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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

ESTATE OF BRIAN C. BUSSEY, by CHERYL 

MERSINO, Personal Representative,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

September 20, 2018

v No. 338880

Oakland Circuit Court

ABC CAB, INC., ABC TRANSPORTATION, 

INC., and GERALD PAGE,

LC No. 2016-153363-NO

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: O’CONNELL, P.J., and CAVANAGH and SERVITTO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff, Cheryl Mersino, personal representative of the estate of Brian C. Bussey, 

appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) 

(no genuine issue of material fact) in favor of defendants, ABC Cab, Inc., ABC Transportation, 

Inc., and Gerald Page. We affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND 

This case arises from the death of 49-year-old Brian Bussey. Bussey had been 

patronizing a bar in Farmington on Wednesday, November 26, 2014. That evening, a bartender

contacted defendants’ taxi service to drive Bussey home. Defendant Page picked Bussey up at 

the bar shortly after 9:00 p.m. and began to drive Bussey home. While Page was stopped at a 

traffic light, Bussey, who was intoxicated, began to fumble with the door handle. Page turned, 

drove a few feet, and stopped. Bussey voluntarily opened the door, paused, and ran. Page saw 

Bussey run toward a small field in the direction of a strip mall with a Kroger and a gas station at 

the intersection. Page looked for Bussey and waited in the strip mall parking lot for 5 to 10 

minutes, but Bussey never returned to the taxi. Page called the bar from where he had picked 

Bussey up to report that Bussey never arrived at his destination. Bussey’s body was discovered 

about four days later in a nearby wooded area. He was wearing only a T-shirt and underwear. 

The other pieces of clothing he had been wearing were lying in different places near his body. 

The medical examiner opined that Bussey died from hypothermia at an unknown time on the 

morning of Thursday, November 27, 2014. 

Plaintiff filed this wrongful death action against defendants, alleging that defendants

breached their duty of care owed to Bussey. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for 
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summary disposition. The trial court agreed with defendants that they owed no duty to Bussey, 

Bussey’s intoxication precluded any claim, and plaintiff could not establish proximate cause. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition. Dalley v 

Dykema Gossett PLLC, 287 Mich App 296, 304; 788 NW2d 679 (2010). The parties relied on 

documentary evidence outside the pleadings, so we review the motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10). 

See Kefgen v Davidson, 241 Mich App 611, 616; 617 NW2d 351 (2000). A motion under MCR 

2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint. Urbain v Beierling, 301 Mich App

114, 122; 835 NW2d 455 (2013). This Court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact. Id. 

III. DISCUSSION 

To establish negligence, a plaintiff must show (1) duty, (2) breach of duty, (3) causation, 

and (4) damages. MEEMIC Ins Co v DTE Energy Co, 292 Mich App 278, 281; 807 NW2d 407 

(2011). “ ‘Duty’ is a legally recognized obligation to conform to a particular standard of conduct 

toward another so as to avoid unreasonable risk of harm.” Cummins v Robinson Twp, 283 Mich 

App 677, 692; 770 NW2d 421 (2009). Generally, a person does not have a legal duty to aid or 

protect another person. Hill v Sears, Roebuck & Co, 492 Mich 651, 660; 822 NW2d 190 (2012). 

However, such a duty may arise if the parties have a “special relationship,” including the 

relationship between a common carrier and a passenger. Dykema v Gus Macker Enterprises, Inc, 

196 Mich App 6, 8; 492 NW2d 472 (1992). This dynamic asks “whether the plaintiff entrusted 

himself to the control and protection of the defendant, with a consequent loss of control to 

protect himself.” Id. at 9. “Factors relevant to the determination whether a legal duty exists 

include the relationship of the parties, the foreseeability of the harm, the burden on the 

defendant, and the nature of the risk presented.” Hill, 492 Mich at 661 (quotation marks and 

citation omitted). The standard of care required is the amount of care that a reasonably prudent 

carrier would exercise under the circumstances. Frederick v Detroit, 370 Mich 425, 430-432; 

121 NW2d 918 (1963). “[A]ny duty ends when the relationship ends[.]” Graves v Warner Bros, 

253 Mich App 486, 498; 656 NW2d 195 (2002). “A person’s status as a passenger of a street car 

or automobile continues until he has safely stepped therefrom and had a reasonable opportunity 

to leave the place at which he alights.” Burch v A & G Assoc, Inc, 122 Mich App 798, 806; 333 

NW2d 140 (1983) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Plaintiff argues that a special relationship existed between defendants and Bussey that 

required defendants to ensure that Bussey arrived home safely. Defendants do not dispute the

carrier-passenger relationship and its corresponding duty of care, but defendants dispute the 

scope and duration of the duty. Defendants claim that the duty only related to the manner of 

driving and the safety of the vehicle and that any duty ended when Bussey voluntarily left the 

vehicle. We agree with defendants. 

Once Bussey voluntarily got out of the taxi, he ended the carrier-passenger relationship,

and defendants no longer owed him a duty of care as a matter of law. Plaintiff did not allege that 

Bussey was unable to step safely from the taxi or safely leave the area where he got out of the 

taxi. When Bussey voluntarily left the taxi and did not return, he no longer entrusted himself to 
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defendants. Defendants were no longer tasked with ensuring that Bussey reached the previously 

agreed-upon destination, nor were defendants required to care for him or notify someone about 

his condition or his hasty exit from the taxi. 

Plaintiff maintains that defendants owed Bussey a higher duty than reasonable care 

because of his intoxication. For example, plaintiff argues that Page should have tried to 

discourage or prevent Bussey from getting out of the taxi and should have called for help after 

Bussey exited. We disagree. This Court rejected a similar argument in Swartz v Huffmaster 

Alarms Sys, Inc, 145 Mich App 431, 434-435; 377 NW2d 393 (1985). This Court explained that 

an independent observer to another person’s intoxication does not have a legal duty to the 

intoxicated person as a matter of public policy, thereby removing that question from the province 

of the jury. Id. at 436. In this case, Page testified that Bussey did not exhibit any signs of being 

drunk and that Page could not smell the odor of alcohol on Bussey. Even if Page knew that 

Bussey was intoxicated, Page, who did not cause Bussey’s intoxication, had no duty to take 

affirmative action, such as warning or restraining Bussey for his protection. 

Moreover, Bussey’s death was not foreseeable. Although it was a cold November 

evening, Bussey ran toward a small field in the direction of a strip mall with open businesses, 

including a supermarket. Therefore, it was not foreseeable that Bussey would freeze to death in 

nearby woods the following morning. Further, asking taxi drivers to physically restrain 

intoxicated passengers or to call the police when an intoxicated passenger unexpectedly, but 

voluntarily, gets out of the taxi would be overly burdensome to taxi drivers. Accordingly, we 

reject plaintiff’s argument that defendants owed Bussey a higher duty because Bussey was 

intoxicated. The trial court did not err by granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition.1 

We affirm. 

/s/ Peter D. O’Connell

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto

 1 Because we conclude that defendants had no duty to Bussey after he got out of the taxi, we do 

not address defendants’ arguments regarding MCL 600.2955a.