Opinion issued August 16, 2012.

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NOS. 01-10-00176-CR and 01-10-00177-CR

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STEVEN CECEILIO TORRES, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 185th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case Nos. 1246750 and 1246751

O P I N I O N

A jury found Steven Ceceilio Torres guilty of two capital murder offenses,

for hiring two people who murdered Jose Perez. The trial court assessed 
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punishment at life imprisonment.1 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(3) (West 

Supp. 2011). On appeal, Torres contends that the trial court committed jury charge 

error, by (1) denying his request for a jury charge for murder, rather than for 

capital murder, based on his reading of the indictment; and (2) failing to properly 

instruct the jury that independent corroboration of accomplice witness testimony is 

a necessity. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Background

Jose Perez was shot and killed in front of his family in a Houston restaurant 

parking lot. He was a man in the wrong place at the wrong time. As Perez left the 

restaurant after dinner, the shooter, Peter Quintanilla, and his accomplice, Michael 

Belmarez, mistook Perez for their intended target, Santiago Salinas, whom they 

sought as a part of a drug-related revenge killing. Evidence at trial revealed that 

Salinas had been targeted for death by Jaime Zamora, a drug cartel leader, because 

Salinas had hurt members of Zamora’s family back in Mexico.

Torres worked for the drug cartel headed by Zamora and Jose Chapa. Chapa 

ordered Torres to find Salinas, and Zamora later met with Torres to give him a 

picture of Salinas. Chapa told Torres that he could find Salinas at the restaurant, 

 

1

Trial-court case number 1246750 and appellate case number 

01-10-00176-CR (employing Peter Quintanilla); trial-court case number 

1246751 and appellate case number 01-10-00177-CR (employing Michael 

Belmarez).
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and that Salinas would be wearing a jersey. Torres called Quintanilla, told him 

about the jersey, and directed Quintanilla to the restaurant. Belmarez testified that

he heard Torres tell Quintanilla over the phone to “take care of [Salinas].”

On the day he was killed, Perez was wearing an Astros jersey. Mistakenly 

believing that Perez was Salinas, Quintanilla shot and killed Perez. Salinas was in 

the restaurant at the time of the murder. Realizing that he was likely the intended 

target, Salinas fled to Mexico. Salinas was killed in Mexico several months later. 

After the shooting, Quintanilla left the restaurant parking lot with Belmarez. 

Two days later, Chapa gave Torres money in an envelope to pay Quintanilla. 

Torres went to Belmarez’s house to meet with Quintanilla, and he delivered the 

money. 

After police discovered Belmarez’s involvement in Perez’s murder, 

Belmarez was indicted for capital murder. He entered into a plea bargain with the 

State in which he agreed to testify against Torres in exchange for a forty-five-year 

sentence for the lesser offense of murder. Belmarez admitted to police that he was 

the driver on the night of the murder and testified at trial that Torres contacted both 

Quintanilla and Belmarez, gave them two guns, and asked them to kidnap Salinas. 

The first time Belmarez knew they were supposed to kill Salinas, rather than 

kidnap him, was when Torres called Quintanilla on the evening of the murder and 
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told them to “take care” of Salinas, which both men understood to mean to kill 

him. Torres also gave $1,500 to each of them after the murder.

Discussion

Capital Murder Instruction

Torres complains that the trial court erroneously denied his request for a jury 

charge on murder, rather than capital murder, because the indictments did not 

properly charge him with capital murder for hire. The indictments, in relevant 

part, read:

Trial-court case number 1246750

. . . STEVEN CECELIO TORRES, hereinafter styled the 

Defendant, heretofore on or about MAY 20, 2006, did then and there 

unlawfully, intentionally and knowingly cause the death of JOSE 

PEREZ, hereinafter called the Complainant, by employing PETER 

QUINTANILLA for remuneration and a promise of remuneration, 

to-wit: MONEY, by SHOOTING THE COMPLAINANT WITH A 

DEADLY WEAPON, NAMELY A FIREARM.

Trial-court case number 1246751

. . . STEVEN CECELIO TORRES, hereinafter styled the 

Defendant, heretofore on or about MAY 20, 2006, did then and there

unlawfully, intentionally and knowingly cause the death of JOSE 

PEREZ, hereinafter called the Complainant, by employing MICHAEL 

BELMAREZ for remuneration and a promise of remuneration, to-wit: 

MONEY, by SHOOTING THE COMPLAINANT WITH A 

DEADLY WEAPON, NAMELY A FIREARM.

The trial court’s jury charge tracked the indictments, in that “by shooting” 

followed after “by employing . . . for renumeration”:
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Trial-court case number 1246750

Now, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable 

doubt that Steven Torres, in Harris County, Texas, on or about May 

20, 2006, unlawfully intended to cause the death of Santiago Salinas 

by employing Peter Quintanilla for remuneration or the promise of 

remuneration, to-wit, money, by shooting Santiago Salinas with a 

deadly weapon, namely a firearm, but instead Peter Quintanilla caused 

the death of Jose Perez by shooting Jose Perez with a deadly weapon, 

namely a firearm, then you will find the defendant guilty of capital 

murder, as charged in the indictment.

Trial-court case number 1246751

Now, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable 

doubt that Michael Belmarez, in Harris County, Texas, on or about the 

20th day of May, 2006, did then and there unlawfully intend to cause 

the death of Santiago Salinas for remuneration from the defendant, 

Steven Torres, to-wit, money, by shooting Santiago Salinas with a 

deadly weapon, namely a firearm, but instead caused the death of Jose 

Perez by shooting Jose Perez with a deadly weapon, namely a firearm, 

then you will find the defendant guilty of capital murder, as charged 

in the indictment; or if you believe from the evidence beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Michael Belmarez, acting alone or with Peter 

Quintanilla as a party to the offense, did then and there unlawfully 

intend to cause the death of Santiago Salinas for remuneration from 

the defendant, Steven Torres, to-wit, money, by shooting Santiago 

Salinas with a deadly weapon, namely a firearm, but instead caused 

the death of Jose Perez by shooting Jose Perez with a deadly weapon,

namely a firearm, then you will find the defendant guilty of capital 

murder, as charged in the indictment 

At the charge conference, Torres’s counsel objected, claiming that the 

indictment did not set forth a proper definition of capital murder:

[Torres’s lawyer:] And our argument is set out in the motion 

and basically based on upon the grammatical structure of the 

indictment, that Mr. Torres is charged with shooting Jose Perez, and 

the language regarding remuneration or employing either Quintanilla 
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or Belmarez, this applies to both causes, is surplusage and does not 

have an object or does not alert Mr. Torres or anyone else, any reader, 

that he employed him for the purpose of killing someone else. We 

argue that is does not state a capital murder offense; it merely states a 

murder offense.

THE COURT: I just want to be clear: that argument is sort of a 

legal argument based on the indictment as opposed to a factual 

argument based on the evidence presented?

[Torres’s lawyer:] Yes. It’s also a grammatical argument, 

Your Honor.

On the day of the charge conference, Torres also filed a “Defendant’s Motion That 

Jury Only Be Instructed for the Offense of Murder, and Defendant’s Requested 

Jury Instruction.” The specific objection in the motion is as follows:

The Defendant submits that the State’s indictments herein, in effect, 

allege that the manner and means whereby Defendant caused the 

death of Jose Perez was by 1) employing either Peter Quintanilla or 

Michael Belmarez, for remuneration of the promise of remuneration 

(money), and 2) by shooting Jose Perez with a deadly weapon, 

namely, a firearm. The indictments, however, do not allege what 

Quintanilla or Belmarez were to do after being employed by the 

Defendant. For example, were they to be look-outs, were they to lure 

Perez to his death, or were they to be get-a-way drivers? Neither 

indictment alleges conduct on the part of either Quintanilla or 

Belmarez other than a passive employment relationship with the 

Defendant. What the indictments do allege, in a common sense 

reading is that the Defendant caused the death of Jose Perez by the 

Defendant shooting Perez with a deadly weapon namely a Firearm.

Torres contends that the indictments charged him only with murder, not capital 

murder for remuneration, and thus the trial court erred in denying his requested 

jury charges on murder. In support of his contention, Torres relies on our court’s 
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decision in Robinson v. State. 266 S.W.3d 8, 10–13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d). In Robinson, we reversed a conviction for capital murder 

because the application paragraph of the jury charge instructed that the jury could 

find the defendant guilty of either capital murder for hire (in the first paragraph), or 

of murder (in the second paragraph, because it failed to include the aggravating 

factor of murder for remuneration). Id. at 15.

The error in Robinson is not present here. In contrast to Robinson, in which 

the application paragraph allowed a conviction for murder without any reference to 

an aggravating factor, here, the indictment and charge in both instances instruct

that the jury must find that Torres employed his co-conspirators to commit the 

murder. Torres argues that Robinson applies by analogy: because the jury charge

here lacks an expressed direct object in both application paragraphs, a jury could 

conclude that Torres committed only murder (by shooting Perez himself) and not 

murder for hire. He contends that one could read the paragraph to require that 

Torres hired others, but not “to shoot”, because the final clause reads “by 

shooting”. But in Robinson, the requisite element of remuneration was entirely 

missing from the faulty portion of the charge. Not so here: the intervening clause 

instructs that the jury must find that Torres caused the death “by employing” 

another “for renumeration. According to Torres, this clause is surplusage. But, the 

final participle phrase—“by shooting”—fairly refers to causing the death of Perez,
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and reasonably conveys the intended meaning. Giving effect to both phrases, the 

charge instructs the jury that that Torres should be found guilty of capital murder if 

he employed Quintanilla or Belmarez to cause the death of another “by shooting”

that person. We hold that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on the 

aggravating factor of murder for hire. 

Accomplice-Witness Instruction

Torres next contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury

that accomplice-witness testimony must be independently corroborated. See TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.14 (West 2005) (“A conviction cannot be had upon 

the testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence tending to 

connect the defendant with the offense committed; and the corroboration is not 

sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense.”). The State 

acknowledges that Belmarez is an accomplice witness as a matter of law, because 

he had pleaded guilty to Perez’s murder at the time of Torres’s trial. The State also 

concedes that the trial court had an affirmative duty to submit an accomplice 

witness instruction to the jury. Smith v. State, 332 S.W.3d 425, 439 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2011). We hold that the trial court erred in failing to exercise its independent 

duty to instruct the jury that accomplice-witness testimony must be corroborated. 

Torres has conceded that this issue was not preserved by an objection in the 

trial court. We therefore review this charge error under the egregious harm 
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standard of review. See Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1984) (test for egregious harm is whether the defendant has been denied a fair and 

impartial trial). A defendant is egregiously harmed by the trial court’s omission of 

an accomplice-witness instruction if a rational jury “would have found the 

corroborating evidence so unconvincing in fact as to render the State’s overall case 

for conviction clearly and significantly less persuasive.” Saunders v. State, 817 

S.W.2d 688, 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We consider the extent of any harm “in 

light of the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, including the contested 

issues and weight of probative evidence, the argument of counsel and any other 

relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole.” Id. at 690

(quoting Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171).

To measure the sufficiency of the corroborating evidence, we eliminate the 

accomplice evidence from the record and determine whether the remaining 

inculpatory evidence tends to connect the defendant to the offense. Malone v. 

State, 253 S.W.3d 253, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). This evidence may be direct 

or circumstantial. Munoz v. State, 853 S.W.2d 558, 559 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). 

In evaluating the non-accomplice evidence, we consider its reliability and the 

strength of its tendency to connect the defendant to the crime. Herron v. State, 86 

S.W.3d 621, 632 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Corroborating evidence is reliable if 

“there is no rational and articulable basis for disregarding it or finding that it fails 
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to connect the defendant to the offense.” Id. at 633. We evaluate the sufficiency 

of non-accomplice evidence in light of the particular facts and circumstances of 

each case. Smith, 332 S.W.3d at 442.

On appeal, Torres admits independent corroborating evidence—including 

his own statements—exists, showing that: (1) Torres was worked for a drug cartel 

in Houston led by Zamora and Jose Chapa; (2) Chapa told Torres to find Salinas; 

(3) Zamora met with Torres and gave him a picture of Salinas; (4) Chapa told 

Torres to find someone to go to the restaurant where Salinas was eating and that 

Salinas was wearing a jersey; (5) Torres enlisted Quintanilla to go to the restaurant; 

(6) Torres later called Quintanilla and informed him about the man wearing a 

jersey; (7) After the murder, Chapa gave Torres gas money and additional money 

in an envelope to pay Quintanilla for killing a man Torres thought was Salinas; and 

(8) Torres met with Quintanilla at Belmarez’s house to deliver the envelope 

containing the money. Torres also identified Quintanilla in a police photo spread

as Peter Quintanilla—the man whom he had conversed with on the day of the 

murder. 

Reliable evidence from sources other than Belmarez connects Torres to the 

capital murder, and independently corroborates Belmarez’s testimony. Given the 

strength of this independent evidence, we hold that the jury would not have 

disregarded the accomplice witness testimony, even had it received the proper 
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instruction. Accordingly, we conclude that Torres has failed to show that he was 

egregiously harmed by the failure to include the instruction.

Conclusion

We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Jane Bland

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Bland, and Sharp. Justice Sharp, concurring in a 

separate opinion.

Publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).