Filed 11/23/21 In re E.D. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re E.D., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

MERCED COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES 

AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

M.D.,

Defendant and Appellant.

F083112

(Merced Super. Ct.

No. 20JP-00041-A)

OPINION

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Merced County. Brian McCabe, 

Judge.

Suzanne M. Nicholson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Forrest W. Hansen, County Counsel, and Jennifer Trimble, Deputy County Counsel, 

for Plaintiff and Respondent.

-ooOoo-
2.

Appellant M.D. (Mother) is the mother of the child E.D., who is the subject of a 

dependency case. Mother challenges the juvenile court’s orders issued at a contested 

selection and implementation hearing that resulted in mother’s parental rights being 

terminated. Mother contends the juvenile court committed reversible error by applying the 

incorrect standard of proof when it found that mother failed to meet her burden to establish 

the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption. She also asserts that the 

juvenile court erred by considering the relative caregiver’s willingness to allow ongoing 

contact between Mother and E.D. in relation to the exception. Finding no prejudicial error in 

the juvenile court’s orders, we affirm.

FACTS

Initial Removal

On April 17, 2020, the Merced County Human Services Agency (Agency) received a 

suspected child abuse report after Mother gave birth to E.D. at a local hospital. A report was 

made due to Mother’s extensive case history with the Agency, which involved multiple 

removals of her adopted daughter, A.D. (sister). Law enforcement took E.D. into protective 

custody based upon the Agency’s concerns that E.D. was at substantial risk of general 

neglect and physical harm.

The Agency filed an original petition alleging E.D. was a child described by Welfare 

and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1), (g), and (j).1 The petition alleged that 

E.D. was at risk due to Mother’s history of physical abuse and neglect of the sister, who was 

involved in an ongoing dependency case.

The report prepared for the April 22, 2020, detention hearing detailed Mother’s eight 

prior child welfare referrals and the sister’s three separate removals from Mother’s care. The 

sister was removed in June of 2016 due to Mother’s absence, February of 2018 due to 

physical abuse by Mother, and February of 2020 due to concerns of physical abuse by 

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless 

otherwise stated.
3.

Mother. Mother contested the recommendation to detain E.D., and she testified that she did 

not cause the injuries that resulted in the removal of the sister on two separate occasions. At 

the detention hearing held April 24, 2020, the juvenile court ordered that E.D. was to remain 

out of Mother’s care, and it set a jurisdiction and disposition hearing for May 21, 2020.

Jurisdiction and Disposition

The Agency filed a Jurisdiction Report after the matter was continued due to the 

COVID-19 pandemic. E.D. had been placed with a relative, and Mother had not yet been 

interviewed for purposes of the report. The report also provided further details surrounding 

Mother’s prior dependency cases involving general neglect and physical abuse of the sister.

As to jurisdiction, the Agency recommended that the juvenile court find the allegations in the 

petition true based upon the risk presented to E.D. from mother’s history of physical abuse 

and neglect.

On August 11, 2020, the Agency filed a Disposition Report, which recommended that 

mother be denied reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(3) and (7). 

These bypass provisions were based upon Mother’s re-abuse of E.D.’s sibling and denial of 

reunification services for the sister on July 21, 2020.

Mother was participating in weekly in-person visits since June 18, 2020, and she was 

observed to be attentive, engaging, and nurturing towards E.D. An Addendum Report was 

filed by the Agency on September 8, 2020, containing additional statements by Mother 

blaming the sister for E.D.’s removal.

The matter was eventually continued and set for a contested hearing to take place on 

October 15, 2020. At the contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the social worker 

testified that mother’s supervised visits for one hour per week with E.D. were appropriate. 

The social worker observed mother lying on the floor, walking around the room, and reading 

books with E.D. during visits. Mother continued to deny physically abusing the sister, and 

she claimed any injuries on the sister were due to bicycle accidents.
4.

The juvenile court found that E.D. fell within the provisions of section 300, 

subdivisions (b) and (j), denied reunification services to Mother pursuant to section 361.5, 

subdivision (b)(3) and (7), and set a section 366.26 hearing for January 28, 2021. 

Specifically, the juvenile court reasoned that it could not find that reunification services were 

in E.D.’s best interests by clear and convincing evidence as Mother was required to prove. 

The juvenile court also noted that it would be struggling to even find the lower standard of 

preponderance of the evidence given the evidence before it.

Section 366.26 Hearing

The section 366.26 report, filed by the Agency on January 15, 2021, recommended 

that the juvenile court terminate Mother’s parental rights and order a permanent plan of 

adoption for E.D. The report describes E.D. as having a strong bond with his relative 

caregivers, who had provided for his needs since being placed directly in their home from the 

hospital. E.D. looked to his relative caregivers as his parents, and the relative caregivers 

were committed to a permanent plan of adoption. Mother regularly attended her supervised 

visitations, which were weekly until the frequency was reduced to monthly at the disposition 

hearing. No formal visitation agreement had been reached, but the relative caregivers were 

“open” to facilitating ongoing contact between E.D. and Mother.

After several continuances, the contested section 366.26 hearing was held on June 22, 

2021.2 The juvenile court began with a hearing on mother’s section 388 petition, which 

requested the juvenile court to order reunification services for E.D. Mother offered 

certificates from courses that she completed for parenting and anger management, and she 

testified that the classes had changed her parenting style. She stated that E.D. was special 

because he was her firstborn, and she claimed to be able to provide stability and security for 

him.

2 The juvenile court denied Mother’s request to continue the section 366.26 

hearing until an appellate decision regarding the sister’s dependency case was issued.
5.

During its ruling on mother’s section 388 petition, the juvenile court explained the 

various burdens of proof that apply depending on the type of request set forth in a section 

388 petition. It ultimately found that mother failed to prove, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, that her requested change was in E.D.’s best interests, and it denied Mother’s 

section 388 petition.

The juvenile court then commenced the contested section 366.26 hearing, which 

began with testimony from Mother. Mother testified that she never missed a visit with E.D. 

and recently celebrated E.D.’s first birthday during a visit. At her supervised visitations, 

Mother played music, sang, and read books to E.D. Mother also reported that E.D. would 

get excited to see her and called her “mama” at the beginning of visits. There were also 

electronic visits over Zoom where Mother interacted with E.D. and the relative caregiver 

about three times per week for 15 to 20 minutes at a time.

Mother testified that she was a “very important person” in E.D.’s life, and she 

believed E.D. would be harmed by the severance of their relationship because he recognizes, 

trusts, and loves her. E.D. fell asleep in her arms during a couple of visits, and Mother 

hugged, kissed, and held him. She observed many of his milestones and encouraged new 

skills at visits, but she acknowledged that the relative caregiver had to share many of them 

with her by video.

Mother also claimed that E.D. tried to get away from the visitation supervisor at the 

end of visits, but the social worker later denied reviewing any notes of such behavior. On 

cross-examination by minor’s counsel, she described her visits with E.D. during the 10 days 

that he was in the hospital after his birth. While at the hospital, Mother had E.D. in her care 

for 24 hours prior to his removal.
6.

The social worker testified that she had observed a visit between Mother and E.D., 

and she had reviewed notes regarding other visits between Mother and E.D. The social 

worker would not call Mother and E.D.’s relationship “special” because she believed E.D. 

was an even-tempered child who easily went to her during her first contact with him. The 

social worker also believed E.D. referred to his relative caregiver as “ ‘Mommy’ ” and 

Mother as “ ‘Mama.’ ”

Mother’s counsel acknowledged that E.D. was adoptable and argued that the 

beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption applied. During her argument she

addressed the juvenile court’s need to consider the harm from a permanent severance of the 

parent-child relationship in relation to the exception. She then emphasized, 

“[T]he Court must assume that upon its ruling that relationship will effectively be 

terminated for all purposes. [¶] The Court must assume that there will be no 

continued visitation, there will not be the continued checking in. While that may 

ultimately end up being the reality, it is not the consideration of this Court.”

Counsel for the Agency asserted that Mother had failed to prove that termination of 

parental rights would be detrimental to E.D., and minor’s counsel joined her comments.

At the beginning of its ruling, the juvenile court noted the Agency’s burden to prove 

that the child is likely to be adopted by clear and convincing evidence. It then proceeded to 

explain that “[o]nce adoptability has been established, the burden shifts to the party claiming 

that termination would be detrimental to the child to prove one of the exceptions enumerated 

under Section 366.26, subsection (c)(1)(a) through (e) by a preponderance of the evidence.” 

The juvenile court cited the case of In re Rachel M. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1295 as 

one of the cases supporting its articulated legal standard. A thorough overview of the 

appropriate legal analysis for the beneficial parent-child relationship exception was provided 

before the juvenile court began weighing the evidence.

The juvenile court noted that E.D. was 14 months old and called both Mother and his 

relative caregiver a parental name such as “mommy.” The evidence to support the existence 
7.

of a bond between Mother and E.D. was described as being limited to observations of the 

Mother, which were countered by some of the social worker’s testimony.

The juvenile court then paused its discussion of the evidence to explain its role in 

applying the facts to the law regardless of its personal feelings. It acknowledged that these 

types of decisions are never easy, even in its 10th year handling dependency proceedings. 

The juvenile court then described its earlier decisions regarding the denial of Mother’s 

motion to continue and section 388 petition.

Prior to returning to the remainder of its beneficial parent-child exception analysis, 

the juvenile court noted that there are adoptions that allow continued contact with the 

biological parents. It discussed the possibility that Mother may continue to have contact 

with E.D. after the adoption because there was no indication that there was a relative 

caregiver looking for the first opportunity to end the parent-child relationship. The juvenile 

court then stated,

“Mother’s counsel points out that the court’s presumption should be and must be that 

that relationship will sever if the court adopts the recommendations, which is to 

terminate parental rights of the mother and order a permanent plan of adoption for the 

child. [¶] Even if I operate under that presumption, I’m not correct that that 

presumption is number one, accurate; and, two is legally irreversible.”

The juvenile court returned to its analysis regarding the exception by noting the 

limited information provided to it that focused on whether a beneficial parent-child 

relationship existed. The juvenile court continued with the following:

“The Court does not find that there is sufficient evidence, based on the burden before 

the Court, upon the shifting of the Court, which is clear and convincing that 

substantial, positive, emotional attachment would occur. That child has a substantial, 

positive, emotional attachment to the mother. And that because of the parental rights 

being terminated, that that would be greatly harmful to the child. There’s just not 

enough information here that suggests that burden has been met and that exception 

applies.”

Mother was complimented on her efforts to have continuous contact with E.D., which 

made the juvenile court pause to think about the case carefully. The juvenile court believed 
8.

the case was not a “ ‘slam dunk’ ” for the Agency, but it ultimately found that Mother failed 

to meet her burden on the exception. Her failure to meet the burden was based upon the 

“countervailing testimony and evidence that the child may view [Mother] as a playmate at 

playdates, because the child is simply too young to understand and comprehend motherfather biology versus contact with people. Sounds like [E.D.] just loves being around 

people.”

The juvenile court proceeded to terminate Mother’s parental rights and order a 

permanent plan of adoption for E.D. Mother filed a timely Notice of Appeal on July 27, 

2021.

DISCUSSION

I. Application of Legal Standard for Exception to Adoption

Mother contends the juvenile court applied the wrong standard of proof to her claim 

that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception applied. She argues any such error 

was prejudicial because the juvenile court stated that mother made the court “pause” and this 

was not a “slam dunk” case for the Agency. Even if Mother is correct that an incorrect 

standard was applied, we conclude that any such error was harmless.

A. Legal Principles

At a section 366.26 hearing, when the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing 

evidence the child is adoptable, it is generally required to terminate parental rights and order 

the child be placed for adoption unless a statutory exception applies. (§ 366.26, 

subd. (c)(1).) One of the statutory exceptions is the beneficial parent-child relationship 

exception, which applies when “[t]he court finds a compelling reason for determining that 

termination would be detrimental to the child” where “[t]he parents have maintained regular 

visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the 

relationship.” (Id., subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)

A parent claiming an exception to adoption has the burden of proof to establish by a 

preponderance of evidence that the exception applies. (In re Melvin A. (2000) 82 
9.

Cal.App.4th 1243, 1252.) “To overcome the preference for adoption and avoid termination 

of the natural parent’s rights, the parent must show that severing the natural parent-child 

relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that 

the child would be greatly harmed. [Citations.]” (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 

466.)

A beneficial relationship is one that “promotes the well-being of the child to such a 

degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, 

adoptive parents.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) While a child may 

derive enjoyment from “pleasant and cordial ... visits” with a parent, that is not the type of 

benefit contemplated by the statute. (In re Brian R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 904, 924.)

B. Standard of Review

A court abuses its discretion when it applies incorrect legal standards. (In re Shannon 

M. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 282, 289.) “Action that transgresses the confines of the 

applicable principles of law is outside the scope of discretion and we call such action an 

‘abuse’ of discretion. [Citation.]” (City of Sacramento v. Drew (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 

1287, 1297.) We review de novo Mother’s claim that the juvenile court applied the incorrect 

standard of proof, as it presents a question of law. (See In re Quentin H. (2014) 230 

Cal.App.4th 608, 613–614.)

California’s Constitution provides, “No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial 

granted, in any cause, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admission 

or rejection of evidence, or for any error as to any matter of pleading, or for any error as to 

any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the 

evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a 

miscarriage of justice.” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; see Code Civ. Proc., § 475.) Under the 

standard in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, reversal is required if “it is 

reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been
10.

reached in the absence of the error.” (See generally In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 60 

[Watson standard for prejudicial error applies in juvenile dependency matters].)

Numerous cases have analyzed an incorrect application of the clear and convincing 

evidence standard in place of the preponderance of the evidence standard under the Watson

standard, and appellate courts have required a showing it was reasonably probable the 

appellant would have achieved a more favorable result under the proper standard of proof.

(Conservatorship of Maria B. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 514, 535; see also In re Bernadette C.

(1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 618, 625 [“Under the factual setting of this case, we cannot conclude 

that the error applying the wrong standard of proof was harmless”]; see also In re L.S. (2014) 

230 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1194 [juvenile court’s application of clear and convincing evidence 

standard to parents’ section 388 petitions instead of preponderance of evidence was not 

harmless because the court of appeal reasoned, “[t]his is not a case where there was no 

evidence of a change or of the best interests of the minors and the court did not simply 

misspeak when stating the burden of proof”].)

C. Analysis

The juvenile court began its ruling with a clear and accurate statement of the 

appropriate standard of proof on both the issue of adoptability (clear and convincing 

evidence) and beneficial parent-child relationship exception (preponderance of the evidence). 

It also appropriately applied a preponderance of the evidence standard to Mother’s section

388 petition requesting an order of reunification services, which has been a source of 

confusion for some juvenile courts. (See In re L.S., supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 1194

[juvenile court’s failure to apply preponderance of the evidence standard relied on “a flawed, 

if seductive, analysis in applying a higher burden of proof than the statute requires”].)

However, after a brief digression from its analysis of the exception, the juvenile court 

stated it was unable to find based on “clear and convincing [evidence]that substantial, 

positive, emotional attachment would occur. That the child has a substantial, positive,

emotional attachment to the mother.” It is unclear whether the juvenile court actually 
11.

applied a clear and convincing standard through its entire analysis or merely misspoke after 

conducting two consecutive hearings involving varying standards of proof and issues.

To the extent that a “clear and convincing” burden may have been placed upon 

mother, it should be noted that it was only referenced in relation to the existence of a 

“substantial emotional attachment” between E.D. and Mother. The fact that the juvenile 

court articulated the appropriate standard of proof at the outset of its ruling would suggest 

that the exception was likely considered under the proper standard. However, it cannot be 

said with certainty that the juvenile court’s analysis was without error given this 

inconsistency. Even accepting that the juvenile court’s application of the standard of proof 

was in error, we find that any such error was ultimately harmless.

Based on our review of this record, we are not convinced that the court would have 

ruled differently absent the error because Mother failed to establish the exception under 

either standard of proof. For Mother to prevail, she needed to show that her relationship with 

E.D. promoted his well-being to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being he could gain 

by being placed in an adoptive home. 

The juvenile court specifically characterized the evidence in support of the exception 

as being limited to observations by Mother. And even that evidence was countered by 

testimony from the social worker. The court was not required to accept Mother’s 

characterization of the strength of their bond or her positive portrayal of her interactions with 

E.D. during visits. The juvenile court even concluded its analysis by noting the “limited 

information” that was provided in relation to the exception. The evidence in the record 

would not have supported a finding that Mother’s relationship with E.D. promoted his wellbeing to such a degree that it outweighed the benefits he would gain in a permanent, adoptive 

home. (See In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 827 [“The parent must do more than 

demonstrate ‘frequent and loving contact[,]’ [citation] an emotional bond with the child, or 

that parent and child find their visits pleasant. [Citation.]”)
12.

Mother points out that the juvenile court did not believe the case was a “slam dunk” to 

argue that the appropriate standard was not applied. However, in context, the court, had 

previously discussed the difficulty of making decisions to sever the parent-child relationship 

over the years and concluded mother failed to prove the exception. The juvenile court went 

on to state that it, “wrestles with this, as a number of times in these instances.” It then noted 

this difficulty of deciding such cases in light of the sincere efforts Mother made to visit the 

child throughout the case. Such attempts by the juvenile court to lighten the moment and 

dignify Mother’s efforts, while making a decision of the utmost gravity, does not necessarily 

signify that it was making a complex legal determination.

The fact that Mother’s persistent efforts in visitation made the court think carefully 

merely suggests that there are some “slam dunk” cases it decides that require little 

deliberation. Such cases likely involve parents who failed to show the first prong of the 

exception through regular visitation, which would end any serious consideration to apply the 

exception. Although Mother’s presented case may not have been a “slam dunk” for the 

Agency, it was still not a close call. At the time of the contested section 366.26 hearing, 

E.D. had spent all but one day of his 14 months with his day-to-day needs being met by his 

relative caregivers who were committed to a plan of adoption.

Unlike the record before the appellate court in In re L.S., we can conclude that there 

was no evidence to support the finding of the parent-child relationship exception and it is 

possible the juvenile court misspoke when articulating the heightened standard. (In re L.S.,

supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 1194.) Given the juvenile court’s view of the limited evidence 

offered by Mother, it cannot be said that it is reasonably probable that a result more 

favorable to her would have been reached had it clearly applied the correct standard of proof, 

even under a federal constitutional standard. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 

[error “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”].)
13.

II. Consideration of Postadoption Contact

Mother also claims the juvenile court improperly considered the relative caregiver’s 

openness to allow ongoing contact between Mother and E.D. in determining that the 

exception did not apply. Mother argues the cases of In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289

(S.B.) and In re C.B. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102 (C.B.) support a proposition that the 

juvenile court’s discussion and possible consideration of the relative caregiver’s willingness 

to facilitate ongoing contact between Mother and E.D. was in error.

A. Legal Principles

The Legislature has acknowledged postadoption contact agreements and declared that 

“some adoptive children may benefit from either direct or indirect contact with birth 

relatives, including the birth parent or parents ..., after being adopted.” (Fam. Code, 

§ 8616.5, subd. (a).) However, the subsequent refusal of an adoptive parent to comply with 

the agreement does not affect the adoption even where such an agreement has been reached. 

(See id., subd. (e)(1).)

In the case of S.B., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th 296, the juvenile court had found the 

parent and child had “an emotionally significant relationship.” A bonding study had also 

been conducted where the clinician opined there was potential harm to S.B. if the parentchild relationship was severed. (Id. at p. 296.) The Agency’s recommendation to terminate 

parental rights was based in part on a relative caregiver’s intent to continue visits between 

the child and parent. (Id. at p. 295.) 

The juvenile court recognized that the child would benefit from continuing her 

relationship with the parent, but the juvenile court terminated parental rights in part because 

the child’s grandparents would allow her relationship with her biological parent to continue.

(S.B., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 300.) The appellate court determined from the record 

before it that the “only reasonable inference” was the child would be greatly harmed by the 

loss of the relationship with her parent. (Id. at pp. 300–301.) This reasoning was based on 

the record showing that the child “loved her father, wanted their relationship to continue and 
14.

derived some measure of benefit from his visits.” (Ibid.) Therefore, it concluded that the 

juvenile court erred when it found the beneficial parent-child relationship exception did not 

apply. (Id. at p. 301.)

The case of C.B., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th 126, involved 9-, 10-, and 17-year-old

children “ ‘of an age where they are intellectually and emotionally aware of whom their 

parents are.’ ” The juvenile court had implicitly found the existence of a “substantial, 

positive emotional parent-child attachment despite the lack of day-to-day contact.” (Id. at 

p. 126.) However, it stated “ ‘[t]here is no evidence that that [loving] connection [between 

mother and the children] would be severed if the Court were to terminate parental rights. 

The Court cannot see that terminating parental rights would “greatly harm” the children ....” 

(Id. at p. 127.) Based in part on this belief, the juvenile court ultimately proceeded to 

terminate parental rights. (Ibid.)

The Court of Appeal found that the juvenile court erred by injecting an improper 

factor into the weighing process and concluded as follows, 

“[I]f a juvenile court determines that a parent has ‘maintained regular visitation and 

contact’ (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)), that there is a ‘substantial, positive emotional 

attachment’ between child and parent benefitting the child [citation], and that the 

benefit from continuing that parent-child relationship in a tenuous placement 

‘promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh’ the benefit that 

child would gain from the stability and permanency of adoption [citation], then the 

parent-child relationship exception is established. In those circumstances, the court 

cannot nevertheless terminate parental rights based upon an unenforceable 

expectation that the prospective adoptive parents will voluntarily permit future contact 

between the child and a biological parent, even if substantial evidence supports that 

expectation.” (C.B., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th p. 128.)

B. Standard of Review

Appellate courts review a juvenile court’s ruling on the application of the beneficial 

parent-child relationship exception using a “hybrid” standard. (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 

Cal.5th 614, 641.) The substantial evidence standard applies to the first two elements of 

regular visitation and existence of a beneficial relationship. (Id. at pp. 639–640.) The 
15.

juvenile court’s decision as to the third element – whether termination of parental rights 

would be detrimental to the child – is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 640.) 

When applying the abuse of discretion standard, “[t]he trial court’s findings of fact are 

reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its 

application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” (Haraguchi 

v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711–712, fns. omitted.)

C. Analysis

First, it cannot be said that the “only reasonable inference” was that E.D. would be 

greatly harmed by the loss of the relationship with Mother as was the case in S.B. The 

juvenile court here specifically found that mother did not prove the existence of a substantial, 

positive emotional attachment with E.D. and there was no bonding study presented regarding 

the strength and nature of the Mother’s bond with E.D. Furthermore, the Agency’s 

recommendation was not based on any promise by the relative caregiver to continue 

visitation. As the juvenile court correctly stated, Mother had provided limited information to 

support her claim on the exception. Therefore, there are no meaningful similarities to S.B.

and the present case that would establish an abuse of discretion.

Second, unlike the case of C.B., we do not believe that the juvenile court ordered 

termination of parental rights on the expectation that there would be ongoing contact 

between the Mother and E.D. The juvenile court never made an express statement that there 

would be no severance of the parent-child relationship based on an agreement for 

postadoption contact. In fact, the social worker’s report explicitly mentioned the lack of any 

formal visitation agreement, and it merely highlighted the relative caregivers being “open” to 

facilitating visitation between Mother and E.D.

Nothing about the juvenile court’s ruling indicated it had found sufficient evidence to 

support the existence of a beneficial relationship and then declined to apply the exception 

based on an unenforceable promise of future visitation. The juvenile court’s comment 

regarding possible future contact was made on the heels of other statements highlighting the 
16.

difficulty of making decisions to terminate parental rights. From the context of the juvenile 

court’s statements, it appeared to be expressing a positive note that Mother might still be 

allowed to maintain contact in order to soften the blow of its forthcoming orders. We also 

find the juvenile court’s response to Mother’s counsel’s statement that it must assume the 

relationship will be severed to be vague and inconsequential rather than suggesting that it 

believed potential postadoption contact necessitated a denial of the exception.

The totality of the juvenile court’s statements at the hearing makes clear that it 

decided to terminate Mother’s parental rights because she failed to meet her burden of 

proving the existence of a beneficial parent-child relationship. We do not believe that the

juvenile court injected an improper factor into its determination on the exception or gave 

information on possible postadoption contact any weight in deciding a permanent plan for 

E.D. Therefore, we find no such error on this record.

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.

POOCHIGIAN, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DETJEN, J.

SMITH, J.