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Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 48909 

C hief Justice Justices 

Maura D. Corrigan	 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Clifford W. Taylor Opinion Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

FILED MAY 29, 2002
 

DANSE CORPORATION, 


Petitioner-Appellant,
 

v	 No. 119011
 

CITY OF MADISON HEIGHTS,
 

Respondent-Appellee.
 

PER CURIAM
 

The Michigan Tax Tribunal entered a judgment, holding
 

that certain personal property belonging to petitioner did not
 

constitute “special tools” and was therefore subject to
 

taxation. On appeal, petitioner argued that guidelines
 

utilized by the Tax Tribunal were not determinative, since
 

they were not rules promulgated in accordance with the
 

Administrative Procedures Act.1 The Court of Appeals
 

affirmed.2 We reverse the judgments of the Tax Tribunal and
 

1 MCL 24.201 et seq.
 

2 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued March 23, 2001


(Docket No. 215486).
 
Court of Appeals because the guidelines relied on to expand
 

the definition of “special tools” did not have the force of
 

law as they were not promulgated under the APA. We remand
 

this case to the Tax Tribunal for reconsideration in light of
 

this opinion.
 

I
 

Petitioner manufactures roof line ridge vents for
 

residential construction. In that process it uses plastic
 

injection molds and related components. It excluded the molds
 

from personal property statements and, as required, noted that
 

fact on the personal property statements it filed. A personal
 

property audit was performed, and respondent subsequently
 

notified the State Tax Commission that personal property
 

allegedly subject to taxation had not been included on
 

petitioner’s 1994 and 1995 personal property statements and
 

sought an increase in the assessment valuation. The State Tax
 

Commission held that the molds were not exempt “special tools”
 

within the meaning of MCL 211.9b and corrected increased
 

assessment valuations were approved. Petitioner filed an
 

appeal with the Michigan Tax Tribunal. After an evidentiary
 

hearing, the Tax Tribunal held that petitioner was not
 

entitled to a MCL 211.9b exemption for the molds. It found
 

that the Legislature intended to allow the State Tax
 

Commission to define what “special tools” meant.
 

2
 
 

The Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting,
 

affirmed. Petitioner has applied for leave to appeal.3
 

II
 

Issues concerning the interpretation and application of
 

statutes are questions of law that this Court decides de novo.
 

Lincoln v General Motors Corp, 461 Mich 483, 489-490; 607 NW2d
 

73 (2000). In Michigan Bell Telephone Co v Treasury Dep’t,
 

445 Mich 470, 476; 518 NW2d 808 (1994), we noted that, in the
 

absence of fraud, review of a Tax Tribunal decision is
 

“limited to determining whether the tribunal erred in applying
 

the law or adopted a wrong principle[.]” “[F]actual findings
 

are conclusive if supported by competent, material, and
 

substantial evidence on the whole record.” Id.
 

III
 

MCL 211.9b provides:
 

(1) All special tools are exempt from
 

taxation.
 

(2) As used in this section, “special tools”


means those manufacturing requisites, such as dies,


jigs, fixtures, molds, patterns, gauges, or other


tools, as defined by the state tax commission, that


are held for use and not for sale in the ordinary


course of business.
 

(3) Special tools are not exempt from taxation


if the value of the special tools is included in


the valuation of inventory produced for sale.


[Emphasis added.]
 

3 The motion to file a brief amicus curiae is granted.
 

3
 
The State Tax Commission has adopted a rule defining
 

“special tools.”4 What is commonly referred to as rule 21
 

provides:
 

“Special tools” as used in section 9b of the


act, means those finished or unfinished devices,


such as dies, jigs, fixtures, molds, patterns, and


special gauges, used or being prepared for use in


the manufacturing function for which they are


designed or are acquired or made for the production


of products or models and are of such specialized


nature that their utility and amortization cease


with the discontinuance of such products or models.
 

Pursuant to MCL 211.10e, assessing officials are required
 

to use an assessor’s manual prepared by the State Tax
 

Commission “as a guide in preparing assessments.” The Tax
 

Tribunal utilized seven guidelines from the State Tax
 

Commission Assessor’s Manual in reaching the determination
 

that the plastic injection molds were not “special tools”5
 

4 1999 AC, R 209.21.
 

5 Chapter 15 of the Assessor’s Manual, entitled “Personal


Property” states at pp 15-6 and 15-7:
 

The following guidelines should be used by the


assessor when making the determination of whether a


particular device is a special tool.
 

1. Special tools include devices such as


dies, jigs, fixtures, molds, patterns and gauges.


Special tools do not include devices which differ


in nature from dies, jigs, fixtures, molds,


patterns, and gauges. Thus the press into which a


die is placed is not a special tool.
 

2. Special tools are specially designed to


produce a particular product and could not be used


to produce a different product.
 

4
 
and therefore were not exempt from personal property tax under
 

MCL 211.9b. In determining that the Assessor’s Manual
 

guidelines were applicable, the Tax Tribunal stated in part:
 

The State Tax Commission (STC) further
 

provided seven guidelines to determine whether a


“particular device is a special tool” based on that


tool’s purpose, “utility and amortization.”
 

Although these guidelines are clarifications of its


Rule 21 general definition and not promulgated


rules, this Tribunal must look at the Legislature’s


intent of allowing the State Tax Commission to not


only define what a special tool is, but to further


allow the STC to clarify how to recognize a special


tool when an assessor sees it and the “utility and
 

3. Special tools are used to produce models


or products which are expected to change. Thus, a


die used to produce a car fender is likely a


special tool because the fender will predictably


change, whereas a mold used in the manufacture of a


common wrench will not change for many years and is


not a special tool.
 

4. Special tools frequently become obsolete


before they wear out and therefore have a short


useful life.
 

5. Models or products produced by special
 

tools are usually expected to change within 3
 

years.
 

6. A die, jig, etc., may have a short life
 

simply because it wears out fast rather than
 

because it is used to produce a model. In this
 

case the tool would not be exempt as a special


tool.
 

7. The term “amortization” used by the State


Tax Commission in its definition of special tools


refers to the writing off of an expenditure over a


certain period of time. This reference to
 

amortization in the definition of special tools is


more of a descriptive aid than a condition that


must be met.
 

5
 
amortization” of that special tool.
 

The Court of Appeals majority agreed that the factors
 

from the Assessor’s Manual were determinative. The Court
 

relied on MCL 211.10e, which provides:
 

All assessing officials, whose duty it is to


assess real or personal property on which real or


personal property taxes are levied by any taxing


unit of the state, shall use only the official


assessor’s manual or any manual approved by the


state tax commission, consistent with the official


assessor’s manual, with their latest supplements,


as prepared or approved by the state tax commission


as a guide in preparing assessments. Beginning


with the tax assessing year 1978, all assessing


officials shall maintain records relevant to the
 

assessments, including appraisal record cards,


personal property records, historical assessment


data, tax maps, and land value maps consistent with


standards set forth in the assessor’s manual
 

published by the state tax commission.
 

It also relied on OAG, 1981-1982, No. 5,909, p 207
 

(May 20, 1981). It further noted that exemption statutes are
 

to be strictly construed in favor of the taxing unit and that
 

a prior decision of that Court appeared to accept a definition
 

of “special tools” that included a factor from the guidelines.
 

The dissenting judge would have held that the Assessor’s
 

Manual did not have legal authority because it was not
 

promulgated as an administrative rule and thus could not
 

impose additional requirements to meet the definition of
 

“special tools” beyond that contained in rule 21. The
 

dissenting judge would have held that the plastic injection
 

molds were “special tools” as defined by rule 21 and that,
 

6
 
 

 

 

therefore, petitioner was entitled to the statutory exemption.
 

IV
 

In order for an agency regulation, statement, standard,
 

policy, ruling, or instruction of general applicability to
 

have the force of law, it must fall under the definition of a
 

properly promulgated rule. If it does not, it is merely
 

explanatory. Goins v Greenfield Jeep Eagle, 449 Mich 1, 7-10;
 

534 NW2d 467 (1995). As the Tax Tribunal noted, rule 21 was
 

properly promulgated under the APA, and therefore has the
 

force of law.
 

However, it is undisputed that the Assessor’s Manual was
 

not promulgated as an administrative rule. Therefore, the
 

manual may be used as a “guide,” but does not itself have the
 

force of law. The portion referred to can only be used to
 

explain rule 21; it cannot impose requirements not found in
 

rule 21 to meet the definition of “special tools.” Thus, for
 

petitioner to have a valid exemption under MCL 211.9b, the
 

molds at issue need only meet the requirements of rule 21. 


MCL 221.10e does not exempt the Assessor’s Manual from
 

APA promulgation requirements. The rules governing
 

construction of a statute are well known. Giving effect to
 

the intent of the Legislature is a fundamental task. We are
 

required to examine the plain language of the involved
 

statutes. In re MCI Telecommunications, 460 Mich 396, 411;
 

7
 
 

596 NW2d 164 (1999). Where the statutory language is
 

unambiguous, the plain meaning reflects the Legislature’s
 

intent and the statute must be applied as written. Tryc v
 

Michigan Veterans’ Facility, 451 Mich 129, 135; 545 NW2d 642
 

(1996). No further construction is necessary or allowed to
 

expand what the Legislature clearly intended to cover. In re
 

MCI, supra at 411. The court must presume that every word has
 

some meaning and, if possible, effect should be given to each
 

provision. People v Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 285; 597
 

NW2d 1 (1999).
 

Following these principles of statutory construction, we
 

conclude that the plain language of MCL 211.10e demonstrates
 

a legislative intent that the Assessor’s Manual is to be used
 

“as a guide.” It cannot be concluded from a plain reading of
 

the statute that the Legislature intended that the State Tax
 

Commission was entitled to bypass the APA and promulgate the
 

Assessor’s Manual as a rule having the force of law. The
 

mandatory “shall” language in MCL 211.10e refers to the
 

requirement that assessors use the Assessor’s Manual as a
 

guide. The statute was apparently enacted in order to create
 

uniformity among appraisal techniques. See OAG, supra at
 

207.6
 

6 We note that this Opinion of the Attorney General was


cited by defendant as authority that the manual has the force


of law. However, a closer reading of the OAG reveals that the
 

8
 
Likewise, MCL 211.9b does not provide the authority for
 

a conclusion that the Legislature intended that the State Tax
 

Commission could bypass the promulgation requirements of the
 

APA. We quote that statute again:
 

(1) All special tools are exempt from
 

taxation. 


(2) As used in this section, “special tools”


means those manufacturing requisites, such as dies,


jigs, fixtures, molds, patterns, gauges, or other


tools, as defined by the state tax commission, that


are held for use and not for sale in the ordinary


course of business. 


(3) Special tools are not exempt from taxation


if the value of the special tools is included in


the valuation of inventory produced for sale.


[Emphasis added.][7]
 

Attorney General concluded that the manual is not subject to


the promulgation rules of the APA because they are not rules.


As a result, local assessors could be forced to use the manual


as a guide. Contrary to defendant’s assertion, this does not


mean that the Attorney General opined that the manual has the


force of law. In any event, opinions of the Attorney General
 

are not binding on courts as precedent. Frey v Dep't of
 

Management & Budget, 429 Mich 315, 338; 414 NW2d 873 (1987).


Indeed, the extent to which a governmental agency is even


bound by an opinion of the Attorney General is open to
 

question. Compare East Grand Rapids Sch Dist v Kent Co, 415


Mich 381, 394; 330 NW2d 7 (1982) (a state agency is not bound


by an Attorney General opinion that a statute is
 

unconstitutional), and Traverse City Sch Dist v Attorney
 

General, 384 Mich 390, 410, n 2; 185 NW2d 9 (1971) (an opinion
 

of the Attorney General commands allegiance of state
 

agencies).
 

7
 While the rule-making authority of the State Tax


Commission may more precisely be characterized as an
 

administrative or executive branch function, it is clear
 

nonetheless that the resemblance of this authority to
 

traditional “law-making” has prompted the Legislature’s


requirement that such authority be exercised only in
 

9
 
The phrase “as defined by the state tax commission” does
 

not, by itself, allow the State Tax Commission to define
 

“special tools” without complying with the APA. The
 

Legislature has prescribed an elaborate procedure for rule
 

promulgation in order to “ensure that none of the essential
 

functions of the legislative process are lost in the course of
 

the performance by agencies of many law-making functions once
 

performed by [the Legislature].” Coalition for Human Rights
 

v DSS, 431 Mich 172, 177-178; 428 NW2d 335 (1988). “[T]he
 

adoption of a rule by an agency has the force and effect of
 

law and may have serious consequences . . . for many people.”
 

Id. at 177.
 

There is no indication the Legislature authorized the
 

State Tax Commission to adopt a rule-like definition using a
 

procedure other than that required by the APA. We will not
 

attribute such an intent to the Legislature absent a clear
 

statement from the Legislature. Therefore, without a clear
 

legislative intent to waive the requirements of the APA, we
 

will not sanction state agency “law-making” in the absence of
 

the legislatively designed protections of the APA.
 

Accordingly, MCL 211.10e cannot be said to have created an
 

exemption from the requirements of the APA for the Assessor’s
 

Manual.
 

conformity with the APA.
 

10
 
Having concluded that rule 21 governs, we now apply to it
 

the same rules of statutory construction. As with a statute,
 

we are governed by its plain language. We agree with the
 

Court of Appeals dissenting judge’s reading of rule 21 as
 

establishing two requirements for qualification for the
 

special tools exemption. First, the special tool must be
 

“used” or be “being prepared for use” in a manufacturing
 

function. It is undisputed that the molds here meet this
 

requirement. Second, the special tools must be of “such a
 

specialized nature that their utility and amortization cease
 

with the discontinuance of such products or models.” The Tax
 

Tribunal and Court of Appeals opined that there also is a
 

short useful life requirement. The Assessor’s Manual
 

guidelines contain such a requirement, but the plain language
 

of rule 21 does not allow that construction. There is nothing
 

in rule 21 suggesting that a proposed special tool have a
 

short useful life. As the dissenting judge in the Court of
 

Appeals noted, rule 21 only addresses whether the tool will
 

have usefulness after the product or model is discontinued.
 

In the words of rule 21, the question is whether the molds’
 

“utility and amortization cease with the discontinuance of
 

such products or models.” There is no other time condition.8
 

8 Univ Microfilms v Scio Twp, 76 Mich App 616; 257 NW2d


265 (1977), is not persuasive. As pointed out by the


dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals, it is not clear what
 

11
 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the Tax Tribunal
 

and Court of Appeals and remand this matter to the Tax
 

Tribunal for reconsideration in light of this opinion. MCR
 

7.302(F)(1).
 

CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,
 

concurred.
 

the Court’s holding was founded on. The Court may or may not


have relied on the life-expectancy issue. If it did, the


holding would lack any basis in the plain language of rule 21.
 

12
 
 

________________________________ 

v 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
 

SUPREME COURT
 

DANSE CORPORATION, 


Petitioner-Appellant,
 

No. 119011
 

CITY OF MADISON HEIGHTS,
 

Respondent-Appellee.
 

KELLY, J. (dissenting).
 

A per curiam opinion is an inappropriate mechanism for
 

resolving this dispute. The issue is one of statutory
 

interpretation concerning the phrase "special tools" found in
 

MCL 211.9b. Resolution of the issue requires consideration of
 

more than just the language found in that particular statute.
 

It also implicates the language of MCL 211.10e, mandating the
 

use of the assessor's manual. Considering the statutes
 

together, it is questionable whether a plain language analysis
 

of MCL 211.9b adequately resolves the matter. 


This Court should not, therefore, decide the dispute in
 

a per curiam decision. Instead, it should allow full briefing
 

and oral argument. I would grant leave to fully consider the
 

effect of MCL 211.10e on MCL 211.9b.
 

CAVANAGH, J., concurred with KELLY, J.