NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE of ARIZONA, Appellee, 

v.

JESSICA LYNNETTE DRESSIG, Appellant. 

No. 1 CA-CR 18-0443 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. S8015CR201601655 

The Honorable Richard Weiss, Judge (retired) 

REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Jana Zinman 

Counsel for Appellee 

Janelle A. McEachern Attorney at Law, Chandler

By Janelle A. McEachern

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 2-13-2020
STATE v. DRESSIG

Decision of the Court

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Jennifer B. Campbell joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Jessica Lynette Dressig appeals her convictions and sentences 

for one count each of possession of dangerous drugs for sale, possession of 

narcotic drugs for sale, possession of marijuana for sale, and possession of 

drug paraphernalia. Because the record is silent concerning whether 

Dressig voluntarily waived her right to be present at trial, we remand to the 

superior court with instructions to hold a hearing to determine if Dressig’s 

absence from the trial constituted a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 

waiver of that right. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

¶2 On December 2, 2016, based on information gathered from an 

informant who alleged Dressig was involved in the sale of illegal drugs, law 

enforcement officers executed a search warrant on the home where they

believed she lived. The officers knocked on the door to the house, and an 

individual later identified as Dressig’s co-tenant opened the door and was 

immediately detained. The officers then attempted to do a protective sweep 

of each room of the home. When they reached the door to the master 

bedroom, however, they found it locked, but could hear someone yelling 

on the other side of the door. The officers realized the individual behind the 

door was not going to unlock it, so one of the officers broke through the 

door and entered the room. Inside the room, the officers found Dressig 

lying on the bed holding a small dog. The officers attempted to detain 

Dressig, but she refused to follow their commands and resisted. The officers 

eventually succeeded in placing Dressig in handcuffs, removed her from 

the room, and searched the home. 

1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the 

verdicts and resolve all reasonable inferences against Dressig. State v. 

Burgess, 245 Ariz. 275, 277, ¶ 3 (App. 2018). 
STATE v. DRESSIG

Decision of the Court

3 

¶3 During the search of Dressig’s bedroom, the officers 

discovered large quantities of marijuana, methamphetamine, and heroin 

stashed in various areas, including on the nightstand by the bed, in a tote 

bag resting on the bedroom floor, and in the bedroom’s closet. The officers 

also discovered syringes, baggies, scales, marijuana grinders, and 

methamphetamine and marijuana pipes in the bedroom and master

bathroom connected to it. The officers arrested Dressig and took her to the 

Bullhead City police station, where she agreed to an interview and to waive

her Miranda2 rights. During the interview, Dressig admitted to possessing 

marijuana and a small amount of the heroin but denied possessing the large 

amounts of methamphetamine and heroin found in the master bedroom. 

She likewise denied that she sold drugs.

¶4 That same day, an initial appearance and arraignment 

hearing was held before the Bullhead City Justice Court, in which Dressig 

appeared via video. After the proceeding, the justice court entered a 

Determination of Release Conditions and Release Order (the “Release 

Order”), setting a $25,000 appearance bond. The Release Order also 

contained the following warning:

CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLATING THIS ORDER: You 

have the right to be present at your trial and at all other 

proceedings in your case. If you fail to appear the court may 

issue a warrant for your arrest and/or hold the trial or 

proceeding in your absence. IF CONVICTED, YOU WILL BE 

REQUIRED TO APPEAR FOR SENTENCING. IF YOU 

FAIL TO APPEAR, YOU MAY LOSE YOUR RIGHT TO A 

DIRECT APPEAL.

Below this warning, the Release Order contained a signature block for the 

defendant to acknowledge she understood the information in the form and 

the consequences if she violated its conditions. Dressig, however, did not 

sign the Release Order.

¶5 A grand jury issued a supervening indictment charging 

Dressig with the crimes noted above. Dressig was arraigned again before 

the superior court, which affirmed her release conditions, including the

$25,000 appearance bond. Unable or unwilling to post a bond for that 

amount, Dressig remained in custody.

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
STATE v. DRESSIG

Decision of the Court

4 

¶6 In March 2017, following several attempts to persuade the 

court to modify Dressig’s release conditions, Dressig’s counsel and the State 

stipulated to releasing her on her own recognizance, and the court accepted 

the stipulation. After her release, Dressig’s attendance at pretrial 

proceedings became sporadic. She failed to appear at the final management 

conference shortly before the trial, and the court issued a bench warrant for 

her arrest. Dressig remained absent during the trial.

¶7 From October 30 to November 1, 2017, the court conducted a 

three-day jury trial. At the beginning of each day of Dressig’s trial, her

counsel noted her absence and moved for a continuance, citing his lack of 

contact with Dressig and uncertainty that he or his office had told Dressig 

of the trial date. The State objected to each motion, arguing that Dressig’s 

lack of contact and absence were voluntary. After hearing the parties’ 

arguments, the court denied the motions, finding that it was Dressig’s 

obligation to maintain contact with her counsel and that “[i]t appears from 

the file that she was previously advised that the trial could take place 

without her being present.” Each day of the trial went forward without 

Dressig, and at the trial’s conclusion, the jury found Dressig guilty as 

charged.

¶8 On March 24, 2018, the police arrested Dressig in Bullhead 

City pursuant to the bench warrant. At the sentencing hearing, Dressig’s 

counsel explained to the court that because Dressig’s absence had delayed 

sentencing for more than 90 days, he believed Dressig had forfeited her 

right to a direct appeal under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) 

section 13-4033(C). The court agreed with Dressig’s counsel that the plain 

language of the statute appeared to bar Dressig’s right to appeal. The court 

then sentenced Dressig to concurrent prison terms for each count totaling 

10 years’ imprisonment, with 183 days’ presentence incarceration credit. In 

an apparent change of heart, Dressig’s counsel filed a notice of appeal

shortly thereafter. 

¶9 Dressig’s appellate counsel filed a brief per Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969), 

certifying that, after a diligent search of the record, she found no arguable 

question of law that was not frivolous. Counsel asked this court to search 

the record for arguable issues. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988); State v. 

Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 537, ¶ 30 (App. 1999). Dressig filed a pro se

supplemental brief. In her supplemental brief, Dressig argued that there 

was insufficient evidence to support her convictions for possession of 

dangerous drugs for sale and narcotic drugs for sale because it was not 

shown that she possessed the methamphetamine and heroin found in the 
STATE v. DRESSIG

Decision of the Court

5 

bedroom. After reviewing the record, we issued a Penson order requesting 

that the parties brief two additional issues: (1) whether the Release Order 

constituted adequate notice to Dressig that the trial could proceed in her 

absence if she failed to appear; and (2) whether that same form constituted 

adequate notice to Dressig that she would lose her right to appeal if she 

voluntarily delayed sentencing by more than 90 days. Our review of the 

record identified no other arguable issues.

DISCUSSION

¶10 At the outset, we address the second issue raised in our 

Penson order: whether Dressig lost her right to appeal her convictions and 

sentences under A.R.S. § 13-4033(C). Dressig’s absence caused sentencing 

to be delayed by more than 90 days, which ordinarily would forfeit her right 

to appeal, A.R.S. § 13-4033(C). However, on the record before us, we are 

unable to determine whether Dressig had been informed that she forfeited

her right to appeal because Dressig did not sign the document in the record 

that contained such a warning—the Release Order. See State v. Bolding, 227 

Ariz. 82, 88, ¶ 20 (App. 2011) (concluding A.R.S. § 13-4033(C) can only be 

applied constitutionally if a defendant is informed of the consequences of 

delaying sentencing). In their respective Penson briefs, Dressig argues, and 

the State concedes, that the record fails to show Dressig received adequate 

notice that her right to appeal could be forfeited. Consequently, we accept

the State’s concession and conclude A.R.S. § 13-4033(C) “cannot be applied 

to [Dressig] in a constitutional manner.” Bolding, 227 Ariz. at 88, ¶ 20. Thus, 

we have jurisdiction over Dressig’s appeal under A.R.S. §§ 13-4031 

and -4033(A) and turn to address the substantive issues raised by Dressig 

and identified in our Penson order. 

A. Sufficient Evidence Supports Dressig’s Convictions for

Possession of Dangerous Drugs for Sale and Narcotic Drugs for 

Sale. 

¶11 In her supplemental brief, Dressig argues there was 

insufficient evidence to support her convictions for possession of 

dangerous drugs for sale and possession of narcotic drugs for sale because

the state failed to prove she knowingly possessed the methamphetamine or 

heroin. 

¶12 We review de novo whether substantial evidence was 

presented to support a conviction. State v. Burns, 237 Ariz. 1, 20, ¶ 72 (2015). 

“‘Substantial evidence’ to support a conviction exists when ‘reasonable 

persons could accept [it] as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion 
STATE v. DRESSIG

Decision of the Court

6 

of [a] defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. at 20–21, ¶ 72 (first 

alteration in original) (quoting State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 16 (2011)). 

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “the relevant question is 

whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” West, 226 Ariz. at 562, 

¶ 16 (quoting State v. Mathers, 165 Ariz. 64, 66 (1990)). “Both direct and 

circumstantial evidence should be considered in determining whether 

substantial evidence supports a conviction.” Id. “Criminal intent, being a 

state of mind, is shown by circumstantial evidence. [A] [d]efendant’s 

conduct and comments are evidence of [her] state of mind.” State v. Bearup, 

221 Ariz. 163, 167, ¶ 16 (2009) (quoting State v. Routhier, 137 Ariz. 90, 99 

(1983)). 

¶13 “The sufficiency of the evidence must be tested against the 

statutorily required elements of the offense.” State v. Pena, 209 Ariz. 503, 

505, ¶ 8 (App. 2005). Under A.R.S. § 13-3407(A)(2), a person is guilty of 

possession of dangerous drugs for sale if it is shown that the defendant

(1) knowingly possessed, (2) a dangerous drug (here, methamphetamine), 

(3) for sale. The same elements apply to prove a defendant guilty of 

possession of narcotic drugs for sale, except that the drug in question must 

be a narcotic drug (here, heroin). A.R.S. § 13-3408(A)(2). Because Dressig 

only challenges whether the State produced sufficient evidence for a jury to 

conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that she knowingly possessed a 

dangerous or narcotic drug—and because sufficient evidence was 

presented concerning the other elements—we only address that element.

¶14 “Possess” in this context means “knowingly to have physical 

possession or otherwise exercised dominion or control over property.” 

A.R.S. § 13-105(34). “Possession may be actual or constructive.” State v. 

Gonsalves, 231 Ariz. 521, 523, ¶ 9 (App. 2013). “Constructive possession can 

be established by showing that the accused exercised dominion and control 

over the drug itself, or the location in which the substance was found.” State 

v. Teagle, 217 Ariz. 17, 27, ¶ 41 (App. 2007). A person’s “mere presence at a 

location where [drugs] are found is insufficient to establish knowledgeable 

possession or dominion and control over [the drugs].” Id. at 27–28, ¶ 41 

(quoting State v. Jung, 19 Ariz. App. 257, 261 (1973)). But “it is not necessary 

to show that a defendant exercised exclusive possession or control over the 

substance itself or the place in which the illegal substance was found; 

control or right to control is sufficient.” State v. Curtis, 114 Ariz. 527, 528 

(App. 1977). 
STATE v. DRESSIG

Decision of the Court

7 

¶15 Here, the State presented overwhelming evidence at the trial

for the jury to reasonably conclude Dressig exercised dominion and control 

over the bedroom and knew that methamphetamine and heroin were

located there. The testimony of several officers involved in searching 

Dressig’s residence established that: (1) Dressig was found in the bedroom 

where the methamphetamine and heroin were found; (2) the door to the 

bedroom was locked and had to be broken down to allow the officers’ entry; 

and (3) Dressig refused to comply with commands and had to be forcibly 

removed from the bedroom. The testimony of the officers concerning the 

subsequent search of the bedroom, supported by photographs of the scene, 

showed that large quantities of methamphetamine and heroin were found 

scattered and hidden around Dressig’s room, including on a nightstand by 

her bed, in a tote bag resting on the bedroom floor, and in the bedroom 

closet. Testimony established that the amount of each drug seized was 

substantial in both weight and value. 

¶16 Dressig acknowledged the bedroom was hers, and the 

testimony of the other resident living in the home confirmed Dressig was 

renting the bedroom where the methamphetamine and heroin were found. 

Finally, regarding possession of the heroin found in the bedroom

specifically, Dressig admitted in her interview that she possessed heroin

but claimed she did not own the amount alleged by the interviewing officer.

¶17 Taken together, Dressig’s conduct and statements during the

search of the home and after her arrest, the large amounts of both 

substances found in her bedroom, and the evidence presented concerning 

her dominion and control of the bedroom, provided overwhelming support 

for a jury to find Dressig constructively possessed the methamphetamine 

and heroin found there. Accordingly, sufficient evidence supports Dressig’s 

convictions for possession of dangerous and narcotic drugs for sale.

B. Because it is Unclear Whether Dressig was Informed of Her Right 

to Attend the Trial and that the Trial Could Proceed in Her 

Absence, Remand for a Hearing on this Issue is Necessary.

¶18 Dressig argues she never received adequate notice of the 

consequences of her failure to appear at trial because the Release Order is 

unsigned and “[t]here is no other evidence that, at any other point going 

forward, reference was made to [the Release Order] or similar warnings.” 

In response, the State implicitly concedes the unsigned Release Order is 

insufficient but claims other evidence within the record demonstrates 

Dressig received notice of her right to attend the trial and that the trial 

would proceed in her absence.
STATE v. DRESSIG

Decision of the Court

8 

¶19 A defendant’s “right to be present at trial is protected both by 

the Sixth Amendment to the federal constitution as incorporated and 

applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and by article II, 

section 24 of the Arizona Constitution.” State v. Levato, 186 Ariz. 441, 443 

(1996). This right is further protected by rule in Arizona. See Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 19.2 (“A defendant in a felony or misdemeanor trial has the right to be 

present at every stage of the trial . . . .”). Like many of the constitutional 

protections afforded to criminal defendants, however, the right to attend 

the trial may be waived. State v. Garcia-Contreras, 191 Ariz. 144, 147, ¶ 9 

(1998). The critical inquiry in this context is whether the defendant’s 

absence is voluntary, as “a valid waiver depends upon voluntariness.” Id.

¶20 Under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 9.1, a 

court may infer that a defendant’s absence is voluntary, and thus a valid 

waiver of the right to be present, “if the defendant had actual notice of the 

date and time of the proceeding, notice of the right to be present, and notice 

that the proceeding would go forward in the defendant’s absence.” If these 

requirements are met, the defendant bears the burden of rebutting the 

presumption that his or her absence was voluntary. State v. Bohn, 116 Ariz. 

500, 503 (1977). Because the superior court’s “finding of voluntary absence, 

and, therefore, the existence of a waiver of the right to be present, is 

basically a question of fact[,] [w]e will not upset a . . . finding of voluntary 

absence . . . absent an abuse of discretion.” State v. Bishop, 139 Ariz. 567, 569 

(1984) (citation omitted) (quotation omitted). However, “in any proceeding 

involving the surrender of Constitutional rights, it must appear from the 

record that the waiver was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made.” 

State v. Avila, 127 Ariz. 21, 25 (1980). 

¶21 Here, Rule 9.1’s first requirement was met. The minute entry 

from a settlement conference Dressig attended approximately a month 

before trial indicates the superior court affirmed the actual date and time of 

the trial after the proceeding. Thus, Dressig received “actual notice of the 

date and time” of the trial. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 9.1. However, there is nothing

in the record before us that provides a basis on which this court can 

determine whether Dressig received the other two predicate warnings

necessary to justify the superior court’s determination that her absence 

constituted a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of her right to 

attend the trial. 

¶22 The Release Order, which contained both notices required by 

Rule 9.1, is unsigned. Without Dressig’s signature, this court cannot 

presume Dressig received the warnings listed in the Release Order at the 
STATE v. DRESSIG

Decision of the Court

9 

time it was issued.3 Acknowledging the Release Order is unsigned, the State 

nevertheless asserts two portions of the record demonstrate Dressig was 

informed of her right to attend the trial and of the consequences if she failed 

to appear. First, the State points to the minute entry from Dressig’s 

arraignment in the superior court, which states: 

The Court admonishes the Defendant and advises her of the 

disclosure process and advises her that her failure to appear 

at any further hearing will result in the issuance of a bench 

warrant. 

* * * 

Discussion ensues regarding release conditions; the Court 

finds that the Defendant is being held on a $25,000.00 bond. 

IT IS ORDERED affirming prior release conditions.

Second, the State claims the superior court’s finding that it appeared from 

the court file that Dressig had been “previously advised that the trial could 

take place without her being present” is evidence that Dressig was 

informed that the trial could proceed in her absence.

¶23 But the cited evidence is at best ambiguous. First, concerning

the arraignment minute entry, the reference to discussions surrounding the 

consequences of failing to appear and of release conditions certainly could 

have included notice to Dressig of her right to be present and a warning 

that the trial could proceed in her absence. But the minute entry does not 

refer to either, and without a transcript of the arraignment, which was not 

provided to this court, we cannot determine whether such a notice or 

warning was given. Second, the superior court’s finding that “it appear[ed]

from the file” that Dressig had received notice that trial could proceed in 

her absence, offers no support for the State’s position because we cannot 

determine on what portion of the record the court based that finding. The 

3 When forms like the Release Order are signed, they are typically 

considered adequate notice to justify the inference contemplated by 

Rule 9.1. See, e.g., State v. Tudgay, 128 Ariz. 1, 3 (1981) (finding requirements 

of Rule 9.1 satisfied by defendant’s signature of release order containing 

notice of right to attend and warning that proceedings could begin in 

defendant’s absence); Bohn, 116 Ariz. at 503 (same); State v. Pena, 25 Ariz. 

App. 80, 80–81 (1975) (same); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. Form 6 (release order 

containing warnings required by Rule 9.1).
STATE v. DRESSIG

Decision of the Court

10 

court could have found this finding on some part of the file that was not 

included in the record on appeal, or it could have erroneously based its

conclusion on the unsigned Release Order. The balance of the record is 

likewise vague. Although there is another minute entry that references 

Dressig being “admonished,” it offers no greater detail than the 

arraignment minute entry.

¶24 Thus, without more, this court is left with the functional 

equivalent of a silent record, as nothing in the record before us today 

provides this court a basis on which it can determine whether Dressig 

received the notices required by Rule 9.1. See State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 

121, ¶ 15 (App. 2007) (minute entry stating the defendant waived the right 

to a jury trial, without more, was insufficient as evidence of waiver). Given 

these ambiguities, and because the waiver of a constitutional right cannot 

be found or presumed from a silent record, we cannot conclude the superior 

court’s inference of voluntariness was justified. See Avila, 127 Ariz. at 25 

(“[I]n any proceeding involving the surrender of Constitutional rights, it 

must appear from the record that the waiver was knowingly, intelligently 

and voluntarily made. Such condition of mind, moreover, will not be 

presumed from a silent record.”).

¶25 Under these circumstances, a remand is appropriate for a 

hearing to determine whether Dressig was adequately informed of her right 

to be present and that the trial could proceed in her absence if she failed to 

appear. See, e.g., State v. Perez, 115 Ariz. 30, 32 (1977) (when the record 

provided an insufficient basis to determine whether a defendant was 

advised of rights articulated in Rule 9.1, a remand for an evidentiary 

hearing was necessary); State v. Cook, 115 Ariz. 146, 150 (App. 1977)

(remanding for hearing to determine circumstances surrounding 

defendant’s absence), supplemented, 118 Ariz. 154 (App. 1978), overruled in 

part on other grounds by State v. Fettis, 136 Ariz. 58, 59 (1983). If the superior 

court determines Dressig received adequate notice of her right to be present 

and the consequences of failing to appear before absconding, Dressig’s 

convictions and sentences are affirmed. However, if the superior court

concludes Dressig did not receive such notice and that her absence was, 

therefore, involuntary, her convictions and sentences must be set aside. 

Whatever the result of the hearing, the party adversely affected by the 

ruling may then appeal. A.R.S. § 13-4032(4) (the State may take an appeal

from “[a]n order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the 

state”); A.R.S. § 13-4033(A)(3) (same but for appeal taken by the defendant). 
STATE v. DRESSIG

Decision of the Court

11 

CONCLUSION

¶26 The case is remanded to the superior court for proceedings 

consistent with this decision.