Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A04-1507-JT-847 | February 15 2016 Page 1 of 15

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Donald E.C. Leicht

Kokomo, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Robert J. Henke

David E. Corey 

Deputy Attorneys General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination 

of the Parent-Child Relationship 

of C.S., Mother, and G.G, 

Father,1 and K.G. and G.G., 

Children,

C.S.,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

February 15, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

34A04-1507-JT-847

Appeal from the 

Howard Circuit Court

The Honorable 

Lynn Murray, Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos.

34C01-1501-JT-5

34C01-1501-JT-6

 

1

Father does not participate in this appeal; however, according to Indiana Appellate Rule 17(A), a party of 

record in the trial court shall be a party on appeal.
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Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

Kirsch, Judge.

[1] C.S. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental 

rights to her children, K.G. and G.G. (collectively, “the Children”). Mother 

raises the following restated issue for our review: whether the juvenile court’s 

termination order is clearly erroneous.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Mother is the biological mother of both K.G., born April 6, 2006, and G.G., 

born April 19, 2007.2 On February 5, 2013, the Indiana Department of Child 

Services (“DCS”) received allegations that Mother’s home had no heat or 

running water, and there were concerns that the family was homeless. On that 

 

2 The juvenile court also terminated the parental rights of the father of the Children, G.G., but he does not 

participate in this appeal. 
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date, the house where the family had been living was condemned, and Mother 

and the Children were moved to Open Arms Shelter (“Open Arms”) in 

Kokomo, Indiana. On February 8, 2013, Mother was asked to leave Open 

Arms due to her behavior and failure to follow the rules. DCS removed the 

Children from Mother’s care because Mother and the Children were without 

suitable housing. At that time, the whereabouts of the father of the Children, 

G.G. (“Father”), were unknown, and he had not had contact with the Children 

for years. 

[4] On February 11, 2013, DCS filed petitions alleging the Children were children 

in need of services (“CHINS”). A fact-finding hearing was held on the CHINS 

petitions on April 8, 2013, and the Children were found to be CHINS on that 

date. At the dispositional hearing held on April 29, 2013, the juvenile court 

ordered Mother, in pertinent part, to: (1) attend visitations with the Children, 

which was dependent on her passing drug screens; (2) not use any drugs or 

alcohol and submit to random drug screens; (3) complete an intensive 

outpatient substance abuse treatment program if she tests positive, with such 

treatment to include relapse prevention; (4) complete a parenting program; (5) 

demonstrate effective parenting skills; (6) obtain and maintain stable housing;

(7) participate in therapy and follow all recommendations; (8) maintain contact 

with DCS and follow their recommendations. Appellant’s App. at 77. 

[5] After the Children were removed, Mother was homeless for several months, but 

was allowed to move back to Open Arms. When she moved back into Open 

Arms, she submitted to a drug screen that later came back positive for 
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amphetamine, methadone, and methamphetamine. At a subsequent review 

hearing in January 2014, it was reported that Mother was not participating in 

drug treatment and had a pattern of doing well for a while and then relapsing 

on drugs and not participating in services or treatment. At an October 2014 

review hearing, it was reported that Mother had tested positive twice for 

marijuana and once for methamphetamine and that she had not completed any 

type of intensive substance abuse treatment or relapse services. Since the 

beginning of 2015, all of Mother’s drug screens were positive for marijuana, 

with the most recent being about a month before the termination hearing. 

Mother also missed drug screens, which DCS and the juvenile court considered 

to be positive screens. At a child and family team meeting held on March 19, 

2015, Mother stated that she was using marijuana and was not going to stop 

doing drugs. Tr. at 35, 101-02.3 Mother left the meeting before it was over and 

did not have any more contact with DCS.

[6] Throughout the length of the case, Mother’s visitation with the Children 

remained supervised, and at times, her visits were suspended. In October 2014, 

she did not visit the Children because she did not have transportation, but did 

not request DCS for assistance with transportation. Her visitation was 

suspended in November 2014 due to her no shows, but visits resumed in 

 

3

Included in the record on appeal are exhibits from each of the Children’s underlying CHINS proceedings 

and transcripts for each of the Children’s cases as they were filed under separate cause numbers, 34C01-1501-

JT-5 and 34C01-1501-JT-6. The exhibits and transcripts are substantially similar, so for ease of reference, we 

shall only refer to the materials under 34C01-1501-JT-5.
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January 2015 when Mother moved back to Kokomo and transportation was 

arranged by DCS. Because her visitations with the Children were conditioned 

upon her submitting to and providing clean drug screens, Mother’s visits were 

suspended at the time of the termination hearing because she had not submitted 

to a drug screen since March 18, 2015. Since that date, Mother did not contact 

DCS to reinstate her visitations or to inquire as to the Children’s welfare.

[7] Mother’s compliance with services was inconsistent throughout the case. In the 

beginning of the case, Mother made tremendous progress in her home-based 

services and parent education, but in October 2014, “the bottom kind of fell out 

for” Mother. Tr. at 14. The service provider only had one contact with Mother 

in November and December 2014. By January 2015, Mother was back to 

participating in services, but after the March 19, 2015 meeting where Mother 

walked out, she had no more contact with her service provider.

[8] Mother completed a mental health evaluation in August 2014 and was referred 

by DCS to both individual and family therapy. Mother never participated in 

any family therapy. Mother attended individual therapy for a period of time, 

but later stopped participating. She had at least three different therapy 

providers, and DCS made the referrals to accommodate her work schedule. 

Mother completed another mental health assessment on February 25, 2015, and 

based on its recommendations, DCS again referred Mother to individual 

therapy, group therapy, and medication management. At the time of the 

termination hearing, Mother had just begun to go back to therapy about a week 

prior to the hearing.
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[9] Mother’s housing situation was inconsistent throughout the case. After the 

Children were removed, Mother was homeless for several months before 

moving back to Open Arms. After staying at Open Arms, she moved into a 

trailer with her friend. Thereafter, Mother moved in with her father in 

Logansport in October 2014, and while living there, she did not contact DCS or 

respond to DCS’s attempts to contact her. In January 2015, Mother moved 

back to Kokomo and again stayed in the trailer before moving in with another 

friend.

[10] In March 2014, Mother began employment at Tyson, but lost that job in 

October 2014 because she missed too many days. Mother then obtained 

employment at a cleaning service, but returned to Tyson because she was able 

to get her job back there two weeks after losing it. She left Tyson in December 

2014 because she did not have transportation. At the time of the termination 

hearing, Mother was working at a pizza restaurant, where she started in 

February 2015.

[11] During the pendency of this case, Mother had two misdemeanor convictions, 

both of which were initiated after the commencement of the CHINS action. 

She was convicted of driving while suspended in November 2014 and of 

disorderly conduct in February 2015. Mother failed to appear for some of her 

court hearings associated with these charges and was therefore incarcerated for 

approximately a week in early 2015.
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[12] Shortly after the Children were removed from Mother’s care, family case 

managers (“FCM”) met with Mother to discuss behaviors displayed by the 

Children, including engaging in sexual play, wetting their beds, having bad 

dreams, and talking about watching scary movies and pornography. At a 

review hearing held on July 21, 2014, the juvenile court found that when the 

Children were told that visitation with Mother may soon transition to 

unsupervised, the Children began exhibiting anxiety and sexualized behaviors. 

Appellant’s App. at 81. At a hearing held on January 12, 2015, the juvenile court 

found that the Children continued to have significant behavioral, psychological, 

and sexual issues; that K.G. had been to the emergency room several times and 

was finally admitted to the hospital for suicidal ideations and attempting to 

harm himself; and that G.G. continued to urinate in the foster home and had 

begun defecating in the home. After his hospitalization, K.G. returned to the 

foster home, but was moved to a residential treatment center after threatening 

the foster mother. G.G. was also moved out of the original foster home and to 

a different foster home. 

[13] On January 5, 2015, DCS filed its petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights 

to the Children. An evidentiary hearing was held on April 20, 2015. At this 

hearing, the FCM testified that she believed that termination was in the 

Children’s best interests because the Children needed a “stable, consistent 

environment to grow up in with parents who can provide for them.” Tr. at 60-

61. DCS’s plan for the Children was adoption. The court appointed special 

advocate (“CASA”) testified that she also believed that termination was in the 
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Children’s best interests because the Children needed permanency in their life 

and a stable home. Id. at 79. In her report, the CASA stated that Mother had 

not shown that she was willing to put the Children ahead of her own wants and 

desires, had chosen a life with drugs over a life with the Children, and had had 

over two years to work with service providers, but her progress had been slow 

and had even regressed. On June 8, 2015, the juvenile court issued its order 

terminating Mother’s parental rights. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[14] We begin our review by acknowledging that this court has long had a highly 

deferential standard of review in cases concerning the termination of parental 

rights. In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. When 

reviewing a termination of parental rights case, we will not reweigh the 

evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 

265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence 

and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. 

Moreover, in deference to the trial court’s unique position to assess the 

evidence, we will set aside the court’s judgment terminating a parent-child 

relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d at 14. 

[15] Here, in terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children, the juvenile court 

entered specific findings and conclusions. When a trial court’s judgment 

contains specific findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we apply a two-tiered 

standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 
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143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the 

findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. 

Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to 

support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 

102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the trial court’s 

decision, we must affirm. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 

1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. 

[16] The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is 

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In 

re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 923 (Ind. 2011). These parental interests, however, are 

not absolute and must be subordinated to the child’s interests when determining 

the proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights. In re J.C., 994 

N.E.2d 278, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). In addition, although the right to raise 

one’s own child should not be terminated solely because there is a better home 

available for the child, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is 

unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. Id. 

[17] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, the State is 

required to allege and prove, among other things:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement 

outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
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(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the 

child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services; 

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). The State’s burden of proof for establishing these 

allegations in termination cases “is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” In 

re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2). 

Moreover, if the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in section 

4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. 

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a) (emphasis added). 

[18] In her argument, Mother does not challenge any of the juvenile court’s findings 

of fact or legal conclusions. In fact, she effectively concedes that the findings of 

fact are not clearly erroneous when she contends that the termination “may be 

‘factually correct,’” but it rests on a weak and inherently contradictory 

foundation. Appellant’s Br. at 3. As Mother does not challenge any of the 

juvenile court’s findings of fact, these unchallenged facts stand as proven. See In 

re B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (failure to challenge findings 

by the trial court resulted in waiver of the argument that the findings were 
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clearly erroneous), trans. denied; McMaster v. McMaster, 681 N.E.2d 744, 747 

(Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (when father failed to challenge specific findings, court 

accepted them as true). Likewise, Mother does not specifically challenge any of 

the juvenile court’s legal conclusions regarding any of the statutory 

requirements under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2). The failure to 

challenge the juvenile court’s legal conclusions results in the waiver of any 

argument as to the sufficiency of such findings. A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1156 n.4. 

Further, Mother does not support any of her contentions with citations to legal 

authority or cogent argument as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 

46(A)(8)(a), and her arguments are, therefore, waived. See Davis v. State, 835 

N.E.2d 1102, 1113 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (concluding that failure to present 

cogent argument or citation to authority constitutes waiver of issue for appellate 

review), trans. denied.

[19] However, given our preference for resolving a case on its merits, we will

address what appear to be Mother’s arguments. In her argument section, 

Mother makes the statement that, “the overriding issue was always the 

marijuana.” Appellant’s Br. at 7. In making a decision to terminate parental 

rights, the juvenile court may consider the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct, 

as well as evidence of a parent’s prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, 

history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and 

employment. In re D.K., 968 N.E.2d 792, 798 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. 

denied. Additionally, the court may consider any services offered by DCS to the 

parent and the parent’s response to those services. Id. Parental rights may be 
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terminated when parties are unwilling or unable to meet their parental 

responsibilities. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265. 

[20] In the present case, although Mother states that her marijuana use was the 

overriding issue in terminating her parental rights, the juvenile court’s 

determination went beyond her use of marijuana as evidenced by the extensive 

findings and conclusions made by the court. Appellant’s App. at 73-93. Further, 

Mother’s marijuana use was a substantial issue in the case due to her multiple 

failed drug screens and her failure to submit to drug screens. During the 

pendency of the case, Mother also failed to participate in drug treatment or 

relapse prevention programs. Because her visitations with the Children were

conditioned upon her submitting to and providing clean drug screens, her visits 

were suspended at the time of the termination hearing because she had not 

submitted to a drug screen since March 18, 2015. Additionally, at a child and 

family team meeting on March 19, 2015, just one month before the termination 

hearing, Mother stated that she was using marijuana and was not going to stop 

doing drugs. Tr. at 35, 101-02. The evidence, therefore, shows that Mother’s 

continued use of marijuana and failure to submit to drug screens and participate 

in treatment programs was in fact a significant issue in the termination case, 

and the evidence of such supported the juvenile court’s conclusions that the 

conditions that resulted in the Children’s removal or the reasons for placement 

outside the home of the parents will not be remedied, that the continuation of 

the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the Children, 

and that termination is in the best interests of the Children.
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[21] Mother further contends that “nationally,” the trend is moving towards 

legalizing marijuana, and “within a few years, . . . a termination like this one 

will not even occur” in Indiana. Appellant’s Br. at 8. Marijuana use, however, 

still remains illegal in Indiana and was so at the time of the termination hearing. 

More notably, the focus is not on whether Mother’s actions were legal or 

illegal, but instead, on whether Mother is unable or unwilling to take care of the 

Children as a result of her actions. If Mother’s drug of choice was alcohol, 

which is legal, but still led to her inability to care for the Children and 

unwillingness to make the changes necessary to have the Children placed back 

in her care, such use of a legal drug could have led to a CHINS adjudication 

and termination of her parental rights. Therefore, Mother’s focus on the 

possible future legalization of marijuana is not the proper inquiry as to her 

continued marijuana use; rather, the proper question is whether her continued 

use of marijuana causes her to be unable to care for the Children and whether 

she is unwilling to change to have the Children returned to her care.

[22] Mother’s remaining arguments are simply requests to reweigh the evidence, 

which we cannot do on appeal. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265. Although 

Mother asserts that the foundation for this case was shaky, we disagree. The 

evidence showed that the Children were removed from Mother’s care, not 

because her apartment had been condemned and they had moved into Open 

Arms, but because she and the Children had been asked to leave Open Arms 

due to Mother’s behavior and failure to follow the rules. After the Children 

were found to be CHINS, Mother was ordered, among other things, to: (1) 
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attend visitations with the Children; (2) not use any drugs or alcohol and submit 

to random drug screens; (3) complete a substance abuse treatment program, 

including relapse prevention; (4) complete a parenting program; (5) 

demonstrate effective parenting skills; (6) obtain and maintain stable housing;

and (7) participate in therapy, following all recommendations. However, 

during the twenty-six months that this case was pending, Mother had multiple 

positive drug screens for marijuana and methamphetamine, among other drugs, 

and she also failed to submit to multiple drug screens, which were viewed as 

being positive screens. Mother failed to ever complete intensive substance 

abuse treatment or relapse services. Mother’s visitations with the Children 

remained supervised throughout the case, and because her visitations with the 

Children were conditioned upon her submitting to and providing clean drug 

screens, visitation was suspended at a point in time because she had stopped

submitting to drug screens. Mother’s compliance with services was inconsistent 

throughout the case, and her participation in therapy was likewise inconsistent 

as she never participated in any family therapy and attended individual therapy 

for a period of time, but then stopped participating. During the pendency of the 

case, Mother was homeless for a few months and lived in several different 

locations, including Open Arms, a trailer with a friend, with her father, and 

with another friend. At the termination hearing, the FCM and the CASA both

testified that termination was in the best interests of the Children because the 

Children needed permanency in their life and a stable home. Based on this 

evidence, we conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to prove the 

statutory requirements under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2). 
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[23] We will reverse a termination of parental rights “only upon a showing of ‘clear 

error’--that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake 

has been made.” In re A.N.J., 690 N.E.2d 716, 722 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) 

(quoting In re Egly, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 1992)). Based on the record 

before us, we cannot say that the juvenile court’s termination of Mother’s

parental rights to the Children was clearly erroneous. We, therefore, affirm the 

juvenile court’s judgment. 

[24] Affirmed.

[25] Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.