FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D2024-0071

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DANIEL JULIO DOMINGUEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

MAJOR JEFF CLOUTIER, Director,

Alachua County Department of 

the Jail,

Respondent.

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Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus—Original Jurisdiction.

January 31, 2024

ON EMERGENCY PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

PER CURIAM.

Having reviewed Respondent’s return, it is the judgment of 

the Court that Petitioner shall be released on Monday, February 

5, 2024, at noon, unless the trial court enters an order setting 

reasonable conditions of pretrial release or conducts further 

proceedings and enters an order under section 907.041(5)(c), 

Florida Statutes. No costs or charges are awarded to either party.

LEWIS and LONG, JJ., concur; RAY, J., concurs with opinion.
2

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No Motions for Rehearing will be permitted.

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RAY, J., concurs with opinion.

The Florida Constitution guarantees that a presumptively 

innocent individual will be released prior to trial on reasonable 

conditions. Art. I, § 14, Fla. Const. Because the petitioner is not 

charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by life in 

prison, the only exception to this guarantee is if a court finds that 

no conditions of pretrial release can reasonably protect the 

community, ensure the presence of the accused, or ensure the 

integrity of the judicial process. See id. That has not occurred. Yet, 

the petitioner has been detained indefinitely based on nothing 

more than an arrest on probable cause. I therefore concur with the 

decision to order the petitioner’s release unless the trial court 

enters an order setting reasonable conditions of pretrial release or 

conducts further proceedings and enters an order containing 

findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting pretrial 

detention. 

The Florida Legislature has implemented the constitutional 

right to pretrial release by statute, and the Florida Supreme Court 

has adopted procedural rules for pretrial release determinations. 

See §§ 907.041, 903.046, Fla. Stat.; Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.131, 3.132. 

For non-dangerous crimes, there is a presumption of release on 

nonmonetary conditions. § 907.041(3)(a), Fla. Stat. For dangerous 

crimes, a monetary condition is required at first appearance upon 

the finding of probable cause. § 907.041(5)(b), Fla. Stat. In both 

situations, the court must consider a variety of factors to 

determine whether nonmonetary conditions, monetary conditions, 

or a combination of both will protect the community against 

unreasonable danger from the defendant, ensure the return of the 

defendant, and ensure the integrity of the judicial process. See

§ 907.041(3)(a), Fla. Stat.; § 903.046(2)(a)–(m), Fla. Stat. (listing 

factors); § 903.047(1)(a)–(c), Fla. Stat. (listing conditions of pretrial 

release). If the court determines that no conditions of release will 

accomplish these objectives and the statutory criteria for pretrial 
3

detention are otherwise satisfied, the court must enter an order of 

detention supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law. See

§ 907.041(5)(k), Fla. Stat.

More to the point here, without an order of detention, the 

court must set reasonable conditions that will put the accused out 

on bail (read: release pending trial). There is a legislative 

expectation, consistent with the constitutional guarantee of 

pretrial release, that a person will not be imprisoned prior to trial 

without a determination by a court that there are no conditions of 

release that could reasonably protect the community, ensure the 

presence of the accused, or ensure the integrity of the judicial 

process.

Here, the State did not seek pretrial detention and there is no 

order of detention. Instead, the trial court granted the petitioner 

pretrial release with conditions including restrictions on travel, a 

prohibition on the possession of weapons or firearms, GPS 

monitoring, and a $500,000 bond. As to the financial condition, the 

undisputed evidence showed that the petitioner cannot afford that 

amount. The petitioner testified that he was not working prior to 

being arrested and does not have any income or real property. He 

said that he does have a “small amount of savings, about $15,000,” 

and a small scooter, worth $1,500 at most, if sold. His parents 

testified that unless they sold their house, all they could contribute 

was $10,000. The State chose not to cross-examine the petitioner

or offer contradictory evidence about his financial condition. Thus, 

the most we know is that the petitioner and his family can only 

come up with $25,000 or a $250,000 bond.1

While this court has previously stated that monetary bail is 

not per se excessive or unreasonable simply because the accused is 

unable to pay it, Dyson v. Campbell, 921 So. 2d 692, 693 (Fla. 1st 

1 Lest there be any concern that defendants have no incentive 

to fully disclose their financial condition in bail determination 

proceedings, there are consequences for a lack of candor. See

§ 903.035(3), Fla. Stat. (making it a crime to intentionally provide 

false or misleading material information or intentionally omit 

material information in connection with an application for bail or 

for modification of bail). 
4

DCA 2006), there is nothing in this record to explain how the trial 

court reached the $500,000 amount. By ordering pretrial release, 

but then conditioning that release on an amount that is not even 

remotely close to what the petitioner can afford, the court has 

converted a condition of release into a jail term without the State 

or the court meeting their respective obligations under the pretrial 

detention scheme. See Mendenhall v. Sweat, 158 So. 280, 281–82 

(Fla. 1934) (“Where a petitioner . . . is entitled to bail he is entitled 

to be released on bail in a reasonable amount, and in such case the 

amount of bail should not be fixed in so excessive an amount as to 

preclude the probability of an ordinary citizen in like 

circumstances and conditions as those of the accused being able to 

furnish, after taking into consideration the gravity of the charge.”); 

cf. Rogers v. State, 966 So. 2d 490, 491 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) 

(denying habeas petition alleging unaffordable bail because the 

defendant failed to present evidence to the trial court that the 

amount of bail was beyond his ability to meet).

In defense of the monetary bail amount, the State argues that 

a defendant’s financial resources are only one of the factors a trial 

court must consider when determining what conditions of release 

will ensure the defendant’s appearance in court and protect the 

public from risk of harm. See § 903.046, Fla. Stat.; Fla. R. Crim. P. 

3.131(b)(3). I do not disagree. The statute and procedural rule set 

forth a comprehensive list of factors for the court to consider, and 

it appears that the court carefully considered those factors. Given 

the seriousness of the charge against the petitioner and other 

considerations, the court was justifiably concerned about placing 

the community at risk of harm through the petitioner’s release. 

But while the court has wide discretion in fashioning appropriate 

conditions of release—after it makes the threshold determination 

to release the accused—it must stop short of imposing a 

requirement that simply cannot be met.2

2 It is worth noting that monetary bail, by itself, does not 

protect the community from risk of harm because funds posted to 

satisfy such a condition will not be forfeited in the event the 

accused commits a new crime following release. See § 903.26(2)(a), 

Fla. Stat. (governing when and how bonds are forfeited).
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The concern of trial judges about the possibility of releasing 

someone who is dangerous or likely to flee is understandable. It 

therefore bears repeating that “[i]f no conditions of release can 

reasonably protect the community from risk of physical harm to 

persons, assure the presence of the accused at trial, or assure the 

integrity of the judicial process, the accused may be detained.” Art. 

I, § 14, Fla. Const. The process for achieving pretrial detention is 

clear and specific. But the pretrial detention statute cannot be 

circumvented through the imposition of an unachievable condition 

of release. 

For these reasons, the petitioner is being illegally detained. I 

agree with the decision to order his release unless the trial court 

enters an order setting reasonable conditions of pretrial release or 

conducts further proceedings and enters an order pursuant to 

section 907.041(5) of the Florida Statutes.

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Stacy A. Scott, Public Defender, and Alexis J. Giannasoli, 

Assistant Public Defender, Gainesville, for Petitioner.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Zachary Lawton, Assistant 

Attorney General, Tallahassee; Brian Stuart Kramer, State 

Attorney, Gainesville, for Respondent.