2005 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit

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P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : P r e c e de n t i al
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Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o you for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit at V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

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UNITED STATE COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

______ No: 04-2465

______ UNIT ED STA TES OF AMERI CA,

Appellant

v.
CRAI G M. HE NDRI CKS; RUSSE LL ROBINSON ELROY DOWE ; DANIE L FLE MING; RANNEY LAR ONDE; ANDY AN TOINE; RUDOLPH CLARK; RAFAEL CIN TRON; KALISHA MARTIN; JACQUELYN CARR

On A ppeal from the District Cou rt for the Virgin Isl ands (D.C. No. 04-cr -00005 ) Distri ct Judge: Honorable Raymond L. Finch

Argued December 16, 2004

Be for e: S LO VI TE R, F UE NT ES , and GR EE NB ER G, Circu it Judges

. (Fil ed: Januar

y 14, 2005)

David M. Nissman U.S. Attor

ney Anthony J. Jenkins Acting U.S. Attorney2 Patri cia M. Sulzbach (Argued) Assist ant U.S. Attorney Distri ct of the Virgin I slands Cynthi a Stone Senior Tri al Attor

ney CriminalDivisi on U.S. Department

of Justi ce Washington, DC 20530 Attorney s for Appell ant
Eric S. Chancellor Christ ianst ed, St. Croix, USVI 00820

Attorne yfo r Ap pe ll ee El ro yDowe Andrew L. Capdeville (Argued) St. Thomas, USVI 00804 Attorneys for Appellee Craig M. Hendricks

Leon ard B. Fra ncis, Jr. Charlott e Amalie, St . Thomas, USVI 00801 Attorney for Appelle e Daniel Fl eming

Kevin W. Weatherbee Charlott e Amalie, St . Thomas, USVI 00802 Attorney for Appelle e Ranney Laronde

Clive R ivers Charlott e Amalie, St . Thomas, USVI 00802 Attorney for Appelle e Andy Antoine1 The Distric t Cou rt has c ontinu ing juris diction over this
case under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and 48 U.S .C. § 1 612 ; this court has juri sdict ion ove r this inter locu tory ap pea l pu rsua nt to 18 U .S.C . § 3731 a nd 28 U .S.C. § 129 4(3).

2 The Distri ct Court a lso i ssued a pre tri al rul ing suppre ssing
a post-a rrest statem ent of Ap pellee Craig He ndrick s bec ause it found that “Hendricks never waived his r ight t o have counsel present durin g the [c us to di al ] i nt ervi ew b y law enforcement officials .” J. A. at

40. Th e U nit ed State s ini tial ly file d a notic e 3 Treston E . Moo re Charlott e Amalie, St . Thomas, USVI 00804 Attorney for Appelle e Rafael Cint ron
Jomo Meade Frederi ksted, St. Croi x, USVI 00840 Attorney for A ppellee Jacq ueline Ca rr

OPINI ON OF THE COURT

SL OV ITE R, Circuit

Judge

.
Inth is inte rl oc ut oryap pe al fi le d by th e Un it edSt at es we must int erpret

for the first time for this court the meaning of “testimonialevidence” a s used in t he Supreme Court’s recent decisi on in Crawford v. Washingt on , 541 U .S. 36, 1 24 S . Ct. 1354 (2004), and deter

mine it s appli cati on to lega lly obtaine d wir et ap e vi den ce and e vi den ce o f co nve rs at io ns b etweensom e of the Defendants and a murdered confi dentia l infor mant (“CI”). The District Court for t he Virgin Islands, 1 in rul ing on the Government’ s motion in limi ne , hel d that be cause of Craw ford such evidenc e could not be introduced at t

rial . The Un ited Sta tes app eals. Fo r the rea sons expla ined b elow , we w ill
revers e the d ecision of the Distric t Cou rt, and w ill rema nd in order t o afford the Distri ct Court t he opportuni ty

to anal yze t

he disputed evidence under the proper standards. 2appeali ng this dec ision, bu t subse quen tlydism issed th at fac et of its appe al.

3 Although the c ase was ori ginally br ought in t he Distr ict Cou rt for the Virgin Isl ands, Divi sion of St. Thomas and St . John, the District Court grant ed the Governm ent’s m otion f or a change of vicina ge and transferr ed the matt er to t he Distr ict Court

for the Virg in Islands, Divisi on of St. Croix. J. A. at 9 4; see g enera lly Gov ’t of V.I. v. Scatli ffe , 580 F. Su pp. 1482 , 1485 (D . V.I. 1984).

4 CI Rivera was murdere d shortly aft er the indictment was retu rne d.
4 I. On April 11, 2003, a federalgrand jur y si tting in the United Stat es Virgi n Islands ret urned a mult i-count

indict ment charging D efenda nts/App ellees And y Antoine, Jacqu elyn Carr, Rafael Cintron, Rudolph Cl arke, El royDowe, Daniel Fleming, Craig M. Hendricks, Ranney Laronde, and RussellRobinson with one or more c ounts of cons piracy , narcotics poss ession and distribut ion, and money la undering. 3 According to t he indictm ent, H endr icks, w ho is th e ow ner o f a fa cially-legitima te marin e serv ices bu siness, w as the le ader o f a larg e-scale narcoti cs-traffic king organi zati on, which pri or to t he arres ts of the Defendants , import ed and dist ribut ed cocaine and marijuana throughout

the Unite d States Virgin I slands and elsewhere. On January12, 2004, t

he United States fi led a moti on in limi ne see kin g pr etria l rulin gs o n th e ad mis sibility o f, inter alia : (1) electronic surve illance tapes obtaine d pursua nt to a court authori zed wiret ap issue d under 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (herei nafter

the “Title II I recor dings”) ; and (2) recordi ngs of
conve rsations betw een con fidential inform ant He ctor Rivera (“CI Rivera”) and various of the Defendan ts. 4 The United Stat es maintai ned that

the rec ordings and conversations at issue qua lified eithe r as a dm issio ns o f a p arty op pon ent, see Fed . R. Ev id. 8 01( d)(2 )(A ), co con spira tor st atem ents , see Fed. R. Evid. 801 (d)(2 )(E ), state me nts a gain st inte rest, see Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) , or as stat ements cover ed by t he resi dual hear say5 The Uni te d St at es ha d ma inta in edth at th e De fend ants
were responsible for CI Ri vera’s deat h and thus, at le ast as to the conversations in vo lv in g C I R iv er a, h ad fo rf eit ed by w rongdoing anyprotection offere d by the rule aga inst h ears ay, see Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6), or the S ixth Am end me nt, see Reynolds v. United Stat es , 98 U.S. 145, 158- 59 (1878). The Distri ct Cour t re jected this argu men t, finding that the United States was “unable to establish
a conclusi ve link be tween [the Defendant s] and the mu rd er of He ctor R ivera.” J.A. at 3 9. Th at ruling is not b efore this cou rt.
5 exc eptio n, see Fed. R. Evid. 807, and thus were admissible. In a Memorandum Opinion dated April27, 2004, t he Distric t Cou rt ruled th at Craw ford , in which the Suprem e Cou rt inter preted t he Confrontat ion Clause of the Sixt h Amendment of the Unite d States Constit ution, “has super ceded the Feder al Rules of Evidence in barring allout-of- court s tate ments made by an unavail able witness whom a defendant has not had the chance to cros s-examine, with except ions only for dyi ng declar ations and forfei ture for

wrongdoing.” J .A. at

38. 5 The D istrict Court noted that the Defendants never had an oppo rtunityto crossexam ine C I Riv era an d that d ue to C I Riv era’s d eath, h e w ould not be av ailable to testify at tri al. The D istrict Court therefore ruled t hat the United Stat es could not intr oduce the
conv ersation s invo lving C I Riv era at trial.

Similarly , regarding the Ti tle I II re cordings , the Distri ct Court noted t

hat the United Stat es had “not s hown that any statem ent rec orde d on the w iretap w as m ade b y a perso n w ho is no longer ava ilabl e and whom Defendants have had an opportuni ty

to cros s-examine. ” J.A. at 39-40. Thus, it r

uled that the U nited S tates co uld n ot introd uce a t trial any statem ents interce pted in the T itle III wire taps ex cept th ose “ statem ents made by a wit

ness who testifie s at t

rial .” J. A. at 40.

The United Stat es ther eafter file d a Motion for Reconsideration. In it s motion, the Government not ed that the rule announc ed in Craw ford is onl y appl icabl e to so- call ed “testimonial ” hearsay

stat ements. J.A. at

48 (citing Craw ford ,6 541 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 1374). It fol lows, t he Government argued, t hat “‘nont esti monial hear saystat ements maysti ll be ad m itte d a s e vi de nc e a ga in st a n a cc us ed . . . i f [ th ey] sa tis f[ y] both prongs of

the [ Oh io v.] R ober ts [, 44 8 U .S. 5 6 (1 980 ),] test .’” J .A. at

47 (quoti ng State v. Rivera , 844 A.2d 191, 201 (Conn. 2004)) . The United St ates urged that none of the evidence at

issue f ell wit hin the de finition of te sti monial hearsay ; it

contended t

hat the refore t

he evidence was not

subject to the r ule of Craw ford

. By Order dat ed May 11, 2004, the Dist rict Court denie d the U nited S tates’ M otion for R econ sidera tion. A lthoug h it agreed with the Government t hat the Craw ford hold ing is inappli cable t o nontest imonialstat ements, it found t hat the evide nce a t issue q ualified as testim onial sta teme nts an d thu s fell within t he rule of Craw ford . The United St ates t hereaft er lodged this tim ely inte rloc uto ry app eal. See g enera lly18 U.S.C. § 3731 (“A n app eal by the Un ited Sta tes sha ll lie to a co urt of a ppea ls from a decis ion or or der of a di stri ct court suppress ing or excludi ng evidence . . . not made after t

he defendant has been put in j eopardy

and before t

he verdic t or fi nding on an indictment . . . .”).

II. The Distri ct Court’ s decis ion to exc lude the evidence at issue tu rned on its ap plication of the Sixth Am endm ent an d its inter pretation of the Supreme Court’s decisi on in Craw ford

. This int erlocutoryappeal t hus present s a quest ion of law which
we r ev ie w de novo
. Un ited Sta tes v. T rala , 386 F.3d 536, 543 (3d C ir. 2004 ); United States v. Barbosa , 271 F.3d 438, 452 (3d Cir. 2001 ). As noted bythe Unite d States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit , the recent

decisi on in Craw ford has “changed t he lega l land sca pe for d eterm inin g w heth er th e ad mis sion of . . . hearsay stat ements viol ates t

he accused’ s right [s]” under the Co nfr ont ation Cla use
. Horton v. All en , 370 F.3d 75, 83 (1st C ir. 200 4); see also Un ited Sta tes v. M cCla in , 377 F.3d 219, 221 (2d Cir. 2004 ) (“ Craw ford redefi nes the Court ’s Sixt h Amendment juri sprudence .

. . . ”). A somewhat det aile d recounting of that7 case, therefore, is usef

ul for resolution o f the case at b ar.
The S tate of W ashington c harged M ichael D. C rawfo rd wit h as sau lt and attem pted mu rde r fo r stab bin g K enn eth L ee, a man Crawford believe d had tri ed to rape his wife. During the police invest igati on, both Crawford and his wife gave formal statements to l aw enforcem ent officials. In her statement, Mrs. Crawford general ly

corrobor ated her

husband’s ver sion of t

he events l eading up t o the fi ght; however, her account of the fi ght itself w as arg uably differen t from that of her h usba nd w ith respect to w hether Le e had d rawn a weap on before Craw ford struc k hi m. Craw ford , 541 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 1357.
At trial, Craw ford claim ed self-defense. Un der a Wa shington statute reg arding m arital privilege, Mrs. C rawfo rd was “unavail able” t o test ify . 541 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 1357- 58. T he pr osec ution s oug ht to ha ve M rs. Cra wford’s s tatem ents to the police ad mitted throug h a cod ified hearsay excep tion. In response, Crawford argued that, not withst anding the hearsay
exce ption, th e adm ission o f his w ife’s sta teme nts w ould violate the Confront ation Cl ause. The t rialcourt, relying on Ohio v. Ro berts , 448 U .S. 56 (1 980 ), foun d M rs. Cra wford’s s tatem ents “tru stw orth y” an d th us a dm itted them

. Craw ford , 541 U .S. at __, 1 24 S . Ct. a t 13 58.

In Ro berts , the Supreme Court had hel d that t he Confrontat ion Clause doe s not pre clude the admissi on of an
unav ailable w itness’s h earsay state men t if it bears “ade quate indici a of rel iabil ity .” Ro berts , 448 U.S. at 66 (i nternal quotations an d citations om itted). Under Ro berts , a hear say statem ent co ntains “ adeq uate in dicia o f reliab ility” if it falls within a “firmly rooted hearsay exce ption” or if it bears “parti culari zed guarant ees of tr ustworthiness. ” Id. Applyi ng this test, the trial cou rt foun d M rs. Cra wford’s s tatem ents trust worthyand there fore admiss ible. Although the Washi ngton Court of Ap peals reversed that deci sion, citing reasons why Mrs. Crawford’s st atements were not tr ustworthy , the Washington Suprem e Cou rt agreed w ith the trial court that Mrs. C rawfo rd’s stat ements showed suffi cient evidence of t

rustwort hiness to be admitt ed. 541 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 1358. The Unit ed State s8 Su pre me Co urt g ran ted C raw for d’s p etitio n fo r cer tiora ri.

Justi ce Scali a, writing for t he Court, began by highli ghting t

he differ ences between the common law practi ce of receiv ing ev idenc e throu gh live testimo ny in cou rt subje ct to adversarial t esti ng with the c ivillaw pract ice of r eceivi ng evidence t

hrough ex parte privat e examinati ons of witnes ses by government offi cial s. Alt hough the Court not ed that common law sy stems had occa sional ly adopted and ut ili zed element s of the ci vil l aw practi ce (refe rri ng at some le ngth to t he notori ous English t rialof Sir Walt er Ralei gh), i t recogni zed that , as illustrated by

various stat e consti tuti onal provi sions circa 1776, the int roducti on of government- sponsored ex parte examinati ons again st an ac cuse d has long been cons idered an an athem a in
com mo n law systems in gene ral and in the A meric an system in parti cular. 541 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 1359-63.

After surv eying various fou nding-era so urces, the Co urt stated that

“the principal evi l at which the Confrontation Clause was direct ed was the ci vil- law mode of crimina l procedur e, and parti cularly i ts use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the ac cuse d.” 54 1 U .S. at __ , 124 S . Ct. at 13 63; see also United States v. Lee , 374 F.3d 637, 644 (8th Cir . 2004) ( discuss ing Craw ford , noting: “The central func tion of t his ri ght [of confrontation] is t o protect indivi duals fr om the use of ex parte statem ents as evide nce a gains t them in a crim inal trial”). W ith the principalfocus of the Confr ontati on Clause thus establ ished, the Court proceeded to uncoupl e the rational e undergirding the prohibi tion aga inst

hearsay from the i mpetus behind t he Confrontat ion Clause, suggesting “that not allhearsay

impli cates the Si xth Amendment ’s co re con cerns .” 54 1 U.S. at __ , 124 S. Ct. at 1 364 ; see also Thomas J. Reed, Crawford v. Washington & the Irre tri evable Breakdown of a Union: Separating the Co nfro ntation Clau se fro m the He arsay R ule , 56 S.C. L. Rev. 185 (2004). It continued:

An off-h and, o verh eard re mark migh t be un reliable evidence and t

hus a good candidate for e xclusi on under hears ay r

ules, but it

bears l ittle res emblance to the civil -law abuses the Confrontation Clause9 targ eted . On the o ther han d, ex parte examinati ons might som etimes be ad missible und er mod ern hearsay rules , but t

he Framers cer

tainly would not hav e co ndo nedth em.
Craw ford , 541 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 1364.

The Craw ford Court noted t hat the text of

the Confrontat ion Clause i s support ive of t his di sti nction. The Clau se pro vides : “In all cr imina l prose cution s, the ac cuse d sha ll enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S . CO NS T. am end. V I. Thu s, the C lause a pplies to “‘witnes ses’ aga inst

the accus ed--i n other words, those who ‘bear test imony .’” 541 U.S . at __, 1 24 S . Ct. at 13 64 (e mp hasis added) (quoting 1 N. Webster , An American Dicti onary of the English Language ( 1828)). As recognized by the Craw ford Court: “‘ Testimony ,’ i s ty pical ly ‘[a] s olemn declaration or affirmat ion made for t

he purpose of es tabli shing or proving
so me f ac t. ’” 541 U. S. at

__, 124 S. Ct . at 1 364 (quotin g 1 N

. Webster, An Am erican Dictionaryof the Engli sh Language (182 8)). Th us, a p erson “w ho m akes a form al statem ent to government offi cers bear s testimony in a sense t hat a per son who makes a casualremark to an acquaint ance does not .” Craw ford , 541 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 1364. After engagi ng in thi s hist oricaland text ual anal ysi s, t

he Court concl uded that , even i f the Confront ation Cl ause “is not solely concerned with testimon ial hearsay, that is its primary object .” Craw ford , 541 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 1365. The Cou rt further opined that, “[w]he re testimonial stateme nts are invo lved, w e do n ot think the F rame rs me ant to le ave th e Six th Amendment’s protec tion t o the vagar ies of t he rules of evidence, much less t o amorphous noti ons of ‘re liabi lit y. ’” 541 U.S. at

__, 124 S. C t. at 13 70.
Therefore, the Court, parti ally abrogating Ro berts , held that “ test imonial ” hearsay stat ements maynot be int roduced against a defendant unl ess the declar ant is unavail able at tri al and the defendant

had a prior

opportuni ty

to cros s-examine t

he decla rant. 54 1 U .S. at __ , 124 S . Ct. at 13 74. Im portan tly, this6 The Co urt, how ever, d id recog nize two potentia l
ex cepti ons to thi s other wise per se rule: (1) dy ing decl arati ons , Craw ford , 541 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 1367 n.6; and (2) fo rfeiture bywr ong doi ng, id. at __ , 124

. S. Ct . at 13 70. See also supra , footnote 5.

7 Som e co mmentators have int erpret ed this stat ement as suggesting that in the future the Court may abrogate completely t

he Ro berts hold ing an d exc lude n ontes timon ial s tate m ents en tirely from the ambit

of the Conf

r ont ation Cla use
. See Edw ard J. Imwinkelri ed, The Trea tm e nt of Prose cution Hear sayUnder Craw ford v. W ashin gton : So me Go od N ew s B ut . . . . , The Champion, Oct. 2004, at16, 18 (“The [ Craw ford ] majority ’s harsh criti cism of Ro berts ’ rel iabil ity standar d makes it even mo re likely that the Court wil l event

ua lly relax t

he standard for admitting nontest imonialhears ay.”). Suc h a de velop men t in Sixth Amendment juri sprudence i s bey ond the provi nce of this c our t. Cf.
10 outcome obtains regar dless of whether the stat ement at i ssue falls within a fi rmly rooted hearsay exception or has a par ticul arize d gu aran tee o f tru stw orth ines s. Id. 6 In sum, i nsofar as “ testim oni al” e vid enc e is c onc ern ed, Craw ford replac ed the
m all ea bl e ju di cia l in qu iry m an da ted by Ro berts with a virtua lly per se rule of e xclu sion

. See United Stat es v. Saget , 377 F.3d 223, 226-27 ( 2d Cir. 2004) (“It is cl ear that a court

faced with an out-of- court t esti monial st atement nee d not perfor m the Ro berts reliabil ity

analysi s, as Craw ford replac es that analy sis wit

h a bright -li ne rule dr awn from the historicalorigi ns of the Con frontation C lause.”). The lynchpin of the Craw ford decisio n thu s is its di sti nc tio n b etw ee n t es tim on ial an d n on tes tim on ial he ar sa y; simply put, t he rule announced in Craw ford applie s only to the for me r cate gor y of sta tem ents

. Craw ford , 541 U. S. at __, 12 4 S. Ct. at 1374. As the Court

explai ned: “Where nonte sti monial hearsay i s at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers’ design t o afford . . . f

lexibi lit y i n the[] de velopment of hearsay law--as does Ro berts , and as would an a pproach that exempted
suc h sta tem ents fro m C onf ron tatio n C laus e sc rutin y altog ethe r.” Id. 7 Thus, unle ss a particular hears ay s tate ment quali fies asAgostini v. Felton , 521 U .S. 203 , 237 ( 199 7); Si erra v . Romaine , 347 F .3d 559, 57 5 n.27 (3d Cir. 2003 ).
11 “testimonial ,” Craw ford is i napplic able and Ro berts still controls.

Notwithst anding the centra lit y of t he term t o its decisi on, the Craw ford Court expres sly decli ned to provi de a comprehensive defini tion of “ test imonialstat ements. ” Craw ford , 541 U.S . at __, 1 24 S . Ct. at 13 74; id. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 1378 (Rehnquist , C.J. , concurring). It di d, however, referenc e several “formulat ions of [t

he] core c lass of

‘tes timoni al’ s tate ments” and furthe r prov ided s om e con crete e xam ples o f evid ence that is obv iou sly testim oni al. Craw ford , 541 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 136 4; see also United S tates v. Ma nfre , 368 F.3 d 83 2, 83 8 n.1 (8th Cir . 2004) ( “The Court in Craw ford specifi call y l eft ambiguous the de finition of ‘t esti monial’ but did not l eave us withou t some be nch m arks.”).

Craw ford had s ugg ested d efinin g testim onial sta teme nts as “‘ ex parte in-cour

t tes timony

or it s functi onal equi valent --that is, materi al such as affidavi ts, custodi al examinations, prior test imony t

hat the defendant was unabl e to cros s-examine or similar p retrial statem ents tha t decla rants w ould reaso nably expect t o be used prose cutori ally .’” 541 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 1364 (quoti ng Brief for Petiti oner Crawford). In it s opini on, the Court adopte d Crawford’s sugges tion as examples of t esti monial statements to which its opi nion would apply. The Court also referr ed to Justice Thomas’ earlier defini tion of “ test imonial statem ents” a s “‘ex trajudic ial statem ents . . . con tained in formalized testi monial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior test imony, or confess ions. ’” 541 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 1364 (quoti ng Wh ite v. Illinois , 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J. , concurring)) . The thi rd and broades t formulation, offe re d t o t he C ou rt b y amicus curiae the Nati onal Associ ation of CriminalDefense Lawyers ( “NAC DL”), would define test imonialstat ements as t hose “‘made under

circumst ances which would lead an obj ecti ve witness reasonably t o belie ve that t he stat ement[s] would be avail able for use at a l ater t

rial .’”12 541 U.S . at __ , 124 S. C t. 13 64 ( quo ting Bri ef o f N AC DL ). Finally, the Court provided sever al concr ete example s of obviousl y t esti monial st atements , refe rencing: “prior test imony [give n] at a p relimin ary hearin g, before a g rand jury, or at a former tri al; and t o poli ce inter rogations .” 54 1 U.S. at __ , 124 S. Ct. a t 13 74.
As we noted above, t

he Court decl ined to a dopt any spec ific de finition of “te stimo nial state men ts.” Instea d, it resol ved the cas e by noting that formal “[s ]tat ements taken by police officer s in the course of interr ogations are . . . te sti monial under even a nar

row standar d.” Craw ford , 541 U. S. at __, 12 4 S. Ct. 1364 . The C ourt therefore h eld that the trial court’s admissi on of Mrs. Crawford’s s tate ments to t he polic e as evide nce a gains t Craw ford violate d his rig hts un der the Sixth Am end me nt.
With this sum mary in p lace, it is no w a ppro priate to consider how the Confrontat ion Clause analy sis in Craw ford applies to the case at bar.

A. The Title II I Recordings Following t

he decisi on in Craw ford , the co urts of appe als have str uggled with t

he defini tion of “ test imonialhearsay .” See, e.g. , United S tates v. Rodrigu ez-M arrero , 390 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2004) (“We conclude that Llaur ador’s s igned confes sion, prese nted u nder oath to the pro secu tor in P uerto R ico, is te st imo ni al hears ay

wit hi n the me aning g iv en b yth e Supr eme Court [in Craw ford ].”); United Stat es v. Cromer , 389 F.3d 662, 674 (6th C ir. 2004 ) (stating that “[ a] statem ent m ade k now ingly to th e a ut ho riti es th at d es cr ib es cr im in al a cti vi ty is alm os t al w ays test imonial ” and thus conc luding t hat CI’s stat ement to pol ice wherein CI impl icat ed defendant in crimina l act ivit y cons tit uted testimo nial he arsay); Parle v . Run nels , 387 F .3d 10 30, 10 37 (9 th Cir. 20 04) (su gges ting, in d ictum , that statem ents co ntaine d in diary con stituted n ontes timon ial hea rsay); United Stat es v. Bruno , 383 F.3d 65, 78 (2d Cir. 2004) (st ating t hat ple a allocu tion tran script an d gra nd ju ry testimon y of un availa ble witn esses c onstitu ted testim onial h earsay); see g enera llyRob ert P. Mostell er, Crawford v. Washington : Encouragi ng & Securing13 the Confront ation of

Witnesses , 39 U. Rich. L. Rev. 511, 533- 615 (20 05).

Under Titl e III of the Omnibus Crime Contr ol and Safe Street s Act of 1968, 18 U.S. C. § 2510 et seq. , a dul y aut horized law enforcement

officer must obtain approval f rom the Unite d States Attorney

General or adesignat ed Assist ant Attor ney Ge neral in orde r to app ly to a fed eral jud ge fo r app rova l to intercept and rec ord w ire comm unications. 18 U .S.C. § 251 6(1); see also United Stat es v. Gior dano , 416 U.S . 505 , 512 -13 (19 74)

. Once such approval is obt ained, the offi cer must pr esent t o a judge a writ

ten appl icat ion for a wir etap, 18 U.S.C. § 2518, which must conta in an adequat e and part icularized s howing of probable c ause. 18 U.S. C. § 2518(3)(b). I t must al so contai n a showing of necess ity , 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c ), and expl ain why “normal i nvesti gative techni ques would be of no avai l.” United St at es v. Adams , 759 F.2d 1099, 1114 (3d Cir. 1985). The Government must furt

her take steps to minimize t he monitoring of nonpertinent conver sati ons and other wise to l imit

invasi ons of privac y. 18 U .S.C. § 251 8(5); see g enera lly United Stat es v. Sorapu ru , 902 F. Supp. 1322 (D. Colo. 1995) . In t he inst ant case, t he Distr ict Court

determi ned that

the wiret aps at i ssue were “legal ly

suffici ent in t erms of authority , probabl e cause, necessi ty , and mini mizati on.” J. A. at 39. Those findi ngs are not befo re this co urt.
As recounted i n Section I , the Distri ct Court r uled that multi ple conver sati ons between the various Defendants and other t hird par ties surreptiti ously

intercepted by

law enforcement through Title II I wiret aps were tes timoni al st atements and thus inadmiss ible unl ess the parti cular s peakers i n any gi ven conve rsation we re to testify at tri al. The D istrict Court’s decisi on to excl ude the Title II I recor dings on the basis of Craw ford --under an y conceivable d efinition of “testimo nial”--
was error. Indeed, at oralargument, counsel for the defens e was un ab le t o a rg ue to th e c on tra ry.
First and foremost, the rec orded convers ations here at issue n either fall with in no r are an alogo us to a ny of the spec ific
exa mp les o f tes timo nial s tatem ents me ntio ned by the Co urt.14 Craw ford , 541 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 1374 (li sti ng “prior tes tim on y [g iv en ] a t a p re lim in ar y he ar in g, b ef or e a gr an d j ur y, or at a f ormer trial[ ,] and . . . pol ice i nterr ogations ” as examples of obviousl y t esti monial st atements ). Second, the rec orded conversations do not

qualif y as “testimonial ” under any of the three d efinition s me ntione d by the C ourt. T hey are n ot “ ex parte in-cour t tes timony

or it s functi onal equi valent ,” nor ar e they “ex traju dicia l state me nts . . . c ont aine d in for ma lized

. . . materi als, such as affi davits , deposi tions , pri or tes timony , or confessi ons.” 541 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 1364 (i nternal citations and quotat ions omit ted). Each of the example s refer red to by the C ourt o r the de finition s it cons idered entails a form ality to the s tate ment absent

from the re corded st atements at is sue here. Even cons idered in perspective of the broad defi niti on offered by

the NACD L, the Ti tle I II re cordings cannot be deemed “testimonial ” as the s peakers ce rtainly did not make t

he statem ents thin king that the y “‘wo uld b e ava ilable fo r use a t a late r tr ial. ’” Craw ford , 541 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. 1364 (quoting Brief of NA CD L). Rathe r, the very purpose o f Title III intercepts i s to capt

ure convers ations that t he parti cipant s beli eve are no t being heard by the au thorities a nd w ill not be availa ble for use i n a prosecution.

A witness “who makes a formal stat ement to gover nment officers bears testimony in a sense that a pers on who makes a casual r emark to an acqua intanc e does not. ” Craw ford , 541 U. S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 1364. The Ti tle I II re cordings here at issue are much more si milar to the latter than the former. Ther efore, as recognized by other courts that have addressed similar i ssues, we find that

the sur repti tious ly

monitored c onversat ions and stat ements cont ained i n the Tit le II I recor dings ar e not “testimonial ” for purpos es of Craw ford

. See Horton v. All en , 370 F.3d 75, 84 ( 1st Cir . 2004) ( finding “ stat ements . . . made durin g a pr ivate c onv ersation ” non testimo nial); State v. Rivera , 844 A.2d 191, 202 (Conn. 2004) (“Glanvi lle made t he stat ement in confi dence and on his own initi ative to a cl ose famil y member

. . . . [It ] clearly

does not fal l within the core categor y of ex parte te stimo nial state men ts that the cour t was conc erned with in Craw ford .”). Cf. United Stat es v. Robins on , 367 F.3d 278, 292 n.20 (5t h Cir. 2004) (“[T]he st atement cha llenge d as hears ay was8 For ex ample, i f the Unit ed State s urges t hat a particul ar Title III reco rding is adm issib le as a coconspi rator stat ement, t

he Distri ctCo urt m ust dete rmin e, inter alia , that the s tate ment was made “‘in fur

theranc e of’” the con spira cy. United Stat es v. Ellis , 156 F.3d 493 , 4 96 ( 3d Ci r. 199 8) (quot in g an d co nst ru in g Fe d. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) (E)). We take no posit ion on whether the Distri ct C ourt should undertake such inquiri es pri or to t rial , or dur ing the course of t

rialas the various obj ecti ons ari se.

15 made during the course of t he conspir acy and is non-t esti monial in natu re.”); United Stat es v. Rey es , 362 F .3d 53 6, 541 n.4 (8 th Cir. 2004 ) (“[C]o-co nspirator statemen ts are nontestimo nial.”); People v. Cook , 815 N .E.2d 879 , 893 (Ill. App. C t. 2004) (“[I]f the statements i n question qualify as co-conspirator st atements, the rul e announced in Craw ford does not ap ply to bar th eir admission .”).

Inasmuch as t

he Distr ict Court

erroneous ly

inter preted t he Craw ford ruling as requiring the rejection of the Title III recordings, we will reverse i ts order denying the United States’ motion in limi ne . As w e conclud ed abo ve, the Title III recordings a re not testimonial. B ecause o f the D istrict Court’s reli ance on Craw ford , it never considered whe ther the Title III conversations were admis sibl e under the proper st andards se t forth in the F edera l Rule s of E viden ce an d, to the exten t it is applicable, the reliability standard unde r Ro berts , 448 U.S . at 66

. But see Bourjaily v. United Stat es , 483 U.S. 171, 183-84 (1987) (“[W]e hold t

hat the Confrontat ion Clause doe s not re quire a court t o embark on an independe nt inquiryinto t he reli ability

of state me nts th at sa tisfy th e req uire me nts o f [F ed. R . Ev id.] 801 (d)(2 )(E ).”). Cf. United Stat es v. I nadi , 475 U.S. 387, 399- 400 (19 86) (holding that Con frontation C lause does not require the pro secu tion to s how that 80 1(d)(2 )(E) d eclara nt is unavail able). Therefore, on remand the Dist rict Court is direct ed to dete rmine on an individ ualize d bas is wh ether e ach o f the T itle III r ecordings is admis sibl e (and, i f admissible, against whom and fo r what p urpose). 8 B. The Conversations Involving CI Rivera The Distric t Cou rt also ru led tha t the U nited S tates co uld9 Of course, the vari ous defendant s and coconspi rator s, as the oth er h alf o f the con ver satio nal e qua tion , c ertai nl y di d not reali ze that the ir statem ents w ere go ing to be used pr os ec ut or ial ly. And, as exp lained in the a bov e text, be caus e they co nstitute adm issions unw ittingly mad e, the d efen dants and coconspirators’ porti ons of t

he CIRivera conver sati ons are cl early nontest imonial st atem ents and are thus not subj ect t o the Craw ford rule

. See UnitedStates v. Saget , 377 F.3d 223, 229-30 (2d Ci r
. 20 04 ) ( “We

. . . conclude that Beckham’s statements t o t he CI were not test imonial , and Craw ford does no t bar their admission .”).
16 not int roduce conver sati ons between CI River a and vari ous of the Defendants . Although oc casional ly a tel ephone conversation betw een R ivera a nd o ne of the D efen dants wa s cau ght in a Title III wiretap, the con versations that fall w ithin this heading are face-t o-face conver sati ons that were recorded by

Rivera weari ng a tapi ng device pr ovided by the Government. It cannot be disput ed that

CI Rivera knew of the Government ’s sur repti tious recordi ng and documentati on of these c onversat ions. The Distri ct Court not ed that , “[i ]n disc ussing t he ‘core’ class of state me nts th at are con side red testim oni al, the . . . [ Craw ford ] Court speci fical ly

include d ‘. . . pret

rialstat ements that declarants w ould reaso nably expect to be used pro secutorially.’” J.A. at 68 (quoti ng Craw ford , 541 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 1364). The Dist

rict Court reas oned that

because CI River a was working with t

he Government for t

he very reason of obt aining evidence against the D efenda nts for use in the Gov ernmen t’s invest igati on and prosecution, t he conversations fel l within the rule of Craw ford

. Th e D istrict Co urt’s ana lysis is n ot w itho ut so me app eal. Insofar as they contai n the st atements of CI Rivera, the conversations re asonably could be cat egorize d as invol ving sta tem en ts t ha t R iv er a e xp ec ted to be us ed pr os ec ut or ial ly; obtaining evidence for

the pros ecuti on is, after all, the rais on d’être of b eing a confidentia l inform ant. 9 However, the Craw ford decisio n cites w ith app rova l Bourjaily v. United States , 483 U.S. 171 ( 1987), a ca se in which t he Court rej ected a Confrontat ion Clause obj ecti on to the a dmissi on of a17 conversation between a co- defendant and a c onfident ial pol ice informant . Indeed, the Craw ford Court refe renced Bo urjaily as an exam ple of a ca se in wh ich nontestim onial statemen ts were correctly admitt ed against

the defendant

despit e the l ack of a prio r op por tun ity for c ross -ex am inati on. See Craw ford , 541 U.S. at __, 124 S.Ct. at 1368 (ci ting Bo urjaily , 483 U.S. at 181- 84).

In Bo urjaily , the Court addres sed the admi ssibi lit y of admissi ons made unwittingly by Will iam Bourjai ly ’s codefendant ( and purport ed coconspir ator) to an inf ormant. The Court held t

hat even t

hough Bourjaily had not had a prior opportuni ty

to cros s-examine hi s co-defendant regardi ng the stat ements, if the stat ements were admis sibl e under Fed. R. Evid. 801 (d)(2)(E ) their intro ductio n as e viden ce ag ainst B ourjaily did not run afo ul o f the Co nfr ont ation Cla use
. Bo urjaily , 483 U.S. at 183. The Court r eached thi s outcome despi te the fact t hat the co-defendant was, due to his invocation of the privil ege against self-inc rimi natio n, “u nav ailab le” to testif y at trial. Bo urjaily , 483 U.S . at 18 2. A s m entio ned , Craw ford appr oved of this holding, citing it as an example of a cas e that is “cons ist ent with” the principle that the Si xth Amendment permit s the admissi on of nontestimonialstat ements in t he absence of a prior opp ortu nity fo r cro ss-e xam inati on. Craw ford , 541 U.S. at __, 124 S.C t. at 13 67.

To b e sure , there is a diffe rence betw een th e ana lysis undertake n by t

he Court in Bo urjaily and the analysi s urged by the Defendants here. Spec ific ally , in Bo urjaily , the Court focused on the unavailability of the coconspirator whose conversation with a c onfident ial informant the Government sought t o intr oduce. In c ontras t, t he Defendants her e emphasize the unavai labil ity

of the confi dentia l infor mant. St ated otherwis e, al though the Bo urjaily Court addres sed the Confrontat ion Clause implicat ions of t he admissi on of conversations with a government i nformant, it foc used on the non-infor

mant half of t

he conversation. During oralargument befor e us, t he United States conceded that

it was not

seeking t o intr oduce the st atements of18 CI Rivera for

their trut h and thus cor

rectly argued that

the intro duc tion of h is sta tem ents wo uld pre sen t no hea rsay p rob lem

. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). As recognized by the Craw ford Co urt, the Confront ation Cl ause li kewise “does not bar the us e of test imonialstat ements for pur poses othe r than es tabli shing the trut h of the matt er asse rted. ” Craw ford , 541 U. S. at __, 12 4 S. Ct. 13 69 n .9; see also Un ited Sta tes v. T rala , 386 F.3d 536, 544- 45 (3d Cir. 2004) (fi nding no Confrontation Cla use viol ation where reli ability

of out-of- court s tate ments was not at issue and wh ere th e sta tem ents we re n ot in trod uce d fo r the ir truth ). The refor e, eve n if w e w ere to h old tha t CI R ivera’s statem ents wit hi n the co nve rs at io ns ar e the mse lv es te st im oni al , an i ss ue we need not re ach, such an outcome would not pr eclude t he United States from introducing CI Rivera’s stat ements for a purpose other t han establ ishi ng the tr

uth of the matter s contained there in.

Due to the Craw ford Court’s r eaffir mation of Bo urjaily , we conclude that

the part y admis sion and cocons pirat or port ions of the di sputed CI River a conversations ar e nontestimonialand thus, assuming compli ance with t he Federal Rules of Evidence , are a dm issib le. See also Saget , 377 F.3d at 229-30. St ated oth erw ise, Craw ford present s no bar t o the admiss ion of the stat ements of Defendants or thei r coconspi rator s made in the
con ver satio ns w ith C I Ri ver a tha t he s urre ptitio usly re cor ded

. Under these circumstance s, we conclude that t he Government should be pe rmitt ed to int roduce the balance of t

he conversations, i.e ., t

he stat ements of CI River a which, as t he Government argues, put the s tate ments of the other par ties to the conversations “i nto pers pecti ve and make them int elli gible to the jury and recogni zable as admissi ons.” United Stat es v. M cD ow ell , 918 F.2d 1004, 1007 (1st Ci r. 1990) (int ernal citations and q uotatio ns om itted); see also United Stat es v. Stelt en , 867 F .2d 45 3, 454 (8th C ir. 1988 ) (per c uriam ); United States v. Gutie rrez- Chavez , 842 F.2d 77, 81 (5th C ir. 1988); United Stat es v. Murray , 618 F.2d 892, 900 (2d Cir. 198 0); Un ited Sta tes v. L emo nakis , 485 F.2d 941, 948 -49 (D .C. Cir. 197 3).

We thus hold that if a Defendant or hi s or her10 In a n argum ent posi ted in t he alt ernative, Defendant Hendricks, joined by

Defendants Laronde and Fl eming, argue that
even if the Distri ctCourt miscons trued Craw ford , this cou rt shou ld not revers e bec ause the D istrict Co urt’s de cisio n t o exclude t he disput ed evi dence w as also based on finding s of unreliability-- findings to which the De fendan ts suggest this cou rt should defer. See Br. of Appell ee Hendricks at12. But see Bo urjaily , 483 U. S. at 184. The Defendants are c orrect that r elia

bili ty determi nations
are matte rs pec uli arly wit hin the k en o f the distr ict co urts. See UnitedStates v. Lawr ence , 349 F.3d 109, 115 (3d Cir. 200 3); UnitedStates v. Starks , 515 F.2d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 1975). Here, ho wev er, the Dist

rict Court’s de cisi on to excl ude the di sputed evidence wa s base d on its erron eous inte rp retation of Craw ford and
cons eque ntly did not turn on any findings of unre liability. For this reason, the al ternative argument is unconvi ncing.
19 coconspir ator makes s tate ments as par t of a re ciproca l and integr ated conver sati on with a government informant

who later becomes unavail able for tri al, the Confront ation Cl ause does not bar the introduction of the informant ’s portions of t he conversation as ar e reasonably r equired to place t he defendant or
coco nspira tor’s no ntestim onial sta teme nts into conte xt. Accordingly , the Distri ct Court’ s ruling to excl ude the conversations i nvolving CI Rive ra on the ba sis of Craw ford was error. Non etheless, as we stated abov e in respect to the T itle III recordi ngs, on r emand the District Court must det ermine on an indivi dualiz ed basis whether each of t he disput ed conversations is i ndeed authentic and otherwise admis sibl e under the Rules of Evidence and the decisi onal law thereon.

III. We therefore will grant the United States’ appeal, reverse the order of the Dist

rict Court, and remand for furt her proceedi ngs not i nconsist ent with t his opi nion. 10