SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO . A

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BARBARA LOMBARDI, Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. CHRISTOPHER BUJNOWSKI and PAULINE BUJNOWSKI, Defendants

- Respondents.

___________________________

Submitted May 20, 2020

– Decided J une 16, 2020 Before Judges Mayer and Enright. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. L

- 2170

- 17. Hegge & Confusione, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Michael J

. Confusione, of counsel and on the brief). Verdiramo & Verdiramo, PA, attorneys for respondents (Vincent S. Verdiramo, on the brief).
PER CURIAM NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court

. " A lthough it is posted on the internet , this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited

. R

. 1:36

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Plaintiff Barbara Lombardi appeals from an October 9, 2019 order involuntarily dismissing her claims in accordance with R ule 4:37

- 2(b). We affirm , substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Robert H. Gardner's cogent oral opinion. We provide the fo llowing brief comments. On July 27, 2000, plaintiff
obtained a $45,000 cashier's check from her bank . She provided the check to defendant Christopher Bujnowski, the husband of her niece , defendant Pauline Bujnowski , so Christopher 1 could start a dental l ab. On the same day plaintiff withdrew these funds, s he added a notation to her withdrawal slip , but not the cashier's check, that read, "Business loan for Pauline and Chris Bujnowski. "
P laintiff did not provide a copy of this withdrawal slip to defendant s and they

never signed a ny document s confirming the monies Christopher received
constituted a loan

. At trial, p laintiff testified she did not ask defendants to sign a promissory note or a contract when she gave the check to Christopher because " [t] hey're family, I wouldn't ask them to do that." During her direct examination, plaintiff was asked if there was "an understanding as to when [the money] was going to

1 Because defendant s share the same last name, we refer to the m by their first names. We intend no disrespect by this practice.3 A

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be repaid." Plaintiff testified, "it just was never discussed, in the beginning, when th ey were going to pay it back." As of the trial date, no portion of the funds were repaid to plaintiff. During plaintiff's cross - examination , she conceded that when she gave Christopher the cashier's check , he did not say when he would pay her back.
Pl aintiff also admitted there was no writing to document the transaction , other than the withdrawal receipt she retained. Further, she acknowledged there was "not a single document anywhere" that set forth a term, interest rate, or repayment plan for the lo an. Additionally, she affirmed she had given gifts to her nieces and nephews "plenty of times" over the years. Lastly , plaintiff maintained the loan was "between Chris and I. Pauline really wasn't involved in this loan . . . . All the communication was between me and Chris." At the close of plaintiff's testimony, defendants moved for an involuntary dismissal and Judge Gardner granted th eir application

. The judge found by plaintiff's own admission that "Pauline was not involved . . . here," so dismissal

was appropriate as to Pauline. Turning to Christopher, the judge found:

there's no writing here . . . anywhere

. . . that acknowledges by the [d]efense the fact that there was a loan . . . . There's no meeting of the minds

. . . , there's no writing here t o say that the defense, in any way, was going to repay a debt, this particular money. . . . I find this was a gift, not a loan and based upon the credibility4 A

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- 19T2 of the witness, as well as the testimony and the evidence supplied, I don't find there is a scinti lla of evidence here to show that this, in fact, was a loan, rather than a gift. On appeal, plaintiff argues the judge erred in granting defendants' motion for involuntary dismissal because she had a "right to recover on the unpaid loan." Alternatively, she argues she was entitled to recoup the $45,000 based on the grounds of unjust enrichment. We are not persuaded. Our review of a trial court's fact

- finding in a non

- jury case is limited.
S eidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A. , 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011)

. "The general rule is that findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence. Deference is especially appropriate when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibi lity ." Ib id. (quoting Cesare v. Cesare , 154 N.J. 394, 411

- 12 (1998)). However, we owe no deference to a trial court's interpretation of the law, and review issues of law de novo. State v. Parker , 212 N.J. 269, 278 (2012); Mountain Hill, LLC v. Twp. Comm . of Middletown , 403 N.J. Super. 146, 193 (App. Div. 2008).

" A contract arises from offer and acceptance, and must be sufficiently definite ' that the performance to be rendered by each party can be ascerta ined with reasonable certainty.'" Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan , 128 N.J. 427, 435 (1992) (citations omitted). Where parties agree on essential terms and manifest5 A

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some intention to be bound by those terms, an enforceable contract is created. Ibi d. By contrast, when the parties do not agree on essent ial terms, a contract is typically deemed unenforceable. The involuntary dismissal rule requires a trial court to enter judgment in favor of a defendant if, after the presentation of plaintiff's evidence, "upon the facts and upon the law the plaintiff ha s shown no right to relief." R. 4:37

- 2 (b).
In making that assessment, the trial court must afford all favorable inferences to the plaintiff. Fox v. Millman , 210 N.J. 401, 428 (2012). "When reviewing a dismissal at the close of a plaintiff's case, [an] appellate court accepts the truth of the plaintiff's evidence together with the legitimate inferences that the evidence supports." Cameco, Inc. v. Gedicke , 157 N.J. 504, 5 09 (1999). Guided by these principles, we are satisfied Judge Gardner properly fou nd that plaintiff failed to marshal a sufficient quantum of evidence to demonstrate she loaned defendants $45,000 and was entitled to repayment of those funds. In fact, plaintiff's testimony confirmed there was no meeting of the minds regarding any terms for the loan nor a plan for repayment. Additionally , plaintiff conceded that the funds were given solely to Christopher , and there was no written agreement between the parties regarding repayment of the $45,000 from the time Christopher r eceived this mone y in 2000 until plaintiff filed suit against6 A

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defendants in 2017. Under these circumstances, we see no basis to disturb Judge Gardner's decision to grant defendant s ' motion for an involuntary dismissal. We also find unavailing plaintiff's contention that she was entitled to relief on the basis of unjust enrichment. This argument was not advanced in plaintiff's complaint nor raised at any point during the trial. To the extent we have not addressed p laintiff's remaining arguments , we are satisfied they la ck sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.
R. 2:11

- 3(e)(1)(E). Affirmed.