COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-10-00480-CR

NO. 02-10-00481-CR

NO. 02-10-00482-CR

NO. 02-10-00483-CR

NO. 02-10-00484-CR

NO. 02-10-00485-CR

NO. 02-10-00486-CR

MARCUS WAYNE RHODES APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM THE 372ND DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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According to testimony from many witnesses at trial, over the course of 

several years leading up to 2009, appellant Marcus Wayne Rhodes committed 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
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aggravated sexual assault against five women and attempted to sexually assault 

two other women. Each woman had a criminal history, including convictions for 

prostitution.

In April 2009, Grand Prairie police officers arrested appellant at his job. 

After his arrest and after the Grand Prairie officers gave him Miranda2 warnings, 

those officers and two Fort Worth officers recorded an interview with him. The 

Fort Worth officers arrived for the interview in time to watch appellant receive the 

Miranda warnings from an adjoining room through closed-circuit television. The 

Fort Worth officers later entered the interview room to talk to appellant while the 

Grand Prairie officers watched that part of the interview from the adjoining room. 

Appellant never said that he wanted to end the interview or talk to a lawyer.

Grand juries indicted appellant with six counts of aggravated sexual 

assault and two counts of attempted sexual assault, among other charges.3 

Appellant’s indictments contained habitual offender notices alleging that he had 

been previously convicted of two other felony offenses. The trial court appointed 

counsel for appellant and granted his motion for the appointment of an 

investigator. Appellant filed motions to suppress the recorded oral statement that 

 

2See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1630 

(1966).

3See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 15.01(a), 22.011(a) (West 2011), 

§ 22.021(a)(1)(A)(i)–(ii), (2)(A)(ii)–(iii) (West Supp. 2012).
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he had made to the police. The trial court viewed the recording and held a 

hearing on appellant’s motions but denied them.

Appellant agreed to participate in one trial to resolve all of his charges. He

pled not guilty to each offense. His predominant defensive theories at trial were

that the victims of his crimes were not credible and had consented to the sexual 

encounters that they had with him as part of prostitution agreements. After a jury 

heard extensive evidence and arguments from the parties, it convicted appellant 

of six counts of aggravated sexual assault and two counts of attempted sexual 

assault.

Appellant chose the trial court to assess his punishment in each case. He

pled true to the indictments’ habitual offender notices, and his wife testified in the 

punishment phase. The trial court sentenced appellant to life sentences for five

of the aggravated sexual assault convictions, life sentences for each of the 

attempted sexual assault convictions, and a sentence of fifty years’ confinement 

for the remaining aggravated sexual assault conviction. The court ordered each 

sentence to run concurrently with the others. Appellant brought these appeals.

Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to 

withdraw as counsel and a brief in support of that motion. In the brief, counsel 

avers that in his professional opinion, there are “no errors warranting reversal 

that can be legitimately supported by the record.” Counsel’s brief and motion 

meet the requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a professional 

evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for 
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relief. 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967); see In re Schulman, 

252 S.W.3d 403, 406–12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (analyzing the effect of Anders). 

We gave appellant an opportunity to file a pro se response to his counsel’s brief, 

but he has not done so. The State has not filed a brief.

Once an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on 

the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, we 

are obligated to independently examine the record and to determine whether 

there are arguable grounds for appeal. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 

511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to 

withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988). 

We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s brief. We agree with 

counsel that the appeal is frivolous; we find nothing in the record that might 

arguably support the appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2006). Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm 

the trial court’s judgments.

PER CURIAM

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and GARDNER, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: November 1, 2012