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i

43–250 2008

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–120]

HEARING

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED

PROGRAMS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS

ON

BUDGET REQUEST ON U.S. STRATEGIC

POSTURE AND BUDGET REQUEST FOR

STRATEGIC PROGRAMS

HEARING HELD

FEBRUARY 27, 2008

(II)

STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, Chairman

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas

RICK LARSEN, Washington

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama

RUDY BARNES, Professional Staff Member

KARI BINGEN, Professional Staff Member

ZACH STEACY, Staff Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2008

Page

HEARING:

Wednesday, February 27, 2008, Fiscal Year 2009 National Defense Authorization Act—Budget Request on U.S. Strategic Posture and Budget Request

for Strategic Programs ......................................................................................... 1

APPENDIX:

Wednesday, February 27, 2008 .............................................................................. 25

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2008

FISCAL YEAR 2009 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST ON U.S. STRATEGIC POSTURE AND BUDGET REQUEST

FOR STRATEGIC PROGRAMS

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Everett, Hon. Terry, a Representative from Alabama, Ranking Member, Strategic Forces Subcommittee .................................................................................. 3

Tauscher, Hon. Ellen O., a Representative from California, Chairman, Strategic Forces Subcommittee ..................................................................................... 1

WITNESSES

Chilton, Gen. Kevin P., Commander, United States Strategic Command, U.S.

Air Force ............................................................................................................... 5

D’Agostino, Thomas P., Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy ........................................................................ 7

Vickers, Hon. Michael, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations,

Low-Intensity Conflict, and Interdependent Capabilities, U.S. Department

of Defense ............................................................................................................. 10

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Chilton, Gen. Kevin P. ..................................................................................... 29

D’Agostino, Thomas P. ..................................................................................... 50

Vickers, Hon. Michael ...................................................................................... 61

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Mr. Everett ........................................................................................................ 93

Mr. Reyes .......................................................................................................... 96

Ms. Tauscher ..................................................................................................... 77

Mr. Thornbery ................................................................................................... 96

(1)

FISCAL YEAR 2009 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST ON U.S. STRATEGIC

POSTURE AND BUDGET REQUEST FOR STRATEGIC

PROGRAMS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 27, 2008.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in room

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ellen Tauscher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, STRATEGIC

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

Ms. TAUSCHER. Good afternoon. This hearing of the Strategic

Forces Subcommittee will come to order.

The purpose of today’s hearing is to examine the United States

strategic posture and the fiscal year 2009 budget request for strategic programs, including nuclear weapons, missile defense, intelligence, and military space assets.

Our committee has jurisdiction over each of these areas, tracking

closely with the reach of the U.S. Strategic Command, or

STRATCOM. Therefore, I want to thank General Kevin Chilton,

commander of STRATCOM, for being here today.

The committee also charges the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) with developing and maintaining the nuclear

warheads that support our strategic deterrents. For that reason, I

want to thank Mr. Tom D’Agostino, the Under Secretary of Energy

for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the NNSA, for appearing

here today.

Finally, I want to welcome Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael Vickers, whose portfolio—Special Operations, Low-Intensity

Conflict, and Interdependent Capabilities—includes establishing

the strategic policies that General Chilton is charged with executing.

We asked each of you to be here today because your interconnected roles are very important to this committee. I believe

that, to examine the strategic posture of the United States, each

of you are needed to help paint a full picture.

Highlighted through an op-ed authored by former Defense Secretary Bill Perry, former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and

George Schultz, and former Senator Sam Nunn, there is a growing

bipartisan chorus of statesmen and experts calling for the U.S. to

adopt a policy designed to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons.

2

In response, this subcommittee has called for a larger national

discussion of this issue, and the Congress has acted. The National

Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) establishes a bipartisan commission to examine U.S. strategic posture and recommend an appropriate policy for the 21st century. The goal of the Commission

will be to determine the proper balance between our nuclear and

conventional forces and review the roles of our Nation’s nonproliferation and Missile Defense Program.

I hope that each of you here today can assure the subcommittee

that the Administration will fully support this bipartisan Commission.

We would also like your input on what key questions the Commission should consider. What do you think has changed in our security environment since the last Nuclear Posture Review, NPR,

that should be explored? And how has the concept of strategic deterrence shifted since the end of the Cold War?

Since we have both the head of STRATCOM and the NNSA with

us, I would ask that both parties give us a sense of how the Administration is looking at Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) this

year as well as Complex Transformation from both a programmatic

and strategic perspective.

During the past year, we have had vigorous discussions here and

abroad over the U.S. proposal to install missile defense interceptors

in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic. I have traveled to Europe several times over the past year to show our European allies

how seriously we take our shared security interests.

I have urged the Administration to work through the National

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to establish a joint U.S.-European missile defense capability. I have urged them to ‘‘NATO-ize’’

the shield and focus on the threat posed by short-and mediumrange missiles pointed at Europe and our forward-deployed troops.

Our key concern about missile defense is that the Bush Administration’s budget request appears to delay the use of a very important system for defeating short-and medium-range missiles—Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). In that regard, we are

particularly interested in the warfighter’s perspective on the requirements for these and other systems designed to defeat the

threat posed by short-and medium-range missiles.

Finally, one year ago, we dealt with an ill-advised and dangerous

Chinese anti-satellite test (ASAT). Just last week, we witnessed

the U.S. successfully intercept a failed satellite on the verge of reentering the atmosphere and threatening populated areas with

1,000 pounds of hydrazine fuel. The missile we used to intercept

this satellite was part of our Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System

(BMD).

I applaud the open manner in which our military has explained

and executed this mission. As I see it, our Nation took responsibility for eliminating a risk we created ourselves.

General Chilton, you and General Cartwright, as well as your

whole team, should be commended for a job well done. We used a

defensive system to defend life, limb, and property. The Commanding Officer and the crew of the Lake Erie deserve our congratulations and thanks for a very tough job.

3

I also see this event as a sign that the U.S. must establish more

thoughtful international protocols for space-faring nations. As a

Nation critically dependent on space assets, such steps are vital to

our national security interests.

Today, I would ask you to address the following concerns about

our space assets: What is our national and military policy if our

space assets are attacked? Do we have contingency plans for closing the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) gaps

that our warfighters would experience? And, finally, what are the

merits and drawbacks of establishing rules for the road in space?

While we are all acutely aware of the stress six and a half years

of war have placed on our military, I want to be clear: The United

States faces pressing strategic challenges beyond Afghanistan and

Iraq. This subcommittee takes these issues seriously, and we intend to advance the discussion and chart the right path for the

United States.

Now let me turn to our Ranking Member, Mr. Everett, for any

comments he might have.

But, before I do, I just want to take note that, as we kick off the

fiscal year 2009 authorization cycle, we do so mindful that our

ranking member will be retiring at the end of the year.

Mr. Everett, you have been a great asset to Congress and to the

American people, and a credit to your constituents, and to this

committee and subcommittee. I am grateful to you for your good

work, and your partnership, and your friendship, and I want you

and our audience to know that I will be working with Chairman

Skelton to honor your service in the fiscal year 2009 National Defense Authorization Act.

Mr. Everett, the floor is yours.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TERRY EVERETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, RANKING MEMBER, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. EVERETT. Madam Chairman, I do not know how to follow

that. Thank you very much. You are most kind to make that statement, and I do appreciate—very much appreciate—our friendship,

and I appreciate the work that I am going to mention that you

have done in this committee. I am going to mention it in my opening statement.

And I also want to join you in recognizing our witnesses today

for appearing before us.

We welcome you back, General, in your new position.

General CHILTON. Thank you, sir.

Mr. EVERETT. I will say you have my congratulations or condolences, whichever you prefer. But, no, we appreciate the expertise

that you bring to that position.

And I also want to join the chairman in congratulating our witnesses for their efforts in successfully intercepting a disabled National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) satellite last week. This challenging mission was not one you had envisioned or one you had a

lot of time to prepare for, yet you did the job well and safeguarded

the public from potential harm. I commend the transparent manner in which your plans and intent were communicated to Congress, to the American people, and to the international community.

4

At a hearing two weeks ago, the Deputy Director of National Intelligence, Dr. Fingar, testified on the broad global threat and challenges facing the United States. Chief among these include the continuing terrorist threat, weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related proliferation, Iran and North Korea’s WMD and missile programs, increasing cyber-attacks on the U.S. networks, Pakistan nuclear security, growing counterspace threats, and China People’s

Liberation Army (PLA) modernization. These are the security challenges that will continue to shape our strategic forces posture and

policy well beyond traditional nuclear deterrence.

I would like to hear from our witnesses their thoughts on the

change in strategic environment, and its implications for our defense policy and capability needs. I remain concerned about our

space protection posture and how our military operates in a space

threat environment. Do military contingency plans and exercises

consider satellite attacks? I am told that we have workarounds and

alternatives, but I have found that when I pull a thread, there is

very little detail.

And perhaps, Madam Chairman, we could have a classified briefing on this later on.

The Chinese ASAT test remains a stark reminder to me of what

we are up against. The Chinese and others must know that attacks

against our satellites are simply unacceptable.

I appreciate your thoughts on policy options, Mr. Vickers, to

deter others from holding our space assets at risk and how we can

develop a more robust space architecture.

We have similar challenges in the cyber domain. I will be the

first to say this is an even less understood security risk than space.

Your observations are valued as we examine the National Cyber

Initiative and get our arms around the cyber elements spread

across the Federal Government. Last year, commanders from U.S.

Strategic Command (STRATCOM), U.S. Pacific Command

(PACOM), and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) testified to the need for

more missile defense inventory to keep pace with growing missile

threats.

General Chilton, I would like to ask you to discuss the

warfighters missile defense force structure requirements. I would

also like your assessment on the missile defense test program and

when you would have confidence in the operational effectiveness of

the missile defense system.

President Bush has met with Prime Minister Topolanek earlier

today and discussed the importance of missile defense and collective security. Polish Prime Minister Tusk visits the U.S. next

month.

I understand teams of Czech, Polish, and U.S. negotiators have

worked incredibly hard to obtain missile defense agreements. I

want to publicly thank them for their efforts and encourage a

speedy conclusion.

I would also publicly like to thank our chairman for the efforts

that she has made, which have been tremendous, in this endeavor.

She has done it in a very diplomatic way, and yet she, in my estimation, has moved the process forward.

5

These efforts reflect a shared commitment to our relationships

with our collective security. I hope our witnesses will expand upon

these negotiations.

I also understand we are making progress in NATO integration.

There again, I would like to thank the chairman for what she has

done in that regard.

I was recently briefed on the joint missile defense scenarios being

run between MDA and C2BMC System and NATO’s Prototype

Command and Control System. Building upon the 2001 Nuclear

Posture Review, the secretaries of defense, state, and energy released a statement last summer on U.S. national security and nuclear weapons and stated their intent to provide a detailed strategy

later this year.

With the witnesses assembled today, we have an opportunity to

discuss policy issues associated with strategic deterrence, the military’s nuclear requirements, their assessment of the current nuclear stockpile and Reliable Replacement Warhead Program, and

the viability, long-term risk, and force structure implications of the

future with life-extension weapons and RRW.

Before I close, I would like to acknowledge NNSA and the Administration, and credit them with implementing the largest nuclear stockpile reduction since the end of the Cold War. NNSA’s

dismantlement rates are at an all-time high. The Moscow Treaty

deductions for operational deployed strategic warheads are on

track.

The stockpile reduction directed by the President in 2004 to cut

the 2001 nuclear weapons stockpile by 50 percent by 2012 has already been accomplished, and an additional 15 percent reduction

was announced last September, and the nonproliferation program

has expanded to reflect the evolving proliferation threats.

Again, I want to pay tribute to our chairman. Much of what we

have done in this committee has been through her leadership, and

I am really proud to be associated with this committee under her

leadership.

Thank you very much.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Everett.

I will note for our witnesses that we have received your prepared

statements and are very appreciative that you have provided them

to the committee ahead of this afternoon’s hearing, and if you

would like to summarize your prepared testimony, we will be able

to move more quickly to questions.

General Chilton, we will start with you. The floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF GEN. KEVIN P. CHILTON, COMMANDER,

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND, U.S. AIR FORCE

General CHILTON. All right. Thank you.

Thank you, Madam Chairman and Representative Everett both,

for your leadership, and members of the committee, thank you very

much for this opportunity to be here and share my thoughts with

you and answer the questions that you have with regard to where

we are in STRATCOM and where we are headed.

I also want to thank not only the members personally, but also

your staffs for the great support and open dialogue we have had

between myself and your staffs, and my staff and your staffs. I

6

think it is one of the healthiest relationships we have, and I am

committed to continuing that open dialogue between STRATCOM

and the members of this committee and their staffs.

And I would be remiss if I did not thank you for your support

of our men and women in uniform.

I have been before this committee before in other hats. This is

my first time as the STRATCOM Commander and as a Joint Commander of Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and it is a proud opportunity that I have.

So it is congratulations, not condolences, Mr. Everett, and I

thank you for that.

To have this job, as the STRATCOM Commander, is both humbling, but also incredibly rewarding considering the quality of people that I work with, and the dedicated men and women we have

serving STRATCOM, which not only wear a uniform—we have a

tremendous number of civil servants in STRATCOM that support

our operations day in and day out, just as dedicated as our men

and women in uniform. I have become very proud of them and very

humbled that I can lead them.

If I could, I would appreciate if my statement could be submitted

for the record, ma’am.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Without objection.

General CHILTON. Thank you.

I will just to summarize just at the new commander briefly my

observations on the command and where I am taking the command.

First of all, I spent the first month immersing myself in the command and going out and visiting all my component commanders

and also taking the advice of Senator Nelson, who in my preparations for confirmation hearings, commended that I go out and immerse myself also in the nuclear enterprise, and so I have been out

and visited all of our laboratories in the Department of Energy

(DOE). I have the Pantex Plant on my schedule, as well as a visit

to Y–12 yet to come, and so I have taken that advice to heart.

As I look at the missions assigned to STRATCOM, we have a lot

of missions, a diverse set of missions, but what I found is there is

a thread that runs through all of our mission areas, and that is

they are global in nature. So STRATCOM truly has a global focus.

In fact, it may be better named a global command. But that is our

focus, and those are our mission areas.

But with eight mission areas, if all are important, the feeling is

that nothing is important, if they are all equally important. So I

had to focus myself on energy, and I have looked at these mission

areas very closely, and I divided them into two major groups.

One group is where I have forces assigned to STRATCOM, which

are conducting daily operations, 24–7, in mission areas, where I

have subordinate commanders who can do planning and who can

pass my orders on to tactical-level commanders and execute things

day in and day out. These are the mission areas that require 24–

7 attention by the command.

They are mission areas that operate daily across global boundaries and are totally agnostic to lines drawn on a map. Regional,

state boundaries, indeed continents do not matter to these mission

7

areas, and these mission areas are strategic deterrence, space, and

cyberspace.

And so I have made the effort to increase the staff at the headquarters’ focus and the command’s focus—daily focus—on not only

executing the missions we are assigned in these areas every day,

but making sure we are doing it in an integrated fashion.

The other mission areas we have are no less important, but in

these mission areas, I found we do not have forces assigned from

the services to conduct operations, and rather than having a focus

of operating across boundaries, these mission areas require

STRATCOM to lead in knitting together the seams between boundaries in the regional combatant commands. And this would be in

the areas of integrating missile defense, combating weapons of

mass destruction, information operations (IO), not to include network operations, and ISR.

I do not own a single ISR platform. I do not own any WMD forces

to go out and carry out that mission. I do not own IO forces that

conduct psychological operations or military detection, nor do I

have my finger on the trigger of our Missile Defense Program, but

our job is a very important one, is to make sure that these global

capabilities that have global concerns, cross-cutting concerns, are

knitted together appropriately, and we take that mission set very

seriously, equally seriously.

I guess I would close by saying that is the focus I have tried to

bring. I have also made some adjustments in the headquarters to

refocus on these areas, to bring the integration function up to the

headquarters, to reemphasize our leadership role and responsibility, particularly in the nuclear mission area, and we have made

some changes there that I think are moving the ball forward for

the future.

And you know what? It is pretty easy when you have the kind

of people I have working for me to make these kind of changes and

to move forward.

Again, I thank you for this opportunity to be with you today.

[The prepared statement of General Chilton can be found in the

Appendix on page 29.]

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, General Chilton.

Under Secretary D’Agostino, the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF THOMAS P. D’AGOSTINO, ADMINISTRATOR,

NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Certainly. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate the opportunity to testify here today before the committee.

I also appreciate the time you took this morning, and the committee took this morning, with Chairman Skelton to talk to Deputy

Administrator Will Tobey. He was pleased to be able to talk about

the programs on the nonproliferation side.

I would also like to point out we have a few of our future leaders,

I believe, sitting in the back, as we have done in the past, give

them an opportunity to see this country at work, and so I am always pleased to have them with me.

Mr. Everett, I appreciate your comments on the changes and the

improvements we have made in the stockpile, particularly our work

8

in dismantlement. We are very proud of that record, and we have

a lot more work to do, and we plan on continuing to focus.

The work done at the Pantex Plant, of course, is a key part of

that, as it is at Y–12. So we are going to keep the attention on that

particular element because it not only helps us with dismantlement, but it helps hone our skills that we need in order to deliver

products to the Defense Department (DOD).

I feel the nuclear weapons complex is at a crossroads. Maintaining the status quo and just keeping our complex kind of doing what

we did last year is not really an option, and I think delay and inaction will only increase the costs and elevate the risks associated

with manufacturing and maintaining an aging stockpile.

Regardless of stockpile transformation plans, and while we are

shrinking the total size, facilities need to be upgraded, and the

challenge for us will be to move from an aging nuclear weapons

complex designed for the Cold War and move that and shift that

toward a 21st century national security enterprise that is integrated, that is cost effective, and that eliminates unnecessary redundancy, but also is at the forefront of science and technology.

In addition, our 21st century enterprise will continue to leverage

the scientific underpinnings of the historic nuclear weapons mission to respond to a full range of national security challenges that

we have and, beyond nuclear weapons sustainment, shift those

more toward nuclear counterterrorism and nuclear nonproliferation

activities. And, as an example, we provide technical support to the

Defense Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigations

(FBI) and emergency-render safe and post-event nuclear technical

forensics activities, and a lot more needs to be done in that area,

and we are going to be looking to shift more toward that area.

Infrastructure improvements are a major part of the Complex

Transformation plan that we have, and we have made important

progress, but we have a lot more to do. Some major facilities that

we have date back to World War II and cannot readily meet today’s

safety and security requirements. Let me give you just two quick

examples, if I could.

A sufficient capability to work with plutonium is an essential

part of a national security enterprise and is required for as long as

we retain a nuclear deterrent, and most likely even longer. Currently, we have a very small production capacity at Los Alamos,

about 10 pits per year, at our TA–55 area. Our building at Los Alamos, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility, is well over

50 years old and is insufficient to support the national security requirements for the stockpile and for future national security mission areas.

So, whether we continue on our existing path or move toward a

replacement modern warhead-type stockpile, we still need the capacity to produce about 50 to 80 pits per year, which is less than

one-tenth of our Cold War level, as well as the ability to carry out

Pit Surveillance, which is an essential part of maintaining our

stockpile.

The second example is uranium component production. Every

warhead, whether it is refurbished or replaced, will need uranium

components. Our current facilities date back to the Manhattan

Project. Securing these facilities from terrorist threats in a post–

9

9/11 environment is increasingly difficult and increasingly costly,

particularly, also, operating them with modern safety requirements

and standards that we expect.

So the construction of our highly enriched uranium materials facility at Y–12 is going to allow us to consolidate our uranium storage with a significantly reduced security footprint and more work

will be needed in that area.

I would like to turn briefly to the stockpile. The stockpile has not

required nuclear testing to date, but keeping this stockpile healthy

has become an increasingly difficult challenge. Periodically, we

identify problems with the warheads that in the past would have

been resolved with nuclear tests. Our Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) has worked well so far to help us avoid that prospect.

And the considered judgment of the National Weapons Laboratory directors, however, is that maintaining certification of finelytuned designs of an aging Cold War stockpile through life-extension

programs (LEPs) without underground testing involves increasing

risk. An alternative path could be a stockpile based on replacement

warheads that, unlike Cold War warheads, would be designed for

certification without additional testing.

Indeed, our experts from our laboratories—again, their best technical judgment today is that it will be less likely that we would

need to conduct nuclear testing to maintain safety, security, and

reliability into the future if we pursue this modern replacement

path, than if we continued on working on our legacy warheads.

In December, I provided Congress classified information giving

further details on these matters, and I am aware also that we had

our lab directors talk to the committee a few weeks back to talk

about these matters.

We are often asked why do we believe it is so important to study

reliable replacement concepts now, and there are a number of reasons. First, the study will provide critical information to ensure

that the next Administration, as well as the bipartisan Commission

that this committee has established, can complete the timely review of the nuclear posture. Providing information to the committee, I think, is very important for that committee to understand all

the implications of modern replacement concepts, that those things

can provide.

Second, we have concerns about our ability under life-extension

only strategy to ensure the long-term safety and reliability of today’s stockpile, absent testing, and what that might mean for our

stockpile makeup.

Third, we have warheads that have 1960s to 1980s safety, security, and antiterrorism features. It does not mean that these warheads are not currently safe and secure, but we can and should do

better, and I believe that these reliable replacement concepts provide opportunities to incorporate the latest technological advances

for precluding unauthorized use in a post–9/11 environment. It

would be very difficult to back fit these into existing Cold War warheads.

Fourth, nuclear skills are absolutely vital to the nation, not just

for sustaining our deterrent, but also in such areas as nuclear

forensics, nuclear counterterrorism, and in solutions for the intelVerDate 22-MAR-2001 13:53 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 043250 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-120\43250.TXT HNS1 PsN: HNS1
10

ligence community. In a few years, nearly all of the older generation will have retired.

Finally, the Department of Energy continues to believe that

these concepts make sense and are worth studying due to its enabling features for the future stockpile.

The foundation for future reductions, in my view, are the ability

to transform the nuclear weapons complex into a responsive infrastructure and responsive enterprise; ongoing efforts to understand

the challenges to the stockpile and modern means of addressing

these challenges; and efforts between future Administrations and

Congress to restore a consensus on the future nuclear deterrent

force posture and the resulting stockpile that results from all this.

I recognize that the completion of the Reliable Replacement

Study was not funded in the 2008 Omnibus Appropriations Act, in

part due to concerns that the Administration had not fully communicated its policies which guide nuclear forces posture and programs.

The Administration will shortly provide to Congress a second

paper to accompany its white paper on nuclear policy that was

transmitted last year. This second paper will outline in detail the

strategy which guides our programs, including the size of the stockpile.

Our goal is to complete the study as a means to assure that the

next Administration, as mandated by Congress, can complete its

nuclear policy.

Thank you very much for the time to make these statements,

and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. D’Agostino can be found in the

Appendix on page 50.]

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Under Secretary.

Assistant Secretary Vickers, welcome to the subcommittee.

Secretary VICKERS. Thank you very much.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you again for being here. The floor is

yours.

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL VICKERS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS, LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT, AND INTERDEPENDENT CAPABILITIES,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Secretary VICKERS. Chairwoman Tauscher, Ranking Member

Everett, thank you for your leadership and the support you provide

to our strategic forces.

Distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you as well.

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today with you to report

on the progress we are making in transforming our strategic capabilities to meet 21st century challenges. Indeed, as both you, Chairwoman Tauscher, and you, Ranking Member Everett, noted in your

opening remarks, the strategic environment has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War, and I would be happy to talk

about that in greater detail in the question-and-answer session.

To summarize, we have made considerable progress in the area

of missile defense, substantially less progress in the areas of strategic strike, and we are working very, very hard to develop approVerDate 22-MAR-2001 13:53 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 043250 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-120\43250.TXT HNS1 PsN: HNS1
11

priate policies and capabilities in the rapidly evolving areas of

space and information operations.

Our nuclear forces remain our ultimate deterrent, and we look

forward to supporting the efforts of the Bipartisan Commission on

Nuclear Policy and Strategy in the 21st Century.

We believe at some point, as Under Secretary D’Agostino said,

our Nation will require modernized nuclear warheads. We believe

those warheads would provide similar capabilities to the warheads

we currently have, but would be less sensitive to manufacturing

tolerances, aging of materials, hopefully be certifiable without nuclear testing, and very importantly have advanced safety and security features.

As Under Secretary D’Agostino noted, we believe modernization

of the infrastructure is even more important.

I want to thank members of the subcommittee for your support

of Prompt Global Strike (PGS). The funds that have been appropriated allow us to conduct research and development on a widerange of technologies that hopefully will lead to an important capability in the near-to mid-term.

In missile defense, we now have a multilayered initial system

that is available today to protect the U.S. homeland, as well as our

deployed forces, and our friends and allies. The U.S. remains committed to working with our allies in the field of missile defense.

Japan reached a very important milestone this December when

its Kongo Surface Combatant successfully intercepted a ballistic

missile target with an SM–3 interceptor.

We are concluding our negotiations on basing our long-range missile defense elements in Poland and the Czech Republic. We are

cautiously optimistic that we will be able to complete an agreement

with the Czechs imminently and with the Poles soon thereafter.

It is our hope that at the upcoming Bucharest Summit in April,

that NATO will be in a position to recognize the growing missile

threat to Europe and support territorial defense as a means of addressing that threat and welcome the U.S. contribution to European missile defense, while recognizing that the Europeans have

important work to do themselves.

Because we wish to allay Russian concerns, we have met a number of times, over the past year, to share intelligence information,

discuss transparency and confidence-building measures, and seek

ways in which we could work jointly with them to address ballistic

missile threats. We remain committed to working with them to address this common threat, while demonstrating that our missile defense program poses no threat to their strategic forces.

We face a widening range of threats to our space capabilities,

such as radio frequency jamming, laser blinding, and anti-satellite

systems. The maturation of these threats requires a broad range of

capabilities and options, from diplomatic to military, to assure our

space capabilities and to protect our vital interest in space.

The Department’s investment strategy in space seeks to balance

a number of requirements. We need to modernize Space Situational

Awareness (SSA) capabilities, improve protection plans for space

assets, develop architectural solutions, including Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) concepts, and then establish an operations

posture to be able to respond to attack and maintain the ability to

12

deny adversaries the use of space capabilities that could harm our

forces or our homeland.

In implementing our national space policy, we support U.S. Government efforts to promote safe, and responsible use of space and

support voluntary guidelines for safe space operations.

Finally, in the area of cyberspace, both Nation States and nonstate actors continue to seek ways and means to counter the advantages we obtain from our use of information and to turn those same

advantages against us in both conventional and unconventional

ways. We are working very closely with our interagency partners

to scope the missions that we will be asked to conduct, address our

respective roles, both active and supporting, and determine how

best to address potential adversaries’ attempts to counter our information advantages. We are making progress, but much remains to

be done.

In conclusion, transformation of our Nation’s strategic capabilities to meet the uncertainties and challenges ahead depends critically on a sustained partnership between the Department of Defense and Congress. I look forward to working with you to achieve

our shared goals for developing and deploying the strategic capabilities our Nation requires.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Vickers can be found in the

Appendix on page 61.]

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you.

General Chilton, and probably for also Assistant Secretary Vickers, I am deeply concerned that the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is going to expire in 2009, and I believe that the United

States should begin negotiating now on a binding verifiable agreement that would lead to further reductions in deployed nuclear

forces.

In your view, what are the risks and benefits to the United

States of reducing the number of operationally deployed nuclear

warheads below the Moscow Treaty’s range of 1,700 to 2,200?

General CHILTON. Ma’am, I will take your question with regard

to comfortability of the combatant commander below those numbers, given our current infrastructure, and then I would ask Secretary Vickers to comment on prospects of a follow-on for the treaty.

Having looked at the nuclear infrastructure that Secretary

D’Agostino just reviewed for us and the condition that it is in

today—the fact that we do not have a production capability, which

means we do not have the flexible infrastructure required to deal

with an uncertain strategic future, which I think was another line

of questioning I am looking forward to talk about given the age of

our warheads and that we are not yet closed on whether we are

going to go down a life extension or a modernized weapon program,

but the distinct need that I feel as the combatant commanders,

that as I look to the future, I will not have the tools to conduct my

strategic deterrent mission if we do not move out in directions appropriately—given that construct, I am comfortable with 1,700 to

2,200 today, but I am not comfortable with considerations below

that until we have that flexible capability, as a combatant commander.

13

Ms. TAUSCHER. And before we go to Assistant Secretary Vickers,

I just want to pull that string just a little bit because it seems to

me that it would not only be the question of flexibility, but is it

also about responsiveness of the complex?

General CHILTON. It is. Yes, ma’am. And I assume that word

when I say flexibility, and I should not.

When you have a responsive complex that has the capacity to

flex to production as you may need it or adjust your deployed force

posture in the future, should you need it—in other words, if we go

to a lower number—you need to be certain that you can come back

up, should the strategic environment change, and you cannot necessarily without that flexible or responsive infrastructure behind it,

and that is probably one of my great concerns.

And then how you posture both the portion of your stockpile that

you hold in reserve, and your confidence in the weapons that you

have deployed, is very much a function of modernizing, in my view,

the weapons systems that we have available today, which are, as

the Secretary described, of Cold War legacy design, and the associated issues with them.

Ms. TAUSCHER. One more quick one before we go to Assistant

Secretary Vickers. I do not want to put words in your mouth, but

am I hearing you say that the more confidence you have in the existing responsive complex and in the weapons themselves, the more

likely it would be that hedge weapons, so to speak, the reserve

weapons, would be less important to maintain?

General CHILTON. Yes. You are not putting words in my mouth.

I mean, that is what I have said before, and I believe firmly that

if we can build a modern weapon that has increased reliability, the

safety and security that we need for the threats that we face today,

and is maintainable, and we have the responsive infrastructure

that allows us to maintain them and also account for strategic uncertainty in the future, then the need for the large number of

hedge weapons that we have on the shelf, that part of the on-theshelf stockpile, part of the stockpile that is on the shelf, I believe

can be dramatically reduced.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Assistant Secretary Vickers.

Secretary VICKERS. I concur fully with General Chilton’s assessment of where we are and what would enable us to go forward. The

Administration is committed to pursuing a post-START agreement

with the Russians. We are in the early stages of that, however.

Ms. TAUSCHER. We would, I think, like to know more about that.

So perhaps we can get together and you can inform us as to where

we are in that because I think that we do not want this just to

begin to lapse as the Administration moves out the door and find

ourselves in a gap period——

Secretary VICKERS. Yes, ma’am.

Ms. TAUSCHER [continuing]. Especially with the change of Administration in Russia. It is important that we keep those lines

open.

Well, General Chilton and Assistant Secretary Vickers, in many

ways, are the client or the users of these weapons Under Secretary

D’Agostino. I guess I am moving over to you to talk about the fact

that in fiscal year 2008, we made funds available for Advanced

Certification, and the resources proposed in the fiscal 2009 budget

14

request—how will you advance the process of answering the questions raised about the proposal to certify a Reliable Replacement

Warhead without testing, considering the questions posed by many

people, including the JASON Panel?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Okay. Thank you, Madam Chair.

In fact, just today, this morning, I do not know if it was coincidence or not, there is a requirement in the appropriations to provide a report within 60 days on our plans for Advanced Certification. I signed out that report this morning. It addresses a couple

of key areas, and so we are going to focus on experiments in this

particular funding line in order to deal with questions on common

failure modes that could happen, whether they are for existing

warheads or for potential future systems. I mean, the focus is to

address the JASON’s report on RRWs, so we are going to kind of

start there first.

The second area has to do with our ability to do surety, take a

look at physical features of surety and how they might impact certification. If you put a piece of surety technology into an existing

warhead, how does that impact the certification piece? That was

the second concern that JASON’s had, and we have a plan to address that.

The third piece had to do with material changes. If we use a material that is a little bit different than what we had in the Cold

War stockpile—and there are cases where we have to do that because, in many cases, we are talking about materials that were

manufactured 40, 50 years ago. In many cases, the manufacturing

processes just do not exist anymore. We are not allowed to use certain chemicals that we have used in the past—how do those things

rack up and stack up on top of each other and impact assessment

as a whole? So that is going to be a huge part of that study.

And the final area is peer review. Establishing not just peer review between lab to lab, which we currently have and I feel is quite

good, but peer review that involves bringing in potentially another

body, and potentially how we would kind of bring all of those peer

review elements together to ensure that the stacking up of small

changes on our existing Cold War stockpile or potential changes

into a modern warhead and modern replacement warhead, and how

those things impact.

Right now, 15 million dollars was appropriated in 2008. We have

requested 20 million dollars, a little bit more, in 2009 because we

think this is an area that is very important—to get to the bottom

of the answers to those four particular questions that have come

up. I feel good about that program. I think it is the right type of

activity to do, and so we are marching down that path.

Thank you.

Ms. TAUSCHER. I am happy to recognize the Ranking Member,

Mr. Everett, for his time.

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you, chairman.

And I thank all of you for your service.

To pick up on the chairman’s comment about your comfort level

for the 1,700 to 2,200 nuclear warheads, how would Prompt Global

Strike figure into that, or would it, because we are talking conventional as opposed to nuclear?

15

General CHILTON. You know, we think back on the new Triad.

The tip of that triad is where we paid attention to strike, and, as

you know, sir, kinetic nuclear, kinetic conventional, and then nonkinetic strike opportunities are the three areas where we are focused on.

In the area of kinetic conventional, I think we have started to

look at already how we can use some of the technologies that we

have today to address some of the issues with regard to deterrents.

I would say, for example, there are folks in the world today who

I think are deterred in certain areas by the fact that we have the

J-Series weapons that we have developed, and delivery platforms

that just could show up overhead at some moment at the United

States’ choosing, and that in and of itself, even with the conventional capability, can be a deterrent in certain areas. Sometimes

those are not adequate and, hence, we have nuclear weapons for

a large number of target sets.

Prompt Global Strike, I put in kind of two categories. One, it can

also provide some strategic deterrent capability in line with maybe

relieving some of the target sets that we would normally cover with

nuclear, but that is not its greatest strength, in my view. I think

the greatest strength of a Prompt Global Conventional Strike

weapon is its ability to control escalation in some scenarios, but

also to provide an additional arrow in the quiver, if you will, of the

country to address emerging threats, that we might find a nuclear

weapon application to be self-deterring to address that threat.

And I will give you an example. Let us hypothesize there is a nation that were to field a robust anti-satellite capability, akin to the

capability we saw demonstrated by the Chinese, and let us say that

nation were to attack our satellites. With a robust capability, you

could essentially deny a lot of the benefits, and most of the satellites that we rely on in low-earth orbit (LEO) in very short order.

I am talking not a week. I am not talking days. I am talking hours.

And so when the phone rings on the STRATCOM Commander’s

desk on that scenario, because he is in charge of defending space,

and the President says, ‘‘General Chilton, make them stop,’’ today,

I can offer him a nuclear option. A country has attacked our space

assets, but no American has died in this scenario. I am not saying

that that would not be the option chosen, but wouldn’t it be also

nice to have a Prompt Global Conventional Strike capability in the

quiver to be able to offer that to the President to make them stop?

And that is where I think this concept has its greatest strength.

Mr. EVERETT. It is obvious we cannot accept the Chinese continuing to dazzle with lasers our satellites. So, from a posture standpoint, when do we call on that Prompt Global Strike to help us?

How do you make that decision? Do we let them continue to dazzle

our satellites?

Secretary VICKERS. Well, are you talking about the decision to

deploy a capability?

Mr. EVERETT. Yes.

Secretary VICKERS. We believe the requirement exists for that capability today for the reasons that General Chilton outlined, that

it will enhance deterrents against some situations, and it will also

provide future Presidents with an expanded array of options in

some important scenarios besides the ASAT scenario that General

16

Chilton described. It could be terrorists with WMD, which is one

of our gravest threats. It could be terrorists plotting other attacks

in the homeland, and the only way to strike that might be with a

rapid Prompt Global Strike weapon. It also may achieve deterrent

effects against those who would be plotting by causing them to

worry about such a capability.

So we believe we need that capability now. We are pursuing a

wide range of technologies in the research and development (R&D)

program that we have been authorized to do, and we welcome

Congress’s support to move forward on this as soon as appropriate.

Mr. EVERETT. General Keller said this morning that in regards

to protecting our assets in space, that if we lose these assets that

as far as the military was concerned that that would be a reverse

time machine. We are told that we have redundancy. As I said in

my opening statement, when you pull that string, though, we do

not see much there.

And perhaps that is the reason, Madam Chairman, that we

might have a classified briefing later on.

But we currently spend less than four percent of the entire defense space budget on SSA and space protection. Is that enough?

General CHILTON. Congressman, I share your concern. I have

been a champion of SSA and improving investment of SSA for several years now, and it was one of the things I tried to emphasize

as the Commander of Air Force Space Command, and now that

they are supporting me, I continue to encourage that investment.

And I am happy that we have gone from now investments in those

programs to increased investments by a substantial amount. So I

think we are headed on the right path here.

But I think you bring up a broader point that is—because Space

Situational Awareness is one element of what we need for space

protection. The broader point that you bring up, I think, is right

on the mark with regard to our dependence on these capabilities

and the way we conduct military operations, and are we adequately

exercising and preparing for the case where someone might counter

those dependencies or try to deny us those dependencies.

And we have a way to go in that area, I believe, particularly in

the way we exercise, the way we are able to exercise, and the way

we plan in the regions for our various war plans, to make sure that

we do have the alternative paths to provide us with the capabilities

that we will need to ultimately be victorious in whatever the scenario.

But what I always caution here is that although we need a robust space element here, and we need to look at protection as well,

we also need to make sure we are not putting all our eggs in one

basket because we know we cannot have ever the perfect defenses.

And so we need to consider in the case of communications, for example, robust terrestrial communications, robust space communications, and air-to-air communications that can back that up and integrate that, and we have work to do there.

Mr. EVERETT. Well, how do you look at the fact that we have

pretty much devastated the Transformational Satellite System

(TSAT)? In the outyears, we are cutting four billion dollars from

TSAT. What is that going to do to STRATCOM——

General CHILTON. Two things.

17

Mr. EVERETT [continuing]. Or our Future Combat Systems (FCS)

which cannot go forward without TSAT.

General CHILTON. I have two concerns with regard to the way

ahead in global satellite communications.

One, as the STRATCOM Commander, for my needs as the Commander of STRATCOM, I need uninterrupted, which means I cannot stand a gap in a capability for being able to do nuclear command and control, which means I need a secure survivable command and control system. I depend on today the Milstar satellite,

in the near future the Advanaced Extremly High Frequency

(AEHF) satellite, and TSAT would be the next part of that, and I

am concerned that out in the 2018 and 2020 time period that we

do not develop a gap there in this constellation. Now that is my parochial concern.

From a broader concern, which I am chartered to advocate for for

all the regional combatant commanders and services, you are right

on with your remarks with regard to how TSAT is a critical element of the Army’s Future Combat System. When we look at the

growth in ISR that is programmed in and our needs and dependencies and the warfighter demands and the investments we are

making in Global Hawks and other platforms, not to mention the

need for a space radar system, and you look at how you are going

to get that data moved around the planet and available to the

warfighter on the edge of the battlefield, we need to increase bandwidth in that space-based capability.

It is not just space. We need to look at terrestrial, but, again, I

caution putting all our eggs in one basket. We learned what a very

inexpensive anchor can do to terrestrial communications, and so I

think we need to continue to move forward, increase the bandwidth

that we provide to the warfighter, both in the terrestrial airbreathing and space element.

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you for that.

Am I correct in saying on the new AEHF that the terminals are

not synchronized with it, or do you know——

General CHILTON. Let me take that for the record, and I will go

back and check, but my understanding was that that was resynchronized, that they are, in fact, synchronized, but let me make

sure I have that exactly right.

Mr. EVERETT. Okay. Finally, I have some questions for the record

concerning Prompt Global Strike that I would appreciate a

prompt—hopefully—response to.

General CHILTON. Absolutely. Happy to do that.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 93.]

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you, chairman.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Everett.

The gentleman from Washington, Mr. Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Secretary Vickers, in your testimony, you note on page 11 that,

‘‘DOD further implements our national space policy by supporting

efforts to promote safe and responsible use of space. We seek mutually beneficial international cooperation on space activities, and

support commercial and foreign space surveillance needs to ensure

safe space operations,’’ and you go on to say—and this is where my

18

question comes—‘‘DOD seeks to promote compliance with existing

legal regimes, acceptance of international debris mitigation guidelines, and development of additional voluntary guidelines for safe

and responsible space operations.’’

The first two seem to be fairly clear. Perhaps you can speak to

that. But in particular, can you help us understand specifically

what you mean by ‘‘additional voluntary guidelines for safe and responsible space operations,’’ and do you think it would be useful to

establish international rules of the road for space operations?

Secretary VICKERS. Well, I believe we have pretty substantial

rules of the road now in terms of some legal obligations, some

shared understandings, but as space becomes a more cluttered environment, then the need for new measures, you know, as we

found—as we went through the Cold War, for example, to take an

analogy—where we developed procedures for naval peacetime interaction that was instrumental in providing some stability during the

Cold War. That would be analogous to space.

Specifically, what those might be, I think, will depend on as the

situation evolves, but, you know, we took our obligations—General

Chilton can speak to this much more expertly than I can—in terms

of the recent shoot down very seriously depending on how things

evolved that we knew we were legally obligated to do.

Mr. LARSEN. Sure. Well, I appreciate that. Your testimony does

say DOD seeks to promote and so on. The way it is written, it

would seem to me it says DOD also seeks to promote the development of additional voluntary guidelines. My curiosity is——

Secretary VICKERS. I——

Mr. LARSEN. Is that what DOD is doing, or are you tossing it out

there for our consideration or——

Secretary VICKERS. No, I think it is——

Mr. LARSEN. How should I read that?

Secretary VICKERS. Right. I think it is a general goal, at this

point, to ensure as space becomes a more complex environment

that where we should have additional measures for safe operations

that we pursue those commensurate with the rest of our national

space policy which is to ensure freedom of action.

Mr. LARSEN. And that is my next set of questions, and perhaps

General Chilton can start with the answers. It is on page 10 of Secretary Vickers’ testimony, but I presume this is applicable to anybody sitting before me. ‘‘The U.S. rejects claims of sovereignty by

any nation over space; rejects limitations on the fundamental right

to operate in or acquire data from space; and retains the right of

free passage through and operations in space without interference,’’

the national space policy.

Let us, for the sake of this argument right now, assume China

does not cause us any problems. Let us remove that from the table

because I have heard enough China scenarios. Let us assume it is

Russia, and Europe, and Japan with its commercial program, and

so on. What do their national space policies say, and are they consistent with ours, and what do we do to sand off the rough edges

that we might have with other countries? For instance, if we retain

the right of free passage through operations in space without interference, do the Europeans have a problem with that, or do they

19

have the same one? And what happens if we conflict, not militarily,

of course, but in terms of operationally, you know, what happens?

General CHILTON. Sure.

Mr. LARSEN. How are we thinking about that? And you can understand why I want to get away from China.

General CHILTON. I think——

Mr. LARSEN. I want to have a rational conversation about it.

General CHILTON. Sure. I think I understand.

I am reminded of a story I heard once. I think it was in the State

of Ohio when they had the first automobile accident, when automobiles were first invented, and at the time, there were only two

automobiles in the entire State of Ohio, and they managed to run

into each other. So, you know, probably shortly after that, somebody sat down and said, ‘‘Well, maybe when we pass, we will go

to right,’’ or, you know, ‘‘If you are coming head on, I will go right,

you go right, and we will miss,’’ you know, those rules, those kinds

of things, or the concept in seafaring where nations demand the

right of free passage on the ocean. Somehow we figured out, you

know, you put the green light on the right side of your ship and

the red light on the left and there are certain rules for passing

from the rear, et cetera.

Now Keplerian dynamics in space takes care of a lot of that stuff

for you automatically, but simple, open dialogue, I think, is what

is most important. You know, we all do station keeping with our

satellites up there, particular a geosynchronous orbit, and so some

satellites move—and we are watching that—and starting to be on

a path that is getting close to ours. So then we have to decide are

we going to move or what is going to happen or we will watch it

for a while, and so if we have open dialogue and understanding and

communication, like, ‘‘Hey, I am getting ready to do station keeping

on this, so that you will know, and here are my parameters, and

here us where I am, and here is where I am going, do not worry.’’

It relieves some of that.

Those are kind of the open dialogue kind of discussions I think

we can have. We are not at the red light-green light phase in this

domain yet, but I think—and I do not want to put words in the secretary’s mouth, so I will let him respond as well. As we look to the

future, what are those kind of dialogues and what discussions

should we have?

Mr. LARSEN. That is exactly it. In your testimony, in previous

testimonies last year, and from other folks, there is this concern

about increasing use, and we have looked at it through Chairman

Everett’s leadership at the time, getting it started, talking about

how we use space and trying to educate people on how we use

space, why it is important that we are there and what we do to

protect our assets up there.

But that can be said for many other countries, too. They want

to protect their assets. We want to protect what we have. And

there is a lot of space in space, obviously, but it still seems that

with everybody wanting to use it perhaps at the same orbits, are

we getting to a point where we need to have more thoughtful discussions than just having, you know, the open dialogue, more

structured discussions, I guess.

20

General CHILTON. I am not sure yet, but, I mean, we are past

the point of not having any dialogue. We certainly need to have

that, and——

Mr. LARSEN. No, no, no. I understand.

General CHILTON. I think we have to be careful about thinking

about making rules and restrictions that are unenforceable, too.

Mr. LARSEN. Sure.

General CHILTON. With regard to space debris, for example, I

think that is a good one. So we came to a conclusion a few years

ago that the way the United States and Russia mostly, at the time

the Soviet Union, were launching things in orbit, we were not paying much attention to the fact that our upper stages after a few

months in orbit sometimes exploded because the tanks overpressurized, you know, because we were not worried about it.

But, you know, then we started keeping track of the stuff up

there and said, you know, ‘‘This is heading in the wrong direction.

Ultimately, we are going to create so much debris up there,’’ and

so we kind of agreed as spacefaring nations that we were going to

mutually try to reduce the amount of debris generated in just normal launch and orbit operations. Russia does that, and we do that

to the best we can, and those are the kind of open dialogues that

responsible spacefaring nations ought to have and encourage folks

to adopt and do it.

But to say, ‘‘Okay. I am going to say you must design this into

your rocket,’’ you this other country, ‘‘to operate in space,’’ that is

an unenforceable rule, so better to have the dialogue and get reasonable response and behavior to include sharing information and

sharing best practices and adopting those, I think, at this stage of

where we are in space.

Mr. LARSEN. Did you have anything else to share?

Secretary VICKERS. No. I mean I would agree on the debris. The

point is we do have a number of standing instruments already that

we adhere to, and we are in discussions, you know, to try to further

develop some. You know, on the other hand, it has to be consistent

with the rest of our space policy where General Chilton, as combatant commander, has responsibility as a warfighter that we do not

unduly restrict his, you know, options as well.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you.

Ms. TAUSCHER. I would like to notify members we have been told

that we may have votes, a series of two or three, between 3:00 and

3:15. So I want to go to Mr. Franks from Arizona, and then we

would like to get to Mr. Thornberry, if we could. So, if you guys

could restrict to five or six minutes, I would appreciate it. And

then, hopefully, we will get a second round.

Mr. Franks from Arizona.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Madam Chair.

And I thank all of you for being here. You know, you guys are

the ones that keep watch for all of us, and I appreciate it very, very

much.

And, General Chilton, I just want to say a special word of congratulations to you. It was a good day for America when you became the Commander of Strategic Command. I say that, I think,

on behalf of the entire committee.

General CHILTON. Thank you, sir.

21

Mr. FRANKS. I had the privilege of meeting this morning with

General Keller, and he emphasized not only the interdependency,

but the critical importance of America being dominant, not only in

air, but in space and in cyberspace, because of the way that they

all work together, and in his 21st century white paper, General

Mosley says essentially the same thing, and he expounded on that

in the committee this morning.

And I just think that your successful test here sort of reflects all

of that. When you knocked down this satellite, you proved that the

Aegis is now a working system and that the connection between

those three areas is vitally important. And I am wondering if you

think, General Chilton, that it is time to move some of these missile defense assets out of the MDA research and development budget lines and into the procurement budget lines for services like the

Air Force and others to begin to take over and to operate.

General CHILTON. Well, thank you, Congressman.

And thank you for the compliment, particularly over the activities last week. I would just add for the record, from my perspective,

it was a tremendous joint effort and interagency effort, all of government. So many departments and agencies participated in that,

not only in the execution, but in the preparations we were making

for the contingency where we might be unsuccessful in destroying

the tank, and offering U.S. assistance to the nations of the world,

as Madam Chair said, because we were responsible and we took

that responsibility seriously. So thank you for recognizing that.

You asked a great question with regard to the balance between

R&D, procurement, and operation and maintenance (O&M) of systems, and I have thought about this a bit, and, of course, we work

very closely with MDA. I am familiar with how they spend their

budgets, and I know that the services are under a lot of stress

today for not only ongoing operations, but in particular, in my parent service, the Air Force, for the urgent recapitalization needs

they have, the Army for the needs that they will have in the future, not only building systems like FCS, but in reconstituting after

this tough fight they have been in. So there is going to be this tension here on where best to take the money from.

I would just caution that we do not throw the baby out with the

bathwater with regard to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). I

have been in the test business before in my career and a little bit

in acquisition when I was at the National Aeronautics and Space

Administration (NASA) for the Space Station Program. I am absolutely amazed how far and how fast we have come in the last five

years in fielding a capability with the construct we have set up in

the Missile Defense Agency, and so, as we look to the future and

there will be challenges on finding the monies to field these systems and the inventories that we need, whether they be THAAD

or Patriot Advanced Capability–3 (PAC–3) or Aegis or the new systems that are coming on board, like Airborne Laser (ABL), et

cetera. There will be tensions there, but we have to be careful not

to break something that is working pretty darn good at getting new

capabilities out there.

It is a tough problem, Congressman. I wish I had an answer. You

know, the easy one is more TOA, but I know the challenges that

presents, as well to the country.

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Mr. FRANKS. Well, listen, I want to, Madam Chair, give Mr.

Thornberry a chance here.

So I just want you to know that I think this missile interception

of the satellite showed that you have a missile defense asset to performing a space mission, and it really, in my mind, demonstrates

that there is really more of a psychological or artificial line between

national security, space, and missile defense, and it is important,

I think, that the two be emphasized and work together. I know

that that is against kind of the perspective of the service.

So, congratulations again. I would like to ask more questions, but

I want to make sure Mr. Thornberry has time.

General CHILTON. Thank you, sir.

Ms. TAUSCHER. I appreciate that, Mr. Franks.

Mr. Thornberry of Texas.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I appreciate

my colleague from Arizona.

Although I think these people have been too easy on you all——

[Laughter.]

Mr. THORNBERRY. And let me play devil’s advocate just a little

bit. Both General Chilton and Secretary Vickers have a tremendous

number of things in your area of responsibility (AOR). A lot of

things I am very interested in.

There is a lot of intellectual energy going on right now about how

the Nation faces the threat in cyberspace. Mr. Everett has been

pushing, and there is, I think, a lot of intellectual energy in planning and thought into space for the future.

I do not see any of that intellectual energy on what nuclear deterrence means in the future. I do not hear anybody talking about,

‘‘Okay, the characteristics of a nuclear weapon that would effectively deter whoever, everybody, whoever in the 21st century would

be this, and we cannot really test that. We can only do this, and

here is the difference between the ideal weapon that would deter

and what we can produce.’’

I do not see any of that, particularly in the Department of Defense, and some people would even argue that nuclear deterrence

has atrophied to some extent in the Defense Department, and so

Secretary D’Agostino—you know, his folks are just kind of left to

keep on doing what they are doing.

Now, what am I missing?

General CHILTON. Well, I think your concerns are well founded.

What you are missing, I would say, Congressman, recently, is the

comments I made at the Strategic Weapons in the 21st Century

Conference two or three weeks ago at the Reagan Building and a

speech I gave at AFA last week where I stood up and addressed

those things, those very concerns that you mentioned.

And here is kind of the crux of my message; nuclear deterrence

will be every bit as important for the remainder of this century. My

children and grandchildren will need a nuclear deterrent. I do not

think that is in conflict at all with the desire to reduce nuclear

weapons. It is just a reality.

I think in the Cold War, my parent service in particular, I would

argue there was none better at knowing and understanding what

it meant to provide strategic nuclear deterrents for this Nation.

When the Cold War ended, we found ourselves as a Nation in a lot

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of shooting wars, conventional shooting wars, and the Air Force

will tell you they have been in a shooting war, they have had people in harm’s way since 1991, with our part in Southern Watch and

Northern Watch going throughout all the 1990’s right on into our

current conflicts.

For sure, since 2001, we have been focused on conventional warfare and unconventional warfare in this Nation, and I would say

perhaps we have lost some focus on that area that you just described that I believe is so important for the future, as well. And

I would put the focus in this regard: We must continually remind

ourselves that in a world of strategic nuclear deterrence, readiness

is a mission.

It is not bomb-found targets. It is being able to show the world

that you are able to do that, and that takes trained people, it takes

adequate delivery systems, and in the end, it takes a warhead that

is designed for the 21st century, not for the 20th century, and what

we have today in our inventory are warheads that are designed for

the 20th century where the principle design requirement was, because of the size, the numbers we needed, and the limited number

of delivery vehicles and the size of those delivery vehicles that we

had, maximize the bang and minimize the volume.

And we were able to take risks in reliability because we had a

robust test program and we had a robust manufacturing program,

and we designed and planned to replace those weapons every 20

years. And we could take risks in safety and security and we could

take risks in maintainability because safety and security were not

as high on the list as getting the numbers up there in that Cold

War, and maintainability was not as required if you planned to replace them every 20 years, and you had a robust production capability.

The world has changed. Tomorrow, we worry because of the terrorist threat more about safety and security. We have zero production capacity in this country. I would argue that for Mr. D’Agostino

that being able to produce 8 to 10 a year as a production capability—I have been to that facility. It is a laboratory. It is not a production facility. And we no longer want to test.

So, in that environment, I would say our number one requirement for the modern warhead is reliability. Our numbers two and

three are safety and security. And maintainability is on that list

as well. That is what I need as a combatant commander, to provide

strategic deterrents for this country, nuclear deterrents, in the

coming century.

Secretary VICKERS. I think there is a lot of thinking going on on

strategic deterrence. We are still working our way through it. I

think it is fair to say the problem has gotten a lot more complicated in the sense we face a wider range of actors, including now

non-state as well as state, that require more tailored deterrent concepts against a wider array of actions we are trying to deter and

with a wider range of instruments, integrating that with Prompt

Global Conventional Strike, non-kinetic attack, and particularly in

the area of non-kinetic, that area of deterrence is really challenging, and we are putting a lot of effort into that.

In general, I think cutting across those areas, complicating the

deterrence problem is the growing challenge of attribution which

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cuts across a number of potential threats where our ability to positively attribute an attack is central to our ability to deter it or adequately respond. So we are working hard. I think it is fair to say

that there are a number of these areas where we are not as far

along as we were in the Cold War, but we are working on it.

Mr. THORNBERRY. It just seems clear to me—and I know to you

all too—that if we do not take ourselves seriously, the bad guys are

not going to take it seriously either when it comes to nuclear deterrence.

And I know we are out of time. We have to vote. Mr. D’Agostino,

one of the things I would like to ask you to do for the record, since

we have to go, is can you give us the potential disadvantages or

concern of the Stockpile Stewardship Life Extension Program only

approach without RRW? I would like those listed if you can send

something up to us, you know, 1 through 5 or 10 or whatever it

is. I think that helps us to make the balance.

And I yield back, Madam Chair.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 96.]

Ms. TAUSCHER. I think maybe we can just have a briefing on

that. I think we would like to sit around the table and kick that

around.

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I would be glad to do that. Thank you.

Ms. TAUSCHER. General Chilton and Under Secretary D’Agostino

and Assistant Secretary Vickers, we are faced with about 40 minutes of votes. We want to thank you. The committee wants to

thank you very much for being here today. Your testimony was

very comprehensive that you sent up to us. We obviously see you

all the time. We are very happy to do this. We like to do it in public.

We want to recognize the people setting behind you and the people sitting around us. Obviously, all of your staffs have worked

very, very hard. They serve the American people sometimes very

quietly, certainly anonymously. We want to thank our subcommittee staff for their hard work, too.

And we thank you very much for appearing before us today, and

we look forward to the continued relationship. We, obviously, have

a long list of things we are going to do. Thank you very much.

Secretary VICKERS. Thank you.

General CHILTON. Thank you.

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Thank you.

Ms. TAUSCHER. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

FEBRUARY 27, 2008

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TAUSCHER

Ms. TAUSCHER. The House-approved FY 2008 defense authorization bill contains

a provision establishing a strategic commission to evaluate U.S. strategic posture for

the future, including the role that nuclear weapons should play in the national security strategy. What key questions should the commission consider?

General CHILTON. Today we can predict neither who our adversaries might be in

2030-2040, nor the precise nature and scale of the threats they might pose to our

security in that timeframe, any more than our predecessors in 1940 could predict

the threats we would face in 1962-1972, not those in 1980, could predict the threats

we would face in the 2002-2012 period. Yet, decisions we make in the next several

years will profoundly shape the strategic forces, both conventional. and nuclear, kinetic and non-kinetic, that we will have available out to 2030-2040. Thus, our challenge in defining and building our future strategic posture is to address the Nation’s

security needs over decades, not years. This means our focus must be on what our

forces will need to be able to do now and in the future, rather than on specific

threats they will need to counter. With such a comprehensive, capabilities-based approach in mind we suggest the commission consider the following questions:

1. Over the next two or three decades, what must U.S. forces and supporting

infrastructure be able to do in order to:

a. Assure our allies regarding our security commitments

b. Dissuade undesirable military competition

c. Deter attacks on our vital interests

d. Defend U.S. vital interests and, if necessary, defeat any adversary

in a manner that results in an outcome favorable to U.S. interests

What are the strategic capabilities required to enable U.S. forces to do what is

required in pursuit of these goals over that timeframe?

2. What roles do U.S. nuclear weapons play in that set of strategic capability

requirements? Which of these roles are unique to nuclear weapons? Which

of these roles represent a contribution nuclear forces make to the broader

strategic posture and capabilities set?

3. What are the decision and programmatic timelines associated with providing

the identified strategic capability requirements, including essential supporting infrastructure?

4. How can a bipartisan consensus be built behind the identified set of strategic

capability requirements so that the required decisions can be made and sustained?

5. How should we posture our nuclear weapon enterprise today to be able to

adequately respond to future technological surprise or a sudden change in

the national security environment?

Ms. TAUSCHER. What has changed in our security environment since the last Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) that should be emphasized in the strategic commission?

General CHILTON. Since the 2001 NPR, a number of significant events and programs have changed our strategic security environment:

• Initiation and conduct of the global war on terror in response to al Qaeda attacks on the U.S.

• Profound intelligence failures regarding WMD programs in Iraq

• China tested an anti-satellite weapon and continues an extensive modernization of their conventional and nuclear forces

• North Korea tested a nuclear weapon and launched a Taepo Dong 2 missile

• The U.S. and Russia stayed on track to meet the nuclear weapons stockpile

limits set by the Moscow Treaty

• Iran has made important advances in its pursuit of nuclear technology and

long range missiles

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• State and non-state actors continue to pursue and proliferate ballistic missile

and WMD technology

• Increased global dependence on cyberspace and the threat posed by increasing

cyber intrusions

• Growth of U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense system capabilities

Intensification of multiple pre-2001 global trends:

Æ Ethnic and religious conflict

Æ Increasing international demand for diminishing resources

Æ Economic rise of China, India, and Russia

Æ Evolution of the NATO alliance

Æ Lack of governance in ‘‘failed states’’

Ms. TAUSCHER. What are the gaps or shortfalls between the objective capabilities

in the New Triad identified in the last NPR and our Nation’s current strategic capabilities? Where is the most and the least progress being made? Please describe any

impediments to achieving the objectives outlined in the New Triad.

General CHILTON. The New Triad strategy mandates a broader set of capabilities

to ensure a credible deterrence in the 21st century. In addition to the legacy nuclear

TRIAD, it envisions a mix of advanced offensive and defensive capabilities enabled

by a robust infrastructure and improved command and control, planning, and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capabilities. Since 2001, USSTRATCOM’s

Integrated Priority List has reflected capabilities necessary to achieve the strategy.

In addition, we have been working very closely with the other Combatant Commanders to articulate capabilities needed using the Senior Warfighters Forum process. The most significant advancements have been made in reducing our legacy nuclear forces to a level commensurate with our national security needs and fielding

an initial missile defense capability. Key challenges remain, including recapitalizing

the Nation’s aging nuclear infrastructure, fielding a conventional prompt global

strike capability, developing a robust cyber operations capability, improving space

situational awareness, increasing satellite communications throughput and information transport capabilities, and evolving to a modern National Command Capability.

We must ensure we are taking the right steps to have the human capital available

to support these varied missions and understand that further reductions of the nuclear stockpile are constrained by the ability of the nuclear infrastructure to respond

to a technological surprise, or a national security need. The New Triad strategy requires significant transformation and recapitalization, including a significant fiscal

commitment and continued balancing of risks along the path.

Ms. TAUSCHER. What do you believe are the security threats with the greatest implications for our strategic posture, policies, and capability investments?

General CHILTON. The greatest strategic security threats are those that would

prevent U.S. military freedom of action in the Air, Maritime, Space, and Cyberspace

domains. These are strategic domains that are fundamental to the global projection,

command and control, and sustainment of U.S. military power. Without freedom of

action in these domains the U.S. would be unable to defend its vital interests both

at home and abroad.

Threats that would deny U.S. use of space and cyberspace capabilities also have

strategic implications. Our dependence on Cyberspace and space-enabled capabilities creates potential vulnerabilities with far reaching implications. We depend on

cyberspace and space.

Weapons of mass destruction in the hands of non-state actors or rogue states, particularly those with regional or global delivery systems is another security threat

we face today. Non-state actors’ attempts to acquire WMD combined with challenges

to the political stability of several nuclear-capable nations undermine non-proliferation efforts and present a serious threat to our national security today and in the

foreseeable future.

Ms. TAUSCHER. After taking command in October and reviewing STRATCOM’s

missions, organization, and priorities, please comment on your assessment of the

command. What, if any, changes you might implement?

General CHILTON. I have been privileged to find a Command filled with such a

hardworking team of military and civilian members. The Command has done an extraordinary job adapting to—and achieving successes in executing—tasks across the

range of assigned missions. As we move forward in refining our execution of Unified

Command Plan assigned missions, our biggest efforts will be in operationalizing our

abilities to execute within two key sets of missions. The first are our primary lines

of operation, the areas where we are executing operations across boundaries each

and every day: Space, Cyberspace, and Strategic Deterrence. The second set are

missions where we work to find and knit together the gaps and seams between

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Commanders’ areas of responsibilities and capabilities to enable mission effectiveness: Integrated Missile Defense, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, and Information Operations.

Structurally, our Command and subordinates can execute assigned missions, in

some cases, requiring manpower augmentation to achieve the desired capacity. We

plan no structural changes but are studying the manpower alignment among our

components.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Today, while STRATCOM is active in setting warfighter’s requirements for military capabilities, it is the responsibility of the services to fund and

develop those capabilities. Please describe the working relationship between

STRATCOM and the services.

General CHILTON. USSTRATCOM works to maintain an effective working relationship with each of the Services to fund and develop warfighting capabilities.

USSTRATCOM’s annual Integrated Priority List (IPL) is our entry point into Service budget process. The IPL clearly outlines those warfighting capability gaps we assess as unacceptable and serves as a valuable mechanism to focus the Services during development of their respective budgets. Throughout the budget cycle, we work

directly with the Services, our Components, the Joint Staff and OSD to identify, develop and fund programs required to close these gaps. This year for example,

USSTRATCOM conducted a detailed review of the IPL with each Service component. The session was conducted early in the development cycle for Service budgets:

USSTRATCOM is also an active participant in review and assessment of Service

budgets before they are submitted to the President. In summary, we enjoy a positive

relationship with the Services and I am satisfied the processes we participate in ensure our requirements are visible and appropriately adjudicated.

Ms. TAUSCHER. What strategic missions and warfighter needs are not being met

by the current DOD investment portfolio?

General CHILTON. USSTRATCOM continues to monitor the state of our nuclear

force and we are actively engaged with our Service Components to ensure timely

investments are made to replace aging components’ before they reach end-of-life, fill

existing gaps, and begin required research and development to preclude future capability gaps. We need Congressional support to fund the Department’s request for a

Conventional Prompt Global Strike (PGS) capability and a reliable replacement warhead. With regard to our ability to strike high-value, time sensitive targets in denied territory, current response options available to our Nation’s leadership are limited to either the availability of pre-positioned conventional forces or a self-deterring

long-range nuclear response. PGS provides a responsive flexible option to achieve

national security objectives. In addition, I am increasingly concerned with the Nation’s ability to sustain a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear warhead stockpile in the

absence of underground nuclear testing.

In the 21st Century, the mindset of space as purely an ‘‘enabler’’ must change.

The Chinese kinetic Anti-Satellite test (ASAT) conducted in early 2007 made it clear

that space is not a sanctuary. Our adversaries understand our dependence upon

space-based capabilities and are actively developing capabilities that will challenge

our Nation’s dominance and could deliver a crippling blow to national defense. I request continued Congressional support in the development and fielding of a credible

deterrent capability to deter and if necessary defeat any and all threats to our space

systems.

In the cyber arena, the Department’s technology investments are making a difference, but the ever increasing threat is rapidly outstripping our manpower resources. Implementing a strategy to build the required cyber workforce is a high priority as we enter the next budget cycle. Our challenge is to define, shape, develop,

deliver, and sustain a cyber force second to none, and our most pressing need is to

produce adequately trained cyber warfare personnel. Congressional support of the

President’s budget will enable DOD to expand the training pipeline, and we pledge

to work with Congress as we develop our future resource and manpower requirements for DOD cyber capabilities.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Please describe the process involved in setting requirements for

the future nuclear force structure. What is STRATCOM’s role? What obstacles or

challenges might be impeding more specific definition of military requirements for

the future nuclear force structure?

General CHILTON. National level policy and strategy provide the guidance for

DOD’s processes which determine requirements, guide acquisition, and allocate resources. These processes are informed by analyses conducted in a collaborative manner between the Services, Joint Staff, Combatant Commanders, and the Office of the

Secretary of Defense. USSTRATCOM is a principal participant in these analyses

and is responsible to identify military requirements to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and advocate for sufficient funding in DOD’s budget formulation procVerDate 22-MAR-2001 13:53 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 043250 PO 00000 Frm 00083 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\110-120\43250.TXT HNS1 PsN: HNS1
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ess. USSTRATCOM is also a statutory voting member of the Nuclear Weapons

Council and is instrumental in the development of nuclear stockpile,, requirements.

The key challenge we face in our desire to reduce nuclear force structure to the lowest level necessary to meet national security requirements is our lack of progress

in building a responsive nuclear infrastructure and replacing our cold war era designed and built nuclear weapons with a family of more reliable, safe, secure, and

maintainable weapons.

Ms. TAUSCHER. What warfighter requirements could be met by the proposed

RRW? Can these needs be satisfied by maintaining the current stockpile through

the Stockpile Stewardship Program and Life Extension Programs (LEPs)? Why or

why not?

General CHILTON. Modern replacement warheads will enable us to improve performance margins (which yields increased), security, safety, and maintainability of

our nuclear stockpile. Our Cold War era warheads have decreasing performance

margins (and hence decreasing reliability) and are becoming increasingly difficult

and expensive to maintain and certify. Life extension programs do not allow increases to performance margins, security, and safety of the current stockpile. The

real risk is that we could someday detect a catastrophic technical failure of a family

of Cold War era warhead and are unable to repair and certify the warhead. We believe these risks are higher for the current stockpile than for modern replacement

warheads. To mitigate these risks, we continue to maintain a larger hedge of nondeployed warheads than would be necessary for a stockpile of modern warheads.

Fielding a family of warheads with increased margin, safety, security, arid maintainability prioritized in the design criteria will allow a reduction in the nondeployed nuclear stockpile. Current weapons remain safe and secure, but in today’s

security environment and with modernization, we can and should do better. The

American people deserve the safest, most secure and reliable stockpile we can deliver without underground nuclear testing.

Ms. TAUSCHER. What risks do you see, if any, in pursuing an ‘‘LEP only’’ strategy,

as opposed to proceeding with the reliable replacement warhead? Are there force

structure implications based on whether the Nation pursues a ‘‘LEP only’’ or RRW

approach? If so, what?

General CHILTON. It is increasingly challenging and expensive to certify and

maintain legacy warheads. The most significant risk is our potential inability to certify the reliability of a weapon after detecting a significant technical failure that we

previously would’ have resolved with underground nuclear testing. We believe these

risks are greater for our highly optimized, Cold War era warheads that required nuclear testing in the past than for modern replacement warheads optimized for certification without nuclear testing. To mitigate these risks we continue to maintain

a larger hedge of non-deployed warheads than would be necessary otherwise with

a more modern design. The warhead sustainment approach we take has implications for the stockpile size but not for force structure size (i.e. the composition and

mix of nuclear delivery systems). Force structure requirements are dictated by policy.

Ms. TAUSCHER. How do decisions on future delivery systems (e.g., JCBM, bomber

modernization) impact RRW capabilities and timelines? Conversely, how do RRW

decisions influence development of future delivery systems?

General CHILTON. Modern replacement warheads must provide the same military

capability as the legacy warheads they replace. We are not advocating for new nuclear capabilities. With respect to legacy systems, we will make different trades

than were made during the Cold War to make the warhead compatible with an existing system. For example, a modern replacement warhead might have less explosive power—which is OK—given the increased accuracy of our delivery systems.

With respect to future delivery systems, we think it will enable us to take full advantage of the attributes a modern replacement warhead provides when designing

those systems resulting in improved reliability, safety, security and maintainability.

Ms. TAUSCHER. What role would RRW play in the Nation’s overall strategic deterrence objectives, particularly given investments in a conventional PGS capability?

General CHILTON. The increased reliability, safety, security, and maintainability

of modern replacement warheads provides increased confidence in our ability to

meet our strategic deterrence objectives. This will enable us to further reduce our

reliance on non-deployed warheads to achieve the smallest nuclear stockpile consistent with national security requirements. PGS capabilities, when fielded, will provide

non-nuclear strike options contributing to deterrence but will not eliminate the need

for a credible nuclear deterrent. The U.S. will maintain nuclear weapons as long as

other nations continue to possess them.

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Ms. TAUSCHER. The FY 2008 re-direction of Conventional Trident Modification

(CTM) funds precludes the leading option for a near-term PGS capability. What options will be explored with the funding ($117.6 million) proposed for FY 2009?

General CHILTON. Broadly speaking, USSTRATCOM’s goal is to coordinate Air

Force, Navy and Army research, development, test and evaluation efforts through

recommendations for the Defense wide Prompt Global Strike account which is being

managed by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology

& Logistics—to mature key enabling technologies required to deploy a land-based

PGS capability as soon as possible.

Ms. TAUSCHER. What are the military’s requirements for mid-term and long-term

PGS capabilities? Can you comment on potential scenarios where a PGS capability

would be used?

General CHILTON. USSTRATCOM requires a capability to deliver prompt, precise,

conventional kinetic effects at intercontinental ranges against strategic, high-value

targets in denied territory. We are focused on maturing technologies to field a system and close the capability gap as soon as possible. Prompt global strike capability

will provide greater flexibility for National leadership and is most appropriate when

there is a serious threat to national security, and time to position today’s global

strike capabilities is not available, such situations could include attacks against our

critical national space capabilities.

Ms. TAUSCHER. What are your views of the relative merits between the CTM concept and a possible conventional ICBM?

General CHILTON. CTM was proposed as a near-term hedge PGS solution until

more flexible or capable systems are developed and fielded. The CTM has merit because it can be fielded quickly with demonstrated technology and leverages existing

SSBN infrastructure. A fully mature conventional strike missile concept could provide additional flexibility through payload options, extended range and enhanced

maneuver to engage targets. The conventional strike missile (land based approach)

concept will not be co-located with existing nuclear weapons basing and affords over

time the ability to improve capability as new technology becomes available.

Ms. TAUSCHER. What role did STRATCOM play in the planning for the attempted

intercept of the non-responsive satellite?

General CHILTON. On behalf of the Department of Defense, USSTRATCOM led

dual planning efforts: to intercept the failed satellite and to conduct global consequence management for the hazardous hydrazine propellant, if the intercept had

failed. USSTRATCOM integrated the efforts and capabilities of multiple geographic

combatant commands and numerous Federal agencies that were required to achieve

mission success. Once the decision was taken to conduct the intercept,

USSTRATCOM coordinated preparations and directed the specific intercept based

on the approval of the SECDEF.

Ms. TAUSCHER. What capabilities are the services, combatant commands, and the

intelligence community telling you they need from future space systems? How do

you see STRATCOM facilitating the efforts needed to meet these needs? How are

these needs and their priorities reflected in the FY 2009 DOD budget request?

General CHILTON. Space system requirements are developed in wide collaboration

between DOD the Intelligence Community (IC) and other Federal agencies. These

requirements include space situational awareness (SSA) and space weather; space

protection; uninterrupted nuclear C2 and missile warning capabilities, world-wide

positioning, navigation and timing data; global communications; and Intelligence,

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; as well, as the enabling capabilities to support

those missions, launch ranges, and ground infrastructure.

We facilitate these efforts through contribution, interaction, and participation

with Capability Portfolio Managers, our Integrated Priority List, Senior Warfighter

Forums, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and Mission Requirements Board (MRB), Integrated Collection Architecture, and the Planning, Programming, Budget and Execution process. There is adequate balance across all domains given the current total obligation authority.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Are current joint space programs with the intelligence community

adequately supporting warfighter intelligence requirements? How would you change

the investment strategy to better support the warfighter in theater?

General CHILTON. Recent realignment efforts, including the stand-up of our Joint

Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

and the Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center resulted in better

alignment with the Intelligence Community. Developments such as the Broad Area

Space-Based Imagery Collector provides a tiered, enterprise solution of airborne,

commercial and national imagery systems that could serve as a model for fulfilling

other warfighter intelligence requirements.

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Future investments need to address future capability gaps in information transport, net-centric data sharing, improved modeling and simulation tools, analytical

tools, and better automated decision aids. Investing in on-going data integration efforts will better support warfighter intelligence requirements while providing tradeoff opportunities in sensors, processors, and analysis. However, there is also on

going collaboration with the Intelligence Community in several areas to develop

shared investment strategies to create efficiencies for future systems.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Please describe the potential operational concepts and value that

‘‘operationally responsive’’ space (ORS) solutions provide to the joint forces. What is

your assessment of the ORS program office implementation and its responsiveness

to warfighter needs?

General CHILTON. ORS solutions may provide the joint force a diverse set of space

capabilities that address urgent needs for warfighting effects. Expected ORS solutions include 1) better/innovative use of existing, fielded space capabilities (both inspace and on-ground), 2) rapid deployment of field-ready capabilities to augment

current or replenish lost capabilities, and 3) accelerated development of new capabilities when required.

While it is too early to give a full assessment of the ORS Office, my initial assessment is that the ORS Office has been effective in their first six months of operations

and that they are progressing toward laying this foundation for the future.

Ms. TAUSCHER. How are space assets modeled in warfighter operational plans

(OPPLANS) and contingency plans (CONPLANS)? How do OPPLANS and

CONPLANS account for scenarios where our space assets are neutralized or attacked?

General CHILTON. Geographic combatant commanders assume current space assets will be available during contingency operations incorporating these space capabilities in their OPLANS and CONPLANS. While a robust modeling of these systems has not reached an ideal level of maturity, in the course of plan development,

particularly as a part of exercises and training, planners assess applicable space assets and their necessity for the developed plan. In the case that an exercise indicates the loss of space assets, planners develop branch plans to account for and mitigate the effects of those losses. As part of risk mitigation, planners consider a layered approach of alternate systems (both space, air, and terrestrial) with commensurate capabilities to support military operational effectiveness.

Ms. TAUSCHER. To what degree do current military exercises and wargaming incorporate scenarios where our space assets are neutralized or attacked and scenarios where redundancies or alternatives are exercised?

General CHILTON. Using a blended training and exercise approach, STRATCOM

utilizes tailored event scenarios which show the exercise adversary taking measures

to purposefully jam satellites or create jamming in exercise operating areas that degrades or denies associated capabilities resident on targeted platforms: Additionally,

by utilizing the blended training and exercise approach, STRATCOM is capable of

swiftly reacting to emerging threats by building scenarios to train Blue Players on

an as-needed basis. An example of the training program responding to emerging

threats occurred during the multiple training sessions that provided crewforce training for the recent engagement of a re-entering satellite.

STRATCOM also incorporates degradations to satellites and satellite support

equipment, as well as disruptions from Space Weather that negatively impacts onorbit assets or negatively impacts the use of satellites by Blue Players during an

exercise. These types of events have been incorporated in the past in the GLOBAL

series of exercises and will continue to be exercised during the upcoming GLOBAL

THUNDER 2008 and GLOBAL LIGHTNING 2009.

As far as redundancies or alternatives being exercised, STRATCOM has used exercise scenarios that require Blue Players to realize that coverage or operational capabilities can be used despite the associated system being degraded or denied. Specifically, we train the Blue Player to realize that perfect coverage is not always required to have use of a particular asset. STRATCOM will continue to use scenarios

where redundancies or alternatives are exercised during GLOBAL STORM/AUSTERE CHALLENGE 2008 and other future exercises.

Ms. TAUSCHER. What is our national and military policy if our space assets are

attacked? Do we have clear ‘‘red lines’’ or thresholds for attacks against our space

assets? What are the merits of a declaratory policy that signals our intent and lays

out consequences? What are the merits of ‘‘rules of the road’’ in space?

General CHILTON. The 2006 national space policy declares U.S. space capabilities

as ‘‘. . .vital to its national interests. Consistent with this policy, the United States

will: preserve its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space; dissuade or

deter others from either impeding those rights or developing capabilities intended

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ference; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to

U.S. national interests.’’

The unique global nature of space capabilities and the ramifications of purposeful

interference or destruction require complex international considerations. While no

‘‘red lines,’’ or thresholds for attacks against our space assets exist, our current national space policy provides adequate guidance to allow the U.S. appropriate responses on a case-by-case basis.

The U.S. has developed its space capabilities within the context of a body of international law referred to as the Outer Space Regime—a manifestation of the body

of space law comprised of international and domestic agreements and precedents.

Rooted in the ideals of ‘‘space for peaceful purposes’’ and ‘‘free access,’’ the existing

Outer Space Regime is sufficient in regulating military activities in outer space,

without presenting additional constraints, such as a restrictive ‘‘rules of the road,’’

that may limit flexibility to future challenges.

Ms. TAUSCHER. The head of Army SMDC has said that within three years, China

may be able to challenge the U.S. at a ‘‘near-peer level’’ in space. What are

STRATCOM and DOD doing to ensure that the U.S. military will maintain its access to space, to defend U.S. interests in space, and to engage in mutual threat reduction measures?

General CHILTON. U.S. National Policy for space is based on freedom of access for

all space faring nations who follow international conventions on space. The significant U.S. use of space is founded on maintaining access to space and deterring those

who would threaten any nation’s rights to peaceful use of space. If deterrence should

fail, then we will defend U.S. interests in space. STRATCOM’s assessment is that

no single nation presently or in the near future possesses the capability, short of

the use of nuclear weapons, to defeat our space systems. However, several nations

are developing their space capabilities, and with significant investments could pose

a challenge to our freedom of access in the future. In order to maintain our assured

access, STRATCOM articulates the warfighters’ requirements that the services and

the Intelligence Community (IC) provide.

STRATCOM is working in close coordination with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), across the Intelligence Community, and the Services on

the integration of the Intelligence Collection Architecture (ICA). The ICA is an overarching IC effort to tackle ‘‘hard’’ intelligence issues. It is jointly led by the ODNI

and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. STRATCOM participates across

the ICA effort, with STRATCOM’s Directorate of Capabilities and Resource Integration as Command Lead, supported by our Directorate of Intelligence. One of seven

chartered ICA working groups is the Space Survivability Working Group, which is

assessing threats to U.S. space architectures. They will identify the highest priority

investments to protect critical intelligence capabilities that can be implemented

within 10 years, and develop specific programmatic proposals to be considered in the

FY 2010-15 budget builds for the National Intelligence Program and Military Intelligence Program.

STRATCOM participation in the ICA is linked with a range of ongoing

STRATCOM activities with other DOD, Joint Staff, IC, and Service efforts in the

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance arenas, including Operationally Responsive Space. These ongoing efforts are worked in consonance with the guidance

established in the National Military Strategy and National Space Strategy.

Ms. TAUSCHER. What do you see as the limiting-technologies in future conflict scenarios? Are current investment plans addressing this need?

General CHILTON. One significant challenge will be to ensure information gets to

the users in time to be actionable. Information in a net-centric environment will

make information available to participants (people, processes, or systems).

We will need to be able to transport this information globally through space in

volumes and speeds meaningful to all warfightes. In addition, the ever expanding

number and sophistication of objects in space is out pacing our capacity and capability to monitor and characterize those objects which could pose a threat to our ability

to use space. We need to continually explore technological opportunities to increase

our awareness of the operational environment of space and our ability to counter

any threats. As our dependence on complex information systems and applications

in the space and cyber domains increases, so too does the risk to vulnerabilities inherent in complex systems. Additionally; the proliferation of emerging telecommunications/information systems technology challenges our ability to combat and defend

against potential adversary use of that technology. We need to continually explore

technological opportunities to increase our awareness of the operational environment of space and cyberspace and our ability to counter any threats. We have aggressively worked the FY09 budget with the Services and Agencies emphasizing our

most critical needs are identified and addressed.

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Ms. TAUSCHER. Please describe what missile defense capabilities are included in

this year’s Prioritized Capabilities List (PCL). How does the budget request reflect

the PCL?

General CHILTON. The current PCL covers the entire span of missile defense capabilities requested by the warfighter. The Missile Defense Agency Summer Study did

an alignment of the MDA Program of Record against the PCL. The conclusion from

the study indicates that while there are funding shortfalls to fully meet desired capabilities, MDA PB09 reflects expenditures against all 27 PCL capabilities.

Ms. TAUSCHER. What is STRATCOM’s assessment of the Missile Defense Agency’s

revised Block Structure? Does it reflect the warfighter’s prioritized capability needs?

General CHILTON. Our assessment is that the revised Block Structure allows the

Missile Defense Agency to address concerns about transparency, accountability, and

oversight to better communicate to Congress and combatant commands MDA’s plans

and baselines for its continuing improvements in Ballistic Missile Defense System

capabilities, MDA has given thorough consideration to the warfighters’ Prioritized

Capabilities List. in its development goals and fielding priorities. The establishment

of the near-term, sea-based terminal program in the current FY08 budget is an example.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Last year, LTG Kevin Campbell, Commander of the JFCC–IMD,

testified that STRATCOM’s analysis (i.e., the Joint Capabilities Mix Study) indicated that combatant commanders required twice as many THAAD and SM–3 interceptors than are currently planned in order to meet current requirements. I understand that STRATCOM has recently completed further analysis on this subject in

the Joint Capabilities Mix Study II. What were the key findings from this study and

when will you be in a position to brief the Committee on its results?

General CHILTON. The Joint Capabilities Mix (JCM) II study provides an initial

recommendation for the minimum number of THAAD and SM–3 interceptors required by 2015. The Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization

(JIAMDO) is available to brief the results in a closed session upon your request.

Ms. TAUSCHER. To what extent will the results of that study be taken into account

as DOD develops the fiscal year 2010 budget request?

General CHILTON. Joint Staff-led Joint Capabilities Mix Study Part II (JCM II)

was completed in March 2007 and will be considered by Services and MDA as POM

10 is finalized.

Ms. TAUSCHER. How would STRATCOM assess missile defense testing conducted

to date and MDA’s test plans? Are they sufficient to give you confidence in the operational effectiveness of the Ballistic Missile Defense System? If not, what changes

would you suggest?

General CHILTON. MDA is on a solid track in the effort to improve operational

realism of the planned tests. As the advocate for the warfighter, we have developed

the Operational Readiness & Acceptance (OR&A) process that deliberately integrates warfighter test and exercise objectives in the BMDS test program. MDA has

been receptive and responsive to this process. The upcoming flight test of the

Ground Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system is a good example of increasing

operational realism in these venues.

Missile defense tests are assessed by three organizations: MDA’s Capability Assessment Team, the joint Service Operational Test Agency, and OSD’s Director of

Operational Test and Evaluation group. These organizations provide independent

assessments and reports—reports that the Warfighter uses, along with its participation in test and operations, to conduct their military utility assessment.

Ms. TAUSCHER. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee last

year, your predecessor, General James Cartwright, said his priority for missile defense was to focus greater attention and resources on the threat from short- and

medium-range ballistic missiles. Do you share General Cartwright’s view that we

need to place greater priority on countering the threat from shod-and medium-range

ballistic missiles?

General CHILTON. The results of the JCM II have highlighted the need for an increase in our capabilities to counter short and medium range missiles, specifically

to increase the number of THAAD and SM–3 interceptors. I support this assessment.

Our mission at STRATCOM is to advocate for desired missile defense capability

and characteristics for all Combatant Commands. The Geographic Combatant Commanders who have responsibility for countering short- and medium-range ballistic

missiles within their areas of responsibility (AOR) are actively determining the relative priority of the capabilities they need to counter threats, facing the U.S. The

COCOMs then provide STRATCOM the justification necessary for us to advocate for

new capabilities via the DOD Missile Defense Executive Board and the Prioritized

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Capabilities List. MDA factors COCOM inputs into their budget to achieve an effective balance for defense against the threat.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Where do you believe we should focus our priority with regard to

missile defense?

General CHILTON. Missile defense (MD) directly supports the new Strategic Triad

by deterring and dissuading potential adversaries from investing in missile technologies; and, when necessary, effectively defeating rogue nation ballistic missile

threats to the US. The present program for missile defense is being extended to

corer deployed forces and Friends and Allies. Toward that end, we must develop effective missile defense capability with following focus:

• Develop a capability to counter the growing Iranian missile threats

• Integrate—global missile defense capability that integrates with Allies and

other capabilities within the Triad

• Inventory—increase the current MD inventory against all threat ranges. Investments develop advanced technologies to stay ahead of emerging threats

Ms. TAUSCHER. The FY 2009 budget request contains $720.0 million for a European missile defense site. For a number of reasons, deploying long-range interceptors in Europe will raise serious command and control challenges. To what extent

have STRATCOM and other combatant commander begun to plan to operate a European missile defense site?

General CHILTON. USSTRATCOM, in collaboration and coordination with the

other Combatant Commands, has been working to establish the Global Concept of

Operations (CONOPS) that would address command and control questions to include those associated with the European Capability. We have conducted O–6 and

General/Flag Officer (GOFO) tabletop discussions with the Combatant. Commanders, Services, MDA, and OSD and have developed recommended courses of action

for the CONOPS. We expect to complete our findings this year and seek formal approval.

Ms. TAUSCHER. What do you believe are the key command and control challenges

associated with a European missile defense site?

General CHILTON. We are examining several command and control structures

with varying degrees of centralization to address the globalization of missile warfare. The key, challenge will be to integrate the European Capability within the context of the U.S. and theater missile defense systems to provide for effective operations across the system’s functional and geographic boundaries.

Ms. TAUSCHER. To what extent has STRATCOM begun to engage the NATO Military Authorities on command and control issues associated?

General CHILTON. STRATCOM has begun engagement with NATO on identification of Command and Control (C2) issues through information exchanges, exercises,

and war-games with NATO’s Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense Program Office.

Ms. TAUSCHER. MDA is fundamentally a research and development organization

with responsibility to develop future capabilities, However, because the services

have generally been reluctant to assume responsibility for fielding missile defense

capabilities, MDA has taken on much of this responsibility. The FY 2008 NDAA an

independent study to examine MDA roles and missions, which is to be conducted

by the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA). What recommendations would you

make to the study team to ensure that MDA is responsive to the warfighter in the

future?

General CHILTON. USSTRATCOM participated in the 2007 MDA Summer Study

that examined means to improve MDA responsiveness. We would submit these recommendations from MDA’s 2007 Summer Study to IDA. The MDA 2007 Study Recommendations:

• Restructure the MDA Systems Engineering Process (SEP) to include additional

warfighter inputs at key points

• Improve Warfighter Involvement Process (WIP) activity to encompass analysis

of quantity, operating locations, and deployment timing

• Restructure/expand the change request process to permit resolution of single

element items, fielding, and training requests

• Insert the Achievable Capability List (MDA’s response to the PCL) and the Capability Assessment Report into the evolved SEP

Modify tie PCL to convey both a long-term vision of the objective BMDS and a

more specifically defined capability needs.

Ms. TAUSCHER. In 2002, the Unified Command Plan (UCP) assigned STRATCOM

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erations. However, mission execution remains the responsibility of each geographic

combatant commander in their respective area of responsibility (AOR). Do you believe you currently have sufficient authority to ‘‘adjudicate’’ disputes that could arise

between combatant commanders during missile defense operations?

General CHILTON. The current UCP does not give CDRUSSTRATCOM the authority to adjudicate disputes between combatant commanders during the execution of

actual missile defense operations. To ensure we are prepared to conduct missile defense operations, I have sufficient authority to adjudicate disputes between combatant commanders during the planning process. During actual missile defense operations, the current UCP directs USSTRATCOM to provide warning and assessment

of missile attack only.

Ms. TAUSCHER. How are you using your current authorities, as outlined in the

UCP, to minimize disputes from occurring?

General CHILTON. JFCC IMD conducts collaborative planning and works with the

Combatant Commands to (COCOMs) identify areas of disagreement. One effective

avenue for dispute resolution is the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMDS) Management

Structure. This structure with representatives from the COCOMs, Missile Defense

Agency, and other partners work to prevent capability issues, and when disputes

arise, resolve at an early stage. This has been successful to date in resolving issues.

We continue to conduct wargames and exercises with Combatant Commanders to

increase knowledge of missile defense capabilities and operations. We insert new

knowledge and lessons learned into current operational procedures and plans.

Ms. TAUSCHER. We also understand that STRATCOM is in the process of developing a new global missile defense concept-of-operations. Can you provide us a general

idea of the various options that you’re examining?

General CHILTON. We are examining several command and control structures

with varying degrees of centralization to address the globalization of ballistic missile

defense. Our courses of action consider variations on support and command relationships for locations of launch of the ballistic missile, predicted impact and location

of missile defense resources among others. We have held tabletop war-games to explore the issues associated with each option.

Ms. TAUSCHER. In 2004, STRATCOM conducted a Military Utility Assessment of

the initial set of ground-based missile defense (GMD) capabilities deployed in California and Alaska to determine their militarily effectiveness. How confident are you

in current GMD system capabilities?

General CHILTON. We assess that the BMDS can defend the homeland against a

limited North Korean ballistic missile attack.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Are there areas where you believe improvements need to be made?

General CHILTON. The military utility assessment process is continuously maturing the product. The increased number of completed tests, with a commensurate increase in operational realism, has increased our ability to understand and assess the

system’s performance and military utility. Continued emphasis on validating our

models and simulations will enhance our confidence in test results. Additionally, the

warfighter-developed Operational Readiness & Acceptance (OR&A) process has improved the integration of warfighter test and exercise objectives in the BMDS test

program.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Do you have any plans to conduct another Military Utility Assessment of the GMD system in the near future?

General CHILTON. The Military Utility Assessment (MUA) of the GMD is an

iterative on-going process. The 2008 MUA is currently in development.

Ms. TAUSCHER. The House-approved FY 2008 defense authorization bill contains

a provision establishing a strategic commission to evaluate U.S. strategic posture for

the future, including the role that nuclear weapons should play in the national security strategy. What key questions should the commission consider?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. In addition to the seven specific questions identified in the legislation, other key questions the commission should consider include:

• What are the allied perceptions of U.S. stockpile reductions? To what degree

could substantial reductions call into question the viability of the U.S. extended

deterrent to the point allies may decide to develop then own nuclear forces as

a result?

• What is the status of foreign nuclear weapons capabilities and the possible

threat to U.S. national security threat this may pose?

• What are the specific nonproliferation impacts, if any, of modest reductions of

U.S. nuclear forces and the nuclear stockpile?

• What are the long-term national security consequences of maintaining an aging

nuclear stockpile absent underground nuclear testing?

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Ms. TAUSCHER. Do you see any risks to the U.S. moving lower than the Moscow

Treaty’s specified range of 1700 to 2200 operationally deployed warheads? In your

estimation, what is the proper range for operationally deployed warheads to aim for

by the end of the next decade (2020)?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The Department of Energy provides the Department of Defense

with the number of weapons required to meet national security requirements. We

remain committed to maintaining the smallest number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security requirements. The Department of Defense established

security requirements for the size and composition of the nuclear stockpile and operationally deployed forces.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Would a decrease in operationally deployed warheads to range of

1,000 to 1,200 substantially change the investment required to maintain our nuclear

arsenal?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes. The degree of potential costs could vary greatly. The answer

to this question is highly dependent on the types of warheads in the stockpile (i.e.,

which Cold-war, legacy weapons versus refurbished modern replacement warheads)

and the degree to which the nation commits to a responsive infrastructure to support a larger nuclear weapons stockpile with multiple types and spares, or fewer

types and a build-as-needed capability.

The President has provided a vision for the future that is focused on achieving

the smallest stockpile consistent with our national security needs. Consistent with

this vision the NNSA in conjunction with the Department of Defense (DOD) are

working to achieve a level of 1,700 to 2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear

weapons (ODSNW) by 2012. In addition to these ODSNW weapons, there is an additional quantity of weapons that are kept by DOD for augmentation. Without a Congressionally-supported stockpile transformation plan, the United States will continue to manage technical risks associated with an aging stockpile of legacy nuclear

weapons, and the geopolitical uncertainties of the years ahead, by maintaining the

large inventory of reserve weapons to backup the ODSNW quantity. Cost savings

for a force of 1,000 to 1,200 ODSNW would be dependent on the ability to reduce

the total size of the stockpile, including the large inventory of reserve weapons that

are kept for augmentation purposes.

Achievement of a modern, responsive infrastructure and production of RRWs are

two means of achieving additional reductions in the total stockpile size that could

lead to cost savings. The RRW designs will provide more favorable reliability and

performance margins than the current stockpile of legacy nuclear warheads. Additionally, RRWs will make nuclear weapons safer and more secure against unauthorized use by incorporating state-of-the-art security that cannot be retro-fitted into the

older legacy nuclear weapons. This position has beers clearly articulated by the Secretaries of Defense, Energy and State in their joint statement titled ‘‘National Security and Nuclear Weapons: Maintaining Deterrence in the 21st Century’’, dated July

2007.

Ms. TAUSCHER. What risks do you see, if any, in pursuing an ‘‘LEP only’’ strategy,

as opposed to proceeding with the reliable replacement warhead?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. There are risks associated with use control, safety, reliability,

and the ability to certify without nuclear testing.

One very important area of risk in the pursuit of only an LEP approach is the

limitation on options that are available for including enhanced surety features. For

example, limitations exist for modifying legacy systems to include new use control

features, changing conventional high explosive (HE) primaries to use insensitive

HE, and adding fire resistance to help prevent spread of plutonium in accident environments. All of these options exist with higher margin RRW designs that are not

constrained by optimized weight and volume trades that resulted in today’s lowmargin legacy weapon designs.

A second primary area of risk with pursuing only an LEP approach is associated

with being able to reconstruct obsolete processes and/or materials for low margin

legacy warheads that no longer exist in the production complex. Re-certification of

legacy warheads undergoing an LEP will be complicated if materials in some designs cannot be manufactured, or if processes for original materials cannot be resurrected, such as the current difficulty being experienced on a material for the W76–

1 LEP. This situation could require replacement of parts with new materials that

were not in the original, tested design. Any variances from the original design would

have to be carefully evaluated using the tools of stockpile stewardship. Without the

ability to test the weapons to validate the results of simulations, greater uncertainty

will result. Consequently, NNSA may not be able to certify that the weapon meets

the high-reliability currently required by nuclear systems.

Last, each successive LEP on a weapon type or design change in a single LEP

introduces uncertainties and risk either associated with slight changes in features

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or in manufacturing process changes that cannot be avoided. What is not known is

how sensitive the final performance of the warhead will be to these cumulative

changes. Since the legacy warhead designs are fixed and complex, the designer does

not have much latitude to increase margin and must accept these unknown uncertainties. Through multiple LEPs of the same warhead these uncertainties will increase and the confidence in the design is expected to diminish. For these reasons,

the need for nuclear testing to validate warhead design variances introduced during

LEPs cannot be completely ruled out.

Ms. TAUSCHER. How do decisions on future delivery systems (e.g., ICBM, bomber

modernization) impact RRW capabilities and timelines? Conversely, how do RRW

decisions influence development of future delivery systems?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. RRW is intended as a replacement for weapons currently in the

stockpile. In its inception, RRW–1 was intended to be a replacement for a portion

of the warheads deployed on the Trident SLBM. Similarly, should the RRW concept

be eventually approved and advanced, an RRW variant could be an option for a B61

gravity bomb replacement.

Implications for future delivery systems are best addressed by the Department of

Defense. That said, while either RRW options or existing warheads could provide

viable candidates, RRW systems could offer advantages in concert with long-term

reliability and enhanced safety and security.

Ms. TAUSCHER. The House-approved FY 2008 defense authorization bill contains

a provision establishing a strategic commission to evaluate U.S. strategic posture for

the future, including the role that nuclear weapons should play in the national security strategy: What key questions should the commission consider?

Secretary VICKERS. There are four major questions that are likely to form the

basis of our own posture review, and obtaining the commission’s perspective on

these framing questions would be useful. The four questions are:

1) What is the current and likely future security environment?

2) What policies are required to meet our security goals in those environments?

3) What nuclear forces are required to carry out these policies?

4) What infrastructure is required to develop and sustain these nuclear forces?

Ms. TAUSCHER. What has changed in our security environment since the last Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) that should be emphasized in the strategic commission?

Secretary VICKERS. The efforts of states of concern and non-state actors to obtain

WMD and the means to deliver them have intensified since the last NPR. The discovery of the wide-reaching proliferation network run by A.Q. Khan is especially

troubling. North Korea’s nuclear test of October 2006 and declared acquisition. of

nuclear weapons raise the prospects that North Korea will have a number of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. The ongoing modernization of Russian and Chinese strategic forces is also a matter of concern that will have to be

carefully monitored.

Ms. TAUSCHER. What do you believe are the security threats with the greatest implications for our strategic posture, policies, and capability investments?

Secretary VICKERS. As the President has stated, the proliferation of nuclear weapons poses the greatest threat to our national security. Nuclear weapons are unique

in their capability to inflict instant loss of life on a massive scale. For this reason,

nuclear weapons hold special appeal to rogue states and terrorists. The efforts of

states of concern and non-state actors to obtain nuclear weapons and other forms

of WMD, as well as the means to deliver them, have intensified since the last NPR.

The discovery of the wide-reaching proliferation network run by A.Q. Khan is especially troubling. North Korea’s nuclear test of October 2006 and declared acquisition

of nuclear weapons raise the prospects that North Korea will have a number of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. North Korea and Iran are also of particular concern because of the demonstrated willingness of each to transfer sensitive

weapons technology to others, their efforts to develop ballistic missiles of ever greater ranges, and their willingness to sponsor groups that engage in terrorism. The ongoing modernization of Russia’s and China’s strategic forces must also be taken into

account when developing our own strategic posture, policies, and capability investments.

Ms. TAUSCHER. What role would RRW play in the nation’s overall strategic deterrence objectives, particularly given investments in a conventional PGS capability?

Secretary VICKERS. To meet the needs of a more complex security environment,

the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review envisioned a more flexible New Triad that consists

of strike systems, nuclear, non-nuclear, and non-kinetic; defenses, both active and

passive; and a responsive infrastructure, supported by robust planning, intelligence

and command and control capabilities. The United States has made great strides

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in developing and deploying both very advanced conventional weapon systems and

missile defenses.

Over tune, the development and deployment of these systems may further reduce

U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons for selected deterrence-related objectives and some

strategic targets. However, for the foreseeable future, advanced conventional weapons and missile defenses will not decrease the need for nuclear capabilities. Both

advanced conventional weapons and missile defenses can enhance deterrence, but

the ability to deter rests ultimately and fundamentally on the availability and continued effectiveness of U.S. nuclear forces. The United States will need to maintain

a nuclear force, though smaller and less prominent than in the past, for the foreseeable future.

Our long-term goal is to rely more on a revived nuclear weapons infrastructure

and less on reserve warheads in the stockpile to respond to unforeseen events. However, until we are confident that we have the capability to respond to unexpected

developments by producing nuclear weapon components in sufficient quantities, we

will need to retain more reserve warheads than otherwise would be desired to hedge

against technical problems or adverse geopolitical changes.

The Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) will be key to sustaining confidence

in the U.S. nuclear stockpile. Moreover, once the RRW is deployed in significant

numbers as replacements for low-margin-of-error legacy warheads, some or all of the

reserve warheads retained in the stockpile for reliability purposes can be retired

and dismantled without incurring significant risk.

Many questions regarding the future nuclear stockpile and nuclear force cannot

be answered with precision today. The answers will depend on knowledge gained

by further work on programs such as RRW, by efforts to modernize the nuclear warhead infrastructure, and by closely watching emerging trends around the world.

Completion of the RRW Phase 2A Design Definition and Cost Study will provide

cost estimates to develop, produce, and deploy replacement warheads. This will form

the basis of a decision whether or not to seek Congressional authorization and funding to begin RRW engineering development and to refine future plans.

Ms. TAUSCHER. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee last

year, your predecessor, General James Cartwright, said his priority for missile defense was to focus greater attention and resources on the threat from short-and medium-range ballistic missiles. Do you share General Cartwright’s view that we need

to place greater priority on countering the threat from short-and medium-range ballistic missiles?

Secretary VICKERS. The most prominent threat we face today comes from rogue

nations with large arsenals of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. These nations view their arsenals as a means to coerce and intimidate their neighbors, and

deny freedom of action to western coalition forces. With regard to short- and medium-range missiles that threaten our friends and allies, we must continue to

strengthen our defenses against these threats.

While building capabilities against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles

should be a near-term priority, we cannot afford to ignore the growing long-range

threat from rogue nations. Both North Korea and Iran are working to develop

longer-range ballistic missiles as well as space launch capabilities, which are adaptable for use as inter-continental ballistic missiles. We know that North Korea is a

leading proliferator of ballistic missile technology, and Iran is one of its main customers. We must continue to develop capabilities to counter these threats, and to

improve them over time to ensure we stay ahead of the threat.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Has the concept of strategic deterrence changed since the end of

the Cold War? If so, how?

Secretary VICKERS. Strategic deterrence is as valuable today as it was at the

dawn of the atomic age over 50 years ago. However, the United States’ approach

to strategic deterrence has changed to meet the unique challenges of the 21st Century.

During the Cold War, our greatest security concern was the Soviet Union. Potential threats from China and regional states such as North Korea were considered

lesser-included cases that could be addressed by the same capabilities deployed to

counter the Soviet Union. Today, the global security environment is radically different. The primary national security challenges now facing the United States is the

nexus of violent extremists and regional states of concern that possess or seek to

attain weapons of mass destruction (WMD). However, China’s modernization and

expansion of its nuclear force is also a concern. In addition, Russia’s modernization

of its large nuclear force, including the world’s largest non-strategic nuclear arsenal,

and its robust infrastructure, remains a security concern. Despite these dangerous

challenges, the United States has reduced its strategic nuclear weapons stockpile by

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80% since the height of the Cold War, and its non-strategic stockpile by over 90%

since 1991.

Although not suited for every 21st Century challenge, nuclear weapons remain an

essential element in modern strategy. Nuclear forces continue to represent the ultimate deterrent capability that supports U.S. national security. Extended deterrence

is key to U.S. alliances, both in NATO and, in Asia, assuring allies and friends of

the credibility of U.S. security commitments. U.S. nuclear weapons deter potential

adversaries from the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction against the

United States, its deployed forces and its allies and friends. In the absence of this

‘‘nuclear umbrella’’ some non-nuclear allies might perceive a need to develop arid

deploy their own nuclear capability.

Ms. TAUSCHER. What should the U.S. nuclear strategy be if deterrence is an outdated approach? What implications does this have for the size and composition of

the future U.S. nuclear force?

Secretary VICKERS. Deterrence is as important today as it was 50 years ago. U.S.

nuclear forces continue to be the ultimate deterrent to adversaries who would use

WMD against the United States, its forces, allies, or friends. Furthermore, through

extended deterrence, the U.S. assures allies and friends of the credibility of U.S. security commitments and obviates the need for them to develop their own nuclear

capability.

Force sizing methodology during the Cold War was based primarily on a strategic

conflict with the Soviet Union: Today, however; force sizing is based on the abilities

of the operationally deployed forces, the force structure, and the nuclear weapons

infrastructure to meet the spectrum of political and military goals. This includes

present and unforeseen technical or geopolitical developments.

The United States has adapted its nuclear force size and composition to meet

modern security challenges. The United States has reduced its strategic nuclear

weapons stockpile by 80% since the height of the Cold War, and its non-strategic

stockpile by over 90% since 1991. In addition, we have significantly reduced our nuclear forces by taking four ballistic missile submarines out of strategic service, retiring all Peacekeeper ICBMs, removing 50 Minuteman III ICBMs from alert, converting the B–1 bomber fleet to a purely conventional force, and taking the Advanced

Cruise Missile out of service.

Force sizing is also guided by the challenges facing the nuclear weapons infrastructure. The infrastructure has atrophied and U.S. nuclear weapons. are maintained well beyond their design life. The United States, in fact, is now the only nuclear weapons state that does not have the capability to produce a new nuclear warhead. The United States must hedge its nuclear force size and composition to address these technical and geopolitical realities.

Ms. TAUSCHER. What roles do STRATCOM, OSD Policy, and NNSA have in the

National Cyber Initiative? What do you see as the key issues in the cyber arena?

Secretary VICKERS. As the Nation becomes more networked, new partnerships will

develop as a result of the common need for security across the Nation. The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) recognizes these dependencies

and assigns order and purpose to the stakeholders and their particular areas of responsibility. USSTRATCOM’s mission is to direct network operations and defense,

while deterring adversaries. OSD Policy defines and has broad oversight of Departmental roles and responsibilities as well as interdependencies as prescribed by law.

NSA, true to the national cyber security strategy and Presidential order, is not only

the national manager for National Security Systems, but also assesses cyber threats

from abroad.

Cybersecurity is of critical importance because of the tremendous capabilities and

potential vulnerabilities afforded by the nation’s reliance on information and the information technology infrastructure. It is critical that we address not only DOD

cyber threats, but the threats that loom over the nation as a whole. The National

Strategy to Secure Cyberspace is a document of elemental importance in the security of this country, and the cyber initiative recognizes that DOD agencies and federal departments play a separate but complementary role. The Cyber Initiative codifies these relationships and empowers us to work jointly to safeguard the country’s

‘‘nervous system.’’ We fully recognize that we must deal with this problem not just

in the DOD, but broadly across the entire range of the Federal sector. Because we

are embarking on a relatively new effort—one to protect an ephemeral but indispensable national asset—the CNCI is a major step in an ongoing iterative effort. As

DOD and other federal sectors improve their collective security postures, we will

gain a heightened understanding of the threats, the degree to which our efforts are

mitigating those threats, and the enhancements we must make to instill integrity

and resiliency into national cyberspace.

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Ms. TAUSCHER. Do you see any risks to the U.S. moving lower than the Moscow

Treaty’s specified range of 1,700 to 2,200 operationally deployed warheads? In your

estimation, what is the proper range for operationally deployed warheads to aim for

by the end of the next decade (2020)?

Secretary VICKERS. Any consideration of moving to lower levels than currently envisioned in the Moscow Treaty must carefully take into account the need to retain

the ability to respond to technological, operational, and geo-political risks in a timely manner. The Administration has not yet identified any lower range for operationally deployed warheads in 2020; this may be determined in the upcoming Nuclear

Posture Review.

Ms. TAUSCHER. What role did OSD Policy play in the planning for the attempted

intercept of the nonresponsive satellite?

Secretary VICKERS. OSD Policy supported the Department’s coordination and decision-making process, and facilitated the interface between the Department, the National Security Council and other U.S. Government Departments and Agencies. In

this context, OSD Policy supported the Secretary of Defense in his capacity as one

of the President’s national security advisors. OSD Policy facilitated legal analysis

to ensure the engagement was consistent with international agreements and legal

obligations, supported the development of diplomatic and public affairs plans, and

supported military and diplomatic exchanges with the international community.

Ms. TAUSCHER. What is our military’s response posture? For example, what would

be our response if a military communications satellite like Wideband Global System

were jammed?

Secretary VICKERS. National space policy states that the United States considers

space capabilities vital to its national interests and views purposeful interference

with its space systems as an infringement on its rights. Consistent with this policy,

the United States will take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities,

respond to interference, and if necessary, deny adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests.

When interference with a satellite system is detected, the first step is to properly

characterize and attribute the interference event. If the interference is determined

to be purposeful and the source of the interference can be attributed, a broad range

of options will be considered to mitigate or eliminate the interference threat depending on the level of hostilities and the source of the interference. During peacetime,

diplomatic and/or regulatory measures will normally be used initially to attempt to

eliminate the interference. During hostilities, a broader range of options to include

military response will be considered.

The Department of Defense continues to work with its interagency partners to improve the U.S. Government’s ability to respond rapidly to purposeful interference

events. The key is to continue to improve our space situational awareness capabilities. Space situational awareness provides indications and warning of hostile activities, enables real time assessment and attribution of purposeful interference, and

is fundamental to our ability to respond to purposeful interference and protect our

vital space interests.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Please provide an update on the status of missile defense negotiations with Poland and the Czech Republic. When are we likely to have signed and

ratified agreements from Poland and the Czech Republic?

Secretary VICKERS. We have now had six rounds of negotiations with Poland on

an agreement to base a groundbased missile defense interceptor site in Polish territory. These sessions have been productive and we have made a great deal of

progress on a draft text. Only a few major issues remain.

Poland’s position is that U.S. assistance in modernizing Polish armed forces is an

important component of agreeing to base the interceptors on its soil. Secretary Rice

and Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski agreed in February that BMD negotiations

and security assistance talks would proceed on a ‘‘separate but parallel’’ basis. Since

then, we have held separate talks on both the MD basing agreement and security

assistance. The United States is committed to working with Poland to analyze priorities for the Polish military and determine the best way to improve Poland’s capabilities as a NATO ally. As we make progress, in this area, we are confident we will

also make further progress on the BMD agreement. We hope to have the BMD

agreement signed and ratified in the next few months.

In parallel, we have also had six rounds of separate negotiations with the Czech

Republic on an agreement to base a missile defense tracking radar in Czech territory. These talks have made even greater progress and we are in the process of resolving a small number of drafting issues that will allow us to finalize the draft

agreement text. We are hopeful that we will have a signed agreement in the coming

weeks, at which point it will likely be submitted to the Czech parliament for ratifiVerDate 22-MAR-2001 13:53 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 043250 PO 00000 Frm 00095 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\110-120\43250.TXT HNS1 PsN: HNS1
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cation. The Czechs themselves are unsure how long the ratification process may

take.

Ms. TAUSCHER. On February 1, 2008, the Polish Foreign Minister stated that the

United States had agreed in principle to provide Poland additional ‘‘security guarantees’’ in exchange for hosting the proposed interceptor site. What types of additional

security guarantees is the United States considering providing to Poland?

Secretary VICKERS. Poland’s position is that U.S. assistance in modernizing Polish

armed forces, especially air defenses, is an important component of agreeing to base

the interceptors on its soil. Polish government officials tell us that this aspect is critical because they must be able to make the case to the Polish public that hosting

U.S. missile defense assets increases Poland’s security. They have asked for military

assistance and an additional bilateral security arrangement with the United States.

The U.S. position is that NATO Article V is the cornerstone of our security relationship and that there is no stronger guarantee, as the United States takes its Article V obligations very seriously. Therefore we are not considering additional security guarantees for Poland. However, the United States has committed to assisting

Poland with the modernization of its armed forces. We are working with Poland to

analyze priorities for the Polish military and determine the best way to improve Poland’s capabilities as a NATO ally. This process will take a number of months, and

should result in a plan for effective and economical means to help Poland modernize

its forces.

Secretary Rice and Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski agreed in February that

BMD negotiations and security assistance talks would proceed on a ‘‘separate but

parallel’’ basis. Since then, we have held separate talks on both the missile defense

basing agreement and security assistance.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Please provide an update on discussions with NATO. To what extent has NATO increased its focus and investment in territorial missile defense? To

what extent has STRATCOM engaged with NATO on command and control (C2)

issues and integration of C2 systems?

Secretary VICKERS. At the 2007 NATO Defense Ministerial, the Alliance tasked

further work in analyzing the political and military implications of territorial missile defense. Specifically, the Alliance directed that the U.S. proposal to place longrange missile defense assets in Europe be taken into account as part of the analysis.

We are confident that the April 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest will result in further positive developments along these lines.

Selected NATO member states are making investments in missile defense that

could be useful for territorial defense. NATO members have invested over ÷700 million in the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program.

Together with their investments in PATRIOT systems, ALTBMD could provide

point defense for European critical infrastructure and population centers. Italy and

Germany are co-developing with the U.S. the Medium Extended Air Defense missile

defense system. Other NATO allies have shown interest in equipping their surface

combatants with Aegis Standard Missile-3 sea-based interceptors: These capabilities

could provide our NATO allies with territorial defense capabilities, as well as

deployable forces for out-of-area coalition warfare.

STRATCOM, via its Joint Force Component Commander for Integrated Missile

Defense, has conducted a series of multi-lateral ballistic missile defense exercises

to explore coalition missile defense operations. Joint Project Optic Windmill/Alliance

is one such exercise and is part of a collection of Global Integrated Missile Defense

training events. These exercise events explore the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense

System (BMDS) with NATO playing a major role. In the exercises, NATO introduces

elements of the future Active Layered Theatre Missile Defense (ALTBMD), and

NATO C2 systems, together with the national Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense contributions to the Alliance, using both NATO’s Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)

and Response Force (NRF) concepts. These types of events offer a unique environment to explore future capabilities, evaluate command and control options, and refine tactics, techniques and procedures.

Ms. TAUSCHER. What would be the key command and control challenges associated with a European missile defense site? To what extent have STRATCOM and

other combatant commanders begun to plan to operate a European missile defense

site?

Secretary VICKERS. Some of the key challenges for command and control of the

European missile defense sites include establishing supported and supporting relationships, weapons release authority, and developing processes for planning, integrating and coordinating combined missile defense operations. These challenges are

a natural part of the evolution of missile defenses. The Unified Command Plan

tasks USSTRATCOM with leading a collaborative planning process that includes

providing global ballistic missile defense solutions. STRATCOM, via its Joint Force

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Component Commander for Integrated Missile Defense, is already leading an effort

to gain Combatant Commander agreement on a series of basic principles to support

a global ballistic missile defense concept of operations that will include European

missile defense capabilities. The basic principles will be agreed to in 2008 and will

be used to develop and finalize the concept of operations.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. EVERETT

Mr. EVERETT. Am I correct in saying on the new AEHF that the terminals are

not synchronized with it, or do you know?

General CHILTON. Regrettably, AEHF terminal synchronization remains a challenge. Only about 80 Secure Mobile Anti jam Reliable Tactical Terminals (SMART–

T) will be available when AEHF is ready for operations in FY10. Strategic terminals

will not be fielded in sufficient quantities to transition networks from Low Data

Rate MILSTAR capability to Extended Data Rate AEHF capability until approximately 2015.

To ensure the Services address this issue, USSTRATCOM emphasized terminal

synchronization within our #1 Integrated Priority List item for Fiscal Years 2010-

2015. We are also working with the Network Centric Capabilities Portfolio Manager

to include terminal synchronization language in the Joint Programming Guidance.

We are also closely monitoring terminal and space programs to leverage programmatic efficiencies that improve synchronization efforts.

Mr. EVERETT. Please provide STRATCOM’s recommendation on the revised High

Altitude Transition plan and U–2 retirement plan, year-by-year, based on

STRATCOM’s Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) gaps analysis.

General CHILTON. STRATCOM is currently conducting its assessment of the revised High Altitude Transition (HAT) plan through the Defense Department and

analyzing courses of action necessary to maintain airborne ISR capability for the

warfighter. Our 2008 assessment updates a similar study completed by STRATCOM

in 2006 and will address specific combatant command concerns associated with the

transition. My intent is to identify DOD operational risk and potential mitigation

options through the end of Fiscal Year 2012. The findings will be presented to the

Joint Requirements Oversight Council in April 2008. STRATCOM continues to support active management and assessment of the HAT plan to deliver capabilities

while limiting DOD risk associated with U–2 divestiture.

Mr. EVERETT. The U–2 Optical Bar Camera (OBC) provides a broad area search

capability to support treaty monitoring and COCOM requirements. With no plans

to migrate the OBC over to Global Hawk, how will the COCOM requirement for a

broad area search capability be satisfied?

General CHILTON. USSTRATCOM and regional combatant commanders recognize

the operational value the U–2’s OBC capability provides. However, there is also an

understanding of the value in transitioning to the next generation of digitized,

broad-area, space and airborne imaging capabilities, requiring fewer processing resources, but with faster product delivery. STRATCOM will continue to examine

Global Hawk and enterprise-wide capabilities to ensure Combatant Commander ISR

requirements are satisfied. The requirement for releasable, broadarea imaging capabilities is part of a STRATCOM led assessment of the Air Force’s High Altitude

Transition (HAT) plan scheduled for completion in April 2008. The divestiture of the

U–2 aircraft will continue to be actively managed to ensure that all critical requirements are met throughout the transition to the Global Hawk.

Mr. EVERETT. Who are the planned users of TSAT and what impact does the $4

billion reduction to TSAT across the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) have on

these users?

General CHILTON. TSAT is expected to support a variety of strategic and tactical

users, ranging from the President down to the individual small combat unit. Users

include command centers servicing all Combatant Commands/Services/Agencies;

Army, Marine, Navy, and Air Force units and platforms; various unmanned aerial

systems; and special operations forces.

The $4 billion reduction extends reliance on lower capacity, non-network centric,

and unprotected legacy systems; potentially creates an unintended gap in survivable

and protected communications for nuclear command and control in the 2020 timeframe; delays the exponential increase in wideband capacity that our geographic

combatant commanders are demanding for transporting intelligence, surveillance,

and reconnaissance data; and postpones delivery of antijam, low probability of intercept, and networked communications-on-the-move capabilities for our deployed

warfighters.

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We are currently working with OSD and all of our mission partners to determine

the appropriate investment strategy for military SATCOM. We are analyzing the

contributions from the entire wideband and protected satellite communications portfolio to determine the architecture that best meets the warfighter’s future SATCOM

requirements.

Mr. EVERETT. What is your assessment of the synchronization between the launch

of military SATCOM systems and the fielding of compatible user terminals? How

are you ensuring that user terminals are fielded to keep pace with new capabilities

introduced on WGS(already on-orbit), AEHF (I QFY09), and the Navy’s MUOS (FYI

10)?

General CHILTON. Terminal synchronization has been a USSTRATCOM priority

for the past several years. While the Services have made some progress on aligning

terminal fielding schedules with satellite launches, synchronization remains a challenge. Terminals currently lag satellite deployment by 2-5 years, essentially expending up to a third of the satellite’s lifetime while the user population waits for terminals to be fielded:

To ensure the Services address this issue, USSTRATCOM emphasized terminal

synchronization within our #1 Integrated Priority List item for Fiscal Years 2010-

2015. We are also working with the Network Centric Capabilities Portfolio Manager

to include terminal synchronization language in Joint Programming Guidance. We

are also closely monitoring terminal and space programs to leverage programmatic

efficiencies that improve synchronization efforts.

Mr. EVERETT. What roles do STRATCOM, OSD Policy, and NNSA have in the National Cyber Initiative? What do you see as the key issues in the cyber arena?

General CHILTON. USSTRATCOM is the lead Combatant Command for Cyberspace supporting DOD’s National Cyber Initiative tasks including operation and defense of the Global Information Grid, development of capabilities to increase the security of our networks; and collaboration with USG agencies and others to bolster

cyber security.

Key issues in the cyber area are situational awareness, attribution, supply chain

vulnerabilities and the development of a professional work force.

Mr. EVERETT. Can you provide a description of the military requirements for conventional Prompt Global Strike (PGS) and STRATCOM’s strategy for satisfying

those requirements?

General CHILTON. STRATCOM requires a capability to deliver prompt, precise,

conventional kinetic effects at intercontinental ranges against strategic, high-value

targets in denied territory. The Department’s strategy includes: 1) focus current

PGS Defense-wide account investments on key PGS enabling technologies, 2) leverage existing capabilities and ongoing demonstrations in the areas of propulsion and

guidance, 3) transition from technology application to operationally relevant and realistic flight demonstrations, 4) work with the Services to develop operational concepts and deployment plans, and 5) align all described efforts towards fielding a capability as soon as possible.

Mr. EVERETT. What are the leading candidate system solutions for fulfilling

STRATCOM PGS mission requirements that Congress should invest in and why?

General CHILTON. The Department is currently reviewing the initial results of the

Prompt Global Strike Analysis of Alternatives. This joint study lead by the Air

Force has provided information on a range of solutions that address Prompt Global

Strike requirements. The analysis confirmed investments are needed in advanced

aero vehicles and weapons supporting a range of basing concepts. We are, working

with USD (AT&L) and the Services to focus the defense-wide account to deliver an

initial capability at the earliest possible opportunity. We are also focused on maturing the key technologies necessary to develop and deliver an operational capability

quickly.

Mr. EVERETT. What utility does the Army’s Advanced Hypersonic Weapons (AHW)

Technology Demonstration program provide for PGS?

General CHILTON. The AHW technology demonstration has the potential to advance technology in the area of advanced aerobodies, thermal protection materials

and systems, and guidance, navigation, and control. However its objectives must be

clearly and better integrated with DOD’s prompt global strike technology path forward and support planned Service demonstrations.

Mr. EVERETT. Does STRATCOM have any recommendations for consideration by

Congress on how best to apportion the $100M set-aside in the FY08 defense wide

account?

General CHILTON. In accordance, with the National Defense Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 2008 STRATCOM has provided USD (AT&L) the military requirements

for the Prompt Global Strike systems. These requirements will be used to inform

the obligation and expenditure plan currently in coordination with USD (AT&L).

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The apportionment of the $100M should focus on the development of a viable demonstration which leads to a fielded capability by no later than 2014.

Mr. EVERETT. How much finding to support the conventional PGS mission area

are you requesting for this next year? How will those hinds be apportioned?

General CHILTON. The President’s budget request contains $117M for continued

progress to develop a PGS capability. The funding remains in a Defense-wide

RDT&E account under the control of USD (AT&L). The budget request supports

continued investment in critical enabling technologies and preparation and execution of PGS demonstrations by DARPA and the Services. Our objective is to focus

the investment to deliver an initial PGS capability at the earliest possible opportunity.

Mr. EVERETT. 1(a). What roles do STRATCOM, OSD Policy, and NNSA have in

the National Cyber Initiative?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. 1(a). Currently NNSA does not have an official role (a seat at

the table) in the National Cyber Initiative, however we are working with DOE OCIO

(does have a seat at the table) to understand which requirements from the initiative

are to be implemented by DOE and NNSA. I cannot speak for STRATCOM and

OSD.

Mr. EVERETT. 1(b). What do you see as the key issues in the cyber arena?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. 1(b). There are a number of issues to be considered when evaluating the cyber arena; however, I believe that all of these issues can be summed

up into four key areas: a) Lack of clear Public Policy and implementable standards

to include public policy is normally ambiguous and many of the industry standards

are costly to implement; b) Challenge of keeping pace with an ever-changing threat;

c) Inability to provide a real-time technical collaboration solution when threats and

vulnerabilities are identified to include the ability to collaborate with other sites

when an incident occur; and d) education of the general workforce, to include our

technical experts.

Mr. EVERETT. What roles do STRATCOM, OSD Policy, and NNSA have in the National Cyber Initiative? What do you see as the key issues in the cyber arena?

Secretary VICKERS. As the nation becomes more networked, new partnerships will

develop as a result of the common need for security across the nation. The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) recognizes these dependencies

and assigns order and purpose to the stakeholders and their particular areas of responsibility. USSTRATCOM’s mission is to direct and defend computer network operations. OSD policy defines broad Departmental roles and responsibilities as well

as interdependencies as prescribed by law. The National Security Agency (NSA),

true to the national cyber security strategy and Presidential order, is not only the

national manager for National Security Systems, but also assesses cyber threats

from abroad.

Cybersecurity is of critical importance because of the tremendous capabilities and

potential vulnerabilities afforded by the nation’s reliance on information and the information technology infrastructure. It is critical that we address not only cyber

threats to DOD, but the threats that loom over the Federal government as a whole.

The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace is a document of elemental importance

in the security of this country, and the cyber initiative recognizes that DOD agencies and federal departments play a separate but complementary role. The Cyber

Initiative codifies these relationships and empowers us to work jointly to safeguard

the government’s networks. Since we are embarking on a relatively new effort—one

to protect an evolving but indispensable national asset—the CNCI is a major step

in an ongoing iterative effort. As DOD and other federal sectors improve their collective security postures, we will gain a heightened understanding of the. threats, the

degree to which our efforts are mitigating those threats, and the enhancements we

must make to instill integrity and resiliency into national cyberspace.

Mr. EVERETT. Given the Congressional concerns in PGS for the last 2 years, have

the various conventional PGS options been formally assessed as being policy and

treaty compliant?

Secretary VICKERS. The Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State submitted a

report to Congress on Conventional Trident Modification (CTM) in February 2007

addressing Congressional concerns. The report articulated mission types that both

the Departments of Defense and State believe justify a Prompt Global Strike (PGS)

system as a needed near-term capability, introduced a comprehensive assurance

strategy for these long-range, conventionally-armed ballistic missiles, and provided

the Department of State views on salient international issues associated with PGS.

We have indicated that CTM, if deployed, would remain accountable and compliant

with the START Treaty. Other PGS capabilities have not progressed sufficiently to

be reviewed for compliance under START.

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. REYES

Mr. REYES. The FY 2009 budget request delays delivery of all four THAAD fire

units by varying degrees. STRATCOM and the other combatant commanders have

noted that delivery of the THAAD system was one of their highest missile defense

priorities. Where on STRATCOM’s missile defense priority list do you currently

place THAAD?

General CHILTON. Terminal defense and mobile active defense assets remain a

high priority and are expressed as such in the current Prioritized Capabilities List.

Per the Missile Defense Agency funds have been allocated to deliver all four THAAD

fire units on schedule.

Mr. REYES. To what extent did MDA consult with STRATCOM and other combatant commanders prior to moving forward with its decision to delay the delivery of

the THAAD fire units?

General CHILTON. The potential delivery delay of THAAD firing units was under

consideration by MDA. However, MDA decided to allocate additional funds needed

to restore fire units (#3 and #4) to maintain the original schedule. The MDA Director is readily available for consultation when such issues arise.

Mr. REYES. What is STRATCOM’s requirement for THAAD? What is the total requirement for THAAD as requested by all Combatant Commanders?

General CHILTON. STRATCOM, with the other combatant commanders, participated in Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization-led Joint Capability

Mix studies to provide initial recommendations for minimum THAAD force structure. This study can be presented to you in closed session by the Joint Integrated

Air and Missile Defense Organization. This information will be combined with the

Defense Planning Scenario-based Analytical Agenda efforts to further refine these

requirements.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. D’Agostino, one of the things I would like to ask you to do

for the record, since we have to go, is can you give us the potential disadvantages

or concern of Stockpile Stewardship life-extension program only approach without

RRW? I would like those listed up to us, you know, one through five or 10 or whatever it is. I think that helps us to make the balance.

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Under a life-extension approach, current planning indicates that

over the next 25 years all legacy warheads that remain in the stockpile will require

extensive life extension programs (LEPs). These LEPs would be conducted to refurbish or replace existing nuclear and non-nuclear parts with the goal of extending

the life of each warhead type for another 30 years. That includes nine different warhead types and the requirement to survey and maintain spares for each. The RRW

approach reduces the number of types and enables new safety, surety, and security

features.

One very important issue on the pursuit of only an LEP approach is the limitation

on options that are available for including enhanced surety features. For example,

limitations exist for modifying legacy systems to include new use control features,

changing conventional high explosive (HE) primaries to use insensitive HE, and

adding fire resistance to help prevent spread of plutonium in accident environments.

All of these options exist with higher margin RRW designs that are not constrained

by optimized weight and volume trades that resulted in today’s low-margin legacy

weapon designs.

A second primary issue with pursuing only an LEP approach is associated with

being able to reconstruct obsolete processes and/or materials for low margin legacy

warheads that no longer exist in the production complex. Re-certification of legacy

warheads undergoing an LEP will be complicated if materials in some designs cannot be manufactured, or if processes for original materials cannot be resurrected,

such as the current difficulty being experienced on a material for the W76–1 LEP.

This situation could require replacement of parts with new materials that were not

in the original, tested design. Any variances from the original design would have

to be carefully evaluated using the tools of stockpile stewardship. Without the ability to test the weapons to validate the results of simulations, greater uncertainty

will result. Consequently, NNSA may not be able to certify that the weapon meets

the high-reliability currently required by nuclear systems.

Last, continued aging and each refurbishment activity on a weapon type introduces uncertainties either associated with slight changes in features or in manufacturing process changes that cannot be avoided. What is not known is how sensitive

the final performance of the warhead will be to these cumulative changes. Since the

legacy warhead designs are fixed and complex, the designer does not have much

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latitude to increase margin and must accept these unknown uncertainties. Through

multiple LEPs of the same warhead or multiple design changes in a single LEP

these uncertainties will increase and the confidence in the design is expected to diminish. Worst case, if there are too many deviations from the test base, the uncertainty in the calculations may exceed the capability of NNSA to certify weapon reliability using simulations alone. For these reasons, the need for nuclear testing to

validate warhead design variances introduced during LEPs cannot be completely

ruled out.

Mr. THORNBERRY. What are the Department of Defense’s roles and responsibilities

in the Administration’s new cyber security initiative? How is the Department of Defense organized for this mission? What are the legal and or policy obstacles to DOD

fulfilling its roles and missions? What is the role of private industry since they own

most of the infrastructure? In your opinion is there a ‘‘chilling effect’’ of not updating FISA by providing liability protection for businesses, and will this impede the

DOD progress in this mission area? What technologies, processes and procedures

are being considered to protect the privacy of U.S. citizens? How will you keep up

to date with technology and technically savvy adversaries? What are the necessary

work force skills for this initiative to be successful? What are the DOD gaps and

strengths in this area? What training programs are in place or need to be developed?

Secretary VICKERS. DOD is responsible for supporting DHS and DNI in the implementation of the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI). DOD is

also leading, or co-leading, four of the twelve initiatives and one of the seven

enablers. The Secretary has designated USD(P) as the lead coordinator for the Department with critical support being provided by ASD–NII, ASDHD&ASA, USD–I,

Comptroller, and the Joint Staff. Currently, there are no policy issues or legal obstacles for DOD support to the CNCI. Work with private industry is identified in one

of the initiatives, and is led by DHS. DOD defers to DNI for any detailed discussion

on the topic of FISA issues but DOD’s position is that the CNCI does not ask telecommunication firms to take any action that would expose them to legal liability.

DOD is sensitive to any perceived privacy issues related to the deployment of technologies associated with CNCI. An overarching objective of the CNCI into protect

Federal information systems, to include the protection of U.S. citizens’ personal information that resides on these systems. The initiative addresses new technologies

by making significant investments in cyber R&D and leap-ahead technology research to maintain U.S. technological advantages. DOD is recognized as the Federal

leader in cyber defense capabilities and much of the groundwork that DOD accomplished is being leveraged for the Federal community. In order to achieve the cyber

protection goals of the CNCI and DOD, one potential pitfall is lack of funding. The

Training and Education initiative of the CNCI is focused on bringing together the

various Departmental training programs, including college scholarship programs, to

identify best-of-breed. DOD has a very robust training program in cyber security

and the CNCI will try to broaden this approach across the Federal Government and

the nation.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Has DOD identified specific programs and budget lines that are

associated with this initiative? If so, please provide with this response. Are there

additional program or budget requirements that have not been addressed? How will

DOD manage this initiative within OSD/NSA/Services

Secretary VICKERS. Yes, the Department has established a specific program element (PE) code that will capture the Cyber Security finding throughout the Department. PE 0305103x is executable in all appropriations for the Information System

Security Program and Military Intelligence Program budgets.

DOD does not anticipate making additional budget requests under the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) beyond those already identified

in the President’s budget submission.

DOD is managing the initiative as follows:

USD(P) is the DOD lead for the CNCI in support of an initiative that directs certain policy actions across the Federal government. USD(P) is DOD’s policy lead and

ASD(HD&ASA) is the focal point within USD(P).

ASD(NII)/DOD CIO is the Principal Staff Assistant (PSA) to the SecDef with respect to information assurance (IA) (cyber/computer network defense (CND)) activities. NII/CIO has played and continues to play a central role in helping bring the

various DOD Components together to coordinate the DOD partnership in the CNCI

as well as working with the OSD Comptroller and OMB to develop and subsequently justify the DOD (non-NIP) portion of the budget request. NII will play an

oversight role as the Initiative evolves, as we do for other IA related activities in

the Department to ensure the Components are executing according to plans.

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USD(I) owns the MIP aspects of the DOD CNCI budget (either through NSA or

DIA) which affords them an oversight responsibility as well. NII/CIO works very

closely with USD(I) in this process.

Mr. THORNBERRY. How will you measure success? Does the program scale to

maintain speed, processing, and bandwidth? What is your return on investment—

how will you demonstrate value for the costs?

Secretary VICKERS. The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI)

provides the foundation for a national cybersecurity program that will enable the

U.S. to fundamentally change the balance of power from one that currently favors

cyber intruders and attackers over our network defenders to one more favorable to

the U.S. national and economic interests. The Office of Management and Budget

(OMB) requires measures that describe progress towards achievement of goals and

efficiency in use of resources to make that progress. To this end, the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) methodology will be used to assess and improve program performance. Key parts of this process include the development of meaningful

performance measures and the tracking of anticipated (or desired) targets over time

through a structured review process. The Departments and Agencies involved in developing this program believe it will provide a much greater degree of cybersecurity

throughout the Federal government and when fully implemented, across the nation.

Only through the implementation of a comprehensive initiative will the United

States realize the full benefit of an optimal cybersecurity solution.

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