateral meetings with the negotiators, she has helped the parties to consolidate the gains they have made in their bilateral discussions and provided encouragement as they continue on the often challenging course toward a final peace 

treaty. My own work to buttress the negotiations has taken me to Israel and the 

Palestinian territories over 40 times. 

U.S. engagement has concentrated not on the provision of unilateral proposals but 

on promoting an atmosphere of consistency and stability within which the parties’ 

bilateral negotiations can flourish. As recent events in Israel demonstrate, the political dynamics in the region are often fluid. However, there is no better indication 

of the value of the U.S. role than that, despite a temporary inward focus as Israel 

undergoes a political transition, we have seen no depreciation in Israel’s interest in 

forging a lasting agreement with its Palestinian partners. The same is true on the 

Palestinian side, as President Abbas and the PA remain steadfast in their commitVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:57 Jan 15, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\MID-EAST BETTY
9 

ment to negotiations, even as rejectionist groups like Hamas continue their attempts 

to thwart a meaningful dialogue. 

In addition to launching the bilateral negotiations, Annapolis was a significant 

step toward stimulating momentum for comprehensive peace throughout the region. 

Fourteen Arab countries sat with the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Defense 

Minister of Israel and committed to pursuing a resolution to their longstanding conflict, building on Egypt and Jordan’s previously historic steps. The Arab League continues to reiterate its support for a two-state solution through its promotion of the 

Arab League Initiative. Syria has since undertaken indirect talks with Israel, facilitated by our ally Turkey. With the election of President Sleiman and the inauguration of the National Dialogue, stability is returning to Lebanon, and it is our hope 

that progress can be made in launching efforts to resolve the remaining issues between that country and Israel. While retaining our focus on the more mature bilateral Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, we should recognize these other complementary developments as an important indicator of the current regional dynamic and 

regional states’ interest in a comprehensive peace. 

The impact of U.S. diplomatic efforts has been magnified by the Quartet’s role in 

marshalling the energies of the international community. The Quartet has provided 

a vital forum for coordinating external backing for the negotiations; guaranteeing 

that the international community abides by the principle of ‘‘do no harm’’ by supporting, rather than intervening in, the bilateral dialogue; and protecting the negotiations from destructive forces. The Quartet established principles for the international community’s engagement with Palestinian officials: Renunciation of violence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of past agreements. Hamas brutality in 

Gaza since the 2007 coup, illustrated by its crackdown in recent months on those 

opposed to its illegitimate rule, underscore the importance of these principles. While 

we welcome the restoration of calm between Gaza and Israel, pursuing negotiations 

based on the Quartet principles remains the only path toward a long-term peace. 

There are some improvements to conditions on the ground, which if expanded, will 

encourage further political progress. Palestinians who do not see an improvement 

in their daily lives will lose faith in the negotiations. Regional governments are increasingly concerned about Israel’s settlement activity, which undermines confidence and is seen as prejudging the outcome of negotiations. LTG William Fraser, 

and his successor, Major General Selva, continue to monitor roadmap implementation based on the U.S. mandate from the parties at Annapolis. While the parties 

have made some progress, albeit modest, in meeting their obligations under the 

roadmap, they must redouble their efforts: Palestinians must dismantle the infrastructure of terrorism and promote an atmosphere of tolerance, and Israel must 

freeze settlement activity, including natural growth, and increase access and movement for Palestinians. 

The international community also bears a responsibility to assist in improving 

conditions on the ground and in building a democratic Palestinian state. Led by the 

United States and the European Union, donors are providing direct budget support 

to the PA; ensuring that the basic needs of Palestinians are being met; funding 

high-impact projects to benefit Palestinians; and promoting efforts to link security, 

governance, and economic development. At the Paris Donors Conference, which 

followed Annapolis in December 2007, the U.S. pledged $555 million in 2008 to 

include support for implementation of the Palestinian Reform and Development 

Plan (PRDP), which lays out the PA’s plan for creating a viable and sustainable 

economy with secure revenue streams in the mid-to-long term. The United States 

has exceeded our pledged amounts. To date, with support from Congress, we have 

been able to make available $150 million in the form of a cash transfer for budget 

assistance to the PA and over $157 million in contributions to United Nations Relief 

and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), comprising $57 million to 

UNRWA’s Emergency Appeal for the West Bank and Gaza and over $99 million to 

its General Fund for ongoing activities benefiting Palestinian refugees throughout 

the region. In fiscal year 2008, the U.S. also allocated $239 million for project assistance. These funds are currently being obligated in the West Bank and Gaza by the 

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for economic growth, democracy and governance, food assistance, education, health, water supply and budget 

support. An additional $25 million in INCLE funds will support the development 

of Palestinian security services. Congress subsequently appropriated in the FY 2009 

‘‘bridge’’ another $150 million in direct budget support to be provided in FY 2009 

and an additional $50 million for security support to the PA for FY 2009. 

Under the government of Prime Minister Fayyad, the PA has undertaken substantial economic and fiscal reforms, which have been endorsed by both the World 

Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The PA has increased accountability 

and transparency and instituted a number of austerity measures to limit the growth 

10 

of its budget, including by reducing the size of the public sector payroll, freezing 

wage increases, reducing utilities subsidies for citizens, and implementing tax administration reforms to increase tax revenue. The PA has instituted financial administrative reforms to track and manage donor funds and ensure that they do not 

end up in the hands of Hamas or other terrorist organizations. It has also established a single treasury account for all PA financing, eliminated all parallel financing mechanisms outside of this account, it developed a single comprehensive civil 

society roster and payroll. 

Maintaining broad international backing for the PA is crucial in guaranteeing 

that it continues to develop as the governing body of the Palestinian territories. Regional partners bear a special responsibility in demonstrating their support for the 

Annapolis process in this regard. We have welcomed the recent large financial commitments from Saudi Arabia, U.A.E, Kuwait, and Algeria and hope that these actions will pave the way for other Arab States to follow their lead. Without additional 

budget support, the PA will be unable to operate at the budgeted levels reviewed 

by the international community. It faces an anticipated $300 to $400 million cash 

shortfall in calendar year 2008 and the reality of continuing budget shortfalls 

throughout 2009 and 2010, which prevent the PA from engaging in long-term planning and from investing in the Palestinian people. 

The United States also continues to help the Palestinians build skilled, competent, and professional security forces that can establish rule of law in the West 

Bank and help the PA serve as a reliable security partner for Israel. Ensuring that 

the PA is able to maintain law and order throughout all of the areas it oversees 

and assume counterterrorism responsibility from Israel is also a critical element in 

improving the daily life of civilians. The U.S. has spent $86 million to train, equip, 

and garrison over 1,000 members of the National Security Forces and Presidential 

Guard under the auspices of U.S. Security Coordinator LTG Keith Dayton, and we 

have requested an additional $25 million above the $75 million noted earlier to continue this program. Just last week, another 500-man National Security Force special 

battalion crossed into Jordan to commence training. Ultimately, it is our plan to 

train a total of five special battalions for the West Bank and two for Gaza. 

These trained forces are the cornerstone of a plan to couple improvements in law 

and order with economic development and criminal justice sector capacity building 

in targeted areas of the West Bank. The goal is to demonstrate the potential for 

real success in a future Palestinian state by creating the conditions for security and 

economic growth. The first tangible example of this strategy has been Jenin. Israel 

has shown a willingness to ease security restrictions in the Jenin governorate under 

the principle of ‘‘as the Palestinians do more, we will do less.’’ As a result, we have 

begun to see real progress on the security situation and in the economy. Unemployment in and around Jenin is down, trade between the Northern West Bank and 

Israel is up, and Israeli officials have publicly commented on the positive improvements in security in and around the city. We are focused on continuing the success 

of the Jenin Initiative by pushing for further economic development; an increased 

emphasis on criminal justice sector initiatives, including the training of judges and 

prosecutors and the construction of jails and courthouses; and a persistent law-andorder effort. The international community must underpin these endeavors by meeting the $242 million pledged at the June 2008 Berlin Conference on Palestinian 

policing and the rule of law. 

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict would not have endured for 60 years if the obstacles to peace were limited and the solutions easily reached. However, the framework 

for negotiating a final resolution of the conflict is before us: Determined, professional negotiations between the parties; consistent yet constructive international engagement, led by the United States; and a vigorous effort to improve conditions on 

the ground. This formula has resulted in several key advances: Israel and the Palestinians now express common aspirations; they underscore their commitment to 

reaching a comprehensive agreement on all issues, without exception, as agreed at 

Annapolis; they pledge to continue their bilateral, confidential, and continuous negotiations until this goal is achieved; and they both attest that the negotiating structure is effective and productive and that they intend to keep it in place. 

President Bush’s vision of a Palestinian state at peace with Israel will not come 

in a single dramatic moment but as the result of a methodical, sincere initiative by 

the parties to conclude a lasting agreement that benefits both their people. The confidential nature of their work, and the United States respect for their request on 

this score, is indicative of the seriousness of the negotiations. These negotiations are 

not in the pursuit of glory but an authentic and resolute effort toward a comprehensive treaty, and though such an agreement will not be signed tomorrow, the United 

States must stay the course to ensure that the foundation laid for peace results in 

a new future for the region. 

11 

Senator KERRY. Let me begin by trying to frame the larger picture. I know you can’t go into the details and I’ve got some sense 

of some of the details, as well. But I think it would be helpful to 

the general discussion for you to try to give us an honest assessment at this point of what people might fairly expect here, so that 

we don’t have heightened expectations or dashed hopes. 

We have I think 116 days left of the Bush administration. We 

have 40-plus days until there’s an election and power dramatically 

shifts. We may or may not see a government in the next weeks in 

Israel, and with President Abbas, we have to see what happens. 

His term is up in January and we don’t quite know yet where that 

goes. So all three of the major players here are in a state of flux. 

Give us your best sense—I read an account yesterday of some 

leakage of some kind, suggesting a certain division of annexation 

and land and so forth, things that have been agreed to, none of 

which break really particularly new ground from Taba years ago, 

but which sort of said that Jerusalem and the right of return are 

not on the table in that regard. 

Now, that gets into the details and I’m not asking you to go 

there, but it certainly reflects on this question of expectations. So 

can you give us a sense today of what we who follow this and think 

about it a lot ought to be expecting, or what’s in your sort of upside, down-side balance on it? 

Mr. WELCH. I will try to do so. I think it’s important at the outset to make a distinction between what’s going on in the negotiations, which are bilateral and confidential, and U.S. policy on any 

given point that might be an element in the negotiations. 

Let me begin with sketching where I think things are. First of 

all, there’s a high sense of expectation whenever you mention this 

issue in the context of negotiations. But we need to remember that 

since the collapse of U.S.-led efforts at the end of 2000 there really 

hasn’t been a negotiation on the permanent status issues until the 

last 9 months. Again, that period—there’s lots of reasons for why 

that happened and it was a terribly difficult period for the parties. 

But the collapse in confidence and morale on the part of people on 

both sides to undertake this was very considerable. So it’s no small 

achievement to reverse that, get people focused again on what is 

the goal. That’s one point. 

The second point: What is that goal? There should be two states 

and one will be a state called Palestine. You know, it’s within our 

lifetimes and our political understanding that the concept of a Palestine was alien. Now it’s an articulated goal, and both parties 

agree to that. 

Senator KERRY. Can I say to you with all due respect, Mr. Secretary, for those of us—I’ve been here for 24 years now following 

this thing. That’s not a big deal right now. I mean, that ground 

was broken a long time ago. The talks fell apart in 2001 in January, just before the Clinton administration left, and largely because 

the players in those talks knew because of what had happened 

from people who didn’t want them to succeed and the levels of violence in Israel that Sharon, Prime Minister Sharon, was going to 

win the election, and it was impossible for Arafat to cut a deal 

which he knew he couldn’t go back to Ramallah and sell to anybody 

12 

because Prime Minister Sharon had already publicly rejected the 

Oslo Accords. 

So the equation has been since then sort of one driven, frankly, 

by Prime Minister Sharon and the Likud originally, and then 

Kadima as it came to be because of differences there in how to proceed. But this notion that everybody’s decided they want two states 

doesn’t satisfy anybody any more in terms of an accomplishment or 

a great change. I mean, that’s 6 years, 8 years old. 

The debate now is over how much like Swiss cheese this state 

is going to look and what sort of rights and access are going to go 

with it, et cetera, and what happens to the settlements and so 

forth. 

So I think what we need is a better sense of whether these talks 

currently being undertaken are going to come up with some, in 

your judgment, specific agreements that reinforce the steps of the 

roadmap? Are they going to be different from the roadmap? Are 

they going to be agreements in principle on some larger issues, 

leaving out the most thorny ones? Or could we expect something 

more comprehensive? 

Mr. WELCH. Well, I think the transition in Ariel Sharon’s own 

understanding of the goal from one of rejection of the Oslo negotiation to telling his people that a Palestinian state ought to be a goal 

is a very significant one. So I do think that is an important change. 

Second, again speaking about the parties themselves, Senator, 

they have laid out that they want a comprehensive agreement. By 

that they mean no partial agreements or no steps along the way 

that would prejudice their ability to arrive at a comprehensive 

agreement. That’s an important understanding right now between 

the two that are negotiating because from time to time there are 

other ideas floated out there about way stations on the way to a 

real peace treaty. 

Third, they subscribe to the idea that this should be continuous, 

confidential, and bilateral, which I expect will mean that it can be 

made irreversible, too, so that you can make progress, but you 

don’t go back to a situation where it gets thrown out if one or the 

other party changes or some of those watching from the outside 

change their approach. 

You asked about the roadmap. They have a common understanding that, even though they’re negotiating permanent status 

now, if they arrive at an agreement it’s only implemented in 

accordance with the roadmap. That’s important because the 

sequentiality of the roadmap had always been a question. 

Finally, they committed at Annapolis to negotiations on the core 

issues without exception and that is the purpose of this negotiation. In terms of our approach to it, we have joined them in saying 

it ought to be confidential, so I won’t be one of those who puts out 

there elements of it. 

Senator KERRY. I understand. 

Mr. WELCH. I don’t think you would expect me to do that. 

Senator KERRY. Can you tell us where we are with respect to the 

roadmap? Where would it pick up in sequentiality? 

Mr. WELCH. Well, if you recall there were three phases and the 

idea of comprehensive negotiations really didn’t come until the second and third phases. Both parties have accepted to do the permaVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:57 Jan 15, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\MID-EAST BETTY
13 

nent status negotiations now, it being understood that the roadmap 

has to be implemented before any treaty is implemented. 

The picture is mixed. There are some of the obligations of the 

parties that are being addressed, some that even have been fulfilled, but others that need further work. For example, on the Palestinian side, while they’re trying to rebuild security cooperation 

and security capability, this chain of prevention is pretty inadequate right now and they need to do a lot more to reform and restructure and rebuild their security services. This is in their interests because they see it first and foremost, as you know, Senator, 

as a law and order problem. They want their streets clean and safe. 

On the Israeli side, we are very concerned, as you pointed out, 

about the settlement activity. I think that’s, even beyond being a 

roadmap obligation, it is prejudicial to the kind of climate of confidence that’s necessary to sustain a negotiation and implicates 

potential final status issues, and that’s worrisome to see. 

Senator KERRY. Can you share with us what perpetuates that as 

an ongoing source of tension between us and our friends? It’s been 

the policy of our country for years that that’s, ‘‘unacceptable,’’ but 

it has never changed what happens. 

Mr. WELCH. Well, you’re right in the sense that our policy, 

though one of expressing concern and opposition to settlement 

activity, while at the same time raising what it implies for—— 

Senator KERRY. I’m distinguishing, incidentally, between building within those areas immediately around Jerusalem, which are 

already by everybody’s acceptance within the annexation concept, 

versus those areas that might be out by the Jordan River Valley 

or elsewhere. 

Mr. WELCH. Well, most of the settlement activity that we can observe is concentrated west of the fence or barrier that Israel has 

put up for what are described as security purposes. Though there 

is activity elsewhere, it’s modest. I’m not here to answer for why 

Israel continued doing this. I don’t think the international community makes a distinction, and the United States doesn’t. We’re concerned because this activity harms the confidence of people. It undermines the morale of folks when they see this happening. At the 

same time, it’s a bit of a political football in Israel, too. 

Senator KERRY. Last question. Then I’ll turn it over to Senator 

Hagel. 

Are you encouraged? I mean, it strikes me that what’s happened 

in Jenin and sort of the trust that has grown there, and frankly 

the willingness of Israel to be open-minded and experiment with 

that and allow those forces to take some initiative has been very 

positive. It may be a good model for what you could do as you 

stretch that further throughout the West Bank. Would that be an 

accurate assessment? 

Mr. WELCH. Yes; that would be our both hope and expectation. 

Fundamentally it rests on trying to bring several things together 

at once: Security, the security effort; some investment in the community concerned; and greater cooperation between Israelis and 

Palestinians. As you know, for example, in Jenin they live very 

close to one another. Traditionally, in the days before the current 

difficulties, Israelis used to cross into Jenin and go shopping. 

Senator KERRY. Right. 

14 

Mr. WELCH. Commerce was relatively free and that was important to the people in the area. Movement has become much more 

difficult in recent years. So as both Israelis and Palestinians sense 

that there’s some change there, I think those who would try to act 

against that will be pressured by their community not to do so, 

both Palestinian and Israeli. 

We would like to target international assistance more effectively 

on supporting that concept in other places, too. Some places are difficult. Hebron, al-Khalil, the most populous city in the southern 

West Bank, is a particularly sensitive area. But I think both parties would be willing to take a look at how they could do it there 

as well. 

In the middle of the West Bank, in Ramallah, Nablus, Jericho, 

the northern outskirts of Jerusalem, the southern outskirts of Jerusalem, Bethlehem, that kind of cooperative effort is under way, 

though perhaps in a little less organized fashion. 

So yes, overall the expectation would be that if this works in one 

place you could transmit it to another. 

Senator KERRY. Well, I really appreciate your coming here today. 

As I said, I’m going to have to leave at 10 of. I’ll leave the gavel 

with Senator Feingold, who can close it out unless another Senator 

comes at that time. But we appreciate your efforts enormously on 

this, Secretary, we really do. 

Senator Hagel. 

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Secretary Welch, let me make just a general comment, and I 

want to really address some of the issues that Senator Kerry noted 

in his opening statement and some of the commentary here over 

the last 10 minutes. You have said things like people need to see 

progress to develop confidence, there is a sense of morale that’s important in all this, they have to see their lives getting better in the 

Middle East, or wherever in the world when there has been despair 

and war, conflict. 

As I evaluate the last 8 years in the Middle East, I come to a 

conclusion that the Middle East today is more dangerous, more 

complicated, more combustible, more unstable than maybe ever, 

but certainly more than any time in the last 8 years. You can go 

through the countries. I mean, Syria, we don’t have an ambassador 

in Syria. It’s good that we had a meeting today with the Lebanese 

President with President Bush. I would not think that’s a resounding statement of things are going well in Lebanon. Hezbollah is 

now well entrenched in Lebanon. 

We have over 150,000 troops still in Iraq, spending $10–$12 billion a month in Iraq. I wouldn’t consider that yet a great success, 

with the administration saying, well, we can’t take any more troops 

out even though, as Secretary Gates said this week, Afghanistan, 

Pakistan, represent as dangerous a threat to our country as any 

part of the world, but yet we don’t have enough troops to send 

there to help out our commanding general who says he needs three 

new brigades. 

Iran. I don’t think Iran is particularly more inclusive in its attitude, nor in the reality of what they’ve been doing the last 8 years. 

15 

Gaza. I’m not sure we’re better off in Gaza today with Hamas in 

charge. Israel still is uncertain about what kind of government it’s 

going to get, who’s going to be the government. 

So as you add all this up, I have a little maybe different assessment of where we are today in the Middle East. Going back to 

some of your comments about circles of control and people don’t see 

progress and other points, we’ve done a good job in the last 8 years 

focusing expectations—conferences, promises, policies, intentions. 

But we seem not to be able to get anywhere with it. 

I get to the Middle East fairly often, and when people see in 

Israel and the West Bank more checkpoints, more settlements, as 

Senator Kerry has noted—8 years ago there wasn’t a fence. 

And by the way, I make these evaluations not assigning any responsibility or blame to any particular country or leader or individual. But I think I’m stating a pretty good inventory of fact here. 

So how do we break this? For example, Hamas. Do we think 

Hamas just fades away? Are we willing to deal with Hamas or how 

are we going to deal with Hamas? I don’t think they’re going to just 

assume that they’re going to be in any deal. Why—for example, you 

talked about Turkey brokering an engagement with Israel and 

Syria. Why didn’t we do that? If that’s so important to this administration, obviously enough that you’re taking some credit for it in 

your commentary, why don’t we have an ambassador there? Why 

are we still withholding our ambassador? 

So I’m going to let you respond to this because I see a lot of disconnects, Mr. Secretary, from what you say, what this administration has said, from the reality of where we are. Again, if you would 

want to respond to any of that, and then I have a couple of specific 

questions. 

Thank you. 

Senator KERRY. Mr. Secretary, before you do and before I have 

to go, I want to take a point of personal privilege here if I can for 

a moment. I’m going to leave the gavel with Senator Hagel. I just 

want to say a few words as I do. 

This is probably the last hearing that the Foreign Relations Committee will hold in this session of Congress, barring emergency circumstances. Therefore it will be the last time that this fellow will 

be sitting to my left and be taking part in this committee’s proceedings. I just want to say on a personal level—I had occasion to 

be able to say something about Senator Warner yesterday—there 

are few folks on the other side of the aisle who have just been superb in their willingness to reach across the aisle, to put the country ahead of their party, to think out loud and be willing to tell it 

the way they see it. 

Senator Hagel and I share the common experience of an uncommonly unpopular war in a difficult period of our country’s history 

and I think we both learned a lot of the same lessons from that 

experience and we’ve both tried to apply them here in our conduct 

of public policy. But I want to express my deep personal admiration 

for Senator Hagel, who has suffered the obvious and expected 

brickbats from members of his own party on occasion for speaking 

the truth as he saw it, who’s been unrelenting in his willingness 

to stand up and put the interests of our country and common sense 

16 

and sense of duty and responsibility to the Constitution way ahead 

of any kind of politics whatsoever. 

We’ve been very, very lucky to have him as a member of this 

committee and I consider myself very lucky to have him as a 

colleague and have him as a friend. I’ve traveled with him. We 

were in a fun helicopter episode in Pakistan together. We’ve been 

through the snows and the heat of the desert and a lot of other 

things. 

But what a pleasure to serve with him, and this committee will 

miss his service enormously, and I thank him for it, as I know all 

my colleagues would if they were here. So thank you. 

Thank you for permitting me to do that. I appreciate it. 

Senator HAGEL. Thank you, John. 

That was generous and thoughtful and I appreciate Senator 

Kerry’s comments. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your friendship 

over the years as well and cooperation. 

So I guess it’s just you and me, and it may not be pleasing, but 

nonetheless it is. So if you would like to respond to anything that 

I have said and then we can get on with some other particular 

questions. 

Thank you. 

Mr. WELCH. Well, thank you, Senator. It’s good to be one on one 

with you, although some might say it’s an uneven match. 

I began my career working in the NEA area of the State Department in 1979 in Pakistan, which was part of my bureau at that 

time. I was burned out of that Embassy, and last week I was 

awoken at 2:45 in the morning as an attack was under way on our 

Embassy in Sana’a, Yemen. So I know that the Middle East is a 

dangerous, complicated, and combustible place, sir. 

That said, if we only look at the trouble spots in the Middle 

East—and I think of course duty obliges us most days to do that— 

we are missing a bigger picture. Much of the Middle East is quite 

stable. It is not inhospitable. It is not combustible. And relations 

with the United States in most countries in that area are pretty 

good. 

We just completed a successful trip to North Africa. One stop on 

that trip was Libya. We’ve gradually repaired our relationship with 

Libya. It’s not all that it could be, but it’s been improving, and we 

have a serious dialogue with them where we had none just several 

years ago. So if you look at North Africa as a whole now, there is 

no hole in it in terms of a good solid relationship with the United 

States. 

In the Levant countries, they’ve had more than their share of 

trouble, and of course the centerpieces of that are the Israeli-Palestinian arena, but also especially Lebanon. I do see that there’s reason for hope there. I think when Lebanese come up with solutions, 

for example, it’s important to be supportive of those, and we’ve 

tried, because Lebanon is so evocative in the Middle East as a symbol of diversity in democracy, to help Lebanese. It is a complicated 

picture because one important part of the Lebanese political scene 

is Hezbollah, which is a terrorist organization with which we have 

had a great deal of difficulty over the years. 

In Iraq, sir, as you know I don’t work on it day to day, but I do 

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17 

ship with the Arab world. I think we’ve seen progress on that, 

especially in recent months. 

Just a couple of years ago, people were suggesting to us that we 

find a better regional diplomatic architecture or international diplomatic architecture to help support Iraq’s return to sovereignty and 

sufficiency. I think we’re making progress there. I’ll let others 

speak to the situation inside Iraq and what the requirements there 

demand, but what I do know is in terms of reintegrating it into the 

world things have gone better. 

I find Iran, as you mentioned, one of the most perplexing and difficult problems in front of us. We have, however, given substance 

to a diplomatic approach. There are three Security Council resolutions in effect now, quite a number of IAEA decisions which set the 

rules of the road for Iran. Regrettably, they’re not choosing yet to 

respond in a positive way to a package of incentives that has been 

suggested to them in return for suspending their nuclear misbehavior. But it’s important to put in place those diplomatic building blocks so that there is an international consensus on how to 

address this problem. 

Much of our discussion today, of course, has been about the 

Israeli-Palestinian issue. Again, I think the return to negotiations 

is pretty fundamental. Would I like to see more progress on some 

of the things you mentioned? Absolutely. I do believe that it’s important not to overrate the political power of Hamas within Palestine. They won an election for the Legislative Council by a plurality which was less than the majority that Abu Mazen won when 

he ran for President. I don’t know how the next election will fare, 

but the example that they’ve shown to Palestinians in Gaza is 

hardly an inspiring one and there’s some evidence to suggest it has 

not really taken hold in the West Bank either, where the political 

balance still remains quite a bit different. 

I believe that any new administration, sir, ought to address this 

issue as a matter of priority. Obviously, I’d like to prepare it as 

well as possible for them when that day comes. I think the experience of the last years has taught us that you can’t single out any 

one of these problems alone and leave it unaddressed. It requires 

effort across the board, and particularly in the last years we’ve 

tried to apply that. It’s an ambitious agenda, I know, and I’d 

hardly be here to tell you we’ve succeeded on all parts of it, but 

I think we’ve made a good effort. 

Senator HAGEL [presiding]. Thank you. Well, let me get into 

some more specific areas. Let’s start with Syria. Why haven’t we 

returned our Ambassador to Syria? 

Mr. WELCH. We recalled our Ambassador after the murder of 

former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. There was a sense then that 

it was appropriate to lower the level of our diplomatic interaction 

with Syria. We have concerns with Syrian policy and behavior in 

a number of areas. 

In Lebanon, Syria had been present with its military forces for 

long beyond the welcome that they received early on in Lebanon’s 

civil war. The Lebanese wanted them out and they withdrew their 

military forces. Regrettably, they didn’t withdraw their effort to 

apply influence in Lebanon and, wrongly or rightly, because of 

their failure to convince most Lebanese that they were on their 

18 

side in trying to move their country safely ahead, they’ve been 

blamed for a lot that’s gone on there. 

In Iraq, Senator, you know the Iraq situation very well. If you 

look on the perimeter of that country, it has difficult borders in almost every direction, but the most permeable, the most insecure, 

and the least controlled have been with Syria. That’s been an especially severe problem for the Iraqis and, yes, for American troops 

stationed in Iraq. That situation improved somewhat, but I would 

argue largely because of Iraqi security effort and American security 

effort. 

Syria remains a sponsor of terrorist groups. There are a number 

of them safe havened in Damascus. It is more—it is easier for the 

political chairman of Hamas to give a speech in Damascus than it 

is for a Syrian civil rights advocate. We think that’s, especially 

under today’s conception of what needs to be done in the ArabIsraeli conflict, dangerous and antiquated, and I know it’s presented a problem, not merely to the Israelis who’ve been on the 

receiving end of some of this terrorism, but also to others, including 

the Palestinians. 

Syria, if you look at all the change that has been occurring in the 

Arab world, everything ranging from economic growth to an expansion of political participation, more openness in the media, seems 

to be lagging behind in almost every category, particularly in 

human rights behavior. Granted, this is a far from perfect area 

across the board, but it’s possible to single out some places that are 

notably less advanced and Syria would be one of those. 

When we see that there is some Syrian response that we deem 

to be meaningful across these concerns, I think we would reexamine our relationship. We do maintain a diplomatic presence there. 

Our dialogue is limited with Syria. We would like that to improve, 

but I’m an advocate of purposeful diplomacy, not simply diplomacy 

for the word alone. 

Senator HAGEL. Thank you. 

Let me respond to a couple points you’ve made. On Syria, if in 

fact, we, as you have noted, are encouraging the Turks with their 

incentives regarding Israel and Syria, if in fact, as I have been told 

directly by Prime Minister Olmert on different occasions over the 

last 2 years, that engaging Syria is clearly in the interest of Israel, 

for obvious reasons, then I’m not sure how we then play much of 

a role in this standing on the sideline with no opportunity to help 

incentivize a change in behavior. And by the way, you and I both 

know that the Syrians have been helpful in some ways on that 

Iraqi border. 

But I guess the bigger part of this is where does this all go? It’s 

the same question on Hamas and Hezbollah. Hamas and Hezbollah 

are there. That is a reality. You note that Hamas may not be particularly beloved, but the fact is they are in control in Gaza. The 

fact is Hezbollah is firmly entrenched in Lebanon. What are we 

thinking about in the way of dealing with those realities? Not, as 

I said earlier, policies, not intentions, not aberrations, but where 

and how do we move from this point to this point? 

In the case of Syria, the next administration is going to have to 

deal with these realities, because I actually, as opposed to some of 

the points that you made—and you’re certainly correct about some 

19 

of the progress, significant progress in North Africa, but I wasn’t 

speaking about North Africa—I think we’ve gone backward in 

many dangerous areas. 

I think the Syrian Ambassador issue is one where we could take 

some creative thinking and apply it, as you say, to comprehensive 

strategies. To me, that means if we are going to see progress on 

the Israeli-Palestinian front and attempt to bring these issues to 

some higher ground, which obviously we are going to end the year 

evidently with no new agreement that I’m aware of, then, just as 

you say, step by step, but we have to see progress in that. We have 

to be creative. There has to be some incentive. There has to be 

some movement. Status quo doesn’t exist. Things either get better 

or they get worse. 

I know you work within the confines of the authorities you have 

and that flexibility is given to you by administrations. As I said in 

my comments, I’m not holding you accountable to that, but this 

next administration it seems to me is going to have to break 

through a lot of the good intentions and we’re going to have to 

move to some higher ground and do some creative thinking through 

some comprehensive strategic foreign policy. 

In the Israeli-Palestinian case I don’t know how you do that— 

and you mentioned this—this is my word, not yours—by compartmentalizing our relationships. Well, we’ll do a little Syria here, 

we’ll do Iraq over here, we’ll do Iran here, we’ll give Iran the privilege of talking to us based on our conditions. But Iran is connected 

to all these trouble spots. At the same time the Iraqi Government, 

which we take some credit for helping create, has a relationship 

with Iran every day. It is literally an Alice in Wonderland kind of 

thing. We act like that’s not happening, but the Iraqi Government 

is in and out of Teheran. That’s what I consider a comprehensive 

strategy. 

Let me go to the Hamas and Hezbollah issues for a moment, because you tell me how we deal with this. You tell me how we are 

going to find ways to position Abbas, Fatah, whoever’s in charge, 

to give them some upper hands, Lebanon, and facing the reality of 

these two organizations. Obviously Iran is connected into a good 

deal of this. So what would be your thought on—take Hamas. We 

just let it go? We think that it will just self-destruct? Where do we 

go? What do we do? They are a reality. 

Mr. WELCH. Senator, I think in answering this question I’d like 

to return to your opening premise. I agree with you completely that 

across the board this region of the world is in many respects the 

epicenter of our foreign policy. It is incredibly important to the 

United States. And I would hope that once our transition is under 

way for the new administration that they will consider it a very 

high priority to deal across the board with these issues. 

This is not a matter of bureaucratic self-interest on my part. I 

just think it will take that sort of intensity elevation of this basket 

of issues. 

Hamas and Hezbollah, sir, you’re right, are realities. They have 

a certain level of political support in their communities and, interestingly, both the Palestinian community and Lebanon are among 

the most politically open and emancipated in the Middle East in 

20 

the sense that they do have votes and the votes are reasonably 

honest, and some good people win and sometimes they don’t. 

It’s not the principle that they should have a vote that is an 

issue for us, even though that’s aroused some anxiety in some 

places some times. It’s their policies that concerns us. We don’t 

have to accept that their policy is a reality that is impermeable to 

change, impervious to change. What we’re trying to do is, if they 

can’t figure out what the best thing to do for their people is, then 

maybe their people can make a different decision, vote for someone 

else or make a course correction themselves. 

In the mean time, as I alluded to earlier—maybe I wasn’t clear 

enough—I believe that the moderate center in both these communities is more substantial than the minorities associated with these 

groups. So it’s very important to give them the authority, the 

power, the capability that they seek within their societies so that 

they can rebalance them. 

That requires an investment of American resources, too, and 

happily we’ve been willing to do that both for the Palestinians and 

the Lebanese. But it’s at the end of the day up to them, too. We’re 

not going to be able to exclude people, but the terms by which they 

are included are decisions that they can make. 

The alternative, to sort of say, well, gee, can’t do anything about 

that because they’re there, they’re armed, they’re dangerous and 

we have to cope with that reality, I think would be frankly premature capitulation. I don’t think that the moderates would want 

to do that and they would feel abandoned by the United States 

were we to, even by our inaction, suggest that that would be the 

alternative. 

Whether this will work I don’t know, because at the end of the 

day in—let’s take the Palestinian territories for example. People 

want to see change, so they’ll reward those who are going to bring 

them the kind of change they want to see. Unfortunately, they’ve 

been through a long period of militancy there and it’s had its effect 

on politics. Now it’s being recalibrated. I believe we have the best 

and most encouraging Palestinian Government in a long time 

there. They’ve taken substantial political risks and personal risks 

to move things ahead, and we have to help them. 

In Lebanon, that’s a very complicated society and a lot of people 

are meddling around in it. There’s tremendous risk there, but I am 

encouraged by the agreement that was reached in May in Doha 

and the election of a new President. This offers I think a path 

ahead, restoring dialogue to Lebanon, where it had unfortunately 

collapsed. 

I believe that what happened when Hezbollah took up arms 

against the Lebanese people will have an effect on their standing, 

because it sort of puts at risk their claim to be a resistance. They’re 

nothing but an armed militia hanging onto a cause, but willing to 

use their guns against their own. I think again the majority of Lebanese are not going to tolerate that. 

Senator HAGEL. What would you say—and you mentioned lessons 

learned in some of your statements. What would you say would be 

the most significant lessons we’ve learned, should have learned, on 

this Arab-Israeli issue over the last 8 years? How would you frame 

the future? How are you going to advise the next Secretary of State 

21 

and President as to what should be the policy over the next 4 

years? What should we do differently? Anything? Have we learned 

anything? 

It goes back to my earlier point, I think things have gotten 

worse. Now, you may not agree with that, so you I suspect would 

tell the next Secretary of State and the next President, we’ll just 

keep doing what we’re doing. Or you tell me, what would you do 

and what would you say? How would you do something differently, 

what would you do, how would you do it, and what lessons have 

we learned that would predicate those recommendations? 

Mr. WELCH. Sir, I would use three very straightforward words: 

Priority, investment, and results. We have to make this a priority. 

It will require an investment, and I mean that in a real sense, not 

just a diplomatic sense. And No. 3, it’s imperative to produce 

results, because results count. 

We’ve been through a long drought. I believe—I’m not disagreeing with you that there are all these difficulties, sir, but I believe there is an opportunity here, particularly in the last year that 

we’ve rebuilt the negotiation. But it’s not complete, and it can be 

challenged and it can be shaken. I don’t even dismiss that it could 

be reversed. I think that is very dangerous. The idea of two states 

is potentially at risk under those circumstances, and I don’t see an 

alternative here. 

We will have a transition process that happily in my Department 

I think I can say will be reasonably well organized, sir, and I’ll 

have a chance to provide plenty of advice. But I would say in this 

context that those were the three things that I would try and say 

to the new team: Give it a priority, put some serious effort on the 

table, and expect and demand results. 

Senator HAGEL. Within that, I didn’t hear anything different that 

you would suggest, because I assume what you have said we have 

been doing and what you’ve just said we should be doing is a continuation of the three principles that you laid out, which I assume 

you think we’ve been doing, and putting forth effort and prioritization. I assume we’re doing those. 

Mr. WELCH. We are. 

Senator HAGEL. You wouldn’t see anything different, then? 

Mr. WELCH. We are doing these things. And I’m sorry, I thought 

you had asked me about what to advise the next folks. 

Senator HAGEL. Well, basically does that mean we just keep 

doing what we’re doing? 

Mr. WELCH. Yes, but—— 

Senator HAGEL. Nothing different? Nothing new? 

Mr. WELCH. That’s certainly necessary. It may not be sufficient. 

We have 31⁄2, 3 months, more or less, still left of what I would like 

to see as productive effort, and we’re not stopping as of November 

5. We stop at 12:01 January 20 for this administration. And I’m a 

professional diplomat. There’ll be others like me around who will 

try to carry on throughout the national security bureaucracy, for 

that matter. And we can do things between now and then. 

There are some things that we have under way right now where 

I still believe that there’s room for progress and you might even, 

if you took a look at them, see them as innovative. 

22 

Senator HAGEL. Well, I don’t think it’s been a lack of effort, certainly not on your part, on our professional career diplomats. I 

don’t think anyone has ever suggested that. But you will be in a 

position, as you know, to make recommendations to a new administration. And I think the reality is, you talk about 31⁄2 months left. 

This administration, any administration with 31⁄2 months left, is 

essentially over and the idea and the concept within the framework 

of all outside parties knowing that you will have a new President 

and a new administration, and any capital expended or any effort 

would be wiser to do with that new administration. 

So my point being—and you understand that; you’ve been 

through many administrations—that there’s always new hope, new 

possibilities, when a new administration takes office. What my 

question was about was, based on whatever the lessons learned you 

and your colleagues have seen, have absorbed, what would you say, 

if anything, a new administration should do differently, if we 

should do anything differently? 

I understand, as we all do, industry and efforts and leadership 

and prioritization. I mean, again I assume we’ve been doing that. 

But I’m talking about beyond that. I’m talking about policy and 

should we be incentivizing things differently, should we be trying 

something new, should we be framing the issue differently. Those 

are the kinds of things that I would ask you. 

Mr. WELCH. Well, it’s a thoughtful question. Most of the complex 

problems that you’ve mentioned, Senator Hagel, sometimes Americans take a look at them and see them as issues of organized violence, war, despair. But in most of those cases there are really serious political problems involved, and it isn’t sufficient to use one 

tool alone in these cases. I’m not a soldier; I’m a diplomat. I believe 

that ‘‘diplomacy’’ is a strong word, not a weak one. 

I think at the heart of the three points I made is that we have 

to search for political solutions in these cases, while at the same 

time protecting our security interests and advancing them where 

necessary. I think if you do that you improve the possibilities. And 

I believe that using American credibility and strength in a diplomatic sense is an important part of our national power. I’d like to 

think that when we—across the region, in those cases where we 

have deployed that tool, we have been diligent and rigorous in 

using it to advance our interests. We sometimes take some hits for 

it publicly because diplomacy is an untidy business, and you don’t 

always do it with people you like or that you would spend an 

evening with. But it’s for a purpose and it can produce results, 

sometimes at a lower cost than the alternatives. 

I think after a career in public service of the kind I’ve had, I 

think that that’s what I’d like to pass on, not merely to the next 

administration, but to my colleagues. It’s physically and politically 

not risk-free. These are decisions that have to be made, and our 

leadership expects, as I tried to indicate, results and, by the way, 

still expects more in the next 31⁄2 months. 

In return, I ask for the chance to give objective advice and try 

new ways of doing it. Sometimes, sir, it works and sometimes it 

doesn’t. 

Senator HAGEL. Thank you. 

What results do you think are possible over the next 31⁄2 months? 

23 

Mr. WELCH. Well, I would like to see, bearing in mind that Israel 

has to compose its new political leadership, that this negotiating 

track that we’ve embarked on to support does move ahead. Ideally, 

it would produce an agreement. If it doesn’t, it must be continued 

and continued on a substantial basis, so we try to build that every 

single day. I think it has to be done carefully and quietly, but that 

is in my judgment incredibly important. 

Second, we have, as I mentioned with respect to North Africa, 

but I didn’t mention with respect to the Arabian Peninsula, good 

relationships with all these countries and we could still broaden 

our partnership with them. I’m worried about Yemen, for example, 

Senator Hagel, where I think a new level of attention and investment has to be brought. It’s a difficult country and has a really serious problem with its internal security and I think that requires 

us, working with Saudi Arabia and Oman, to see whether we can 

help, but also some decisions on our part. 

Then there are some overarching questions, too. For example, in 

my area of responsibility there are countries from which there are 

quite a number of detainees at Guantanamo have come, and as we 

look at returning these, these folks, to their places of origin, we 

need to do that in a rigorous way, but we need to do it, because 

I think reducing the profile of that problem is very much in our interests. That cuts across virtually the entire region, I regret to say, 

although there are some high concentrations of certain detainees. 

One of the most important changes we’ve seen in the last several 

years across the Arab world is there is one of the largest transfers 

of wealth in human history now occurring. A great deal of money 

to be invested in the Arab world, and there is a sharp rise in interArab trade and investment, which I think is wholesome for the 

economies across the region. But they’ve got problems, too, both in 

interacting with each other and high inflation, high unemployment 

in some cases. 

So continuing the effort to promote economic reform and engagement with them on trade issues is vital. I think I would hope that 

the next administration could take a look at our trade policy and 

keep available the option of free trade agreements, including in 

this area. 

We need to reconnect also in an important way with these societies, cooperating in everything from health to education to democracy promotion activities. That varies from place to place, but it’s 

more rigorous and institutionalized across the region. And we’ve 

had—that’s had some—I don’t want to overrate it—some success. 

What’s really encouraging to me as somebody who has worked on 

this region for a long time is the number of Americans who are interested in it, and not just because of the bad news. When I went 

to Egypt in 2001 there were two dozen people studying Arabic at 

the American University in Cairo. When I left in 2005, 4 years 

later, there was about 20 times that number. Middlebury College 

has a language program in Alexandria, Egypt, now. 

I love the fact that Americans want to connect into these societies, where 7 years ago they saw them as alien and hostile. I think 

again, increasing that openness on their part and on our part is a 

really important step for the future. 

Sorry if I went on. 

24 

Senator HAGEL. Well, those are objectives and what we need to 

do. But let me go back again. You said you would hope that we 

could still accomplish some things over the next 31⁄2 months. What 

are you talking about? What do you believe we can accomplish over 

the next 31⁄2 months? A new peace agreement on Israel-Palestinian 

issues, or what were you referring to when you mentioned that? 

What’s possible in your opinion, as you have noted, still possible 

over the next 31⁄2 months as a result? 

Mr. WELCH. Well, I think we can make progress in the IsraeliPalestinian negotiations. I believe it was Senator Kerry who said 

there’s a bit of a pause, but it’s not a halt. I do believe there is a 

way to do this in a measured, careful, confidential way. 

Senator HAGEL. Do you believe that in the next 31⁄2 months we 

can get an agreement that takes us to a higher ground position? 

Mr. WELCH. That’s a good question and I want to be careful in 

answering it. There is a difference between possibility and probability. I think it’s really important, Senator Hagel, to have a lofty 

objective out there. If you sell yourself short, you’re not going to 

encourage parties who already have a difficulty in cooperating and 

working with one another to try and move forward. So it’s good to 

have an ambitious goal. It increases leverage. 

We’d like to attain that. Whether we will is another question. 

But I don’t think we should pull back from that goal. To the degree 

we can make progress toward it, I believe that we should make 

that progress irreversible so it can be transferred over. That’s one 

arena. 

I think that including in dealing with the Iranian threat, the reestablishment of Iraq as a sovereign, secure country, troubled 

though it is internally, still is hugely important to the stability and 

security of the entire region. So reconnecting it into the region and 

reconnecting the region to it is I think very, very important. 

Some of Iraq’s neighbors and others have begun to reestablish 

diplomatic missions there—a halting process, but a good one. Communication between the Iraqi Government and all of its neighbors, 

Iran included, but also Turkey, Syria, Jordan, even Saudi Arabia, 

certainly Kuwait, has improved. Those borders are more secure 

today than they were before. That’s a really important project. 

As I mentioned, I also think that we need to pay special attention to Yemen, not just because there was a terrorist attack on our 

Embassy, but it’s a rather complicated situation and needs an investment. 

There are other areas of concern, too. One of the reasons that we 

were focusing on North Africa is because of a recrudescence of extremist activity in that region, which is seeing itself most violently 

in Algeria. That’s going to require greater regional cooperation and 

greater cooperation by the United States with that region. 

So those are a few of the things that we want to work on. I 

should say within the North Africa arena, too, I’m determined to 

see this agreement that we made with Libya implemented in full 

because once that happens I think we can move off the plateau 

we’re on and improve that relationship. It would be very good to 

turn that over in a much better fashion to the next administration 

as well. 

Senator HAGEL. Thank you. 

25 

Mr. Secretary, as we wind this meeting down I want to again 

thank you and your colleagues for your efforts and your good work, 

also acknowledge—when you speak of contributions made by professional diplomats, I am aware and it should be noted that you 

lost your father last month. If I have my facts correct, I think he 

was a 33-year career diplomat, much accomplished and highly regarded, World War II veteran, survivor of Pearl Harbor, a man who 

gave immensely to his country. So to you and your family, we are 

sorry, but we appreciate his great service to our country; and you 

obviously follow right along the family genetic trail. So thank you. 

Mr. WELCH. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator HAGEL. This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., U.S. SENATOR FROM

PENNSYLVANIA

Thank you, Chairman Kerry, for holding this important hearing today on the Middle East Peace Process. This year we marked the 60th anniversary of the founding 

of Israel, a state created by the Jewish people as a place where Jews could live in 

peace. Unfortunately, for Israelis and Palestinians, that peace has proved elusive 

throughout the years. The consequences of inaction have proved costly to all those 

in the region whose daily lives are shaped by political decisions they have little control over. They have also had dramatic spillover effects within the global community 

amongst those who see a stalemate on the peace process as vindication that there 

can never be peace between peoples of different religions and cultures. 

Mr. Chairman, I was pleased when the Bush administration convened the Annapolis Conference in November 2007. After 6 years of missing American leadership on 

this vital matter, many of us had hopes that we could finally move forward on addressing the difficult issues that have separated Israelis and Palestinians for so long 

now. Israeli Foreign Minister Livni and former Palestinian Prime Minister Qurei 

have made important strides in bringing both sides back to the negotiating table. 

While it looks unlikely that a comprehensive agreement will be reached this year, 

it is imperative that both sides, in good faith, keep talking and investing in the 

process. 

Similarly, the next U.S. administration must be actively engaged on the Middle 

East Peace Process from the very onset. Strong American leadership will be critical 

to bringing about a lasting solution whereby two states, Israel and Palestine, can 

live side by side in peace and security. Solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 

will also reap benefits for other U.S. foreign policy and national security priorities 

in the region and the broader Muslim world. History has repeatedly shown us we 

cannot afford to sit on the sidelines when it comes to this vital issue. 

RESPONSES OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY DAVID WELCH TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR

THE RECORD BY SENATOR RICHARD LUGAR

Question. How can the Foreign Relations Committee be helpful in ensuring that 

the progress made on the Annapolis process is preserved and continued into a new 

administration? 

Answer. During their recent briefing for the Quartet in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, 

on November 9, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators requested three forms of assistance from the international community: (1) Support for the parties’ continuing efforts to reach a final, comprehensive peace and respect for their mutually agreed 

principles for the negotiations; (2) promotion of an environment conducive to peace, 

nonviolence, and the two-state solution, including ongoing provision of political and 

economic assistance to the Palestinian Authority; and, (3) no third party intervention in the bilateral negotiations. We intend to respect the parties’ requests. To that 

end, it is likely that, in the months ahead, the administration will ask for congressional support for infrastructure projects and institutional capacity-building to improve the lives of Palestinians and bolster the credibility of the legitimate Palestinian Government, which demonstrated its desire for a durable and lasting peace 

26 

with Israel. We must also continue to support efforts to promote good governance 

and the rule of law in the Palestinian territories to lay the foundation for the establishment of a democratic and viable Palestinian state. 

Question. Would it be appropriate for the administration to offer ‘‘bridging proposals’’ to help parties progress in their bilateral negotiations? 

Answer. In their briefing for the Quartet on November 9, Israeli and Palestinian 

negotiators reported on the significant progress made to date in their bilateral negotiations and described the mutually agreed principles that govern their dialogue. 

While welcoming support and assistance from the international community once an 

agreement is reached, the parties’ requested that the negotiations remain bilateral 

and confidential. We will respect the parties’ request to avoid direct, third-party 

intervention so they may continue their negotiations toward fulfillment of the promise of Annapolis and the establishment of a Palestinian state. 

Question. What sort of progress is USAID making with respect to PA projects, 

work with the ministries, etc? What costs were incurred in delaying projects because 

of restrictions on interactions with the Palestinians? Are civil works receiving the 

same sort of support and attention as General Dayton’s work? Are the efforts balanced? More specifically, have civil works projects been commenced to take advantage of the progress USSC has made in Jenin and in other areas of the West Bank? 

Answer. During the period of restrictions on interactions with the Hamas-led PA, we estimate that USAID incurred $14 million in costs associated with the suspension or cancellation of projects. In June 2007, Hamas violently took control of the 

Gaza Strip. President Mahmoud Abbas declared a national emergency, dismissed 

the Hamas government, and appointed a new government comprised entirely of nonHamas, independent ministers under the leadership of Prime Minister Salam 

Fayyad. Immediately after Secretary Rice removed the restrictions on contact with 

the PA, USAID moved rapidly to reorient programs to support the new Prime Minister’s government. Existing activities were redirected to involve PA Ministries as 

both partners and beneficiaries. USAID staff and implementing partners became 

active participants in PA sectoral planning processes that resulted in the preparation of the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP), which the PA presented to the international donor community at the Palestinian Donors Conference 

in December 2007. USAID worked very closely with its PA counterpart ministries 

in developing the spending plan for the $68 million in West Bank and Gaza FY 2008 

New Obligating Authority (NOA) funding, the $171 million in FY 2008 Emergency 

Supplemental project funding and the $300 million total in Cash Transfer funding 

that was provided in the FY 2008 NOA and FY 2009 ‘‘Bridge Supplemental’’ appropriations. Robust USAID commitments to civil works projects in FY 2008 include $91.5 mil- lion allocated to essential public infrastructure projects identified by the PA; $38 

million for governance and rule of law activities, including a special focus on PA 

capacity building; $52 million for economic growth and job creation programs that 

address high PA priorities; and $40.5 million for investments in health, education, 

and youth-oriented programs that support PA efforts to provide essential services 

to the Palestinian people and enhance the credibility of the Abbas/Fayyad government. All of these activities are under way at this time, delivering on our commitments made at the Palestinian Donors Conference, with total expenditure rates for 

all programs estimated at $41 million per month in FY 2009. 

USAID is working closely with General Dayton and the USSC, the Special Envoy 

for Middle East Regional Security (SEMERS) General Jones, as well as international partners to implement a coordinated strategy that links security assistance 

with economic and institutional development. USAID economic and social development activities both support and benefit from the improvements in security in Jenin 

accomplished by Palestinian National Security Forces with USSC assistance. Our 

support for rule of law and governance programs is closely coordinated with more 

specific assistance to police forces provided by the European Union Police Coordinating Office for Police Support (EUPOL COPPS). As a key part of the coordinated 

program, USAID announced $3 million in initial assistance activities in Jenin on 

May 28, 2008; these activities are completed or nearly completed. In her recent visit 

to a major USAID hospital renovation site in Jenin, Secretary Rice announced the 

next phase of an additional $14 million in USAID commitments in Jenin. More 

broadly, USAID has direct assistance activities under way and planned in all 11 

West Bank Governorates. 

Question. As the USSC’s work proceeds, is there a sense that PA leadership has 

sufficient will and capability to take the necessary decisive steps to end terrorist 

activity? 

27 

Answer. The Palestinian Authority Security Forces, especially those trained with 

State Department assistance under the auspices of the U.S. Security Coordinator, 

LTG Keith Dayton, have shown increased will and capability to confront the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank. In Jenin, Nablus, and Hebron, three of the 

West Bank’s largest cities and most populated governates, deployed forces have arrested members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, dismantled al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade 

structures, and in one notable case, discovered a large cache of explosives. Israeli 

Domestic Intelligence Chief Yuval Diskin recently described security cooperation 

with the West Bank authorities as ‘‘excellent, especially in combating terrorism’’ as 

well as shutting down 60 institutions connected to Hamas. This illustrates the increasing degree of confidence with which Israel views the Palestinian Authority’s 

ability to provide for law and order in the West Bank. 

Question. What signs are there that the IDF will cede authority to the PA forces 

in the West Bank? 

Answer. The IDF has made incremental steps toward allowing increased Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) activity, most notably in Jenin and Hebron, 

and has reduced its activity in other sectors in order to reduce Palestinian pressure 

on President Abbas and the PA. The IDF over the last 6 months has operated on 

a policy of ‘‘as the PA does more, we will do less.’’ As a result, the Government of 

Israel allowed the PASF to deploy to Jenin while reducing the IDF’s footprint in 

the area. The IDF and PASF have also increased their level of cooperation. As a 

sign of the success of this cooperation, the GOI has also allowed the PA to deploy 

a limited number of forces to Hebron, a city to which until recently the GOI was 

unwilling to allow the PASF to deploy. 

Final authority for security remains with the IDF, however. The IDF continues 

to carry out regular incursions into Area A, to deny PASF freedom of movement in 

Areas B and C, and to refuse to give the PASF ‘‘right of first refusal’’ on arrests. 

Question. What benchmarks or metrics should we use to measure the progress of 

the Palestinian security forces and the effectiveness of U.S. assistance to these 

forces? 

Answer. The main goals of our assistance to the PA Security Services (PASF) are 

to help the Palestinians meet their roadmap obligations and help set the conditions 

for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A key measure of the 

progress of the PASF toward meeting roadmap obligations is the number of arrests 

and prosecutions of criminals and terrorists in the West Bank. By all accounts, the 

increased PASF security operations throughout the West Bank have instilled a high 

degree of public support for the imposition of the rule of law in the Palestinian communities, addressed lawlessness in many important areas, enabled increased economic development, a key to reducing frustrations which spur radical support, and 

reduced the incidences of direct terrorist threats within the area. 

A less tangible, but no less important metric is the level of security cooperation 

between the IDF and PASF, engendered by PASF professionalization under USSC 

auspices, which helps build trust between the two sides. The Government of Israel 

has stressed that until they trust the PASF to prevent all forms of terror from Palestinian territory, they will not cede security control to the PASF. However, cooperation between the IDF and PASF, which has markedly improved, has led the IDF 

to reduce its operations in certain areas of the West Bank where the PASF is operating. The ability of the PASF to help improve overall law and order in the West 

Bank is also noteworthy. Jenin’s residents have widely praised the performance of 

the U.S.-trained PASF forces there, and cite their presence as responsible for reduced lawlessness. We view this new dynamic as a key step toward a two-state solution and a demonstration of the effectiveness of U.S. assistance to the PASF. 

Question. According to a report this week by major aid agencies, despite the cessation of violence in Gaza the flow of commercial and humanitarian goods across 

border crossings remains severely impeded. What efforts are being undertaken to 

better facilitate the movement of goods in and out of Gaza while still preserving 

Israeli security needs? What efforts are being taken to strengthen the still fragile 

Hamas-Israel calm? 

Answer. Despite several months of fragile calm in the Gaza Strip since the 

‘‘tahdiya’’ was declared July 19, the humanitarian situation there remains challenging, and has worsened dramatically since November 4, when hostilities resumed 

between Hamas-affiliated militants and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Since the 

tahdiya began on July 19, Israel has allowed a net increase in the number of trucks 

allowed into Gaza. However, even with this increase, the number remains less than 

the amount of trucks entering Gaza prior to the Hamas take over. Border crossings 

have been closed frequently since November 4, resulting in a temporary suspension 

28 

of the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East’s 

(UNRWA) food distribution program that affected 60,000 people, and fuel shortages 

that are causing ongoing blackouts across Gaza City and compromising hospital 

operations. 

Hamas’ actions remain the primary cause of suffering in Gaza. Assuming the 

tahdiya is reestablished, Israel can mitigate the difficult humanitarian situation by 

increasing operating hours at crossings, including for humanitarian organization 

staff and medical cases, and expanding its definition of humanitarian items to include basic construction materials. 

In targeted approaches to the Government of Israel (GOI), we have had past success facilitating the import into Gaza of required items for specific humanitarian 

projects, including obtaining GOI agreement to allow in approximately 20 truckloads of supplies and sports equipment for UNRWA’s 2008 ‘‘Summer Games,’’ as 

well as metal piping and other supplies to help facilitate a joint USAID/EU/World 

Bank sewage project in Beit Lahiya in early 2008. 

We and others in the international community will continue this type of approach 

on humanitarian projects of interest to the USG and importance to the people of 

Gaza, making use of the coordination mechanisms and communication channels 

within the GOI’s Office of the Coordinator for Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT). At the same time, we will work as we always have done with the 

Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority at the policy level toward a 

comprehensive, lasting solution to the hardships now faced by the Palestinian people: A comprehensive peace agreement that leads to the establishment of an independent Palestine governed by a democratically elected leadership, living side by 

side with Israel in peace and security. 

Question. Will you make the reports of General Fraser and General Jones available to the committee? 

Answer. The Roadmap Monitoring mission, previously headed by Lieutenant General Fraser, and currently headed by Lieutenant General Selva, and the office of the 

Special Envoy for Middle East Regional Security, headed by General Jones (ret.) are 

reporting directly to Secretary Rice. The Roadmap Monitoring mission’s reports are 

not disseminated beyond Secretary Rice, and General Jones will not be creating a 

final report. 

Question. What is your view of the apparent rapprochement between Jordan and 

Hamas? 

Answer. We continue to welcome Jordanian efforts to overcome Palestinian divisions, consistent with the Quartet principles. Jordan has been a vital contributor 

to the Middle East Peace Process. 

As we have long stated, Hamas can be a part of the peaceful process by accepting 

the principles outlined by the Quartet: Renunciation of violence and terror, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements between the parties, including 

the roadmap. 

Question. Is the administration actively supporting the current Israel-Syria proximity talks? 

Answer. While our focus remains on supporting the more mature Israeli-Palestinian track, consistent with the process launched at Annapolis in November 2007, 

we have welcomed Turkey’s efforts to facilitate indirect negotiations between Israel 

and Syria in order to advance comprehensive peace throughout the region. We have 

stated our willingness to be helpful in this regard at any time that it is useful to 

the parties. Engagement with Syria, including by Israel, should address the full 

range of our concerns about Damascus’ policies, including ending the flow of foreign 

fighters into Iraq and of weapons into Lebanon, renunciation of the Syrian Government’s support for terror and expulsion of the leadership of Palestinian terrorist 

groups from its territory, cessation of cooperation with the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards, and an end to human rights violations. 

Question. Has the Department, or Embassy Cairo, made any public statements 

with respect to the continued imprisonment of Ayman Nour? Or, of other lower profile political prisoners? 

Answer. Secretary Rice, Ambassador Scobey, and I have all publicly spoken out 

on a number of occasions against the continued imprisonment of Ayman Nour. This 

is something that we regularly raise, both publicly and privately, with the Egyptians at all levels. President Bush, for example, raised it with President Mubarak 

when they last met. We have repeatedly raised our serious concerns about the path 

and pace of political reform and democracy in Egypt at the highest levels, and we 

will continue to do so. As part of this effort, we also regularly call for the release 

29 

of all political prisoners in Egypt, and for an end to the harassment and detention 

of political activists and journalists in Egypt. 

Question. I continue to be disappointed in progress on the Status of Forces/Strategic Framework Agreement, and in the failure of the Department to provide draft 

text of the agreement as Senators Biden, Kerry, Hagel and I requested some months 

ago. What is the backup plan, should the agreement not be concluded in time, or 

should we not get agreement on key principles? What’s the worst case scenario? Can 

PM Maliki grant immunities to our forces and authorize combat and detention operations by executive fiat? 

Answer. We are confident that the many months of negotiations on the Status of 

Forces/Strategic Framework Agreement will yield mutually beneficial agreements 

between the United States and the Government of Iraq. While the United States 

could seek an extension of the mandate for the multinational force currently provided under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1790, in past years, the Security 

Council has acted to extend the mandate based upon the request of the Iraqi Government, and Prime Minister Maliki has made it clear that he does not support 

such an extension. It is our understanding that Prime Minister Maliki could not 

grant immunities to our forces by unilateral executive action. 

Question. Has Iraq agreed to provide all Embassy and Chief of Mission personnel 

privileges under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961? Will 

WPPS contractors be covered? Have discussions been concluded or even commenced 

on these points? 

Answer. Like our diplomats and staff posted at U.S. missions throughout the 

world, Embassy personnel in Iraq will enjoy applicable privileges and immunities 

under the rules set forth in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 

(VCDR). The level of privileges and immunities that any individual employee is 

entitled to will depend upon one’s position and role within the U.S. mission. Since 

negotiations began in March, the Iraqis have consistently stated that they oppose 

continued immunity from Iraqi legal process for offenses that contractors—in particular security contractors—may commit related to activities carried out under 

their contracts. The status of contractors has been a significant area of discussion 

between the United States Government and the Government of Iraq, and to date 

we have not reached agreement on this point. 

RESPONSES OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY DAVID WELCH TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR

THE RECORD BY SENATOR RUSSELL FEINGOLD

Question. What impact does the recent diplomatic strain between the U.S. and 

Russia over the Georgia crisis have on the future of the Quartet [U.S., EU, U.N. 

and Russia] produced Roadmap? 

Answer. The Quartet continues to play an important role in supporting efforts by 

Israel and the Palestinians to arrive at a negotiated peace. In that regard, the roadmap remains an important guide toward achieving a two-state solution. A future 

peace treaty between the parties, as enumerated by Israel and the Palestinians at 

the November 2007 Annapolis conference, will be subject to the implementation of 

the roadmap. 

Question. If President Abbas does step down in 2009 and elections don’t take 

place, the Palestinian Legislative Council’s Speaker—who is a member of Hamas, 

would serve as acting President—a move that could very likely mean an end to the 

peace process. Likewise, if elections are held, there is a good chance Hamas would 

do even better than it did last time. Can you describe the political situation in the 

Palestinian Territories and assess for us the political strength of Fatah and Hamas? 

Answer. Fatah and Hamas remain at odds over control of the Palestinian territories. The Palestinian Authority, led by President Abbas, is firmly in control of the 

West Bank while Hamas has retained control over Gaza and consolidated power 

since its takeover of that area in June 2007. The two sides have engaged periodically in reconciliation talks, mediated by Egypt, but there has been no concrete 

progress. Abbas has laid out his conditions for a Palestinian reconciliation, which 

reflect the Quartet principles—renunciation of violence, recognition of Israel, and 

acceptance of past agreements between the parties. Hamas has rejected these 

principles. 

Hamas and Fatah are also at odds over when the President’s term expires. Abbas’ 

position is that his term does not end on January 9, 2009, as Hamas alleges. He 

has stated that his term ends concurrent with the term of the Palestinian LegislaVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:57 Jan 15, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\MID-EAST BETTY
30 

tive Council, currently scheduled for January 2010, as stated in the 2005 elections 

law agreed to by all parties. 

Fatah has been able to maintain its base of support in the West Bank. Security 

initiatives in Nablus, Jenin, Qalqilya, Tulkarm, and Bethlehem—and shortly in 

Hebron—have reduced crime against Palestinian citizens, leading to increased commerce and improvements in overall economic conditions. Furthermore, PA coordination with Israel Defense Forces has resulted in a smaller Israeli footprint in West 

Bank towns. As an indicator of the credit accruing to Fatah in the West Bank from 

these initiatives, recent polling shows that Fatah’s popularity is increasing against 

Hamas and Abbas continues to poll higher in head-to-head contests when paired 

against Hamas leaders. Hamas remains strong and well organized in Gaza, exerting 

near-total control. 

Question. It is my understanding that the humanitarian situation in Gaza ranks 

third worst in the world—after Somalia and Darfur. In May 2008, a number of credible organizations released a report that described the humanitarian crisis as a 

man-made disaster resulting from the isolation and blockade of Gaza after its takeover by Hamas militants last June. Certainly Israel has a right—and an obligation—to protect its citizens from rocket attacks from Gaza, but how effective has the 

current strategy been and where do you see room for improvement—so that Israel 

has the protection it needs and the people of Gaza are not deprived of basic services? 

Answer. Hamas’ actions remain the primary cause of suffering in Gaza. However, 

Israel may be able to help mitigate the difficult humanitarian situation by increasing operating hours at crossings, including for humanitarian organization staff and 

medical cases, and allowing certain items to expedite the continuation of international humanitarian projects in the Gaza strip. 

Despite a fragile calm in the Gaza Strip since the ‘‘tahdiya,’’ or period of calm, 

was declared June 19, the humanitarian situation there remains challenging. Since 

then, Israel has increased the number of truckloads crossing into Gaza from the low 

point of 2,380 truckloads per month in the 12-month period following the June 2007 

Hamas takeover. The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 

reports that in September 2008, 4,049 truckloads entered Gaza. However, this number still represents a sharp decrease from 12,000 truckloads that entered in May 

2007, prior to the Hamas takeover of Gaza, due in large part to crossings closures 

prompted by intermittent rocket fire from Hamas-affiliated militants. 

We will continue to work with Israel, and the wider international community, on 

these issues, making use of the coordination mechanisms and communication channels within the GOI’s Office of the Coordinator for Government activities in the territories. At the same time, we will continue to support the efforts of the Government 

of Israel and the Palestinian Authority to reach a comprehensive, lasting solution 

to the hardships now faced by the Palestinian people: An independent Palestine governed by a democratically elected leadership, living side by side with Israel in peace 

and security. 

Question. Citizen Diplomacy is crucially important to breaking down differences 

and building understanding. So I closely followed the situation surrounding the 

Gazan Fulbright scholars this past summer who were initially not allowed to leave 

to obtain U.S. visas. In May, Secretary Rice said: ‘‘If you cannot engage young people and give them a complete horizon to their expectations and to their dreams, 

then I don’t know that there would be any future for Palestine.’’ Clearly, situations 

like this impact our ability to engage in broader public diplomacy efforts in the Middle East, and further strain the relationship between Israelis and Palestinians. Can 

you tell me what proactive steps the State Department is taking to engage Palestinian youth in people-to-people exchanges, and how we can avoid a repeat of this 

unfortunate situation? 

Answer. The State Department is committed to providing Fulbright exchange opportunities for Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza. The Fulbright Program, 

the U.S. Government’s flagship international exchange program, is designed to increase mutual understanding between the people of the U.S. and other countries 

and regions. Through our diplomacy and exchange programs, the State Department 

seeks to engage young Palestinian leaders to promote learning, tolerance, and international cooperation. Other initiatives, such as the International Visitors Program, 

the Youth Exchange and Study (YES) program, and the Young Writers Program, 

further enable cultural exchange and the opportunity for future Palestinians leaders 

to broaden their understanding of the United States. 

In FY 2009 and pending funding availability, we expect to award up to 20 Fulbright grants to students and scholars from the West Bank and Gaza to pursue 

31 

graduate degrees, research and teaching opportunities in the U.S. The State Department works closely with the Government of Israel on a consistent basis to ensure 

that procedures are in place for all Department-sponsored exchange participants, including Fulbright grantees, to be able to travel to apply for visas. 

Once visa applications have been made, the Department will pursue the timely 

processing of visa applications and other forms of official permission required for 

travel of Palestinian students accepted to programs of study in the U.S. and elsewhere. Our posts in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem have developed a specific procedure for 

handling Fulbright applications, including coordination with Israeli authorities early 

in the process to ensure that any questions or problems are resolved in a manner 

that does not unduly inconvenience applicants or cause extensive delays. 

RESPONSES OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY DAVID WELCH TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR

THE RECORD BY SENATOR GEORGE VOINOVICH

Question. What is a realistic expectation for the status of the talks when President Bush leaves office? 

Answer. Israelis and Palestinians are engaged in the first serious negotiations in 

nearly a decade and continue to express their commitment to the Annapolis process. 

The parties have reiterated on numerous occasions that their goal remains to conclude a final, comprehensive agreement by the end of 2008 that establishes a Palestinian state and ends the conflict. The U.S. will continue to promote an environment 

conducive to these negotiations in a manner that allows the parties to pursue their 

bilateral initiative. 

Question. What is your assessment by all stakeholders toward implementation of 

UNSCR 1701? 

Answer. Progress has been made since August 2006 toward a permanent ceasefire and long-term solution to the Israeli-Lebanese conflict via the principles and 

elements of UNSCR 1701. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have deployed 

throughout the country for the first time in 40 years, and a strengthened UNIFIL 

has helped to prevent renewed hostilities. 

However, important elements of UNSCR 1701 remain unimplemented. No 

progress has been made toward securing the Lebanon-Syria border against unauthorized weapons shipments as called for by paragraph 14 of UNSCR 1701. A recent 

report of the U.N.’s Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team noted that, 

while facing severe political and logistical constraints, the Lebanese Government 

could do more to seal the border. Israel also alleges persistent Hezbollah violations 

of the weapons-free zone south of the Litani River stipulated by paragraph 8 of 

UNSCR 1701. While neither we nor UNIFIL has been able to corroborate this specific claim, Hezbollah is working to expand military infrastructure, including fortifications and lines of communication, in UNIFIL’s area of operations while rebuilding its military arsenal north of the Litani River. 

Nor has there been significant progress in disarming all armed groups in Lebanon 

and establishing government monopoly on the use of force. However, the national 

dialogue process recently relaunched by President Sleiman is a step toward this goal 

and is addressing Lebanon’s national defense strategy, including the status of 

Hezbollah’s arms. 

Israel commits regular air and sea violations of Lebanon’s territorial sovereignty, 

citing an overriding need to gather intelligence on Hezbollah’s activity inside Lebanon pending full implementation of the UNSCR 1701 arms embargo and an end 

to Hezbollah rearmament. Israeli citizens and troops also remain north of the Blue 

Line in the divided border village of Ghajar, in violation of UNSCR 1701. UNIFIL 

is working with both the Lebanese and Israeli Government to broker a solution. 

Finally, the U.N. Secretary General continues to request additional cluster munition 

targeting data from Israel. The U.N. has deemed information provided to date insufficient to aid cleanup operations in south Lebanon. 

We continue working to support Lebanese security services, especially with training and equipment useful in border security missions, and to explore with our allies 

options for greater international involvement on the border. We will continue to encourage Lebanese-led processes like the National Dialogue to focus on a political solution to the issue of Hezbollah’s arms. While recognizing the security concerns that 

drive Israeli overflights, we have urged a reduction in number to avoid provocations. 

We have also encouraged Israel to accept UNIFIL’s interim plan for northern 

Ghajar as a means to resolve a potential flashpoint and to demonstrate to Lebanon 

the value of diplomacy, as contrasted with Hezbollah’s armed ‘‘resistance.’’ Finally, 

we will continue to support U.N.-led diplomacy aimed at resolving the Sheba’a 

32 

farms dispute consistent with paragraph 10 of UNSCR 1701, perhaps in the context 

of a new or renewed Israeli-Lebanese armistice that addresses other outstanding 

elements of UNSCR 1701. 

Question. How can the United States best encourage implementation of UNSCR 

1701—specifically stemming the flow of arms to Hezbollah? 

Answer. We have undertaken bilateral and multilateral efforts to improve implementation of the UNSCR 1701 arms embargo. We are providing the Lebanese 

Armed Forces (LAF) with equipment—including night vision devices, Humvees, and 

secure communications gear—to improve their ability to monitor the border and 

interdict smuggling. Nearly $7M of this equipment supported requirements identified by the German-led Northern Border Pilot Project (NBPP). While the NBPP’s 

technical assistance to Lebanese security forces achieved only limited results, it provided important lessons for possible future multilateral efforts to help Lebanon 

secure its borders. We have continued to remind the Lebanese Government of its 

obligations under UNSCR 1701—political and logistical complications notwithstanding—to prevent arms smuggling into Lebanon, and have encouraged them to 

seek international assistance if necessary. 

Ultimately, however, it will be difficult or impossible to end weapons smuggling 

without the full cooperation of the Syrian Government, which continues to provide 

direct material support, including weaponry, to Hezbollah and other groups that 

threaten Israel’s security. We have raised this issue in our limited recent contact 

with the Syrians, and encouraged Israel to make Syrian support for these groups 

a key component of Israeli-Syrian talks. 

Question. Does the administration intend to push for a ‘‘status document’’? If so, 

what is the administration’s rationale toward publication of a detailed status document prior to the conclusion of any agreement? 

Answer. Consistent with the spirit of Annapolis, the parties continue to reiterate 

their commitment to reach a final, comprehensive agreement by the end of the year. 

The U.S. role is to support the parties’ efforts toward this goal and ensure the stability of the negotiating environment. We continue to respect the parties’ request to 

maintain confidentiality in the negotiations and to avoid direct intervention in their 

bilateral dialogue. 

Question. What is your view on the current political situation in the Palestinian 

territories? 

Answer. Fatah and Hamas remain at odds over control of the Palestinian territories. The Palestinian Authority, led by President Abbas, is firmly in control of the 

West Bank while Hamas has retained control over Gaza and consolidated power 

since its takeover of that area in June 2007. The two sides have periodically engaged in reconciliation talks, mediated by Egypt, but there has not been any concrete progress. Abbas has laid out his conditions for a Palestinian reconciliation, 

which reflect the Quartet principles—renunciation of violence, recognition of Israel, 

and acceptance of past agreements—and the PLO’s commitment to the peace. 

Hamas has rejected these principles. 

Hamas and Fatah are also at odds over when the President’s term expires. Abbas’ 

position is that his term does not end on January 9, 2009, as Hamas alleges. He 

has stated that his term ends concurrent with the term of the Palestinian Legislative Council, currently scheduled for January 2010, as stated in the 2005 elections 

law agreed to by all parties. 

Question. How would you assess the political strength of Fatah and Hamas? 

Answer. Fatah has been able to maintain its base of support in the West Bank. 

Security initiatives in Nablus, Jenin, Qalqilya, Tulkarm, and Bethlehem—and 

shortly in Hebron—have reduced crime against Palestinian citizens, leading to increased commerce and improvements in overall economic conditions. Furthermore, 

PA coordination with Israel Defense Forces has resulted in a smaller Israeli footprint in some West Bank towns. As an indicator of the credit accruing to Fatah in 

the West Bank from these initiatives, recent polling shows that Fatah’s popularity 

is increasing against Hamas and Abbas continues to poll higher in head-to-head contests when paired against Hamas leaders. Hamas remains strong and well organized in Gaza, exerting near-total control. 

Æ