The Honor able Judit h M. Ba rzilay , J udg e, United States Court of International Trade , * sitti ng by desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0747n.06 No. 09-3192 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v. AL BERT WARD, De fe nd a nt- Ap pe lla

nt. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP PEAL FROM THE UN I TED STA TE S DI STR I CT CO UR T F OR TH E SO UT HE RN D IS T R IC T O F O H IO

BEF ORE: GUY and G RI FF I N, Circuit J udg es; and B ARZ I L AY, Judge. * BA RZI L AY, Judge. Appellant Alber

t Ward (“Appe llant” or “ Ward”) bring s this appeal following his conviction for ( 1) knowing ly , intentionally , and unlawf ully possessing w ith intent to di stribute more than 50 g rams of c ocaine base a

nd (2) knowing ly and intentionally maintaining a place for distributing the drug s. He raises three issues befor e the court. First, he claims that the district court e rre d in denying his Motion t o Suppress the evidence found in his hotel room beca use he did not voluntarily

consent to the room’s sea

rch. Second, he challeng es t he district cour t’s denial of his Motion to Suppress the

same e vidence beca

use he be lieves that the police seized him without rea sonable suspi cion, which in turn tainted his supposed consent to searc h his hotel room. Finally , he conte nds that the district court misapplied the F eder al Sentencing Guidelines when it include d in his criminal history cate g oryThe undisputed fa cts of this case come f rom the district court’ s order denying 1 Appellant’s motion to suppress. See ge nerally R.E. Doc. 84 ( Un ite d S tat es v . W ar d , No. 1:07- CR-73-001, 2008 WL 2635061 (S.D. Ohio J une 27, 2008) ( order denying motion to suppress))

. 2 calc ulati o n a c r im in a l o f f e n s e th a t h e c o mm itte d a s a juv e n il e . F o r th e r e a s o n s g iv e n below, Ap pe lla nt’ s argume nts fa il. I. Background & P roce dural Hi story 1 On J une 2, 2007, Middletown, Ohio police of fice r De tective Winters re sponded to a dis tur ba nc e be tw e e n a

ma le pa sse ng e r i n a

g re e n c a r a

nd a wo man s tand ingne xt to the c a r i n a Put t Putt Golf Center parkinglot. Upon ar rival, De tective Winters observe d what appe are d to be an alterc ation between Tosi a Clemons (“Clemons”) and the c ar’ s occupa nts. The vehicle ’s driver , Br andon Da

vis (“Davis”), and pa sseng er, K y ron Thomas (“Thoma s”), drove off. Detec tive Wint ers pursued them a

nd pulled the ca

r over at the B est Value I nn. W h en De t ective Winters obser ved Thomas making fra

ntic movements to and fr om the car ’s console are a, he order ed him to step out of the c ar a

nd conducte d a pat- down sea rch of Thomas’s outer clothing, dur ing w hich he f ound 2.8 g rams of c rac k coca ine. The de tective a lso seized ammuniti on that he obser ved on the f

loorboard of the pa sseng er side of

the ca r and f ound two g uns, a .32 ca liber and .3 8 ca l iber, in the ve hicle. De te c tiv e Wint e rs a rr e ste d T ho ma s. At that point, Detective Winters conta cted Of fice r B irch to pick up Clemons. Offic er B irch complied and br oug ht Clemons to t he B est Value I nn. Offic er B irch que s t i oned Clemons, who informed him that she, Thomas, a nd Davis had stay ed in the Be st Value Inn the pre vious night but subsequently had chec ked out of their room. Offic er Birc h then spoke with the hotel cl er k , who inf or me d h im that T ho ma s, Da vis , a nd Cle mon s had c he c ke d out of Roo m 22 4 a

nd ha d c he c ke d in to Room 220. B ased upon the wea pons and cr ack c ocaine found on Thomas’s pe rson and in the c ar,3

Of fi c e r B ir c h a sk e d the ho te l sta ff to take him to Roo m 22 4. Th e c le a nin g la dy , h ow e ve r, mis take nly led him to Room 220 and knocke d on the door. W hen a ma n, later ide ntified as Ward, ope ned the door, Off icer Birc h asked if he knew Da vis. The room’s oc cu p an t s ai d he did not and close d the door. After

rea liz ing that the clea

ning la dy had led him to the wrongroom, Off icer Birc h radioe d Detec tive Wint ers to inf

orm him that another suspect was in the room that Thomas, Da v i s , and Clemons had rente d that morning . Detec ti v e W i n t ers spoke with Clemons, who tol d him that another g un might be in the hote l room. Offic er B irch c onsequently waited outside the hote l room for f iv e to te n mi n u te s u n ti l War d c a me o u ts id e . O f f ic e r B ir c h d e ta in e d a n d c u f f e d War d at g un po int . O ff

ic e r B ir c h d id n ot r e a d h im h is Miranda rig hts, but advised him that they had found

cra ck coc aine a

nd two wea

pons in the ca

r of the a pprehe nded suspec ts and that they had information that another g un might be in Ward’ s hotel room. Offic er B irch a nd the newly -ar

rived Of fice r Stone

as ked Ward for permission to se arc h the hotel room for a g un, which Ward g ave b y s i gn i n g a consent-to- sear ch form. Be fore Ward signe d the form, the office rs informed him that he wa s not

re qu ir e d to do so . A c c or din g to the of fi c e rs , Wa

rd g a ve no ind ic a tio n th a t he did no t un de rs tand

his rig ht not to c onsent. Offic er Birc h sear ched Room 220 and f ound 792 g rams cr ack c ocaine in the ref rig erator. He f

ound no g un. On J une 20, 2007, a g rand jury for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, returne d

an indictment that c harg ed Ward with: (Count 1) “conspir[ing ] to knowing ly , intentionally and

un lawf ull y po sse ss w ith int e nt to dis tr ibute in e xce ss of 50 g ra ms of c oc a ine ba se (c ra c k) , a

Sc he du le II C o n tr o l l e d

S u b s t a n c e , ” i n v i o l a t i o n o f 2 1 U

. S

. C

. § 8 4 1 ( a ) ( 1 ) a n d ( b ) ( 1 ) ( A ) ; ( C o u n t2 ) “ kn o w i n g l y, intentionally , and unlawf

ully possess[i ng ] wit h intent to distribute in e x cess of 50 g rams of c ocaine4

base ( cra ck), a

Schedule I IContro l l ed S u bstance ,” in violation of § 841(a) (1) a nd (b)( 1)(A) ; and (C o u n t4 ) “ kn o wi n gl y an d i n t en t i o n al l y m ai n t ai n [ i n g] a pl ac e . . . f o r t h e p u rp o s e o f d i s t ri b u t i n g a Sc he du le I ICon tr oll e d Su bs tanc e ,” in c on tr a ve nti on of 21 U. S.C. § 8 56 . R. Do c . 13 at 1- 5. At tr ia l, Ward moved the c ourt to suppress the e vidence seized from his hotel room on the g rounds that he did not voluntarily

consent to the sea

rch. The court denied the motion. R. D oc. 84 ( United States

v . W ar d , No. 1: 07-CR-73-001 (S.D. Ohio J une 27, 2008) (order deny ing motion to suppress))

. The

c ourt ba se d it s r e a so nin gon

se ve ra l f a c tor s: [T] he De fenda

nt is 29 y ear s old and, ac cordingto the Pretrial Service s Offic er, ha s a GE D d e g re e . T he De fe nd a nt ha s un de rg on e tr e a tme nt f or ps y c hiatr ic pr ob le ms i n the pa st, bu t th e me nta l he a lth a sse ssm e nt pr e pa re d by the B ur e a

u o f P ri so ns in t

his ca s e i n d i ca t es t h at t h e De fe n d an t i s co mp et en t t o as s i s t wi t h h i s d ef en s e. Al t h o u gh [he ] sc or e d at th e low

e nd of int e lle c tua l r a ng e on

the Wec hs le r t e st, the re po rt a lso i n d i cates the results may undere stimate his true level of c og nitive functioni n g. There fore , the Def

endant’ s ag e, education, and intellig ence indicate that his conse nt was fr eely

g iven. Additionally , [he] has many prior ar rests and c onvictions, which also supports the conc lusion that his consent was voluntary

. . . . [Furthermore ], althoug h the Def endant was in c ustody at the t i m e h e ga ve consent, this fac t is not dispositive of the issue of voluntariness. The police advise d War d o f h is c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht t o r e fu se to c on se nt to t he se a rc h, wh ic h s up po rt s a fi nding that his consent was voluntary . During the evidentiar y hear ing, police officers te sti fi e d th a t Ward ind ic a te d th a t he un de rs too d th a t he c ou ld r e fu se to c on se nt t o th e se a rc h. Al so , th e int e rv a l be tw e e n the De fe nd a nt’ s d e te nti on a nd his c on se n t t o s e a r c h w a s b r i e f , w h i c h s u

p p o rt s a f i n d i n g o f v o l u n t a r i n e s s b e c a us e it indicates that the police did not o v er b ea r [ h i s ] will. There is no e vidence that the polic e used thre ats, promises or other forms of c oerc ion to obtain the Defe ndant’s consent. . . .

. . . . Th e on ly

iss ue that g ive s p a

us e is w he the r O ff

ic e r B ir c h h ad a

re a so na ble suspicion to seiz e the De fenda nt based on information provided by Tosia Clemons conce rning another

g un possibly

being involved in the case

. . . .

. . . . Under

the t o t al i t y o f the c ircumstance s of this case, the Court finds that Of fi c e r B ir c h h a d r e a so n to be lie ve t hat the De fe nd a nt w a s arm e d a nd da ng e ro us . There fore , Offic er B irch’s stop a nd seizure of the Def

endant was justified under the Four th Amendment. Consequently , the Defenda nt’s consent to sear ch his room was not vitiated by an i l l egal stop and se izure. When Office r B irch stopped the5

Def endant, he was c ontinuing the investig ation from the tra ffic stop in the hotel parkinglot in which cra ck coc aine a nd two g uns wer e re cover ed. The Def endant’ s prese nce at the hotel room was a surprise to O ffice r Birc h beca use he e x pecte d the room to be unocc upied when he arr ived to look throug h it. The Def endant’ s unexpected appe ara n ce i ntroduce d a leve l of unce rtainty into the situation. Then, Offic er B irch lea

rned f rom the other of

fice rs, via Tosia Clemons, that there was po ssi bly a thi rd g un inv olv e d in

the c ri me a nd that it wa s in the De fe nd a nt’ s r oo m. Clemons was obviously in a g ood position to provide this information bec ause she had informe d

th e o f f ic e r s th a t s h e s p e n t t

h e n ig h t i n th e h o te l r o o m w it h coDef end an t s Thomas and Da

vis. There fore , beca

use of the guns and drug s alrea dy re cover ed, it was re asonable for Of fice r B irch to believe the Def endant ha d possession of or re ady acc ess to a nother g un. I ndeed, g iven that the off icer s found two g uns with two of th e s u s p ec t s , it would be rea sonable to believe that the third pe rs on that w a s a

pp a re ntl y inv olved cou ld b e a rm e d a s w e ll. Gi ve n th e se circ umstan ce s , there fore , it was rea sonable for Offic er B irch to stop and seize the Def endant whe n he exited the hotel room in order to protect his safe ty

and that of the other off icer s at the sce ne. The ref

ore, the Def

endant’ s consent to t he sea rch w as not tainted by an illeg al stop and seizure. R. D oc. 84 at 6-10 (citations omitted). The court also noted that Clemons late r denie d telling Of fice r Wint ers a bout a possible third g un in the hotel room; howeve r, the c ourt found this tes t i mony not

c re dib le , b e c a

us e Cle mon s w a s an “ a dmi tte d da ily mari jua na us e [r] a t the tim e of

[War d]’ s arr e st” and possessed a

“volatile and hy sterica l persona lity [t hat] rende r[ed] her perc eption and re collection of the unfolding events unre liable.” R. Doc . 84 at 3 n.1. On September 17, 2008, the jury returne d a g uilty verdic t f or Ward on Counts 2 and 4 of the ind ic tme nt. B e fo re se nte nc ing , Ward fi le d a n o bje c tio n to hi s P re se nte nc e I nv e sti g a tio n Re po rt

. Specifica lly , he contested the inclusion of his adult felony drug traff

icking conviction for pur

poses of e nh anc ing his se nte nc e purs ua nt t o 2 1 U .S. C. § § 8 41 and 85 1 b e c a us e he wa s se ve nte e n y e a rs old

a t the tim e of the of

fe ns e . R. Do c . 12 3 a t 1. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d W ard’ s ch all enge bec a us e Ward had be en convic ted as a n adult and se n t en ce d t o s er v e over a y ear in prison for that cr ime. Ward did not object to the court’ s finding that he had a C riminal History Categ ory of I I I . The c ourt6

deter mined that the SentencingGuidelines re quired Ward to rece ive a mandatory minimum sentenc e

o f 2 4 0 m o n t h s f

o r C o u n t 2

. It a l s o s e n t e n c e d h i m t o 2 3 5 m o n t h s o n C o u n t4 t o r u n c o n c u r r e n t l y. Ward now appe als. This Court has subject matter jur isdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. II. Discussion A. The M ot ion to Suppr e ss Ap pe lla nt ch a lle ng e s the dis tr ic t cou rt ’s de nia l of his Mot ion to S up pr e ss o n tw o g ro un ds : that the district court e rre d in finding that he volunt arily consente d to the s ear ch of his hotel room

and that th e dis tr ic t c ourt

sh ou ld h a ve fo un d th a t th e po lic e la c ke d r e a so nable suspi c ion to d e ta in him, which in turn tainted his c onsent to searc h his hotel room. When reviewinga district cour t’s denial of a motion to suppress, this c ourt examines the lower c ourt’s finding s of fa ct for c lear err or and its co n cl u s i o n s of law de novo

. United States v. Flores , 571 F.3d 541, 544 ( 6th Cir. 2009);

ac c or d Un ite d S

tat es v . Ca ru the rs , 458 F.3d 459, 464 (6 t h C i r. 2006). The court will over turn a district court’s fa ctual finding s only if they convey a “de finite and fir

m conviction that a mistake ha s been c ommitt ed.” United States v. W orley , 193 F.3d 380, 384 (6th Cir. 1999) (citation & quotation marks omitted). More over, the court must examine the evidenc e “in the lig ht most favorable to the g overnme nt,” Un ite d S

tat es v . E rwi n , 155 F.3d 818, 822 (6th Cir. 1998) (e n banc) , as we ll as defe r to the district court’s credibility assessments “inasmuch as t he court was in the best position t o make such a de termination.” Un ite d S tat es v . H ill , 195 F.3d 258, 264- 65 (6th Cir. 1999) (c itation omit ted). 1. Whether War d Volun tarily Consented to t he Search of His H otel Room Th e F ourt

h A me ndme nt p ro te c ts “ [t]he ri ght of the p e op le to b e se c ur e in t he ir pe rs on s, h o u s es , p apers, and ef

fec ts, ag ainst unrea sonable sea rche s and seizures.” U .S. Const . amend. IV. Among its many

safe g uards, it protec ts indivi duals ag ainst warr antless sea rche s, except in limi ted7

circ umstances, suc h as whe n police office rs conduct a sear ch with consent. Florida v. Roye r , 460 U. S. 49 1, 49 7 (1 98 3) ; ac c or d United States v. Riascos- Suarez , 73 F.3d 616, 625 ( 6th Cir. 1996). W h e r e t h e v a l i d i t y o f

a s e a r c h r e s t s u

p o n c o n s e n t , t h e S t a t e h a s t h e b u r d e n o f p r o v i n g “ b y a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e” thr oug h “cle ar and positive te stimony ” that the nec essar y consent was fr eely

and voluntarily

obtained. Riascos-Suarez , 7 3 F .3 d at 62 5; ac c or d Roye r , 460 U.S. at 497. This Court has deemed consent voluntary when it is “unequivoc al, spec ific and intellig ently g iven, [and] uncontaminated by

any duress or c oerc ion.” United States v. Iv y , 165 F.3d 397, 402 (6th Cir. 19 98 ) (c itatio n & qu otatio n mark s o mit te d) ; ac c or d Sc hn e c k

lot h v. Bu sta mo nte , 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973). To evaluate whether an individual’s c onsent rises to this st andar d, the cour t must ex amine

“ the tot a lity

of the c ir c ums tanc e s, ” inc lud ing“ the a g e , in te lli g e nc e , a nd e du c a tio n o f the ind ivi du a l; whether the individual unde rstands the rig ht to refuse to consent; whethe r the individual understa nds his or her c onstitut ional rig hts; the leng th and nature of dete ntion; and the use of c oerc ive or punishing c onduct by

the police.” Riascos-Suarez , 73 F .3 d a t 62 5 ( c itatio ns omi tte d) ; accord I vy , 16 5 F .3 d at 40 2; se e Sc hn e c k lot h , 412 U.S. at 248. I n this analy sis, the district court’s finding s of fac t based upon c redibility finding s “ar e g ene rally

not subject to reve rsal upon appe llate re view.” Ivy , 1 65 F .3 d at 40 1 ( c itatio n & qu otatio n ma rk s o mit te d) . “ I nd e e d, wh e n th e re are tw o p e rm iss ibl e views of the e vidence , the fa ct finder ’s choice betwee n them cannot be cle ar l y erroneous.” Id. at 401-02 (c itation & quotation marks omitted). Citi ngthe same fa c ts that th e dis tr ic t c ourt se t f orth in its or de r d e nyinghis Mo tio n to Sup pr e ss , A p p e l l a n tm a i n t a i n s t h a th e d i d n o tv o l u n t a r i l y

c o n s e n tt o t h e s e a r c h o f

h i s h o t e l r oo m. Appellant B r. 9-14. Amonghis various critiques of the trial court’ s decision, he focuse s on the fa ct t h a t t h e ar

r e s t i n g o f f i c e r s d i d n o t g i v e h im h is Miranda war nings pr ior to asking him to si g n the8

consent for

m. See Appellant B r. 12-14. Althoug h the district court brie fly addre ssed this question,

see R.E. 84 at 10-11, the court believes it should elabor ate upon the lower court’s rea soning. Ward’ s Miranda argument has no leg al foundation, as “the Miranda rule prote cts ag ainst violations of the Self-Inc rimination C lause [of the Fifth Amendment ], which, in turn, is n o t i m p l i cate d by the int ro du c tio n at tr ia l of

ph y sic a l e vid e nc e re su lti ngfr om v olu nta ry sta te me nts .” Un i t ed S t a t es v. Patane , 5 42 U. S. 6 30 , 6 34 (2 00 4) (t hir d & fo ur

th e mph a se s a dd e d) ; see also id. at 641 (“ [A] mere failure to give Miranda war nings does not, by itself, violate a suspect’s constitutional rights or e ven the Miranda rule.” ). With respect to Appellant’s other arguments, the court adopts the re asoning of the low e r c ourt

a nd a ff ir ms i ts c on c lus ion

tha t Ward vo lun tari ly

c on se nte d to the se a rc h of h is r oo m. 2. Whether P olice Lawf ully S eize d Ward The purvie w of the F ourth Amendment e ncompasses s eiz ures of the per son, including i nvestig atory

stops by police off

icer s. Te rry

v . O hio , 3 9 2 U

. S. 1 , 1 6

- 1 7 ( 1 9 6 8 )

. T h e v a lidity of a

se izur e un de r t

he F ourt h A me ndme nt d e pe nd s o n w he the r it is “ re a so na ble [] ba se d u

po n th e tot a lity of the c ircumstance s.” Hi ll , 1 9 5 F. 3 d at 2 6 4 (c i t i n g Oh io v . R ob ine tte , 5 19 U. S. 3 3, 39 (1 99 6) ); see Te rry , 392 U.S. at 19. I f an individual consents to a sea rch dur ing a

n unrea sonable, a

nd there fore unlawful, seizure, the n the illeg al seizure taints the subsequent sear ch and rende rs the evidenc e that it produced ina dmissibl e. See R oyer , 460 U.S. at 507-08. This Court has established a two-par t te st to determine the r easona bleness of a

n investigatory sto p: F ir st, the c ourt

de te rm ine s de novo wh e the r the re e xiste d a t the tim e of the sto p, in l ig ht o f a ll of the fa cts, “a proper basis for the stop, which is judge d by examining whether t he law e nforc ement officia ls were awa

re of specific and ar

ticulable fa cts which g av e rise to reasona ble suspicion.” Car uth e rs , 4 58 F .3 d at 46 4 ( c itatio n & qu otatio n ma rk s o mit te d) ; se e Un ite d S tat es v . A rv izu , 5349

U.S. 266, 273 (2002); R oyer , 4 60 U. S. at 49 8 ( “ [C]er ta in s e izur e s a

re jus tif ia ble un de r t

he F ourt h Am e ndme nt if th ere is a rt ic ula ble su sp ic ion

that a pe rs on ha s c omm itt e d o r i s a

bo ut t o c omm it a crime.” ). The likelihood of suspe cted c riminal activity need not rise to the level of a pre pondera

nce of the e vidence , let alone pr obable c ause. Arv izu , 534 U.S. at 274. Fur thermore , police off

icer s may “dra w on t h ei r own ex perie nce a nd specia liz ed tra ining to make infere nces f rom and de ductions about the cumulative inf

ormatio n av ai l able to them that mi g ht well elude a n untrained pe rson.” Flores , 5 71 F .3 d at 54 4 ( c ita tio n & qu otatio n ma

rk s o mit te d) ; ac c or

d A rv izu , 534 U.S. at 273. Ul tim a te ly , h ow e ve r, thi s ana ly sis c on sti tut e s a n ob je c tiv e sta

nd a rd : “ [W]ould

the fa c ts a

va ila ble to the office r at the m oment of t he seiz ure . . . war rant a man of re asonable caution in the belief that the ac tion taken was a

ppropriate ? ” Te rry , 392 U.S. at 21-22 (citations & quotation marks omitted). Second, if the stop wa s proper , the cour t must determine “whe ther the de g ree of intrusion . . . was

re a so na bly re la te d in sc op e to t he sit uatio n a t ha

nd , w hic h is jud g e d b y

e xami nin g the re a so na

ble ne ss of the off icials’ conduc t give n their suspicions and the surr ounding c ircumstance s.” Car uth e rs , 458 F .3 d at 464 (c itatio n & quo ta tio n mar ks omi tte d) ; se e Te rry , 392 U.S. at 21. For example, a police office r may

“take nece ssary

measure s to determine whe ther [a] person is . . . car rying a wea pon and to neutralize [a] threat of phy sical har m” if he r easona

bly believes that suspect t o b e ar m ed and dang erous to the of

fice r or other s. Te rry , 392 U.S. at 24. Ward maintains that Offic er B irch impermissibly detained him without rea sonable suspicion and that, there fore , the district c ourt err ed in a llowing the fruits of the subsequent sear ch of his hotel

ro om i nto e vid e nc e a t tr ia l. A pp e lla nt B r. 14 -2 5. Spe c if

ic a lly , h e c la ims that O ff

ic e r B ir c h s ho uld

no t ha ve re lie d on Cle mon s’ s sta te me nts that the re wa s ano the r g un in War d’ s hote l roo m be c a us e the district court late r found Clemons “not cr edible.” Appellant Br. 21 (c itation & quotation marksAp pe lla nt a pp e a rs to b e lie ve inc or

re c tly that hi s p re vio us c on vic tio n b oo ste d h is o ff e ns e 2 level by three points. See Ap pe lla nt B r. 26 . T he c on vic tio n, ho we ve r, a dd e d thre e po int s to his criminal history

calc ulation. See Appellant’s Pre sentenc e Investig ation Report 4-5, 7. 10 omi tte d) . Ward

a lso ins ist s that the po lic e un re a so na bly de ta ine d him be c a

us e the y “ us e d the mos t intrusive and threatening means possible,” i.e . arr ested him at g un point. Appellant Br . 24. I n light of the su c c inc t and

le g a lly a c c ur a te a na ly sis of

the se iss ue s by the dis tr ic t court , this c ourt a do pts its

rea soning in full and a ffirms its finding that the police lawfully seized Ward. See R. Doc. 84 at 8-10. B. Whether the D istrictCourt Cor rec tly Appli ed the Sentencing Guidelines Appellant ar g ues that the district cour t should not have consider ed a criminal offe nse that he committed a s a juvenile – althoug h he was tried and convicted as an adult, and sentenc ed to t hree ye ar s i np r i s o n –

i n i t s c a l c u l a t i o n o f

h i s c r i m i n a l h i s t o r

y c a t e g o r y. See Appellant B r. 26-27. 2 Th is C ourt

re vie ws a dis tr ic t c ourt ’s se nte nc e fo r p ro c e dura l and su bs tanti ve re a so na

ble ne ss. Un ite d S tat es v . D ie tz , 577 F.3d 672, 697 ( 6th Cir. 2009), cert. de nied , 1 30 S. Ct . 1 72 0 ( 20 10 ); see G a ll v . United States , 552 U.S. 38, 46, 51 (2007). In doing so, it re views the district cour t’s

a pp lic a tio n o f t

he Se nte nc ingGu ide lin e s de novo and its findings of fac t for clear error

. Di e tz , 577 F.3d at 698 (citation om itted). The procedur al reasonablene ss analy sis require s the court to ensur e that th e tr ia l c o u rt “ c o mm itte d n o s ig n if

ic a n t p r o c e d

u r a l e r r o r , s u c h a s f

a il in g to c a lc u late (or imp r o p e r l y c a l c u l a t i n g ) t h e G u i d e l i n e s r a n g e , tr e a t i n g t h e G u i d e l i n e s a s m a n d a t o r y , f a ili ng to consider the [18 U.S .C.] § 3553(a) fac tors, selec ting a sentenc e based on clea rly err oneous fa cts, or failing to adequately

explain the chosen sentenc e.” Ga ll , 5 52 U. S. at 51 ; se e Di e tz , 577 F.3d at 697. Ex amin ing a

sentenc e’s substantive r easona bleness re quires the c ourt to determine w hether the sentenc e is “propor

tionate to the seriousne ss of the circ umstances of the offe nse and offe nder, a nd sufficie nt but not g reater than ne cessa ry , to comply

with the purposes of § 3553( a).” Di e tz , 577 F.3d11

a t 70 0 ( c itatio n & qu otatio n ma rk s o mit te d) ; se e Ga ll , 552 U.S. at 51. War d’ s c la im that th e dis tr ic t c ourt sh ou ld no t ha ve us e d h is p ri or

fe lony c on vic tio n to calc ulate his criminal history cate g ory fails. The S entenc ing Guidelines expli citly command the tria l

c ourt to a dd thr e e po int s to a de fe nd a nt’ s cr imi na l histo ry if he c omm itt e d anof fe ns e a s a juv e nil e but “was c onvicted as a

n adult and rece ived a sentenc e of imprisonment exceeding one y ear and one

mon th. ” U.S. S .G. § 4 A1 .2 (d )( 1) ; see id. § 4 A1 .1 (a ). Ap pe lla nt’ s c on vic tio n me e ts the se qualifications. See Appellant’s Pre sentenc e Investig ation Report 7. III. Conclusi on The c ourt AF FI RMS t he ruling s of the district cour t.