IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2020 ND 262

Nicole A. Lindstaedt, Petitioner 

v.

Terry F. George, Respondent and Appellant

No. 20200127

Appeal from the District Court of Stutsman County, Southeast Judicial 

District, the Honorable Mark T. Blumer, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by Tufte, Justice.

Nicole A. Lindstaedt, petitioner; no appearance.

Kara E. Brinster, Carrington, N.D., for respondent and appellant; submitted 

on brief.

FILED 

IN THE OFFICE OF THE 

CLERK OF SUPREME COURT 

DECEMBER 17, 2020 

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
1

Lindstaedt v. George

No. 20200127

Tufte, Justice.

[¶1] Terry F. George appeals a domestic violence protection order entered 

against him, claiming the district court erred, without properly explaining the 

factual basis for its decision, in finding that a preponderance of the evidence 

supported that actual or imminent domestic violence had or would occur. We 

affirm the domestic violence protection order.

I

[¶2] Nicole A. Lindstaedt and George were in a dating relationship for 

approximately four years. They lived together and had a child in common. In 

February 2020, Lindstaedt petitioned for a domestic violence protection order 

against George. She alleged George choked her, punched her, threatened to kill 

her, and forced her to have sex with him. After a hearing, the district court 

found George had committed domestic violence and issued a protection order 

against him. The order prohibited George from having contact with Lindstaedt 

for two years.

II

[¶3] “A district court’s finding of domestic violence is a finding of fact that will 

not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous.” Ficklin v. Ficklin, 2006 ND 

40, ¶ 11, 710 N.W.2d 387. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced 

by an erroneous view of the law, if no evidence supports it, or if, on the entire 

record, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake 

has been made.” Lovcik v. Ellingson, 1997 ND 201, ¶ 10, 569 N.W.2d 697. 

“Whether the [district] court has misinterpreted the domestic violence statute 

is a question of law that is fully reviewable on appeal.” Ficklin, at ¶ 11.

[¶4] “The party seeking the protective order must prove actual or imminent 

domestic violence by a preponderance of the evidence.” Lovcik, 1997 ND 201, 

¶ 11. A relevant factor to consider is past abusive behavior, but it is not 
2

dispositive. Id. at ¶ 16. Another relevant factor is the context and history of 

the relationship between the parties. Ficklin, 2006 ND 40, ¶ 12.

[¶5] There must be a “showing of actual or imminent domestic violence” 

before a court may enter a protection order. N.D.C.C. § 14-07.1-02(4). 

“Domestic violence” is statutorily defined under N.D.C.C. § 14-07.1-01(2) as 

including:

physical harm, bodily injury, sexual activity compelled by physical 

force, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, 

bodily injury, sexual activity compelled by physical force, or 

assault, not committed in self-defense, on the complaining family 

or household members.

A district court trying an action upon the facts without a jury “must find the 

facts specially.” N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a)(1). A district court must make findings of 

fact sufficient to enable an appellate court to understand the factual 

determinations made by it and the basis for its conclusions of law. Hanneman 

v. Nygaard, 2010 ND 113, ¶ 19, 784 N.W.2d 117. When there is conflicting or

disputed evidence, detailed findings are particularly important because this 

Court defers to a district court’s choice between two permissible views of the 

evidence and the district court decides issues of credibility. See Cass County 

State’s Attorney v. R.A.S. (In re R.A.S.), 2008 ND 185, ¶ 8, 756 N.W.2d 771.

[¶6] The domestic violence protection order findings of fact state only that the 

acts constituting domestic violence were “[r]ecent physical and verbal assaults 

as testified to on the record. And for the reasons stated on the record.” “When 

a district court makes its detailed findings on the record, a written order need 

not repeat all findings.” Clarke v. Taylor, 2019 ND 251, ¶ 9, 934 N.W.2d 414. 

On the record, the district court found that “[s]he testify [sic] that he choked or 

threatened to kill her; hit her, had nonconsensual sex with her.” The court 

further stated that “. . . when he came back, she was packing things to leave. 

She wanted out of there. So with his testimony, I feel like somewhat 

corroborates that she wanted to leave.” The court did not address the testimony 

of George’s witness, Jason Burndt, which directly contradicted some of 

Lindstaedt’s testimony as to when the domestic violence occurred. George 
3

argues “[t]he court erred egregiously in determining the credibility of 

Lindstaedt at the hearing.” The court granted the protection order based in 

part upon recent events of verbal and physical abuse, so the court must have 

found her testimony to be credible. Odden v. Rath, 2007 ND 51, ¶ 22, 730 

N.W.2d 590. This Court “give[s] great deference to a factfinder’s opportunity to 

observe the witnesses and determine credibility.” Id. “We will not reexamine 

findings of fact made by the trial court upon conflicting evidence, and a choice 

between two permissible views of the weight of the evidence is not clearly 

erroneous.” Buzick v. Buzick, 542 N.W.2d 756, 758 (N.D. 1996). “[T]his Court 

will not reverse simply because it may have viewed the evidence differently.” 

See Swanson v. Swanson, 2019 ND 25, ¶ 5, 921 N.W.2d 666 (citing Rebel v. 

Rebel, 2013 ND 116, ¶ 9, 833 N.W.2d 442). Although the court’s findings lack 

specificity, we understand the rationale for its decision that George committed 

domestic violence. Clarke, 2019 ND 251, ¶ 11.

III

[¶7] We conclude the district court’s finding of domestic violence was not 

induced by an erroneous view of the law, nor are we left with a definite and 

firm conviction a mistake has been made. Our review of the record shows that 

Lindstaedt presented sufficient evidence for the district court to find domestic 

violence by recent physical harm and nonconsensual sex. We affirm the 

domestic violence protection order.

[¶8] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.

Gerald W. VandeWalle

Daniel J. Crothers

Lisa Fair McEvers

Jerod E. Tufte