IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

September 2021 Term

_______________

No. 21-0233

_______________

SRC HOLDINGS, LLC, 

FORMERLY KNOWN AS WILLIAMS HOLDINGS, LLC,

DOING BUSINESS AS WILLIAMS TRANSPORT,

Petitioner

V.

THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF WEST VIRGINIA;

DONALD R. ABNER,

DOING BUSINESS AS AMBASSADOR LIMOUSINE AND TAXI SERVICE; 

AND CLASSIC LIMOUSINE SERVICE, INC.,

Respondents

_____________________________________________

Appeal from Public Service Commission of West Virginia

Case No. 20-0020-MC-TC

AFFIRMED

_____________________________________________

Submitted: September 15, 2021

Filed: November 2, 2021

Michael W. Carey Jessica M. Lane

David R. Pogue General Counsel

Carey, Douglas, Kessler & Ruby, PLLC Public Service Commission

Charleston, West Virginia of West Virginia

Attorneys for the Petitioner, Charleston, West Virginia

Williams Transport Attorney for the Respondent,

Public Service Commission

of West Virginia

Jared C. Underwood

FILED

November 2, 2021

released at 3:00 p.m.

EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA
Pullin, Fowler, Flanagan, Brown &

Poe, PLLC

Beckley, West Virginia

Attorney for the Respondents,

Donald R. Abner, doing business as 

Ambassador Limousine and Taxi

Service, and Classic Limousine

Service, Inc.

CHIEF JUSTICE JENKINS delivered the Opinion of the Court.

JUSTICE ARMSTEAD, deeming himself disqualified, did not participate in the 

decision of this case.

JUDGE DENT, sitting by temporary assignment.
i

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1. When considering whether a common carrier by motor vehicle certificate 

transfer application should be approved, it is not necessary to show that the requested 

transfer will serve the public convenience and necessity. 

2. A common carrier by motor vehicle certificate transfer application should 

be approved where the proposed transferee demonstrates that it is able to supply the public 

service the certificate authorizes because the proposed transferee has the experience, 

equipment, finances, and insurance to carry on the transferor’s business under the 

certificate sought to be transferred. 

3. A dormant common carrier by motor vehicle certificate may not be 

transferred.
1

Jenkins, Chief Justice:

The petitioner herein, SRC Holdings, LLC, formerly known as Williams 

Holdings, LLC, doing business as Williams Transport (“Williams” or “Williams 

Transport”), appeals from an order entered February 17, 2021,1 by the Public Service 

Commission of West Virginia (“PSC”). By that order, the PSC approved the application

of one of the respondents herein, Ambassador Limousine and Taxi Service 

(“Ambassador”), to transfer the common motor carrier certificate held by the other 

respondent herein, Classic Limousine Service, Inc. (“Classic”), to Ambassador. On appeal 

to this Court, Williams argues that the PSC erred by approving the certificate transfer. The 

respondents herein, the PSC, Ambassador, and Classic, urge this Court to uphold the 

certificate transfer. Upon a review of the parties’ arguments and briefs, the record 

designated for appellate consideration, and the pertinent authorities, we conclude that the 

PSC did not err by permitting Classic to transfer its common motor carrier certificate to 

Ambassador. Accordingly, we affirm the PSC’s February 17, 2021 order.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This appeal arises from Ambassador’s application to transfer Classic’s 

common motor carrier certificate to Ambassador. Prior to the proposed certificate transfer, 

1

On April 6, 2021, the Public Service Commission of West Virginia (“PSC”) 

entered a corrective order to fix a clerical error in its February 17, 2021 order, from which 

the instant appeal has been taken. Because the April 6, 2021 order addresses only the 

correction of the clerical error and does not consider the merits of the case, we will refer to 

the February 17, 2021 order as the order at issue in this appeal.
2

Ambassador possessed three motor carrier certificates, which authorized it to operate in 

four West Virginia counties: Fayette, Greenbrier, Raleigh, and Summers. Classic, who 

holds the common motor carrier certificate sought to be transferred, is a smaller operation 

whose primary focus is to provide transportation for customers of its two restaurants in 

Raleigh County. Nevertheless, Classic also transports customers within the other eight 

counties authorized by the subject motor carrier certificate; in total, Classic’s certificate 

authorizes it to operate as a motor carrier in nine West Virginia counties: Boone, Fayette, 

McDowell, Mercer, Monroe, Nicholas, Raleigh, Summers, and Wyoming.

Williams also has motor carrier certificates authorizing it to transport 

passengers in several West Virginia counties—Boone, Fayette, Lincoln, Logan, Raleigh, 

Summers, and Wayne—although it operates primarily in Boone and Logan Counties. 

Objecting to the transfer of Classic’s common motor carrier certificate to Ambassador, 

Williams claimed that, because Classic provides minimal transportation services in all 

counties in its territory except for Raleigh County, Classic’s certificate has become 

geographically dormant as to the remaining counties for which it is certificated. Williams 

also argued that Classic’s certificate has become operationally dormant as to those 

customers who Classic does not regularly transport, such as railroad employees. Finally,

Williams complained that allowing Ambassador to provide transportation services in these 

areas, both geographically and operationally, will amount to devastating competition to 

Williams. By order entered February 17, 2021, the PSC approved Ambassador’s 
3

application and allowed Classic to transfer its common motor carrier certificate to 

Ambassador. This appeal by Williams followed.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The instant proceeding is before the Court on appeal from a decision of the 

PSC. Our review of PSC rulings is guided by the following standard:

“‘The principle is well established by the decisions of 

this Court that an order of the public service commission based 

upon its finding of facts will not be disturbed unless such 

finding is contrary to the evidence, or is without evidence to 

support it, or is arbitrary, or results from a misapplication of 

legal principles.’ United Fuel Gas Company v. Public Service 

Commission, 143 W. Va. 33[, 99 S.E.2d 1 (1957)].” Syl. Pt. 5, 

Boggs v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 154 W. Va. 146, 174 S.E.2d 331 

(1970).

Syl. pt. 1, Sierra Club v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 241 W. Va. 600, 827 S.E.2d 224 

(2019). See also Syl. pt. 2, Monongahela Power Co. v. The Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 

166 W. Va. 423, 276 S.E.2d 179 (1981) (“In reviewing a Public Service Commission order, 

we will first determine whether the Commission’s order, viewed in light of the relevant 

facts and of the Commission’s broad regulatory duties, abused or exceeded its authority. 

We will examine the manner in which the Commission has employed the methods of 

regulation which it has itself selected, and must decide whether each of the order’s essential 

elements is supported by substantial evidence. Finally, we will determine whether the 

order may reasonably be expected to maintain financial integrity, attract necessary capital, 

and fairly compensate investors for the risks they have assumed, and yet provide 
4

appropriate protection to the relevant public interests, both existing and foreseeable. The 

[C]ourt’s responsibility is not to supplant the Commission’s balance of these interests with 

one more nearly to its liking, but instead to assure itself that the Commission has given 

reasoned consideration to each of the pertinent factors.”). In view of this standard, we 

proceed to consider the parties’ arguments.

III.

DISCUSSION

On appeal to this Court, Williams reasserts the issues it raised during its

objection to the certificate transfer before the PSC: (1) Classic’s limited use of its common 

motor carrier certificate has rendered it both geographically and operationally dormant 

making it nontransferable, and (2) Ambassador’s proposed use of Classic’s certificate 

essentially will create new competition in the same territory that Williams currently 

services.

The PSC certificate at issue in this case allows the holder to operate as a 

common motor carrier in the State of West Virginia. Pursuant to West Virginia Code 

section 24A-1-2(2) (eff. 2000),

2

2

We cite to the 2000 version of West Virginia Code section 24A-1-2 because 

that is the statutory enactment that was in effect at the time that Ambassador filed its 

January 2020 certificate transfer application. However, the recent amendments to this 

provision do not substantively change the definition of “common carrier by motor vehicle.” 

See W. Va. Code § 24A-1-2 (eff. 2021) (“‘Common carrier by motor vehicle’ means any 

person who undertakes, whether directly or by lease or any other arrangement, to transport 

passengers or property, or any class or classes of property, for the general public over the 
5

“[c]ommon carrier by motor vehicle” means any person 

who undertakes, whether directly or by lease or any other 

arrangement, to transport passengers or property, or any class 

or classes of property, for the general public over the highways 

of this state by motor vehicles for hire, whether over regular or 

irregular routes, including such motor vehicle operations of 

carriers by rail, water or air and of express or forwarding 

agencies, and leased or rented motor vehicles, with or without 

drivers[.]

Operation as a common motor carrier in West Virginia requires the issuance of a certificate 

by the PSC:

No common carrier by motor vehicle shall operate any 

motor facility for transportation of either persons or property 

for hire on any public highway in this state except in 

accordance with the provisions of this chapter, and no person, 

after January one, one thousand nine hundred forty, shall, at 

the same time, hold under this chapter a certificate as a 

common carrier and a permit as a contract carrier authorizing 

operations for the transportation of property by motor vehicles 

over the same route or within the same territory unless for good 

cause shown and the commission determines that such 

certificate and permit may be held consistent with the public 

interest and the policy stated in section one, article one of this 

chapter.

W. Va. Code § 24A-2-2 (eff. 1939). See also W. Va. Code § 24A-2-5(a) (eff. 1980) 3 (“It 

shall be unlawful for any common carrier by motor vehicle to operate within this state 

highways of this state by motor vehicles for hire, whether over regular or irregular routes, 

including such motor vehicle operations of carriers by rail, water, or air, and of express or 

forwarding agencies, and leased or rented motor vehicles, with or without drivers[.]”).

3

Again, we cite the version of the statute that was in effect at the time of 

Ambassador’s January 2020 certificate transfer application. However, we note that the 

recent legislative amendments to this provision do not impact our decision of this case. See

W. Va. Code § 24A-2-5(a) (eff. 2021) (“It shall be unlawful for any common carrier by 

motor vehicle to operate within this state without first having obtained from the 
6

without first having obtained from the commission a certificate of convenience and 

necessity.”). Similarly, PSC approval also is required to transfer a motor carrier certificate 

from one carrier to another: “No certificate issued under this chapter shall be assigned or 

otherwise transferred without the approval of the commission.” W. Va. Code § 24A-2-

5(c).4

From these statutes, it is apparent that determining whether a certificate 

should be transferred rests within the discretion of the PSC. We previously have explained 

what considerations are and are not relevant to this decision. In regard to irrelevant factors, 

we have held that

[t]he transfer of an existing certificate of convenience 

and necessity for a common carrier by motor vehicle is 

controlled by W. Va. Code, 24A-2-5(c) which states: “No 

certificate issued under this chapter shall be assigned or 

otherwise transferred without the approval of the commission.” 

Subsection (c) does not contain any language requiring a 

commission a certificate of convenience and necessity unless the common carrier is an 

emergency substitute carrier.”).

4

The 2021 legislative amendments also altered the text of West Virginia 

Code section 24A-2-5(c) by adding subsection (2) which imposes temporal requirements 

on the certificate transfer process; however, because this legislative language was not in 

effect at the time Ambassador filed its motor carrier certificate transfer application, these 

time periods do not apply to this proceeding. See W. Va. Code § 24A-2-5(c)(2) (eff. 2021) 

(“An application by a motor carrier to transfer a certificate of convenience and necessity, 

or a portion thereof, to another motor carrier possessing one or more certificates of public 

convenience and necessity for the same commodity shall be affirmed or denied within 90 

days of the submission of a complete application for transfer. The commission shall make 

a determination within ten business days of receiving a transfer application if the 

application is complete and notify the applicant if additional information is required. If the 

commission shall fail to act on a complete application within 90 days, the application to 

transfer the certificate shall be deemed approved.”).
7

showing that the public convenience and necessity be served 

by the transfer. We conclude that the transfer of such 

certificate does not depend upon a showing that the public 

convenience and necessity will be served.

Syl. pt. 1, Chabut v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 179 W. Va. 111, 365 S.E.2d 391 (1987). 

While a showing of public convenience and necessity is not necessary to transfer a common 

motor carrier certificate, two other factors are required to be satisfied: (1) the transferee’s 

ability to provide the certificated service and (2) the certificate’s continued viability due to 

lack of dormancy.

First, “[t]he chief inquiry at a transfer hearing is the ability of the proposed 

new certificate holder to carry on the business.” Syl. pt. 2, id. This analysis requires a 

consideration of whether the transferee is a fit and proper party to hold the transferred 

certificate and to provide the public service authorized thereby. We have construed the 

fitness determination to include the following factors: “In a Public Service Commission 

proceeding to transfer a Motor Carrier permit, a carrier is ‘fit and proper’ when it has the 

experience, equipment, insurance and financial ability to carry on the business that is being 

transferred.” Syl. pt. 3, Solid Waste Servs. of W. Va. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 188 W. Va. 

117, 422 S.E.2d 839 (1992).

Second, the certificate sought to be transferred must not have become 

dormant from nonuse, i.e. where the transferor has failed to provide the services the subject 

certificate authorizes it to supply. As to this factor, we have observed that
8

[t]he concept of “dormancy” relates to the failure of a 

certificate holder to operate for a period of time under the 

certificate. This can give rise to several adverse consequences 

to the certificate holder such as a cancellation of the certificate 

or, in the event of a transfer, a finding that it is not transferable 

because of nonuse.

Chabut, 179 W. Va. at 114, 365 S.E.2d at 394 (citations omitted). See also Cox v. Pub. 

Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 188 W. Va. 736, 743, 426 S.E.2d 528, 535 (1992) (per curiam)

(upholding PSC’s “finding of dormancy” and resultant denial of transfer of common carrier 

by motor vehicle certificate based on certificate’s dormancy).

Although we have not extensively considered the effect of the dormancy of 

a motor vehicle carrier’s certificate, the PSC has found dormancy to be a crucial 

consideration in a certificate transfer proceeding and has ruled that a dormant certificate 

may not be transferred. In this regard, the PSC specifically has recognized that a criterion 

for determining whether a certificate transfer application should be approved is a finding 

“[t]hat the certificate is not dormant—that the holder thereof (transferor) has actively 

engaged in the operation under the certificate sought to be transferred[.]” William P. 

Hopson, M.C. Case No. 16280, at 2 (W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Apr. 17, 1978). In other 

words, “[t]he almost universal rule is that dormant rights will NOT [be] transferred unless 

a public need for the service can be shown.” Carroll Trucking Co., M.C. Case Nos. 132, 

1902, and 3821, at 4 (W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm’n July 13, 1976) (emphasis in original; 

citations omitted).
9

Moreover, “[t]he issue of dormancy is an important matter to be considered 

in a transfer proceeding . . . . [because] [t]he transfer of a dormant certificate would 

constitute a new service without demonstrating a public need therefore and could adversely 

affect any protesting carriers.” Hopson, at 3 (citations omitted). Finally, with specific 

respect to the case sub judice, the PSC has observed that dormancy

can be either geographical or operational in nature. 

Geographical dormancy is a failure to provide service to a 

representative number of points within the authorized area of 

service. Operational dormancy is the failure to provide all or a 

portion of the type of service which a certificate holder is 

authorized to render. In either case to determine whether or 

not a certificate is dormant, a determination must be made as 

to “whether substantial lawful operations have been performed 

under the certificate.”

Elk Valley Sanitation, Inc. v. Charles Edward Snodgrass, M.C. Case 21268, at 4 (W. Va. 

Pub. Serv. Comm’n June 22, 1982) (quoting Hopson, at 3 (citations omitted)) (additional 

citation omitted). See also James Eugene Fletcher, Case No. 10-1799-MC-TC, at 6 

(W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Apr. 20, 2012) (noting that PSC “will not rely strictly on the 

passage of a period of time to decide the issue of whether rights to a geographic area or 

rights to perform certain operations have become dormant”).

To facilitate the consideration of these various factors in certificate transfer 

cases, we now hold that, when considering whether a common carrier by motor vehicle 

certificate transfer application should be approved, it is not necessary to show that the 

requested transfer will serve the public convenience and necessity. We additionally hold 

that a common carrier by motor vehicle certificate transfer application should be approved 
10

where the proposed transferee demonstrates that it is able to supply the public service the 

certificate authorizes because the proposed transferee has the experience, equipment, 

finances, and insurance to carry on the transferor’s business under the certificate sought to 

be transferred. Finally, we hold that a dormant common carrier by motor vehicle certificate 

may not be transferred. We further recognize that a common carrier by motor vehicle 

certificate becomes dormant when the certificate holder fails to substantially operate or 

otherwise supply the services the certificate authorizes it to provide.

Having established the standard by which to evaluate whether a common 

motor carrier certificate should be approved, we now consider the errors assigned on 

appeal. Among its various arguments, Williams complains that approving the requested 

certificate transfer and allowing Ambassador to provide common motor carrier services in 

the territory covered by Classic’s certificate will create unfair competition because 

Williams already provides transportation services in that same area. We find this argument 

to be without merit, though, because consideration of whether a common carrier by motor 

vehicle certificate transfer should be approved does not turn on whether the transfer will 

serve public convenience and necessity, and, in fact, as recognized by our holding herein, 

such a showing is not required. Accord Syl. pt. 1, Chabut, 179 W. Va. 111, 365 S.E.2d 

391.

Williams also argues that Ambassador’s application to transfer Classic’s 

motor carrier certificate to Ambassador should be denied because Classic’s certificate is 
11

dormant. In support of its arguments, Williams contends that Classic’s certificate is 

geographically dormant as to all certificated counties but Raleigh because, although the 

subject certificate authorizes Classic to provide motor carrier services in nine counties, 

Classic historically has provided the majority of its transportation services in only one 

county—Raleigh. Likewise, Williams argues that Classic’s certificate also is operationally 

dormant because Classic has not provided transportation for a specific type of customer, 

i.e. railroad employees, and, thus, Classic’s failure to transport such customers has rendered 

its certificate dormant therefor.

We begin our consideration of these arguments by referring to the language 

of Classic’s certificate that is at issue herein. Classic’s motor carrier certificate authorizes 

the following operations:

Statement of Authority

to operate as a common carrier by motor vehicle in the 

transportation of passengers in limousine service between 

points and places in Boone, Fayette, McDowell, Mercer, 

Monroe, Nicholas, Raleigh, Summers and Wyoming Counties, 

on the one hand, and points and places in West Virginia, on the 

other hand.

The certificate further identifies the “Commodities” as “[l]imousine” and the “Counties” 

as “Boone[,] Fayette[,] McDowell[,] Mercer[,] Monroe[,] Nicholas[,] Raleigh[,] 

Summers[, and] Wyoming[.]” Notably, the certificate is silent as to the number of 

customers required to be serviced in each of the certificated counties. Also absent from 

the express language of the certificate is any limitation as to the type of customers Classic 
12

is or is not authorized to transport thereunder; the only specification in this regard is the 

authority to transport “PASSENGER.”

With respect to Williams’s geographical dormancy argument, we reject 

Williams’s contentions because the record evidence demonstrates that Classic has provided 

motor carrier services in each of the counties in which it is authorized to operate. As the 

PSC astutely explained in its order approving the certificate transfer:

Williams Transport argued in its exceptions that the 

certificate to be transferred is geographically dormant in all 

counties except Raleigh because it is the only county where 

Classic Limousine conducted “substantial operations.” The 

specific facts and circumstances of this case are relevant to a 

determination of what constitutes “substantial operations.” 

Substantial operations in an urban area are certainly different 

from those in a rural area and are different for a garbage hauler 

compared to a taxi/limo service provider. It is not as simple as 

Williams Transport’s comparison of the number of customers 

involved in the Cox case (urban garbage hauler) and the 

number of customers served by Classic Limousine (mostly 

rural limousine service). In this circumstance, the operator of 

Classic Limousine testified that 80% of its business occurred 

in Beckley/Raleigh County, but when called upon it made a 

bandful [sic] of trips each year into the eight other 

counties . . . . Given the largely rural nature of the area covered 

by this certificate, it is not particularly surprising the majority 

of the calls for limousine service occurred in Beckley. The 

mostly rural nature of the territory coupled with the existence 

of competition from other carriers make the few trips each year 

constitute substantial operations. Further, Classic Limousine 

did not refuse to provide service in any of the counties when 

called upon. Based on the foregoing, the Commission does not 

find this certificate to be geographically dormant. The 

Commission concludes that Classic Limousine conducted 

substantial operations under its certificate in all counties.
13

Citing Cox v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 188 W. Va. 736, 426 S.E.2d 528; (additional 

citation omitted). Thus, the PSC determined that Classic’s motor carrier certificate is not 

geographically dormant. We find the PSC’s reasoning in this regard to be legally sound 

and supported by the record evidence. See Syl. pt. 1, Sierra Club v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of 

W. Va., 241 W. Va. 600, 827 S.E.2d 224. Therefore, the PSC’s finding that Classic’s motor 

carrier certificate is not geographically dormant is hereby affirmed.

Williams also complains that Classic’s motor carrier certificate is 

operationally dormant as to a certain type of passenger because Classic never transported 

railroad employees. To resolve this assignment of error, we first must determine whether 

Classic’s certificate limits the type of passenger that it may transport. The certificate, itself, 

authorizes the transportation of “passengers,” and grants authority to operate “limousines.” 

The term “passenger” is not defined by statute or rule, but the term “limousine” is defined 

by the PSC’s rules as follows:

“Limousine” means a motor vehicle, equipped with at 

least three (3) doors, and with seating capacity, and separate 

sets of working seatbelts, for at least five (5) passengers, 

including the driver, in which a passenger or set of passengers 

is transported at a rate not less than ten dollars ($10.00) per 

vehicle trip or vehicle round trip, if that vehicle either (a) is 

used to transport passengers on a frequent basis between fixed 

points, such as airports and hotels or motels; or (b) is used as a 

specialized limousine.
14

W. Va. C.S.R. § 150-9-1.8.m. (eff. 2016).5 In determining that Classic’s certificate was 

not operationally dormant, the PSC ruled as follows:

Williams Transport next argued that the certificate is 

operationally dormant as it pertains to the transportation of 

railroad workers. The ALJ held that the certificate to be 

transferred is general in nature as it allows the transport of any 

class of customer by limousine. The ALJ determined that 

because Classic Limousine has been transporting customers by 

limousine, its certificate is not dormant. The Commission 

agrees. Classic Limousine operated as a common carrier 

providing limousine service. There is no evidence in the record 

that Classic Limousine refused to provide limousine service to 

railroad workers or to any other class of customer. Classic 

Limousine provided service to customers that requested 

service. . . . 

. . . . 

The Commission finds that the certificate is valid for the 

general transportation of customers by limousine, which could 

include the transportation of railroad workers.

5

Also defined by the PSC’s rules is the term “specialized limousine”

referenced in its definition of “limousine.” See W. Va. C.S.R. § 150-9-1.8.v. (eff. 2016) 

(“‘Specialized limousine’ means a limousine that is either: (a) a luxury vehicle; (b) a 

vehicle that has seating capacity, and separate sets of working seatbelts, for at least eight 

(8) passengers; or (c) a vehicle that was operated, and properly registered with the 

Commission, under a ‘limousine’ or ‘specialized limousine’ certificate on or before 

January 1, 2002.”). But see W. Va. Code § 24A-1-2 (eff. 2021) (“‘Luxury limousine 

service’ means passenger motor carrier service by pre-arranged appointment with a 

minimum charge of no less than $60.00, with a formally dressed chauffeur, using a large 

and luxurious sedan, sport utility vehicle, or van, or an antique vehicle: Provided, That 

‘luxury limousine service’ does not include a passenger motor carrier that is serving 

railroad crews for railroad purposes or used for nonemergency medical transportation other 

than Medicaid members.”). Regardless of the specific definition employed, though, 

Williams Transport’s operational dormancy argument contests the type of passenger to 

whom Classic’s certificate applies and not the type of vehicle the certificate authorizes it 

to use to provide such transportation.
15

(Internal quotations and citations omitted). We agree with the PSC’s conclusion that 

Classic’s certificate is not operationally dormant as to the transportation of railroad 

employees because the certificate’s authority permits the transportation of passengers, 

generally, and is not limited to any specific type of passenger. Furthermore, there is no 

evidence that Classic refused to transport railroad workers while operating under its motor 

carrier certificate. The PSC’s reasoning in reaching this decision is legally sound and 

supported by the record evidence. See Syl. pt. 1, Sierra Club v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of 

W. Va., 241 W. Va. 600, 827 S.E.2d 224. Therefore, we affirm this ruling as well.6

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the February 17, 2021 order of the 

Public Service Commission of West Virginia permitting Classic to transfer its common 

motor carrier certificate to Ambassador.

Affirmed.

6

Our holdings herein also require a consideration of the prospective 

transferee’s ability to continue the transferor’s provision of services under the certificate 

sought to be transferred. Accord Syl. pt. 3, Solid Waste Servs. of W. Va. v. Pub. Serv. 

Comm’n, 188 W. Va. 117, 422 S.E.2d 839 (1992). However, the parties do not dispute that 

Ambassador is a proper party to operate under Classic’s certificate and that Ambassador is 

able to provide Classic’s certificated services. Moreover, the PSC approved Ambassador’s 

request to transfer Classic’s motor carrier certificate to it, thus finding Ambassador to be 

able to provide the public service for which the certificate was issued to Classic. Therefore, 

further consideration of this factor is not necessary to our resolution of this case.