J-S32011-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DIA WILLIAMS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1973 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 21, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0007810-2014

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED AUGUST 19, 2019

Appellant Dia Williams appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed 

after he was convicted of aggravated assault, possession of an instrument of 

crime, terroristic threats, and simple assault.

1

 Appellant argues that the 

evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated assault 

because the Commonwealth failed to disprove his self-defense claim. He also 

challenges the weight of the evidence. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the facts of this matter as follows:

On the evening of June 20, 2014, at 5711 Master Street in West 

Philadelphia, a verbal and physical altercation occurred between 

[Appellant], and the [victim], landlord Demond Gallman[,] in the 

basement of that rental property. [The victim] responded to 

another tenant’s complaint regarding loss of electricity in her unit 

by inspecting the fuse box in the basement of the property and 

observed that the wires in the fuse box had been pulled out and 

disconnected. [Appellant] then approached [the victim] for 

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1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2702(a), 907(a), 2706(a), 2701(a).
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shutting off his electricity due to unpaid rent and asked [the 

victim] if he would be turning [Appellant]’s electricity back on. 

When [the victim] refused to do so, the [Appellant] responded: 

“Well nobody’s electric is getting cut back on.” [Appellant] then 

reached for [the victim]’s wire cutters and refused to return them 

to [the victim]. [Appellant] pushed [the victim] away using one 

hand with force, causing [the victim] to respond by striking the 

[Appellant]’s face with his fist. [Appellant] responded to [the 

victim]’s strike by continuously swinging directly in a stabbing 

motion at [the victim]’s left temple with his right fist—with the 

wire cutters in [Appellant]’s right hand. [The victim]’s chin was 

cut during the altercation, which resulted in significant blood loss 

and ten stitches. [Appellant] attempted to flee by running to his 

room in the rental property. [The victim] followed [Appellant] to 

his room and observed the window screen missing. Police officers 

found [Appellant] at the stoop of the back door of the rental 

property, unable to move due to injury from jumping out of his 

room’s window. 

Police officers recovered the wire cutters used by [Appellant], and 

traces of blood on the basement door and floor at the scene of the 

altercation. Medical records for [the victim]’s treatment and 

images of facial injuries to [the victim]’s chin were produced for 

trial. Police officers also recovered audio recordings of a third 

party tenant, Ms. Roberts.

Trial Ct. Op., 7/20/18, at 1-2 (record citations and some capitalization 

omitted).

On December 5, 2016, the matter proceeded to a bench trial, at which 

both the victim and Appellant testified. At the conclusion of trial, the trial 

court found Appellant guilty of the foregoing crimes. On February 24, 2017, 

Appellant filed a post-verdict motion arguing that he “had a right to defend 

himself and this was a mutual combat situation caused by the alleged victim.” 

See Post-Verdict Mot., 2/24/17. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion on 

April 13, 2017.
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On July 21, 2017, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. Appellant

moved for extraordinary relief under Pa.R.Crim.P. 704(b) on the basis that he 

acted in self-defense. See N.T. Sentencing Hr’g, 7/21/17 at 6. The trial court 

denied Appellant’s motion and sentenced him to five to ten years’ 

incarceration. On July 31, 2017, Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion 

preserving a challenge to the weight of the evidence. The trial court denied 

Appellant’s motion on August 2, 2017. 

On August 30, 2017, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On 

November 9, 2017, this Court dismissed Appellant’s appeal for failure to file a 

docketing statement. See Pa.R.A.P. 3517. On February 20, 2018, Appellant 

filed a petition to reinstate his appellate rights nunc pro tunc, which the trial 

court granted on February 22, 2018. On March 23, 2018, Appellant filed a 

petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act2 (PCRA), again seeking a 

reinstatement of his appellate rights. 

On June 1, 2018, the trial court reinstated Appellant’s right to file a 

direct appeal nunc pro tunc. That same day, Appellant filed a timely notice of 

appeal. Appellant timely filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement 

on June 27, 2018, and raised the following claims:

1. Th[e trial] court erred, abused its discretion, and unfairly 

prejudiced [Appellant], because the verdict was against the 

weight of the evidence.

2. Th[e trial] court erred, abused its discretion, and unfairly 

prejudiced [Appellant], because the evidence was insufficient to 

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2 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. 
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convict [Appellant] of aggravated assault. There was insufficient 

evidence to prove [Appellant] attempted “to cause serious bodily 

injury to another, or cause[d] such injury intentionally, knowingly 

or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme 

indifference to the value of human life.” Moreover, there was 

insufficient evidence to prove [Appellant] attempted “to cause or 

intentionally or knowingly cause[d] bodily injury to another with a 

deadly weapon.”

Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, 6/27/18, at 1-2 (citations and some 

capitalization omitted). The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion asserting 

that Appellant’s claims were meritless. 

Appellant raises two issues on appeal: 

[1.] Whether the evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to 

convict [Appellant] of aggravated assault[.]

[2.] Whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.

Appellant’s Brief at 8 (full capitalization omitted).

In his first issue, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to 

present sufficient evidence to rebut his claim of self-defense. Id. at 15. In 

support, Appellant refers to his own trial testimony, and concludes that (1) 

the victim “caused, and then escalated, the physical altercation[;]” (2) the 

victim prevented Appellant from retreating; and (3) there was no evidence to 

show that Appellant did not reasonably believe he was in danger of death or 

serious bodily injury. Id. at 18.

Initially, we note that Appellant did not preserve this issue in his Rule

1925(b) statement. Likewise, the trial court did not address it. Appellant’s 

claim is therefore waived. See Commonwealth v. Castillo, 888 A.2d 775, 
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780 (Pa. 2005); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (stating that “[i]ssues not 

included in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the provision 

of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived”).

Even if Appellant properly preserved his claim, we would find it 

meritless. Our standard of review in this context is as follows:

Because a determination of evidentiary sufficiency presents a 

question of law, our standard or review is de novo and our scope 

of review is plenary. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, 

we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and all 

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, were sufficient 

to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 

The facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth 

need not preclude every possibility of innocence. It is within the 

province of the fact-finder to determine the weight to be accorded 

to each witness’s testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the 

evidence. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving 

every element of the crime by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, as an appellate court, we may not re-weigh 

the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 176 A.3d 298, 305-06 (Pa. Super. 2017) 

(citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 187 A.3d 

908 (Pa. 2018).

Under the Crimes Code, self-defense is included under the defense of 

justification, which is a complete defense to criminal liability. See 18 Pa.C.S. 

§ 502. We have explained that

[t]he use of force against a person is justified when the actor 

believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose 

of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by the other 

person. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 505(a). When a defendant raises the 
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issue of self-defense, the Commonwealth bears the burden to 

disprove such a defense beyond a reasonable doubt. While there 

is no burden on a defendant to prove the claim, before the defense 

is properly at issue at trial, there must be some evidence, from 

whatever source, to justify a finding of self-defense. 

Commonwealth v. Bullock, 948 A.2d 818, 824 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation 

omitted).

To disprove a defendant’s claim of self-defense, the Commonwealth 

must establish at least one of the following:

1) the accused did not reasonably believe that he was in danger 

of death or serious bodily injury; or 2) the accused provoked or 

continued the use of force; or 3) the accused had a duty to retreat 

and the retreat was possible with complete safety. It remains the 

province of the jury to determine whether the accused’s belief was 

reasonable, whether he was free of provocation, and whether he 

had no duty to retreat.

Commonwealth v. McClendon, 874 A.2d 1223, 1230 (Pa. Super. 2005) 

(quotation marks and citations omitted).

“When the defendant’s own testimony is the only evidence of selfdefense, the Commonwealth must still disprove the asserted justification and 

cannot simply rely on the [fact-finder’s] disbelief of the defendant’s 

testimony[.]” Commonwealth v. Smith, 97 A.3d 782, 788 (Pa. Super. 

2014). “If there are other witnesses, however, who provide accounts of the 

material facts, it is up to the fact finder to ‘reject or accept all, part or none of 

the testimony of any witness.’ The complainant can serve as a witness to the 

incident to refute a self-defense claim.” Id. (citations omitted).
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Here, the victim testified that Appellant took the victim’s wire cutters 

and then shoved the victim when he attempted to grab them. In response, 

the victim punched Appellant, who retaliated by swinging the wire cutters 

toward the victim’s head in a stabbing motion and eventually striking him. 

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as 

verdict winner, there was sufficient evidence to show that Appellant provoked 

or continued the use of force. See Smith, 97 A.3d at 788 (stating that a 

defendant “must be free from fault in provoking or escalating the altercation 

that led to the offense” (emphasis and citation omitted)); McClendon, 874 

A.2d at 1230. Therefore, Appellant’s sufficiency claim fails.

In his next claim, Appellant argues that the verdict was against the 

weight of the evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 21. Specifically, he asserts that 

the victim’s testimony was “vague, tenuous, and uncertain.” Id. at 23. He 

also claims that the victim displayed “malevolence” towards Appellant, which 

“compels the determination that the [t]rial [c]ourt should not have believed 

the witness.” Id. at 24. Appellant concludes that because the victim was not 

credible, the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, and the trial court 

should have granted him a new trial. Id.

Our standard of review regarding challenges to the weight of the 

evidence is well settled:

A claim alleging the verdict was against the weight of the evidence 

is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. Accordingly, an 

appellate court reviews the exercise of the trial court’s discretion; 

it does not answer for itself whether the verdict was against the 

weight of the evidence. It is well settled that the [fact-finder] is 
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free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine 

the credibility of the witnesses, and a new trial based on a weight 

of the evidence claim is only warranted where the [fact-finder’s] 

verdict is so contrary to the evidence that it shocks one’s sense of 

justice. In determining whether this standard has been met, 

appellate review is limited to whether the trial judge’s discretion 

was properly exercised, and relief will only be granted where the 

facts and inferences of record disclose a palpable abuse of 

discretion.

Commonwealth v. Landis, 89 A.3d 694, 699 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted). 

We have explained that 

[a] new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in 

the testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have 

arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the role of the trial court 

is to determine that notwithstanding all the evidence, certain facts 

are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them, or to give 

them equal weight with all the facts, is to deny justice. A motion 

for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary to the 

weight of the evidence concedes that there is sufficient evidence 

to sustain the verdict; thus the trial court is under no obligation 

to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict 

winner. 

Id. (citation omitted). Further, “[b]ecause the trial judge has had the 

opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate court will 

give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the 

trial judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict is 

against the weight of the evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). “One of the least 

assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s 

conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence 
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and that a new trial should be granted in the interest of justice.” Id. (citation 

omitted).

Here, the trial court explained that it

rendered its verdict with ample record of credible evidence. The 

Commonwealth produced audio records of the separate 911 calls 

on behalf of a third-party resident, medical records and 

documentation of head injury to the [victim], testimony from [the 

victim], [Appellant], and law enforcement personnel—all 

corroborating the attack on [the victim] on June 20, 2014. This 

[c]ourt, in its proper discretion, placed higher evidentiary weight 

on the testimony of the complaining witness than that of 

[Appellant], whose testimony lacked credibility.

Trial Ct. Op. at 5.

Following our review, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial 

court’s ruling. See Landis, 89 A.3d at 699. The trial court found the victim’s 

testimony more credible than that of Appellant. Therefore, the trial court 

appropriately concluded that its verdict was not so contrary to the evidence 

as to require a new trial. See id. Further, we decline to reassess the 

credibility of the Commonwealth’s witnesses and to reweigh the testimony and 

evidence presented at trial. See Commonwealth v. West, 937 A.2d 516, 

523 (Pa. Super. 2007) (emphasizing that the trier of fact is “free to believe 

all, part or none of the evidence,” and “[t]his Court may not [re]weigh the 

evidence or substitute its judgment [f]or that of the fact finder” (citation 

omitted)). Accordingly, Appellant’s challenge to the weight of the evidence 

merits no relief.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/19/19