• v •

Hard Lessons: The Iraq 

Reconstruction Experience

Contents

Preface vii

Key U.S. Figures in Iraq Reconstruction xi

Acronyms xvi

Map of Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xix

Part I: Planning for Postwar Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

1. Planning Begins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

2. The Agencies Engage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

3. The Department of Defense Takes Charge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

4. Staging in Kuwait . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

5. ORHA in Baghdad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Part II: The Coalition Provisional Authority 

Leads Reconstruction 67

6. Charting a New Course . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

7. CPA’s Shortfalls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

8. Treasury’s Triage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

9. Bremer’s Grand Vision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

10. Contracting Billions for Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .105

11. Restoring Iraq’s Capacity to Govern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .115

12. Reconstructing Iraqi Security Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

13. Restarting Oil Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

14. Rebuilding the Electricity Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .144 

15. Iraq Reconstruction in Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

Part III: The U.S. Embassy Takes Charge 163

16. Negroponte’s Revisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .165

17. Contingency Contracting and Program Management . . . . . . . . .172

18. Building in a War Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

19. Iraqi Security Forces and Counterinsurgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .193

20. Elections, Rule of Law, and Fighting Corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . .203

21. Investigating Fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .217
• vi •

Part IV: Overcoming Roadblocks 

to Reconstruction 227

22. Khalilzad’s Adaptations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .229

23. Returning to the Provinces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .247

24. The Primacy of Capacity Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .258

25. Reconstruction Amid Sectarian Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274

26. The Civilian Surge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .295

Part V: Lessons Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321

27. Hard Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .323

Afterword: Reforming Contingency Relief and 

Reconstruction Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .338

Annexes 343

I. The Genesis and Methodology of Hard Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .345

II. Oversight of Reconstruction Programs and Expenditures . . . . . . . 348

Acknowledgements 357

Notes 359
• vii •

Preface

Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience appears virtually upon the 

five-year anniversary of my appointment as Inspector General in Iraq. Shortly 

after that appointment, I met with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, to 

whom I reported, to discuss the mission. His first words were: “Why did you 

take this job? It is an impossible task.” I began to understand why he offered so 

startling a “welcome” during the following week, when I made my first trip to 

Iraq to begin setting up oversight of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), 

then in charge of Iraq’s reconstruction. My office in the Republican Palace, which 

housed the CPA—and would later house the U.S. Embassy—was adjacent to 

the CPA Comptroller’s. What I saw was troubling: large amounts of cash moving quickly out the door. Later that same day, walking the halls of the palace, I 

overheard someone say: “We can’t do that anymore. There is a new inspector 

general here.” 

These red flags were the first signs of how challenging executing oversight 

in Iraq would be. But it has not been impossible, chiefly because of the professional, productive, and courageous conduct of the many auditors, inspectors, and 

investigators who have worked diligently to fulfill the mission of the Office of the 

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR). 

SIGIR’s oversight jurisdiction covers about $50 billion in U.S. funds appropriated by the Congress for Iraq—the largest relief and reconstruction effort 

for one country in U.S. history. This sea of taxpayer dollars flowed to a wide 

spectrum of initiatives, ranging from training Iraq’s army and police to building 

large electrical, oil, and water projects; from supporting democracy-building efforts to strengthening budget execution by provincial councils; and from funding 

rule-of-law reforms to ensuring that the Iraqi government sustains what the U.S. 

program provided. Some of these initiatives succeeded, but, as this report documents, many did not. 

Hard Lessons reviews the Iraq reconstruction experience from mid-2002 

through the fall of 2008. Like SIGIR’s previous lessons learned reports, this 

study is not an audit. Rather, it arises from our congressional mandate to provide 

“advice and recommendations on policies to promote economy, efficiency, and 

effectiveness” in programs created for Iraq’s relief and reconstruction. 

The report presents a chronological history of the reconstruction program, 

threading together a number of themes including: 

• the enormous challenges that security problems posed for 

rebuilding efforts
• Preface •

• viii •

• the dramatic and frequently reactive course-changes in 

reconstruction strategy

• the turbulence engendered by continual personnel turnover at every level

• the waste caused by inadequate contracting and program 

management practices

• the poor integration of interagency efforts caused by weak 

unity of command and inconsistent unity of effort. 

The text of this report—through vignette, interview, and factual detail—explicates these themes by, in turn, laying out the blinkered and disjointed prewar 

planning for postwar Iraq; the CPA’s large and ultimately too ambitious expansion of the reconstruction program; the security-driven reprogrammings required 

by the exploding insurgency; the strongly resourced response of the surge; and 

the rise of Iraq’s role in its own reconstruction. 

Hard Lessons answers some important questions about the U.S. relief and 

reconstruction program in Iraq: 

• Did the program meet the goals it set for itself? Generally no 

on the infrastructure front, but generally yes regarding the 

development of Iraq’s security forces. Electricity and oil outputs remain below goals set by the CPA more than five years 

ago, and the number of successful project completions in the 

key water and health sectors fell far short of hopes. But after 

several false starts and greatly increased U.S. investment, 

Iraq’s security forces have achieved substantial operational 

capabilities, despite remaining doubts about overall unit 

readiness and potential performance levels. 

• Was the program grossly burdened by waste and fraud?

Regarding waste, yes; regarding fraud, no. The overuse of 

cost-plus contracts, high contractor overhead expenses, excessive contractor award fees, and unacceptable program 

and project delays all contributed to a significant waste of 

taxpayer dollars. Although SIGIR and other law enforcement 

agencies have uncovered egregious examples of fraud, the 

size of the total criminal wrongdoing known to date amounts 

to a relatively small percentage of the overall reconstruction 

investment, and the number of individuals involved was 
• Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience •

• ix •

relatively low. The vast majority of those who served the U.S. 

reconstruction program—soldier, civilian, and contractor—

did so honorably. 

• Why did reconstruction efforts so often fail to meet their mark?

Security. That single explanation has been offered up thousands of times since the 2003 invasion as the prevailing 

reason for shortfalls, large and small, in the U.S. program. 

But this explanation leads to a further question. Why was an 

extensive rebuilding plan carried out in a gravely unstable 

security environment? This question underscores an overarching hard lesson from Iraq: beware of pursuing large-scale 

reconstruction programs while significant conflict continues. 

But beyond the security issue stands another compelling and 

unavoidable truth: the U.S. government had neither the established structure nor the necessary resources to carry out 

the reconstruction mission it took on in mid-2003. As Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith said, “Every 

time the United States has had a substantial stabilization 

and reconstruction project, pretty much from World War 

II forward, we’ve [had to] improvise.”

The research for Hard Lessons comprised interviews with hundreds of individuals and the review of thousands of documents. SIGIR reached out to 

virtually every major player in the Iraq reconstruction experience and almost all 

agreed to be interviewed or provide useful responses. Among others, Secretaries 

Powell, Rumsfeld, Gates, and Rice; USAID Administrator Natsios and Deputy 

Administrator Kunder; Deputy Secretaries Wolfowitz, England, Armitage and 

Negroponte; Under Secretary Feith; Ambassadors Bremer, Khalilzad, Crocker, 

Jeffrey, Satterfield, Speckhard, Taylor, and Saloom; and Generals Garner, 

Abizaid, McKiernan, Strock, Eaton, Sanchez, Casey, Petraeus, Odierno, Chiarelli, 

Dempsey, and McCoy were all interviewed by SIGIR or gave helpful information 

or advice. We also interviewed Iraqi leaders, including former Prime Ministers 

Allawi and Ja’afari, Deputy Prime Ministers Chalabi and Salih, Ambassador 

Sumaida’ie, Judge Radhi, and Minister Baban. 

Equally important to the study, SIGIR staff interviewed hundreds of military members, government officials, and civilian contractors who carried out the 

“brick and mortar” work of Iraq’s relief and reconstruction. The report also draws 
• Preface •

• x •

on the body of SIGIR audits, inspections, and investigations, as well as reports 

from other investigative bodies.

 Finally, a somber note. Although this oversight mission has not been “impossible,” it has been dangerous. During 2007, five SIGIR staff members were injured 

by indirect fire in Iraq. And on March 24, 2008, SIGIR auditor Paul Converse 

died from wounds he received during the Easter Day rocket barrage of the Green 

Zone. This report is dedicated to him and to all who gave their lives in Iraq in 

service to our country.

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.

Inspector General

February 2, 2009
• xi •

Key U.S. Figures in Iraq Reconstruction

General John Abizaid – Commander, United States Central Command (July 

2003-March 2007)

Elliot Abrams – Special Assistant to the President and National Security 

Council Senior Director for Near East Affairs (December 2002-February 

2005); Deputy National Security Advisor for Global Democracy Strategy 

(February 2005-January 2009)

Hilda “Bambi” Arellano – USAID Iraq Mission Director (August 

2006-August 2007)

Richard Armitage – Deputy Secretary of State (March 2001-February 2005)

Joshua Bolten – Director, Office of Management and Budget (June 2003-

April 2006); White House Chief of Staff (April 2006-January 2009)

Major General Thomas P. Bostick – Commanding General, U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers-Gulf Region Division (June 2004-June 2005)

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III – Administrator, Coalition Provisional 

Authority (May 2003-June 2004); Presidential Envoy to Iraq (May 2003-June 

2004) 

President George W. Bush – President of the United States 

General George Casey – Director, Joint Staff (October 2001-January 2003); 

Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq (June 2004-February 2007); Chief of 

Staff, U.S. Army (April 2007-present) 

Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin – Assistant Administrator for the Bureau 

for Asia and the Near East, USAID (December 2002-December 2003)

Vice President Richard B. Cheney – Vice President of the United States 

Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli – Commanding General, 1st Cavalry 

Division (2003-2005); Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq (January 

2006-December 2006) 

Robin Cleveland – Associate Director for National Security Programs, Office 

of Management and Budget (March 2001-June 2005)
• Key U.S. Figures in Iraq Reconstruction •

• xii •

Ambassador Ryan Crocker – United States Ambassador to Iraq (March 

2007-present) 

Christopher Crowley – USAID Iraq Mission Director (September 

2007-present)

Lieutenant General Martin E. Dempsey – Commanding General, 1st Armored 

Division (June 2003-July 2005); Commander, Multi-National Security 

Transition Command-Iraq (August 2005-June 2007); Deputy Commander, 

United States Central Command (August 2007-March 2008); Acting 

Commander, United States Central Command (March 2008-October 2008)

Major General Paul Eaton – Commander, Coalition Military Assistance 

Training Team and the Office of Security Cooperation (June 2003-June 2004) 

Gordon England – Deputy Secretary of Defense (January 2006-January 

2009)

Douglas Feith – Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (July 2001-August 2005)

Henrietta Fore – Administrator, United States Agency for International 

Development (November 2007-January 2009)

General Tommy Franks – Commander, United States Central Command 

(July 2000-July 2003)

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner – Director, Office of Reconstruction 

and Humanitarian Assistance (January 2003-May 2003)

Robert Gates – Secretary of Defense (December 2006-present)

Brigadier General Steven Hawkins – Commander, Joint Task Force Four 

(December 2002-March 2003); Commanding General, Task Force Fajr 

(April 2003-June 2003); Commanding General, Task Force Restore Iraqi 

Electricity (September 2003-June 2004) 

Charles Hess – Director, Project and Contracting Office (August 2004-

April 2005)

Ambassador James Jeffrey – Deputy Chief of Mission (June 2004-March 

2005); Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State on Iraq (August 2005-August 

2006); Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Near Eastern Affairs (August 2006-

July 2007); Deputy National Security Advisor (August 2007-January 2009)
• Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience •

• xiii •

Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad – United States Ambassador to Iraq (June 

2005-March 2007)

James Kunder – USAID Deputy Assistant Administrator for Asia and the 

Near East (July 2002-July 2004); USAID Assistant Administrator for Asia and 

the Near East (July 2004-January 2009); USAID Acting Deputy Administrator 

(July 2006-January 2009)

Dawn Liberi – USAID Iraq Mission Director (April 2005-July 2006)

Lewis Lucke – USAID Iraq Mission Director (March 2003-February 2004)

Major General William H. McCoy – Commanding General, U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers-Gulf Region Division (June 2005-October 2006)

Lieutenant General David McKiernan – Commander, Combined Forces 

Land Component Command (September 2002-May 2003) 

Peter McPherson – Chief of Economic Policy, Coalition Provisional 

Authority (April 2003-September 2003)

Frank Miller – Chairman, Executive Steering Group of the National Security 

Council (August 2002-March 2003); Senior Director for Defense Policy and 

Arms Control, National Security Council (January 2001-March 2005)

Christopher Milligan – Iraq Deputy Director, USAID (March 2003-2005)

Rear Admiral (Ret.) David Nash – Director, Program Management Office 

(July 2003-May 2004); Director, Project and Contracting Office/Iraq 

Reconstruction Management Office (June 2004-August 2004)

Andrew Natsios – Administrator, United States Agency for International 

Development (May 2001-January 2006)

Ambassador John Negroponte – United States Ambassador to Iraq (June 

2004-March 2005); Deputy Secretary of State (February 2007-January 2009)

General Raymond T. Odierno – Commanding General, 4th Infantry 

Division (October 2001-June 2004); Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq 

(December 2006-February 2008); Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq 

(September 2008-present)
• Key U.S. Figures in Iraq Reconstruction •

• xiv •

Rear Admiral (Ret.) David Oliver – Director, Office of Management and 

Budget, Coalition Provisional Authority (June 2003-November 2003)

General David Petraeus – Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division 

(March 2003-June 2004); Commander, Multi-National Security Transition 

Command-Iraq (June 2004-September 2005); Commander, Multi-National 

Force-Iraq (February 2007-September 2008); Commander, United States 

Central Command (October 2008-present) 

General (Ret.) Colin Powell – Secretary of State (January 2001-January 2005)

Dr. Condoleezza Rice – National Security Advisor (January 2001-January 

2005); Secretary of State (January 2005-January 2009) 

Donald Rumsfeld – Secretary of Defense (January 2001-December 2006)

Ambassador Joseph Saloom – Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management 

Office (May 2006-May 2007)

Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez – Commander, Combined Joint Task 

Force-7 (June 2003-June 2004)

Ambassador David Satterfield – Deputy Chief of Mission in Iraq (May 

2005-July 2006); Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State on Iraq (August 

2006-present)

Major General Darryl A. Scott – Commander, Joint Contracting CommandIraq (January 2006-January 2008)

Brigadier General Stephen Seay – Commander, Joint Contracting 

Command-Iraq/Head of Contracting Authority (October 2004-2005)

Ambassador Daniel Speckhard – Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management 

Office (June 2005-August 2006); Deputy Chief of Mission (August 

2006-November 2007)

James “Spike” Stephenson – USAID Iraq Mission Director (February 2004-

March 2005)

Lieutenant General Carl Strock – Deputy Director of Operations, Coalition 

Provisional Authority (June 2003-September 2003); Commanding General 

and Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (2004-2007)
• Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience •

• xv •

Ambassador William B. Taylor – Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management 

Office (July 2004-May 2005)

Brigadier General Michael Walsh – Commanding General, U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers-Gulf Region Division (October 2006-October 2007)

Thomas Warrick – Director, Future of Iraq Project (April 2002-March 2003)

Ross Wherry – USAID Senior Reconstruction Advisor for the Bureau for Asia 

and the Near East (October 2002-August 2004); and USAID Director, Office 

of Iraq Affairs (2004-March 2006)

Dr. Paul Wolfowitz – Deputy Secretary of Defense (March 2001-May 2005)
• xvi •

Acronyms

AIRP Accelerated Iraq Reconstruction Program

BSA Board of Supreme Audit

CAP Community Action Program

CCCI Central Criminal Court of Iraq

CENTCOM United States Central Command

CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Program

CFLCC Coalition Forces Land Component Command

CJTF Combined Joint Task Force

CMATT Coalition Military Assistance Training Team

CPA Coalition Provisional Authority

CPA-IG Coalition Provisional Authority Inspector General

CPATT Coalition Police Assistance Training Team

CPI Commission on Public Integrity

CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies

CSP Community Stabilization Program 

DART Disaster Assistance Relief Team

DCAA Defense Contract Audit Agency

DCMA Defense Contract Management Agency

DFI Development Fund for Iraq

DoD Department of Defense

DoJ Department of Justice

DoS Department of State

ePRT Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams

ESF Economic Support Fund

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation

FEST Forward Engineering Support Teams

FOB Forward Operating Base

FPS Facilities Protection Service

GAO Government Accountability Office

GRD Gulf Region Division

GST Governorate Support Team

IAF Iraqi Armed Forces

IAMB International Advisory and Monitoring Board

ICDC Iraqi Civil Defense Corps

ICITAP International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program

IDIQ Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity [contract]
• Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience •

• xvii •

IED Improvised Explosive Device

IG Inspector General

IGC Iraqi Governing Council

IIF Iraqi Intervention Force

IIG Iraqi Interim Government

IJ Investigative Judges

IMF International Monetary Fund

ING Iraqi National Guard

IPS Iraqi Police Service

IRDC Iraqi Reconstruction Development Council

IRMO Iraq Reconstruction Management Office

IRRF Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund

ISF Iraqi Security Forces

ISFF Iraq Security Forces Fund

ITAO Iraq Transition Assistance Office

JCC-I Joint Contracting Command – Iraq

JMD Joint Manning Document

JSAT Joint Strategic Assessment Team

JSPA Joint Strategic Planning and Assessment 

JTF Joint Task Force 

LGP Local Governance Program

LOGCAP Logistics Civil Augmentation Program

MAAWS Money as a Weapons System

MBPD Million Barrels Per Day

MNC-I Multi-National Corps – Iraq

MNF-I Multi-National Force – Iraq

MNSTC-I Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq

MoD Ministry of Defense

MoI Ministry of Interior

MW Megawatt

NGO Nongovernmental Organization

NRRRF Natural Resources Risk Remediation Fund

NSC National Security Council

NSPD National Security Presidential Directive

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom

OMB Office of Management and Budget

OPLAN Operations Plan
• Acronyms •

• xviii •

ORHA Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs

OTI Office of Transition Initiatives

PCO Project and Contracting Office

PHC Primary Healthcare Center

P.L. Public Law

PMO Program Management Office

PRB Program Review Board

PRDC Provincial Reconstruction Development Council

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team

QRF Quick Response Fund

REO Regional Embassy Office

RFP Request for Proposal

RIE Restore Iraqi Electricity

RIO Restore Iraqi Oil

RSCMA Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008

S/CRS Department of State-Office of the Coordinator for 

Reconstruction and Stabilization

SAMP Single Acquisition Management Plan

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

SOE State-owned Enterprise

SOMO State Oil Marketing Organization

SOW Statement of Work

SPMO Sector Program Management Office

TAL Transitional Administrative Law

TNA Transitional National Assembly

TRA Transition Readiness Assessment

UN United Nations

UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution

USAAA United States Army Audit Agency

USACE United States Army Corps of Engineers

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USIP United States Institute of Peace

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
• Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience •

• xix •

Part I

Planning for Postwar Iraq

September 2001 to May 2003

• 3 •

Chapter 1

Planning Begins

I have no idea what CENTCOM was planning, and I 

have absolutely no idea what the Joint Chiefs of Staff were 

planning. I do know that the political guidance they were 

getting from Rumsfeld, the NSC, and the White House 

was, ‘You got about three months to get [the postwar Iraqi 

government] up and running.’*

General Colin Powell 

Secretary of State (2001-2005)

The origins of U.S. reconstruction policy in Iraq are rooted in a series of debates that occurred during the fall of 2001, when President Bush ordered the 

Pentagon to revise its plans for deposing Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.1

 From 

the outset, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld believed that, after Saddam’s 

fall, power should rapidly transfer to an interim Iraqi authority. Reflecting this 

belief, Pentagon officials conceived of U.S. forces as liberators who would leave 

Iraq within months of toppling the regime. In this scenario, the United States 

would not need to administer the functions of Iraq’s government after major 

combat operations ceased. 2

A different view of regime change developed at the State Department. Some 

senior officials in Foggy Bottom believed that Iraq, with its history of sectarian 

violence, could not be easily reshaped. They concluded that invading Iraq and 

replacing its totalitarian regime would require a U.S. commitment of enormous 

scope, carried out over a period of years, engaging everything from Iraq’s judiciary 

to its electrical grid. Secretary of State Colin Powell pointedly told the President 

that “when you hit [Iraq], it’s like a crystal glass. It’s going to shatter. There will be 

no government. There will be civil disorder. You’ll have 25 million Iraqis standing 

around looking at each other.”3

The tense interplay between these competing visions fundamentally shaped 

the process of prewar planning for postwar Iraq in the fifteen months that preceded the March 2003 invasion. As planning moved forward, experts inside and 

outside government—including some at the Department of Defense—warned 

that failing to prepare for a more extensive engagement after regime change exposed the United States to extraordinary risks. Although the NSC agreed that 

* SIGIR interview with General (Ret.) Colin Powell, former Secretary of State, February 4, 2008.
• Chapter 1 •

• 4 •

Iraq should be liberated from Saddam’s tyranny, the disagreements about the 

postwar plan remained unresolved right up to the invasion. They arose from 

differing assessments of prewar conditions in Iraq and what the consequences 

of deposing Saddam would be.

A Brief History of Modern Iraq

Shortly after World War I, Winston Churchill, then head of Britain’s War 

Office, told the commander of British forces in Iraq: “The fate of the 

province depends entirely upon whether a reasonable scheme for maintaining order can be devised at a cost which is not ruinous.”4

 Creating a 

“reasonable scheme,” however, proved exceedingly difficult. 

The British shaped and laid claim to modern Iraq through the 1916 SykesPicot agreement, negotiated by the United Kingdom, France, and Russia 

in anticipation of the fall of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War 

I. By 1920, Iraqis living under British military occupation had compiled 

a list of grievances against their foreign rulers. Shi’a clerics in the south 

demanded an independent Islamic government. The Kurds in the north 

wanted autonomy. Tribesmen throughout the country opposed the 

British-imposed tax system and forced labor. Eventually, senior Sunni 

and Shi’a clerics joined together to issue a fatwa calling for rebellion. 

An insurgency started in Baghdad and quickly spread across the country, forcing the British to move up their timetable for granting Iraq full 

sovereignty.5

In their efforts to build an independent state, British officials faced the 

challenge of melding three distinct social structures (tribal, clerical, urban), 

three ethno-religious groups (Sunni Kurds, Sunni Arabs, Shi’a Arabs), and 

three territorial regions (north, central, south).6 The solution they ultimately settled on, undertaken with the advice of British Arabists Gertrude 

Bell and T.E. Lawrence, was to install a king, Emir Faisal, to lead the new 

country. The 1921 investiture of Faisal—a Sunni—entrenched a pattern 

of volatile sectarian politics that would burden Iraq for decades.7

The exercise of power by the minority Sunnis over the majority Shi’a 

produced instability: 58 separate governments ruled Iraq in the 37 years 

between 1921 and the 1958 revolution that overthrew the monarchy.8

In 1963, the Sunni-controlled Ba’ath party took power in a coup.9 By the 

mid-1970s, a middle class had emerged in Iraq that was a model for its 

neighbors. High oil prices briefly pushed the country’s per capita gross 
• Planning Begins •

• 5 •

domestic product past that of Spain’s. A secular state with an excellent 

education system and a thriving economy, Iraq seemed poised to break 

with its turbulent past. But this relative renaissance was not to last. 

In 1979, a law school dropout named Saddam Hussein seized power. He 

would rule Iraq for the next 24 years at ruinous cost. In 1980, Saddam 

launched his country on a disastrous eight-year war with Iran that left 

a half million Iraqis dead. The war ended the country’s brief period of 

prosperity, decimated a generation of young men, and roiled tensions 

between the regime’s Sunni Arab elite and their Shi’a and Kurdish countrymen. In 1990, Saddam invaded Kuwait and the United States quickly 

responded, leading to the 1991 Gulf War.10 Saddam was badly defeated 

by a broad coalition of forces, and his regime became an international 

pariah. By the year 2000, the impact of multiple wars, severe international 

sanctions, and repressive rule had left Iraq a broken country. 

Iraq Under Saddam

In 2003, Iraq’s population of around 27 million people lived in an area about the 

size of California. The land between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, known as the 

cradle of civilization, had given birth to remarkable innovations in writing, farming, law, medicine, and governance. But Iraq suffered under a brutal tyrant whose 

destructive policies had led to the imposition of harsh United Nations (UN) 

sanctions. The deterioration of the country’s physical infrastructure stemmed, 

to varying degrees, from these sanctions, Saddam’s neglect, the Iran-Iraq War, 

and the 1991 Gulf War. 

During the Gulf War, Iraq inflicted significant damage on Kuwait. Under the 

supervision of then-Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, Kuwaiti and U.S. officials planned the reconstruction of Kuwait in advance of its liberation. Kuwait’s 

quick recovery largely resulted from work carried out by the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers (USACE) and private contractors, including Bechtel, and Brown and 

Root, both of which would later play major roles in Iraq’s reconstruction.11

Although Saddam restored some essential services after the Gulf War, the 

larger recovery of Iraq proved more daunting. United Nations-imposed sanctions and an international trade embargo, aimed at preventing the regime from 

acquiring ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, limited the country’s 

capacity to recover.12 Iraq’s non-oil economy was especially hard hit. By the mid1990s, unemployment and under-employment exceeded 50 percent.13 Iraq’s 
• Chapter 1 •

• 6 •

gross domestic product, which peaked in 1990 at $74.9 billion, remained below 

$20 billion throughout most of the decade.14

Under Saddam, Iraq had plunged from a gradually advancing middle-income 

country to a poor and underdeveloped one. In its shift “from relative affluence to 

massive poverty,” 60 percent of Iraq’s population was left heavily dependent on 

the government-provided food ration for their livelihood.15 By the mid-1990s, 

these rations, delivered through the country’s public distribution system, provided 

only 1,100 calories per person per day, causing widespread malnutrition.16

Faced with rising social and economic instability, Saddam acceded in 1995 

to a UN proposal, on the table since 1991, to allow the use of proceeds from 

controlled oil and gas sales to purchase food and medicine.17 Under the new 

“Oil-for-Food Program,” the UN managed monthly distributions of 450,000 

tons of flour, clarified butter, peas, lentils, beans, sugar, tea, salt, and soap through 

a network of 44,000 privately owned corner stores. At one level, the program 

worked, effectively doubling the population’s per capita caloric intake.18 But 

beneath the sanctions and authorized oil sales, an illicit economy flourished. 

Institutionalized corruption infected both the government and the supporting 

UN programs, spawning powerful criminal elements within Iraq.19

The reversal in U.S.-Iraqi relations during Saddam’s rule—with Saddam first 

an ally and then an enemy—increased Iraqi suspicion that the West had designs 

on its territory and oil wealth. These suspicions—together with the effects of 

internal political violence, Saddam’s ceaseless propaganda, a corrupt public sector, regular shortages of food, medicine, and everyday goods, and frequent U.S. 

bombing of air-defense installations in the no-fly zones—led to a siege mentality 

among many Iraqis. 

The peculiar mix of charity and harsh sanctions that defined the international 

community’s relations with Iraq in the years following the Gulf War presented a 

paradox. Saddam’s brutal secrecy and intrigue shrouded the inner workings of the 

Iraqi state, while the UN’s distribution scheme for goods and services provided 

the international organization with extensive connections in the country.20 Thus, 

in 2003, the UN sanctions committee had a list of every good it had permitted 

Iraq to import for about a decade, down to fuses in power plants.21 Although the 

UN’s records were not organized as a needs assessment of the infrastructure, a 

diligent review of them could have revealed how much cement a particular Iraqi 

factory produced or what spare parts an Iraqi electricity plant had ordered. 
• Planning Begins •

• 7 •

Initial Planning

On September 29, 2001, Secretary Rumsfeld ordered a review of existing Iraq 

war plans.22 Shortly thereafter, General Tommy Franks, Commanding General 

of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)—the combatant command with 

responsibility for the Middle East and Central Asia—removed a small group of 

key planners from the Afghanistan campaign and directed them to revise plans 

to attack Iraq.23 At the outset, Secretary Rumsfeld did not advise the planners to 

prepare for a lengthy occupying military administration after Saddam’s regime 

fell.24 He presumed that others in the government, probably the Department of 

State, would handle the governance aspects of “Phase IV,” military parlance for 

operations after the end of major combat.25

The concept of operations Rumsfeld and Franks devised in four videoconferences between Thanksgiving and late December 2001 focused chiefly on the 

combat phase. The war plan Secretary Rumsfeld briefed to President Bush on 

December 28, 2001, anticipated a rapid postwar handoff to a provisional Iraqi 

government and a minimal continuing military footprint.26

In early 2002, the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs launched 

the “Future of Iraq Project” to assess postwar requirements. Six days after the 

President named Iraq as part of the “Axis of Evil” in his January 29, 2002 State of 

the Union address, project director Thomas Warrick submitted an outline of subjects to Ambassador Ryan Crocker, then serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

State for Near Eastern Affairs. The outline anticipated seventeen working groups, 

composed primarily of Iraqi exiles, that would evaluate post-invasion needs in 

areas ranging from rule of law and public finance to oil, energy, and anticorruption.27 The project would serve both as a means to expand postwar planning and 

as a vehicle to consolidate competing Iraqi exile groups, who were involved with 

the project from its earliest days.

White House coordination of nascent planning for Iraq began in the spring of 

2002 during twice-weekly meetings of the National Security Council’s Deputies 

Committee, which comprises the second-in-command officials—or their representatives—from the Departments of State and Defense, the CIA, and the 

military’s Joint Staff.28 Ideas about how to handle the postwar phase took shape 

during these meetings. The Deputies Committee focused on three concepts: a 

liberation model in which Iraqis would quickly take charge through a provisional 

government; a military administration led by CENTCOM; or a civilian transitional authority, perhaps run under UN auspices. Irrespective of which concept 

or combination of concepts would apply, policymakers addressed three linked 

issues: how to secure public order, what relief and reconstruction operations 
• Chapter 1 •

• 8 •

would be necessary, and how to promote U.S. interests in Iraq’s longer-term 

economic and political stability.29

“One of our main themes was liberation rather than occupation,” Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith said. “There was this constant debate between those of us who said we’ve got to push the Iraqis forward,” Feith 

recounted, and others who judged that the Iraqis would be ready to govern themselves only after several years.30 Reflecting the views of Secretary Rumsfeld, Feith 

advocated a rapid transition to Iraqi control. Drawing lessons from past nationbuilding efforts, he and Rumsfeld believed that minimizing the military’s presence 

would force local populations to rely more rapidly upon their own leaders to 

resolve problems. They were convinced that by limiting the military’s postwar 

role in Iraq, the United States could avoid the “culture of dependency” that had 

taken root in other post-conflict interventions.31

The U.S campaign in Afghanistan appeared to support the rapid-transfer approach.32 After a small U.S. force achieved military victory, political authority 

passed to Hamid Karzai, an Afghan exile leader selected by a loya jirga—a grand 

assembly of Afghan tribal leaders—and subsequently appointed president of 

Afghanistan at an international conference in Bonn. Per capita reconstruction 

expenditure in Afghanistan had remained modest. Officials viewed this seemingly 

successful postwar transition as a vindication of the Administration’s break with 

conventional wisdom about nation building, buttressing arguments of Defense 

officials that Afghanistan should serve as the model for Iraq.33

The State Department argued against applying the Afghanistan model to Iraq. 

State experts believed that Iraqi exile leaders were unlikely to garner the same 

level of support from their countrymen as Karzai had enjoyed from Afghans. 

Moreover, State’s analyses suggested that Iraq would need a longer transitional 

period because of the need to reconcile Iraq’s competing ethnic and sectarian 

groups. The State Department advocated a U.S.-led “Transitional Civil Authority” 

that would govern postwar Iraq during a “multi-year transitional period to build 

democratic institutions.”34 This approach ultimately was embodied by the 

Coalition Provisional Authority, which ruled postwar Iraq from May 2003 to 

June 2004 ostensibly under the Defense Department’s aegis.

Interagency Planning Accelerates

By mid-2002, an invasion of Iraq remained in the realm of speculation for all 

but a handful of senior officials in Washington. The machinery of interagency 

planning in the National Security Council largely sat idle, leaving open the fissure between planning for war and planning for war’s aftermath. The differences 

among the three underlying policies for a postwar framework—rapid transfer to 
• Planning Begins •

• 9 •

Iraqi control, military administration, or civilian transitional authority—had yet 

to be seriously addressed, much less resolved. Nor had officials reached consensus on the public order and reconstruction requirements for each scenario.35

In August 2002, the President and his advisors enlarged the Iraq planning 

effort to include civilian agencies that ostensibly would administer the postwar 

phase. Iraq: Goals, Objectives, Strategy, a national security document signed by 

President Bush on August 29, 2002, articulated an evolving strategy that would 

employ “all instruments of national power” to free Iraq from Saddam. The document stated that the United States would “work with the Iraqi opposition to 

demonstrate that we are liberating, not invading Iraq, and give the opposition a 

role in building a pluralistic and democratic Iraq, including the preparation of a 

new constitution.” As for rebuilding, the U.S. strategy would:

...demonstrate that the United States is prepared to play a 

sustained role in the reconstruction of post-Saddam Iraq 

with contribution from and participation of the international 

community, that rapidly starts the country’s reconstruction, 

that preserves but reforms the current Iraqi bureaucracy and 

reforms Iraqi military and security institutions.36

Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld and Vice President Cheney met with Iraqi 

exile leaders to show support and to express the seriousness of U.S. intentions.37

To help execute the ambitious mission envisioned by the August 29 document, the Joint Staff instructed CENTCOM that it should begin planning to 

administer Iraq for an interim period after the invasion. This order appeared to 

counter the earlier Rumsfeld presumption that the Defense Department would 

not bear principal responsibility for managing the country after the combat phase 

concluded. Despite the Joint Staff order, “there wasn’t a whole lot of intellectual 

energy being focused on Phase IV,” one of CENTCOM’s key planners said.38

While most of CENTCOM’s staff focused on Phases I, II, and III, Major Thomas 

Fisher and Major Ray Eiriz, two mid-level officers who had served in Bosnia and 

Kosovo, took charge of Phase IV.39

To jump-start postwar planning efforts across the government, National 

Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice established a National Security Council 

(NSC) Executive Steering Group on Iraq in August 2002 and asked Frank 

Miller, an NSC senior director, to chair it. The Joint Staff had already formed a 

political-military team to link detailed operational planning at CENTCOM with 

interagency planners in Washington. An energy infrastructure working group, a 

diplomatic working group, a global communications office, and a humanitarian 

working group eventually joined the planning effort.40
• Chapter 1 •

• 10 •

Under Secretary Feith also enlarged the Pentagon office responsible for Iraq 

policy planning. Until then, only four people in Defense’s Near East and South 

Asia Office had worked full-time on Iraq.41 Feith brought together a staff of about 

a dozen under a new “Office of Special Plans” to engage in large-scale planning for 

war. Later, officials working on the management of postwar Iraq would discover 

that this office had produced relevant analyses and concept papers that were not 

shared during interagency consultations or with those who eventually played a 

leading role in postwar Iraq—emblematic of the extensive compartmentalization 

of prewar planning for postwar Iraq.42

NSC’s Humanitarian Working Group

Assessing how the war might disrupt the provision of food, water, and shelter fell 

to an interagency Humanitarian Working Group led by Elliot Abrams, an NSC 

senior director, and Robin Cleveland, associate director of the White House Office 

of Management and Budget (OMB).43 The working group, which began weekly 

meetings in Cleveland’s office in September 2002, included officials from the CIA, 

United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Joint Staff, 

and the Departments of Defense, State, Treasury, Justice, and Commerce.44

One nightmare scenario loomed above all others—the possibility that Saddam 

would use chemical or biological weapons against an invading force or his own 

people. In the wake of such a disaster, hundreds of thousands or even millions of 

Iraqis might flee. Very large refugee flows were thought by Pentagon analysts to be 

the most likely challenge the United States would face in the aftermath of an invasion.45 Accordingly, Cleveland and Abrams focused their working group on how 

the U.S. government would respond to large-scale humanitarian contingencies.

They also considered the role of the UN. Several officials initially resisted 

continuing the Oil-for-Food Program—which partially financed Iraq’s public 

distribution system, through which 25 million Iraqis received a monthly food 

staple—on grounds that it ceded too much control to the UN. But USAID and 

State officials argued that the program would help prevent starvation if food became scarce. A related question was how to administer oil revenues accruing 

under the Oil-for-Food Program. Several working group members again argued 

against continuing UN control, with State and USAID officials again urging that 

the international body was best suited to serve as custodian of Iraq’s oil wealth. 

Several rounds of adjudication through the Deputies Committee left the UN in 

control of the Oil-for-Food program and its revenues.46

Under the leadership of Elliot Abrams, the Humanitarian Working Group 

quietly coordinated with the international aid community to develop a “no-strike” 

list of civilian infrastructure, such as hospitals and power plants. To separate the 
• Planning Begins •

• 11 •

regime’s military command and control facilities from known civilian sites, the 

UN and NGOs familiar with Iraq nominated locations that the military would 

then cross-walk through an intelligence-community database.47

Although the working group had been chartered to evaluate only humanitarian contingencies, its participants soon realized that Iraq’s infrastructure and 

ministries would play essential roles in postwar operations.48 Ambassador Wendy 

Chamberlin and Ross Wherry of USAID thus began a reconstruction assessment 

that considered what it would take to get the infrastructure and ministries up and 

running after the invasion.49 This raised a fundamental strategic question: how 

extensive should postwar reconstruction be? Reconstruction geared to repair war 

damage would differ greatly from attempting to reverse the deleterious effects of 

the Iran-Iraq war, sanctions, and Saddam’s own destructive policies.50

The lack of information about Iraq’s infrastructure and government institutions made it difficult to determine what was necessary to restore essential 

services. “We never had anything more than a PowerPoint briefing,” a Defense 

official later commented. “We might have had some financial estimate papers, 

but it was a lot of back-of-the-envelope, ‘what will it take to fix the Ministry of 

fill-in-the-blank.’ It was all guesstimates made on top of suppositions.” 51 The few 

detailed reports reviewed by the working group suggested that sanctions had 

significantly limited Iraq’s recovery from the first Gulf War. For example, a UN 

assessment of the electrical sector concluded that a lack of spare parts left the 

system remarkably fragile. In light of Iraq’s substantial oil wealth, however, the 

scope of expected infrastructure repairs seemed manageable. The group assumed 

that long-term repairs could be undertaken and funded by the Iraqis.52

With military, political, and democratization plans developed out of sight of 

the Humanitarian Working Group, its members could consider only in general 

terms how reconstruction might help legitimize a new Iraqi state. The group 

asked for but never received a briefing on how public-order requirements would 

be met. It was also not permitted to examine the potential role of reconstruction in civil administration. Department of Justice proposals to employ police 

trainers were dismissed as falling outside the group’s mandate.53 The Defense 

Department asserted that it had plans for postwar security well in hand.54 As one 

working group member said, it appeared that “a lot of things were decided but 

never discussed.”55

In the absence of direction from above, the working group’s co-chairs, Abrams 

and Cleveland, developed a set of core judgments about postwar Iraq. “It was 

taken as an assumption,” one participant said, “that the war would be brief, war 

damage would be minimal, and oil revenues would finance almost all of recon-
• Chapter 1 •

• 12 •

struction.”56 They also assumed that the political people would somehow “pull a 

Karzai out of the hat,” and that the Iraqis would take care of the rest.57

Towards the end of 2002, with time running out and war a few months away, 

working group officials were putting in eighteen-hour days to make sure their 

parts of the plan came together. General Franks at CENTCOM did not seriously 

question the approach developed under Abrams’s and Cleveland’s leadership. 

Briefed twice by the working group’s members on their findings, General Franks 

reacted favorably. “On both occasions, he said this was good,” an official recalled. 

Franks said that the reconstruction and humanitarian planning “basically jibes 

with what we’re thinking.”58

Structuring Postwar Administration

On October 15, 2002, Under Secretary Feith briefed the National Security 

Council on a proposed structure for CENTCOM’s military administration 

of postwar Iraq. The structure consisted of a military headquarters, known as 

Combined Joint Task Force-Iraq (CJTF-I), headed by a three-star general, and 

a civil administration, headed by a civilian “Iraq coordinator.” Both would fall 

under CENTCOM’s command. 

The briefing recommended that the Secretary of Defense be placed in charge 

of the entire effort, reflecting Rumsfeld’s view that political, economic, and security activities in postwar Iraq should not be managed by separate institutions.59

This proposed structure touched off a vigorous debate among interagency planners. Lieutenant General George Casey, who would command military forces 

in Iraq from 2004 to 2006, later said, “We lost, in my view, two months while we 

fought over who was going to be in charge.”60

CENTCOM divided Phase IV into three overlapping stages—Alpha, Bravo, 

and Charlie.61 During Alpha, the military would have the lead; during Bravo, a 

U.S. civilian authority would move to the forefront; during Charlie, the Iraqis 

would take charge. “None of this was exclusive,” CENTCOM’s chief of war plans 

explained. “It was who dominated and who had the lead during those phases.”62

The “A-B-C” approach was a way for the military to conceptualize what and when 

certain tasks would have to be performed, given that planners did not yet know 

whether U.S. policy ultimately would call for a rapid handoff to Iraqi leaders or 

to a civilian transitional authority of longer duration. The phases were set; their 

duration was not. 

On October 18, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld asked Feith to stand up the 

postwar planning office that would prepare for the civil administration of Iraq. 

But Rumsfeld canceled that order just a few days later. Feith later learned from 

Deputy National Security Advisor Steven Hadley that the reversal came from a 
• Planning Begins •

• 13 •

Presidential decision that the U.S. government should not engage in highly visible postwar preparations while in the middle of international efforts to defuse 

the threat posed by Iraq without war.63

These decisions reflected a strategic resistance to bringing postwar planning 

into the open. All the interagency Iraq planning groups worked in secret. Few 

knew the others existed. Officials justified the extreme secrecy on the grounds 

that ongoing diplomatic negotiations would be undercut if Saddam knew that 

postwar planning was well underway. “There was a reluctance to pull that all together,” Feith explained, “because, while you’re saying that you want to resolve 

this dispute through non-military means, there’s a sense that you’re contradicting 

yourself if you’re not only planning for the war but planning for the postwar.”64

While postwar planning efforts progressed under strict secrecy, the build-up of 

troops and materiel around Iraq’s borders continued—a necessary threat to 

make diplomatic negotiations credible in the eyes of Saddam.

The structure of postwar administration and the mechanics of political transition remained undecided through the fall. A revised version of the strategy 

paper, Iraq: Goals, Objectives, Strategy, issued in late October 2002, reflected 

the lack of a clear decision on these matters. Rather than articulating a detailed 

timetable for transition to Iraqi control, the memorandum spoke only of an 

interim administration that would provide for “external and internal security,” 

“humanitarian assistance,” and “the country’s political, economic, and security 

reconstruction.”65

Early Warnings

As planning for the invasion moved forward, the Departments of Defense and 

State produced assessments of what could go wrong. In October 2002, Secretary 

Rumsfeld, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers, Vice 

Chairman General Peter Pace, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, and Under Secretary 

Feith developed a “Parade of Horribles” memo that presented 29 possible catastrophes the invasion of Iraq might engender. In retrospect, the memo proved 

remarkably prescient. Number thirteen was not finding weapons of mass destruction. Other fears included sectarian and ethnic strife among Sunnis, Shi’a, and 

Kurds; the failure to capture Saddam Hussein; Iraq fracturing into two or three 

pieces; U.S. postwar involvement lasting ten years, rather than two to four; the cost 

of the postwar effort being too high; and a turnabout in world opinion.66 Rumsfeld 

shared the memo at an NSC meeting with the President, the Vice President, the 

Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor, and the CIA Director.67

In mid-December, Secretary Powell received a twelve-page warning—coauthored by Ryan Crocker, eventual Ambassador to Iraq—titled “The Perfect 
• Chapter 1 •

• 14 •

Storm.” This memo accurately warned that the struggle for dominance after the 

fall of Saddam would inspire violent clashes among Iraq’s sects, tribes, and ethnic 

factions, possibly leading to the country’s fragmentation.68 Deputy Secretary 

of State Richard Armitage believed that this memo was shared with the NSC, 

although members of Frank Miller’s Executive Steering Committee were not 

privy to it or to Rumsfeld’s “Parade of Horribles” memo.69

Caveats about what lay ahead could also be found in the history of nation 

building.70 Of the sixteen countries in which the United States attempted to 

implant institutions of democratic government over the past century, only 

four—West Germany, Japan, Panama, and Grenada—remained democratic a 

decade after U.S. forces ended their active involvement in governance. In three 

countries—Cuba, Haiti, and Nicaragua—intervention led to worse misrule and 

greater economic decline.71 Some political scientists and historians noted that 

Iraq’s social and political attributes could make the country inherently resistant 

to political reform by outsiders, and that any effort there would be unlike the U.S. 

occupation of Germany and Japan.72 Both Germany and Japan were highly developed societies with homogeneous populations and established bureaucracies. 

Operational planning for their occupation began within months of the bombing 

of Pearl Harbor, and thousands of native speakers were trained.73

The potential difficulty in remaking Iraq’s political system was underscored 

in January 2003 by a then-classified National Intelligence Council assessment, 

Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq, which predicted that establishing a 

democratic system in Iraq “would be a long, difficult, and turbulent process.”74 CIA 

Director George Tenet and his deputy, John McLaughlin, did not highlight the findings of the assessment to interagency planners or ask that it be briefed to the NSC’s 

Executive Steering Group on Iraq or to the NSC’s Deputies Committee.75

Several other studies outlined how the expected difficulties of regime change 

would affect the military and civil missions in Iraq.76 The most comprehensive was 

by Conrad Crane and Andrew Terrill of the Army War College Strategic Studies 

Institute. In coordination with the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, 

Crane’s interdisciplinary team began work on their study in October 2002. Two 

dozen officials from the Joint Staff, Joint Forces Command, and the Departments 

of Defense and State vetted its interim findings in mid-December. Published 

February 1, 2003, the report identified 135 tasks that military and civilian agencies would need to perform across 21 categories of activity.77

The Congress also examined postwar scenarios. On August 1, 2002, the 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing at which members heard 

warnings from scholars about potential challenges an invasion of Iraq could bring. 

It would be the only congressional examination of postwar scenarios before the 
• Planning Begins •

• 15 •

Congress authorized the President to “use the Armed Forces of the United States 

as he determines to be necessary and appropriate” to defend the United States 

against the threat from Iraq and to enforce UN resolutions regarding Iraq.78

Although six committees and two subcommittees held more than a dozen hearings subsequent to the vote in Congress to approve the use of force, most of the 

hearings focusing on post-Saddam Iraq did not occur until just before hostilities 

began in March 2003.79

The Future of Iraq Project

By late 2002, participants in the State Department’s Future of Iraq Project began 

formulating their own vision of postwar administration. Working independently 

of other planning teams, fourteen of the project’s seventeen working groups met 

between July 2002 and April 2003, bringing some 200 Iraqi exiles together with 

government and international experts.80 The project identified a range of issues 

that an invading army inevitably would confront, from the possibility of political violence to the decrepit electricity, oil, and water infrastructures. The richly 

developed reports constitute the single most rigorous assessment conducted by 

the U.S. government before the war. Although the findings of each working group 

did not amount to an operational plan, their reports contained facts and analysis 

that could—and in some cases did—inform operational planning. 

Several factors—particularly timing—kept most project findings from influencing interagency deliberations. Of the fourteen working groups that did 

meet, many carried their deliberations into 2003—too late to influence prewar planning.81 Moreover, the completed reports proved of varying utility. The 

Transitional Justice Working Group, for example, offered a detailed analysis of 

Iraq’s political-military establishment. The specific suggestions it contained came 

close to constituting an action plan on the legal front. Others, such as the Public 

Health and Humanitarian Needs Working Group, offered only a generalized set 

of recommendations drawn from previous international crises. 

The NSC’s Executive Steering Group invited the project’s director, Thomas 

Warrick, to brief the group shortly before the invasion, but the project’s unwieldy 

reports—which in toto ran more than 1,000 pages—could not be easily reduced 

to a set of slides that policymakers could absorb.82 Warrick’s briefing did not 

raise a single issue for decision and was not viewed as useful at the time. To planners preparing for war and a short postwar operation, the Future of Iraq Project 

did not look like a coherent operational plan.83 Only when Warrick produced 

an edited volume of findings after the war began could the project be seen as a 

comprehensive guide to issues the United States could face—and, by then, was 

already facing.84
• Chapter 1 •

• 16 •

Perhaps most critically, the project’s reports did not capture the attention of 

the State Department’s senior decision-makers. Secretary of State Colin Powell 

and his Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage did not use them to bolster their 

cautionary views or to push for more detailed planning on worst-case scenarios. 

Without a high-level patron, the project’s reports lacked the visibility and clout 

to reach key decision-makers in time.85 “I never felt that the Future of Iraq Project 

was embraced or connected to the actual planning effort for regime change,” 

Ambassador Ryan Crocker said, “and the farther we went into the calendar, the 

more noticeable that became.”86

Fragmented Planning

The divergence Crocker noticed was the consequence of a planning process that 

had been fragmented from its beginning. For nearly a year, the NSC exercised 

loose coordination over separate efforts by State and Defense and did not seek 

the participation of post-conflict experts at USAID. The marked separation between civilian and military preparations, which had existed since late 2001, was 

followed by further fragmentation within the interagency planning process, which 

had begun in earnest in August 2002. Even as officials thought they were moving 

toward an integrated master plan, the building blocks of that plan were being 

developed in a piecemeal fashion that rendered risks and needs less visible. 

The reasons for the fragmentation were in part bureaucratic, but, in an important sense, they were also the product of higher-level strategic judgments. 

Calls for better-integrated planning and greater capacity to address worst-case 

scenarios were subordinated to the views of Defense Department officials who 

were committed to a rapid transfer of power. The liberation approach they and 

others backed became the operative strategy, with the White House elevating it 

to official U.S. policy by late fall 2002.87

As the fall turned to winter, NSC officials moved to integrate this vision of 

regime change into operational plans being prepared by the government’s civilian 

agencies. USAID was among the first to be mobilized.
• Planning Begins •

• 17 •

Essential Services Overview: Prewar Levels in Iraq

Metric88

Preinvasion

Electricity Production 

Megawatts 4,075

Oil Production 

Million Barrels per Day 2.58

Iraqi Security Forces

Soldiers and Police 1,300,00089

Telecommunications

Landline Subscribers 833,000

Mobile Subscribers 80,000

Iraq’s electricity sector suffered from years of inadequate maintenance and poor 

management under Saddam.90 According to the International Monetary Fund 

(IMF), Iraq’s monthly electricity production, from March 2002 to March 2003, 

averaged 4,075 megawatts per day.91 The distribution of power under Saddam 

heavily favored Baghdad, which received between 16 and 24 hours of power per 

day, while the average Iraqi household outside the capital received power for just 

4 to 8 hours per day.92

The U.S. Department of Energy estimated that Iraq’s oil production fell to 2.0 

million barrels per day (MBPD) in 2002, but increased to 2.58 MBPD just before 

the war.93 Although oil production itself is not an essential service, oil feeds the 

refineries that produce petroleum products for domestic consumption, is critical 

to electricity generation, and provides Iraq with much of the revenue that supports other services.
• 18 •

Chapter 2 

The Agencies Engage

We needed to be thinking at a much different order of magnitude 

of what is required to reconstruct a failed state, in the context of a 

U.S. military invasion.

James Kunder

USAID Deputy Assistant Administrator for

Asia and the Near East (2002-2004)*

In 2002, the United States Agency for International Development administered 

nearly $7.5 billion in foreign aid programs.1

 Its 2,000 employees and 5,000 contractors worked in more than 100 developing countries across the world.2

 Many in 

government nonetheless viewed USAID as a minor player running small projects 

in faraway places. Despite its relative lack of capacity, USAID was fast becoming an essential player in the late 2002 planning for postwar Iraq. The National 

Security Council assumed that USAID’s disaster response teams could help 

contain humanitarian crises that might follow the invasion, and that its development know-how could help repair Iraq’s infrastructure and support the country’s 

transition to democracy. Some Pentagon planners—particularly those unfamiliar 

with USAID’s missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan—imagined that 

the agency had vast powers to rush in civilians behind the troops and establish 

conditions that could lead to the soldiers’ deployment home.

USAID officials first learned of their expected role in Iraq well after war 

planning had begun. Notably, USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios was not 

formally consulted in the early planning phases.3

 Ross Wherry, who ultimately 

directed much of the agency’s reconstruction preparations, began to learn about 

Iraq planning in mid-2002 through a series of chance encounters, cryptic notes, 

and indirect suggestions that the agency should develop contingency scenarios.4

The agency did not become formally involved until August 2002, when USAID 

Assistant Administrator Wendy Chamberlin was asked to serve on the NSC’s 

Humanitarian Working Group. 

White House officials would ask several USAID officials to join the planning 

efforts over the next month.5

 The agency’s Asia and Near East Bureau soon took 

charge of reconstruction planning, while the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and 

Humanitarian Assistance prepared for humanitarian relief operations.6

 In early 

October 2002, Administrator Natsios formed USAID’s Iraq Task Force, chairing 

* SIGIR interview with James Kunder, USAID Acting Deputy Administrator, February 15, 2008.
• 19 •

• The Agencies Engage •

its weekly meetings thereafter to coordinate the agency’s efforts. Several hundred 

USAID employees eventually would work full time on Iraq plans.7

When it came to mobilizing resources for possible humanitarian disasters in 

Iraq, USAID officials proceeded with full Administration support.8

 Mobilizing 

reconstruction resources, however, was a different matter. The NSC conceived of 

reconstruction primarily in terms of brick-and-mortar work, but USAID viewed 

such rebuilding as only part of a long-term social and political transformation 

necessary to achieving a fully democratic Iraq.9

 This divergence reflected larger 

disagreements among the President’s advisors over what the postwar mission in 

Iraq demanded, making for a difficult and tense planning process.10 In every aspect of the effort—in both the humanitarian and reconstruction areas—complex 

contracting regulations and time pressures pushed USAID’s capacities to the 

limit, exposing structural weaknesses in the U.S. government’s capacity to mobilize for contingency relief and reconstruction operations.11

USAID’s Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq, first drafted in October 2002, stated 

the Administration’s emerging policy that “reconstruction will aim to bring Iraqi 

facilities back to a modestly improved pre-conflict level.” It also included this 

pointed—and, in retrospect, markedly accurate—assessment: “complete reconstruction to the economic and institutional capacity of 1980 (conditions prior to 

the Iran-Iraq war) will require years of public investment.”12

Planning to Prevent a Humanitarian Disaster

The fear that Saddam would severely damage his own country in response to a 

U.S. invasion drove much of USAID’s humanitarian planning. “What happens 

if Saddam blows up the dikes, the dams, floods the country?” Natsios asked.13

Refugees also were a paramount concern. In response, USAID mobilized its cadre 

of U.S.-based and international NGOs that carry out the agency’s humanitarian 

missions. The agency’s disaster relief expert, Jonathan Dworken, chaired regular 

meetings in the USAID crisis room to plan their deployment. 

USAID’s Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance built the largest Disaster 

Assistance Response Team in the agency’s history.14 USAID’s Office of Transition 

Initiatives (OTI), which works to stabilize countries making the transition from 

violence to peace, also mobilized much of its staff to work on Iraq planning.15

Programs to prevent or minimize acts of reprisal and to maximize high-visibility 

projects that would symbolize U.S. goodwill were geared toward best-case, worstcase, and middle-range scenarios.16

Food was also a top priority.17 The World Food Program, the food-aid branch 

of the UN, was deemed best suited to manage the logistics; it had the capacity to 

rush in 600,000 metric tons of food to feed 25 million people each month.18 In 
• 20 •

• Chapter 2 •

the early fall of 2002, the Director of USAID’s Office of Food for Peace alerted 

World Food Program officials in Rome that hostilities in Iraq might be imminent. Robin Cleveland, co-chair of the NSC’s humanitarian working group, then 

authorized up to $200 million for the World Food Program to survey roads, 

identify warehouses, and preposition trucks, supplies, and staff.19 It was the first 

U.S. down payment on postwar Iraq. 

Success in Iraq would depend significantly upon synchronizing civilian relief 

efforts with military combat operations. In early November 2002, a contingent 

from the NSC’s Humanitarian Working Group spent two days at CENTCOM 

headquarters in Tampa, Florida.20 The Humanitarian Planning Team, as this 

contingent came to be known, worked to improve coordination between planners at CENTCOM and USAID.21 In Tampa, the planning team and its military 

counterparts walked through what each agency and the military would do in the 

event of mass civilian casualties, refugee flows, and disruptions in the water and 

food supply. 

Institutional differences made this joint planning difficult.22 In the view of 

some USAID officials, CENTCOM planners had a circumscribed view of postwar operations. Military planning naturally emphasized the combat phase. “They 

were very focused on operations orders: take this hill by this date, take this crossroads,” Wherry said. USAID planners realized that meeting humanitarian needs 

would fall almost entirely on their shoulders.”23

Planning for Reconstruction

The evolving postwar plan called for a shift to reconstruction efforts once humanitarian needs were met. The scope of reconstruction would depend upon the 

amount of damage.24 The Humanitarian Working Group developed reconstruction plans for various sectors and assigned an agency to lead each one. USAID 

would bear responsibility for most sectors, including health, water and sanitation, 

electricity, education, transportation, telecommunications, and agriculture/rural 

development. It also would complement governance efforts by the Department 

of State. Officials at Treasury would handle plans for financial recovery and economic development. Oil was assigned to the Pentagon.25

Wendy Chamberlin, Ross Wherry, and Christopher Milligan managed 

USAID’s reconstruction planning.26 The agency’s institutional culture embraced 

a concept of development that went beyond merely rebuilding what war destroyed. Physical rehabilitation of damaged infrastructure would be one step in 

a larger democratic transition. Neighborhoods would need to elect their own 

governing councils to restore civil order. Teachers and civil servants would have 

to stay on the job. Employment programs, micro-lending, and other economic 
• 21 •

• The Agencies Engage •

stimuli would be offered alongside programs that fostered reconciliation. This 

conflict transformation framework had informed international peacekeeping 

missions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.27 USAID officials proposed that 

it should also be adopted in Iraq. 

White House officials were skeptical. This was exactly the kind of nation building the Administration had wanted to avoid. Robin Cleveland, co-chair of the 

NSC’s Humanitarian Working Group, articulated a more limited view of U.S. 

objectives, insisting that only war damage would be repaired; the new Iraqi state 

would do most of the rebuilding, paying for it with Iraqi oil revenues. USAID 

planners, however, warned that achieving a stable and economically prosperous 

Iraq would require significant U.S. investment.28

The postwar policy for Iraq envisioned a democratic state that would threaten 

neither its regional neighbors nor U.S. interests. “Security, humanitarian assistance, and reconstruction aid,” National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice 

stated, would be deployed “in support of this vision.”29 How much reconstruction aid would be enough to achieve these goals was a matter of dispute between 

White House and USAID officials. 

The U.S. postwar strategy had a two-phased approach. USAID would attend first to providing food, water, public health, and emergency electricity. 

Once Iraq stabilized, it would expand its focus to improving basic infrastructure, 

including electricity, roads, irrigation systems, hospitals, markets, and schools. 

The overarching goal of infrastructure repair was to return service delivery to 

pre-conflict levels. 

Alongside physical reconstruction, USAID planned to promote economic 

renewal by bolstering Iraq’s private sector, improving its banking system, and 

modernizing its agricultural economy. One of the primary goals was to establish 

a regulatory regime favorable to private enterprise that would, in time, make 

Iraq competitive in the world market. USAID put forth its plans, recognizing 

that fostering democratic governance in Iraq based upon the rule of law would 

be an enormous challenge. 

The Department of State had the lead on developing a specific governance 

strategy, with USAID participating by preparing assistance programs that would 

help reform Iraq’s local governance. USAID expected State to provide guidance, 

but in the absence of a detailed framework from the Department, the agency developed its own plan in which authority over funding many civic services would 

devolve to local governments, which had no previous experience in managing 

the delivery of essential services or administering the rule of law.30 This proposed 

radical restructuring of Iraqi governance institutions was meant to promote a 

clean break from Saddam’s highly centralized control.
• 22 •

• Chapter 2 •

USAID’s approach to reconstruction embraced the Administration’s transformational ambitions for Iraq, but also revealed the gulf between those ambitions 

and the limited resources that White House officials were willing, at the time, to 

commit. These differences came into stark relief when USAID’s Vision for PostConflict Iraq contrasted the goals for each sector with the status of Iraq’s dilapidated 

infrastructure. In the electricity sector, for instance, restoring service to prewar levels 

depended on finding enough portable generators and securing adequate supplies of 

fuel, substantial logistical challenges in a country with minimal refining capacity.31

A similar gap between goals and resources existed in the agricultural sector, 

Iraq’s largest industry after oil. Fostering “commercial processes and a marketbased food economy” would require repairing irrigation systems on more than 

two million acres of land, engaging in extensive technology-transfer programs, 

and immediately providing assistance for upcoming rice and barley harvests.32

To meet the education sector’s goal of reopening schools for the new term, the 

United States would need to repair 3,000 schools and provide supplies and instructional kits to 12,500 more.33

Conflicted Planning

Planners framed reconstruction policy for postwar Iraq by setting benchmarks in 

each sector at one month, three months, six months, and twelve months. These 

benchmarks developed through a sustained back-and-forth debate between White 

House officials and those at USAID and other agencies. For example, OMB’s 

Robin Cleveland argued that the number of schools rehabilitated would be a good 

indicator for progress in the education sector. But the idea of counting buildings 

was anathema to USAID, whose subject-matter experts insisted that the percentage of children in school would be a more accurate measure of progress toward 

primary-education goals. The number of schools became the benchmark.

Cleveland’s demands often pushed planners beyond what they believed they 

could reasonably deliver. Missing from the intelligence, according to USAID’s 

Wherry, were assessments of the economy, governance, agriculture, and other “soft” 

aspects of Iraq’s condition. “If it couldn’t be got by a satellite, we just didn’t have it,” 

he said.34 At one point, Chris Milligan was directed to establish indicators for the 

transportation sector. “I had a turn-around time of four hours to determine how 

many miles of roads would be re-opened or repaired,” he said. To meet the deadline, 

he went to the USAID reference library, researched the available data on Iraq’s road 

networks, and provided his “best estimate” based upon limited information.35 The 

estimate went directly into USAID’s Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq. “A targeted 50 

percent, or about 2,200 kilometers, of economically important roads and bridges 

open to high speed traffic,” was the sector goal.36
• 23 •

• The Agencies Engage •

USAID Reconstruction Sector-Goals Timeline

Immediate Post Conflict 60 Days 6 Months 12 Months 18 Months

Water and Sanitation

Rubber water bladders 

and purification 

equipment for up to 

one million displaced 

persons. Generators will 

be provided to power 

water systems pumps as 

required. 

Repairs will begin on up to 

10 urban water systems, 

assuming secure access 

to them.

Dependable minimum 

water supply will have 

been re-established in 

15 cities.

Water systems will 

begin to be returned 

to local control. 

Revenue generation 

will be an issue at that 

point.

Dependable 

minimum water 

supply will have 

been re-established 

in all cities greater 

than 25,000 persons. 

Primary sewage 

treatment will have 

been restored in ten 

urban centers.

Public Health

Delivery of medicines 

and consumable surgical 

supplies to treat injured 

civilians and operate 

medical facilities. 

Basic health services will 

be available to a targeted 

25% of the population, and 

maternal/child health up 

to 50% of the populations, 

in secure areas.

Basic health services will 

be available to a targeted 

50% of the population, and 

maternal/child health up to 

100% of the populations, in 

secure areas

The reformed 

Ministry of Health will 

begin operating the 

health care system. 

Referral hospitals will 

be functioning in 21 

urban locations.

Basic Health services 

available to the entire 

population. Advanced 

surgical services 

available.

Transportation

Damage assessments will 

be reviewed to prioritize 

reconstruction efforts. 

Repairs to Umm Qasr 

and Basra International 

proceed.

Port of Umm Qasr and 

Basra International Airport 

reopened for humanitarian 

traffic. Flour mills 

connected to seaport.

A targeted 50%, or about 

2,200 kilometers, of 

economically important 

roads and bridges are open 

to high-speed traffic. Ports 

of entry for highways are 

appropriately controlled.

Reconstruction of 

roads, rail and barge 

landings completed 

to minimal level.

The Ministry of 

Public Works will 

be restructured, 

and furthered 

transportation 

assistance will make 

a transition to being 

the responsibility of 

the Ministry and local 

governments.

Electricity

Install emergency 

generators at hospitals, 

pumping stations, other 

priority sites.

A targeted 550 dieseldriven emergency 

generators will be installed. 

Rapid assessments 

conducted as security 

permits, and a power 

restoration plan prepared.

15% of the high voltage 

(132Kv and 33Kv) 

distribution net repaired, 

including rehabilitation of 

a targeted 50 substations 

and 5 generation plants 

in key urban areas. 40% 

of the previously served 

population has electricity.

Generation of 6,750 

MW achieved.

An additional 60 

substations and 

another 5 generation 

plants operational. 

Total electric supply 

a targeted 75% of 

pre-1991 level, with 

electricity reaching 

most, if not all, of the 

urban population.

Local Development

Prevent destruction of 

land records, ration lists, 

public documents.

Identify key local leaders 

and councils; connect 

them to opportunities for 

relief and reconstruction 

assistance, using small 

grants for immediate 

assistance as appropriate. 

Radio stations operating in 

secure areas.

Reconstruction offices 

established in all 18 

provinces to coordinate 

projects and facilitate 

service provision. Interim 

local assemblies have clear 

roles and responsibilities.

Local governments 

counterbalance 

recentralization 

tendencies; 

interim democratic 

institutions 

demonstrate 

representative and 

transparent local 

governance.

Local administrations 

have responsibility for 

revenue generation 

for local services.

Economic Governance

Technical assistance 

teams will begin work 

outside Iraq to prepare 

for the needs of the 

Finance Ministry and 

the banks. 

Technical teams ready to 

move into Iraq to assist 

a vetted Iraqi financial 

leadership team. Small 

business lending facility 

prepared to open.

Central Bank and MOF 

operating. Central Bank 

and SOMO cooperate on 

oil sales and food imports. 

Permissive environment 

for private banks. If a new 

currency is needed, ready 

for issuance. Programs 

promote competitiveness 

and global trade

MOF handles all 

government payrolls. 

Legal framework is 

hospitable to private 

business.

Privatization of stateowned businesses 

is occurring. 

Widespread access to 

private commercial 

banks.

Source: USAID, Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq, February 19, 2003.

Although some USAID officials had taken part in interventions in Bosnia, 

Kosovo, and Haiti, the agency had not had a role in large-scale contingency relief 

and reconstruction operations since the Civil Operations and Revolutionary 

Development Support (CORDS) program in Vietnam.37 USAID’s office computers were not even outfitted to email the classified plans agency officials were 

developing. Each time its planners completed a new draft, they had to hand-carry 

copies to the White House.38
• 24 •

• Chapter 2 •

Navigating between agency views and White House demands proved difficult. Realizing that he could not bridge some of the divides, USAID’s Milligan 

decided to “jump through hoops” to get as many resources as possible to mobilize 

contractors and agency personnel in advance of the invasion. “Just tell me what 

I need to do to secure the money so we can be reasonably prepared,” Milligan 

remembers thinking.39 Although members of the Humanitarian Working Group 

had disagreements along the way, at no point did they take these issues to the 

level of Frank Miller’s Executive Steering Group on Iraq or to Stephen Hadley’s 

Deputies Committee.40

By December 2002, USAID had arrived at a picture of what the agency 

thought it would take to reconstruct Iraq within the policy guidelines set by the 

NSC. Officials consolidated humanitarian and reconstruction plans in a huge 

spreadsheet that became known as the “horse blanket.”41 The horse blanket 

showed the order in which USAID would mobilize its workforce and the many 

contractors it employed. It was a checklist of what would need to happen inside 

the agency to get ready for postwar Iraq. 

In a briefing to the NSC Deputies Committee on December 10, 2002—with 

war just over three months away— Robin Cleveland and Elliot Abrams presented 

the Humanitarian Working Group’s final recommendations. Most of the briefing slides detailed humanitarian preparations; a few dealt with reconstruction 

and the complex Iraqi political situation that would emerge after the invasion.42

The presentation listed the assumptions on which the group had based its plans. 

A secure environment was first.43 The briefing also made clear that the working 

group had planned for only a modest intervention. After the meeting, USAID 

was “instructed to go full bore with detailed planning,” including drawing up the 

contracts to carry it out.44

USAID Mobilizes Contractors

Like most U.S. civilian agencies, USAID had little in-house surge capacity. Almost 

all of its mission in Iraq would be executed by NGOs and the small circle of companies that traditionally bid on the agency’s contracts. By early 2003, six in ten of 

the personnel running USAID’s overseas missions were contractors, the result of 

a 37 percent cutback in government staff in the decade following the Cold War.45

“We lost a third of the Foreign Service and a third of the civil service in the mid90s,” Administrator Natsios said, “and we never got them back.”46

Mobilizing USAID’s contractors was complicated. By law, U.S. agencies must 

follow the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), an encyclopedic compendium 

of rules governing federal contracting.47 The FAR values procedural fairness and 

transparency over expediency.48 Its mandatory reviews and restrictions would 
• 25 •

• The Agencies Engage •

later rankle officials in Baghdad, who thought its provisions were not well-suited 

for contingency contracting in a war-zone. A number of FAR exemptions allowed 

for flexibility in unusual circumstances.49 One of the most important was the 

“notwithstanding authority” clause, which permitted USAID’s Office of Foreign 

Disaster Assistance to award grants to relief organizations outside normal FAR 

processes, if international disaster relief demands required it.50

USAID had existing contracts for frequently used services, which enabled it to 

set up some postwar contingency programs for Iraq rapidly. These “indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity” (IDIQ) contracts were held by firms that maintained 

ready-response capabilities. As planners identified needs, agency officials would 

issue “task orders” under an IDIQ contract, which the contractor would then 

carry out. Pre-authorization letters also enabled USAID to mobilize contractors 

and emergency-relief organizations before specific task orders were written or 

grants awarded.51 In extraordinary situations, agency officials could waive the 

FAR’s “full and open competition” requirement. 

On January 16, 2003, with war looming, USAID Administrator Andrew 

Natsios did just that, waiving the FAR’s full and open competition requirement 

for all war-related contracts. USAID’s late entry into planning, Natsios argued, 

made it impossible to use the normal bidding processes.52 The agency’s Inspector 

General later certified that USAID properly justified the waivers for each contract 

it let with less than full and open competition.53

A number of USAID’s contractors received urgent phone calls during this period. The day after Christmas 2002, Bruce Spake, Vice President at Development 

Alternatives, Inc. (DAI), heard from USAID official Rob Jenkins: “Bruce, we’re 

interested in talking to you about some possible work in a place in the Middle 

East. You read the newspapers, don’t you?” Jenkins asked Spake to write a concept paper for working in a destabilized country in the Middle East “without 

using that country’s name.” Spake turned in a paper the next day, and DAI was 

awarded a contract shortly thereafter. In February 2003, the company dispatched 

an advance team to begin operations in Kuwait, weeks before senior U.S. civilian 

leadership arrived in the region.54

USAID also awarded a total of $41 million in international disaster assistance 

to a broad array of NGOs, including Mercy Corps, Save the Children, and the 

International Rescue Committee.55 By the end of February, the agency had provided $17.3 million for prepositioning relief commodities in theater.56

Contracting was more complicated on the reconstruction side, in part because 

USAID’s development ethos had long since moved away from viewing large 

infrastructure projects as catalysts for economic growth. Although the agency 

activated several of its standing IDIQ contracts, it still needed new contracts 
• 26 •

• Chapter 2 •

for the large-scale construction tasks looming ahead.57 Crafting their language 

was a crucial step in the mobilization process. To ensure that reconstruction 

policy formulated by the NSC translated into the right assets on the ground, 

contracting officers from USAID’s management bureau had begun working with 

experts across the agency in the late fall of 2002 to write the necessary “statements 

of work,” which are basic—but critical—descriptions of a project and what is 

required to implement it. Many of the statements of work mirrored the goals 

outlined in USAID’s Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq and the indicators developed 

by the NSC’s Humanitarian Working Group.58

Eleven teams finalized the statements of work in early December and wrote 

requests for proposals during the last two weeks of the year.59 “The instruction 

was...get in, get it [done], get out,” Ross Wherry recalls. But because USAID’s 

experts believed rebuilding would take longer, its contracting officers added options to extend each contract.60

From February through May 2003, USAID awarded eight major contracts 

worth $1.3 billion, the largest short-term burst of contracting in the agency’s 

history.61 This was just the beginning. The agency would soon let many more 

contracts, and it would dramatically increase the value of those already awarded.62

The contracting surge put the agency in a cash crunch. Officials drew $110 million 

from existing accounts on an emergency basis, “mortgaging the fourth quarter of 

AID’s budget in order to do what we had to do in January, February, and March,” 

Wherry said.63 The Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF 1), which the 

Congress created in April 2003, ended up funding most of these contracts.64
• 27 •

• The Agencies Engage •

USAID’s Initial Reconstruction Contract Awards 

Date 

Awarded Contractor & Sector

Original 

Contract 

Amount 

($ Millions) 

Original Contract 

Ceiling or Current 

Obligation 

($ Millions)

Contract 

Length

Contract 

Type & 

Procurement 

Method

02/07/03

International 

Resources Group 

(IRG): Personnel 

Services Contract

 $7.000 $27.10 3 month, with 

2 option years

CPFF: 

Sole Source

03/17/03 AFCAP: Logistics $26.00 $91.50 2 years

CPAF: Interagency 

agreement

03/21/03 SkyLink Air: Airport 

Administration $10.200 $27.20 

18 months, 

with 2 option 

years

CPFF: Less than 

full and open

03/07/03 SSA Marine: Iraq 

Seaport Assessment $4.800 $14.32 1 year with no 

option year

CPFF: Less than 

full and open

04/11/03

Research Triangle 

Institute: Local 

Government I

 $168.000 $241.91 I year, with 2 

option years

CPFF: Less than 

full and open

04/11/03 Creative Associates, 

Inc. (CAI): Education I $62.628 56.50 1 year, 2 

option years 

CPFF: Less than 

full and open

04/17/03 Bechtel National: 

Infrastructure $680.000 $1,029.83 18 months CPFF: Less than 

full and open

04/30/03 Abt Associates: 

Health Systems $43.800 $23.03 1 year CPFF: Less than 

full and open

06/01/03

Army Corps 

of Engineers: 

Architecture and 

Engineering Services

 $3.00 $38.09 1 year, 2 

option years 

Interagency

agreement

06/25/03

Management 

Systems International: 

Monitoring and 

Evaluation

 $5.038 $15.12 

1 base year 

and 2 option 

years

Task Order: 

RFP to all 

holders of IQC

07/24/03 Bearing Point: 

Economic Recovery I $79.583 $79.58 1 year with 2 

option years

CPFF: Less than 

full and open

10/15/03

Development 

Alternatives, 

Inc.: Agricultural 

Development

 $36.900 $106.70 

1 year with 

two option 

years

CPFF: 

Full and Open

Source: SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons Learned in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 32.

By far the most substantial IRRF 1 contract during this period—and the largest single contract ever let by USAID—went to Bechtel International on April 

17, 2003: $680 million for major infrastructure reconstruction. The expedited 

bidding process shortened the procurement time normally required for so large 

a contract from seven months to three.65 Of the seven contractors invited to 

compete, only two submitted bids.66

The Bechtel contract’s statement of work reflected the planners’ beliefs that 

rebuilding Iraq’s infrastructure would help achieve U.S. foreign policy goals. “The 
• 28 •

• Chapter 2 •

U.S. government envisions a postwar reconstruction effort,” the statement read, 

“as a highly visual symbol of good faith toward building trust for economic, social 

and cultural benefits as well as for political stability in the region.”67 Five months 

later, USAID would increase the Bechtel contract’s value to $1.03 billion.68

Defense’s Oil Sector Plan

As USAID planned for its sectors, the Department of Defense prepared for the oil 

sector, while Treasury focused on financial and economic recovery plans. Senior 

officials believed that a rapid post-invasion restoration of Iraq’s oil sector was central to achieving U.S. strategic goals. The prospect that oil revenues could finance 

Iraq’s reconstruction led the Administration to assert in March 2003 that total 

costs to the American taxpayer would be limited.69 With 115 billion barrels of 

known reserves and potentially 100 billion more lying in wait—the world’s thirdlargest reserves—Iraq, in theory, could rely exclusively on oil to provide not only 

electricity, gasoline, and cooking fuel, but also most of the revenue it needed for 

reconstruction.70 But Iraq’s dilapidated oil infrastructure stood in the way. 

During the 1991 Gulf War, the U.S. bombing campaign severely damaged 

the country’s refineries and oil distribution networks.71 The lack of proper maintenance during the sanctions era further degraded the oil sector to the point that 

Saddam was unable to make use of a 1998 UN authorization that allowed oil sales 

to double.72 Despite the import of more than a billion dollars in spare parts and 

equipment under the Oil-for-Food program, Iraq’s production capacity only 

marginally improved during the latter half of the 1990s. 

On September 20, 2002, Under Secretary Feith established the Energy 

Infrastructure Planning Group inside the Department of Defense, placing it under 

the leadership of Michael Mobbs.73 Representatives from the Departments of State, 

Energy, and Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency eventually joined.74

Formal meetings began in November, with draft plans due by mid-December.75

The task of determining how to revitalize Iraq’s oil sector far exceeded the U.S. 

government’s in-house expertise. The need to turn to a specialized private sector 

company led to the first significant—and the most controversial—contract in 

Iraq reconstruction. Although a number of firms could repair oil infrastructure, 

the decision to classify the oil cell’s planning restricted the universe of supporting contractors to those with security clearances.76 Mobbs thought that the 

Houston-based firm of Kellogg Brown and Root (KBR), the prime contractor 

for the U.S. Army’s massive Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), 

was a logical choice.77 LOGCAP is the Army’s standing IDIQ contract for the 

worldwide support of military operations, chiefly providing troops in the field 

with food, fuel, and billeting. 
• 29 •

• The Agencies Engage •

Just as USAID had outsourced much of its work in the years after the Cold 

War, the military also had turned to the private sector to perform work once done 

by its own personnel. Under the LOGCAP contract, which KBR held for all but 

a few years since the program’s inception in 1985, contractors provide services 

ranging from building bases to cooking food and doing laundry. LOGCAP grew 

out of the post-Vietnam downsizing of the armed services, reflecting the government-wide growth of outsourcing, which would dramatically affect the war and 

reconstruction efforts in Iraq.78 In World War II, one contractor was deployed 

for every seven soldiers.79 During the 2003 invasion, that number had increased 

to one for every 2.4.80 By 2006, contractors outnumbered soldiers in Iraq.81

KBR’s responsibilities under LOGCAP meant that it was already working in 

support of the Defense Department’s Iraq war plans. Mobbs wanted to capitalize 

on this existing relationship. Hiring KBR, though, could create the appearance of a 

conflict of interest, because Vice President Cheney was the former CEO of KBR’s 

parent company Halliburton.82 Under Secretary Feith raised this issue at a Deputies 

Committee meeting and even alerted the Vice President’s office. According to 

Mobbs, White House officials said the mission took priority over whatever political 

fallout might occur from granting a sole-source contract to KBR.83

A second possible conflict arose. The General Counsel of the Army Materiel 

Command ruled that asking KBR to assist the oil cell was outside the scope of 

activities permitted under the LOGCAP contract. The legal opinion acknowledged that a contract for the logistical support of military operations was not an 

appropriate vehicle for funding plans to repair a foreign country’s oil infrastructure. The matter was forwarded up the chain, first to the Army General Counsel, 

and then to the Department of Defense General Counsel, who settled the matter 

on November 8, 2002.84 So long as the job did not extend to actual repair work, 

the opinion stated, the contract could go forward under LOGCAP.85 A task order 

for $1.9 million was issued to KBR the same day.86

The link between planning and executing oil sector repairs, however, could 

not be easily severed. On March 8, 2003, just three months after KBR had received its planning contract and one week before the invasion of Iraq, the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) awarded KBR a $7 billion sole-source contract for repair work on Iraq’s oil sector.87 As the contracting documents reveal, 

part of the basis for this award was the previous task order issued to KBR.88 This 

would be the single largest reconstruction contract in Iraq and the largest known 

sole-source contract in U.S. history. 

A subsequent review by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found 

that the original November task order was beyond the scope of the LOGCAP 

contract and that the Army Field Support Command should have prepared a 
• 30 •

• Chapter 2 •

written justification to authorize the work without competition.89 But Defense 

officials later justified their use of LOGCAP by citing overriding national security 

interests in getting planning started. “We certainly did not have time to run a 

competition to see who was going to support us,” Mobbs said.90

USACE mobilized to help with the oil sector work. General Robert Crear, 

commander of the Corps’ Southwest Division, established Task Force Restore 

Iraq Oil (RIO) as part of the plan to rush engineers into theater. Task Force 

RIO’s projected strength was 129 personnel, 90 of whom would be civilians.91 By 

February 2003, a Task Force RIO advance team had deployed to Kuwait. 

As Task Force RIO and the Energy Infrastructure Working Group proceeded, 

Frank Miller and NSC staffer Pamela Quanrud developed a longer-term plan for 

moving control of Iraq’s oil infrastructure back to Iraqis. Avoiding the perception 

that the United States would annex Iraq’s oil wealth for its own purposes was a 

crucial goal. Miller and Quanrud devised a way to manage downstream and upstream production while also assembling a governing board of Iraqis. Decisions 

about Iraq’s oil wealth were not to be seen as made by the United States alone. 

Their plan was approved by the President—who came to call Quanrud “the petroleum lady”—in January 2003, when war with Iraq was two months away.92

Treasury’s Financial Reconstruction Plan

The NSC gave the Treasury Department a unique mission for postwar Iraq—

preserving and restoring the country’s financial system—that Treasury ultimately 

executed with success in the chaotic months after Saddam’s fall. Treasury officials 

recognized that the financial recovery of Iraq depended upon the simultaneous 

accomplishment of two interdependent feats: maintaining confidence in the 

country’s currency and restoring operations at Iraq’s financial institutions, including its central and commercial banks and the Ministry of Finance. Without 

a functioning financial system and a stable currency, commerce in Iraq—and 

thus much of ordinary life—would grind to a halt.

Addressing these and other economic challenges fell to Treasury Under 

Secretary John Taylor, who, beginning in September 2002, led the agency’s 

Iraq planning efforts, along with Van Jorstad, George Mullinax, and David 

Nummy.93 Taylor established the Treasury’s Task Force on Iraq Financial 

Reconstruction, setting up offices in the Treasury Department’s Market Room. 

Taylor and his team soon found that reliable information about Iraq’s economy 

was almost nonexistent. 

The International Monetary Fund had not done a technical analysis of Iraq’s 

economy for twenty years, and Iraqi data-collection entities had atrophied under 

Saddam. Almost no bank in Iraq transferred money electronically, and the regime 
• 31 •

• The Agencies Engage •

had co-opted the once-functional Central Bank to “lend” money to Saddam’s 

cronies. There was also the issue of dealing with Iraq’s dual system of currency—

the “Swiss” dinar used in the Kurdish region in northern Iraq and the “Saddam” 

dinar used everywhere else.94

Taylor worked with Iraqi participants drawn from the Future of Iraq Project 

and experts across the government to draft contingency plans to prevent a monetary collapse and stabilize Iraqi assets.95 The plan focused on securing key financial 

institutions after Saddam’s regime fell and then using seized Iraqi assets to pay 

the government’s employees and pensioners until a permanent system could be 

established. In support of this planning, the President issued an executive order 

on March 20, 2003—the day the war began—authorizing the freezing of Iraqi 

funds held in U.S. banks. The United States ultimately vested about $1.9 billion 

of these assets in the Treasury Department for—among other things—paying 

Iraqi salaries.96

NSC’s Asymmetry

A striking asymmetry resulted from the NSC-led planning process: the U.S. 

government planned for the worst-case humanitarian scenario while it simultaneously planned for the best-case reconstruction one. Humanitarian planning for 

postwar Iraq advanced smoothly because the humanitarian disaster contingencies involved were straightforward, and the President had backed the effort from 

the beginning. Consequently, humanitarian planners could mobilize any part of 

the government and were free to reach out to international institutions to obtain 

help in formulating what became a robust multilateral approach. By contrast, 

irreconcilable views of how extensive the U.S. financial and administrative role 

in Iraq might become impeded reconstruction planning. Repairing war damage 

ultimately became the policy goal, but little connection was made between how 

the rebuilding would—or even could—bring about a democratic transition.97

The reality was that most policymakers considered reconstruction a relatively 

minor issue. They saw USAID’s contract with Bechtel as a “standby” measure—

for emergency use only.98 USAID officials—who, in 2002, had privately predicted 

a $90 billion rebuilding scenario over three to five years—could not have gotten 

“traction” for a large reconstruction plan with the officials to whom they reported 

in the interagency planning group.99

The responsibility for reconstruction, along with all the other bureaucratic 

and administrative duties playing out in the fragmented planning process, would 

soon fall under the Department of Defense, which, at Secretary Rumsfeld’s request, would be given full responsibility for administering postwar Iraq.
• 32 •

Chapter 3 

The Department of Defense Takes Charge

It has long been a concern of mine that the U.S. Government 

lacks a standing capability in the area of reconstruction and 

that there is no long-established team of civilians, let alone an 

experienced joint civilian-military team, to handle the challenges 

of major post-conflict tasks.*

Donald Rumsfeld

Secretary of Defense (2001-2006)

In the wake of the October 2002 decision to delay establishing a civilian office in 

the Department of Defense to coordinate interagency planning for postwar Iraq, 

the existing planning groups pressed on independently.1

 USAID created a detailed plan for humanitarian relief and reconstruction operations. A Department 

of Defense team prepared to restore Iraq’s oil infrastructure, and a team at the 

Department of the Treasury planned to restore Iraq’s financial infrastructure. 

An interagency humanitarian planning team, with representatives from agencies 

across the government, worked at CENTCOM headquarters. But the absence of 

a single coordinating office meant there was no management locus around which 

postwar planning could coalesce. “What was lacking,” Under Secretary Douglas 

Feith would later say, “[was] the integration.”2

The postwar structure briefed to the National Security Council in mid-October—a three-star military headquarters and a parallel civilian administration—still 

existed only as a diagram on a briefing slide. The Administration lacked a consensus policy on key matters, such as the formation of an interim Iraqi authority and 

a timeframe for transferring power to it. “Liberation” had become the dominant 

assumption, but whether liberation could be easily achieved and stability secured 

was viewed differently by defense, diplomatic, and development officials. All the 

while, troops and materiel flowed to the Gulf. 

At CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, Florida, the small building that 

housed Iraq war planners was a beehive of activity. Every week seemed to bring 

a new major event requiring action. First was the President’s speech to the UN 

in September 2002, then the war resolution before the Congress in October. 

Next came the issue of obtaining basing rights in the region. Periodically, yet 

another Rumsfeld-directed revision of the war plan would arrive, triggering 

* Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense, letter to SIGIR, April 4, 2008.
• 33 •

• The Department of Defense Takes Charge •

commanders’ conferences, new iterations of deployment schedules, and a blizzard of briefing slides.3

Through all of this activity, Phase IV got short shrift—but not without notice. 

Since late August 2002, the Joint Staff had worried that Phases I through III had 

swamped CENTCOM and that planning for Phase IV had fallen behind.4

 The 

Joint Staff recognized that CENTCOM had devoted insufficient resources to integrate government-wide postwar planning within Phase IV and to coordinate it 

with phases I through III.5

 Majors Thomas Fisher and Ray Eiriz, the CENTCOM 

planners working on Phase IV, had other responsibilities that pulled them from 

their postwar planning work.6

On December 11, 2002, the Phase IV planners, spurred by the Joint Staff, 

started catching up. Major Fisher quickly initiated an intense postwar planning session with a 40-person interagency team. Three days later, he briefed 

the Joint Staff on the draft Phase IV plan. It predicted rough going ahead. “We 

were assuming that there would be no government that moves in, so we were 

anticipating chaos,” Major Fisher said. “We did make the assumption that at 

some point there would be an international mandate, either of the Coalition or 

of the United Nations.”7

 After Fisher’s briefing, the Director of the Joint Staff, 

Lieutenant General George Casey, realized that CENTCOM needed to augment 

the Phase IV effort, so he created a joint task force—designating it JTF-4—to 

supply 58 more personnel to help with postwar planning.8

Defense Leads Postwar Planning

On December 18, 2002, the President used the phrase “war is inevitable” at an 

NSC meeting.9

 The remark prompted Secretary Rumsfeld to launch the longawaited civil-administration office that would help manage postwar Iraq. Soon 

thereafter, the President resolved the question of its chain of command. 

At Secretary Rumsfeld’s request, and with Secretary of State Colin Powell’s 

concurrence, the President placed the Defense Department in charge of all postwar activity.10 “State does not have the personnel, the capacity, or the size to deal 

with an immediate postwar situation in a foreign country that’s eight thousand 

miles away from here,” Secretary Powell explained.11 Lodging oversight of both 

military and civilian functions in the Defense Department, Rumsfeld had argued, 

would ensure a seamless transition from combat to reconstruction. A unified 

chain of command, running from the Secretary down through CENTCOM, 

would prevent the split between the military and civil reconstruction seen in 

Bosnia and Kosovo.12

The President formalized the decision on January 20, 2003, by issuing National 

Security Presidential Directive 24 (NSPD 24), consolidating responsibility for 
• 34 •

• Chapter 3 •

managing postwar Iraq in a new organization, the Office of Reconstruction and 

Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA), housed within the Defense Department.13 With 

a stroke of his pen, the President superseded the existing system for interagency 

postwar planning inside the NSC. This dramatic shift shocked some Iraq planners. “Within a 24-hour period all of a sudden Robin and Elliot go away,” USAID 

Administrator Natsios said, referring to the Humanitarian Working Group led 

by Robin Cleveland and Elliot Abrams.14 “We were just stunned,” the agency’s 

acting Deputy Administrator James Kunder said. “It was our first insight into the 

fact that there were big processes going on that we were oblivious to.”15

As Defense officials consolidated control, the period of adjustment that 

followed was turbulent. Some compared the implementation of NSPD 24 to 

a hostile takeover. “You don’t need to worry about the nuts and bolts of basic 

reconstruction,” NSC Senior Director Frank Miller remembers two Defense 

officials saying. “It’s now an [Office of the Secretary of Defense] operation.” 

“Thereafter,” Miller said, “it was ‘you guys stay out, we don’t need your help.’”16

NSPD 24’s new arrangements directly affected CENTCOM’s Phase IV planning. “There were two phases to the plan we had developed,” Major Eiriz said. 

First, the Humanitarian Planning Team would ensure that the rest of the government be “in synch” with CENTCOM’s plans for humanitarian contingencies. 

“Then there was going to be the reconstruction planning team,” to address the 

restoration of Iraq’s civil institutions and infrastructure. But after NSPD 24 was 

issued, CENTCOM stood down the Humanitarian Planning Team and assigned 

the reconstruction mission to JTF-4.17

Strategy and Force Levels 

The standing war plan for Iraq, developed by General Franks’s predecessors at 

CENTCOM, called for a half million troops—a number Secretary Rumsfeld and 

his aides thought much too high in light of advances in war-fighting technology 

and service integration.18 Relying on a large force would bring more troops into 

theater than needed, Rumsfeld argued, and would also constrain the President’s 

ability to respond quickly to any other provocations.19 “We got told that it was 

old think, too big, wasn’t innovative, and to readdress the planning using a different set of assumptions,” said Colonel Mike Fitzgerald, CENTCOM’s chief 

of war plans.20

Secretary Rumsfeld pushed General Franks to develop a more flexible plan, 

one that would rely on fewer troops. “It was clear to the planners, over time,” 

Fitzgerald said, “that some of the assumptions we had made were not going to 

be accepted very well unless they went the way the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense was thinking.”21 The revised war plan significantly reduced aggregate 
• 35 •

• The Department of Defense Takes Charge •

force levels. General Franks ultimately recommended to the President that he 

send only 160,000 combat soldiers, two-thirds less than the number initially suggested by CENTCOM planners.22

The President questioned whether this lower troop level would affect security 

after the invasion. “In the area of law-and-order, the President and Rice asked 

Tommy Franks if it was covered,” Frank Miller recalled. “He said it was—‘every 

village will have a mayor, a lieutenant, captains, a structure.’ He was asked again 

if he was sure—he emphatically answered, ‘It’s covered.’”23

The Coalition ground forces commander, Lieutenant General David 

McKiernan, “really felt strongly about the inadequacy of the force,” said Colonel 

Mike Fitzgerald.24 The idea of fewer troops similarly unsettled CENTCOM Phase 

IV planners, as Major Fisher explained:

The thing we kept going back to was we’ve only got so many 

people. Do you want them on the streets protecting people? 

Do you want them on the borders keeping WMD from getting away and keeping terrorists from getting in? Do you want 

them on the oil pipelines to keep the oil flow flowing? Do you 

want them handing out food to people that need food? Do 

you want them securing bank vaults and things of that nature? 

Do you want them conducting [medical programs] to build 

good will? I would sit there and talk to these people from [the 

office of the Secretary of Defense] and they’d say, ‘You know, 

we need to improve security on the borders.’ And I’d say, ‘Do 

you know when you stretch the border of Iraq out, it’s longer 

than our border with Mexico? How many divisions would 

you have to put in Arizona, New Mexico, California, Texas 

to secure our border?’25

Building ORHA

On Thursday, January 9, 2003, Jay Garner, a retired Army Lieutenant General 

and president of the defense contractor SY Technology, was lunching at a restaurant in New York when Under Secretary Douglas Feith called his cell phone. 

Garner had successfully led Operation Provide Comfort, a humanitarian mission 

in Northern Iraq, after the 1991 Gulf War. “We just got out of the Secretary’s 

office,” Feith said, “The Secretary would like for you to consider coming in and 

helping us put together a postwar organization.”26

Garner and Rumsfeld had served together on a federal advisory panel, and 

the Secretary thought it would be easier for a former military man—especially 
• 36 •

• Chapter 3 •

one who knew Iraq—to work with CENTCOM.27 Garner met with Feith and 

Rumsfeld the following week. When he agreed to lead ORHA, Lieutenant General 

Garner could not have known he was “embarking on mission impossible,” as one 

national security aide described his job.28 Just 56 days after ORHA moved into 

its empty Pentagon offices, the United States would be at war.29

Created by NSPD 24, ORHA started with no staff, was barely integrated into 

the military command structure, and—from day one—encountered hostility 

from the very parties whose activities it was asked to coordinate. Three military 

commands, two civilian agencies, and the circle of White House officials expecting to oversee postwar administration learned of Garner’s appointment after 

the fact.30 “Rumsfeld pulled the rug out from under them,” Garner recalls. “They 

never forgave us for that.” 31

The success of ORHA was premised on the idea that Garner would “operationalize” plans that had already been well developed through the interagency 

process. But when Lieutenant General Garner arrived at the Pentagon, no master 

civilian plan was there to greet him. “They hadn’t lined up anybody to brief us...

we really had to find out what they were doing by word of mouth.” Garner later 

learned about the Office of Special Plans—Feith’s Pentagon unit dedicated to 

postwar planning—but its products, Garner said, were “never given to us, we 

never saw it, didn’t know about it.” Garner learned of the office’s existence just 

before the invasion, when one of his aides happened across it by chance.32

The logistical and staffing challenges inherent in starting ORHA from scratch 

were overwhelming. “We didn’t have a desk, we didn’t have an office, we didn’t 

have a telephone, we didn’t have anything,” Garner recalls. Arabic linguists, regional specialists, and military planners were nowhere in evidence. Garner himself 

started work on a volunteer basis when the Pentagon was unable to process his 

hiring as a temporary employee.33

Lieutenant General Garner moved quickly to build a team. He brought in 

retired Lieutenant General Ron Adams as his deputy and hired retired Lieutenant 

General Jerry Bates and Colonel Paul Hughes as senior advisors. Colonel Thomas 

Baltazar was assigned by Feith’s office, and Chris Milligan came over from 

USAID. USACE sent Major General Carl Strock to be ORHA’s seventh member. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice meanwhile urged government 

agencies to provide more personnel to support the fledgling organization.34

Garner organized ORHA into three pillars: humanitarian assistance, civil 

administration, and reconstruction.35 When Chris Milligan moved into the 

Pentagon the week of January 20, 2003, he helped Garner and Bates flesh out 

the pillar structure.36 The reconstruction and civil administration pillars would 

oversee Iraq’s 22 ministries. To get the ministries back on their feet, an American 
• 37 •

• The Department of Defense Takes Charge •

“senior advisor” assigned to each would serve as the liaison between ORHA and 

the new Iraqi government.

Garner wanted a U.S. government agency in charge of each pillar. “Adams and 

I sat down,” he remembers, “and we put State Department over humanitarian 

affairs, and we put State Department over civil administration, and we put USAID 

over reconstruction.”37 It was a division that reflected each agency’s expertise, as 

well as existing interagency plans. But Rumsfeld objected to Garner’s decision, 

demanding that a Defense official control all three pillars. “I had a running gun 

battle with the Defense Department on who were the leaders of each of these 

pillars,” Garner recalled.38

Secretary Rumsfeld eventually relented, claiming only the civil administration 

pillar as Defense’s own, but he still questioned the appropriateness of several officials selected by State and USAID. “The White House,” Rumsfeld later wrote, 

“believed [the selections] would not be a good fit within ORHA.”39 Garner named 

Ambassador George Ward to lead the humanitarian pillar, with Dick Owen, a 

USAID official, as his deputy. USAID official Lew Lucke took charge of the reconstruction pillar, with Christopher Milligan in the deputy slot.40

Finding a lead for civil administration proved difficult.41 Feith eventually 

nominated Michael Mobbs, who had overseen the department’s oil-planning 

cell.42 The State Department immediately protested the appointment of a lawyer 

rather than a professional diplomat to such a key position. Under Secretary of 

State Marc Grossman told Garner that Mobbs was unqualified for the job. Garner 

brokered a compromise in which Ambassador Barbara Bodine, an experienced 

Arabist who had previously served in Baghdad, would join ORHA to support 

civil administration and provide experience that Mobbs lacked.43

Unable to assemble a large civilian support staff quickly, Garner filled much 

of the rest of his staff with military personnel. When he asked the Joint Chiefs 

for 90 military personnel, Lieutenant General Casey, Director of the Joint Staff, 

initially refused. “No, too many people,” Casey said, telling Garner that ORHA 

would not be operating 24 hours a day. “If you think we’re not going to have a 

24/7 operation over there,” Garner thundered, “where the hell have you been in 

your career?”44 Only after Garner scheduled a meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld 

to protest the refusal did Casey relent.45

The staff Garner cobbled together was an ad hoc team—a portent of things 

to come in post-invasion Iraq. Many of the leadership positions were filled by 

officials pulled from retirement or outside government. Senior State Department 

officials were conspicuously absent. “There was not a lot of participation or enthusiasm for the mission even at senior levels at the State Department,” George 

Ward said. “It was ‘if you don’t want us, we’re not going to play the game.’”46
• 38 •

• Chapter 3 •

Struggling for Resources and Control 

As ORHA organized itself at the Pentagon, JTF-4, the Joint Staff’s Phase IV task 

force, was doing the same thing at CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa. In midDecember, Casey had tapped Brigadier General Steven Hawkins, his subordinate 

from operations in Bosnia, to command JTF-4. Hawkins arrived at CENTCOM 

the same day Garner was asked by Secretary Rumsfeld to lead ORHA.47 Phase IV 

planning was transferred from the CENTCOM planning cell to JTF-4 during the 

third week of January 2003, about two months before the invasion would begin.48

The division of duties between ORHA and JTF-4 was ambiguous. Hawkins 

saw JTF-4 as more than just an organization to assume control of CENTCOM 

Phase IV planning. Casey, who launched JTF-4 before ORHA’s formation, had 

intended it to become the command center for postwar operations in Iraq, led 

by a three-star general.49 In this formulation, JTF-4—not ORHA—would have 

the postwar operational lead after the fall of Saddam’s regime. Dozens of area 

specialists and the best military planners would help it work directly with USAID, 

the Department of State, USACE, and the Coalition Forces Land Component 

Command (CFLCC).50 ORHA’s creation fundamentally altered this vision, but 

the new arrangement was anything but clear. 

CENTCOM’s leadership was not happy with either ORHA or JTF-4. Although 

Rumsfeld envisioned ORHA as a “module that fit within the CENTCOM structure,” military commanders viewed it as an unwanted interloper. “I was getting 

phone calls from Jay Garner, even after he deployed,” Feith said. “CENTCOM was 

referring to ORHA as ‘they’ and ORHA would refer to CENTCOM as ‘they.’”51

JTF-4 received the same arms-length treatment from CENTCOM. “I couldn’t 

even get office supplies back [at CENTCOM headquarters in] Tampa,” Brigadier 

General Hawkins remembered. “I went to the craft trade show at the Officers’ 

Club and took office supplies off of every display table,” he said. “That’s how I put 

the first pads of paper on the desk to put the task force together.”52

The cold receptions Garner and Hawkins received reflected the frustration 

within CENTCOM over the ever-shifting management of Phase IV. “What we 

had asked for was a Corps Commander and staff that was already developed,” 

Colonel Fitzgerald said in reference to the three-star command the Joint Staff envisioned for postwar Iraq. “What we got [with JTF-4] was General Hawkins—a 

one-star general—and 50 great Americans trying to do great work, but with no 

guidance, no headquarters to accept them, no resources available. They were just 

orphan children.”53

Others at CENTCOM viewed ORHA and JTF-4 as the long-promised “interagency cavalry” riding to the post-invasion rescue. ORHA and JTF-4 personnel, 

however, had an opposite view, seeing CENTCOM as subject to their direction 
• 39 •

• The Department of Defense Takes Charge •

on postwar matters and obligated to furnish the military resources they needed to 

manage postwar Iraq. Each side tried to have its way. CENTCOM Commander 

General Tommy Franks cited an operational order that placed ORHA under his 

control. In response, Garner asserted his independence by invoking his reporting 

relationship to the Secretary of Defense and the Presidential charter for ORHA. 

“It was a continual battle on who worked for whom,” Fitzgerald said.54

In a period of three weeks, the Pentagon’s military and civilian leadership 

had launched what became competing postwar organizations. This failure in 

organizational unity hobbled the efforts of both ORHA and JTF-4 to mobilize 

for the mission. The resulting “confusion-of-command” dynamic foreshadowed 

problems that would afflict the Iraq reconstruction program in various ways over 

the next six years.55

Two Chains of Command

ORHA’s Garner tried to broker a solution to the crossed lines of postwar authority. He asked that ORHA and JTF-4 be merged, with Hawkins becoming 

commander of “ORHA’s operational arm.” When this was rejected, Garner advocated placing General John Abizaid, CENTCOM’s Deputy Commanding 

General, in charge of the Iraq theater, with McKiernan and Garner as co-equal 

subordinates.56 McKiernan would oversee security and troop movements, and 

Garner would handle civil administration, reconstruction, and humanitarian 

relief.57 It seemed logical to have a “military guy” in charge, Garner reasoned. 

“I didn’t own any helicopters, and I didn’t own any fuel, and I didn’t own any 

trucks,” he said.58

The Department of Defense weighed this option, but, on the eve of war, 

Rumsfeld backed away from it as well. Garner made one last phone call to 

Rumsfeld from Kuwait. “He finally got so mad at me, he said, ‘We’re not discussing this anymore,’ and hung up.”59 General Franks also opposed a major 

postwar military command and told his planners he did not see a headquarters 

commanded by a four-star general—which the military would eventually create 

in June 2004—as necessary.60

Ironically, this chain-of-command confusion was exactly what Secretary 

Rumsfeld had hoped to avert by placing postwar administration under the control of the Department of Defense. Yet, by establishing ORHA in parallel to 

JTF-4, and then not having the CENTCOM commander effectively arbitrate 

between them, Rumsfeld created the very situation he had sought to prevent. “I 

pointed out to the President and to Dr. Rice,” Secretary Powell said, “that they 

authorized and set up two chains of command.” “They said ‘no we didn’t,’” but 

then “checked and realized that’s what they had done.”61
• 40 •

• Chapter 3 •

ORHA Prepares

While Lieutenant General Garner navigated through the colliding chains of 

command, his staff focused on preparing for postwar Iraq. The humanitarian 

pillar took charge of the food program and the disaster relief that the NSC’s 

Humanitarian Working Group had planned. Food, water, medicine, and shelter 

were being positioned in Kuwait and Jordan.62 The reconstruction pillar began 

using the new USAID contracts, especially the International Resources Group 

(IRG) contract for technical experts.63

Tom Wheelock, IRG’s chief of party, arrived at the Pentagon in February 

2003 to augment ORHA’s reconstruction staff, which now numbered more than 

30. He reviewed the reconstruction targets previously established by the NSC, 

and immediately noted that they went well beyond what could be accomplished 

with the level of funding provided. The $680 million Bechtel reconstruction contract, according to Wheelock, would be “a drop in the bucket.”64

The arrival of more USACE personnel into ORHA reignited debates about 

what reconstruction should accomplish. USACE saw physical rebuilding as 

reconstruction’s primary goal. “When [USACE] said reconstruction,” Major 

General Strock said, “[those at USAID] were not thinking of bricks and mortar 

and concrete. They were thinking of governance and human rights and those 

kinds of softer aspects of reconstruction, which are very important,” Strock said. 

“But at the end of the day, the laws of physics apply, and if you’re going to get 

water to people you need to understand Bernoulli’s equation.”65

The civil administration pillar was the least developed.66 Finding reliable 

information about Iraq was a challenge. CIA briefings on public services and 

ministry functions were of limited use. “Nobody could tell how many ministries 

currently existed in the Iraqi government,” an ORHA official said. Garner kept 

asking, “Where is my list of ministries?”67

Iraq’s Postwar Politics

Ordinarily, a political-military plan would have clearly articulated a detailed strategy for engaging with the leaders of Iraqi factions in postwar Iraq. But because 

Defense officials intended to transfer control rapidly to an interim Iraqi authority, 

ORHA was told it would not need such a plan.68 “The expectations derived from 

policy set in Washington were that the establishment and devolution of authority 

to an Iraqi entity would proceed quickly,” an ORHA planner wrote, obviating 

the need for a governance strategy.69

Garner wanted a second opinion on how to approach the politics of Iraq. In 

late February, one of his staff placed a call to Len Hawley, a former NSC staffer 

with expertise in political-military planning. After evaluating ORHA’s staffing 
• 41 •

• The Department of Defense Takes Charge •

structure, Hawley advised Garner that—at a minimum—he needed a political deputy and a political intelligence section.70 Trying to govern Iraq with the 

civil-administration staff he had, Hawley said, would be akin to “running Fairfax 

County [a major suburban area in northern Virginia] with eight people.” Failure 

to move immediately to control the struggle for power would permit powerful 

criminal constituencies to develop. “In this kind of work,” Hawley said, “the clock 

ticks. Nothing can wait.”71

ORHA’s Resource Problem 

Iraq’s postwar politics was only one of many worries. At the end of February, just 

three weeks before the invasion, Garner was still trying to hire enough staff. The 

President authorized agencies to “detail” personnel temporarily to ORHA, but 

they were not compelled to do so—and few did.72 ORHA secured some personnel through defense contractors, but these personnel were prohibited by law 

from formulating policy or managing government resources.73 To help solve its 

personnel shortfalls, Garner exploited a temporary-appointment category within 

U.S. law that is normally used to staff boards and commissions.74 These “3161 

appointments” enabled ORHA and later the CPA to bypass the cumbersome 

hiring procedures required by civil service regulations.75

ORHA also needed administrative, logistics, and other operational support. Colonel Robert Costello, detailed by the Department of Defense to serve 

as ORHA’s logistics chief, joined the team on January 27, 2003. With Garner’s 

approval, Costello immediately began using the LOGCAP contract to meet 

ORHA’s support needs. Costello developed a statement of work that envisioned an ORHA contingent in Baghdad of 200, with 50 more in three regional 

offices.76 Although the military staff ORHA needed was forthcoming, Garner 

ultimately had to rely on a commercial contract to supply the organization’s communications support because his request for dedicated military communications 

assistance was denied. This denial proved to be a consequential decision. Rather 

than being seamlessly integrated into the secure communications systems used 

by war planners at CENTCOM as well as McKiernan’s theater ground command, ORHA had to rely on commercial services, such as Internet connections 

and personal email accounts. Unable to send or receive classified information, 

ORHA’s staff, at a critical juncture, would effectively be cut off from both war 

planners in Kuwait and officials in Washington. 

Securing resources for postwar relief and reconstruction was yet another 

battle. In several meetings with National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, 

Garner presented anticipated requirements for reconstruction funding.77 At each 

successive meeting, he brought Rice an ever-expanding list of requests, but few 
• 42 •

• Chapter 3 •

were granted.78 “I needed $28 million up front for judicial reform, indigenous 

media, food, refugees, internally displaced persons, and energy,” Garner recalls. 

“Never did get any of those.”79

Garner also approached Rumsfeld for reconstruction funding, but the 

Secretary was similarly unpersuaded by Garner’s long list. Garner laid out four 

rebuilding scenarios for Rumsfeld, from “do what absolutely needs to be done 

and no more” to “redo the whole country of Iraq.” 

“What do you think that’ll cost?” Rumsfeld asked. 

“I think it’s going to cost billions of dollars,” Garner said. 

“My friend,” Rumsfeld replied, “if you think we’re going to spend a billion 

dollars of our money over there, you are sadly mistaken.”80

In the five years following that remark, the United States appropriated nearly 

$50 billion for Iraq’s relief and reconstruction.

The “Rock Drill”

One month before combat operations began, representatives from all military 

and civilian agencies involved in postwar administration met together for the 

first time. The occasion was a “Rock Drill,” an interagency rehearsal convened 

by Garner. In a packed conference room at the National Defense University, 

ORHA’s staff joined officials from the NSC, the Vice President’s office, the Joint 

Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, USAID, and the Departments of 

Treasury, Commerce, and State. Admiral James Robb, head of policy and planning at CENTCOM, flew in. From Kuwait, Lieutenant General McKiernan 

dispatched Major General Albert Whitley, his British deputy, whom he had 

put in charge of Phase IV planning. JTF-4’s Brigadier General Hawkins was 

also there.81

Not everyone made it to the Rock Drill, and some of those who came had orders not to participate fully. Senior State Department officials were conspicuously 

absent.82 Officers from CENTCOM, CFLCC (CENTCOM’s ground combat 

arm), and JTF-4’s Hawkins arrived with instructions that limited the extent of 

their cooperation with ORHA. These “red lines,” an ORHA planner wrote, “related both to the supporting/supported commander issue and to the feelings of 

inadequate force structure to address post-conflict planning requirements.”83

Most worrying, General Abizaid—who Garner assumed would be named the 

overall commander in Iraq—was absent.84

During the two-day conference, key ORHA officials briefed six aspects 

of their evolving strategy: planning assumptions; requirements; high-impact 

actions; measures of effectiveness at 30, 90, 180, 270, and 360 days; policy decisions required; and “showstoppers.” Security was the number-one showstopper. 
• 43 •

• The Department of Defense Takes Charge •

Official meeting notes state that “current force packages are inadequate for the 

first step of securing all the major urban areas, let alone for providing an interim 

police function.”85

Ambassador George Ward, head of ORHA’s humanitarian pillar, asked, “How 

am I going to protect humanitarian convoys, humanitarian staging areas, humanitarian distribution points?” A flag officer who had flown in from CENTCOM 

said, “Hire war lords.” “Wait a minute,” Ward thought, “folks don’t understand 

this. There are warlords in Afghanistan, not in Iraq. There were no warlords to 

rent.” “At that point,” Ward said, “I thought this was going to fail because no one 

is paying serious attention to civilian security.”86

Dick Mayer, a former police officer and deputy director of the Department 

of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, 

proposed that 5,000 international police advisors be rushed into Iraq to bolster 

rule-of-law efforts after the military victory. But no plans were made for such a 

deployment. “What happens to law and order in the meantime?” the meeting 

notes say. “We risk letting much of the country descend into civil unrest and chaos 

whose magnitude may defeat our national strategy of a stable new Iraq.”87

The lack of adequate reconstruction budgets was the second showstopper. “It 

seems likely that we will begin military action before we know whether sufficient 

Phase IV funds will be available,” the notes read. Everyone was desperate for 

skilled interpreters. Participants were told to expect “economic-related violence.” 

“We should expect to see the economically disadvantaged residents of Saddam 

City [the Shi’a slum in Baghdad, renamed Sadr City after Saddam’s fall] do a bit 

of Robin Hooding...in short, civil unrest will be the rule, not the exception.” The 

absence of a governance plan also concerned Rock Drill participants. “What sort 

of future Government of Iraq do we have in mind,” the summary notes read, “and 

how do we plan to get there?”88

The Rock Drill exposed problems created by the disjointed postwar preparations. “It became clear,” said one participant, “that not everything was going 

to be as well organized by the civilians as it was by the military. In part the civilians either weren’t fully on board, or didn’t take [planning and preparation] 

seriously, or didn’t throw their best people at [the subjects]—but the civilians 

weren’t prepared.”89

Lieutenant General Garner noticed a man seated near the front who asked 

tough, insightful questions. It was Thomas Warrick. When Garner pulled him 

aside during a break, he learned that Warrick had led a year-long State Department 

study on postwar Iraq.90 Dumbfounded that no one had told him about the Future 

of Iraq Project, Garner asked Warrick to join ORHA on the spot.
• 44 •

• Chapter 3 •

Briefing the President

On March 10, 2003, just over a week before the bombing started, Garner briefed 

President Bush in the White House Situation Room on ORHA’s postwar plan. 

Rice, Rumsfeld, Powell, CIA director George Tenet, and General Franks sat 

around the table. Vice President Cheney joined by video link. 

Garner’s briefing slides outlined ORHA’s pillars, the gaps the Rock Drill revealed, and what remained to be done. He told the President that a tremendous 

amount of work was still necessary to make the interagency postwar plans operational. Garner outlined his major concerns, including some of the “showstoppers” 

identified at the Rock Drill. He focused on the need to fund Iraq’s public servants, 

police, and army; to rush in international stability forces after Saddam’s fall; and 

to employ the Iraqi army for reconstruction.91

The President authorized Garner’s proposal to use the Iraqi army on reconstruction projects. Envisioning something like the Depression-era Civilian 

Conservation Corps, Garner hoped to help demobilize the army and use it to 

populate a large labor force for reconstruction efforts. The plan, first developed by 

USACE’s Major General Strock, anticipated marching the disarmed soldiers into 

camps, forming 200-man construction units, and putting them immediately to 

work.92 Everyone in the situation room agreed that this was an excellent idea. 

The President was receptive to Garner’s briefing, asked a few questions, and 

thanked him for his service. The meeting was over in less than an hour.93 On the 

same day, Frank Miller presented the President with an overview of postwar political strategy, specifically addressing de-Ba’athification and recommending that it be 

undertaken lightly, so as to preserve Iraqi administrative capacity. The President 

approved Miller’s recommendation for a “light” de-Ba’athification policy. 

Two days later, Under Secretary Feith, echoing Garner, briefed the President 

that the Iraqi Army would not be demobilized.94 Feith also presented a plan to 

transfer governance authority shortly after Saddam’s fall to a new entity called the 

“Iraqi Interim Authority.” The President previously had decided against forming 

a provisional Iraqi government in advance of the invasion, a decision conveyed 

to the Iraqi opposition by Zalmay Khalilzad, the President’s Ambassador to Free 

Iraqis, in late February 2003 at the Salah al-Din political conference in Kurdish 

Iraq. Feith proposed brokering a formal power-sharing agreement between the 

new Iraqi Interim Authority and the U.S.-led Coalition shortly after Saddam 

was deposed. The leadership committee formed at the Salah al-Din conference, 

comprising Iraqi exiles and Kurdish leaders, would serve as the core group for 

the new authority, which would work in partnership with the Coalition’s transitional authority.95 This concept would allow Iraqis to exercise some political 

control from the outset, with the Coalition controlling the pace at which power 
• 45 •

• The Department of Defense Takes Charge •

was transferred. The President endorsed Feith’s proposal. Because it was premised on the notion that Iraqi governmental institutions would emerge from 

the war reasonably intact, the plan’s actual implementation would depend on 

the course of the war.

The Eve of Departure

Garner’s last week before deploying was a tough one. Shortly before his briefing 

to the President, Secretary Rumsfeld asked him to remove two key members 

of his staff—Thomas Warrick, head of the Future of Iraq Project, and Meghan 

O’Sullivan, a young State Department employee who worked in the agency’s 

Office of Policy Planning.96 Rumsfeld eventually permitted O’Sullivan to return, 

but Warrick was gone for good. A separate “hold” by the Department of Defense 

was placed on Garner’s request for seven ambassadorial-level appointments from 

the State Department, three of whom were Middle East experts. In exasperation, 

Secretary Powell told Secretary Rumsfeld, “Don, we’re trying to help.”97

The final surprise came on March 14, 2003, two nights before deployment. 

Late in the evening an aide called to say that Rumsfeld wanted to see Garner at 

eight the next morning.98 Rumsfeld told Garner that he was not comfortable with 

the people selected as ORHA ministerial advisors, and that he would rather make 

the appointments himself.99

“I’m going to give you a new set of ministry officials,” Rumsfeld said.100 Garner 

was incredulous. 

“It’s too late. I’m leaving tomorrow. In a month from now we’ll be doing this.” 

“No,” Rumsfeld shot back. “I want [Defense] to run all these.” 

Garner asked, “Is [Defense] going to run Agriculture? [Defense] is going to 

run Health?”

Rumsfeld requested that Garner send a list of advisors essential to keep. 

“I never told anybody about this,” Garner said, figuring that “if they show up, 

we’ll give them the job.”101

Garner’s frustration led him to reflect on lessons learned just before he deployed. 

“The Administration started way too late,” Garner said. “We’ve only really been in 

business six weeks, and we only began to get people three weeks ago.” Garner nevertheless was hopeful that ORHA would overcome its late start. “We’ll get there,” 

he said. “It will look like hell, but we’ll all come together on the objective.”102
• 46 •

Chapter 4

Staging in Kuwait

The funding was too little, it was too late, and it was too damn 

hard to get. *

Lieutenant General Jay Garner

Director of ORHA (2003)

In the six weeks since Jay Garner started work as coordinator of postwar relief 

and reconstruction, 167 military and civilian personnel had joined ORHA. On 

the morning of March 16, 2003, they gathered in a parking lot at the Pentagon to 

begin their journey to Baghdad. Secretary Rumsfeld stepped outside the building 

to wish the men and women of ORHA well. They then took buses to Andrews 

Air Force Base, where they boarded a chartered plane bound for Kuwait.1

 In less 

than a week, the invasion would begin.

Jay Garner had barely arrived in Kuwait before a second round of sparring 

broke out over senior advisors. Now the Office of the Secretary of Defense was 

calling to say that the candidates Rumsfeld was in the process of selecting had 

been superseded by new White House selections. The 23 senior advisors on 

board the flight—Garner’s original picks—would arrive in Kuwait unaware there 

had been two attempts to strip some of them of their positions. As he had done 

with Rumsfeld’s candidates, Garner decided he would ignore the White House 

appointees until they arrived—if they ever did.2

The start-up of ORHA had turned into a tug of war between cabinet secretaries. Ten of thirteen USAID contracts had yet to be signed. ORHA had no directive 

authority over military resources. Only about a dozen passengers on the flight 

knew any Arabic.3

 So much of Garner’s time had been spent arguing over who was 

to deploy that he was still developing basic plans for managing postwar Iraq. 

Camp Villa

General Franks placed ORHA under the operational control of the Coalition 

Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), Lieutenant General McKiernan’s 

ground command in Kuwait. Garner wanted to co-locate with McKiernan’s headquarters at Camp Doha, one of several U.S. military bases outside Kuwait City, 

but the advance party he dispatched found there was no room left at the base.4

ORHA would have to find its own place to stay. 

* ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of 

ORHA, April 22, 2004.
• 47 •

• Staging in Kuwait •

Garner turned to the LOGCAP contractor KBR, which quickly arranged quarters for ORHA at the Kuwaiti Hilton Resort. Locating the Coalition’s postwar 

headquarters at a four-star hotel seemed extravagant at first, but few alternatives 

existed, and the Hilton’s perimeter walls gave a measure of security. McKiernan’s 

soldiers, who slept in tents and portable trailers, dubbed it “Camp Villa.”5

ORHA’s staff members from USAID did not remain at the Hilton long, moving instead to the Radisson, some 30 miles away, where the NGOs they worked 

with were staying. Garner’s logistics chief argued with USAID’s mission director, 

Lew Lucke, urging that it was important for all of ORHA’s staff to stay together, 

but Lucke saw advantages to the Radisson. Garner sided with Lucke, deciding 

that it was acceptable for USAID to co-locate with its implementing partners.6

This left ORHA, JTF-4, and CENTCOM’s postwar planners scattered among 

five places: on three sides of Kuwait City, at CENTCOM rear in Tampa, and 

CENTCOM forward in Qatar. Sophisticated military networks are set up to 

allow “real-time” communication of classified material, but without a supporting 

military communications unit, ORHA was unable to tap into these networks. 

Passing classified plans through the hotel’s Internet network would have been a 

criminal offense. Nor could the plans be discussed on unsecure phones. When 

Rumsfeld could not reach Garner on a protected line his first night in Kuwait, 

two aides brought a secure satellite phone on the next flight.7

 The rest of the staff 

bought phone cards at the poolside gift store and did what they could with their 

personal email accounts.

Garner soon found he could not buy much, either. The Army contracting 

command serving as ORHA’s purchasing department refused to “warrant” the 

officers sent to Kuwait with letters authorizing them to sign contracts on the 

government’s behalf.8

 Without this crucial authority, ORHA could not purchase 

the resources it needed. The Defense Contract Management Agency stepped 

into the breach, but by the time Lieutenant Colonel Steve Elliot arrived in late 

March 2003 with a minimal staff, a long list was waiting.9

 The $146 million 

ORHA had in its account, hardly enough for staff and supplies, was supposed to 

pay for interpreters, translators, start-up funds for a new Iraqi media, seed money 

for demobilizing the Iraqi military, and Iraqi expatriates to serve as subjectmatter experts.10

Coordination in Chaos

ORHA had barely unpacked its bags in Kuwait before war was unleashed in Iraq. 

Operation Iraqi Freedom began on March 20, 2003 (Iraq time).11 Shortly thereafter, Garner’s deputy, Ron Adams, flew to Qatar to meet with General Abizaid, 

only to discover a large parallel universe of planners and plans at the CENTCOM 
• 48 •

• Chapter 4 •

forward command. “I felt frustrated, betrayed,” Adams said, “that we were having 

access to this kind of material and this kind of energy so late in the game.” “Why,” 

Adams wondered, “weren’t they co-located with us in February?”12

McKiernan’s staff at Camp Doha had its hands full. To the great displeasure 

of its commander, Brigadier General Hawkins, JTF-4 had been subsumed at 

Doha into the staff of Major General Albert Whitley, the British two-star general whom McKiernan had deputized to lead Phase IV planning for CFLCC.13

By the end of March, little of JTF-4 remained intact. Whitley and McKiernan 

supported Garner, at least rhetorically, but in the end they did not meet ORHA’s 

needs—not the least of which was the implementation of a unified Phase IV effort. CENTCOM treated ORHA’s requests as low priority, setting many of its 

incoming communications in a pile that remained untouched until April 19.14

Garner was one of the few go-betweens among the four postwar-planning 

factions—ORHA, JTF-4, CFLCC, and CENTCOM. He demanded that everyone meet.15 On March 27 and 28, representatives from each staff convened at 

the Hilton, but no unified mission plan emerged, as Garner had hoped. With the 

war underway, all that could be done was de-conflict the separate plans in places 

where the execution of one would interfere with another. By the time two ORHA 

staffers managed to produce a unified plan, it was largely overcome by events.16

As Garner made last-ditch efforts to coordinate plans on the ground in 

Kuwait, the fight over personnel continued. Determined to keep as many of his 

senior advisors as possible, Garner contacted Secretary Rumsfeld by commercial 

email from the Hilton. “Sir, on Saturday you questioned the Agency leads for 12 

of the 23 Iraq Ministries...We might not agree with State’s nominees, but they 

did step up to the plate a month ago and began nominating people,” Garner 

wrote. An enclosed chart outlined who among his senior advisors should stay and 

whom he could permit to go. “Of greater concern,” Garner noted, were vacancies 

in ministries for which the Defense Department assumed responsibility. Five of 

them still had no assigned senior advisor.17

Two days later, a briefing slide from the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

arrived. It listed a star-studded mix of former cabinet members, senators, and 

governors, both Republican and Democrat, as ministerial advisor candidates. 

Harvard President Larry Summers was listed for Finance; the former head of 

General Electric, Jack Welch, for Electricity; Bill Bennett for Education; and 

Senator Rick Santorum (R-PA) for Trade.18 Few had ever worked in developing countries. None spoke Arabic.

Secretary Powell reacted immediately. “We have identified qualified people 

to fill all eight positions that Garner assigned us. All have regional, functional 

management experience, several of them speak Arabic,” Powell wrote Rumsfeld. 
• 49 •

• Staging in Kuwait •

“We have frozen these assignments until you and I deal with this at an early opportunity.”19 Powell’s intervention helped. Garner kept his State Department 

senior advisors.

USAID Efforts

As the invasion got underway, USAID accelerated its humanitarian assistance 

preparations. Dozens of NGOs and hundreds of workers were in position. Tens 

of thousands of hygiene kits, plastic sheeting, and blankets were at the ready.20 The 

UN World Food Program mounted the largest relief operation in its history, filling 

warehouses in Kuwait, Jordan, and Turkey with food, water, and medicine.21

To coordinate its army of relief workers, USAID set up a Humanitarian 

Operations Center in Kuwait. This meeting place for USAID and its NGO partners was about ten miles away from the Radisson in a compound donated by the 

Kuwaiti government.22 Maps, communications equipment, and computers were 

spread among the buildings. After USAID entered Iraq, it established similar 

Humanitarian Operations Centers across the country. Together with their military equivalent—Civil-Military Operation Centers—the humanitarian centers 

coordinated delivery of aid in each of Iraq’s regions.23

Behind the army of soldiers and the army of relief workers came a third organized force—the army of contractors. They were the last to arrive. Because the 

order to begin the long and complicated contracting process was not issued until 

December 2002, most reconstruction contracts were not awarded until late April 

2003. The compressed timetable meant that, at war’s start, many companies had 

yet to receive word on their bids.24

The gap was the inevitable result of a contracting cycle begun only ten weeks 

before war started—a consequence of excluding USAID from the planning 

process for an entire year. As soon as USAID and ORHA made the awards, 

contractors began mobilizing. But this usually entailed an extended process of 

activating staff and recruiting the “muddy boots” operators who know how to get 

things done.25 Notably, USAID did not award its major infrastructure contract to 

Bechtel until April 17—over a week after Baghdad fell—and the company did 

not deploy personnel into Iraq in any strength until May. Contractors working 

for the USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives arrived sooner. The office used 

its IDIQ contract (SWIFT I) to mobilize its contractors immediately, including 

Development Alternatives, Incorporated, which had established a Kuwait office 

more than two weeks before ORHA arrived.26
• 50 •

• Chapter 4 •

Governance Questions Answered

How military units would administer Iraqi territory under their control remained 

an open question as late as mid-March 2003. With no political-military plan formulated in Washington, CENTCOM moved ahead with its own ad hoc plan, deciding 

to establish Governorate Support Teams (GSTs) primarily from civil affairs units, 

whose reservist soldiers frequently brought applicable civilian skills. The GSTs 

would follow closely behind the invasion force, taking charge of towns once they 

fell under Coalition control. They would serve as the point of contact with town 

mayors and municipal governments across Iraq, helping to bring order by standing 

up town councils in places where none existed. The eventual transition to civilian 

control under ORHA and then to an interim Iraqi authority would open the door 

for the military’s exit.27 CENTCOM officers had presented a rough version of the 

GST strategy at Garner’s March 27-28 meeting at the Kuwait Hilton.28

CENTCOM’s GST plan was compatible with USAID’s Local Governance 

Program (LGP), which assumed that a national political process, overseen by 

the Department of State, would quickly shift the deposed regime’s centralized 

authority to local democratic entities. USAID proposed a “transfer” of centralgovernment civil servants to the local level, paring back national ministries to 

their essential functions.29 Teams of experts funded by USAID’s LGP would 

arrive shortly after the invasion to help newly elected town councils improve 

education, health, water, markets, and roads. By devolving control directly to 

local officials and empowering them to spend U.S. reconstruction money, planners hoped to quickly break Iraq from the pattern of centralized authoritarianism 

that had gripped the country for decades.30

Implementing these loosely coordinated local governance plans yielded a 

number of unanticipated consequences. Saddam’s regime had been like a giant 

octopus with tentacles reaching down into every village in Iraq through a system of ministry “directors general.” Through these directors general, ministries 

controlled the disbursal of resources in each Iraqi province. Coalition plans superseded the director general system, shifting authority to town councils created 

by GSTs or USAID’s LGP teams.31 This radical and rapid restructuring of local 

government would shape debates about Iraqi federalism for years to come.

Governance plans at the national level were equally loose. Garner planned 

on using the “big tent” method to bring Iraqi leaders together to form a national 

interim government.32 This approach had worked reasonably well with the loya 

jirga process in Afghanistan, which had quickly named Hamid Karzai the leader 

of postwar Afghanistan. Garner hoped to use his good relations with the Kurds to 

help move quickly to the appointment of an Iraqi interim authority, as approved 

by the President on March 10, 2003. 
• 51 •

• Staging in Kuwait •

ORHA Expands

In early April 2003, as ORHA continued postwar planning at the Hilton, its staffing needs kept growing. The Office of the Secretary of Defense estimated that 

the staff of ORHA might reach 1,268, plus a 600-person military police battalion 

provided for security.33 Even this estimate—many time higher than originally 

expected—would prove too small. 

After ORHA arrived in Baghdad on April 21, its staff quickly increased, eventually peaking at 2,500—about eight times its original estimate of 350.34 Back 

at the Pentagon, the comptroller’s office was asked why there was such a huge 

rise in ORHA’s staffing. Dov Zakheim, the Defense Department Comptroller, 

responded: “ORHA projected staffing levels and budget requirements will vary 

greatly as they get a better grip on the requirements of their mission.”35

ORHA’s rapid expansion unsettled its contracting staff. Lieutenant Colonel 

Elliot, ORHA’s contracting officer from the Defense Contract Management 

Agency, had only three officers on staff with warrants to write contracts.36 As needs 

mounted rapidly and the details of contracts were often left unspecified, Elliot 

found he was forced to make policy decisions. “I’m making the decision as to what’s 

prudent. And that shouldn’t be my job. That should be the customer’s job,” Elliot 

said. From his perspective, “There [was] no planning”—it was all reaction.37

Views From Washington

As ORHA struggled to carry out its mission, several Administration officials 

gave hopeful briefings. During an interview on April 23, USAID Administrator 

Natsios predicted that the cost of reconstruction to American taxpayers would 

be minimal. “The American part of this will be $1.7 billion. The rest of the 

rebuilding of Iraq will be done by other countries...and Iraqi oil revenues.”38

But National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice offered a more cautious assessment in an April 4 press briefing. “Our goals are clear,” she said. “We will 

help Iraqis build an Iraq that is whole, free and at peace with itself and with its 

neighbors; an Iraq that is disarmed of all WMD; that no longer supports or 

harbors terror; that respects the rights of Iraqi people and the rule of law; and 

that is on the path to democracy.”39

The National Security Advisor was circumspect about the details of 

Administration plans. “Specific means of achieving these goals are being worked 

out now. Many can only be developed once Saddam’s regime is gone. To a large 

extent, the means to these goals will depend on things outside our current control.” She further noted that the Administration did not know what conditions 

it would find inside Iraq. “We do not know, for instance, what damage Saddam 

Hussein’s regime may inflict on the Iraqi people in the regime’s last gasps. We do 
• 52 •

• Chapter 4 •

not know what we’ll find on the ground once the regime is gone—for instance, 

the condition of Iraqi natural resources or its infrastructure.” 

Rice pointedly observed that a long-term occupation was far from the minds 

of the President’s advisors. “ORHA is not a provisional government for Iraq, civilian or military. The goal is to transition responsibilities to the Iraqi people as soon 

as possible,” she said.40 Within weeks, this approach would be superseded when 

the Coalition Provisional Authority was installed to occupy and rule Iraq. 

Saddam’s regime fell the week after Rice’s briefing. Soon looting and chaos 

began to engulf Baghdad and many provincial capitals. As ORHA’s senior advisors watched their ministries burn on CNN, a fatalistic mood took hold at the 

Hilton. Garner had been so hopeful that things would all come together, but now 

he had grave doubts. ORHA was about to face a far greater challenge than harnessing the interagency system. They were about to cross the berm into Iraq.
• 53 •

Chapter 5

Orha in Baghdad

At the end of this there is [a] real simple truth. If you don’t plan 

and organize and rehearse together, you end up with ad hoc 

solutions during execution. [Iraq] is a classic case of not having 

done it all together.*

Lieutenant General David McKiernan

Commander of Coalition Forces 

Land Component Command (2002-2003)

As the Coalition prepared for war, so did Saddam Hussein. In the fall of 2002, 

he declared a general amnesty, freeing thousands of violent criminals.1

 As U.S. 

troops massed along the Iraqi border in the spring of 2003, Saddam deployed 

Iraqi military units both to defend against the invasion and to prevent a coup 

in the rebellious Shi’a south. Ministers made contingency plans, just as they 

had in 1991, to weather the conflict and repair damage once hostilities ceased.2

Saddam sent a memorandum instructing state agencies to sabotage infrastructure, shoot dissident Shi’a clerics, and burn the regime’s records if U.S. troops 

entered Baghdad.3

As the country braced for impending attack, Saddam’s workers moved furniture out of his main palace and removed the palace doors to minimize damage 

caused by the concussion of bombing.4

 Bank managers personally safe-guarded 

the financial data of customers at 170 branches across Iraq.5

 The director of computer services at the Ministry of Trade secured in his home the list of every Iraqi 

household eligible for food rations.6

 After the official Oil-for-Food ration list 

vanished amid looting, this copy was later used as a basis for registering voters in 

Iraq’s first democratic election.7

The Iraqi people also prepared.8 Shopkeepers boarded up their stores, women 

stockpiled food and water, and men headed to gun shops.9

 Tens of thousands of 

families fled Baghdad and its suburbs for safety in the countryside. 

The reckoning began on March 17, 2003. In an Oval Office address, 

President George W. Bush gave Saddam Hussein and his two sons, Uday and 

Qusay, an ultimatum to leave the country within 48 hours. But they did not 

leave. Bombing started on March 20 (Iraqi time), and U.S. ground units rolled 

into Iraq the next day. 

* SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General David McKiernan, former Commander of Coalition Forces 

Land Component Command, December 5, 2006.
• 54 •

• Chapter 5 •

Invasion

The experience of the invasion force differed by region. In the north, a small number of U.S. Special Forces troops linked with Kurdish Peshmerga, the armed force 

of Iraq’s autonomous northern region, which opposed Saddam. Together they 

pushed south against Iraqi Army units dug into defensive positions. In Baghdad, 

Iraqis had such confidence in the accuracy of American “smart weapons” that 

many watched the bombing from their rooftops, but the precision targeting had 

serious second-order effects. Telephone service ceased. Explosions broke pipes 

all over the city, causing sewage to contaminate what water still flowed out of 

the tap. Then, on April 4, power surges shorted out most of Baghdad’s electrical 

infrastructure. Much of the city went dark.10

Because Turkey and Saudi Arabia had denied U.S. troops passage, the main 

invasion force came through Kuwait. Special operations units captured oil fields 

and dams almost immediately, and oil engineers from Halliburton extinguished 

the few oil-well fires that were set. Thousands of troops with the Third Infantry 

Division and First Marine Expeditionary Force then pushed north. Rather than 

advancing methodically to capture and hold territory, the war plan called for a 

daring sprint to the capital.11 The idea was to put the regime down before it could 

deploy chemical weapons. Lieutenant General McKiernan’s troops sped by most 

population centers, avoiding combat in favor of pushing to Baghdad. 

The fast-moving U.S. invasion force meant that troops engaged Saddam’s 

forces only briefly in many towns. Some cities were occupied quickly, but in the 

west and north, U.S. troops did not arrive until weeks after Baghdad fell. Many 

Iraqis were left listening to conflicting accounts of the invasion’s outcome on 

regime and foreign radio broadcasts, never seeing troops from either side.12 The 

uniformed Iraqi military largely abandoned their posts after little or no fight, but 

sustained resistance materialized in many southern towns. Sandal-clad fighters in 

civilian garb, both foreign and Iraqi, used rocket-propelled grenades and pick-up 

trucks to organize ambushes that frequently turned deadly for the attackers as 

they encountered first-hand the lethal power of the invading force.13

“The enemy we’re fighting is different from the one we’d war-gamed against,” 

said Lieutenant General William S. Wallace, commander of V Corps, one of the 

main ground units.14 To General John Abizaid, the only Arabic-speaking senior 

commander in theater, the signs were ominous. Garner remembers Abizaid telling him the first week in April: “I’ve been listening to everything they’re saying 

on the radio. I’ve been reading Al Jazeera, and I’m looking at what’s happening. 

I’m telling you. We’re going to have a guerrilla war on our hands.”15
• 55 •

• ORHA in Baghdad •

Initial Assessments

Sixty-two people from USAID’s Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)—

the largest ever fielded—followed quickly upon the heels of the invading force.16

On March 27, DART members crossed into Iraq to assess the humanitarian 

situation in the port town of Umm Qasr, a major supply node in Iraq where 60 

percent of Iraq’s Oil-For-Food imports were offloaded. British commandos had 

seized the port after sustained fighting. Elements from the U.S. Army’s 354th Civil 

Affairs Brigades began repair work after British troops took control.17

USAID’s DART team found the port in poor but working condition. Team 

members identified two back-up generators that, with minor repairs, could power 

the entire facility. Three grain vacuums were operational, and the port’s 24 silos 

were available for storage once swept for explosives. A day later, the Sir Galahad, 

a British relief ship carrying more than 230 metric tons of food, medicine, and 

blankets, was able to dock.18

All seemed to be going reasonably well. There were no major signs of humanitarian crisis, and no chemical weapons had been used. But worrisome news 

soon arrived from USACE, which had embedded Forward Engineering Support 

Teams (FESTs) in U.S. combat brigades.19 Traveling in Humvees equipped with 

a satellite link to their headquarters, these highly mobile military and civilian 

engineer teams quickly assessed the state of the power plants and other civil infrastructure they came across during their advance into Iraq.20 The dilapidated 

infrastructure reported everywhere by FEST personnel confirmed USACE’s 

prewar assessment that a major reconstruction effort—on the order of $35 billion 

for a “middle-range” damage scenario—would be necessary.21

To augment the information from the FEST reports, Garner asked USAID’s 

DART team to shift its role and begin conducting infrastructure assessments. 

At first they refused.22 The team members were reluctant to take on activities 

that fell outside the mandate of a normal DART mission, which is to assess humanitarian conditions—such as food supply availability and likelihood of disease 

outbreak. Their leadership, at USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance in 

Washington, was also averse to allowing the unarmed teams to operate in an 

environment where residual fighting continued.23 By the first week of April, the 

DART team’s failure to carry out Garner’s request threatened to unravel the fragile cooperation between the military and civilian communities inside ORHA.24

Garner was seething. “They refused to come in,” he said, “because it wasn’t 

permissive. You know, I have this civilian organization in this not-permissive 

environment in Suburbans, which are not hardened. Yet you [the DART commander] have $350,000 hard Mercedes. You have body armor, which these 
• 56 •

• Chapter 5 •

people [ORHA personnel] don’t have, and your people refuse to come in here, 

and they’re staying in very expensive hotels.”25

Ambiguity about lines of authority aggravated the situation. Did a USAID asset, 

the DART team, report to its agency headquarters in Washington or was the team 

now under operational control of ORHA, an office of the Department of Defense? 

Instead of appealing to the NSC for arbitration, Secretaries Donald Rumsfeld and 

Colin Powell had a “war of memos” trying to settle the issue. 26 Relations between 

the Departments of State and Defense had become increasingly tense in the late 

winter and early spring of 2003.27 Only when Garner phoned Powell and threatened 

to oust the DART teams did they agree to comply with Garner’s direction.28

ORHA Enters Iraq

ORHA personnel first crossed into hostile territory on April 1 at the port of Umm 

Qasr, where the situation had deteriorated rapidly since the DART team’s first 

forays four days before. Coalition soldiers, who cautioned that they did not have 

enough troops to stop the looting, reported, on April 2, 2003, that more than 

200 residents had carried off every useful piece of equipment at the port. Looters 

took desks and chairs, electrical generators, conveyor belts, and even a forklift. 

“Anything not nailed down” was gone, the DART team reported on its second 

visit.29 Work to rehabilitate the port was set back by weeks. The looting itself—the 

first major episode reported in Iraq—presaged a period of extraordinary difficulty 

that the Coalition would face in the weeks ahead. 

ORHA used Umm Qasr as a testing ground to calibrate its approach to the 

post-invasion environment. “We thought of Umm Qasr as a laboratory where 

we could see what worked and what didn’t,” an ORHA official explained. “It gave 

us a chance to get some real work done as opposed to just theorizing and writing 

position papers.”30

Restoring Umm Qasr presented three significant challenges. First was simply 

performing the brute physical work of reconstruction. The port was badly in need 

of dredging. Sunken obstacles and unexploded ordnance posed a danger to approaching ships.31 The second was luring Iraqis back to work. Port workers who 

encountered Coalition soldiers were understandably skittish.32 The third was 

coordinating civil and military authorities, which proved extremely difficult, a 

precursor to similar problems that would burden the U.S. relief and reconstruction endeavor in Iraq for years to come.33

On April 11, 2003, Lieutenant General Garner crossed into Iraq at Umm 

Qasr. He visited the port, delivered a speech before a newly formed town council, 

inspected a school, and was briefed by his staff. 34 He and his team then began 

making plans to move to Baghdad, which had fallen four days before. 
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• ORHA in Baghdad •

Baghdad Falls 

British troops took control of Basrah on April 6. Baghdad began to capitulate the 

next day, after armored columns made “thunder runs” into the city center. As U.S. 

troops took over Saddam’s presidential palace on the Tigris River’s west bank, jubilant Iraqis, with the help of U.S. Marines, toppled the statue of Saddam Hussein 

in Firdos Square. Looting on a wide scale began that day, first on the fringe of the 

fighting and then later in plain view of American military patrols.35 In response, 

protective Iraqi militias sprang up in neighborhoods across the city, putting men 

with AK-47s atop makeshift barricades. Gunfire could be heard throughout the 

night as robberies and revenge killings took place.36

Deteriorating conditions on the ground began to supersede Coalition plans. 

The rush to the capital meant that fewer than two divisions—about 25,000 

soldiers—occupied the capital, a city of about six million, amounting to an approximate ratio of one U.S. soldier to every 250 residents. “That’s not enough to 

control a city of six million people,” Lieutenant General David McKiernan said.37

With U.S. troops scattered across Baghdad, looting seemed almost impossible to 

prevent. Patrols had no appetite or mandate to stop it, and McKiernan had orders 

to continue pushing troops north to carry out the search for weapons of mass 

destruction that were assumed to be in central Iraq. One option was to impose 

martial law and shoot looters on sight, but McKiernan could not bring himself 

to issue the order. “This is not just the Saddam Feyadeen that are in there looting 

the stores, it’s the population,” McKiernan explained. “It’s children and women. 

What are you going to do? What’s a soldier on the street going to do? Fire warning 

shots around them? The answer is, and I’ll accept full responsibility, I said ‘we are 

not going to shoot to kill. We’re not going to do that.’”38

Laith Kubba, a prominent Iraqi exile who helped found the Iraqi National 

Congress, later observed that the lack of an effective media organization from day 

one hamstrung the Coalition, which might have been able to calm the public had 

it communicated a clear message. “Iraqis are used to military coups. When they 

take place, they tune in to their radios,” Kubba said. “They wait for an announcement, number one, to tell them, ‘All important personnel working in electricity 

and water, report back to work, and you’ll be given access. Everybody else is 

under curfew from so-and-so hours.’ Instead there was a day, two days and three 

days of no authority.”39

The interactions between occupier and occupied were aggravated by the way 

troops were assigned to patrol zones. “We had divided the city up into target 

areas that didn’t have any relevance to political boundaries,” Lieutenant General 

Strock said. Some brigade commanders were spread across four neighborhoods. 

To Strock, the arrangement was far from ideal. “I remember saying, you know, 
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• Chapter 5 •

it would be really nice if we could align up our security zones with our political 

boundaries and then you would have much more synergy.”40

The frequent movement of units from one zone to the next undermined the 

incipient personal relationships developing between commanding officers and 

community leaders. Yet another complication arose when civilians entered the 

mix. The military used a specialized system of grid coordinates to plot patrol zones, 

but civilians in ORHA, and the NGOs with whom they worked, normally used 

longitude and latitude to mark locations.41 The Coalition was literally not working 

off the same maps, adding unnecessarily to the confusion on the ground.

ORHA Arrives in Baghdad

Garner was eager to get to Baghdad, but the military leadership had a different 

view of when ORHA should deploy. “Tommy Franks didn’t want us to be there 

for 60 to 90 days,” Garner recalled.42 The CENTCOM Phase IV plan called for 

the military to secure Iraq for six to eight weeks before beginning the transition 

to civil administration. It was all part of the three stages of Phase IV. But Garner 

believed conditions were right for ORHA to start its operations, even if the timing 

was in advance of what military planners had expected.43

On April 17, Garner flew to meet Franks in Qatar. “I got in a big argument, 

pretty tense argument,” Garner said. “Look, Jay,” Franks told him, “there’s still 

fighting going on in Baghdad. The last thing I need is a bunch of damn civilians 

running around there and me having to worry about taking care of them. Dave 

McKiernan doesn’t have the force to do that.” “I realize that,” Garner replied, 

“but what’s happening is vacuums are being created and they’re being filled up 

with what you and I don’t want them filled up with, and the only way to prevent 

that is to get us in there.”44

“He was exasperated with me,” Garner remembered. “He finally just, kind of, 

shook his head and shrugged his shoulders.” The next day, Franks called to say 

that ORHA could go in. “We don’t have the force in there to give you the proper 

amount of security,” Franks said. “God bless you and good luck.”45

Garner immediately dispatched a small advance party. He followed two 

days later, on April 21, flying with his senior staff aboard a C-130 to Baghdad 

International Airport and traveling from there to the Republican Palace, one of 

Saddam’s grand edifices on the banks of the Tigris, which would house ORHA 

for its brief tenure.46 Most of the rest of ORHA’s staff drove up from the south in 

several convoys over the next week. 

During ORHA’s first days in Baghdad, achieving effective communications 

was again a debilitating problem. Some ORHA officials had Thuraya commercial 

satellite phones, but they were unable to receive calls inside the palace without an 
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• ORHA in Baghdad •

outside antenna. No phone system was yet established, so the staff had to walk 

from office to office to communicate.47 With the Baghdad telephone exchange 

down, it was impossible to reach Iraqis. Commercial communications equipment 

acquired by ORHA had also failed to operate, leaving the Baghdad team out of 

touch with its regional offices in Erbil, Hilla, and Basrah.48 After an urgent call from 

Garner, Lieutenant General McKiernan dispatched a communications unit to the 

Republican Palace to connect ORHA to SIPRNET, the military’s classified network. 

Even with this support system, bottlenecks still impeded communications.49

Looting and its Consequences

Two weeks had passed since Saddam’s regime had fallen. Outside the gates of the 

Republican Palace where ORHA was trying to set up shop, anarchy reigned. “We 

found the city in utter chaos,” said Richard Miller, one of six police advisors sent 

by the Justice Department. In some places, “corpses littered the streets, AK-47 

fire was near constant, and looters operated with impunity.”50 Many government 

buildings had been destroyed. 

“A lot of the ministries turned out to be blasted cinders,” noted Ambassador 

Tim Carney, senior advisor for the Ministry of Industry and Minerals.51 “They 

not only took everything out of there, but they stripped the electrical wires out 

of the wall, and they stripped most of the plumbing out, and then they set the 

buildings on fire,” Garner said.52 Fires burned so hot that concrete in many buildings exploded.53 ORHA advisor Christopher Spear waded into ransacked rooms 

filled three feet deep with paper debris. Clean-up crews hauled away six tons of 

scattered documents from the Ministry of Health alone. “We would say they took 

everything but the kitchen sink, [but] they took that, too,” Spear said.54

The looting quickly changed into organized theft by gangs of Iraqi criminals 

and insurgents trying to destabilize the country. In a military compound under 

nominal guard by U.S. soldiers, one of these gangs smashed through a rear wall and 

used a crane to remove valuable precision milling equipment used to manufacture 

Scud missiles. “They knew exactly what they were going for,” Spear said.55

Millions of dollars in cash stored in Rafidain and Rasheed bank branches 

and at the Central Bank were looted or destroyed, as were the contents of safety 

deposit boxes.56 “Organized crime found its golden opportunity,” the Iraqi politician Samir Sumaida’ie said.57 Some government officials joined in the melee. 

In Mosul, a prison guard sold all the prison beds for scrap.58 In time, ORHA’s 

senior advisors would learn that the theft of Iraq’s assets had, in truth, started 

years before, when corrupt government officials began regularly selling ministry 

property “to pad their own pockets.”59
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• Chapter 5 •

The looting went on for several weeks. “In a lot of cases,” Garner said, “after we 

began to try to reoccupy buildings, they still got set on fire. The Health Ministry 

got set on fire two or three times after we occupied it, because there just wasn’t 

enough force to provide security on everything.”60 The Oil Ministry was the only 

ministry to escape major damage. It was protected by Coalition troops as soon as 

they entered Baghdad, minimizing but not preventing looting. The ministry was 

reopened on May 2, in advance of others.61 To ORHA senior advisors, it stood 

as a symbol of what might have been. 

The oil infrastructure seemed to have emerged from the invasion largely intact. Fewer than ten oil well fires were set. But post-invasion looting in the oil 

sector went on for ten weeks, from March 20, 2003, through the end of May.62

Of the oil sector damage the Coalition had to repair, only one-third resulted 

from the war. The remaining two-thirds of the damage—amounting to $943 

million—was caused by looting.63

The contours of post-Saddam political life could be seen taking shape in the 

patterns of destruction. Eleven of Baghdad’s thirty-three hospitals were protected 

by a Shi’ite militia. These hospitals survived completely intact but others left unprotected were stripped clean.64 Shi’ite militias also took control of the city of 

Amarah, preventing looting before it could get started.65 In isolated cases, loyal 

staff at public institutions held looters at bay. Thirty engineers secured the Basrah 

refinery by using heavy equipment to block the gates.66

The looting had three major effects. The first was its high cost. Estimates vary, 

but looting clearly caused billions of dollars in damage, greatly adding to the total 

cost of relief and reconstruction.67 The second—the looting of conventional munitions depots—had severe long-term consequences for U.S. forces in Iraq. The 

war plan assumed that some elements of Iraq’s security forces would be used to 

“provide internal security,” including guard duty at the hundreds of arms caches 

across the country.68 This assumption did not hold. Thousands of tons of munitions were looted in the weeks after Baghdad fell, and some of it doubtlessly was 

later used to build improvised explosive devices that would be employed against 

U.S. personnel.69

The third effect—the lost opportunity to restore government services 

quickly—also had long-term consequences. With public institutions and critical infrastructure reduced, in some cases, to smoldering rubble, ORHA’s senior 

advisors would have to rebuild ministries, not just restart them. The unexpected 

extent of the destruction dealt a critical setback to Administration plans for a 

rapid transfer of power and would eventually force a significant course change.
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• ORHA in Baghdad •

Troop Strength

On April 21, the day Lieutenant General Garner arrived in Baghdad, Secretary 

Rumsfeld—following the advice of CENTCOM Commander General Franks—

canceled the deployment of 50,000 additional combat troops scheduled to arrive 

in the region and ordered the withdrawal of the Third Infantry Division as soon 

as the First Armored Division arrived.70 Rumsfeld’s decision shocked some commanders on the ground, including CFLCC Commander Lieutenant General 

McKiernan, who were counting on the additional manpower to provide a secure environment for post-conflict stabilization. The reversal also dumbfounded 

McKiernan’s CFLCC staff, that had just sat through two video conferences with 

senior Pentagon officials who had affirmed the decision to continue deploying 

forces.71 Garner called Rumsfeld and said, “You’ve got to stop this. You can’t pull 

troops out. In fact, we probably need more right now.”72

Paying for Reconstruction

The widespread looting and the damage it wrought meant that the reconstruction 

funds the Congress had just appropriated would be inadequate to quickly restore 

Iraq’s essential services to prewar levels. On April 16, 2003, President Bush had 

signed Public Law 108-11 creating the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund.73 The 

$2.475 billion congressional appropriation funded the program of humanitarian 

relief and reconstruction planned by the NSC, which had assumed that an extensive 

reconstruction would not be needed because Iraq’s infrastructure would remain 

largely intact after the war and that Iraqi oil revenues would fund most reconstruction. On the same day, General Franks issued his “Freedom Message,” declaring the 

Coalition’s intention to “exercise powers of government temporarily, and as necessary.” Franks’s message also identified an entity, called the Coalition Provisional 

Authority (CPA), that would be responsible for the governance of Iraq.74

USAID was the largest recipient of IRRF 1 money, receiving just over 70 

percent of the appropriation. A separate provision of the bill established an $800 

million Natural Resources Risk Remediation Fund (NRRRF) to support emergency fire fighting, repair damage to oil facilities and related infrastructure, and 

preserve oil distribution capability. NRRRF funds were used to help pay part of 

the costs of Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil (RIO), administered by USACE.75

New Iraqi Politics

Chaos on the ground threw the plan for a rapid political transfer to an interim Iraqi 

authority into confusion. On April 15, Garner and Presidential Envoy Zalmay 

Khalilzad assembled more than a hundred key Iraqi leaders in the southern city 

of Nassriya.76 To encourage leaders within Iraq to step forward, the United States 
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• Chapter 5 •

excluded the heads of exile opposition groups, who had formed the Leadership 

Committee from the Salah al-Din conference. Although the Nassriya meeting was 

boycotted by several clerics and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution 

in Iraq, a larger follow-on gathering was planned for Baghdad later in April.77

On April 22, Garner flew to meet with Kurdish leaders he knew from the humanitarian operation he led in 1991. He undertook this trip and other meetings 

with Iraqi politicians to further the process of forming an interim Iraqi authority, in 

accord with the President’s approved plan. “He was really pushing them both pretty 

hard,” Lieutenant General Strock said of Garner’s interaction with Ahmed Chalabi 

and Jalal Talabani. “He was playing hardball with them, saying, ‘Look, you guys got 

to stand up and come together and set aside your differences,’” Strock said.78

Secretary of State Colin Powell then dispatched Khalilzad and Ambassador 

Ryan Crocker to southern Iraq for talks on political transition, but there were 

intense disagreements over how to proceed.79 Garner was trying to carry through 

the standing plan for a rapid transfer.80 But in Washington, officials were concerned that conditions were not right for creating the interim authority. The next 

step would come on April 28, when more than 250 Iraqi leaders would convene 

a second political conference in Baghdad. 

ORHA’s Goals

On April 24, 2003, Garner briefed CFLCC Commander Lieutenant General 

McKiernan on eleven goals he wanted ORHA to help accomplish. McKiernan 

and Garner both assigned a member of their senior staff to the leadership of each 

task. The goals were:

1. Security

2. Salaries Paid Nationwide

3. Return Police to Work and Train Them

4. Return Ministries to a Functional Level

5. Restore Basic Services to Baghdad

6. Prevent a Fuel Crisis

7. Purchase Crops

8. Solve Food Distribution Challenges

9. Install Town Councils Nationwide.

10. Deploy and Integrate Government Support 

Teams With Local Government

11. Prevent Cholera and Dysentery81
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• ORHA in Baghdad •

The goals Garner had set for himself were enormous, as were the obstacles to 

accomplishing them. For example, adequate and reliable power was unavailable. 

“It is a Catch-22,” senior oil advisor Gary Vogler explained.82 Without fuel oil, 

electric plants cannot produce electricity, yet without a steady supply of electricity, crude cannot be refined into fuel oil. 

In Basrah, Coalition personnel trying to restart essential services faced a similar conundrum. “The circle was amazing,” JTF-4’s Lieutenant Colonel Joseph 

Morgan said. “Just in that one area, just looking at how we could turn on power, 

so we could turn on water, so we could turn on electricity.”83

Many of Garner’s other goals fell under the purview of the civil administration 

pillar, where plans were less developed and leadership weakest.84 The part of the 

mission that Rumsfeld told Garner would be least essential was now crucial, and 

ORHA was not well staffed to carry it out.

ORHA’s Early Departure

In the last week of April 2003, Baghdad was descending into further disorder. 

ORHA’s limited resources were consumed with finding ministerial staff members 

who had fled, reconstituting records, and locating workspace for almost the entire 

central government. Garner could not arrange enough military security escorts 

for his staff to move unfettered around the city. As for the rest of the country, 

ORHA had not established formal mechanisms for coordination with the military 

units occupying towns and villages across Iraq, much less with Iraqi leadership 

at the provincial level. Coordination was in short supply everywhere: between 

ORHA and Washington, ORHA and the military, and ORHA and the Iraqis.85

Suddenly Iraq seemed very large, and ORHA’s staff seemed very small.

In this chaotic atmosphere, more than 200 Iraqi leaders arrived in Baghdad 

for the “big tent” meeting on April 28, 2003. Garner presided, with Ambassadors 

Khalilzad and Crocker in support. The political conference was attended by all 

the key Iraqi players, including representatives from the major Shi’a political 

party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. Under Garner’s 

guidance, the Iraqis at the conference resolved to create an interim government 

at their next meeting in four weeks. After the meeting, Garner announced this 

decision through the Iraqi and U.S. media. It appeared to some in Washington 

that the concept of an interim Iraqi authority might still be realized.86 But out of 

view, a significant change in strategy was developing.

On May 6, just fifteen days after Jay Garner had arrived in Baghdad, President 

Bush announced that L. Paul Bremer III, a former ambassador and career Foreign 

Service Officer, as his new Presidential Envoy to Iraq. Bremer also would lead 
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• Chapter 5 •

the Coalition Provisional Authority, the civil authority that General Franks announced in his April 16 freedom message.87

Ambassador Bremer had first been approached at the beginning of April by 

senior officials in the Defense Department and the Office of the Vice President.88

Although Garner had been told when first appointed to lead ORHA that he would 

eventually be followed by a person with a diplomatic or political background, he 

did not learn of Bremer’s selection until Rumsfeld phoned him with the news on 

the evening of April 21, Garner’s first night in Baghdad. “I never saw CPA coming,” 

Garner said.89 He did not immediately tell his staff of the impending change.

Bremer’s arrival would reflect a sea change in U.S. policy. ORHA was designed 

as a short-term holding mechanism, to be followed by a rapid shift to an interim 

Iraqi authority, mirroring the swift transition that occurred in Afghanistan. But 

the deteriorating situation in Iraq apparently had caused the White House to 

change plans. Zalmay Khalilzad, the President’s envoy to the Free Iraqis, recalled: “The idea that I was working on initially, with support from everyone in 

Washington, was to form an interim authority that we could work with. A decision was made not to pursue that option until later, and therefore the Coalition 

Provisional Authority was established.”90

During the summer of 2003, the U.S. role in Iraq, under Bremer’s leadership, 

rapidly and massively expanded, far eclipsing the minimalist liberation vision that 

had set planning for war in motion a year and a half earlier, and superseding the 

quick transfer to an interim Iraqi authority that the President had approved at 

the March 10, 2003 NSC meeting.
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• ORHA in Baghdad •

Essential Services Overview: The Effects of Invasion

Metric91

PreinvasionPostinvasion

Electricity Production 

Megawatts 4,075 711

Oil Production 

Million Barrels per Day 2.58 0.30

Iraqi Security Forces

Soldiers and Police 1,300,000 7,000-9,00092

Telecommunications

Landline Subscribers 833,000 0

Mobile Subscribers 80,000 0

Human Toll

U.S Troop Fatalities - 139

Civilian Contractors93 - 1

U.S. Civilians - ~9

Iraqi Civilians - 7,413

Financial Cost ($ billions) 

U.S Funding - $3.45

Iraqi Funding - $0.00

International Funding - $0.00

Total Funding - $3.45

Production of electricity came to a near-complete halt during the 2003 invasion. 

By mid-April 2003, the grid was generating an average of just 711 megawatts of 

electricity per day.94 Postwar looting and sabotage had destroyed nearly 1,000 

electrical towers, and the loss of numerous electrical control systems caused frequent blackouts in Baghdad.95

Without electricity, oil production also came to a standstill. Many oil facilities 

were safely shut down, but some oil stocks were destroyed by fire. Although production restarted fairly quickly, it averaged only 300,000 barrels per day—about 

one-eighth of prewar levels—in May 2003.96

Already in a state of severe disrepair, Iraq’s essential services declined precipitously after the March 20 invasion due to war damage, looting, and sabotage. 

ORHA had neither the time nor the resources to fix these problems. Thus, the 

CPA took them on, shouldering the responsibility for restoring broken essential 

services and distributing them more fairly among all Iraqis. 

Part II

The Coalition Provisional 

Authority Leads Reconstruction

May 2003 to June 2004

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Chapter 6

Charting a New Course

But the President’s instructions to me...when I had lunch with 

him alone on May 6th, were that we’re going to take our time 

to get it right...The President had effectively, though perhaps 

not formally, changed his position on the question of a short or 

long occupation, having before the war been in favor of a short 

occupation. By the time I came in, that was gone.*

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III 

CPA Administrator (2003-2004)

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III landed in Baghdad on May 12, 2003, less than two 

weeks after President Bush appointed him Presidential Envoy to Iraq and designated him to lead the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Just under a month 

had passed since the first members of ORHA had settled into Saddam’s Republican 

Palace. But ORHA’s days were numbered. Bremer’s arrival and Garner’s quick departure marked the beginning of a significant shift in U.S. reconstruction policy. 

The new envoy, then 62 years old, enjoyed a solid reputation as a diligent, 

intelligent public servant. He had enjoyed a long career at the State Department, 

followed by distinguished private- and public-sector stints.1

 But the choice of 

Bremer raised some eyebrows. Neither his Foreign Service background nor his 

private-sector work included experience in post-conflict peacekeeping, contingency operations, or reconstruction. He had never participated in a joint 

civilian-military operation, had little experience in international development, 

had never served in the Middle East, and did not speak Arabic.2

Ambassador Bremer was first contacted about leading the CPA in early April 

2003, when the Vice President’s chief of staff, Lewis “Scooter” Libby, called to 

ask whether he would consider serving in Iraq.3

 Meetings at the Pentagon soon 

followed, and, by the end of April, he was preparing to deploy to Iraq. All of 

this occurred just as Jay Garner was settling into Baghdad with his ORHA staff.4

Secretary Powell recalled that Rumsfeld telephoned him about this time to say 

that the White House wanted to remove Garner because he did not seem to be 

the right man for the job. When Rumsfeld asked Powell if he knew Bremer, Powell 

said yes and that he “didn’t have any reason to object.”5

 Rumsfeld later said that 

the Administration always intended that Garner’s position within CENTCOM 

* SIGIR interview with Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, former CPA Administrator, March 18, 2008.
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• Chapter 6 •

would be eliminated, and that a senior diplomat outside the military chain of 

command would be appointed to head the CPA.6

On May 6, the President appointed Bremer as envoy to Iraq, directing him to 

“oversee Coalition reconstruction efforts and the process by which the Iraqi people 

build the institutions and governing structures that will guide their future.”7

 In a May 

13, 2003 memo, Secretary Rumsfeld informed Bremer that he, as Administrator of 

the CPA, would be “responsible for the temporary governance of Iraq.” Rumsfeld 

directed Bremer to “oversee, direct and coordinate all executive, legislative, and judicial functions necessary to carry out this responsibility, including humanitarian relief 

and reconstruction and assisting in the formation of an Iraqi interim authority.”8

Ambassador Bremer took charge of a country in political and economic 

chaos, with no government, no electricity, and no functioning security forces. 

Not a single drop of oil flowed to export spigots. He now faced the daunting task 

of restoring virtually every aspect of Iraqi life, from reopening ministries to paying 

government salaries, from restarting essential services to providing healthcare, 

and from collecting garbage to cleaning sewage from the streets.

The CPA quickly subsumed ORHA, retaining many of its members. 

Ambassador Bremer reported to the President through the Secretary of Defense. 

But, as a Presidential envoy, Bremer also reported directly to the President. “I 

was neither Rumsfeld’s man nor Powell’s man. I was the President’s man,” said 

Bremer.9

 These parallel chains of command would create problems for the Iraq 

program. CENTCOM was tasked by Rumsfeld to “directly support the Coalition 

Provisional Authority by deterring hostilities; maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity and security; searching for, securing and destroying weapons of mass 

destruction; and assisting in carrying out U.S. policy generally.”10 Despite this 

order, unity of effort in Iraq proved elusive during the CPA’s early days because 

Ambassador Bremer and General Franks reported to the Secretary of Defense 

through separate channels.

The Occupation Begins

Within days of arriving in Baghdad, Ambassador Bremer issued three important 

directives. The first established the CPA as an occupying authority. The second 

banned certain Ba’ath Party members from public service. The third dissolved 

Iraq’s military and other security forces.

CPA Regulation Number 1: Liberation to Occupation

On May 16, 2003, Ambassador Bremer signed and issued CPA Regulation 

Number 1, establishing the CPA’s mission, authority, and responsibilities.11

The regulation provided that the CPA “shall exercise powers of government 
• 71 •

• Charting a New Course •

temporarily in order to provide for the effective administration of Iraq” for an 

undefined transitional period. The CPA would work: 

...to restore conditions of security and stability, to create conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their 

own political future, including by advancing efforts to restore 

and establish national and local institutions for representative 

governance and facilitating economic recovery and sustainable reconstruction and development.12

This order also vested Ambassador Bremer with “all executive, legislative and 

judicial authority necessary to achieve [CPA’s] objectives.” Iraqi law would continue in effect unless it was “suspended or replaced by the CPA.”13

The new regulation signaled a developing shift in U.S. policy. The postwar 

strategy for Iraq—approved by the President on March 10, 2003—assumed 

that the country’s governing institutions would survive the invasion and remain 

sufficiently intact to continue to administer the offices of government and provide the Iraqi people with essential services. The President’s policy anticipated 

establishing an interim Iraqi authority with which the CPA would work to develop a political process for the eventual permanent transfer of sovereignty to a 

new, democratically elected government. The March 10 NSC Situation Room 

briefing to the President, however, did not define how the members of the new 

interim Iraqi authority would be chosen and what its authority would be during 

the postwar period.14 On April 28, 2003, the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

produced a briefing book on the development of the Iraqi Interim Authority, stating that the Department and “the U.S. government interagency process have yet 

to decide upon a final structure for the IIA, and have not announced an approach 

or timetable for implementing the concept.”15

When Bremer arrived in Iraq on May 12, the United States did not have a 

well-developed plan in place for transferring political power to an interim Iraqi 

authority, despite operative orders anticipating a fairly imminent withdrawal 

of most U.S. forces. The unexpected complete collapse of Iraq’s governing institutions, widespread and debilitating looting, and disagreements among U.S. 

government officials about the composition of the interim authority prevented 

the Coalition from promptly effecting the hoped-for quick transition. The 

absence of clarity on the way forward amid Iraq’s evolving post-invasion conditions was underscored in Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith’s May 15, 

2003 congressional testimony, given the day before the CPA issued Regulation 

Number 1. He said: “We are pursuing [our] goals with a two-part determination: 

a commitment to stay and a commitment to leave.”16
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• Chapter 6 •

Ambassador Bremer said that, by the time he was appointed, senior 

Washington officials had agreed that the political transition would take much 

longer than initially anticipated at the March 10 briefing. On May 6, President 

Bush told Bremer “to take the time necessary” to set Iraq on the path to democracy. Two days after Bremer’s meeting with the President, Secretary Rumsfeld 

presented a paper at his morning staff meeting stating that the transition from 

despotism to a democracy will not happen fast or easily. It concluded that it 

could not be rushed.17

The rapid policy change in Washington was slow to filter to Iraq, where both 

civilian and military leadership assumed that the March 10 strategy still controlled. When Ambassador Bremer arrived, ORHA’s Jay Garner and Zalmay 

Khalilzad, the President’s envoy to Iraqi exile groups, were actively engaging 

with Iraqi leaders, primarily from the exile community, to quickly form an interim authority. Bremer’s issuance of Regulation Number 1 effectively ended 

this initiative. 

On May 22, Bremer proposed a new political plan under which the Iraqis 

would form a governing council, produce a new constitution, and then hold elections for a permanent government. On that same day, he submitted his first report 

to the President through Secretary Rumsfeld, stating that he had “re-launched the 

political dialogue with Iraqi leaders” and that “full sovereignty under an Iraqi government can come after democratic elections, which themselves must be based 

on a constitution agreed by all the people.” The President wrote back, “You have 

my full support and confidence. You also have the backing of our Administration 

that knows our work will take time.”18

Meanwhile, CENTCOM was still following its original strategy. General 

Franks had issued orders in April—pursuant to prewar plans—to move much of 

the initial invasion force out of Iraq by the end of July. He anticipated a U.S. military presence in Iraq of “fewer than 30,000 troops by the first of August.”19 By May 

1, 2003, CENTCOM had dismantled its forward command-and-control center 

in Qatar. Two weeks later, the Defense Department announced that Lieutenant 

General David McKiernan’s command (CFLCC) would soon leave Iraq and 

that his large headquarters would be replaced by a much smaller Combined Joint 

Task Force 7 (CJTF-7), led by Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez.20 During 

this period, Lieutenant General Sanchez repeatedly expressed concern to General 

John Abizaid about the ongoing troop withdrawals, while Ambassador Bremer 

also warned Washington that security was deteriorating.21

General Abizaid assumed command of CENTCOM on July 8. Three days 

later he issued orders halting the U.S. troop withdrawal. Forces withdrawn 

during that early summer included U.S. Army Engineer units that could have 
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• Charting a New Course •

supported the incipient reconstruction mission. The loss of these units hampered 

the Coalition’s capacity to carry out quick-impact rebuilding projects during the 

CPA’s first weeks.22

CPA Regulation Number1, which made the CPA the occupying authority of Iraq and Bremer—in effect—a proconsul, “completely flabbergasted” 

many Iraqis, according to senior exile leader Ali Allawi, who would serve as the 

Minister of Trade, Defense, and Finance in successive Iraqi governments. Allawi 

was shocked that, “within the space of a few days, the entire process that was to 

lead to a provisional Iraqi government had been abruptly stopped, and then upended.”23 The change raised suspicions among Iraq’s indigenous tribal, political, 

and religious leadership, who chafed at the idea of an occupation by foreigners, 

after suffering under Saddam’s dictatorship for decades.

On May 22, 2003, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 1483, recognizing the CPA as the temporary governing authority in Iraq, directing it to 

work to “promote the welfare of the Iraqi people,” and advising it to “comply 

fully” with all obligations under international law.24

CPA Order Number 1: De-Ba’athification 

On the same day that he signed CPA Regulation Number 1, Ambassador Bremer 

issued CPA Order Number 1, a de-Ba’athification directive that stripped certain former members of Saddam’s Ba’ath Party of political influence in Iraq. In 

his April 16 Freedom Message, General Franks already had done away with the 

Ba’ath Party, which had about two million members in 2003.25

Conceived in Washington and promulgated with little Iraqi involvement, the 

de-Ba’athification order eliminated all Ba’ath Party structures and banned “Senior 

Party Members”—those in the top four ranks of the party—from serving in Iraq’s 

public sector.26 The order also provided for the immediate dismissal of anyone in 

the top three layers of management in any government institution (including ministries, state-owned enterprises, universities, and hospitals) if he or she had been a 

“full member” of the Ba’ath Party.27 Because the vast majority of senior officials in 

Saddam Hussein’s regime were Ba’ath Party members, the order effectively fired 

most senior leaders in Iraq’s government, severely depleting the bureaucracy of 

key personnel. The order also allowed for exceptions and waivers.

Before the war began, interagency planners debated the delicate trade-off between the need to eliminate the Ba’ath Party and the need to retain an effective 

administrative bureaucracy in postwar Iraq. A consensus developed favoring a 

policy to remove the Ba’ath Party’s most-senior ranks; but the meaning of “mostsenior ranks” was left undefined.28 The intelligence community estimated that 

implementing the order down to the Party’s fourth level would affect “only about 
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one percent of all party members or approximately 20,000 people, overwhelmingly 

Sunni Arabs.”29 Many in the Shi’a and Kurdish communities believed that a strong 

de-Ba’athification policy was crucial to prevent a Ba’athist return to power. 

Some senior U.S. officials opposed the de-Ba’athification order. They argued 

that it would strip Iraq’s governance institutions of key senior management and 

thus jeopardize the Coalition’s primary goal of stabilizing the country. For example, ORHA’s Jay Garner and the CIA station chief in Baghdad urged Ambassador 

Bremer to modify the order, believing the policy needlessly would create enemies 

for the Coalition and undercut national reconciliation.30 Bremer refused, saying 

he had his instructions from Washington.31

Most Iraqis agreed that some de-Ba’athification was necessary, but many 

believed that the CPA order had gone too far. For example, Nazar Janabi, the 

Director General for Defense Policy and Requirements in Iraq’s Ministry of 

Defense from 2004 to 2006, thought that only the top three levels of the Ba’ath 

Party should have been subject to the order. It would have had a far “less disenfranchising impact” if it had been restricted to just those levels, he said.32

The de-Ba’athification order arguably reached beyond what President Bush 

had approved on March 10, 2003, when the NSC’s Frank Miller had briefed 

him on the policy. The President had then determined that “we ought to remove what we understood to be the top layer” of the Ba’ath Party (although no 

further definition was given to what the top layer comprised). Whether “the top 

layer” reached down to the fourth rung is subject to dispute. Miller believed that 

“the Ba’athist regime ought to [have been] dealt with in truth and reconciliation 

panels. Membership in the Ba’ath Party ought not to [have been] an immediate 

disqualification for office.”33

Whatever its reach should have been, the consequences of the deBa’athification order quickly became clear: it reduced the ranks of Iraq’s capable 

bureaucrats and thus limited the capacity of Iraqi ministries to contribute to reconstruction. “The impact of this de-Ba’athification order was devastating,” said 

Lieutenant General Sanchez, Commander of Coalition forces in Iraq at the time. 

“Essentially, it eliminated the entire government and civic capacity of the nation. 

Organizations involving justice, defense, interior, communications, schools, universities, and hospitals were all either completely shut down or severely crippled, 

because anybody with any experience was now out of a job.”34

Some of Iraq’s Sunnis equated the order with a “de-Sunnification” of the government. Samir Sumaida’ie, a Sunni who became a member of the Iraqi Governing 

Council (IGC) and then served as Iraq’s Minister of Interior, criticized the order for 

focusing on removing people rather than getting rid of an outmoded ideology. “The 

whole thing was applied in a very negative way,” he said. “It was far too wide-ranging, 
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• Charting a New Course •

and as a result, created a backlash. There were a lot of people who were just ordinary 

people who [joined the party simply because they] wanted to survive.”35

On May 25, 2003, Bremer signed CPA Order Number 5, creating an Iraqi 

De-Ba’athification Council to “investigate and gather information” on “the extent, 

nature, location and current status of all Iraqi Ba’ath Party property and assets” as 

well as “the identity and whereabouts of Iraqi Ba’ath Party officials and members 

involved in human rights violations and exploitation of the Iraqi people.” The 

council, composed entirely of Iraqis, was tasked to help the CPA Administrator 

identify and classify former Ba’ath Party members, eliminate Ba’ath Party structures, and reclaim Ba’ath Party assets. Importantly, it also advised Bremer about 

who should be exempted from de-Ba’athification.36

The CPA gave the council responsibility for de-Ba’athification, but “did 

not provide enough authority, resources, or oversight for them to manage 

the process.”37 It eventually turned the de-Ba’athification process over to the 

Iraqi Governing Council.38 In November 2003, the Supreme National DeBa’athification Commission replaced the Iraqi De-Ba’athification Council; 

Ahmed Chalabi, the Shi’a expatriate politician, served as its first chairman.39

CPA Order Number 2: Disbanding the Military

One week after issuing the de-Ba’athification order, Ambassador Bremer handed 

down another momentous order that also had unanticipated and significant consequences. CPA Order Number 2, titled “Dissolution of Entities,”abolished seven 

institutions: the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Information, the Ministry of 

State for Military Affairs, the Iraqi Intelligence Service, the National Security Bureau, 

the Directorate of National Security, and the Special Security Organization. 

The order put every member of Iraq’s army, air force, navy, and air defense 

force, as well as the Republican Guard, the Special Republican Guard, the 

Directorate of Military Intelligence, and the Emergency Forces—some 500,000 

men—immediately out of work, many without any compensation. Although 

the roughly 300,000 conscripts could receive a small termination payment, no 

soldier with the rank of colonel or above was eligible for either a termination 

payment or a pension.40

This CPA order surprised some policymakers in Washington. The NSC had 

not vetted the decision, and NSC Iraq coordinator Frank Miller said that the 

President had expected the army to continue after regime change because the 

Coalition could not “afford to put 300,000 men with guns in their hands on the 

street.”41 Secretary Powell first learned of the order at a May 22, 2003 NSC meeting at which Bremer, via secure video-teleconference from Iraq, announced his 

intent to issue the order the following day.42
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• Chapter 6 •

“When the Army was disbanded,” Secretary Powell recalled, “I called Dr. Rice 

and said, ‘What happened?’ Nobody seemed to know about this and [her] answer 

was, ‘We have to back Jerry [Bremer].’ There was no meeting on it; there was no, 

‘Gee, is this a good idea?’ You couldn’t even tell who had decided it...I saw Peter 

Pace, the Vice Chairman, a little later and I said, ‘Peter, did you guys know about 

this?’ He said, ‘Hell, no!’”43

The order was drafted by the CPA’s senior advisor for national security, Walt 

Slocombe, in consultation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and circulated to senior military leaders, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff.44 Under Secretary Feith later acknowledged that it was an error in judgment 

for the Pentagon not to have discussed disbanding the army with senior-level officials of other agencies before formally approving the issuance of the order. But 

he maintains that it was the right decision substantively because the Iraqi army 

was top-heavy with generals, otherwise badly organized, corrupt, and had been 

an instrument of oppression in Iraq.45 Slocombe later said that the order merely 

reflected facts on the ground because Iraq’s forces had essentially disbanded in 

the wake of the invasion. Moreover, the Kurdish and Shi’a leaders objected to 

any reconstituted version of Saddam’s army.46

Key U.S. generals in Iraq expressed concerns about the order before it was 

issued.47 CENTCOM’s Phase IV plan, approved by the President, anticipated 

using the Iraqi army to help stabilize the country and assist with reconstruction. 

To this end, the military had dropped leaflets across Iraq before the invasion 

urging soldiers not to fight and promising no reprisals against those who laid 

down their arms. Some U.S. ground commanders argued that the army had not 

“dissolved,” but that Iraq’s soldiers had gone home, awaiting direction. In each 

region across the country, U.S. brigade commanders had contacted Iraqi military 

leaders and, through them, had begun to reconstitute army units.48

To replace the disbanded forces, Bremer and Slocombe proposed creating 

a small volunteer Iraqi army.49 The plan called for the Coalition to train about 

40,000 Iraqi soldiers, divided into three light infantry divisions, over the next 

two and a half years. The first division would be ready for deployment in the fall 

of 2004, the second division in the fall of 2005, and the third in early 2006.50 The 

plan would allow the “New Iraqi Army” to draw on carefully vetted officers from 

Saddam’s old force, but it had to exclude the top ranks of the Ba’ath Party and 

anyone from the inner circle of the old security forces.51

Leading Iraqis disagreed with the CPA’s decision to disband the army. Ali 

Allawi said Iraqi attitudes toward the army were far more complicated than 

Americans understood. The police (which were not disbanded) and other internal security forces were “detested,” but the armed forces “generated considerable 
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• Charting a New Course •

sympathy and respect throughout Iraq.” According to Allawi, the public at large 

saw the army “as an integral part of the identity of the state of Iraq,” and it was 

difficult, “even for the Shi’a, to accept a wholesale dissolution of the armed forces 

and to leave the country bereft of an army.”52

Laith Kubba—one of the founding members of the Iraqi National Congress, 

an advisor to the Future of Iraq Project, and later a spokesman for the Iraqi government—said, “the measure to dissolve the Iraqi army was not a smart one.” 

Kubba believed that Ambassador Bremer needed the old army to help Iraq make 

the transition to democratic governance. “Now if that means you need to utilize 

some of the people who were in the bureaucracy, in the army, in the regime, and 

if they’re vital and crucial to make that transition, then you take them on board.” 

He added, “Alienating large numbers of people...was not a smart move.” 53

Within days of the announcement of the “Dissolution of Entities,” crowds of 

former soldiers gathered outside the CPA’s palace gates in Baghdad and around 

U.S. military compounds across the country, demanding the restoration of their 

salaries and pensions. In Mosul, where Major General David Petraeus was commanding the 101st Airborne Division, disbanded military members demonstrated 

for several days in front of the city hall. Iraqi policemen shot and killed one of the 

protestors and wounded three others, sparking a riot. Over the next two days, 

eighteen of Petraeus’s soldiers were wounded, and two Humvees were burned. 

Riots in Baghdad and elsewhere claimed American and Iraqi lives. Ten days later, 

Bremer modified the policy, announcing that the CPA would pay salaries and 

pensions to members of the disbanded army.54

Major General Petraeus later said that the order to disband the army sparked 

an anti-Coalition sentiment that fueled the nascent insurgency in Iraq, igniting 

nationalist impulses against “the occupiers.” Petraeus believed that the order 

created “tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of additional enemies 

of the Coalition.”55
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Chapter 7

CPA’s Shortfalls

Jerry [Bremer]—God bless him—he was never given a set of 

coordinated instructions from the Administration. He went in 

pretty much on his own.*

General Colin Powell 

Secretary of State (2001-2005)

When Ambassador Bremer arrived in Iraq, he ostensibly had at his disposal 

both U.S. appropriated funds and Iraqi money that he could use to fund government operations and reconstruction programs. In April 2003, the Congress 

had approved $2.4 billion for the newly created Iraq Relief and Reconstruction 

Fund, which would become the primary U.S. funding account for Iraq’s 

reconstruction. 

The Office of Management and Budget apportioned the first appropriation 

to the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF 1) among five implementing agencies, with USAID receiving more than 70 percent.1

 USAID already 

had marked these IRRF 1 funds for use before the CPA’s creation, and thus 

Ambassador Bremer had limited influence over how this money was spent.2

 The 

CPA’s advisors, however, sought to shape specific job orders under the various 

IRRF 1 contracts USAID managed. Disagreements over these job orders marked 

the beginning of a disputatious relationship between the CPA and USAID.

Unlike IRRF 1, Ambassador Bremer had virtually complete control over Iraqi 

money, which came from three sources: vested funds in U.S. bank accounts frozen by an executive order shortly before the March 2003 invasion; seized funds 

that Coalition forces had recovered in Iraq; and oil and gas revenues controlled 

by the UN under the Oil-for-Food program. The CPA would expend about $20 

billion of these Iraqi funds by the end of its fourteen-month tenure.3

U.S. Funding 

In the April 2003 IRRF 1 legislation, the Congress directed that the funds be used 

to pay for “humanitarian assistance” and “rehabilitation and reconstruction in 

Iraq.” The Congress identified twelve humanitarian and reconstruction sectors 

for fund use, with the OMB apportioning the money among the agencies shown 

on the following chart.4

* SIGIR interview with General (Ret.) Colin Powell, former Secretary of State, February 4, 2008.
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• CPA’s Shortfalls •

Breakdown of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Apportionments by Agency 

($ Millions)

Source Agency Apportioned

IRRF

USAID $1,820.3

Department of Defense $518.3

Department of State $125.4

Department of the Treasury $6.0

U.S. Trade and Development Agency $5.0

Total $2,475.0

Source: Data as of September 30, 2004; CPA-IG, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress; October 2004, 55.

USAID had initiated contracting for Iraq’s reconstruction in early 2003 and, 

by early May, it had awarded twelve contracts, obligating about $1.5 billion in 

IRRF 1 dollars. The agency divided the contracts between “hard” projects to restore infrastructure and “soft” programs to support health, education, agriculture, 

and economic reform initiatives. Bechtel received the largest single contract, $680 

million, for infrastructure projects in Iraq.5

After the March 2003 invasion, USAID quickly began to establish a presence in 

Iraq, and, by mid-summer, the agency had 30 offices open in 15 of the country’s 18 

provinces, staffed by more than 400 people. Reflecting USAID’s transformation 

over the previous fifteen years into an agency heavily reliant on contractors, only 

about a dozen of the deployed personnel were full-time agency employees.6

Iraqi Funds

In May 2003, the U.S. government, the Coalition, and the United Nations took 

several important steps to give the CPA access to Iraqi funds for reconstruction 

programs and to fund government operations. An executive order issued on the 

eve of the invasion permitted Ambassador Bremer to use $1.7 billion in vested 

Iraqi assets, which had been drawn from various banks and deposited into the U.S. 

Federal Reserve Bank of New York.7

 During the invasion, U.S. forces seized about 

$900 million from various locations across Iraq, finding much of it in Saddam’s 

palaces. Bremer generally used the vested funds to pay Iraqi government salaries 

and the seized funds to support reconstruction projects. The U.S. military carried 

out many of the first reconstruction projects using seized funds, which marked 

the beginning of a critical program that Bremer would soon formalize in a CPA 

order as the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP). Vested and 

seized Iraqi funds alone, however, could not cover the mounting costs of administering and rebuilding Iraq. For that, the CPA depended on the Development 

Fund for Iraq (DFI). 
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• Chapter 7 •

The DFI

On May 22, 2003, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1483 (UNSCR 

1483), creating the DFI as the new repository for Iraq’s oil and gas revenues.8

 The 

resolution required the deposit of 95 percent of these funds into the DFI account 

at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, from which the CPA could draw to 

pay for “the economic reconstruction and repair of Iraq’s infrastructure, for the 

continued disarmament of Iraq, for the costs of Iraqi civilian administration, and 

for other purposes benefiting the people of Iraq.” The remaining five percent was 

deposited in the UN Compensation Fund for victims of Saddam Hussein’s 1990 

invasion of Kuwait.9

UNSCR 1483 also created the International Advisory and Monitoring Board 

(IAMB) to provide oversight of the DFI and to ensure that the CPA used Iraqi 

revenues for the benefit of the Iraqi people. The IAMB’s membership included 

representatives from the UN, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, 

and the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development. Notwithstanding the 

importance of the IAMB’s mission, the UN failed to appoint its members until 

October 24, 2003, and the board did not have its first meeting until December 

5, 2003, more than six months after the CPA started using the DFI.10

At the end of May 2003, the UN transferred a billion dollars into the DFI 

account “to provide for immediate reconstruction needs,” and the CPA immediately began using it to pay Iraqi governmental salaries and pensions and to finance 

initial reconstruction projects.11 Ambassador Bremer created a Requirement 

Review Board (RRB) to manage the DFI, and the RRB quickly started approving projects, ranging from a $600 water pump to a $4 million radio system for 

the railroads.12 “For lack of a better [term],” noted Ambassador James Warlick, 

the CPA’s point person on the Oil-for-Food program, the DFI became CPA’s 

“bank account” for Iraq.13

On June 15, 2003, the CPA issued two regulations governing the DFI.14 One 

gave Ambassador Bremer complete control of the DFI funds, providing that he 

alone could direct their disbursement.15 The other replaced the RRB with the 

Program Review Board (PRB), directing it to use the DFI in a transparent manner to meet Iraq’s humanitarian needs, support the economic reconstruction, 

fund projects to repair Iraq’s infrastructure, continue disarmament programs, 

and pay for the costs of the country’s civilian administration.16

Program Review Board

Bremer named his new director of economic policy, Peter McPherson, as chairman of the PRB.17 Under McPherson’s guidance, the PRB reviewed numerous 

reconstruction project proposals, making recommendations to the Administrator 
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• CPA’s Shortfalls •

on which the CPA should pursue.18 Ambassador Bremer instructed McPherson to 

“promote the CPA’s objective of actively involving Iraqis in the financial planning 

process, and transferring to the Iraqi interim administration the responsibility for 

budgeting Iraq’s financial resources”—but only one Iraqi representative was on 

the board.19 The PRB was also supposed to develop a comprehensive funding plan 

for the “relief and reconstruction of Iraq,” but it never produced such a plan.20

Because the CPA was legally deemed an “international organization,” Iraqi 

funds under its control were not subject to U.S. contracting regulations. The CPA 

thus developed its own contracting regulations, embodied in CPA Memorandum 

Number 4, which detailed the rules for using the DFI. Among other things, Memo 

4 established conditions for the award of DFI-funded contracts and defined the 

documents required for each contract file. Notably, it put the CPA’s Head of 

Contracting Activity (HCA) in charge of executing all CPA contracts.21

The HCA also was directed to manage Iraqi ministry contracting unless 

the CPA’s Administrator had exempted a ministry after certifying that it had 

established capable contracting systems “adequate to ensure the transparent 

use and management of Iraqi funds.”22 By the end of the CPA’s tenure, Bremer 

had certified just two ministries. Nevertheless, Iraqi ministries regularly engaged 

in independent contracting, in breach of Memo 4, throughout the CPA’s duration. U.S. and international auditors later raised serious concerns about the 

CPA’s weak oversight of the DFI and its failure to enforce its own contracting 

procedures.23

Commander’s Emergency Response Program

On June 16, 2003, Ambassador Bremer authorized the use of DFI funds for 

CERP, an important new program that enabled U.S. military combat units to 

use Iraqi funds for small-scale reconstruction projects to meet Iraqi needs. Three 

days later, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, Commander of CJTF-7, issued 

Fragmentary Order 89, outlining the regulations governing CERP and defining 

eligible projects as those for “the building, repair, reconstitution, and reestablishment of the social and material infrastructure in Iraq.”24 CERP grew into a key 

U.S.-funded reconstruction program in Iraq, ultimately receiving more than $3.5 

billion in U.S. appropriations by the end of 2008.25

Shortly after creating the program, the CPA expanded CERP’s limits on project spending and strengthened its regulations, requiring commanders to appoint 

trained purchasing agents to document their use of CERP funds. General officers 

in charge of regional commands could receive $500,000 in CERP money for 

projects; brigade commanders could receive $200,000. The PRB approved additional tranches upon depletion of these allotments.26
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• Chapter 7 •

The CERP made it possible for U.S. commanders to improve life in Iraqi communities by quickly repairing roads and bridges, rebuilding schools, improving 

health care, and removing trash.27 The program would later play a critical role in 

U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq.

Staffing Problems

Soon after arriving in Baghdad, Ambassador Bremer replaced ORHA’s pillars, 

organizing the CPA into political, economic, administrative, budgeting, and planning sections, which roughly resembled the traditional embassy structure with 

which Bremer was familiar. The CPA absorbed 600 ORHA staff members but 

was still far short of what it needed to manage its burgeoning relief and reconstruction program.28

On May 21, 2003, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz moved to address the CPA’s shortfalls by directing the Department of the Army to meet its 

administrative, logistical, and contracting needs.29 The Army promptly opened a 

contracting office at CPA headquarters in the Republican Palace in Baghdad, appointing an Army colonel to lead the new office. When he arrived at the end of June 

2003, he found that there were just three contracting officers on staff to manage 

all of the CPA’s work.30 He desperately needed more qualified personnel to help 

produce statements of work—the key element in defining a contract’s scope—and 

more lawyers to review contracting documents. Throughout the CPA’s tenure, the 

contracting office was grievously understaffed.31

These personnel problems were symptomatic of those afflicting the entire 

CPA. With no formal recruiting process in place, the CPA resorted to a “pull system” in which senior advisors determined their staffing needs on an ad hoc basis 

and then sent the requests to the CPA’s human resources office in Baghdad. The 

Baghdad office would then send the request to the CPA’s Pentagon office. 32 This 

procedure was too slow, so CPA officials in Iraq began recruiting staff directly 

from federal agencies and presenting them to human resources for immediate 

processing. 33 The CPA also suffered from a very high personnel turnover rate. 

Part of the cause was that, in the summer of 2003, the U.S. still expected a short 

stay in Iraq, and so most people signed up for three-month tours.34

Because of the CPA’s myriad personnel problems, the White House sent 

Katja Bullock, special assistant to the President for presidential personnel, to 

assist in developing a Joint Manning Document (JMD). Bullock promptly produced a JMD that included personnel needs from federal agencies, contractors, 

and Coalition partners. Submitted to the Joint Staff by July 2003, the JMD called 

for a CPA staff of around 1,200 people, which would double its size.35 The Joint 

Staff quickly filled the military slots, but ignored the civilian ones because it 
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• CPA’s Shortfalls •

had no mechanism in place for forwarding staffing requests to the civilian agencies.36 Colonel Dennis DeGraff, CPA’s personnel director, said that “the civilian 

[personnel] piece...just sat on somebody’s desk in [the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense].”37

At the end of 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld deployed a team to Iraq to assess the 

CPA’s personnel situation. Its report concluded that the CPA was “a pick-up 

organization [seeking] to design and execute the most demanding transformation in recent U.S. history.”38 A CPA Inspector General audit of the organization’s 

personnel management system also found problems, noting that “CPA staffing 

needs changed constantly in terms of the number of required personnel,” and 

that the CPA could not keep an accurate count of its personnel.39

Throughout its tenure, the CPA operated with about one-third fewer people 

than it needed and turnover was constant.40 Retired Lieutenant General Jeffrey 

Oster, who served as the CPA’s deputy administrator and chief operating officer 

during 2004, observed: “If you couldn’t get somebody for 90 days, you’d take 

somebody for 60 days.” When the CPA dissolved on June 28, 2004, only seven 

people had served for the CPA’s entire fourteen-month duration.41

The 3161 Provision

During mid-summer 2003, it became apparent that the CPA was going to be in 

Iraq longer than the few months the Pentagon’s leadership had hoped. Meeting 

personnel needs to support the occupation thus quickly moved up on the list 

of priorities. U.S. civilian agencies were failing to provide enough personnel, so 

the Pentagon established a new recruiting team within its White House Liaison 

Office to find and employ staff. Like ORHA, the new team used a special federal 

law designed for temporary organizations—Section 3161 in Title 5 of the United 

States Code—to fill CPA positions quickly. The 3161 provision permitted federal 

hiring free of the usual position classifications and competition requirements.42

Although the Pentagon’s recruiting team had an efficient and effective hiring 

tool, it still needed a pool of candidates with the right skills and experience to 

support a contingency relief and reconstruction operation. Because a ready pool 

did not exist, many of the personnel that the team recruited were poorly qualified 

for the jobs to which they were assigned.43 Furthermore, using the Pentagon’s 

White House Liaison Office as the locus for senior official recruitment exposed 

the effort to charges of politicization. 

By the spring of 2004, more than twenty percent of the CPA’s staff had been 

hired under the 3161 provision. Coalition partners contributed another thirteen 

percent, and around five percent were contractors. Only 149 of the CPA’s 1,196 

staff were detailed from the civilian agencies. Most of these came from the State 
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• Chapter 7 •

Department, USAID, and the U.S. Treasury. The Defense Department drew 

on its military assets to provide the rest.44 The civilian agencies in the federal 

bureaucracy failed to muster more staff for Iraq because they had neither the 

financial nor personnel resources to support a contingency operation.45 Also, 

the worsening security situation in Iraq proved a deterrent. 

Matching Skills to Jobs

The CPA’s Office of Management and Budget staff exemplified the CPA’s personnel problems. When Retired Rear Admiral David Oliver, the first Director of 

CPA’s OMB, started in June 2003, he requested 31 people to meet his enormous 

mission. When he left five months later, in November 2003, only four of his positions were filled.46 Rodney Bent, who worked for OMB in Washington, replaced 

Oliver, finding severe shortages in staff numbers and skills. Bent discovered that 

none of his employees had ever worked on a budget before being deployed to 

Iraq. “I had a relatively young staff that was completely inexperienced and had 

no particular training either in the Middle East or on budget matters,” said Bent. 

“I would think, if we’re ever in this kind of situation again, that we’d want to draw 

on some of the professional staff that does exist” in Washington.47

The Iraq Reconstruction and Development Council 

Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz and Under Secretary Feith created the Iraq 

Reconstruction and Development Council (IRDC) to bolster cultural awareness and Iraqi outreach. First ORHA and then the CPA used the IRDC’s 150 

members as technical advisors to Iraq’s ministries and provincial offices. These 

Iraqi exiles—most of whom were American citizens—had an ambiguous status 

that set them apart from their CPA colleagues (as well as from Iraqi nationals).48

Some CPA officials had concerns that some IRDC members brought potentially 

troublesome political baggage with them, including ties to factions controlled by 

exile politicians.49

A few IRDC members achieved success. For example, Dr. Sinan al-Shabibi 

later became the governor of the Central Bank of Iraq.50 But the IRDC program 

was far from an overall success. It suffered from severe attrition. In the waning 

days of the CPA, only 27 IRDC members still remained on CPA’s roster.51

A post-mortem of the IRDC effort found that it was poorly planned and 

inadequately managed.52 The difficult IRDC experience underscores the need 

for a preplanned, well-prepared cadre of experts who understand the culture, 

history, and economic foundations of a country undergoing a major relief and 

reconstruction operation.53
• 85 •

• CPA’s Shortfalls •

Although the United States was generally unprepared to take on a large-scale 

occupation and rebuilding mission in Iraq in 2003, one agency notably stepped 

up and performed its mission admirably. The U.S. Department of the Treasury, 

having dispatched a well-staffed and well-qualified team, worked first with ORHA 

and then CPA in 2003 to help prevent the collapse of Iraq’s economy.
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Chapter 8

Treasury’s Triage

The banking system [in Iraq] was in shambles. Electronic 

transfer of funds, widely made to people in developed countries, 

was virtually non-existent, making Iraq’s payment system the 

equivalent of a Model-T Ford.*

John B. Taylor

Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs (2001-2005)

When the first group of U.S. Treasury experts arrived in Baghdad in April 2003, 

they found Iraq’s financial system in ruins. Looters had ransacked the Rafidain 

and Rasheed banking chains and pillaged safe-deposit boxes. Just two of the 170 

Rafidain branches, the largest bank chain in the country, were open.1

 The vault 

of the Central Bank of Iraq contained only $350 million in gold and waterlogged 

bank notes. 2 Nearly a billion dollars in foreign currency had been withdrawn from 

the bank before the war. In early May, Iraq’s ministries were bankrupt, unable to 

pay salaries and pensions, and the country’s currency was dangerously unstable.

The U.S. Treasury team worked through the spring and summer of 2003 to 

battle these devastating problems, shoring up Iraq’s banking system, resuming 

civil servants’ payments, stabilizing the currency, and securing a moratorium on 

repayment of Iraq’s international debts. Negotiations that began later in the year 

would significantly reduce this debt. These efforts, among the most successful and 

most important during the early CPA period, prevented the country’s financial 

collapse. But the larger goal of transforming Iraq’s statist economy into one powered by free-market principles would prove much more difficult.

Paying Iraqi Salaries

In May 2003, the CPA began paying Iraqi governmental salaries and pensions, 

using vested and DFI funds. To end the inequities of Saddam’s payment system, 

Ambassador Bremer approved a four-tier monthly pay scale that permitted civil 

servants, based on their grade, to receive $50, $100, $150, or $250 per month.3

Treasury officials in Baghdad worked with the Iraqi Ministry of Finance to develop a roster of eligible civil servants and pensioners. Ministry officials, who had 

secured their payroll records when the war started, turned them over to the CPA, 

and Bremer’s senior advisors used them to develop employee registers for each 

* John B. Taylor, Global Financial Warriors: The Untold Story of International Finance in the Post-9/11 

World (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007), 200.
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ministry.4 The senior advisors then requested budgets to pay salaries based on 

the new payroll grades. Some professions received instant pay raises. Teachers, 

for example, received $50 per month under the new system, a tenfold increase.5

The CPA initially used the $1.7 billion in vested Iraqi funds to pay salaries.6

The cash was packaged at the Federal Reserve Bank in New York, put on pallets, and flown to Baghdad for distribution. These money flights would occur 

continually over the next year, transporting more than $12 billion—or 237.3 

tons of cash—from the United States to Baghdad to fund Iraqi budgets and reconstruction projects.7

Ged Smith, the director of Treasury’s Office of Technical Assistance, remembered calling the New York Federal Reserve Bank to order the first shipment of 

$20 million in small bills: “The guy just laughed and asked, ‘How many planes 

do you have?’”8

 When the money arrived, CPA’s senior advisors loaded bricks 

of cash—nicknamed “footballs”—into trucks and Chevy Suburbans, delivering 

them personally to their respective ministries to pay salaries and other costs. 

Senior Iraqi officials distributed the money to ministry employees.9

 Although 

the payment process lacked the controls necessary for proper accountability, 

it met the urgent need to provide salaries, inject money into the economy, and 

prevent a political crisis. 

Treasury advisors to Iraq’s Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank moved 

quickly to establish a more controlled payroll system. By late June 2003, procedures were in place to pay government salaries through the Rafidain Bank, whose 

branches were quickly reopening. Forty-six branches were operating by August 

in Baghdad, with another 85 branches across the country.10

More than 90 percent of the salary payments during the CPA’s tenure—all 

paid with either vested or DFI funds flown from the United States—went from 

the CPA Comptroller to the Central Bank and then out to recipients through 

the Rafidain Bank chain.11 John Taylor, the Under Secretary of the Treasury, 

testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the first week 

of June 2003, reported that more than 1.5 million workers and pensioners had 

already started receiving regular payments. He described the payments as an 

“initial financial life-line to the Iraqi people.”12

Although the CPA’s payments and new pay-scale provided a “life-line” for 

many Iraqis, they nearly caused a revolt among oil workers. “In the one-product 

economy that Saddam’s disastrous economic policies had developed for Iraq,” 

said Admiral Dave Oliver, Director of CPA’s Office of Management and Budget, 

“the oil workers were accustomed to being specially pampered and not reluctant 

to express their displeasure.” The CPA promised to come up with a new payscale by September, which “kept the oil and electrical ministries working without 
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significant protest.”13 CPA Order Number 30 created thirteen civil-service classifications, each divided into ten steps on a career ladder that mirrored that of 

the U.S. civil service.14

Flying Billions to Baghdad

The CPA relied on the DFI to fund the operations of Iraq’s ministries and 

to pay for reconstruction projects. Held in a Federal Reserve Bank account 

in New York, DFI cash was flown to Baghdad in very large sums whenever 

the CPA requested. These shipments—the largest airborne transfer of 

currency in history—proved an enormous logistical challenge. A typical 

pallet of DFI cash had 640 bundles, with a thousand bills in each bundle. 

Each loaded pallet weighed about 1,500 pounds. The pallets were flown 

into Baghdad’s airport at night and were then driven to the Central Bank 

of Iraq for deposit.15

The first emergency air-lift of money to Iraq was for $20 million, but the 

shipments rapidly grew in size. In December 2003, the CPA requested a 

$1.5 billion shipment, at the time the largest single payout of U.S. currency 

in Federal Reserve Bank history.16 But that record was soon broken when, 

in June 2004, more than $4 billion was flown to Iraq, just before the CPA’s 

transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government. 

The Currency Exchange

Before the war, U. S. Treasury officials were concerned about the two different 

currencies in circulation in Iraq. In northern Iraq, the Kurds used the old Iraqi 

currency, known as the “Swiss” dinar, so named because the currency’s original 

plates were made in Switzerland. In the south, Iraqis used the “Saddam” dinar, 

which bore Saddam Hussein’s picture. The fact that the Saddam dinar was emblazoned with the dictator’s portrait was just one of its problems. It was also easy 

to counterfeit, had only two denominations in circulation, and had plunged in 

value since the 1991 Gulf War. 17

Treasury officials knew that a stable and unified currency system would be 

essential to Iraq’s long-term economic health, so they developed a currency exchange program as part of the agency’s prewar strategy.18 In July 2003, Bremer 

announced the currency exchange plan, noting that the CPA would print and 

distribute new Iraqi banknotes and make them available to the Iraqi public in 

mid-October.19 The Central Bank of Iraq, with Treasury’s support, would manage 
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the exchange and the “New Iraqi Dinar” would replace both the Swiss and the 

Saddam dinars.20

“Currently everyone in Iraq carries a reminder of Saddam in their pockets—

on the banknotes they’re using,” Bremer said. “Shortly after October 15, the first 

batch of Saddam notes will go into the incinerator. At close of business January 

15, 2004, Saddam notes will no longer be legal tender.”21 Between October 2003 

and January 2004, the CPA carried out the exchange with armed convoys delivering the new Iraqi dinars to 243 banks across Iraq. Insurgents attacked fifteen of the 

convoys, wounding eleven people.22 But the attacks did not stop the conversion. 

Iraqis exchanged their old dinars for new ones at banks across the country, with 

the old notes shipped to Baghdad for burning.23

President Bush hailed the exchange program as an important achievement: 

“A stable currency, a new currency, a currency without the picture of the dictator 

or tyrant, or the torturer, however you want to define him, is important for the 

future.”24 The new dinar was stable enough by the end of 2006 to begin appreciating against the dollar.25

Relieving Iraq’s Debt

Estimates of Iraq’s external debt in 2003 ran as high as $130 billion.26 Fearing 

that interest payments on the debt alone could consume most of the country’s 

income, Treasury made it a priority to persuade Iraq’s international creditors 

to forgive or restructure Iraq’s mammoth debt.27 It secured an initial agreement 

with the G-8—comprising the world’s top eight industrialized democracies—to 

give Iraq eighteen months before seeking interest payments on any Iraqi debt. 

Treasury then embarked on an intense negotiation process which eventually 

secured extraordinary debt relief for Iraq.28

In December 2003, President Bush appointed former Secretary of State and 

Secretary of the Treasury James Baker as his special envoy for Iraq’s debt to lead 

the negotiations. Baker heavily engaged with the Paris Club, a debt forum comprising the world’s nineteen richest countries, eventually securing a commitment 

from Club members to write down Iraq’s foreign debt.29

At their economic summit in June 2004, the G-8 endorsed an IMF finding 

that Iraq’s debt should be reduced by 90 to 95 percent. Iraq’s new Minister of 

Finance Abdul al-Mahdi then asked the Paris Club creditors to reduce Iraq’s debt 

by 95 percent and to reschedule payments of the remaining debt over a 23-year 

period. The United States, Canada, and Britain supported the request. Baker’s 

negotiations over the next five months produced a hugely beneficial outcome: 80 

percent of Iraq’s $38.9 billion debt to Paris Club creditors was forgiven.30 More 

significant debt forgiveness would follow over the next few years, which helped 
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the country’s foundering economy to stabilize and begin to grow. The extraordinary elimination of much of Iraq’s debt since 2003 amounts to one of the most 

generous acts of collective international debt-forgiveness in modern times.

CPA’s Economic Reform Agenda

In May 2003, Peter McPherson, the CPA’s Director of Economic Policy, oversaw the CPA effort to pay Iraqi government salaries, restart the banking system, 

and manage the currency exchange program, he began to implement reforms 

to open Iraq’s economy to the free market.31 Some in the CPA contended that 

these reforms should be implemented gradually; others urged letting Iraqis resolve their own issues regarding the country’s economic structure after the CPA 

left.32 The IMF warned that in transition economies like Iraq, “implementation of 

these reforms has typically been difficult and time consuming, reflecting the need 

to build political support for reforms to ensure that they are durable, and that 

adequate institutional capacity exists to ensure effective implementation.”33 But 

McPherson pointed to the IMF’s report on economic reform efforts in Eastern 

Europe, which concluded that the earlier reforms are made, the faster economic 

growth will occur.34 McPherson and his economic team moved briskly ahead, 

focusing much of the CPA’s reformist effort on Iraq’s state-owned enterprises 

and the country’s banking system.

State-owned Enterprises 

After the March 2003 invasion, most of Iraq’s SOEs shut down because of looting. Three wars and a decade of international sanctions had left them “seriously 

de-capitalized, asset-starved, obsolescent, inefficient, saddled with high production costs, over-staffed, and—as a result of looting—in a state of physical 

degradation.”35 But Iraq’s 192 SOEs were the “sole providers of essential public 

utilities and the leading providers of a large number of public goods and services 

as well as of consumer and industrial products.” They accounted for 90 percent 

of the country’s industrial capacity. Eleven different ministries oversaw various 

SOEs, which employed an estimated 500,000 people, or roughly one-eighth of 

the country’s workforce.36

The CPA considered three separate but related issues regarding the SOEs. 

First, how much budget support should it provide to these state businesses? 

Second, should the SOEs be able to draw upon their deposits held by state banks? 

And third, should the debt between the SOEs be cancelled?37

Regarding budgetary support, McPherson and the ministry advisors differed 

on the degree to which the CPA should assist the largely inefficient and outdated 

state-run businesses. The CPA did continue to pay all SOE salaries and, in the early 
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days, gave some financial support to a number of SOEs in the electricity, oil, water, 

and health sectors. But McPherson, who saw the SOEs as vestiges of Saddam’s 

statist economy, did not want to risk wasting additional money on businesses 

about which the CPA had little knowledge. He demanded proof that support for 

the SOEs would stimulate the economy and, in time, create viable companies.38

Some of CPA’s senior advisors, however, pushed to have more money allocated 

immediately to the SOEs, which they saw as vital to Iraq’s economy.39

As to SOE bank accounts, McPherson made the controversial decision in July, 

when the two largest government banks began opening branches, to freeze all 

SOE deposit accounts at these banks. The move prevented individual SOEs from 

drawing on their accounts to purchase supplies, make needed capital improvements, or pay debts. McPherson was concerned about the viability of the state 

banks, which had recorded deposits amounting to about $2 billion but had only 

about $1 billion on hand.40 He feared that any attempt by the SOEs to withdraw 

their money could spark a run on the banks.41

At the same time that the CPA froze the SOE bank accounts, it also cancelled 

all of their debts. McPherson contended that the “maze of obligations between 

government entities” was so complicated and that so many records had been destroyed by looting, that it would take more than a year to sort them out and “even 

then you would not have an accurate record.”42 He concluded, with Bremer’s 

concurrence, that “we should clean the slate and move on.”43 McPherson said that 

many of the SOEs could not survive without huge subsidies, and that he wanted 

to fund only “those that could make practical use of CPA money.”44

Some members of the Treasury’s economic team and senior advisors to the 

ministries objected to these decisions. They contended that debt cancellation 

could weaken the Iraqi government’s long-term credit standing. Moreover, they 

argued that freezing the bank deposits and cancelling all the debt among the SOEs 

hurt the most viable companies—those with money in their accounts—and 

risked leaving Iraq without a manufacturing base and with a huge unemployment 

problem.45 There were also legal concerns about the CPA’s authority under international law to effectively shut down much of Iraq’s manufacturing base.46

Timothy Carney—the CPA’s senior advisor to the Ministry of Industries and 

Minerals, which supervised a number of SOEs—urged that Iraqis should have a 

say in this significant economic decision. In a June 15, 2007 memo to McPherson, 

Carney warned that the proposed SOE policy “risks [undermining the] assets of 

the Iraqi people” and “was drawn up without adequate Iraqi participation.”47

The CPA changed course at the end of July, and started to provide additional 

operating budgets for those SOEs, such as the cement and fertilizer companies, 

that could produce goods and services needed to support reconstruction. By the 
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end of August, about one-third of the SOEs had reopened.48 Dr. Sami al-Araji, an 

American-trained mechanical engineer who had been working for the Ministry 

of Industry and Minerals, criticized the policy on SOEs, because he believed they 

“would have been able to support the [reconstruction] work in the electrical, oil, 

health, water and sewerage, and transport sectors.”49

Banking Reforms

During Saddam’s rule, banks functioned as “vehicles for storing and moving cash 

around the country and—in some cases—outside the country.” They were not 

commercially viable institutions that promoted economic growth.50 The CPA 

economic team and USAID agreed that Iraq’s banking sector needed modernizing, but disagreed on how to do it.51

The CPA promulgated three orders to reform the Iraqi banking system. The 

first, issued on July 7, 2003, suspended the country’s old banking laws, which 

had allowed only the Ministry of Finance to authorize loans to government 

ministries, and gave the Central Bank of Iraq the “authority to determine and 

implement monetary and credit policy without the approval of the Ministry of 

Finance.”52 The second order, issued on July 14, 2003, created the Trade Bank 

of Iraq to manage DFI funds and to help Iraqi businesses finance the imports 

of goods. Noting that Iraq lacked “financial institutions capable of facilitating 

imports and exports of goods and services to and from Iraq,” the CPA authorized the Trade Bank’s capitalization at $100 million.53 The Trade Bank, one 

the CPA’s more important achievements, would issue letters of credit worth 

more than $16 billion over the next five years.54 The third banking order, issued 

on September 19, 2003, established rules for bank licensing, capitalization, 

and management.55

These orders collectively effected two major economic changes simultaneously. They modernized the banking system—making it more structured and 

stable—and changed the credit system, giving more Iraqis greater access to 

capital. Under Saddam, Iraqi banks required hard collateral, such as houses, 

jewelry, gold, or property, to secure a loan. The CPA wanted the banks to make 

credit more available, hoping that increased access to financing would spur 

economic growth.56

The CPA’s banking reforms, however, did not have a significant effect on 

credit practices because the bank branches continued to require 100 percent 

collateral for loans. They could not quickly break their Saddam-era habits, even 

though the Finance Ministry had provided a written guarantee of 50 percent 

against possible losses made on small business loans.57
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The Limits of Economic Change

A number of factors constrained the CPA’s ability to make sweeping economic 

reforms in post-invasion Iraq.58 Disagreement within the Coalition’s ranks over 

the scope of economic reform measures, together with Iraqi opposition, stalled 

ambitious attempts to create a more open economy in Iraq and sidetracked SOE 

reform. There was never any serious discussion about the privatization of electricity, and the oil industry was considered off limits from the beginning. 

The deteriorating security situation and the November 15, 2003 decision 

to accelerate the return of sovereignty to Iraq made it all but impossible for the 

CPA to tackle other significant economic issues, like the state subsidies for food, 

electricity, and fuel.59 By the beginning of 2004, the CPA had set aside its freemarket reform agenda, focusing instead on planning the political transition and 

implementing a wave of new reconstruction projects. According to Ali Allawi, 

who served as Minister of Trade during 2003, “there was not one [Iraqi] voice 

raised in support of the CPA’s economic plans.”60
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Bremer’s Grand Vision

We seem to have transitioned from a cautious beginning 

to requesting funding for everything without a plan or a 

thorough justification. And not only have the cost estimates 

been unrealistic, the entire postwar experience appears to have 

taken us by surprise. We were told that we would be welcomed 

with open arms by the Iraqi people and that Iraqi government 

institutions would be restored after a short hiatus. The vision of 

postwar reconstruction presented to Congress at that time was for 

many of us either hopelessly naive or grossly incompetent. *

Representative Nita Lowey (D-NY)

Chair, House Appropriations Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations 

During mid-2003, several U.S. agencies and international organizations travelled to Iraq to conduct assessments on the country’s reconstruction needs. The 

resulting surveys projected rebuilding costs ranging up to $60 billion, far higher 

than prewar estimates. In the wake of these assessments, Dave Oliver, Director 

of CPA’s Office of Management and Budget, observed: “Our invasion seemed 

to have occurred just as the condition of the entire infrastructure teetered on the 

edge of the cliff of disaster.”1

The assessments also caused Ambassador Bremer to push the CPA to develop 

a new and much more ambitious reconstruction plan. His new vision embraced a 

rebuilding program many times larger than any previously proposed, which would 

require enormous increases in U.S. funding for Iraq’s relief and reconstruction. 

2003 Assessments of Iraq

Four organizations conducted major reviews of Iraq’s infrastructure and economy during the CPA’s first three months: Bechtel, USACE, the UN, and the 

Center for Strategic and International Studies. Their reporting helped shape the 

next phase of the U.S. relief and reconstruction effort.

* Representative Nita Lowey, Statement before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign 

Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Hold Hearing on FY2004 Supplemental: Iraq 

Reconstruction Funds, September 24, 2003.
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The USAID/Bechtel Infrastructure Assessment

Bechtel’s first job under its $680 million contract with USAID was to assess Iraq’s 

infrastructure in six areas: surface transportation, aviation, buildings, water, electricity, and the Umm Qasr Port in southern Iraq. During late April and May 2003, 

Bechtel teams surveyed dozens of sites across the country. What they found disturbed them. Iraq’s infrastructure had collapsed. They estimated rehabilitation 

costs at about $16 billion.2

Bechtel’s assessment identified five challenges then confronting the U.S. 

reconstruction program: (1) worsening security, (2) poor interagency coordination, (3) limited access to information, (4) confusing contracting regulations 

(5) the prevalence of unexploded ordnance. The report predicted that Iraq’s 

deteriorating security situation would cause reconstruction costs to skyrocket. 

The ultimate success of the reconstruction program, Bechtel further noted, 

demanded improved coordination among the U.S. government agencies 

involved.3

 Bechtel urged the CPA to adopt a new systemic approach to rehabilitating Iraq’s infrastructure because: “Power, water, airports, rail, and the port 

are all integrated systems, and each has to be understood as critical components 

of an overall infrastructure network to arrive at the most economic and effective 

implementation plan.”4

The USACE Oil Sector Assessment

In May 2003, USACE, working with Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil, KBR, and 

the Iraqi Ministry of Oil, surveyed Iraq’s oil infrastructure. USACE’s report approximated oil sector damage at $457 million from the war and $943 million from 

postwar looting, estimating reconstruction funding requirements at $1.7 billion. 

But USACE advised that this figure could vary by as much as 40 percent.5

USACE’s assessment underscored the need to sequence and integrate oil 

facility repair with infrastructure work in other sectors. The electrical power grid 

depended on fuel from the oil sector, and oil production facilities required a 

steady supply of electricity. Power plants and oil facilities needed water to cool 

generators. The assessment found that “[a] failure of one component in the system [created] a related problem elsewhere in the system.”6

 Systemic interdependence demanded a high degree of coordination between 

the Iraqi ministries of oil and electricity—coordination that would be missing 

for most of the next five years. USACE emphasized the importance of obtaining 

Iraqi input at every step of the rebuilding process, highlighting the need to build 

capacity so that Iraqis could properly operate and maintain the new parts of their 

infrastructure. Like Bechtel, USACE flagged the growing security problem as a 

major obstacle to further progress.7
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The UN Assessment 

A joint assessment team from the UN and the World Bank spent the summer of 

2003 in Iraq evaluating the country’s development needs, in part to prepare for 

a donors’ conference scheduled for October 2003 in Madrid. The team’s report 

documented the severe consequences of Saddam’s neglect of and under-investment in Iraq’s infrastructure, economy, and social institutions.8

The UN calculated that rebuilding Iraq would cost at least $56 billion over 

three years, with $36 billion needed for health, education, agriculture, privatesector development, government capacity building, and the rule of law. The 

assessment addressed neither oil nor security, opting instead to include CPA’s 

$20 billion estimates for these sectors.9

 Like Bechtel and USACE, the UN report 

warned that, unless the Coalition restored security across Iraq, the economic and 

political transformation of the country could not proceed:

Security concerns are paramount to the Iraqi population, 

influencing their ability to move freely, engage in work and 

education, and participate in the burgeoning political process. 

Without security, progress in rebuilding the critical infrastructure, health and education systems, and access to electricity 

and clean water that have been degraded and destroyed by 

years of corruption, conflict, neglect, and sanctions may be too 

slow to provide a noticeable improvement in the quality of life 

and reassure the Iraqi people of the benefits of a transition to 

an open and democratic society.10

The UN also emphasized the need to strengthen government institutions and 

to restore “core human services.” It identified factors that could impede Iraq’s 

recovery. High on the list was the requirement to restore the almost nonexistent 

executive and administrative capacities of Iraq’s public institutions, most acutely 

revealed in the absence of an effective financial management system.11

The CSIS Assessment

In June 2003, at the request of Secretary Rumsfeld, John Hamre, president of 

the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), led a delegation of 

post-conflict reconstruction experts to Iraq to determine the country’s rebuilding needs. Hamre and his team visited nine of the country’s eighteen provinces 

and met with the CPA’s senior leadership. The CSIS report concluded that the 

United States faced an “enormous task” in Iraq, would have “to stay the course” 

for several years, and would need to provide significant initial funding for reconstruction programs.12
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• Bremer’s Grand Vision •

CSIS also pointedly warned that the CPA had to address immediately the 

deteriorating security situation in Iraq. Hamre recommended engaging more 

Iraqis at every level of the reconstruction effort, expanding programs that could 

provide Iraqis with employment opportunities, and decentralizing political power 

to the provinces. The CSIS report advised that “[the] CPA must be given rapid 

and flexible funding,” adding that “business as usual” was “not an option for operations in Iraq, nor can it be for the funding.”13

A New Strategic Vision

Concurrent with the outside assessments, the CPA’s Office of Strategic Planning 

drafted CPA’s Vision for Iraq, which supplanted ORHA’s Unified Mission Plan.

14

Dayton Maxwell, a former USAID official who had served with JTF-4 during 

prewar planning, was the senior civilian in CPA’s policy planning office, and 

Lieutenant Colonel Robert Polk was the senior military officer.15 They both had 

helped craft ORHA’s Unified Mission Plan before the war.16

The Vision for Iraq defined the CPA’s mission as working to achieve “the conditions for a free, sovereign, democratically elected representative government.” 

The document outlined, in general terms, five “core foundations” that CPA would 

lay to support Iraq through its democratic transformation: security, essential services and civil society, economy, governance, and strategic communications. 

The highest priority, according to the Vision, was “to create a secure and safe 

environment, without which the CPA recognized there could be little progress 

on other goals.” The CPA would work to restore security across the country by 

recruiting and training Iraqi police and military forces. Other goals included 

promoting a rapid transition to a market economy and establishing an effective 

rule-of-law system. The document called for new programs to develop democracy, to create equitable criminal justice processes, to implement a new and fair 

penal code, and to construct new courthouses and prisons. The success of the 

Vision depended upon a “coherent and coordinated information campaign” that 

would explain the scope and nature of U.S. programs to all Iraqis.17

In mid-July, Ambassador Bremer sent the Vision for Iraq to the Pentagon. “I 

am confident,” he wrote, “that this will put us on course for success.”18 By July 18, 

2003, senior Pentagon officials had approved it.19

In the meantime, Ambassador Bremer had tasked Maxwell and Polk to expand the Vision for Iraq by identifying specific tasks aimed at implementing the 

five core foundations, and they quickly completed a new detailed framework, 

entitled Achieving the Vision to Restore Full Sovereignty to the Iraqi People. In late 

July, Bremer took the framework to Washington for briefings with the Congress, 

senior Administration officials, and the press. The 30-page document was the 
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CPA’s first attempt to develop, in some detail, the litany of actions required to 

achieve the core foundational goals of the Vision for Iraq.

20

The CPA’s Achieving the Vision suffered from some serious flaws. First, Iraqis 

were not sufficiently consulted on it. The Iraqi Governing Council, which was 

appointed on July 13, was never given a chance to provide advice on it. Maxwell 

and Polk expressed concern at the time that the CPA was handing the Iraqis a 

fait accompli—a plan they were “just going to have to eat.”21 The CPA also had 

established overly ambitious infrastructure outcomes before ascertaining baseline 

conditions and before determining costs. Moreover, the outcomes had unrealistic 

completion dates, some by October 2003, just three months later. 

The ambitious goals contained in Achieving the Vision included deploying 

30,000 trained Iraqi police, re-establishing the Iraqi Border Guard, reopening 

all courthouses, building eleven new prisons and detention centers, reforming 

the ministries, improving electricity generation capacity to 4,000 megawatts, 

restoring basic health care services to prewar levels, rehabilitating 1,000 schools, 

and reopening the airports and railroads.22 Even under the best of conditions, 

achieving these outcomes on a short timetable was virtually impossible. 

Developing Iraq’s Budget

In early July 2003, the CPA published a budget to fund ministry needs for the 

rest of calendar year 2003. CPA’s senior advisors, then serving as the de facto 

ministers for each ministry, compiled what data they could find and developed a 

budget totaling $6.10 billion. The CPA predicted oil revenues for the rest of 2003 

to be $3.46 billion and expected $432.7 million from taxes and the state-owned 

enterprises, leaving a deficit of $2.2 billion. Bremer planned to cover the difference with vested and seized Iraqi funds, the DFI, and new U.S. appropriations. 

The new Iraqi budget provided only $609.5 million for reconstruction and 

capital improvements.23 This could not begin to meet Iraq’s many reconstruction needs. The CPA’s economic team knew that without a major infusion of 

additional funds, it would not be possible to realize any of the objectives listed 

in Achieving the Vision.

On adoption of the 2003 budget, Ambassador Bremer ordered his senior advisors to develop, with their Iraqi counterparts, a 2004 budget. This effort produced 

more than $35 billion in ministerial requests, but Iraq’s projected 2004 revenues 

amounted to less than $13 billion, leaving a projected deficit of $23 billion.24

“No matter how we pared the list,” said Oliver, “we needed [over] $20 billion 

more than we had available.”25 Faced with a huge shortfall, Ambassador Bremer 

decided to ask the Congress for a dramatic increase in funding to support Iraq’s 
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• Bremer’s Grand Vision •

relief and reconstruction. He would also look to the international community 

for significant contributions. 

In July and August 2003, Oliver and the CPA’s economic team developed a 

new supplemental funding request for Iraq reconstruction that would go to the 

Congress in September. They also shaped the U.S. proposal for the International 

Donors Conference planned in October.26

Asking Congress for Money

In late July 2003, Dave Oliver directed the CPA’s senior advisors involved with infrastructure to contribute to a new reconstruction plan, which would provide the 

basis for the new supplemental request. Oliver charged Dave Nash, a retired rear 

admiral recently arrived in Baghdad as the deputy senior advisor to the Ministry of 

Transportation and Communications, to coordinate the plan’s development.27

Just a few months earlier, Nash had been working as a construction manager in Birmingham, Alabama, for Parsons Brinckerhoff (a large U.S. contractor 

that would later receive sizable Iraq reconstruction contracts). He had made his 

career as a Navy engineer, rising to command the Naval Facilities Engineering 

Command and serving as Chief of Civil Engineers. Like many of the CPA’s early 

recruits, he was in Iraq on a 90-day contract. With a wealth of experience in large 

public-works projects, Admiral Nash arrived at the Republican Palace just as 

CPA’s leadership needed someone with significant construction expertise to 

develop an expansive strategy to rebuild Iraq’s infrastructure.28

After briefly considering asking the Congress for $5 billion, Nash and his planners developed a much larger request. Working with CPA’s senior advisors, Nash 

pulled together a long list of infrastructure projects that would cost about $27 

billion. After whittling it down to $20.3 billion, Bremer approved the proposal 

in early August and sent it to Washington. 

On August 15, 2003, Joshua Bolten, Director of the White House OMB, 

wrote Secretary Rumsfeld, objecting to the size of the CPA’s request. The White 

House had already told the Congress that it would not ask for additional funding 

for Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003. Bolten said the CPA would have to provide a 

detailed justification before the Administration would consider going back to the 

Congress to argue for more money for Iraq reconstruction.29

The CPA had hired Tom Korologos as a senior counselor. Korologos, a veteran lobbyist, addressed Bolten’s concerns in a memo to Bremer on August 17, 

2003. “To delay getting our funds will be a political disaster for the President,” 

he wrote. “His election will hang for a large part on show of progress in Iraq and 

without the funding this year, progress will grind to a halt.” Korologos added that 

he did not believe that the Congress would turn down the supplemental request 
• 100 •

• Chapter 9 •

because “the faster the Iraq CPA succeeds, the quicker ‘our 150,000 boys over 

there’ will start coming home.”30

By the end of August, the CPA had answered Bolten’s demand for more 

data, producing a “Program/Integration Management Plan for Recovery, 

Reconstruction and Redevelopment of Iraq.” The plan’s stated objective was 

to “assist in restoring the stability of Iraq and the Iraqi economy by means of 

infrastructure and development.” It emphasized that U.S. funds were essential to 

meet Iraq’s critical infrastructure needs because oil production and revenues were 

stagnant.31 “These needs are immediate and urgent,” the plan asserted, adding that 

the CPA would “begin execution of these funds before the end of 2003.”32

The CPA’s answer satisfied Bolten. On September 6, 2003, OMB submitted 

a $20.3 billion supplemental request to the Congress. President Bush announced 

the next day that he had asked the Congress for a total of $87 billion to support Iraq 

and Afghanistan, including the $20.3 billion for Iraq’s reconstruction, noting: 

This budget request will support our commitment to helping the 

Iraqi and Afghan people rebuild their own nations, after decades 

of oppression and mismanagement. We will provide funds to 

help them improve security. And we will help them to restore 

basic services, such as electricity and water, and to build new 

schools, roads, and medical clinics. This effort is essential to the 

stability of those nations, and, therefore, to our own security.33

USAID’s Complaints

USAID officials were perturbed by both the process and the substance of the 

CPA’s supplemental request, having been shut out from its development. They 

believed Bremer had acted “in a non-transparent way” and expressed grave concerns about the plan’s failure to include sufficient money for capacity building, 

democracy programs, agriculture efforts, and economic development.34 USAID 

Administrator Andrew Natsios sharply disagreed with the CPA’s premise that a 

large-scale infrastructure program would quickly create jobs and help solve Iraq’s 

most pressing problems. “Development is not building things,” he said. “It’s not 

engineering. It’s institution building.”35

USAID was particularly concerned about underinvestment in the agricultural 

sector, which, at the time of the 2003 invasion, was the country’s second-largest 

employer. Natsios was shocked to find that the supplemental had zero for agricultural programs, which he said are essential “to stimulate the economy and 

keep all the young men in the rural areas,” rather than have them stream into the 

cities where they could be recruited as insurgents.36
• 101 •

• Bremer’s Grand Vision •

In August 2003, before the submission of the supplemental, USAID’s 

Baghdad office sent a memo to Oliver outlining its objections and encouraging 

him to revise the request so that it addressed Iraq’s long-term needs for capacity 

building and sustainability. Oliver responded that the Congress would not fund 

“soft” projects and that the request would not be changed.37

The dispute between the CPA and USAID intensified when USAID discovered 

that the CPA, a Defense Department organization, would manage all of the IRRF 

2 funds. Lewis Lucke, USAID’s Mission Director in Iraq, complained to Oliver:

To exclude us—especially considering the success we have 

achieved and are achieving to date in our programs, and the 

fact that we are a professional development organization that 

is by nature operational overseas—seems short-sighted and 

territorial in the extreme to the detriment of the overall U.S. 

mission in Iraq.38

USAID then developed its own $5 billion supplemental funding request, emphasizing public health and education, the economy, government accountability, 

and technical support. It called for $3.25 billion to restore essential electricity, 

transportation, irrigation, and water infrastructure.39 The proposal gained no 

traction, either within the Administration or on Capitol Hill. Relations between 

USAID and CPA officials continued to deteriorate during and after the submission 

of the 2003 supplemental request. These breakdowns, both personal and bureaucratic, would continue to affect the reconstruction program for years to come.40

Congressional Debates on the Supplemental

During the last two weeks of September 2003, the Congress held seven hearings 

on the supplemental, during which members from both parties demanded to 

know why Iraq was not shouldering more of the reconstruction program’s financial burden. Some argued that the United States should provide support through 

loans, while others saw CPA’s request as an extravagant “wish list.”41

“When I look at some of these justifications and when I look at some of 

the postwar planning in general, two thoughts strike me,” said Representative 

David Obey (D-WI), the ranking member of the House Committee on 

Appropriations. “It looks like it was put together by the president of an 

Optimists Club, rather than someone with an understanding of the world; and 

secondly, it looks like the execution plans have been put together more like an 

MBA term paper than a document that reflects a realistic understanding of the 

society that we’re wishing to operate in.”42
• 102 •

• Chapter 9 •

Senate and House committee members peppered the CPA with written 

“questions for the record” about contracting, management, and oversight. Some 

legislators were struck by the fact that the CPA request contained more than $15 

billion for construction, but provided virtually no information about the contracting 

process. Others raised concerns that the CPA had failed to prioritize the sectors or 

projects within sectors and had not provided timetables for program completion.43

One member observed that a construction program of the size and scope proposed 

by the CPA would take five to seven years to complete in the United States. 

The CPA brushed off all objections: “Our estimates differ. While some of the 

most complex projects may take several years to complete, we anticipate that the 

majority of construction can be completed much sooner.”44

The Congress also raised concerns that the huge appropriation would serve as 

a disincentive to international donors. The CPA countered that Iraq would need 

between $50 billion and $75 billion for reconstruction—well above the supplemental request—and that it planned on presenting a “rich package of projects 

that should appeal to the donors” at the Madrid conference in October.45

The Madrid International Donors Conference

Creating that “rich package” fell to CPA’s Council for International Coordination. 

CPA Regulation Number 5 created the council on June 18, 2003, “to be the 

CPA’s focal point and coordination body for international assistance in the relief, recovery and development of Iraq.”46 Bremer tasked the council, chaired by 

Marek Belka—an economics professor who had served as Poland’s deputy prime 

minister and minister of finance—to coordinate assistance from governments as 

well as international and nongovernmental organizations, make recommendations to the PRB on international assistance efforts in Iraq, coordinate with the 

IMF and the World Bank, and—most important—prepare for the October 2003 

Madrid Donors Conference.47

As he organized for Madrid, Belka faced two significant challenges. First, 

he had to put together a plausible list of projects that interested donors might 

support. Second, he had to overcome the lack of interest on the part of certain 

countries, such as Germany, France, and Russia, that had opposed the Iraq invasion and thus might be disinclined to support Iraq’s economic recovery. 

Planning for Madrid suffered a devastating blow when, on August 19, 2003, 

a truck bomb destroyed the UN headquarters in Baghdad, killing the SecretaryGeneral’s Special Representative, Sergio Vieira de Mello, and 21 others.48 This 

tragedy caused the UN to pull out of Iraq, and cast a pall over Belka’s efforts.49

The attack eventually led many countries to conclude that security was so bad in 

Iraq that contributing funds could have little positive effect in the near term. 
• 103 •

• Bremer’s Grand Vision •

On October 16, 2003, the UN issued Security Council Resolution 1511, 

which aimed to assuage international concerns about America’s expanding role 

and lengthening stay in Iraq. The new resolution stressed the temporary nature 

of the Coalition’s occupation and encouraged the United States to transfer sovereignty to the Iraqis as soon as practicable. Issued shortly before the Madrid 

Donors Conference, UNSCR 1511 was crafted in part to calm the concerns of 

donor nations about U.S. plans for Iraq and thereby persuade them to contribute 

to Iraq’s reconstruction.50 But it did not have this effect.

On October 23 and 24, 2003, a total of 76 countries, 20 international organizations—including the IMF and the World Bank—and 13 nongovernmental 

organizations participated in the Madrid Donors Conference. The United States 

pledged $18.4 billion (the amount of the pending supplemental), and the other 

countries combined pledged a total of $13.5 billion in grants and loans. Fewer 

than half of the attendees announced contributions. Germany, France, and 

Russia pledged nothing. Japan offered the most, contributing more than a third 

of the total non-U.S. amount pledged—$1.5 billion in grants for 2004 and $3.4 

billion in loans.51

To help manage international donations, the UN created the International 

Reconstruction Fund Facility, which the UN Development Group and the World 

Bank would oversee. All qualified companies from any country could bid on 

contracts for projects paid for by the fund.52

Congress Passes IRRF 2

The Congress debated the CPA’s supplemental request during October 2003, 

and, on November 6, it passed the “Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act 

for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan for Fiscal Year 

2004,” allocating $18.4 billion to the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF 

2). The Congress made the money available for two years, meaning that it had to 

be fully contracted by September 30, 2006. Notably, the Congress required the 

CPA to provide an accounting for all revenues—domestic and foreign, including Iraqi—used for Iraq’s reconstruction.53 The Act also created a new oversight 

office—the Inspector General for the Coalition Provisional Authority—which 

became SIGIR in October 2004.

Although the Congress approved the CPA’s funding request almost intact, 

the legislators imposed greater controls and more oversight for IRRF 2, dividing the money among ten sectors and giving the CPA limited authority to make 

adjustments. The Congress provided that the CPA could shift up to ten percent 

from one sector to another, but no sector could be increased by more than twenty 

percent without congressional approval. 
• 104 •

• Chapter 9 •

Iraq Relief and Reconstruction 2 Sector Allocations ($ Billions)

Sector Allocation

Electricity $5.56

Water Resources and Sanitation $4.33

Security and Law Enforcement $3.24

Oil Infrastructure $1.89

Justice, Public Safety Infrastructure, and Civil Society $1.32

Health Care $0.79

Transportation and Telecommunications $0.50

Roads, Bridges, and Construction $0.37

Education, Refugees, Human Rights, and Governance $0.28

Private Sector Development $0.15

Total $18.44

Source: P.L. 108-106, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of 

Iraq and Afghanistan for Fiscal Year 2004, November 6, 2003. Numbers may not add up due to rounding.

The IRRF 2 legislation stipulated that, in addition to the CPA, only five 

agencies could use the funds to implement reconstruction programs—the 

Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Department of the 

Treasury, the Department of Health and Human Services, and USAID. The 

Congress encouraged each to “provide significant financial resources, technical 

assistance, and capacity building to counterpart organizations led by Iraqis.”54

Section 2207 of the legislation required the OMB, in consultation with the 

CPA’s Administrator, to submit quarterly reports to the Congress on the status 

of IRRF 2 projects. The first Section 2207 Report was due on January 5, 2004, and 

it had to contain a complete list of proposed projects.55 The CPA now had less 

than two months to compile the list of projects, develop a spend plan, and build 

an office to manage what quickly had become the largest foreign reconstruction 

program for a single country in U.S. history.
• 105 •

Chapter 10

Contracting Billions for Reconstruction

They [CPA] sat down in a four-day period and came up with a 

list of projects of what they wanted to do. And they were all highend capital expenditures: build the big this, build the big that.*

Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli 

Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq (2006)

In early November 2003, the Congress appropriated $18.4 billion to the Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF 2). The CPA had established the Program 

Management Office (PMO) to oversee the burgeoning reconstruction program, 

and Bremer had appointed Dave Nash, the man who had helped develop the 

new reconstruction plan, as the PMO’s first director. Nash quickly shaped a new 

management structure for the CPA’s reconstruction efforts and began developing 

a program of projects. In the IRRF 2 legislation, the Congress required the CPA 

to produce a “spend plan”—a comprehensive list of projects, including estimated 

costs and timelines for completion by early January 2004. 

The $18.4 billion IRRF 2 program would included $12.6 billion for construction projects and another $4 billion for procurement, including everything from 

personal protective gear, weapons, and vehicles for Iraq’s security forces to construction materials for the oil, water, and electricity sectors. The remaining $1.8 

billion was for capacity development, governance, and economic reform programs.1

 Almost all of the IRRF 2 was designated as Defense Department money, 

meaning that the Pentagon was ultimately responsible for the use of this reconstruction money.

Creating the Program Management Office

The CPA created the PMO because USACE and USAID—the two U.S. agencies 

with established systems for managing large construction and international assistance programs—reported that they did not have the resources in Iraq to manage 

an $18.4 billion rebuilding effort. USAID said it did not have the staff or organizational capacity to manage more than a $5 billion program. USACE was just 

starting to establish its new office in Iraq—the Gulf Region Division (GRD)—to 

manage infrastructure projects, and it would not open until January 2004.2

* SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, former Commander of MNC-I, February 

19, 2008.
• 106 •

• Chapter 10 •

Ambassador Bremer had to move rapidly on his mammoth new reconstruction plan to demonstrate the U.S. commitment to restoring Iraq’s essential 

services and promoting the country’s economic development. The question 

was how to do so. With USACE and USAID out of the picture, Admiral Nash 

persuaded Bremer that, by consolidating management of the entire program 

under the PMO and staffing it largely with contractors, the CPA could launch 

the IRRF 2 program by the end of 2003. To meet this timeline, Nash proposed 

outsourcing most of the management to private contractors.

Steve Browning, who headed the CPA’s Office of Iraqi Infrastructure, warned 

Ambassador Bremer that it would be impossible to begin so large a program that 

quickly because contracting regulations demanded a rigorous bidding process. 

“You can’t get contracts in place by that time,” Browning told Bremer. But Nash 

had assured Bremer that, given the importance of the mission, the CPA could 

get special dispensation from the Defense Department to accelerate contracting 

processes.3

 Although the Defense Department did expedite the process, it was 

not able to award contracts as quickly as Nash predicted.

Dov Zakheim, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense, initially opposed the creation of 

the PMO, which he saw as a form of “empire building.”4

 He thought it a duplication of existing USAID and USACE expertise. But Nash met with Zakheim at 

the Pentagon in mid-September and “convinced him that no entity in Iraq or 

Washington was going to take on this work with existing resources and using 

current procedures.”5

At the beginning of September 2003, the PMO had a staff of one—Admiral 

Nash—and no money. On September 9, Zakheim—despite his reservations 

about the office—allocated $10 million to it for “personnel, logistics and contractor support for approximately six months.”6

 A week later, the Department of 

the Army authorized USACE to spend another $9 million to support the PMO.7

USACE then provided Nash with fifteen people from two private firms, Stanley 

Consultants and Michael Baker Corporation.8

Outsourcing Oversight

Nash created a four-tiered organization to oversee the Iraq reconstruction effort: 

the PMO, the PMO Support Office, six Sector Program Management Offices 

(SPMOs), and twelve design-build contractors.9

 Although the organizational 

structure included government supervision of contractors (as required by the 

FAR), Nash’s plan ultimately outsourced to private contractors much of the 

program-management and oversight responsibilities, thus diluting the government’s authority.
• 107 •

• Contracting Billions for Reconstruction •

Staffed by a small group of government employees at the top, the PMO nominally oversaw the entire operation. Immediately under it (on the organizational 

chart) was a private management company that worked with USACE in the PMO 

Support Office to supervise the six SPMOs, which were run by private contractors 

who supplemented a handful of government employees. Each of the six SPMOs 

supervised two design-build construction contractors that carried out projects 

in a specific reconstruction sector.10

Major General Ronald Johnson, the USACE Director of Military Programs, 

was Nash’s deputy director, and he supervised the overall reconstruction 

operation. USACE engineers provided much of the quality assurance for 

IRRF 2 contract execution. In January 2004, Major General Johnson became 

Commanding General of USACE’s Gulf Region Division and continued to supply most of the manpower for reconstruction quality-assurance programs.11

To staff the management offices, Nash proposed hiring 100 government 

personnel to perform the inherently governmental management and oversight 

functions required by government regulations.12 But the PMO was never able to 

hire more than half the government staff it needed. Thus, it relied heavily—perhaps excessively—on the contractors in the SPMOs to oversee reconstruction. 

This unprecedented outsourcing of traditionally governmental responsibilities 

raised concerns on Capitol Hill.13

The six primary infrastructure sectors under the PMO’s aegis were: electricity; 

public works and water; security and justice; communications and transportation; 

oil; and buildings, education, and health. The SPMOs wrote construction requirements and worked with the design-build firms to develop projects. USACE oversaw 

construction after project designs were completed and work had commenced.14

Electricity 

 Sector

Electricity

D-B** Contracts

Security/Justice

D-B Contracts

Security/Justice 

Sector

Oil D-B Contracts

Oil 

Sector

Public Works/

Water Sector

Public Works/

Water

D-B Contracts

Communication

Transportation Sector

Communication/

Transportation

D-B Contracts

Buildings/

Education/Health

D-B Contracts

Buildings/

Education/Health 

Sector

Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Design-build Program Management Structure 

Source: SIGIR, Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement, July 2006, 54.

*SPMO: Sector Program Management Oce

**D-B: Design-build

PMO Support Oce

PMO

SPMO* SPMO SPMO SPMO SPMO SPMO
• 108 •

• Chapter 10 •

The twelve “design-build” construction contractors were awarded indefinite 

delivery, indefinite quantity (IDIQ) cost-plus contracts for design, engineering, 

and physical work in the sectors. To prevent conflicts of interest, contractors could 

not win management and design-build contracts in the same sector. The government also reserved the right to restrict any company to a total of four contracts.15

Start-up Problems

At the end of October 2003, just before the Congress passed the IRRF 2 supplemental, the PMO had insufficient funds and too few personnel to operate 

effectively. Although Pentagon Comptroller Zakheim had authorized $10 million 

for the PMO, it took two months for the money to wend its way through the bureaucracy. The PMO did not receive this operating capital until mid-November 

2003. According to Zakheim, OMB acted slowly in allocating the money. “The 

problem was that the OMB insisted on approval,” Zakheim said, “and OMB 

became kind of a black hole, from which funds would emerge on what appeared 

to be a whimsical basis.”16 The OMB demanded detailed descriptions from the 

CPA on how it planned to spend IRRF 2 dollars before it would release them.17

It released no IRRF 2 funds until after the CPA submitted its spend plan in early 

January 2004. 

When the Congress passed the IRRF 2 supplemental in early November 2003, 

the PMO consisted of Admiral Nash, two government employees detailed from 

USACE, and thirteen USACE contractors. Of the 100 government employees 

Nash requested, only 8 had arrived by January 2004.18

Staff shortages were not the only problem; the skills the new PMO employees brought to the job were frequently not the right ones. A year after the PMO 

was created and just before the Program Contracting Office subsumed it in the 

summer of 2004, a frustrated Admiral Nash would have just half the number 

of people he needed—roughly one government employee for every $400 million the PMO was overseeing, or about ten times more than the average State 

Department contracting officer managed.19

The Contracting Plan

In early September 2003, Admiral Nash notified Tina Ballard, Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of the Army for Policy and Procurement, that the CPA would need a 

major acquisition plan to award the IRRF 2 contracts. Ballard quickly assembled a joint Department of Defense team, which included contracting personnel 

from USACE and the Navy, to develop a Single Acquisition Management Plan 

(SAMP) for IRRF 2.20
• 109 •

• Contracting Billions for Reconstruction •

The SAMP established procedures for the award of twelve large IRRF 2 

design-build contracts and six reconstruction management contracts. It created 

selection boards and developed guidelines to prevent conflicts of interest. To 

maximize flexibility, the SAMP provided that all contracts would be IDIQ contracts. These contracts allow for the provision of an indefinite quantity of supplies 

or services during a fixed period of time; they are used when the government 

cannot determine in advance the precise construction requirements.21

The SAMP team issued requests for bids in mid-December 2003.22 Only companies from the United States, Iraq, and force-contributing nations could bid.23

All proposals—except for those in the oil sector, which USACE had solicited during summer 2003—had to be submitted by February 5, 2004. The government 

received 53 bids on the contracts but made no awards until late March.24

Several factors caused the IRRF 2 contract-award process to be slower than 

Ambassador Bremer wanted. Because of concerns raised by the Congress about 

prewar sole-source contracting and IRRF 1’s many limited-competition awards, 

the SAMP source-selection boards scrupulously complied with the requirements 

of the Federal Acquisition Regulation. But complying with the FAR’s complex 

procedural requirements meant that more time was needed to review the bids.25

The Program of Projects

The PMO built its project list based on the ten sectors defined by the IRRF 2 legislation. Nash and his fifteen USACE contractors, in consultation with the CPA’s 

senior advisors, developed the first master project list. The senior advisors had already developed reconstruction proposals with their ministers, as part of the 2004 

budget process, and they incorporated many of these into the IRRF 2 project list. 

The PMO tracked the projects by using Project Identification Forms (PIFs), which 

described the justification, scope, and estimated cost of each proposed project and 

gave it a priority.26 The information from 5,000 PIFs was entered into a “monster 

Excel spreadsheet,” from which the PMO derived its final project list.27

The quality of the project list was uneven. Some ministries, such as Water 

Resources, had complete designs sitting on the shelf that had been “waiting for 

Saddam to go away so they could build these projects.”28 But others had nothing. 

Moreover, some ministries disagreed with the CPA’s decisions. For example, the 

Ministry of Health favored building large hospitals, but the CPA wanted to focus 

on small primary-care clinics. Although Iraqis were accustomed to providing 

and receiving medical services through a hospital system, the senior advisor to 

the Ministry of Health believed that a network of clinics focusing on preventive 

and primary health care would most effectively and efficiently help Iraq meet 

nationwide health care needs.29
• 110 •

• Chapter 10 •

To estimate the costs for each project, the PMO took the base cost of each 

project and added fixed charges for security, transportation, procurement, program management, and award fees. The PMO estimated that security costs would 

add seven percent, a figure provided by Bechtel. Bechtel developed this figure, assuming that the environment would be, in military parlance, “semi-permissive.”30

But by late 2003, Iraq’s security environment had drastically deteriorated.31

On December 1, the PMO presented a list of 1,706 prioritized projects to 

Ambassador Bremer and representatives of USAID, the military, and CPA’s 

senior advisors. This was the first time that most of the participants, including 

USAID, had seen a comprehensive project list.32 The group had nine days to 

review the plan and comment on it before Bremer sent it to Washington. “It 

was like a grocery list,” said Nash, “You could go down so far, draw a line, and 

that’s how much money you had, and then we took the rest of the projects 

and we said, ‘We’ll give those to the Iraqis.’” Projects that fell below the funding cut-off for each sector were assigned to Iraq’s Ministry of Development, 

Planning, and Cooperation.33 The ministry was expected to find other donors 

to fund them.34

In mid-December 2003, after receiving the CPA’s program of projects, 

the OMB convened an interagency meeting to discuss it, inviting USAID 

Administrator Andrew Natsios to attend. Other participants included National 

Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice; her deputy, Stephen Hadley; Robin 

Cleveland, associate director of the OMB; the Pentagon Comptroller, Dov 

Zakheim; and Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz. According to Natsios, 

Cleveland—who had been skeptical about the CPA’s planned use of the IRRF 2 

allocations—wanted him in the room because she knew he would make a strong 

argument against certain aspects of the proposed plan.35

Cleveland was right. Natsios told the group: “If this thing gets approved, 

you’ll have no money for elections, no money for rebuilding local governance, 

no money for building the university system, no money for the health system.” 

Calling the plan “a recipe for disaster,” he recommended reserving some of the 

money for non-construction projects and contingencies.36 Natsios strenuously 

objected to the CPA’s big infrastructure approach, arguing that it flouted the lessons learned from decades of international development experience. Wolfowitz 

and Hadley responded to Natsios’s concerns by directing that $4 billion in IRRF 

2 funds be held in reserve, preventing the PMO from immediately allocating or 

obligating that money.37

Two weeks later, Natsios received an angry call from Ambassador Bremer, 

accusing him of destroying the IRRF 2 plan. Natsios countered that CPA had put 

together an unrealistic and excessively optimistic construction timeline. Bremer 
• 111 •

• Contracting Billions for Reconstruction •

believed that, under his original plan, the CPA could have begun construction 

by March. But Natsios, who had managed Boston’s “Big Dig,” one of the largest 

and most problem-ridden construction projects in American history, viewed the 

CPA’s timetable as “utterly ridiculous.”38

On January 5, 2004, the OMB delivered the CPA’s project plan in the first 

Section 2207 Report, to the Congress. The submission included the first of what 

would become many requests for re-allocations of IRRF 2 funds. In this initial realignment, the OMB shifted funds within the security sector to allocate additional 

funds for democracy-building efforts, a step driven in part by the November 15, 

2003 decision to transfer sovereignty to Iraq by June 30, 2004.39 Other readjustments included taking $150 million from the budget for the New Iraqi Army to 

augment the border enforcement program and moving $25 million from the witness protection program to support democracy projects.40 The OMB observed that 

maintaining “flexibility in the allocation of resources among projects and for new 

projects” was critical, given the evolving security and political situations in Iraq.41

Managing Project Information

The Congress authorized $50 million as part of the IRRF 2 supplemental to 

help the CPA meet its reporting and monitoring obligations. The OMB apportioned the money to the Department of Defense for the CPA’s operating 

expenses, but the PMO did not get any of this money until May 2004, a month 

before the CPA expired.42

The PMO’s leadership decided against adopting any existing project information management systems, because none offered “the full complement 

of integrated capabilities” they believed they needed.43 The PMO developed a 

hybrid system, combining an asset-management program with off-the-shelf software, but the hybrid system did not work well.44 The PMO needed an integrated 

program management system from the start in order to stay on top of the program, track contracts, prevent overspending, and measure progress. But it would 

be many months before it had a usable system. 

“You lose track of a program, a big program like this with 3,000 projects, you 

never get it back,” observed Nash.45 The delay in creating an integrated information system that could track projects had long-term consequences, hampering 

program and project management for years to come.

The “Bridging” Contracts

When it became clear in late 2003 that the Defense Department would take longer than hoped to award the IRRF 2 design-build contracts, USAID and PMO 

took innovative steps to implement projects by other contractual means. 
• 112 •

• Chapter 10 •

The Bechtel Contract

In October 2003, USAID solicited proposals for Phase II of its infrastructure 

program to bridge the period between the end of IRRF 1-funded operations and 

the time that IRRF 2 design–build contractors could mobilize to Iraq. USAID 

had awarded its original contract to Bechtel without full and open competition. 

This time three firms, including Bechtel, submitted bids. 

On January 4, 2004, USAID awarded Bechtel another large Iraq reconstruction contract, this one for $1.82 billion. Upon award, Bechtel quickly bolstered 

its Iraq staff, anticipating an array of new projects from the PMO. But the PMO 

made little use of this contract, issuing just four task orders to Bechtel—for a total 

of $180 million of work—between January and March 2004.46

The reason for PMO’s minimal use of the Bechtel bridge contract may have 

stemmed from the increasingly fractious relationship between USAID and the 

CPA. USAID officials believed that, after Natsios’s successful fight to put a hold 

on $4 billion in IRRF 2 money, Admiral Nash reacted by limiting the number of 

task orders issued to Bechtel.47 Nash denies this was the case.48 He said his problems with USAID boiled down to a simple power struggle. Describing it as a great 

“harangue,” Nash said the “argument was over who is in charge” and “how things 

will be run.” He insisted that the CPA needed one central organization, in this 

case the PMO, to manage the program, but that USAID “did not understand—or 

agree with—this concept.”49

The simmering enmity between the CPA and USAID weakened reconstruction progress at this critical juncture. With no new work forthcoming during the 

winter of 2004, USAID’s Mission Director James “Spike” Stephenson confronted 

Nash in March about the lack of task orders and “reminded him of the Bechtel contract’s purpose.” Nash demurred, saying that he wanted all the work to move ahead 

in unison. Stephenson took his complaints to Bremer but nothing changed.50

At the end of March 2004, Stephenson met with Tom Gibb, Nash’s deputy 

for programs, and they worked out a truce that resulted in a trickle of task orders. 

The Bechtel contract, however, would not be fully utilized until after the CPA 

dissolved in June 2004. During this period of relative inactivity, USAID still had 

to pay Bechtel’s entire overhead costs, ultimately reducing the amount available 

for reconstruction projects.51

The Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence

The CPA’s reconstruction priorities in December 2003 included renovating Iraqi 

military facilities for the New Iraqi Army by June 2004. Realizing that the designbuild contracts would be awarded later than hoped, Nash looked for existing 

contracts that he could use for construction projects. 
• 113 •

• Contracting Billions for Reconstruction •

The Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence (AFCEE) in San Antonio, 

Texas, had an existing IDIQ contract—called the Worldwide Environmental 

Restoration and Construction Contract—for a wide range of construction services at U.S. military bases around the world. In January 2004, the U.S. Air Force 

Chief of Staff approved the CPA’s request to use the AFCEE contract to accomplish construction projects in Iraq.52

The IRRF 2 supplemental had allotted $745 million for the construction of 

New Iraqi Army facilities. By the end of May 2004, the PCO had awarded AFCEE 

fifteen task orders valued at $481.2 million. Three of these, totaling $42.3 million, 

went to non-military projects, such as the reconstruction of schools, government 

buildings, and pumping stations. These appeared to be beyond the scope of the 

CPA’s original request. A CPA Inspector General (CPA-IG) audit of the contracts subsequently found that “AFCEE’s role in awarding task orders on behalf 

of the CPA was not clearly defined, and the continued use of AFCEE’s contract 

vehicle provided less than necessary transparency to the public.”53

IRRF 2 Contract Awards 

In March 2004, the Defense Department announced the award of the major IRRF 

2 design-build construction and program management contracts for Iraq’s reconstruction. Over $5 billion in new contracts had been approved in less than 90 days. A 

typical contracting process involving awards of this size could take over a year.54

AECOM Technology Corporation won the umbrella services management 

contract, valued at $50 million, to support PMO’s program management. The 

following two tables show the program management contracts and design-build 

construction contracts that were awarded:

IRRF 2 PMO Program Management Contracts

Sector Contractor(s)

Maximum Value

($ Millions)

Electricity Iraq Power Alliance Joint Venture (Parsons Energy and 

Chemical Group, Parsons Brinckerhoff – USA/UK) $55

Water and 

Public Works CH2M Hill and Parsons Water Infrastructure (USA) $55

Communications 

and Transportation

Berger/URS Joint Venture (Louis Berger 

Group & URS Group – USA) $15

Building, Education 

and Health

Berger/URS Joint Venture (Louis Berger 

Group & URS Group – USA) $15

Security and Justice Berger/URS Joint Venture (Louis Berger 

Group & URS Group – USA) $30

Oil Foster Wheeler (UK) $30

Source: SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons Learned in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 59-60.
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• Chapter 10 •

IRRF 2 Design-Build Construction Contracts

Sector Contractor(s)

Maximum Value

($ millions)

Electricity, 

Generation Fluor-Amec Joint Venture (USA/UK) $500

Electricity, 

Transmission and 

Distribution (North)

Washington Group International (USA) $500

Electricity, 

Transmission and 

Distribution (South)

Perini Corp. (USA) $500

Public Works (North) Fluor-Amec Joint Venture (USA/UK) $600

Public Works (South) Fluor-Amec Joint Venture (USA/UK) $500

Water Resources Washington Group International & Black and Veatch (USA) $600

Communications Lucent Technologies (USA) $75

Transportation Contrack/AICI/OIC/Archirodon Joint Venture 

(USA/Egypt/Netherlands/Panama/UAE) $325

Building, Education, 

and Health Parsons Delaware (USA) $500

Security and Justice Parsons Delaware (USA) $900

Source: SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons Learned in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 59-60.

USACE already had awarded two design-build contracts for the oil sector 

in January. The one for northern Iraq went to Parsons Iraq Joint Venture ($800 

million); the one for the oil-rich southern region went to Kellogg, Brown and 

Root ($1.2 billion).55

Nash demanded that the IRRF 2 contractors move quickly, giving them 

30 days to deploy to Iraq and directing that each be prepared to execute $500 

million dollars in work. This proved an expensive demand. The contractors did 

quickly mobilize significant numbers of personnel and equipment, putting large 

construction forces on the ground in very short order. But most contractors 

did not receive task orders for reconstruction work until months later because 

of the PMO’s slow management practices, the worsening security situation, 

and the widespread uncertainties that accompanied the CPA’s administrative 

transition, as well as the program review by Ambassador John Negroponte after 

he took over from Bremer. 

By the time the CPA closed its doors at the end of June 2004, the PMO had 

spent only $366 million of the $18.4 billion IRRF 2 appropriation.56 Bremer was 

never able to realize his grand reconstruction vision.
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Chapter 11

Restoring Iraq’s Capacity to Govern

The CPA came and they were obsessed [with] decentralized 

government...I kept telling them, before you devolve power, you 

have to have power to devolve. We don’t have power to devolve.* 

Samir Sumaida’ie

Iraqi Governing Council Member (2003-2004) 

The CPA, the military, and USAID adopted different approaches to restoring 

Iraq’s national, regional, and local governments. The CPA initially concentrated 

on finding suitable candidates for the new Iraqi Governing Council and on restarting the national ministries. Ambassador Bremer issued a series of orders to 

improve governance by reforming Saddam-era institutions and creating new organizations to combat corruption. At the same time, the U.S. military and USAID 

launched an array of projects to establish regional and local councils across Iraq 

and to encourage community participation in governance.

Local Governance Needs

In Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Baghdad firmly controlled all aspects of governance. 

The Ba’ath Party appointed provincial governors—known as “mini-Saddams”—

and Saddam’s directors general extended ministry control into the provinces, 

exerting authority over local budgets, administering essential services, and 

managing state-owned enterprises. The provincial councils possessed nominal power, while local councils protected Saddam’s interests at the district and 

neighborhood level.1

The 2003 invasion shattered this repressive system, with most senior Ba’ath 

Party officials fleeing as local bureaucracies dissolved.2

 Remnants of provincial 

councils and a handful of directors general continued minimal operations, but 

virtually all connections between Baghdad and local governments collapsed.3

Ambassador Bremer arrived in Iraq to find governance in disarray. Several initiatives—some led by the U.S. military, some by USAID—were underway, all 

seeking to fill the post-Saddam governance vacuum. 

* SIGIR interview with Samir Sumaida'ie, Iraqi Ambassador to the United States and former Iraqi 

Governing Council Member, March 11, 2008.
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• Chapter 11 •

The Military Builds Local Governments 

Coalition military commanders entered Iraq with, among other duties, a general 

mission to establish regional and local councils with whom they could work to 

develop governance in their areas of operation. They did not, however, have any 

specific guidance on how to establish new councils. Consequently, each commander devised a political process as he saw fit.

In early May 2003, Major General David Petraeus—then commanding 

the 101st Airborne Division in northern Iraq—assembled a new city council in 

Mosul, the capital of Ninewa province, establishing qualifications for council 

members and deciding how the local populace would select them. Over a 10-

day period, Petraeus and his team organized a city-wide convention where some 

270 delegates, representing all of Mosul’s religious and ethnic groups, elected a 

new 24-member city council and a mayor.4

 “We had to hammer all this out, and 

obviously all of it was very torturous and bloody battles, and nobody thought 

they had enough representation,” said Petraeus. “I think it was the ten toughest 

days of my life because everybody wanted something more than what they had. 

Everybody had a grievance.”5

Lieutenant General James Conway, Commander of the 1st Marine 

Expeditionary Force, which controlled Najaf in central Iraq, took a different approach. He scheduled province-wide elections so that Iraqis could directly choose 

a new provincial council. Conway, who would later become the Commandant 

of the Marine Corps, set the elections for July 4, 2003. By mid-June, the Marines 

had registered political parties and were printing ballots. When Scott Carpenter, 

CPA’s Director of Governance, found out about Conway’s plan, he told him that 

Iraq had neither a constitution nor an electoral law upon which to base such an 

election.6

 Ambassador Bremer also said he was concerned that Shi’a Islamist 

parties “would clamor for them across the south since they were most likely to 

win in those early days.”7

 At the last moment, the CPA persuaded Conway to 

cancel the elections.8

As the U.S. military established provincial and local Iraqi councils, they expected civilian agencies to rush in with resources to support the new councils. 

USAID had awarded three contracts to support local governance, to develop 

community-based organizations, and to provide local grants for reconstruction 

projects. The largest governance contract—valued at $168 million—went to the 

Research Triangle Institute (RTI) for the creation of transparent and accountable local and provincial governments, the provision of training to strengthen 

civil society, and the restoration of basic services.9
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• Restoring Iraq’s Capacity to Govern •

USAID’s Local Governance Program

On April 22, 2003—eleven days after receiving its contract—RTI sent an advance 

team to Kuwait, expecting to have about a month to organize before entering Iraq. 

But USAID ordered RTI to move out immediately.10 The first group of RTI contractors promptly crossed the border and headed for Basrah, while the second 

set out for Baghdad to help create the capital’s new city council.11

Within days of getting the “go order,” the first RTI team—driving Chevy 

Suburbans loaded with tents, fuel, food, satellite phones, and office supplies—

pulled into Basrah, the largest city in southern Iraq. What they found was a disaster: 

public offices stripped of all furnishings, widespread looting, and no basic services.12

The British forces controlling the city asked RTI to engage with the city’s provincial 

council, and so Aaron Williams, RTI’s team leader, consulted with the local Shi’a 

leaders on the councils “to determine what their priorities and needs were.”13

The team sought out Iraqi technocrats to identify projects the city urgently 

needed for essential services.14 By mid-May RTI had hired about two dozen Iraqis 

and was working with the local council to implement emergency water and electricity projects. The Basra office was the first of what would become 22 offices that 

RTI opened across Iraq during the spring and summer of 2003.15

Money for the provinces usually came from the Central Bank in Baghdad, 

but with the collapse of governing institutions, not a single dinar from the bank 

could make its way to the provinces. In the absence of funding from the capital, 

the U.S. military supported local councils by providing money through the fledgling CERP program. USAID also provided grants to assist councils with small 

infrastructure projects.16

Clarifying roles, responsibilities, and working relationships among the military, the CPA, and USAID and its contractors proved a major challenge. The 

military perceived USAID and its contractors as “relief in place” and “expected 

to rapidly hand over [to them] public services restoration, infrastructure reconstruction planning and coordination, and managing relationships with newly 

formed local councils throughout Iraq.” But neither USAID nor its contractors 

had sufficient resources to sustain this mission.17

The Community Action Program

In April 2003, USAID began a Community Action Program (CAP) in Iraq, 

awarding contracts worth$120 million to five contractors.18 Unlike other USAIDfunded activities in Iraq, the CAP required local groups to contribute to projects. 

Implementation depended upon local facilitators and contractors, and “community action groups” composed of Iraqis elected by their neighbors. 
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• Chapter 11 •

The CAP used small amounts of reconstruction funding as a catalyst for local 

capacity-building initiatives. During the CPA’s tenure, CAP contractors started 

more than 1,700 projects, costing about $61.7 million, ranging from sewage-system repair to rehabilitating schools and health clinics. A USAID Inspector General 

audit found that CAP generally achieved its intended goals, including citizen participation, local government cooperation, and local employment generation.19

The National Ministries

To help restart the looted and broken national ministries, USAID contractor Development Alternatives Incorporated (DAI) created a package called 

“Ministry in a Box.” Each kit cost $122,000 and provided furniture and supplies 

for 100 civil servants. USAID employed dozens of small Iraqi companies across 

Baghdad to manufacture and assemble all the elements that went into each package. The ministries soon demanded more of them, and DAI had delivered 132 

“Ministries in a Box” by the fall of 2003.20

The CPA depended chiefly on its senior advisors for hands-on capacity development. Among other things, the senior advisors assisted new Iraqi ministers 

in implementing the de-Ba’athification order, appointing and developing new 

ministry leadership, devising new budgets, identifying reconstruction projects, 

and securing sufficient CPA funding for ministry operations. But these efforts fell 

far short of meeting ministry capacity-development needs.

The CPA used the DFI to fund ministry budgets, which included paying for 

salaries, operating expenses, and capital projects. By April 2004, the CPA had 

authorized the expenditure of about $20 billion in DFI funds for Iraq’s national 

budget. When the CPA transferred sovereignty to Iraq at the end of June 2004, the 

ministries had received $8.8 billion dollars to pay for administrative operations. 

But this money was poorly controlled, as a SIGIR audit would later find.21

The Iraqi Governing Council

Soon after his arrival in Baghdad, Ambassador Bremer directed his governance 

team to create a new Iraqi Governing Council as the first step in a process to 

transfer political power back to Iraqi control. The IGC would be the initial postinvasion Iraqi authority, although it would serve only in an advisory capacity. The 

IGC’s creation also would satisfy UNSCR 1483’s requirement that CPA form 

an Iraqi transitional administration (to work in partnership with the CPA) until 

the Iraqi people elected a new government.22

To find candidates for the IGC, the CPA’s governance team canvassed 

the country, meeting with economic, religious, and tribal leaders.23 Under the 

CPA’s plan, the IGC would appoint a committee to draft a new constitution 
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• Restoring Iraq’s Capacity to Govern •

for Iraq. This would pave the way for national elections and a democratically 

elected government. 

At the end of June 2003, while the CPA was still evaluating potential IGC 

members, Iraq’s most respected Shi’a religious leader—the Grand Ayatollah Ali 

Husaini al-Sistani—issued a fatwa declaring that a council chosen by occupying 

authorities could not be charged with drafting the constitution. Grand Ayatollah 

Sistani said there was no guarantee that such a committee would write a constitution reflecting the true interests of the Iraqi people and expressing the nation’s 

Islamic identity. Sistani demanded immediate elections for a new national assembly to draft a new constitution and present it to the people for a vote.24 Bremer 

rejected Sistani’s demand, pressing forward with his plans to form the IGC and 

have that body name a constitutional drafting committee. 

The CPA named 25 Iraqi leaders of different religious and ethnic backgrounds 

to the IGC in mid-July. By early September 2003, the IGC had appointed new 

ministers to run the country’s 25 ministries. The ministers reflected the religious 

and ethnic balance of the council. Although the diversity was commendable for 

its pluralist aims, it was also controversial because it laid the foundations for 

sectarian strongholds that would later develop in some ministries.25 With the 

appointment of new ministers, the role of the CPA’s senior advisors changed. 

They had been serving as the de facto ministers of Iraq, but they now took on 

an advisory capacity, serving the new Iraqi ministers. The senior advisors still 

greatly influenced ministry policy, but this shift signaled that the slow process of 

transferring governance authority back to Iraqi control had begun. 

On September 8, 2003, Ambassador Bremer published a transitional roadmap for Iraq in a Washington Post opinion piece.26 The article—a framework 

for an extended occupation by the CPA—set off alarm bells in Washington. 

Secretary Rumsfeld said it was the first time he realized that “Bremer was not 

ready to hand over responsibilities for governance of Iraq to Iraqi leadership” as 

quickly as originally envisioned and was instead “taking a route somewhat different than what we had believed would be the approach.”27 Bremer said that the 

op-ed contained nothing new, and that the Pentagon had approved the transition 

plan. He added that he spoke regularly with Rumsfeld and had sent the opinion 

piece to the Pentagon three days before it was published.28

Washington reacted quickly to the perception that the CPA was planning a 

long occupation. The White House formed an Iraq Stabilization Group under 

National Security Advisor Rice’s aegis, and a push began to return full sovereignty 

to Iraqis more quickly than Bremer perhaps had anticipated.29 Secretary Rumsfeld 

also convened strategic review meetings with Ambassador Bremer and General 

Abizaid to discuss the ramifications of Bremer’s proposed transition plan.
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• Chapter 11 •

Accelerating Sovereignty’s Return

In late September 2003, Iraqi leaders, representatives of the international community, and senior officials in Washington began to pressure the CPA to announce a 

new timeline for returning sovereignty to Iraqis. Pentagon officials, in particular, 

pushed for a shortened timeline. Rumsfeld expressed “enthusiasm for the concept 

of granting sovereignty as soon as possible to the Council or some other group of 

Iraqis.” Bremer replied that Iraqis should quickly be given more responsibility, but 

urged that it be done “in a manner that [has] a fair chance of success.”30

On October 6, Bremer learned that President Bush had put National Security 

Advisor Condoleezza Rice in charge of the newly created White House Iraq 

Stabilization Group to coordinate Iraq policy and speed up reconstruction efforts.31 Secretary Rice said the new organization was to support the Pentagon, 

not supplant it, but the move reflected growing tensions among agencies in 

Washington, between agencies and the White House, and between Washington 

and Baghdad.32 Rice asked Ambassador Robert Blackwill, who had become deputy national security adviser for strategic policy in August 2003, to manage the 

new group. According to Blackwill, there was an “estrangement, [a] very serious 

estrangement, between the Pentagon and the State Department. The interagency 

process was essentially not working.”33

Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage recalled an exchange illustrating 

the estrangement of which Blackwill spoke:

One day, in the fall of 2003...we were coming out of the 

[White House situation] room and Dr. Rice turned to 

Rumsfeld and I was between the two of them—but she kind 

of leaned over...and said, ‘Don, would you call Jerry [Bremer] 

and have him do X, Y, or Z?’ And [Rumsfeld] said, ‘No, he 

doesn’t work for me.’ [Rice] said, ‘Yes, he does. Who does 

he work for?’ And [Rumsfeld] said, ‘He works for the NSC.’ 

And this is because Rumsfeld found out that Jerry was at least 

communicating with—if not taking instructions from—the 

National Security Advisor.34

Blackwill travelled to Iraq in September 2003 and quickly concluded that the 

United States would not be able to sustain its position there on Bremer’s timetable 

because “the occupation would become more and more intolerable to the Iraqis.”35

In close collaboration with Dr. Rice and senior officials at the Defense and State 

Departments, Blackwill helped implement a major course correction for the occupation. This change was driven in part by the fact that some at the Pentagon and 
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• Restoring Iraq’s Capacity to Govern •

at the NSC believed that Bremer had been making momentous decisions about the 

future of Iraq that had not been “debated seriously at the principals level.”36

On October 16, 2003, the international community joined in by formally 

pushing for a speedier return to full Iraqi sovereignty. UN Security Council 

Resolution 1511 stated that “the day when Iraqis govern themselves must come 

quickly,” and asked the Iraqi Governing Council, in conjunction with the CPA, to 

provide the Security Council with “a timetable and a program for the drafting of a 

new constitution for Iraq and for the holding of democratic elections under that 

constitution.” It further called on the CPA to “return governing responsibilities 

and authorities to the people of Iraq as soon as practicable.”37

One month later, on November 15, 2003—barely a week after the U.S. 

Congress passed the $18.4 billion IRRF 2 reconstruction package—the CPA 

announced an agreement to pass sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government by 

the end of June 2004, just seven months later.38

The agreement required a series of predicate events. By the end of February 

2004, the IGC had to approve the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), 

which would define the laws for the interim government. Three months later, 

local caucuses in each of Iraq’s eighteen provinces would elect delegates to an 

Iraqi Transitional National Assembly, which would then elect leaders of the new 

government. On June 30, 2004, the CPA and the IGC would dissolve, and the 

Iraqi Interim Government would take power. Provincial elections would occur 

on January 30, 2005, the constitution would be written and approved by referendum on October 15, 2005, and national elections would be held on December 

31, 2005. The agreement further stipulated that “Coalition forces will continue 

to work side-by-side with new Iraqi police and security institutions to ensure a 

peaceful transition to a sovereign, democratic and secure Iraq.”39

This was an extraordinary timetable: provincial and national elections—and 

a constitutional referendum—all to be held in a violence-stricken Iraq within 

thirteen months. 

Supporting Provincial and Local Governments

The CPA divided Iraq into four administrative regions—north, central, south 

central, and south. It also appointed coordinators and established offices in each 

provincial capital.40 Because of its gradual expansion into the provinces, most of 

the CPA’s coordinators arrived after the military and USAID contractors had 

established relationships with their Iraqi counterparts.41 The ensuing confusion 

over roles and responsibilities made for a mix of government employees, contractors, and troops whose plans and programs often worked at cross-purposes. 
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• Chapter 11 •

Mark Etherington, the CPA’s coordinator in Wasit province, said he had 

assumed that USAID would help form councils and establish their rules of procedure. Instead, the USAID team in his area “consisted of specialists in subjects 

such as women’s rights, agriculture, and water supply” who “knew nothing about 

Councils or any of the fields that were pressing priorities for us at the time.” 

Etherington noted that USAID’s private contractors made his job more difficult. 

As he put it, “one was left with a raft of largely unaccountable companies with their 

own sets of rules and security procedures, arriving at intervals, whose roles had 

never been properly defined or harmonized with CPA’s political objectives.”42

A SIGIR audit of USAID’s local governance program noted a lack of clear 

policy guidance, and criticized both USAID and its contractor for failing to define 

the program’s goals. USAID’s contractor was supposed to submit quarterly work 

plans, but failed to do so, producing instead an implementation plan in August 

2003 that simply listed the core activities planned for the year.43

In December 2003, Ambassador Bremer convened a “Commanders and 

Leaders” conference in Baghdad to address the implications of the November 

15 sovereignty transfer agreement. At the conference, Bremer announced that 

the CPA would triple spending over the next three months to create jobs and 

foster stability, which would help facilitate the transfer of power.44

The CPA created two new DFI-funded programs—the Rapid Regional 

Response Program (known as R3P) and the Accelerated Iraqi Reconstruction 

Program (AIRP)—to funnel money into provincial reconstruction projects. The 

CPA’s provincial offices received $120 million in R3P funds to support projects to 

improve essential services, create jobs, and stimulate the economy.45 In addition, 

the CPA approved $277 million for the AIRP to fund high-impact, high-visibility 

projects in ten strategic cities: Baghdad, Ba’quba, Falluja, Mosul, Ramadi, Samarra, 

Tikrit, Najaf, Diwaniya, and Kerbala.46 AIRP projects aimed to improve access to 

potable water, sanitation, health, education, and transportation. 47

In April 2004, after ten months of governing Iraq, Ambassador Bremer 

promulgated CPA Order Number 71, strengthening the powers of local and 

provincial governments. The order specifically spelled out the powers of local 

officials, from mayors to police chiefs, and provided that the provincial councils 

were to be “funded from national budget allocations that are separate from the 

budgets of the ministries and other national institutions,” and were to “perform 

their responsibilities independently from the control or supervision of any ministry.” The provincial councils could even “approve or veto” the appointment of 

directors general and “local ministerial officials for positions designated as ‘senior 

positions,’” a dramatic departure from Saddam-era practices.48
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• Restoring Iraq’s Capacity to Govern •

The order’s radical decentralization of power was not well received by many 

Iraqi political parties, who differed about how much control should remain in 

Baghdad. Thus, the CPA—which had two months left in power—made little 

attempt to implement the order. 

The Iraqi budgets for 2004 did not allocate any money directly to local and 

provincial governments.49 Consequently, with no budget and no real authority 

over any other financial resources, the provincial councils were unable to do 

much for their constituent populations. By the time the CPA dissolved in June 

2004, the Iraqi public had little faith in the appointed provincial councils, seeing 

them as creations of the occupation authorities.50

As the Coalition struggled to assemble local, provincial, and national governments, it also tried, with too few resources, to rebuild Iraq’s police and army. 
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Chapter 12

Reconstructing Iraqi Security Forces

[The U.S.] Army was absolutely focused in May [2003] 

on wrapping up the fight...They had just finished combat 

operations, and then we went through this terrific problem of 

social mayhem, looting, the lawlessness that occurred, so the 

Army was absolutely focused on its mission of bringing order to 

the country...There was zero thought on what the Army could 

do to develop security forces—zero.*

Major General Paul Eaton

Commander of CMATT and OSC (2003-2004)

The CPA planned to create a new security force—the New Iraqi Army—

accountable to Iraq’s civil authorities and capable of maintaining national 

security. But the CPA’s efforts in this regard foundered because of poor planning, insufficient resources, and the failure to effectively counter the growing 

insurgency. However, mounting violence and the November 15, 2003 decision 

to return sovereignty to the Iraqis forced acceleration of plans to rebuild and 

deploy Iraq’s security forces.

Although a spirit of liberation briefly prevailed in Baghdad after it fell, postinvasion Iraq quickly descended into a maelstrom of looting and violence as Iraqi 

military and police personnel fell from view and the paramilitary and intelligence 

services dissolved.1

 CPA Order Number 2 exacerbated matters by essentially “firing” the entire Iraqi military, with—at least initially—no compensation. Amid 

the ensuing chaos, the CPA sought to rebuild Iraq’s security forces, aiming to 

inculcate Western concepts of accountability and rule of law. Critical resource 

shortages, a dearth of qualified trainers, and the violent environment finally forced 

major U.S. policy changes on the security front as the CPA era ended.

The Iraqi Police Service

Contingency operations—particularly in post-conflict situations—usually occur 

in environments characterized by broad insecurity and unpredictable violence, 

with indigenous security forces too weak or too corrupt to maintain order.2

 A 

prewar assessment by the U.S. Department of Justice’s International Criminal 

Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) recommended that 5,000 

* ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and 

OSC, December 27, 2004.
• 125 •

• Reconstructing Iraqi Security Forces •

international police advisors be deployed to Iraq to reform the country’s police 

system.3

 But NSC planners believed that postwar security in Iraq would not be 

a significant problem and that the Iraqis would be able to maintain public order, 

concluding that ICITAP’s proposal for police training was unnecessary. 

“With the police, we recommended that we leave the administration of justice 

and law and order in Iraq in Iraqi hands, because we didn’t understand the culture, 

we didn’t understand the language, we didn’t have a corps of people we could rush 

there,” recalled Frank Miller, who headed the NSC’s Iraq group. “We didn’t want 

Americans enforcing the Iraqi law. We did not envision occupation.”4

Unlike the Ministry of Defense, Iraq’s Ministry of Interior with its large Iraqi 

police force was not dissolved by CPA Order Number 2. The MoI was expected 

to take on the civil security mission, as part of a quick handover of internal security responsibilities to Iraqi police.5 “We had bad intelligence,” Miller later 

conceded. “We believed that the Iraqi police were a corrupt, but generally efficient police force. It turns out they were both corrupt and not a particularly 

efficient police force.”6

Soon after the invasion, an assessment team comprising personnel from 

ICITAP and the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs (INL) travelled to Iraq to assess the Iraqi Police Service 

(IPS), judiciary, and prison system. By the time this team of 25 experts arrived 

in May 2003, looters had destroyed most of the Ministry of Interior, as well as 

many police stations across the country, leaving the police force infrastructure 

in tatters. Gerald Burke, a member of the six-person team assigned to assess the 

police, said their conclusions could be summed up in one sentence: “The police 

need everything.”7

The assessment team submitted its report to the CPA at the end of May 2003. 

Its conclusions were troubling: the Iraqi police were incapable of restoring public 

order and, unless quickly reformed, they could “not constitute a suitable, viable, 

and sustainable police service that can engender public trust and confidence.”8

The assessment recommended the immediate deployment of 2,500 international 

police officers to restore order and the recruitment of 360 professional police 

trainers and 6,600 international police advisors to reform the Iraqi police.9

 But 

the NSC again rejected these recommendations, viewing them as too ambitious 

and too expensive. Ultimately, Ambassador Bremer requested IRRF 2 funding 

for 1,500 police advisors—of whom 1,000 would be American.10
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• Chapter 12 •

Training Iraq’s Police

Bernard Kerik became the first senior advisor to the Ministry of Interior in May 

2003. The controversial former New York City police commissioner faced dual 

challenges: quickly reconstituting Iraq’s police forces so they could restore public 

order and reforming an institutional culture in which respect for human rights 

and community policing was unknown. 

The rapidly worsening security environment increased the tension between 

the need to provide short-term security and the goal of long-term institutional 

reform. Moreover, criminal looting had gutted law enforcement’s public infrastructure. To address these myriad problems, Kerik put six members of the 

ICITAP/INL assessment team in charge of rebuilding police stations and training 

academies, retraining the police forces, and improving ministerial capacity.11

Although Kerik, according to his own estimates, reopened 35 police stations 

in Baghdad and recalled 40,000 police officers in three months, some contend he 

spent too much time conducting tactical operations—leading teams of recalled 

Iraqi police on nighttime raids in Baghdad—and not enough time on developing 

a workable strategy to train, equip, and employ Iraqi police across the country.12 Lieutenant General Sanchez considered Kerik’s efforts “a waste of time 

and effort.” He thought they were too Baghdad-centric and neglected critical 

equipment needs.13

Lieutenant General Scott Wallace, Commander of the Army’s V Corps, tasked 

the 18th Military Police Brigade with organizing and mentoring the residual police force. Joint U.S.-Iraqi patrols were policing the streets of Baghdad by May 

9, 2003.14 But when Ambassador Bremer arrived on May 12, only 4,000 poorly 

trained, pistol-wielding police were on duty in Baghdad, a city of more than 7 

million people.15 Determined to bolster these numbers, Bremer issued a directive 

in June 2003 that police who failed to return to work by July 3 would be fired; 

about 38,000 former police returned by the deadline. Their ranks were further 

strengthened by an additional 30,000 new officers recruited across the country by 

Lieutenant General Sanchez’s Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) staff.16

Finding a facility large enough to train tens of thousands of Iraqi police was an 

important priority. According to John Meiklejohn—the CPA advisor in charge 

of police academies and curriculum—the Ministry of Interior’s infrastructure 

had been “totally ransacked.” USACE began reconstructing police academies 

by the end of May, and instruction started as classrooms were finished. With the 

help of U.S. Military Police instructors, the first four classes of 25 to 30 students 

began on June 28, 2003.17

The CPA needed to expand Iraq’s police training capacity quickly. Security conditions were deteriorating rapidly, so the CPA looked abroad, first contemplating 
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using an air base in Hungary. Meiklejohn scrapped the idea in late September 2003, 

when the Jordanians agreed to train 1,500 Iraqi police per month.18 He flew to 

Amman in October to manage the rapid construction of and logistics for the new 

International Police Training Center in Muwwaqqar, Jordan.19 In late November 

2003, the first class of 456 Iraqi cadets began an eight-week training course in 

makeshift facilities while construction continued on permanent facilities.20

The CPA’s police training program was constrained by funding and staffing 

shortfalls. Its various initiatives depended almost entirely on Iraqi funds because 

no U.S. money was appropriated for this purpose. The 2003 Iraqi national budget 

initially provided just $2.4 million for police operations. Although 2004 Iraqi 

funding increased to $122.4 million, chiefly to pay police salaries, the capital 

budget for police infrastructure remained low.21

During the fall of 2003, crime continued to rise in Iraq, forcing CJTF-7 to 

increase the training rate of Iraqi police. Ambassador Bremer feared that it was 

doing little more than rearming elements of Saddam’s abusive and ineffective police force, so he had INL design a three-week Transition and Integration Program 

that CJTF-7 could use.22 Despite marginal improvements brought about by the 

new curriculum, military trainers still had little understanding of Iraq’s police 

methods or existing Iraqi criminal justice procedures.23

Border Enforcement and Facility Protection

The CPA established the Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) on August 

24, 2003, but allocated scant resources for training.24 New recruits had little experience, and previous immigration officials were excluded from employment 

because of their connection to Saddam’s secret police. 

After the 2003 invasion, Iraq’s borders were porous, subject to easy infiltration 

by foreign fighters. U.S. soldiers tried to fill gaps, but they had no interpreters, could 

not read Arabic passports, and were unfamiliar with reviewing customs papers. The 

soldiers were soon overwhelmed by masses of people trying to enter Iraq; border 

traffic “backed up literally for miles.”25 By June 2004, only 255 members of the Iraqi 

DBE had received training from the Coalition.26 Iraq’s porous borders remained 

an egregious security problem for several years after the 2003 invasion.

The Facilities Protection Service (FPS) was the last major security force to 

stand up under the Ministry of Interior. It provided site security for ministry 

facilities and provincial government buildings.27 By 2004, the FPS ranged from 

80,000 to 100,000 personnel, but its members received just three days of training 

and light equipment, putting it at “the lower end of the spectrum of capabilities.”28 Most notably, some ministers used the FPS to mask militia and sectarian 

elements within their ministries.29
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New Iraqi Army

On May 23, 2003, CPA Order Number 2—the order dissolving Saddam’s military 

structures—announced the formation of the New Iraqi Army.30 Whatever the 

negative consequences of Order 2, it provided a clean break from the old force and 

a new slate for the systematic rebuilding of Iraq’s army. It failed to address, however, what resources the CPA should use to accomplish this enormous mission. 

CPA Order Number 22, issued in August 2003, expanded upon Order 2, 

establishing the New Iraqi Army as the basis of “militarily effective, professional, 

and non-political armed forces for the military defense of the nation.”31 The order 

provided that the army would be civilian-controlled, a tenth of its previous size, 

nationally recruited on a volunteer basis, and focused strictly on external defense. 

The CPA believed that the New Iraqi Army—unlike the police force—need not 

be fielded immediately. Plans called for training three divisions of light motorized 

infantry battalions over two years. Including headquarters units, the total end 

strength for the New Iraqi Army would amount to a modest 40,000.32

Responsibility for training the Iraqi army fell to Major General Paul Eaton, 

who arrived in Iraq on June 13, 2003, to take command of the Coalition Military 

Assistance Training Team (CMATT). Major General Eaton soon realized that 

the army training mission was “not a high priority” for the CPA or the U.S. military. The only real policy direction came from a 24-page PowerPoint presentation 

from CENTCOM. It did not contain “execution level” plans for manning, training, 

equipping, or employing the 40,000-man force, all of which had to be accomplished 

with a budget of just $173 million drawn from the DFI. According to Eaton, “there 

was zero participation on the part of the Army Staff. Zero participation on the 

part of [the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command]. Zero participation on 

anybody’s part except for an ad hoc team on personal request from me.” With no 

strategic plan, limited resources, and only five staff members, CMATT “set out to 

man, train, and equip the Iraqi Armed Forces essentially in a vacuum.”33

Major General Eaton set August 1, 2003, as the training start date for the 

Iraqi army, leaving just six weeks to prepare. In the middle of June, he selected 

Kirkush, northeast of Baghdad, as the site of the first training base, because its 

isolation provided a measure of security. CMATT contracted with an Iraqi firm 

to refurbish the barracks and to provide power, water, and sewerage. Two weeks 

later, another Iraqi firm was contracted to provide water, food, and fuel for the 

trainees.34 Using Iraqi contractors helped leverage CMATT’s meager resources 

and established a civilian contracting model that would form the basis of support 

for Iraq’s Ministry of Defense.35

A U.S. contractor was placed in charge of recruiting enlisted men, and 

CMATT selected the officers. On July 15, 2003, CMATT asked U.S. Army 
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division commanders in Iraq to provide 45 former Iraqi lieutenant colonels to 

populate the new officer corps, hoping these former officers would bring needed 

experience, but not be so senior that they could not be retrained along Western 

lines. But when these new officers refused to serve without being reinstated to 

their Saddam-era rank and pay, CMATT dismissed them and lowered the recruitment requirement to major. Seventy-five percent of the new force—including 

almost all of the NCOs and officers—had prior military experience.36

Security worsened over the summer of 2003 and, during a brief August 2003 

visit to Iraq, Secretary Rumsfeld decided to cut the Iraqi army’s two-year training time in half.37 CMATT desperately needed help to meet this new timeline 

and found some during a visit by Major General Eaton to Jordan to purchase 

equipment. During his trip to Amman, Eaton asked Jordan’s chief of military 

training to consider whether he could support the training of 2,000 new Iraqi 

Army officers. In late August, word came that King Abdullah of Jordan had agreed 

to provide help.38 Buoyed by this support, CMATT developed a new training 

model. In the first eight-week segment, the Jordanian military would retrain former Iraqi officers at a base outside Amman, while Coalition partners trained 

non-commissioned officers (NCOs) at a reconstructed military academy in Taji, 

Iraq. In the second stage, CMATT would form battalions of Iraqi officers and 

enlisted soldiers, and the new battalions would train in Iraq as whole units for a 

three-month period.39

Many Iraqi officers resented training in Jordan, but only by using Jordanian 

and U.S. military units to train officers and NCOs did CMATT have any hope of 

achieving the training results needed before the new September 2004 deadline. 

By November 15, 2003, CMATT’s plan to stand up the New Iraqi Army was 

underway, and the CPA had promised more funding through IRRF 2.40

Iraqi Civil Defense Corps

As the insurgency grew during the latter half of 2003, CJTF-7’s overstretched 

forces were unable to maintain public order. CENTCOM commander General 

Abizaid and CJTF-7 commander Lieutenant General Sanchez thus began to 

develop a new Iraqi security force component that could help fight the insurgency.41 This force—the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) —would assist with 

constabulary duties, employ former members of the Iraqi military, and give Iraqis 

a sense of ownership of security in their communities.42

CJTF-7 began training the first six ICDC battalions in July 2003. CPA Order 

Number 28 officially established it as an institution that was “distinct from the 

Iraqi police force and the New Iraqi Army” on September 3, 2003.43 Because the 

ICDC was not part of the original CPA security sector plan, it posed significant 
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coordination problems from its inception. Its chain of command went from 

Lieutenant General Sanchez to General Abizaid to Secretary Rumsfeld. There 

was little coordination with the Iraqi police or army and no accountability to any 

Iraqi ministry or the CPA. 

Some in CMATT feared the ICDC could become a parallel security structure, 

competing with the police in local affairs and diluting the Iraqi Army’s authority 

at the national level.44 But Coalition commanders valued the ICDC as a way to 

enable Iraqis to provide security for their own country, while supplementing 

CJTF-7’s overstretched forces. By April 2004, the ICDC had grown from the 

six battalions initially authorized to 45 battalions across the country, amounting 

to 36,000 personnel.45

Growing Insecurity

During the summer of 2003, insurgent attacks on Iraq’s infrastructure had supplanted looting as the chief reconstruction security problem. Repeated sabotage 

of pipelines and power lines impeded economic recovery and limited the success 

of early attempts to restore essential services. The deterioration of the security 

situation delayed reconstruction projects, interrupted supply delivery, and disrupted daily life across Iraq. All this “fed into Iraqi feelings of resentment and 

despair, which fueled insurgency and crime, thereby worsening the security climate.”46 The violence prevented many CPA officials from leaving the Green Zone, 

limiting their contact with—and thus their understanding of—Iraqis.47

In October and November 2003, the growing insecurity highlighted the need 

to hasten security force training and improve its resourcing. Security funding finally 

received a much-needed boost with the passage of IRRF 2 on November 6, 2003. 

The sector received $3.29 billion, including $1.22 billion for the police forces, $2 

billion for the Iraqi army, and $76 million for the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps.48

Reforming MoD and MoI

The impending June 2004 deadline for the transfer of sovereignty forced CPA 

officials to rethink security sector development. In mid-November 2003, the 

CPA’s Office of Policy Planning warned Ambassador Bremer that Iraq required 

“legitimate and accountable systems of security to prevent violent conflict.” These 

included not only the security forces, but also intelligence services and judicial 

and penal institutions. The CPA’s Office of Policy Planning further advised that 

the CPA’s narrow focus on Iraq’s short-term security problems had limited the 

efforts to address longer-term reforms. 

The CPA needed to pursue “a more integrated approach to security sector 

reform that will meet Iraq’s future needs and enable the coalition to transfer 
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responsibility for security to Iraqis.”49 It also needed to address the absence of 

a legal framework for the use of force by Iraq’s military, the disparity between 

force requirements and security budgets, the need to ensure that the new Iraqi 

security forces would operate under civilian control, and the need to insulate the 

security forces from sectarian influences.50 The failure to address this last crucial 

issue would have lethal consequences in 2004 and 2005, as the Iraqi Ministry of 

Interior became infiltrated by sectarian militias.

Another gap was the need for a new Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MoD). The 

plan was to create the new MoD in April 2005, but the new date to transfer sovereignty shortened the timeline by a year.51 The CPA quickly focused on finding 

senior leadership for MoD.52 It strove for ethnic balance in the new MoD leadership and sought to ensure that military promotions would be based on merit, 

not sectarian affiliation. Experience requirements for high-level jobs meant that 

former military officers (mostly Sunnis) filled a third of the new civilian positions and virtually all of the top military positions.53 The CPA provided the new 

leadership with three weeks of training in Washington at the National Defense 

University and the U.S. Institute of Peace. The training established “a foundation 

of understanding of civilian control of the military, some basics in defense-sector 

management and issues, and (not unimportantly) a look at a successful, functional 

democratic country.”54

Iraqis themselves had little influence on the new ministry’s design. Major 

General Eaton believed that 30 years of oppression under Saddam had left them 

unable or unwilling to challenge the ideas posed by CPA advisors and CJTF-7 

officials.55 There was still concern about Iraqi Governing Council involvement in 

selecting the new Minister of Defense. The CPA feared that political allegiances 

of IGC members would exert a negative influence.56 Thus, the choice of the 

new minister of defense was not discussed with the Iraqis to avoid allegations 

of politicization.57

Reforming the Ministry of Interior was more difficult than restarting the 

MoD. The Iraqi police force had not been a viable institution during Saddam’s 

reign, so there was no cadre of competent mid-level management from which 

to draw new leadership. Procurement problems also impeded progress.58 The 

State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 

Affairs had failed to promptly contract with DynCorp for housing, food, security, 

facilities, and other support for the International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs). 

The IPLOs were supposed to train and advise Iraqi police.59 Because of the contracting delay, only a few dozen came to Iraq during the first six months of the 

occupation, far short of the 5,000 originally recommended and the 1,500 that 

Bremer approved.60
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Security Challenges

A few early successes suggest that a counterinsurgency strategy might have proved 

effective during the CPA’s tenure in Iraq. Shortly after occupying Mosul, Major 

General David Petraeus and the 101st Airborne Division, worked directly with 

local community leaders in the city to implement critical reconstruction projects 

that helped reduce violence.61 Most units in Iraq, though, had little counterinsurgency training or experience, and the Coalition’s campaign strategy was “wrapped 

around killing and capturing the insurgents,” not promoting political participation, economic opportunity, and public buy-in.62 Replicating the 101st Airborne’s 

methods across the country might have helped tamp down the insurgency, but it 

would have required more troops and a coordinated counterinsurgency strategy. 

This was eventually used in 2007, during the surge, and ultimately quelled most 

violence in Iraq.

On October 14, 2003, the White House reported to the Congress that 

70,000 Iraqis were engaged in security operations, and another 13,000 were 

in training.63 Secretary of State Colin Powell claimed that the Department of 

Defense “kept inventing numbers of Iraqi Security Forces—the number would 

jump 20,000 a week! ‘We now have 80,000, we now have 100,000, we now have 

120,000.’”64 But Secretary Rumsfeld later said that changes in how the Defense 

Department tracked Iraqi troop readiness accounted for the changes over time 

in the numbers reported.65

Some CPA and CJTF-7 leaders felt that the perceived inflation of Iraqi troop 

numbers hurt the Coalition’s effort. According to Ambassador Bremer, “it was 

increasingly clear that the Pentagon’s apparent preoccupation with the spring 

[2004] troop rotation was creating unhealthy pressures to wish a competent 

Iraqi security force into being faster than possible.”66 Lieutenant General Sanchez 

echoed the point, noting that, “at various times, the Department of Defense inflated the numbers of effective Iraqi forces,” while ignoring the fact that “the 

enduring challenge was building capable and effective Iraqi forces rather than 

simply adding numbers.”67

Given the CPA’s persistent personnel shortages, General Abizaid strongly advocated that the U.S. military take over the security force training responsibilities 

“because [CPA’s] people didn’t have the capacity” to do it well. He also pushed 

for a bigger Iraqi army and said it was necessary to “really put the muscle of DoD” 

behind the training effort.68 Unsurprisingly, this idea created controversy. Many 

civilian police advisors feared that giving the police training mission to the military 

would sacrifice the Iraqi police force’s “long-term institutional and personnel development for expediency and would have negative consequences, saddling Iraq 

with security forces that could possibly endanger the country’s future.”69 Major 
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• Reconstructing Iraqi Security Forces •

General Eaton also had reservations; consolidating training for all Iraqi security 

forces under a single military command threatened to divert resources from the 

Iraqi army and thus undermine long-term capacity building there as well.70

The Eikenberry Report

In November 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld ordered an assessment by Major 

General Karl Eikenberry to determine what reforms were necessary to produce 

enough capable Iraqi forces to take over security responsibilities. Released in 

February 2004, the Eikenberry report described CPA training efforts as underresourced and disorganized, noting in particular that the development of Iraq’s 

police force was so far behind that transferring security responsibilities would 

not be possible for many months. Eikenberry’s report concluded that the U.S. 

military should manage the training of Iraq’s army and police.71

Rumsfeld accepted Eikenberry’s recommendations and authorized CJTF-7 to 

form the Office of Security Cooperation (OSC). Major General Eaton assumed 

command on March 9, 2004. Both CMATT and the newly established police training command—the Coalition Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT)—fell 

under OSC’s purview.72 “At this point, the distinction between an Iraqi military 

force and an Iraqi civilian rule-of-law police service became almost interchangeable with the use of the term ‘Iraqi Security Forces,’” said Gerald Burke, a member 

of the CPA’s first police training team. “It was at this time that input or control of 

the police training by civilian police experts was significantly reduced.”73

With the reorganization of training for the Iraqi Security Forces underway, 

the Department of Defense advanced an ambitious plan to cede security responsibilities to the Iraqis. In March 2004, Lieutenant General Sanchez announced 

that, as the Iraqi security forces proved capable and credible enough to maintain 

local security, Coalition forces would redeploy to bases outside major cities. From 

there, they would coordinate with the Iraqis and provide quick-reaction forces, 

but the ISF would have daily policing and patrolling duties.74 As the security 

situation improved, the size of Coalition forces would decrease from 130,000 to 

115,000, and the number of U.S. forward operating bases within the city would 

drop to eight in May 2004 from its June 2003 high of 60.75

Iraqi Force Failures

The first test of this new security sector strategy was a disaster. In April 2004, 

Sunni insurgents attacked Coalition forces in Falluja, Baghdad, Ramadi, 

Samarra, and Tikrit, while the Mahdi Army occupied Najaf in the south and 

Sadr City in Baghdad. Many elements of the newly deployed Iraqi Security 

Forces proved unwilling or unable to fight. Some abandoned their posts and 
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aided the insurgency.76 Others mutinied when they came under fire.77 Iraqi 

police units collapsed in Falluja, Najaf, Kerbala, and Kut, and the number of 

Iraqi police dropped by nearly 3,000 in one week in April 2004. The Iraq Civil 

Defense Corps fared worst of all. From April 2 to April 16, up to 12,000 ICDC 

members deserted; the rates reached up to 30 percent in northeastern Iraq, 49 

percent in Baghdad, 30 percent in the south-central region, and 82 percent in 

western Iraq.78 The Defense Department’s plan to transfer security responsibilities rapidly to the Iraqis had failed.

Recovery and Reorientation

The April uprisings pitted Iraq’s police, military, and civil defense corps against 

well-armed insurgents and militias across Iraq. Of the 200,000 Iraqi security 

force personnel rushed into service, “no more than 5,000” were “fully trained 

and equipped.”79 Few were ready for counterinsurgency operations; only the Iraqi 

Army was trained to fight organized enemies (although a mere eight percent of 

its force was considered ready before the uprising).80

The Defense Department now focused the various Iraqi military and police 

forces on a single threat—the insurgency within Iraq. This was a departure not 

only for the Iraqi army, whose mandate under CPA Order Number 22 had specifically prohibited its participation in domestic affairs, but also for the police, who 

had to add counterinsurgency to their criminal justice responsibilities.81 But the 

disastrous results of the April 2004 uprisings forced the Defense Department to 

modify how the Iraqi security forces were being trained. Major General Eaton’s 

Office of Security Cooperation began to refocus the mission on the development 

of more heavily equipped, specially trained counterinsurgency forces.

The Coalition Police Assistance Training Team brought a military approach 

to equipping the Iraqi police. CPATT analyzed Iraqi police needs for materiel, 

infrastructure, weapons, and other pacing items.82 Because of the contracting 

challenges in Iraq, the requested equipment did not reach the police until after 

the transfer of sovereignty. According to Lieutenant General Sanchez, it took 30 

to 45 days to document requirements and issue contracts and another 45 to 60 

days before deliveries began.83

CPATT also improved field training programs for Iraqi police, implementing 

specialized programs in four key areas that had been neglected: counterterrorism, 

intelligence, organized crime, and corruption. These were implemented at the 

Jordan and Baghdad police academies, as well as several smaller regional training 

academies.84 Meanwhile, the Ministry of Defense reoriented its forces toward domestic security missions. Shortly after the April uprisings, an Iraqi general visited 

various Iraqi army units, recruiting volunteers for a division that could operate 
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anywhere inside the country.85 Named the Iraqi Intervention Force, the unit was 

heavily armed and trained specifically for counterinsurgency.86

Iraqi officials also wanted a larger regular military, demanding an increase 

at a May 2004 conference between Department of Defense officials and the 

Iraqi leadership. General Abizaid recalled that Prime Minister Allawi “actually 

pounded on the table about as hard as I’ve ever seen a human being pound on the 

table and said the army was too small, and that he had to have more.”87

A Hard Lesson Learned

The CPA’s July 2003 Vision for Iraq declared that “our first priority is to create a 

secure and safe environment, without which there can be little progress on other 

goals.”88 This foundational goal proved exceedingly difficult to achieve. During 

the CPA’s tenure, Coalition forces could not provide the secure environment 

necessary for the Iraqi police and military to develop into competent and accountable security forces. By the time of the June 2004 transition, just half of 

Iraq’s army and two-thirds of its police forces had received any training at all, 

and the quality of that training varied widely.89

A transition team assessment report delivered to the Secretary of Defense on 

June 23, 2004—five days before Iraq assumed full sovereignty—showed that just 

six percent of Iraqi Police Service members had completed a police academy program. The report concluded that if this number did not at least triple by the end 

of the year, the newly sovereign Iraq would be at “high risk.”90 The Iraqi security 

forces were also poorly equipped. Despite the new IRRF 2 appropriations for 

security, contracting delays caused serious shortages in weapons, vehicles, body 

armor, and communications equipment.91

The disastrous performance of the Iraqi Security Forces in the April 2004 

uprisings revealed that the Department of Defense had prematurely pushed security responsibilities onto Iraqi shoulders. The Iraqi’s confidence in the country’s 

security forces—and in their sponsors, CJTF-7 and the CPA—plummeted as 

violence soared in 2004.92 The human toll was also severe; thousands of civilians 

were killed amid the growing violence.93 Pressed by time and under-resourced, 

the CPA and CJTF-7 could not adequately prepare the Iraqi Security Forces to 

fight the growing insurgency. Prematurely substituting Iraqi forces for Coalition 

forces had proved a mistake. As the performance of the 101st Airborne Division 

in Mosul suggested, the Coalition needed a new counterinsurgency strategy.
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Chapter 13

Restarting Oil Production

There’s a lot of money to pay for this that doesn’t have to be U.S. 

taxpayer money...the oil revenues of that country could bring 

between $50 and $100 billion over the course of the next two 

or three years...We’re dealing with a country that can really 

finance its own reconstruction, and relatively soon.*

Dr. Paul Wolfowitz

Deputy Secretary of Defense (2001-2005)

Iraq has the third-largest oil reserves in the world.1 Given this immense oil 

wealth, Iraq should have been able to pay for its own reconstruction from the 

start. But three debilitating wars, institutionalized governmental corruption, and 

crippling international sanctions all contributed to a breakdown of the country’s 

oil sector. 

Oil output peaked at 3.5 million barrels per day in July 1990, eight months 

before the first Gulf War. Because of damage inflicted during that war, production 

plummeted to less than 500,000 barrels per day, gradually increasing over the 

next decade to reach an average of 2.5 million barrels per day by early 2003.2

Iraq’s proven natural gas reserves—112 trillion cubic feet—are the tenthlargest in the world. Natural gas production also declined after the first Gulf War, 

as processing facilities deteriorated for lack of spare parts and maintenance. In 

2003, Iraq was “flaring”—igniting, and burning off—about 60 percent of the 

natural gas released in the production of crude oil, because it lacked the capacity 

to capture it for domestic consumption or export.3

Iraq’s Oil Infrastructure 

Iraq’s oil industry is an intricate web of what is known in oil-business parlance 

as “upstream,” “midstream,” and “downstream” operations. Upstream consists 

of oil fields, oil wells, and gas-oil separation plants; midstream facilities include 

refineries, gas-processing and stabilization plants; and downstream operations 

comprise distribution networks, terminals, and service stations.4

Most of Iraq’s oil and gas reserves lie in the southeastern and northwestern 

parts of the country. In 2003, about 70 percent of the oil produced in Iraq came 

from the north and south Rumaila fields near the southern city of Basrah and 

* Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Statement before the House Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense, March 27, 2003.
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• Restarting Oil Production •

the Kirkuk fields in the western part of Kurdistan.5 About two-thirds of its oil 

wells were in the Rumaila fields, and about one-third were in the north, in and 

around Kirkuk.6

Oil from the Rumaila fields has two notable attributes. First, it is “light,” meaning it has relatively low viscosity and yields a high percentage of desirable products 

when refined. Second, it is “sweet,” meaning that it has only a small amount of 

hydrogen sulfide and carbon dioxide, both of which corrode production facilities. 

“Some of the best crude in the world comes out [of southern Iraq],” said Brigadier 

General Robert Crear, who commanded Task Force RIO. “When it comes out 

of the ground, it goes through the gas-oil separating unit, and it goes straight to 

a ship for export,” without further treatment.7

At the time of the 2003 invasion, the country had two functioning export 

pipelines. The Ceyhan line carried oil from Kirkuk to the Turkish port of Ceyhan 

on the Mediterranean, and a pipeline from the Rumaila fields in the south carried 

oil to off-shore platforms near Basra.8

Iraq also had three main refinery complexes—in Baiji, Basra, and Doura—that 

collectively possessed the capacity to process about 570,000 barrels of crude oil 

per day. The Doura refinery, with a capacity of 110,000 barrels per day, supplied 

most of the fuel for nearby Baghdad. The two refineries at Baiji, in north-central 

Iraq, had a refining capacity of 310,000 barrels per day, and the Basrah facility 

near the Umm Qasr port could process 150,000 barrels per day.9

Despite this significant nominal capacity, Iraq’s refineries did not have the 

technology to process a broad range of refined products. Their obsolete systems 

left 45 percent of every barrel of crude oil behind as “heavy fuel oil,” a thick, sticky 

residue of limited commercial value. Iraq and other countries in the Middle East 

use heavy fuel oil to run large thermal power plants. Before the 2003 invasion, 

Iraq did not produce enough gasoline and cooking gas to meet domestic demand; 

thus, it traded its excess heavy fuel oil in exchange for refined products. For every 

three truckloads of heavy fuel oil exported to Jordan and Turkey, Iraq imported 

one truckload of gasoline.10

Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil

Determined to avert the environmental disasters experienced during the first 

Gulf War—when Saddam started 700 oil-well fires—USACE’s Task Force RIO, 

KBR, and the military developed extensive plans to prevent or putout such fires.11

One of the first task orders issued under KBR’s $7 billion contract with the Army 

Field Support Command was for a contingency plan to repair and restore Iraq’s 

damaged or destroyed oil structures. A separate contract for $37.5 million was 

awarded to KBR for the purpose of prepositioning fire-fighting equipment.12
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USACE prepared to fight up to 1,500 well fires, but most of the RIO team 

thought Saddam Hussein loyalists would not have time to sabotage more than 

thirty percent of the approximately 1,000 wells in the south. The team feared 

losing most of the 500 wells in the north because Turkey denied the Coalition 

access to Iraq, lengthening the time it would take for U.S. forces to secure the 

northern Iraqi oil fields at Kirkuk.13

During and immediately after the March 2003 invasion, no serious sabotage 

of the northern or southern oil fields occurred, with only nine fires recorded.14

Gary Vogler, a former Exxon-Mobil executive who served as a member of the 

Energy Infrastructure Planning Group in the run-up to the war and later as an oil 

advisor to ORHA and the CPA, attributed the small number of fires to USACE’s 

“fantastic planning” and to the fact that Coalition forces prevailed so quickly.15

USACE found and disarmed explosive devices at several wells and many gas-oil 

separation plants in the south.16

If the good news was that Iraq’s oil fields suffered little damage during the 

invasion, the bad news was that Task Force RIO had not expected the widespread 

damage that post-invasion looting and the developing insurgency would cause. 

In the south, where U.S. troops bypassed the oil infrastructure on the way to 

Baghdad, vandals and thieves stripped facilities of anything of value. Oil advisors 

had identified key installations that needed to be protected, but “[the military] 

said they didn’t have enough people to do that,” recalled one advisor.17 Task 

Force RIO had more firefighters than it needed but not enough oil people with 

operational experience to restore the damaged infrastructure.18

Reopening the Ministry of Oil 

On their first visit to the Ministry of Oil at the end of April 2003, Gary Vogler 

and Clark Turner, an oil advisor from the Pentagon team, found the offices damaged and most of the files missing. This shocked them because CENTCOM had 

planned to protect the oil ministry buildings. Apparently, during the brief time 

between the entry of Coalition forces into Baghdad and the arrival of troops at 

the oil ministry, significant looting had occurred.19

Vogler and Turner’s first job was to find an interim minister to oversee restarting ministry operations.20 On May 3, Vogler, a senior advisor to the ministry, 

called a meeting of the entire ministry staff to announce that Thamir al-Ghadban, its director of planning before the war, would serve as interim oil minister.21

Turner recalled that Ghadban then made a short speech that encapsulated Iraqi 

ambivalence toward the Coalition. He said that, “Whatever you call this unfortunate incident, we don’t like to be occupied.” He urged the Americans to 
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• Restarting Oil Production •

concentrate on providing security. If the Americans could do that, Ghadban said, 

Iraqis could handle the reconstruction of the oil sector.22

Turner and Vogler then began searching for more employees who could help 

Ghadban stabilize the ministry. “Our philosophy was we weren’t going to change 

anything,” said Turner. “We wanted to keep as many of the Ba’athists there as 

possible to help out and then later do the de-Ba’athification.”23 Ghadban said 

that, although the de-Ba’athification order affected some high-ranking technical 

people, its most deleterious impact was to severely politicize the ministry, which 

had longer-term harmful effects on the ministry’s operations.24

In 2003, the Ministry of Oil had about 15,000 employees.25 They oversaw 22 

state-owned enterprises, which engaged in everything from drilling and producing oil and gas to processing and exporting it. Dozens of other SOEs supported 

the ministry, providing a variety of goods and services.26 These companies had operated under memoranda of understanding with the UN Oil-for-Food program, 

as well as agreements among themselves. The ministry’s director general in charge 

of national manufacturing bore responsibility for coordinating the activities of 

the SOEs. He hoped to get some of them to work on oil sector reconstruction, 

but most of the factories had been looted and were struggling to survive.27

The Task Force RIO engineers made progress. The Rumaila fields in the 

south were soon producing modest amounts of oil, while the Kirkuk fields in 

the north were producing more than 30,000 barrels per day. By late April, Doura, 

Baghdad’s main refinery, was processing 40,000 barrels per day—still less than 

half the refinery’s capacity.28

Fuel Shortages

In late spring 2003, the CPA faced a serious fuel crisis. Iraq could not meet domestic 

demand for kerosene, diesel, liquefied petroleum gas, and gasoline. Looting had 

shut down some refineries, the invasion had disrupted the distribution system, and 

huge subsidies continued to encourage smuggling. With the refineries operating at 

low levels—or out of commission altogether—the Ministry of Oil tried to meet 

growing demand by drawing on supplies from its reserve inventory.29

By mid-May, Iraq was almost out of gasoline. Liquefied petroleum gas, sold in 

twelve-kilogram bottles and used primarily for cooking, had all but disappeared 

from the markets. The ministry set up a rationing system that reduced the number 

of truckloads of gasoline delivered to each gas station by almost 70 percent, trying 

to ensure that all stations would get some gasoline. Many received none at all.30

As the lines at gas stations grew longer, the Coalition turned to Task Force RIO 

and the KBR contract to solve the immediate problem, and they began to fund the 

massive import of refined products. Defense Department officials did not know 
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how much fuel would be required or how long it would be necessary to import it, 

but had anticipated that they would need to provide a 10- to 30-day supply.31

During the summer and fall of 2003, Iraq’s refineries repeatedly shut down 

because of power shortages, insurgent attacks, or the lack of storage space for the 

heavy fuel oil that was a byproduct of their refining process. Thus, Task Force 

RIO’s requests for refined fuels rapidly rose during the hot summer in 2003. 

From July 16 to August 3, USACE continuously raised the amount of fuel that it 

was requesting under the KBR contract. By the fall, USACE had “increased the 

funding on Task Order 5 from $24 million to $871 million, a value more than 

36 times greater than the initial allocation.” Five of the ten task orders ultimately 

issued to KBR under its $7 billion contract would be for importing fuel.32

Rebuilding Begins

In July 2003, the Corps of Engineers, the Ministry of Oil, the CPA, and KBR 

developed a strategy to get Iraq’s oil infrastructure back to prewar production 

capacity. The resulting “Iraq Oil Infrastructure Restoration Plan” identified 220 

projects, divided between “procurement only” activities (to obtain materials) 

and “engineer-procure-construct” contracts (for design and construction). 

Procurement-only activities used most of the funding.33

The Ministry of Oil drew on its own technical experts, as well as those of 

KBR and Task Force RIO to survey the upstream facilities—the fields and wells 

that had sustained most of the serious damage from looting and war—and to 

develop rehabilitation plans for them. But the ministry used its own engineering 

and construction firm, the State Company for Oil Projects, for most oil sector 

construction. KBR focused on purchasing and importing spare parts, new vehicles, and safety gear, as well as heavy equipment.34

Infrastructure Security

Iraq exported no oil from March to June 2003. The UN, which managed the 

country’s oil exports under the Oil-for-Food program, had halted exports when 

the invasion began.35 UN Security Council Resolution 1483, passed at the end 

of May 2003, required all income from oil sales to be deposited into the newly 

created DFI, paving the way for the resumption of exports in June.36 Northern 

exports started almost immediately; on June 22, 7.5 million barrels stored in tanks 

at the Turkish port of Ceyhan were sold.37

Meanwhile, Task Force RIO worked to bring the southern oil fields, badly 

damaged by looting, back on line. In mid-June, Iraq’s State Oil Marketing 

Organization (SOMO) began issuing “spot” tenders—or sales orders—for both 
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• Restarting Oil Production •

southern and northern oil. It was not until the end of July, however, that SOMO 

signed its first contracts to export 20 million barrels of Basra crude per month.38

In June 2003, Vogler estimated that Iraq might be able to produce three million barrels of oil per day within a year.39 Production climbed steadily during 

June and July, reaching 1.3 million barrels per day at the end of August 2003.40

By the end of October, the country was pumping just over two million barrels per 

day and exporting more than half of it. In the first five months of post-invasion 

operations, Iraq had earned about $2.6 billion in oil export revenues, depositing 

them in the DFI for use by the CPA.41

Significant insurgent attacks on the oil sector began in June 2003. Seven bombs 

shut down three pipelines: the Ceyhan line, the north-south pipeline, and a natural 

gas line. Between June and November 2003, insurgents launched thirteen major 

attacks on pipelines and oil facilities, severely limiting growth in production and 

exports.42 The CPA’s senior advisor to the oil ministry said the pattern of attacks indicated an organized insurgent campaign to sabotage Iraq’s oil infrastructure.43

Building an Iraq Oil Protection Force

Protecting the oil infrastructure soon became an important priority. In mid-July 

2003, Vogler requested $50 million from the CPA on behalf of the Ministry of 

Oil for a security contract to protect the pipelines and facilities. He estimated that 

the Coalition was losing at least $20 million per day from sabotage and continued 

looting. Advisors to the oil ministry searched for companies that could provide 

protection and found six already working in Iraq.44

On August 6, 2003, the CPA awarded a $39.5 million, one-year fixed-price 

contract to Erinys Iraq, a subsidiary of a private British security company, to 

train a 6,500-person Iraqi guard force to protect 140 oil sites across Iraq.45 By the 

end of the year, the CPA had modified the contract eleven times and more than 

doubled the number of guards it wanted Erinys to train to counter the increasing 

violence. Erinys ultimately was paid $104 million to provide training and site 

protection over two years.46

A month after awarding the Erinys contract, the CPA established Task Force 

Shield to oversee the training and operation of the Iraq Oil Protection Force. 

Task Force Shield reported to CJTF-7 until May 2004, when it began reporting 

to the Multi-National Force-Iraq, CJTF-7’s replacement.47

SIGIR’s audit of the Task Force Shield programs uncovered numerous problems: too short or ever-changing timelines, confusing lines of reporting authority, 

competing notions of what the contract required, and ambiguity as to which 

government entity actually oversaw the contract. The pressure to respond to 

rapidly escalating attacks accounted for some of these problems, but auditors 
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could not verify the many specific line-item costs, could not determine the total 

number of guards trained by the contractor, and could not account for most of 

the equipment procured.48

According to Erinys, which recruited most of its staff from the British military, the CPA’s directive to get “boots on the ground” meant that the company 

immediately had to assess needs, draw up plans, and implement a program in a 

“whirlwind of concurrent activity driven by intense Coalition pressure to deploy 

guards.”49 The security situation deteriorated faster than Erinys or anyone else 

could train guards to address it. The oil infrastructure sustained nine serious attacks in November 2003. 50

Already spread thin, the lightly armed pipeline patrols “found themselves 

frequently overmatched by insurgents operating in strength and armed with 

rocket-propelled grenades.” 51 James Wilshire, the Erinys manager for the central 

region, and his Iraqi translator, Majid Husein Jasim, were killed in an ambush on 

November 11, 2003, while traveling between Baghdad and the Doura refinery. 

Jasim was the first of 23 Iraqis killed while serving with the oil protection force 

from August 2003 to December 2004.52

Oil at the End of the CPA

Few oil fires occurred during the March 2003 invasion, but subsequent pipeline 

sabotage and looting of oil facilities caused severe damage to the oil sector, ultimately preventing the CPA from reaching its oil production or export goals. 

During the CPA’s tenure, insurgents launched more than 70 attacks on pipelines, 

wells, refineries, storage tanks, and individuals working for the Ministry of Oil.53

Much of the CPA’s efforts and Ministry of Oil resources went into repairing 

pipelines and other oil facilities.

All the oil pipelines suffered at least some damage during this period, but none 

more than the one connecting the Kirkuk oil fields in the north to the Turkish 

port of Ceyhan. This important pipeline, the only one for northern exports, was 

repeatedly shut down by insurgent attacks.54 Thus, during most of the CPA’s existence, Iraq did not export any oil from the Kirkuk fields by pipeline. By the end of 

June 2004, Iraq was producing more than 2 million barrels of oil per day, almost 

all of it in the south, still well short of the prewar 2.58 million barrels per day.55

The CPA channeled most of the resources it devoted to the oil sector into repairing pipelines, importing refined fuels, boosting production to increase export 

revenues, and protecting oil sites. It paid less attention to upgrading Iraq’s refining 

capacity because the refineries, although obsolete and decrepit, had not suffered 

as much from the war and looting. The refineries were crucial, but had so many 

mechanical failures in 2003 that they were down a third of the time.56
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• Restarting Oil Production •

With Iraq’s refineries unable to meet domestic demand for refined petroleum products, the CPA continued to import diesel and gasoline into oil-rich 

Iraq. Because many of Iraq’s power plants also depended on these refined fuels, 

the shortage forestalled progress on another major CPA objective: restoring 

electricity.
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Chapter 14

Rebuilding the Electricity Sector

We were measuring the wrong things. [Average daily megawatt 

production] was a metric that you could easily define and would 

demonstrate some progress, but we weren’t really focused on the 

right things in putting the electrical grids back on line.*

Lieutenant General Carl Strock 

USACE Commander, Chief of Engineers (2004-2007)

Brigadier General Steven Hawkins received a late-night phone call on April 11, 

2003, in Doha, Kuwait. The U.S. Army had completed its “thunder runs”—armored thrusts into the heart of Baghdad—and now occupied a city where the 

power grid had crashed, taking down all the other infrastructure systems with it, 

including water and sewerage. Lieutenant General McKiernan wanted the lights 

back on in Baghdad immediately.1

Tapped by Lieutenant General George Casey in January to lead Joint Task 

Force-4, Brigadier General Hawkins had spent the previous four months planning to manage the transition to a new Iraqi government.2

 Now he was on his way 

into Iraq, suddenly responsible for what would become one of the Coalition’s 

most intractable challenges—Iraq’s broken electricity sector. 

Twenty-four hours later, Hawkins and his 28-member team boarded a C-130 

bound for Baghdad. Tasked to restore power, water, sewerage, and hospital services to the city, they called themselves Task Force Fajr, the Arabic word for 

“dawn” or “new light.”3

Task Force Fajr

Task Force Fajr landed in Baghdad at 2:30 a.m. on April 13, 2003. Iraqi electrical engineers who knew the capital’s power system met them for a pre-dawn 

conference in downtown Baghdad. The Iraqis and the Americans recognized the 

mission’s urgency. “All of us knew that potable water, sewer systems, and hospitals would not function without power.”4

 They also realized it was just a matter 

of time before the loss of power would cause a humanitarian crisis.

Devising a solution was difficult because the Iraqi engineers did not have 

complete drawings showing Baghdad’s transmission and distribution networks.5

Someone said that the Karkh water treatment plant just north of Baghdad had an 

* SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Carl Strock, former USACE Commander, Chief of 

Engineers, May 13, 2008.
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• Rebuilding the Electricity Sector •

operational ten-megawatt generator. Hawkins and his engineers hit on an idea 

and immediately set to work to get power to Baghdad by routing the Karkh plant’s 

power through an intermediate substation and onto Baghdad’s grid. Lights soon 

began to flicker on across the city, and the grid was gradually patched back together, averting disaster.6

After getting Baghdad’s lights on, Brigadier General Hawkins and his team then 

engaged in a form of triage to determine where to distribute the limited available 

power. Hospitals had first priority, followed by water-treatment facilities and sewerage systems; domestic consumption came next, followed by businesses and factories. 

Within two weeks, the capital’s critical facilities had the power they needed to operate.7

 By the end of April, Iraq’s power plants were generating 1,275 megawatts, up 

50 percent since the invasion, but still only about a quarter of prewar levels.8

While Task Force Fajr pieced together Baghdad’s power grid, the Coalition 

began reconstituting Iraq’s Commission of Electricity. The commission, which 

would later become the Ministry of Electricity, was responsible for the generation, 

transmission, and distribution of power throughout the country. It had about 

38,000 personnel on its payroll before the March 2003 invasion. As with most 

other ministries, the Commission of Electricity staff had dispersed in the wake 

of the invasion. 

In May, the CPA asked a respected Iraqi electrical engineer, Dr. Kareem 

Waheed al-Aboudi, to head the commission. He had a doctorate in electrical 

engineering and previously served as the director general of the commission’s 

technical office.9

 In one of the first acts of U.S. capacity building in Iraq, Hawkins 

embedded engineers from Task Force Fajr in the commission to help Dr. Kareem 

and his Iraqi engineers get it operating again. 

Task Force Fajr disbanded on June 15, 2003, but many of its members continued working for the CPA on Iraq’s electricity problems, some helping to 

rehabilitate power generation and distribution across the country, which was critical to the CPA’s overall mission of establishing a stable and democratic Iraq.10

Challenges in the Electricity Sector

An array of problems hobbled CPA’s effort to restore Iraq’s electrical system. 

Wars, sanctions, and decades of mismanagement had left the entire network 

dilapidated.11 Moreover, the country did not have enough trained personnel to 

upgrade and maintain the electrical systems. Iraq did not produce enough refined 

fuels to sustain operations at all of its power plants and the country’s pipeline 

system was inadequately developed to ensure effective delivery of the right fuel to 

the right power generation facilities.12 Finally, the insurgency frequently targeted 

the electricity infrastructure, causing blackouts and impeding progress. 
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Electricity Infrastructure

In 2003, Iraq’s power sector was a network of electrical generation plants, transmission systems, and distribution networks that fed power to hospitals, industries, 

government buildings, and neighborhoods. Electrical substations, which adjust 

voltage levels for distribution, connected power plants to transmission systems 

and distribution networks. Seven large thermal power plants produced more 

than 54 percent of the country’s electricity, two hydroelectric facilities generated 

another 24 percent, and nine gas-turbine power plants provided 21 percent.13

Before the invasion, Iraq had the “nameplate capacity” to produce over 9,000 

megawatts of power.14 But achieving that level of output required all facilities to 

be operational and running optimally, which was not possible because of chronic 

maintenance problems and fuel shortages.15 The first Gulf War severely damaged Iraq’s power plants, transmission lines, and electrical substations, reducing 

average daily power output in 1991 to 2,325 megawatts.16 Revenue from the 

Oil-for-Food program helped fund repair work that had increased generation to a 

daily average of about 4,000 megawatts by the end of 2002.17 Although the March 

2003 invasion deliberately avoided targeting Iraq’s power system, looting, poor 

maintenance, and a lack of spare parts, made it impossible to restore electricity 

quickly. By the early summer of 2003, Iraq’s power plants were generating about 

3,500 megawatts, a five-fold increase from immediate post-invasion levels but still 

at least 500 megawatts below prewar levels.18

Iraq’s main generating facilities were in serious disrepair because “most plants 

[had] been operated in a manner that has degraded the output of the plant and 

eliminated most environmental controls.”19 To make matters worse, because Iraq 

had not adhered to uniform standards in equipment acquisition, its power plants 

were a hodgepodge of “parts and repairs...from many different suppliers using 

many different codes and standards (and sometimes none at all).”20

The transmission systems and distribution networks were even more fragile. 

“The system was more like a string of old-fashioned Christmas lights than a modern national power grid,” said Lieutenant General Strock. “When one key facility 

went out, the entire system failed.”21 Delicate and deteriorated, Iraq’s electricity 

sector was essentially held together by “Band-Aids and rubber bands.”22

 Security Problems

Soon after Baghdad fell, gangs of looters stripped substations and control centers 

of copper, computers, and communications equipment. Bechtel found thirteen 

destroyed transmission towers, all stripped clean of their copper.23 Although 

USACE estimated that “fewer than 50 high-voltage electricity transmission 

towers were toppled or significantly damaged as result of the war,” by mid-June 
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• Rebuilding the Electricity Sector •

vandals and scavengers had destroyed more than 700 towers and taken the copper from thousands of miles of high-voltage wires.24

“It was like Pac Man,” said USAID’s Tom Wheelock, former chief of party 

for the agency’s personnel contractor International Resources Group. “They just 

started at one end of the transmission line and worked their way up, taking down 

the towers, taking away the valuable metals, smelting it down, selling it into Iran 

and Kuwait.”25 At one point the looters had cut all four electric transmission lines 

connected to Basrah’s oil refinery, exacerbating an already severe fuel shortage 

and causing riots in the city.26

In addition to the looting problem, the fledgling insurgency began sabotaging 

key electricity infrastructure nodes and attacking repair crews. The insurgents 

“routinely targeted joint U.S.-Iraqi electricity meetings,” as well as Iraqis who 

were associated with the Coalition electricity restoration effort. In early June 

2003, insurgents shot to death a senior Iraqi distribution engineer in front of 

her children as she left her Baghdad home. By the end of June, “attacks on Iraqi 

electrical engineers and facilities in and around Baghdad” occurred daily.27

Many senior Iraqis working for the Commission of Electricity disappeared 

after the invasion. De-Ba’athification further eroded the commission’s staff, and 

insurgent attacks made some afraid to go to work. Lieutenant General Strock 

recalled that “many of the local Iraqis with expertise necessary to restore and 

operate critical infrastructure were either unavailable or fearful of working with 

the Coalition.”28

The Electrical Power Security Service (EPSS), which had existed under 

Saddam Hussein, was supposed to protect power plants and substations. The 

CPA tried to continue this weak force but found that it lacked trained staff, had 

limited equipment, and was staffed by personnel with little interest in protecting 

the power grid.29 Task Force Shield was charged with training and equipping 

6,000 Iraqi EPSS guards for the new Ministry of Electricity. But, as with the Oil 

Protection Force, Task Force Shield failed to meet its mission. 

A SIGIR audit found that only 334 EPSS guards were trained, despite the fact 

that the contract required 300 per month for two years. Additionally, the EPSS 

Training Academy at Taji was not built according to the contract’s requirements, 

and $4.7 million in equipment there could not be accounted for. SIGIR’s review 

of the EPSS program concluded that it “barely got underway and only trained a 

limited amount of guards.”30

Fuel Problems

In 2003, most Iraqi power plants burned diesel, natural gas, or heavy fuel oil to 

generate electricity. Iraq’s seven thermal power plants, which generated more 
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than half the electricity for the entire country, could run on heavy fuel oil, a thick, 

low-value byproduct of Iraq’s antiquated refining process and the only fuel that 

the country had in surplus.31 Iraq’s refineries produced more heavy fuel oil than 

its thermal plants could use, so Iraq exported the excess, mostly to Jordan and 

Turkey, in exchange for gasoline, diesel, and other refined products. The war 

disrupted this quasi-barter system. The storage tanks for heavy fuel oil quickly 

reached capacity, forcing the refineries to shut down and halting production of 

other refined fuels needed by other power plants.32

Iraqis filled the power gap by buying small generators to provide power to their 

homes, as well as to small businesses, water plants, and hospitals. But these generators did not contribute to the national grid, were relatively expensive on a per-capita 

basis to operate, and exacerbated fuel shortages. Nevertheless, Iraqi entrepreneurs 

imported and sold tens of thousands of the portable systems to households all over 

Iraq. The boom in home generation increased demand for refined fuels such as 

diesel and liquefied petroleum gas, stoking black market activity.33

The CPA’s plan to expand power generation focused on importing gas turbine 

generators—which are relatively easy to transport and install—rather than building new thermal units.34 This was the quickest way to add generation capacity to 

the grid. But Iraq did not produce enough refined fuel to power these generators, 

and its distribution system was inadequate to deliver the fuel it did produce. 

Moreover, Iraq did not have enough trained personnel to maintain and operate 

the more delicate gas turbine engines, which require frequent maintenance. The 

decision to install gas turbines, based in part on the assumption that the Iraqi oil 

industry could rapidly rehabilitate its natural gas industry, foundered when plans 

to develop the national gas delivery system fell by the wayside.35

Developing a Plan

The first CPA senior advisor on electricity, Peter Gibson, had worked with hydroelectric plants in the Pacific Northwest, but nobody on his small staff of four 

was an expert in the field.36 Gibson instituted weekly strategy sessions in the 

Green Zone that brought together USACE, USAID, Bechtel, and the head of 

the Commission of Electricity—and his key managers—to develop a work plan 

for the electricity sector. By the end of June 2003, when Dick Dumford arrived 

as USAID’s electricity specialist, the strategy sessions had yet to produce such a 

plan.37 “We started looking around at what needed to be done,” said Dumford, 

“and came up with a list as long as your arm.”38

The CPA used DFI funds to pay for electricity projects but also had access 

to U.S. appropriations through USAID’s contract with Bechtel. In July 2003, 

the CPA’s Program Review Board approved $77 million from the DFI for the 
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• Rebuilding the Electricity Sector •

capital expenditures portion of the 2003 Iraqi budget for the Commission of 

Electricity.39 The CPA looked to Bechtel, which had received funding from 

USAID for work in the electricity sector, to advise the commission on how best 

to spend this money.40

Bechtel’s Assessment

On April 17, 2003, USAID contracted with Bechtel to assess Iraq’s power facilities and systems and to execute critical repairs that would permit and promote 

“rapid and significant improvements in the quality and reliability of electricity 

services.”41 After spending the month of May assessing Iraq’s electricity system, 

Bechtel estimated repair costs would amount to about ten times the value of its 

$680 million contract with USAID.42 Bechtel warned that the “reconstruction of 

Iraq’s power sector is a long-term effort,” and that one of the biggest challenges 

to come would be conveying to the Iraqi population the reality that “there will 

be a delay in providing reliable, 24-hour-a-day power.”43

The Bechtel assessment recommended focusing on rehabilitating power 

plants, replacing destroyed substations, and installing new generator units. It 

further advised that the CPA establish a capacity-building program to get Iraqis 

on the road toward “standardization of operation and maintenance practices,” 

highlighting the need to strengthen coordination between the ministers of 

electricity and oil.44

The Push for 4,400 Megawatts

In mid-summer 2003, Ambassador Bremer surprised many in Iraq and 

Washington when he announced that the Coalition would have Iraq’s average 

daily electricity supply back up to prewar levels by early October.45 He expanded 

the CPA’s operations office, asking its director, Peter Andrew Bearpark, to manage the “infrastructure” ministries involved in providing essential services.46

Bearpark became the Director of Operations and Infrastructure, with then-Major 

General Strock as his deputy. At the end of July, Bearpark appointed Stephen 

Browning, a senior civilian from USACE who had served as a senior advisor to 

several ministries, to take charge of infrastructure.47

Browning found that the Coalition’s electricity team had no plan for how 

the CPA and the Ministry of Electricity would restore electricity to prewar levels 

by October.48 He immediately created an Electricity Action Team, comprising 

personnel from USAID, USACE, and the Iraqi Commission of Electricity. 

On August 18 and 19, Browning convened a conference with every one of 

Iraq’s power plant managers to shape the plan to reach the 4,400-megawatt target. Capacity for over 9,000 megawatts existed, but only about 3,000 were being 
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generated. The question was how to put some of the idle capacity to work.49

Browning asked each Iraqi power plant manager to present proposals for improving output.50

Browning’s team concluded that the only way to reach Bremer’s 4,400-megawatt goal was to target quick repairs that would have the greatest impact on 

generation. The staff put together a list of equipment needs for each plant and 

then scoured warehouses across Iraq for parts.51 They found caches of equipment 

and spare parts, purchased under the UN Oil-for-Food program, which plant 

managers had been hoarding.52

Throughout September, Browning and his team worked diligently with the 

ministry’s engineers to complete targeted repairs. USACE engineers concentrated on downed transmission lines and broken substations; Bechtel provided 

technical assistance for generation plant repairs; and BearingPoint helped with 

sector studies and system forecasts. The CPA’s senior advisors met with the 

Ministries of Electricity and Oil once each week to address the recurrent fuel 

problems. Browning’s effort did not include any major construction, but instead 

focused on minor repairs and technical assistance. The work was feverish, eighteen hours per day. “We pulled out all the stops, and it looked hopeless at times, 

but we made it,” said one team member. On October 6, Iraq produced 4,518 

megawatts, exceeding the CPA’s target by 118 megawatts.53

The effort, though successful, took a toll on the grid’s infrastructure. Browning 

had warned Ambassador Bremer that pushing the system to reach 4,400 megawatts could cause breakdowns that would make sector-wide rehabilitation more 

difficult. He believed that the focus should have been on building a sustainable 

power generation system.54

The decision to set an output metric like 4,400 megawatts as the goal had both 

short- and long-term negative effects on management. In the short term, the decision caused senior officials at the Pentagon and the White House to fixate on the 

metric rather than moving forward on multifaceted improvements of the system. 

In the long term, the focus created a perennial desire to judge electricity sector 

performance on one metric—whether current output exceeded prewar levels. 

Even before the CPA reached the 4,400 target, Ambassador Bremer set a lofty 

new goal. In a broadcast to the Iraqi people on August 29, 2003, he said, “About 

one year from now, for the first time in history, every Iraqi in every city, town, 

and village will have as much electricity as he or she can use; and he will have it 

24 hours a day, every single day.”55 At the time, the CPA estimated the current 

unsatisfied demand at 6,000 megawatts, but that number would rise as Iraqis anticipated greater amounts of power being available in the foreseeable future.56
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Task Force Restore Iraqi Electricity

During a visit to Baghdad in July 2003 when the CPA was developing its plans to 

increase the country’s power supply, Lieutenant General Robert B. Flowers, the 

USACE commanding general, told Bremer that he could bolster electricity reconstruction by deploying a new task force, similar to Task Force RIO. Ambassador 

Bremer immediately jumped at the idea. In August 2003, CENTCOM authorized 

USACE to develop and deploy a team, called Task Force Restore Iraqi Electricity 

(RIE), to provide rapid reconstruction assistance to the electricity sector.57

USACE recruited Brigadier General Hawkins, formerly Commander of Task 

Force Fajr, to return to Baghdad to head Task Force RIE. He and his team—

which included 84 USACE civilians and 90 soldiers, many with specialized skills 

in the electricity field—arrived at the end of September 2003. Task Force RIE 

also included mechanical, civil, and electrical engineers.58 Their job was to help 

CPA reach its 6,000-megawatt goal by the summer of 2004. 

Task Force RIE designed a plan for 26 projects to repair and upgrade existing 

power generation, transmission, and command and control facilities to “restore 

reliable electricity to national and regional power grids.” To manage the work, 

Task Force RIE established bases in Baghdad and in the northern, central, and 

southern regions of the country.59

USACE used three IDIQ contracts it already had in place with Perini 

Corporation, Washington Group, and Fluor International to implement the first 

Task Force RIE projects. These three companies eventually won the three IRRF 

2 electricity sector contracts, no doubt in part because of their work with Task 

Force RIE. USACE tasked each company to start projects to repair the electrical infrastructure in a different region: Perini Corporation in the south, Fluor 

International in the center, and Washington Group in the north.60 By October 

2003, the contractors had begun many projects, covering everything from refurbishing power plants to restoring transmission towers.61

Electricity at the End of the CPA 

The Congress allocated $5.56 billion—or nearly 30 percent of IRRF 2—to the electricity sector when it passed the supplemental legislation on November 6, 2003.62

One week after the supplemental was enacted, Robyn McGuckin, the CPA’s deputy 

advisor to the Ministry of Electricity, called a meeting of CPA’s electricity team to 

review the list of proposed electricity projects covered by IRRF 2. The projects 

were divided among the categories of new generation, rehabilitation, controls and 

communications, transmission, and distribution. McGuckin needed to have a prioritized list of projects ready for the first Section 2207 Report to the Congress. Her 

list eventually included 110 generation, transmission, and distribution projects.63
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In the late spring of 2004, insurgents stepped up attacks on the electricity 

infrastructure. They targeted contractors working to restore generation plants, 

substations, and transmission lines, forcing some companies to suspend operations. Washington Group International locked down its power plant construction 

site in Mosul for three days following an assault that included ambushes, and 

small-arms and mortar fire.64 Subcontractors like General Electric and Siemens 

pulled staff from project sites after attacks in April. Insurgents also targeted Iraqis 

working on reconstruction projects.65 Ambushes of convoys carrying reconstruction supplies and materials caused added delays.

The wave of violence drove costs higher, pushing all electricity projects over 

budget and forcing the prime contractors to spend more on security. Perini’s 

security costs would total $63.4 million, about 18 percent of the $356.5 million it 

spent; Washington Group’s security bill amounted to $44.5 million, 14.3 percent 

of the $310 million it spent.66

Despite the exploding security situation, work in the electricity sector continued. By June 2004, Task Force RIE had launched 66 projects and USACE said 

it was on target to increase generation by 1,295 megawatts, even though work 

on seven generation plants was well behind schedule. When the CPA closed its 

doors on June 28, 2004, Iraq’s average daily generation capacity stood at 4,200 

megawatts, well short of its 6,000-megawatt goal.67
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Chapter 15

Iraq Reconstruction in Transition

Sovereignty involves more than a date and a ceremony. It 

requires Iraqis to assume responsibility for their own future.*

President George W. Bush 

From January to June 2004, the CPA concentrated on preparing to pass sovereignty to the Iraqis and on developing a process for the formation of a new 

democratic government in Iraq. In collaboration with the UN, the CPA assisted 

the Iraqi Governing Council in developing the Transitional Administrative Law 

(TAL), which provided dates for provincial and parliamentary elections and for a 

referendum on a new constitution. The TAL would serve as the legal foundation 

upon which the new Iraqi Interim Government would operate. 

The CPA also prepared to pass oversight of the U.S. reconstruction program 

to a new U.S. Embassy, the first in Iraq since 1991. By the end of June 2004, the 

Department of Defense formally handed over management of the reconstruction program to the Department of State, and a new set of ad hoc organizations 

assumed control of a faltering reconstruction mission.

The Transitional Administrative Law

The November 15, 2003 transition agreement anticipated the transfer of sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government by the end of June 2004.1

 But certain Iraqi 

leaders—including the Grand Ayatollah Sistani—disagreed with Bremer about 

how the new interim government should be chosen. Bremer proposed holding 

caucuses in each of the provinces; Sistani insisted on national elections.2

In early 2004, the United States and the Iraqi Governing Council turned to 

the UN for help. It appointed Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, a former Algerian 

foreign minister who had recently served as the Special Representative of the UN 

Secretary General in Afghanistan.3

 When Brahimi and his UN team arrived in 

Iraq, they quickly concluded that it was logistically impossible to hold national 

elections before the June 30 transfer of sovereignty. He proposed deferring the 

elections until after the transfer. The Iraqis accepted the recommendations, and 

the CPA turned to the work of developing the TAL.4

* President George W. Bush, “'We Will Finish the Work of the Fallen,” Remarks by the President, April 

14, 2004.
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• Chapter 15 •

Through the TAL, the CPA sought to enshrine the core principles of Western 

federalism in Iraqi law; but the Iraqis quickly voiced their disagreement. The 

Sunnis wanted a united Iraq, so they could continue to play an important role, 

while Shi’a clerics, led by Sistani, were adamant that the law be clearly informed 

by Islam.5

 Finally, on March 8, 2004, the CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council 

approved the TAL, a consensus document full of compromises.6

The TAL served effectively as Iraq’s interim constitution, with 62 articles that, 

among other things, guaranteed fundamental rights for all Iraqis, outlined the Iraqi 

Interim Government’s authority, and defined a timeline for electing a permanent 

democratic government in Iraq. It provided that all Iraqi laws—including the 

regulations, orders, and directives promulgated by the CPA and in place before 

the June 30, 2004 transfer of sovereignty—would remain in force unless amended 

or rescinded by the Iraqi Interim Government or its successors. It made Islam the 

official faith of Iraq, stating that it was “to be considered a source of legislation.”7

 In 

an important concession to the Kurds, the law recognized the Kurdistan Regional 

Government, giving it control over its police forces and internal security.8

The TAL provided for an eighteen-month transition period, requiring three 

national elections in less than a year. The Iraqi Interim Government would 

commence operations no later than June 30, 2004, and would hold the first 

election—for provincial councils and the National Assembly—by January 31, 

2005. The National Assembly would draft a constitution by August 15, 2005, with 

the Iraqi people voting on it no later than October 15, 2005. National elections 

would occur by December 15, 2005, for the Council of Representatives, which 

would be seated by the end of the year.9

The task of forming the Iraqi Interim Government was given to Brahimi, who 

worked closely with U.S. officials and Iraq’s major political leaders in developing 

the new government. At the end of May, the Iraqi Governing Council chose one 

of its members, Ayad Allawi—a secular Shi’a who had lived in exile during the 

Saddam years—as interim prime minister. On June 1, 2004, Brahimi and Allawi 

announced the formation of the new Iraqi Interim Government, including the 

president, the deputy prime minister, two vice presidents, twenty-six ministers, 

and five ministers of state.10

The Use and Misuse of the Development Fund for Iraq

About $20 billion dollars, predominantly from oil sales, were deposited into the 

Development Fund for Iraq from May 2003 to the transfer of sovereignty to the 

IIG in June 2004. The DFI roughly equaled the total of both IRRF appropriations ($20.9 billion) approved by the Congress. The CPA used most of the DFI 

to fund Iraq’s national budget, which chiefly supported ministry operations. A 
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smaller portion of the DFI—$7 billion—went to CPA-approved relief and reconstruction efforts.11

SIGIR audits found that the CPA failed to exert adequate control of the DFI 

used to support the Iraqi national ministries or reconstruction projects.12 An audit 

of DFI disbursements to Iraqi ministries made through the national budget process concluded that the CPA failed to enforce adequate management, financial, 

and contractual controls over approximately $8.8 billion of DFI money. SIGIR 

found that there was “no assurance that the funds were used for the purposes 

mandated by [UN] Resolution 1483.” Ambassador Bremer and the CPA disagreed with SIGIR, arguing that the auditors had failed to account for the very 

difficult security environment the CPA operated in and ignored the steps taken 

to improve recognized management weaknesses. Although it acknowledged the 

extraordinary danger confronting the CPA, SIGIR nevertheless found that the 

“CPA management of Iraq’s national budget process and oversight of Iraqi funds 

was burdened by severe inefficiencies and poor management.”13 Moreover, SIGIR 

concluded that the chaotic circumstances required more stringent oversight—

not less, as the CPA suggested.

The CPA appeared to be averse to oversight of the DFI. Dov Zakheim, the 

Pentagon comptroller, said that Bremer “resisted the creation of the IAMB for 

a very long [time]” because “he didn’t want to be audited by a bunch of international auditors.” Zakheim added, “You can have rules, but if you resist the auditing 

and you resist the implementation of the rules...what kind of rules are they?”14 

The CPA did not appoint an accounting firm to audit its use of the DFI until 

March 2004.15 Work started on this audit only after the CPA signed the contract 

with KPMG on April 5, 2004—nearly a year after the DFI had been established 

and less than three months before the CPA would expire. 

DFI Spending Frenzy

In late April 2004, as the handover of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government 

neared, Ambassador Bremer ordered his staff to step up the expenditure of DFI 

funds while the CPA still had control of them and could use them to support 

reconstruction projects.16 Spike Stephenson, the USAID Mission Director in 

Iraq, described this process as “a frenzied initiation of activities.”17

On May 15, the Program Review Board approved the very general expenditures of some $2 billion for major projects: Iraqi security forces ($500 million), 

improvements in the electricity sector ($315 million), oil infrastructure reconstruction ($460 million), and supporting the Iraqi Property Claims Commission 

($180 million).18 Some PRB members disputed the proposed expenditures. Neil 

Hawkins, an Australian foreign aid official, said that five voting members thought 
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the proposals, initially presented as one package on May 12, were “inadequately 

documented.” He added, “You have one paragraph, half a page, for $70 million...

You had to say, ‘That’s not good enough.’” The documentation was improved 

before the final vote three days later, when most, but not all the components were 

approved.19 Bremer was furious at the resistance.20

During the final six weeks before the handover, more than $5 billion was 

either transferred to Iraq’s ministries or committed to CPA-administered reconstruction projects—amounting to over one-third of all the DFI funds that the 

CPA disbursed during its entire fourteen-month existence. In the week before the 

transition, CPA officials ordered urgent disbursements of more than $4 billion 

from the Federal Reserve, including one shipment of $2.4 billion—the largest 

in the bank’s history.21

Operation Plan Sovereign Iraq

In concert with the transfer of sovereignty to the IIG, White House officials 

wanted to normalize relations with Iraq’s new government by establishing a U.S. 

embassy in Baghdad, moving responsibility for managing the U.S.-Iraqi relationship to the State Department. 

On March 19, 2004, an interagency Transition Planning Team arrived in 

Baghdad to develop what became known as “Operation Plan (OPLAN) Sovereign 

Iraq.” The OPLAN was the first attempt since the 2003 invasion to develop an interagency strategy for the coordination of efforts to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. To 

develop the OPLAN, joint assessment teams looked at security, staffing, financial 

management, acquisitions and contracting, and communications. 

Not surprisingly, the Transition Planning Team identified security as the 

foremost problem in Iraq but offered no proposals for reducing the violence.22

During the CPA’s existence, the U.S. military’s mission did not include providing 

security for either U.S. civilian government agencies or private firms contracted 

for reconstruction projects. Thus, the CPA and the private firms working to rebuild Iraq had to hire private security companies to protect them. 

By May 2004, the State Department, USAID, USACE, and the CPA had all 

contracted with private security firms.23 The transition team identified twelve 

different private security contractors providing “various levels of force protection” and recognized that these private contractors would continue to play an 

important role supporting the U.S. program Iraq.24

The OPLAN perpetuated the bifurcated military command and civilian management structures. The military would continue to report to CENTCOM, while 

the civilians working on reconstruction would report to the new ambassador. 

Although the OPLAN urged cooperation and coordination, it did not mandate 
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• Iraq Reconstruction in Transition •

it, stating only that the Commanding General of the Multi-National Force-Iraq 

should serve as the principal military advisor to the ambassador.25

On May 11, President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive 

36, legally formalizing key aspects of the OPLAN.26 The State Department, 

through the Chief of Mission to Iraq, would be in charge of all U.S. activities in 

Iraq except for military operations and the development of Iraq’s security forces, 

which would be the Defense Department’s responsibility. The new directive also 

established new ad hoc organizations to manage the reconstruction program: 

the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) and the Project and 

Contracting Office (PCO).

IRMO and PCO inherited the mission of CPA’s PMO. IRMO, under the 

jurisdiction of the State Department, absorbed most of the CPA’s former senior 

advisors (now known as senior consultants), who would continue to provide 

technical and operational reconstruction assistance to the Iraqi ministries.27

IRMO eventually concentrated its efforts on building the capacity of the ministries to function independently.

The PCO, a temporary organization within the Defense Department, provided acquisition and project management support for the execution of IRRF 

construction and non-construction projects. The U.S. Army was responsible 

for funding, staffing, and operating the new office. Under the transition plan, 

the PCO would be “responsive” to the U.S ambassador to Iraq “concerning the 

requirements and priorities for projects to support reconstruction programs that 

are unrelated to the Iraqi Security Forces” and to the Multi-National Force-Iraq 

commanding general “with respect to requirements and priorities concerning 

training and equipping the Iraqi military and police forces.”28

The PCO took over management of approximately $12.4 billion of the $18.4 

billion of IRRF 2.29 It also took over the financial management systems used to 

prepare the quarterly Section 2207 Report to the Congress. Although the organization was run by USACE, it fell under chief of mission authority, reporting to the 

embassy’s deputy chief of mission, as did IRMO.30 These crossed lines of reporting 

created operational conflicts as the IRRF 2 process unfolded.

CENTCOM consolidated Coalition military forces under the new MultiNational Force-Iraq (MNF-I), with Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) 

controlling operations. At the end of June, it also established the Multi-National 

Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) to organize, train, and equip 

Iraq’s security forces. 
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• Chapter 15 •

Leaving the Provinces

The CPA had opened offices in seventeen of Iraq’s eighteen provinces. The 

OPLAN eliminated all but four: Kirkuk, in Tameem province; Mosul, in Ninewa

province; Basrah, in Basrah province; and Hilla, in Babil province. Although 

driven by security concerns and budget constraints, the decision also reflected 

an attempt to transition to the more traditional structure of an embassy. The 

OPLAN called for civilians to be “embedded” in military commands in five 

regions. They would serve with the military civil affairs units supporting reconstruction and capacity-building initiatives. These early attempts at civil-military 

cooperation would evolve into the Provincial Reconstruction Team program 

under Ambassador Khalilzad.

On June 8, 2004, UNSCR 1546 endorsed the formation of the Iraqi Interim 

Government and approved the timetable for elections and the referendum on 

Iraq’s new constitution. The UNSCR also noted the presence of the multinational 

force in Iraq, authorizing it to take all necessary measures to preserve the security 

and stability of Iraq.31

The End of the CPA

The CPA, which the UN had recognized in UNSCR 1483 as an “occupation 

authority,” had several missions assigned to it by the U.S. government and the 

international community, including: the administration of Iraq; the reform of the 

country’s bureaucratic, security, and economic institutions; the repair of Iraq’s 

infrastructure; and the establishment of a democratic foundation for a constitutional government that would represent all of the country’s people.32 Each of 

these missions required a mammoth effort; tackling them all simultaneously, as 

the CPA had sought to do, called for a level of operational synchronization that 

was simply beyond the CPA’s capacity. 

When the CPA came into being, it did not have the staff or resources to lead 

a comprehensive rebuilding program in Iraq. The Defense Department, which 

was given the lead over postwar Iraq by NSPD 24, had failed to provide the CPA 

with sufficient numbers of qualified staff and an integrated overarching plan that 

articulated achievable objectives for the rebuilding of Iraq. Operating in a crisis 

environment, the CPA had no time to deliberate or develop alternative implementation plans. Ambassador Bremer made quick decisions that responded to 

changing circumstances on the ground. This process yielded some ill-advised 

orders that undermined the CPA’s capacity to achieve its very ambitious reconstruction goals. 

In 14 months, the CPA promulgated more than 100 orders, numerous 

regulations, memoranda, and public notices addressing everything from de-
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• Iraq Reconstruction in Transition •

Ba’athification and reforming the criminal justice system to disbanding the Iraqi 

army and amending trade laws. It stood up new security organizations, including 

a new Iraqi army, the Iraq Civil Defense Corps, and the Facilities Protection 

Service. It created new departments and ministries for Iraq, including the Ministry 

of Electricity, the Department of Border Enforcement, the Ministry of Science 

and Technology, the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Human Rights, 

and the Ministry of Defense. To fight endemic corruption, the CPA established 

an Iraqi inspector general system, based on the U.S. model, and the Commission 

on Public Integrity. It appointed an independent electoral commission to ensure 

free and fair elections and promulgated regulations seeking to decentralize the 

authority of Baghdad by devolving power to local government. TheCPA orders 

also reformed banking laws, the penal code, government salaries, and traffic regulations; opened the country to foreign investment; and established a modern 

stock exchange.33

The CPA helped shape the development of a democratic Iraq, but it never had 

the organizational capacity to realize many of its goals. It was forced to improvise, 

creating ad hoc offices such as the PMO to perform vital reconstruction tasks. 

These offices filled boxes on ever-expanding organizational charts but remained 

under-staffed and under-resourced from the CPA’s inception until its end. 

In a hastily arranged ceremony, the CPA folded its tent in the Green Zone on 

June 28, 2004, returning sovereignty to Iraq two days ahead of schedule. As its 

senior officials departed, the CPA issued a glowing report card on itself titled, “An 

Historic Review of CPA Accomplishments.” Ambassador Bremer compared the 

reconstruction of Iraq to the Marshall Plan, and the CPA’s self-assessment ended 

with a list of achievements purporting to show that the CPA had done more in a 

shorter period of time in Iraq than the United States had accomplished nearly six 

decades earlier in postwar Germany. For example, Bremer noted, the CPA had 

created an independent central bank in two months; Germany did not have one 

for three years. Iraq became independent after one year; German sovereignty did 

not come for a decade. The CPA had “trained a new military” in three months; in 

Germany it took ten years. The CPA put together a reconstruction program in 

just four months; the Marshall Plan was designed over three years.34

The CPA’s self-assessment missed the mark. The Iraq it left behind was in a 

perilous state. The Coalition’s record on improving security, providing essential 

services, jumpstarting the economy, and laying the foundation for good governance was very mixed. The CPA concluded that “Iraq has many challenges ahead; 

however, it is poised to be a nation united, prosperous, and able to take its rightful 

place as a responsible member of the region and the international community.”35

This was a remarkably optimistic assessment given the environment in which it 
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was issued. Iraq had slipped into the grip of a fierce insurgency, more U.S. troops 

were dying almost every day, and the occupation had soured many Iraqis on the 

continuing U.S. presence in their country. It would be up to Ambassador John 

Negroponte and General George Casey to develop new approaches to address 

the most serious threat to the continuing reconstruction of Iraq: security. 

The Marshall Plan and the Iraq Reconstruction Program 

From 1948 to 1951, the Congress appropriated more than $12 billion for the 

Marshall Plan, equal to about $100 billion in 2008 dollars.36 The four-year 

program, a joint U.S.-European venture, provided aid to sixteen countries 

in the wake of the devastation of Europe caused by World War II.

The most salient difference between the Iraq program and the Marshall 

Plan was that the latter’s aid was conditional, with each recipient country 

required to deposit money into a counterpart fund. U.S. money spent on 

rebuilding Iraq was not made contingent on any contribution from Iraq.37

It effectively was a series of huge grants.

The Marshall Plan’s Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), an independent agency created by the Congress, managed the program for its 

entire four-year duration.38 The management of the U.S. reconstruction 

effort in Iraq, however, changed hands four times in two years—from the 

NSC to ORHA to the CPA to the U.S. Embassy.

Those who developed the Marshall Plan methodically and successfully 

cultivated widespread bipartisan congressional and public support, even 

though opposing parties controlled the White House and the Congress. 

Secretary of State George C. Marshall made an extensive speaking tour 

of the country, selling the idea of an enormous foreign aid program for a 

defeated enemy. The head of the ECA in Washington was auto-industry 

executive Paul Hoffman, a Republican Party leader; his deputy in Paris 

was former ambassador and businessman Averill Harriman, a Democratic 

Party leader. Hoffman gave some 150 speeches about the Marshall Plan’s 

value.39 In contrast, the CPA’s IRRF 2 request was conceived, prepared, 

and presented in less than three months; the Congress passed it after 

only four days of debate.

The Marshall Plan recruited a mix of experienced civil servants and professionals from the private sector and academia. Thousands of talented 

candidates applied for each job opening, with only 1 out of every 200 

hired. A streamlined deployment process was able to get prospective 
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• Iraq Reconstruction in Transition •

employees medically examined, then hired and issued security clearances, passports, and travel vouchers in only two days.40 The standard 

tour of service with the ECA was two years. 

The CPA staff, cobbled together and roiled by conflicting lines of authority and institutional allegiances, had a very uneven quality. Although 

some personnel were hired and deployed quickly, others had to wait up 

to ten months. Turnover was high; most CPA officials served for only a few 

months.41 Similar turnover problems afflicted the U.S. Embassy when it 

took over the management of the reconstruction program.

The Marshall Plan was structured to restore the remnants of a democratic system. In Iraq, the United States sought to implant an entirely 

new system of government, building democracy where a dictatorship 

or monarchy had long prevailed. The nations in Western Europe had homogeneous societies, functioning institutions, a tradition of democratic 

governance, and advanced technical knowledge. They were also at peace. 

Iraq lacked a history of democratic government, had weak public institutions, and never had a diversified market economy.42 Violence in Iraq, 

stemming chiefly from sectarian disputes, undermined every aspect of 

the reconstruction effort. Above all, the Iraq program, unlike the Marshall 

Plan, never received adequate resources to match its ambitious vision.
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Essential Services Overview– Transition 

From the CPA to the Embassy 

Metric43

PreinvasionPostinvasionCPA 

Transition

Electricity Production 

Megawatts 4,075 711 3,621

Oil Production 

Million Barrels per Day 2.58 0.30 2.16

Iraqi Security Forces

Soldiers and Police 1,300,000 7,000-9,000 87,00044

Telecommunications

Landline Subscribers 833,000 0 791,000

Mobile Subscribers 80,000 0 461,000

Human Toll

U.S Troop Fatalities - 139 862

Civilian Contractors - 1 46

U.S. Civilians - ~9 52

Iraqi Civilians - 7,413 16,848

Financial Cost ($ billions) 

U.S Funding - $3.45 $22.93

Iraqi Funding - $0.00 $16.00

International Funding - $0.00 $13.60

Total Funding - $3.45 $52.53

When Ambassador Bremer arrived in May 2003, electricity production averaged 

just 711 megawatts per day. At the time the CPA transferred sovereignty to the 

Iraqi Interim Government, production had risen to 3,621 megawatts.45 This significant improvement in one year was still well below the 6,000 megawatts the 

CPA had set as its ultimate goal.46 The CPA effort to get electricity production 

up to 4,400 megawatts was fleetingly successful in October 2003, but the shortterm actions taken to meet that target proved counter-productive to long-term 

progress.47

Oil production increased fairly steadily in 2003 and 2004, but still suffered from 

the consequences of insufficient maintenance and poor infrastructure security. By 

the time of Ambassador Bremer’s departure, production had reached an average 

of 2.16 million barrels per day, a significant increase from the immediate postwar 

output, but still below prewar levels.48
Part III

The U.S. Embassy Takes Charge

June 2004 to June 2005

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Chapter 16

Negroponte’s Revisions

Security was the paramount issue...without security, it was going 

to be impossible to move these economic projects forward...That 

was one of the fundamental corrections that had to be made.*

Ambassador John Negroponte

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq (2004-2005)

Ambassador John Negroponte presented his diplomatic credentials to the Iraqi 

Interim Government on June 29, 2004, the day after the CPA passed sovereignty 

back to Iraq. The President had placed the new ambassador, who had been serving as the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, in charge of the 

largest and most challenging diplomatic mission in the world, which then had a 

staff of about 900 Americans and 550 Foreign Service Nationals.1

 Negroponte 

would serve in Iraq for nearly nine months before leaving in March 2005 to become the first Director of National Intelligence.2

Shortly after arriving in Baghdad, Ambassador Negroponte put the CPA’s reconstruction plans on hold and directed a thorough re-examination of the $18.4 

billion program. This review led to a series of IRRF 2 reprogrammings intended 

chiefly to improve security in Iraq by increasing funding for training and equipping 

Iraq’s security forces, and to strengthen democracy by increasing investment in the 

preparations for three elections scheduled for 2005. During Negroponte’s tenure, 

the U.S. government reallocated $4.41 billion of IRRF 2.3

IRMO vs. PCO

Negroponte took the helm of a reconstruction program in transition. The recently signed National Security Presidential Directive 36 defined the functions 

of two new offices—the Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office and the 

Project and Contracting Office. IRMO was a Department of State entity, and 

PCO was part of the Department of Defense. 

NSPD 36 placed IRMO in charge of formulating reconstruction policy, 

and the CPA’s advisors to the Iraqi government continued as ministry “senior 

advisors” within the new IRMO structure.4

 The senior advisors operated as consultants to Iraqi ministers by helping them coordinate ministry operations and 

reconstruction projects.5

* SIGIR interview with Ambassador John Negroponte, former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, February 12, 2008.
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• Chapter 16 •

The PCO inherited PMO’s duties to provide acquisition and project management support to the U.S. relief and reconstruction program. It also took charge 

of providing program management services for IRRF projects “to ensure [the] 

integration of projects within and across infrastructure sectors and within and 

across other sectors when requested by IRMO or other agencies.”6

 USACE provided technical support and quality assurance programs for PCO’s projects.

Although NSPD 36 sought to clarify reconstruction roles and responsibilities, 

its ambiguities actually aggravated the management situation in Iraq, making it 

more difficult to achieve unity of effort by fragmenting reconstruction responsibilities. IRMO and PCO reported to different masters, the Multi-National 

Security Transition Command-Iraq managed its own affairs, and USAID continued to control its own programs. In practice, the chief of mission was only 

nominally in charge of the overall reconstruction program.7

 The diffusion of 

authority limited Ambassador Negroponte’s ability to integrate reconstruction 

programs, weakened management capacity, and fed interagency tensions, all of 

which impeded progress. 

The PMO’s Dave Nash ran both the PCO and IRMO during the first two 

months after the transition. Ambassador William B. Taylor, a career diplomat with 

extensive reconstruction experience, replaced Nash as the head of IRMO in late 

summer 2004. Charlie Hess, who had served as director of the operations and 

response division of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, took over as director of the PCO at about the same time.8

 Hess understood that he reported to three 

different people—the commanding general in Iraq, the secretary of the Army, and 

the ambassador—but he did not believe that he reported to the IRMO director.9

The Strategic Review of IRRF 2

In early July 2004, the MNF-I command was upgraded to a four-star general with 

General George Casey replacing Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez as senior 

theater commander.10 General Casey’s and Ambassador Negroponte’s paramount concern was security. “I felt that we had moved into a reconstruction phase 

when we were still actually in a conflict phase,” said Negroponte. “We were in an 

insurgency.”11 Negroponte concluded that implementing economic development projects would be fruitless as long as security remained a serious problem.12

General Casey concurred, noting that the reconstruction program and military 

operations required integration in a way that was “mutually reinforcing.”13

Ambassador Negroponte directed IRMO to conduct a complete review of 

the IRRF 2 program and to develop a new strategic plan that would address the 

problem that had most bedeviled the CPA—the breakdown of security across 

Iraq. He asked IRMO to analyze the original CPA spend plan and to provide 
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• Negroponte’s Revisions •

suggestions for adjusting its budget allocations among the ten reconstruction 

sectors.14 IRMO’s senior staff worked with USAID, PCO, and the military 

throughout the summer of 2004, identifying ways to use the IRRF 2 program to 

bolster Iraqi security capabilities.15

In the spring of 2004, OMB had apportioned more than $11 billion of IRRF 

2 to four implementing agencies: Defense, State, USAID, and Treasury, with 

Defense receiving over three-quarters of the funds.16 By the time the CPA dissolved, only a small portion of IRRF 2 had been spent ($366 million).17 The 

Congress had earmarked $5.56 billion for electricity and $4.3 billion for water 

resources and sanitation. IRRF 2 program managers, however, had not planned 

to begin construction on major projects in these two sectors until 2005.18

Ambassador Negroponte seized upon these funds as available capital that he 

could recommit—with congressional approval—to pressing new priorities, most 

notably security. 

The First Reprogramming

USAID’s mission director, Spike Stephenson, was barely on speaking terms with 

Admiral Nash when the Negroponte/Casey strategic review began. According to 

Ambassador Taylor, “the relationship between PCO and USAID was not good.”19

USAID, which had been largely ignored during the creation of IRRF 2, welcomed 

the strategic review because it offered the agency a new opportunity to shape the 

reconstruction effort. “It gave us a chance to get in on the policy end of it,” said 

Stephenson. “Win or lose, you got to speak your piece.”20

USAID’s piece was a proposed development package for more investment 

in capacity-building and democracy projects. It also sought an additional $200 

million for its Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI). The OTI had been providing 

expertise to military-led CERP projects, which were increasing Iraqi employment and promoting economic development. Through this program, USAID 

had helped implement many CERP projects, particularly in Baghdad. “We were 

doing them literally at the direct request of the major subordinate commanders,” 

particularly Major General Peter Chiarelli (then commanding the 1st Cavalry 

Division), said Stephenson.21

After listening to presentations from all of the major reconstruction and security players, Ambassador Negroponte and General Casey agreed to move $3.46 

billion to programs to strengthen Iraq’s security forces, promote economic and 

private-sector development, build democracy, and prepare for the upcoming 

elections. The security sector alone received an increase of $1.81 billion from 

reprogrammed funds.22 At the same time, $1.94 billion was taken from the water 

sector and $1.07 billion from electricity.23
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• Chapter 16 •

Because the reallocations amounted to a more than ten percent shift in funding within IRRF 2, the State Department had to submit a request for congressional 

approval. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage made the department’s 

case for the funding shifts before the House Appropriations Committee, stating 

that “our most urgent priority right now is security. Short-term stability and longterm prospects in Iraq quite simply depend on improving the security situation.”24

The Congress agreed, approving all the changes on September 30, 2004.25

The Second Reprogramming 

While the Congress evaluated Negroponte’s first reprogramming request, the 

State Department initiated a second review.26 PCO’s new director, Charlie 

Hess, objected and sent a long email to Ambassador Taylor stating that it was 

a bad idea to send another group of short-term “helpers” to “squeeze more hypothetical dollars from the IRRF program to accomplish other much-needed 

program objectives.”27 Hess wanted to avert further delays in starting IRRF 

projects, which had been frozen during the first reprogramming. He believed 

that it was time to stop analyzing the program’s financial allocations and to start 

accomplishing rebuilding work. The contractors on the ground were accruing 

millions of dollars in overhead costs without producing much. “Every day that 

we rethink what we are all about is one less day of getting on with the job.”28 His 

complaints fell on deaf ears.

In December 2004, the State Department announced the second reprogramming, moving $457 million in IRRF 2 money, again mostly out of the water sector. 

The reallocation restored $211 million to the electricity sector for quick-impact 

projects and transferred $246 million for projects to improve essential services 

in the embattled cities of Falluja, Samarra, Najaf, and Sadr City. The latter shift 

sought to mollify restive populations in the most dangerous parts of Iraq.29

For the second time in four months, Ambassador Taylor had to tell the 

Minister of Municipal and Public Works, Nesreen Berwari, that the funding for 

her water treatment, waste management, and irrigation projects was going to be 

cut significantly. She had worked closely with the CPA to develop the program, 

and Taylor, who had previously gone to her office to inform her of the first cut, 

did not look forward to giving her more bad news. Minister Berwari told Taylor 

she never wanted to see him in her office again. “She said it with a little bit of a 

smile,” Taylor said, “but not much.”30
• 169 •

• Negroponte’s Revisions •

The Third Reprogramming

In the spring of 2005, Charlie Hess again was exasperated to learn that the State 

Department was planning yet another reprogramming of IRRF 2, this time 

focusing on new operations and maintenance efforts, the electricity sector, 

and project cost overruns. Hess complained to his Defense Department boss, 

Claude Bolton, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and 

Technology, stating: 

The impact of incremental reprogramming has a significant 

detrimental effect on the momentum of program execution 

(it slows the pace) and consequently results in increased 

overhead costs while we sort out the skills and contracting 

staffing levels necessary to execute the remaining work. This 

is particularly debilitating when accomplished in a series of 

back-to-back reprogramming exercises where, as we finish 

dealing with the first reprogramming cycle, it is followed by yet 

another round of reprogramming reviews. Again, this stifles 

momentum, generates added costs and typically reduces effectiveness of program dollars.31

Hess’s complaints again had no effect. 

On March 25, 2005, the State Department notified the Congress of its desire 

to reallocate $832 million.32 Drawing mostly from pending energy-sector projects 

and five large water projects, the realignment provided $225 million to bolster the 

essential services infrastructure in Baghdad, and $607 million to fund operations 

and maintenance programs.33 Sustainability had become an increasing concern 

among U.S. officials, who worried that Iraq did not have the capacity to maintain 

new or refurbished facilities once transferred.34 Most of the new sustainment 

funding went to the electricity sector.35
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• Chapter 16 •

Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Allocations by Sector for June 2004, December 

2004, and June 2005 ($ Millions)

Sector

June 2004 

Allocation

December 2004

Allocation

June 2005 

Allocation

Percent Change 

from Original

Security & Law Enforcement $3,235.0 $5,045.0 $5,017.6 55%

Justice, Public Safety 

Infrastructure, and Civil 

Society

$1,484.0 $1,953.0 $2,188.5 47%

Electricity Sector $5,465.0 $4,369.0 $4,318.5 -21%

Oil Infrastructure $1,701.0 $1,701.0 $1,723.0 1%

Water Resources and 

Sanitation $4,247.0 $2,279.0 $2,146.0 -49%

Transportation and 

Telecommunications 

Projects

$500.0 $513.0 $508.4 2%

Roads, Bridges, and 

Construction $368.0 $360.0 $334.0 -9%

Health Care $786.0 $786.0 $786.0 0%

Private Sector Employment 

Development $183.0 $843.0 $840.0 359%

Education, Refugees, 

Human Rights, Democracy, 

and Governance

$259.0 $379.0 $363.0 40%

Administrative Expenses $213.0 $213.0 $214.0 0%

Total $18,439 $18,439 $18,439

Source: OMB, Section 2207 Report, Funding Table, July 2004; and DoS, Section 2207 Report, Status of Funds, 

July 2005. Note: Totals may not add up due to rounding.

The Impact of the Reallocations

Negroponte’s reallocations reflected the U.S. government’s response to changing 

conditions in Iraq, chiefly the worsening security situation. They also demonstrated recognition of the need to increase investment in Iraq’s political process. 

Each funding shift, however, caused the elimination or curtailment of planned 

or ongoing infrastructure projects.

The water sector suffered the most, losing nearly 50 percent of its funding 

(from $4.25 billion to $2.15 billion), which forced the cancellation of numerous projects.36 The electricity sector was the second-hardest hit, suffering a loss 

of almost a quarter of its IRRF 2 money (from $5.47 billion to $4.32 billion), 

resulting in a reduction of proposed power projects. This cut planned increases 

in electricity capacity from 3,400 megawatts to 2,100 megawatts.37

Notwithstanding these infrastructure funding cuts, Negroponte and Casey 

firmly believed that the reprogrammings were necessary to implement their new 

strategy. They recognized that the CPA’s vision had given inadequate weight 
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• Negroponte’s Revisions •

to security, democracy, and project sustainment.38 Along with the security and 

democracy increases, the reprogrammed funds supported new sustainment 

programs across the ministries.39 But these funds, although an important start, 

addressed only a fraction of Iraq’s operation and maintenance needs. As the State 

Department noted, “the process of capacity development to manage and sustain 

infrastructure projects will take time.”40
• 172 •

Chapter 17

Contingency Contracting and 

Program Management

I was the deputy prime minister in charge of reconstruction, and 

I still have difficulty understanding what USAID, IRMO, and 

GRD-PCO actually do.*

Dr. Barham Salih

Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq (2004-present)

The United States struggled in Iraq to establish integrated contracting and program management systems that could provide effective direction, support, and 

oversight of the reconstruction program. Beginning with the creation of the 

CPA’s Program Management Office in August 2003, a succession of contracting and program management offices suffered under varying sets of complex 

contracting regulations, divergent chains of authority, changing program 

requirements and shifting reconstruction priorities. A shortage of qualified 

contracting officers, continuous staff turnover, and poor program management 

practices, particularly regarding quality assurance programs, weakened oversight 

of reconstruction projects. Finally, contracting officers did not have adequate 

information systems to track contract activity.

Contracting Shortfalls 

Every reconstruction project begins with a contract that defines the government’s 

expectations of a contractor. A good contract clearly describes the work requirements, the construction schedule, and the budget. Contractors perform only what 

the contract provides, albeit in an environment that anticipates change orders. 

The government manages quality-assurance programs to ensure contract compliance, and the contractor manages quality-control programs to ensure that its 

workers accomplish contract requirements effectively. 

In February 2004, Brigadier General Stephen Seay took over as CPA’s Head 

of Contracting Activity. Seay brought an extensive Army contracting and program management background to his new job. He inherited an office that was 

grossly understaffed and completely overwhelmed by hundreds of DFI contracts. 

The most serious problem was the dearth of qualified contracting personnel who 

could develop good project requirements and statements of work. 

* SIGIR interview with Dr. Barham Salih, Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, June 20, 2006.
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• Contingency Contracting and Program Management •

Brigadier General Seay concluded that the contracting office could not manage the approaching wave of IRRF 2 contracts. He thus rapidly reorganized and 

expanded the small office, recruiting a dozen new people, including acquisition 

professionals who could draft statements of work, thereby free contracting officers to do their job of writing contracts.1

 Seay also requested more lawyers “to 

troubleshoot solicitations and to support contracting so that procurement and 

construction delays did not result from disputes relating to the contracting process.” He wanted to make sure that each solicitation and contract award process 

followed the FAR and the IRRF 2 statutory requirements.2 

Despite implementing many improvements, Brigadier General Seay still 

struggled with familiar problems: personnel shortages, poor program management, and inadequate information management systems. For example, his staffing 

chart called for 69 people. Throughout his one year in Iraq, over a third of Seay’s 

staff positions remained vacant.3

Contracts and Task Orders 

A Pentagon team handled the contract award process for the twelve IRRF 2 contracts but the PMO and then the PCO planned and managed their execution. 

Under the PMO’s organizational structure, the sector program-management 

contractors—private firms hired to help manage the design-build contractors—

were supposed to develop project requirements and prepare them for execution 

through task orders. They took reconstruction projects identified by the PMO/

PCO and defined the work requirements, schedules, and budgets.4

 Seay’s contracting office then took this information and developed task orders, which the 

PMO/PCO would assign to construction contractors. GRD provided quality 

assurance for the projects.

Developing and managing task orders in 2004 and 2005 proved to be difficult. The contracting office did not have management or information systems 

that could effectively track them. The PCO did not have enough information 

about potential projects to develop good scopes of work; and it had too few 

career government employees capable of negotiating with contractors to define 

good requirements. The SPMOs tried to fill this void, but they “were really just 

construction supervisors, not program managers.”5

Seay attempted to solve these problems by holding program-wide reviews 

with all the contracting officers, program managers, and contractors. This remedial measure had some success but Seay still had to contend with PCO program 

managers who “preferred to build facilities” rather than think through the “preconstruction and task order award process.”6
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• Chapter 17 •

Andy Bailey, vice president of the Louis Berger Group, which had the program 

management contracts for three sectors—Communications and Transportation; 

Building, Education, and Health; and Security and Justice—thought that the design-build management concept was “brilliant,” but the execution poor. He said 

that the PMO/PCO had neither the systems nor the processes in place to support the effort. Moreover, there were serious disagreements regarding the proper 

role of contractors who served as program managers. For example, the contracting office and the GRD argued for more government oversight, believing that 

too many contractors were overseeing other contractors.7

 A SIGIR assessment 

later noted that “the many layers of management, including program management contractors, made it difficult to determine who had ultimate authority over 

money, people, and projects.”8

Information System Challenges

The IRRF 2 legislation required the Administration to submit reports to the 

Congress every three months updating the use of the funds on a project-by-project basis and including estimates of the costs required to complete each project. 

The Congress provided $50 million to develop a system to manage the program 

and track projects, but the PMO failed to create a good information management 

database for IRRF 2. 9

When Brigadier General Seay arrived in early 2004, he found no existing 

information management program to track contracts. “We had to scramble to 

assemble an automated system,” he said. “There was a computer system in boxes, 

but there was no one who was a qualified system administrator who could set it 

up for us and keep it running.”10

In the absence of a single integrated database, each implementing agency 

established its own. USAID used its proprietary financial and program management system while the Department of Defense used its system to track CERP 

projects. Because these systems were not compatible, someone from Seay’s office 

had to go to IRMO and PCO every day to ensure that everyone all had the same 

information on every contract.11

In 2004, in response to SIGIR audits criticizing the lack of a single projectmanagement system, the PCO created the Iraq Reconstruction Management 

System (IRMS), to integrate data on all projects in Iraq.12 Through IRMS, the 

PCO sought to reconcile various incompatible information management systems 

by developing a “PCO Solution” that would assemble essential data and thus allow 

managers visibility into the entire range of reconstruction activity.13 But it would 

be years before the United States had a reasonably integrated system to manage 

and monitor reconstruction. A subsequent SIGIR review found that the failure 
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• Contingency Contracting and Program Management •

to develop a cohesive information management system “hampered the work of 

others who rely upon the PCO data set for reporting purposes.”14 The IRMS ultimately was able to track only about 70 percent of all reconstruction projects.

Contracting Waste

During the spring of 2004, the IRRF 2 design-build contractors quickly mobilized 

and deployed to Iraq, but most of the task orders for construction work were 

not ready. While the PMO and the contracting office struggled to develop task 

orders, the construction companies, awaiting new work, continued to charge high 

overhead costs.15 Five design-build firms during this period submitted invoices 

totaling $62.1 million in overhead costs and only $26.7 million in construction 

costs, an example of the scope of waste caused by project delays.16

As costs rose, U.S. civilian and military authorities in both Baghdad and 

Washington became increasingly anxious to see reconstruction projects started. 

Apart from curbing waste, they wanted to demonstrate the U.S. commitment 

to Iraq by improving essential services, building the Iraqi Security Forces, and 

helping the Iraqi Interim Government prepare for the 2005 elections. They also 

hoped to undercut the insurgency by providing electricity, clean water, and jobs, 

while simultaneously stimulating economic progress and fostering democratic 

political processes. This new urgency forced the PCO to issue task orders rapidly, 

before they had been “definitized”—meaning before the government and the 

contractor had reached formal agreement on what would be done, how much it 

would cost, and when it would be completed.17

Contracting regulations allow “undefinitized contracts” under two conditions: 

when there is not enough time to negotiate a definitized contract or when it is 

imperative to make a binding commitment that allows work to begin immediately. 

But by law, these contracts must eventually be definitized.18 A SIGIR audit found 

that some contracting officials in Iraq erroneously believed that the definitization 

requirements did not apply to Iraq task orders. This incorrect assumption caused 

millions of dollars in waste.19

The Creation of the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq

In November 2004, CENTCOM formally established the JCC-I to support reconstruction and military contracting in Iraq.20 The Assistant Secretary of the 

Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology designated Brigadier General 

Seay as the new commander of the JCC-I and appointed two Principal Assistants 

Responsible for Contracting, one to supervise U.S. military contracting and the 

other to manage reconstruction contracting. JCC-I assumed responsibility for 

managing all remaining DFI-funded contracts and for developing a training 
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• Chapter 17 •

program to help Iraqi ministries strengthen their contracting and procurement procedures. USACE still maintained its own contracting office, based in 

Washington, D.C., with a forward contingent in Iraq.21 The change also did not 

affect USAID or the Department of State, which continued to write their own 

contracts and manage the IRRF 2 funds apportioned to them.22

A New Contracting Strategy

During the late summer of 2004, the embassy re-evaluated the wisdom of continuing to use the large IRRF 2 design-build contracts. The reconstruction program was 

shifting emphasis from big infrastructure projects to targeted programs supporting 

security, governance, and economic development. Moreover, the design-build 

cost-plus contracts were proving too expensive and difficult to manage.

Task orders were issued under the design-build contracts on either a costplus or fixed-price basis, but virtually all were cost plus “incentive fee” contracts. 

Under cost-plus contracts contractors are reimbursed for all expenses, regardless of whether projects are successfully completed. The incentive-fee formula 

determines the contractor’s award fee on top of the guaranteed fixed fee. The 

design-build contractors in Iraq usually received a guaranteed fee of three 

percent and were eligible for an additional incentive award fee of up to twelve 

percent. Thus, contractors could earn up to fifteen percent of the costs of any 

contract in award fees.23

In the unstable environment of mid-2004, cost-plus contracts appeared to 

some to be tantamount to “an open checkbook.”24 The contractors countered 

these complaints by asserting that running construction programs in Iraq’s dangerous environment justified the high costs. The government was also negligent 

in controlling costs. For example, many contracts had clauses that permitted the 

government to convert them from a cost-plus to a fixed-price contract (after a 

percentage of design work was completed). But government contracting offices 

failed to exercise these conversion provisions, and they were frequently excised 

from contracts after the first year. 

High contract costs ultimately led the PCO to stop issuing new task orders 

under the design-build IDIQ contracts and to begin contracting directly on a 

fixed-price basis with Iraqi firms.25 The FAR’s “simplified acquisition” rules, which 

require fewer bids and less cost data for contracts valued under $500,000, allowed 

contracting officers to rapidly award new work to local contractors. When the 

Congress increased the threshold for simplified acquisition to $1 million, more 

direct contracting became possible.26

In the fall of 2004, the high costs of the design-build contractors, the de-emphasis on large infrastructure projects, and a new push to create jobs led embassy 
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• Contingency Contracting and Program Management •

officials to urge the PCO to move work from big firms to Iraqi companies. PCO 

director Charlie Hess opposed the move. “My professional belief is that we are 

in an extremely precarious acquisition position if we attempt to move more than 

a modest amount of awarded work to some other contract vehicle (unless the 

contractor is failing to perform),” he wrote. “Work that has been awarded to the 

[design-build contractors] under full and open competition in accordance with 

the criteria established at the time of award should not be moved to accomplish 

other worthwhile purposes now.”27

Hess believed that, because of increased security risks, the design-build 

contractors had opted to work through Iraqi subcontractors anyway. “The [design-build contractors] are on the hook for contract performance whether they 

subcontract with one firm or many firms,” he said. “On the other hand, as we attempt to move to more direct contracting with Iraqi firms, the U.S. government 

takes on the risk of overseeing many more contractors in terms of execution and 

contract administration.”28 But the change in reconstruction strategy ultimately 

proved beneficial and began to reduce costs.

Monitoring Costs and Performance

In the IRRF 2 legislation, the Congress required the Administration to provide 

continuing analysis on how much it was going to cost to complete each IRRF 

2 project. Cost-to-complete estimates determine the amount of work, time, 

and money needed to finish an ongoing project.29 But neither the CPA nor 

the embassy was able to develop a system that provided consistent cost-tocomplete analysis. 

The lack of an integrated program management system significantly contributed to this shortfall. A 2005 SIGIR audit concluded that “IRMO, as well as 

GRD-PCO, MNSTC-I, and USAID (the reporting entities), failed to develop 

methodologies to assure reliable and transparent cost-to-complete reporting.”30

PCO Merges with GRD

When the PMO was first established, USACE provided construction management and quality assurance for IRRF 2 construction projects. The Defense 

Department always envisioned that USACE, which had more experience in 

managing projects during the construction and closeout phases, would eventually assume all program management responsibilities for IRRF 2 infrastructure 

projects.31 In March 2005, the PCO submitted a plan to merge with the GRD. On 

October 14, 2006, the PCO ceased to exist, and the GRD thus became the sole 

entity responsible for overseeing the completion of the Defense Department’s 

IRRF 2 construction program.32
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• Chapter 17 •

Moving Forward

As the IRRF 2 program matured, the U.S. government reformed and reorganized reconstruction offices in Iraq, seeking to improve coordination within and 

among agencies. Some changes—such as the formation of JCC-I—incrementally 

helped. But others—such as the creation of the PCO and IRMO, with their ambiguous lines of authority—perpetuated existing problems. 

The various reorganizations invariably created new layers of management, interweaving public- and private-sector program managers. But none of the reforms 

vested anyone with the ultimate responsibility—and authority—for the entire 

reconstruction program. As a result, there was plenty of management oversight, 

but little accountability.33

Contracting and program management problems—coupled with the turbulence engendered by constant organizational change—affected the ability of 

construction firms to build projects on time and within budget. To add to these 

many troubles, they were building in a war zone.
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Chapter 18

Building in a War Zone

I felt that because we instituted the program when we did, we had 

to spend a disproportionate amount of the money on security. I 

realize that’s now accepted as a fact of life, but the cost seemed to 

me very, very high.*

Ambassador John Negroponte

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq (2004-2005)

No aspect of the U.S. program to rebuild Iraq was left untouched by the escalating violence of 2004 and 2005. Coalition troops and members of Iraq’s security 

forces were not the only ones dying: insurgent attacks claimed the lives of many 

reconstruction workers. More than 400 non-Iraqi civilians had died by September 

2005. Of the 147 U.S. civilian deaths that had occurred as of October 2005, 117 

were contractors killed by insurgents.1

 The number of non-Iraqi contractor deaths 

would continue to rise, nearing 1,300 by the end of 2008.2

Iraq’s dangerous environment posed serious challenges for both design-build 

contractors and the PCO’s program managers. It was often impossible to carry 

out projects in dangerous areas. And it was more difficult to draft contracts with 

well-defined statements of work when contracting personnel could not visit project sites. Similarly, U.S. government quality-assurance personnel frequently could 

not monitor project progress because of rising conflict. 

Reconstruction Under Fire

Violence also impinged upon the relationships between U.S. reconstruction 

officials—whose travel outside the Green Zone was increasingly circumscribed—and their Iraqi counterparts. Insurgent attacks on building sites and on 

the convoys carrying supplies to them delayed construction work. Intimidation 

of Iraqi employees caused frequent work stoppages. And the design-build firms 

and their subcontractors experienced a high turnover in Iraqi staff, as personnel were killed or fled to escape the violence. By the end of 2005, deteriorating 

security conditions had severely slowed work and driven costs higher in every 

reconstruction sector, threatening the entire effort. 

The increasing conflict altered the reconstruction program in two significant ways. First, the United States had to reprogram resources within IRRF 2 

* SIGIR interview with Ambassador John Negroponte, former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, February 12, 

2008.
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• Chapter 18 •

to fund the massive expansion of Iraq’s security forces. These reprogrammings 

had the effect of canceling hundreds of planned and ongoing projects, causing 

what came to be termed a “reconstruction gap”—the difference between what 

was intended and what was actually built.3

 Second, the direct security costs for 

every reconstruction contract escalated. A 2005 SIGIR examination of nine major 

construction firms that were awarded IRRF 2 contracts found that security costs 

accounted for up to 16.7 percent of the contract price, more than double the 

original estimates by PMO.4

The U.S. military’s mission did not include providing security protection 

for U.S. civilian government agencies and contractors. These organizations 

consequently hired private security companies to protect their employees.5

By December 2004, government agencies and reconstruction contractors had 

obligated more than $766 million for private security firms.6

 Despite this large 

expenditure, neither the State Department nor the Pentagon had complete data 

in 2005 for what these companies actually cost or on the number of people they 

employed in Iraq. The Defense Department could only estimate that at least 60 

private security providers employed as many as 25,000 people.7

 But without the 

protection provided by these firms, neither the U.S. civilian agencies nor the contractors they employed would have been able to perform their missions. In 2008, 

a SIGIR review found that $5.3 billion had been obligated to 77 private security 

contractors to provide security services in support of U.S.-funded projects and 

programs since 2003.8

In the face of growing violence, the U.S. government pressed ahead with 

major infrastructure projects to improve the provision of essential services. Both 

the U.S. military and civilian leaders hoped the enhancements would help sustain 

military successes in the fight against the insurgency. But SIGIR audits of key 

programs in the oil, electricity, water/sewerage, and health sectors revealed that, 

between June 2004 and July 2005, the United States reconstruction program 

made only limited progress because of the unstable security environment.

The Oil Sector

Under the IRRF 2 program, two design-build firms—Parsons Iraq Joint Venture 

(PIJV) in the north and KBR in the south—worked on oil projects to rehabilitate pipelines, refineries, gas-oil separation plants, and export facilities. KBR, as 

part of Task Force RIO, had operated in the southern oil sector since the March 

2003 invasion.9

 By July 2005, the United States had provided about $2.7 billion 

in U.S.-appropriated funds and another $2.7 billion in Iraqi funds—much of it 

going to KBR—to rebuild Iraq’s oil infrastructure, import refined fuels, develop 

oil security and pipeline repair teams, and provide technical assistance.10
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• Building in a War Zone •

Despite this significant U.S. investment in the oil sector, Iraq’s production fell 

after reaching a peak of 2.54 million barrels per day (MBPD) in September 2004. 

From June 2004 to June 2005, Iraq averaged less than 2.2 MBPD and exported 

only about 1.4 MBPD.11 The worsening security environment, inadequate contractor performance, and frequent program changes accounted for the decline in 

oil production.12 In October 2004, the State Department reported that security 

had driven cost estimates higher and caused delays in projects to repair oil export 

terminals, pump-compressor stations, and gas-oil separation plants.13

In January 2005, a significant decrease in the levels of oil production and 

exports stemmed from “the number and locations of pipelines sabotaged, combined with an inability to secure some strategic pipelines.”14 Attacks on the 

northern pipeline brought all pipeline exports from the Kirkuk oil fields to a halt 

in December 2004.15 Iraq’s Ministry of Oil reported that insurgents launched 

186 attacks during 2004, causing more than $6 billion in damage to oil fields 

and pipelines. At least 138 oil-security and technical employees were also killed 

during this period.16

The Qarmat Ali Water Treatment Plant

Security was the largest but not the only problem afflicting the oil sector. 

Reconstruction planners frequently failed to coordinate oil sector projects sufficiently, making it difficult to achieve production objectives. In Iraq’s southern oil 

fields, for example, years of underinvestment and poor maintenance made it impossible to sustain the underground pressure needed to pump oil out of the ground. 

Clean water had to be pumped into the fields to produce sufficient pressure. But 

the only source of clean water was the Qarmat Ali water treatment plant and the 

collection of 48-inch pipes that carried its water to eight pump stations.17

Task Force RIO contracted with KBR for a $225 million project to refurbish 

the Qarmat Ali water treatment plant. By August 2004, KBR had completed 

much of the work, and six of the eight water-injection pump stations were operational. But repeated breakdowns of the corroded pipes prevented the system from 

injecting the necessary amounts of water into the oil fields. KBR’s contract did not 

include repair of the field-pipes, so the PCO issued another task order to repair 

the pipes.18 This project was still ongoing in mid-2006 because of delays due to 

the degraded state of the delivery systems.19 The failure to complete the Qarmat 

Ali project significantly limited the productivity of the southern oil fields. 

In late 2004, the PCO became increasingly concerned about KBR’s “failure 

to adequately control and report costs” of its rehabilitation work in the southern oil fields. The PCO issued a “cure notice”—or intention to terminate the 

contract—unless KBR provided a more detailed explanation of costs by January 
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29, 2005.20 Six months later, KBR finally convinced the PCO that it had satisfactorily addressed the cost issues. But during this period, the PCO decided to 

begin shifting work to PIJV, which had the oil sector contract for the north. In 

the spring of 2005, PIJV mobilized its resources southward to conduct facilities 

assessments, and the PCO eventually gave it much of the southern oil sector work 

originally intended for KBR.21

The Al Fatah Pipeline Crossing

The oil sector problems in northern Iraq were also challenging. During the invasion that toppled Saddam Hussein, the United States inadvertently bombed 

the Al Fatah Bridge, destroying the fifteen oil and gas pipelines it carried across 

the Tigris River. The damaged lines included the major crude-oil pipeline that 

originated in the rich Kirkuk oilfields and angled 100 kilometers southwest to Al 

Fatah, where it crossed the Tigris to supply Iraq’s largest refinery and the power 

plant at Baiji.22 Al Fatah also connected the oil fields to the Ceyhan pipeline, the 

direct avenue for oil export to Turkey. The loss of this important connection 

cost Iraq at least $5 million per day and contributed to keeping export levels 

below prewar levels.23

On June 8, 2003, a group of Task Force RIO engineers, along with representatives from KBR, USAID, and Bechtel, visited the Al Fatah project site and 

concluded that the easiest way to repair the pipelines was to restore the bridge 

and install new pipes across it. The engineers recommended that USAID use 

its Bechtel contract to rebuild the bridge and that Task Force RIO use its KBR 

contract for the pipe installation. Task Force RIO engineers estimated the project’s total cost at about $5 million and calculated that it would take two to four 

months to complete.24

The first delay occurred when Bechtel said it could not start the job for two 

months. The CPA and Iraq’s Ministry of Oil, concerned that the site was vulnerable to insurgent attacks, looked for an alternative solution. One of the CPA’s oil 

experts suggested using a technique called “horizontal directional drilling,” which 

entailed excavating a tunnel under the river for the placement of pipes. With CPA 

approval, the advisor contacted Laney, Inc., an American company that specialized in horizontal drilling. Laney advised that a 40-inch crude-oil pipe could be 

installed in as little as six weeks, depending on soil conditions.25

The CPA considered awarding a sole-source contract to Laney so work 

could proceed quickly but instead authorized KBR to manage a competitive 

subcontracting process for the project.26 KBR posted the Al Fatah job, received 

responses from four qualified bidders, and awarded the subcontract, valued 

at nearly $50 million, to a joint venture of Wilbros, Inc., and Laney. KBR also 
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• Building in a War Zone •

awarded a $10,000 contract to Fugro, Inc., to do a geotechnical analysis of the 

Al Fatah soil. The Fugro report described the geology in the area as complex and 

recommended that KBR do further field exploration before beginning horizontal 

drilling.27 KBR instead opted against doing the field studies—a fatefully expensive 

decision, as time would reveal.

The subcontractors on the project mobilized in October 2003 but refused to 

begin work until a secure camp was established at Al-Fatah. Insurgent activity had 

made the area increasingly dangerous. By the end of January 2004, the contractors finally began horizontal drilling only to discover that the riverbed’s loose 

subsurface made it impossible to tunnel a hole large enough to accommodate a 

40-inch pipe.28 For the next five months, the contractors drilled unsuccessfully 

into the crumbling shale and loose gravel, with tunnels repeatedly collapsing. 

USACE finally cancelled the project in August 2004, a year after it had started. 

KBR attributed the failure to unforeseen subsurface geologic conditions. But the 

Fugro report had raised exactly this issue.29

A SIGIR inspection found that USACE and KBR failed to ensure that the 

necessary engineering studies were completed before the project began. “The 

government and the contractor failed to adequately research, plan, design, and 

manage the project,” the SIGIR assessment concluded, and thus “$75.7 million allocated to the project was exhausted, while only 28 percent of the drilling 

scope was completed.”30 Because this was a cost-plus contract, the government 

was unable to recover the taxpayer dollars that KBR unwisely spent—and thus 

wasted—on this project.

Oil Sector Challenges

Partly as a result of continuing cost problems with KBR, the PCO restructured 

the way it managed projects in the oil sector, melding the resources of the oil 

ministry’s state-owned enterprises with the expertise of design-build contractors. 

The design-build companies provided engineering, procurement, and technical 

support, while the Iraqi companies supplied labor and equipment for construction. This collaborative approach allowed the PCO to stretch the remaining IRRF 

2 funds for the oil sector and to complete repairs on more gas-oil separation 

plants than would have been otherwise possible.31

By the spring of 2005, the PCO had definitized task orders for 82 oil sector 

projects worth $781 million and was negotiating another 55 projects worth $323 

million. The delay in finalizing the 55 pending projects arose from a change in 

contracting strategy as well as an “insufficient staff to execute the workload.”32

The U.S. emphasis on increasing oil production meant that two important 

and related issues were left largely unaddressed: increasing the supply of refined 
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• Chapter 18 •

petroleum products and reforming Iraq’s subsidy system for those products. 

With little money in IRRF 2 for refineries, the embassy encouraged Iraq to invest 

in upgrading them.33 Estimates for rehabilitating the country’s existing refinery 

system ranged as high as $7 billion.34

The shortage of refined fuels in Iraq presented a conundrum. Iraq needed 

to boost its supplies of refined fuels and increase its production and export of 

crude oil. But projects to increase refinery capacity and those to improve production competed for the same limited ministry funds. Oil production projects, 

which quickly put cash in the government’s coffers, usually trumped refining. 

But that outcome limited Iraq’s capacity to meet its own refining needs, which 

made it more difficult to rebuild another vital sector that depended heavily on 

these fuels: electricity.

The Electricity Sector

From the start of the reconstruction program, increasing Iraq’s electricity production to prewar levels was a top U.S. priority. When Ambassador Negroponte 

initiated his strategic review in mid-2004, the sector’s $5.54 billion allocation—

amounting to nearly one-third of IRRF 2—was divided among generation ($2.79 

billion), transmission ($1.55 billion), distribution ($998 million), an automated 

monitoring and control system ($150 million), and security ($50 million).35

Negroponte’s reprogrammings first reduced and then restored IRRF 2 funds 

for electricity projects, so that by July 2005, the sector was down about twenty 

percent from its original IRRF 2 allocations.36 By the end of March 2005, about 

$5.7 billion in U.S. appropriations and Iraqi funds had been allocated to improve 

the electricity infrastructure across Iraq.37 Only the security sector would get 

more money—in fact, five times more. 

Although the U.S. reconstruction program made progress in rebuilding the 

electricity sector during the two years following the 2003 invasion, by the spring 

of 2005, Iraq’s average daily power output was still below prewar levels.38 U.S. 

officials attributed the shortfall to a litany of familiar problems: security, sabotage, 

shortages of appropriate fuels for generating facilities, limited ministerial capacity, 

inadequate operations and maintenance, poor program management, and project 

cancellations caused by cost overruns and realignments.39

The government had awarded contracts to four design-build firms to rehabilitate and rebuild the electricity grid in Iraq. Through the PCO, the Defense 

Department managed three of the firms: FluorAMEC Joint Venture for nationwide generation projects, Washington Group International for transmission and 

distribution projects in the north, and Perini Corporation for transmission and 

distribution projects in the south.40
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About $1.1 billion in USAID money was contracted to Bechtel for the electricity sector work.41 Bechtel was supposed to implement 22 electricity projects 

during the 2003 to 2005 period, but SIGIR and USAID Inspector General audits found that Bechtel’s projects frequently failed to meet their objectives.42

The Bechtel effort at the Doura Power Plant, one of the main facilities providing 

electricity for Baghdad, illustrates the problems that design-build contractors 

encountered in the electricity sector.

The Doura Power Plant

USAID tasked Bechtel to rehabilitate two of the four steam turbines at the Doura 

power plant. The two turbines were designed to produce 160 MW each, but—

because of poor maintenance—neither was operational at the time of the 2003 

invasion. Bechtel began work at the plant on August 1, 2003, planning to complete 

the project within nine months. A series of delays pushed the completion date 

to the end of 2005, more than a year overdue, and the final cost was more than 

four times greater than planned (rising from $34.1 million to $121.1 million).43

The security situation at the project site had deteriorated in late 2003, and 

ministry employees and Bechtel’s subcontractors refused to go to work. The contractor camp at Doura “was a shoot ‘em up place.”44 Bechtel beefed up security, 

and the U.S. military agreed to guard the gate to the project, a rare example—

during this period—of U.S. forces providing infrastructure security. Nevertheless, 

by the summer of 2004, several subcontractors had pulled out, and Bechtel had 

to employ new support for the project. 

The two Doura turbines were reported substantially complete by June 2005, 

but only one had been commissioned by February 2006.45 The other was almost 

ready, needing only a process called steam blowing before becoming fully operational. Because the project was over budget, USAID decided to turn it over to 

the ministry to complete the finishing touches.46 But the ministry was not ready 

to operate or maintain it.

In August 2006, one of the Doura units experienced “catastrophic failure” 

because of poor maintenance of the “exciter,” a key component that supplies 

power to the generator’s rotor. The ministry removed an exciter from another 

unit to replace the broken one, and the repaired unit operated until April 2007, 

when another major failure occurred. USACE/GRD then stepped in and took 

over the project, eventually bringing both units online by the end of the summer.47 But more U.S. money had to be expended on this project after it had been 

turned over to the Iraqis. 
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Case Studies in Waste

During 2004 and 2005, rising costs and the re-allocation of IRRF 2 funds forced 

the embassy to cancel or reduce the scope of several large projects undertaken by 

Bechtel and Perini in the electricity sector. These included building new power 

generation plants, as well as restoring transmission and distribution lines.

Bechtel: As part of the first realignment of IRRF 2 resources, USAID cancelled the 

$100.6 million Bechtel project to rehabilitate Units 4 and 5 of the Baiji Thermal 

Power Plant. The project would have increased the plant’s output by 275 MW, but 

USAID halted the project in late September 2004, just three months after it began. 

At that time, Unit 4 was producing about 125 MW, just 57 percent of its design 

capacity. About $7 million was spent on the project before its cancellation.48

USAID terminated another large Bechtel effort—the $381 million Mansuria 

Natural Gas Power Plant project—after very substantial U.S. investment. Bechtel 

was contracted to build two new electric plants about 65 miles northeast of 

Baghdad. The site was selected so that the plant could use the natural gas in the 

Mansuria fields to power its turbines. In February 2004, after an urgent request 

from CPA for a quick increase in the Baghdad electricity supply, USAID fasttracked the project, increasing costs. But it was halted in the summer of 2004 in 

the wake of the first IRRF 2 reprogramming.49

The Mansuria power plant project was finally cancelled in the spring of 

2005, but not before Bechtel had billed the government for $62.7 million for a 

base camp and for the purchase of turbines, generators, transformers, and other 

equipment. In June 2005, USAID transferred much of the Mansuria equipment 

to the Ministry of Electricity, which said it would install all of it at projects in 

the Najaf area.50

Perini: In March 2004, the Defense Department awarded Perini a $500 million 

IRRF 2 contract to repair the electrical transmission and distribution lines in 

southern Iraq. By late 2004, however, the PCO concluded that Perini’s overhead 

costs—which included security costs—were too high and began to cut back on 

issuing task orders. The PCO eventually terminated half of Perini’s task orders 

because of its cost proposals that “significantly exceeded budgets and available funding,” and “concerns about the company’s management of project schedules.”51

Perini’s Basrah substation task orders illustrate the cost problem. Perini 

had received a task order in May 2004 for eight projects to improve Basrah’s 

electricity-distribution network. The PCO budgeted $36 million to rebuild five 

substations and to rehabilitate the distribution network. Substations convert 

high-voltage electricity from transmission lines to low-voltage electricity that 
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feeds distribution lines, which carry power to local communities. In July 2004, 

Perini submitted a $105 million cost proposal for these projects. The PCO then 

reduced the project’s scope to just the substation work, and Perini consequently 

dropped its price to about $44 million. By October 2004, further negotiations 

brought the cost down to about $23 million and work began. Perini completed 

the substations in September 2005, at a cost of $28.8 million.52

A March 2006 SIGIR inspection of the substations reported that, although the 

construction met the “standards of the design,” they were not operating because 

the Ministry of Electricity had failed to install transmission and distribution lines 

as agreed.53 A follow-up visit by SIGIR found the substations finally operational 

in October 2006—more than a year and a half after Perini completed them.

Between June and October 2004, the PCO issued additional task orders to 

Perini to build more substations and distribution networks in Babil, Anbar, ThiQar, Najaf, Umm Qasr, and Basrah. But by the end of the year, the PCO had 

terminated much of this work. A SIGIR audit found that Perini completed five 

of the ten task orders issued under the $500 million contract, and that the PCO 

cancelled the remainder. The U.S. government ultimately paid $123 million to 

Perini—including its mobilization costs and its $8 million award fee—on a contract that produced just $26 million in finished projects.54

An Evolving Reconstruction Strategy

In late January 2004, the embassy used money freed up by de-scoping designbuild contracts to initiate a new Rapid Recovery Program with the Ministry of 

Electricity. The program sought to increase the hours of available power in advance of the January 2005 elections by completing projects begun during the 

CPA period that had been turned over to the ministry before completion because 

of cost overruns.55 Recognizing that the Iraqis did not have the capacity to manage and maintain new infrastructure, IRMO and PCO continued the shift away 

from the “design-build-handover” model, moving toward inculcating a “buildtrain-handover” approach, which emphasized not just project completion, but 

also the need for Iraq to invest in operations and maintenance programs.56

The Water and Sewerage Sector

The original IRRF 2 plan earmarked $4.33 billion for the water sector, giving it the 

second-highest infrastructure priority, behind electricity, but Negroponte’s strategic reviews cut $2.2 billion from the sector.57 Nearly $1.5 billion of the remaining 

funds went to projects to provide clean drinking water for Iraq’s population. The 

rest was used to build sewerage systems, improve irrigation, and repair the 149-mile 

Sweetwater Canal in southern Iraq, which delivered fresh water to Basrah.58
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Three design-build contractors worked on U.S. water projects: Bechtel, 

FluorAMEC, and a joint venture between Washington Group International and 

Black & Veatch. By the summer of 2005, USAID had assigned 34 water and sanitation rehabilitation projects worth $369 million in IRRF 1 money to Bechtel.59

Meanwhile, the PCO issued task orders funded by IRRF 2 to FluorAMEC and 

to Washington Group to provide potable water, build sewage systems, and help 

Iraq manage its water resources.60

As of June 2005, Bechtel had completed eighteen task orders, repairing six 

sewage treatment facilities, rehabilitating two water treatment plants, and constructing a large water-supply system for a city in southern Iraq. But a dozen of 

Bechtel’s water projects suffered significant delays.61

A GAO assessment identified several reasons for the delays. GAO found that, 

in addition to ubiquitous security challenges, the CPA’s initial assessments for the 

sector had underestimated water-project costs by 25 to 50 percent, thus requiring 

the re-scoping of many projects and the cancellation of others. High staff turnover 

and poor project-site selection also created delays.62

A SIGIR audit of the $500 million FluorAMEC contract found that, of four 

water sector task orders awarded to FluorAMEC in 2004, the PCO had terminated two by July 2005 because of funding constraints caused by project delays.63

The other two were significant projects, including the largest single IRRF 2 project, 

which was supposed to provide water to 300,000 Iraqis in the Nassriya area. 

The Nassriya Water Supply System

The PCO awarded the task order for the Nassriya water supply project in April 

2004, estimating then that it would cost between $90 million and $120 million. But 

shortly after FluorAMEC began construction in August 2004, the PCO’s watersector manager realized that the project’s cost would be much higher, and would 

exceed the available budget. He recommended merging two nearby water projects 

into the Nassriya project. In January 2005, the PCO definitized the task order for 

the merged projects at $172 million. Five separate modifications over the next year 

increased the price tag to just over $244 million. By October 2007, FluorAMEC 

had finished the Nassriya project and turned it over to the Iraqis, at a final cost of 

$277 million—almost three times the estimated cost, and about two years late.64

Sustaining this complex water treatment facility became an issue. A September 

2005 GAO report concluded that “the long-term outlook for sustaining reconstructed Iraqi [water] facilities remains unclear.”65 GAO’s concerns were 

substantiated in late 2007, when SIGIR inspectors visited the Nassriya water 

project to find it operating at just twenty percent of capacity, three months after 

being commissioned and transferred to Iraqi control.
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The Falluja Wastewater Treatment System

Fierce fighting between Sunni-backed insurgents and Coalition forces erupted 

in Falluja in the spring of 2004 and continued through November when U.S. 

military officials finally secured the city. Although the fighting had forced many 

residents to flee, Falluja’s population was still around 180,000. With no existing 

wastewater treatment system, much of the city’s raw sewage was dumped directly 

into the Euphrates River. Sewage ran in the streets, exposing the city’s residents 

to serious public health problems.66

Seeing Falluja as a “hub for the campaign of violence aimed at destabilizing 

Iraq’s interim government and driving foreign military forces from the country,” 

the embassy wanted to launch a project that would benefit the city’s population 

and demonstrate the U.S. commitment to enhancing life in that beleaguered 

Sunni bastion.67 In June 2004, the PCO issued a $32.5 million task order to 

FluorAMEC to design and construct a new wastewater treatment system that 

would serve most of the city. The embassy prioritized the project, identifying it as 

a “key national reconciliation issue.”68 The task order provided a completion date 

eighteen months out.69 Four years later, when SIGIR inspectors visited Falluja to 

assess the project, work was still ongoing.

FluorAMEC experienced a series of security problems as it attempted to build 

the Falluja wastewater treatment system. Insurgent activity prevented it from 

conducting proper site evaluations. One member of a survey team was wounded 

by gunfire. Contractors also had to deal with unexploded ordnance, improvised 

explosive devices, and intimidation.70

But security was not the only obstacle. The contractor had based its design on an Iraqi engineering firm’s plans for a typical wastewater stabilization 

pond—known as a lagoon system—that recycles water, which is then used for 

irrigation. The system’s principal advantages were “simplicity, low cost, and high 

efficiency.”71 But in August 2005, the new Iraqi Ministry of Municipalities and 

Public Works notified the embassy that the lagoon system was unacceptable; 

it wanted a system of more-sophisticated compact sewage-treatment units.72

IRMO and PCO spent the next three months negotiating with ministry officials 

about which system best suited Falluja. Finally, in November 2005, the United 

States abandoned the lagoon-system design, with all of the investment that had 

already gone into building it, and agreed to build the more modern system that 

the minister wanted.73 This change caused substantial cost increases and more 

delay. Whether the Iraqis could operate so modern a water treatment system 

also became an issue. 

Because of slow progress, the U.S. government terminated FluorAMEC’s 

task order for the Falluja project in September 2005, after expending $18.7 
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million—more than half the cost of the original task order. Then, between 2005 

and 2008, the U.S. government spent an additional $79.3 million—drawn from 

IRRF, CERP, and DFI funds—on 45 other contracts, mostly with Iraqi firms, in 

an attempt to complete the system. 

SIGIR’s 2008 inspection of the Falluja project found that, when finally finished, the wastewater treatment system, which was supposed to serve the entire 

population of Falluja, will serve a little more than a third of the city’s population, 

will have cost three times its original price, and will have been completed four 

years later than originally planned. Moreover, serious questions remain about 

whether the Iraqis can sustain the system once it becomes operational in the 

spring of 2009.74

The Health Sector

IRRF 2 allocated $786 million for Iraq’s health sector. The CPA designated $439 

million of that money for a program to build 150 new primary healthcare centers 

(PHCs) across Iraq and to renovate 17 hospitals. Another $297 million was allocated for procuring medical equipment for the clinics and hospitals, setting up 

a mobile blood collection program, rebuilding the Academy of Health Science, 

training PHC staff, and providing technical assistance to the Ministry of Health. 

Fifty million dollars supported construction of a modern pediatric hospital in 

Basrah.75 None of the Negroponte reprogrammings affected these allocations. 

Nevertheless, no single U.S. construction program encountered more problems 

than the health sector’s effort to construct 150 PHCs across Iraq. 

Fundamental disagreements between U.S. officials and the Iraqi Ministry 

of Health about the approach to health care stymied sector progress from the 

outset. U.S. experts wanted to move Iraq away from its hospital-based national 

health care system to one emphasizing preventive care delivered at local clinics. 

This change was necessary, U.S. experts believed, to ensure health care delivery 

in rural areas, where access to basic medical services did not exist.76 The Iraqi 

medical community resisted this change, urging reconstruction officials to put 

U.S. money into renovating hospitals rather than into a new chain of rural clinics. 

Their complaints had no effect.

The Primary Health Clinic Program

In March 2004, the Defense Department awarded a $243 million design-build 

contract to Parsons Delaware to upgrade 17 hospitals, repair 3 ministry buildings, 

and build 150 new primary healthcare centers across Iraq.77 The contract also 

required Parsons to provide and install medical and dental equipment for each 

of the primary healthcare centers.78 In May 2004, Parsons received three task 
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orders from PMO, initially valued at $88 million, to build 41 healthcare centers 

in central Iraq, 49 in the northern region and 60 in the south. The equipment was 

to cost an additional $70 million. 

For a variety of reasons, the program fell far short of meeting its goals. A SIGIR 

audit concluded that Parsons and the U.S. government agencies in charge of 

managing the contract—IRMO, PCO, and USACE—shared responsibility for 

the program’s failure. SIGIR cited the high turnover in personnel, poor program 

management, and weak quality assurance as the primary factors that caused the 

program to fail.79 From May 2004 to the end of 2005, eight different contracting officers, six different program managers, and five different PCO sector leads 

worked on the clinic program.80 This constant turnover made it difficult to resolve the many problems that arose among the contractor, the U.S. government, 

Parsons, and the Iraq Ministry of Health. 

SIGIR auditors found that the U.S. government’s program managers lost 

track of program costs and schedules. In September 2005, the JCC-I reduced the 

scope of the project and formally notified Parsons that it had lost confidence in 

the company’s ability to deliver the projects on schedule and within budget.81 The 

PCO terminated the contract because Parsons had completed only six clinics, 

while spending $186 million on the program (about 77 percent of the definitized 

costs).82 After the termination of the Parsons contract, over 100 of the partially 

built clinics were completed through direct contracts with Iraqi firms.

SIGIR inspections of five primary healthcare centers in Kirkuk revealed that 

the clinics’ construction was so shoddy that it “raised questions as to the safety 

of occupancy of the structures.” The inspections concluded that “inadequate 

quality control and quality assurance on the part of the contractor and the U.S. 

government, respectively, resulted in not properly identifying and correcting 

construction deficiencies.”83

Parsons also had a $70 million contract for the delivery and installation of 

medical equipment to each of the primary healthcare centers, including X-ray 

machines, exam tables, patient beds, ventilators, defibrillators, incubators, dental 

chairs, lights, and cabinets.84 The clinic supplies began arriving in Baghdad in the 

spring of 2006, long before any clinic was open, but the U.S. government did “not 

fully know the type, quantities, and condition of the equipment” it received. By 

June 2006, Parsons had delivered 115 “full or partial medical equipment sets 

to the warehouse in Abu Ghraib.”85 Jack Holly, a retired Army colonel who 

was asked by CPA to manage its logistics operation, said he had to build a new 

climate-controlled storage facility to house the medical supplies.86 He cited the 

Parsons equipment-delivery fiasco as a prime example of poor coordination in 

Iraq reconstruction operations.87
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The Demise of Design-Build Contracts

During 2004 and 2005, reconstruction efforts across the sectors faced many 

challenges: deteriorating security, poor project integration, insufficient collaboration with and acceptance by Iraqis, weak Iraqi capacity to sustain projects, and 

poor U.S. contract and program management. Overhead costs skyrocketed as 

all reconstruction contracts required increasing security. Many projects were descoped and then declared complete, while others were simply cancelled. Virtually 

every project ended up over budget and behind schedule.

But there was some progress in the program as well. By June 2005, PCO, 

IRMO, and the JCC-I had decisively moved away from the design-build model, 

which would yield cost savings and build Iraqi capacity. Reallocated funds frequently went to support security initiatives, operations and maintenance, and 

programs promoting democracy. But Iraq’s security forces were far from ready 

for the task that confronted them.
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Iraqi Security Forces and Counterinsurgency

In the fall of 2004, it was very difficult. I remember a day of 55 

dead bodies of [Iraqi] soldiers who were trying to go on leave 

from Mosul... Ambushes of three minibuses full of recruits who 

had just completed basic training and going home. Just endless 

challenges during that time on the security front.*

Lieutenant General David Petraeus

Commander of MNSTC-I (2004-2005)

The scope and nature of U.S. support to Iraq’s security forces changed dramatically 

after the June 2004 transfer of sovereignty. By Presidential order, the MultiNational Force-Iraq was assigned responsibility for building the Iraqi security 

forces and it designed an ambitious new program to train, equip, employ, and support Iraq’s forces. Faced with escalating violence across the country, MNF-I aimed 

to boost the Iraqi Security Forces’ capacity and effectiveness, so that the Iraqi government eventually could assume control of security in all eighteen provinces. 

MNF-I divided responsibilities for Iraq’s security forces between two subordinate commands. The Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

was responsible for training and equipping Iraqi security forces; the MultiNational Corps-Iraq was responsible for the operational control of trained 

and equipped units.1

Iraq’s Growing Security Needs

In July and August 2004, a formal “troops-to-task” assessment was conducted by 

a team of senior military officers under the leadership of MNF-I’s commander, 

General George Casey and the commander of MNSTC-I, Lieutenant General 

David Petraeus. “We started by figuring out what we wanted those forces to do,” 

Lieutenant General Petraeus said. “What are their tasks and purposes? Number 

two, based on certain assumptions, what types of forces do you need? How are 

you going to organize them?”2

The assessment concluded that the Iraqi forces were not prepared to combat 

the violent insurgency then threatening the fledgling democracy. The country 

urgently needed more forces—both police and military—trained, equipped, 

and prepared for counterinsurgency operations. 

* SIGIR interview with General David Petraeus, Commander of MNF-I and former Commander of 

MNSTC-I, March 2, 2008.
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The CPA designed the Iraqi police and military forces to deal with the mundane missions of domestic law enforcement and national defense; they had 

not trained and equipped the police to face heavily armed and well-organized 

insurgents, nor had they prepared Iraq’s army to provide internal security. The 

April 2004 uprisings made clear that Iraq’s security forces did not have the capacity to successfully combat the growing insurgency.3

 Significant change was 

needed immediately. 

MNF-I called for three major initiatives to bolster the Iraqi Security Forces 

(ISF) structure. The Iraqi Police Service would expand from 90,000 to 135,000; 

the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps—renamed the Iraqi National Guard—would 

add 20 battalions, for a total of 65; and the number of border patrol officers 

would double to 32,000.4

 In all, the plan called for bringing the number of trained 

and equipped personnel to approximately 271,000.5

 Virtually all Iraq’s security 

forces—from the local police to the special operations forces—would receive 

counterinsurgency training. 

General Casey’s and Lieutenant General Petraeus’s conclusion that the 

growing insurgency required a substantially larger Iraqi force heavily influenced 

Ambassador Negroponte’s strategic review of reconstruction funds.6

 The IRRF 

2 legislation provided $3.24 billion of its total $18.44 billion to support the 

ISF, but the expansions to meet the security requirement proposed by MNFI’s troops-to-task assessment immediately created additional funding needs.7

Ambassador Negroponte’s first reallocation included $1.81 billion to strengthen 

Iraq’s forces.8

Building Iraqi Capacity

In preparing the ISF for its many missions, MNSTC-I faced enormous challenges: equipment procurement lagged behind training and logistical support 

was nonexistent. MNSTC-I commander Lieutenant General Petraeus knew that 

building institutions to enable the ISF to prevail in the field would be “very, very 

painful and very difficult.”9

 Petraeus began by improving MNSTC-I’s flexibility, 

funding, and contracting capacity, allowing it to increase quickly the ISF’s rate 

of expansion.10 MNSTC-I first established flexible contracting mechanisms for 

procurement and construction, working with an array of military agencies, such 

as the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq, USACE, the Defense Logistics Agency, 

and the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment.11 This contracting flexibility was complemented by an increase in capacity as MNSTC-I 

bypassed PCO and IRMO to get more contracting officers and purchasing 

agents from CENTCOM.12 As Lieutenant General Petraeus would later note, 

this strategy also saved money.
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By October 2004, security construction was booming. Work rapidly progressed at Al Kasik, An Numaniyah, Tallil, and Kirkuk military bases, and was 

completed at Umm Qasr Naval Base. Police academies were built or refurbished 

in Mosul, Baghdad, Al Sulaymaniyah, Hilla, Al Kut, Al Asad, and Basrah. The 

camp at Taji was expanded to accommodate the new elite Special Police Forces, 

and hundreds of police stations across the country were under construction.13

The equipping of Iraq’s security forces similarly accelerated. Contracts 

awarded in early 2004 finally began to deliver. The Iraqi National Guard received 

310 vehicles, nearly 30,000 AK-47s, 969 PKM machine guns, and other muchneeded equipment in summer 2004.14 The Ministry of Interior forces began 

receiving equipment as well, including trucks, sport-utility vehicles, AK-47 assault rifles, Glock pistols, radios, and body armor.15

Transforming the ISF

Through the second half of 2004 and into 2005, the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) and 

the Iraqi Police Service grew rapidly. MNSTC-I developed new units with greater 

capabilities, making possible Iraqi participation in counterinsurgency activities.

Ministry of Interior 

The CPA had envisioned the IPS as a traditional law-and-order police force accountable to local authorities. This vision reflected a community-policing model, 

where the primary police task is upholding the rule of law by conducting criminal 

investigations, questioning witnesses, and arresting suspects.16 As in most insurgencies, however, the police bore the brunt of the violence. Pitted against heavily 

armed and motivated foes, the IPS experienced high casualty and desertion rates 

in 2004. The insurgency also undermined the IPS in other ways: training was 

disrupted, morale was low, and increasing attacks kept many officers confined 

to their stations.17

One of the main conclusions of MNSTC-I’s troops-to-task assessment was that 

the Iraqi police needed better training and equipment. This required more funding, 

so Petraeus recommended moving more IRRF 2 funds to support MNSTC-I.18 In 

June 2004, $849.3 million was reprogrammed to supplement the $1.04 billion already shifted to improve police training, equipping, and employment.19 MNSTC-I 

also added specialized courses in leadership, internal affairs, negotiation, investigation, and crowd control.20 The new programs combined counterinsurgency 

training with courses in survival skills and counterterrorism.21

The CPA’s efforts to create Ministry of Interior (MoI) paramilitary units 

for special operations achieved minimal results. The Emergency Response 

Units—based on U.S. SWAT teams—were well trained and equipped, but only 
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40 personnel were operationally ready by July 2004.22 MNSTC-I and the MoI 

thus created additional heavily armed and specially trained police units called the 

Special Police Forces, consisting of the Special Police Commandos, Mechanized 

Police, and the Public Order Battalions. In April 2006, these forces were reorganized into the National Police.23

In September 2004, Iraq’s Minister of Interior, Bayan Jabr, created the Special 

Police Commandos, an elite paramilitary force for indigenous counterinsurgency 

support.24 When Lieutenant General Petraeus was given a demonstration of 

their abilities, he was impressed and committed more MNSTC-I funds to support them, developing a six-week intensive training course at the Special Police 

Commando Academy in northern Baghdad.25

The MoI also created the Mechanized Police for rapid response deployment, 

fixed-site security, and cordon-and-search operations. Training in operations, communications, and maintenance began at Taji Military Base in November 2004.26

Once trained, these forces were stationed mostly in and around Baghdad, where 

they conducted vehicle-mounted operations to secure high-value routes, such as 

“Route Irish,” the road to Baghdad International Airport.27 MNSTC-I awarded a 

$43.9 million contract to build permanent facilities for the Mechanized Police.28

Public Order Battalions rounded out the MoI’s elite civil-security forces. 

They were a lighter force intended for situations not requiring the greater combat 

power of the Special Police Commandos and the Mechanized Police.29 Although 

Public Order Battalions conducted counterinsurgency operations, they primarily 

performed traditional police functions in very hostile environments.30 Their first 

training program began in late September 2004 at An Numaniyah military base, 

and nearly 1,110 students graduated in mid-November, comprising the first three 

Public Order Battalions.31

Ministry of Defense 

The size and capability of the security forces under the Ministry of Defense 

increased dramatically during late 2004 and 2005. The IAF grew from three divisions to ten, incorporating the Iraqi National Guard (ING)—formerly the Iraqi 

Civil Defense Corps—and developing new specialized counterinsurgency units. 

The Iraqi special operations forces attained more proficiency, and the Iraqi navy 

and air force took their first formative steps. The ICDC had been a key Combined 

Joint Task Force-7 initiative, but it performed disastrously during the April 2004 

uprisings, when almost half its personnel deserted. Local commanders reconstituted much of the force as the ING, and implemented new vetting and training 

procedures to make it a more reliable and effective force.32
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The 2004 troops-to-task assessment pointed to the ING as critical to the 

counterinsurgency effort. The Congress—at Ambassador Negroponte’s request—reallocated $442 million in IRRF 2 funds to support its growth.33 By 

January 2005, 42 of the 45 ING battalions were manned above 70 percent—a 

major recovery from their April 2004 collapse.34 The increasing professionalism of 

the ING was recognized on January 6, 2005, when the Iraqi Interim Government 

announced that it would be integrated into the Iraqi army.35

Like the MoI, the MoD developed new special counterinsurgency units following the April 2004 uprisings, calling them the Iraqi Intervention Force (IIF), 

which began operating in Baghdad in June 2004.36 Although smaller than the 

ING, the IIF was designed specifically for counterinsurgency operations. Its 

members received an extra five weeks of training, better equipment, and more 

tactical support from MNC-I.37

The nascent Iraqi Air Force and Navy were the weakest components of the 

IAF. MNSTC-I, following the CPA’s original plan, did not equip the Air Force 

with fixed-wing fighters or bombers—considering them “unnecessary and incapable of influencing the counterinsurgency fight”—and instead favored aerial 

reconnaissance and transport aircraft.38 By August 2004, two Iraqi Air Force reconnaissance aircraft were conducting airborne assessments of damage to Iraqi 

oil-pipelines. The fledgling Iraqi Navy policed Iraq’s waterways to deter smuggling 

and other illicit activities and to protect Iraq’s port and oil assets in the Persian 

Gulf.39 Like the Air Force, Iraq’s Navy had limited operational capacity.40

In July 2004, the MoD established the Iraqi Special Operations Force (ISOF) 

as an elite force operating outside the Iraqi Armed Forces chain of command.41

The ISOF consisted of a Commando Battalion, which was trained to conduct 

raids and seize airfields, and the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Force (ICTF), which 

was trained to fight high-threat terrorist organizations.42 U.S. Special Forces provided instruction to the ISOF, using the U.S. Ranger program for the Commando 

Battalion and U.S. elite counterterrorism forces programs for the ICTF. In time, 

the ISOF became the most effective counterinsurgency force in Iraq.43

Training Adapts

After being trained and equipped by MNSTC-I, Iraqi units were transferred to 

the control of MNC-I, which deployed them in support of the counterinsurgency 

campaign. In the fall of 2004, Special Police Commandos acquitted themselves 

well in offensive operations in Baghdad, Falluja, Samarra, Mosul, North Babylon, 

and elsewhere.44 An ISF high-water mark came on January 30, 2005, when 

130,000 security force personnel provided security at more than 5,200 polling 

sites throughout the country so that more than 8 million Iraqis could vote.45
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U.S. commitment to training also increased. From November 2003 to November 

2004, the number of U.S. soldiers whose primary mission was to advise Iraqi units 

grew from 350 to 1,200.46 Many of these new advisors came from the Army Reserve 

98th Division, an institutional-training division known as the “Iroquois Warriors,” 

which had been filling many of MNSTC-I’s headquarters billets.47

MNSTC-I designed new advisory programs to partner U.S. teams with Iraqi 

units in basic training, and then to stay together during deployments.48 Between 

ten and fifteen U.S. military personnel comprised each team. The advisory teams 

mentored their Iraqi counterparts and served as a critical link to U.S. logistics, 

communications, medical, and fire-support capabilities.49

Retired General Gary Luck’s early 2005 assessment reaffirmed the importance of these embedded advisory teams. He advocated doubling or tripling the 

number of advisors partnering with Iraqi units, believing that this increase would 

allow Iraqi units to take the lead sooner in the counterinsurgency campaign.50 In 

response to Luck’s assessment, MNSTC-I expanded the embedded advisors program. In the late spring of 2005, MNSTC-I changed the name of the partnered 

advisory teams to Military Transition Teams to reflect more accurately MNF-I’s 

goal of transitioning security responsibility to Iraq.51

Measuring Progress

During the CPA’s tenure, the primary metric used to measure the ISF’s progress 

was the number of security force personnel “on duty.” But this metric obscured 

the distinction between trained and untrained personnel, leading to exaggerated 

expectations, constantly changing force-size numbers, and consequent credibility 

problems regarding these numbers.52 For example, of the 83,789 IPS personnel 

reportedly on duty shortly before the transition of sovereignty in June 2004, 

only 26,876 (32 percent) had received any training. Of those trained, more than 

three-quarters had received just the short Transition Integration Program training, meaning that only 5,857 academy-trained personnel were in the IPS.53 MoI 

manning data were further skewed because personnel who were absent without 

leave or deceased were not removed from the “on duty” rolls. Corrupt Iraqi officials collected the payments to these “ghost employees,” who accounted for 20 

to 30 percent of the MoI staff.54

During 2004, MNSTC-I made a number of important reforms that improved 

U.S. policymakers’ ability to measure progress. Immediately after the transition, 

MNSTC-I replaced the “on duty” metric with a “trained and equipped” personnel 

metric.55 The net result was that the report showed a 75 percent drop in MoI force 

totals, from 181,297 “on duty” personnel on June 15, 2004, to 47,255 “trained 

and equipped” personnel on August 25, 2004. 
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In the winter of 2004-2005, MNSTC-I developed a Transition Readiness 

Assessment (TRA), based on the U.S. military’s readiness-reporting system, to 

measure both training and equipping status, as well as operational effectiveness.56

MNC-I Transition Teams administered the TRAs every month, reflecting MNFI’s belief that “the best measure of the capabilities of Iraqi units and improvements 

in the security situation comes from commanders on the ground.”57

The TRAs graded units on a four-level scale, assessing their ability to conduct 

counterinsurgency operations. At level one, they could operate independently. 

At level two, Iraqi units needed MNC-I “enablers”—such as medical evacuation, transport, and fire support—to operate. At level three, Iraqis could operate 

only alongside MNC-I forces. And at level four, ISF units were still in training or 

otherwise not capable.Transition teams used the TRAs to estimate how many 

months it would take a unit to advance to the next level.58 By July 2005, only one 

IAF unit was rated at level one, although 24 were judged at level two.59

Iraq Security Forces Fund 

National Security Presidential Directive 36 resolved many of the ISF training 

and equipping problems by authorizing the Defense Department to take charge 

of all security force development in Iraq. But it did not solve the resource problem. MNF-I still depended on IRRF 2 to fund most of its training programs.60

The $1.81 billion reallocation approved by the Congress in September 2004 had 

helped, but MNSTC-I needed more. 

By January 2005, MNSTC-I had obligated $1.44 billion of the $2.32 billion 

available in IRRF 2 funds for the Ministry of Interior security forces. It also had 

obligated $1.69 billion of the $2.64 billion available to the MoD security forces.61

Even with this new investment, the expanding ISF were unable to stem the rising 

violence, and the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior could not sustain and 

support the forces without U.S. assistance.62

It was clear that transitioning security responsibilities would cost much more 

than IRRF 2 could provide. Thus, in November 2004, MNSTC-I began developing its own supplemental request for the specific purpose of increasing U.S. 

investment in training and equipping the ISF.63 After months of negotiation, 

OMB submitted a congressional budget request on February 14, 2005.64

On May 11, 2005, the Congress approved the request, appropriating $5.39 

billion to the newly created Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF). The Congress 

provided the Defense Department flexibility on the use of the funds, allowing it 

to reallocate large amounts of money for different ISF purposes without seeking 

congressional approval, as was required under IRRF 2.65 Additional appropriations through 2008 would bring the total value of ISFF appropriations to $17.9 
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billion.66 Coupled with nearly $5 billion in IRRF 2 allocations, investment in 

Iraq’s security sector was by far the single largest Iraq reconstruction expense.67

Perilous Progress

By the end of June 2005, MNSTC-I had spent $544 million on construction projects for the IAF, up from $57 million a year earlier. It also had spent $346 million 

on military equipment, compared to just $11 million the previous year.68 But even 

with these dramatic increases, new problems surfaced regarding ISF equipment 

accountability, logistics capability, and sectarian infiltration of the forces.

Logistics

In June 2004, the capacity of Iraq’s Ministries of Interior and Defense to support 

security forces in the field was very weak. “There wasn’t even a Ministry of Defense 

building, much less something that you would call a Ministry of Defense,” said 

Lieutenant General Petraeus. Only “about five guys with cell phones and a couple 

of old generals” remained.69 Petraeus added that the Ministry of Interior “was 

nascent, to put it mildly.”70

Iraqi Army units could not sustain independent operations for any significant 

period of time without U.S. support.71 The police struggled with vehicle maintenance 

and equipment distribution.72 As a consequence, the ISF remained heavily dependent on MNF-I funding, logistics, transportation, and fire support as their mission 

evolved and as they became more proficient in counterinsurgency operations.73

Continuing security problems across Iraq meant that, for MNSTC-I, 

strengthening the ministries’ logistical capabilities was secondary to equipping 

and training security forces. Unfortunately, this caused MNSTC-I to overlook 

oversight functions necessary to account for all equipment. For example, it failed 

to implement a tracking system for weapons issued to the ISF. As a SIGIR audit 

concluded, MNSTC-I should have appointed, at its inception, an officer accountable for property (including weapons). It finally did appoint one in the spring 

of 2005, but the absence of an effectively managed distribution system hindered 

MNSTC-I’s ability to track equipment provided to the Iraqi forces.74

In response to the audit, MNSTC-I developed a tracking system that catalogued equipment by serial number, vehicle identification number, or some 

other unique identifying number. When MNSTC-I issued the equipment to 

the Iraqis, the Iraqi recipient had to sign for it.75 But even with these new policies, security problems prevented MNSTC-I staff from consistently collecting 

physical records, which led to accountability weaknesses. As a consequence of 

these shortfalls, MNSTC-I could not properly account for many of the weapons 

it issued, both before and after implementing the new tracking system. Thus, too 
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many U.S.-supplied weapons intended for ISF use may have ended up in militia 

or insurgent hands.76

Regarding logistics, MNSTC-I established a fixed-base logistics doctrine for 

supporting the ISF.77 This meant that Iraqi supply, transportation, and maintenance capabilities above the unit level would be centrally located and directed 

to units as needed. In support of the program, MNSTC-I constructed a logistics 

depot for weapons and equipment at the Taji Army Base and started training a 

transportation regiment to deliver equipment to the Iraqi security forces.78 But 

authority to advise the Ministries of Defense and Interior on logistics and other 

issues still resided with IRMO and the U.S. mission. It was not until October 1, 

2005, that MNSTC-I became responsible for institution-building at the ministerial level, thus ending a bifurcated approach that had hindered progress.79

Sectarianism

As the ISF grew, a number of serious recruiting and manning problems also arose. 

MNSTC-I recruited nationally for the Iraqi Army, with the goal of creating a 

diverse security force whose personnel were not tied to a particular province, 

sect, ethnicity, or tribal group.80 Recruiting was more complicated for the police 

because it was difficult for MNSTC-I to vet recruits for the IPS. 81 It consequently 

relied on Iraqis, especially community leaders, for vetting, but this approach 

opened the IPS manning process to politicization. The huge expansion of the 

police payroll during Ambassador Negroponte’s tenure and beyond stemmed 

in part from the growth of new IPS patronage networks. 82

The CPA’s Transitional Administrative Law outlawed militias, and CPA 

Order 91, issued in March 2004, established a process to integrate them into 

the ISF. But the program was underfunded and understaffed.83 The larger sectarian militias, particularly the Kurdish Peshmerga and the Shi’a Badr Corps, 

remained largely intact. Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army—one of the main adversaries during the April 2004 uprisings—was also not part of the integration 

plan.84 Compounding the problem, many Iraqis viewed militias as the primary 

guarantors of security in certain areas, and some members of the Iraqi parliament 

depended on militias for protection.85

Some militia members who integrated into the ISF retained their old loyalties; their sectarian agendas undermined certain segments of the ISF, especially 

within the Ministry of Interior.86 The Special Police Force proved most problematic 

regarding infiltration. The Ministry of Interior’s desperate need for experienced 

recruits forced them to piece together units from Saddam-era commando units and 

Shi’a militia, each of which were likely to have their own sectarian agendas.87 The result was a force “riddled with corruption and sectarian influence,” whose members 
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engaged in routine shakedowns for private gain and committed appalling human 

rights abuses.88 These elite Iraqi units, trained and equipped by MNSTC-I for counterinsurgency, were regularly accused of human rights abuses. The sectarian and 

militia influences in Iraq’s security forces fed the country’s growing communal 

violence and threatened the return of abuses commonplace under Saddam.89

Security Redux

In its first year of existence, MNF-I made significant progress in training, equipping, and employing the ISF. MNF-I and the Iraqi Ministries of Interior and 

Defense expanded the size of the various Iraqi forces and added new counterinsurgency units that could better address Iraq’s security needs. Improved measures 

of training and equipping and unit effectiveness helped MNF-I, CENTCOM, 

and the Pentagon track progress, adjust policy, and allocate resources. During the 

year, MNF-I also initiated a large-scale advisory program to mentor and support 

Iraqi forces in the field and took critical first steps in developing Iraq’s logistical 

capabilities, so that security responsibilities could eventually be transferred. 

Progress was expensive. But the additional resources improved the ability of 

the Iraqi security forces to fight the insurgency. Under the command of MNCI, Iraqi units performed well in Falluja in November 2004, across the country 

in late January 2005, and in May 2005, when Iraqi forces engaged in their first 

coordinated counterinsurgency operation without significant U.S. assistance. 

During “Operation Lightning,” the ISF operations across Baghdad resulted in 

the capture of 108 suspected insurgents.90

Problems nonetheless remained. Iraqi ministerial capacity continued to be 

weak.91 MNC-I commanders reported that some Iraqi units who assumed control 

over their own territory subsequently collapsed. In March 2005, for example, an 

Iraqi unit that deployed to the border “virtually disintegrated, allowing foreign 

fighters to enter Iraq from over the Syrian border.”92 The new counterinsurgency mission assigned to the ISF placed them in direct contact—and often 

confrontation—with the Iraqi populace, and they increasingly became the target 

of insurgent attacks. Service in the ISF was dangerous: a total of 296 Iraqi police 

and military personnel were killed in June 2005—nearly ten per day.93

The ISF was not yet the professional force that the CPA had envisioned. 

Many of the elite forces created to fight the insurgency were increasingly infiltrated by sectarian elements and implicated in human rights abuses.94 Factions 

within the ISF became politicized, feeding the growing conflict.95 MNF-I faced 

a moving target: as it trained and equipped Iraqi security forces for counterinsurgency, it was unwittingly feeding the sectarianism that would rack Iraqi 

society in 2005 and 2006.
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Chapter 20

Elections, Rule of Law, and 

Fighting Corruption

Corruption is a disease which is connected with many aspects 

of the government and in this society. It has become now a 

social phenomenon from the low rank and class to the higher 

rank in government...and for that reason there is no remedy 

for that except privatization. I think the government failed to 

defeat the corruption.*

Ali Baban 

Minister of Planning, Government of Iraq (2006-present) 

The United States intended to build strong and democratic national and local 

governments in Iraq. Notwithstanding this noble goal, the original IRRF 2 plan 

allocated relatively few resources for governance and democracy programs. 

The original plan divided support for democracy, rule of law, anticorruption, 

and governance programs in Iraq between two sectors: $1.3 billion went to the 

Justice, Public Safety Infrastructure, and Civil Society sector, while $280 million 

went to the Education, Refugees, Human Rights, and Governance sector. Most of 

the money in the justice sector was allocated for physical infrastructure projects, 

including courts and prisons. Democracy-building activities initially received 

$100 million—about one-half of one percent of the $18.4 billion IRRF 2.1

 Just 

$10 million in IRRF 2 funding went to civil-society programs. Almost no money 

was designated for anticorruption programs.2

Although the new constitution and the 2005 elections were signal achievements for Iraq, sustaining democratic institutions required a strong foundation 

in the rule of law. But, as with many U.S. programs in Iraq, several government 

agencies engaged in the effort, with none in charge. Moreover, support for Iraq’s 

anticorruption entities—necessary to protecting Iraq’s resources from waste or 

theft—was very weak. 

Building Democracy

In 2003 and 2004, the CPA and then the U.S. Embassy recognized the need 

for more money to support the political process outlined in the Transitional 

Administrative Law.3

 The CPA moved money into democracy projects just after 

* SIGIR interview with Ali Baban, Minister of Planning, November 23, 2008.
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the November 15, 2003 agreement to return sovereignty to Iraqis. It also reprogrammed $358 million from infrastructure projects to efforts aimed at establishing 

the democratic foundations for a new Iraq. OMB divided these reprogrammed 

funds among the Defense Department, the State Department, and USAID to support a wide range of new projects, including developing political parties, building 

governance capacity, and promoting transparency in political and civic life.4

Following Ambassador Negroponte’s mid-2004 strategic review, the State 

Department shifted another $380 million into democracy building, pushing the 

total reallocation to this sector above $830 million. This new money included 

$100 million to strengthen local and provincial governments and $200 million to 

help reduce sectarian conflict.5

 By the summer of 2005, total funding adjustments 

had increased U.S. investment in democracy building to $942 million.6

In late 2004 and 2005, the United States obligated approximately $130 

million for non-security assistance to support two national elections and the constitutional referendum in 2005. The Department of State awarded $30 million 

to the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute 

to organize political parties and provide training to build their capacity.7

 But 

almost a third of this money—$41.1 million—supported the work of the new 

Independent Electoral Commission as it readied Iraq for the three elections. 

The Independent Electoral Commission

At the end of May 2004, the CPA established the Independent Electoral 

Commission of Iraq to “organize, oversee, conduct, and implement all elections” 

required by the TAL.8

 A week later, it promulgated Order Number 96, delineating 

the “legal framework for genuine and credible elections” to elect the members to a 

new Transitional National Assembly (TNA), which would eventually follow the 

CPA and Iraqi Interim Government as the third temporary governing body ruling 

Iraq in less than a year. CPA Order 96 further provided that the elections,which 

would be for provincial councils and the Kurdistan Regional Government, as well 

as the TNA, had to take place by the end of January 2005. Any “political entity” 

could present a list of candidates to the electoral commission for approval, but 

one-third of the candidates on any submitted list had to be women.9

The UN team that advised the Iraqi government on voter registration and 

other electoral issues recommended treating the entire country as a single voting 

district. There was not enough time to draw a system of geographical districts for 

the 275 assembly seats before the mandated election date.10 Although easier to 

organize, the single-district approach had inherent problems. The most significant 

was that members elected to the assembly would primarily be accountable to 

their parties—not the voters. 
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With $40 million in U.S. funding, the International Foundation for Election 

Systems helped the Independent Electoral Commission prepare for the January 30, 

2005 elections by drafting regulations, training staff, planning logistics, and procuring voter registration forms.11 The electoral commission began distributing voter 

registration materials in October 2004 and registered more than 14 million Iraqis 

by January 2005. The ballot offered 256 political entities from which to choose, 

representing nearly 19,000 candidates running for the Transitional National 

Assembly, the provincial councils, and the Kurdistan National Assembly.12

Elections and Increasing Violence

During the summer and fall of 2004, the Iraqi Interim Government and the 

Coalition faced renewed conflicts with the followers of Shi’a leader Muqtada 

al-Sadr in Najaf, as well as with insurgents in the Sunni cities of Falluja and 

Samarra. Grand Ayatollah Sistani stepped in again to end a tense standoff in 

Najaf between Muqtada al-Sadr and the Coalition-backed ISF.13 In the wake 

of the Najaf crisis, Sistani forged a new coalition—the United Iraqi Alliance, 

combining the major Shi’a parties—to compete for seats in the January 2005 

elections. Meanwhile, continuing battles against extremists in Samarra and 

Falluja hardened Sunni sentiment against the Coalition. 

On November 9, 2004, in the wake of the Coalition attacks on Falluja, Iraq’s 

most prominent Sunni political party—the Iraqi Islamic Party—announced 

its withdrawal from the Iraqi Interim Government, having decided against participating in the January 2005 elections.14 Sunni Arabs—who had dominated 

Iraq’s governing and economic institutions under Saddam Hussein and who 

comprised about twenty percent of Iraq’s population—had the most to lose 

from a single-list election.15 Some predicted that if elections took place without Sunni participation, they “would be cut out of the process of governing and 

constitution-making for the duration of the transition, leaving them little option 

but violent resistance.”16

The elections occurred as scheduled on January 30, 2005. About 130,000 

members of Iraq’s security forces, with U.S. support, guarded polling stations 

across the country. The Iraqi Interim Government had banned vehicular traffic 

and closed the borders two days before the election. On election day, insurgents 

launched about 300 attacks, killing at least 35 people and wounding more than 

100. Despite this violence, attacks were fewer than anticipated.17

Some 8.5 million Iraqis, nearly 60 percent of the registered electorate, cast 

ballots. President Bush hailed the results: “Today, the people of Iraq have spoken 

to the world, and the world is hearing the voice of freedom from the center of 

the Middle East.”18
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Twelve political groups won seats in the Transitional National Assembly. The 

United Iraqi Alliance, with its coalition of predominantly Shi’a groups, received 

more than 50 percent of the vote, giving it 140 of the 275 seats. The Kurdish 

bloc earned 27 percent of the vote, giving it 75 seats. Ayad Allawi’s Iraqi List, 

with about 14 percent of the vote, garnered 40 seats.19 Only 17 Sunni Arabs were 

elected, giving them about six percent of the seats in the new body.20

Six weeks later, the TNA met for the first time in the heavily fortified Green 

Zone, but factional disputes delayed the formation of the government until 

April 2005 when the Presidency Council finally took shape. Kurdish leader Jalal 

Talabani was named president, and Sunni Sheikh Ghazi al-Yawar and Shi’a Adel 

Abdel Mahdi were named vice presidents. The Presidency Council then named 

Shi’a leader Ibrahim al-Ja’afari as Prime Minister.21

At the end of April, the TNA approved a cabinet that still needed ministers 

for five critical ministries: Defense, Oil, Electricity, Industry, and Human Rights. 

Even with some of these key cabinet positions vacant, Iraq’s first elected government was sworn into office on May 3, 2005. A week later, the TNA named a 

55-member committee to draft the country’s permanent constitution.22 Only two 

of the committee’s members were Sunnis, sowing yet another seed of dissension 

that would burst forth in 2006’s sectarian violence.23

Although many Iraqis and international observers called for extending the 

deadline for producing a new constitution, the United States pushed the drafting 

committee to meet the August 15 deadline provided by the TAL. To speed the 

process, Shi’a and Kurdish leaders removed the negotiations from the drafting 

committee, placing them instead in the hands of a new Leadership Council. By 

the end of August, the new council formally submitted a draft constitution to the 

TNA, just two weeks overdue.24

The Sunnis, who had been largely cut out of negotiations by the Shi’a alliance 

and the Kurds, strongly opposed the constitution. Former Prime Minister Ayad 

Allawi, a Sunni, and Muqtada al-Sadr, a Shi’a, criticized the content and the hurried, secretive process by which the document was drafted.25 Sunnis objected to 

the federal model, favoring instead a stronger central government.26

The Rule of Law

As the United States sought to help Iraq form a representative government based 

on a constitution that protected the rights of all Iraqis, it also used reconstruction 

dollars to try to rebuild Iraq’s justice system. A mix of U.S. government agencies—the Department of Defense, the Department of State, USAID, and the 

Department of Justice—bore responsibility for various aspects of the rule-of-law 

program in Iraq, but none was in charge of coordinating their disparate efforts. 
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The lack of any concentrated responsibility for this critical area meant that 

there was no coordinated leadership on rule-of-law initiatives and a paucity of personnel devoted to the effort. For example, only in June 2005 would the embassy, in 

response to SIGIR audits, appoint a rule-of-law coordinator for Iraq initiatives.27

A State Department Inspector General review of the rule of law in Iraq, issued 

two and a half years after Coalition forces toppled Saddam Hussein, found an absence of coordination “among U.S. elements in Iraq, between Washington and the 

field, and between the United States and coalition partners and potential donors 

or NGO implementers.”28 The report concluded that the government had been 

very slow to disburse the few funds allocated for rule-of-law projects, particularly 

regarding capacity building.29 Most of the funds obligated in 2004 and 2005 in the 

justice sector went for infrastructure projects, which were supposed to be carried 

out under the $900 million IRRF 2 contract awarded to Parsons Delaware for border-control posts, police and civil defense facilities, fire stations, and courthouses 

and prisons.30 Parsons fell far short of fulfilling its obligations, and the United States 

terminated the contract in 2007, after expending $333 million.

Rebuilding Prisons

In May and June 2003, a Department of Justice team surveyed 21 of Iraq’s 151 

prisons and detention facilities, finding that almost all had “been looted, trashed, 

burned, and everything of any value either destroyed or stolen.”31 The CPA estimated that the total cost of rehabilitating the prisons would range from $50 

million to $100 million.32

Despite its history as a brutal detention center under Saddam, Abu Ghraib, the 

country’s largest prison, was the only maximum-security facility capable of housing dangerous inmates.33 During the first months after the invasion, the Coalition 

housed prisoners in temporary facilities—tents or plywood buildings—and in 

hastily rehabilitated detention centers. In July 2003, the CPA re-opened Abu 

Ghraib, which had the capacity to hold 400 people.34

From March to November 2004, the PMO/PCO issued 53 task orders 

to Parsons Delaware for construction projects, including prisons, in the security and justice sector. By December 2004, due to Parsons poor progress, the 

U.S. government cancelled 26 of the task orders, most before much work had 

been accomplished. A SIGIR audit found that of the 53 original task orders assigned to Parsons, the contractor successfully completed only eighteen, which 

included the construction of border posts, courts, fire stations, and military or 

police academies. 

The government terminated nine of the 53 task orders, seven for convenience and two for default. The two terminated for default involved two 
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Western-style prisons—the Nassriya Corrections Facility and the Khan Bani 

Sa’ad Corrections Facility. SIGIR’s audit of Parsons concluded that “terminated 

and canceled task orders accounted for approximately $142 million of the $366 

million disbursed to Parsons.”35

Before its contract was terminated, Parsons had completed about 45 percent of the work on two security buildings at the Nassriya prison but much less 

was accomplished at the Khan Bani Sa’ad prison north of Baghdad. While the 

Nassriya prison was eventually finished by a follow-on contractor, the Khan Bani 

Sa’ad story—perhaps the single greatest project failure in the U.S. reconstruction 

program—illustrates many of the problems the government and its contractors 

faced in Iraq.36

The Khan Bani Sa’ad Prison

In May 2004, the CPA awarded a task order for $73 million to Parsons to build 

a maximum-security prison in Diyala Province. The project, scheduled to begin 

immediately and be finished by November 2005, had problems from the start.37

Construction did not begin until November 2004 and progressed very slowly, chiefly 

because of poor security conditions and weak subcontractor performance. 

In the spring of 2006, Parsons notified USACE-GRD that the prison would 

not be completed until September 2008, three years late. The U.S. government 

promptly terminated the contract for default, noting that “Parsons has endangered completion both by continued schedule slips and by incurring massive 

cost overruns that cannot be sustained by the Government...The circumstances 

that have caused the vast majority of the schedule slips have, in fact, been within 

Parsons’ control.”38

Parsons attributed the many delays to poor security, contending that when 

the contract was awarded the U.S. government indicated that Iraq would be 

relatively stable. The U.S government disagreed, pointing out that neither the 

original contract nor the task order suggested that Parsons would be working in 

a permissive environment.39

The government continued work on the prison, awarding a fixed-price bridging contract to an Iraqi subcontractor of Parsons. In September 2006, the GRD 

awarded two contracts to an Iraqi contractor for further construction on the 

prison and one to a U.S. contractor to rehabilitate the prison’s electrical system. 

None of these contractors made significant progress. In March 2007, GRD sent 

the Iraqi company a list of items it had failed to deliver and, in June 2007, GRD 

terminated the contract. 

At this point, the U.S. government stopped all work, having spent three years 

and approximately $40 million on the project, with just 52 percent of it finished. 
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Moreover, the completed work had major structural problems, including improperly laid concrete floors and poorly built walls. GRD informed Iraq’s Deputy 

Minister of Justice that it would turn the incomplete Khan Bani Sa’ad prison over 

to the Iraqi government on August 1, 2007, but the deputy minister refused to 

accept it, stating that the ministry had no plans to “complete, occupy, or provide 

security for this facility.”40

When SIGIR inspectors visited Khan Bani Sa’ad in June 2008, they found an 

unoccupied, unsecured site with numerous construction problems; $1.2 million 

worth of material was missing.41 Ultimately, the U.S. program spent $40 million 

on the project, terminating it in 2007—without any prospect of return on the 

investment. Khan Bani Sa’ad will probably never house an inmate. The Iraqis in 

Diyala derisively referred to the skeletal, half-built prison on the flatlands north 

of Baghdad as “the whale.”42

Building Courts

The Ba’athist constitution consolidated Iraq’s civilian court system in the 

Ministry of Justice, giving Saddam strict executive control over the judicial system. Saddam tightened his stranglehold on the legal system by creating military 

and security courts.43 CPA Order Number 2, which disbanded the Iraqi military and intelligence services, abolished these courts as well.44 An array of other 

courts—appellate, criminal, civil, and juvenile—continued under the jurisdiction 

of the Ministry of Justice. 

In mid-2003, the CPA and the Department of Justice estimated that the 

country had 130 courthouses, 570 courts, and 710 judges.45 Early U.S. judicial 

reform initiatives foundered, in part because some in the Iraqi legal establishment 

felt detached from the planning and rehabilitation process. Sermid Al-Sarraf, a 

member of the Iraqi Jurists Association, testifying before the U.S. Congress at 

the end of June 2003, said that the CPA had largely left Iraqi lawyers and judges 

out of discussions about how to reform the country’s legal system. He pointed 

out that a Department of Justice assessment team failed to include a single Iraqi 

legal professional and that the CPA had inexperienced people making arbitrary 

decisions affecting Iraqi law. “Iraqis are feeling like strangers in their own country,” Al-Sarraf said. “Either through neglect, lack of understanding, or for the sake 

of expediency, current efforts seem to be avoiding direct Iraqi involvement and 

their opinions in important decisions.”46

The CPA created a critically important new legal institution—the Central 

Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI)—empowering it to try serious offenses committed 

since the invasion and giving it jurisdiction over “any and all criminal violations,” 

regardless of where they occurred within Iraq. By August 2003, the new court 
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was open in the Green Zone and trying its first cases. The CCCI concentrated its 

limited resources on offenses involving “terrorism, organized crime, government 

corruption, and acts intended to destabilize democratic institutions.”47

To ensure that justice was administered fairly in the new Iraq, the CPA first 

had to resolve the issue of whether judges who had served under the Saddam 

regime, and had been Ba’athists, could continue in office. In one of its first orders, the CPA created a Judicial Review Committee to vet former judges and 

prosecutors for connections to the Ba’ath Party, vesting it with the power to 

remove those with significant connections.48 Over the next year, the committee 

removed about 180 judges.49

By the fall of 2003, too few Iraqi courts were up and running. At the end of 

November, Judge Daniel Rubini, a senior advisor to the Ministry of Justice, sent 

a memo to CPA’s leadership noting that there had only been twenty criminal 

convictions in Baghdad since the criminal courts re-opened in May and only 

80 trials nationwide. Many investigative judges feared bringing cases to trial because of potential attacks. Corruption was also a major problem. “Police, court 

investigators, and investigating judges hold out for bribes before acting upon a 

defendant’s case,” said Rubini.50

The CPA also sought to construct courthouses, but did not devote sufficient 

resources to the effort, partly because the IRRF 2 money was not available until the 

end of its tenure. In April 2004, the OMB allocated $135 million for the construction and repair of courthouses, as well as for increasing their security.51 This funding 

sought to address the very serious problem of judicial security in Iraq. In November 

2003, gunmen kidnapped and killed Muhan Jabr al-Shuwaili, the top judge in Najaf, 

who had supported the creation of a judicial commission to investigate former 

Ba’ath Party officials.52 A month later, insurgents killed Youssef Khoshi, a senior 

judge in Mosul, firing six bullets into his back.53 Attacks on judges have plagued 

the reconstruction program since its inception. By the end of 2008, more than 40 

judges or their family members had been murdered in Iraq since the 2003 invasion. 

Many more had quit their jobs and fled the country because of threats.54

Anticorruption Initiatives

Corruption permeated Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Although it infected every level 

of Iraq’s government, it was concentrated chiefly among the ruling elite of the 

Ba’ath Party and those who served them. The fact that the problem of corruption 

persisted after the U.S. invasion is no surprise because, as scholars have noted, 

“Corruption thrives in the environment of post-conflict reconstruction,” which 

combines “large public procurement projects, major funding infusions, and inadequate government economic management.”55 Throughout the life of the U.S. 
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reconstruction program, Iraqi corruption “exerted a corrosive force upon [the] 

fledgling democracy,” contributing to a flight of capital that “directly harmed the 

country’s economic viability.”56

Corruption in Iraq’s government, which Prime Minister Maliki has referred 

to as a “second insurgency,” fundamentally impeded U.S. efforts to develop ministry capacity.57 Institutions of government were “undermined by the widespread 

association of political elites with corrupt activities.”58 The oil sector’s corrupt 

practices were particularly egregious. 

A 2006 GAO report noted that “about 10 percent of refined fuels are diverted 

to the black market, and about 30 percent of imported fuels are smuggled out 

of Iraq and sold for a profit.”59 Some oil-smuggling money reportedly ended up 

in the hands of insurgents.60 Failing to exert effective oversight came at a high 

price: the cost of corruption to Iraq during 2004 and 2005 was estimated at $4 

billion per year.61

Developing a New Anticorruption System

To combat this “second insurgency,” U.S. officials implemented comprehensive 

reforms of Iraq’s anticorruption system, setting up new institutions and drafting 

new laws. But the U.S. efforts to help develop effective Iraqi oversight institutions, 

begun under the CPA and continued by the embassy, produced mixed results, 

primarily because of underfunding and a lack of coordination among the U.S. 

agencies administering various initiatives. 

Before the U.S. invasion, the Board of Supreme Audit (BSA) served as Iraq’s 

primary government oversight agency. Created by Great Britain during its occupation of Iraq in the 1920s, the BSA had become a paper tiger under Saddam. 

To augment the BSA’s efforts, the CPA established two new anticorruption institutions: the Commission on Public Integrity (CPI) and the ministry inspectors 

general (IGs) system.62

The CPA’s conception of how these new entities should function was simple 

and quintessentially American. An IG would notice something amiss that could 

be the result of corruption and would forward to the CPI a file documenting his 

suspicions, along with whatever evidence he managed to gather. The CPI then 

would conduct a criminal investigation, much as the FBI does upon receiving 

a referral from a U.S. inspector general. After completing the investigation, the 

CPI would deliver its findings to the CCCI’s investigative judges. The judges, 

functioning much like U.S. prosecutors, would decide whether to bring the case 

to trial, close it, or send it back to the CPI for further investigation.63

In practice, things rarely ran this smoothly. To begin with, the CPA failed 

to provide adequate resources to the two institutions it created. Ambassador 
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Bremer authorized a budget of just $35 million—$20 million from the DFI and 

$15 million from IRRF 2.64 Most of these funds went to the CPI, with the IGs 

receiving nothing until the very end of the CPA’s tenure. 

Compounding these funding troubles was the fact that nothing like either 

institution had previously existed in Iraq. This led to misunderstandings and 

suspicions about them among ministry officials. Modeled on Hong Kong’s muchlauded Independent Commission Against Corruption, the CPI was intended to 

be Iraq’s primary corruption-fighting agency. The IGs were modeled on the U.S. 

system of federal inspectors general and were designed to be frontline anticorruption watchdogs in every ministry.65 But the perception of foreign taint burdened 

both the CPI and the IGs from their inception. 

High-ranking Iraqi officials expressed confusion about where these two institutions fit within the country’s highly formalized legal hierarchy. Many mistakenly 

believed that the CPI had independent arrest authority. Similarly, many GOI 

ministers mistrusted their IGs and perceived them as spies for either the Prime 

Minister’s Office or the Americans. Grafted onto the existing Iraqi legal system 

and inadequately supported by their U.S. creators, the CPI and the IGs struggled 

to find their footing in a new, corrupt, and dangerous Iraq.66

The Commission on Public Integrity 

On January 28, 2004, CPA Order Number 55 established the CPI, giving it statutory authority to investigate allegations of corruption against Iraqi governmental 

officials and to forward cases meriting judicial action to the CCCI. Order 55 

further charged the CPI with educating the Iraqi populace about the dangers of 

corruption, drafting and administering financial disclosure regulations for government employees, and revising Iraq’s Code of Conduct for public servants.67

Although established in January 2004, the CPI remained leaderless until the 

waning days of the CPA. Finally, in June 2004, the last month of the CPA’s existence, Ambassador Bremer appointed Judge Radhi Hamza al-Radhi as CPI’s first 

Commissioner. Radhi had served as a judge during Saddam’s regime. Because of 

his independence and integrity, he had been imprisoned and tortured.68

Almost from the first day of its existence, American advisors were involved 

with the CPI’s operations. The State Department’s Bureau of International 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs committed $11 million to train the 

CPI’s investigators and to purchase equipment. The CPA allocated this money 

to the U.S. Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training 

Assistance Program, which provided a handful of trainers.69 By the summer of 

2005, more than 150 CPI investigators were being trained by 20 ICITAP advisors.70 Significant INL-funded training programs for the CPI continued until 
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2008, when the embassy scaled them back, partly because of the CPI’s diminishing effectiveness as a law enforcement institution.

During the eighteen months following its formation, the CPI filed 541 cases 

with the CCCI, including 42 against ministers, their deputies, and ministerial 

directors general. Judge Radhi later told a U.S. congressional oversight committee 

that, for perhaps the first time in Middle East history, “a minister was arrested, 

in accordance with the rule of law, in a non-political, non-sectarian manner on 

corruption charges.” He noted, however, that early cases like this inflamed strong 

opposition to the CPI, resulting in efforts to limit its powers.71

The CCCI, which received all corruption case referrals, proved an unsatisfactory 

vehicle for prosecuting them. The overburdened court—charged with prosecuting 

terrorism, organized crime, and ethnic and sectarian violence—was either unwilling or unable to devote adequate attention to corruption cases.72 Of the 3,000 cases 

forwarded to the court by the CPI between 2004 and 2007, the CCCI adjudicated 

and rendered only 241 guilty verdicts—about 8 percent. “However, the cost of 

corruption that my Commission has uncovered so far across all ministries in Iraq 

has been estimated to be as high as $18 billion,” Judge Radhi said.73

Article 136(b) of the Iraqi Penal Code—first enacted in 1971— also hampered the CPI’s ability to investigate corruption. This law provides that no case 

against a ministry official or former official can go to trial without the permission of the minister of the agency involved. In June 2004, the CPA suspended 

the law, but the Iraqi government later reinstated it.74 In the six months from 

September 2006 to February 2007, Article 136(b) was invoked to block investigations by the CPI in 48 cases involving 102 defendants.75 CPI Commissioner 

Radhi believed that the use of Article 136(b) “prevented CPI from transmitting 

many corrupt employees’ cases to court until CPI received permission of the 

agency it was investigating...presenting obvious problems.” In the spring of 

2007, Prime Minister Maliki issued an executive order similarly providing that 

no action could be taken against any minister without permission of the Prime 

Minister’s Office. Radhi stated that this official action blocked many corruption cases, “at an estimated worth of 100 billion Iraqi dinar [approximately 

$80 million].”76

Despite often being stymied by these and many other roadblocks, the CPI’s 

modest efforts to enforce the law soon made it a target. Between 2004 and 2007, 

31 CPI employees were assassinated, and 12 family members were murdered. 

Judge Radhi himself lived under constant threat. He ultimately had to flee Iraq, 

seeking political asylum in the United States in August of 2007.77 Since then, 

the CPI has struggled to open new investigations and has been unable to establish a true nationwide presence. It remains an open question whether the CPI 
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is rooted firmly enough in the Iraqi political structure to survive the eventual 

withdrawal of U.S. support. 

Iraq’s Inspectors General 

CPA Order 57, signed by Ambassador Bremer on February 10, 2004, “established 

within each Iraqi ministry an Office of Inspector General . . . headed by an Inspector 

General [IG].”78 The IGs were initially appointed by Ambassador Bremer to serve 

a five-year term, which could be renewed for an additional five-year period. By the 

time the CPA closed its doors in June 2004, Bremer had named 29 IGs to five-year 

terms. When sovereignty was returned to the Iraqis in 2004, the power to appoint 

and re-appoint IGs shifted to the prime minister’s office.79

The duties of Iraqi IGs, virtually identical to those of their American counterparts, include auditing ministry records and activities; conducting administrative 

investigations; addressing allegations of waste, fraud, and abuse; recommending 

corrective actions to the minister; and cooperating with investigative agencies 

and the judiciary on cases.80 To accomplish these many tasks, the Government 

of Iraq is supposed to accord the IGs “full and unrestricted access to all [ministerial] offices.” Order 57 also gave the IGs the power to subpoena witnesses and 

documents. The IGs are supposed to report their findings to their minister and 

to issue an annual report to the Iraqi public.81

Today, more than 30 IGs serve in the Government of Iraq. Most of them are 

housed within its ministries, with the remainder working at quasi-ministerial 

government entities, such as the Shi’a, Sunni, and Christian Endowments. Each 

IG’s staff ranges in size from the very small (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs IG 

has approximately 20 employees) to the very large (the Ministry of Defense IG is 

authorized a staff of several thousand). The budget to pay staff and fund other expenses comes from the IG’s parent ministry through the Ministry of Finance.82

The perception of the IGs as a foreign antibody inserted into Iraq’s body 

politic by the Americans persists. Many IGs believe that “everyone assumes we’re 

just spies for the Americans.” One IG noted: “If we’re too active, our minister will 

fire us.” Another said, “If I do my job, they’ll kill me.”83

Since 2004, the U.S. government has provided limited support to build the 

capacity of Iraq’s IG system. CPA Order 57 stated that “to be effective” the IGs 

required “adequate resources.”84 The CPA, however, budgeted no DFI funds 

for the IGs, nor was any money forthcoming from the Departments of State or 

Justice. It fell to the Department of Defense to lead the way. 

In March 2004, a Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) official detailed to SIGIR, Dr. Charles Johnson, arrived in Iraq to help the new IGs. 

He quickly developed good relations with the beleaguered and ill-trained group, 
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providing them their first instruction on oversight. Johnson soon submitted a 

request for $11 million for the IGs to the CPA’s Program Review Board, but the 

proposal lost by one vote. However, on June 27, 2004—the day before the CPA 

closed shop—Ambassador Bremer overturned the vote, directing that $11 million in Iraqi funds be allocated to support the IG system. But, Johnson recounted, 

“the IG offices were anything but operational at the time of the transition” to Iraqi 

sovereignty on June 28, 2004.85

In 2005, a team from the DoD IG Investigations and Evaluations Directorate 

traveled to Baghdad to train and advise the IGs in the government’s two largest 

ministries: the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense. To this day, 

the Defense Department, through MNSTC-I, continues to train, mentor, and 

advise the IGs and their staffs in these ministries. Scant U.S. assistance has been 

provided to any of the other Iraqi IGs. While the State Department was pouring millions of dollars and dozens of personnel into capacity building efforts at 

the CPI, it offered almost nothing to the IGs. Finally, in February 2007, State 

appointed a senior consultant to Iraq’s Inspectors General. He alone—with no 

budget—was responsible for training, mentoring, and advising the non-security 

ministry IGs.86

The Board of Supreme Audit 

CPA Order Number 77, signed by Ambassador Bremer in April 2004, reconstituted the BSA, the oldest and most highly regarded anticorruption institution 

in Iraq and the analogue to the U.S. Government Accountability Office.87 The 

CPA’s creation of the CPI and the IG system removed and redistributed some 

of the BSA’s responsibilities, but it still remained the sole government-wide 

auditing agency in Iraq, with “jurisdiction to oversee all public contracts.”88

Mindful of its 70-year history, the BSA guards “jealously what it perceives as its 

prerogatives.” It has been a reluctant player in the “U.S.-imposed anticorruption 

structure...often hesitant about providing its audit findings to the two other 

anticorruption agencies.”89

When the CPA ceased operations, the BSA was still “severely antiquated in 

terms of its methodology, in terms of its requirements, and in terms of its abilities.” With a staff of 1,200, it had only five computers and “only between 100 and 

150 real...auditor[s]—for an entire nation.”90 The first head of the BSA, Dr. 

Ihsan Karim Ghanem, appointed by Ambassador Bremer, was killed by a suicide 

bomber on the streets of Baghdad in 2004.91

U.S. support for the BSA has been meager. INL allocated money to the GAO 

for an Arabic translation of its Government Auditing Standards. The GAO also 

trained a small number of mid-level auditors, but very little capacity-building 
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funding was allocated to the BSA.92 International funding was also limited.93

Today, the BSA is functional, but its capacity to provide effective oversight of 

the Iraqi government’s expenditures needs bolstering. 

An Uphill Battle

A 2006 joint survey by SIGIR and the State Department Inspector General 

found that the institutional framework for Iraqi anticorruption activities that the 

CPA put in place was “fragile.” The absence of adequate financial support further 

weakened that framework. The survey also found that, “despite the fact that 

attacking corruption is among the top U.S. priorities in Iraq,” the total amount 

allocated through June 15, 2006, was only $65 million, “less than .003 percent 

of the total IRRF funding to date.” Furthermore, these very modest funds were 

poorly managed.94

SIGIR’s subsequent reviews of the Anti-Corruption Working Group, formed 

by the embassy to oversee U.S. anticorruption programs, found that it suffered 

from a lack of consistent leadership and interagency coordination. In 2008, a 

SIGIR audit noted that, despite an articulated commitment to improving the U.S. 

anticorruption program, much more “remains to be accomplished to establish 

and implement a comprehensive and effective program.”95
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Chapter 21

Investigating Fraud

If an IG team was in there from the get-go, we may have had free 

rein, but it would not be the Wild West. They could have told us, 

if you do A, B, C, D, you won’t get in trouble. It might have been a 

pain in the butt, but we would live with it.*

Robert J. Stein 

Comptroller, CPA South-Central Region (2003-2004) 

(now serving nine years in prison)

Since April 2003, hundreds of thousands of U.S. civilian and military personnel 

have participated in the Iraq reconstruction effort. The vast majority of them 

served honorably, but some did not. During the CPA’s existence, when there 

was little oversight of the reconstruction effort and no fraud-fighting presence in 

Iraq, an unscrupulous few took advantage of the chaotic circumstances to enrich 

themselves. Not until SIGIR (then operating as the CPA Inspector General) 

began to deploy to Baghdad in March 2004, did the United States have meaningful numbers of auditors and investigators permanently based in Iraq to pursue 

allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse. 

As the chart at the end of this chapter shows, there have been at least 35 

convictions resulting from criminal misconduct committed during the U.S. reconstruction program. Although this amounts to a small percentage of the total 

number of Americans who have served in Iraq, the egregious acts by those who 

chose to break the law harmed the rebuilding effort in two important ways. First, 

their criminal activity diverted funds from important projects, sidetracking the 

programs in which those projects played a part. Second, their criminality tarnished the reputation of the United States in the eyes of many Iraqis. Although 

the scope of the fraud was relatively small, the brazen nature of many of the crimes 

underscores the importance of maintaining a strong oversight presence from the 

beginning of any contingency relief and reconstruction operation. 

The Bloom-Stein Conspiracy

During the U.S. occupation’s first months in 2003, rumors of theft and fraud were 

rife throughout the CPA and contractor communities. Once SIGIR established 

a presence in the Republican Palace in March 2004, whistleblowers had a place 

* SIGIR interview with Robert Stein, former Defense Department contractor, Federal Penitentiary, 

Petersburg, VA, June 13, 2007.
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to report alleged crimes. In April 2004, one such individual told SIGIR auditors 

about troubling financial practices he had witnessed—and, in fact, had participated in—as a member of the CPA Comptroller’s office. He specifically raised 

concerns about the regional comptroller for the CPA’s South-Central Region. 

The Scheme Unfolds

Robert J. Stein, Jr., served as Comptroller for the CPA’s South-Central Region 

in late 2003 and 2004. Stein, who liked to dress in black and tell people he had 

been a member of the U.S. Army’s elite Delta Force (one of many lies he told), 

was hired by S&K Technologies, a company with a $5 million contract to provide 

administrative support services to the CPA. Despite a federal credit-card fraud 

conviction in 1996—for which he served eight months in prison—Stein was 

cleared to serve in Iraq. He also had been sued for embezzling $750,000 from a 

previous employer.1

 SIGIR auditors later learned that Stein reportedly had an 

accomplice who helped him hide these potentially disqualifying facts.2

Stein arrived in Iraq in November 2003, and was sent to the South-Central 

Region headquarters in Hilla, about an hour’s drive southwest of Baghdad and the 

site of the ancient city of Babylon and Nebuchadnezzar’s palace. Stein’s first assignment was as director of security, logistics, and re-supply operations. In December 

2003, when the sergeant then serving as the South-Central Region’s comptroller 

went on leave, Stein was placed in the position, making him responsible for overseeing, disbursing, and accounting for millions of reconstruction dollars. “I was supposed 

to be the operations specialist,” Stein later said, “I wasn’t there to be comptroller.”3

Almost immediately upon assuming his new office, Stein entered into a criminal conspiracy with Philip Bloom, a corrupt American contractor with burgeoning 

businesses in Iraq. From December 2003 to June 2004, Stein rigged bids for and 

funneled contracts to Bloom, who received more than $8.6 million in cash from 

this fraudulent activity. Bloom repaid Stein and other complicit CPA employees 

with a variety of kickbacks, including jewelry, deluxe cars, weapons, business-class 

airline tickets, and cash. Bloom also laundered more than $2 million in stolen 

funds for Stein and his fellow CPA South Central criminals, using bank accounts 

in Iraq, Switzerland, and Romania (of which he was a dual citizen).4

The Scheme Unravels

On the day the SIGIR (then the CPA-IG) was appointed—January 20, 2004—

Stein emailed Bloom: “I love to give you money.”5

 The Bloom-Stein conspiracy 

was, at that moment, in full tilt. But its unraveling began in April 2004, when 

complaints about Stein came to SIGIR’s attention. In response to these allegations, SIGIR immediately deployed auditors to Hilla to investigate.6
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SIGIR’s auditors met in Hilla with Lieutenant Colonel Deborah Harrison, 

the South-Central Region’s deputy comptroller. Harrison—known as the “bird 

lady of Hilla” because of the large bird cage in her office populated by more than 

twenty birds—told the auditors that regional comptroller Robert Stein was on 

emergency leave in the United States because his son had brain cancer. The auditors later would learn that Stein was actually on a trip to Disneyland with his son, 

for which Bloom had paid all expenses.7

The auditors pressed Harrison for documentation on the South-Central 

Region’s use of money on reconstruction projects. She was unable to provide 

any records, but attempted to allay concerns by assuring the auditors that she 

would get all the documents from Stein when he returned. Harrison then emailed 

Stein, warning him that the SIGIR auditors were onto his criminal scheme. “Don’t 

worry,” Stein retorted, “[SIGIR] will never figure it out.”8

The Audits Begin

The auditors were now highly suspicious that significant fraud was occurring 

in the CPA office at Hilla. They initiated an audit to track every dollar spent 

by the South-Central Region and to determine how much money the CPA’s 

Comptroller had disbursed to Stein to fund reconstruction activities. 

The CPA Comptroller’s documents indicated that Stein had received three 

disbursements totaling $57.8 million in cash.9

 But the lead SIGIR auditor found 

a picture in Hilla showing Stein surrounded by a mountain of cash, with a sign 

saying, “$58.8 million.” When the auditors alerted the CPA Comptroller to this 

fact, the Comptroller responded, “I have no idea how much [money] Stein got.” 

The auditors found other incriminating photos, including one showing several 

hands reaching into a suitcase containing millions of dollars in cash, with one 

hand—Stein’s—sporting an expensive Breitling watch, which he had recently 

received from Bloom.10

After Stein returned to Hilla, SIGIR’s auditors confronted him about the fund 

discrepancies they had found. Stein recounted that he had traveled to Baghdad 

in January 2004 with three others from Hilla in two unarmored SUVs to pick up 

tens of millions of dollars in cash for reconstruction from the CPA Comptroller’s 

vault. He said he met with the CPA Comptroller’s staff, signed a receipt (which 

the CPA Comptroller could not produce for SIGIR’s auditors), backed up his 

SUV to the palace entrance, and loaded more than $58 million in cash into the 

back. “It’s amazing,” he later said. “The vault had pallet upon pallet of hundred 

dollar bills. This was more cash than Donald Trump had ever seen in his life. 

When you work around money like that, it becomes ‘so what, it’s just paper.’ 
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The procedures were so lax it was unbelievable. I worked government contracts 

before in the States, so I know.”11

After their meeting with Stein, the auditors called the IG with troubling 

news—there was evidence of rampant fraud in Hilla. The IG promptly deployed 

a team of investigators to support the auditors’ work. SIGIR’s lead auditor had 

documented a litany of various acts of alleged fraud, waste, and abuse by Stein 

and Bloom. The most flagrant examples involved two pet projects of Stein’s: the 

Babylon Police Academy and the Kerbala Library. 

The Babylon Police Academy 

The Babylon Police Academy was intended to be the leading police training institute for the South-Central Region. Stein awarded eleven contracts and four grants 

to Bloom for demolition work, barracks and classroom construction, and the 

purchase of generators and other equipment. Upon review of the contracts and 

grants, the auditors found that Stein had kept the costs of each contract and grant 

below $500,000—the ceiling above which he would have had to seek approval 

from the CPA’s Comptroller before award.12 The auditors further discovered that 

Stein had disbursed most of the contract and grant money before any contracts 

had been signed. When SIGIR auditors visited the police academy, they saw that 

much of the work was incomplete or had not begun. 

The contracts and grants for the police academy totaled $7.3 million. Of that, 

SIGIR concluded that CPA officials “needlessly expended almost $1.3 million 

in contract funds for duplicate construction” and for “equipment not needed, 

not delivered, and overpriced.” Moreover, Stein “could not account for more 

than $2 million of disbursed grant funds.” The auditors were also “unable to 

clearly determine” whether the remaining $4 million had been used to meet 

contract obligations.13

The Kerbala Library

Located 45 kilometers south of Hilla, the Kerbala Library houses southern Iraq’s 

most important collection of Arabic translations of western literature—as well as 

books on history, philosophy, politics, and science. Stein awarded five contracts 

to Bloom’s companies, ostensibly to repair the aged library, to purchase furniture 

and new bookcases, to provide Internet services and landscaping, and to train 

librarians. Stein also approved a $210,000 grant to pay librarian salaries and issued 33 micro-contracts—worth approximately $535,000—to purchase 30,000 

books. The total outlays came to $2,128,916.14

When SIGIR auditors visited the library, they found the same problems 

they had seen at the police academy: circumvention of regulations, improper 
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disbursements, and the failure to monitor contracts. The quantity and quality of 

equipment delivered was far below the requirements stipulated in the contract. 

For example, the contractor provided only 14 personal computers and desks, not 

the 68 computers and 60 desks required by the contract. There were no Internet 

connections. Flimsy plastic patio chairs, not the upholstered metal ones specified 

in the contract, sat in the hall. The library’s manager said he had received no grant 

money for salaries or books. 

SIGIR’s auditors concluded that CPA officials had needlessly disbursed more 

than $1.8 million on the project to rehabilitate the library. Of this, about $1.6 

million was spent on work that was never done.15

End Game

During 2004 and 2005, several auditors from SIGIR spent many months in Hilla, 

carefully reviewing documentation, visiting project sites, and interviewing CPA 

South-Central Region personnel. A series of audits issued in 2005 detailed numerous findings of egregious misconduct, mismanagement, and potential fraud, 

concluding that the CPA’s “controls” of cash disbursements were so weak that 

“the South-Central Region paying agents and the DFI Account Manager could 

not properly account for or support $96.6 million in cash and receipts.”16

SIGIR’s investigators, along with partners from the Internal Revenue Service 

and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, soon pieced together this spectacular array of incriminating evidence, bringing into relief the complex Bloom-Stein 

conspiracy and implicating a handful of senior officials in Hilla. SIGIR took the 

case to Department of Justice prosecutors, who presented it to a grand jury. 

Subpoenas were issued and, in November 2005, Robert Stein was arrested at 

his home in Fayetteville, North Carolina.17

Six people were eventually convicted for their roles in the Bloom-Stein criminal scheme; another was charged and is awaiting trial. Stein, convicted on money 

laundering and fraud charges, received a prison sentence of nine years. Bloom 

pleaded guilty to three counts of conspiracy, bribery, and money laundering, and 

received a sentence of 46 months. Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Hopfengardner, who 

conspired to direct contracts to Bloom and received $100,000 in kickbacks, was 

convicted and sentenced to 21 months in prison. Lieutenant Colonel Harrison, 

the deputy comptroller at the South-Central Region headquarters, pleaded guilty 

to fraud after admitted to receiving a Cadillac Escalade from Bloom and stealing 

more than $300,000 from the CPA. She awaits sentencing.18

After a lengthy trial in October 2008, Colonel Curtis Whiteford, once the 

second-most senior official in Hilla, and Lieutenant Colonel Michael Wheeler, 

an advisor on South-Central Region reconstruction projects, were convicted of 
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conspiracy to commit bribery and for interstate transportation of stolen property. 

Whiteford and Wheeler also await sentencing.19

Although federal prosecutors proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

Bloom-Stein criminals stole at least $8.6 million, the full extent of their fraud was 

probably greater. How much they actually stole will probably never be known. 

The Cockerham Case 

In mid-2006, agents from SIGIR and the Departments of Defense, Treasury, 

Homeland Security, and Justice initiated a lengthy joint investigation that broke 

up a multi-million-dollar bribery scheme at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. On July 22, 

2007, U.S. Army Major John Cockerham, the chief perpetrator of the scheme, was 

arrested at his home in San Antonio, Texas, by SIGIR and other federal agents for 

bribery, money laundering, and conspiracy. While serving as a contracting officer 

in Kuwait, Cockerham solicited and received more than $9 million in bribes from 

Defense Department contractors in exchange for awarding them contracts for 

bottled water and other goods and services funded in part by money from the Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund. Cockerham’s wife and sister were also charged 

for their money-laundering activities. Cockerham and his wife pleaded guilty on 

January 31, 2008. They await sentencing. Cockerham’s sister was scheduled for 

trial in March 2009.20

Major James Momon, Jr., the officer who replaced Cockerham in Kuwait and 

who continued the crime scheme, also pleaded guilty to bribery and conspiracy 

to commit bribery. According to his plea agreement, entered on August 13, 

2008, Momon accepted $5.8 million in bribes from five Defense Department 

contractors supplying goods and services to U.S. military bases in Kuwait. He 

also awaits sentencing.21

Investigative Results

From 2004 to 2008, SIGIR has built a robust investigative capacity, with 26 investigators on staff, including 6 stationed in Iraq. SIGIR’s investigations, which 

frequently have involved teaming with other law enforcement organizations, 

have produced eighteen indictments, thirteen convictions, five imprisonments, 

and more than $17 million in fines, forfeitures, and restitution payments as of 

December 31, 2008. 

SIGIR and the other law enforcement agencies operating in Iraq have obtained 

at least 35 convictions. The following table provides an overview of those cases.
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• Investigating Fraud •

Name Charges Date of Conviction Sentence

Maj. Theresa Baker, USAR

Contracting Officer Conspiracy and bribery 12/22/2008 Pending

Col. Curtis Whiteford, USAR

Senior Official, CPA SouthCentral Region

Conspiracy, bribery, 

and wire fraud 11/7/2008 Pending

Lt. Col. Michael Wheeler, 

USAR CPA Reconstruction 

Advisor

Conspiracy, bribery, 

wire fraud, interstate 

transportation of stolen 

property, and bulk cash 

smuggling

11/7/2008 Pending

David Ramirez

Contractor, Readiness 

Support Management, Inc.

Bulk currency 

smuggling and 

structuring 

transactions

10/9/2008 Pending

Lee Dubois

Contractor, Future Services 

General Trading and 

Contracting Company

Theft of government 

property 10/7/2008 Pending

Robert Bennett

Contractor, KBR

Violating the AntiKickback Act 8/28/2008 Pending

Maj. James Momon, Jr., USA

Contracting Officer Conspiracy and bribery 8/13/2008 Pending

Lt. Col. Debra M. Harrison, 

USA Acting Comptroller for 

CPA South-Central Region

Conspiracy, bribery, 

money laundering, 

wire fraud, interstate 

transportation of stolen 

property, smuggling 

cash, and preparing 

false tax returns

7/28/2008 Pending

Maj. John Lee Cockerham, 

Jr., USA Contracting Officer

Bribery, conspiracy, 

and money laundering 6/24/2008 Pending

Melissa Cockerham

Wife of Maj. John Cockerham

Conspiracy and money 

laundering 6/24/2008 Pending

Lt. Col. Levonda Selph, USAR

Contracting Officer Conspiracy and bribery 6/10/2008 Pending

Raman International Corp. Conspiracy and bribery 6/3/2008 $500,000 fine and 

$327,192 restitution

Michael Carter

Project Engineer, Force 

Protection Industries

Violating the AntiKickback Act 1/25/2008 Pending

Capt. Austin Key, USA

Contracting Officer Bribery 12/19/2007 Pending

Maj. John Rivard, USAR

Contracting Officer

Bribery, conspiracy, 

and money laundering 7/23/2007

10 years in prison; 

3 years supervised 

release; $5,000 

fine; and $1 million 

forfeiture order 

Kevin Smoot

Managing Director, Eagle 

Global Logistics, Inc.

Violating the 

Anti-Kickback Act 

and making false 

statements

7/20/2007

14 months in prison; 

2 years supervised 

release; $6,000 fine; 

and $17,964 restitution
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• Chapter 21 •

Name Charges Date of Conviction Sentence

Anthony Martin

Subcontractor Administrator, 

KBR

Violating the AntiKickback Act 7/13/2007

1 year and 1 day 

in prison; 2 years 

supervised release; and 

$200,504 restitution

Jesse Lane, USAR

223rd Finance Detachment

Conspiracy and honest 

services wire fraud 6/5/2007

30 months in prison 

and $323,228 

restitution

Steven Merkes

DoD Civilian, Operational 

Support Planner

Accepting illegal 

gratuities 2/16/2007

12 months and 1 day 

in prison and $24,000 

restitution

Chief Warrant Officer Peleti 

Peleti, Jr., USA Army’s Food 

Service Advisor for Kuwait, 

Iraq, and Afghanistan

Bribery and smuggling 

cash 2/9/2007

28 months in prison 

and $57,500 fine and 

forfeiture

Jennifer Anjakos, USAR

223rd Finance Detachment

Conspiracy to commit 

wire fraud 11/13/2006

3 years probation; 

$86,557 restitution; 

and $100 assessment

Sgt. Lomeli Chavez, USAR

223rd Finance Detachment

Conspiracy to commit 

wire fraud 11/13/2006

3 years probation; 

$28,107 restitution; 

and $100 assessment

Sgt. Derryl Hollier, USAR

223rd Finance Detachment

Conspiracy to commit 

wire fraud 11/13/2006

3 years probation; 

$83,657.47 restitution; 

and $100 assessment

Sgt. Luis Lopez, USAR

223rd Finance Detachment

Conspiracy to commit 

wire fraud 11/13/2006

3 years probation; 

$66,865 restitution; 

and $100 assessment

Bonnie Murphy

Contracting Officer

Accepting unlawful 

gratuities 11/7/2006 1 year supervised 

release and $1,500 fine

Samir Mahmoud

Employee of U.S. 

construction firm

Making false 

statements 11/3/2006

1 day credit for time 

served; and 2 years 

supervised release

Gheevarghese Pappen

USACE Civilian 

Soliciting and 

accepting illegal 

gratuities

10/12/2006

2 years in prison; 1 year 

supervised release; and 

$28,900 restitution

Lt. Col. Bruce 

Hopfengardner, USAR

Special Advisor to CPA 

South-Central Region

Conspiracy, conspiring 

to commit wire fraud 

and money laundering, 

and smuggling 

currency

8/25/2006

21 months in prison; 

3 years supervised 

release; $200 fine; and 

$144,500 forfeiture

Faheem Mousa Salam

Interpreter, Titan Corp.

Violating the Foreign 

Corrupt Practices Act’s 

Anti-Bribery Provisions

8/4/2006

3 years in prison; 2 

years supervised 

release; 250 hours 

community service; 

and $100 special 

assessment

Mohammad Shabbir Khan

Director of Operations for 

Kuwait and Iraq, Tamimi 

Global Co. Ltd.

Violating the AntiKickback Act 6/23/2006

51 months in prison; 

2 years supervised 

release; $10,000 fine; 

$133,860 restitution; 

and $1,400 assessment
• 225 •

• Investigating Fraud •

Name Charges Date of Conviction Sentence

Philip Bloom

Owner - Global Business 

Group, GBG Holdings, and 

GBG-Logistics Division 

Conspiracy, bribery, 

and money laundering 3/10/2006

46 months in prison; 

2 years supervised 

release; $3.6 million 

forfeiture; $3.6 million 

restitution; and $300 

special assessment

Stephen Seamans, 

Subcontracts Manager, KBR

Wire fraud, money 

laundering, and 

conspiracy

3/1/2006

12 months and 1 

day in prison; 3 years 

supervised release; 

$380,130 in restitution; 

$200 assessment

Christopher Cahill

Regional Vice President, 

Middle East and India, Eagle 

Global Logistics, Inc.

Major fraud against the 

United States 2/16/2006

30 months in prison; 

2 years supervised 

release; $10,000 fine; 

and $100 assessment 

(a civil settlement with 

EGL arising from the 

same facts resulted 

in a settlement of $4 

million)

Robert Stein

CPA South-Central 

Comptroller and Funding 

Officer

Felon in possession of 

a firearm, possession of 

machine guns, bribery, 

money laundering, and 

conspiracy

2/2/2006

9 years in prison; 3 

years of supervised 

release; $3.6 million 

forfeiture; $3.5 million 

restitution; and $500 

special assessment

Glenn Powell

Subcontracts Manager, KBR

Major fraud and 

violating the AntiKickback Act8/1/2005

15 months in prison; 

3 years supervised 

release; $90,973.99 

restitution; and $200 

assessment

Source: SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 2009, Section 4.

Fighting Fraud in Contingency Operations

In the first year of the reconstruction experience in Iraq, weak or absent oversight 

permitted unscrupulous individuals to commit fraud and other crimes. This hard 

lesson underscores the need to ensure that future contingency operations include 

strong oversight from their outset so that U.S. taxpayers’ dollars are kept as safe 

as possible from criminal abuse, and that when crimes do occur, the perpetrators are caught and brought to justice. Although maintaining the proper balance 

between operational effectiveness and strong oversight will always be challenging 

in a contingency operation, ensuring a robust inspector general presence from an 

operation’s inception must never again be overlooked as it was in Iraq.
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• Chapter 21 •

Essential Services Overview – Transition 

from Negroponte to Khalilzad

Metric22

PreinvasionPostinvasionCPA 

Transition

Negroponte 

Era

Electricity Production 

Megawatts 4,075 711 3,621 4,262

Oil Production 

Million Barrels per Day 2.58 0.30 2.16 2.13

Iraqi Security Forces

Soldiers and Police 1,300,000 7,000-9,000 87,000 171,300

Telecommunications

Landline Subscribers 833,000 0 791,000 998,000

Mobile Subscribers 80,000 0 461,000 2,422,000

Human Toll

U.S Troop Fatalities - 139 862 1,745

Civilian Contractors - 1 46 217

U.S. Civilians - ~9 52 113

Iraqi Civilians - 7,413 16,848 29,155

Financial Cost ($ billions) 

U.S Funding - $3.45 $22.93 $29.21

Iraqi Funding - $0.00 $16.00 $21.03

International Funding - $0.00 $13.60 $13.87

Total Funding - $3.45 $52.53 $64.11

In June 2005, Iraq’s average daily electricity production was 4,262 megawatts, 

an increase of approximately 600 megawatts from the year before.23 A variety of 

problems—including security, cuts in IRRF 2 funding, and decisions to defer 

maintenance in favor of short-term generation initiatives—made these levels of 

production unsustainable. 

More than $5 billion was drawn from IRRF 2, Defense Department funds, and 

Iraqi money to support oil sector reconstruction, but Iraq’s unstable security 

environment—including numerous attacks on pipelines and other oil facilities—

delayed projects and reduced production and exports. Thus, oil production had 

not returned to prewar levels by the time Ambassador Negroponte left Iraq in 

mid-2005.24
Part IV

Overcoming Roadblocks 

to Reconstruction

 June 2005 to October 2008

• 229 •

Chapter 22 

Khalilzad’s Adaptations

The Khalilzad approach was very much a systems-management 

RAND-style approach, which is come in, assume nothing...and 

take a new look from the ground up. What are the mission tasks? 

What are the mission resources? And what are the structures to 

apply those resources most effectively?*

Ambassador David Satterfield 

Deputy Chief of Mission (2005-2006)

The Iraq that Zalmay Khalilzad left in the spring of 2003—after serving as 

Special Presidential Envoy and Ambassador-at-large to the Free Iraqis—was 

not the country to which he returned as the new U.S. Ambassador in June 2005. 

Khalilzad’s April 2003 attempt to piece together an interim Iraqi government with 

Jay Garner had been superseded by a fourteen- month occupation during which 

the CPA assumed all governing responsibilities. Iraqi factions reacted violently 

to the occupation, turning against each other and the Coalition. Two years later, 

the violence had claimed the lives of nearly 25,000 Iraqi civilians, 1,328 Coalition 

soldiers, and 330 contractors.1

 “Security,” Ambassador Khalilzad said, “was a 

defining issue, shaping everything, and it got more complicated over time.”2

Khalilzad—the Bush Administration’s highest-ranking Muslim official—is an 

American who was born in Afghanistan and raised as a Sunni. He watched Iraq’s 

descent into violence from the country of his birth, where he had served as ambassador since November 2003. During his ambassadorship, Khalilzad succeeded 

in helping Afghan leaders draft a constitution, strengthen their new democratic 

government, and develop their economy. Most notably, Khalilzad pioneered 

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), a novel approach to stabilizing Afghan 

provinces that placed civilian development experts in military units.3

The U.S. reconstruction program that Khalilzad took over in Iraq was several 

orders of magnitude larger than the effort in Afghanistan. In the economy-offorce operation that Khalilzad led in Kabul, all the relevant high-level military 

and civilian staff could fit around a single table. In Baghdad, he arrived to an 

immense, sprawling enterprise, with separate military and civilian headquarters 

on opposite sides of the city managing separate—and frequently disconnected—

reconstruction missions.

* SIGIR interview with Ambassador David Satterfield, former Deputy Chief of Mission, April 14, 2008.
• 230 •

• Chapter 22 •

Iraq’s desperate political and security situations required Khalilzad’s immediate intervention. The Sunni boycott of the January 2005 elections left the Iraqi 

Interim Government dominated by Shi’a and Kurdish factions, which maneuvered to consolidate control over federal and provincial institutions. The ensuing 

polarization fueled an escalation in sectarian violence that slowed the pace of 

reconstruction and dimmed prospects for national reconciliation. Khalilzad 

needed a new strategy. 

Strategic Reassessment

Before the new ambassador’s arrival, the Departments of Defense and State 

had begun independent reviews of reconstruction strategy. Secretary Rumsfeld 

dispatched retired General Gary Luck to Iraq to review security force training. 

Luck’s call to expand in-the-field training of Iraq’s army and police seconded 

an emerging consensus in Washington for increased investment in the security 

sector.4

 The new Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF), with its $5.7 billion for ISF 

support, opened a new stream of significant reconstruction funding that, in time, 

would rival the IRRF in size.5

In early February 2005, newly confirmed Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 

sent a team to Iraq led by Ambassador Richard Jones, the former CPA deputy 

administrator.6

 Jones concluded that violence and fragmentation had caused the 

Iraqi state to fail and called for the reconstruction effort to pivot from a capitalinvestment approach to a capacity-building focus. The Jones report reached 

troubling conclusions about the civilian element of the program, finding that 

reconstruction efforts as then configured—with personnel generally restricted 

to the Green Zone and only four regional outposts—was ill suited to reviving 

Iraq’s provincial and local governments. Jones called for new joint civil-military 

teams to deploy into the provinces, possibly placing one in every combat brigade.7

The Jones team also found that the lack of on-the-job mentoring of police forces 

led to poor neighborhood policing, a critical weakness in a country in the grip 

of an insurgency.8

Ambassador Khalilzad used these and other reviews to develop a new strategy.9

 First, he sought to broaden Sunni participation in the political process, 

hoping to convince Sunni insurgents to view the United States as an “honest 

broker” and thus to encourage them to lay down their arms. Khalilzad believed 

that only if Sunnis reengaged with the government could he shepherd the country’s leaders through the difficult process of writing a constitution.10

Khalilzad’s second priority was to defeat the insurgency, a task that demanded 

close collaboration with General George Casey, commanding general of MNFI. After considering several counterinsurgency strategies, Khalilzad favored the 
• 231 •

• Khalilzad’s Adaptations •

“oil-spot” approach advocated by defense policy analyst Andrew Krepinevich, 

which called for the targeted application of military force to create safe havens 

from which stability could be extended.11 The success of the oil-spot approach 

hinged upon the delivery of reconstruction aid immediately after military clearing 

operations that suppressed violence. Local populations would support Coalition 

efforts only if they saw tangible, sustainable improvements in their quality of life. 

Whether to adopt a more aggressive country-wide counterinsurgency posture or 

keep the military mission focused on the transition to Iraqi security forces would 

later become the subject of intense debate between Secretaries Rumsfeld and 

Rice. Rumsfeld favored the transitional approach.12

Finally, Khalilzad had to reevaluate the complex and disjointed reconstruction effort.13 Upon his arrival in Baghdad, his first act—like Negroponte’s before 

him—was to freeze all IRRF 2 obligations while he conducted a bottom-up review. “He was not convinced that the decisions of 2002 and 2003 were relevant 

to the world of summer 2005,” said Ambassador David Satterfield, Khalilzad’s 

deputy chief of mission.14 Khalilzad wanted to move funding into civilian stability 

operations that would help support a counterinsurgency campaign and emphasize IRRF projects that would have an immediate impact. “I came to do a job,” 

said Khalilzad of his IRRF 2 review, “And the question was really, ‘how much did 

I have of the $18 billion?’”15

Reconstruction at an Impasse

Khalilzad landed in Iraq as the actual rebuilding work under IRRF 2 peaked. By 

the end of June 2005, the Congress had appropriated almost $30 billion in taxpayer dollars for Iraq’s reconstruction to an alphabet soup of funding accounts, 

including IRRF 1, IRRF 2, ESF, CERP, and ISFF.16 The DFI and international 

donors also funded reconstruction, but only a small percentage of the international pledges had been kept.17

After a long planning and mobilization phase, the sweeping reconstruction 

program initiated by Ambassador Bremer’s CPA—and modified by Ambassador 

Negroponte’s re-programming—was in high gear, with a thousand projects finished and a thousand more underway. Tens of thousands of private contractors 

from hundreds of firms now worked across Iraq, employing an estimated 180,000 

Iraqis on U.S.-funded projects.18 Of the $18.4 billion IRRF 2 appropriation, nearly 

three-quarters had been obligated and a third disbursed.19 Under the structure 

set up in Baghdad, State Department officials directed most programs, while the 

Defense Department officials executed the lion’s share of their funding, managing 

seventy cents of every U.S. dollar spent. The rest was divided among USAID, the 

Department of State, and Treasury.20
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• Chapter 22 •

Despite extraordinary outlays of cash and other resources, the IRRF 2 program had not achieved its goal of stabilizing Iraq or significantly improving 

infrastructure outputs. Delivery of essential services continued to lag behind 

targets established by reconstruction managers.21 Oil revenues were not yet sufficient to fund all Iraqi government operations and a nationwide reconstruction 

program.22 The power grid remained unreliable; fuel shortages, sabotage, and a 

fragile distribution system caused frequent blackouts, including a nationwide one 

in August 2005.23 Rising security costs and the cancellation or delay of dozens 

of water-sector projects made it unlikely that the Coalition’s original goals for 

potable water and sewage would be met.24

In all sectors, rebuilding was more difficult, more expensive, and more time 

consuming than anticipated, primarily because of continuing violence, but also 

because of contracting snarls and quality-control shortfalls. Maintaining what 

the United States built—what officials called the challenge of sustainment—

emerged as yet another problem for reconstruction managers. Some completed 

projects transferred to Iraqi control were falling apart, raising concerns that Iraqi 

administrators—with their outmoded technical skills, limited management 

capacity, and uneven access to spare parts and supplies—would be unable to 

maintain new U.S.-provided facilities.25

Despite some significant local successes, the reconstruction effort had yet to 

generate the hoped-for nationwide goodwill that might temper attacks against 

Coalition forces and calm tensions among Iraq’s rival groups. Most Iraqis perceived their lives as no better than under Saddam; for some, life seemed worse.26

Reconstruction Gaps

By the spring of 2005, policymakers were beginning to identify internal weaknesses in the reconstruction program. Poor interagency cooperation across the 

vast enterprise was plainly evident. At least a dozen offices representing six U.S. 

agencies directly spent IRRF 2 funds. According to a SIGIR report, there was 

“minimal, if any, integration among the various systems that these offices used 

to manage information on contracting, finance, and projects.”27

Incompatible data systems made generating a reliable, consolidated view of 

all activities a virtually impossible task. The reconstruction program lacked the 

basic elements of integrated program management, including a database that 

could match projects with the contracts that fund them and estimate how much 

their completion would cost. The organizational fragmentation made it difficult 

to present an accurate picture of progress.28

How the institutions that managed reconstruction interfaced with each other 

was also a leading cause for concern. The July 2003 decision by the CPA to create 
• 233 •

• Khalilzad’s Adaptations •

an ad hoc contracting and management structure—the PMO—had by 2005 

led to many degrees of separation among Coalition officials, contractors, and 

the mid- and lower-level Iraqi officials who would inherit what had been built 

or rebuilt. 

At the very bottom of this administrative ladder was an army of contractors 

who actually did the brick-and-mortar work. The project scopes and requirements to which they built frequently were not determined in partnership with 

the ultimate customer—the Iraqis—as should ordinarily happen. Instead, the 

attempt by U.S. program officers to work on the Iraqis’ behalf frequently ran 

afoul of what they wanted. By 2005, most U.S. reconstruction managers were 

concentrated in the PCO. But USAID, State, MNF-I, JCC-I, and USACE also 

had contracting and program officers; and for almost all rebuilding projects, the 

GRD provided quality assurance and independent verification of results.29

IRMO was yet another player. The Ambassador made IRMO responsible for 

overall policy guidance on reconstruction and granted its director the additional 

title of “Strategic Director of Economics and Governance,” with broad responsibilities for ensuring program coordination.30 In the opinion of Lieutenant General 

Peter Chiarelli, who returned to Iraq as MNC-I commander in November 2005, 

IRMO “became another layer that I felt, in many instances, was detached from 

reality.”31 To Ambassador Khalilzad, however, IRMO was a central node that 

helped him manage the massive reconstruction enterprise.32

The complex of administrative structures that managed Iraq’s reconstruction 

in 2005 and 2006 would have been difficult to navigate in peacetime. But Iraq was 

not safe, and the violence was killing more contractors each month. MNF-I did 

not have enough forces to provide fixed security for Iraq’s critical infrastructure—

oil pipelines, refineries, and electrical substations—and still conduct its other 

counterinsurgency operations. Contractors and civilian government officials 

continued to rely heavily on the private sector for security. 

Private security services, provided by dozens of companies, protected reconstruction people and programs; security costs could increase a typical project’s 

price tag by up to 22 percent.33 The need to guard Coalition advisors as they 

worked within Iraqi ministries drove security costs for capacity-building projects 

higher still, ranging from 24 to 53 percent.34 Because contracts let under IRRF 

2 assigned responsibility for security to the contractor, expenses for guards and 

hardening facilities were taken directly from funds that would otherwise have 

been used for brick-and-mortar work. To make up the difference, mangers had 

to de-scope projects or provide additional funds.

The insurgency had a powerful second-order effect. By restricting most reconstruction personnel to the Green Zone, the violence disrupted the oversight 
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• Chapter 22 •

relationships necessary to ensure a project’s successful completion. Program 

managers, contracting officers, contractors, and the engineers who conduct quality assurance normally work together in the field, but insurgent activity made such 

face-to-face collaboration impossible. Oversight ordinarily done on site was now 

done via email, sometimes through hired Iraqi surveyors using digital cameras 

to take pictures—or not done at all. Teams from GRD continued conducting 

missions from their offices in south, central, and northern Iraq, but security conditions drastically curtailed their size and number.35

Although a number of Iraqis found employment as subcontractors, IRRF 2 

did not bring about the large-scale job creation originally envisioned. Rather than 

hiring local firms directly, IRRF 2 introduced a competitive contracting process 

similar to that used in the United States. Letting contracts under the FAR was 

a roadblock for many Iraqi firms, most of whom knew nothing about federal 

contracting. The acquisition regulations mandated by U.S. law thrust Web-based 

personal identification numbers and thousand-page rulebooks on family-run 

businesses that had yet to join the global business environment. Online contracting, which frequently entailed bids of more than a hundred pages, bewildered 

Iraqi contractors who were used to sealing a business deal with just a handshake. 

Ruth-Ann Ijames, a senior advisor to JCC-I, described the challenge as “trying to 

make U.S. rules work in a non-U.S. country to mobilize a non-U.S. economy.”36

A second roadblock for Iraqi contractors was the difficulty of obtaining startup capital. IRRF 2 contracting used a purchase-order system in which payment 

was rendered upon delivery of services, not in advance. As a result, Iraqi contractors who had performed satisfactory work on a pay-as-you-go cash basis for 

military contracting officials in the pre-IRRF 2 days were relegated to the role 

of subcontractors, working for other firms—often from Gulf States—who had 

mastered the art of bidding on projects and possessed sufficient capital to cover 

start-up costs.37 This subsidiary position, combined with their unfamiliarity with 

the complexities of modern contracting, left Iraqi companies vulnerable to predatory business partners from the United States and elsewhere.38

Ambassador Daniel Speckhard, IRMO’s second director, explained that “layers of middlemen” emerged as large multinationals “tried to find local partners 

to be able to implement their programs.”39 Even as the U.S. objective to “employ 

Iraqis” grew more pressing, the Coalition’s actual capacity to do so trended in 

the opposite direction. The U.S. program was allowing too many reconstruction 

dollars to exit Iraq into the coffers of non-Iraqi firms.

IRRF 2 emphasized capital expenditures—the building of new facilities—

rather than improving existing infrastructure and the ability of Iraqis to sustain 

it. The end result was that the U.S. invested billions of dollars for only marginal 
• 235 •

• Khalilzad’s Adaptations •

gains in essential services. In the view of one assessment, Iraq was a bleeding patient, hemorrhaging at an alarming rate, kept alive only by expensive 

American transfusions.40

When Khalilzad arrived, many planned reconstruction projects had yet to 

start and a significant number that were underway would not be finished, giving 

rise to what became known as the “reconstruction gap.”41 Increased spending on 

security needs, higher costs for materials, project delays, cost overruns, multiple 

reprogrammings, and added expenses for maintenance all contributed to the gap 

between the number of projects promised and the number actually completed.42

All of this left Khalilzad with a stark bottom line: “There was very little money 

left,” he said, to meet ambitious reconstruction goals.43

The program of infrastructure reconstruction set in motion by Bremer, and 

amended by Negroponte, had yet to achieve its goal of giving Iraq a reasonably 

modern infrastructure upon which a stable economy could be built. It had produced neither a reduction in sectarian conflict nor a decrease in attacks against 

Coalition forces. 

Devising a New Strategy

To assess the situation and propose a way forward, Khalilzad formed the Joint 

Civil-Military Strategic Planning Group, known informally as the Red Cell. “I 

took a couple of months to take a top-to-bottom look,” Khalilzad said.44 The 

current strategy was based on the Joint Mission Plan issued by Ambassador 

Negroponte and General Casey in February 2005, and a cable sent in April by 

the Secretary of State.45

Khalilzad asked the Red Cell to devise a plan that would break the back of the 

insurgency in one year and defeat it in three. The Red Cell assessment was more 

pessimistic: it would take three years to break the insurgency and five years to 

defeat it.46 Moreover, the current strategy—overly focused on transitioning security responsibilities to the Iraqis—would fail if it was followed. A new approach 

was needed, one that recognized that it was unwise to hand off security responsibilities to provinces that were at best only marginally ready to perform them. A 

different way of linking security and reconstruction was also necessary, one that 

would require tighter integration of civil and military efforts and greater focus on 

civilian stability operations in support of a counterinsurgency campaign.47

The heavy reliance on private-sector firms to carry out civilian operations 

meant that major change would come slowly. “The instruments were pretty 

constrained,” one senior advisor to Khalilzad recalled. “On the civilian side, almost nothing is done directly: virtually everything is done through a contractor. 

It’s much tougher. If we didn’t have a primary contractor on the scene, you can 
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• Chapter 22 •

imagine the delay that there would be to put a bid out and get someone over. It’s 

a very tough way to do business.”48

Ambassador Khalilzad’s first impulse was to request a new appropriation from 

the Congress for civilian stabilization operations. While he was exploring this 

option, Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans. After the scale of the devastation 

became apparent, Khalilzad realized it was unlikely that the Congress would fund 

new civilian programs for Iraq and instructed his staff to craft a strategy based on 

the appropriations that had already been made.49 The strategy they produced focused on three crucial areas: integrating military and civilian activities, achieving 

the right balance of reconstruction programs, and returning a civilian presence 

to the provinces.

Military and Civilian Integration

Like Ambassador Negroponte before him, Khalilzad recognized the fundamental imbalance between civilian and military assets. Civilian agencies, because of 

their comparatively small size and concentration in the Green Zone, had limited 

insight into Iraqi society. On the other hand, military personnel at the brigade 

level ventured daily into Iraqi neighborhoods, but were not as cognizant of the 

political process playing out in Baghdad or as expert in economic and political 

development as their civilian colleagues.50 This mismatch of expertise and reach, 

along with poor agency integration, persisted from the occupation’s earliest days. 

As in 2003, the challenge in 2005 was to pair the knowledge of civilian experts 

with the military’s on-the-ground presence.

The concerted movement toward greater integration of civilian and military reconstruction began in mid-2004, when military representatives were 

encouraged to attend meetings of the embassy country team and the Joint 

Steering Committee. After General Casey’s arrival, a new Deputy Chief of Staff 

for Political-Military-Economics at MNF-I worked closely with the embassy’s 

Political-Military Counselor and the Director of IRMO on economics, governance, and reconstruction issues. General Casey also established an interagency 

Strategic Operations Center, which hosted regular briefings for senior military 

and civilian staff.51

Khalilzad and Casey further augmented these joint staff structures. In 2005, 

IRMO established “post-kinetic” coordinators whose job was to bring civilian 

reconstruction resources to bear once military operations had stabilized an area. 

Key civilian and military staff met weekly in core groups on reconstruction, 

economic policy, political issues, and public communications, each of which 

became part of an integrated line of operation and reporting in support of goals 

established in the campaign plan.52 Joint participation was nurtured, to a degree, 
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in the standing committees that the military uses to evaluate effects, including 

the Effects Synchronization Board. Khalilzad also created the Joint Strategic 

Planning and Assessment office (JSPA) to conduct strategic planning, provide 

independent analysis, and act as a liaison to the MNF-I planning and assessment 

offices.53 JSPA gave civilian analysts more scope to evaluate strategy options in 

partnership with the military, whose planning staff dwarfed that of their civilian counterparts. “As Zal always said,” Ambassador Speckhard remembers, “he 

wanted to talk about integration, not coordination.”54

Balancing Reconstruction Programs 

“Jointness” was not an end in itself. Above all, U.S. policymakers were asking what 

combinations of civilian and military operations would produce the desired effects. The Jones assessment team, and later Khalilzad, examined how the panoply 

of individual reconstruction projects, stovepiped under various categories, could 

work better as an integrated whole. Military and civilian strategists pushed for 

an examination of the approaches underlying reconstruction and how civilian 

operations could be better incorporated into overall strategy. 

By mid-2005, five functional types of reconstruction projects were being executed: public infrastructure; quick-impact, high-visibility; democracy building; 

transitional stabilization; and capacity building. Each had a role in seeking to 

pacify Iraq and enabling its newly elected government to function independently 

of Coalition support. 

Public infrastructure projects: Public infrastructure projects, underwritten largely 

by IRRF 2, are generally quite complex. With the exception of road building 

and other simple construction, they require specialized engineering and design 

capabilities that call for international firms that generally employ non-Iraqi workers. Although a boon to economic development over the long term, upgrades to 

the water, sewer, electricity, transportation, communication, and oil sectors are 

expensive, take a long time to complete, usually generate little local employment, 

and often are invisible to the public.

Quick-impact, high-visibility projects: Small, quick-impact projects undertaken 

by military commanders are at the other end of the reconstruction spectrum. 

The military has long used “walking around money” to help tactical units on the 

ground gain community support, improving public perceptions of the Coalition 

(“winning hearts and minds”) and enhancing troop safety (force protection). 

In Iraq, CERP fulfilled this purpose. Typical projects included trash cleanups—which improve local sanitation, but also can eliminate hiding places for 
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improvised explosive devices—constructing soccer fields, and building health 

clinics.55 Although many of these projects were congruent with broad Coalition 

goals, when implemented they often were not coordinated with IRRF 2 programs 

or the Iraqi government.56 CERP projects generally did not foster long-term 

change on their own, but rather served as vehicles for allowing the military to 

operate with greater local cooperation in the short-term.

Democracy-building projects: A small portion of IRRF 1 and IRRF 2 funds went 

to programs to build democracy and civil society, and to foster reconciliation. 

The community action and local governance programs developed by USAID 

specifically for post-conflict situations were the primary instruments supporting this approach. They encouraged participatory politics at the community 

level, with the goal of helping a viable democratic infrastructure take root. The 

goal of these “soft” programs was to help Iraqis develop a process for managing 

their affairs in a democracy and to train civil servants and political leaders at all 

levels. It was hard to measure the impact of programs that sought to instill an 

understanding of, and allegiance to, the principles of participatory democracy. 

Evaluating their success or failure posed challenges for both embassy management and oversight organizations.57

 Transitional stabilization projects: The Coalition pioneered another type of intervention. Aimed at stabilizing violent cities, transitional stabilization projects 

sought to bridge quick-impact projects with longer-term development efforts. 

In a prototypical partnership in the spring of 2004, USAID’s OTI worked with 

the 1st Cavalry Division in Baghdad’s Sadr City—a key stronghold of the militant 

Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr—to repair battle damage and jump-start economic 

rebuilding in the wake of major clearing operations.58 On-the-spot grant-making 

authority and the ability to let contracts without having to comply with some of 

the more cumbersome parts of the FAR—mostly for projects employing people 

in the neighborhood—led to quick results.59 These projects, which ranged from 

sewer repair to grants to local businesses, were typically initiated and monitored 

exclusively by Iraqi employees of the Coalition, who operated with relative freedom. Keeping the Iraqi employees who spearheaded these collaborations safe 

from insurgent attack often meant disguising the project’s source of funding; 

keeping the projects themselves safe meant not advertising their location, even 

within the Coalition. The full impact of USAID transitional stabilization projects 

thus remained hidden from both Iraqis and many U.S. officials.60
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• Khalilzad’s Adaptations •

Capacity-building projects: For infrastructure projects to produce the desired 

essential services and for the Iraqi government to function effectively, personnel at all levels had to be properly trained and supported with effective planning, 

budgeting, and operations. Some IRRF 2 projects aimed to build this “capacity” 

where it did not exist and to strengthen existing administrative systems. Capacitybuilding programs undertaken with IRRF funds ranged from classroom training 

for operators of electrical power plants to installation of accounting and information management systems inside government ministries. The U.S. investment 

in Iraq could be sustained only by building institutional capacity within Iraqi 

ministries and the infrastructure they oversaw. 

Ambassador Khalilzad’s advisors concluded that they needed a framework 

for determining the right mixture of these approaches to apply and how to match 

funding and support for them in the constituent parts of the reconstruction effort.61 IRMO senior advisors to Iraqi ministries, USAID program managers, 

MNF-I personnel, and soldiers on the ground each worked according to their 

own priorities, using their own funding streams, and were only loosely coordinated by an overarching plan. 

Focusing on Provincial Support

Ambassador Khalilzad moved to expand civilian operations in the provinces, 

reversing a trend begun after June 2004, when concerns about deteriorating 

security and budget shortfalls led the State Department to close most CPA provincial offices. The 2004 pullback reflected the views of incoming State personnel 

who argued for the development of a normal embassy structure, in which fewer 

Coalition personnel would be involved in Iraqi affairs. In the prevailing State 

Department view, this would push the Iraqi Interim Government to assume 

more responsibility. It was also thought that consolidating advisors within the 

embassy’s political and economic sections would enhance the ambassador’s inhouse capacity to support the management of political and economic affairs. “The 

State Department tried to make it a normal mission,” strategic analyst Andrew 

Rathmell said, but “quickly discovered this would not be possible.”62

Hopes of returning to a normal embassy stayed alive, however. Khalilzad 

had to rebut calls for implementing traditional State Department structures and 

protocols so often that he came up with a one-line riposte: “As soon as we have a 

normal mission,” Khalilzad would shoot back, “we’ll have a normal embassy.”63

In contrast to the embassy’s June 2004 pullback from the provinces, the 

number of U.S. military personnel assisting in developing Iraqi Security Forces 

across Iraq had increased over the previous year as MNSTC-I embedded teams 

of advisors in Iraqi units down to the battalion level. The opportunity to forge 
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enduring relationships between Coalition and Iraqi personnel and fine-tune operations from within the system proved to be “a formula for success” in the eyes 

of its practitioners.64

In reconstruction, the strategy of “pulling back to let the Iraqis do it themselves” failed to stabilize Iraq.65 Iraqi provincial governments remained weak and 

disconnected from the central government. Improving the delivery of essential 

services and the credibility of Iraq’s government would occur only if provincial 

institutions were strengthened. 

By the late spring of 2005, the embassy reached consensus on two courses 

of action: to reconstitute its ability to influence and monitor provincial affairs, 

and to expand on the concept of embedding U.S. personnel in Iraqi institutions 

in order to develop their capacity for self-rule. Khalilzad seized on the consensus that more should be done locally by launching two far-reaching initiatives: 

Provincial Reconstruction Development Councils (PRDCs) and Provincial 

Reconstruction Teams.

Provincial Reconstruction Development Councils: In the spring of 2005, the U.S. 

Embassy reinforced the PRDCs, the first joint Iraqi-American vehicle explicitly 

aimed at building capacity in regional governing institutions.66 The councils, which 

had existed in fifteen provinces in various forms since the CPA days, became an important instrument of coordination that brought together local Iraqi officials and 

the Coalition personnel overseeing reconstruction in their provinces. Everyone 

had a seat at the table: elected Iraqi officials and their municipal staffs, USAID representatives, civil affairs soldiers, and embassy representatives. The development 

councils became a forum where these stakeholders could collectively evaluate 

provincial needs and match them with available U.S. and Iraqi resources.67

In most provinces, PRDCs drew up prioritized lists of projects in line with 

national and provincial development plans. They then worked to secure funding. 

In June 2005, IRMO allocated $241 million to the PRDC partnership—$80 

million through CERP and $161 million through USAID’s Community Action 

Program and Local Governance Program.68 Councils also had their own funding 

provided by the Iraqi government, which, together with U.S. funding, eventually amounted to about $10 million per province.69 This was a relatively modest 

amount, but it marked the start of a trend toward greater spending and control 

by provincial governments. 

Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Khalilzad’s introduction of PRTs in Iraq—a 

concept he brought from Afghanistan—would be his most enduring contribution to the reconstruction program.70 Building on the PRDC concept and 
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recommendations of the Jones review to project civilian power beyond the 

Green Zone, he and General Casey deployed mixed teams of military and civilian reconstruction personnel in the regions. Their mission was to work directly 

with provincial governments and military brigades. Some advisors—including Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno and Dr. Philip Zelikow, the State 

Department’s Counselor—called for small teams to be embedded in every brigade. 

But Khalilzad preferred fielding fewer larger teams that remained under embassy 

control and maintained their own arrangements for basing and support.71

The PRT initiative in Iraq was originally conceived as a two-phase program 

over four years. It was to have a complement of ten PRTs, seven led by the United 

States and one each by the United Kingdom, Italy, and Korea.72 The PRTs’ 

mission, set forth in a joint cable to the Secretary of State, was to “assist Iraq’s 

provincial governments with developing a transparent and sustained capability 

to govern, promote increased security and rule of law, promote political and 

economic development, and provide the provincial administration necessary to 

meet the basic needs of the population.”73 PRTs harkened back to the CORDS 

program in Vietnam, in which USAID and military personnel worked on rural 

development as part of a counterinsurgency campaign.74

Secretary of State Rice delayed announcing the PRT program until the Iraqi 

constitution was ratified by national referendum on October 15, 2005. She did not 

want to give the impression that the U.S. government presumed the existence of 

the regional governance structure before the Iraqis had approved it. In a surprise 

visit to Iraq, she inaugurated the first PRT in Mosul on November 11, 2005.75

The PRT program established a formal framework in which military and civilian personnel could work as an integrated team, rather than as a partnership 

between separate military and civilian offices. Coaxing the Departments of State 

and Defense to set the terms of their first major operational collaboration in Iraq 

required a herculean effort that touched off frequent arguments between MNF-I, 

the embassy, and Washington. A patchwork quilt of memoranda of agreement, 

cables, and military orders—many of them at cross-purposes—evolved to codify 

policy for PRTs. More than a year elapsed before basic issues of budgets, the provision of security, and command and control relationships were resolved, delaying 

full deployment of the PRTs and limiting their early effectiveness in the field.76

PRT control and support: The PRT command structure put the Department of 

State in charge of the program. A military deputy was assigned to each civilian 

team leader. The chain of command and the legalities of program support, however, were ambiguous. By law, State Department officials do not have a place in 

the military’s chain of command. Some Defense Department officials thought 
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the PRT guidelines gave the State Department more control over military assets 

than was permitted under Title 10 of the U.S. Code.77

The exceptionally high cost of providing security for PRTs led to a second 

disagreement. Throughout Iraq, civilians and their movement teams donned 

armor-plated vests when they ventured “outside the wire,” traveling on roads 

that at times were mined with explosives and through neighborhoods where 

ambushes sometimes occurred. Only when supported by platoon- and companylevel firepower could the PRTs carry out their mission in an active combat zone. 

The question of whether PRTs were to be supported by military units, as the 

Department of State wanted, or by private security details, as the Department 

of Defense advocated, remained unsettled for some time.78 Early consideration 

was given to the use of civilian security contractors for all PRTs, but the notion 

was abandoned because of the unsustainable price tags.79

Debates also raged over budget resources. According to the original agreement reached in Baghdad, the Department of State would pay for establishing 

and hosting PRTs at Regional Embassy Office (REO) sites, and MNF-I would 

fund those located on forward operating bases.80 In April 2006, the MNC-I Judge 

Advocate General ruled that the Department of State was responsible for the mission and that Department of Defense operation and maintenance funds could 

not be used to support PRTs.81

The operational impact of this administrative stalemate was immediate. When 

the REO in Mosul closed, the Mosul PRT suddenly had no security or housing, 

forcing the team to relocate to Forward Operating Base Marez. The first PRT, 

personally launched by the Secretary of State, lost its dedicated budgetary and 

movement support, forcing it to rely on the support of the base commander, who 

redirected funds intended for other purposes as a stop-gap. For months the PRT 

had no budget for office supplies or for maintaining its network of computers, 

and no dedicated funds of its own for reconstruction.82

The unexplored frontier of civil-military operations in Iraq was the root problem, leading to shortfalls in financial and policy support by two departments 

unaccustomed to working together. “The PRT policy emerged well before resources started flowing,” Andrew Rathmell explained.83 Thus began what one 

officer called “the REO-PRT shell game.”84 To end the impasse, Major General 

Bill Caldwell, the MNF-I Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Effects, proposed 

that Ambassador Khalilzad and General Casey sign a memorandum declaring 

PRTs a joint mission. The draft included a cost-sharing formula that increased 

the burden on the Department of State. State officials in Washington sought redress from the NSC and the Joint Staff, who left it to the embassy and MNF-I to 
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• Khalilzad’s Adaptations •

negotiate a solution. It took nearly a year before government lawyers negotiated 

a cooperative security agreement for the PRTs.85

PRT personnel: Staffing the PRTs proved another enormous challenge. Finding 

individuals with the right combination of experience, expertise, and judgment 

was difficult. The Department of State and other civilian agencies struggled to 

field adequate numbers of civilian advisors, leaving many PRTs at half capacity 

and forcing the military to fill positions with soldiers who did not have the right 

expertise or experience.86

The mismatch of needs and staff had significant consequences in the field. A 

SIGIR review of the PRTs’ first year of operation found that a veterinarian was 

developing agriculture programs, an aviation maintenance manager was a PRT coleader, and advisors to Iraqi provincial governors included a Navy submariner, an 

ultrasound technician, and an infantry drill sergeant.87 On the whole, PRTs were 

short of personnel who could best assist Iraqis in developing the capacity to administer the economy, establish the rule of law, and foster good governance. Staffing 

challenges, the unresolved budget issue, and troop shortages at prospective PRT 

sites hindered the operations of several PRTs and canceled the deployment of 

another. SIGIR’s 2006 audit found that of the nine PRTs and four satellite offices 

reviewed, four were “generally able,” four were “somewhat able,” three were “less 

able,” and two were “generally unable” to carry out their mission.88

Iraq and Afghanistan: A Brief Comparison

Early success in Afghanistan in 2002 suggested a model that might work 

in Iraq in 2003. The U.S. goals in the two countries were similar—to establish democracy and defeat terrorism. But their geopolitical, economic, 

historical, and cultural differences complicated applying the Afghan 

model to Iraq. 

Soon after Afghanistan’s Taliban government was toppled in late 2001, 

the U.S. installed a new government led by Afghan expatriate Hamid 

Karzai. Under Karzai’s leadership, the Afghan Transitional Authority 

sought to set the country on a path toward democratic stabilization. 

Karzai was formally elected president on November 3, 2004, and was still 

holding that office at the end of 2008.89

ORHA’s director Jay Garner and Special Presidential Envoy to Iraq Zalmay 

Khalilzad aimed to replicate the Afghan model by rapidly transferring 

power to an interim Iraqi authority. But no “Karzai-like” figure emerged. 

For a variety of reasons, the plan to quickly create a sovereign interim 
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government in Iraq was abandoned. After more than a year of a CPAled occupation, the U.S. transferred sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim 

Government in late June 2004. Iraq has since been successively led by 

Prime Ministers Ayad Allawi, Ibrahim Ja’afari, and Nouri al-Maliki.90

In 2002, the vast majority of Afghans had no access to essential services 

such as water and electricity. By contrast, Iraqi citizens were accustomed 

to such services under Saddam and expected them to continue after 

his fall. Afghanistan’s literacy rate was less than 30 percent when the 

Coalition invaded, and Iraq’s was 74 percent (though it fell during 

Saddam’s rule).91 Twenty-five years of conflict had driven educated 

Afghans abroad, but Iraq retained a large professional class and a capable workforce during Saddam’s reign (although many left during the 

violence that followed his fall).92

After the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, U.S. military forces added to the 

existing Afghan forces, aiming to develop an army of about 70,000 soldiers.93 In Iraq, the CPA disbanded the Iraqi Army shortly after the 2003 

invasion and began to build a New Iraqi Army of 40,000.94 Initially, the 

CPA, not the U.S. military, oversaw the training of the New Iraqi Army. 

That changed in 2004 when MNSTC-I took the lead in building the Iraqi 

Security Forces. By late 2008, MNSTC-I had trained well over 200,000 soldiers for Iraq’s military.95

Ambassador Khalilzad developed PRTs in Afghanistan and adapted the 

concept to Iraq in late 2005, with a different mission and organizational 

structure. In Afghanistan, the PRTs sought to “extend the authority of the 

Afghan government into the provinces in order to develop a stable and 

secure environment, enable security sector reform and economic and 

social development.” In Iraq, the PRTs worked with Iraqi provincial and 

municipal councils and civil-society groups to build local governance 

capacity, carry out reconstruction projects, and improve security in 

the provinces.96 In both countries, the PRTs were staffed by civilian and 

military personnel, but in Afghanistan staffing was weighted toward the 

military, while in Iraq it was mostly civilian. 

Since 2001, the Congress has appropriated about $50 billion for Iraq’s 

relief and reconstruction, while just over $30 billion was appropriated 

for Afghanistan.97 About half of the money provided to each country was 

spent on developing security forces.
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Clear-Hold-Build 

By the fall of 2005, many of the threads of civil-military operations were coming 

together. The growing recognition in military circles that reconstruction is a tactically useful “non-lethal effect” was expressed in a handbook for commanders, 

“Money as a Weapons System (MAAWS).” Published by MNC-I in October 2005 

and distributed widely across Iraq, MAAWS embraced reconstruction as a “critical 

enabler of everything we do on the battlefield.” “Effective application of all available resources,” the handbook begins, “is vital to the success of our mission.”98

At the same time, MNF-I and the embassy made progress employing civilian 

reconstruction resources in the military counterinsurgency campaign. Using the 

partnership between USAID’s OTI and the military in Falluja, Najaf, Samarra, 

and Baghdad as a model, officials developed a more robust package of civilian 

stability operations for the Strategic Cities Initiative.99 In the initiative, MNF-I 

coordinated with the NSC to periodically designate Iraqi cities for targeted intervention.100 Now, civilian resources would play a major role in what had been 

a primarily military-led operation.

While the use of reconstruction resources as part of a military-led campaign 

gained traction with lower-level ground commanders in Iraq, a debate erupted 

in Washington. High-level backing for a robust counterinsurgency strategy that 

blended military and civilian resources materialized in the NSC and in the Office 

of the Secretary of State. It became known as “Clear-Hold-Build,” an apt description of the succession of clearing and stability operations undertaken in some of 

the strategic cities.101 But Secretary Rumsfeld and General Casey initially opposed 

this strategy because it would shift the military focus from transitioning security 

responsibilities to the Iraqis and preparing to draw down U.S. forces. 

The rift broke into public view after Secretary Rice testified in favor of the 

Clear-Hold-Build approach before the Senate on October 19, 2005, only to be 

rebuffed by Secretary Rumsfeld, who disavowed the strategy in favor of continuing the emphasis on transition.102 “Anyone who takes those three words and 

thinks it means the United States should clear and the United States should hold 

and the United States should build,” Rumsfeld said, “doesn’t understand the 

situation. It is the Iraqis’ country. They’ve got 28 million people there. They are 

clearing, they are holding, they are building. They’re going to be the ones doing 

the reconstruction in that country.”103

Settling the argument in Rice’s favor, the President publicly put his seal 

of approval on Clear-Hold-Build in a Veterans Day speech on November 11, 

2005.104 Two weeks later, the White House announced “Clear-Hold-Build” as 

official policy in the document “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq.”105 The 

strategy’s integration of military, political, and economic lines of operation was a 
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notable milestone in the evolution of the U.S. approach to Iraq. However, critics 

inside and outside the government asked whether the strategy was sufficiently 

resourced—with adequate numbers of troops and funding for civilian operations—to be effective. Disagreements between the President’s key advisors in the 

Departments of State and Defense soon appeared to be impeding the execution 

of the new strategy.106

Within six months of Ambassador Khalilzad’s arrival in Iraq, the U.S. reconstruction program moved beyond its original emphasis on infrastructure 

construction. Bringing to the table experts in development and counterinsurgency refocused the debate on how reconstruction dollars could support political 

transition and reduce violence. From spring 2005 forward, the reconstruction 

effort began to shift. Now the emphasis was on modest Iraqi-led projects designed 

to deliver jobs and services to the most vulnerable, violent, and strategically significant neighborhoods, and on working as much as possible through municipal 

and provincial institutions. 

In engineering this shift, MNF-I and embassy officials forged a more comprehensive model of civil-military integration that returned U.S. civilian personnel to 

the regions and put them back inside Iraqi institutions. The gradual acceptance 

of the need to integrate civilian and military efforts, and to embed coalition personnel with Iraqis at every level, amounted to a rejection of CPA’s approach to 

nation-building, which relied primarily on infrastructure construction and did 

not sufficiently focus on building capacity inside Iraqi institutions.107 Although 

the Rumsfeld-Rice debate on overall strategy continued, leaving the Clear-HoldBuild strategy under-resourced for over a year, the utility of its approach became 

increasingly apparent. Nevertheless, forging cooperative relationships with Iraqis 

and between U.S. civil and military personnel below the level of the Ambassador 

and the Commanding General remained a major challenge.

Although Khalilzad and a series of strategic review teams succeeded in reconfiguring reconstruction in accordance with a more sophisticated approach 

to nation building and the ongoing counterinsurgency campaign, a signal challenge awaited the nascent strategy. The movement of reconstruction personnel 

out to the provinces and back into Iraqi regional institutions brought to light the 

deeply dysfunctional relationship between officials in Iraq’s central and provincial 

governments. By 2006, reconstruction managers would come to see that U.S. 

efforts to make Iraq into a federal democratic state had actively undermined the 

country’s public institutions.
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Returning to the Provinces

We must not forget the importance of...improving Iraqi lives 

in their communities across the country. Iraq requires not 

only good government at the center, but also effective local 

government and strong coordination between the provincial and 

central governments.*

Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq (2005-2007)

“Go out Assassin’s Gate, over the 3rd ID bridge, onto the highway of death, left 

down through the overpass of assault, and then turn right,” Lieutenant Colonel 

Otto Busher said.1

 It was Sunday, June 25, 2006, and members of the Baghdad 

PRT were on their way to a meeting of the city’s Water and Sewer Board. Their 

convoy of Humvees plowed through Baghdad’s crowded streets, sirens blaring, 

for the short but dangerous trip from the Green Zone to the Amanat—or city 

hall—whose 14,000-man workforce provides basic services to Baghdad residents. 

With weapons ready, the team entered a conference room and waited for Iraqi 

engineers to filter past the armed sentries Busher placed at the door. Tea was 

served before the meeting began.2

The Army Reservist from New Hampshire was on his third tour in Iraq. Using 

skills honed as a city manager in civilian life and as a civil affairs officer in Kosovo, he 

was known in reconstruction circles for his dogged pursuit of water projects across 

Baghdad. With Busher as essential services lead, the Baghdad PRT had forged links 

with the Iraqi engineers working to repair Baghdad’s sewer and water system. Only 

with the Iraqis’ active cooperation would Coalition-sponsored projects be successful. Since their weekly meetings began several months before, the team had helped 

the Baghdad Water and Sewer Board make progress toward self-governance; the 

board’s deputy director general for water, not Busher, chaired meetings.3

The Politics of Service Delivery

At the Amanat that morning, Baghdad’s plumbing was not the only item for 

discussion: politics were also on the agenda. The struggle for power between 

Iraq’s warring factions had by now engulfed municipal institutions across Iraq. 

Assassinations were an all too common occurrence. More than 50 members of 

* Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, “Remarks by Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for the Inauguration of 

the Salah ad Din PRT,” Baghdad embassy Press Release, October 12, 2006.
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the assorted Baghdad councils—city, district, sub-district, neighborhood—had 

been struck down.4

 The Amanat itself had been the site of a sectarian “municipal 

coup.” On August 8, 2005, members of the Badr militia, the armed wing of the 

Shi’a Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), deposed the 

mayor, a secular technocrat who had been appointed by the central government. 

SCIRI replaced him with the man whom the newly elected and SCIRI-dominated 

provincial council had also appointed governor of Baghdad Province.5

One of the first agenda items for the meeting concerned what Busher called 

“the water pipe to nowhere.”6

 An enterprising district council in a Sunni neighborhood had convinced a civil affairs company to build a pipe connecting their 

constituents, then without fresh water, to a nearby water plant under construction. The plan sounded reasonable to the civil affairs team, which used CERP 

funds to initiate construction through a local contractor. 

There was, however, a technical stumbling block. The plant pumped water at 

far higher than household pressures. Had the lines been connected, “everyone’s 

faucets would have ended up in their backyards,” Busher said.7

 Worse yet was a 

political issue: the construction commissioned by the civil affairs team crossed a 

de facto sectarian boundary. The Shi’a who held sway over city government took a 

“Shi’a first” view of service delivery. Even if the pipes were completed, city officials 

would not allow the connection to a Sunni neighborhood to be activated.8

Next on the agenda was a bigger problem—a water treatment plant in the 

city’s Karkh neighborhood that was being refurbished by the Coalition—the 

same plant whose generator Task Force Fajr used to turn on Baghdad’s lights 

after the invasion. When finished, the plant and its adjacent reservoir would hold 

a week’s worth of fresh water for Baghdad’s seven million residents, a vital supply that would help blunt the insurgents’ efforts to sabotage the city’s essential 

services. Engineers on the water board, however, had identified a potential showstopper. A contractor on the project had purchased a PVC reservoir liner that 

was not certified for human use. The Iraqi water engineers were outraged and 

threatened to reject the project unless the liner was replaced.9

As Busher worked to address these and other problems, a car bomb exploded 

two blocks up the street, sending black smoke billowing skyward. Amanat security 

guards had witnessed insurgents casing Busher’s convoy from nearby rooftops, and 

now an Iraqi police checkpoint had been attacked by a vehicle-borne IED.10

Busher’s meeting at the Amanat demonstrates many of the issues the reconstruction effort faced in 2006. Projects had to pass through a maze of Iraqi and 

Coalition institutions before they even began. Coordination was a perennial challenge, in part because it was not always clear who was in charge on either side. 

To corral the disparate players, the PCO mandated in June 2006 that all relevant 
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• Returning to the Provinces •

Iraqi and Coalition authorities sign a memorandum of agreement before moving 

forward with any project.11 Even when this rudimentary level of coordination was 

achieved, political agendas often intervened. Sorting out who was Shi’a and who 

was Sunni was hard enough; discerning who was following a sectarian agenda and 

who was impartially carrying out the job was almost always impossible. 

As PRTs penetrated the institutions of the Iraqi state, they discovered that 

sectarianism and the battle for control between provincial and ministerial officials 

had crippled once-functioning organs of public administration. The never-ending 

stream of minor catastrophes that resulted made some reconstruction officials 

compare their lives to the movie Groundhog Day, in which the protagonist suffers 

through a bad day he is condemned to repeat perpetually.12 The cycle’s root causes 

were apparent. The struggle for power in Iraq’s new electoral system, hurriedly 

arranged in the last days of the CPA, had overwhelmed the public institutions 

that manage reconstruction. The seeds of this tangled story were planted in 2003, 

matured in 2004, and finally burst open in 2005.

Reconstructing Governance in Iraq 

After the 2003 invasion, Coalition military units across Iraq worked to restore 

local government. They did so under a loose plan, developed after the invasion 

started, in which Governorate Support Teams composed of civil affairs personnel 

and USAID contractors assisted military commanders in forming local councils. 

The plan, however, reflected an unresolved tension in U.S. policy over how to connect the councils formed in neighborhoods, cities, and provinces to the national 

government in Baghdad. The United States had begun the war without any notion of how the new councils it was installing—and attempting to empower—at 

the community level of Iraqi society would integrate with existing institutions at 

the top.13 The councils immediately found themselves at odds with the provincial 

directors general, who reported to national ministries in Baghdad and jealously 

guarded their prerogative to oversee public services and disburse funding.14

The debate over how to make central ministries accountable to local communities, and thereby decentralize the power of a formerly tyrannical regime, 

played out during the CPA era. As Ambassador Bremer sought to usher Iraq into 

a democratic era, the extent to which Iraq’s central and provincial governments 

would share power remained contested. The CPA put enormous resources into 

electing councils across Iraq, envisioning a system in which they held most of the 

power in each province.15

Iraqis were divided over Bremer’s plan to radically devolve power from 

Baghdad to the provinces. The Shi’a in the south and the Kurds in the north 

wanted an even greater devolution of power, one that maximized local control 
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in regions with Kurdish and Shi’a majorities. Sunnis and many leaders in the 

national ministries in Baghdad, however, preferred continued concentration of 

power in the central government. This struggle was at the heart of what the new 

Iraqi state was to be. Bremer’s actions—including enshrining the decentralization 

of power in the TAL—marked the opening gambit in what became an extended 

imbroglio over Iraqi federalism.16

Ministry Politicization

As the Iraqi debate over federalism unfolded in the occupation’s first three years, 

Iraq’s political parties battled not only for victory in the country’s first democratic elections, but also for control of the central ministries and their powerful 

chains of directors general. Under the CPA, members of the Iraqi Governing 

Council were able to exploit what control Bremer allowed them over the ministries. Each council member was permitted to appoint a minister and thereby 

control a ministry.17 This undisguised power grab continued under the Iraqi 

Interim Government established after the return of sovereignty on June 28, 

2004. Given the traditional mores of Arab culture and widespread nepotism 

under Saddam, IGC members—and many of the interim ministers who followed them—appointed their sons, cousins, and other members of their own 

families, tribes, or parties to ministry positions, establishing a ruling clique that 

further stocked ministerial ranks with political loyalists.18

Almost overnight, a majority of the ministries of Iraq’s central government—

once controlled by the Ba’ath Party, but largely staffed by technocrats—became 

aligned with, and then dominated by, competing political parties. Sadrists seized 

the Health and Education ministries. Employing the model of service delivery embraced by Hezbollah—the radical Islamic Shi’a group based in Lebanon—they 

openly deployed ministry resources to build support among the Shi’a underclass. At the same time, SCIRI, the largest Shi’a political party, took control of 

the Ministry of the Interior—and its powerful internal security apparatus—and 

later the Ministry of Finance. The major Sunni party, the Iraqi Accord Front, 

would exert a lesser degree of control over the newly formed Ministry of Defense. 

Who received services and who did not was increasingly decided on the basis of 

political allegiance and sectarian identity.19

The capture of central ministries by political parties had enduring consequences for reconstruction and for the development of a functioning Iraqi state. 

A new cadre of directors general was selected for party loyalty rather than technical competence. As parties put their people in power, political rivalries affected 

relations among ministries and between national and provincial governments. 

Ministerial appointments of provincial officials injected national party politics 
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• Returning to the Provinces •

into local affairs. The result was, at times, a significant breakdown in local order. 

In several instances, the Minister of Interior refused to assent to the dismissal of 

police chiefs by provincial authorities and insisted that party loyalists remain in 

the job—exactly the kind of central-government control Ambassador Bremer’s 

reforms had sought to reverse.20

Another dynamic eroded ministry competence. Each time the cabinet was 

reshuffled and ministers changed, a whole new clique moved into the upper echelons of ministry staff. Institutional knowledge of ministry operations, as well 

as training paid for by U.S. capacity-development programs, went out the door 

with their predecessors.

Local-National Disconnect 

After the January 2005 elections, the Shi’a parties took full advantage of the 

Sunni boycott to consolidate their influence, especially in the capital. A primer 

on city politics written by the Baghdad PRT chronicles what happened next. 

“The lopsided nature of political power, with SCIRI/Badr domination, has created a desperate chemistry for the province,” it states. A “political Darwinism” 

prevailed in which the Shi’a party elite centralized authority.21 The result of the 

Sunni boycott was that Iraq’s capital was ruled by what one official characterized 

as a “Shi’a dictatorship.”22 During this period, SCIRI deposed Baghdad’s mayor 

and took over the Amanat. 

The Shi’a takeover opened rifts between provincial councils, stacked with 

SCIRI supporters, and many of the 437 neighborhood, 195 sub-district, and 

96 district councils that USAID had established across Iraq as part of its LGP.23

Although provincial councils were supposed to represent a province’s entire population, the Sunni boycott of the 2005 election yielded Sunni-majority provinces 

ruled by Shi’a councils. Projects and services came to be distributed along sectarian lines, reflecting the “Shi’a first” mentality that Lieutenant Colonel Busher 

witnessed at the Amanat. By mid-2006, the party grip was entrenched. “SCIRI/

Badr has worked diligently to maintain and increase their hold on power,” the 

primer continues, “trying to delay new elections or any structural changes that 

might weaken their position.”24

One of USAID’s local governance advisors took an even bleaker view of the 

effect of the elections.During 2004, the LGP had worked to “solidify and extend 

the role of sub-national governmental institutions to prevent, or at least discourage, a recentralization of power.”25 “The party list system sabotaged [the LGP],” 

the advisor said, laying waste to two years of diligent work fostering authentic 

local governance in Iraq.26 USAID had helped create a mechanism in Iraq for 
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local representation that was undermined both by the electoral formula and a 

disregard for decentralization that dated back to the CPA.27

Issues of federalism and provincial government that would directly impact 

reconstruction were again on the negotiating table when the constitution was 

drafted during the late spring and summer of 2005. Ambassador Khalilzad pressured the constitutional drafting committee to clearly demarcate federal from 

provincial responsibilities, but the issue proved too explosive to settle.28 The draft 

constitution deferred until a later time the question of provincial powers—and 

thereby how public administration would be controlled at the local level. 

The continuing disagreements between Iraq’s Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurdish populations, over how much power the central government should have nearly caused 

the constitutional referendum to fail. In the electoral formula governing the referendum process, a simple majority was required for approval, but the constitution 

could also have been defeated by a “no” vote with a two-thirds majority in three or 

more governorates.29 When Iraqis went to vote on October 15, 2005, Kurdish- and 

Shi’a-dominated provinces supported the constitution by overwhelming margins, 

while Sunni-dominated provinces voted against it in equal measure.30 A simple 

nationwide majority was achieved, but the constitution narrowly missed defeat 

by the governorate rule. Two predominantly Sunni provinces—Anbar and Salah 

Al-Din—voted against the constitution by more than the required two-thirds 

majority. Although a majority of voters in a third province—Ninewa—rejected 

the constitution, it fell short of the two-thirds majority required to qualify as a “no” 

vote, allowing the constitution to be passed.31

Under the new constitution, national elections were held two months later, on 

December 15, 2005, to select members of Iraq’s first permanent legislature. This 

time, Iraq was divided into electoral districts by province, although the party-list 

system remained in force.32 Sunni participation in the elections brought some 

balance to the distribution of power in the National Assembly, but elections for 

local and provincial offices were postponed repeatedly, perpetuating the Shi’a 

over-representation on provincial councils. The failure to hold provincial elections complicated reconstruction efforts at the local level. Who held government 

office did not necessarily reflect who held power in the province. As a result, 

provincial elections remained a political grievance held by almost all non-Shi’a 

parties, as well as those Shi’a parties not aligned with the ruling coalition. 

Three years would pass before the issue was resolved. Provincial elections 

planned for September 2006 were postponed until March 2007 after the Shi’amajority parliament failed to appoint an electoral commission and draft election 

bylaws. Soon another delay was announced, putting off still further the prospect of 

a democratic rebalancing of Iraq’s provincial and local governments. Throughout 
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• Returning to the Provinces •

2007, parliament refused even to consider implementing legislation on provincial 

powers. A law eventually passed in February 2008 but was then vetoed by the 

Presidency Council. Although the veto was later rescinded, the law would not 

come into effect until a law on national elections was fashioned.33 On September 

24, 2008, the Provincial Election Law was finally passed, mandating national 

elections before January 31, 2009.34

The long delay in holding competitive local elections left political conflicts 

simmering across the country, complicating efforts of reconstruction personnel 

to work at the local level. Despite the approval of the new constitution and the 

seating of an elected national parliament, the organization of Iraq’s local governments, as specified in CPA Order 71, was by now a poor guide to who actually 

wielded control. In the absence of a clear legal framework, power fell to those best 

positioned to seize it, both inside and outside institutions of government. The 

resulting breakdown between the central government and provincial councils—

and in turn between the provincial governments and neighborhood and district 

councils—crippled the administration of public services the U.S. reconstruction 

program was trying to rebuild. 

Regional Responses 

In response to the fragmentation of the Iraqi state, military and civilian officials 

used USAID soft programs, PRTs, and brigade combat teams to strengthen local 

administrative capacities and connect provincial governments with national 

ministries. The sheer logistics of setting up the PRTs and assessing the status of 

reconstruction and institutional development in each province was difficult. All 

PRTs were explicitly tasked to bridge the local-national disconnect, but it was 

often the larger and more powerful brigade combat teams who made the most difference. By 2006, brigade commanders came to see improving local governance 

as an essential part of their mission. In addition to their primary tasks of securing the battle space, brigades often would provide security for local government 

facilities and at times for local officials. They also used their CERP funds and civil 

affairs brigades to support local government initiatives.

Both brigade commanders and PRT leaders found that pushing past Ba’athist 

practices and transforming the roles and responsibilities of local officials was 

difficult. One PRT official commented, “It’s still ‘big man’ diplomacy,” in which 

people rather than institutions wield power.35 Provincial council members, not 

used to discretionary authority, were often reluctant to act independently on 

behalf of their constituencies. “In a post-authoritarian society, where you have to 

be told what you are allowed to do (not what you aren’t), provincial and local government leaders are not going to be risk takers,” a PRT political officer explained. 
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“In the end, if people do not know what they are allowed to do, or what they are 

supposed to do—they will end up either doing nothing, or they will do what is 

in their best interest.”36

In Diyala province, relations deteriorated so badly that the governor resorted 

to arresting directors general to force them to attend council meetings. Despite 

the trying conditions, PRTs and brigade commanders helped create legitimacy 

for the provincial governments and had some success at uniting officials from 

different sects. One PRT leader said, “Without our presence you would have a 

full-scale civil war.”37

Coaxing local officials to work together productively was only half the battle. 

Relations had to be nurtured between municipal governments and the provinces, and between the provinces and Baghdad. In many places, relationships 

were so lacking that provincial leaders wanting to meet with ministerial officials 

transmitted their requests through the embassy.38 Many also relied on Coalition 

commanders for transportation to and from Baghdad, a practice that military 

commanders came to call “helicopter diplomacy.” “Making the lack of ground 

rules even worse,” a political officer remarked, “is the incredibly poor communication between and among all levels of the Iraqi government. If, by some stroke 

of luck or hard work, there are clear and comprehensive rules for something, it is 

highly likely that they have not been transmitted to all of the appropriate people 

in an effective or open manner.” 39

The efforts of the PRTs and brigades slowly opened a conversation between 

provincial and national officials. In the late summer of 2007, five governors from 

the northern non-Kurdish provinces arrived in Baghdad to attend a conference 

arranged by the office of the Deputy Prime Minister. It was one of the first meetings of its kind. Governors from some of the most violent provinces of Iraq were 

allowed to air their concerns. They complained that some ministry directors general were operating in the provinces outside the control of provincial authorities. 

The governor of Diyala stood up and said that he did not even have the phone 

numbers for ministry officials in Baghdad.40 It was clear that provincial and local 

governments were not yet ready to govern, and that focused PRT support to build 

local and provincial capacity would be necessary for an extended period. 

USAID Expands Local Governance Program

Operating in parallel with the PRTs, USAID soft programs also played an essential role in helping local governments improve. The LGP began a $350 million 

initiative on October 1, 2005, which aimed to join the citizen councils it formed 

across Iraq into an integrated network and build their capacity for local administration. Democracy advisors from the LGP also worked at the national level as 
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• Returning to the Provinces •

advocates for writing clearly stated powers, roles, and responsibilities for local 

governments into Iraqi law.41 The challenge was to provide a forum and a legal 

framework in which a fledgling cadre of Iraqi civil servants and elected officials 

could bridge the institutional gaps that had resulted from the Coalition’s remaking of the Iraqi political system into federal, provincial, and local institutions.42

The LGP was unlike the Coalition’s other methods of assistance. Its physical 

isolation from other U.S. government agencies, its predominantly Iraqi face, and 

its work at political levels far removed from national government created what 

was in effect a parallel reconstruction effort. Four USAID regional offices—in 

Baghdad, Hilla, Erbil, and Basrah—were embedded in local neighborhoods, 

rather than being housed on forward operating bases. When the compounds 

needed food, they sent Iraqi employees, many of whom lived in surrounding 

neighborhoods, to purchase it at nearby markets. The compounds’ outer rings 

of security were manned by Iraqi details, not U.S. military or international guard 

forces. One compound shared a wall and part of its security detail with a nextdoor mosque.43 For every international advisor staffing the program, more than 

ten fulltime Iraqi professionals provided management training and assisted with 

projects.44

USAID’s emphasis on distancing themselves from the embassy and blending 

with local communities was met with dismay in some corners of the U.S. mission. A huge American purse was being emptied in parts of Iraq about which the 

State Department knew little, and the success in realizing its goal—developing 

a functional local government—was hard to measure. 

An audit of the LGP program by the USAID Inspector General in 2007 found 

that “the local governance activities did not have intended outputs or baselines 

to measure progress against because USAID/Iraq failed to enforce contract requirements.” The inspector general’s office also stated, “In our view, [USAID’s 

contractor] reported only on successful achievements rather than progress 

achieved toward specified targets.”45 A subsequent SIGIR audit raised similar 

concerns, noting that although program outcomes appeared to be positive, identifying and tracking project funds and outcomes required improvement.46

The LGP’s high-water mark of institution building was the creation of the 

Iraq Local Government Association in August 2006. Council members across 

Iraq recognized the need for a local government advocacy group within Iraq’s 

developing political framework. With USAID support, members of the Baghdad 

provincial council worked throughout the summer of 2006 to plan a conference in Baghdad that would be a vehicle for provincial authorities to lobby 

the national government, which was attempting to draft a provincial powers 

law. Council members from around the country wanted to make sure that the 
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• Chapter 23 •

process of political decentralization would not be derailed. Conference attendees included 110 representatives from all of Iraq’s 18 provincial councils. 

They unanimously adopted a draft local government code and moved to form a 

permanent Local Government Association, electing a member of the Baghdad 

Provincial Council as its chair. 

The Local Government Association became a single voice speaking at the 

national level for local institutions and built a caucus of support in the Council 

of Representatives.47 It was an impressive opening of a dialogue between Iraq’s 

local and national leaders over how the devolution of power would proceed and 

how the capacities of local government would develop. 

Barriers to Progress

Despite the Coalition’s best efforts, the provision of government services became 

more rather than less politicized in the years following the CPA. By 2006, the U.S. 

approach to democratizing Iraq, while simultaneously federalizing its government structures, yielded mixed results. The local and district councils created 

immediately after the invasion had not become formally linked to the directors 

general who administered services using funding provided by the central government. Soon, ministries were deeply riddled with partisan infighting. The elections 

that were to be the capstone of a new democracy were based on a formula that 

only increased the forces driving Iraqis apart. The failure to hold new provincial 

elections also compromised the legitimacy of provincial councils through with 

which power was to be shared. 

Even though Iraq’s constitution ostensibly defined the framework for a unified state, political authority had fragmented into Kurdish, Arab Shi’a, and Arab 

Sunni constituencies, themselves split by deep and violent divisions. Rival Shi’a 

parties, each with their own militias, fought over key government positions in 

the south and over the central question of federal unification. In the Sunni areas, 

a combustible mix of terrorists, insurgents, and powerful rural tribes rejected 

Shi’a dominance in a government that was the inevitable result of nominally 

democratic elections. Despite the deployment of substantial Coalition resources 

beyond the Green Zone, there seemed to be an unbridgeable gap between provincial governments and the increasingly isolated national government.

By the end of 2006, U.S. officials agreed that the single most important governance challenge was to strengthen the connection between Iraq’s national and 

provincial institutions, so services could be delivered and government properly 

administered in the new decentralized framework. “Capacity building”—ensuring the ability of the Iraqi government to handle its own affairs—became 

the catchword for reconstruction’s next phase. Doing this would require the 
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• Returning to the Provinces •

Coalition to continue stitching together its “top-down” efforts in Baghdad with 

the “bottom-up” efforts in the provinces, linking all levels of the Iraqi government 

and the reconstruction. While this effort was underway, a series of failures in 

reconstruction projects turned over to Iraqi control underlined how important 

Iraqi capacity would be. The sustainment of facilities had fallen into crisis, yet 

another casualty of Iraq’s failed administrative state.
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Chapter 24

The Primacy of Capacity Development

Our job is not to build it for them, our job is to help them build 

the capacity so that they can use their own substantial resources 

to do things for themselves.* 

Ambassador Joseph Saloom

Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (2006-2007)

On most days in Baghdad, plumes of black smoke from at least one of the Doura 

power plant smokestacks are visible in the southwest sky—a sign that the generators beneath them are turning, putting a few dozen megawatts each on the grid. 

Blue sky over Doura almost always means that something is wrong, as was the 

case in August 2006, when an electrical surge disabled the plant. Despite a threeyear, $90-million project to restore it, the plant that supplied much of Baghdad’s 

power ground to a halt.1

Doura’s failure had many causes. Plant technicians had overlooked dust and 

debris collecting in the generators’ cooling systems. The debris should have been 

discovered by a routine check, but plant managers had yet to establish a formal 

maintenance program for Doura’s equipment. They had also followed orders 

from directors general at the Ministry of Electricity to swap critical components 

between the generators, which caused parts to deteriorate faster and break down 

more frequently. The directors general themselves were hamstrung by a ministry 

policy that forbade plant-level employees from purchasing replacement parts 

before emergencies occurred.2

 The minister was under pressure from the Prime 

Minister, who gave continuous power-generation precedence over scheduled 

shut-downs for repairs.3

 Ultimately, this chain of failures was a product of U.S. 

reconstruction policy that emphasized rebuilding Iraq’s physical infrastructure 

but not the institutions to maintain it. 

All across Iraq in late 2005 and beyond, a series of SIGIR inspections discovered that physical infrastructure put in place by U.S.-funded reconstruction was 

breaking down and coming off-line.4

 Failures plagued both refurbished and new 

facilities in the water, electrical, sewer, and oil sectors. It was not just a question 

of maintaining individual plants and teaching Iraqi engineers who run them to 

master more advanced machinery. It was about building the systems and processes within Iraq’s government to sustain the infrastructure it had just received. 

* SIGIR interview with Ambassador Joseph Saloom, former IRMO director, April 21, 2008. 
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• The Primacy of Capacity Development •

Unless the government could manage these necessary operations, the Doura 

power plant and facilities like it would continue to fall apart. 

From the beginning, reconstruction policymakers knew it would be a 

challenge to build capacity inside Iraq’s government and marshal it to sustain 

reconstruction facilities.5

 A variety of U.S. agencies and organizations made efforts to develop functioning institutions within Iraq’s ministries, but—despite 

millions of dollars in contracts and, at times, furious activity—the embassy failed 

to create large-scale capacity-building programs until late 2006. Even then, the 

effectiveness of the U.S. strategy was mixed. 

Iraq’s Capacity Crisis 

In Iraq, the story of capacity development—the ability of the government to operate effectively—begins with Saddam Hussein. Iraq’s government did function 

before the 2003 invasion. Despite significant deficiencies on every front, some 

three dozen ministries controlled virtually every factory, warehouse, administrative office, and service facility in the Iraqi inventory, as well as the distribution 

of essential commodities, including fuel and food. Even after the imposition of 

international sanctions choked the flow of spare parts and cash, the Saddam regime expected its ministries to perform as usual. 

To meet Saddam’s demands, officials became “entrepreneurial” and, at times, 

draconian. Ministries made shadowy credit arrangements so that ledgers would 

remain in the black; raw materials produced within Iraq were stockpiled and often 

withheld from other ministries; ministries imported materials in contravention 

of international sanctions; and a climate of fear kept workers in line.6

 Power over 

the ministries was jealously guarded by Iraqi officials at the highest ranks, many 

of whom sought to profit from their positions.7

 All these practices left a legacy of 

corruption for the embassy to try to overcome. 

Looting following the 2003 invasion dealt the first major blow to government 

capacity. Next came the exodus of both people and property from Iraq’s government offices, effectively redefining reconstruction from restarting a government 

to building one anew. The goal was to restore the core capacities of government—

its strategic and policy-planning ability, as well as its financial, information, and 

human resources management. To this end, USAID contracted in July 2003 with 

BearingPoint to give Iraq’s Ministry of Finance the tools to start collecting, tracking, and disbursing state revenue.8

 Part of the BearingPoint contract required the 

provision of a state-of-the-art financial management information system, which 

turned out to be unworkable. It was a harbinger of the challenges to come: having 

been built with U.S. rather than Iraqi accounting practices in mind, it was rejected 

by the Iraqi civil servants who were to use it.9
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• Chapter 24 •

In the summer of 2003, three major funding streams—CERP, IRRF 1, and 

the DFI—were available for capacity-building efforts. Working independent of 

U.S. government agencies, CPA senior advisors drew on what they could get 

from the military and USAID, as well as on funds for projects approved by the 

Program Review Board. Most funds came from Iraqi money in the DFI. More 

than $10 billion was set aside during the first year for ministerial operations; $1.2 

billion came from U.S. funds.10

Down in the trenches of reconstruction, U.S. military engineers and international contractors were in a position to develop sustainment programs for the 

effective operations and maintenance of the infrastructure projects they were 

building. But the IRRF 1 contract with Bechtel, like the other infrastructure contracts, did not emphasize sustainment. A short paragraph in the contract required 

Bechtel to “provide technical assistance and training to build the capacity for 

effective operation and maintenance.”11 What the sustainment programs might 

include or how their success would be measured was not specified.

USAID officials in charge of administering the IRRF 1 contracts assumed that 

a core cadre of ministry employees would carry over the maintenance practices of 

the old era.12 The CPA, however, had dismissed many of those ministry employees in the de-Ba’athification process, and those that remained found it difficult 

to push past the culture of centralized management and take responsibility for 

maintaining local facilities.13 Even if Iraqi officials had taken the initiative, few in 

the summer of 2003 had functioning procurement systems or even regular communication with ministry offices in Baghdad. USAID’s second Bechtel contract, 

reflecting the expansion of reconstruction’s scope and duration under IRRF 2, 

placed greater emphasis on maintenance and sustainability. It required that every 

job order written under the contract specify the level of technical capacity that 

would be passed to the Iraqis.14

As the CPA’s PMO grew to administer the larger part of IRRF 2 funding, it 

too approached capacity building and sustainability with greater purpose. PMO 

internal guidelines suggested that contracting officers use Iraqi services “to the 

greatest extent practicable,” and that design-build contractors collaborate with 

ministries in drafting project requirements. As much as 16 percent of a contractor’s award fee became dependent on the ability to train local staff and transition 

projects effectively to the Iraqis.15

Simply writing language into IRRF 2 contracts, however, did not constitute 

a true sustainability program. There was no U.S. commitment to fund projects 

aimed exclusively at maintenance objectives, an oversight that troubled USAID 

officials experienced with infrastructure construction in the developing world. 

In their view, PMO’s staff, largely composed of engineers without development 
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• The Primacy of Capacity Development •

experience, tended to issue infrastructure contracts without attention to follow-on 

maintenance.16 USAID’s own infrastructure cell was acutely aware of the problem 

by late winter 2004, but the agency’s loss of influence during the early CPA period marginalized its ability to advocate for sustainability contracts.17 “Bremer,” 

according to USAID Mission Director Spike Stephenson, “was not interested 

in anything but construction.”18 The CPA went so far as to remove $50 million 

from an operations and maintenance budget that USAID proposed.19 Although 

specific task orders would allow training at the ministry level to continue, the lack 

of dedicated sustainability contracts left it to the Iraqis to make critical purchases 

for maintaining facilities—which most ministries were unable to do.20

Despite the lack of emphasis on sustainability and capacity building, some 

international contractors found that the professional development of Iraqi 

subcontractors was in their own best interests. They went beyond what was required by their contracts to establish substantial training programs. One example, 

“Bechtel University,” introduced a cadre of Iraqi contractors to international procurement policies, safety routines, and quality assurance practices.21 The theory 

was that if Iraqi firms were taught these skills, they would effectively use them in 

the future. Graduates of Bechtel University later took leadership roles in other 

reconstruction projects.22

Widespread success in IRRF-sponsored training programs at the plant level, 

however, was elusive in 2003 and 2004. Thomas Wheelock, who helped lead 

USAID’s management of the Bechtel IRRF contracts, noted that there was such 

a range of competence among Iraqi technicians that it was difficult to design any 

universally applicable curricula. Some of the greatest challenges to facility-level 

sustainability were found in the management ranks at central ministries, where 

maintenance programs were designed and critical spare parts were procured. 

The PMO could require sustainment measures in the task orders it issued to contractors, but without a program to link them to efforts at the ministry level, there 

was little chance for long-term, effective management.23 In the reconstruction 

program’s first two years, there was no coordinated effort among the U.S. organizations working in Iraq to draft and implement strategies for interagency capacity 

building or sustainment that would reach all parts of the reconstruction effort. 

The Problem of Sustainability 

In the fall of 2004, Bruce Parmelee, a program officer in USAID’s Community 

Action Program, discovered a rehabilitated water-treatment plant on the outskirts 

of Hilla sitting idle after repairs costing $5 million. Work on the plant had been 

completed, but there was no effective effort to transfer the facility to local Iraqi 

authorities. Because the job order focused only on the facility, contractors did not 
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connect the plant to the city’s network of water-pipes and sewers or teach Iraqi 

employees how to use it. Few people in Hilla even knew it existed, and the facility 

had already started to decay. It was a perfect example of the failure to incorporate 

an adequate plan for transfer and sustainability.24

A similar set of sustainment issues arose across the reconstruction effort in 

2004 and 2005.25 Contracts written for physical reconstruction frequently left 

out the crucial next step of ensuring that the new facilities would be used and 

maintained. A policy of keeping international contractors on hand for 90 days 

to assist with early operations was seen by IRMO as woefully insufficient.26 The 

security situation compounded the challenge, with targeted attacks on infrastructure, the withdrawal of international engineers, and widespread attrition among 

Iraqi technicians. The effort was also affected by Iraq’s political process, which 

led to constant changes in ministries’ leadership in the three years before the 

installation of a permanent government in 2006.27

All of these factors hampered the delivery of essential services that reconstruction was supposed to provide. The major indicators of government performance 

in 2004 and 2005 were generally flat.28 “It became clear,” Ambassador David 

Satterfield said, “that we ran the real risk of huge multi-million dollar projects...

sitting alone, non-operative, because we had not put the same focus on sustainability as we have on building it.” Satterfield added, “It had been assumed that 

Iraqis would take on the last-mile connectivity but they never did.”29

PCO Addresses Capacity Development 

Working closely with contractors building essential services facilities, PCO 

took the earliest steps to prioritize sustainability efforts. Much of the initiative 

began in the water sector where, by the late summer of 2004, the sheer number 

of projects outlined by the IRRF 2 spending plan convinced water-sector program managers that a separate capacity-development program was necessary. 

The 79-page Management and Interface Plan, which PCO briefed to agencies, 

think-tanks, congressional staff, and contractors, outlined five critical levels at 

which the embassy could help develop the Iraqi government’s capacity to sustain 

reconstruction.30

The PCO focused on level 5 of this framework—infrastructure—while encouraging other parts of the U.S. mission to engage further upstream. By early 

2005, the mission had established an internal office, staffed by two people in 

Baghdad and two in Washington, specifically charged with coordinating PCO’s 

capacity-development initiatives. In March 2005, PCO modified statements of 

work for the IRRF 2 sector program-manager support contractors to include key 

sustainability objectives.31
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• The Primacy of Capacity Development •

The PCO sustainability office also created reporting systems that tracked the 

new contract requirements, ranging from the number of Iraqi technicians trained 

on a project to documenting overall lessons learned by contractors working in 

the field. One result was a new set of confidential PCO databases that tracked 

the effectiveness of all Iraqi subcontractors hired by the design-build contractors, as well as the progress of PCO-sponsored capacity-development activities.32 

Training programs run by prime contractors ultimately reached 509,000 Iraqis 

and comprised more than a million hours of training.33

The focus on sustainability by the PCO eventually led it to look beyond the infrastructure level. In 2005, it established eight technical learning centers in seven 

provinces.34 The centers offered hands-on training in equipment maintenance 

and engineering innovations that had been unknown in sanctions-era Iraq. Six 

focused on the water sector, the first sector to embrace all aspects of PCO’s sustainment strategy, and two were established for workers in oil and electricity.35

Further up the ladder, a new PCO grant program encouraged ministries 

to shoulder a larger portion of the management of reconstruction. The PCO 

would reimburse ministries for the costs of projects if they agreed to manage 

their planning, solicitation, bidding, financing, and construction. The entire 

PCO’s Five-Level Approach

Level 1

Policy

Level 2

Laws and Regulations

Level 3

Inter-Organizational

Level 4

Iraqi Ministries

Level 5

Infrastructure

Functions Responsible Parties

Interface

Interface

Interface

Interface

Iraqi Policy, Strategy, 

Program Direction

Drivers (e.g., 

Requirements, Incentive 

Structures, Budgets)

Focus on Required

Management Interfaces 

between Iraqi Ministries

Institutional Development (e.g., 

Structures, Missions, Business 

Systems/Processes, Integrated 

Logistics Support,HR)

Labor Force Development 

and Training at 

Facility/System Level

US State Department, 

USAID, IRMO, World Bank, 

Donors, Iraqis

GRD/PCO, USAID, 

JCC-I/A, World Bank, 

Donors, Iraqis

US State Department, 

USAID, IRMO, GRD/PCO, 

World Bank, Donors, Iraqis

US State Department, 

USAID, IRMO, World Bank, 

Donors, Iraqis

US State Department, 

USAID, IRMO, World Bank, 

Donors, Iraqis

Legend

Policy and 

Direction

Information, 

Reporting

Source: PCO, “Capacity Development: A Foundation for 

a Sustainable Future,” undated.
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capacity-building effort, from vocational training to ministerial agreements, was 

encapsulated in an IRMO white paper in May 2005. The paper praised the “PCO 

Management and Interface Plan,” which became the basis of the first interagency 

capacity development strategy in Iraq reconstruction.36

However, this strategy—and, in particular, the cooperation it presumed 

between IRMO, the State Department, USAID, and PCO—did not take hold 

in 2005. Events quickly overtook the white papers circulating in the embassy. 

During Ambassador Khalilzad’s tenure, failures in infrastructure sustainment 

became more significant. More completed projects were not operating, and essential service benchmarks in key sectors like electricity and oil remained unmet.37

Nearly a year after the PCO introduced its interagency engagement strategy, the 

State Department concluded that a more “integrated approach was essential.” 

Agencies had implemented reconstruction programs “without a clear understanding of the programs’ objectives or their contribution to the larger goal of 

transferring responsibility for reconstruction to the Iraqi government.”38

Reorganizing Capacity-Development Efforts 

The Department of State initiated a “National Capacity Development Program” 

in late 2005. The plan focused on the twelve key ministries that accounted for 65 

percent of Iraq’s government workforce of 2.2 million people, and oversaw 74 

percent of the national budget. Instead of assigning responsibility for the ten civilian ministries to one organization or agency—as had been done for the Ministries 

of Interior and Defense—the embassy asked USAID to focus on medium-term 

capacity issues while IRMO and the Departments of State looked after immediate needs.39 “We tried to build on the senior consultants,” recalled Ambassador 

Speckhard, who served first as IRMO director and then as deputy chief of mission 

under Ambassador Khalilzad. “The first step was to go out and have each one of 

them do an intensive survey of their own ministries to make judgments on how 

they were doing on strategic planning, on leadership and personnel, on budget 

and finance, and on public communications.”40

The Embassy tapped IRMO to coordinate the new capacity-building effort, 

but overseeing the capacity-development activities of so many permanent and 

semi-permanent agencies in the U.S. government proved too tall an order for an 

ad hoc group of senior consultants.41 The consultants’ principal charge had always 

been to maintain relationships with key Iraqi officials—including the minister—

in each ministry, allowing the exchange of information and resources between the 

embassy and the Iraqi government. Many senior consultants focused on keeping 

these crucial connections going and simply did not have the time to deal with all 

the other U.S. agencies who were supposed to be involved in capacity building. 
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IRMO was itself burdened with developing its own capacity—that is, recruiting enough qualified advisors to replace those who were leaving. “Every year,” 

Ambassador Speckhard said, “you’re turning over some 90 percent.”42

In March 2006, when it became apparent that IRMO alone could not effectively coordinate the initiative, the deputy chief of mission ordered the creation of 

a Ministerial Capacity Team. The idea was to link the work of senior consultants 

with other efforts in the Green Zone by bringing everyone together in a coordinating body. Vested with a $15 million dollar budget, the Ministerial Capacity 

Team began a series of efforts to build capacity into the ministries. It constructed 

a new press room for the office of the prime minister, created a digitized copy of 

the Iraqi legal code, and assembled a much-needed survey of Iraq’s health infrastructure. Projects like this, however, did not amount to a systemic strategy for 

correcting plant-level failures by redressing ministerial deficits at the top.43

By summer 2006, the formula changed yet again. Thirty officers from Coalition 

forces and a similar number of reporting officers from the State Department 

joined IRMO senior advisors in what were called Ministerial Assistance Teams.44

The teams developed one-year programs designed to jump-start capacity just as 

ministries received permanent ministers for the first time. By early 2007, twenty 

advisors worked in the Ministry of Oil, eighteen in the Ministry of Finance, and 

eighteen in the Ministry of Electricity.45

The introduction of new faces into a tightly knit group of advisors and ministers—one that already had to work around language barriers, cultural differences, 

and gaps in technical knowledge—disrupted the solid relationships that had 

been established. For this reason, the ministry assistance teams failed to gain the 

necessary momentum. Neither IRMO’s senior consultants nor the Iraqi ministry 

officials who for three years had built very specific partnerships wanted others 

to intrude.46

The failure of Ministerial Assistance Teams in 2006 opened again the question of who was in control. In 2006, the embassy created a Joint Task Force for 

Capacity Development that included representatives from USACE, USAID, 

MNSTC-I, the embassy, and IRMO.47 For the first time in more than three years, 

a central body met to oversee the agencies and organizations that had significant 

relationships with various components of the Iraqi government. Unfortunately, 

the task force was yet another meeting of men and women in the Green Zone 

who lacked the authority to mandate action by their constituent agencies.48

The task force coincided with a new initiative by USAID to provide medium-term capacity assistance to Iraqi ministries. The $165 million Tatweer

program—Arabic for “development”—focused initially on enhancing the professional qualifications of civil servants at the ministries of Planning, Finance, Oil, 
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Electricity, and Water Resources. Management Systems International (MSI), 

USAID’s implementing partner, intended to attach its own training programs 

to Iraq’s National Center for Consultation and Management Development, a 

training academy in Baghdad’s suburbs run by the Ministry of Planning. MSI 

also sought to establish its own ministry assistance teams staffed by Arabicspeaking advisors.49

Implementation of the Tatweer program was slow. By December 2006, MSI 

had positioned advisors in only the Ministries of Oil and Electricity, even though 

the other ten civilian ministries mentioned in the National Capacity Development 

Plan were scheduled for assistance. The lack of MSI advisors and the limited 

reach of the Ministerial Coordination Team over USAID programs seriously 

compromised the overall effort.The Center for Consultation and Management 

Development did not fare much better. By December 2006, USAID reported 

that the center’s ability to host and expand on MSI training programs was limited.50 Two subsequent audits found that implementers were having difficulty 

finding Iraqis who were willing to participate in the training programs, and that 

the center prohibited foreign advisors from visiting its premises because their 

presence would draw attention to the compound and create a security risk to 

Iraqi attendees.51

To direct these myriad activities, the embassy turned finally to the Joint 

Executive Steering Committee. With high-ranking representatives from MNFI, USAID, GRD, MNSTC-I, IRMO, and each embassy section, the steering 

committee had originally served as the policy planner for the emergent PRT 

program. In late summer 2006, the steering committee’s mandate was enlarged 

to make it the strategic hub for all joint efforts among agencies in Iraq, including 

capacity-building programs.52 The Joint Task Force on Capacity Development 

now reported to the steering committee, which was chaired by the deputy chief of 

mission.53 Although this structure in theory brought the ambassador into closer 

contact with the capacity-development program, policy influence remained with 

IRMO, whose director frequently chaired steering committee meetings in the 

absence of the deputy chief of mission.54

An imminent deadline soon complicated these arrangements. In the continuing effort to “normalize” operations, the embassy set IRMO’s demise as 

an organization for early 2007. IRMO’s last director, Ambassador Joe Saloom, 

arrived in May 2006 to begin shutting down the three-year-old organization.55

His own perception was that the State Department wanted to create a year-long 

“glide-path” for senior consultants, who would continue overseeing reconstruction in their ministries, but increasingly under the direction of section heads at 

the embassy.56 It was all part of a trend to bring the functions of many ad hoc 
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offices created to manage reconstruction together under the traditional embassy 

structure, with its political and economic sections.

The transition to Saloom’s leadership in IRMO revived the search for adequate 

measures of success in capacity development. IRMO’s initial effort—started in 

September 2006 to measure core indicators of Iraqi ministry capacity—quickly 

ran out of steam and failed to produce further findings.57 Nevertheless, the assessment confirmed that most ministry staff lacked sufficient training to do their 

jobs, and that a quarter of all ministerial functions depended on Coalition or 

other foreign support.58

The Rise of Budget Execution

By late 2006, a growing awareness that the Iraqi government was ill-prepared to 

move money from its treasury to the many offices that actually spend the budget helped bring focus to the capacity-building program. Iraq’s capital reserves 

were growing, and much of the money was not being spent. Embassy officials 

wanted to prepare for the day when Iraqi revenues alone would carry reconstruction forward.59 Exasperated with the scope of ongoing capacity-building efforts, 

IRMO leaders were happy to narrow their focus. “It became obvious, once again,” 

Ambassador Speckhard said, “that we bit off more than we could chew, in the 

timeframes we were talking about.” “To make noticeable differences in the shortterm,” he said, “you really need to focus on a few things.”60

With new input from the Ambassador and a working group established on 

budget execution, U.S. officials zeroed in on the failure of Iraqi institutions to 

spend their capital budgets, citing it as “the most important capacity restraint 

to the Government of Iraq’s performance.”61 Improving the ability of the Iraqi 

government to spend its own revenue became the keystone in a new arc of 

capacity-development activities. It was all part of a shift in the reconstruction 

program to supporting Iraqi priorities with Iraqi resources. Iraqi budget performance would be tracked daily on both the civilian and military side of the U.S. 

program, and all efforts would be made to increase the rate at which Iraqi money 

flowed from ministry budgets to reconstruction contracts.

Once the embassy identified budget execution as a clear measure of progress, 

it marshaled nearly every agency at its disposal to improve it. IRMO, JCC-I, the 

Department of the Treasury, USACE, the embassy economic section, and the 

ambassador’s front office all became deeply involved in providing program management and contracting assistance to Iraqi ministries. The Iraqi Prime Minister’s 

office and the office of Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih also engaged in 

the effort. Salih convened weekly meetings on procurement and spending approval processes with the Ministers of Planning and Finance and officials in 
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provincial and city government.62 It was an “all-government approach,” according to Ambassador Saloom. 63

The Ministry of Planning was one of the weak links in the chain. Iraqi law requires the Ministry of Planning to approve all requests for funding by other parts 

of the Iraqi government. Only after receiving Ministry of Planning approval can 

the Ministry of Finance disburse funds to ministries or provinces. A Ministry of 

Planning “fusion cell” was created. Dozens of Americans, many of them of Iraqi 

origin, took desks next to ministry employees in order to coach them at every step. 

In some cases, they even answered the phones. The support of Iraqi bureaucrats, 

often untrained and not used to making major funding decisions, accelerated the 

pace at which the Iraqi government increased its capital expenditures.64

These innovative efforts yielded modest results at first. Before budget execution was identified as a priority, the Iraqi government as a whole spent just 17 

percent of its capital budgets, meaning that badly needed infrastructure projects 

had either not begun or were being executed entirely with U.S. funds.65 In 2007, 

the government substantially improved budget execution at the ministerial level, 

spending $4 billion of its $7.9 billion capital budget for an execution rate of just 

over 51 percent. Results in the provinces, however, were mixed. Rates varied from 

a high of 64 percent in Najaf to zero in Diyala province. Strategically crucial Anbar 

province reported spending only $4 million of the $107 million available—an 

execution rate of less than 4 percent.66

Violence was also a major impediment. “The bread and butter of a director general’s job is dealing with his superiors in Baghdad,” Treasury attaché Jeremy Pam 

explained. “Without a war on, he would go back to Baghdad every two weeks. But if 

he can’t drive on the roads, you have the different levels of government increasingly 

cut off from each other.” “Imagine,” Pam said, “if the Internet went down, and you 

didn’t have email. Our budget execution would go down, too.”67

The U.S. mission’s focus on budget execution raised two fundamental issues. 

The first was whether it was wise to be so concerned about the Iraqi capacity to 

spend money quickly.68 The second had to do with the long-term value of the 

more intensive capacity-building approaches directed at the security ministries 

and the Ministry of Planning. In 2007, a GAO audit of the capacity-development 

program concluded that with so many international advisors in effect “sitting 

in” for Iraqi government employees, “the Coalition’s involvement in [Iraq’s] 

budgeting and procurement processes may have hindered the ministries’ capacity to improve their own procurement and contracting systems and perform 

other vital services.”69 “We were not convinced that ministries actually were 

building their own capacity to do those things that we were doing for them,” 

Ambassador Satterfield said.70
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• The Primacy of Capacity Development •

Transferring Completed Projects 

As the United States worked to enhance ministerial capacity, the process for 

transferring completed reconstruction projects to the Iraq government broke 

down. Beginning in 2006, a series of SIGIR audits revealed that the process of 

asset transfer—as project handover is formally called—was not ensuring that the 

Iraqi government was capable and willing to assume responsibility for maintaining 

U.S.-built facilities.71 Transferring responsibility for sophisticated facilities, such as 

electrical or water treatment plants worth tens of millions of dollars, was a difficult 

task by any measure. Detailed operational and maintenance procedures had to be 

drawn up. Manuals and technical documentation had to be handed over. Most 

critically, the Iraqis had to be adequately trained to operate and maintain the facilities on their own, a task that would require careful planning and budgeting skills 

in perpetuity, at both the facility and the ministry responsible for it. 

The breakdown between Iraq’s central and local governments made asset 

transfer an especially arduous task. A municipality’s pledge to care for a facility 

was no guarantee that the central ministry actually responsible for its upkeep was 

prepared to support it over the long term—or even knew it existed. Handing 

over smaller projects, such as schools and clinics, was also fraught with difficulty. 

Although not necessarily difficult to maintain or operate, smaller projects still 

needed to be kept supplied and staffed year after year to realize the full value of 

U.S. investment.

The asset transfer process was the ultimate test of Iraqi buy-in to the U.S. reconstruction effort. If done properly, it would provide three crucial checks. First, 

it would ensure formal recognition by the Iraqi government that a project was 

satisfactorily complete and ready for transfer. Second, it would provide an opportunity for the Iraqi ministries involved in operating and maintaining the facility 

to acknowledge their technical readiness and show that they had dedicated adequate budgetary and personnel resources for all future operations, maintenance, 

and capital-replacement costs. Third, and most important, it would provide an 

occasion for the United States and the Iraqi government to certify that the U.S. 

investment would be cared for responsibly in the years to come.72

The scope of asset transfer, like the reconstruction itself, was enormous and 

involved many projects that the Iraqis never agreed to or wanted in the first place. 

By the middle of 2006, 579 IRRF projects, valued at $765 million, had been 

officially transferred to the Iraqi Ministry of Finance. However, this was only 

18 percent of the total number of completed IRRF projects. Still more projects 

would come from the other reconstruction funds, including CERP and the 

ISFF. The cost of maintaining IRRF projects alone was estimated in 2006 at 

approximately $1.2 billion annually. As that year drew to a close, the United 
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States planned to have the Iraqis shoulder most of this burden. An estimated 

$372 million in sustainment funds would be available within IRRF for short-term 

operations, spare parts, consumables, and contracted support during 2007. The 

government of Iraq would fund the remaining $828 million.73

One of the flaws of the asset transfer approach as it was structured in 2006 

was that each U.S. agency working in Iraq had different procedures, levels of 

detail, and due diligence requirements for transferring projects. A sampling 

showed that one agency provided an exhaustive accounting of asset values and 

maintenance requirements in its transfer package while another provided no 

information at all.74 Procedures differed even within agencies for separate reconstruction funds. 

SIGIR’s asset transfer audits found that the lack of uniformity confused Iraqis 

and caused some assets to be transferred to Iraqi control with insufficient technical documentation. SIGIR recommended that, at a minimum, U.S. managers 

provide formal notification of a project’s transfer to the Iraqi Ministry of Planning, 

Ministry of Finance, and the appropriate operating ministry. The notification 

should list all relevant data and specifications that would allow the Iraqis to plan 

better for long-term upkeep, including the start date, asset cost, estimated shortterm and long-term sustainability costs, terms of warranties, and the location of 

maintenance and systems manuals.75

The lack of one centralized authority to manage asset transfer for the entire 

U.S. reconstruction effort was problematic. Policy guidance issued by the embassy’s Asset Transfer Working Group in April 2006 was not binding. Agencies 

were pursuing different and uncoordinated approaches to transferring completed 

assets to Iraqi control.

In mid-2008, a SIGIR audit found that U.S. agencies continued to develop 

their own transfer procedures—confusing the government of Iraq in the process. USAID, for instance, elected not to use the process established by the Asset 

Transfer Working Group. MNSTC-I took a different approach altogether, trying to develop the capacity within the MoI to sustain all transferred projects.76

MNSTC-I unilaterally transferred 388 projects to the government of Iraq even 

though they did not obtain formal assent—thus putting a billion dollars of U.S. 

investment at potential risk.77

Unilateral transfers caused many problems. A report in 2007 by the BSA, 

Iraq’s audit agency, found that many Iraqi ministries did not have records showing the U.S.-funded reconstruction projects supposedly under their control.78

Later modifications to the asset transfer policy addressed some of the issues identified by the reviews, but these modifications did not apply to all projects provided 

by U.S. reconstruction funds and did not centralize the management of the asset 
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• The Primacy of Capacity Development •

transfer process. The Iraqi government also failed to respond to a memorandum 

of agreement forwarded by the United States, leaving any policy agreement between the two governments at an impasse into the fall of 2008.79

Beyond the Green Zone

By late 2005, nurturing capacity at the provincial and municipal levels had 

become a strategic objective. Four Coalition entities were at work supporting 

the development of capacity in local and provincial governments: Provincial 

Reconstruction Development Councils, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, 

Brigade Combat Teams, and USAID’s Local Governance Program. In 2006, 

policymakers used each of these institutions to help link the capacity development underway in Baghdad with efforts in the provinces. 

PRDCs became a way to tutor Iraqi officials in program and project management while at the same time increasing the Iraqis’ commitment to maintaining 

U.S. projects. “We were dissatisfied with what appeared to be a disconnect 

between our projects and Iraqi sense of ownership and buy-in,” Ambassador 

Satterfield explained. “We were creating white elephants that did not have Iraqi 

buy-in or training to keep going.” PRDCs fostered joint decision making between 

American and Iraqi officials and helped harness Iraqi government capacity in 

the ongoing reconstruction. “The skills gained in doing [the PRDC process],” 

Satterfield said, “would then translate into the ability to use Iraqi funds when the 

provinces were funded.”80

PRTs also played a leading role. Having existed principally as capacity-building institutions, PRTs were staffed to provide guidance to provincial councils, 

governors, directors general, and other local officials. As violence increased across 

Iraq in 2006, new tasks were given to the PRTs, including the execution of economic components of counterinsurgency programs. Becoming an important link 

between provincial reconstruction efforts and the military’s counterinsurgency 

strategy, however, risked undermining PRTs’ original capacity-building mission.81 At first, they were not equipped to become project and program managers 

in their own right.82 The solution was more staff and support from Baghdad, but 

the National Coordination Team, which came to supplant the role of IRMO’s 

Directorate of Operations in overseeing PRTs, was unable to keep pace with the 

increased demands. 

In the spring of 2007, with the PRTs fully deployed, the embassy attempted 

to address staffing and capability shortages for both the teams and the offices that 

supported them from Baghdad by developing a new organization, the Office of 

Provincial Affairs (OPA), with a “direct-report” to the ambassador. This bureaucratic restructuring, along with the appointment of a more senior official to head 
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the office, gave the PRT program a greater opportunity to help lead capacity-development efforts in the provinces. OPA, however, was not well staffed, and at first 

was overwhelmed with carrying out basic reporting and support functions.83

Capacity Building: A Missed Opportunity

Despite the importance of comprehensive capacity-development and sustainment 

programs to the long-term success of the U.S. mission in Iraq, the United States 

failed to develop them in the initial years after the invasion. This did not mean that 

reconstruction officials completely ignored the problem. In the first year of occupation, the CPA expended more than $10 billion of Iraqi and U.S. funds on ministry 

operations.84 In 2004, the PCO modified contracts and introduced a series of 

programs designed to address emerging sustainability challenges in infrastructure 

rebuilding. By the end of 2006, the U.S. government allocated $169 million to 

build Iraq’s governing capacity, and many sustainment efforts began.85

A unified effort to coordinate capacity-building activities proved to be elusive. Officials concentrated on what they knew: diplomats focused on political 

reform, businesspeople on the Iraqi private sector, and engineers on sustaining 

facilities. As a result, many of the weak links in the chain of Iraqi institutions were 

neither understood nor properly addressed, leading to a crisis of Iraqi government mismanagement. Efforts to address this crisis have had only partial success. 

Years after some capacity-building programs began, it was not clear whether 

they had any lasting effect, and no overall strategy had been put in place until 

the end of 2007.86

A look at Diyala province four years after the invasion illustrates how slowly 

Iraq’s governing capacity had developed. None of Diyala’s service directorates 

had a dedicated maintenance budget. Although central-government ministries 

still controlled 80 percent of Iraq’s capital budgets in 2007, the local government 

in Diyala knew no more about ministry projects planned in its territory than it 

did in 2004.87

These shortfalls raise hard questions about how capacity-development programs in Iraq should have been managed. While MNSTC-I flooded the ministries 

of Interior and Defense with more than 200 advisors, each working hand-in-hand 

with Iraqi counterparts, the ten other major civilian ministries had only a handful 

of advisors, except for those involved in the Ministry of Planning effort to increase 

budget execution. 

Finally, the lack of security threatened all capacity-development efforts. Iraqi 

officials often had to limit their days at the office to just two or three hours because of threats from insurgents and warring sects and the length of time it took 

to navigate safely the checkpoints between home and workplace. By 2007, the 
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• The Primacy of Capacity Development •

kidnapping and killing of capacity-development advisors when they left the Green 

Zone led to restrictive policies that limited contacts between Coalition and Iraqi 

officials, sometimes preventing interaction altogether.88 Raising a new system 

of government and endowing it with the capacity to sustain its infrastructure 

effectively was a never-ending challenge, one that still had not been overcome 

toward the end of 2008.
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Chapter 25

Reconstruction Amid Sectarian Violence

To provide security you need to engage people. You need to tackle 

unemployment. You need to create job opportunities, substantial 

opportunity so people would be more involved in their well-being 

rather than explosives and insurgency.* 

Dr. Ayad Allawi 

Prime Minister of Iraq (2004-2005)

Hope that Iraq’s democratic elections would defuse sectarian tensions unraveled 

on the morning of February 22, 2006. At five minutes before seven, al-Qaeda 

terrorists in Samarra destroyed the golden dome of the al-Askari mosque, the 

revered Shi’a holy site on the east bank of the Tigris River, 60 miles north of 

Baghdad. Desecrating the gravesite of the Tenth and Eleventh Imams was a psychic blow to Iraq’s Shi’a and accelerated the pace of sectarian killing that had been 

rising steadily for months. At least 1,300 Iraqis, mostly Sunni, were murdered in 

the next four days, many slain in the streets by organized killing squads associated 

with the militia of Muqtada al-Sadr.1

The humanitarian and political crisis precipitated by the Samarra bombing forced reconstruction policymakers to shift course on a number of fronts. 

Refugees posed the first problem. A quarter-million Iraqis fled their homes, hastening the segregation of Baghdad and south-central Iraq into Sunni and Shi’a 

enclaves.2 By the end of 2006, one out of every eight Iraqis had left the country 

or became displaced within it.3

 Tent cities sprouted to accommodate the most 

desperate homeless, triggering food and water shortages that exacerbated already 

poor conditions. 

In keeping with previous trends, attacks were concentrated in Baghdad and 

the provinces of Anbar, Diyala, and Salah Al-Din.4 The difference was that in the 

month after Samarra, execution-style killings claimed eight times more Iraqi lives 

than insurgent attacks, indicating a shift from insurgency to civil conflict.5 Iraq’s 

history could be seen in the patterns of violence. Tribal codes drove revenge 

killings between Sunni and Shi’a, while the methods of torture and execution—

power drills and severed heads—echoed Ba’athist practices.6 

The mass violence between Iraq’s sects came amid a deadlock over seating the 

new government. Members of the Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurdish factions—elected 

* SIGIR interview with Dr. Ayad Allawi, former Prime Minister of Iraq, February 25, 2008.
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• Reconstruction Amid Sectarian Violence •

to parliament under Iraq’s newly ratified constitution—could not agree who 

should be named ministers. The United States lobbied against nominating the 

incumbent Prime Minister, Ibrahim Ja’afari, to that post again, viewing his divisiveness and political wavering as profoundly unhelpful to reconciliation.7

 With 

government at a standstill, the killing continued. 

The Iraqi government’s inability to contain the flow of displaced persons 

within Iraq further radicalized the population. With the Ministry of Displacement 

and Migration and the Red Crescent unable to meet their basic needs, displaced 

Iraqis turned to neighborhood mosques and the religious offices that supported 

them. SCIRI’s charitable organization, Shahid al-Mihrab, and the offices of Grand 

Ayatollah Sistani and Muqtada al-Sadr distributed cash and material assistance 

to Shi’a refugees, while the Association of Muslim Scholars and the Islamic Party 

aided displaced Sunnis.8 

In response to the security vacuum, the Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigade 

manned hundreds of informal checkpoints to stem the incursion of Sunni terrorists in Shi’a neighborhoods, while a parallel network of Sunni militiamen 

attempted to stop Shi’a killing squads from infiltrating Sunni areas. Numerous 

militia barricades slowed the flow of goods, disrupting Baghdad’s economy. The 

market soon adapted. Informal exchange points on the city’s west side let Sunni 

drivers off-load their wares to Shi’a trucks.9 

When government forces could not stop the killing, refugees also became increasingly dependent on sectarian militias for their safety. The militias that came 

to rule whole sections of Baghdad also penetrated the state security apparatus. In 

2006, the United States discovered evidence of Shi’a death squads operating from 

the Ministry of Interior, and a secret network of prisons across Baghdad.10 Rival 

Shi’a factions asserted claims to the spoils of government, commandeering floors 

of the MoI and appropriating U.S.-purchased weapons and vehicles for militia 

activity.11 Shi’a militias in particular successfully placed large numbers of their 

fighters on the government payroll. The National Police became so compromised 

that Sunnis began calling it a “Shi’a militia in uniform.”12

The Balkanization of Baghdad ushered in a new calculus of risk, in which 

moving between neighborhoods became a kind of Russian roulette. A fake ID 

card bearing a Shi’a name was no longer good enough to get Sunnis through 

Shi’a checkpoints. Websites also advised Sunnis to play Shi’a devotional music 

and hang pictures of Imam Ali, considered the founding leader of the Shi’a, from 

the rear-view mirror.13 
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Reconstruction Under Fire

The volatile conditions undermined the ability of the United States to carry out 

reconstruction activities at construction sites and to visit government offices in 

central and south-central Iraq. Baghdad was especially dangerous. The segregation of Sunni and Shi’a neighborhoods became so pervasive that color-coded 

maps charted sectarian contours and relative levels of violence with block-byblock accuracy.14 The U.S. military office overseeing security for reconstruction 

produced its own version of these maps, replete with “no-go” zones that were 

off-limits to reconstruction convoys. Taken collectively, these maps constitute 

a cartographic history of the reach of U.S. power in Iraq, showing the extent to 

which sectarian violence prevented Coalition contractors from working on reconstruction.15 “I had gotten security-related delays on projects down to under 

five percent by the February [2006] timeframe,” said Major General McCoy, in 

command of USACE-GRD. “We were actually into a fairly permissive environment for us to do construction, and then it started to back away.”16

To coordinate security for construction activities, the GRD relied on its 

regional offices, which were co-located with military units. “We very conscientiously tried to make that coordination a part of the daily battle rhythm for the 

maneuver unit,” McCoy said. “We needed them to either directly or indirectly 

put eyes on those projects to make sure things were continuing.” During the year 

following Samarra, McCoy found himself railing at contractors who often failed 

to account for the delays. “If there are security issues, we’ll accommodate those,” 

he found himself saying, “but you’re a professional contractor, and you ought to 

be managing the labor, the materials, [and] the construction quality that ensures 

we get the construction done on time as much as we can.”17

Government oversight of three of McCoy’s priorities—public health clinics, prisons, and border forts—was affected by the ongoing violence. Violence, 

however, was not the only impediment to effective monitoring. The complicated 

relationships between the various U.S. reconstruction offices were also at fault.18

In McCoy’s assessment, the presumption that reconstruction contracts 

could be managed centrally from Baghdad was part of the problem. “You can’t 

do construction remotely,” McCoy said. “You have to put your eyes on it to see 

it. That’s why we never knew if a project was on time or not. And it was a perfect 

environment for design-build contractors, because they get paid whether it’s on 

time or not.” 

The convoluted management structure also prevented reconstruction managers from holding contractors accountable. “I was up outside Erbil, looking at a 

health clinic,” he said. “There were seven or eight safety violations. I looked over 

at the District Commander and I said, ‘Why aren’t we having a cease work here?’ 
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• Reconstruction Amid Sectarian Violence •

He said, ‘We don’t have the authority to do that. That’s PCO’s call.’ I was finding 

contractors who were like kids playing Mom and Dad,” McCoy said. “They’d go 

to PCO and ask a question, and if they didn’t get the answer they liked, they’d go 

to GRD and ask a question, and they’d keep playing this Mom-and-Dad thing 

back and forth until they got the answer they were looking for.”19

The new wave of violence caused a tide of Iraqi officials to leave the country. 

Although no sources fully document the emigration of the Iraqi professional class, 

one estimate suggests that more than 12,000 doctors fled the country since the 

war began.20 The attenuation of state capacity undermined the effort to rebuild. 

One PRT political officer explained that his province had no “bench,” no backup 

team of capable, educated citizens able to step in and run the government.21 In 

Baghdad, senior advisors searched in vain for young energetic “champions” to 

help them carry out crucial tasks. They found instead “a bunch of people who 

were too old and too locked into the system to leave,” as one senior advisor said. 

“Everyone else is in Jordan.”22

The naming of the Dawa Party’s Nouri al-Maliki as the compromise choice 

for Prime Minister on May 28, 2006, did not ease the violence. Daily attacks 

against U.S. and Iraqi soldiers increased by 44 percent from June 2005 to June 

2006, with IEDs at four times the recorded levels of January 2004.23 Civilian 

deaths proved harder to measure; the estimates range from tens of thousands 

to hundreds of thousands.24 

Maliki’s appointment soon sparked more discontent. “By the middle of July,” 

MNC-I Commander Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli said, “it was clear that 

his government...wasn’t a government of national reconciliation. The Sunnis 

felt they’d been sold a bill of goods.” Chiarelli believed that “Samarra was an accelerator, but nothing near Maliki coming into power.”25 Sunni ministers would 

later pull out of Maliki’s government in protest of unmet political demands and 

not rejoin the government for more than a year.26

Amid the violence, infrastructure attacks skyrocketed. “The insurgents figured 

out that the best way to fight back against the government of Maliki,” Ambassador 

Khalilzad explained, “was to try and strangle Baghdad on the infrastructure side.” 

Rapid-response teams created within the Ministry of Electricity struggled to undo 

damage and stay ahead of the sabotage. Water treatment plant workers and garbage collectors also become targets. Infrastructure security, Khalilzad said, was 

an “uphill battle.”27

In early summer 2006, U.S. military and Iraqi security forces mobilized to 

quell the violence. Operation Together Forward deployed 49,000 Iraqi soldiers 

and police and 7,200 Coalition troops to patrol Baghdad’s most insecure neighborhoods, enforce nighttime curfews, and continue a Friday vehicle ban.28 To 
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coordinate the application of reconstruction resources for the security plan, a 

Joint Planning Commission, which included representatives from U.S. agencies and the government of Iraq, met weekly. MNC-I also established a Joint 

Reconstruction Operations Center under the auspices of the GRD.29

When violence levels did not drop significantly, the Americans and Iraqis 

initiated a second phase of the operation in August 2006. More troops were redeployed from Anbar province to the capital, in effect giving up ground to one 

enemy to fight another. In September, military officials announced their intention 

to construct a series of trenches and berms around Baghdad’s 60-mile circumference and control entry to the city through 28 checkpoints.30

Drawing Down IRRF 2 

The violence triggered by Samarra reached its highest pitch just as the primary 

program of infrastructure reconstruction drew to a close. Ambassador Khalilzad’s 

concern that IRRF 2 would not achieve its goal of pacifying Iraq proved well 

founded. As the last IRRF 2 dollars were being obligated, Iraqi popular support 

for attacks against American troops became a majority position: six in ten Iraqis 

viewed attacks on Coalition forces favorably.31 

The reconstruction program funded by IRRF made its final project allocations 

in as much haste as it had been formulated by CPA officials. The Congress had 

appropriated IRRF 2 in 2003 as “three-year money.” All funds not obligated to a 

specific project or re-obligated to specific sectors by September 30, 2006, could 

be used only to pay adjustments toward existing contracts. In a move reminiscent 

of the rush to spend DFI funds in 2004, the PCO launched a drive to meet the 

deadline, raising concerns in the Congress that the “race to obligate” would lead to 

waste and extravagance.32 “Obligator” posters, in which PCO sector heads superimposed their photographs on a picture of Arnold Schwarzenegger’s Terminator

movie character, adorned the office’s halls, and a massive banner hung in PCO’s 

main workroom: “Obligating ‘R’ Us: Getting ‘Er Done (by 30 Sep 2006).”33

The irony was not lost on those working on reconstruction. “The goal of PCO 

isn’t to complete projects—it’s to obligate the money,” Lieutenant Colonel 

Busher said. “Do you see on the walls, ‘Quality Projects for the Iraqi People by 

September 30’? No—you see the ‘obligator’ posters.”34 The review of IRRF projects and programming holds imposed by Ambassador Khalilzad had shortened 

the timeframe in which PCO had to work.35 Despite the rush, PCO generally 

succeeded in awarding contracts in the largest program of reconstruction since 

the Marshall Plan, although a later SIGIR audit faulted it for improperly shifting 

some funds into holding accounts.36 On the day PCO fully obligated the last of 

the IRRF funds, 88 percent of the IRRF projects had been completed; most of 
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the rest would be finished by the end of 2007.37 The problem was what had been 

left undone in Iraq. 

When night fell on September 30, 2006, much of Baghdad was still dark. 

Attacks on power lines and substation failures left the capital with only three 

hours of government-provided electricity per day, although some parts of the 

city were lit at night by private generators.38 The rest of the country was faring 

better: most provinces received fourteen hours. Although average peak generation surpassed prewar levels for the first time, demand still outstripped supply 

by a factor of two.39

Iraq’s other sectors showed uneven progress. Oil production, the government’s predominant source of revenue, averaged 2.2 million barrels per day.40

A worrisome internal assessment written by the Ministry of Oil advisor warned 

that “inadequate expenditures for maintenance and lack of replacement of critical parts” threatened to undo recent production gains.41 The water sector lagged 

most of all. U.S.-funded projects were on track to bring access to potable water 

to 8.2 million Iraqis.42 Although this met the goal set by IRMO after water funds 

had mostly been reprogrammed to security, only one in three Iraqis had regular 

access to fresh water.43

The lack of essential services depressed the economy. Half the adult population was unemployed or underemployed, and the country’s manufacturing and 

agricultural sectors were mostly in a state of collapse.44 This was not the Iraq 

that Ambassador Bremer envisioned as the legacy of IRRF 2. Speaking to the 

dramatically scaled-back ambitions, GRD’s Major General Bill McCoy said that 

the United States “never intended to completely rebuild Iraq.”45

The Rise of CERP

As IRRF funds began to wind down, reconstruction entered a new phase. The 

PCO stood down after two years as the primary reconstruction executing agency. 

Most of its personnel moved seamlessly to the GRD, which thereafter became 

the leading project contracting office for ongoing construction in Iraq. The drawdown of IRRF also marked a shift in the U.S. approach to reconstruction. 

As a result of changes made by Ambassador Khalilzad in his initial months as 

Chief of Mission, reconstruction became more defined in purpose even as it grew 

more diffuse in execution. With the massive upgrade of Iraq’s physical infrastructure drawing to a close, the design-build contractors that executed IRRF 2 began 

packing up. Bechtel, the first large contractor on the ground in 2003, removed all 

but two of its 200 employees by November 2006.46 It had been a harrowing three 

years for the construction firm. Fifty-two people working on Bechtel projects 

had been killed, and another 49 had been seriously wounded.47 In place of the 
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design-build contractors, Iraqi firms that had served as subcontractors assumed 

increasingly prominent roles. GRD often contracted with them directly to finish 

projects not completed under design-build contracts.48 

The focus shifted from building new facilities to maintaining the new infrastructure’s more complex systems, which overextended Iraqi engineers, who 

lacked technical skills and reliable supply chains. Targeted sustainment and 

capacity-development programs launched by USAID and PCO/GRD brought 

technical assistance into all levels of the Iraqi government. At the same time, the 

PRDCs and PRTs developed by Ambassador Khalilzad moved reconstruction 

money and expertise farther into the provinces to sustain and expand the delivery 

of essential services.

In this new post-IRRF phase, the military oversaw a significant evolution 

of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program.49 Lieutenant General 

Peter Chiarelli had pioneered stability operations in Sadr City while leading the 

1st Cavalry in 2004, and he returned to Iraq in January 2006 as MNC-I commander. The many rounds of de-scoping had left Iraq littered with half-finished 

projects—a power plant that ran at partial capacity here, a waste treatment facility 

left unconnected to the sewer system there. 

Chiarelli saw an opportunity, realizing that a creative application of CERP 

funds—a $510 million program that supported 3,800 projects in fiscal year 

2006—could wring more from what was already constructed.50 Power lines, 

which are comparatively inexpensive to construct, could connect under-utilized 

power plants to Iraqi homes. The same could be done for sewer and water treatment plants. The “invisible capacity” that existed in a variety of sectors could make 

an enormous difference in the lives of the Iraqi people, if only production and distribution networks finally meshed.51 What had begun as “walking around money” 

for soldiers became a powerful tool for linking IRRF-constructed infrastructure 

with the people it was designed to serve. “Our commanders will tell you that 

CERP is probably the most important ‘bullet’ they have,” said Deputy Secretary 

of Defense Gordon England. “I mean, you can help somebody instantly.” 52

Rather than fixing on the number of projects started or completed, as embassy 

reconstruction accounting practices did, officials began to define success as the delivery of services to the Iraqi people. Putting their day-to-day needs first was part of 

a larger recognition of the need to reorient U.S. strategy around counterinsurgency 

goals—the “winning of hearts and minds” through quality-of-life improvements. 

“I made it a purpose of every one of my troops out to brigade commanders to not 

only be briefed on what they were doing kinetically [on the battlefield], but what 

they were doing non-kinetically,” Chiarelli said. “As part of my battlefield tour I 

always make them take me to a project that was going on.”53
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A transformation in military thinking was underway. “The CERP program grew as the military really got into the role of post-kinetic stabilization,” 

Ambassador David Satterfield said. “You had a succession of people like Pete 

Chiarelli who really believed in the value of civil-military work—buying people 

out of violence, out of conflict.”54 The increasing use of CERP for infrastructure 

construction and other large-scale projects brought new challenges. Although 

small humanitarian relief applications for which the program was originally conceived constitute almost half of CERP projects in numerical terms, only four 

percent of total expenditures went to support them. From fiscal year 2004 through 

2006, more than a third of the budget went to CERP projects that cost more than 

$500,000, although these comprised only three percent of all projects.55

Efficiently managing these projects and ensuring their sustainment by the 

government of Iraq was difficult. The military officers who initiated them often 

lacked a background in project management. Occasionally, project documentation lagged or was missing altogether. Although the Joint Reconstruction 

Operations Center tracked CERP projects in Baghdad, no similar centrally administered repository tracked them in the rest of the country.56 Nevertheless, 

CERP functioned in 2006 for brigades, PRTs, and PRDCs as an essential bridge 

linking the capital expenditures made by IRRF 2 to real gains in essential services 

and quality of life for Iraqis. 

Hitches and Roadblocks

As Chiarelli refocused CERP, he found himself managing an unexpected decrease in the civilian programs the military needed most. USAID’s OTI, whose 

pioneering collaboration with the 1st Cavalry Division in 2004 served as a model 

for Clear-Hold-Build, was being moved out of the country. The office’s mandate 

normally permits it to remain active for three years in any one country; at the 

military’s request, this had been extended twice.57 To replace the office, the USAID 

country director began developing other long-term programs, first called “Focused 

Stabilization,” but subsequently renamed “Community Stabilization.”58 

The transition to focused stabilization would strengthen the ability of USAID 

and other civilian organizations to contribute to counterinsurgency operations 

in the “strategic cities” designated by MNF-I and the NSC.59 The operational 

concept for this unique mix of civilian and military assets was published in MNFI’s Joint Campaign Plan. To coordinate its implementation, MNC-I established 

the Interagency Stabilization Task Force.60 This steering body brought Iraqi officials from the ministerial and provincial governments together with embassy 

and military personnel at all levels—from IRMO and USAID down to PRTs 

and NGOs.61 Beginning with the task force’s first meeting on May 28, 2006, the 
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military’s counterinsurgency campaign would be much better coordinated with 

civilian and Iraqi efforts. 

There was, however, a “small” hitch. “[Focused stabilization] didn’t get 

funded,” Chiarelli said.62 USAID was able to obligate only $30 million of IRRF 

funding to International Relief and Development, the contractor that was to 

replace OTI.63 Budgeting and acquisition delays also slowed the program’s 

deployment.64 A strategy that called for mounting significant civilian-led reconstruction operations in at least nine cities appeared in the summer of 2006 to 

have funding for merely three or four. 

The shaky transition to a new vehicle for rapid assistance caused intermittent slowdowns in high-performing programs funded by USAID. At the same 

time, the challenges of staffing and funding PRTs delayed their full deployment. 

The White House had issued its National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, but the 

Department of State and USAID seemed unable to follow through with the 

Clear-Hold-Build strategy it prescribed.65 A lack of capacity was only part of the 

problem. Disagreements continued among the President’s advisors on whether 

the U.S. military should assume a different counterinsurgency posture.66

The partial implementation of Clear-Hold-Build exacerbated a structural 

weakness in the reconstruction program. Although the U.S. capacity to undertake 

rapid, localized interventions through projects funded by CERP and OTI could 

deliver immediate results, the benefits of longer-term development and capacitybuilding efforts pioneered by IRRF often took years to be seen.

The need for “middle-range” interventions was acutely felt in violent provinces like Anbar, where counterinsurgency operations were underway. Lieutenant 

Colonel Christian Shomber, a Reservist on his second tour in the violent Sunnidominated province, served as an economics liaison officer for the Marine 

command. Since his first tour, the situation had grown dire. Shomber saw no 

purpose in continuing approaches to reconstruction that had already failed in 

the province. “If it wasn’t working,” he said, “doing more won’t help.” In place of 

existing programs, he proposed the kind of interventions that fell outside IRRF 

2’s focus on infrastructure construction, but beyond CERP’s purview. “We need 

local community action plans—livestock vaccines, seed distributions, housing 

funds,” Shomber said, projects that could jump-start Anbar’s idle factories and 

farms.67 USAID programs could provide some of these, but it was for the most 

part too dangerous for them to operate in the province.

Other roadblocks existed. Advisors in the embassy, including several who had 

been architects of the CPA’s free-market policies, refused to support Shomber’s 

requests. Shomber, who in civilian life worked as an investment banker on Wall 

Street, was struck by the embassy’s continued reliance on market mechanisms 
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to drive recovery in a province where violence made a “normal” market impossible. It was not the first time that embassy advisors were reluctant to support 

short-term projects that they did not think were likely to be catalysts of longterm growth. OTI’s withdrawal from Iraq further hamstrung Shomber’s efforts 

to deliver economic and political gains that met Iraqi needs and supported the 

counterinsurgency campaign. “Anybody who says [the troops] are getting what 

we need is not listening,” he said.68 

Neglecting Agriculture

Shomber was right to notice that U.S.-funded reconstruction programs had 

overlooked the agriculture sector. Although agriculture was Iraq’s second-largest 

economic activity, with the potential to employ an estimated 25 to 30 percent of 

the population, the IRRF 2 supplemental did not fund any agriculture programs 

in 2003.69 The CPA ultimately stepped back from its initial policy and tasked 

USAID to work with the Ministry of Agriculture to develop a plan. Three years 

later, activity levels were still low. In 2006, the primary instrument was still the 

“Agricultural Reconstruction and Development Program for Iraq,” which USAID 

had launched with $5 million in October 2003.70 During the November 2004 

IRRF 2 reprogramming, Ambassador Negroponte increased its funding to $72 

million, but even this amounted to an investment of only $3 per Iraqi.71

In the wake of decades of inefficient central planning and the systemic underinvestment of the Saddam years, advisors faced difficult decisions to make the 

U.S. agriculture investment stretch as far as possible. The last major infusion of 

agricultural technology had come in the late 1980s, when the United States sold 

Iraq $800 million worth of goods, part of which was an aid package to support 

Iraq’s war against Iran.72 Since then, agricultural production had mostly collapsed 

as a result of dilapidated irrigation systems and limited water supply, as well as the 

high salinity that affected 75 percent of Iraq’s arable land. By 2004, production 

had dipped below pre-war levels.73

Development Alternatives Incorporated, the contractor implementing the 

USAID agriculture program, produced an assessment in April 2004 calling for 

short-term job creation measures to be paired with longer-term reform.74 The 

master plan, developed in coordination with the Ministry of Agriculture, called 

for a two-phase recovery targeted on physical, human, and institutional resources. 

Raising the availability of agricultural inputs was among the most crucial shortterm measures. In the winter of 2003, farmers in Iraq’s non-Kurdish provinces 

had access to only eight percent of the nitrogen fertilizer they needed.75 Pesticides, 

seeds, diesel for machinery, and spare parts were necessary to help spur production and re-establish the domestic market for wheat and other high-value crops. 
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A subsidy fund of $200 million of Iraqi funds in the custody of the Ministry of 

Finance helped purchase some of these agriculture inputs. Livestock improvement was also planned, with poultry and sheep a priority.

In addition to these short-term measures, fundamental reforms were also 

started, including land and water reclamation and privatizing state-owned farms. 

The USAID plan envisioned that the Ministry of Agriculture would be transformed from its historical role as a manager of production to a regulatory body 

that would facilitate a free-market agricultural economy. The U.S. Department of 

Agriculture was also enrolled to help modernize Iraq’s agricultural science base 

and the country’s capacity to engage in regional trade. In 2006, a consortium of 

U.S. universities helped revamp the Iraqi university curricula used to train farmers 

and veterinarians. The Agriculture Department also supplied a handful of advisors 

who worked at the embassy, Ministry of Agriculture, and on PRTs. However, only 

two agriculture advisors were on PRTs at the end of 2006.76

By the end of 2006, when the program shut down, the outputs of USAID’s 

agricultural program appeared impressive: it had helped repair more than 3,000 

tractors, delivered 4,000 tons of wheat seed to a storage facility in Mosul, restored 

70 veterinarian clinics, and distributed 169 seed-cleaning machines.77 In addition, 

longer-term planning had begun: the Ministry of Water joined with the Ministry 

of Agriculture to develop an integrated approach to land and water reclamation.78

Other IRRF 2 funds for water and irrigation projects contributed to the agriculture 

sector, as did smaller expenditures from CERP and other USAID programs. 

On the whole, though, this was not enough to transform Iraq’s beleaguered 

agricultural sector into a modern, market-based system able to produce enough 

for domestic consumption and compete in the regional market. Even if the 

United States had invested more heavily, the failure to deliver reliable essential 

services would have undercut commercial farms. Commercial poultry operations, for instance, require stable electric power to see chicks through their 

fourth week of life. Power and affordable diesel fuel are also essential to operate the pumps that irrigate field crops.79 Agriculture, like Iraq’s other economic 

enterprises, was in need of both modernization and the basic services typically 

supplied by the state.

For these reasons, in May 2007, USAID provided $343 million for a threeyear modernization program called Inma—Arabic for growth—targeted on the 

development of agribusiness and agricultural markets.80 The program aimed to 

forge stronger linkages among farmers, agribusinesses, and markets—both domestic and international. Inma’s implementers would work closely with PRTs 

and continue the technology transfer and modernization programs begun under 

the earlier agricultural effort. It was an aggressive approach in keeping with the 
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sector’s potential, but one that came years too late for Shomber and his fellow 

soldiers in Anbar. 

Standing Up the Iraqi Security Forces

As in many reconstruction sectors, investment in agriculture had been diverted 

to an even more pressing need—Iraq’s security forces. It was part of the U.S. 

approach, announced by Prime Minister Ja’afari and MNF-I in June 2005, to 

transition security responsibilities to the Iraqis through a process known as provincial Iraqi control (PIC).81 President Bush succinctly stated the strategy in a 

June 2005 address. “As Iraqis stand up,” he said, “we will stand down.”82

With the new focus on transitioning security responsibilities, the ISFF surpassed IRRF 2 as the primary reconstruction fund. Appropriations through 2008 

brought the total value of ISFF to $17.94 billion.83 Coupled with $4.97 billion 

in IRRF 2 allocations, spending on the Iraqi security sector was larger than U.S. 

spending on all other sectors combined.84

Iraq Security Forces Fund Appropriations ($ Millions)

Appropriation Public Law Amount

Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the 

Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005 P.L. 109-13 $5,391 

Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the 

Global War on Terror, and Hurricane Recovery, 2006 P.L. 109-234 $3,007 

Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2007 P.L. 109-289 $1,700 

U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq 

Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 P.L. 110-28 $3,842 

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 P.L. 110-161 $1,500 

Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 P.L. 110-252 $2,500 

Total $17,940 

Source: SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2008, 26.

MNSTC-I used ISFF to organize, train, equip, and sustain the Iraqi security 

forces. In addition, more than 4,000 U.S. personnel served in MNC-I transition 

teams, which lived, worked, and fought alongside Iraqi battalions. This constituted an enormous investment of resources that had produced an impressive 

new force, at least on paper. Tens of thousands of police and soldiers had been 

trained, and more than 1,200 facilities were built.85

Despite the outlay of U.S. human and financial resources, Iraqi forces were 

mostly unable to contain the rising violence in 2006. They were extremely vulnerable to sectarian and insurgent attack and also stretched thin, with fewer 

members in per capita terms than security forces in other countries facing similar 
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challenges.86 In the year and a half following the Samarra bombing, three times as 

many Iraqi army and police were killed than Coalition forces in Iraq.87

The sectarian conflict gripping Iraq also played out inside its government. 

Soldiers, police, and judges could not easily shed their sectarian identities when 

on the job. For many, loyalties to sect or tribe competed with their willingness 

to serve the Iraqi state. The police and military also depended on the support of 

a set of institutions that were not yet competent to manage the various forces as 

they confronted the insurgency.

When June 2006 arrived, not one province had attained what Iraqi and U.S. 

officials considered the requisite degree of stability for the transition to provincial 

control to proceed.88 Target dates for the PIC process shifted five more times 

over the next year and a half. By the end of 2007, handoff had occurred in only 

nine of eighteen provinces, and three of those handed off had long been under 

de facto Kurdish control.89

Ministry of Defense

The Ministry of Defense was one of the relatively better functioning parts of the 

Iraqi government, although it too suffered from rampant corruption.90 The army 

as a whole, however, underperformed in a number of key areas just when its services were needed most. Few units were operationally ready and able to conduct 

missions in tandem with U.S. forces or on their own. A byzantine and reportedly 

corrupt contracting and procurement system meant that soldiers lacked the guns, 

body armor, radios, and vehicles to take on the militias and insurgents they were 

fighting—who often had heavy weapons of their own. 

In October 2005, formal responsibility for building capacity in the Ministries 

of Interior and Defense shifted from IRMO to MNSTC-I, ratifying the shift 

that began with the creation of the CPATT and the CMATT in 2004. To help 

develop Iraq’s capacity to equip its own troops, MNSTC-I fielded a team of 68 

advisors, mostly civilian contractors, to assist the ministry’s civilian leadership. 

A separate Joint Headquarters Transition Team of about 50 personnel, also 

mostly contractors, worked with the Iraqi military staff to improve command 

and control and to train and equip the nascent forces.91 The purpose of both 

teams was to mentor their Iraqi colleagues while at the same time strengthening 

capacity inside the ministry.

Their work yielded mixed results. They first tried to bypass the Iraqi procurement system altogether, but attempts to use the U.S. Foreign Military Sales 

system turned into what one senior U.S. commander lamented as “a national 

embarrassment” for the United States. Of $1.7 billion in acquisitions made by the 

government of Iraq in 2006, only $300 million had arrived by mid-2007.92 “We 
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overwhelmed the system,” said Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey, MNSTC-I 

commander. “There was a period of time when we had one desk officer in the 

Department of Defense watching the Iraqi account. Of course, that was just not 

going to work.”93 Although deliveries eventually improved, unexpected delays in 

the U.S. system hamstrung Iraqi forces at a critical moment. 

By October 2006, the CPA or MNSTC-I had trained more than 115,000 

Ministry of Defense personnel.94 Ninety-two Iraqi Army and Special Operations 

battalions were deemed capable of operating independently or “in the lead,” a 

nearly four-fold increase since July 2005.95 These units increasingly took “primary 

area security responsibility” in many parts of the country, and in September 2006, 

Thi-Qar Province became the second province to transfer to PIC.96 The most 

significant continuing shortcomings were the ISF’s logistics and sustainment 

capabilities.97

Coalition advisors also pursued longer-term solutions, including the installation of a new financial management and accounting system. As with the 

unsuccessful effort to install a government-wide financial management system 

in the Ministry of Finance, the design of the Defense Ministry system was illsuited to Iraqi norms and experience.98 Logistics capability nevertheless slowly 

improved, and by 2007 Iraqi expenditures on its security services would exceed 

those of the U.S. government.99

Ministry of Interior 

Iraq’s police, even more than the army, were deeply divided by sectarian rivalry 

and hobbled by administrative malaise. The fragmentation of police training 

identified in reviews of the program in 2005—which faulted a lack of cohesion 

among the civilian trainers, MNSTC-I advisors, and MNC-I officials—had been 

partially addressed.100 A three-phase training program had been introduced by 

MNSTC-I—which named 2006 the “Year of the Police” —and more U.S. forces 

were now mentoring Iraqi police after their graduation. A planned total of 750 

State Department contractors and 2,250 U.S. military personnel would be deployed in police training teams.101

By August 2006, 160 Coalition police transition teams circulated among Iraqi 

police in the field, while an additional 38 teams worked with the Iraqi National 

Police.102 Modules on detecting suicide bombers were added to the training 

courses for new recruits, and local intelligence collection—a key element of 

the counterinsurgency campaign—gradually improved. However, in 2006, the 

Coalition had enough personnel to monitor only a quarter of the 1,200 police 

stations across Iraq. Two hundred stations were considered too dangerous for 

U.S. personnel even to visit.103
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Like the army, the Iraqi police were supported by a ministry that was not 

yet entirely functional. The Ministry of the Interior, described by some as an 

“eleven-story powder keg of factions,” was viewed by many as a protector of Shi’a 

interests.104 It was also a key site of intra-Shi’a rivalry. Political parties, religious 

groups, tribes, families, and members of the government each struggled to bolster 

their authority over forces in the provinces. The Ministry became notorious for 

discriminating by sect in its hiring practices. At times, who got paid came down 

to ethnicity.105

After the Samarra bombing, Ministry of Interior leadership hastened the 

integration of a Shi’a militia into the force. Bayan Jabr, who served as Minister 

of Interior from April 2005 to May 2006 and thereafter as Minister of Finance, 

appointed members of the Badr Organization, the armed wing of the political 

party SCIRI, to key ministerial posts. Much of the controversy centered on the 

Iraqi National Police, an elite counterterrorism force that was 85 percent Shi’a. In 

2005, units had been implicated in a prison torture scandal. Sunni communities 

violently rejected the National Police, seeing it as an extension of Shi’a militia 

killing squads.106

Jawad al-Bolani, who followed Jabr as Minister of Interior, ultimately removed 

commanders from 7 of 9 National Police brigades and 17 of 26 National Police 

battalions, but even this failed to curb sectarian infiltration. A later review found 

the National Police so riddled with sectarian influences that it recommended disbanding it altogether—a suggestion disregarded by Lieutenant General Petraeus, 

who viewed the force as redeemable. Al-Bolani himself was only partially successful in taking the reins. The Interior Ministry’s proximity to Sadr City made travel 

there exceptionally dangerous. On most days, he ran the ministry from an office 

just outside the Green Zone. So many officials were assassinated on their way to 

work that many started sleeping in their offices.107

To help establish capacity within the Ministry of Interior, MNSTC-I assembled a 90-person transition team. The danger forced Coalition officials to move 

around inside the ministry with body armor and heavily armed escorts. Although 

the provision of equipment reached rates of 70 to 80 percent of assessed needs 

in some places, the police—like the military—were still frequently outgunned. 

Ill-trained police patrolling in soft-sided trucks with AK-47s and pistols were little 

match for militias attacking with heavy weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, and 

mortars. As was the case in the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior’s 

budget execution was a perennial problem. Two years after MNSTC-I assumed 

responsibility for capacity development, one third of the ministry’s $3 billion 

budget remained unspent.108
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Sectarian rivalry and an open power struggle between provincial and central 

authorities were often the root cause of poor performance. Once the power to 

hire police devolved to the provinces, tribal sheikhs—who asserted an increasing influence over local government—placed tribal members on the job rolls. 

Although it was expected and often helpful for the police to mirror the sectarian 

character of the neighborhoods they patrolled, payroll remained under control 

of the central ministry, opening the door to favoritism and abuse. A separate 

system for new recruits complicated matters further. Rather than being disbursed 

through the Ministry of Interior payroll system, pay was distributed by provincial 

police chiefs, whom the Ministry of Finance supplied directly with funds. “Ghost 

employees” were a constant concern.109

The attempts to vet police and rid the system of sectarianism and corruption, 

first begun by the qualifying committees in early 2005, grew ever more sophisticated.110 New recruits were made to submit to a retinal scan and fingerprinting, 

which were crosschecked against criminal databases and allowed for more rigorous scrutiny of payroll and rosters. All through 2006 and 2007, purges of the 

police force occurred when the will of local political authorities overcame the 

coercive power of factions controlling the force.111

The militarization of the police was also a growing concern. One review 

found that MNSTC-I’s assumption of leadership over police training inadvertently marginalized the civilian police advisors best positioned to teach Iraqis 

policing skills. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 

Affairs trainers were older—and therefore more respected in Iraqi culture—

than the younger MNC-I soldiers who manned police training teams. They were 

also professional law enforcement officers with experience in civilian policing. 

Fielding sufficient numbers of them was the problem. Although the police command with MNSTC-I requested 6,000, the Congress authorized only 1,000. A 

year and a half after Samarra, 900 were in Iraq, along with some 3,500 military 

personnel. By 2007, they oversaw a police force of more than 230,000—a ratio 

of 1 to 50.112

Expanding Rule of Law Programs

The range of activities falling under the rubric “rule of law” included everything 

from digitizing the Iraqi legal code to training judges, securing court houses, 

and building prisons. Even getting fuel oil to the generators so the courts could 

operate with air-conditioning and light was part of the job. By the end of 2005, 

the United States had expended more than $400 million for law- and securityrelated programs other than police training, $300 million of which went toward 

brick-and-mortar projects and $100 million to capacity building.113
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The sheer number of agencies and funding streams involved in rule-oflaw activities gave rise to all sorts of bureaucratic complications. Funding for 

resident legal advisors from the Department of Justice came through the State 

Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 

Military officials overseeing detainees relied upon prison funds under the control of the embassy, and State Department officials on PRTs used the military’s 

CERP funds to support courts. Coordination was a constant challenge on both 

the Iraqi and American side.

Ambassador Khalilzad instituted a Rule of Law Task Force in 2005, but an 

overall coordinator was not named until 2006. Only in 2007 did Ambassador 

Crocker delegate real authority to the position. “We were sometimes our own 

worst enemies because we did not talk to each other and did not coordinate 

with each other,” said James Santelle, the embassy’s third rule-of-law coordinator.114 The Iraqis were equally disorganized. To promote the integration of 

police, courts, and prisons, INL facilitated the Iraqi Integration Commission, 

comprising the ministers of interior and justice and the chief justice, which first 

met on July 26, 2005.115 A second committee, the Ministerial Committee on 

Rule of Law and Detention, with even wider participation from Iraqi ministries, 

began meeting in 2007. “It was the first time [Iraqi] agencies involved in the rule 

of law sat down at the same table in the Ministry of Justice and talked about these 

issues,” Santelle said.116

The whole effort had many moving parts, the largest of which was the Central 

Criminal Court of Iraq, originally established by the CPA to prosecute terrorism and corruption cases. The CCCI had twelve panels operating at secure sites 

throughout Iraq, but most of the work took place in Baghdad. During 2006, the 

CCCI processed 118 insurgency cases per month.117 Support for a number of 

high-level prosecutions came from the Major Crimes Task Force—a team of 

twelve American law enforcement agents and eleven Iraqi officers, as well as five 

translators—established after a series of bombings went uninvestigated in 2004 

and 2005.118

Processing detainees, whether arrested by U.S. forces or Iraqi authorities, 

was a bottleneck. “It’s bad to have someone in jail for eighteen months without 

seeing a judge,” Santelle said. However, bringing together judges, case files, and 

detainees for hearings that would rule on release or continued incarceration was 

a monumental effort.119 The lack of a developed penal system of jails and prisons was part of the problem. Initial designs by design-build contractor Parsons 

for the major prison complexes at Nassriya and Khan Bani Sa’ad included airconditioning—a luxury few Iraqis could afford—and were constructed to U.S. 

standards rather than Middle Eastern norms. “Iraqi penal theory calls for prisons 
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to be less comfortable than the inmate’s home,” a State Department review found. 

The air-conditioning units stood “a good chance of being unplugged once the 

Americans leave.”120

The large U.S. investment in the CCCI had effectively created a two-tiered 

Iraqi justice system. “For the average Iraqi,” Santelle said, “day-to-day justice 

being doled out is not at the CCCI.” Rather, people were getting divorced, suing 

each other, and working out other legal problems in provincial courts.121 The 

United States was seen to have invested heavily in the CCCI, which served its 

own national interest by prosecuting terrorism cases, but to have done little for 

the courts that Iraqis use most. “We have co-opted the Iraqi justice system for 

our own use and left ordinary Iraqis with nothing,” said Stephen Andersson, a 

resident legal advisor in the Baghdad PRT.122 To the average Iraqi, the CCCI 

courts are an American creation. “We call them the Potemkin Courts,” one former judge said.123

In the courts where ordinary Iraqis sought justice, the insecure environment 

took its toll on the judiciary. The Islamic State of Iraq, an umbrella organization 

of insurgent groups, mounted continual attacks on Baghdad courthouses. The 

chief judge at the al-Rusafa Appellate District Court kept bullets fired at his office 

stacked in his ashtray.124 The danger extended beyond the courthouses themselves. Unlike the CCCI judges, who were granted secure housing in the Green 

Zone or on U.S.-protected rule- of-law compounds, the vast majority of Iraq’s 

judges lived in their own homes with no protection. “Judges are living in places 

like Doura and Kadhamiya,” Santelle said, “and they’ve got to go home at night 

and live amongst the other communities where they are not protected... That’s 

tough for anyone to do.”125

The judges’ vulnerability may have compromised their ability to render impartial verdicts. One former Iraqi judge estimated that nine of every ten decisions 

in the common court system are shaped by extra-judicial considerations, in contrast to four to seven out of ten in the CCCI courts—both unacceptable ratios 

by Western standards.126 Corruption had always been a part of judicial practice 

under Saddam, but after the invasion its motivating factor changed from money 

to safety. “It’s for keeping their life, and keeping their job,” one former judge said. 

The result is that “the courts are functioning but the system is not.”127

Iraq Policy in Crisis

The country had begun coming together again—however slightly—during 

Ambassador Khalilzad’s early tenure, but sectarian violence, accelerated by the 

Samarra bombing, blew it back apart. As summer 2006 turned to fall, U.S. Iraq 

policy fell into crisis. The stalled deployment of the PRTs and slow establishment 
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of the focused stabilization effort undercut the President’s Clear-Hold-Build 

strategy. Chiarelli’s push to use CERP funds for “last-mile” construction could 

not by itself make up for the under-performance of IRRF 2. Enormous capacitybuilding and sustainability challenges loomed, but efforts to address them were 

still unformed.128 Those programs that seemed to work were spread too thinly 

across the war-torn country. Sectarian violence escalated: more than 1,000 Iraqis 

died at the hands of their countrymen every month.129 

The day after congressional elections in 2006, the White House announced 

the resignation of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. The man who oversaw 

the planning and management of the war for more than three years, and who 

opposed some of the White House’s most recent policies, would be replaced 

by Robert Gates, who had directed the CIA in the early 1990s. Gates was then 

serving on the bipartisan review of Iraq policy led by former Secretary of State 

James Baker and former Congressman Lee Hamilton.130 

The Iraq Study Group, commissioned by the Congress and eventually welcomed by the White House, was given access to all intelligence and information 

on Iraq.131 In anticipation of its report and at the direction of the President, 

Deputy National Security Advisor J.D. Crouch began a review of Iraq options. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also undertook their own assessment, as did a number of 

think-tanks in Washington. Plans under consideration ranged from a complete 

pull-out to a major escalation.132

Issued on December 6, 2006, the Iraq Study Group report argued that continuing the current course would lead to failure. Its 79 recommendations addressed 

the full spectrum of policy issues: geopolitics, political dynamics at work in Iraq, 

and the performance of U.S. institutions assisting the Iraqi government. 

To resolve sectarian aggression, the study group set out specific milestones. 

One of the most important was holding local elections to break the monopoly 

on service delivery held by what one official called a “Shi’a dictatorship” that 

ruled most of Iraq’s provincial governments.133 The study group also called for 

reordering the responsibility for Iraq’s security forces and shifting the U.S. role 

to that of training and equipping the Iraqi army and police so that U.S. troops 

could begin to withdraw. The 4,000 American troops now serving in this role 

were seen as inadequate; the study group called for the number to be increased 

to a total of 10,000 to 20,000.134

To ready the Iraqi government for its transition to self-reliance, the study 

group recommended a further $5 billion in economic assistance per year focused 

on capacity development and job creation. The study group also criticized the 

poor coordination between USAID and the Departments of State and Defense. 

“There are no clear lines establishing who is in charge of reconstruction,” the report 
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• Reconstruction Amid Sectarian Violence •

stated. It prescribed a major overhaul of the U.S. effort, calling for the appointment 

of a reconstruction coordinator reporting directly to the President, authorizing 

the ambassador to provide or rescind funding on a project-by-project basis, and 

for the takeover of rule-of-law programs by the Department of Justice.135 

Some observers thought the Iraq Study Group members had not fully appreciated the effectiveness of the Clear-Hold-Build strategy or what a possible increase 

in troop strength could achieve, and had instead bought into the prevailing thinking of General Casey and supporters of the “transition to Iraqis” approach.136 It 

would be up to the President to decide between the competing military strategies. 

By the end of the year, the White House would make its decision.
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• Chapter 25 •

Essential Services Overview – Transition 

from Khalilzad to Crocker 

Metric137

PreinvasionPostinvasionCPA 

Transition

Negroponte 

Era

Khalilzad 

Era

Electricity Production 

Megawatts 4,075 711 3,621 4,262 3,475

Oil Production 

Million Barrels per Day 2.58 0.30 2.16 2.13 1.95

Iraqi Security Forces

Soldiers and Police 1,300,000 7,000-9,000 87,000 171,300 328,700

Telecommunications

Landline Subscribers 833,000 0 791,000 998,000 1,111,000

Mobile Subscribers 80,000 0 461,000 2,422,000 8,720,000

Human Toll

U.S Troop Fatalities - 139 862 1,745 3,248

Civilian Contractors - 1 46 217 916

U.S. Civilians - ~9 52 113 224

Iraqi Civilians - 7,413 16,848 29,155 72,858

Financial Cost ($ billions) 

U.S Funding - $3.45 $22.93 $29.21 $36.96

Iraqi Funding - $0.00 $16.00 $21.03 $37.27

International Funding - $0.00 $13.60 $13.87 $15.20

Total Funding - $3.45 $52.53 $64.11 $89.43

During Khalilzad’s tenure, project delays and increasing security costs limited improvements in essential service delivery. The output increases of the Negroponte 

era were short-lived, especially in the oil and electricity sectors. Insurgent attacks 

and a lack of fuel drove average levels of electricity generation down below prewar 

levels, and power outages again became common. Attacks on critical infrastructure increased in 2006, causing electricity production to fall to a daily average of 

3,475 megawatts by March 2007.138

The oil sector continued to be plagued by corruption and smuggling. Between 10 

and 30 percent of refined fuels was diverted to the black market or smuggled out 

of Iraq.139 Although the oil sector’s capacity was estimated at 3 million barrels per 

day, only about 2 million barrels per day were produced during 2005-2006.140 
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Chapter 26

The Civilian Surge

2006 was a bad year in Iraq. The country came close to 

unraveling politically, economically, and in security terms. 2007 

has brought improvement. Enormous challenges remain. Iraqis 

still struggle with fundamental questions about how to share 

power, accept their differences and overcome their past. The 

changes to our strategy last January—the surge—have helped 

change the dynamics in Iraq for the better.*

Ambassador Ryan Crocker

U. S. Ambassador to Iraq (2007-present)

President Bush unveiled his new Iraq strategy on January 10, 2007, a day after 

fierce fighting broke out in Baghdad off Haifa Street, a thousand yards from the 

Green Zone.1

 In a nationally televised speech, the President announced a “surge” 

of more than 20,000 troops whose primary mission would be to reduce violence 

nationwide.2

 The new focus on civilian security was premised on the notion that 

stemming sectarian violence would enable Iraq’s leaders to reach reconciliation.3

When complete, the surge would add two Marine battalions in Anbar province 

and five Army brigades in Baghdad province.4

The surge in troops would be coupled with an intensive focus on neighborhood reconstruction by joint civilian and military teams and by an expansion of 

USAID programs. The President announced that smaller “embedded” Provincial 

Reconstruction Teams (ePRTs) would place development experts directly inside brigade combat teams. More of the larger “traditional” PRTs would also be 

added.5

 This “civilian surge” would double the number of reconstruction advisors serving outside the Green Zone, bringing the total to 700 by the end of a 

9-month build-up.6

USAID’s Community Stabilization Program (CSP), which operated through 

Iraqi intermediaries with little visible association with U.S. civilian or military 

forces, would expand to work with all PRTs.7

 Iraqi neighborhoods would be 

flooded with modest infrastructure projects that hired unskilled labor for trash 

pickups, awarded grants to invigorate small businesses, and provided vocational 

training and youth programs.8

 It would be an “all-hands-on-deck” approach to 

reversing the acceleration of violence that followed the Samarra bombing.9

* Ambassador Ryan Crocker, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Testimony before the House Committee on 

Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services, September 10, 2007.
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• Chapter 26 •

A New Military Strategy

The surge plan pushed back the possibility of a phased withdrawal of U.S. forces 

for 12 to 18 months. Although it incorporated many of the Iraq Study Group’s 

performance benchmarks, the plan departed from the policies of General George 

Casey, the outgoing commander, and the Iraq Study Group’s call for gradual 

disengagement.10 Like many members of the group, Casey viewed an intrusive 

American presence as counterproductive to solving Iraq’s underlying political and 

security problems and therefore advocated a rapid hand-off to Iraqi forces.11

To carry out the surge, the President nominated—and the Senate unanimously confirmed—General David Petraeus as MNF-I’s new Commanding 

General in Iraq. After his command of MNSTC-I in 2005, which followed his 

2003-04 command of the 101st Airborne in Mosul, Petraeus had directed the 

first rewrite of the Army and Marine Corps’ counterinsurgency manual since the 

Vietnam War. The revised doctrine called for increased use of forces to protect the 

population, even if that put soldiers at greater risk of attack. It also suggested that 

a focus on quality-of-life improvements could help turn the population against 

insurgents.12 Stationing troops in neighborhoods in small combat outposts and 

stepping up patrols would reverse the trend, begun in 2005, of consolidating 

the U.S. presence on large forward operating bases.13 To teach counterinsurgency tactics, the U.S. Army erected a mock Iraqi village at Ft. Irwin, California, 

complete with 400 native Arabic speakers playing insurgents, shopkeepers, and 

security forces. The training course, built at a facility originally used for mock 

tank battles, aimed to replicate the dilemmas that soldiers would face on patrol 

in Iraq.14 The military also mandated that officers rotating into Iraq attend a oneweek course on counterinsurgency, known as “the COIN Academy.”15

Change-of-command ceremonies took place on February 10, 2007, a month 

after the President’s speech. Four days later, General Petraeus and the commander of MNC-I, Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno, presented eight 

slides to President Bush showing how they intended to implement the surge.16

Petraeus put the third iteration of the Baghdad Security Plan into effect quickly. 

By the end of February, 2,700 new U.S. troops had arrived in the capital. By June, 

that number reached 16,700—enough for 400 to 600 combat troops to secure 

each security district established under the plan.17

The troop increases enabled a strategy that Major General Joe Fil, commanding Coalition forces in Baghdad, described as “clear, control, and retain.” U.S. 

forces and capable Iraqi Security Forces would continue to hold territory rather 

than turning it over to ill-prepared Iraqi forces. After mounting clearing operations to drive out insurgents, troops found houses and public buildings to use 

as combat outposts, creating a permanent presence in neighborhoods that had 
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• The Civilian Surge •

been only occasionally patrolled.18 As soon as security was established, USACE 

moved in to restore water and electricity service.19 The military also strengthened 

existing population control measures to separate Shi’a and Sunni enclaves. Many 

of Baghdad’s districts were cordoned off by multiple series of twelve-foot-high 

concrete walls, the longest of which ran for three miles.20

Negotiating with what the campaign plan termed “reconcilable elements” was 

also a key component of the surge.21 A realignment of Sunni tribes in Anbar was 

underway, and their loyalty was up for grabs. Ambassador Khalilzad had been 

quietly talking to them for months; Marine Corps officers had been doing so for 

years. Now it looked as if popular dissatisfaction with al-Qaeda’s brutal tactics, 

along with its infringement on traditional tribal prerogatives, might drive them 

to forge an alliance with the Coalition. 

In one of the war’s most extraordinary stories, small special operations teams 

had been escorting Lieutenant General Graeme Lamb, a British officer familiar 

with the peacemaking negotiations with the Irish Republican Army, to secret 

meetings with insurgent leaders. The response to Lamb’s initiative, which began 

before Petraeus arrived, was promising. Petraeus and his advisors moved to expand this engagement strategy by having brigade and battalion commanders reach 

out to insurgents in their area. “Come in, let’s talk about what it would take, and 

figure it out,” was the rubric.22The Sunni tribes eventually formed U.S.-funded security forces, known in turn as Awakening Councils, Concerned Local Citizens, or 

Sons of Iraq, which would also contribute significantly to the success of the surge. 

Eventually, similar groups were established within some Shi’a communities.

A New Reconstruction Strategy

The surge also ushered in new diplomatic leadership. Ambassador Ryan 

Crocker, the State Department’s senior Arabist, replaced Zalmay Khalilzad 

as U.S. Ambassador to Iraq. At the time of his appointment, Crocker was 

Ambassador to Pakistan. He had previously served as ambassador to Syria, 

Kuwait, and Lebanon; his prior experience in Iraq included a posting there in the 

late 1970s and a short tour with CPA in 2003 as the director of governance.23 The 

Secretary of State also appointed Ambassador Timothy Carney as Coordinator 

for Economic Transition in Iraq, a new position designed to centralize authority for reconstruction and economic affairs.24 A veteran diplomat, Carney had 

initially served with ORHA in 2003, but left Iraq, as did Crocker, soon after 

Ambassador Bremer took charge.25

The diplomatic and economic elements of the surge were slower to materialize. Petraeus arrived to find a collection of reconstruction programs that 

ran mostly independent of one another. In the words of his economic advisor, 
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Colonel Michael Meese, reconstruction consisted of “stovepiped programs out of 

specific appropriation and oversight lines with specific purposes that have a logic 

of their own.” The categorization of funding and authorities, while undertaken 

for “all the right legal reasons,” meant that the Commanding General and the 

Ambassador had little ability to allocate resources among competing programs 

without first returning to the Congress. “What you did as a commander is pull 

on all these strings,” Meese explained. “The answer was full speed ahead on all 

these things.”26

With funding streams essentially fixed until the Congress passed the 2008 

supplemental later in the spring of 2007, Petraeus and Crocker focused on how 

the reconstruction was administered in concert with combat operations and how 

the military itself conceived of its mission. They convened a group of advisors 

with broad expertise in counterinsurgency and political science, dubbed the Joint 

Strategic Assessment Team. After a period of study, they recommended in April 

that political accommodation become the goal of all lines of operation. Every tool 

in the Coalition arsenal—including the use of force, but also political negotiation 

and economic aid—would be used to foster accommodation between warring 

groups. Although falling well short of true reconciliation, this would at least bring 

about local ceasefires that could subsequently be expanded across Iraq.27

The campaign plan later developed on the basis of the JSAT report incorporated several new ideas that would guide the actions of commanders and 

reconstruction personnel. In the previous campaign plan, preparing Iraqis for 

the transition to self-rule was seen as a separate activity. Transition remained 

an important future goal for Petraeus, but he viewed it as inherent in every line 

of operation. The new standard, Meese explained, was “if it can’t be done by the 

Iraqis, we probably shouldn’t do it.” “What is better is a project that takes 60 days 

instead of 30 days—but is done by the Iraqi manager and is sustainable by the 

Iraqis [and] that their operations can support.”28 Nevertheless, Petraeus’s advisors understood that economic incentives would have little traction in a sectarian 

conflict. “People who are killing for political reasons or to ethnically cleanse an 

area are rarely going to stop because of a new job opportunity,” stated one memorandum to the commanding general.29

Ambassador Carney largely concurred with Petraeus’s assessment. “On the 

overall policy, we were continuing to proceed without sufficient Iraqi participation,” he said. “I was appalled when I learned that Iraqis were simply not signing 

off to accept huge numbers of projects.” In Carney’s view, the problem began in 

2003. “We got an insurgency because we didn’t have Iraqis completely with us 

on the effort to move the country forward after we destroyed Saddam Hussein’s 

regime,” he said in 2008. According to his assessment, the endgame was by now 
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• The Civilian Surge •

completely in Iraqi hands. “We essentially wound up in the position, as we are in 

today, of being able to act as a shield and to provide resources, but we are much 

less of an accepted mentor than we might have been if we had taken Iraqis into 

our counsel from the outset,” Carney said. “This is a position of great weakness 

because we are vulnerable to Iraqi bad decisions.”30

To redress the lack of Iraqi participation, the embassy moved to coordinate all 

U.S. economic and reconstruction actions with Deputy Prime Minister Barham 

Salih, Minister of Planning Ali Baban, and Minister of Finance Bayan Jabr. 

Together with National Security Advisor Mowaffak al-Rubaie, the trio said they 

would do their best to ensure that Iraq’s ministries made use of their capital budgets and that provincial governments spent funds allotted to them.31 It would be 

an essential step toward fiscal self-reliance, one that now seemed within reach. 

Between existing ministry budgets, central government grants to provinces in 

2006, and provincial line-item funds in the 2007 Iraqi budget, Iraqis “had more 

than $5 billion to spend.” Spending this Iraqi money became an essential political 

benchmark in the eyes of U.S. lawmakers. “If the Iraqis remained unable or unwilling to spend their own capital investment budget, there was certainly no reason for 

the Congress of the United State to appropriate money for Iraq,” Carney said.32

By late spring, Petraeus, Crocker, and their advisors were still waiting 

for the economic surge to take shape. Although Petraeus arrived in Baghdad 

early in February 2007, the rest of the civilian leadership appeared much later. 

Ambassador Crocker did not assume chief of mission duties until March 29.33

The team that Crocker selected to take over key positions in the embassy came 

still later, in early summer. The staggered arrival hampered coordination between 

the military and civilian leadership, and slowed the implementation of surge policies on the civilian side.34

Delays in the deployment of rank-and-file civilian personnel slowed the 

transition still further. Carney was surprised to find it just as difficult to bring 

people into Iraq in 2007 as it had been in 2003. He resorted to hiring his deputy 

as a contractor when the State Department was unable to add him to the rolls 

quickly. “The recruitment process is in sclerosis,” Carney said. “We are not responsive to the President’s policy for Iraq if we cannot get people hired in fewer 

than six weeks.”35

A funding slowdown further complicated matters. Supplemental funds 

appropriated by the Congress for fiscal year 2006 did not reach Iraq for a longerthan-usual period, forcing programs to scale back activity temporarily. From 

the date when the Congress authorized its spending, money contained in the 

supplemental took between 62 and 218 days to be disbursed in Iraq.36 When 

combined with the longer-than-anticipated time for contractors associated with 
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the economic surge to set up in country, the effects were significant. “Ensuring 

that the non-DoD organizations have the resources provided to do what is necessary is of enormous importance,” Petraeus said later.37

Embedding Reconstruction 

As the Baghdad Security Plan was put into effect, the ePRT and PRT teams 

started arriving at posts across Iraq. Three waves of PRT staff would provide 

almost every brigade with a dedicated staff of development experts, realizing the 

original vision advanced nearly two years before by Lieutenant General Raymond 

Odierno and Dr. Philip Zelikow, the State Department’s Counselor.38 Led primarily by State Department officials, and staffed in part by USAID and reservists 

and civilians from the Department of Defense, ePRT teams of four to eight people 

would help brigades leverage their resources in new ways. 

The expansion of the PRT program was a landmark event in the reconstruction 

effort. For the first time in four years, a formal civil-military structure enabled civilian 

reconstruction experts to work side-by-side with maneuver commanders who were 

prosecuting the war. The experiment in civil-military relations that Ambassador 

Khalilzad saw to an uneasy start in 2005 was taking hold. Reconstruction became 

embedded in brigades and in Iraqi society and focused as much on building capacity inside Iraqi institutions as infrastructure construction.39

The brigades, whose substantial resources were increasingly applied to the 

reconstruction and capacity-building missions, welcomed the arrival of ePRTs. 

“You can tell when you walk in, when the PRT chief is finishing the Battalion 

Commander’s sentences, that’s a great relationship,” Meese said. On the other 

hand, “if the PRT chief can’t find the bathroom because he hasn’t been to the 

HQ often enough,” the relationship has not developed.40 Most of all, ePRTs augmented the capability of brigades to engage with local governments. 

Nowhere in a normal brigade staff structure could “you find people that are 

organized and trained to go help municipal governance and reconstruction issues,” explained Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Winton, Executive Officer of the 

First Brigade Combat Team, Third Infantry Division. By helping brigades integrate their use of CERP funds with embassy reconstruction plans and tying the 

actions of civil affairs teams to the development of local and provincial governments, ePRTs were helping brigades take “essential services to the next level.” The 

war had evolved so that reconstruction, the functioning of local government, and 

security reinforced each other. “Gains in governance and gains in reconstruction 

are linked,” Winton said.41

The PRTs’ daily contact with municipal and provincial officials allowed them 

to gain a level of insight into Iraqi affairs unreachable inside the embassy, which 
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• The Civilian Surge •

usually dealt with Iraq in a more detached fashion. “We are here on the ground, 

face to face, every day, with the mayor, [directors general], sheiks,” one ePRT 

member commented.42 The relationships developed by PRT and civil affairs team 

members allowed them to gauge what interventions would be most effective, and 

allowed Iraqis, rather than Americans, to take the lead in articulating Iraqi needs. 

“We’ve got to start listening to the Iraqis. That’s Development 101,” said David 

Atteberry, the USAID representative on the Rasheed ePRT, located in one of 

the most dangerous neighborhoods in Baghdad. “The answer to most of your 

questions can be found by talking to the people you are working with.”43

To help manage their relationships with Iraqis, many PRTs and Civil Affairs 

teams compiled “facebooks” with digital pictures of directors general and neighborhood and district council members, their mobile phone numbers, and short 

biographical sketches. More sophisticated techniques were sometimes used. 

Wall-sized diagrams mapping relationships among sheiks, provincial council 

members, and municipal officials were updated to reflect assassinations and 

changing loyalties. Some PRTs even kept detailed logbooks, with entries for each 

encounter with an Iraq official, including notes on their moods and personality 

quirks.44 This social network analysis gave PRT members a better sense of the 

complexity of the society in which they were working and a greater ability to 

pass that knowledge to replacements when unit rotations occurred every nine 

to twelve months. 

The military’s acceptance and support of the reconstruction mission, more 

widespread in 2007 than any other previous year of the war, provided the biggest 

boost to PRT and Civil Affairs efforts. The brigades’ wider reach had a multiplier 

effect in achieving reconstruction goals that was an essential part of the surge 

strategy. Lieutenant Colonel Winton explained:

When an NGO shows up and says, I want to establish some 

agriculture programs, we think we have the ability to put fish 

farms in along the Euphrates. Does anybody know of a good 

place to establish a fish farm? The brigade commander turns 

to his battalion commanders, who turn to the company commanders, who turn to their platoon commanders. In 96 hours 

you get the data back. Here are ten historic fish farms. Here 

are their locations. And oh by the way, we have a relationship 

with the guy that owns this one, and we trust him. And oh by 

the way, this one over here has been used as a mortar firing 

point. Don’t go there. We can flood the zone and bring back 

the information.45
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This was exactly the dynamic envisioned by earlier assessments that suggested 

the key to success in Iraq would be marrying civilian development expertise to 

the military’s circulation within local communities.46

PRT Problems

The extensive insight ePRTs gained into the communities they served highlighted 

dilemmas that had plagued reconstruction from the beginning. One of the biggest 

challenges was figuring out whom to trust. With money flooding in, some Iraqi 

government offices took on the atmosphere of the proverbial “smoke-filled back 

room,” where unsavory business was conducted. “My favorite description is the 

bar scene of Star Wars,” one ePRT member recalled. “When you go to a [district 

advisory council] meeting, it’s just a parade of characters.”47 The characters were 

assembled in part to divide up the spoils handed out by the PRT and military. 

“Our district council chairman has become the Tony Soprano of Rasheed, in 

terms of controlling resources,” Atteberry said.48 “You will use my contractor, or 

your work will not get done,” the chairman told the PRT.49

The cozy relationships between Iraqi officials and the contractors employed 

through reconstruction programs attracted allegations of fraud and waste that were 

hard to verify. An audit of USAID’s Community Stabilization Program, which 

made extensive use of Iraqi intermediaries to implement short-term employment 

projects, discovered that program funds might have been diverted to militia activity in one Baghdad district.50 It was the worst fear of any development officer, and 

also an inevitable risk of pushing large sums of money into a warzone. 

The need to keep the loyalty of fledgling local governments in effect left PRTs, 

soldiers using CERP funds, and USAID programs vulnerable to over-pricing of 

materials and services. The PRTs and military units channeling development and 

CERP funds were frequently paying for more than the costs of material in construction. “We’re pumping over $1 million just to renovate the [district advisory 

council] hall,” Atteberry said. “We’re building a farmer’s market across from the 

Doura market, and we’re spending over a million dollars. It’s just a concrete slab 

and a tin roof. And the contract is $900,000.”51

Dealing with local powerbrokers sometimes put the PRTs’ long-term development goals in conflict with the brigades’ immediate needs. On the one hand, 

many of the powerbrokers could make good on their promises to “make things 

happen,” an important skill to soldiers whose first interest is security. Brigades 

taking casualties often resorted to CERP “fast cash” projects that pay Iraqis to 

administer services that local municipalities should already have been providing. 

However, using Coalition cash rather than Iraqi institutions set back efforts to 

foster self-reliance. 
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Trash pickup was the archetypal municipal service in which the brigade’s security needs were in opposition with the traditional development approach. “The 

XO [Executive Officer] of a battalion comes in here,” one ePRT leader recalls. 

“‘If the trash isn’t picked up,’ the XO will say, ‘somebody will put an IED in it and 

one of my guys will go down. I’m not going to get my guys killed. I’m going to pay 

someone to pick up the trash.’”52 It was a pragmatic approach to security, but one 

that provided a disincentive for municipalities to discharge their responsibilities 

promptly. Complicating matters further, the contractors the Coalition employed 

often distorted local labor markets. The USAID Inspector General found that 

wages paid for trash pick-up by the CSP were higher than the average for skilled 

laborers, which put pressure on local officials to continue employing them rather 

than transition to other forms of development.53

In the view of some civilians on PRTs, the set of metrics used by the military 

to measure CERP progress placed too much emphasis on spending money and 

not enough on achieving the right effects. “They are being graded on how many 

projects are being carried out, how much money is flowing to the districts,” said 

Tim Zuniga-Brown, team leader of the Rasheed ePRT. “They should be graded 

on how many projects are being turned over to the Iraqis and how much less 

money they are spending. That would be a better indicator of success.” “Success,” 

Zuniga-Brown said, “is getting Iraqis to deliver their own services using their 

own funds and their own people.”54 Still other PRT officials viewed this type of 

Coalition assistance as wholly counterproductive. “The best thing we could do,” 

one ePRT official said, “is cut off CERP money,” adding that the Iraqis are less 

likely to “spend their money when we’re just pumping in ours.”55

Balancing the brigade’s short-term imperative of force protection against 

the PRT’s longer-term development goals was difficult. Because of the party-list 

electoral structure and the failure to hold new provincial elections, the provincial and district councils through which PRTs and ePRTs worked were to some 

extent a theater for decisions made elsewhere—in party structures that operated outside Iraqi government institutions. Making sense of this murky world 

was mostly beyond the PRTs’ abilities. “It’s so presumptuous to think we have 

any idea what’s going on,” David Atteberry said. “We are continually stumbling 

around in the dark blind. We’re worse than the blind because at least the blind 

know they are blind.”56 Linguistic and cultural expertise had always been in short 

supply and still was. Only 29 of the 610 PRT personnel deployed by mid-2007 

were Arabic-speaking cultural advisors, and several of them, including highly effective Kurds, subsequently quit in protest of the Coalition alliance with Sunni 

tribes.57 “If you don’t have an interpreter,” a military officer serving on an ePRT 

said, “it’s like Wimbledon. You just watch it go from side to side.”58
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Some PRT members doubted that the assistance they provided would affect 

Iraqi politics. It was the same worry that Petraeus’s economics advisor expressed 

when he wrote that economic incentives carried limited currency in a civil conflict. One ePRT member said, “Through the delivery of essential services, we 

might extend legitimacy to the local government, but I don’t know if that’s necessarily true.” When asked what motivated the focus on essential services, the 

official replied, “Out of a sense of moral imperative, out of a sense of wanting to 

do the right thing.” “I know the Iraqis appreciate that we are doing this,” the official said, “but it might not translate into strategic success for us.”59

The other main reservation voiced by PRT leaders concerned the daunting 

scope of their mission. The area of operations of the East Rasheed ePRT had as 

many people in it as the city of Detroit. To advise the brigade on how best to 

serve these 800,000 people and to carry out its own projects, the ePRT had a 

staff of six.60

Boosting Iraq’s Manufacturing Base

As ePRT staff moved out into local neighborhoods and PRTs continued their 

work with provincial governments, reconstruction entities in the Green Zone 

began implementing the economic surge with newly available funding and personnel. Steering reconstruction and military procurement contracts to viable Iraqi 

businesses became a key U.S. objective. The idea was straightforward. Sustaining 

the Coalition’s presence in Iraq cost more than twice Iraq’s gross domestic product.61 The military spent a significant portion of these costs on goods and services 

that could be procured locally. If properly channeled, military needs could drive 

job creation in the Iraqi industrial base and thus help end the insurgency soldiers 

were there to fight. 

During the transition to direct, fixed-price contracting in late 2006 and 2007, 

USACE-GRD moved diligently to “Iraqify” their workforce, relying as much as 

possible on Iraqi contractors and vendors, many of whom had been trained by 

Bechtel University and other multinational firms.

62 A special effort called the 

“Iraqi First” program was begun in mid-2006 by Major General Darryl Scott, 

head of JCC-I.63 From October 2006 to September 2007, JCC-I awarded $2.7 

billion in contracts to Iraqi firms who collectively employed an estimated 75,000 

Iraqis. In the first half of 2007 alone, it provided Iraqi businesses with more than a 

billion dollars of business.64 By early 2008, more than 4,100 Iraqi companies were 

registered with the Coalition, which awarded 85 percent of them at least one contract. Overall, 90 percent of reconstruction projects awarded by USACE-GRD 

were going to Iraqi firms.65 It was the latest of many attempts by the Coalition to 

involve Iraqi firms in the reconstruction of their country.66
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An effort to revive Iraqi factories also got underway. Deputy Under Secretary 

of Defense Paul Brinkley led a task force to explore what it would take to breathe 

life into a sector of the economy that had employed an estimated 500,000 Iraqis 

in 2003.67 “Frankly, we had exported a lot of our business processes to Iraq, and 

they were inappropriate,” said Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, 

who recruited Brinkley to go to Iraq.68

Brinkley became convinced that the CPA-era decision to close Iraq’s stateowned enterprises should be reversed.69 There were an unknown number of 

shuttered factories that could put Iraqis back to work. With private investment 

not yet entering the country, Brinkley advocated using Coalition funds to pay 

start-up and capital improvement costs that would bring these enterprises back 

online. Many in the State Department doubted the wisdom of this initiative. 

Although State Department officials had resisted Defense Department plans 

to decommission the state-owned enterprises in 2003, by 2007 the embassy’s 

economics section was skeptical that reviving long-closed factories would be the 

best use of U.S. resources. 

Once again, the U.S. failed to achieve a unified policy on what role stateowned industries should play in Iraq’s economic recovery. The debates became so 

vituperative that Brinkley moved his staff from the embassy to separate quarters in 

the Green Zone. He also drew his budget exclusively from Defense Department 

funding, over which State personnel had little or no say.70 Deputy Secretary of 

Defense England later said “that the whole Brinkley operation was also part of 

the interagency confusion in terms of who is responsible for what.”71

By March 2007, Brinkley had selected 140 factories as candidates for Coalition 

assistance.72 The factories manufactured everything from farm equipment to 

pharmaceuticals. Brinkley based decisions on how to allocate assistance on the 

potential speed and economic impact of a factory’s restart.73 By September 2007, 

he had succeeded in opening 17 of them. Brinkley intended his $200 million budget for assistance to be the catalyst for eventually creating 150,000 Iraqi jobs.74

The End of IRRF 2

Elsewhere around the embassy, programs that had existed since 2003 and 2004 

were in a state of transition. Most remaining IRRF 2 projects were closed out 

during 2007. About 450 were still on the books in 2008.75 GRD personnel anticipated that only fifteen to twenty of the largest and most complicated among 

them would still be underway by mid-2009. 76 Although the drawdown of IRRF 2 

had led most large design-build contractors to pack up, new projects and ongoing 

military construction needs kept more than a thousand GRD employees working 

across Iraq’s three regions. The 2008 supplemental budget also provided $285 
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million for sustainment programs and $60 million for capacity development, 

which the GRD used to fund vocational training of young apprentices and onthe-job training for more experienced workers at both infrastructure sites and 

in ministries.77

The focus of reconstruction shifted overwhelmingly to supporting Iraqi 

initiatives, in national as well as local ventures. In this new phase, Ambassador 

Crocker said, “You have to listen as much as you talk. Let them tell you the problem and then use ways they think it can be fixed with our help. It is not going to 

resemble how the Walla Walla, Washington City Council deals with Olympia, 

but it may work in Iraqi terms. So we talk about Iraqi solutions....It has to work 

for them.”78

Reorganizing the Embassy

Just as the civilian surge reached its highest point, Ambassador Crocker reorganized the embassy, strengthening his ability to give high-level direction for 

the reconstruction program.79 The IRMO had housed the senior advisors who 

worked with Iraqi ministries and oversaw reconstruction in the various sectors. Of 

its 258 positions, 147 moved to embassy sections, and 44 others were eliminated. 

The remaining 67 became the staff of the embassy’s Iraq Transition Assistance 

Office (ITAO), which retained responsibility for the Ministries of Electricity and 

Water, as well as residual ministerial capacity-building efforts.80

The reorganization further realized the desire of State Department management to bring reconstruction more directly under the embassy’s control. The 

embassy’s economics section assumed responsibility for the Ministries of Oil, 

Agriculture, Trade, Transportation, and Communication. The Rule-of-Law Task 

Force took the Ministries of Justice and Interior. The Health and Human Services 

section took on the Ministry of Health, and Treasury attachés had the Ministry 

of Finance. The National Coordination Team, which directed the PRTs, became 

the Office of Provincial Affairs. The Public Affairs section assumed responsibility 

for the Ministries of Education and Culture. At times, these shifts were confusing. 

The formal point of contact for the Ministry of Planning, for instance, was at first 

unclear. Initially, representatives of the embassy’s political and economic sections 

and ITAO disavowed their assigned role.81

The new staffing structure was devised by Patrick Kennedy, the State 

Department’s Undersecretary for Management, whom Crocker had invited to 

review embassy operations. Kennedy’s report aimed to prepare officials for the 

move to the new embassy complex, still under construction, where space would 

be at a premium.82 The Kennedy Report also recommended increased staffing 

in the embassy’s economic and political sections, lengthening tours to eighteen 
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months, and ensuring at least one-week overlaps during personnel rotations. 

Wider dissemination of PRT weekly reports were also needed, in part because 

State Department personnel paid less attention to dispatches not distributed in 

cable form.83

To many, the embassy reorganization made reporting chains more complex 

than before. The cadre of U.S. personnel in IRMO whose primary job was to 

travel “outside the wire” to interface with senior managers in the Iraqi government was now dispersed through multiple offices. Its convoluted organizational 

chart depicts the complexity inherent in an effort that by July 2007 involved at 

least 62 agencies or sub-agency offices in reconstruction alone.84

When Petraeus arrived, his advisors identified eight major coordination 

bodies.85 “We have an underdeveloped Iraqi bureaucracy and an overdeveloped 

U.S. bureaucracy,” Colonel Meese observed, “and the two of them [make] each 

other [stagnate].”86 By 2007, spending too much time dealing with the Coalition 

bureaucracy—and not enough meeting with Iraqis—was a frequent complaint 

of officials based in the Green Zone. It was a far cry from the CPA period, where 

individuals could more easily take the initiative. “We so rapidly went from...the 

Wild West days,” one senior advisor lamented, “to a different kind of waste.”87

Deputy Secretary

of State

Defense

Reconstruction

Support Office

(DRSO)

Secretary of the

Army

U.S. Central

Command

(CENTCOM)

Multi-National

Force-Iraq (MNF-I)

Chief of Mission

(COM)

Bureau of Democracy,

Human Rights, & Labor

(DRL) Iraq Reconstruction

Management Office

(IRMO)

U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers Gulf /Region

Division – Project and

Contracting Office

(USACE/GRD-PCO)

U.S. Agency for

International

Development (USAID)

Project and

Contracting Office -

Washington

 (PCO-W)

Assistant Deputy

Assistant Secretary

– Army (Policy and

Procurement) –

Iraq/Afghanistan

Secretary of the

Air Force

Deputy Chief

of Staff

(Installation &

Logistics)

U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers

(USACE) - HQ

Corps of Engineers

Transatlantic Program

Center (CETAC)

Dept of Army

ASA (AL&T)

Bureau of Diplomatic

Security

(DS)

Bureau of International

Narcotics and Law

Enforcement Affairs

 (INL)

Bureau of Political and

Military Affairs

(PM)

Bureau of Population,

Refugees & Migration

(PRM)

Criminal

Division

ICITAP

OPDAT

U.S. Institute of

Peace

Overseas

Private

Investment

Corporation

 (OPIC)

Bureau for

Democracy,

Conflict &

Humanitarian

Assistance

(DCHA)

Bureau for Asia and

the Near East

(ANE)

Department of

Treasury

The Civil

Engineer

Air Force Center for

Environmental

Excellence

(AFCEE)

Multi-National Security

Transition CommandIraq (MNSTC-I)

USAID Mission

Director Iraq

Homeland Security

(Iraq)

Northern

District

Central

District

Southern

District

Joint Contracting

Command Iraq/

Afghanistan

(JCC-I/A)

LEGEND

Line of Authority

Line of Significant Coordination

Department of

Justice

Attorney General

Justice

Attaché

United States

Marshals Service

Federal Bureau of

Investigation

Drug Enforcement

Administration

Bureau of

Alcohol, Tobacco,

Firearms and

Explosives

Regional Crimes

Liaison Office

Secretary of State

Senior Advisor to the

Secretary & Coordinator

for Iraq

(S/I)

Secretary of

Defense

Embassy 2007 Organizational Chart 

USG Funds Flow for Iraq

Source: SIGIR Audit 07-008, “Fact Sheet on the Roles and Responsibilities of U.S. Government Organizations 

Conducting IRRF-Funded Reconstruction Activities,” July 26, 2007, i. 

Bureau of Near

Eastern Affairs

(NEA)
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The lack of executive authority was apparent everywhere. Even though 

Crocker and Petraeus assigned coordinators to the political, economic, military, communication, and rule-of-law lines of operation, the coordinators in 

most cases did not have tasking or budget authority over the offices they were 

responsible for managing. A truly joint command structure never evolved. To 

Crocker and Petraeus, achieving unity of effort, in which everyone worked toward 

common goals, was more important than unity of command, where action was 

not always predicated upon achieving consensus. This arrangement worked well 

enough when the military and civilian leadership saw eye to eye, but when they 

disagreed, the civilian and military arms of the U.S. government would at times 

work at cross-purposes.88

The complexity of the Coalition effort and its chain of command was especially difficult for the Iraqis to understand. Figuring out whom to contact for help 

was often the first problem. Frustration at the ever-growing Green Zone staff 

evoked suggestions for radical change. “If I were you,” USAID’s acting-Deputy 

Administrator James Kunder advised Ryan Crocker, “I’d reduce the embassy 

presence to a hundred people and give everybody else two choices: they can 

either go to a PRT, or they can go home.”89

Crocker and Petraeus were acutely aware of the management challenge that 

faced them. “You have to be joined at the hip,” Petraeus said. “That’s why the 

Ambassador and I have offices next to each other.” “If all else fails,” Petraeus said, 

“once a week, the ambassador and the MNF-I commander get to sit down with 

the President of the United States and the NSC. And you can again cut through 

quite a few layers of bureaucracy in a real hurry in that kind of situation.”90 The 

physical proximity maintained by Crocker and Petraeus, however, did not always 

extend to their staffs, who continued working in separate office space, frequently 

attending separate morning meetings, and reporting through separate chains 

of command.91 Despite this litany of challenges, the civil-military relationship 

between the embassy and MNF-I improved steadily during 2007. 

Social Capital and the Civilian Surge

Relationships with Iraqis that often eluded embassy personnel flourished just 

miles away in compounds maintained by USAID contractors, and to a lesser 

extent on PRTs. The Community Stabilization Program, the Community Action 

Program, and the Local Governance Program employed Iraqis to work in neighborhoods not far from the Green Zone, as well as in other places across Iraq. By 

2007, this approach to reconstruction—the strengthening of Iraqi civil society 

by operating within it—was viewed as a crucial tool.92
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Through interventions large and small, in places from community halls to 

main street businesses, the CAP and LGP continued to reinforce democratic 

processes, build capacity, and spur commerce in more than a hundred neighborhoods across Iraq. The CSP, designed in 2005 to execute the civilian component 

of Clear-Hold-Build, mounted the largest effort in monetary terms.93 By providing 

short-term employment and vocational training programs, as well as micro-grants 

and youth activities, the $544 million program harnessed underemployed populations in the wake of clearing operations—a cohort that would otherwise be 

vulnerable to the cash-for-violence scheme of insurgents and militias.94

The program operated in tandem with military campaigns in Baghdad, Kirkuk, 

Mosul, Falluja, Ramadi, Al Qaim, Habaniyah, Ba’quba, Basrah, and eventually 

nine other cities, often gaining access to neighborhood leaders and organizations through relationships established by other USAID initiatives.95 By the end 

of 2007, it employed 319,583 Iraqis in short-term labor projects and provided 

13,275 with vocational training for a total of 260,000 man-months of employment.96 More than 260,000 man-months of short-term employment helped make 

visible community improvements, many of which were overseen by municipal 

governments in places just swept by violent clearing operations.97 The role of 

this economic stimulus in solidifying security gains, although hard to measure, 

was seen by its implementers and military personnel as an essential element of 

the surge’s success.98

All of these programs were carried out with little overt evidence of U.S. funding. The low-profile facilities maintained by USAID, along with the outreach it did 

in local neighborhoods, meant its people were rarely attacked. USAID, perhaps 

more than other reconstruction entities, believed that security could be achieved 

by muting the association with the Coalition and by gaining community trust 

and cooperation. 

It was a sociological, rather than an exclusively physical conception of security. 

The office of Grand Ayatollah Sistani, for instance, issued a carefully worded fatwa

permitting Shi’a to work with USAID implementing partners, but not the Coalition 

military. Sistani’s office even issued identification cards to Iraqi workers hired by 

one of the USAID programs, giving them safe passage through militia checkpoints 

when collaborating with the Coalition would have meant certain death.99

The Security Net 

USAID’s compounds constituted a parallel reconstruction apparatus that in 

2007 many embassy personnel did not know existed. The secrecy was in part by 

design to keep the Iraqis who worked there safe, but it was also because the embassy’s regional security officer deemed these compounds unsafe for government 
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personnel. According to standing Regional Security Office rules, they were offlimits to civilian officials. At a time when mentoring was essential, one of the 

few venues in which Western advisors and their Iraqi protégés could build solid 

relationships was walled off in the name of security.100

The security office’s restrictions gave rise to a curious asymmetry. During 

the surge, the military, State officials in ePRTs, and USAID contractors exposed 

themselves to greater risk by frequently meeting with Iraqis in their communities, 

while other civilian personnel, under more restrictive Chief of Mission security 

protocols, were prevented from holding or attending such meetings.101 If the 

State Department’s conservative protocol for measuring danger had been strictly 

observed, the embassy in Baghdad itself would have closed.102 The ePRTs were 

able to achieve the high degree of engagement enjoyed by USAID contractors 

because the military brigades they worked with assumed responsibility for their 

security, and the units had a higher acceptance of risk in allowing site visits.103

By mid-2007, the Regional Security Office sought to extend its control to 

vetting assistance provided to Iraqis. In the process, the office nearly smothered the PRT Quick Response Program before it began. Since their creation 

in 2005, PRTs had lobbied for a CERP-like fund so they could sponsor small 

and medium-sized projects autonomously. Eighteen months later, the embassy 

developed the Quick Response Fund, funded by ESF. With an initial tranche 

of over $100 million, the QRF program was to be the surge’s signature civilian 

resource—the primary financial means by which PRTs could independently 

undertake short-term capacity-development projects in their areas.104

The initial procedures that governed the fund’s distribution for projects larger 

than $25,000 entailed three stages of review.105 After the PRT completed a sevenpage grant application and a five-page summary, a technical committee at the 

embassy reviewed the proposal.106 From there, proposals went to Washington, 

where a separate technical committee evaluated them. Once these two operational hurdles were cleared, a new requirement mandated that they be sent for 

review by the Regional Security Office, which had never before played an active 

role in vetting recipients of grant funds.107 The QRF funds thus were initially 

saddled with administrative requirements that far exceeded the military’s parallel CERP program, in which a brigade commander could unilaterally approve 

expenditures up to $200,000. 

PRT members were flabbergasted when they received an email in September 

2007 from a mid-level staffer in the Office of Provincial Affairs detailing these 

extensive vetting procedures.108 Rather than checking potential grant recipients 

against a government database of terrorist suspects, as had been the original policy, the Regional Security Office requested Iraqi applicants to list their 
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• The Civilian Surge •

associations and life histories on a multipage form similar to that used for U.S. 

government security clearances.109 In addition, the Iraqis were required to submit 

fingerprints and agree to have their information stored in a database. Forms could 

not be faxed or scanned; the security office required an original signature.110

Although the danger of money falling into the wrong hands was real, PRT 

members knew that if the new rules were followed, the fund would be unusable. 

Iraqis, wary of who would have access to information about their whereabouts 

and associations, would not consent to the security review. It would be humiliating for grant recipients, usually esteemed members of their communities, to 

submit fingerprints as though they were common criminals. Finally, no PRT 

leaders would be willing to send their personnel into the Red Zone for the 

sake of chauffeuring paperwork. PRT personnel began calling the program the 

“Quagmire Response Fund.”111

The rules were eventually streamlined. Micro-purchases would not need prior 

approval, and the embassy could approve projects up to $25,000. Only those 

larger than $25,000 would be sent to Washington for review. Nevertheless, the 

dispute over procedures limited total disbursements in the program’s first five 

months to just $3.5 million.112 As a consequence, PRTs initially lost much of 

their “surge” capacity to engage provincial governments, missing opportunities 

for progress during early lulls in violence. As of late September 2008, 2,065 programs have been approved through QRF grants, and almost 50 percent of funds 

have been disbursed.113

Status of the Sectors

As the civilian surge developed more effective tools, reconstruction went on in 

each of the major sectors: electricity, oil and gas, water and sewer, security, and 

justice. The IRRF program had essentially ended. By the end of 2007, just under 

four percent of the IRRF 2 monies had yet to be obligated; only six percent was 

unexpended.114 Security and justice was ultimately the largest sector of the IRRF 

reconstruction program, constituting 40 percent of its expenditures. Electricity 

was next at 23 percent, water at 11 percent, and oil and gas at 9 percent. Of the 

contractors responsible for the program’s execution, Bechtel expended more than 

$1.1 billion, followed closely by FluorAMEC, Parsons, KBR, and the Washington 

Group International.115

In the new post-IRRF phase, Iraqi expenditures began to rival and then exceed 

U.S. funding in many areas. Provincial and ministerial budget execution, although 

still low in absolute terms, nevertheless pushed increasing amounts of Iraqi revenues into capital projects. On the U.S. side, reconstruction was mostly funded by 

CERP, ESF, and ISFF, with much of new construction occurring in the security 
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sector and through efforts in the provinces.116 PRDCs were increasingly active in 

developing ESF-funded and embassy-approved projects in the provinces. 

In 2006 and 2007, funding for PRTs and PRDC projects totaled $790 million, 

and PRDCs managed more than 400 projects, with a cumulative value of $495 

million. In addition, $217 million went to the Infrastructure Security Program, 

which spent $110 million constructing pipeline exclusion zones—essentially 

large berms and other obstacles blocking access to the major oil pipelines—

designed to prevent illegal tapping and sabotage. Another $51 million was 

spent hardening critical sites and making improvements to the facilities used 

by Strategic Infrastructure Battalions, the main Iraqi force responsible for infrastructure security.117

But it was not an easy time. The heightened levels of violence following the 

Samarra bombing continued well into the first half of 2007. Reconstruction personnel faced extraordinarily trying conditions, and many lost their lives. From 

January 2006 until March 2007, 418 contractors working on reconstruction or 

for the military were killed.118

In some places, contractors continued their work, often at great risk, while 

others suspended operations altogether, leading to high overhead costs as contractors sat idle waiting for projects to resume or be re-scoped. A SIGIR audit 

found that for reasons of security, mismanagement, and cost overruns, the U.S. 

government terminated 1,262 contracts and task orders, either for default or 

convenience, during the course of the reconstruction program. Of the nearly 

$1 billion value of these contracts and task orders, the government had already 

paid $600 million. Although a few of these projects were near completion, the 

vast majority were not.119

Electricity

In the electricity sector, the push continued to raise generation capacity and put 

more megawatts on the grid, as did the efforts to stabilize and expand the distribution networks that carried power to Iraqi homes and businesses. In the transition 

from the IRRF-funded effort, the scope of activities pursued by the embassy broadened to include training of personnel at generation plants and at the Ministry of 

Electricity. On the generation side, connecting to the right fuel sources remained 

problematic. In 2007, 16 of the 35 gas turbines built by the United States were 

using diesel, crude oil, or heavy fuel instead of the natural gas they were designed 

for, resulting in higher maintenance costs and the loss of an estimated 2,000 MW of 

daily production. Improving access of these turbines to natural gas and to reliable 

fuel sources at generation plants nationwide was linked to ongoing work in the oil 

and gas sector, as well as Coalition efforts to interdict oil smuggling.120
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Meanwhile, the Iraqi government struggled to gain control over the many 

substations responsible for routing power across the grid, which remained unstable and prone to insurgent attack. In June 2007, eight of the twelve major 

transmission lines feeding Baghdad were out of service. Coalition and Iraqi forces 

moved to improve security along these lines while constructing dozens more 

transmission lines and substations. Average daily output, however, was still 1,740 

megawatts below the CPA’s 6,000 megawatt goal.121

Oil and Gas

Increasing capacity in the oil and gas sector remained linked to progress in the 

electricity sector and to the overall security situation: refineries need reliable 

power to function, and the network of pipes was vulnerable to attack and criminal tapping. For almost all of 2007, interdiction of the northern pipelines left the 

southern oil terminal at Basrah as the only node for oil export. 

Output hovered at just over two million barrels per day, even though the 

system’s capacity—if free from attacks and without maintenance shutdowns—by 

now reached three million. Ongoing facility upgrades included installing communication links at oil terminals, repairing multiple liquid-natural-gas plants, and 

installing oil-metering equipment at the terminal. Sustainability and capacitybuilding challenges remained a high priority.122

Water

By mid-2007, the 1,095 water projects funded by IRRF were 90 percent complete. Although the revised targets for increasing access to potable water and 

sewage were largely met, cutbacks dating from the 2004 reprogrammings, which 

removed more than a billion dollars from the sector to fund pressing security 

needs, meant that the Coalition’s original ambitions in the water sector would not 

be realized. In Baghdad, only 30 percent of homes were connected to distribution 

lines. Sewer service reached 40 percent in Najaf and 50 percent in Basrah, but 

remained essentially nonfunctional in Kirkuk, Samarra, and Falluja.123

The challenges that plagued the water sector nationwide could be seen in 

the $277 million Nassriya water delivery system. Designed to produce potable 

water for a half-million Iraqis in five cities, the plant suffered from a long list of 

problems that curbed output: the lack of a reliable power supply, a weakened 

pipe system unable to withstand the plant’s higher pressure flow, illegal taps on 

the transmission lines, and poorly qualified staff unwilling to attend contractorprovided training.124 Ambassador Crocker’s personal intervention in the failing 

project spurred performance improvements in the months after it was found to 

be operating substantially below capacity. “The Nassriya water treatment plant 
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• Chapter 26 •

is not going to be the largest monument to American folly in decades out here,” 

Crocker said. His focus was on helping the Iraqis reach solutions on their own. 

“How can we help the Iraqis complete the Nassriya main drain?” he said. “We 

put so much money into sustainment. Don’t let it go to waste.”125

Security and Justice

Throughout 2007, re-training of National Police brigades—a process known as 

“re-bluing”—continued, as did the training and equipping of Iraq’s other security forces, which now numbered more than 350,000.126 The decline in violence 

was especially helpful to the court system.127 The construction of the Rusafa 

rule-of-law complex, bringing together multiple parts of the justice system in one 

place, greatly facilitated the processing of cases in Baghdad.128 Although coaxing 

judges to use modern investigative methods—including forensic evidence—

and to eschew sectarian influences remained a challenge, progress in the judicial 

system continued.129

By mid-2008, 655 courts operated in Iraq. Major Crimes Courts—regional 

branches of the Central Criminal Court of Iraq—were being established in all 

18 provinces. The 567 judges, 281 investigative judges, 312 assistants, and 645 

judicial investigators working nationwide were protected by a force of more than 

5,000 guards.130 Nonetheless, just under half of all inmates in Iraqi detention were 

awaiting trial, contributing to overcrowding in four of the six prison facilities 

transferred to Iraqi control.131

The Surge in Late 2007

The surge brought more personnel and funds into Iraq, but more important, it 

redefined the terms of reconstruction. Brigades became a center of gravity in the 

reconstruction effort in a new way: brigade commanders and ePRTs each viewed 

capacity as a top priority. No longer was transition, the Casey-era watchword, 

the primary goal. The surprising agility with which the military embraced the 

economic and reconstruction missions was made possible by the wide support 

in its ranks for the counterinsurgency doctrine articulated and implemented by 

Petraeus. What was resisted in 2003 and 2004 was seen as absolutely necessary by 

2007. Using brigades as “landlords” for the ePRT program yielded the intended 

multiplier effect on capacity building and reconstruction. Through these innovations, civil-military cooperation reached new heights. 

Despite significant progress in specific places, Iraq in 2007 proved stubbornly 

resistant to many of the surge’s political and economic innovations and to the 

Coalition effort overall. In July 2007, the new Prime Minister of Britain, Gordon 

Brown, proposed a host of policy initiatives in a letter to Iraqi Prime Minister 
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Nouri al-Maliki. These included “an integrated energy strategy,” “banking reform,” and possibly a “National Investment Commission”—ideas that had been 

minted by the Coalition back in 2003 and were still relevant only because they had 

not been fulfilled.132 In August 2007, Minister of Finance Bayan Jabr announced 

that completing Iraq’s reconstruction would require an additional investment of 

$100 billion to $150 billion—an amount equal to what had already been spent.133

It was a sobering reminder of how the continuing violence had undone so much 

of the infrastructure investments made by the United States and Iraq.

Targeted killings also continued. On the first day of Ramadan, Sheikh Abd alSattar, leader of the Anbar awakening, was assassinated just a week after President 

Bush, during a September 2007 visit, personally commended his efforts at fighting 

al-Qaeda.134

By fall 2007, the surge and other political developments in Iraq, including the 

Sunni awakening, brought about a modest reduction in violence, with total attacks trending downward across Iraq.135 Calmer conditions did not immediately 

translate into progress on reconciliation or passage of the legislative articles the 

Congress had hoped Iraqi leaders would tackle.136

The Congress wrote eighteen benchmarks into the 2007 emergency supplemental appropriations act that funded the surge; the President had to certify 

that the Iraqi government was making progress toward meeting the benchmarks 

before it could receive further support from the Economic Support Fund, absent 

a Presidential waiver of the requirement.137 An initial White House assessment in 

July 2007 found that few of the benchmarks had been fulfilled, but that satisfactory progress was being made.138

A later GAO audit, released in advance of the September 15, 2007 testimony 

of General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker before the Congress, found that 

the Iraqi government had met three, partially met four, and had not met eleven 

of the eighteen benchmarks.139 Petraeus and Crocker acknowledged in their 

testimony that few of the benchmarks had been met, but cited continued Iraqi 

progress toward achieving them as reason enough for the Coalition to continue 

the surge.140

A second set of benchmarks came into play in the International Compact with 

Iraq, a framework negotiated in 2007 through which international donors and 

aid organizations, including the World Bank, United Nations, and International 

Monetary Fund, pledged support in return for progress in bringing Iraq’s laws 

and economy in line with international best practices.141 Along with the standby 

arrangement negotiated with the International Monetary Fund, the International 

Compact with Iraq was another step toward reintegrating Iraq into the regional 

and international economy. 
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Although signs of progress could be discerned, the road ahead remained long. 

Iraq in 2007 was rated by analysts at the World Bank in the bottom 10 percent 

of all countries in measures of corruption and accountability, political stability, 

government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and rule of law.142 In December 

2008, the International Monetary Fund agreed to cancel 80 percent of Iraq’s 

foreign debt.143

The Surge and Its Aftermath in 2008

As 2008 dawned, violence continued to recede. The military effort to pacify first 

Baghdad and then western and north central Iraq paid off, but at great cost to 

U.S. and Iraqi troops. Attacks against Coalition forces during the initial phases of 

the surge reached their highest level since 2003. However, relative calm returned 

to large parts of the country, partly because of the surge, but also because of the 

organization of Sunni groups—and eventually Shi’a groups—into local security 

forces. Neighborhoods gripped by near-constant violence since the increase in 

attacks after Samarra returned to something like normalcy, and levels of ethnosectarian violence fell precipitously. 

During 2008, the Iraqi Army demonstrated increasing ability as it performed clearing operations in Basrah and Sadr City with limited U.S. support. 

Although fierce fighting persisted in parts of Ninewa, Diyala, Salah Al-Din, 

and Basrah provinces, overall attacks in late 2008 fell to their lowest level since 

2003.144 The improving security situation was a boon to civilian programs. In 

the summer of 2008, a USAID contractor estimated that with fewer cancellations of meetings and convoys, the LGP was achieving a 25 percent higher 

mission-accomplished rate.145

More than any year since the 2003 invasion, 2008 produced a gradual and persistent transition to Iraqi leadership in reconstruction and security. Establishing 

uniform contracting and funds-disbursal regulations by the Ministries of Planning 

and Finance enabled directors general across Iraq’s government to execute their 

budgets more easily. The existence of clear rules and a national budget passed by 

Iraq’s parliament meant that U.S. reconstruction officials increasingly worked to 

reinforce Iraqi priorities, rather than retrofitting U.S. projects into the Iraqi system. “You don’t have to worry about getting post-hoc buy-in,” said the Treasury 

attaché, when “things originate in the Iraqi system.”146

In April, Ambassador Crocker testified before the Congress that “the era of 

U.S. major infrastructure projects is over.”147 Although some new construction 

continued, the effort to build capacity was in full swing; 238 Coalition employees 

worked in the non-security ministries, and many large sustainment programs 

were being carried out across the country.148
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The global economy provided an unexpected boost to Iraq’s reconstruction. 

Record oil prices—which peaked at over $140 per barrel during the summer of 

2008—and sustained export production buoyed Iraq’s coffers and continued the 

trend toward greater capital expenditures by its ministries and provincial governments.149 A subsequent decline in prices, however, constrained Iraq’s burgeoning 

reconstruction plans, forcing budgetary revisions upon the government. 

Political progress was uneven in 2008. Passage of the important hydrocarbons law remained elusive, but the parliament did pass provincial powers and 

provincial elections laws that would lay the foundation for eventual provincial 

elections in January 2009.150 Although the Iraqi government began performing 

at ever higher levels, the U.S. presence still remained large, with 164,000 contractors and 157,000 troops seemingly an enduring feature of the political and 

security landscape.151

Despite the continued engagement of so many soldiers and advisors, care 

was not always taken to ensure Iraqi input and acceptance. Officials conducting a 

review of PRTs—now the signature reconstruction program—were astonished 

to learn that Prime Minister Maliki had never been fully briefed on the program’s 

details. The teams of U.S. advisors interacted with an entire swath of the Iraqi government without having formally sought the Prime Minister’s permission.152

The Ultimate Impact of Reconstruction

Toward the end of 2008, there were few direct ways to take a final measure of 

the impact of U.S. reconstruction programs. U.S. goals went beyond putting 

megawatts on the grid or providing more gallons of treated water. Using reconstruction as a tool, the goal was to create a self-reliant Iraqi government and a 

satisfied population, and to increase trust between Iraqis and the United States 

and among Iraqis themselves. 

Only recently have nationwide surveys measuring satisfaction rates with essential services been undertaken with any degree of consistency. The data suggest 

that, broadly speaking, a majority of Iraqis remain unsatisfied with the delivery 

of basic services, including electricity, water and sewer, and trash removal. More 

significantly, these satisfaction rates tend to vary by location and sectarian identity. Rates in Baghdad, for instance, are markedly lower than many other areas in 

the country, especially the Kurdish region. Interestingly, the rates of satisfaction 

with essential service delivery during the surge have been broadly similar among 

Sunnis and Shi’a for potable water, sewage, food, and trash, but divergent for electricity, fuel delivery and, to a lesser extent, health.153 For electricity in particular, 

this is counterintuitive, because Sunni-majority provinces typically enjoyed more 

hours of power per day than almost all Shi’a-majority provinces during the same 
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time period.154 Actual differentials in service delivery thus do not alone account 

for the differing rates of satisfaction among sectarian communities. Historical 

entitlements, perceived political disenfranchisement, and expectations raised by 

early Coalition pledges also likely affected satisfaction rates.

Even with Iraqi levels of satisfaction trending upward and violence trending 

downward, the United States was still caught in a nation-building effort it had 

not anticipated and still did not fully understand. In 2000, future Secretary of 

State Condoleezza Rice articulated her belief that the U.S. military should focus 

primarily on combat operations. “Carrying out civil administration and police 

functions is simply going to degrade the American capability to do the things 

America has to do,” she said, adding, “We don’t need to have the 82nd Airborne 

escorting kids to kindergarten.”155 Eight years later, during the surge, the 82nd

Airborne, serving its second Iraq deployment, was helping oversee the construction of greenhouses outside Tikrit.156

More than five years after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the ultimate 

success of the reconstruction program and the future of Iraq were still unresolved. 

The Joint Campaign Plan that Crocker and Petraeus promulgated was predicated 

on the belief that stopping openly violent clashes would allow Iraqis gradually to 

resolve their conflicts through elections rather than militias. Such a transformation was both elusive and extraordinarily costly—for Americans and Iraqis—in 

lives and national treasure. 

Even as the security situation improved dramatically through the second 

half of 2008, potentially violent rivalries between political groups competing for 

power still threatened Iraq’s fragile government structures. “SCIRI is fighting 

Sadr is fighting Fadhila,” said an Iraqi whose home is in Basrah, where clashes 

have frequently taken place. The social effects of violence have taken their toll 

on family life. For most of the past four years, he said, “it is too dangerous for my 

kids to play outside the house. They have bicycles; they are walking on the roof. 

They play football inside the house.” Even as violence recedes, and life regains 

a degree of normalcy in many provinces, the new realities of post-Saddam life 

bring their own complications. Before, he said, many Iraqis could remain largely 

ignorant of politics. “Now it’s a truth for all life.”157
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Essential Services Overview – After the Surge 

Metric158

PreinvasionPostinvasionCPA 

Transition

Negroponte 

Era

Khalilzad 

Era Surge Ends

Electricity Production 

Megawatts 4,075 711 3,621 4,262 3,475 4,400

Oil Production 

Million Barrels per Day 2.58 0.30 2.16 2.13 1.95 2.43

Iraqi Security Forces

Soldiers and Police 1,300,000 7,000-9,000 87,000 171,300 328,700 478,500

Telecommunications

Landline Subscribers 833,000 0 791,000 998,000 1,111,000 1,200,000

Mobile Subscribers 80,000 0 461,000 2,422,000 8,720,000 ~13,000,000

Human Toll

U.S Troop Fatalities - 139 862 1,745 3,248 4,115

Civilian Contractors - 1 46 217 916 1,229

U.S. Civilians - ~9 52 113 224 271

Iraqi Civilians - 7,413 16,848 29,155 72,858 95,236

Financial Cost ($ billions) 

U.S Funding - $3.45 $22.93 $29.21 $36.96 $50.46

Iraqi Funding - $0.00 $16.00 $21.03 $37.27 $50.33

International Funding - $0.00 $13.60 $13.87 $15.20 $17.00

Total Funding - $3.45 $52.53 $64.11 $89.43 $117.79

By mid-2008, daily electricity production had edged up above prewar levels, with 

outputs averaging 4,400 megawatts per day. The third quarter of 2008 showed 

postwar highs, averaging over 4,900 megawatts per day. But Iraqi demand still far 

outpaced production. The electricity distribution system improved too, but equitable allocations among the provinces and major cities remained a problem.159

Oil production continued to rise through 2008, falling just short of prewar levels 

of 2.58 million barrels per day by mid-year. The July 2008 production rate reached 

2.43 million barrels per day—the highest since the 2003 invasion. Because of the 

success of infrastructure security measures, no successful pipeline attacks occurred in 2008.160

Part V

Lessons Learned

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Hard Lessons

I don’t think we had the right structure...We tried in Iraq to 

give it to a single department, the Department of Defense. That’s 

why the President has now said that we need a civilian response 

corps that can do those activities. But clearly, we didn’t have the 

right structure.*

Dr. Condoleezza Rice

Secretary of State (2005-2009)

In March 2003, the United States invaded Iraq, made short work of its armed 

forces, and easily toppled Saddam Hussein’s government. A well-trained and 

properly equipped force achieved a quick and efficient military victory. But the 

United States was unprepared and ill-equipped to deal with what came next: a 

“post-conflict” environment torn by violence, looters, criminals, and a nascent insurgency; a governmental system in a state of complete collapse; and an economy 

that had slipped into idle and then switched off. 

With no established plans to manage the increasing chaos it faced, no developed doctrine of nation building to rely on, and no existing governmental 

structures through which to carry out contingency relief and reconstruction operations, policymakers struggled to respond to a broken Iraq. They abandoned 

the hoped-for quick transfer of power to an interim Iraqi authority and entered 

into an occupation. Thrust into this deepening crisis, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer 

III and the Coalition Provisional Authority were asked to do the virtually impossible: restore order, restore governance, restore the economy, and restore basic 

services—quickly, with limited resources, and little capacity to act. 

Focusing on the economy, Bremer improvised an infrastructure-heavy reconstruction program that became the largest foreign assistance effort undertaken by 

the United States since the Marshall Plan. Although a short period of shaky peace 

followed Saddam’s fall, the rapidly growing problems in Iraq—especially in the 

security sector—were beyond the CPA’s capacity to solve. The formal dissolution 

of Iraq’s military and a more extensive de-Ba’athification effort than anticipated 

aggravated matters by sidelining two expected sources of Iraqi assistance.

The United States struggled over the next six years to develop and implement a strategy for reconstructing Iraq as a stable and democratic nation on 

* Fox News interview with Dr. Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, December 7, 2008.
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the path to prosperity. Deteriorating security both informed and complicated 

every decision. Employing a variety of tactics to address the growing violence, 

the United State poured money and—finally—more troops into the country, 

all while trying to rebuild Iraq’s physical infrastructure, its security forces, and 

its capacity to govern. U.S. governmental agencies, military units, nongovernmental organizations, international groups, and private-sector firms engaged 

in the massive effort.

Through trial and error, the U.S. strategy moved away from the CPA’s large 

infrastructure approach to a more modest, Iraqi-driven program focused on developing the fledgling government’s capacity for self-rule. Along the way, the 

U.S. government created a series of ad hoc offices and systems as it moved from 

crisis to crisis. The government and the private contractors it employed adapted 

as they learned hard lessons from the rebuilding program, gradually becoming 

more effective in an exceedingly lethal environment. Notwithstanding this progress, the United States still struggled in late 2008 to make Iraq’s reconstruction 

a success.

Each of the four periods of reconstruction chronicled in Hard Lessons yields 

unique conclusions. Taken collectively, they underscore the need for the U.S. 

government to reform its approach to contingency relief and reconstruction 

operations and to develop greater capacity to execute them. 

Prewar Planning and ORHA (September 2001-April 2003)

The U.S. approach to Iraq reconstruction had its origins in the fall of 2001, when 

the President and the Secretary of Defense began fashioning the Iraq war plan 

according to a “liberation” model. From the outset, the Pentagon’s leadership 

believed that victory would be swift and that a new interim Iraqi authority would 

quickly assume power. They planned on Iraq’s police providing postwar security 

and anticipated that Iraqi oil revenues would fund most relief and reconstruction 

projects. When Iraq’s withering post-invasion reality superseded these expectations, there was no well-defined “Plan B” as a fallback and no existing government 

structures or resources to support a quick response. 

During prewar preparations, certain officials at the Department of State 

and the U.S. Agency for International Development argued that the postwar 

reconstruction of Iraq would be more difficult, would take more time, and would 

require an extraordinary commitment of financial and human resources. But even 

veteran development experts misjudged what would be necessary to rebuild the 

country’s physical, security, and governmental infrastructure. “We needed to 

be thinking at a much different order of magnitude [about] what is required to 
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• Hard Lessons •

reconstruct a failed state, in the context of a U.S. military invasion,” USAID’s 

Deputy Administrator James Kunder later said.1

Force size was a central issue. Planners across the government and within 

the military disagreed on how many troops would be necessary. Prewar analyses 

of post-conflict situations suggested that at least 300,000 troops—and perhaps 

as many as 500,000—would be required to maintain post-invasion order in a 

country with the size and population of Iraq. But the President and his advisors, both military and civilian, decided against deploying so large a number 

and chose not to prepare for large-scale reconstruction operations. Instead, the 

invasion plan called for deploying a light and agile force. Post-conflict efforts 

focused on averting humanitarian disasters like those that followed the first Gulf 

War. The plan assumed the best-case reconstruction scenario and the worst-case 

humanitarian scenario. 

Historically rooted conceptions of defense, diplomacy, and development 

shaped the content of prewar reconstruction discussions. Military planners excluded post-conflict experts from early deliberations that determined the scope 

of U.S. policy. USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios, the highest-ranking 

Administration official with both development and combat experience, was 

not invited to NSC meetings until long after the war began. 

The way the U.S. government is structured facilitated this exclusion. Since 

1947, the Departments of Defense and State—and later USAID—have operated mostly independently of one another, even though in today’s world overseas 

missions usually require a blending of each one’s strengths, along with those of 

other U.S. government agencies. Integrating their various capabilities was left to 

the President’s war cabinet and the NSC staff, where joint planning is difficult 

to manage and tends to be subject to the personalities of those who inhabit key 

posts. “Don’t try to use Iraq as the model [for reform],” Secretary of State Colin 

Powell cautioned, “without recognizing and acknowledging that it was as much 

a process and personality as it was a structural problem.”2

The government’s lack of strong mechanisms to integrate the work of separate departments led the White House to delegate interagency missions to a 

lead agency just months before the invasion. The battle over whether the liberation model would guide Administration policy in Iraq became, in truth, a battle 

over which department would control reconstruction itself. In the absence of a 

clear precedent on how to coordinate postwar operations of this magnitude, the 

President decided, in late 2002, to hand operational control for planning and 

managing post-invasion Iraq to the Department of Defense, sidelining the only 

interagency system—the NSC—designed to orchestrate the government’s actions in international security matters. 
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Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld recognized that this was not a perfect 

solution. “The U.S. government has had to rely on quickly assembled, ad hoc 

efforts, such as [the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance], 

to coordinate reconstruction,” he later wrote.3

 “The truth is,” Secretary of State 

Condoleezza Rice would later say, “we really did not have, either in any department or in the U.S. government as a whole, an institution that could really deal 

with post-conflict stabilization.”4

 “A lot of it wasn’t handled very well,” Rice added. 

“There are a lot of things, if I could go back and do them differently, I would.”5

The Coalition Provisional Authority (May 2003-June 2004)

The liberation model—in which a rapid transfer of power to Iraqi authorities 

would enable U.S. troops to depart 90 days after the regime’s fall—broke down 

almost immediately after the invasion. Neither the U.S. military nor the civilian 

leadership was prepared for the complete disintegration of Iraq’s government and 

the subsequent loss of law and order. The looting and the chaos it engendered 

destroyed plans for a rapid transfer of power. With public institutions and critical 

infrastructure crippled, the mission of ORHA’s successor agency—the Coalition 

Provisional Authority—turned from restoring essential services to rebuilding 

from scratch the ministries that provided them.

The CPA adopted a maximalist approach to reconstruction, developing plans to 

transform every aspect of Iraqi society, from the banking system to traffic laws. But 

the CPA—and the U.S. government agencies that supported it—demonstrated 

an inadequate understanding of both Iraqi culture and the complicated internal 

political relationships that existed among and within various Iraqi groups. 

During the first weeks of its existence, the CPA issued momentous orders—

de-Ba’athification and disbanding the military—with insufficient interagency 

debate. Although there may have been sound reasons for removing members of 

the Ba’ath party from senior government positions and for dissolving the army, 

both decisions added considerably to the difficulty of reconstruction and establishing a functioning government. Had these issues been fully discussed by the 

war cabinet and within the CPA, the United States might have acted differently. 

Instead, the U. S. rebuilding program was left to deal with the instant loss of many 

of the Iraqi technocrats it would later need. It also had to build entirely new Iraqi 

security forces, a task that would ultimately consume more than half of all U.S.-

appropriated reconstruction dollars.

In 2003, the United States lacked an accepted doctrine for contingency relief 

and reconstruction operations that could inform how decision-makers should 

address the complex array of problems then at play in Iraq. There was no agreedupon approach to Iraq’s reconstruction, little understanding of the dynamics of 
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• Hard Lessons •

post-conflict rebuilding, and no structure for the rapid provision of resources to 

the CPA. Moreover, those at the head of what quickly became the largest overseas 

rebuilding effort in U.S. history struggled to differentiate between the pursuit 

of transformational goals for their own sake and what it would take to achieve 

rapidly the U.S. national objective of a stable Iraq. Efforts across many sectors 

were poorly conceived, overambitious, and often at cross-purposes. Part of the 

problem was that the CPA failed to consult sufficiently with Iraqis to understand 

what they really wanted from the reconstruction program. Consequently, the 

CPA made decisions that often undercut the goals they were trying to reach. 

The reform of Iraq’s economy was a striking example of how the lack of an 

accepted doctrine undermined U.S. objective. The CPA decided, over considerable internal opposition, to discontinue support to Iraq’s state-owned enterprises. 

Its senior economic advisor apparently did not appreciate the interdependence 

among factories producing chlorine, agricultural fertilizer, and cement and the 

impact their closing would have on Iraq’s oil, electricity, water, and agricultural 

sectors. Rather than committing resources to their continued existence, the CPA 

hoped that an emergent private-sector in Iraq would generate a new manufacturing sector, employ large numbers of people, and produce the goods the country 

needed. But Iraq’s harsh postwar reality quickly trumped economic theories that 

suggested a market solution was possible.

By mid-summer 2003, the CPA had settled on a strategy to spur growth by 

rebuilding infrastructure, focusing particularly on the electricity, oil, and water 

sectors. The CPA hoped that these projects, once completed, would energize the 

economy and supply Iraqis with needed essential services. The Administration 

persuaded the U.S. Congress to appropriate $18.4 billion to fund this grand vision, and the CPA created the first of what would be several ad hoc organizations 

to manage reconstruction—the Program Management Office. Like the organizations that came before and after, the PMO did not have the personnel and the 

systems to administer so large a program effectively. 

Believing that conditions in Iraq demanded speed, the CPA developed its 

reconstruction program in great haste, missing opportunities to integrate adequately the views of Iraqis and implementing agencies—USAID, the State 

Department, and the military—in the process that led to the creation of the second Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund. Many of the program’s infrastructure 

projects also suffered from inadequate design, weak government oversight, and 

a lack of planning for Iraqis to sustain them. 

Growing Iraqi opposition to the prolonged transition to self-rule—complemented by the U.S. desire to disengage from a lengthening occupation—resulted 

in the announcement on November 15, 2003, to transfer sovereignty from the 
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CPA to Iraq by June 30, 2004. Reconstruction plans that had just been devised 

on a two-year timetable now had to shift, and the rush began to prepare Iraq’s 

government to stand on its own in seven months. The announcement also meant 

that U.S. appropriations for reconstruction—slowed by the NSC’s high-level 

review in Washington—would not arrive until the very end of the CPA’s tenure. 

Ambassador Bremer had to fund most of the CPA’s early reconstruction projects, as well as Iraqi government operations, with Iraqi funds held in trust by the 

UN and the United States. But the CPA failed to keep detailed accounts of how 

most of this money was spent. Expenditures of the roughly $20 billion in DFI 

money used by the CPA were initially tracked on an Excel spreadsheet—hardly 

a sufficient control. At its end, the CPA had barely begun to execute the grand 

reconstruction program it had designed.

An even more fundamental problem plagued the CPA’s efforts. Its reconstruction strategy was premised on a “permissive” environment, meaning one 

generally free from violence; but most of Iraq was racked by violence for most of 

the CPA’s existence.Almost immediately after the invasion, many in Iraq—from 

the CPA Administrator and the Commanding General of Coalition forces to 

Iraqis in the ministries and on the streets—recognized that security was the most 

compelling issue confronting the country. Lieutenant General Sanchez, the man 

in charge of the U.S. military in Iraq, requested more troops in May 2003. Until 

mid-July, though, the United States stuck to its original plan to reduce troop 

strength as quickly as possible. The troop withdrawal stopped only when General 

Abizaid replaced General Franks as CENTCOM commander.6

With the increase in violence, planners confronted a political and economic 

landscape that was evolving faster than they could adapt to or understand. All the 

while, the magnitude of what needed to be done was overwhelming. The absence 

of a well-defined doctrine or an effectively coordinated strategy caused the CPA’s 

approach to reconstruction to have a disjointed and ad hoc quality: Get the oil 

flowing. Stop the smugglers. Get the electricity up and running. Clean out the 

sewers. Re-write the textbooks. Change the currency. Employ more Iraqis. Focus 

on the cities. Focus on agriculture. Focus on security.

The U.S. Embassy under Negroponte (July 2004-June 2005)

When the new U.S. Embassy in Iraq inherited the CPA’s reconstruction program in 

July 2004, the U.S. ambassador faced two critical problems. First, the United States 

had to adjust the reconstruction program to address the deteriorating security 

conditions in Iraq. Second, more capabilities needed to be mobilized to implement 

the rebuilding program. The U.S. reconstruction management structure was overwhelmed by the challenges of building in a war zone. Contractors found it difficult 
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• Hard Lessons •

to carry out projects in the dangerous environment, and the lack of adequate oversight by government contracting officers, program reviewers, and other agencies 

permitted wasteful spending to careen out of control. Safeguarding reconstruction 

personnel, equipment, and work sites against insurgent attacks further drove up 

costs. The violence also prevented managers and quality control engineers from 

visiting projects to check progress. The system of oversight so crucial to effective 

reconstruction had collapsed. The United States had to change course. 

Immediately after his arrival in Iraq, Ambassador John Negroponte ordered 

a review of all reconstruction priorities, which led to a reprogramming of $3.46 

billion, with most of the shifted funds going to the security sector. More reprogramming followed and, by September 2005, U.S. officials had shifted a total 

of $5.59 billion—nearly a third of reconstruction appropriations—to support 

security, job creation, and economic reform projects, drawing the money chiefly 

from the water and electricity sectors. The CPA designed its program to be executed in a secure postwar environment, but the rise of a violent insurgency 

forced the reconstruction effort to change course from laying the foundation 

for long-term economic growth to producing short-term results in support of a 

counterinsurgency campaign. The challenge was to achieve security gains while 

fostering economic and democratic development. 

By the middle of 2005, the United States had completed a thousand projects 

using IRRF 2 funding and had another thousand underway. Hundreds of firms 

were active across the country, employing tens of thousands of foreign contractors and an estimated 180,000 Iraqis. The rebuilding effort, however, proved to be 

more expensive and time consuming than planners anticipated. Power generation 

and distribution continued to fall short of Coalition goals, as did oil production, 

chiefly because so much of Iraq’s critical infrastructure was vulnerable to sabotage 

and in poor condition. 

Project management systems remained problematic. In late 2005, the embassy still could not match projects with the contracts that funded them, nor 

could it estimate how much they would cost to complete. Completed projects 

also were failing after being turned over to Iraqis who were unable to properly 

maintain and operate the facilities. These failures highlighted the need to build 

capacity in Iraqi institutions so the country could manage the new infrastructure 

the United States was providing.
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The U.S. Embassy under Khalilzad and Crocker (June 2005-2008)

U.S. reconstruction strategy continued to evolve during the tenure of Ambassador 

Zalmay Khalilzad, who arrived in Baghdad in June 2005. A new approach for 

counterinsurgency operations, called Clear-Hold-Build, further integrated military and civilian efforts. Khalilzad deployed Provincial Reconstruction Teams 

across Iraq, adapting a concept that he developed during his tenure as ambassador 

to Afghanistan. The PRTs, together with Provincial Reconstruction Development 

Councils, helped Iraq’s provincial governments improve their working relationships with Iraq’s central government and strengthened the coordination of Iraqi 

and Coalition resources. 

From Khalilzad forward, the reconstruction effort moved quickly away from 

the large infrastructure approach and toward more modest projects designed to 

deliver jobs and services to the most vulnerable, violent, and strategically consequential Iraqi cities and towns, and to do this, as much as possible, through 

provincial, municipal, and local institutions. By going through official Iraqi institutions instead of around them, U.S. reconstruction expenditures directly served 

the goal of building a functioning Iraqi state.

As the U.S. ability to deliver reconstruction resources improved, the amount 

of money it had left to spend diminished. Meanwhile, Iraq fell further into chaos. 

As many as 300 companies provided security services to the U.S. reconstruction effort, increasing costs on some large reconstruction contracts by 24 to 

53 percent.7

The Samarra bombing in February 2006 exacerbated sectarian tensions, overlaying the insurgency with civil conflict among Iraq’s sects. The resulting political 

fragmentation complicated efforts to build capacity in ministries held captive by 

political parties with sectarian or regional agendas. As the nature of the violence 

evolved from a traditional insurgency to a sectarian struggle, economic incentives 

proved less and less effective and military force became more necessary. 

The 2007 surge of troops and the complementary civilian effort—driven by 

a revised counterinsurgency strategy formulated by General David Petraeus and 

Ambassador Ryan Crocker—ushered in a new era. As the major program of U.S. 

infrastructure rebuilding began drawing to a close, emphasis moved to building 

capacity inside Iraqi institutions and using direct contracts with Iraqi firms to 

help the country’s economy recover. 

As the surge of troops and civilian resources peaked, the U.S. investment in 

Iraq’s security forces also began to pay dividends. In 2005, the Congress had authorized the Iraq Security Forces Fund, a major new appropriation that eventually 

matched the IRRF in size. During the following three years, the ISFF channeled 

more than $18 billion into training and equipping Iraq’s police and soldiers, 
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• Hard Lessons •

building the facilities they used, and developing the Ministries of Defense and 

Interior. The increase in the size, reliability, and readiness of Iraqi forces contributed to a significant reduction in violence that began in the summer of 2007 and 

was sustained through 2008. 

The surge’s hard-won security gains led to a more secure reconstruction environment. With the accumulation of oil revenues in Iraqi capital budgets, the 

Government of Iraq now had in its coffers the resources necessary to pursue its 

own relief and reconstruction program. Helping Iraq execute this new budget 

emerged as a key objective. By the end of 2008, the reconstruction program was 

many orders of magnitude more Iraqi-driven and Iraqi-funded than when it had 

begun in 2003.

Over nearly six years, the U.S. program had undergone an extraordinary 

evolution. What was originally conceived as a modest program to repair war 

damage and treat refugees had ballooned into an expansive and expensive 

nation-building effort. This in turn was supplanted by a counterinsurgency 

campaign and then a countrywide initiative to build Iraqi capacity. Constant 

re-evaluations of how U.S. resources could be employed to achieve the desired 

result of a stable Iraq led to a shift from large infrastructure reconstruction to a 

program that combined “soft” and “hard” projects aimed at mitigating security 

problems and building capacity.

 Of the many lessons to be drawn from Iraq reconstruction, the most compelling speak to the need to develop an agreed-upon doctrine and structure for 

contingency relief and reconstruction operations to guide the use of military 

and economic power so that the United States is ready when it next must intervene in a failed or failing state. The Iraq reconstruction experience chronicled in 

this report, in hundreds of audits and inspections, and in three previous Lessons 

Learned reports led SIGIR to identify these most significant hard lessons:8

First Principles for Contingency Relief and Reconstruction Operations

	 •	 Security is necessary forlarge-scale reconstructionto succeed. A successful reconstruction program requires a balancing of security, political, 

and economic interests. Reconstruction cannot proceed on a large scale 

without the requisite security to protect those carrying out the projects and those overseeing them. In Iraq, the scope of reconstruction 

was too often unmatched by available security resources. To this day, 

Iraq’s reconstruction environment has never been truly “post-conflict.” 

Endlessly rebuilding in the wake of sustained attacks on reconstruction 

personnel and critical infrastructure proved to be a demoralizing and 
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• Chapter 27 •

wasteful proposition. To guide decisions on funding projects facing security threats, the U.S. government should analyze whether and at what 

costs those security risks can be mitigated. Projects should only proceed 

when senior leaders determine that the strategic objective they fulfill 

outweighs the risk of failure and the costs of mitigating security risks. 

	 •	 Developing the capacity of people and systems is as important as

bricks and mortar reconstruction. The CPA’s reconstruction program 

focused chiefly on large infrastructure projects aimed at improving service 

delivery. Little of its money was set aside to boost government capacity. 

The failure to pursue capacity-building efforts alongside infrastructure 

construction led to a crisis in sustainability that continues to this day. The 

deterioration of poorly maintained infrastructure projects after transfer to 

Iraqi control could end up constituting the largest source of waste in the 

U.S. reconstruction program. A robust capacity-development program 

implemented from the outset of the reconstruction effort could have 

helped obviate this circumstance. Such a program should be an essential 

component of future contingency relief and reconstruction operations. 

	 •	 Soft programsserve as an important complement to military operations in insecure environments. An emerging lesson from Iraq is that 

when violence is pervasive, soft programs—like those orchestrated by 

USAID and Provincial Reconstruction Teams—are especially important 

in advancing U.S. goals. Operating through Iraqi intermediaries reduced 

the exposure of reconstruction personnel to violent attack and helped deliver economic stimuli to local communities even when Coalition military 

forces were engaged in clearing operations. The apparent success of these 

programs, although often hard to quantify, highlights the extent to which 

social capital matters. Working through indigenous networks seems to 

increase community acceptance and provide a higher and more lasting 

degree of local security than military or private-security protection alone 

could achieve. Especially because many such programs operate out of view 

of most U.S. personnel, the selection of metrics and careful monitoring of 

expenditures are critical to ensuring value for the U.S. taxpayer.

	 •	 Programs should be geared to indigenous priorities and needs. 

Host country buy-in is essential to reconstruction’s long-term success. Much of the early and some later efforts in Iraq focused on large 

projects that were meant to benefit Iraqis directly. Other projects devised new and more efficient systems for conducting business inside 
• 333 •

• Hard Lessons •

the Iraqi government. In many cases, there was a lack of sufficient Iraqi 

participation in deciding how or what to reconstruct and ensuring that 

projects could be maintained afterwards. Detailed joint planning with 

Iraqi officials—perhaps the most important prerequisite for success 

after security—only gradually improved over time. 

	 •	 Reconstruction is an extension of politicalstrategy. The reconstruction experience in Iraq revealed deficiencies in how the U.S. government 

understands the dynamics of societies it seeks to influence through military and non-military means. War, politics, and reconstruction are linked 

in ways that individuals within the government failed to appreciate in 

the opening years of the Iraq conflict. If war, as Clausewitz said, is an 

extension of politics by other means, so too is relief and reconstruction 

an extension of political, economic, and military strategy. In this regard, 

there is a distinct difference between pursuing reconstruction to catalyze 

long-term economic growth and deploying reconstruction to support a 

counterinsurgency campaign. 

Organizing the Interagency System for Contingency 

Relief and Reconstruction Operations

	 •	 Executive authority belowthePresidentisnecessary to ensure the effectiveness of contingency relief and reconstruction operations. The 

role of executive authority—and the lack thereof—over interagency 

coordination lies at the heart of the failures in the Iraq reconstruction 

program. The question of who was in charge, both in Washington and 

in Baghdad, was fiercely contested throughout the reconstruction effort. 

Was the CPA Administrator the President’s envoy or an employee of the 

Secretary of Defense? Was the ambassador to Iraq the President’s personal representative, with authority over all U.S. personnel and resources, 

or merely the chief State Department official? Do personnel on detail 

report through their agency chain of command or to the heads of embassy sections? To what extent can the “lines-of-operation” coordinators 

designated by the ambassador and the commanding general task agencies under their purview for support? The lack of unity of command in 

Iraq meant that unity of effort was seldom achieved. Too often, programs 

were designed to meet agency goals, rather than U.S. national interests. 

Stronger integration was needed not only between the military and civilian agencies but also among the civilian agencies themselves. With weak 
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• Chapter 27 •

interagency cooperation an endemic feature of the U.S. national security 

system, reform efforts should press for structures that will promote the 

development of a unifying strategy with clearly delineated agency responsibilities and adequate authority to enforce its execution. 

	 •	 Uninterrupted oversight is essential to ensuring taxpayer value in

contingency operations. In the absence of effective management by 

government officials, contractors in Iraq were often left in dangerous 

circumstances to carry out insufficiently defined contracts written by 

inexperienced contracting officers who lacked situational awareness. In 

this chaotic environment, it was, at times, difficult to differentiate between 

reliable contractors who could carry out good work and those whose ad 

hoc operations and lack of experience pointed to failure. As a result, contractors fell into two clusters. Most companies responsibly complied with 

the requirements of their contracts, even if the U.S. administrative apparatus did not make the best use of their capabilities. A relative few took 

advantage of the situation by committing fraud. In this context, uninterrupted oversight by inspectors general and the Congress—accompanied 

by adequately staffed quality-control and quality-assurance programs—is 

essential to ensuring the efficient and effective use of taxpayer dollars. 

	 •	 An integratedmanagementstructure is necessary to ensure effective

interagency reconstruction efforts. After the reconstruction program 

got underway in 2003, at least 62 offices and agencies ultimately became involved in managing IRRF-funded projects.9

 There were no 

interagency project management and information systems that could 

coordinate the activities of the hundreds of firms and subcontractors 

performing construction work orders at thousands of sites across Iraq. 

An integrated management structure—coupled with an interoperable 

information system—could have helped to ensure that programs and 

projects were planned and executed with effective communication, control, and cooperation. 

	 •	 Outsourcingmanagementtocontractorsshouldbe limitedbecause it

complicates lines of authority in contingency reconstruction operations. By law, contractors report solely to the government contracting 

officers or the designated representatives of the agency that awarded 

the contract. In Iraq, authority for reconstruction plans and policy 

was given to the IRMO, under control of the ambassador. At the same 

time, contracting officers operating out of the PCO were under Defense 
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• Hard Lessons •

Department supervision and thus only nominally under the authority 

of the ambassador. The proliferation of contractors serving as managers and advisors in each of the offices raised questions regarding what 

constituted inherently governmental activity, and the extent to which 

oversight authority can be delegated to a contractor.

Contracting Mechanisms and Human Resources 

in Contingency Relief and Reconstruction Operations

	 •	 TheU.S. governmentshould develop newwartime contracting rules

that allow for greater flexibility. The United States needs contracting 

reform that enables U.S. dollars to be more effectively used in contingency relief and reconstruction operations. A “Contingency FAR” 

should be developed by the Congress and the executive branch. The 

Federal Acquisition Regulation’s complicated contracting regulations, 

which can be modified by agency rules, should be knitted into a single 

set of simplified, uniform rules for conflict environments that all contracting agencies would have to use. A much larger corps of well-trained 

and experienced contracting officers must also be developed and then 

maintained for deployment during all phases of contingency operations, including planning. Similarly, a diverse pool of contractors with 

expertise in post-conflict reconstruction should be pre-competed and 

pre-qualified to be available when a contingency operation begins.

	 •	 The U.S. government needs a new human-resources management

system capable of meeting the demands of a large-scale contingency 

relief and reconstruction operation.Supplying adequate numbers of 

personnel with the requisite expertise emerged as a critical bottleneck 

early in the reconstruction effort. Employing experts to work temporarily in Iraq often entailed long delays before their deployment, and many 

of those who finally arrived stayed for only three to six months. Although 

personnel recruitment improved somewhat as the reconstruction enterprise matured, at no time were there sufficient numbers of experienced 

advisors to meet Iraq’s critical capacity-building needs. Washington 

was unable to draw effectively on the extraordinary talent available in 

America to form a cadre of workers that combined private-sector expertise with academic knowledge and bureaucratic skill. Further, the 

failure to provide unambiguous authority to the Chief of Mission in 

NSPD 36 and the reluctance of the several chiefs of mission to exercise 

that authority made the effective cross-jurisdictional management of 
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• Chapter 27 •

personnel almost impossible. A uniform set of human resource rules that 

would apply to all federal personnel deployed for contingency operations is needed, as are stronger recruiting mechanisms and a large stable 

of ready-to-deploy personnel. 

	 •	 The U.S. government must strengthen its capacity to manage the

contractors that carry out reconstruction work in contingency 

relief and reconstruction operations. Once Baghdad fell and the 

looting began, the scope of reconstruction quickly overwhelmed the 

U.S. government’s standing capacity to respond. The post-Cold War 

downsizing of USAID and military construction capacities increased 

reliance on the private sector. Neither the NSC, the CPA, nor the 

Pentagon could mobilize contractors fast enough as they struggled to 

comply with complex FAR regulations while awarding large cost-plus 

contracts. Nor were they able to provide the degree of government 

oversight that was necessary. The decision to reduce the number of 

warranted contracting officers during the ten years preceding the Iraq 

invasion proved particularly consequential.10 It became clear that the 

U.S. and international contractors hired by the CPA were not ready to 

quickly mount a large-scale reconstruction operation in a dangerous 

security environment. 

	 •	 Diplomatic, development, and area expertise must be expanded

to ensure a sufficient supply of qualified civilian personnel in contingency reconstruction operations. Despite the crucial need for 

diplomatic skills and development expertise in contingency relief and 

reconstruction operations, as well as for area experts fluent in local culture and politics, the civilian agencies that provide them proved unable 

to staff the number of positions needed in Iraq. The Iraq reconstruction 

experience illustrates the extent to which civilian agencies do not have 

the capacity to project power abroad. Cuts at USAID have halved the 

number of permanent government employees at that agency, severely 

attenuating its technical competence and managerial facility.11 To remedy this weakness, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has called for a 

“dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national 

security.”12 The Congress and the President should consider a long-term 

strategy for building technical and area expertise in the government’s 

civilian diplomatic and development agencies and creating mechanisms 

for deploying such capabilities abroad in times of crisis and peace.
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• Hard Lessons •

• • •

The following Afterword suggests ways the hard lessons of Iraq reconstruction can 

be addressed further, focusing on the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian 

Management Act of 2008, which the Congress recently passed to enhance the 

ability of the United States to carry out contingency relief and reconstruction 

operations abroad.
• 338 •

Afterword

Reforming Contingency Relief and 

Reconstruction Operations

History will judge the war against Iraq not by the brilliance 

of its military execution, but by the effectiveness of the posthostilities activities.*

Lieutenant General Jay Garner 

Director of ORHA (2003)

Since the Marshall Plan transformed Europe after World War II, the United 

States has undertaken large and small contingency relief and reconstruction 

operations in countries from Bosnia and Haiti to Sri Lanka and Somalia. Every 

President since Harry Truman has faced at least one contingency requiring the 

deployment of civilian and military resources abroad. Even so, the government as 

a whole has never developed a legislatively sanctioned doctrine or framework for 

planning, preparing, and executing contingency operations in which diplomacy, 

development, and military action all figure. 

On October 14, 2008, the President signed into law “The Reconstruction 

and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008” (RSCMA), as part of the 

Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for 2009. It is the most 

significant congressional legislation ever passed regarding the structure of and 

planning for contingency relief and reconstruction operations.1

RSCMA addresses a number of recommendations for contingency operations 

reform that SIGIR put forward in its three previous lessons learned reports.2

 Most 

notably, the Act creates a structure to address planning, personnel, and program 

management needs. The Act places responsibility for preparing the civilian side 

of contingency relief and reconstruction operations within the Department of 

State and directs the Secretary of State—in consultation with the Administrator 

of USAID—to develop an interagency strategy for executing reconstruction and 

stabilization operations.3

RSCMA provides for a presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed 

Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, whose significant duties and 

responsibilities include:

• coordinating the development of interagency contingency 

plans and procedures to mobilize and deploy civilian personnel 

* ORHA, “A Unified Mission Plan for Post-Hostilities Iraq,” April 2003.
• 339 •

• Reforming Contingency Relief and Reconstruction Operations •

and conduct reconstruction and stabilization operations for 

various types of crises

• identifying personnel in state and local governments and 

in the private sector who are available to participate in the 

Civilian Reserve Corps or otherwise participate in reconstruction and stabilization activities

• taking steps to ensure that training and education of civilian 

personnel to perform reconstruction and stabilization activities are adequate and are carried out, as appropriate, with other 

agencies involved with stabilization operations

• planning, in conjunction with USAID, to address requirements, such as demobilization, disarmament, rebuilding of 

civil society, policing, human rights monitoring, and public 

information, that commonly arise in reconstruction and stabilization crises

• maintaining the capacity to field on short notice an evaluation team consisting of personnel from all relevant agencies to 

undertake on-site needs assessments4

The Act further states that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the 

USAID Administrator, may create a Response Readiness Corps and a Civilian 

Reserve Corps. The Response Readiness Corps, if formed, “shall be composed of 

active and standby components consisting of United States Government personnel, including employees of the Department of State, the United States Agency 

for International Development, and other agencies.” The Civilian Reserve Corps, 

if formed, shall employ and train “individuals who have the skills necessary for 

carrying out reconstruction and stabilization activities, and who have volunteered 

for that purpose.”5

A Giant First Step

The new architecture created by RSCMA establishes in U.S. law reforms that 

the President set in motion when he signed NSPD 44, which assigned the State 

Department the lead in managing government-wide civilian preparation for 

contingency operations.6

 The duties that must now be carried out by the State 

Department’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) are 

monumental. The coordinator’s office must monitor activities worldwide, prepare contingency plans, coordinate the development of relief and reconstruction 
• 340 •

• Afterword •

strategy across the government, and perform human-resources functions (recruitment, training, equipping) on a grand scale. But without adequate funding 

and a large staff, S/CRS will not be able to accomplish all these tasks. Three things 

are necessary to fulfill the Act’s purpose.

First, the Congress must provide appropriations suitable to meet the RSCMA 

mandate. Some of the necessary funding may come from the President’s Fiscal 

Year 2009 Budget Request to the Congress, which included $249 million for a 

Civilian Stabilization Initiative that would vastly improve the civilian partnership 

with United States Armed Forces in post-conflict stabilization situations.7

 But 

the new Congress should address the funding mandates contained in RSCMA 

with all due speed.

Second, more must be done to ensure that the interagency coordination and 

integration required by RSCMA actually occurs. The State Department’s S/CRS 

office was initially created in June 2004 to lead civilian planning for contingency 

operations, but it has been hamstrung both by weak budgets and a lack of authority. Only in late 2008, more than four years after its creation, were the office’s 

proposals for government-wide reform beginning to gain any traction.8

 Even 

though the Congress has now written the roles of S/CRS fully into law, its ability 

to foster change across the government remains unproven, and many of the same 

structural obstacles remain. Contingency relief and reconstruction operations 

are not inherently the function of any single department, and the concept has no 

single constituency in the Congress, whose oversight committees are organized 

along departmental lines.9

The Department of Defense, usually the largest player in contingency relief 

and reconstruction operations, has pursued its own course toward enhancing its 

capacities for such operations. DoD Directive 3000.05, issued in November 2005, 

provided that “stability operations are a core U.S. military mission” that “shall be 

given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and 

integrated across all DoD activities.” The directive assigns the military departments responsibility to conduct contingency relief and reconstruction operations 

if civilian agencies cannot.10 In response to this directive, USACE has strengthened 

its engineering support to combatant commands and enhanced its own capacity to deploy divisions specializing in post-conflict reconstruction.11 In addition, 

the Army has made stability operations a central part of its doctrine.12 However, 

progress toward meeting the goals of directive 3000.05 has been uneven, as noted 

by many reports, including the Gansler Commission on Contracting.13

Third, the Administration should work to revise and integrate the civilian 

and military components of contingency relief and reconstruction operations.

The President and the relevant cabinet secretaries should ensure that all 
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• Reforming Contingency Relief and Reconstruction Operations •

agencies—especially Defense and State—better integrate the structure and 

resources for contingency relief and reconstruction operations. The Iraq reconstruction experience was characterized by a continuing and disabling lack of 

coordination among the government agencies, contractors, and other organizations involved. As much as any other factor, this lack of coordination—arising 

from weak integration—kept the U.S. program from achieving its objectives. 

Only by strengthening agency integration and preparation can the United States 

move toward the “jointness” necessary for successful contingency operations.

Unity of Command and Unity of Effort

The Iraq reconstruction experience makes clear that contingency relief and 

reconstruction operations are inherently complicated, and that they require 

coordinated and cross-jurisdictional structures, planning, resources, and management. This broaches a difficult conundrum—finding a way to achieve unity 

of command in a multi-agency operation. The military has the security role; State 

has the diplomatic mission; USAID provides humanitarian relief and development expertise; and other agencies have specific missions. Although roles may 

adjust as conditions change, agency personnel always report to their department 

heads in Washington. This chain of command, as it currently stands, will inevitably exert a countervailing force on interagency coordination.

As General Petraeus said:

State is never going to put an ambassador under a general, and 

DoD is never going to put a general under an ambassador. So 

you have to resolve to work together. You have to make way 

and pull together and be joined at the hip. You have to have 

unity of purpose is the bottom line.14

When unity of command is missing and unity of purpose does not foster unity 

of effort, a solution can only be implemented at the top. Interagency working 

groups operating at several levels across the government can and do make decisions that affect many departments and agencies. But under the current system, 

only the President has the decisive authority necessary to require interagency 

coordination for contingency relief and reconstruction operations. 

The Iraq endeavor fell short on many occasions because the absence of unity 

of command prevented unity of effort. Too often, agencies and offices worked in 

their respective stovepipes without ensuring that their activities fully supported 

U.S. goals and objectives and avoided duplicating other agencies’ efforts. The 

NSC apparently was powerless to break many of the logjams that occurred.
• 342 •

• Afterword •

The Project on National Security Reform, under the auspices of the Center 

for the Study of the Presidency, recently issued a report that noted: “Presidential 

intervention to compensate for the systematic inability to integrate or resource 

missions well centralizes issue management and burdens in the White House.” 

The fact that “integration across disciplines is left to the President” has serious 

consequences; the government often cannot coordinate its own actions in a contingency environment.15 A new integrated interagency management system for 

contingency relief and reconstruction operations is necessary to ensure their 

future success.

As the Iraq reconstruction experience demonstrates, the U.S. government was 

neither prepared for nor able to respond to the ever-changing demands of the contingency relief and reconstruction mission it faced in Iraq. Reform of U.S. policy 

for contingency operations—embodied in RSCMA—is a prerequisite for future 

success. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates observed, “In recent years the lines 

separating war, peace, diplomacy, and development have become more blurred, 

and no longer fit the neat organizational charts of the 20th century.”16 The inevitability of future contingency relief and reconstruction operations after or during 

conflict, disaster, or political chaos demands that the U.S. government develop new 

ways of preparing for and managing the projection of civil-military power. 

The President and the Congress should take further steps toward achieving 

this goal. Time and resources must be devoted to assembling a sound doctrine 

for contingency relief and reconstruction operations and for developing the 

capabilities throughout the government to carry them out. Great effort, reflection, and imagination could put the Iraq reconstruction experience to good use, 

yielding new structures, resources, and approaches that apply and build on the 

hard lessons learned in Iraq.
Annexes

• 345 •

Annex A

The Genesis and Methodology of Hard Lessons

Genesis of the Project

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) is the successor 

to the Coalition Provisional Authority Inspector General (CPA-IG), which was 

created by the Congress in November 2003. The Congress created SIGIR in 

October 2004 by amendment to Public Law 108-106. The agency’s mandate, 

expanded several times by the Congress, is the oversight of the use of reconstruction funds for Iraq, most notably the two Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds 

(IRRF 1 and 2) and the Iraq Security Forces Fund, the Commander’s Emergency 

Response Program, and the Economic Support Fund. To carry out this mandate, 

SIGIR conducts audits, inspections, reviews, and investigations.1

SIGIR’s work is embodied in quarterly reports to the Congress, audit reports, project assessment reports, congressional testimony given by the Special 

Inspector General, and the SIGIR Lessons Learned Initiative. SIGIR’s lessons 

learned reports capture and apply the lessons learned from the Iraq reconstruction 

experience, comporting with SIGIR’s congressional mandate to provide advice 

and recommendations that “promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in 

the administration of [reconstruction] programs and operations” in Iraq.2

The SIGIR lessons learned initiative began with “Lessons Learned in Human 

Capital Management” (released in February 2006), the development of which 

included a day-long forum at Johns Hopkins University on September 20, 2005, 

where more than 30 experts, many of whom served in Iraq, discussed issues of 

human capital policy, recruitment, retention, and continuity of staff, among other 

issues that related to personnel in Iraq reconstruction programs. Similar sessions 

were part of SIGIR’s two subsequent lessons learned reports: Contracting and 

Procurement (released in July 2006) and Program and Project Management 

(released in March 2007).3

 Shortly after the second report’s release, SIGIR began 

work on a more-comprehensive narrative of the reconstruction effort, focusing 

on the major events that shaped its course and the central themes that emerged 

from the program, aiming to produce a cumulative report on lessons learned 

from Iraq reconstruction.

Hard Lessons is that report, capping SIGIR’s Lessons Learned Initiative. It 

seeks to answer the following questions:

• How—and how well—did the U.S. government meet its 

mission to restore Iraq’s infrastructure and economy, rebuild 
• 346 •

• Annex A •

the country’s military, foster civil society, and establish democratic institutions?

• What lessons have been learned that can guide the United 

States in making future contingency relief and reconstruction operations more coordinated, efficient and thus 

successful?

Methodology

The Hard Lessons team drew on SIGIR’s audits, investigations, inspections, and 

other reports to root the book’s findings in the broader context of the U.S. mission in Iraq. Its members used government archives, including the unclassified 

documentary record from ORHA, the CPA, and the U.S. Embassy Baghdad, as 

well as those records in the Departments of Defense and State, USAID, and the 

White House that relate to Iraq reconstruction. Further documentary resources 

included USAID contractor reports and data from the Project Contracting Office 

and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division.

It should be noted that this report is not an audit product. Its methodology 

differs from the standards set for audit reports, which use generally accepted 

government auditing norms, issued by the Comptroller General of the United 

States—the head of the U.S. Government Accountability Office. SIGIR’s historical account of reconstruction is also drawn from a wider range of source material, 

including books, articles, and reports by scholars, think tanks, and individuals 

who were participants in the effort.

This documentary evidence, however useful, can tell only part of the story 

of Iraq’s reconstruction. The account was greatly strengthened by hundreds of 

interviews conducted by SIGIR staff and the Special Inspector General. These 

provided a great deal of information on when key decisions were made, why 

they were made, and what their consequences were. Efforts were made to interview key Iraqi officials, as well as American and Coalition participants. The 

writers made every attempt to balance the statements of individual interviewees 

with other sources, so that conclusions were not based solely on the memory or 

opinion of one person. 

Research was conducted mainly in SIGIR’s offices in Arlington, Virginia, 

but also included several staff trips to Iraq between 2006 and 2008. These trips 

yielded many interviews with U.S. and Coalition personnel, contractors, Iraqi 

government officials, and Iraqi private citizens. 

The Special Inspector General interviewed key civilian and military leadership, including virtually all of the high-ranking officials from the Departments of 
• 347 •

• The Genesis and Methodology of Hard Lessons •

State and Defense, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers involved in Iraq reconstruction. Among these were the 

current and former commanding generals of Multi-National Force-Iraq and the 

current and former U.S. ambassadors to Iraq. 

While in Iraq, team members observed reconstruction first-hand as they visited 

military civil affairs units, the Army Corps of Engineers, military brigades, NGOs, 

and contractors working on behalf of the U.S. mission. Team members, along with 

staff from SIGIR’s audits, inspections, and investigations directorates, conducted 

site visits at major reconstruction institutions and projects in cities across Iraq.

In addition, SIGIR researchers consulted scholars who are conducting similar projects. Dr. Gordon Rudd, the ORHA/CPA historian, graciously agreed 

to provide access to his many interviews of key officials. The United States 

Institute of Peace, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the 

Center for Army Lessons Learned also provided interview transcripts and other 

documentation. 

The report’s major conclusions were presented to and discussed by a diverse 

group of experts on April 30, 2008, at a peer roundtable hosted by the Center for 

Strategic and International Studies. Participants included experts on Iraq and reconstruction from academia, major Washington think tanks, nonprofit organizations, 

and U.S. government agencies. Representatives attended from the Departments 

of State and Defense, USAID, the U.S. Institute of Peace, the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, the Government Accountability Office, the Army’s Peacekeeping and 

Stability Operations Institute, and the National Defense University. 

The project was also ably served by the ongoing advice of outside reviewers. 

Several editorial advisors—all experts in the field of post-conflict operations—

commented on drafts at various points in the project and met four times in 2007 

and 2008 to review chapter drafts and provide advice on the project’s direction. 

This project also had the benefit of insights from individuals both inside and 

outside of government who made helpful comments on early drafts. In addition, 

officials from SIGIR’s audits, investigations, and inspections divisions provided 

the writing team with invaluable help at various stages of the drafting process. 

Lastly, SIGIR asked stakeholder agencies to vet a final draft. Copies were sent 

to the Departments of State and Defense, USAID, and the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers. While this occurred formally near the end of the editing process, all of 

these agencies were involved in the project at various times along the way. Their 

staffs provided helpful technical and analytical observations that were subsequently integrated into the text.
• 348 •

Annex B

Oversight of Reconstruction 

Programs and Expenditures

Since 2003, the U.S. Congress has appropriated more than $50 billion for the 

support of relief and reconstruction efforts in Iraq, including the restoration 

of the country’s oil and electricity sectors, the establishment of new security 

forces, and the strengthening of Iraq’s capacity to govern itself.1

 A number of 

federal agencies—including SIGIR, the U.S. Army Audit Agency, the Inspectors 

General of the Departments of Defense, State, and USAID, and the Government 

Accountability Office—have conducted oversight of and reporting on the expenditure of funds for Iraq relief and reconstruction activities.2

This extensive body of work is available in studies, reports, audits, inspections, 

and congressional testimony covering issues that arose during the expenditure 

of U.S. government funds for or in Iraq. They range from the meticulous analysis of specific projects to broad overviews of entire programs and sectors. Most 

included recommendations for improving the management of reconstruction 

efforts now and in the future. 

In 2008, the Congress established the independent, bipartisan Commission on 

Wartime Contracting to study U.S. wartime contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Its mandate is to study, assess, and make recommendations concerning contracting for “the reconstruction, logistical support, and performance of security 

functions” in both theaters from 2003 to the time of the commission’s final report 

in 2010. Its objectives include assessing “the systemic problems identified with 

interagency wartime contracting,” identifying instances of waste, fraud, and abuse 

and “ensuring accountability for those responsible.3

The tension inherent in maintaining financial accountability while achieving 

foreign policy objectives has long had a place in the history of nations. In an iconic 

letter, the Duke of Wellington asked the British Foreign Office in 1812 if he was to 

“train an army of uniformed clerks in Spain for the benefit of the accountants...

in London or, perchance, to see to it that the forces of Napoleon are driven out 

of Spain.” He had, he said, accounted for every farthing, “with two regrettable 

exceptions.” One, he claimed, was a “hideous confusion as to the number of jars 

of raspberry jam issued to a cavalry regiment during a sandstorm in Western 

Spain,” and the other a shilling-and-nine-pence unaccounted for in a battalion’s 

petty cash. “This reprehensible carelessness,” Wellington wrote, “may be related 

to a pressure of circumstance, since we are at war with France, a fact which may 

come as a bit of surprise to you gentlemen in Whitehall.”4
• 349 •

• Oversight of Reconstruction Programs and Expenditures •

Those overseeing and reporting on the expenditure of billions of U.S. dollars appropriated for the reconstruction of Iraq had to face many of the same 

challenges faced by the reconstruction managers themselves, particularly in providing an adequate number of personnel to accomplish oversight work. Given 

the vicissitudes of the reconstruction effort—which was dogged from the start 

by persistent violence, shifting goals, constantly changing contracting practices, 

and undermined by a lack of unity of effort—a complete accounting of all reconstruction expenditures is impossible to achieve. 

Oversight of the Iraq reconstruction program began slowly. No oversight 

plan accompanied either Lieutenant General Garner or Ambassador Bremer as 

they went to Baghdad to head the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian 

Assistance and the Coalition Provisional Authority, in April and May of 2003. 

During the run-up to war and the initial months following the invasion, oversight 

did not exist, with the notable exception of limited efforts by the USAID OIG. 

USAID included an IG as part of the Iraq Task Force set up within the agency 

during the planning phase in advance of combat operations. 

USAID OIG staff went into Iraq ahead of other federal oversight agencies, establishing a Baghdad office in the early summer of 2003. At first, the office was staffed 

by assignments on a three-month temporary duty (TDY) rotation basis until July 

2004; at that point, it became permanent and tour length became more regular.5

During its short duration, ORHA had no IG dedicated to provide oversight of 

its reconstruction programs. For the CPA, Ambassador Bremer, in June of 2003, 

appointed an interim IG—a single official on loan from the DoD OIG—but 

he had no staff and the IG had very little effect. An Iraq-specific oversight presence, with a clear mandate, was not created until passage of the law that funded 

the second tranche to the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund in November 

2003—the CPA-IG, which later became SIGIR.6

The Federal Oversight Agencies in Iraq

USAID

Until the March 2004 arrival in Baghdad of CPA-IG’s first auditors, inspectors, and investigators, the USAID OIG was the only IG to house a fully staffed 

in-country office in Baghdad. The USAID OIG had institutional experience in 

conducting oversight abroad. Since 2008, the office has conducted audits of the 

contracts comprising most of the USAID-based effort in Iraq. The USAID OIG 

released its first Iraq audit in March 2004, followed by audits of the first ten Iraq 

reconstruction contracts issued by the agency. Although the audits identified 

some minor irregularities, they found no substantial problems and lauded USAID 
• 350 •

• Annex B •

staff for their performance under the trying circumstances in which contracts 

were awarded and executed. As of the end of 2008, the office had released a total 

of 28 Iraq audits reporting on both “hard” and “soft” infrastructure programs.7

Government Accountability Office

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is charged with enabling the 

Congress to meets its constitutional responsibility to ensure that federally programmed funding is expended properly for its legislated purpose and used for the 

benefit of the American people. By 2008, GAO’s responsibilities in Iraq had substantially increased since the planning stages of the Iraq war. Since January 2002, 

GAO has produced more than 160 testimonies and reports on the Iraq war. More 

than 100 of these reports specifically targeted reconstruction issues. The agency’s 

remaining reports on Iraq focused heavily on military or veterans’ affairs.8

Department of State Office of the Inspector General

DoS OIG conducted five Iraq reconstruction-related reviews in 2004; three of 

them addressed routine aspects of embassy operations. In 2005, DoS OIG issued fourteen Iraq-related reports on topics ranging from a review of the U.S. 

Embassy in Baghdad to Iraqi police training. Seven reports were released in 

2006, five of which dealt with indirect cost rates (such as the costs of operating 

and maintaining facilities and equipment and administrative salaries). The other 

two focused on Department of State contracting procedures. In 2007, the office 

released three Iraq reports, examining the Iraqi Police contract with the Bureau 

of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (a joint audit with SIGIR), the 

delivery of security services by DynCorp International, and projects conducted 

by the National Endowment for Democracy. By the end of 2008, the DoS OIG 

had issued 33 Iraq audits.9

Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General 

The DoD OIG role in oversight of Iraq reconstruction, governance, and security 

efforts included supporting other DoD audit and investigative organizations. 

DoD OIG did the first auditing on Iraq contracting.10 Between 2004 and the 

end of 2008, DoD OIG produced 46 audits relating to Iraq reconstruction, and 

many others related to military operations in Iraq.11 In July 2008, a DoD OIG 

report on recommendations made by the panoply of audit agencies regarding 

oversight in Iraq identified the “most prevalent” systemic management and 

performance challenges. These included: contract management and resource 

limitations; asset accountability; and financial management, including accuracy 

of cost reporting and accountability.12
• 351 •

• Oversight of Reconstruction Programs and Expenditures •

U. S. Army Audit Agency 

Between May 2004 and the end of 2008, USAAA—which effectively serves as the 

internal auditor for the Secretary of the Army— released 61 Iraq reports or audits. 

The major focus of the agency’s oversight efforts has been various aspects of the 

Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), which was the contracting 

mechanism for approximately half the Army’s Iraq reconstruction-related work. 

The agency has also examined various other programs, such as the Commander’s 

Emergency Response Program, as well as the procurement and repair of military 

and logistical equipment.13

Like many other agencies, USAAA did not initially send auditors to Iraq and 

when they were finally deployed, their numbers fluctuated. By the fall of 2005, 

nine were working in Iraq and six in Kuwait. In April 2006, fourteen were assessing LOGCAP contracts in both places; that number fell to eleven by July 2006 

and was down to four at the end of 2006, although it increased to 29 following 

the holiday season.14 During the summer of 2007, USAAA had seven auditors 

working in Iraq and six others working on LOGCAP in Kuwait. As of September 

30, 2008, a staff of seventeen auditors worked in Iraq and seven in Kuwait.15

Defense Contract Audit Agency 

With a staff of more than 4,000 in 300 field offices across the world, the Defense 

Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)—which effectively serves as internal auditor 

for the Comptroller of the Department of Defense—is a major force for accountability of contracts awarded by the Department of Defense.16 Although the audits 

are not generally public documents, DCAA has conducted thousands of audits on 

Iraq reconstruction, including some undertaken in coordination with SIGIR. 

Early in the reconstruction program, the DCAA alerted the DoD OIG to 

irregularities it had noticed in contracts awarded by the Defense Contracting 

Command-Washington for ORHA and CPA. A subsequent review found that, 

although procedural shortcuts had led to less than full accountability, contracting officers had not acted in bad faith. The commander of Defense Contracting 

Command-Washington wrote that it would be “unconscionable to recommend 

that administrative action be taken against the contracting officials and not hold 

senior officials responsible for generating the demands.”17

Later DCAA reviews identified more serious problems. In early 2006, a controversy arose over the near-full payment of fees of $263 million billed by the 

contractor KBR for oil-sector work, including what appeared to be exorbitant 

charges for transporting fuel to Iraq from Turkey and Kuwait. DCAA auditors 

raised serious questions about these charges.18 Although a 2004 audit reported 

that the costs were inflated and not supported by documentation, the Army 
• 352 •

• Annex B •

decided to pay KBR all but $10.1 million of those contested costs. That meant 

the Army withheld payment on just 3.8 percent of the charges questioned by the 

Pentagon audit agency, far below the rate at which the agency’s recommendation 

is usually followed or sustained by the military.19

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

Some six months after the CPA took over the reconstruction mission in Iraq, 

the Congress created the office of the CPA-IG, through the November 2003 

IRRF 2 legislation.20 Had an operational IG been in place from the start of CPA, 

irregularities discovered post hoc might have been prevented. During the ORHA 

and early CPA periods, there were frequent uses of procedural shortcuts and 

liberal interpretation of federal acquisition regulations, leading to contracting 

irregularities. Some—but not all—of these can be understood in light of the 

exigencies associated with jump-starting Iraq’s reconstruction program in a 

wartime environment. An audit criticizing the CPA oversight of $8.8 billion in 

Development Fund for Iraq money provided to Iraqi ministries was challenged 

by Ambassador Bremer on exactly those grounds, arguing that it was unrealistic 

to demand anything else in the midst of a country in chaos.21

During the process leading to passage of IRRF 2 legislation, a lively debate 

in the Senate followed the introduction by Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) of an 

amendment proposing that the GAO audit the CPA. Although some senators 

thought that enough oversight already existed, and that the GAO would serve 

as the default oversight agency, a number were in favor of even more stringent 

oversight to be conducted by a Special Inspector General. Senator Russ Feingold 

(D-WI) introduced an amendment that proposed setting aside $10 million for 

the creation of the Office of Inspector General for the CPA. When the bill went 

to conference, the Feingold amendment was ultimately adopted.22

The legislation gave the CPA-IG the same powers as other federal agency 

inspectors general, but President Bush, in his signing statement, added some 

restrictions. He said that the IG was to refrain from “initiating, carrying out, or 

completing an audit or investigation, or from issuing a subpoena, which requires 

access to sensitive operation plans, intelligence matters, counterintelligence matters, ongoing criminal investigations by other units of the Department of Defense 

related to national security, or other matters the disclosure of which would constitute a threat to national security.” The statement added, however, that the 

Secretary of Defense “may make exceptions to the foregoing direction in the 

public interest.”23 The restrictions never impeded CPA-IG or SIGIR’s work.

The IG was appointed on January 20, 2004, and the first CPA-IG auditors arrived in Baghdad in mid-March 2004, just over three months before the CPA was 
• 353 •

• Oversight of Reconstruction Programs and Expenditures •

to close its doors. The transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government, 

which took place on June 28, 2004, started the clock toward the sunset of the 

CPA-IG—which was scheduled to occur six months after the CPA’s demise.24

 In June 2004, Robin Cleveland, Deputy Director of the Office of Management 

and Budget, put forward a plan to transfer the CPA-IG’s oversight responsibilities 

to the IGs of USAID, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense. 

However, in October 2004, again at Senator Feingold’s impetus, the Congress 

took oversight in a different direction by passing a new law that transformed the 

CPA-IG into the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction and giving it 

oversight responsibilities for all IRRF 2 relief and reconstruction dollars.25

SIGIR initiated new oversight activities under its mandate to report on IRRF 

2. Independent accountability in Iraq was buttressed by the full-scale staffing 

of SIGIR, the development of innovative oversight practices by a new staff of 

inspectors, a focus on timely performance auditing rather than ex post facto financial review, and on increased coordination among executive-branch audit 

and investigative agencies overseeing Iraq. 

Audits and Inspections: SIGIR has produced more than 250 audits and inspections since 2004, covering a range of reconstruction issues, including contracting, 

anticorruption, funding obligations, asset transfers, and the Iraqi Security Forces. 

The purpose of SIGIR audits has been to determine whether programs and 

operations funded by the United States are being managed efficiently and effectively and to promote effective change through “real time” reporting.26

SIGIR’s inspections focus on the construction and/or sustainment of specific 

projects. Assessments determine if project components were adequately designed 

before construction or installation, if construction or rehabilitation adequately 

met the standards of the design, if the contractor’s quality-control plan and the 

U.S. government’s quality-assurance program were adequately carried out, if 

project sustainability and operational effectiveness were adequately addressed, 

and if project results were consistent with the original objectives.27

In July 2008, SIGIR issued a capping report prepared by its audits directorate that identified key recurring systemic management issues identified in the 

agency’s audits of Iraq reconstruction efforts. Four broad issues, which fed into 

and are widely evinced in Hard Lessons, were seen as central contributing causes 

to the deficiencies noted in the body of SIGIR’s audit work:

• The difficulty of implementing reconstruction programs 

in an insecure environment points to the need for a better 
• 354 •

• Annex B •

understanding of the potential impact of the lack of security 

on contingency reconstruction efforts.

• The lack of an integrated management structure that provides clear lines of authority, interagency coordination, and 

program accountability impacted the successful delivery of 

projects.

• The need to attract, develop, and retain qualified program 

and contract-management personnel was not anticipated 

and worked against the effective implementation of reconstruction programs.

• Working closely with host-country government officials 

and other groups is essential in developing reconstruction 

projects and programs that will—and can be—accepted and 

maintained.

Understanding these issues, the report states, is “critical to avoid repeating them 

in the future.” Their prevalence in Iraq “contributed significantly to reduced program effectiveness and increased the potential for fraud, waste, and abuse.”28

Investigations: In addition to audits, inspections, and the lessons learned initiative, SIGIR undertook a number of criminal investigations, with more than 370 

cases opened between the agency’s inception and the end of 2008. At that time, 

SIGIR had 67 open investigations, more than 30 of which had been assigned to 

prosecutors at the Department of Justice. The investigatory work of SIGIR had 

also resulted in eighteen arrests, seventeen indictments, thirteen convictions, and 

five imprisonments. The investigators’ work yielded fines, forfeitures, recoveries, 

and restitution of more than $17 million.29

Lessons Learned Initiative: SIGIR’s Lessons Learned initiative first focused on 

three main areas of Iraq reconstruction: human capital management, contracting 

and procurement, and program and project management. Three reports were 

issued in February 2006, July 2006, and March 2007—the latter two at hearings 

before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. The 

initiative’s purpose was to identify significant challenges in reconstruction and to 

identify actionable recommendations to improve the overall reconstruction effort. Much of the data, documentation, and personal observations supporting the 

lessons-learned conclusions were gleaned from a series of forums which brought 
• 355 •

• Oversight of Reconstruction Programs and Expenditures •

together experts representing the full spectrum of agencies, organizations, and 

individuals participating in the reconstruction of Iraq.30

The reports have led to legislative and executive action to improve both Iraq’s 

ongoing reconstruction and the government’s approach to managing contingency contracting and operations. For example, the Office of Federal Procurement 

Policy adopted SIGIR’s contracting recommendation as guidance for contingency 

situations. The Accountability in Government and Contracting Act, introduced by 

Senator Susan Collins (R-ME) and unanimously approved by the Senate in 2007, 

proposed implementation of a number of SIGIR’s recommendations.31

Quarterly Reports: SIGIR’s quarterly reports to the Congress provide a snapshot of the current state of Iraq reconstruction. Twenty reports have been issued 

between March 2004 and January 2009. They break down reconstruction progress by sector and funding stream, with a focus on IRRF-funded programs and 

projects. Published 30 days following the end of each quarter of the fiscal 

year, the reports summarize SIGIR findings, including audits, inspections, 

investigations, and analysis of data and developments related to Iraq reconstruction progress, as well as a summary of oversight conducted by 

other agencies. The activities of the IG during each quarter and updates 

on various SIGIR initiatives are also reported.32

Interagency Initiatives

As the number of oversight agencies deploying auditors and inspectors to Iraq 

increased after 2003, SIGIR spearheaded several coordinating bodies to ensure that duplicate work did not take place and to provide additional support 

to incoming agencies. These include: the Iraq Inspectors General Council, the 

Iraq Accountability Working Group, the Special Investigative Task Force for 

Iraq Reconstruction, and the International Contract Corruption Task Force. 

Each body has a specific purpose, but all provide a forum for discussion and collaboration on oversight efforts in Iraq. For example, the Iraq Inspectors General 

Council—based in Arlington, Virginia—is a vehicle for collaboration among the 

IGs and staff of the many agencies involved in using and overseeing IRRF 2; the 

Iraq Accountability Working Group also coordinates audit efforts in Baghdad. 

The Special Investigative Task Force for Iraqi Reconstruction—a partnership 

including the IRS, FBI, Department of Homeland Security, and the Department 

of State IG—pursued the Bloom/Stein conspiracy and followed a number of 

leads arising from that case. The International Contract Corruption Task Force 

is a group of federal agencies that combines resources to investigate and prosecute cases of contract fraud and public corruption in U.S. government spending 
• 356 •

• Annex B •

on Iraq reconstruction. In addition to SIGIR, it includes the Defense Criminal 

Investigate Service, U.S. Army Criminal Investigations, and the IGs of the State 

Department and USAID.

Oversight of contingency operations is important and must begin early in 

their planning. Although there is a trade-off between operational necessity and 

accounting accuracy during conflict, the danger that huge amounts of money 

may be potentially wasted or stolen makes it essential to provide a meaningful 

and robust oversight presence in contingency operations. All future post-conflict 

reconstruction plans should include a strong oversight function to make sure 

American taxpayers’ money is properly used to achieve the nation’s objectives.
• 357 •

Acknowledgements

A word of heartfelt thanks to all the SIGIR staff who helped plan, develop, and 

compile Hard Lessons. I especially commend my two senior writers, Victoria 

Butler and Christopher Kirchhoff, who shouldered virtually all the writing burden, 

which included research travels to Iraq. Thanks to Executive Editor Colonel (Ret.) 

John R. Martin and Senior Editor Barbara Wolfson for good insight and guidance. I thank the researchers—Jennifer McGee, Bradley Larson, and Gwendolyn 

Toops—for thousands of hours of detail work to help ensure the report’s accuracy. 

I thank our editorial advisors for their invaluable assistance: Dr. Philip D. Zelikow 

of the University of Virginia; Fredrick D. Barton of the Center for Strategic and 

International Studies; Dr. Dana Eyre of the U.S. Institute for Peace; Dr. Terrence 

K. Kelly of RAND Corporation; Dr. Ernest R. May of Harvard University; and Dr. 

Gordon W. Rudd of the U.S. Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting.

Each of these advisors provided consistently helpful advice and insights, but 

one deserves special recognition. Dr. Rudd, the ORHA/CPA Historian, conducted hundreds of nearly contemporaneous interviews with key reconstruction 

figures during the early stages of the program, and he provided them all to SIGIR. 

Our report is stronger and deeper for his diligent work and generous spirit. 

I also thank the many SIGIR staff-members who supported the research, writing, and review of Hard Lessons, including: Ginger Cruz, Brian Flynn, Dave Warren, 

Jon Novak, Hillel Weinberg, Lynne Halbrooks, Danny Athanasaw, Glenn Furbish, 

Barry Holman, Karl Tool, Dan Willkens, Paul Cooksey, Christopher Griffith, 

Andrea Bernardo, Kristine Belisle, Bill Maly, Joan Hlinka, Kevin O’Connor, 

Christopher Williams, Dena Nevarez, Sandy Keith, Rick Olson, Mike Boisvenue, 

Scott Michaud, Robin Raphel, Hunter Keith, Roger Williams, Kirk Johnson, Rick 

Whitaker, and David Gandle. Thanks also to Ed Gold, Christine Bath-Zachery, 

Barbara Lewis, and Nell Todd. Tender thanks to my wife, Adriana Sanchez Bowen, 

who put up with my many hours away working on this project.

Finally, I sincerely thank the hundreds of people who contributed to Hard 

Lessons by giving of their time, talent, and knowledge in interviews, written responses, or comments on early drafts. Their service and sacrifice in supporting 

Iraq’s reconstruction—and in telling its story—made this report possible.

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.

Inspector General

• 457 •

Abizaid, Gen. John 42, 47, 54, 72, 119, 130, 

132, 135, 238

Al-Aboudi, Kareem Waheed 145

Abrams, Elliot 10–12, 24, 34

See also: National Security Council

Accelerated Iraq Reconstruction 

Project (AIRP) 122

Achieving the Vision to Restore Full 

Sovereignty to the Iraqi People 97–98

Adams, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Ron 36–37, 47–48

Afghanistan 43, 50, 64, 99, 243–244

Hamid Karzai 8, 50

Air Force Center for Environmental 

Excellence (AFCEE) 112–113

Allawi, Ali 73, 76–77, 93, 135

Allawi, Prime Minister Ayad 154, 206, 244, 274

Andersson, Stephen 291

Al-Araji, Sami 92

Armitage, Richard 14, 16, 120, 168

Atteberry, David 301, 303

Ba’ath Party 4, 44, 70, 73–75, 115, 139, 

147, 159, 209–210, 250, 323

Baban, Ali 203, 299

Babylon Police Academy 220

Bailey, Andy 174

Baker, James 89, 292

Ballard, Tina 108

Baltazar, Col. Thomas 36

Bates, Lt. Gen. Jerry 36

BearingPoint 150, 259

Bearpark, Peter Andrew 149

Bechtel International 27–28, 31, 40, 49, 

79, 94–96, 110–112, 146, 148–150, 182, 

185–188, 260–261, 279, 304, 311

“Bechtel University,” 261

USAID/Bechtel Infrastructure 

Assessment 95

Belka, Marek 102

Bent, Rodney 84

Berwari, Nesreen 168

Black & Veatch 188

Blackwell, Robert 120

Bloom, Philip 218–219, 221

Al-Bolani, Jawad 288

Board of Supreme Audit (BSA) 

211, 215–216, 270

Bodine, Barbara 37

Bolten, Joshua 99–100

Bolton, Claude 169

Brahimi, Lakhdar 153–154

Bremer, Amb. L. Paul III 63–64, 69–82, 

86, 88–89, 91, 94, 97–99, 102, 105–106, 

110, 114–115, 118–120, 122, 125–126, 

130, 132, 149–151, 153, 155–156, 

158–159, 162, 212–215, 231, 235, 

249, 250–251, 261, 297, 323

Brigade Combat Team 271

Brinkley, Paul 305

Brown, Gordon 314

Browning, Steve 106, 149–150

Bullock, Katja 82

Burke, Gerald 125

Bush, President George W. 3, 33, 43, 53, 

61, 63, 70, 72, 89, 153, 157, 295, 315

Iraq: Goals, Objectives, Strategy 9, 13

Busher, Lt. Col. Otto 247–248, 251, 278

Caldwell, Maj. Gen. Bill 242

Camp Doha 46, 48

Camp Villa 46–47

Carney, Amb. Tim 59, 91, 297–299

Carpenter, Scott 116

Casey, Gen. George 12, 33, 37–38, 144, 

160, 166–167, 170, 193–194, 230, 

235–236, 241–242, 245, 292, 296, 314

Center for Strategic and International 

Studies (CSIS) 94, 96–97

CSIS Assessment 96

Hamre, John 96–97

Central Criminal Court of Iraq 

(CCCI) 209–213, 290–291;

Major Crimes Courts 314

Central Intelligence Agency 

(CIA) 7, 14, 28, 40, 74

Chalabi, Ahmed 62, 75

Chamberlin, Amb. Wendy 11, 18, 20

Cheney, Vice President Richard B. 5, 9, 29, 43

Chiarelli, Lt. Gen. Peter 105, 167, 

231, 233, 277, 280–282, 292

Civil Military Strategic Planning Group 235

Clear-Hold-Build 245–246, 

281–282, 292–293, 330

Cleveland, Robin 10–11, 20–22, 24, 34, 110

Coalition Forces Land Component Command 

(CFLCC) 38, 42, 46, 48, 61–62, 72

Index
• 458 •

•Index •

See also: McKiernan, Lt. Gen. David; 

and Whitley, Maj. Gen. Albert

Coalition Military Assistance Training 

Team (CMATT) 128–130, 133, 286

See also: Eaton, Maj. Gen. Paul

Coalition Police Assistance Training 

Team (CPATT) 133–134, 286

Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) 

52, 61, 64–65, 69–71, 73–106, 108–124, 

127–133, 135, 138–143, 145, 147–162, 

165–168, 170, 172, 177, 182, 186, 

187–188, 190, 194–195, 198, 201–203, 

207–221, 229, 231-232, 239–240, 244, 

246, 249–250, 252, 256, 260–261, 

272, 278, 283, 287, 290, 297, 305, 307, 

323–324, 326–329, 332–333, 336;

Coalition Provisional Authority 

Inspector General (CPA-IG) 103, 113;

CPA Order No. 1 73;

CPA Order No. 2 75, 124–125, 128, 209;

CPA Order No. 5 75, 102;

CPA Order No. 22 134;

CPA Order No. 28 129;

CPA Order No. 30 88;

CPA Order No. 55 212

CPA Order No. 57 214;

CPA Order No. 71 122–123, 253;

CPA Order No. 77 215;

CPA Order No. 91 201

CPA Order No. 96 204;

CPA Regulation No. 1 70, 73;

CPA Regulation No. 5 102

Head of Contracting Activity 

(HCA) 81, 172;

Task Force Shield 141

Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) 

72, 81, 126–127, 129–133, 135, 141, 196

See also: Sanchez, Lt. Gen. Ricardo

Combined Joint Task ForceIraq (CJTF-I) 12

Commander’s Emergency Response 

Program (CERP) 79, 81–82, 117, 

167, 174, 190, 231, 237–238, 240, 

248, 253, 260, 269, 279–282, 284, 

290, 292, 300, 302–303, 310–311

Commission on Electricity 145, 147–149

Commission on Public Integrity 

(CPI) 159, 211–213, 215

See also: Al-Radhi, Judge Radhi Hamza

Community Action Program (CAP) 

117–118, 240, 261, 308

Community Stabilization Program (CSP) 

295, 302–303, 309

Conway, Lt. Gen. James 116

Corruption 6–7, 115, 134, 159, 201, 203, 

210–216, 259, 286, 289–291, 294, 316, 355

Anti-Corruption Working Group 216

Costello, Col. Robert 41

Council of Representatives 154, 

Courts 203, 209–210, 290–291, 314; 

Courthouses 97–98, 207, 210, 289

See also: Central Criminal 

Court of Iraq (CCCI)

Crear, Gen. Robert 30, 137

Crocker, Amb. Ryan 7, 13, 16, 62–63, 290, 

295, 297, 299, 306, 308, 313–316, 318, 329

de-Ba’athification 44, 73–75, 

118, 139, 147, 260, 323, 326

See also: CPA Order No. 1

Defense Contract Audit Agency 

(DCAA) 351

Defense Contract Management 

Agency (DCMA) 47, 51

DeGraff, Col. Dennis 83

de Mello, Sergio Vieira 102

Dempsey, Lt. Gen. Martin E. 287

Department of Agriculture 284

Department of Commerce 10, 42

Department of Defense (DoD) 10–11, 

13, 16, 28–29, 31–33, 39, 42, 45, 48, 51, 

56, 72, 104–106, 113, 120, 132–135, 

139, 153, 157–158, 165, 167, 169, 

174, 180, 186, 190, 199, 203, 206, 

214–215, 222, 226, 230–231, 241–242, 

246, 286, 292, 305, 325, 340–341

Energy Infrastructure Planning 

Group 28, 30, 138

Department of Energy 28

Department of Health and Human 

Services 104

Department of Homeland Security 222

Department of Justice (DoJ) 10–11, 43, 59, 

124, 206–207, 209, 212, 214, 221, 290

Department of State (DoS) 10, 13, 16, 

20–21, 28, 37–38, 45, 49, 56, 69, 83, 

104, 108, 111, 120, 153, 156–157, 

167–169, 171, 180–181, 203, 

206–207, 214–216, 230–231, 233, 
• 459 •

• Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience •

239, 241–243, 246, 255, 264–265, 

282, 287, 291–292, 299, 305–307, 310, 

324–325, 327, 333, 338–339, 341;

Bureau of International Narcotics 

and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) 

125–127, 131, 212, 215, 289–290;

“Future of Iraq” project 7, 15, 43, 45;

Office of the Coordinator for 

Reconstruction and Stabilization 

(S/CRS) 338–340

Department of Treasury 10, 20, 30–32, 

42, 84–89, 91, 104, 167, 222, 231, 267

Development Alternatives, Inc. 

(DAI) 25, 118, 283;

DAI Assessment 283

See also: Spake, Bruce

Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) 79–81, 

86–88, 92, 98, 118, 122, 128, 140–141, 

148, 154–156, 172, 175, 190, 212, 214, 

221, 260

Disaster Assistance Relief Team (DART) 5, 56 

Doura Power Plant 185

Dumford, Dick 148

Duncan Hunter National Defense 

Authorization Act for 2009 338

Eaton, Maj. Gen. Paul 124, 

128, 131, 133–134

Economic Cooperation Administration 

(ECA) 160–161

Economic Support Fund 

(ESF) 231, 310–312

Education 22, 34, 82, 122

See also: Iraq – Essential services in (chart)

Eikenberry, Maj. Gen. Karl 133

The Eikenberry Report 133

Eiriz, Maj. Ray 33

Electrical Power Security Service (EPSS) 147

Elliott, Lt. Col. Steve 47, 51

Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team 

(ePRT) 295, 300–304, 310, 314

England, Secretary of Defense 

Gordon 280, 305

Erinys Iraq 141–142

Etherington, Mark 122

Facilities Protection Service (FPS) 127, 159

Falluja Wastewater Treatment System 189

Al Fatah Pipeline Crossing 182–183

Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 

24–25, 106, 109, 173, 176, 238, 335–336

Feith, Douglas 8, 10, 12–13, 28–29, 32, 

35–38, 43, 45, 71, 76, 84;

“Parade of Horribles” memo 13–14

Fil, Maj. General Joe 296

Fisher, Maj. Thomas 33, 35

Fitzgerald, Col. Mike 34–35, 38

Flowers, Lt. Gen. Robert B. 151

FluorAMEC 151, 184, 188–189, 311

Forward Engineering Support 

Team (FEST) 55

Forward Operating Base (FOB) 133, 242, 

255, 296

Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 89 81

Franks, Gen. Tommy 7, 12, 34–35, 39, 43, 

58, 61, 70, 72–73, 328;

“Freedom Message” 61, 73

Fugro Inc. 183

Garner, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Jay 35–43 45–50, 52, 

54–56, 58–64, 69, 72, 74, 229, 243, 338

Gates, Secretary of Defense Robert 242, 

292, 336

General Electric 152

Al-Ghadban, Thamir 138–139

Ghanem, Ihsan Karim 215

Gibson, Peter 148

Government Accountability Office (GAO) 

29, 188, 211, 215, 268, 315

Government Auditing Standards (GAS) 215

Governorate Support Team (GST) 50

Green Zone 130, 148, 159, 179, 206, 210, 

230, 233, 236, 241, 247, 256, 265, 270, 

273, 288, 291, 295, 304–305, 308

Grossman, Marc 37

Gulf Region Division (GRD) 105, 107, 

173–174, 177, 185, 208–209, 231, 

234, 265, 276–280, 304–306

Gulf War 5–6, 11, 28, 35, 88, 136, 146

Hadley, Stephen 12, 24, 110

Halliburton 54

Harrison, Lt. Col. Debra 219, 221

Hawkins, Brig. Gen. Steven 38, 42, 48, 

144–145, 151

See also: Task Force Restore 

Iraqi Electricity (RIE)

Hawkins, Neil 155–156

Hawley, Len 41
• 460 •

•Index •

Hess, Charles 166, 168–169, 177

Holly, Jack 191

Hughes, Col. Paul 36

Hussein, Saddam 3, 5, 17, 21, 31, 43, 50–54, 

57–58, 60, 73, 86, 88, 91, 115, 127, 147, 

182, 205, 207, 209–210, 244, 250, 298, 

318, 323

Ijames, Ruth Anne 234

Improvised Explosive Device (IED) 248, 303

Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity 

[contract] (IDIQ) 25, 28, 49, 107, 109, 

113, 151, 175

Independent Electoral Commission 204–205

Inspectors General (IG) [Iraqi] 211–215 

See also: CPA Order No. 57; and 

Commission on Public Integrity (CPI) 

International Advisory and Monitoring 

Board (IAMB) 80, 155

See also: Development Fund for Iraq 

(DFI); and United Nations Security 

Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1483

International Criminal Investigative 

Training Assistance Program 

(ICITAP) 124–126, 212

International Monetary Fund (IMF) 17, 

30, 80, 89–90, 102–103, 315–316

International Police Liaison Officer 

(IPLO) 131

International Police Training Center 127

See also: Meiklejohn, John

International Reconstruction Fund 

Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) 103

International Relief and Development 282

International Resources Group (IRG) 40, 147

See also: Wheelock, Tom

Iraq

Essential services in (charts) 17, 65, 162, 

226, 294;

modern history of 4;

under Saddam Hussein 5–6;

Iraq Local Government Association 255–256

Iraq Oil Protection Force 141–142

Iraq Reconstruction and Development 

Council (IRDC) 84

See also: Al-Shabibi, Sinan

Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 

(IRMO) 157, 165–167, 174, 177–178, 

187, 189, 191–192, 194, 201, 233–234, 

236, 239, 240, 262, 264–267, 271, 

279, 281, 286, 306–307, 334

See also: Speckhard, Amb. Daniel; 

and Taylor, Amb. William

Iraq Reconstruction Management 

System (IRMS) 174–175

Iraq Stabilization Group 119–120

Iraq Study Group 292–293, 296

Iraq Transition Assistance 

Office (ITAO) 306

Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) 195–197, 199–200

Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) 

129–130, 134, 159, 194, 196

Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Force (ICTF) 197

Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) 74–75, 

98, 115, 118–119, 121, 153–154, 250

Iraqi Interim Authority (IIA) 44

Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) 154, 

158, 162, 175, 197, 204–205

Iraqi Intervention Force (IIF) 197

Iraqi National Congress 57, 77

See also: Kubba, Laith

Iraqi National Guard (ING) 195–197

Iraqi Police Service (IPS) 125, 195, 198, 201

See also: Kerik, Bernard; and 

Wallace, Lt. Gen. William Scott

Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) 

26–27, 61, 78–79, 101, 103–114, 121, 125, 

130, 135, 151, 157, 160, 165–170, 173– 

180, 183–184, 186–188, 190, 194–195, 

197, 199–200, 203, 207, 210, 216, 226, 

231–234, 237–239, 260–262, 269–270, 

278–285, 292, 305, 311–313, 327, 330, 334

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) 175, 193–194, 

198–202, 205, 239, 287, 296

Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF) 199, 

230–231, 269, 285, 311, 330

Iraqi Special Operations Force (ISOF) 197

Ja’aferi, Prime Minister Ibrahim 244, 275, 285

Jabr, Bayan 196, 299, 315

Janabi, Nazar 74

Johnson, Charles 214–215

Johnson, Maj. Gen. Ronald 107

Joint Contracting Command-Iraq (JCC-I) 

175, 178, 191–192, 194, 233–234, 267, 304

See also: Scott, Maj. Gen. Darryl

Joint Manning Document (JMD) 82

See also: Bullock, Katja

Joint Planning Commission 278
• 461 •

• Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience •

Joint Reconstruction Operations Center 

278, 281

Joint Strategic Assessment Team (JSAT) 298

Joint Strategic Planning and Assessment

(JSPA) 237

Joint Task Force-4 (JTF-4) 34, 

38–39, 42, 47–48, 63

See also: Hawkins, Brig. Gen. Steven

Joint Task Force on Capacity

Development 265–266 

Jones, Amb. Richard 230

Kellogg Brown and Root (KBR) 28, 29, 47, 

95, 114, 137, 139–140, 180–182, 311

Kennedy, Patrick 306

The Kennedy Report 306

Kerbala Library 220

Kerik, Bernard 126

See also: Iraqi Police Service (IPS)

Khalilzad, Amb. Zalmay 44, 61–64, 63, 

64, 72, 158, 229–231, 233, 235–237, 

239–244, 246–247, 252, 264, 

277–279, 290, 294, 297, 300, 329

Korologos, Tom 99

Krepinevich, Andrew 231

Kubba, Laith 57, 76

Kunder, James 18, 34, 308, 325

Kurdistan 4–5, 31, 44, 50, 54, 62, 

88, 137, 154, 249, 317

Kurdistan National Assembly 205

Kurdistan Regional Government 154, 204

Lamb, Lt. Gen. Graeme 297

Libby, Lewis “Scooter” 69

Local Governance Program (LGP) 

50, 240, 251, 254–255, 271, 309, 316

Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 

(LOGCAP) 28–30, 47

Lowey, Rep. Nita 94

Luck, Gen. (Ret.) Larry 198, 230

Lucke, Lewis 37, 101

Madrid International Donors Conference

102–103

Major Crimes Task Force 290

Al-Maliki, Prime Minister Nouri 211, 

213, 244, 277, 315, 317

Marshall Plan 159–161, 278, 323, 338

Maxwell, Dayton 97–98

See also: Polk, Lt. Col. Robert; Unified 

Mission Plan; and Vision for Iraq 

Mayer, Dick 43

See also: International Criminal 

Investigative Training Assistance 

Program (ICITAP)

McCoy, Maj. Gen. William H. 276–277, 279

See also: Gulf Region Division (GRD)

McGuckin, Robin 151

McKiernan, Lt. Gen. David 35, 39, 41, 

46–48, 53–54, 57, 59–62, 72

See also: Coalition Forces Land 

Component Command (CFLCC)

McPherson, Peter 80–81, 90–91

Meese, Col. Michael 298, 300, 307

Meiklejohn, John 126–127

Miller, Frank 14, 24, 30, 34–35, 43, 

74–75, 125

See also: National Security Council (NSC)

Miller, Richard 59

Milligan, Christopher 20, 22, 24, 36–37

Ministerial Assistance Team 265

Ministerial Capacity Team 265

Ministerial Coordination Team 266, 271

Ministry of Agriculture 283–284, 306

Ministry of Defense (MoD) 130–131, 

134, 159, 196–197, 199, 200–201, 

206, 214, 250, 272, 286–288, 330

See also: Allawi, Ali

Ministry of Electricity 145, 147, 150–151, 

159, 186–187, 206, 258, 265–266, 312

Ministry of Environment 159

Ministry of Education 250

Ministry of Finance 214, 250, 259, 265, 

268–270, 284, 287, 288–289

See also: Allawi, Ali

Ministry of Foreign Affairs 214

Ministry of Health 190, 250, 306

Ministry of Human Rights 159, 206

Ministry of Interior (MoI) 130–131, 

195–200, 215, 250–251, 270, 

272, 275, 286–289, 306, 330;

Department of Border 

Enforcement (DBE), 127, 159

See also: Al-Bolani, Jawad; and Jabr, Bayan

Ministry of Justice 209–210, 290, 306

Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works

168, 189

See also: Berwari, Nesreen 
• 462 •

•Index •

Ministry of Oil 138–140, 142, 150, 181–182, 

206, 265–266, 279

See also: Al-Ghadban, Thamir

Ministry of Planning 265–266, 268, 270, 

272, 306;

National Center for Consultation and 

Management Development 266

See also: Baban, Ali

Ministry of Science and Technology 159

Ministry of Transportation and 

Communications 99, 306

Ministry of Water Resources 266, 284

Mobbs, Michael 28–30, 37

Money as a Weapons System (MAAWS) 245

Morgan, Col. Joseph 63

Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNCI) 157, 193, 197, 199, 202, 242, 

245, 277–278, 280–281, 287, 289

See also: Chiarelli, Lt. Gen. Peter; Odierno, 

Gen. Raymond; and Petraeus, Gen. David

Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) 141, 

157, 165, 193–194, 198–200, 202, 

230, 233, 236–237, 239, 241–242, 

245–246, 266, 281, 284, 289, 296, 308

See also: Casey, Gen. George; and 

Odierno, Gen. Raymond

Multi-National Security Transition 

Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) 157, 

166, 177, 193–202, 215, 239, 244, 

265–266, 270, 272, 285–289, 296

See also: Dempsey, Lt. Gen. Martin; 

and Petraeus, Gen. David

Nassriya Water Supply System 188

Nash, Rear Adm. (Ret.) David 99, 

105–108, 110, 112, 166–167

See also: Program Management Office 

(PMO); Project and Contracting 

Office (PCO); and Iraq Reconstruction 

Management Office (IRMO)

National Capacity Development Plan 266

National Capacity Development Program 264

National Coordination Team 306

National Intelligence Council 14 

National Security Council (NSC) 3, 

8–9, 16, 18–19, 26, 30–34, 42, 61, 

64, 74–75, 120, 121, 125, 160, 245, 

281, 308, 325, 328, 336, 341;

Deputies Committee 7, 24, 29;

Executive Steering Committee 

on Iraq 14–15, 24;

Humanitarian Working Group 10, 20–21, 

24, 26, 40

See also: Miller, Frank; and Abrams, Elliot

National Security Presidential 

Directive (NSPD)

NSPD 24 33–34, 36, 158;

NSPD 36 157, 165–166, 199, 335;

NSPD 44 339

National Strategy for Victory in Iraq 245

See also: Clear-Hold-Build

Natsios, Andrew 18, 24, 25, 51, 110–112, 325

Natural Resources Risk Remediation 

Fund (NRRRF) 61

Negroponte, Amb. John 114, 160, 165–168, 

170, 179, 184, 187, 190, 194, 197, 201, 203, 

226, 231, 235–236, 283, 294, 328–329

New Iraqi Army 124, 128–129

Nongovernmental Organization (NGO) 11, 

19, 24–25, 47, 49, 58, 207, 281, 301

Obey, Rep. David 101

Odierno, Gen. Raymond T. 241, 296, 300

Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) 271–272

Office of Security Cooperation 

(OSC) 133–134

See also: The Eikenberry Report

Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) 10, 22, 78, 84, 87, 94, 99–100, 

104, 108, 110–111, 167, 203, 210

See also: Cleveland, Robin

Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian 

Affairs (ORHA) 34–43, 46, 48–52, 56, 

58–60, 62, 64–65, 69, 72, 74, 82–85, 

97, 138, 160, 243, 297, 324, 326

See also: Spear, Christopher; Unified 

Mission Plan; and Ward, Amb. George

Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) 

19, 167, 238, 245, 281–283

Oil-for-Food Program 6, 10, 28, 53–54, 

78, 80, 139–140, 146, 150

See also: United Nations; and 

Warlick, Amb. James

Oliver, Rear Adm. (Ret.) David 

84, 87, 94, 98–99, 101

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 47

Operation Plan (OPLAN) 

Sovereign Iraq 156–158

Operation Together Forward 277
• 463 •

• Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience •

Oster, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Jeffrey 83

Pace, Gen. Peter 13, 76

Pam, Jeremy 268

Parsons (contractor) 99, 114, 180, 

182, 190–191, 207–208, 311

Perini Corporation 151, 184, 186–187

Petraeus, Gen. David 77, 116, 132, 

193–194, 196, 200, 288, 296–300, 

307, 308, 314–315, 318, 330, 341

Pipeline Exclusion Zones 312

Polk, Lt. Col. Robert 97–98

See also: Maxwell, Dayton

Powell, Gen. (Ret.) Colin 3, 9, 13, 

16, 33, 39, 43, 45, 48–49, 56, 

62, 69, 75–76, 78, 132, 325

Power plants 10, 144–152

Baiji Thermal Power Plant 186;

Bechtel Assessment 149;

Mansuria Natural Gas Power Plant 186;

Substations 146, 149, 152, 

186–187, 233, 279, 313

See also: Doura Power Plant; Electrical 

Power Security Service (EPSS); and Task 

Force Restore Iraqi Electricity (RIE) 

Primary Healthcare Center (PHC) 190–191

Private security 156, 180, 233, 242, 

Project and Contracting Office (PCO) 

113, 157, 165–168, 173–179, 181–184, 

186–189, 191–192, 194, 207, 233, 248, 

261, 263–264, 272, 277–280, 334

Program Management Office (PMO) 

105–114, 159, 166, 172, 173–175, 177, 

180, 191, 207, 233, 260–261, 326;

PCO Management and Interface Plan

262–264;

PMO Support Office 106–107

Program Review Board (PRB) 

80–81, 102, 155, 215, 260

Provincial Council vii, 115–116, 

122–123, 154, 204, 

Provincial Election Law 253

Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) 285–287

Provincial Reconstruction Development 

Council (PRDC) 240, 271, 280–281, 312

Provincial Reconstruction Team 

(PRT) 229, 240–244, 247, 249, 

251, 253–254, 265, 271–272, 277, 

280–282, 284, 290–291, 295, 300–304, 

307–308, 310–312, 317, 330, 332

See also: Embedded Provincial 

Reconstruction Team (ePRT); 

and Zuniga-Brown, Tim

Public Order Battalions 196

Qarmat Ali Water Treatment Plant 181

Quick Response Fund (QRF) 310–311

Quick Response Program (QRP) 310

Al-Radhi, Judge Radhi Hamza 212–213

Rapid Regional Response Program (R3P)

122

Rathmell, Andrew 239, 242

Reconstruction and Stabilization 

Civilian Management Act of 2008 

(RSCMA) 337–340, 342

Red Cell

See: Civil Military Strategic 

Planning Group

Refineries 17, 28, 136–137, 139–140, 

142–143, 148, 180, 182, 184, 233, 313;

Baiji refinery 137, 182

Basrah refinery 60, 137, 147

Doura refinery 137, 139, 142

Regional Embassy Office (REO) 242

Requirement Review Board (RRB) 80

Research Triangle Institute (RTI) 116–117

See also: Williams, Aaron

Rice, Secretary of State Condoleezza 9, 

21, 35, 36, 39, 41, 43, 51–52, 76, 110, 

119–120, 230, 245–246, 318, 323, 326

Al-Rubaie, National Security 

Advisor Mowaffak 299

Rubini, Judge Daniel 210

Rule of Law Task Force 290, 306

Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense Donald 3, 

7, 9, 12–13, 31–37, 39, 42–43, 45–48, 56, 

61, 69–70, 72, 99, 119–120, 129–130, 

132–133, 231, 245–246, 292, 326

Al-Sadr, Muqtada 201, 205, 275, 318

Salah al-Din Political Conference 44, 62

Salih, Deputy Prime Minister 

Barham 172, 267, 299

Saloom, Amb. Joseph 258, 266–267, 268

Sanchez, Lt. Gen. Ricardo 72, 74, 81, 

126, 130, 132–134, 166, 328

Santelle, James 290

Santorum, Sen. Rick 48

Al-Sattar, Sheikh Abd 315
• 464 •

•Index •

Satterfield, Amb. David 229, 

231, 262, 268, 271, 281

Scott, Maj. Gen. Darryl 304

Seay, Brig. Gen. Stephen 172–174 

Section 2207 Report 104, 111, 151

Sector Program Management Office 

(SPMO) 106–107, 173

Al-Shabibi, Sinan 84

Shomber, Lt. Col. Christian 282–284

Single Acquisition Management 

Plan (SAMP) 108–109

Al-Sistani, Grand Ayatollah Ali Husaini 

119, 153, 205, 275, 309, 318

Slocombe, Walt 76

See also: CPA Order No. 2

Smith, Ged 87

Sons of Iraq 297

Spake, Bruce 25

Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction (SIGIR) 103, 118, 

122, 141, 147, 155, 174–175, 177, 180, 

183, 185, 187–191, 200, 207–209, 

214, 216–222, 232, 243, 255, 258, 

269–270, 278, 312, 331, 338

See also: Coalition Provisional Authority 

Inspector General (CPA-IG)

Spear, Christopher 59

Speckhard, Amb. Daniel 234, 264, 267

State-owned Enterprise (SOE) 73, 

90–93, 98, 115, 139, 183, 305, 327

State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO)

140–141

Stein, Robert J. 217–222, 225, 355

S&K Technologies 218

See also: Bloom, Philip; and 

Harrison, Lt. Col. Debra

Stephenson, James “Spike” 112, 155, 167, 261

Strock, Lt. Gen. Carl 40, 43, 57, 62, 144,

146–147, 149

Surge 295–297, 299, 301, 304, 306, 

308–311, 314–315, 319, 330

Sumaida’ie, Samir 59

Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in 

Iraq (SCIRI) 248, 250–251, 275, 288, 318

Talabani, President Jalal 62, 206

Task Force Fajr 144–145, 151, 248

See also: Hawkins, Brig. Gen. Steven

Task Force Restore Iraqi Electricity (RIE)

151–152

Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil (RIO) 30, 

61, 95, 137–140, 151, 180–182

Taylor, Amb. William 166–168

Taylor, Under Secretary of the 

Treasury John 30–31, 87

Tenet, George 14, 44

Transfer of sovereignty 71, 88, 122, 327

Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) 199

Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) 

121, 153–154, 201, 203–204, 206, 250

Transitional National Assembly 

(TNA) 205–206

Turner, Clark 138–139

Umm Qasr (port) 56, 95, 137, 187, 195

Unified Mission Plan 97

See also: Vision for Iraq; and 

Achieving the Vision to Restore Full 

Sovereignty to the Iraqi People

United Nations (UN) 5, 33, 79–80, 

94, 96, 102, 140, 153, 315;

World Food Program 19, 49

See also: Oil-for-Food Program

United Nations Security Council 

Resolution (UNSCR)

Resolution 1483 73, 80, 

118, 140, 155, 158;

Resolution 1511 103, 121;

Resolution 1546 158

United States Agency for International 

Development (USAID) 10, 16, 18, 

20–22, 24, 26–29, 31–32, 34, 36–38, 

40, 42, 46–47, 49–51, 55–56, 61, 78–79, 

84, 92, 95, 97, 100–101, 104–106, 110, 

112, 115–118, 121–122, 147–149, 

155–156, 167, 174, 176–177, 182, 

185–186, 188, 203, 206, 231, 233, 

238–241, 245, 249, 251, 253–255, 

259–261, 264–266, 270–271, 280–284, 

292, 295, 301–303, 308–310, 316, 

324–325, 327, 332, 336, 338, 339, 341;

Civil-Military Operations Centers 49;

Civil Operations and Revolutionary 

Development Support (CORDS) 23, 241;

Iraq Task Force 18;

Office of Foreign Disaster 

Assistance 19, 25, 55

See also: Stephenson, James “Spike;” Vision 

for Post-Conflict Iraq; and Wherry, Ross
• 465 •

• Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience •

United States Army Audit 

Agency (USAAA) 351

United States Army Corps of Engineers 

(USACE) 5, 29–30, 36, 38, 40, 

43, 55, 61, 94–95, 105–109, 114, 

137–138, 140, 148–152, 156–157, 

166, 176–177, 183, 185, 191, 208, 

233, 265, 267, 276, 297, 304, 340;

USACE Oil Sector Assessment 95

See also: Strock, Lt. Gen. Carl

United States Central Command 

(CENTCOM) 7, 9, 12, 20, 32–36, 

38–39, 41–43, 47–48, 50, 58, 61, 

69, 72, 76, 128–129, 138, 151, 

156–157, 175, 194, 202, 328;

Phase IV plan 7, 9, 12, 33–35, 

38, 42–43, 48, 58, 76

See also: Abizaid, Gen. John; Dempsey, 

Lt. Gen. Martin; Franks, Lt. Gen. 

Tommy; and Petraeus, Gen. David 

United States Embassy Asset Transfer

Working Group 270

Vision for Iraq 97–98, 135

See also: Maxwell, Dayton; 

and Polk, Lt. Col. Robert

Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq 19, 22, 26

Vogler, Gary 63, 138–139, 141

Wallace, Lt. Gen. William Scott 54, 126

Ward, Amb. George 37, 43

Warlick, Amb. James 80

Warrick, Thomas 7, 15, 43, 45

See also: Department of State, 

“Future of Iraq” project 

Washington Group International 

151–152, 184, 188, 311

Water 15, 20–21, 23, 40, 50, 54, 57, 

63, 91–92, 95, 101, 105, 107, 109, 

113–114, 117, 122, 128, 144–145, 

167–170, 175, 180, 187–190, 232, 

237, 247–248, 258, 261–263, 266, 269, 

274, 277, 279–280, 283–284, 297, 

306, 311, 313–314, 317, 327, 329;

See also: Falluja Wastewater Treatment 

System; Nassriya Water Supply System; 

and Qarmat Ali Water Treatment Plant

Wheelock, Tom 40, 147

Wherry, Ross 11, 18, 20, 22, 26

Whitley, Maj. Gen. Albert 42, 48

Williams, Aaron 117

Winton, Lt. Col. Douglas 300–301

See also: Embedded Provincial 

Reconstruction Team (ePRT)

Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of 

Defense Paul 13, 84, 110, 136

World Bank 80, 96, 102–103, 315–316

Zelikow, Dr. Philip 241, 300

Zakheim, Dov 51, 106, 108, 110, 155

Zuniga-Brown, Tim 303

See also: Embedded Provincial 

Reconstruction Team (ePRT)
• 359 •

Endnotes

Chapter 1

1 For an account of the September 13, 2001, National Security Council (NSC) meetings and several follow-on 

sessions concerning the debate over Iraq war plans, see Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon 

at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 13-15, 47-49.

2 SIGIR interviews with Brigadier General (Ret.) Mark Scheid, former CENTCOM logistics planner; Colonel 

John Agoglia, former CENTCOM planner; and Colonel (Ret.) Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM J5 

Chief of War Plans. 

3 SIGIR interview with General (Ret.) Colin Powell, former Secretary of State and Richard Armitage, former 

Deputy Secretary of State, February 4, 2008; and Karen DeYoung, Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell (New York: 

Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 401-403.

4 Christopher Catherwood, Churchill’s Folly: How Winston Churchill Created Modern Iraq (New York: 

Carroll & Graf, 2004), 74.

5 Judith S. Yaphe, “The View from Basra: Southern Iraq’s Reaction the War and Occupation, 1915-1925,” in 

The Creation of Iraq, 1914-1921, ed. Reeva Spector Simon and Eleanor H. Tejirian (New York: Columbia 

University Press,2004), 28-30.

6 Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 2nd edition, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003), 12-19.

7 Christopher Catherwood, Churchill’s Folly: How Winston Churchill Created Modern Iraq (New York: 

Carroll & Graf, 2004), 19, 44, 74.

8 Christopher Catherwood, Churchill’s Folly: How Winston Churchill Created Modern Iraq, (New York, NY: 

Carroll & Graf, 2004), 7, 123, 130, 217, 221.

9 Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 2nd edition, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003), 113-116.

10 Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 2nd edition, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003), 177-178, 207-

208, 217-259. 

11 Kuwaiti political structures remained intact after the nation’s leadership fled in 1990.This enabled negotiations with the United States before military action restored the Kuwaitis to power, a very different situation 

than in 2002 and early 2003 when the Iraqi exile leadership was fractious and could not provide a unified front 

with which to negotiate plans. Nevertheless, the condition of Kuwait’s infrastructure proved worse than anticipated, just as would happen in Iraq in 2003. Sewage, water, and electricity plants in Kuwait failed in 1991. 

The effort ultimately repaired 10,000 kilometers of electrical lines and restored more than 145 schools, 1,000 

public buildings, and hundreds of other facilities. The Army Corps of Engineers alone completed 1,200 task 

orders with the help of international contractors. Janet A. McDonnell, After Desert Storm: The United States 

Army and the Rebuilding of Kuwait (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1999), 31, 129-131, 176-185.

12 See: United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 661, 687, 706, 712, 986, and 1051. UNSCR 

661 of August 6, 1990, imposed comprehensive economic sanctions on Iraq, exempting food and medicine, 

and established a committee to oversee implementation of the sanctions; UNSCR 687 of April 3, 1991, set 

terms for a cease-fire and maintained the terms of the embargo; UNSCR 706 of August 15, 1991, set out a 

mechanism for an oil-for-food program and authorized an escrow account to be established by the SecretaryGeneral (to fund an oil-for-food program, $1.6 billion was to be raised in six months by the sale of Iraqi oil); 

UNSCR 712 of September 19, 1991, confirmed the sum of $1.6 billion to be raised by the sale of Iraqi oil in 

a six-month period to fund the Oil-for-Food program; UNSCR 986 of April 14, 1995, enabled Iraq to sell 

oil worth up to $1 billion every 90 days and use the proceeds for humanitarian supplies (it also set terms of 

reference for the Oil-for-Food program); and UNSCR 1051 of March 27, 1996, established the export/import 

monitoring system for Iraq.

13 Independent Inquiry Committee, “The Impact of the Oil-for-Food Programme on the Iraqi People,” 

September 7, 2005, 8, 16.

14 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, “Annual Statistical Bulletin 2001,” 2001, 3.
• 360 •

• Endnotes•

15 United Nations Security Council S/1999/356, “Annex II: Report of the Second Panel Established Pursuant 

to the Note by the President of the Security Council of 30 January 1999 (S/1999/100), Concerning the 

Current Humanitarian Situation in Iraq,” March 30, 1999; and Independent Inquiry Committee, “The Impact 

of the Oil-for-Food Programme on the Iraqi People,” September 7, 2005, 10.

16 To make up the additional intake necessary to survive, the very poor relied on wheat flour and bread, the 

only foodstuff whose prices remained low. Independent Inquiry Committee, “The Impact of the Oil-for-Food 

Programme on the Iraqi People,” September 7, 2005, 18, 20.

17 UN Secretariat Memorandum S/1996/356, “Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretariat of 

the United Nations and the Government of Iraq on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 986 

(1995),” May 20, 1996.

18 UN Office of the Iraq Programme: Oil-for-Food, “Background Brief: Food Basket,” February 26, 

2003, http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/food-facts.html; and GAO Testimony 04-651T, “United Nations: 

Observations on the Oil for Food Program,” April 7, 2004.

19 Independent Inquiry Committee, “Manipulation of the Oil-for-Food Programme by the Iraqi Regime,” 

October 27, 2005, 1-9; and Iraq Survey Group, “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on 

Iraq’s WMD with Addendums,” September 30, 2004, 8-9, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/duelfer/index.html.

20 For an overview of international aid provided to Iraq in the 1990s, see GAO Report 03-792R, “Rebuilding 

Iraq,” May 15, 2003.

21 SIGIR interview with William Orme, Director of Communications, UN Development Program, September 

8, 2006.

22 Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York: 

HarperCollins, 2008), 219.

23 The cell’s members included Major General Victor Renuart, CENTCOM Director of Operations (J3); 

Brigadier General John F. Kimmons, CENTCOM Director of Intelligence (J2); Colonel David D. Halverson, 

Chief of Operations Plans Division, CENTCOM (J3); and Colonel Mark Scheid, Chief of Logistics Plans 

Division, CENTCOM (J4). SIGIR interview with Brigadier General (Ret.) Mark Scheid, former CENTCOM 

logistics planner, September 20, 2006. 

24 SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM J5 Chief of War Plans, May 

30, 2008; SIGIR interview with Brigadier General (Ret.) Mark Scheid, former CENTCOM logistics planner, 

September 20, 2006; and SIGIR interview with Colonel John Agoglia, former CENTCOM planner, May 22, 

2008. Secretary Rumsfeld later stated, “I do not recall, nor do others present in the numerous discussions with 

General Franks, giving any guidance that could be interpreted as requesting CENTCOM not plan for Phase 

IV postwar operations, as General Franks will attest. Nor would I have minimized its importance.” Donald 

Rumsfeld, written comments to SIGIR, November 5, 2008. Michael Fitzgerald, CENTCOM Chief of War 

Plans, attests that, “We, CENTCOM, were not in charge of designating and developing the government, 

determining who would be responsible in immediate post-conflict.” Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM J5 

Chief of War Plans, May 30, 2008.

25 SIGIR interviews with Brigadier General (Ret.) Mark Scheid, former CENTCOM logistics planner, 

September 20, 2006; and Colonel John Agoglia, former CENTCOM planner, May 22, 2008. The notation 

used for campaign phases changes over the years as military doctrine evolves. From 2001 to 2006, the phases 

were: 1-Deter/Engage; 2-Seize; 3-Decisive Operations; and 4-Transition. Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication 

3-0, “Joint Operations,” III-18-III-21, http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/jp-doctrine/jp3_0(01).pdf. In 

2006, the phases were changed to 0-Shape; 1-Deter; 2-Seize Initiative; 3-Dominate; 4-Stabilize; and 5-Enable 

Civil Authority. Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication 3-0, “Joint Operations,” IV-26-IV-30, http://www.dtic.

mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf. The phases represent general guidance to combatant commanders 

and may be changed for specific plans. For purposes of this book, Phase IV refers to the establishment of selfsustaining peace, civil control, and the rule of law.
• 361 •

• Chapter 1 •

26 For popular accounts, see Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story 

of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006); Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The 

American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Group, 2007); Bob Woodward, State of Denial: 

Bush at War, Part III (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006); and Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: 

Simon & Schuster, 2004).

27 Warrick initially discussed this evaluation with State Department officials Steve Beecroft, Alan Limpert, 

and others from the Iraq desk. ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Thomas S. Warrick, former Senior 

Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, November 10, 2004. Dr. Gordon Rudd 

was the staff historian for both the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and 

the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). All of Rudd’s interviews will be identified as “ORHA/CPA 

Historian.” The groups were: Democratic Principles and Procedures; Economy and Infrastructure; Defense 

Policy and Institutions; Education; Public Health and Humanitarian Needs; Civil Society Capacity Building; 

Transitional Justice; Water, Agriculture and Environment; Preserving Iraq’s Cultural Heritage; Public Finance; 

Oil and Energy; Local Government; Anti-Corruption Measures; Foreign and National Security; Free Media; 

Migration; and Public Outreach. DoS, “Future of Iraq Project,” May 12, 2003, Overview, 4, http://www.gwu.

edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB198/FOI%20Overview.pdf.

28 These meetings, held in the White House situation room, included Deputy Secretary of State Richard 

Armitage, Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith, Vice 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace, Chief of Staff to the Vice President I. Lewis “Scooter” 

Libby, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John McLaughlin, and Deputy National Security Advisor 

Steven Hadley. General Wayne Downing—then Zalmay Khalilzad and later Frank Miller—attended as staff 

representatives from the NSC. The internal NSC calendar referred to the Deputies gatherings as “regional 

affairs” meetings, obscuring their purpose from the wider NSC staff. ORHA/CPA Historian interview with 

Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, December 17, 2004. For a general description of the 

“Deputies Lunches,” see Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on 

Terror (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 237-298.

29 Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York: 

HarperCollins, 2008), 237-298; and SIGIR interview with Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy, March 21, 2008.

30 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, December 

17, 2004; and Richard Armitage, “The Future of Iraq,” Department of State policy paper distributed to the 

Deputies Committee on July 25, 2002, as quoted in Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at 

the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 277-78.

31 Donald Rumsfeld, “Beyond Nation Building,” DoD speech, February 14, 2003.

32 For an analysis of the Afghan campaign, see Stephen Biddle, “Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: 

Implications for Army and Defense Policy,” Strategic Studies Institute, November 2002.

33 It was only later that the initial gains in Afghanistan unraveled with the resurgence of the Taliban. David 

Rohde and David E. Sanger, “How a ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan Went Bad,” New York Times, August 12, 2007; 

and Center for the Study of the Presidency, “Afghanistan Study Group Report,” January 30, 2008.

34 Richard Armitage, “The Future of Iraq,” Department of State policy paper distributed to the Deputies 

Committee on July 25, 2002, as quoted in Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of 

the War on Terror (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 277-78.

35 SIGIR interviews with Douglas Feith, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, March 21, 2008; SIGIR 

interview with Colonel (Ret.) Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM (J5) Chief of War Plans, May 30, 2008; 

and SIGIR interview with Colonel John Agoglia, former CENTCOM planner, May 22, 2008.

36 Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 154-56; and NSC briefing, “Iraq: 

Goals, Objectives, Strategy,” circulated by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, October 29, 2002.

37 Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York: 

HarperCollins, 2008), 281-83.

38 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel John Agoglia, former CENTCOM planner, June 28, 2003.
• 362 •

• Endnotes•

39 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Major Thomas Fisher, former CENTCOM planner, August 

27, 2003; and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Major Ray Eiriz, former CENTCOM planner, 

December 7, 2006.

40 SIGIR interviews with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, June 26, 

2008; and February 4, 2008; and Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War 

on Terror (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 276-77.

41 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, December 17, 

2004. 

42 Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, multiple interviews with ORHA/CPA Historian and SIGIR; and 

DoD IG Report 07-INTEL-04, “Report on the Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of the Under Secretary 

of Defense for Policy,” February 9, 2007. Douglas Feith disputes the assertion that the name of the office was 

chosen as a deliberate deception and that its products were not widely shared, saying that “The Office of Special 

Plans was one of the most transparent offices in the United States Government.” Douglas Feith, former Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy, written comments to SIGIR, January 7, 2009.

43 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, August 

19, 2008.

44 SIGIR interview with Wendy Chamberlin, former USAID Assistant Administrator, Near East Bureau, May 

3, 2006. 

45 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Major Ray Eiriz, former CENTCOM planner, December 7, 2006.

46 SIGIR interview with Jonathan Dworken, former Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster 

Response for the NSC, October 11, 2006.

47 Colin H. Kahl, “In the Crossfire or the Crosshairs? Norms, Civilian Casualties, and U.S. Conduct in Iraq,” 

International Security 32, no. 1 (Summer 2007), 16.

48 According to Frank Miller, to whom the Humanitarian Working Group reported, it was not originally 

charged to do any reconstruction planning. SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the 

Executive Steering Group of the NSC, June 26, 2008.

49 SIGIR interview with Wendy Chamberlin, former USAID Assistant Administrator, Near East Bureau, May 

3, 2006. 

50 SIGIR interview with Jonathan Dworken, former Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster 

Response for the NSC, October 11, 2006; and SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the 

Executive Steering Group of the NSC, June 26, 2008.

51 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel (Ret.) Joseph J. Collins, former Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Stability Operations, August 29, 2006.

52 SIGIR interview with Jonathan Dworken, former Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster 

Response for the NSC, October 11, 2006.

53 SIGIR interview with Jonathan Dworken, former Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster 

Response for the NSC, October 11, 2006.

54 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel (Ret.) Joseph J. Collins, former Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Stability Operations, August 29, 2006.

55 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel (Ret.) Joseph J. Collins, former Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Stability Operations, August 29, 2006.

56 SIGIR interview with Jonathan Dworken, former Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster 

Response for the NSC, October 11, 2006.

57 The “Karzai” comment refers to how Hamid Karzai emerged in Afghanistan as a national leader around 

whom the nation could generally rally. Karzai, an Afghan exile leader, was named as the country’s president after 

the overthrow of the Taliban.
• 363 •

• Chapter 1 •

58 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel (Ret.) Joseph J. Collins, former Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Stability Operations, August 29, 2006.

59 SIGIR and ORHA/CPA Historian interviews with Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 

December 17, 2004, January 27, 2005, and March 21, 2008; and Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the 

Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 315-317, 544-45.

60 SIGIR interview with General George Casey, former Director of the Joint Staff and former Commander of 

MNF-I, July 30, 2008.

61 This subdivision of Phase IV had long been CENTCOM’s preferred concept of operations, and was taken 

from OPLAN 1003-98, a standing plan for war in Iraq that had been approved by the Secretary of Defense in 

1998. SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM J5 Chief of War Plans, 

May 30, 2008.

62 SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM J5 Chief of War Plans, May 

30, 2008.

63 SIGIR interview with Douglas Feith, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, March 21, 2008; and 

Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York: Harper 

Collins, 2008), 316-317. 

64 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, December 17, 

2004. 

65 The strategy paper was circulated on October 29, 2002. Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor, 

Memorandum to the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, Chief of Staff to the 

President, Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Principals’ Committee 

Review of Iraq Police Paper,” October 29, 2002, as reproduced in Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the 

Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 541-43.

66 SIGIR interview with Douglas Feith, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, January 27, 2005.

67 SIGIR interview with Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense, December 12, 2008.

68 Assistant Secretary of State William Burns and his deputy, Ryan Crocker, worked to produce a twelve-page, 

single-spaced analysis of political risks they titled “The Perfect Storm.” Karen DeYoung, Soldier: The Life of 

Colin Powell (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 459; and SIGIR interview with Ambassador Ryan Crocker, 

United States Ambassador to Iraq, February 24, 2008.

69 SIGIR interview with General (Ret.) Colin Powell, former Secretary of State and Richard Armitage, former 

Deputy Secretary of State, February 4, 2008; and SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the 

Executive Steering Group of the NSC, August 19, 2008.

70 For an overview of the literature, see, for instance: James Dobbins, et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building: 

From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003); and Stephen Kinzer, Overthrow: America’s Century 

of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq (New York: Times Books, 2006). For an opposing view, see Justin 

Logan and Christopher Preble, “Failed States and Flawed Logic: The Case Against a Standing Nation-Building 

Office,” CATO Institute Policy Analysis, no. 560 (January 11, 2006). 

71 Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper, “Lessons from the Past: The American Record on Nation Building,” Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief, no. 24 (May 2003), 2, 4.

72 See: Charles Tripp, “Iraq: The Imperial Precedent,” Le Monde Diplomatique, January 13, 2003; and Brent 

Scowcroft, “Don’t Attack Saddam,” Op-Ed, Wall Street Journal, August 15, 2002.

73 For perspectives on the Germany case study and how historians viewed its relevance to Iraq, see Charles S. 

Maier, Seminar, “Comparative Insights: Marshall Plan, Japan, and Iraq,” Seminar at Massachusetts Institute of 

Technology, Cambridge, MA, March 7, 2005, http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/255/. On the use of historical 

analogy between Japan and Iraq, see John W. Dower, “A Warning from History: Don’t Expect Democracy in 

Iraq,” Boston Review, February 2003; John W. Dower, “The Other Japanese Occupation,” The Nation, July 7, 

2003; and John W. Dower, “Lessons from Japan about War’s Aftermath,” Op-Ed, New York Times, October 

27, 2002. These analyses are drawn from a larger body of scholarship, including: John W. Dower, Embracing 

Defeat: Japan in the Wake of WWII (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000).
• 364 •

• Endnotes•

74 National Intelligence Council, “Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq,” January 2003, as reproduced in: 

U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Prewar Intelligence Assessments about Postwar Iraq,” May 25, 

2007, 56-94.

75 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, August 

19, 2008.

76 The Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in November 2002 hosted 

a meeting of more than 70 scholars, experts, and practitioners from inside and outside the government to 

discuss post-intervention reconstruction and political stabilization of Iraq. A 41-page proceeding of the 

workshop, “Iraq: Looking Beyond Saddam’s Rule,” was circulated across the government, including to the 

office of Douglas Feith. National Defense University, “Workshop Report: Iraq: Looking Beyond Saddam’s 

Rule,” National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies in collaboration with the Naval 

Postgraduate School, November 20-21, 2002; Edward P. Djerejian and Frank G. Wisner, co-chairs, Guiding 

Principles for U.S. Post-Conflict Policy in Iraq (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003); Richard W. 

Murphy and C. Richard Nelson, “Winning the Peace: Managing a Successful Transition in Iraq,” The Atlantic 

Council Policy Paper, January 2003; William D. Nordhaus, “Iraq: The Economic Consequences of War,” The 

New York Review of Books 49, no. 19, December 5, 2002; and Bob Davis, “Cost of Iraq War May Top $100 

Billion,” Wall Street Journal, September 16, 2002. For subsequent news accounts, see Carl Kaysen, Steven E. 

Miller, Martin B. Malin, William D. Nordhaus, and John D. Steinbruner, War with Iraq: Costs, Consequences 

and Alternatives, (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts, 2002); Frederick D. Barton and Bathsheba 

N. Crocker, “A Wiser Peace: An Action Strategy for Post-Conflict Iraq,” Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, January 2003; and Anthony Cordesman, “Planning for a Self-Inflicted Wound: U.S. Policy to Reshape 

a Post-Saddam Iraq,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 31, 2002.

77 Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, “Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military 

Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario,” U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, February 1, 2003.

78 Sinan Al-Shabibi, Colonel (Ret.) Scott Feil, Rend Rahim Francke, and Phebe Marr testified before the 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 1, 2002, as part of a multi-day hearing on Iraq. Their panel 

focused specifically on post-Saddam Iraq. U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Hearings to Examine 

Threats, Responses, and Regional Considerations Surrounding Iraq,” July 31 and August 1, 2002. Also see 

Phebe Marr’s subsequent writings, especially Phebe Marr, “Iraq ‘The Day After’: Internal Dynamics in PostSaddam Iraq,” Naval War College Review LVI, no. 1 (Winter 2003); P.L. 107-243, Authorization for Use of 

Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002, October 16, 2002; and White House Press Release, “Statement 

by the President,” October 16, 2003.

79 GPO Access, “Congressional Hearings,” 107th Congress (2001-2002), 108th Congress (2003-2004), http://

www.gpoaccess.gov/chearings/.

80 The project’s first meetings, held April 9 and 10, 2002, under the auspices of the Middle East Institute, a 

nonpartisan research center in Washington, DC, opened with the discord that was to mark its findings and 

Iraqi exile politics more generally. Ahmed Chalabi, the prominent Iraqi exile and leader of the Iraqi National 

Congress, raised concerns about the Middle East Institute’s participation. He viewed the think tank as an unnecessary intermediary between the Iraqi National Congress and the State Department. Acceding to Chalabi’s 

concerns, the State Department agreed to be the project’s sole sponsor, with meetings resuming in early July. 

ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Thomas S. Warrick, former Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary 

of State for Near Eastern Affairs, November 10, 2004. The three groups that did not meet were Refugees and 

Internally Displaced Persons; Foreign and National Security Policy; and Preserving Iraq’s Cultural Heritage. 

DoS, “The Future of Iraq Project,” May 12, 2003, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB198/

index.htm.

81 Four of the groups (Education; Free Media; Transparency and Anti-Corruption Measures; and Civil 

Society Capacity Building) did not begin meeting until after the start of the new year. DoS, “Future of Iraq 

Project,” Overview, 7-8, May 12, 2003, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB198/FOI%20

Overview.pdf. For details on updates sent to the Executive Steering Group, see ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Thomas S. Warrick, former Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, 

November 10, 2004.
• 365 •

• Chapter 2 •

82 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Thomas S. Warrick, former Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary 

of State for Near Eastern Affairs, November 10, 2004.

83 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, August 

19, 2008.

84 For the edited volumes of the Future of Iraq Project, see DoS, “The Future of Iraq Project,” May 12, 2003, 

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB198/index.htm.

85 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, August 

19, 2008.

86 SIGIR interview with Ambassador Ryan Crocker, United States Ambassador to Iraq, February 24, 2008. 

87 NSC briefing, “Iraq: Goals, Objectives, Strategy,” circulated by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, 

October 29, 2002; and Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror

(New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 541-543.

Essential Services Overview – Prewar Levels in Iraq

88 International Monetary Fund, “Iraq: Statistical Appendix,” August 2007; Energy Information 

Administration, Department of Energy, “Iraq Country Analysis Brief,” December 2005, as cited in SIGIR, 

Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2006, 34; Kenneth M. Pollack, The Threatening Storm: 

The Case for Invading Iraq (New York: Random House, 2002), 116-117; and Economist Intelligence Unit, 

“Country Profile: Iraq,” 2005, 34; International Telecommunication Union, “World Telecommunication/ICT 

Indicators,” no date, A-30m, http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/at_glance/cellular03.pdf.

89 There were an estimated 500,000 people working in various intelligence, security and police organizations. 

With the inclusion of the armed forces and paramilitary units, the estimate for the total Iraqi Security Forces 

is 1.3 million. Kenneth M. Pollack, The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq (New York: Random 

House, 2002), 116-117.

90 Bechtel National, Inc., “Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Program,” Assessment Report submitted to 

USAID, June 2003; and Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Testimony before the Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee, May 22, 2003. 

91 International Monetary Fund, “Iraq: Statistical Appendix,” August 2007. Pre-war estimates of electricity production ranged from 3,250 to 4,500 megawatts per day. The 2003 UN/World Bank estimated production at 

4,500 MW. United Nations/World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs Assessment,” October 2003, 28. The Gulf Region 

Division later noted, “4,500 MW represents a short-term peak before the war. The full prewar average for 2002 

was 4,300MW.” GRD, response to SIGIR vetting for the Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 

18, 2007. Iraq Transition Assistance Office reports that data from the Ministry of Electricity “suggest that 

prewar high levels of production... never exceeded 70,000 MWhr [megawatt hours]” which translates into 

3,250 MW. ITAO-Electricity response to SIGIR Vetting for the Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 

January 13, 2008.

92 DoS Briefing by U.S. Embassy Baghdad, November 30, 2005, as cited in SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the 

United States Congress, July 2006, 25.

93 Energy Information Administration, Department of Energy, “Country Analysis Brief: Iraq,” December 

2005, as cited in SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2006, 34.

Chapter 2

1 USAID, “2002 Congressional Budget Request,” http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cbj2002/request.html.

2 USAID, “Primer: What We Do and How We Do It,” revised January 2006, http://www.usaid.gov/

about_usaid/PDACG100.pdf. In 2002, only 1,985 of USAID’s workforce were government employees; 

more than two-thirds of the workforce of 7,741 was made up of contractors. GAO Testimony 03-117T, 

“Foreign Assistance: USAID Needs to Improve Its Workforce Planning and Operation Expense Accounting,” 

September 23, 2003, 1-2.

3 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, April 17, 2006.
• 366 •

• Endnotes•

4 SIGIR interview with Ross Wherry, former USAID Director of the Office of Iraq Affairs, April 5, 2006; and 

SIGIR interview with Wendy Chamberlin, former USAID Assistant Administrator, Near East Bureau, May 3, 

2006. 

5 Chamberlin had just stepped down as Ambassador to Pakistan, and knew White House planners from her 

long career at the Department of State. SIGIR interviews with Wendy Chamberlin, former USAID Assistant 

Administrator, Near East Bureau, April 18, 2007 and May 3, 2006. 

6 The Asia and Near East Bureau was headed by Chamberlin. USAID Press Release, “Wendy Chamberlin 

Sworn in as Head of USAID’s Asia and Near East Bureau,” December 2, 2002.

7 Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, email to SIGIR, October 25, 2008.

8 SIGIR interview with Jonathan Dworken, former Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster 

Response for the NSC, March 29, 2007.

9 SIGIR interviews with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, February 9, 2006 and March 

27, 2007.

10 SIGIR interviews with Wendy Chamberlin, former USAID Assistant Administrator, Near East Bureau, May 

3, 2006 and April 18, 2007. 

11 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, April 17, 2006.

12 USAID, Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq, February 19, 2003. Although not released to the public until February 

2003, a working draft of this document was produced by members of the Humanitarian Working Group in the 

fall of 2002.

13 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, April 17, 2006.

14 USAID Fact Sheet, “USAID Contingency Plans for Humanitarian Assistance to Iraq,” February 24, 2003.

15 SIGIR interview with Lauren Barbour, former Iraq Team Leader, USAID Office of Transition 

Initiatives,December 20, 2005; USAID, “Transition Initiatives,” http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/crosscutting_programs/transition_initiatives/.

16 USAID memorandum, “USAID Consultations on Iraq Contingency Plans,” February 24, 2003, http://pdf.

dec.org/pdf_docs/PDABY342.pdf.

17 SIGIR interview with Jonathan Dworken, former Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster 

Response for the NSC, March 29, 2007.

18 USAID memorandum, “USAID Consultations on Iraq Contingency Plans,” February 24, 2003, http://pdf.

dec.org/pdf_docs/PDABY342.pdf.

19 SIGIR interview with Jonathan Dworken, former Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster 

Response for the NSC, March 29, 2007; USAID memorandum, “USAID Consultations on Iraq Contingency 

Plans,” February 24, 2003, http://pdf.dec.org/pdf_docs/PDABY342.pdf; USAID Press Release, “USAID 

Announces $200 Million in Emergency Food Assistance to Iraq,” April 2, 2003; and World Food Program 

Press Release, “WFP Welcomes International Response to Iraq Appeal,” April 4, 2003.

20 SIGIR interview with Jonathan Dworken, former Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster 

Response for the NSC, March 29, 2007.

21 Interestingly, the group was not directed to meet by the Joint Staff Political-Military Cell, but rather arose 

more spontaneously from contacts of lower and mid-level staff members on the NSC and at CENTCOM. 

ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Major Ray Eiriz, former CENTCOM planner, December 7, 2006.

22 SIGIR and ORHA/CPA Historian interviews with CENTCOM planners Colonel (Ret.) Michael 

Fitzgerald, Colonel John Agoglia, Major Thomas Fisher, and Major Ray Eiriz.

23 SIGIR interview with Ross Wherry, former USAID Director of the Office of Iraq Affairs, April 5, 2006. 

24 SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, March 27, 2007.
• 367 •

• Chapter 2 •

25 SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, February 9, 2006. Joshua B. 

Bolten, OMB Director, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 29, 2003; and USAID, 

“Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq,” February 19, 2003. Shelter and payroll management assistance sectors had been 

considered but were ultimately dropped. 

26 Milligan, a USAID official, had worked in Ecuador, Zimbabwe, and finally Indonesia, where Agency personnel were evacuated after the Bali bombing. Shortly thereafter, Wendy Chamberlin included him in planning.

27 Jock Covey, Michael J. Dziedic, and Leonard R. Hawley, eds., The Quest for Viable Peace: International 

Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation (Washington, DC: USIP, 2005).

28 SIGIR interviews with Ross Wherry, former USAID Director of the Office of Iraq Affairs, April 5, 2006; 

Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, March 27, 2007; Jonathan Dworken, former Director 

for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response for the NSC, March 29, 2007; and Wendy Chamberlin, 

former USAID Assistant Administrator, Near East Bureau, April 18, 2007.

29 Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor, Memorandum to the Vice President, the Secretary of State, 

the Secretary of Defense, Chief of Staff to the President, Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Principals’ Committee Review of Iraq Police Paper,” October 29, 2002, as reproduced 

in Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York: 

HarperCollins, 2008), 541-43.

30 USAID, “Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq,” February 19, 2003.

31 See: “Electricity” in USAID, “Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq,” February 19, 2003.

32 See: “Food, Agriculture, and Rural Economy” in USAID, “Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq,” February 19, 2003.

33 See: “Education” and “Electricity” in USAID, “Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq,” February 19, 2003.

34 SIGIR interview with Ross Wherry, former USAID Director of the Office of Iraq Affairs, April 5, 2006.

35 SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, February 9, 2006.

36 See: “Transportation” in USAID, “Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq,” February 19, 2003.

37 The CORDS pacification program in rural Vietnam is an interesting precursor to Provisional 

Reconstruction Teams used in Afghanistan and Iraq. See: R. W. Komer, RAND Report R-967-ARPA, 

“Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam,” August 1972; 

Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam (New 

York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1999); and Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America 

in Vietnam (New York: Vintage, 1989).

38 SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, March 27, 2007.

39 SIGIR interviews with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, April 14, 2006; and March 

27, 2007.

40 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the National 

Security Council, August 19, 2008.

41 SIGIR interview with Wendy Chamberlin, former USAID Assistant Administrator, Near East Bureau, April 

18, 2007. The military also uses this term to denote large depictions of plans, schedules or programs. 

42 SIGIR interview with Ross Wherry, former USAID Director of the Office of Iraq Affairs, April 5, 2006; and 

SIGIR interview with Wendy Chamberlin, former USAID Assistant Administrator, Near East Bureau, April 18, 

2007. 

43 SIGIR interview with Jonathan Dworken, former Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster 

Response for the NSC, March 29, 2007; and SIGIR interview with Ross Wherry, former USAID Director of 

the Office of Iraq Affairs, November 2, 2005.

44 SIGIR interview with Ross Wherry, former USAID Director of the Office of Iraq Affairs, April 5, 2006. 

45 GAO Testimony 03-1171T, “Foreign Assistance: USAID Needs to Improve Its Workforce Planning and 

Operation Expense Accounting,” September 23, 2003, 1-5.
• 368 •

• Endnotes•

46 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, April 17, 2006.

47 For current provisions for the FAR, see Acquisition Central, “Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR),” 

http://www.acqnet.gov/FAR/.

48 James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: Basic 

Books, 1991 reprint edition), 126-127.

49 USAID Acquisition Regulation (AIDAR), Subpart Level 48, CFR 706.302-70, October 18, 2007, http://

www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/300/aidar.pdf. A good overview of contracting procedures can be found in: 

Valerie Bailey Grasso, Congressional Research Service Report RL32229, “Iraq: Frequently Asked Questions 

about Contracting,” updated March 18, 2005; and John R. Luckey, Congressional Research Service Report 

RS21555, “Iraq Reconstruction: Frequently Asked Questions Concerning the Application of Federal 

Procurement Statues,” June 23, 2003. For an overview of budget mechanisms for humanitarian assistance, see 

Rhoda Margesson, Congressional Research Service Report RL33769, “International Crisis and Disasters: U.S. 

Humanitarian Assistance, Budget Trends, and Issues for Congress,” updated May 3, 2007; and SIGIR Lessons 

Learned Forum: Contracting and Procurement, Washington, DC, December 5, 2005.

50 Authority comes from Public Law 87-195 which amended the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA). P.L. 87-195, 

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Section 491, September 4, 1961. The FAA of 1961 releases the agency from 

some of the more stringent requirements for domestic acquisition. The conditions under which exemptions 

may be invoked are outlined in an addendum specific to each agency. USAID implements the procurement aspects of the FAA under AIDAR provision 48 CFR 701.601. AIDAR, Subpart Level 48, CFR 701.601, October 

18, 2007, http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/300/aidar.pdf. 

51 Under a pre-authorization letter, contractors proceed “at risk,” which means that they will only be reimbursed for expenses later deemed by USAID to have been appropriate given the nature of the pending task.

52 Bruce N. Crandlemire, USAID Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Memorandum to Wendy Chamberlin 

and Timothy T. Beans, “USAID’s Compliance with Federal Regulations in Awarding the Iraq Education Sector 

Contract, (AIG/A Memorandum 03-001),” June 6, 2003, http://www.usaid.gov/oig/iraq_doc/memorandum_03-001_6-06-03.pdf. Seven exemptions in the FAR allow contracting officers to hold shorter bid periods, 

use a pre-selected list of bidders, or award a contract outright without competition. (The latter is known as nobid or sole-source contracting.) Thorough justification must accompany these awards and the FAR prescribes 

that they be re-competed as soon as practical. The FAR requires a written, certified justification before any 

exemption to full and open competition is used. The FAR Subpart 6.3 governs the applicability. FAR, Subpart 

6.3, “Other Than Full and Open Competition,” June 12, 2008, http://www.arnet.gov/far/current/html/

Subpart%206_3.html#wp1086841. The AIDAR provides regulations for USAID. AIDAR, Subpart Level 48, 

CFR 706.302-70, October 18, 2007, http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/300/aidar.pdf.

53 USAID IG Audit A-000-04-003-P, “Capping Report on the Audit of USAID’s Compliance with Federal 

Regulations in Awarding the Iraq Phase I Contracts,” May 19, 2004.

54 SIGIR interview with Bruce Spake, Vice President of DAI, November 2, 2006.

55 USAID, “Funding Summary #3, Fiscal Year (FY) 2003,” April 2, 2003.

56 USAID memorandum, “USAID Consultations on Iraq Contingency Plans,” February 24,2003, http://pdf.

dec.org/pdf_docs/PDABY342.pdf.

57 SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, March 27, 2007. On January 

24, 2003, USAID issued IRG a request for proposal, giving the organization three days to respond. On February 

7, 2003, USAID subsequently issued the firm the Agency’s first sole-source contract in the reconstruction effort. USAID Press Release, “USAID Reconstruction Efforts in Iraq,” May 1, 20003. See also: IRG Press Release, 

“IRG will support USAID in the overall planning, monitoring, coordination, management, and reporting on 

reconstruction and rehabilitation activities across a variety of sectors including health, agriculture, civil society 

strengthening, and infrastructure.” IRG, “IRG Selected to Implement Key Post-War Reconstruction,” March 

13, 2003. “Only one of the first eight contracts was sole-sourced by USAID, for personnel support, which was 

awarded to IRG.” USAID Fact Sheet, “Contracting by USAID for Reconstruction of Iraq, Questions and 

Answers,” May 2, 2003, http://www.usaid.gov/press/factsheets/2003/fs030508.html.
• 369 •

• Chapter 2 •

58 For examples of USAID’s Statements of Work see RTI, USAID contract EDG-C-00-03-00010-00, Section 

C, April 11, 2003; Abt Associates, USAID contract RAN-C-00-03-00010-00, Section C, April 30, 2003; and 

CAI, USAID contract EDG-C-00-03-00011-00, Section C, April 11, 2003. 

59 SIGIR interview with Wendy Chamberlin, former USAID Assistant Administrator, Near East Bureau, May 

3, 2006.

60 SIGIR interview with Ross Wherry, former USAID Director of the Office of Iraq Affairs, April 5, 2006.

61 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 29.

62 For final amounts of USAID contracts, several of which were increased multiple times, see USAID, 

“Assistance for Iraq Contracts and Grant,” http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/.

63 SIGIR interview with Ross Wherry, former USAID Director of the Office of Iraq Affairs, April 5, 2006. 

64 P.L. 108-11, Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2003, and for other 

purposes,” April 16, 2003; and SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Contracting and Procurement, Washington, 

DC, December 5, 2005, 29-30.

65 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 30; and Bruce N. 

Crandlemire, USAID Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Memorandum to Gordon West and Timothy T. 

Beans, “USAID’s Compliance with Federal Regulations in Awarding the Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction 

Program Phase II Contract (AIG/A Memorandum 04-006),” April 20, 2004, http://www.usaid.gov/oig/iraq_

doc/memo04_006.pdf. USAID eventually increased the contract’s ceiling to $1.03 billion in September 2003.

66 USAID Press Release, “USAID Awards Iraq Infrastructure Contract,” April 17, 2003.

67 USAID Bechtel Contract EEE-C-00-03-00018-00, Section C, http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/pdf/

BechtelSecC.pdf.

68 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 30.

69 “There’s a lot of money to pay for this that doesn’t have to be U.S. taxpayer money...the oil revenues of 

that country could bring between $50 billion and $100 billion over the course of the of the next two or three 

years... We’re dealing with a country that can really finance its own reconstruction, and relatively soon.” Paul 

Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, in a hearing before the House Appropriations Committee, March 27, 

2003. 

70 Iraq contains 115 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, the third largest in the world. Since only 10 percent 

of the country has been explored, analysts believe that there is much more to be found. Energy Information 

Administration, Department of Energy, “Country Analysis Briefs: Iraq,” August 2007. 

71 Eliot A. Cohen, Director, “Gulf War Air Power Survey,” U.S. Air Force, 1993; and ORHA/CPA Historian 

interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003. 

72 The resolution authorized expanding sales from $2.1 billion to $5.256 billion in a six-month period. UN 

Press Release SC/6492, “Security Council Authorizes Sale of Iraq Oil to Offset Shortfall in Revenues Resulting 

from Delay in Oil Sales, Drop in Oil Prices,” March 25, 1998; and United Nations Security Council Resolution 

1153, February 20, 1998.

73 Michael H. Mobbs, “Memorandum for the Record: Potential for Competition in Obtaining Contractor 

Services Required by the Energy Infrastructure Planning Group (EIPG),” November 8, 2002. 

74 Members included Mike Mackowski, Senaca Johnston from State, Barbara Glotfelty from DoD 

Contracting, Matt Armitrano, a consultant, and a CIA representative. SIGIR interview with Gary Vogler, CPA 

Senior Advisor to Oil, May 10, 2006.

75 Michael H. Mobbs, “Memorandum for the Record: Potential for Competition in Obtaining Contractor 

Services Required by the Energy Infrastructure Planning Group (EIPG),” November 8, 2002; and SIGIR 

Lessons Learned Forum: Contracting and Procurement, Washington, DC, December 5, 2005. 

76 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Contracting and Procurement, Washington, DC, December 5, 2005.

77 Donald L. Trautner, “A Personal Account and Perspective of the U.S. Army Logistics Civil Augmentation 

Program (LOGCAP),” 2004 Conference of Army Historians, July 15, 2004.
• 370 •

• Endnotes•

78 Donald L. Trautner, “A Personal Account and Perspective of the U.S. Army Logistics Civil Augmentation 

Program (LOGCAP),” 2004 Conference of Army Historians, July 15, 2004. 

79 Lieutenant Colonel Steven T. Mitchell, “Targetable Logistics: Contractors in Zones of Conflict-Backbone 

or Underbelly?” U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Paper, March 18, 2005, 4.

80 T. Christian Miller, Blood Money: Wasted Billions, Lost Lives, and Corporate Greed in Iraq (New York: 

Little, Brown and Company, 2006), 76.

81 For a detailed analysis of contractors in the Iraq theater, see Congressional Budget Office, “Contractors’ 

Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq,” August 2008.

82 Michael H. Mobbs, “Memorandum for the Record: Potential for Competition in Obtaining Contractor 

Services Required by the Energy Infrastructure Planning Group (EIPG),” November 8, 2002. In this memorandum Mobbs identifies Bechtel and Fluor as among other contractors who have the technical capacity but not 

an existing connection to CENTCOM. See: SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Contracting and Procurement, 

Washington, DC, December 5, 2005. 

83 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Contracting and Procurement, Washington, DC, December 5, 2005.

84 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Contracting and Procurement, Washington, DC, December 5, 2005. 

85 John L. Long, Associate General Counsel, Acquisition and Logistics, Memorandum to Barbara Glotfelty, 

Energy Infrastructure Planning Group, “Legal Position on LOGCAP Scope of Work,” November 8, 2002.

86 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Contracting and Procurement, Washington, DC, December 5, 2005.

87 USACE, “Frequently Asked Questions: Engineer Support to Operation Iraqi Freedom,” USACE 

Missions—Oil Fire Suppression and Restoration of Production, updated September 5, 2007. 

88 “The resulting contingency plan was used as justification for subsequently awarding a sole-source contract 

to Kellogg Brown & Root for restoring the oil infrastructure, for which nearly $1.4 billion was obligated during 

fiscal year 2003.” GAO Report 04-605, “Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and 

Management Challenges,” June 2004, 14, 16, 19-20. The contract was replaced by competitively procured 

contracts in January 2004. KBR was awarded a contract capped at $1.2 billion to repair the oil infrastructure of 

Southern Iraq. Parsons Iraqi Joint Venture was awarded a contract capped at $800,000 to carry out repairs in 

Northern Iraq. USACE, “Frequently Asked Questions: Engineer Support to Operation Iraqi Freedom. USACE 

Missions—Oil Fire Suppression and Restoration of Production,” updated January 20, 2004, http://www.

hq.usace.army.mil/cepa/iraq/faq.htm (accessed April 24, 2006). 

89 Although the contingency plan that violated contracting regulations was used as justification for the 

sole-source contract to Kellogg Brown & Root, GAO found that the award of the contract generally complied 

with applicable legal standards. GAO Report 04-605, “Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award 

Procedures and Management Challenges,” June 2004, 19-21.

90 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Contracting and Procurement, Washington, DC, December 5, 2005.

91 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Brigadier General Robert Crear, Commander of Task Force RIO, 

June 25, 2003.

92 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the National 

Security Council, August 19, 2008.

93 For an overall account of Treasury’s activities, see Chapters 7, 8 and 9 in John B. Taylor, Global Financial 

Warriors: The Untold Story of International Finance in the Post-9/11 World (New York: W.W. Norton & 

Company, 2007); and U.S. Treasury, “Contingency Plans for Reconstruction of Iraq’s Financial Institutions 

and Financial Markets,” April 28, 2003.
• 371 •

• Chapter 3 •

94 Iraqi currency printed before 1990 in Switzerland is referred to as the Swiss dinar, which was still used in 

the Kurdish region at the time of the 2003 invasion even though the Iraqi Central Bank began printing a new 

currency, known as the Saddam dinar, in 1991. Iraq, as a result, had two systems of currency, one of which—the 

Saddam dinar—had been subject to inflation, and another—the Swiss dinar—which had not lost nearly as 

much of its value, even though it had technically ceased to be legal tender. For a description of how the Treasury 

team approached this problem, see Chapters 7, 8 and 9 in John B. Taylor, Global Financial Warriors: The 

Untold Story of International Finance in the Post-9/11 World (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007).

95 For supplementary accounts, see USIP and ORHA/CPA Historian interviews with David Nummy, former 

Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Finance, October 14, 2004, and June 23 and 27, 2003.

96 GAO Testimony 04-579T, “Recovering Iraq’s Assets: Preliminary Observations on U.S. Efforts and 

Challenges,” March 18, 2004; Roger H. Bezdek, “Using Vested Assets for the Reconstruction of Iraq,” Public 

Fund Digest 5, no. 2 (2005); and Executive Order 13290, “Confiscating and Vesting Certain Iraqi Property,” 

March 20, 2003.

97 SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, April 14, 2006. 

98 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, June 26, 

2008.

99 SIGIR interview with Jonathan Dworken, former Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster 

Response for the NSC, March 29, 2007.

Chapter 3

1 SIGIR interview with Douglas Feith, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, March 21, 2008; 

and Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York: 

HarperCollins, 2008), 316-317.

2 SIGIR interview with Douglas Feith, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, March 21, 2008.

3 SIGIR interview with Colonel John Agoglia, former CENTCOM planner, May 22, 2008. 

4 SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM J5 Chief of War Plans, May 30, 

2008; SIGIR interview with Colonel John Agoglia, former CENTCOM planner, May 22, 2008; and Michael 

R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq

(New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 140-46.

5 SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM (J5) Chief of War Plans, May 

30, 2008; and SIGIR interview with Colonel John Agoglia, former CENTCOM planner, May 22, 2008. 

6 Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Fisher, former CENTCOM planner, email to SIGIR, October 20, 2008.

7 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Major Thomas Fisher, former CENTCOM planner, August 27, 2003.

8 SIGIR interview with General George Casey, former Director of the Joint Staff and former Commander 

of MNF-I, July 30, 2008. For an early history of JTF-4, see Chapter 4 of Nora Bensahel et. al., After Saddam: 

Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008).

9 SIGIR interview with Douglas Feith, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, March 21, 2008; 

and Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York: 

HarperCollins, 2008), 347.

10 Powell explained his concurrence in the following terms: “People say, ‘Well it should have been State.’ State 

does not have the personnel, the capacity, or the size to deal with an immediate postwar situation in a foreign 

country that’s eight thousand miles away from here, so there was never a disagreement about this. It made 

sense. I point out to people that Douglas MacArthur was not a Foreign Service Officer...neither was Lucius 

Clay a Foreign Service Officer.” SIGIR interview with Colin Powell, former Secretary of State, February 4, 2008.

11 SIGIR interview with Colin Powell, former Secretary of State, February 4, 2008.
• 372 •

• Endnotes•

12 SIGIR interview with Douglas Feith, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, March 21, 2008; 

and Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York: 

HarperCollins, 2008), 347-50. Frank Miller disputes that the discussion of the Defense Department’s takeover 

of the reconstruction mission was as clear as Feith characterized it. SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former 

Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, February 4, 2008.

13 National Security Archive, “New State Department Releases on the ‘Future of Iraq’ Project,” September 1, 

2006, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB198/index.htm. National Security Presidential 

Directive 24, “Post-War Iraq Reconstruction,” January 20, 2003, is not publicly available. Information 

about NSPD 24 was obtained through: DoD IG Audit D-2004-057, “Contracts Awarded for the Coalition 

Provisional Authority by the Defense Contracting Command-Washington,” March 18, 2004, 1. 

14 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, April 17, 2006.

15 SIGIR interview with James Kunder, USAID Acting Deputy Administrator, February 15, 2008.

16 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, February 

4, 2008.

17 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Major Ray Eiriz, former CENTCOM planner, December 7, 2006.

18 For an overview of how the war plan developed, see Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, 

Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006).

19 SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM (J5) Chief of War Plans, May 

30, 2008; and Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion 

and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 48-51, 52-54, 66-67.

20 SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM (J5) Chief of War Plans, May 

30, 2008.

21 SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM (J5) Chief of War Plans, May 

30, 2008.

22 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

September 14-15, 2005. For an overview of how force levels evolved, see Michael R. Gordon and General 

Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon 

Books, 2006), 95-105.

23 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, 

December 12, 2005.

24 SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM J5 Chief of War Plans, May 

30, 2008.

25 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Major Thomas Fisher, former CENTCOM Planner, August 27, 

2003. 

26 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

September 14-15, 2005. An account of Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner’s involvement in ORHA is to be 

published in 2009 by Gordon Rudd, the ORHA/CPA Historian.

27 SIGIR interview with Douglas Feith, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, March 21, 2008.

28 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey S. Kojac, NSC military aide, October 19, 

2007.

29 DoD News Transcript, “DoD News Briefing-Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers,” March 20, 2003.

30 SIGIR interview with Wendy Chamberlin, former USAID Assistant Administrator, Near East Bureau, April 

18, 2007.

31 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

March 30, 2004. 
• 373 •

• Chapter 3 •

32 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

March 30, 2004. Douglas Feith asserts that his office provided Garner with both written and oral briefings. 

Feith also asserts that Garner must have known about the office of Special Plans. Douglas Feith, former Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy, written comments to SIGIR, January 7, 2009.

33 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

March 30, 2004. 

34 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

March 30, 2004; and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel (Ret.) Paul Hughes, former ORHA/CPA 

Director of Strategic Policy, June 29, 2006.

35 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

March 30, 2004; and ORHA, “Contracting Support for ORHA, Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian 

Assistance (ORHA) Operational Structure,” March 28, 2003. 

36 SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, February 9, 2006.

37 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

March 30, 2004. 

38 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

September 14-15, 2005. Douglas Feith recalls contention only over the Civil Affairs pillar Douglas Feith, former 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, written comments to SIGIR, January 8, 2009.

39 Secretary Rumsfeld characterizes this exchange differently. “As I recall, the issue with General Garner was 

not whether Defense should staff every position at ORHA, but over several individuals whom the White House 

believed would not be a good fit with ORHA.” Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense, written comments to SIGIR, November 5, 2008.

40 USAID Assistant Administrator Wendy Chamberlin had called Lucke—formerly AID’s mission director 

in Jordan, the agency’ssecond largest mission—out of retirement in October when she learned he spoke some 

Arabic. SIGIR interview with Wendy Chamberlin, former USAID Assistant Administrator, Near East Bureau, 

April 18, 2007.

41 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

March 30, 2004. 

42 Mobbs was not Feith’s first choice. Feith’s first candidate was ineligible to serve. His second, David Kay, was 

appointed to ORHA, but resigned after two days. Kay would eventually lead the Iraq Survey Group, a task force 

that searched for weapons of mass destruction at the war’s end. Although Mobbs had served in the U.S. Arms 

Control and Disarmament Agency in the 1980s, much of his professional experience was as a lawyer specializing in corporate and commercial matters in Russia and Eastern Europe. Fox News, “Bio: Michael H. Mobbs,” 

provided by ORHA, April 23, 2003.

43 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

September 14-15, 2005. 

44 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

September 14-15, 2005; and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel Thomas Baltazar, C3 Operations 

Officer for ORHA, June 10, 2003. 

45 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

September 14-15, 2005. 

46 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with George F. Ward, former Head of Humanitarian Pillar of ORHA, 

June 29, 2006.

47 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Brigadier General Steven Hawkins, former Commander, JTF-4, June 

23, 2003.

48 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Major Thomas Fisher, former CENTCOM Planner, August 27, 2003.
• 374 •

• Endnotes•

49 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Brigadier General Steven Hawkins, former Commander, JTF-4, June 

23, 2003; and SIGIR interview with Brigadier General Mike Jones, Director of J-5 Middle East Affairs, April 13, 

2007.

50 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Brigadier General Steven Hawkins, former Commander, JTF-4, June 

23, 2003. 

51 SIGIR interview with Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, December 17, 2004.

52 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Brigadier General Steven Hawkins, former Commander, JTF-4, June 

23, 2003.

53 SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM J5 Chief of War Plans, May 

30, 2008.

54 SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM J5 Chief of War Plans, May 

30, 2008.

55 SIGIR interview with Brigadier General Mike Jones, Director of J-5 Middle East Affairs, April 13, 2007. 

Title X of the U.S. Code obliges the Joint Chiefs to provide military advice to the President. A staff larger than 

that working for the Secretary of Defense backs the Joint Chiefs. These different echelons of planning—the 

Joint Staff in Washington, combatant commanders in the field, and civilian staff in the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense—are collaborative, at least in theory. Some analysts note that Rumsfeld’s tenure strained this system 

of civil-military cooperation. Michael C. Desch, “Bush and the Generals,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 3 (May/June 

2007). Secretary Rumsfeld himself, however, disputes this characterization. “Relationships with the Joint Chiefs 

during my tenure were professional. As is their statutory obligation, they provided useful and constructive advice to the President and to me.” Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense, written comments to SIGIR, 

November 5, 2008. Rumsfeld notes that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Meyers and Richard H. 

Kohn wrote a rebuttal to Desch’s article. See: Richard B. Myers and Richard H. Kohn, “The Military’s Place,” 

Foreign Affairs 86, no. 5 (September/October 2007).

56 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Brigadier General Steven Hawkins, former Commander, JTF-4, June 

23, 2003.

57 ORHA/CPA Historian interviews with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

April 5, 2006, and September 14-15, 2005. 

58 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

September 14-15, 2005. 

59 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

September 14-15, 2005. 

60 SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM J5 Chief of War Plans, May 

30, 2008.

61 SIGIR interview with General (Ret.) Colin Powell, former Secretary of State, February 4, 2008.

62 SIGIR interview with Bob Gersony, former Advisor to the USAID Administrator, January 16, 2007; and 

ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Ronald E. Adams, former Deputy Director of 

ORHA, September 29, 2006. 

63 Milligan sent a memorandum to Lieutenant General (Ret.) Garner summarizing progress across eleven sectors and highlighting outstanding issues for his action. Christopher Milligan, Reconstruction and Humanitarian 

Assistance Group, memorandum to Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, Director of ORHA, “Status of 

Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance Preparations,” January 26, 2003.

64 SIGIR interview with Thomas Wheelock, former Chief of Party for USAID’s contractor International 

Resources Group, January 5, 2006.

65 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Carl A. Strock, former Commanding 

General of USACE, October 30, 2006. Bernoulli’s equation is used by engineers to describe the relationship 

between air pressure and velocity in fluid dynamics. 
• 375 •

• Chapter 3 •

66 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

March 30, 2004. 

67 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel Robert D. Costello, Jr., ORHA Chief of Logistics, June 15, 

2003.

68 Douglas Feith disputes this characterization. Douglas Feith, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 

written comments to SIGIR, January 7, 2009.

69 Dayton Maxwell, “Deliberate and Development Post-Conflict Planning in Iraq: The Office of Policy, 

Planning, and Analysis, Coalition Provisional Authority, A USAID Perspective,” unpublished manuscript, July 

23, 2004, 9.

70 Leonard Hawley, “Urgent Policy Issues and Capability Needs: U.S. Interim Civilian Transitional 

Administration (ICTA) in Iraq,” written analysis to Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, March 10, 2003.

71 SIGIR interview with Leonard Hawley, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Peacekeeping, 

February 12, 2008.

72 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Human Capital Management,” January 2006, 7-9.

73An inherently governmental activity involves: (1) binding the United States to take or not to take some 

action by contract, policy, regulation, authorization, order, or otherwise; (2) determining, protecting, and 

advancing economic, political, territorial, property, or other interests by military or diplomatic action, civil or 

criminal judicial proceedings, contract management, or otherwise; (3) significantly affecting the life, liberty, 

or property of private persons; or (4) exerting ultimate control over the acquisition, use, or disposition of 

United States property (real or personal, tangible or intangible), including establishing policies or procedures for the collection, control, or disbursement of appropriated and other federal funds. White House 

Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 (Revised), “Performance of Commercial Activities,” May 

29, 2003; and FAR, Subpart 7.5, “Inherently Governmental Functions,” http://www.acquisition.gov/far/

current/html/Subpart%207_5.html.

74 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Human Capital Management,” January 2006, 10.

75 The statutory provision used was Title 5, Section 3161, of the U.S. Code, under 5 CFR 213.3199.

76 ORHA, “Staffing for the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA),” Attachment to 

email from Larry Hanauer, Special Assistant to the Director of ORHA, to Gretchen Anderson, Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “ORHA Personnel Growth,” April 18, 2003.

77 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel Thomas Baltazar, C3 Operations Officer for ORHA, June 

10, 2003. 

78 General Garner dictated notes for the record on February 28, March 3, and March 10, 2003 about the general status of ORHA preparations and his meetings with Secretary Condoleezza Rice, President Bush, and the 

United Nations. ORHA/CPA Historian and SIGIR interviews with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner. 

79 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

September 14-15, 2005. 

80 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

April 5, 2006.

81 A spreadsheet of Rock Drill attendees was maintained by ORHA staff. ORHA, “Rock Drill,” undated. 

During military operations undertaken with other countries, officers from the coalition countries typically join 

the headquarters staff in various capacities.

82 The Political-Military and Near East Affairs bureaus did not dispatch their senior officers handling the Iraq 

portfolio. ORHA, “Interagency Rehearsal and Planning Conference: Summary and Analysis,” February 21-22, 

2003.

83 Dayton Maxwell, “Deliberate and Development Post Conflict Planning in Iraq: The Office of Policy, 

Planning, and Analysis, Coalition Provisional Authority, A USAID Perspective,” unpublished manuscript, 

July 23, 2004, 23-24; and ORHA, “Interagency Rehearsal and Planning Conference: Summary and Analysis,” 

February 21-22, 2003.
• 376 •

• Endnotes•

84 ORHA, “Interagency Rehearsal and Planning Conference: Summary and Analysis,” February 21-22, 2003.

85 ORHA, “Interagency Rehearsal and Planning Conference: Summary and Analysis,” February 21-22, 2003.

86 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with George F. Ward, former Head of Humanitarian Pillar of ORHA, 

June 29, 2006.

87 ORHA, “Interagency Rehearsal and Planning Conference: Summary and Analysis,” February 21-22, 2003.

88 ORHA, “Interagency Rehearsal and Planning Conference: Summary and Analysis,” February 21-22, 2003.

89 SIGIR interview with Ross Wherry, former USAID Director of the Office of Iraq Affairs, April 5, 2006.

90 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

March 30, 2004. 

91 Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, follow-up interview notes to ORHA/CPA Historian, March 10, 

2003; and SIGIR and ORHA/CPA Historian interviews with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner.

92 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Carl A. Strock, former Commanding 

General of USACE, October 30, 2006. 

93 Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, follow-up interview notes to ORHA/CPA Historian, March 3, 2003; 

and SIGIR and ORHA/CPA Historian interviews with Lieutenant General Garner.

94 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, 

December 12, 2005; and Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the 

Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (Pantheon Books, 2006), 160-63.

95 SIGIR interview with Douglas Feith, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, March 21, 2008; 

and Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York: 

HarperCollins, 2008), 402-11.

96 Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, follow-up interview notes to ORHA/CPA Historian, March 10, 

2003. 

97 SIGIR interview with General (Ret.) Colin Powell, former Secretary of State, February 4, 2008; and 

ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

March 30, 2004. 

98 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

September 14-15, 2005. 

99 Douglas Feith asserts that Rumsfeld wanted to institute a “proper analysis and process” to “find the best 

candidates in the United States, not just the best ones in the U.S. government. See Douglas Feith, War and 

Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 387.

100 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

March 30, 2004. 

101 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

March 30, 2004. 

102 Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, follow-up interview notes to ORHA/CPA Historian, March 10, 

2003.

Chapter 4

1 SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Paul Hughes, former ORHA/CPA Director, Strategic Policy Office, 

May 2, 2007.

2 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

September 14-15, 2005.

3 Gordon Rudd, ORHA/CPA Historian, compiled a list of language skills of ORHA personnel. SIGIR conversations with Gordon Rudd, ORHA/CPA Historian, Summer 2007.
• 377 •

• Chapter 4 •

4 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel Robert D. Costello, Jr., ORHA Chief of Logistics, June 15, 

2003. 

5 SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Paul Hughes, former ORHA/CPA Director, Strategic Policy Office, 

May 2, 2007.

6 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel Robert D. Costello, Jr., ORHA Chief of Logistics, June 15, 

2003; and SIGIR and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former 

Director of ORHA, October 27, 2008. 

7 SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Paul Hughes, former ORHA/CPA Director, Strategic Policy Office, 

May 2, 2007.

8 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 21.

9 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant Colonel Stephen M. Elliott, Contracting Officer for 

ORHA as part of DCMA’s Contingency Contracting Administration Services Mission, July 12, 2003.

10 Some question remains about the purpose of this funding. Some say it was strictly for the ORHA staff and 

translators; the ORHA/CPA comptroller says the purpose was more expansive. Gary Minor, “Financing the 

Fight—From the Front,” Air Force Comptroller (January 2004). 

11 The war started on March 20 in Iraq, late evening on March 19 in the United States. The date of the event in 

local time is used for this report.

12 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Ronald E. Adams, Deputy Director of 

ORHA, September 29, 2006.

13 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, April 5, 2006. For a 

chronology of JTF-4’s dissolution, see Nora Bensahel et al., After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation 

of Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 51-52. 

14 Dayton Maxwell, “Deliberate and Development Post Conflict Planning in Iraq: The Office of Policy, 

Planning, and Analysis, Coalition Provisional Authority, A USAID Perspective,” unpublished manuscript, July 

23, 2004, 24.

15 ORHA’s leaders did not give it credence, and it was never formally issued. ORHA/CPA Historian interview 

with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Ronald E. Adams, Deputy Director of ORHA, September 29, 2006.

16 Dayton Maxwell, “Deliberate and Development Post Conflict Planning in Iraq: The Office of Policy, 

Planning, and Analysis, Coalition Provisional Authority, A USAID Perspective,” unpublished manuscript, July 

23, 2004, 23-24.

17 Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, Director of ORHA, memorandum to Secretary of Defense Donald 

Rumsfeld, passed through Larry Hanauer, Special Assistant to the Director of ORHA, March 21, 2003. 

18 OSD, “Policy, Governance & External Relations in Post War Iraq, Ministry Candidates,” March 25, 2003.

19 Colin Powell, Secretary of State, memorandum to Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, untitled, March 

26, 2003.

20 USAID Press Release, “Food and Non-Food Relief Supplies to Iraq,” April 10, 2003.

21 SIGIR interview with Sloan Mann, USAID/OTI DART team member, August 10, 2007; and USAID, “A 

Year in Iraq,” May 2004, 4. 

22 For background on the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) and for an articulation of NGO reticence, 

see Refugees International, “Humanitarian Coordination for Iraq: A Job for the United Nations,” April 9, 2003. 

The article notes that, “Even as they rely on the HOC for access, the view of most aid agencies is that close 

association with the military forces of a belligerent compromises the impartiality that lies at the core of their 

mission. The aid agencies provide humanitarian assistance based on need, not politics; the idea of using aid 

strategically to win “hearts and minds” is anathema to the humanitarian community. Yet while the principles 

espoused by most aid organizations would seem to dictate distance from the HOC, pragmatism seems to have 

dictated association.” 
• 378 •

• Endnotes•

23 Dayton Maxwell, “Deliberate and Development Post Conflict Planning in Iraq: The Office of Policy, 

Planning, and Analysis, Coalition Provisional Authority, A USAID Perspective,” unpublished manuscript, July 

23, 2004, 18. 

24 USIP interview with Thomas Wheelock, Chief of Party for USAID’s contractor International Resources 

Group, September 8, 2004.

25 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Brigadier General Steven Hawkins, former Commander, JTF-4, June 

23, 2003.

26 SIGIR interview with Bruce Spake, Vice President of DAI, and Steve Connolly, Task Order Manager, DAI, 

November 2, 2006.

27 Dayton Maxwell, “Deliberate and Development Post Conflict Planning in Iraq: The Office of Policy, 

Planning, and Analysis, Coalition Provisional Authority, A USAID Perspective,” unpublished manuscript, July 

23, 2004, 40.

28 CENTCOM, “Governorate Support Team (GST) Concept,” briefing slides; and Lieutenant Colonel 

Thomas Fisher, former CENTCOM planner, email to SIGIR, October 20, 2008.

29 Christopher Milligan, “Bottom Up Governance: For a Democratic Iraq,” briefing slides, April 2, 2003, 11, 14.

30 Jon Wegge and T. Christopher Milligan, “Regime Change and Local Government: A Strategy for a Stable 

Iraq, with Lessons from Indonesia,” November 2002.

31 SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, March 27, 2007, and 

Christopher Milligan, “Bottom Up Governance: For a Democratic Iraq,” briefing slides, April 2, 2003.

32 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

September 14-15, 2005.

33 Larry Hanauer, Special Assistant to the Director of ORHA, email to Gretchen Anderson, Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “ORHA Personnel Growth,” April 18, 2003. 

34 Some of that staff included personnel who provided security but were not assigned specifically to ORHA. 

ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant Colonel Stephen M. Elliot, Contracting Officer for ORHA 

as part of DCMA’s Contingency Contracting Administration Services Mission, July 12, 2003; and Director 

for Operations and Personnel memorandum to Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “Questions from 

Jaymie Durnan—Why the Huge Increase in [ORHA] Staff?” attachment to email from Larry Hanauer, Special 

Assistant to the Director of ORHA, to Gretchen Anderson, of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 

“ORHA Personnel Growth,” April 18, 2003. 

35 Dov S. Zakheim, Under Secretary of Defense and Comptroller, memorandum to Special Assistant to 

the Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Response to Your Question on Increased Staffing Level for the Office of 

Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance,” April 14, 2003.

36 Two could write them for up to $5 million; the other could write contracts for up to $1 million. SIGIR, 

“Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 21; and ORHA/CPA Historian 

interview with Lieutenant Colonel Stephen M. Elliot, Contracting Officer for ORHA as part of DCMA’s 

Contingency Contracting Administration Services Mission, July 12, 2003.

37 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant Colonel Stephen M. Elliot, Contracting Officer for 

ORHA as part of DCMA’s Contingency Contracting Administration Services Mission, July 12, 2003.

38 ABC News, “Project Iraq,” Nightline, April 23, 2003.

39 Dr. Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor, “Dr. Condoleezza Rice Discusses Iraq Reconstruction,” 

White House Press Release, April 4, 2003. 

40 Dr. Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor, “Dr. Condoleezza Rice Discusses Iraq Reconstruction,” 

White House Press Release, April 4, 2003.
• 379 •

• Chapter 5 •

Chapter 5

1 Kathleen T. Rhem, “Security Still Most Serious Concern for U.S. Forces in Iraq,” American Forces Press 

Service, May 15, 2003; and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Michael Kelly, Australian Army Colonel, 

June 12, 2004.

2 SIGIR interview with Sinan al-Najaar, former senior manager in an Iraqi ministry, November 30, 2006.

3The Saddam memorandum was published in Arabic by Al-Hayat (London) on July 12, 2003. For a translated 

version, see Middle East Media Research Institute, Special Dispatch Series no. 538, “A Top Secret Document 

Dated January 23, 2003 from Iraqi Intelligence: A Plan for Action in the Event of a Regime Downfall,” July 17, 

2003.

4 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel Glenn Collins, ORHA/CPA Facility Manager, July 17, 2003.

5 SIGIR conversations with Barbara Lewis, former Senior Advisor to the Rafidain Bank, Summer 2007.

6 Robin Raphel, former Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Trade, email to SIGIR, April 11, 2007.

7 The Independent High Electoral Commission, “Fact Sheet: Voter Registration Update in the International 

Zone,” June 25, 2008.

8 For a description of ordinary life in Iraq in the weeks preceding the invasion, see Anthony Shadid, Night 

Draws Near: Iraq’s People in the Shadow of America’s War, Part One: Before (New York: Henry Holt, 2005). 

9 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Brigadier General Steven Hawkins, former Commander, JTF-4, June 

23, 2004.

10 CNN, “Ground Troops Clash Over Baghdad Airport,” April 4, 2003.

11 For an account of the war plan, see Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside 

Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006).

12 Anthony Shadid, Night Draws Near: Iraq’s People in the Shadow of America’s War (New York: Henry Holt, 

2005), 67, 96-97.

13 For a representative account of a clash between coalition and irregular forces, see Michael R. Gordon and 

General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: 

Pantheon Books, 2006), 217-221.

14 Colin H. Kahl, “COIN of the Realm: Is There a Future for Counterinsurgency?” Foreign Affairs 86, no.6 

(November/December 2007); and Bernard Weinraub and Thom Shanker, “A Nation at War: Under Fire; 

Rumsfeld’s Design for War Criticized on the Battlefield,” New York Times, April 1, 2003.

15 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, April 1, 2006.

16 USAID, “A Year in Iraq,” May 2004, 4.

17 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Brigadier General David Blackledge, Commander of the 354th Civil 

Affairs Brigade, January 2, 2004; ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Mike Gfoeller, former Deputy Director 

of ORHA Region-South, August 10, 2003; and USAID, “Assistance for Iraq: DART Assessment of Umm Qasr 

and Relief Efforts,” March 27, 2003.

18 USAID, “Assistance for Iraq: DART Assessment of Umm Qasr and Relief Efforts,” March 27, 2003. A 

month later, on April 26, another DART team based in Jordan crossed into al-Anbar province to monitor 

conditions in western Iraq. USAID, “Assistance for Iraq: DART Ar Rutbah Assessment,” April 26, 2003.

19 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Schappi Marsh, FEST team member, July 

30, 2003.
• 380 •

• Endnotes•

20 During the invasion’s initial phase, FEST teams helped shut down a hydroelectric dam that would have 

impacted the operations of the Third Infantry Division if it had failed. The FEST teams also ensured bridges 

over the Euphrates River could support M-1 tanks waiting to cross. Tele-engineering kits enabled them to relay 

real-time images to the reach-back center in the United States, where Farsi and Arabic-speaking engineers stood 

ready to translate diagrams and control panel labels. This capacity to draw on reach-back expertise brought new 

levels of engineering know-how to the battlefield. Once combat needs were met, the FEST teams moved on to 

assessing oil, water and electricity infrastructure. Two fully outfitted FEST-Main teams, larger units augmented 

with more engineers, worked with Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil. As the restoration of power became a major 

need, FEST teams later assisted Task Force Restore Iraq Electricity. By the end of May, eighteen teams were 

in country working for ORHA through a USAID-USACE agreement. SIGIR interview with William Fritz, 

USACE Assistant Deputy G-3 (Operations), Chief, Concepts, Plan and Doctrine Branch, March 1, 2006. 

21 The USACE operations center and Infrastructure Assessment Team completed the assessment in the fall 

of 2002. Estimates for three scenarios were drawn: no damage, middle-range damage, extensive damage. $35 

billion was the middle-range scenario. SIGIR interview with William Fritz, USACE Assistant Deputy G-3 

(Operations), Chief, Concepts, Plans and Doctrine Branch, March 1, 2006.

22 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

April 22, 2004.

23 Only a two-man contingent from the DART team remained in Umm Qasr after March 27, 2003. The rest of 

the team made follow-up trips from Kuwait on April 2 and April 5, 2003. USAID, “Assistance for Iraq: DART 

Assessment of Umm Qasr and Relief Efforts,” April 7, 2003. 

24 SIGIR interview with Bob Gersony, former Advisor to the USAID Administrator, January 16, 2007.

25 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

April 22, 2004.

26 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, April 17, 2006.

27 In a letter to Secretary Rumsfeld on the relationship between DART and ORHA, Secretary Powell wrote, “if 

operational disagreements arise between DART and ORHA and cannot be resolved...the final resolution of 

the matter will come to us.” Later that day, Powell wrote another letter regarding the selection of ORHA staff, 

claiming “these individuals may not be acceptable to you and that you have your own list of candidates to fill 

these positions. We have frozen these assignments until you and I deal with this.” Colin Powell, Secretary of 

State, letters to Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, March 26, 2003. In response Rumsfeld wrote, “If you 

agree to this common sense approach, our involvement in subsequent disputes will be kept to a minimum.” 

Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, letter to Colin Powell, Secretary of State, “Disaster Assistance 

Response Team and the Garner Group,” March 31, 2003.

28 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

April 22, 2004.

29 USAID, “Assistance for Iraq: DART Assessment of Umm Qasr and Relief Efforts,” April 4, 2003.

30 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Mike Gfoeller, former Deputy Director of ORHA Region-South, 

August 10, 2003.

31 DoD News Transcript, “DoD News Briefing-ASD PA Clarke and Major General McChrystal,” April 10, 

2003.

32 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

September 14-15, 2005.

33 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Brigadier General David Blackledge, Commander of the 354th Civil 

Affairs Brigade, January 2, 2004.

34 For contemporaneous accounts of Garner’s visits to Umm Qasr and developments there, see CNN, “U.S. 

Interim Administrator Visits Iraq,” April 12, 2003.

35 DoD News Transcript, “DoD News Briefing-Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers,” April 7, 2003; and 

David L. Phillips, Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 8.
• 381 •

• Chapter 5 •

36 Anthony Shadid, Night Draws Near: Iraq’s People in the Shadow of America’s War (New York: Henry Holt, 

2005), 378-380. 

37 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General David McKiernan, former Commander of Coalition Forces Land 

Component Command, December 5, 2006.

38 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General David McKiernan, former Commander of Coalition Forces Land 

Component Command, December 5, 2006.

39 Public Broadcasting Service, “Interview with Laith Kubba,” FRONTLINE, September 11, 2003.

40 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Carl A. Strock, former Commanding 

General of USACE, October 30, 2006.

41 The military grid used by NATO militaries is based on the Universal Transverse Mercator coordinate 

system, not longitude and latitude. SIGIR interview with Dustin Felix, Civil Affairs Officer in the 5th Brigade, 1st

Cavalry Division, December 21, 2005.

42 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

September 14-15, 2005. 

43 SIGIR interview with Colonel John Agoglia, former CENTCOM planner, May 22, 2008; and SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM (J5) Chief of War Plans, May 30, 2008.

44 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

September 14-15, 2005.

45 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

September 14-15, 2005.

46 Lieutenant General Garner recalls that Colonel Colin Boag, a British colonel, informed him of two possible 

locations to house ORHA: the Rashid Hotel or the Republican Palace. Since the media was already in the hotel, 

and Garner was concerned about the security risks of a vertical structure, he elected to house ORHA in the palace. SIGIR and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director 

of ORHA, October 27, 2008.

47 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

September 14-15, 2005.

48 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel Glenn Collins, ORHA/CPA Facility Manager, July 17, 2003.

49 Dayton Maxwell, “Deliberate and Development Post Conflict Planning in Iraq: The Office of Policy, 

Planning, and Analysis, Coalition Provisional Authority, A USAID Perspective,” unpublished manuscript, July 

23, 2004, 10-17.

50 Richard Miller, “A Brief History of CPATT,” unpublished manuscript, May 15, 2005, 1. CPATT stands for 

the Coalition Police Assistance Training Team. Chapter 12 explains the creation of CPATT and other Iraqi 

security forces, both police and military.

51 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Timothy Carney, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Industry and 

Minerals, June 12, 2003.

52 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

September 14-15, 2005.

53 SIGIR interview with Bruce Spake, Vice President of DAI, and Steve Connolly, QRF Coordinator, DAI, 

November 2, 2006.

54 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Christopher Spear, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Labor and 

Social Affairs, July 15, 2003; and SIGIR interview with James Haveman, former Senior Advisor to the Ministry 

of Health, and Robert Goodwin, former Chief of Staff, Ministry of Health, December 22, 2005.

55 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Christopher Spear, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Labor and 

Social Affairs, July 15, 2003.

56 SIGIR conversations with Barbara Lewis, former Senior Advisor to the Rafidain Bank, Summer 2007.
• 382 •

• Endnotes•

57 SIGIR interview with Samir Sumaida’ie, Iraqi Ambassador to the United States, March 11, 2008.

58 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Major General Donald F. Campbell, Senior Advisor to the Ministry 

of Justice, July 14, 2003.

59 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Major Lyn S. Brown, Advisor to the Ministry of Youth and Sport, 

June 22, 2004.

60 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

September 14-15, 2005.

61 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.

62 USACE, “Iraqi Oil Infrastructure Restoration Strategic Plan: Rough Order of Magnitude,” June 3, 2003; and 

ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.

63 USACE, “Iraqi Oil Infrastructure Restoration Strategic Plan: Rough Order of Magnitude,” June 3, 2003.

64 ORHA/CPA Historian and SIGIR interviews with Steven Browning, Task Force RIO Advisor, June 21, 

2003 and April 26, 2006. 

65 Dept. of the Army Memorandum to CJTF-7 C9, “Information Paper: Religious Groups in Iraq,” June 24, 

2003, 5.

66 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.

67 Peter W. Galbraith, National Defense University, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee, June 12, 2003. One estimate of looting circulating among CPA officials was $12 billion. L. Paul 

Bremer, James Dobbins, and David Gompert, “Early Days in Iraq: Decisions of the CPA,” Survival, August 

2008, 23, 46.

68 Colonel (Ret.) Gregory Fontenot, Lieutenant Colonel E.J. Degen, and Lieutenant Colonel David Tohn, On 

Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons 

Learned, 2005).

69 GAO Report 07-444, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: DoD Should Apply Lessons Learned Concerning the Need 

for Security over Conventional Munitions Storage Sites to Future Operations Planning,” March 2007, 1, 5.

70 USAID, “Iraq – Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance,” Fact Sheet #16, Fiscal Year (FY) 2003, April 

21, 2003, 3. The 1st Cavalry division turned around en route. Rumsfeld also elected to remove the Third Infantry 

Division from the theater as soon as the 1st Armored Division, commanded by then-Major General Ricardo 

Sanchez, arrived—making for a net gain of zero troops. Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, Wiser in Battle: 

A Soldier’s Story (New York: HarperCollins, 2008); Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, 

Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon, 2006); Thomas E. 

Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Group, 2006); and ORHA/CPA 

Historian interview with Colonel John Agoglia, former CENTCOM planner, September 22, 2006. 

71 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel John Agoglia, former CENTCOM planner, September 22, 

2006. 

72 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, April 1, 2006.

73 P.L. 108-11, Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003, April 16, 2003.

74 General Tommy R. Franks, “Freedom Message to the Iraqi People,” April 16, 2003.

75 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 27.

76 For an account of the Nassriya conference and early political events, see Douglas Feith, War and Decision: 

Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 416-26; and Kenneth 

Katzman, Congressional Research Services Report RL31339, “Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and PostSaddam Governance,” January 7, 2004, 22-23. 

77 BBC, “Key Shia Leader Returns to Iraq,” April 16, 2003.

78 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Carl Strock, former Commanding General of USACE, 

May 13, 2008.
• 383 •

• Chapter 5 •

79 Karen DeYoung, Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), 463.

80 SIGIR and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of 

ORHA, October 27, 2008.

81 Different iterations of this list exist. See: annotated briefing slide, “ORHA’s Key Tasks (Complete by 15 Jun 

03),” undated; and another annotated slide by the same title, also undated. 

82 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.

83 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Morgan, JTF-4 Chief of Public Works, 

August 12, 2003.

84 Michael Mobbs left ORHA shortly after its arrival in Baghdad. SIGIR conversations with Gordon Rudd, 

ORHA/CPA Historian, Summer 2007.

85 Lieutenant General Garner notes that Iraqis and the military were cooperative, and that the coordination 

between Washington and ORHA was most problematic. SIGIR and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with 

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, October 27, 2008.

86 SIGIR interview with Douglas Feith, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, March 21, 2008; 

and Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York: 

HarperCollins, 2008), 421.

87 General Tommy R. Franks, “Freedom Message to the Iraqi People,” April 16, 2003.

88For Bremer’s own account of his selection, see L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq,The Struggle to Build a 

Future of Hope (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006).

89 Garner notes that he asked Rumsfeld to consider delaying Bremer’s arrival until July 1, 2003, by which time 

he felt he could prepare for a transition. Rumsfeld disagreed. SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) 

Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, April 1, 2006; and SIGIR and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with 

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, October 27, 2008. 

90 SIGIR interview with Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, former Presidential Envoy to the Free Iraqis, March 

19, 2008.

Essential Services – The Effects of Invasion

91 International Monetary Fund, “Iraq: Statistical Appendix,” August 2007; and DoD, Iraq Status Update, 

August 28, 2003. Scott Wilson, “Bremer Shifts Focus to New Iraqi Economy; U.S. Occupation Chief Cites 

Progress on Restoring Order,” Washington Post, May 27, 2003. USAID noted that 95 percent of landlines 

were down and cell phone service was only provided in Basrah. USAID: Assistance for Iraq, “NGO Pre-Bid 

Conference,” April 17, 2003. Iraq Coalition Casualty Count; “US Deaths By Month,” updated September 

2008; Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, “Iraq Coalition Casualties: Contractors,”, updated July 2008; Ariana 

Eunjung Cha, “Peril Follows Contractors in Iraq; Tennessee Pair Killed Despite Precautions,” Washington 

Post, November 14, 2003; Iraq Body Count, “Documented civilian deaths from violence,” updated August 

24, 2008; P.L. 108-7, Consolidated Appropriations Resolution for Fiscal Year 2003, February 20, 2003; 

and P.L. 108-11, Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2003, and for other 

purposes,” April 16, 2003. 

92 CPA Orders 1 and 2 greatly impacted the security forces as the Army was disbanded and many others loyal 

to Saddam deserted. The Iraqi Army post-invasion did not exist. The numbers available for the Iraq Security 

Force only includes the Iraqi Police. CPA Order Number 1, “De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society,” May 16, 

2003; and CPA Order Number 2, “Dissolution of Entities,” May 16, 2003. 

93 The exact number of civilian contractor deaths are unknown and only include those which have been 

reported to the Department of Labor and the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count. This probably underestimates 

civilian casualties. 

94 International Monetary Fund, “Iraq: Statistical Appendix,” August 2007.

95 CPA, “A Free Iraq’s Vision for the Future,” October 23, 2003.

96 DoD, Iraq Status Update, August 28, 2003, 14.
• 384 •

• Endnotes•

Chapter 6

1 CPA, “Biography: Ambassador L. Paul Bremer,” undated; and L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq, The 

Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 3-5, About the Authors.

2 Peter W. Galbraith, The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End, (New York: 

Simon and Schuster, 2007), 118.

3 L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq, The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: Simon and Schuster, 

2006), 6.

4 L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq, The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: Simon and Schuster, 

2006), 11-12. 

5 SIGIR interview with General (Ret.) Colin Powell, former Secretary of State, February 4, 2008.

6 Donald Rumsfeld, for Secretary of Defense, written comments to SIGIR, January 7, 2009.

7 White House Press Release, “President Names Envoy to Iraq,” May 6, 2003.

8 Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, memorandum to L. Paul Bremer, Presidential Envoy to Iraq, 

“Designation as Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority,” May 13, 2003.

9 L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: Simon & Schuster, 

2006), 12.

10 Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, memorandum to L. Paul Bremer, Presidential Envoy to Iraq, 

“Designation as Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority,” May 13, 2003.

11 Two international laws—The 1907 Hague Regulation and the Geneva Conventions of 1949—pertain to 

occupations. Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations states that a “territory is considered occupied when it is 

actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such 

authority has been established and can be exercised.” According to their common Article 2, the four Geneva 

Conventions of 1949 apply to any territory occupied during international hostilities. They also apply in situations where the occupation of state territory meets with no armed resistance. 

12 CPA Regulation Number 1, “The Coalition Provisional Authority,” May 16, 2003.

13 CPA Regulation Number 1, May 16, 2003.

14 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Iraqi Interim Authority Overview,” April 28, 2003.

15 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Iraqi Interim Authority Overview,” April 28, 2003.

16 Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Testimony before the House Committee on 

International Relations, May 15, 2003.

17 L. Paul Bremer, III, former CPA Administrator, written comments to SIGIR, December 19, 2008.

18 L. Paul Bremer, III, former CPA Administrator, written comments to SIGIR, December 19, 2008.

19 Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 

168.

20 Major General Sanchez had been nominated for appointment to the grade of Lieutenant General on May 

5, 2003. His appointment was for the command of V Corps in Europe. DoD Press Release, “Flag and General 

Officer Announcements,” May 5, 2003. A Corps headquarters, which would be the basis for CJTF-7, is much 

smaller and more tactically oriented than an Army headquarters, which was the basis for the Coalition Forces 

Land Component Command .

21 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Ricardo Sanchez, former CJTF-7 Commander, October 

26, 2007; and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with L. Paul Bremer III, former CPA Administrator, January 

7, 2008.

22 SIGIR interview with Major General William H. McCoy, former Commander of USACE-GRD, June 5, 

2008.
• 385 •

• Chapter 6 •

23 Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale University 

Press, 2007), 105.

24 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483, May 22, 2003; and L. Elaine Halchin, “The Coalition 

Provisional Authority (CPA): Origin, Characteristics, and Institutional Authorities,” Congressional Research 

Service Report RL32370, updated September 21, 2006.

25 General Tommy R. Franks, “Freedom Message to the Iraqi People,” April 16, 2003. Two million members: 

Sharon Otterman, “IRAQ: De-Ba’athification,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 7, 2005.

26 “Senior Party Members” were Regional Command Members, Branch Members, Section Members, and 

Group Members. CPA Order Number 1, “De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society,” May 16, 2003. 

27 More junior ranks included Member and Active Member. CPA Order Number 1, May 16, 2003.

28 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with J. Scott Carpenter, Governance Director of the CPA, June 18, 2004.

29 L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq,The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: Simon & Schuster, 

2006), 40.

30 ORHA/CPA Historian interviews with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, Director of ORHA; Robin 

Raphel, Coordinator for Civil Administration; David Nummy, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Finance; Gary 

Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil; and Major General David Petraeus, Commander of the 101st 

Airborne Division .

31 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, 

September 14-15, 2005.

32 SIGIR interview with Nazar Janabi, former Director General, Ministry of Defense, July 2, 2008.

33 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, February 

4, 2008.

34 Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 

184.

35 SIGIR interview with Samir Sumaida’ie, Iraqi Ambassador to the United States, March 11, 2008.

36 CPA Order Number 5, “Establishment of the Iraqi De-Ba’athification Council,” May 25, 2003.

37 Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 

185.

38 CPA Memorandum Number 7, “Delegation of Authority Under De-Ba’athification Order No. 1,” 

November 4, 2003.

39 Sharon Otterman, “IRAQ: De-Ba’athification,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 7, 2005.

40 CPA Order Number 2, “Dissolution of Entities,” May 23, 2003. 

41 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, February 

4, 2008.

42 SIGIR interview with General (Ret.) Colin Powell, former Secretary of State, February 4, 2008.

43 SIGIR interview with General (Ret.) Colin Powell, former Secretary of State, February 4, 2008.

44 SIGIR interview with L. Paul Bremer III, former CPA Administrator, March 18, 2008. 

45 SIGIR interview with Douglas Feith, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, March 21, 2008.

46 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Meghan O’Sullivan, CPA Governance Team Member, December 

29, 2003. 

47 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Ricardo Sanchez, former CJTF-7 Commander, October 

26, 2007.
• 386 •

• Endnotes•

48 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General David McKiernan, former Commander of Coalition Forces Land 

Component Command, December 5, 2006; SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Ricardo Sanchez, 

former CJTF-7 Commander, October 26, 2007; and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Major General 

David Petraeus, Commander of the 101st Airborne Division, July 28, 2003.

49 L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq, The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: Simon & Schuster, 

2006), 55.

50 Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, former CJTF-7 Commander, written comments to SIGIR, October 

26, 2008.

51 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Walter B. Slocombe, Senior Advisor for Defense and Security Affairs, 

July 18, 2003.

52 Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale University 

Press, 2007), 157.

53 Public Broadcasting Service, “Interview with Laith Kubba,” FRONTLINE, September 11, 2003.

54 Kirsten Lundberg, “The Accidental Statesman: General Petraeus and the City of Mosul, Iraq,” Kennedy 

School of Government Case Program, 2006, 41.

55 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Major General David Petraeus, Commander of the 101st Airborne 

Division, July 28, 2003.

Chapter 7

1 P.L. 108-11, Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2003, April 16, 2003.

2 Most contracts were indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts. U.S. government agencies use 

IDIQ contracts when exact quantities of supplies and/or services to be obtained through the contract cannot 

be precisely determined. Task orders are then issued as more detail becomes available. FAR, Subpart 16.5, 

“Indefinite-Delivery Contracts,” June 12, 2008, http://www.arnet.gov/far/current/html/Subpart%2016_5.

html.

3 This estimate includes cumulative deposits to fund Iraqi government operations and reconstruction programs. CPA-IG, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2004, 59-60. A smaller portion of these 

funds, approximately $7 billion, was allocated for relief and reconstruction projects. GAO Report 05-876, 

“Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Funding and Reconstruction Efforts,” July 2005, 2. 

4 The humanitarian and reconstruction sectors established by the legislation were: (1) Water/sanitation infrastructure; (2) feeding and food distribution; (3) supporting relief efforts related to refugees, internally displaced 

persons, and vulnerable individuals, including assistance for families of innocent Iraqi civilians who suffer losses 

as a result of military operations; (4) electricity; (5) health care; (6) telecommunications; (7) economic and 

financial policy; (8) education; (9) transportation; (10) rule of law and governance; (11) humanitarian demining; (12) agriculture. P.L. 108-11, Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2003, 

April 16, 2003. The Department of Health and Human Services never received any IRRF 1 funding.

5 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 32.

6 SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, Deputy Director of USAID in Iraq, February 9, 2006; and 

ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Christopher Milligan, Deputy Director of USAID in Iraq, August 13, 

2003.

7 Joshua B. Bolten, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, Testimony before the Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee, July 29, 2003; and Executive Order 13290, “Confiscating and Vesting Certain Iraqi 

Property,” March 20, 2003. 

8 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483, May 22, 2003.

9 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483, May 22, 2003.
• 387 •

• Chapter 7 •

10 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483, May 22, 2003; International Advisory and Monitoring 

Board (IAMB), Press Release, “Establishment of the International Advisory and Monitoring Board,” October 

24, 2003; and IAMB, “Minutes of the organizational meeting held at the United Nations Headquarters, New 

York,” December 5, 2003.

11 United Nations Press Release, “Oil-for-Food Programme: Status of Funds 19 November 2003,” November 

19, 2003; DoS Fact Sheet, “UN Security Council Resolution 1483 Lifts Sanctions on Iraq; International 

Community Pledges Assistance for People of Iraq,” May 22, 2003; and Timothy Carney, “We’re Getting in Our 

Own Way,” Washington Post, Op-Ed, June 22, 2003.

12 CPA, Program Review Board Minutes, June 7, 2003.

13 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with James D. Warlick, Consular for Oil-for-Food program, June 13, 

2004.

14 CPA Regulation Number 2, “The Development Fund for Iraq,” June 10, 2003.

15 CPA Regulation Number 2, June 10, 2003.

16 CPA Regulation Number 3, “Program Review Board,” June 18, 2003.

17 McPherson had taken leave from his job as president of Michigan State University to serve with the CPA. He 

chaired the PRB for the first two months and then turned over chairmanship to Oliver. Dave Oliver, “Restarting 

the Economy in Iraq,” November 2003, 9. 

18 CPA Regulation Number 3, June 18, 2003. 

19 CPA Public Notice, “Managing Financial Resources for Iraq,” June 18, 2003; and KPMG, “Development 

Fund for Iraq: Report of Factual Findings in Connection with Disbursements: For the Period from 1 January 

2004 to 28 June 2004,” October 14, 2004, 2.

20 CPA Regulation Number 3, June 18, 2003.

21 CPA Memorandum Number 4, “Contract and Grant Procedures Applicable to Vested and Seized Iraqi 

Property and the Development Fund for Iraq: Implementation of Regulation Number 3, Program Review 

Board,” August 19, 2003. 

22 CPA Memorandum Number 4, August 19, 2003.

23 SIGIR Audit 05-004, “Oversight of Funds Provided to Iraqi Ministries through the National Budget 

Process,” January 30, 2005, 18; KPMG, “Development Fund for Iraq Appendix: Matters Noted Involving 

Internal Controls and Other Operations Issues During the Audit of the Fund: For the Period to 31 December 

2003,” June 2004; and IAMB, Report of the International Advisory and Monitoring Board of the Development 

Fund for Iraq, “Covering the Period from the Establishment of the DFI on May 22, 2003 until the Dissolution 

of the CPA on June 28, 2004,” December 14, 2004, 4.

24 Mark S. Martins, “The Commander’s Emergency Response Program,” Joint Force Quarterly 37 (2nd Quarter 

2005). Martins was deputy legal counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time he wrote this 

article. A Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) is a change or amendment to a previous operational order.

25 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2008, 16.

26 Mark S. Martins, “The Commander’s Emergency Response Program,” Joint Force Quarterly 37 (2nd Quarter 

2005), 48.

27 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 88. 

28 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Human Capital Management, Washington, DC, September 20, 2005, 56.

29 ORHA was mentioned in the memorandum, but it had already been subsumed by CPA by this time. The 

executive agency for ORHA was transferred seamlessly to CPA until ORHA officially dissolved in mid-June. 

SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 24.
• 388 •

• Endnotes•

30 SIGIR refers to HCA as the “HCA office” when speaking of HCA as an organization and “HCA” when referring to the person in charge of the HCA office. The HCA office acted as the contracting organization for the 

CPA, and later for the CPA’s Project Management Office (PMO) after the PMO was created in the fall of 2003. 

When the CPA dissolved, the HCA office continued its contracting support for the Project and Contracting 

Office (PCO), which took over many of the PMO’s responsibilities. This distinction is noted in SIGIR, “Iraq 

Reconstruction: Lessons in Human Capital Management,” January 2006, 119.

31 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 25-26, 48-51.

32 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Human Capital Management,” January 2006, 13-14.

33 CPA-IG Audit 04-002, “Management of Personnel Assigned to CPA in Baghdad,” June 25, 2004, 1, 4.

34 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Human Capital Management,” January 2006, 29; and DoS, comments to SIGIR, October 28, 2008.

35 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Human Capital Management, Washington, DC, September 20, 2005; and 

ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel Dennis J. DeGraff, CPA Director of Personnel, June 25, 2004.

36 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Human Capital Management,” January 2006, 14.

37 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel Dennis J. DeGraff, CPA Director of Personnel, June 25, 

2004.

38 DoD Personnel Assessment Team, “Report to the Secretary of Defense,” February 11, 2004, 3.

39 CPA-IG Audit 04-002, “Management of Personnel Assigned to CPA in Baghdad,” June 25, 2004, 1, 3.

40 GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight 

Issues,” June 2004, 37. Other analysis suggests the CPA never had more than 55 percent of its staffing 

requirement. Terrence K. Kelly, Ellen E. Tunstall, Thomas S. Szayna, and Deanna Weber Prine, Stabilization 

and Reconstruction Staffing: Developing U.S. Civilian Personnel Capabilities (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 

Corporation, 2008).

41 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Human Capital Management, Washington, DC, September 20, 2005, 

73-74.

42 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Human Capital Management,” January 2006, 10. According to 

Colonel DeGraff, the U.S. government relied on the 3161 special hiring authority because most federal agencies did not respond to repeated requests for personnel. The Secretary of Defense sent letters to his cabinet-level 

counterparts asking them to help staff the CPA, but by late fall 2003, few had provided adequate numbers of 

personnel. In November 2003, the NSC appealed to the federal agencies for assistance, but this plea was similarly ineffective. ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel Dennis J. DeGraff, CPA Director of Personnel, 

June 25, 2004.

43 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Human Capital Management,” January 2006, 21.

44 GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and 

Oversight Issues,” June 2004, 39. The number of military and civilian staff provided to the CPA by the Defense 

Department varied from month to month. For example, in March 2004, the Defense Department provided 293 

military and 168 civilian personnel, or 461 of the 1,196 on the CPA personnel roster. When the CPA ended, 

384 of the CPA’s 1,050 staff were either members of the U.S. military or civilians from the Defense Department.

45 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel Dennis J. DeGraff, CPA Director of Personnel, June 25, 

2004.

46 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Human Capital Management, Washington, DC, September 20, 2005, 132.

47 USIP interview with Rodney Bent, former OMB Director, September 14, 2004.

48 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Human Capital Management,” January 2006, 22; and Nora 

Bensahel et al., “After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 

Corporation, 2008), 118, 184.

49 Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale University 

Press, 2007), 100.
• 389 •

• Chapter 8 •

50 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Human Capital Management,” January 2006, 22.

51 GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight 

Issues,” June 2004, 39. 

52 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Human Capital Management,” January 2006, 22; and DoD IG 

Audit D-2004-057, “Contracts Awarded for the Coalition Provisional Authority by the Defense Contracting 

Command-Washington,” March 18, 2004, 10-11, 28-29. The costs of the contract soon rose. For example, 

one third of the subject-matter experts demanded life insurance, and SAIC requested the use of higher labor 

rates than originally negotiated “because the subject matter experts required higher compensation.” The value 

of the contract grew from $7.7 million when it was awarded on March 5, 2003, to $24.8 million by the end of 

November. 

53 DoS, comments to SIGIR, October 28, 2008.

Chapter 8

1 SIGIR conversations with Barbara Lewis, former Senior Advisor to the Rafidain Bank, Summer 2007. 

2 John B. Taylor, Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, Testimony before the Senate 

Committee on Foreign Relations, June 4, 2003. The Treasury team found that looters, frustrated by their inability to break into the vaults, had opened a sewer main and flooded the central bank. ORHA/CPA Historian 

interview with David Nummy, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Finance, June 23, 2003. 

3 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with David Nummy, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Finance, June 27, 

2003.

4 John B. Taylor, “Billions Over Baghdad,” New York Times, Op-Ed, February 27, 2007.

5 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with David Nummy, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Finance, June 27, 

2003.

6 Joseph A. Christoff, GAO Director of International Affairs and Trade and Davi M. D’Agostino, GAO 

Director of Financial Markets and Community Investment, Testimony before the House Committee on 

Financial Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, March 18, 2004; and ORHA/CPA 

Historian interview with George B. Wolfe, Deputy General Counsel, U.S. Treasury Department, June 13, 2004.

7 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Memorandum, “Cash Transfers to the Coalition 

Provisional Authority,” February 6, 2007, 6.

8 SIGIR interview with George “Ged” Smith, U.S. Treasury attaché, August 20, 2007.

9 Timothy Carney, We’re Getting in Our Own Way,” Washington Post, Op-Ed, June 22, 2003; and Timothy 

Carney, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Industry and Minerals, written comments to SIGIR, November 16, 

2008.

10 SIGIR conversations with Barbara Lewis, former Senior Advisor to the Rafidain Bank, Summer 2007. 

11 SIGIR conversations with Barbara Lewis, former Senior Advisor to the Rafidain Bank, Summer 2007. 

12 John B. Taylor, Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, Testimony before the Senate 

Committee on Foreign Relations, June 4, 2003. 

13 Dave Oliver, “Restarting the Economy in Iraq,” November 2003, 23.

14 CPA Order Number 30, “Reform of Salaries and Employment Conditions of State Employees,” September 

8, 2003.

15 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Memorandum, “Cash Transfers to the Coalition 

Provisional Authority,” February 6, 2007, 6.

16 Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, Statement before the House Committee on Oversight and Government 

Reform, February 6, 2007; and Robert Kraus email to Joseph Botta, “DFI-Cash00220,” December 12, 2003, 

as cited in: House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Memorandum, “Cash Transfers to the 

Coalition Provisional Authority,” February 6, 2007, 6-7.
• 390 •

• Endnotes•

17 John B. Taylor, Global Financial Warriors: The Untold Story of International Finance in the Post-9/11 

World (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007), 200-210; and CPA Press Release, “Iraq Currency Exchange Begins,” 

October 15, 2003.

18 John B. Taylor, Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, Testimony before the Senate 

Committee on Foreign Relations, June 4, 2003. 

19 CPA Press Release, “Text of Ambassador Bremer’s Address to the Iraqi People: Budget and Banknotes,” no. 

0014, July 7, 2003.

20 CPA Order Number 43, “New Iraqi Dinar Banknotes,” October 14, 2003.

21 CPA, “Iraq Currency Exchange,” http://www.iraqcoalition.org/budget/IraqCurrencyExchange.html.

22 USIP interview with Brigadier General Hugh Tant, former Director of Iraqi Currency Exchange Program, 

October 22, 2004.

23 John B. Taylor, “Billions Over Baghdad,” New York Times, February 27, 2007; and John B. Taylor, Global 

Financial Warriors: The Untold Story of International Finance in the Post-9/11 World (New York: W.W. 

Norton, 2007), 225-245.

24 George W. Bush, “President Holds Press Conference,” White House Press Release, October 28, 2003.

25 John B. Taylor, Global Financial Warriors: The Untold Story of International Finance in the Post-9/11 

World (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007), 243.

26 John B. Taylor, Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, Testimony before the Senate 

Committee on Foreign Relations, June 4, 2003. 

27 John B. Taylor, “Billions Over Baghdad,” New York Times, February 27, 2007; and John B. Taylor, Global 

Financial Warriors: The Untold Story of International Finance in the Post-9/11 World (New York: W.W. 

Norton, 2007), 250-273.

28 John B. Taylor, Global Financial Warriors: The Untold Story of International Finance in the Post-9/11 

World (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007), 250, 260-262.

29 John B. Taylor, Global Financial Warriors: The Untold Story of International Finance in the Post-9/11 

World (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007), 263.

30 John B. Taylor, Global Financial Warriors: The Untold Story of International Finance in the Post-9/11 

World (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007), 250-273. The Paris Club is an informal group of financial officials 

from 19 creditor nations that helps debtor countries restructure their debts; the London Club is a similar group 

of private international creditors.On November 21, 2004, long after the CPA was gone, the London Club 

members agreed, in the light of “the exceptional situation of the Republic of Iraq and of its limited repayment 

capacity over the coming year” on “exceptional treatment” that significantly reduced Iraq’s external debt. See 

Paris Club Press Release, “The Paris Club and the Republic of Iraq Agree on Debt Relief,” November 21, 2004. 

31 Dave Oliver, “Restarting the Economy in Iraq,” November 2003, 23. 

32 SIGIR interview with George “Ged” Smith, U.S. Treasury Attaché, August 20, 2007; Christopher Foote, 

William Block, Keith Crane, and Simon Gray, “Economic Policy and Prospects in Iraq,” Journal of Economic 

Perspectives 18, no. 3 (Summer 2004); and Nora Bensahel et al., After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the 

Occupation of Iraq (Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation, 2008), 195-208.

33 International Monetary Fund, “Iraq: Macroeconomic Assessment,” October, 21, 2003.

34 Peter McPherson, former CPA director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, January 7, 2009.

35 Zoubida Allaoua, et al., “State Owned Enterprises Reform in Iraq,” World Bank: Reconstructing Iraq 

Working Paper no. 2, July 26, 2004.

36 Zoubida Allaoua, et al., “State Owned Enterprises Reform in Iraq,” World Bank: Reconstructing Iraq 

Working Paper no. 2, July 26, 2004.

37 Peter McPherson, former CPA director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, January 3, 2009.

38 Peter McPherson, former CPA director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, January 3, 2009.
• 391 •

• Chapter 9 •

39 Peter McPherson, former CPA director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, January 3, 2009 

and August 19, 2008.

40 The $2 billion in recorded deposits included $1 billion from SOEs and $1billiion from private depositors. 

Peter McPherson, former CPA director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, January 7, 2009.

41 Peter McPherson, former CPA director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, January 7, 2009.

42 Peter McPherson, former CPA director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, January 3, 2009.

43 Peter McPherson, former CPA director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, January 3, 2009.

44 Peter McPherson, former CPA Director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, August 19, 2008.

45 Peter McPherson, former CPA Director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, August 19, 2008.

46 The Geneva Conventions require an occupying power to protect the assets of the state, but there is little 

precedent for determining if state-owned industries are included in this provision of the Conventions. 

Christopher Foote, William Block, Keith Crane, and Simon Gray, “Economic Policy and Prospects in Iraq,” 

Journal of Economic Perspectives 18, no. 3 (Summer 2004).

47 Timothy Carney, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Industry and Minerals, memorandum to Peter 

McPherson, CPA Director of Economic Policy, “Fatal Flaws in Budget Policy towards State-Owned 

Enterprises,” June 15, 2003. Timothy Carney was Ambassador to Sudan (1995–1997) and Haiti (1998–1999) 

and served with UN peacekeeping missions in Cambodia, Somalia and South Africa. State Department 

Biography, “Timothy M. Carney, Chargé d’Affaires,” http://haiti.usembassy.gov/timothy_m4._carney.

48 International Monetary Fund, “Iraq: Macroeconomic Assessment,” October 21, 2003, 9.

49 SIGIR interview with Dr. Sami Al-Araji, Deputy Minister of Industry and Minerals, May 2007.

50 John B. Taylor, Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, Testimony before the Senate 

Committee on Foreign Relations, June 4, 2003.

51 USAID IG Audit E-266-04-004-P, “Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Economic Reform Program,” September 20, 

2004; and SIGIR interview with Gareth Davies, Chief of Party, Bearing Point, May 15, 2007.

52 CPA Order Number 18, “Measures to Ensure the Independence of the Central Bank of Iraq,” July 7, 2003.

53 CPA Order Number 20, “Trade Bank of Iraq,” July 14, 2003

54 Peter McPherson, former CPA director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, January 3, 2009.

55 CPA Order Number 40, “Bank Law,” September 19, 2003.

56 SIGIR interview with Gareth Davies, Chief of Party, Bearing Point, May 15, 2007.

57 Peter McPherson, former CPA Director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, August 19, 2008.

58 Christopher Foote, William Block, Keith Crane, and Simon Gray, “Economic Policy and Prospects in Iraq,” 

Journal of Economic Perspectives 18, no. 3 (Summer 2004).

59 Anne Ellen Henderson, USIP Special Report 138, “The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with 

Economic Reconstruction in Iraq,” April 2005. Under the Oil-for-Food program, the United Nations assisted 

the government of Iraq in providing a “food basket” for all Iraqis. An estimated 60 percent of the population 

depended on the food and supplies provided by the UN. This social safety net cost the Iraqi government about 

$4.9 billion per year. International Monetary Fund, “Iraq: Macroeconomic Assessment,” October, 21, 2003.

60 Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War and Losing the Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale 

University Press, 2007).

Chapter 9

1 Dave Oliver, “Restarting the Economy in Iraq,” November 2003, 23.

2 Bechtel National, Inc, “Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Program,” Assessment Report submitted to 

USAID, June 2003, 4.4. 
• 392 •

• Endnotes•

3 Bechtel National, Inc, “Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Program,” Assessment Report submitted to 

USAID, June 2003, 3.1.

4 Bechtel National, Inc, “Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Program,” Assessment Report submitted to 

USAID, June 2003, 3.1.

5 USACE, “Iraqi Oil Infrastructure Restoration Strategic Plan, Rough Order of Magnitude,” June 3, 2003, 

ii, 5, 6.

6 USACE, “Iraqi Oil Infrastructure Restoration Strategic Plan, Rough Order of Magnitude,” June 3, 2003, 1.

7 USACE, “Iraqi Oil Infrastructure Restoration Strategic Plan, Rough Order of Magnitude,” June 3, 2003; and 

Joint Planning Workshop, “Restoration of Iraqi Oil Infrastructure Final Work Plan,” July 24, 2003, http://

www.energyintel.com/resources/workplan.pdf.

8 United Nations/World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs Assessment,” October 2003.

9 United Nations/World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs Assessment,” October 2003, v, 55-56.

10 United Nations/World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs Assessment,” October 2003, 3.

11 United Nations/World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs Assessment,” October 2003, 56.

12 Frederick Barton, Bathsheba N. Crocker, John J. Hamre, Johanna Mendelson-Forman, and Robert C. Orr, 

“Iraq’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction: A Field Review and Recommendations,” July 17, 2003, foreword, iii.

13 Frederick Barton, Bathsheba N. Crocker, John J. Hamre, Johanna Mendelson-Forman, and Robert C. Orr, 

“Iraq’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction: A Field Review and Recommendations,” July 17, 2003, 2, 5-7.

14 The Office of Strategic Planning was later renamed the Office of Policy, Planning, and Analysis. Dayton 

Maxwell, “Deliberate and Development Post-Conflict Planning in Iraq: The Office of Policy, Planning and 

Analysis, Coalition Provisional Authority, A USAID Perspective,” unpublished manuscript, July 23, 2004, 5.

15 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Dayton Maxwell, USAID official assigned to the CPA Office of 

Policy, Planning, and Analysis, and Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Polk, ORHA Director of Plans, August 14, 

2003.

16 Dayton Maxwell, “Deliberate and Development Post Conflict Planning in Iraq: The Office of Policy, 

Planning and Analysis, Coalition Provisional Authority, A USAID Perspective,” unpublished manuscript, July 

23, 2004, 9-10; and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Dayton Maxwell, USAID official assigned to the 

CPA Office of Policy, Planning, and Analysis, and Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Polk, ORHA Director of Plans, 

August 14, 2003.

17 CPA, A Vision for Iraq, July 11, 2003.

18 L. Paul Bremer III, CPA Administrator, memorandum to President Bush, “Iraqi Strategy,” July 21, 2003.

19 Dayton Maxwell, “Deliberate and Development Post-Conflict Planning in Iraq: The Office of Policy, 

Planning and Analysis, Coalition Provisional Authority, A USAID Perspective,” unpublished manuscript, July 

23, 2004, 27.

20 Dayton Maxwell, “Deliberate and Development Post Conflict Planning in Iraq: The Office of Policy, 

Planning and Analysis, Coalition Provisional Authority, A USAID Perspective,” unpublished manuscript, July 

23, 2004, 27-28.

21 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Dayton Maxwell, USAID official assigned to the CPA Office of 

Policy, Planning, and Analysis, and Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Polk, ORHA Director of Plans, August 14, 

2003.

22 CPA, “Achieving the Vision to Restore Full Sovereignty to the Iraqi People,” October 1, 2003.

23 CPA, “Republic of Iraq Budget Revenues and Expenses: 2003 July-December,” 2003, 3, 5-6.

24 Dave Oliver, “Restarting the Economy in Iraq,” November 2003, 24-25.

25 Dave Oliver, “Restarting the Economy in Iraq,” November 2003, 20, 24-25.

26 Dave Oliver, “Restarting the Economy in Iraq,” November 2003, 20, 30.
• 393 •

• Chapter 9 •

27 SIGIR interview with Rear Adm. (Ret.) David Nash, former Director of the Iraq PMO, January 13, 2006.

28 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Rear Adm. (Ret) David Nash, Director of the Iraq PMO, July 1, 

2004; and Design-Build Institute of America, “Leadership and Staff: David Nash,” http://www.dbia.org/

about/staff/bod/nash.htm.

29 Tom C. Korologos, CPA congressional liaison, memorandum to L. Paul Bremer III, CPA Administrator, 

“Supplemental Memo Rebuttal,” August 17, 2003.

30 Tom C. Korologos, CPA congressional liaison, memorandum to L. Paul Bremer III, CPA Administrator, 

“Supplemental Memo Rebuttal,” August 17, 2003.

31 CPA, “Program/Integration Management Plan Recovery, Reconstruction and Redevelopment of Iraq,” 

August 29, 2003, 1.

32 CPA, “Request to Rehabilitate and Reconstruct Iraq,” September 2003, 2.

33 George W. Bush, “Address of the President to the Nation,” White House Press Release, September 7, 2003.

34 SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, February 9, 2006.

35 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, March 17, 2008.

36 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, March 17, 2008.

37 SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, February 9, 2006.

38 Lewis Lucke, USAID mission director in Iraq, email to Rear Adm. (Ret.) David Oliver, CPA Director, 

Management and Budget Office, “RE: Final Draft Info Paper on Execution of the FY04 Supplemental for Iraq 

Relief Reconstruction Fund2,” October 21, 2003.

39 USAID, “Priorities for USAID under FY04 Supplemental,” October 2003.

40 SIGIR interview with Rear Adm. (Ret.) David Nash, former Director of the Iraq PMO, March 3, 2006; 

SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, February 9, 2006; and SIGIR 

interview with Dayton Maxwell, USAID Official assigned to the CPA Office of Policy, Planning and Analysis, 

November 3, 2005.

41 Representative Nita M. Lowey, Testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign 

Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs, September 24, 2003.

42 Representative David R. Obey, Testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign 

Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs, September 30, 2003.

43 Questions from the House and Senate Staffs and Answers attached to an email to Adm. (Ret.) David Oliver, 

CPA Director, Management and Budget Office, October 4, 2003.

44 Questions from the House and Senate Staffs and Answers attached to an email to Adm. (Ret.) David Oliver, 

CPA Director, Management and Budget Office, October 4, 2003.

45 Questions from the House and Senate Staffs and Answers attached to an email to Adm. (Ret.) David Oliver, 

CPA Director, Management and Budget Office, October 4, 2003.

46 CPA Regulation Number 5, “Regarding the Council for International Coordination,” June 18, 2003.

47 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Peter Andrew Bearpark, CPA Director of Operations, December 18, 

2003; and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Andrew L.J. Goledzinowski, Deputy Chairman, Council for 

International Coordination, January 1, 2004. Marek Belka became Prime Minister of Poland in June 2004 after 

serving with the CPA. UN, “Marek Belka, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission 

for Europe,” http://www.un.org/sg/senstaff_details.asp?smgID=3.

48 United Nations, “In Memoriam,” September 4, 2003, http://www.un.org/staff/condolence/inmemoriam.

html.

49 UN Press Release, “Annan to Withdraw UN Staff from Iraq,” March 17, 2003.

50 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511, October 16, 2003.
• 394 •

• Endnotes•

51 Joseph A. Christoff, GAO Director of International Affairs and Trade, Testimony before the House 

Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, 

May 9, 2007.

52 United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, “Trust Fund Facility,” http://www.uniraq.org/donors/irffi.asp.

53 Congress added two important oversight mechanisms to the legislation. Section 2207 of the law required 

the Office of Management and Budget to produce quarterly reports documenting how the money was being 

spent. Section 3001 created the Office of the Inspector General of the CPA. It required the Inspector General 

to produce quarterly reports to the Congress on the “obligations, expenditures, and revenues associated with 

reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in Iraq.” P.L. 108-106, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations 

Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan for Fiscal Year 2004, November 6, 2003.

54 P.L. 108-106, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq 

and Afghanistan for Fiscal Year 2004, November 6, 2003.

55 P.L. 108-106, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq 

and Afghanistan for Fiscal Year 2004, November 6, 2003.

Chapter 10

1 OMB, Section 2207 Report, January 2004; and SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Program and Project 

Management, April 12, 2006.

2 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management,” March 2007, 48-49, 53-54.

3 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Steve Browning, former Task Force RIO Advisor, July 21, 2007.

4 Dov S. Zakheim, former Under Secretary of Defense and DoD Chief Financial Officer, email to SIGIR, “Re: 

An Iraq-related question for SIGIR Lessons Learned,” June 30, 2008.

5 Rear Adm. (Ret.) David Nash, Director of the Iraq PMO, email to Peter Andrew Bearpark, CPA Director of 

Operations, “Re: Establishing Communications,” September 18, 2003.

6 DoD Cover Brief, “Project from the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)—Iraq Project Management 

Office (PMO),” September 9, 2003; and SIGIR interview with Craig Johnson, Stanley Consultants, spokesman 

for the “Baker-Stanley” team and former PMO Program Engineer, March 9, 2006.

7 CPA/Department of the Army, letter to Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARC), September 

15, 2003.

8 SIGIR interview with Craig Johnson, Stanley Consultants, spokesman for the “Baker-Stanley” team and 

former PMO Program Engineer, March 9, 2006; and Craig Johnson, Stanley Consultants, spokesman for the 

“Baker-Stanley” team and former PMO Program Engineer, written comments to SIGIR, November 4, 2008.

9 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management,” March 2007, 56; and SIGIR 

interview with Rear Adm. (Ret.) David Nash, former Director of the Iraq PMO, March 3, 2006.

10 USACE, comments to SIGIR, November 4, 2008. A design-build contractor is responsible for every phase 

of a project from design to completion, although it may subcontract pieces of a project to other contractors. 

SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management,” March 2007, 56.

11 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management,” March 2007, 53; and ORHA/

CPA Historian interview with Major General Ronald Johnson, Deputy Director of the Iraq PMO, June 27, 

2004.

12 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Program and Project Management, Washington, DC, April 12, 2006.

13 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Contracting and Procurement, Washington, DC, December 5, 2005; and 

SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management,” March 2007, 52-53, 57-59.

14 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management,” March 2007, 53.
• 395 •

• Chapter 10 •

15 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 55; and DoD, “Iraq 

Reconstruction Pre-Proposal Conference Briefing, Program Management and Design-Build Construction,” 

January 21, 2004, 10, 27, 32.

16 Dov S. Zakheim, former Under Secretary of Defense and DoD Chief Financial Officer, email to SIGIR, “Re: 

An Iraq-related question for SIGIR Lessons Learned,” June 30, 2008.

17 SIGIR interview with Rear Adm. (Ret.) David Nash, former Director of the Iraq PMO, January 13, 2006.

18 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Program and Project Management, Washington, DC, April 12, 2006.

19 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Program and Project Management, Washington, DC, April 12, 2006; and 

SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Contracting and Procurement, Washington, DC, December 5, 2005.

20 PMO/PCO Historian interview with Tina Ballard, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, November 17, 

2004.

21 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 54-56.

22 PMO/PCO Historian interview with Tina Ballard, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, November 17, 

2004.

23 Paul Wolfowitz, “Determination and Findings,” December 5, 2003; and GAO Report 04-605, “Rebuilding 

Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and Management Challenges,” June 2004, 28-46. GAO 

identified two issues with the memorandum. First, GAO concluded that the memorandum constituted a class 

determination and finding, which is prohibited by the Federal Acquisition Regulation. Additionally, GAO 

noted that the waiver to competition requirements was based on a public interest exception, which can only be 

issued by the Secretary of Defense. GAO noted that while the Deputy Secretary has broad authority to act on 

behalf of the Secretary of Defense, he did not have authority to do so in this instance.

24 CPA-IG Audit 04-005, “Award of Sector Design-Build Construction Contracts,” July 23, 2004, 6.

25 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management,” March 2007, 64-65; and 

PMO/PCO Historian interview with Tina Ballard, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, November 17, 

2004.

26 CPA, “Rebuilding Iraq: Prioritized Supplemental Project List,” December 1, 2003; and SIGIR interview 

with Craig Johnson, Stanley Consultants, spokesman for the “Baker-Stanley” team and former PMO Program 

Engineer, March 9, 2006.

27 SIGIR interview with Craig Johnson, Stanley Consultants, spokesman for the “Baker-Stanley” team and 

former PMO Program Engineer, March 9, 2006; and Craig Johnson, Stanley Consultants, spokesman for the 

“Baker-Stanley” team and former PMO Program Engineer, written comments to SIGIR, November 4, 2008.

28 SIGIR interview with Craig Johnson, Stanley Consultants, spokesman for the “Baker-Stanley” team and 

former PMO Program Engineer, March 9, 2006.

29 SIGIR interview with James Haveman, former Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Health, December 22, 

2005; and SIGIR interview with Craig Johnson, Stanley Consultants, spokesman for the “Baker-Stanley” team 

and former PMO Program Engineer, March 9, 2006.

30 SIGIR interview with Craig Johnson, Stanley Consultants, spokesman for the “Baker-Stanley” team and 

former PMO Program Engineer, March 9, 2006.

31 Craig Johnson, Stanley Consultants, spokesman for the “Baker-Stanley” team and former PMO Program 

Engineer, written comments to SIGIR, November 4, 2008.

32 SIGIR interview with Rear Adm. (Ret.) David Nash, former Director of the Iraq PMO, March 3, 2006.

33 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Program and Project Management, Washington, DC, April 12, 2006. 

34 SIGIR interview with Rear Adm. (Ret.) David Nash, former Director of the Iraq PMO, January 13, 2006.

35 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, March 17, 2008.

36 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, April 17, 2006.

37 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, April 17, 2006.
• 396 •

• Endnotes•

38 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, April 17, 2006.

39 OMB, Section 2207 Report, January 2004. The decision to transfer sovereignty earlier than originally envisioned by Ambassador Bremer is discussed in detail in subsequent chapters. The CPA—and the U.S. Embassy 

that replaced it in June 2004—repeatedly re-aligned money in the supplemental to meet changing needs on 

the ground in Iraq. Part III of this book looks at re-programming in more depth.

40 OMB, Section 2207 Report, January 2004.

41 OMB, Section 2207 Report, January 2004. 

42 SIGIR Audit 05-026, “Fact Sheet on the Use of the $50 million Appropriation to Support the Management 

and Reporting of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund,” January 27, 2006; and SIGIR interview with Rear 

Adm. (Ret.) David Nash, former Director of the Iraq PMO, March 3, 2006.

43 CPA, “Program Management Plan,” October 15, 2003, Figure 2 as cited in: SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: 

Lessons in Program and Project Management,” March 2007, 60.

44 SIGIR interview with Rear Adm. (Ret.) David Nash, former Director of the Iraq PMO, March 3, 2006.

45 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Program and Project Management, Washington, DC, April 12, 2006.

46 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 66; SIGIR interview 

with James “Spike” Stephenson, USAID Iraq Mission Director, January 19, 2006; and SIGIR interview with 

Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, April 17, 2006.

47 James Stephenson, Losing the Golden Hour, An Insider’s View of Iraq’s Reconstruction (Washington, DC: 

Potomac Books, 2007).

48 SIGIR interview with Rear Adm. (Ret.) David Nash, former Director of the Iraq PMO, January 13, 2006.

49 SIGIR interview with Rear Adm. (Ret.) David Nash, former Director of the Iraq PMO, March 3, 2006.

50 James Stephenson, Losing the Golden Hour, An Insider’s View of Iraq’s Reconstruction (Washington, DC: 

Potomac Books, 2007), 33.

51 James Stephenson, Losing the Golden Hour, An Insider’s View of Iraq’s Reconstruction (Washington, DC: 

Potomac Books, 2007), 32-35.

52 CPA-IG Audit 04-004, “Task Orders Awarded by the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence in 

Support of the Coalition Provisional Authority,” July 28, 2004, 4-5, 7-8.

53 CPA-IG Audit 04-004, “Task Orders Awarded by the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence in 

Support of the Coalition Provisional Authority,” July 28, 2004, 4-5.

54 John Daley, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, written comments to SIGIR, June 26, 2008.

55 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 60.

56 OMB, Section 2207 Report, July 2004, Funding Table.

Chapter 11

1 SIGIR interview with Vijay Samaraweera, Senior Policy Advisor for Regional Government, RTI 

International, August 16, 2007.

2 For Umm Qasr and South-Central, see ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Mike Gfoeller, former Deputy 

Director of ORHA Region-South, August 10, 2003; Amatzia Baram, “Post-Saddam Iraq: The Shiite Factor,” 

The Brookings Institution, April 30, 2003; and Ken Pollack, “The Seven Deadly Sins of Failure in Iraq: A 

Retrospective Analysis of the Reconstruction,” The Brookings Institution, December 1, 2006.

3 Peter W. Brorsen, “Accountability Builds Legitimate Government,” Capacity.org 32 (December 2007); 

USAID, “Transcript: Local Governance Update,” June 19, 2003; and USAID, “New Freedom and 

Opportunities: Founding a New Democracy in Iraq”, November 18, 2003.

4 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Major Gen. David Petraeus, Commander of the 101st Airborne 

Division, July 28, 2003.
• 397 •

• Chapter 11 •

5 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Major General David Petraeus, Commander of the 101st Airborne 

Division, July 28, 2003.

6 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with J. Scott Carpenter, CPA Director of Governance, June 18, 2004.

7 L. Paul Bremer, III, former CPA Administrator, written comments to SIGIR, December 19, 2008.

8 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with J. Scott Carpenter, CPA Director of Governance, June 18, 2004.

9 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 32; and Research 

Triangle Institute, USAID contract EDG-C00-03-00010-00, Section C, April 11, 2003.

10 SIGIR interview with Dr. Ronald Johnson, Senior Vice President for International Development, RTI 

International, March 2, 2006.

11 USIP interview with Aaron Williams, Vice President for International Business Development, RTI 

International, October 1, 2004.

12 USIP interview with Charles “Chuck” Costello, Deputy Chief of Party in the Local Governance Support 

Project with RTI International, October 14, 2004.

13 USIP interview with Aaron Williams, Vice President for International Business Development, RTI 

International, October 1, 2004.

14 USIP interview with Aaron Williams, Vice President for International Business Development, RTI 

International, October 1, 2004.

15 USIP interview with Charles “Chuck” Costello, Deputy Chief of Party in the Local Governance Support 

Project with RTI International, October 14, 2004.

16 USIP interview with Aaron Williams, Vice President for International Business Development, RTI 

International, October 1, 2004; SIGIR interview with Dr. Ronald Johnson, Senior Vice President for 

International Development, RTI International, March 2, 2006; and USIP interview with Charles “Chuck” 

Costello, Deputy Chief of Party in the Local Governance Support Project with RTI International, 

October 14, 2004.

17 RTI International, “Lessons Learned Brief: Military-Civilian Cooperation in Postwar Iraq: Experience with 

Local Governance Reconstruction,” Brief no. 7, May 2005.

18 USAID IG Audit E-267-05-001-P, “Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Community Action Program,” January 31, 

2005, 6.

19 USAID IG Audit E-267-05-001-P, “Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Community Action Program,” January 31, 

2005, 5, 11-12.

20 SIGIR interview with Steve Connolly, QRF Coordinator for DAI, December 21, 2006.

21 SIGIR Audit 05-004, “Oversight of Funds Provided to Iraqi Ministries through the National Budget 

Process,” January 30, 2005, 3, 15.

22 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483, May 22, 2003. 

23 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with J. Scott Carpenter, CPA Director of Governance, June 29, 2004.

24 The English translation of the fatwa differs depending on who did the translation. BBC News/Middle 

East, “Ayatollah Sistani in quotes,” August 27, 2004; Babak Rahimi, USIP Report 187, “Ayatollah Sistani and 

the Democratization of Post-Ba’athist Iraq,” June 2007; and Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “How Cleric Trumped 

U.S. Plan for Iraq: Ayatollah’s Call for Vote Forced Occupation Leader to Rewrite Transition Strategy,” 

Washington Post, November 26, 2003.

25 According to Carpenter, the Council consisted of 25 members so each could select a cabinet minister. 

ORHA/CPA Historian interview with J. Scott Carpenter, CPA Director of Governance, June 29, 2004.

26 L. Paul Bremer III, “Iraq’s Path to Sovereignty,” Washington Post, Op-Ed, September 8, 2003.

27 Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense, written comments to SIGIR, November 5, 2008.
• 398 •

• Endnotes•

28 L. Paul Bremer III, “Facts for Feith: CPA History,” National Review, March 19, 2008; and SIGIR interview 

with L. Paul Bremer III, former CPA Administrator, July 11, 2008. 

29 SIGIR interview with Douglas Feith, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, March 20, 2008.

30 L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a future of Hope (New York: Simon & Schuster, 

2006), 167.

31 L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a future of Hope (New York: Simon & Schuster, 

2006), 187.

32 L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a future of Hope (New York: Simon & Schuster, 

2006), 188; and David. E. Sanger, “White House to Overhaul Iraq and Afghan Missions,” New York Times, 

October 6, 2003.

33 Public Broadcasting Service, “Interview: Robert Blackwill,” FRONTLINE, July 25, 2006. 

34 SIGIR interview with Richard Armitage, former Deputy Secretary of State, February 4, 2008.

35 Public Broadcasting Service, “Interview: Robert Blackwill,” FRONTLINE, July 25, 2006.

36 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, 

February 4, 2008.

37 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511, October 16, 2003.

38 Iraqi Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority, “The November 15 Agreement: Timeline 

to a Sovereign, Democratic and Secure Iraq,” November 15, 2003. 

39 Iraqi Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority, “The November 15 Agreement: Timeline 

to a Sovereign, Democratic and Secure Iraq,” November 15, 2003.

40 Iraq’s eighteen major federal units are called governorates or provinces. The terms are used interchangeably, 

but this book will exclusively use the term “province.” Sharon Otterman, “Iraq: The Changing Plan,” Council 

on Foreign Relations, December 1, 2003.

41 RTI International, “Lessons Learned Brief: Military-Civilian Cooperation in Postwar Iraq: Experience with 

Local Governance Reconstruction,” Brief no. 7, May 2005.

42 Mark Etherington, Revolt on the Tigris: The al-Sadr Uprising and the Governing of Iraq (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 

University Press, 2005), 223-224.

43 USAID IG Audit E-267-06-003-P, “Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Local Governance Activities,” July 10, 2006, 5.

44 Mark Etherington, Revolt on the Tigris: The al-Sadr Uprising and the Governing of Iraq (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 

University Press, 2005), 133.

45 GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight 

Issues,” June 2004, 32.

46 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management,” March 2007, 70, 101.

47 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2003, 69.

48 CPA Order Number 71, “Local Governmental Powers,” April 6, 2004. 

49 CPA, “Republic of Iraq: 2004 Budget,” October 2003. For all of Iraq’s 2003 and 2004 budgets, see http://

www.cpa-iraq.org/budget.

50 USIP interview with Charles “Chuck” Costello, Deputy Chief of Party in the Local Governance Support 

Project with RTI International, October 14, 2004.

Chapter 12

1 Robert Perito, USIP Special Report 137, “The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Public 

Security in Iraq: Lessons Identified,” April 2005, 3; and DoD Briefing, “Rebuilding the Iraqi Military,” January 

21, 2003, declassified March 12, 2007, 2.
• 399 •

• Chapter 12 •

2 Scott Feil, “Building Better Foundations: Security in Postconflict Reconstruction,” The Washington Quarterly

25, no. 4 (Autumn 2002), 97-98.

3 Michael Gordon, “For Training Iraq’s Police, the Main Problem Was Time,” New York Times, October 21, 

2004.

4 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, February 

4, 2008.

5 Even if an organized insurgency had not begun, the Iraqi police would probably have had difficulty maintaining order. At the eve of the invasion, a web of secret police, paramilitary organizations, and intelligence services 

were the main providers of public order. However, these groups were guilty of many human rights abuses committed under Saddam, and DoD prewar planning called for their dissolution. In contrast, the Iraqi police service 

only ventured out of their stations “to round up possible suspects, extract confessions by force, and extort 

bribes from family members for release of the suspects.” Seth G. Jones, Jeremy M. Wilson, Andrew Rathmell, 

and K. Jack Riley, Establishing Law and Order after Conflict (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 

109-110; and Robert Perito, USIP Special Report 137, “The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with 

Public Security in Iraq: Lessons Identified,” April 2005, 2-3. DoD Briefing, “Rebuilding the Iraqi Military,” 

January 21, 2003, declassified March 12, 2007.

6 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, February 

4, 2008. CIA officials denied Frank Miller’s claim that they provided intelligence assessments suggesting Iraq’s 

police were capable of maintaining order. Michael Gordon, “For Training Iraq’s Police, the Main Problem Was 

Time,” New York Times, October 21, 2004.

7 SIGIR interview with Gerald Burke, Advisor to the Baghdad police, June 14, 2007.

8 CPA, “Iraqi Police: An Assessment of the Present and Recommendations for the Future,” May 30, 2003, 20, 

as cited in: House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “Stand Up and 

Be Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces,” July 2007, 55.

9 Robert Perito, USIP Special Report 137, “The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Public 

Security in Iraq: Lessons Identified,” April 2005, 5. Police trainers conduct classroom instruction on human 

rights, investigations, and rule of law, in addition to firing range and other practice exercises. Police advisors 

conduct follow-up training and mentorship in the field, where they coach and support new police officers as 

they apply their new methods and techniques. 

10 SIGIR interview with Gerald Burke, Advisor to the Baghdad police, June 14, 2007.

11 Robert Perito, USIP Special Report 137, “The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Public 

Security in Iraq: Lessons Identified,” April 2005, 6.

12 White House Press Release, “President Bush, Police Commissioner Kerik Discuss Police Force in Iraq,” 

October 3, 2003; and SIGIR interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and 

OSC, May 28, 2008.

13 Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez quoted in: Stephanie Gaskell, “Former Iraq Commander: Bernard 

Kerik Was ‘A Waste of Time’ in Iraq,” New York Daily News, May 5, 2008. See also Lieutenant General 

Ricardo S. Sanchez, Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 249-251.

14 Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story (New York: HarperCollins, 

2008), 191; and Kristopher Joseph, “18th Military Police Brigade helps Iraqis Restore Law and Order,” 

USAREUR News Release, May 16, 2003.

15 L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: Simon & Schuster, 

2006), 19.

16 DoS IG Report ISP-IQO-05-72 and DoD IG Report IE-2005-002, “Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police 

Training,” July 15, 2005, 19.

17 SIGIR interview with John Meiklejohn, Advisor for police academies and curriculum, June 14, 2007.
• 400 •

• Endnotes•

18 SIGIR interview with John Meiklejohn, Advisor for police academies and curriculum, June 14, 2007; and 

L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: Simon & Schuster, 

2006), 168. 

19 SIGIR interview with John Meiklejohn, Advisor for police academies and curriculum, June 14, 2007.

20 DoS IG Report ISP-IQO-05-72 and DoD IG Report IE-2005-002, “Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police 

Training,” July 15, 2005, 39-40, 55.

21 Initial allocations from the Iraqi budget for the Ministry of Interior totaled $22.9 million, including $2.4 

million for operational expenses and $20.5 million for capital expenditures. CPA, “Republic of Iraq Budget 

Revenues and Expenses: 2003 July-December,” 2003. Capital expenditures were reduced with the revision, to 

$16.5 million. CPA, “Summary of Changes to Ministry Budgets Arising from 30 Day Review,” July 2003.

22 L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: Simon & Schuster, 

2006), 168-170; and GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential 

Services, and Oversight Issues,” June 2004, 57.

23 Andrew Rathmell, Olga Oliker, Terrence K. Kelly, David Brannan, and Keith Crane, Developing Iraq’s Security 

Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 46.

24 CPA Order Number 26, “Creation of the Department of Border Enforcement,” August 24, 2003.

25 U.S. troops deployed as immigration inspectors received a three-hour training module. In the United States, 

training for immigration duties takes four months, followed by extensive field training, and an immigration 

officer in the United States would not be considered proficient at reviewing documents for at least three years. 

USIP interview with Larry G. Hines, Advisor for customs and border enforcement, October 3, 2004. 

26 Robert Perito, USIP Special Report 137, “The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Public 

Security in Iraq: Lessons Identified,” April 2005, 9.

27 CPA Order Number 27, “Establishment of the Facilities Protection Service,” September 4, 2003.

28 Sharon Otterman, “Iraq: Security Forces,” Council on Foreign Relations , March 16, 2004; and Walter 

Slocombe, “Iraq’s Special Challenge: Security Sector Reform ‘Under Fire,’” in Reform and Reconstruction of the 

Security Sector, ed. Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi (Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Centre for the Democratic 

Control of Security Forces, 2004), 244.

29 DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, June 2007, 36.

30 CPA Order Number 2, “Dissolution of Entities,” May 23, 2003.

31 CPA Order Number 22, “Creation of a New Iraqi Army,” August 7, 2003.

32 Combat Studies Institute interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and 

OSC, August 3, 2006; and CPA Order Number 22, August 7, 2003.

33 Combat Studies Institute interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and 

OSC, August 3, 2006.

34 Combat Studies Institute interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and 

OSC, August 3, 2006.

35 USIP interview with Colonel P.J. Dermer, former CPA governance advisor, August 22, 2004.

36 SIGIR interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and OSC, May 20, 2008.

37 L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: Simon & Schuster, 

2006), 150.

38 Combat Studies Institute interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and 

OSC, August 3, 2006.

39 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and 

OSC, January 1, 2004.

40 Combat Studies Institute interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and 

OSC, August 3, 2006.
• 401 •

• Chapter 12 •

41 SIGIR interview with General John Abizaid, former CENTCOM Commander, February 4, 2008.

42 Walter Slocombe, “Iraq’s Special Challenge: Security Sector Reform ‘Under Fire,’” in Reform and 

Reconstruction of the Security Sector, ed. Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi (Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva 

Centre for the Democratic Control of Security Forces, 2004), 241; and GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding 

Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues,” June 2004, 57.

43 Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story (New York: HarperCollins, 

2008), 254; Lieutenant General (Ret.) Ricardo Sanchez, former CJTF-7 Commander, written comments 

to SIGIR, October 26, 2008; and CPA Order Number 28, “Establishment of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps,” 

September 3, 2003.

44 Combat Studies Institute interview with Lieutenant Colonel Blaise Cornell-d’Echert, former CMATT 

official, October 31, 2006.

45 Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story (New York: HarperCollins, 

2008), 254-255.

46 Anne Ellen Henderson, USIP Special Report 138, “The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with 

Economic Reconstruction in Iraq: Lessons Identified,” April 2005, 9.

47 Celeste Ward, USIP Special Report 139, “The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with 

Governance in Iraq,” May 2005, 6.

48 OMB, Section 2207 Report, January 2004, 18.

49 CPA Office of Policy Planning, “Iraqi Security Sector Reform Action Memo,” November 14, 2003.

50 CPA, “Draft Framework for Iraqi National Security Institution Building,” December 10, 2003.

51 Andrew Rathmell, Olga Oliker, Terrence K. Kelly, David Brannan, and Keith Crane, Developing Iraq’s 

Security Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 

2005), 27-28; and USIP interview with Frederick Smith, former Deputy Senior Advisor for National Security 

Affairs, August 4, 2004. 

52 USIP interview with Colonel P.J. Dermer, former CPA governance advisor, August 22, 2004. The reforms 

made Iraq one of the only Arab countries with a civilian-led defense ministry. Arnold Luethold, “Security 

Sector Reform: the Arab Middle East,” in Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector, ed. Alan Bryden 

and Heiner Hänggi (Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Security Forces, 

2004), 103.

53 The concern for ethnic balance also extended to the other “power ministries” involved in national security, 

including the Ministries of Interior, Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Justice. USIP interview with Frederick Smith, 

former Deputy Senior Advisor for National Security Affairs, August 4, 2004.

54 Andrew Rathmell, Olga Oliker, Terrence K. Kelly, David Brannan, and Keith Crane, Developing Iraq’s 

Security Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 

2005), 30.

55 SIGIR interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and OSC, May 28, 2008.

56 Colonel P.J. Dermer, CPA governance advisor, memorandum to Frederick Smith, Deputy Senior Advisor 

for National Security Affairs, “Thoughts on Choosing the Iraqi Minister of Defense,” December 5, 2003.

57 USIP interview with Frederick Smith, former Deputy Senior Advisor for National Security Affairs, August 

4, 2004.

58 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Steven Casteel, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Interior, July 3, 

2004.

59 SIGIR Audit 07-016, “Interim Review of DynCorp International, LLC, Spending Under Its Contract for 

the Iraqi Police Training Program,” October 23, 2007.

60 Gerald Burke, Advisor to the Baghdad police, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, April 25, 2007.
• 402 •

• Endnotes•

61 The relative peace, however, was short-lived. Fewer in number, the 101st Airborne Division’s successors 

could not prevent Mosul from succumbing to increased violence. Amatzia Baram, USIP Special Report 134, 

“Who Are the Insurgents? Sunni Arab Rebels in Iraq,” April 2005, 7-9.

62 Public Broadcasting Service, “Interview: General Jack Keane (Ret.),” FRONTLINE, February 8, 2007, and 

May 1, 2007.

63 OMB, Section 1506 Report, October 2003, 3. 

64 SIGIR interview with General (Ret.) Colin Powell, former Secretary of State, February 4, 2008.

65 Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, SIGIR interview, December 12, 2008.

66 L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: Simon & Schuster, 

2006), 157.

67 Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story (New York: HarperCollins, 

2008), 316.

68 SIGIR interview with General John Abizaid, former CENTCOM Commander, February 4, 2008.

69 Robert Perito, USIP Special Report 137, “The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Public 

Security in Iraq: Lessons Identified,” April 2005, 11.

70 SIGIR interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and OSC, May 28, 2008.

71 Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story (New York: HarperCollins, 

2008), 315; and Andrew Rathmell, Olga Oliker, Terrence K. Kelly, David Brannan, and Keith Crane, 

Developing Iraq’s Security Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 

Corporation, 2005), 51-52. 

72 Operational control was ceded to the military, although the CPA retained administrative control of budgets 

and policy direction came from CPA advisors. SIGIR interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former 

Commander of CMATT and OSC, May 28, 2008.

73 Gerald Burke, Advisor to the Baghdad police, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, April 25, 2007.

74 Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, “Combined Joint Task Force 7 Briefing from Baghdad,” DoD News 

Transcript, February 26, 2004.

75 Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, “Combined Joint Task Force 7 Briefing from Baghdad,” DoD News 

Transcript, February 26, 2004; and Sharon Otterman, “Iraq: Security Forces,” Council on Foreign Relations, 

March 16, 2004.

76 Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story (New York: HarperCollins, 

2008), 329-331; and GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential 

Services, and Oversight Issues,” June 2004, 49, 58.

77 Andrew Rathmell, Olga Oliker, Terrence K. Kelly, David Brannan, and Keith Crane, Developing Iraq’s 

Security Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 

2005), 36.

78 GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight 

Issues,” June 2004, 59.

79 Lawrence Korb, “Five Steps To a More Stable Iraq,” Star-Ledger, April 11, 2004.

80 GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight 

Issues,” June 2004, 56.

81 CPA Order Number 22, August 7, 2003.

82 SIGIR interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and OSC, May 28, 2008.

83 Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story (New York: HarperCollins, 

2008), 317.
• 403 •

• Chapter 13 •

84 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Steven Casteel, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Interior, July 3, 

2004.

85 SIGIR interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and OSC, May 28, 2008.

86 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with David Gompert, Senior Advisor for National Security Affairs, June 

13, 2004.

87 SIGIR interview with General John Abizaid, former CENTCOM Commander, February 4, 2008.

88 CPA, A Vision for Iraq, July 11, 2003.

89 DoD, Iraq Status Working Papers, July 13, 2004.

90 DoD, “Transition Update to the Secretary of Defense,” Iraq Interagency Transition Planning Team, June 

23, 2004, 5, 11.

91 DoD, Iraq Status Working Papers, July 13, 2004; Anthony Cordesman, Iraqi Security Forces: A Strategy for 

Success (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 85; and Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, 

Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 317. 

92 Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Security Studies, “Public Opinion in Iraq: First Poll 

Following Abu Ghraib Revelations,” May 14-23, 2004, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/

poll/2004/06iiacss.pdf.

93 Gilbert Burnham, Riyadh Lafta, Shannon Doocy, and Les Roberts, “Mortality after the 2003 Invasion 

of Iraq: A Cross-Sectional Cluster Sample Survey,” The Lancet 368, no. 9545 (October 21, 2006); and The 

Brookings Institution, “Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq,” 

July 23, 2004, 5.

Chapter 13

1 Energy Information Administration, Department of Energy, “Country Analysis Briefs: Iraq,” August 2007, 2.

2 Lawrence Kumins, “Iraq Oil: Reserves, Production, and Potential Revenues,” Congressional Research Service 

Report RS21626, updated April 13, 2005, 1-2.

3 Energy Information Administration, Department of Energy, “Country Analysis Briefs: Iraq,” August 2007.

4 Norm Kent, ITAO Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, written comments to SIGIR, June 4, 2008.

5 USACE, “Iraqi Oil Infrastructure Restoration Strategic Plan, Rough Order of Magnitude,” June 3, 2003, 1.

6 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.

7 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Brigadier General Robert Crear, Commander of Task Force RIO, 

June 25, 2003.

8 USACE, “Iraqi Oil Infrastructure Restoration Strategic Plan, Rough Order of Magnitude,” June 3, 2003.

9 Energy Information Administration, Department of Energy, “Country Analysis Briefs: Iraq,” August 2007, 14.

10 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.

11 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003; 

and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Brigadier General Robert Crear, Commander of Task Force RIO, 

June 25, 2003.

12 GAO Report 04-605, “Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and Management 

Challenges,” June 2004, 19, 36. 

13 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.

14 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Brigadier General Robert Crear, Commander of Task Force RIO, 

June 25, 2003.

15 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Oil Ministry, June 18, 2003.

16 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.
• 404 •

• Endnotes•

17 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Clark D. Turner, Member of the Energy Infrastructure Planning 

Group in the Pentagon and Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 24, 2003.

18 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Clark D. Turner, Member of the Energy Infrastructure Planning 

Group in the Pentagon and Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 24, 2003.

19 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Clark D. Turner, Member of the Energy Infrastructure Planning 

Group in the Pentagon and Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 24, 2003.

20 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Clark D. Turner, Member of the Energy Infrastructure Planning 

Group in the Pentagon and Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 24, 2003.

21 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.

22 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Clark D. Turner, Member of the Energy Infrastructure Planning 

Group in the Pentagon and Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 24, 2003.

23 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Clark D. Turner, Member of the Energy Infrastructure Planning 

Group in the Pentagon and Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 24, 2003.

24 SIGIR interview with Thamir al-Ghadban, Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, July 7, 2007.

25 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Clark D. Turner, Member of the Energy Infrastructure Planning 

Group in the Pentagon and Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 24, 2003.

26 USACE, “Iraqi Oil Infrastructure Restoration Strategic Plan, Rough Order of Magnitude,” June 3, 2003, 2.

27 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Clark D. Turner, Member of the Energy Infrastructure Planning 

Group in the Pentagon and Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 24, 2003.

28 Energy Information Administration, Department of Energy, “Iraq Energy Chronology: 1980-November 

2005,” December 2005.

29 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.

30 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.

31 GAO Report 07-839, “Defense Contract Management: DOD’s Lack of Adherence to Key Contracting 

Principles on Iraq Oil Contract Put Government Interests at Risk,” July 2007, 17.

32 GAO Report 07-839, “Defense Contract Management: DOD’s Lack of Adherence to Key Contracting 

Principles on Iraq Oil Contract Put Government Interests at Risk,” July 2007, 5-7, 17.

33 Joint Planning Workshop, “Restoration of Iraqi Oil Infrastructure Final Work Plan,” July 24, 2003, http://

www.energyintel.com/resources/workplan.pdf.

34 Joint Planning Workshop, “Restoration of Iraqi Oil Infrastructure Final Work Plan,” July 24, 2003, http://

www.energyintel.com/resources/workplan.pdf.

35 Kenneth Katzman, “Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program, International Sanction, and Illicit Trade,” Congressional 

Research Service Report EL30472, April 16, 2003, Summary.

36 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483, May 22, 2003. 

37 Steve Wright, “Iraqi Oil Exports Increasing,” USACE Engineer Update 27 no.8 (August 2003).

38 Energy Information Administration, Department of Energy, “The Iraq Energy Chronology: 

1980-November 2005,” December 2005.

39 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.

40 International Monetary Fund, “Iraq: Macroeconomic Assessment,” October 21, 2003, 10.

41 The Brookings Institution, “Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam 

Iraq,” June 29, 2006; and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483, May 22, 2003.

42 Energy Information Administration, Department of Energy, “Iraq Energy Chronology: 1980-November 

2005,” December 2005.
• 405 •

• Chapter 14 •

43 Energy Information Administration, Department of Energy, “Iraq Energy Chronology: 1980-November 

2005,” December 2005; and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the 

Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.

44 CPA, Program Review Board Minutes, July 12, 2003.

45 CPA Contracting Action, Contract DABV01-03-C-0007, awarded to Erinys, August 6, 2003; and Erinys, 

“The Erinys Iraq Oil Protection Force: Infrastructure Security in a Post-Conflict Environment,” October 2005. 

The company’s name is the Greek word for Fury, the mythological personification of vengeance.

46 SIGIR Audit 06-009, “Review of Task Force Shield Programs,” April 28, 2006, 10.

47 SIGIR Audit 06-009, “Review of Task Force Shield Programs,” April 28, 2006, i, 1.

48 SIGIR Audit 06-009, “Review of Task Force Shield Programs,” April 28, 2006, 5-15.

49 Erinys, “The Erinys Iraq Oil Protection Force: Infrastructure Security in a Post-Conflict Environment,” 

October 2005.

50 Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS), “Iraq Pipeline Watch,” http://www.iags.org/iraqpipelinewatch.htm.

51 Erinys, “The Erinys Iraq Oil Protection Force: Infrastructure Security in a Post-Conflict Environment,” 

October 2005, 23.

52 Erinys, “The Erinys Iraq Oil Protection Force: Infrastructure Security in a Post-Conflict Environment,” 

October 2005.

53 Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS), “Iraq Pipeline Watch,” http://www.iags.org/iraqpipelinewatch.htm.

54 Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS), “Iraq Pipeline Watch,” http://www.iags.org/iraqpipelinewatch.htm.

55 ITAO, Monthly Import, Production and Export, response to SIGIR data call for the Quarterly Report to the 

United States Congress, April 2008; and SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2006, 34.

56 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with J. Michael Stinson, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 12, 

2004.

Chapter 14

1 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Brigadier General Steven Hawkins, former Commander, JTF-4, June 

23, 2003. 

2 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Brigadier General Steven Hawkins, former Commander, JTF-4, June 

23, 2003. 

3 Brigadier General Steven R. Hawkins and Colonel (Ret.) Gordon M. Wells, “Nation-Building in 

Mesopotamia: U.S. Military Engineers in Iraq,” ARMY 55, no. 2 (February 2005).

4 Brigadier General Steven R. Hawkins and Colonel (Ret.) Gordon M. Wells, “Nation-Building in 

Mesopotamia: U.S. Military Engineers in Iraq,” ARMY 55, no. 2 (February 2005).

5 Major General Carl Strock, USACE Director of Civil Works, Testimony before the House Committee on 

Government Reform, March 11, 2004. Strock was one of the original members of ORHA and became Deputy 

Director for Operations and Infrastructure for the CPA. He later served as Commanding General of the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers.

6 Brigadier General Steven R. Hawkins and Colonel (Ret.) Gordon M. Wells, “Nation-Building in 

Mesopotamia: U.S. Military Engineers in Iraq,” ARMY 55, no. 2 (February 2005).

7 Brigadier General Steven R. Hawkins and Colonel (Ret.) Gordon M. Wells, “Nation-Building in 

Mesopotamia: U.S. Military Engineers in Iraq,” ARMY 55, no. 2 (February 2005).

8 International Monetary Fund, “Iraq: Statistical Appendix,” August 2007.
• 406 •

• Endnotes•

9 Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Electricity, “About the Minister,” Biography of Dr. Kareem Waheed al-Aboudi. 

He became Minister of Electricity under Prime Minister Maliki.

10 GAO-04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues,” 

June 2004, 85.

11 Bechtel National, Inc., “Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Program,” Assessment Report submitted to 

USAID, June 2003.

12 Colonel Mike Moon, USACE, formerly with GRD, email to SIGIR, July 3, 2008.

13 Bechtel National, Inc., “Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Program,” Assessment Report submitted to 

USAID, June 2003.

14 Nameplate capacity is the maximum amount of electricity a facility can generate. Bechtel National, Inc., “Iraq 

Infrastructure Reconstruction Program,” Assessment Report submitted to USAID, June 2003.One megawatt 

provides enough power to service an estimated 3,000 homes. USACE-GRD, “Restore Iraqi Electricity,” http://

www.grd.usace.army.mil/news/factsheets/docs/USACE-RIE%20factsheet.pdf. 

15 World Bank, “Republic of Iraq: Emergency Electricity Project,” Project Information Document, October 4, 

2004.

16 United Nations/World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs Assessment,” October 2003, 28.

17 World Bank, “Republic of Iraq: Emergency Electricity Project,” Project Information Document, October 4, 

2004; and Isam Al Khalisi, “Decentralizing and Restructuring of Iraq’s Electricity Supply System,” Middle East 

Economic Survey XLVIII, no. 1 (January 3, 2005).

18 Bechtel National, Inc., “Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Program,” Assessment Report submitted to 

USAID, June 2003, 2.4.

19 Bechtel National, Inc., “Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Program,” Assessment Report submitted to 

USAID, June 2003, 2.4-2.9.

20 Bechtel National, Inc., “Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Program,” Assessment Report submitted to 

USAID, June 2003.

21 Major General Carl Strock, USACE Director of Civil Works, Testimony before the House Committee on 

Government Reform, March 11, 2004.

22 USIP interview with Thomas Wheelock, Chief of Party for USAID’s contractor International Resources 

Group, September 8, 2004. 

23 Bechtel National, Inc., “Bechtel, USAID, and the Iraq Infrastructure Program: Accomplishments and 

Challenges,” 2, http://www.bechtel.com/assets/files/projects/Accomplishments_and_Challenges.pdf.

24 Major General Carl Strock, USACE Director of Civil Works, Testimony before the House Committee 

on Government Reform, March 11, 2004; and Bechtel National, Inc., “Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction 

Program,” Assessment Report submitted to USAID, June 2003.

25 USIP interview with Thomas Wheelock, Chief of Party for USAID’s contractor International Resources 

Group, September 8, 2004.

26 Bechtel National, Inc., “Bechtel, USAID, and the Iraq Infrastructure Program: Accomplishments and 

Challenges,” http://www.bechtel.com/assets/files/projects/Accomplishments_and_Challenges.pdf.

27 Brigadier General Steven R. Hawkins and Colonel (Ret.) Gordon M. Wells, “Nation-Building in 

Mesopotamia: U.S. Military Engineers in Iraq,” ARMY 55, no. 2 (February 2005).

28 Major General Carl Strock, USACE Director of Civil Works, Testimony before the House Committee on 

Government Reform, March 11, 2004.

29 Tom Wheelock and Robyn McGuckin, “Iraqi Power Sector: CPA’s Legacy and Lessons,” Middle East 

Economic Survey XLVIII, no. 29 (July 18, 2005).

30 SIGIR Audit 06-009, “Review of Task Force Shield Programs,” April 28, 2006.
• 407 •

• Chapter 14 •

31 Tom Ochs, et.al., “Fuels and Power Generation: Lessons Learned and a Path Forward,” February 12, 2007; 

Bechtel National, Inc., “Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Program,” Assessment Report submitted to USAID, 

June 2003, 2.4-3.0; and ORHA/CPA historian interview with Gary Vogler, advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 

18, 2003.

32 ORHA/CPA historian interview with Gary Vogler, advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.

33 Issam Chalabi, “Iraq’s Uncertain Oil and Political Prospects,” Middle East Economic Survey L, no. 48 

(November 26, 2007). 

34 Tom Ochs, et.al., “Fuels and Power Generation: Lessons Learned and a Path Forward,” February 12, 2007, 

13-35; SIGIR interview with Bob Krause, advisor to the Ministry of Electricity, May 20, 2007

35 Colonel Mike Moon, USACE, formerly with GRD, email to SIGIR, July 3, 2008; and Energy Information 

Administration, Department of Energy, “Country Analysis Brief: Iraq,” August 2007, 6-10. 

36 SIGIR interview with Dick Dumford, Program Manager for USAID, May 18, 2007; and SIGIR interview 

with Stephen Browning, former Deputy Director of Infrastructure, October 3, 2007. 

37 SIGIR interview with Dick Dumford, Program Manager for USAID, May 18, 2007; and ORHA/CPA 

Historian interview with Brigadier General Steven Hawkins, former Commander, JTF-4, June 23, 2003.

38 SIGIR interview with Dick Dumford, Program Manager for USAID, May 18, 2007.

39 CPA, “Republic of Iraq Budget Revenues and Expenses: 2003 July–December,” 2003, 6.

40 CPA, Program Review Board Minutes, August 19, 2003. 

41 Bechtel, USAID contract EEE-C-00-03-00018-00, 12, http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/pdf/Bechtel.

pdf; and SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons Learned in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 32.

42 Bechtel National, Inc. “Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Program, Recommended Implementation Plan,” 

June 2003, 1-1.

43 Bechtel National, Inc., “Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Program,” Assessment Report submitted to 

USAID, June 2003, 2.4-2.7.

44 Bechtel National, Inc., “Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Program,” Assessment Report submitted to 

USAID, June 2003.

45 DoD News Transcript, “Ambassador Paul Bremer Interview on CBS Face the Nation,” July 20, 2003. On 

the same day, Bremer also told Fox News, “We are expecting to be back at prewar levels in the next six weeks 

or so.” Ambassador Bremer, “Ambassador L. Paul Bremer Interview with Fox News Sunday,” DoD News 

Transcript, July 20, 2003. 

46 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Peter Andrew Bearpark, CPA Director of Operations, December 18, 

2003.

47 Browning was the Senior Advisor to the Ministries of Health; Religious Affairs; and Transportation and 

Communications. MWH Press Release, “Stephen Browning Joins MWH Executive Team,” April 25, 2006; and 

SIGIR interview with Stephen Browning, former Task Force RIO Advisor, October 3, 2007.

48 SIGIR interview with Stephen Browning, former Deputy Director of Infrastructure, October 3, 2007; and 

SIGIR interview with Dick Dumford, Program Manager for USAID, May 18, 2007.

49 SIGIR interview with Dick Dumford, Program Manager for USAID, May 18, 2007.

50 SIGIR interview with Stephen Browning, former Deputy Director of Infrastructure, October 3, 2007.

51 Tom Wheelock and Robyn McGuckin, “Iraqi Power Sector: CPA’s Legacy and Lessons,” Middle East 

Economic Survey, XLVIII, no. 29 (July 18, 2005); SIGIR interview with Stephen Browning, former Deputy 

Director of Infrastructure, October 3, 2007; and SIGIR interview with Dick Dumford, Program Manager for 

USAID, May 18, 2007.

52 SIGIR interview with Dick Dumford, Program Manager for USAID, May 18, 2007.

53 SIGIR interview with Dick Dumford, Program Manager for USAID, May 18, 2007.
• 408 •

• Endnotes•

54 SIGIR interview with Stephen Browning, former Deputy Director of Infrastructure, October 3, 2007.

55 L. Paul Bremer III, “Broadcast to the Iraqi People,” August 29, 2003.

56 USAID Fact Sheet, “Upgrading Electricity in Iraq,” August 15, 2003.

57 SIGIR interview with Stephen Browning, former Deputy Director of Infrastructure, October 3, 2007

58 USACE, “Major Effort Restoring Iraq Electricity,” Engineer Update 28, no.2 (February 2004).

59 USACE, “Major Effort Restoring Iraq Electricity,” Engineer Update 28, no.2 (February 2004).

60 OMB, 2207 Report, April 2004, Appendix 3.

61 USACE, “Major Effort Restoring Iraq Electricity,” Engineer Update 28, no. 2 (February 2004).

62 P.L. 108-106, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq 

and Afghanistan for Fiscal Year 2004, November 6, 2003.

63 CPA Electricity Advisory Team, “Meeting Agenda: Project Review for the IIRO – 2004 Supplemental 

Budget,” email from Robyn McGuckin, November 13, 2003.

64 GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight 

Issues,” June 28, 2004, 92-93.

65 Jamie Wilson, “Attacks Halt Rebuilding of Iraq,” The Guardian, April 27, 2004.

66 GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight 

Issues,” June 28, 2004, 91.

67 GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight 

Issues,” June 28, 2004, 88.

Chapter 15

1 Iraqi Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority, “The November 15 Agreement: Timeline 

to a Sovereign, Democratic and Secure Iraq,” November 15, 2003.

2 Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale University 

Press, 2007), 215.

3 UN News Centre, “Summary of Press Briefing by Lakhdar Brahimi, Special Advisor to the SecretaryGeneral,” March 16, 2004.

4 Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale University 

Press, 2007), 228-232.

5 Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale University 

Press, 2007), 230-232.

6 George W. Bush, “President Bush Congratulates Iraq for Transitional Administrative Law,” White House 

Press Release, March 8, 2004; and Iraqi Governing Council, “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the 

Transitional Period,” Articles 55-56, March 8, 2004.

7 Iraqi Governing Council, “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period,” Article 7, 

March 8, 2004.

8 Iraqi Governing Council, “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period,” Articles 

55-56, March 8, 2004.

9 Iraqi Governing Council, “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period,” Article 61, 

March 8, 2004.

10 CPA Transcripts, “Statements by United Nations Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, Iraqi President Ghazi al-Yawar, 

and Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, Topic: The New Interim Government for Iraq,” June 1, 2004. Also 

named was a deputy prime minister for security affairs.

11 GAO Report 05-876, “Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Funding and Reconstruction Efforts,” July 2005, 2.
• 409 •

• Chapter 15 •

12 SIGIR Audit 05-004, “Oversight of Funds Provided to Iraqi Ministries through the National Budget 

Process,” January 30, 2005, 5; and SIGIR Audit, 04-009, “Coalition Provisional Authority Comptroller Cash 

Management Controls Over the Development Fund for Iraq,” July 28, 2004, 5.

13 SIGIR Audit 05-004, “Oversight of Funds Provided to Iraqi Ministries through the National Budget 

Process,” January 30, 2005, 5.

14 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Contracting and Procurement, Washington, DC, December 5, 2005.

15 IAMB, “Report of the International Advisory and Monitoring Board of the Development Fund for Iraq: 

Covering the Period from the Establishment of the DFI on May 22, 2003, until the Dissolution of the CPA on 

June 28, 2004,” 2-3. Almost $6 million in DFI funds was committed by the CPA to pay for the audit.

16 OMB, Section 2207 Report, July 2004, 70.

17 James Stephenson, Losing the Golden Hour: An Insider’s view of Iraq’s Reconstruction (Herndon, VA: 

Potomac Books, 2007), 68. 

18 CPA, Program Review Board Minutes, May 15, 2004.

19 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Neil Hawkins, CPA’s Director of Development Coordination and 

Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Planning, June 21, 2004.

20 James Stephenson, Losing the Golden Hour: An Insider’s view of Iraq’s Reconstruction (Herndon, VA: 

Potomac Books, 2007), 69. 

21 Rep. Henry Waxman, Ranking Minority Member, Statement before the House Committee on Government 

Reform, June 21, 2005.

22 National Security Council, Interagency Transition Planning Team, “Operation Plan Sovereign Iraq,” Draft, 

version 1.3, April 2004.

23 GAO Report 05-737, “Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Improve Use of Private Security Providers,” July 

2005, 13.

24 National Security Council, Interagency Transition Planning Team, “Operation Plan Sovereign Iraq,” Draft, 

version 1.3, April 2004, K-2

25 National Security Council, Interagency Transition Planning Team, “Operation Plan Sovereign Iraq,” Draft, 

version 1.3, April 2004.

26 National Security Presidential Directive 36, “United States Government Operations in Iraq,” May 11, 2004. 

27 National Security Council, Interagency Transition Planning Team, “Operation Plan Sovereign Iraq,” Draft, 

version 1.3, April 2004, D-3,4.

28 National Security Council, Interagency Transition Planning Team, “Operation Plan Sovereign Iraq,” Draft, 

version 1.3, April 2004, A-10

29 GAO Report 05-876, “Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Funding and Reconstruction Efforts,” July 2005, 4.

30 National Security Council, Interagency Transition Planning Team, “Operation Plan Sovereign Iraq,” Draft, 

version 1.3, April 2004, G-3.

31 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546, June 8, 2004.

32 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483, May 22, 2003.

33 A complete listing of the various orders, regulations and memoranda promulgated by CPA can be found at 

www.cpa-iraq.org. 

34 CPA, “An Historic Review of CPA Accomplishments,” June 2004, 71.

35 CPA, “An Historic Review of CPA Accomplishments,” June 2004, 71.

The Marshall Plan and Iraq Reconstruction
• 410 •

• Endnotes•

36 Barry Eichengreen and Marc Uzan, “The Marshall Plan: Economic Effects and Implications for Eastern 

Europe and the Former USSR,” Economic Policy 7 no. 14, (April 1992); and Greg Behrman, The Most Noble 

Adventure: The Marshall Plan and the Time When America Helped Save Europe (New York: Free Press, 

2007), 4-5.

37 Barry Machado, In Search of a Usable Past: The Marshall Plan and Postwar Reconstruction Today,”

(Lexington, VA: George C. Marshall Foundation, 2007), 34; and Greg Behrman, The Most Noble Adventure: 

The Marshall Plan and the Time When America Helped Save Europe (New York: Free Press, 2007), 179-180.

38 Greg Behrman, The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall Plan and the Time When America Helped Save 

Europe (New York: Free Press, 2007), 165.

39 Barry Machado, In Search of a Usable Past: The Marshall Plan and Postwar Reconstruction Today,”

(Lexington, VA: George C. Marshall Foundation, 2007), 8, 15-22, 129.

40 Barry Machado, In Search of a Usable Past: The Marshall Plan and Postwar Reconstruction Today,”

(Lexington, VA: George C. Marshall Foundation, 2007), 35-37.

41 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Human Capital Management,” January 2006, 25-29, 34-37.

42 Barry Machado, In Search of a Usable Past: The Marshall Plan and Postwar Reconstruction Today,”

(Lexington, VA: George C. Marshall Foundation, 2007), 117-18.

Essential Services Overview – Transition from CPA to the Embassy

43 International Monetary Fund, “Iraq: Statistical Appendix,” August 2007; ITAO, Monthly Import, 

Production and Export, response to SIGIR data call for the Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 

2008; DoD, Iraq Status Report, June 15, 2004, and July 6, 2004; Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, “U.S. Deaths 

By Month,” updated September 2008; SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2005, 

12; Iraq Body Count, “Documented civilian deaths from violence,” updated August 24, 2008; P.L. 108-106, 

Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan 

for Fiscal Year 2004, November 6, 2003; CPA, “Republic of Iraq Budget Revenues and Expenses: 2003 

July–December,” 2003; CPA, “Republic of Iraq: Revisions to 2004 Budget,” March 2004; and GAO Report 

05-876, “Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Funding and Reconstruction Efforts,” July 2005, 10.

44 This estimate only includes the number of trained personnel. Although an estimated 74,000 Facilities 

Protection Service members were listed as part of the security forces, in August 2004 they were deemed unfit as 

a whole and no longer included in estimates. DoD, Iraq Status Report, June 15, 2004, 29-30; and DoS, Weekly 

Status Report, August 25, 2004, 24. 

45 International Monetary Fund, “Iraq: Statistical Appendix,” August 2007. 

46 USAID Press Release, “Upgrading Electricity in Iraq,” August 15, 2003.

47 Joint Staff and CPA, “Iraq Fact Sheet,” October 21, 2003.

48 ITAO, Monthly Import, Production and Export, July 2007 as cited in: SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United 

States Congress, July 2007, 81.

Chapter 16

1 Baghdad embassy, “Statement by Ambassador John D. Negroponte at Presentation of Credentials 

Ceremony,” June 29, 2004; and OMB, Section 2207 Report, July 2004, 14. A career Foreign Service officer, 

Negroponte had served as ambassador to Honduras, Mexico, and the Philippines before retiring in 1997 to 

become Executive Vice President for Global Markets of the McGraw-Hill publishing company in New York. 

He returned the State Department in 2001 as the United States Permanent Representative to the United 

Nations before his assignment to Iraq. DoS, “Biography of John Negroponte,” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/

biog/80476.htm.

2 White House Press Release, “President Holds Press Conference,” February 17, 2005.

3 SIGIR Audit 05-029, “Challenges Faced in Carrying Out Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Activities,” 

January 26, 2006, 4-6. 
• 411 •

• Chapter 16 •

4 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management, March 2007, 10, 82-83; and 

OMB, Section 2207 Report, July 2004, 14-15.

5 SIGIR interview with William B. Taylor, former Director of IRMO, April 3, 2008.

6 OMB, Section 2207 Report, July 2004, 15.

7 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management, March 2007, 84-86.

8 SIGIR interview with William B. Taylor, former Director of IRMO, April 3, 2008; and PCO, “PCO Iraq 

Reconstruction Update,” December 15, 2004.

9 OMB, Section 2207 Report, July 2004, 15; Claude M. Bolton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Army for 

Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services 

Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support on Iraq Reconstruction and Contracting, February 7, 

2006; and SIGIR interview with Charles Hess, former Director of PCO, April 24, 2006.

10 DoD News Release, “Casey Takes Over Iraq Commander’s Reins from Sanchez,” July 1, 2004.

11 SIGIR interview with Ambassador John Negroponte, former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, February 12, 2008.

12 SIGIR interview with Ambassador John Negroponte, former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, February 12, 2008.

13 SIGIR interview with Gen. George Casey, former Director of the Joint Staff and former MNF-I 

Commander, July 30, 2008.

14 The ten sectors were: Security and Law Enforcement; Justice, Public Safety Infrastructure, and Civil Society; 

Electricity; Oil Infrastructure; Water Resources and Sanitation; Transportation and Telecommunications; 

Roads, Bridges, and Construction; Health Care; Education, Refugees, Human Rights, Democracy and 

Governance; and Private Sector Development. For an overview of the changes, see: OMB, Section 2207 Report, 

July 2004, 17-20

15 SIGIR interview with Ambassador William B. Taylor, former Director of IRMO, April 3, 2008.

16 CPA-IG, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2004, 55-56.

17 OMB, Section 2207 Report, July 2004, 20.

18 OMB, Section 2207 Report, January 2004, 19; and Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, Testimony 

before the House Appropriations Committee, Foreign Operations Subcommittee, September 24, 2004.

19 SIGIR interview with Ambassador William B. Taylor, former Director of IRMO, April 3, 2008.

20 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Program and Project Management, Washington, DC, April 12, 2006.

21 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Program and Project Management, Washington, DC, April 12, 2006.

22 DoS, Section 2207 Report, October 2004, 2.

23 DoS, Section 2207 Report, October 2004, 2-4.

24 Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, Testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, 

Foreign Operations Subcommittee, September 24, 2004.

25 Section 133 of P.L. 108-309 amended P.L. 108-106. P.L. 108-309, Making Continuing Appropriations for 

the Fiscal Year 2005, September 30, 2004.

26 SIGIR interview with Charles Hess, former Director of PCO, April 24, 2006.

27 Charles Hess, Director of PCO, email to William B. Taylor, Director of IRMO, September 5, 2004.

28 Charles Hess, Director of PCO, email to William B. Taylor, Director of IRMO, September 5, 2004.

29 DoS, Section 2207 Report, January 2005, 8.

30 SIGIR interview with Ambassador William B. Taylor, former Director of IRMO, April 3, 2008.

31 Charles Hess, Director of PCO, memorandum to Claude M. Bolton, Assistant Secretary of the Army for 

Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, March 2005.

32 DoS, Section 2207 Report, April 2005, 5.
• 412 •

• Endnotes•

33 GAO Report 05-876, “Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Funding and Reconstruction Efforts,” July 2005, 8; and 

DoS, Section 2207 Report, April 2005, 6-7; and DoS, Section 2207 Report, April 2005, 6-7.

34 IRMO, “Iraq Reconstruction Program: Framework for Sustainable Operations,” May 18, 2005; and 

PCO, “Iraq Capacity Development: PCO Management and Interface Plan,” November 22, 2004; and PCO, 

“Program Management Plan,” Section 10, Capacity Development, October 7, 2004. 

35 DoS, Section 2207 Report, April 2005, 7.

36 OMB, Section 2207 Reports, Funding Table, July 2004; DoS, Section 2207 Report, Status of Funds, July 

2005; and SIGIR Audit 05-029, “Challenges Faced in Carrying Out Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

Activities,” January 26, 2006, 21-23.

37 OMB, Section 2207 Reports, Funding Table, July 2004; DoS, Section 2207 Report, Status of Funds, July 

2005; and SIGIR Audit 05-029, “Challenges Faced in Carrying Out Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

Activities,” January 26, 2006, 18.

38 SIGIR Audit 05-029, “Challenges Faced in Carrying Out Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Activities,” 

January 26, 2006, 7.

39 DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2005, 7.

40 DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2005, 5, 7.

Chapter 17

1 Brig. Gen. Stephen Seay, Head of Contracting Activity, comments to SIGIR, October 23, 2008.

2 Brig. Gen. Stephen Seay, Head of Contracting Activity, comments to SIGIR, October 23, 2008.

3 SIGIR interview with Brig. Gen. Stephen Seay, Head of Contracting Activity, November 2-3, 2005.

4 USACE, comments to SIGIR, November 4, 2008.

5 SIGIR interview with Brig. Gen. Stephen Seay, Head of Contracting Activity, June 29, 2006.

6 SIGIR interview with Brig. Gen. Stephen Seay, Head of Contracting Activity, November 2-3, 2005.

7 SIGIR interview with Andy Bailey, Vice President of Louis Berger, March 14, 2006.

8 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management,” March 2007, 85.

9 SIGIR Audit 06-001, “Management of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Program: The Evolution of the 

Iraq Reconstruction Management System,” April 24, 2006, 1.

10 SIGIR interview with Brig. Gen. Stephen Seay, Head of Contracting Activity, November 2-3, 2005.

11 SIGIR interview with Brig. Gen. Stephen Seay, Head of Contracting Activity, November 2-3, 2005.

12 SIGIR Audit 06-001, “Management of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Program: The Evolution of the 

Iraq Reconstruction Management System,” April 24, 2006, 3.

13 SIGIR Audit 06-001, “Management of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Program: The Evolution of the 

Iraq Reconstruction Management System,” April 24, 2006, 17.

14 SIGIR Audit 06-001, “Management of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Program: The Evolution of the 

Iraq Reconstruction Management System,” April 24, 2006, 4. 

15 The PMO and the succeeding PCO had tried to simplify tracking of design-build contractors’ overhead 

costs through administrative task orders. These task orders were supposed to capture all the administrative 

costs separately from the direct costs of the task orders for project construction. Administrative task orders were 

only issued to five of the design-build firms, though, and “only one of the contractors had adequate accounting and billing systems to capture administrative costs.” SIGIR Audit 06-028, “Review of Administrative Task 

Orders for Iraq Reconstruction Contracts,” October 23, 2006, ii.

16 SIGIR Audit 06-028, “Review of Administrative Task Orders for Iraq Reconstruction Contracts,” October 

23, 2006, iii.
• 413 •

• Chapter 18 •

17 The Defense FAR Supplement defines “undefinitized contract action” as “any contract action for which the 

contract terms, specifications, or price are not agreed upon before performance is begun under the action.” 

Defense FAR Supplement (DFARS), Subpart 217.7401 (d), revised May 12, 2006.

18 DFARS, Subpart 217.74, “Undefinitized Contract Actions,” revised May 12, 2006.

19 SIGIR Audit 06-019, “Review of the Use of Definitization Requirements for Contracts Supporting 

Reconstruction in Iraq,” July 28, 2006, 5-6.

20 CFC FRAGO 09-668, “Contracting and Organizational Changes,” 122143Z, November 12, 2004, as cited 

in: SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 76.

21 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 77.

22 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 76-77.

23 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management,” March 2007, 117.

24 See, for example: Miriam Pemberton and William D. Hartung, eds. Lessons From Iraq: Avoiding the Next 

War (Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2008).

25 The DoD estimates that the shift from design-build to direct contracting with Iraqis saved between 20 

to 50 percent in the electricity distribution area. GAO Report 07-30R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Status of DOD’s 

Reconstruction Program,” December 15, 2006, 9; and SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting 

and Procurement,” July 2006.

26 P.L. 108-375, Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, October 28, 2004.

27 Charles Hess, Director of PCO, email to William B. Taylor, Director of IRMO, September, 5, 2004.

28 Charles Hess, Director of PCO, email to William B. Taylor, Director of IRMO, September, 5, 2004.

29 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management,” March 2007, 106, 108.

30 SIGIR Audit 05-027, “Methodologies for Reporting Cost-to-Complete Estimates”, January 27, 2006, 9.

31 USACE, comments to SIGIR, November 4, 2008.

32 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management,” March 2007, 84.

33 SIGIR interview with Linda Allen, Senior Consultant for Environment, Municipalities, Public Works, and 

Water, May 12, 2007.

Chapter 18

1 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2005, 12. The Defense Base Act provides disability compensation and medical benefits to employees and death benefits to eligible survivors of employees of 

U.S. government contractors who perform work overseas. For contractors working overseas, the Defense Base 

Act requires contractors to provide insurance coverage for employees performing work on contracts funded by 

the U.S. government. The insurance provides lost wages and survivor benefits for death, injury, or other work 

interruptions, such as kidnapping. If war risk is found, the U.S. government reimburses insurance carriers for 

their costs and assumes responsibility for future payments. Defense Base Act death and injury claims are filed 

with the Department of Labor. Department of Labor, “Defense Base Act (DBA) Frequently Asked Questions 

(FAQ),” May 2005.

2 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2008, 14.

3 SIGIR Audit 08-020, “Key Recurring Management Issues Identified in Audits of Iraqi Reconstruction 

Efforts,” July 27, 2008, 4-7.

4 SIGIR Audit 08-020, “Key Recurring Management Issues Identified in Audits of Iraqi Reconstruction 

Efforts,” July 27, 2008, 6.

5 SIGIR Audit 09-005, “Agencies Need Improved Financial Data Reporting for Private Security Contractors,” 

October 30, 2008, 1-2; and GAO Report 05-737, “Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Improve the Use of 

Private Security Providers,” July 2005, 3.
• 414 •

• Endnotes•

6 GAO Report 05-737, “Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Improve the Use of Private Security Providers,” 

July 2005.

7 GAO Report 05-737, “Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Improve the Use of Private Security Providers,” 

July 2005, 3, 8. By 2008, SIGIR identified 322 companies who provided security services with contracts totaling 

more than $6 billion. SIGIR Audit 09-005, “Agencies Need Improved Financial Data Reporting for Private 

Security Contractors,” October 30, 2008, 3.

8 More than $662 million was obligated to contracts for another 233 companies for tasks that could have 

included physical security, but the descriptions of work were too general to ensure that the funds did not go for 

other services. SIGIR Audit 09-005, “Agencies Need Improved Financial Data Reporting for Private Security 

Contractors,” October 30, 2008, i-ii, 3.

9 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” 19, 60.

10 GAO Report 05-876, “Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Funding and Reconstruction Efforts,” July 2005, 14.

11 DoS, Section 2207 Reports, July 2005, 11-12; April 2005, 9-10; and January 2005, 4-5.

12 GAO Report 05-876, “Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Funding and Reconstruction Efforts,” July 2005, 13, 17.

13 DoS, Section 2207 Report, October 2004, I-47; and GAO Report 05-876, “Rebuilding Iraq: Status of 

Funding and Reconstruction Efforts,” July 2005, 14. The gas-oil separation plants, or GOSPs, separate crude 

oil from natural gas liquids at well sites. Some of these liquids are processed to produce liquefied petroleum gas, 

used primarily for cooking and heating in Iraq.

14 DoS, Section 2207 Report, January 2005, I-79.

15 Lawrence Kumins, Congressional Research Service Report RS21626, “Iraq Oil: Reserves, Production, and 

Potential Revenues,” updated April 13, 2005, 4-5.

16 Ariel Cohen, “Reducing U.S. Dependence on Middle Eastern Oil,” Heritage Foundation backgrounder no. 

1926, April 7, 2006, 5-6.

17 DoS, Section 2207 Report, April 2005, I-55; and DoS, Section 2207 Report, January 2005, I-80.

18 DoS, Section 2207 Report, January 2005, I-80.

19 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2006, 34.

20 DoS, Section 2207 Report, April 2005, I-55.

21 DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2005, I-57.

22 SIGIR Inspection SA-05-001, “Pipeline River Crossing: Al Fatah, Iraq,” January 27, 2006, 2.

23 SIGIR Inspection SA-05-001, “Pipeline River Crossing: Al Fatah, Iraq,” January 27, 2006, 2.

24 SIGIR Inspection SA-05-001, “Pipeline River Crossing: Al Fatah, Iraq,” January 27, 2006, 4.

25 SIGIR Inspection SA-05-001, “Pipeline River Crossing: Al Fatah, Iraq,” January 27, 2006, 4-5.

26 SIGIR Inspection SA-05-001, “Pipeline River Crossing: Al Fatah, Iraq,” January 27, 2006, 5.

27 SIGIR Inspection SA-05-001, “Pipeline River Crossing: Al Fatah, Iraq,” January 27, 2006, 5-6.

28 SIGIR Inspection SA-05-001, “Pipeline River Crossing: Al Fatah, Iraq,” January 27, 2006, 8.

29 SIGIR Inspection SA-05-001, “Pipeline River Crossing: Al Fatah, Iraq,” January 27, 2006, 8.

30 SIGIR Inspection SA-05-001, “Pipeline River Crossing: Al Fatah, Iraq,” January 27, 2006, i, 8.

31 DoS, Section 2207 Report, April 2005, I-55.

32 DoS, Section 2207 Report, April 2005, I-56.

33 ORHA/CPA historian interview with Michael Stinson, senior advisor to the Minister of Oil 2003- 2004, 

June 12, 2004.

34 GAO Report 05-876, “Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Funding and Reconstruction Efforts,” July 2005, 19.

35 OMB, Section 2207 Report, April 2004, 45-49.
• 415 •

• Chapter 18 •

36 DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2005, 48-56.

37 GAO Report 05-876, “Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Funding and Reconstruction Efforts,” July 2005, 20.

38 GAO Report 05-876, “Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Funding and Reconstruction Efforts,” July 2005, 20.

39 Compiled from DoS, Section 2207 Reports, October 2004, January 2005, April 2005, and July 2005; and 

GAO Report 05-876, “Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Funding and Reconstruction Efforts,” July 2005, 20.

40 American Military Engineers, “Engineering and Construction Efforts to Rebuild Iraq,” August 19, 2004.

41 USAID Audit E-267-05-003-P, “Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Electrical Power Sector Activities,” June 29, 2005, 3.

42 USAID Audit E-267-05-003-P, “Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Electrical Power Sector Activities,” June 29, 2005, 4.

43 USAID Audit E-267-05-003-P, “Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Electrical Power Sector Activities,” June 29, 2005, 

8-9.

44 SIGIR interview with Dick Dumford, Program Manager for USAID, May 18, 2007.

45 SIGIR Report PA-07-103, “Doura Power Station Units 5 and 6, Baghdad, Iraq,” July 18, 2007, 7.

46 SIGIR interview with Dick Dumford, Program Manager for USAID, May 18, 2007.

47 SIGIR Inspection PA-07-103, “Doura Power Station Units 5 and 6, Baghdad, Iraq,” July 18, 2007, i.

48 USAID Audit E-267-05-003-P, “Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Electrical Power Sector Activities,” June 29, 2005, 7.

49 USAID Audit E-267-05-003-P, “Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Electrical Power Sector Activities,” June 29, 2005, 

7; and SIGIR Audit 05-024, “Management of the Mansuria Electrical Reconstruction Project,” January 23, 

2006, 2-4.

50 SIGIR Audit 05-024, “Management of the Mansuria Electrical Reconstruction Project,” January 23, 2006, 3.

51 SIGIR Audit 08-011, “Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of Electricity-Sector Reconstruction Contract with 

Perini Corporation,” April 29, 2008, iii-iv.

52 SIGIR Audit 08-011, “Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of Electricity-Sector Reconstruction Contract with 

Perini Corporation,” April 29, 2008, 5, 23.

53 SIGIR Inspection PA-05-008, “Al Seraji Substation, Basrah, Iraq,” March 10, 2006; SIGIR Inspection 

PA-05-007, “Al Kaffat Substation, Basrah, Iraq,” March 10, 2006; SIGIR Inspection PA-05-006, “Hamdan 

Substation, Basrah, Iraq,” March 10, 2006; and SIGIR Inspection PA-05-005, “Al Hakamia Substation, Basrah, 

Iraq,” March 10, 2006.

54 SIGIR Audit 08-011, “Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of Electricity-Sector Reconstruction Contract with 

Perini Corporation,” April 29, 2008, ii, 1, 3-4. SIGIR auditor Paul Converse provided significant work on this 

audit before he was killed in Iraq on March 24, 2008.

55 DoS, Section 2207 Report, January 2005, I-65-67.

56 DoS, Section 2207 Report, April 2005, I-43.

57 OMB, Section 2207 Report, January 2004, Funding Table; and DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2005, 

Funding Table.

58 DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2005, I-62-70.

59 USAID Audit E-267-05-004-P, “Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Water and Sanitation Rehabilitation Activities,”

June 30, 2005, 17.

60 SIGIR Audit 08-018, “Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of Water Sector Reconstruction Contract with 

FluorAMEC, LLC,” July 15, 2008; and GAO Report 05-872, “Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Water and Sanitation 

Efforts Need Improved Measures for Assessing Impact and Sustained Resources for Maintaining Facilities,” 

September 2005, 11.

61 GAO Report 05-872, “Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Water and Sanitation Efforts Need Improved Measures for 

Assessing Impact and Sustained Resources for Maintaining Facilities,” September 2005, 2, 11.
• 416 •

• Endnotes•

62 GAO Report 05-872, “Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Water and Sanitation Efforts Need Improved Measures for 

Assessing Impact and Sustained Resources for Maintaining Facilities,” September 2005, 21-25.

63 SIGIR Audit 08-018, “Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of Water Sector Reconstruction Contract with 

FluorAMEC, LLC,” July 15, 2008, ii.

64 SIGIR Audit 08-018, “Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of Water Sector Reconstruction Contract with 

FluorAMEC, LLC,” July 15, 2008, 5-6.

65 GAO Report 05-872, “Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Water and Sanitation Efforts Need Improved Measures for 

Assessing Impact and Sustained Resources for Maintaining Facilities,” September 2005, 28.

66 SIGIR, PA 08-144, PA08-145, PA08-146, PA08-147, PA 08-148, “Fallujah Waste Water Treatment System, 

Falluja, Iraq,” October 27, 2008, 1-2, 13-14.

67 SIGIR, PA 08-144, PA08-145, PA08-146, PA08-147, PA 08-148, “Fallujah Waste Water Treatment System, 

Falluja, Iraq,” October 27, 2008, 7.

68 SIGIR, PA 08-144, PA08-145, PA08-146, PA08-147, PA 08-148, “Fallujah Waste Water Treatment System, 

Falluja, Iraq,” October 27, 2008, 4.

69 The initial completion date was set to three and a half years but the CPA chose to accelerate the date to 

eighteen months. SIGIR Inspections PA 08-144, PA08-145, PA08-146, PA08-147, PA 08-148, “Fallujah Waste 

Water Treatment System, Falluja, Iraq,” October 27, 2008, 9.

70 SIGIR Inspections PA 08-144, PA08-145, PA08-146, PA08-147, PA 08-148, “Fallujah Waste Water 

Treatment System, Falluja, Iraq,” October 27, 2008, 8-9.

71 SIGIR Inspections PA 08-144, PA08-145, PA08-146, PA08-147, PA 08-148, “Fallujah Waste Water 

Treatment System, Falluja, Iraq,” October 27, 2008, 11, 14.

72 SIGIR Inspections PA 08-144, PA08-145, PA08-146, PA08-147, PA 08-148, “Fallujah Waste Water 

Treatment System, Falluja, Iraq,” October 27, 2008, 11-12.

73 SIGIR Inspections PA 08-144, PA08-145, PA08-146, PA08-147, PA 08-148, “Fallujah Waste Water 

Treatment System, Falluja, Iraq,” October 27, 2008, 16.

74 SIGIR Inspections PA 08-144, PA08-145, PA08-146, PA08-147, PA 08-148, “Fallujah Waste Water 

Treatment System, Falluja, Iraq,” October 27, 2008, i.

75 DoS, Section 2207 Report, April 2005.

76 DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2005, I-81.

77 SIGIR Audit 06-011, “Management of the Primary Healthcare Centers Construction Projects,” April 29, 

2006, i, 1.

78 SIGIR Audit 06-025, “Review of the Medical Equipment Purchased for the Primary Healthcare Centers 

Associated with Parsons Global Services, Inc.” July 28, 2006.

79 SIGIR Audit 06-011, “Management of the Primary Healthcare Centers Construction Projects,” April 29, 

2006, 5.

80 SIGIR Audit 06-011, “Management of the Primary Healthcare Centers Construction Projects,” April 29, 

2006, 7.

81 SIGIR Audit 06-011, “Management of the Primary Healthcare Centers Construction Projects,” April 29, 

2006, 14.

82 SIGIR Audit 06-011, “Management of the Primary Healthcare Centers Construction Projects,” April 29, 

2006, i, 1, 5.

83 SIGIR Inspections PA-06-042, SIGIR PA-06-043, SIGIR PA-06-044, SIGIR PA-06-045, SIGIR PA-06-046, 

“Primary Health Care Centers Numbered KE-01, KE-02, KE-03, KE-04, and KE-05, Kirkuk, Iraq,” April 25, 

2006, i-ii.

84 SIGIR Audit 06-025, “Review of the Medical Equipment Purchased for the Primary Healthcare Centers 

Associated with Parsons Global Services, Inc.,” July 28, 2006, 34.
• 417 •

• Chapter 19 •

85 SIGIR Audit 06-025, “Review of the Medical Equipment Purchased for the Primary Healthcare Centers 

Associated with Parsons Global Services, Inc.,” July 28, 2006, ii.

86 SIGIR interview with Jack Holly, Project and Contracting Office logistics, May 2007.

87 SIGIR interview with Jack Holly, Project and Contracting Office logistics, May 2007.

Chapter 19

1 House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “Stand Up and Be 

Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces,” July 2007, 93-94.

2 Combat Studies Institute interview with Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, former commander of MNSTC-I, 

December 11, 2006.

3 SIGIR interview with Col. Chris King, former MNSTC-I Deputy J5, June 12, 2008.

4 DoS Report ISP-IQO-05-72 and DoD IG Report IE-2005-002, “Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police 

Training,” July 15, 2005, 9; and DoS, Section 2207 Report, October 2004, I-1.

5 House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “Stand Up and Be 

Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces,” July 2007, 94.

6 GAO Report 06-788, “Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve 

U.S. Goals,” July 2006, 11.

7 OMB, Section 2207 Report, July 2004, 17.

8 P.L. 108-309, Making Continuing Appropriations for the Fiscal Year 2005, and for Other Purposes, 

September 30, 2004.

9 SIGIR interview with Gen. David Petraeus, Commander of MNF-I, March 2, 2008.

10 Donald. P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign (Ft. Leavenworth, 

KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 453-454; Combat Studies Institute interview with Col. Peter 

DeLuca, former J7 (Engineer) for MNSTC-I, June 1, 2006; and SIGIR Audit 08-005, “Differences in Services 

and Fees for Management and Administration of Iraq Reconstruction Contracts,” January 29, 2008.

11 SIGIR Audit 08-005, “Differences in Services and Fees for Management and Administration of Iraq 

Reconstruction Contracts,” January 29, 2008; and Combat Studies Institute interview with Col. Peter DeLuca, 

former J7 (Engineer) for MNSTC-I, June 1, 2006.

12 Donald. P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign (Ft. Leavenworth, 

KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 453-454.

13 DoS, Section 2207 Report, January 2005, 5-8; and DoS, Section 2207 Report, April 2005, 4-5. SIGIR inspections later revealed improper design practices and poor construction at the Baghdad Police College. SIGIR 

Inspections PA-06-078.2 and PA-06-079.2, “Baghdad Police College: Baghdad, Iraq,” January 29, 2007.

14 DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2004, I-12.

15 DoS, Section 2207 Report, October 2004, I-14

16 GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight 

Issues,” June 2004, 56.

17 Donald. P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign (Ft. Leavenworth, 

KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 467.

18 Donald. P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign (Ft. Leavenworth, 

KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 467.

19 DoS, Section 2207 Report, October 2004, I-1-3.

20 GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight 

Issues,” June 2004, 60; and DoS, Section 2207 Report, October 2004, I-4.
• 418 •

• Endnotes•

21 Donald. P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign (Ft. Leavenworth, 

KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 467.

22 DoS, Weekly Status Report, July 27, 2004, 24.

23 Gen. (Ret.) James L. Jones, Chairman, “Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of 

Iraq,” September 6, 2007, 109.

24 DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, October 2005, 39; and MNF-I, “Iraqi Special Police,” July 22, 

2006.

25 DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, October 2005, 39.

26 DoS, Section 2207 Report, January 2005, I-7.

27 MNF-I, “Iraqi Special Police,” July 22, 2006; and DoS, Section 2207 Report, April 2005, I-2.

28 DoS, Section 2207 Report, April 2005, I-5.

29 DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, October 2005, 39.

30 MNF-I, “Iraqi Special Police,” July 22, 2006.

31 DoS, Section 2207 Report, January 2005, I-7.

32 DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2004, I-2, I-11.

33 DoS, Section 2207 Report, October 2004, 4.

34 DoS, Section 2207 Report, January 2005, I-20.

35 DoS, Section 2207 Report, April 2005, I-11.

36 House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “Stand Up and Be 

Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces,” July 2007, 93; and DoS, Section 

2207 Report, July 2004, I-9.

37 By January 2005, the IIF comprised twelve of the army’s 27 battalions and was integrated as the 1st Division 

of the IAF. DoS, Section 2207 Report, January 2005, I-3, I-18.

38 House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “Stand Up and Be 

Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces,” July 2007, 98.

39 DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, July 2005, 16.

40 DoS, Section 2207 Report, October 2004, I-2; and House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on 

Oversight and Investigations, “Stand Up and Be Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi 

Security Forces,” July 2007, 99.

41 GlobalSecurity.org, “Iraqi Intervention Force, New Iraqi Army, 1st Division,” http://www.globalsecurity.

org/military/world/iraq/iif.htm, accessed on April 17, 2008.

42 House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “Stand Up and Be 

Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces,” July 2007, 99-100.

43 Anthony Cordesman, Iraqi Security Forces: A Strategy for Success (Westport, CT: Praeger Security 

International, 2006), 172; and DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, July 2005, 13. 

44 DoS, Section 2207 Report, January 2005, I- 2-3.

45 DoS, Section 2207 Report, April 2005, I-1.

46 Donald. P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign (Ft. Leavenworth, 

KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 456.

47 Combat Studies Institute interview with Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, former commander of MNSTC-I, 

December 11, 2006.

48 Donald. P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign (Ft. Leavenworth, 

KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 461.
• 419 •

• Chapter 19 •

49 House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “Stand Up and Be 

Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces,” July 2007, 14-15, 130-132. After 

the transition teams moved under MNC-I control with their Iraqi units, a coordination line was maintained 

between the advisory teams and MNSTC-I, because MNSTC-I’s mission still included recruiting replacement 

soldiers and providing the bulk of individual equipment for Iraqi personnel. Combat Studies Institute interview 

with Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, former commander of MNSTC-I, December 11, 2006.

50 Eric Schmitt, “General Seeking Faster Training of Iraq Soldiers,” New York Times, January 23, 2005; and 

DoD News Transcript, “Media Availability with Secretary Rumsfeld; General John Abizaid and General 

George W. Casey, Jr.,” February 11, 2005. 

51 Donald. P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign (Ft. Leavenworth, 

KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 462.

52 Anthony Cordesman, Iraqi Security Forces: A Strategy for Success (Westport, CT: Praeger Security 

International, 2006), 157.

53 DoD, Weekly Status Report, June 22, 2004, 29.

54 GAO Report 07-308SP, “Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional 

Oversight,” January 2007, 23, 45. SIGIR found that many of these problems persisted in Defense Department 

reporting on the Iraqi Security Forces as late as October 2008. SIGIR Audit 08-015, “Interim Analysis of Iraqi 

Security Force Information Provided by the Department of Defense Report, Measuring Stability and Security 

in Iraq,” April 25, 2008; and SIGIR Audit 09-002, “Challenges in Obtaining Reliable and Useful Data on Iraqi 

Security Forces Continue,” October 21, 2008.

55 House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “Stand Up and Be 

Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces,” July 2007.

56 Joseph A. Christoff, GAO Director, International Affairs and Trade, Testimony before the House 

Committee on Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International 

Relations, March 14, 2005. “Geographic areas secured by ISF forces” was added as a third indicator of progress 

by October 2005. This came to be known as the Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) Process. DoD, Measuring 

Stability and Security in Iraq, October 2005, 27.

57 GAO Report 07-308SP, “Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional 

Oversight,” January 2007, 31.

58 DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, July 2005, 13.

59 DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, October 2005, 30. DoD provided aggregate information on 

unit readiness to oversight agencies, but did not release unit-level reports, despite repeated requests by GAO. 

Questions remained about how TRAs influenced training and equipping policy. GAO Report 07-308SP, 

“Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight,” January 2007, 31. TRAs 

were first used to assess the Iraqi Armed Forces, and a law-enforcement analogue was later developed for the 

Special Police Forces. The lack of consistent MNC-I presence at local police stations prevented systematic 

operational assessments of the IPS during this period. DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, July 2005, 

14-19; and DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, October 2005, 29.

60 National Security Presidential Directive 36, “United States Government Operations in Iraq,” May 11, 2004; 

and SIGIR interview with Col. John Ferrari, former CJTF-7 strategic planner and OMB program examiner, 

September 10, 2008.

61 DoS, Section 2207 Report, January 2005, 11.

62 DoD, “FY 2005 Supplemental Request for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom 

(OEF), and Operation Unified Assistance,” February 2005, 78.

63 SIGIR interview with Col. Chris King, former MNSTC-I Deputy J5, July 24, 2008.

64 Office of Management and Budget, “FY 2005 Emergency Supplemental Request,” February 14, 2005, 25-

26, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/amendments/supplemental_2_14_05.pdf.
• 420 •

• Endnotes•

65 P.L. 109-13, Making Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and 

Tsunami Relief, for the Fiscal Year Ending September 20, 2005 and for Other Purposes, May 11, 2005.

66 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2008, 19. ISFF appropriations include: 

P.L. 109-234, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2006, June 15, 2006; P.L. 109-289, 

Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2007, September 29, 2006; P.L. 110-28, U.S. Troop 

Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2007, 

December 21, 2007; and P.L. 110-161, Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2008, December 26, 

2007.

67 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2008, 19; and DoS, Section 2207 Report, 

July 2008, Status of Funds. When CERP and other Economic Support Fund appropriations are included, total 

U.S. funding for Iraq security totals more than $27 billion as of July 2008. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United 

States Congress, July 2008, 4.

68 DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2004, 17; and DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2005, 18.

69 SIGIR interview with Gen. David Petraeus, Commander of MNF-I, March 2, 2008.

70 Combat Studies Institute interview with Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, former commander of MNSTC-I, 

December 11, 2006.

71 DoS, Section 2207 Report, January 2005, I-4.

72 DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, October 2005, 38.

73 House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “Stand Up and Be 

Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces,” July 2007, 91.

74 SIGIR interview with Gen. David Petraeus, Commander of MNF-I, March 2, 2008; and GAO Report 07-

711, “Stabilizing Iraq: DoD Cannot Ensure that U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces,” 

July 2007, 9.

75 SIGIR Audit 06-032, “Iraqi Security Forces: Review of Plans to Implement Logistics Capabilities,” October 

28, 2006, 7-8.

76 SIGIR Audit 06-033, “Iraqi Security Forces: Weapons Provided by the U.S. Department of Defense Using 

the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund,” October 28, 2006, 8-10; GAO Report 07-711, “Stabilizing Iraq: 

DoD Cannot Ensure that U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces,” July 2007, 11-12; DoD 

IG Audit D-2008-026, “Management of the Iraq Security Forces Fund in Southwest Asia-Phase III,” November 

30, 2007, 9-10; and Claude M. Kicklighter, Department of Defense Inspector General, Testimony before the 

Senate Appropriations Committee, March 11, 2008. The White House did not certify that a registration and 

monitoring system for weapons issued to the Iraqi security forces had been established until October 2008. 

George W. Bush, President of the United States, letter to Chairmen and Ranking Members of the House and 

Senate Committees on Armed Services, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Senate Committee on 

Foreign Relations, and the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, October 23, 2008.

77 Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, “2006 Combat Studies Institute Military History Symposium Keynote 

Presentation,” in Kendall Gott, ed., Security Assistance: U.S. and International Historical Perspectives (Ft. 

Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006) 6.

78 DoS, Section 2207 Report, January 2005, I-4, 15.

79 SIGIR interview with Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey, former commander of MNSTC-I, April 10, 2008; DoD, 

Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, October 2005, 27; and SIGIR interview with Gen. David Petraeus, 

Commander of MNF-I, March 2, 2008.

80 IAF recruits signed a national service contract that required them to serve anywhere they were assigned, 

although there was no legal penalty for dropping out of the military. DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in 

Iraq, July 2005, 17.

81 DoS Report ISP-IQO-05-72 and DoD IG Report IE-2005-002, “Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police 

Training,” July 15, 2005, 23.
• 421 •

• Chapter 20 •

82 Andrew Rathmell, “Fixing Iraq’s Internal Security Forces: Why Is Reform of the Ministry of Interior So 

Hard?,” CSIS, November 2007, 10.

83 Iraqi Governing Council, “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period,” March 8, 

2004; and CPA Order Number 91, “Regulation of Armed Forces and Militias Within Iraq,” June 2, 2004.

84 DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, July 2005, 23.

85 Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, “Advance Policy Questions for Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus, Nominee to 

be General and Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq,” January 23, 2007, 14,.

86 Andrew Rathmell, “Fixing Iraq’s Internal Security Forces: Why Is Reform of the Ministry of Interior So 

Hard?,” CSIS, November 2007, 11.

87 House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “Stand Up and Be 

Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces,” July 2007, 86.

88 House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “Stand Up and Be 

Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces,” July 2007, 71; and Andrew 

Rathmell, “Fixing Iraq’s Internal Security Forces: Why Is Reform of the Ministry of Interior So Hard?,” CSIS, 

November 2007, 10-11.

89 Joseph A. Christoff, GAO Director, International Affairs and Trade, Testimony before the House Armed 

Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, March 13, 2007, 11-12.

90 DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2005, I-1.

91 SIGIR interview with Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey, former commander of MNSTC-I, April 10, 2008.

92 Kenneth Katzman, Congressional Research Service Report RL31339, “Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts 

and Post-Saddam Governance,” July 5, 2005, 32.

93 The Brookings Institution, “Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam 

Iraq,” July 11, 2005.

94 DoS, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “Country Reports on Human Rights 

Practices–2005: Iraq,” March 8, 2006.

95 James D. Fearon, “Iraq’s Civil War,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 2 (March/April 2007).

Chapter 20

1 OMB, Section 2207 Report, January 2004, 45.

2 OMB, Section 2207 Report, January 2004, 102.

3 DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2005, I-31-43.

4 OMB, Section 2207 Report, January 2004, 45-47.

5 DoS, Section 2207 Report, October 2004, 7, I-30.

6 DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2005, I-31-43.

7 GAO Report 05-932R, “Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Assistance for the January 2005 Elections,” September 7, 2005, 

2, 5.

8 CPA Order Number 92, “The Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq,” May 31, 2004.

9 CPA Order Number 96, “The Electoral Law,” June 15, 2004.

10 United Nations, “Iraq Electoral Fact Sheet, May 17, 2007. For a history of UN involvement, see: United 

Nations Security Council Report S-2005-585, “Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 30 of 

Resolution 1546 (2004),” September 7, 2005.

11 GAO Report 05-932R, “Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Assistance for the January 2005 Elections,” September 7, 

2005, 5-6.

12 DoS, Bureau of Public Affairs, “Iraqi Elections: January 30, 2005,”January 25, 2005.
• 422 •

• Endnotes•

13 Council on Foreign Relations, “Iraq Timeline 2004,” December 31, 2004.

14 Council on Foreign Relations, “Iraq Timeline 2004,” December 31, 2004.

15 Jonathan Morrow, USIP Special Report 155, “Iraq’s Constitutional Process II: An Opportunity Lost,” 

November 2005.

16 Larry Diamond, “Not Perfect, but ‘Reasonably Credible,’” Op-Ed, Wall Street Journal, October 25, 2004.

17 Kenneth Katzman, Congressional Research Service Report RS21968, “Iraq: Government Formation and 

Performance,” updated May 2, 2007, 2; and Council on Foreign Relations, “Iraq Timeline 2005,” October 13, 

2005.

18 George W. Bush, “President Congratulates Iraqis on Election,” White House Press Release, January 30, 

2005.

19 GAO Report 05-932R, “Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Assistance for the January 2005 Elections,” September 7, 2005, 3.

20 Jonathan Morrow, USIP Special Report 155, “Iraq’s Constitutional Process II: An Opportunity Lost,” 

November 2005.

21 Council on Foreign Relations, “Iraq Timeline 2005,” October 13, 2005.

22 Council on Foreign Relations, “Iraq Timeline 2005,” October 13, 2005.

23 Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale University 

Press, 2007), 404.

24 Jonathan Morrow, USIP Special Report 155, “Iraq’s Constitutional Process II: An Opportunity Lost,” 

November 2005, 9.

25 Jonathan Morrow, USIP Special Report 155, “Iraq’s Constitutional Process II: An Opportunity Lost,” 

USIP Special Report 155, November 2005; and Lionel Beehner and Sharon Otterman, “Iraq: Drafting the 

Constitution,” Council on Foreign Relations, August 23, 2005.

26 Jonathan Morrow, USIP Special Report 155, “Iraq’s Constitutional Process II, An Opportunity Lost,” USIP 

Special Report, November 2005, 11.

27 DoS-OIG Report No. ISP-IQO-06-01, “Inspection of Rule-of-Law Programs, Embassy Baghdad,” October 

2005, 7.

28 DoS-OIG Report No. ISP-IQO-06-01, “Inspection of Rule-of-Law Programs, Embassy Baghdad,” October 

2005, 15.

29 DoS-OIG Report No. ISP-IQO-06-01, “Inspection of Rule-of-Law Programs, Embassy Baghdad,” October 

2005, 8.

30 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006; and SIGIR Audit 08-

019, “Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of the Security and Justice Contract with Parsons Delaware, Inc.,” July 28, 

2008, 3.

31 CPA Ministry of Justice, “Prisons and Detention Centers in Iraq: An Assessment and Recommendations for 

Prisons in a Free Society,” June 15, 2003, 5.

32 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Maj. Gen. Donald F. Campbell, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of 

Justice, July 14, 2003.

33 CPA Ministry of Justice, “Prisons and Detention Centers in Iraq: An Assessment and Recommendations for 

Prisons in a Free Society,” June 15, 2003, 6.

34 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Maj. Gen. Donald F. Campbell, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of 

Justice, August 13, 2003.

35 SIGIR Audit 08-019, “Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of the Security and Justice Contract with Parsons 

Delaware, Inc.”, July 28, 2008, 3.

36 SIGIR Audit 08-019, “Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of the Security and Justice Contract with Parsons 

Delaware, Inc.”, July 28, 2008, 8-24.
• 423 •

• Chapter 20 •

37 SIGIR Audit 08-019, “Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of the Security and Justice Contract with Parsons 

Delaware, Inc.” July 28, 2008, 17.

38 SIGIR PA-08-138, “Khan Bani Sa’ad Correctional Facility, Khan Bani Sa’ad, Iraq,” July 25, 2008, 1.

39 SIGIR Audit 08-019, “Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of the Security and Justice Contract with Parsons 

Delaware, Inc.,” July 28, 2008.

40 SIGIR PA-08-138, “Khan Bani Sa’ad Correctional Facility, Khan Bani Sa’ad, Iraq,” July 25, 2008, ii, 3-4, 5-8.

41 SIGIR PA-08-138, “Khan Bani Sa’ad Correctional Facility, Khan Bani Sa’ad, Iraq,” July 25, 2008, 22.

42 Senator Bryon L. Dorgan, Chairman, Statement before the Senate Democratic Policy Committee, 

September 22, 2008, 2.

43 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Maj. Gen. Donald F. Campbell, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of 

Justice, July 14, 2003; and Robert Perito, USIP Report 104, “Establishing the Rule of Law in Iraq,” April 2003.

44 CPA Order Number 2, “Dissolution of Entities,” May 23, 2003.

45 GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resources, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and 

Oversight Issues,” June 28, 2004, 80.

46 Sermid Al-Sarraf, Board of Directors, Iraqi Jurists’ Association, Testimony before the Senate Committees on 

Foreign Relations and Judiciary, June 25, 2003.

47 CPA Order Number 13, “The Central Criminal Court of Iraq,” March 22, 2004.

48 CPA Order Number 15, “Establishment of the Judicial Review Committee,” June 23, 2003.

49 United Nations, “The Present Situation of Human Rights in Iraq,” June 9, 2004, 34. 

50 Judge Daniel L. Rubini, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Justice, memorandum to Ambassador Richard 

Jones, Deputy Administrator, November 29, 2003.

51 GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resources, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and 

Oversight Issues,” June 28, 2004, 82.

52 Agence France Presse (AFP), “Governor Calls Strike in Najaf after Judge Killed,” November 6, 2003.

53 Luke Harding, “Judge Shot Dead in Northern Iraq,” The Guardian, December 24, 2003.

54 GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resources, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and 

Oversight Issues,” June 28, 2004, 82-83.

55 Cheryl W. Gray and Daniel Kaufmann, “Corruption and Development,” Finance and Development 35 no. 1 

(March 1998), 9.

56 Stuart Bowen, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Testimony before the House Committee 

on Foreign Affairs’ Subcommittees on International Relations, Human Rights, and Oversight, and on the 

Middle East and South Asia, March 27, 2007.

57 Danny L. Athanasaw and Christopher M. Griffith, “Iraq Inspectors General: A Work in Progress,” unpublished, 2008, 5. (The authors served with the U.S. Department of State in Embassy Baghdad’s anticorruption 

office, where their portfolio including advising Iraq’s Inspectors General.) 

58 SIGIR Audit 07-007, “Status of U.S. Government Anticorruption Efforts in Iraq”, July 24, 2007, 1.

59 David M. Walker, GAO Comptroller General, Testimony before the House Committee on Government 

Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, July 11, 2006.

60 “The oil is being smuggled from Sunni militias and in Basra through the Shi’ite militia and. . . they use this 

to purchase weapons. . . .These monies will target the killing of Iraqis and Americans.” Judge Radhi Hamza alRadhi, former Commissioner, Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity, Testimony before the Senate Committee 

on Appropriations, March 11, 2008. 

61 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2006, 5.
• 424 •

• Endnotes•

62 USIP interview with Charles Grinnell, Senior Advisor to the Commission on Public Integrity, October 

22, 2004; and Stuart Bowen, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Statement before the House 

Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittees on International Relations, Human Rights, and Oversight and 

The Middle East and South Asia, March 27, 2007.

63 CPA Order 55, “Delegation of Authority Regarding the Iraq Commission on Public Integrity,” January 28, 

2004; and CPA Order 57, “Iraqi Inspectors General,” February 5, 2004.

64 The money was for “personnel costs and to ramp up its information collection, administration, and community outreach responsibilities.” OMB, Section 2207 Report, April 2004, 29-30. 

65 SIGIR interview with Charles B. Johnson, CPA Trainer and proponent of building the IG system, October 

9, 2007; and USIP interview with Charles Grinnell, Senior Advisor to the Commission on Public Integrity, 

October 22, 2004.

66 Danny L. Athanasaw and Christopher M. Griffith, “Iraq Inspectors General: A Work in Progress,” unpublished, 2008.

67 CPA Order 55, “Delegation of Authority Regarding the Iraq Commission on Public Integrity,” January 28, 

2004.

68 Radhi, a Shi’a, had refused to join the Ba’ath Party. USIP interview with Charles Grinnell, Senior Advisor to 

the Commission on Public Integrity, October 22, 2004.

69 CPA Order 55, “Delegation of Authority Regarding the Iraq Commission on Public Integrity,” January 28, 

2004; DoS and the Broadcasting Board of Governors-OIG Report ISP-IQO-06-50, “Survey of Anticorruption 

Programs: Embassy Baghdad, Iraq,” August 2006, 21; and SIGIR Audit 06-021, “Joint Survey of the U.S. 

Embassy—Iraq’s Anticorruption Program,” July 28, 2006, 17. 

70 Charles B. Johnson and Major Shawn Turner, “Report on Iraqi Anticorruption Systems,” October 25, 2007, 

27.

71 Judge Radhi Hamza al-Radhi, Commissioner, Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity, Testimony before the 

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, October 4, 2007. 

72 DoS, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 

2005: Iraq,” March 8, 2006.

73 Judge Radhi Hamza al-Radhi, Commissioner, Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity, Testimony before the 

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, October 4, 2007.

74 CPA Memorandum Number 3 (Revised), “Criminal Procedures,” June 27, 2004; Stuart Bowen, Special 

Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Testimony before the House Committee on the Judiciary 

Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, June 19, 2007; and SIGIR, Quarterly Report to 

the United States Congress, April 2007, 101.

75 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 2007, 101.

76Judge Radhi Hamza al-Radhi, Commissioner, Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity, Testimony before 

Senate Committee on Appropriations, March 12, 2007. He added, “There was pressure put on the judiciary 

not to prosecute cases on behalf of individuals. Many of Iraq’s judges live in fear of torture and assassination 

of themselves and their family members if they adjudicate cases of senior government officials.” Currency 

converted at XE Universal Currency Converter, http://www.xe.com/ucc/convert.cgi, accessed July 2008.

77 Judge Radhi Hamza al-Radhi, Commissioner, Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity, Testimony before the 

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, October 4, 2007.

78 CPA Order 57, “Iraqi Inspectors General,” February 5, 2004. 

79 Appointment of an Inspector General is subject to confirmation by Iraq’s national legislature, the Council of 

Representatives. CPA Order 57, “Iraqi Inspectors General,” February 5, 2004.

80 For a complete list of IG duties see: CPA Order 57, “Iraqi Inspectors General,” Section 5, February 5, 2004.
• 425 •

• Chapter 21 •

81 CPA Order 57, Section 6(1) details the IGs’ powers. CPA Order 57, “Iraqi Inspectors General,” February 

5, 2004. Subpoena power is better understood as “request” power. Oftentimes, the individual suffers no legal 

consequences for failing to provide the documents or show up for interviews.

82 Danny L. Athanasaw and Christopher M. Griffith, “Iraq Inspectors General: A Work in Progress,” unpublished, 2008.

83 Danny L. Athanasaw and Christopher M. Griffith, “Iraq Inspectors General: A Work in Progress,” unpublished, 2008, 1.

84 CPA Order Number 57, “Iraqi Inspectors General,” February 10, 2004.

85 SIGIR interview with Charles B. Johnson, CPA Trainer and proponent of building the IG system, October 

9, 2007. Johnson later said that the decision to overturn the vote was done literally at the last minute, in an email 

at 2300 hours to the CPA Treasury Advisor.

86 DoD OIG, “DoD OIG Provides Assistance to Iraqi IGs,” http://www.dodig.osd.mil/gwot_iraq/

support_iraq_ig.htm. 

87 CPA Order Number 77, “Board of Supreme Audit,” April 25, 2004.

88 Stuart Bowen, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Testimony before the House Committee 

on Oversight and Government Reform, October 4, 2007.

89 Danny L. Athanasaw and Christopher M. Griffith, “Iraq Inspectors General: A Work in Progress,” unpublished, 2008, 3.

90 USIP interview with Charles Grinnell, Senior Advisor to the Commission on Public Integrity, October 22, 

2004.

91 UN, “Iraq: Situation Report,” June 28-July 4, 2004.

92 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2006, 114-115.

93 DoS and the Broadcasting Board of Governors-OIG Report ISP-IQO-06-50, “Survey of Anticorruption 

Programs: Embassy Baghdad, Iraq,” August 2006, 9-10.

94 DoS and the Broadcasting Board of Governors-OIG Report ISP-IQO-06-50, “Survey of Anticorruption 

Programs: Embassy Baghdad, Iraq,” August 2006, 17.

95 SIGIR Audit 08-023, “Anticorruption Efforts in Iraq: U.S. and Iraq Take Actions but Much Remains to Be 

Done,” July 29, 2008, 1-2; SIGIR Audit 08-008, “U.S. Anticorruption Efforts in Iraq: Sustained Management 

Commitment is a Key to Success,” January 24, 2008, 2-3; SIGIR Audit 07-007, “Status of U.S. Government 

Anticorruption Efforts in Iraq,” July 24, 2007; and SIGIR Audit 06-021, “Joint Survey of the U.S. EmbassyIraq’s Anticorruption Program, July 28, 2006.

Chapter 21

1 SIGIR Interview with Robert Stein, Federal Penitentiary, Petersburg, VA, June 13, 2007; and SIGIR, 

Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 31, 2006, Appendix J-1.

2 SIGIR interviews with Brian Flynn, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections; Kevin O’Connor, SIGIR 

Auditor; and Special Agent Erick Vail, SIGIR Investigator, May 2007. Brian Flynn was the Assistant Inspector 

General for Audit from 2004-2005.

3 SIGIR interview with Robert Stein, former DoD contractor, Federal Penitentiary, Petersburg, VA, June 13, 

2007.

4 Department of Justice, “U.S. Contractor Sentenced in Case Involving Bribery, Fraud, and Money Laundering 

Scheme in al-Hillah, Iraq,” February 16, 2007.

5 James Glantz, “Wide Plot Seen in Guilty Plea in Iraq Project,” New York Times, February 2, 2006.

6 SIGIR interviews with Brian Flynn, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections; Kevin O’Connor, SIGIR 

Auditor; and Special Agent Erick Vail, SIGIR Investigator, May 2007.
• 426 •

• Endnotes•

7 SIGIR interviews with Brian Flynn, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections; Kevin O’Connor, SIGIR 

Auditor; and Special Agent Erick Vail, SIGIR Investigator, May 2007.

8 SIGIR interviews with Brian Flynn, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections; Kevin O’Connor, SIGIR 

Auditor; and Special Agent Erick Vail, SIGIR Investigator, May 2007.

9 SIGIR Audit 05-006, “Control of Cash Provided to South-Central Iraq,” April 30, 2005, 6.

10 SIGIR interviews with Brian Flynn, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections; Kevin O’Connor, SIGIR 

Auditor; and Special Agent Erick Vail, SIGIR Investigator, May 2007.

11 SIGIR interview with Robert Stein, former DoD contractor, Federal Penitentiary, Petersburg, VA, June 13, 

2007.

12 SIGIR Audit 05-016, “Management of the Contracts and Grants Used to Construct and Operate the 

Babylon Police Academy,” October 26, 2005, 8-10.

13 SIGIR Audit 05-016, “Management of the Contracts and Grants Used to Construct and Operate the 

Babylon Police Academy,” October 26, 2005.

14 SIGIR Audit 05-020, “Management of Contracts, Grants, and Micro-Purchases Used to Rehabilitate the 

Kerbala Library,” October 26, 2005, 2-3.

15 SIGIR Audit 05-020, “Management of Contracts, Grants, and Micro-Purchases Used to Rehabilitate the 

Kerbala Library,” October 26, 2005, 10-12, 18, 34, Appendix I.

16 SIGIR Audit 05-006, “Control of Cash Provided to South-Central Iraq,” April 30, 2005, 4.

17 Department of Justice Press Release, “U.S. Contractor Sentence in Case Involving Bribery, Fraud, and 

Money Laundering Scheme in Al-Hillah, Iraq,” February 16, 2007.

18 Department of Justice Press Release, “Army Lieutenant Colonel Pleds Guilty to Participating in Wire 

Fraud Scheme Arising out of Al-Hillah, Iraq,” July 28, 2008; SIGIR Audit 05-006, “Control of Cash Provided 

to South-Central Iraq,” April 30, 2005, 11; Department of Justice Press Release, “U.S. Contractor Sentence 

in Case Involving Bribery, Fraud, and Money Laundering Scheme in Al-Hillah, Iraq,” February 16, 2007; and 

SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2006, Appendix J.

19 Department of Justice Press Release, “U.S. Army Colonel and Lt. Colonel Convicted of Conspiracy for Role 

in Fraud Scheme in Al-hillah, Iraq,” November 7, 2008.

20 Department of Justice Press Release, “U.S. Army Major Pleads Guilty to Bribery Scheme Related to 

Department of Defense Contracts in Kuwait,” August 13, 2008.

21 Department of Justice Press Release, “U.S. Army Major Pleads Guilty to Bribery Scheme Related to 

Department of Defense Contracts in Kuwait,” August 13, 2008.

Essential Services Overview - Transition from Negroponte to Khalilzad 

22 International Monetary Fund, “Iraq: Statistical Appendix,” August 2007; ITAO, Monthly Import, 

Production and Export, response to SIGIR data call for the Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,

April 2008. DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, July 2005, 12; DoS, Iraq Weekly Status Report, June 

8, 2005; Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, updated September 2008; SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United 

States Congress, October 2005, 12; Iraq Body Count, “Documented civilian deaths from violence,” updated 

August 24, 2008; P.L. 108-287, Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2005, August 5, 

2003; P.L. 109-13, Making Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Defense, the Global War on Terror, 

and Tsunami Relief, for the Fiscal Year Ending September 20, 2005 and for Other Purposes, May 11, 2005; 

Presidency of the Iraqi Interim National Assembly: The State General Budget for 2005; and SIGIR, Quarterly 

Report to the United States Congress, July 2005, F-3. 

23 DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2005, 10-11; October 2005, 12; and International Monetary Fund, “Iraq: 

Statistical Appendix,” August 2007.

24 GAO Report 05-876, “Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Funding and Reconstruction Efforts,” July 2005, 14-17.
• 427 •

• Chapter 22 •

Chapter 22

1 In 2005, the U.S. government did not keep official statistics on civilian deaths; these civilian numbers 

are estimates by the nongovernmental organization Iraq Body Count. See Iraq Body Count, “A Dossier of 

Civilian Casualties 2003-2005,” July 2005. Coalition and contractor death figures come from Hannah Fischer, 

Congressional Research Service Report RL32492, “American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists 

and Statistics,” July 13, 2005, 16; and SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2005, 4. 

2 SIGIR interview with Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, March 19, 2008.

3 Zalmay Khalilzad, “Afghanistan’s Milestone,” Op-Ed, Washington Post, January 6, 2004.

4 Eric Schmitt, “General Seeking Faster Training of Iraq Soldiers,” New York Times, January 23, 2005.

5 P.L. 109-13, Making Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and 

Tsunami Relief, for the Fiscal Year Ending September 20, 2005 and for Other Purposes, May 11, 2005. By July 

2008, ISFF would grow to $17.9 billion. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2008, 4. 

6 SIGIR interview with Philip Zelikow, former Counselor, U.S. State Department, June 26, 2008. See also: 

Robin Wright and Glen Kessler, “Rice Sends Team to Assess Iraq Transition,” Washington Post, February 

15, 2005; and Bob Woodward, State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 

387-89.

7 SIGIR conversations with Philip Zelikow, former Counselor, U.S. State Department, August and September 

2008; and SIGIR interview with Celeste Ward, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations 

Capabilities, September 9, 2008.

8 SIGIR interview with Philip Zelikow, former Counselor, U.S. State Department, June 26, 2008; and Bob 

Woodward, State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 387-89, 396-97, 

412-15.

9 Khalilzad’s transition staff cite four milestone documents that articulate his strategy: a 35-slide briefing delivered to the NSC; the written testimony Khalilzad submitted for his Senate confirmation hearing; an op-ed he 

wrote in The Wall Street Journal; and, after the draft Iraqi constitution was written, a speech delivered at CSIS. 

SIGIR interview with Marin Strmecki, Senior Advisor to Ambassador Khalilzad, January 21, 2008. See Zalmay 

Khalilzad, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 7, 

2005; Zalmay Khalilzad, “The Battle of Baghdad: Rampant Insecurity—And a Detailed Plan to Combat It,” 

Op-Ed, Wall Street Journal, August 23, 2006; and Zalmay Khalilzad, “Iraq: A Status Report,” CSIS Statesmen’s 

Forum, July 11, 2006.

10 Zalmay Khalilzad, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 

June 7, 2005.

11 Krepinevich briefed Khalilzad in Washington, D.C. Krepinevich’s subsequent article in Foreign Affairs was 

derived from these briefings. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., “How to Win Iraq,” Foreign Affairs (September/

October 2005). Some military officials also refer to this as the “ink-spot” strategy.

12 Public Broadcasting Service, “Interview with Philip Zelikow,” FRONTLINE, February 6, 2007.

13 SIGIR interview with Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, March 19, 2008. 

14 SIGIR interview with David Satterfield, former Deputy Chief of Mission, April 14, 2008.

15 SIGIR interview with Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, March 19, 2008.

16 U.S. Appropriated Funds ($29.1 billion): P.L. 108-11 ($3.34 billion), P.L. 108-106 ($19.48 billion), P.L. 

108-287 ($0.14 billion), P.L. 109-13 ($6.136). SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 

2008, 17-18.

17 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2005, Appendix F; and SIGIR, Quarterly Report 

to the United States Congress, October 2008, 17-18.

18 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2005, Introduction, 29-30. 

19 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2005, 23.
• 428 •

• Endnotes•

20 The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reallocated the $18.44 billion of IRRF 2 funds as follows: 

DoD, $12.98 billion (70.4%); USAID, $3.10 billion (16.8%) DoS, $1.20 billion (6.5%); Treasury $390 million 

(2.12%); USIP, $10 million (.05%). SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2005, 24-25.

21 For a summary of reconstruction metrics, see SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 

2005, 29-35. 

22 Oil production was 16 percent below the Ministry of Oil target of 2.5 million barrels per day. SIGIR, 

Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2005, 30.

23 SIGIR, Quarterly Reports to the United States Congress, July 2005, 33, and October 2005, 19-20. 

24 For background on progress in the water sector and details about the reprogramming, see GAO Report 05-

872, “Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Water and Sanitation Efforts Need Improved Measures for Assessing Impact and 

Sustained Resources for Maintaining Facilities,” September 2005.

25 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2005, 3-5.

26 ABC News Poll, “Iraq—Where Things Stand,” December 12, 2005.

27 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2005, 3.

28 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 2005, 3; SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United 

States Congress, July 2005, 107; SIGIR Audit 05-021, “Management of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

Programs: Cost-to-Complete Estimate Reporting,” October 24, 2005, i; and SIGIR Audit 07-003, “Cost-toComplete Reporting for Iraq Reconstruction Projects,” July 26, 2007, 3.

29 For more detail on contracting and program management, see SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in 

Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006; and SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project 

Management,” March 2007.

30 Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, vetting comments to SIGIR, October 27, 2008.

31 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, former Commander of MNC-I, February 19, 

2008.

32 Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, comments to SIGIR, October 27, 2008.

33 SIGIR Audit 09-005, “Agencies Need Improved Financial Data Reporting for Private Security Contractors,” 

October 30, 2009, 3; SIGIR Audit 06-044, “Fact Sheet on Major U.S. Contractors’ Security Costs Related 

to Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Contracting Activities,” January 30, 2007, 2; and DoS, Section 2207 

Report, January 2006, 8. The January 2006 Section 2207 Report also listed water, health care, and roads/

bridges/construction projects that were canceled because funds were shifted to security. In addition to reducing funds available for construction projects, rising security costs made it more challenging to estimate the 

costs to complete projects. PCO management advised SIGIR that, as of March 31, 2005, the estimated cost 

for project security had risen from the original program baseline of $1.2 billion to more than $2 billion. SIGIR 

believes that actual costs (e.g., delays caused by security problems, higher force levels than expected) may be 

much higher. SIGIR Audit 05-011, “Cost-to-Complete Estimates and Financial Reporting for the Management 

of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund,” July 26, 2005, 4; and GAO Testimony 06-179T, “Rebuilding 

Iraq: Enhancing Security, Measuring Program Results, and Maintaining Infrastructure Are Necessary to Make 

Significant and Sustainable Progress,” October 18, 2005. 

34 SIGIR Audit 09-005, “Agencies Need Improved Financial Data Reporting for Private Security Contractors,” 

October 30, 2009, 6.

35 SIGIR interview with Major General William H. McCoy, former Commander, USACE-GRD, June 5, 2008; 

and SIGIR interview with Lieutenant Colonel Otto Busher, Baghdad PRT member, June 25, 2006.

36 SIGIR interview with Ruth-Ann Ijames, Senior Advisor to JCC-I, June 25, 2006.
• 429 •

• Chapter 22 •

37 SIGIR interviews conducted in Amman, Jordan, with anonymous Iraqi business owners in June 2006; 

and multiple interviews in the spring of 2006 with Browning Rockwell, U.S.-Iraqi business consultant. See 

also: SIGIR interview with Ruth-Ann Ijames, Senior Advisor to JCC-I, June 25, 2006. The PCO developed a 

web-based management tool, the Subcontracting Excellence Program Database, to monitor the progress of 

subcontracted work. Ylli Bajraktari, “Economic Empowerment of Women in Iraq: The New Way Forward,” 

USIP Briefing, May 2006; SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management,” March 

2007, 96; and SIGIR Audit 07-009, “Review of Bechtel’s Spending under Its Phase 2 Iraq Reconstruction 

Contract,” July 24, 2007, 23-26.

38 SIGIR interviews with several anonymous Iraqi firms headquartered in Amman, Jordan in June and July 

2006.

39 SIGIR interview with Daniel Speckhard, former IRMO Director and former Deputy Chief of Mission, April 

29, 2008. 

40 SIGIR interview with Philip Zelikow, former Counselor, U.S. State Department, June 26, 2008; and Bob 

Woodward, State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 387-89.

41 The term “reconstruction gap” denotes the differences between what was expected to be built and what was 

actually built. It was first discussed in SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2005, 3.

42 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2005, 3.

43 SIGIR interview with Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, March 19, 2008.

44 SIGIR interview with Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, March 19, 2008.

45 In addition to the Negroponte-Casey campaign plan, Ambassador Negroponte and General Casey 

published a second joint mission statement on February 7, 2005, titled “A Plan for the Year Ahead: Transition 

to Self-Reliance.” This, along with a Secretary of State cable “U.S. Government Position on Political/Security 

Principles and Priorities for Iraq Reconstruction,” Cable 061748Z APR 05, SECSTATE 6360, established the 

strategic direction of U.S. reconstruction policy in early 2005. SIGIR interview with Marin Strmecki, Senior 

Advisor to Ambassador Khalilzad, January 21, 2008.

46 SIGIR conversations with Dana Eyre, former USAID consultant, Summer 2006; and Terrence K. Kelly, 

former JSPA director, August 13, 2007.

47 SIGIR conversations with Dana Eyre, former USAID consultant, Summer 2006; and Terrence K. Kelly, 

former JSPA director, August 13, 2007.

48 SIGIR interview with Marin Strmecki, Senior Advisor to Ambassador Khalilzad, January 21, 2008. 

49 SIGIR interview with Marin Strmecki, Senior Advisor to Ambassador Khalilzad, January 21, 2008.

50 This observation was forcefully made by the strategic review performed by Ambassador Negroponte and 

General Casey in July 2004, and its follow-on analysis by General Luck and members of the Joint Forces 

Command in August 2004. Leonard R. Hawley, “An Analysis of the DCS for Political and Economic Effects,” 

August 2004; and Henry W. Stratman, “Orchestrating Instruments of Power for Nationbuilding,” Joint Forces 

Quarterly 41 (2nd quarter 2006), 33-34. 

51 When the strategic communications portfolio was added to PME in 2005, the incumbent became the 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Effects. Henry W. Stratman, “Orchestrating Instruments of Power for 

Nationbuilding,” Joint Forces Quarterly 41 (2nd quarter 2006), 35.

52 Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, comments to SIGIR, October 27, 2007.

53 Although the Joint Strategic Planning and Assessment office was approved in late 2005, it was not fully 

operational until mid-2006. For details of its formation, see SIGIR interview with Terrence K. Kelly, former 

JSPA director, August 13, 2007. 

54 SIGIR interview with Daniel Speckhard, former IRMO Director and former Deputy Chief of Mission, April 

29, 2008.

55 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 2008, 35-38.

56 SIGIR Interview with John Bowersox, former Senior Advisor for Health, November 1, 2006.
• 430 •

• Endnotes•

57 For a description of democracy building programs, see USAID Fact Sheet, “Democracy and Governance: 

Advancing Freedom Around the World,” July 24, 2008. 

58 Major General Peter W. Chiarelli and Major Patrick R. Michaelis, “Winning the Peace: The Requirement for 

Full-Spectrum Operations,” Military Review (July-August 2005), 4-17.

59 USAID, “Assistance for Iraq: USAID/Military Cooperation,” updated June 21, 2006; and James “Spike” 

Stevenson, “Military-Civilian Cooperation: A Field Perspective,” Foreign Service Journal (March 2006), 55-62. 

60 James Stephenson, Losing the Golden Hour: An Insider’s View of Iraq’s Reconstruction (Washington, DC: 

Potomac Books, Inc., 2007), 102. 

61 SIGIR interview with Marin Strmecki, Senior Advisor to Ambassador Khalilzad, January 21, 2008.

62 SIGIR interview with Andrew Rathmell, former Director of CPA Office of Planning and Analysis and 

consultant to Joint Strategic Planning and Assessments, June 26, 2006.

63 SIGIR interview with Marin Strmecki, Senior Advisor to Ambassador Khalilzad, January 21, 2008. 

64 SIGIR interview with Colonel Kenneth Cox, Engineer Brigade Commander, June 24, 2006.

65 SIGIR interview with Andrew Rathmell, former Director of CPA Office of Planning and Analysis and 

consultant to Joint Strategic Planning and Assessments, June 26, 2006.

66 SIGIR interview with Calvin Crane, Regional PAO Coordinator, August 12, 2007; and SIGIR, Quarterly 

Report to the United States Congress, October 2005, 7. For background and commentary on PRDCs, see 

Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq Handbook,” version 1.5, October 

2006, 38; MNF-I, Operation Iraqi Freedom Press Conference, “Provincial Reconstruction,” October 2, 2006; 

MNF-I, Operation Iraqi Freedom Press Briefing, October 9, 2006; and Robert Perito, USIP Report 185, 

“Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq,” March 2007, 8.

67 Plans were also drawn up to create Provincial Support Teams composed of the U.S. Embassy, PCO, and 

USAID staff, but only three deployed and a later assessment of their performance found them an insufficient 

vehicle. Inadequacies of the Provincial Support Teams are discussed in Unclassified Baghdad 4045, “Action 

Plan to Build Capacity and Sustainability within Iraq’s Provincial Governments,” from embassy Baghdad to 

SECSTATE, 010330Z October 2005. SIGIR interview with Celeste Ward, political aide to Lieutenant General 

Peter Chiarelli, and Colonel Kenneth Cox, Engineer Brigade Commander, June 24, 2006.

68 DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2005, 2-3.

69 USACE-GRD, Susan M. Fournier, “Provinces Succeed in Selecting Projects,” February 24, 2006.

70 Michael J. McNerney, “Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?” 

Parameters (Winter 2005-2006), 37. For further background on the PRT history and operating concept, 

see Robert Perito, “Hearts and Minds Model?” Armed Forces Journal (December 2005); and Robert Perito, 

USIP Special Report 152, “U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons 

Identified,” October 2005.

71 SIGIR conversations with Philip Zelikow, former Counselor, U.S. State Department, August and September 

2008; and SIGIR interview with Celeste Ward, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations 

Capabilities, September 9, 2008. With the changing military footprint and eventual transition to Iraqi control, 

Khalilzad did not want to embed teams in brigades that would soon be withdrawn or repositioned. Ambassador 

Zalmay Khalilzad, vetting comments to SIGIR, October 27, 2008.

72 Robert Perito, USIP Special Report 185, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq,” March 2007, 4; and 

Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, October 

19, 2005.

73 Unclassified Baghdad 4045, “Action Plan to Build Capacity and Sustainability within Iraq’s Provincial 

Governments,” From embassy Baghdad to SECSTATE, 010330Z October 2005.
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• Chapter 22 •

74 The CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support) pacification program in rural 

Vietnam was an interesting precursor to Provisional Reconstruction Teams used in Afghanistan and Iraq. R. 

W. Komer, RAND Report R-967-ARPA, “Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN 

Performance in Vietnam,” August 1972; Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final 

Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1999); Neil Sheehan, A 

Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (New York: Vintage, 1989); and David Passage, 

“Speaking Out: Caution: Iraq is Not Vietnam,” Foreign Service Journal (November 2007). 

75 SIGIR interview with Calvin Crane, Regional PAO Coordinator, August 12, 2007; and Condoleezza Rice, 

“Remarks at the Inauguration of the Provincial Reconstruction Team,” November 11, 2005.

76 SIGIR Audit 06-034, “Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq,” October 29, 2006, 

8-11; and SIGIR conversations with Philip Zelikow, former Counselor, U.S. State Department, August and 

September 2008.

77 Ginger Cruz, Deputy Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Testimony before the House Armed 

Services Committee, September 5, 2007; and SIGIR Audit 06-034, “Status of the Provincial Reconstruction 

Team Program in Iraq,” October 29, 2006, 9.

78 Joe Saloom, IRMO Director, memorandum to David M. Satterfield, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim, “P.R.T. 

Support Issues,” July 6, 2006.

79 Some PRTs did retain PSD support, but plans for all PRTs to be supported were dropped. DoS Cable, 

“Estimated Costs for DS PRT Security Recommendations,” Ref. Baghdad 2236; Randall Bennett, Regional 

Security Officer, “PRT PSD Teams discussion between RSO Bennett and Lieutenant General Chiarelli on 

07/25/2006,” August 10, 2006; and DoS, “DoS Financial Plan to Support PRT Excel,” undated.

80 Unclassified Baghdad 4045, “Action Plan to Build Capacity and Sustainability within Iraq’s Provincial 

Governments,” From embassy Baghdad to SECSTATE, 010330Z October 2005; and SIGIR Audit 06-034, 

“Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq,” October 29, 2006, 8. 

81 SIGIR Audit 06-034, “Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq,” October 29, 2006, 8. 

82 SIGIR site visit to Mosul PRT and follow-up correspondence, Forward Operating Base Marez, June 22, 

2006. 

83 SIGIR interview with Andrew Rathmell, former Director of CPA Office of Planning and Analysis and 

consultant to Joint Strategic Planning and Assessments, June 26, 2006.

84 SIGIR interview with Rear Admiral Scott R. Van Buskirk, Director, Office of National Unity, Strategic 

Effects, June 20, 2006.

85 Ginger Cruz, Deputy Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Testimony before the House Armed 

Services Committee, September 5, 2007; and SIGIR Audit 07-015, “Review of the Effectiveness of Provincial 

Reconstruction Teams in Iraq,” October 18, 2007. See also: Supplemental Agreement to the Memorandum 

of Agreement between Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, and Chief of Mission, U.S. Mission Iraq 

Regarding Security Responsibility on PRT Security Responsibilities and Requirements, November 9, 2006; 

and Memorandum of Agreement between the Deputy Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Regarding PRT Support, February 22, 2007. 

86 SIGIR Audit 06-034, “Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq,” October 29, 

2006, 15.

87 Ginger Cruz, Deputy Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Testimony before the House Armed 

Services Committee, September 5, 2007.

88 SIGIR Audit 06-034, “States of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq,” October 29, 2006, 5.

89 Bonn Agreement, “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment 

of Permanent Government Institutions,” December 5, 2001.

90 Kenneth Katzman, Congressional Research Service Report RL31339, “Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and 

Security,” updated November 7, 2006.
• 432 •

• Endnotes•

91 CIA, “The World Factbook - Afghanistan,” January 2008; and CIA, “The World Factbook - Iraq,” January 

2008. 

92 James Kunder, USAID Asst Administrator, Near East Bureau, Testimony before the House Committee on 

International Relations, March 9, 2006.

93 Decree of the President of the Islamic Transitional State of Afghanistan on the Afghan National Army, 

December 1, 2002 as cited in: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, “Rebuilding Afghanistan: 

Peace and Stability,” December 2, 2002, Annex 1, http://www.unama-afg.org/docs/_nonUN%20Docs/_

Internation-Conferences&Forums/Bonn-Talks/decree%20on%20army.pdf.

94 Combat Studies Institute interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and 

OSC, August 3, 2006; and CPA Order Number 22, August 7, 2003.

95 SIGIR interview with General Paul Eaton, former CMATT Commander, May 20, 2008.

96 Robert Perito, USIP Senior Program Officer, Testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee 

on Oversight and Investigations, October 18, 2007.

97 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2008, 16; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the 

United States Congress, October 2008, 1.

98 MNC-I, “Money as a Weapons System (MAAWS): MNC-I Smart Book For Resource Managers,” MNC-I 

C8, October 1, 2005, 2.

99 USAID, “Transition Strategy: 2006-2008,” PowerPoint Briefing, September 2005; and USAID, “Strategy 

and Impact of Iraq Transition Initiative: OTI in Iraq (2003-2006), Final Evaluation,” September 30, 2006, 15.

100 The list of strategic cities infrequently changed, based on periodic assessments coordinated by the NSC 

and MNF-I. One list is located at: USAID, “Annex 1- Strategic Cities in Iraq,” http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/pdf/Annex1-StrategicCitiesinIraq.pdf.

101 Clear-Hold-Build is slightly different than the oil-spot strategy, in that it advocates a broader emphasis on 

creating safe havens simultaneously across all areas of operation by emphasizing civilian security, rather than 

selecting only some regions for intervention. Public Broadcasting Service, “Interview with Philip Zelikow,” 

FRONTLINE, February 6, 2007.

102 Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 

October 19, 2005; DoD News Transcript, “News Briefing with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and 

General Peter Pace,” November 29, 2005; and Public Broadcasting Service, “Interview with Philip Zelikow,” 

FRONTLINE, February 6, 2007.

103 DoD News Transcript, “News Briefing with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General Peter 

Pace,” November 29, 2005.

104 George W. Bush, “President Commemorates Veterans Day, Discusses War on Terror,” November 11, 

2005.

105 NSC, “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq,” November 30, 2005.

106 Public Broadcasting Service, “Interview with Philip Zelikow,” FRONTLINE, February 6, 2007; SIGIR 

interview with Philip Zelikow, former Counselor, U.S. State Department, June 26, 2008; and SIGIR interview 

with Celeste Ward, political aide to Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, and Colonel Kenneth Cox, Engineer 

Brigade Commander, June 24, 2006.

107 For an elaboration of the conflict transformation approach, see Jock Covey, Michael J. Dziedzic, and 

Leonard R. Hawley, eds., The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict 

Transformation (Washington, DC: USIP, 2005).
• 433 •

• Chapter 23 •

Chapter 23

1SIGIR interview with Lieutenant Colonel Otto Busher, Baghdad PRT member, June 25, 2006.

2Sgt. Samson Barini, “Minutes from Meeting with the Water Sector at the Amanat,” Baghdad PRT 

Infrastructure Report, June 25, 2006. Members of SIGIR’s lessons learned team observed this meeting. See, 

also: Baghdad Water Authority, “Minutes of Meeting—The Coordination with USAID,” June 11, 2006. 

3SIGIR interview with Lieutenant Colonel Otto Busher, Baghdad PRT member, June 25, 2006.

4 Dan Bisbee, Baghdad PRT, “Baghdad Governance,” 3rd ed., April 2007, 10. This manual was written as a 

primer to city politics for reconstruction personnel working in Baghdad, and is widely circulated among officials 

and contractors.

5 Dan Bisbee, Baghdad PRT, “Baghdad Governance,” 3rd ed., April 2007, 11-12; and James Glanz, “Baghdad 

Mayor is Ousted by a Shiite Group and Replaced,” New York Times, August 10, 2005. 

6Sgt. Samson Barini, “Minutes from Meeting with the Water Sector at the Amanat,” Baghdad PRT 

Infrastructure Report, June 25, 2006; and SIGIR interview with Lieutenant Colonel Otto Busher, Baghdad 

PRT member, June 25, 2006. A SIGIR inspection found similar problems at the Nassriya water treatment plant, 

where the local distribution system would not be able to withstand increased water pressure and would thus 

lead to major leakages when the water treatment became operational. SIGIR Inspection PA-07-116, “Nassriya 

Water Treatment Plant, Nassriya, Iraq,” April 28, 2008, 28-29.

7Sgt. Samson Barini, “Minutes from Meeting with the Water Sector at the Amanat,” Baghdad PRT 

Infrastructure Report, June 25, 2006; and SIGIR interview with Lieutenant Colonel Otto Busher, Baghdad 

PRT member, June 25, 2006.

8SIGIR interviews with Lieutenant Colonel Otto Busher, Baghdad PRT member, June 19-28, 2006. See also: 

Dan Bisbee, Baghdad PRT, “Baghdad Governance,” 3rd ed., April 2007, 12; and SIGIR interview with Joseph 

Gregoire, Baghdad PRT leader, June 20, 2006.

9Sgt. Samson Barini, “Minutes from Meeting with the Water Sector at the Amanat,” Baghdad PRT 

Infrastructure Report, June 25, 2006; and SIGIR interview with Lieutenant Colonel Otto Busher, Baghdad 

PRT team member, June 25, 2006.

10 SIGIR interview with Sgt. Timmy R. Rostro, Convoy Commander Red 2, Unit 43029, June 25, 2006, and 

subsequent correspondence, July 4, 2006.

11 SIGIR interviews with Lieutenant Colonel Otto Busher, Baghdad PRT member, June 19-28, 2006.

12“Groundhog Day” is a term that some military personnel use to describe “another day in Iraq.” SIGIR interview with Lieutenant Colonel Otto Busher, Baghdad PRT member, June 25, 2006.

13 USIP interview with Colonel P.J. Dermer, former CPA governance advisor, August 22, 2004.

14 SIGIR interview with Vijay Samaraweera, Senior Policy Advisor for Regional Government, RTI 

International, August 16, 2007.

15 This was made explicit in articles 55 and 56 of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) and CPA Order 

Number 71. In theory, these writs empowering local government moved Iraq further toward a decentralized federal republic in which the central government would nominate governors, whose appointment and 

tenure would be subject to the approval of provincial councils. The councils and the governor would manage 

ministerial outposts in each province headed by the directors general, thereby putting the resources of national 

ministries under the direction of local elected officials. Iraqi Governing Council, “Law of Administration for the 

State of Iraq for the Transitional Period,” Articles 55-56, March 8, 2004; and CPA Order Number 71, “Local 

Governmental Powers,” April 6, 2004. SIGIR interview with Vijay Samaraweera, Senior Policy Advisor for 

Regional Government, RTI International, August 16, 2007.

16 For a discussion of the debate over federalism, see Eric Herring and Glen Rangwala, Iraq in Fragments: The 

Occupation and its Legacy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006); and Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of 

Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007).
• 434 •

• Endnotes•

17ORHA/CPA Historian interview with J. Scott Carpenter, CPA Director of Governance, June 29, 2004. For 

an analysis of how Iraqi factions took control of Iraqi ministries, see Eric Herring and Glen Rangwala, Iraq in 

Fragments: The Occupation and Its Legacy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).

18SIGIR interview with Ali A. Allawi, former Iraqi Minister of Trade and Minister of Defense, September 13, 

2007. For an account of nepotism and political capture, see Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the 

War, Losing the Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007).

19Eric Herring and Glen Rangwala, Iraq in Fragments: The Occupation and its Legacy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 

University Press, 2006), chapters 1-3.

20 Eric Herring and Glen Rangwala, Iraq in Fragments: The Occupation and its Legacy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 

University Press, 2006), 118, 125. 

21Dan Bisbee, Baghdad PRT, “Baghdad Governance,” 3rd ed., April 2007, 10.

22 James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton, co-chairs, “The Iraq Study Group Report,” December 6, 2006, 20.

23USAID, “Local Governance Program,” Final Report, June 2005, 12.

24Dan Bisbee, Baghdad PRT, “Baghdad Governance,” 3rd ed., April 2007, 10.

25 USAID, “Local Governance Program,” Final Report, June 2005, 9.

26SIGIR interview with Vijay Samaraweera, Senior Policy Advisor for Regional Government, RTI 

International, August 16, 2007.

27 Dan Bisbee, Baghdad PRT, “Baghdad Governance,” 3rd ed., April 2007.

28For a detailed history and analysis of Iraq’s constitutional negotiations, see Noah Feldman and Roman 

Martinez, “The International Migration of Constitutional Norms in the New World Order: Constitutional 

Politics and Text in the New Iraq: An Experiment in Islamic Democracy,” Fordham Law Review 75, no. 2 

(November 2006), 883-920.

29 Iraqi Governing Council, “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period,” Articles 

55-56, March 8, 2004.

30 Noah Feldman and Roman Martinez, “The International Migration of Constitutional Norms in the New 

World Order: Constitutional Politics and Text in the New Iraq: An Experiment in Islamic Democracy,” 

Fordham Law Review 75, no. 2 (November 2006), 900-901.

31 United Nations Security Council Report S-2005-585, “Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to 

Paragraph 30 of Resolution 1546 (2004),” September 7, 2005.

32Dan Bisbee, Baghdad PRT, “Baghdad Governance,” 3rd ed., April 2007, 34.

33 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 2008, 145-46.

34 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2008, 6.

35SIGIR interview with John Jones, Diyala PRT member, August 9, 2007.

36Mat Bouldin, Diyala PRT member, email to SIGIR, August 17, 2007.

37SIGIR interview with John Jones, Diyala PRT member, August 9, 2007.

38 SIGIR interview with Robert Tillery, former National Coordination Team Chief of Staff, January 11, 2008.

39Mat Bouldin, Diyala PRT member, email to SIGIR, August 17, 2007.

40SIGIR site visit to the Northern Governors Conference, Baghdad, August 2007.

41Not until 2008 was the original CPA Order Number 71, outlining the authorities of local governments, 

replaced with a formal Provincial Powers Law. The Provincial Powers Law was approved on March 19, 2008. 

Reuters, “Iraq Presidency Passes Provincial Powers Law,” March 19, 2008.
• 435 •

• Chapter 24 •

42 For background on the Local Governance Program II, see USAID, “Iraq Strengthening Local and Provincial 

Governance Program: Annual Report, October 1, 2005-September 30, 2006,” December 2006; and USAID, 

“Assistance for Iraq: “Contracts and Grants,” http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts, and USAID, “Iraq Local 

Governance Program (LGP): 2007 Annual Report,” October 1, 2006-December 31, 2007,” January 15, 2008.

43SIGIR interview with Todd Helmeke, RTI regional team leader in Hilla, August 25, 2007.

44USAID, “Iraq Local Governance Program II (LGP II),” undated, http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/

pdf/AI4-IraqlocalGovernanceProgram_LGPII_FactSheet.pdf. 

45 USAID Audit E-267-07-007-P, “Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Local Governance Activities,” July 31, 2007, 1, 5.

46 SIGIR Audit 09-003, “Cost, Outcome, and Oversight of Local Government Program Contract with 

Research Triangle Institute,” October 21, 2008.

47 SIGIR interview with Vijay Samaraweera, Senior Policy Advisor for Regional Government, RTI 

International, August 16, 2007.

Chapter 24

1 USAID contracted with Bechtel in 2003 (IRRF 1) and again in 2004 (IRRF 2) to rebuild vast parts of Iraq’s 

electrical infrastructure. The Doura power plant’s number 5 and number 6 generators were the objects of two 

Bechtel job orders under the IRRF 1 and IRRF 2 contracts. The first, amounting to $90.8 million, called for 

the rehabilitation of the two generators. The second, amounting to an additional $80 million, called for the 

establishment of operations and maintenance training for personnel at the Ministry of Electricity. Work on 

the generators was scheduled for completion on April 30, 2004. Actual completion was delayed by almost two 

years, to April 2006. SIGIR Inspection PA 07-103, “Doura Power Stations 5 and 6, Baghdad, Iraq,” July 18, 

2007, 3-4.

2 SIGIR Inspection PA 07-103, “Doura Power Stations 5 and 6, Baghdad, Iraq,” July 18, 2007, i-ii, 7-10.

3 For instance, the pressure on working-level engineers was so extreme that not only were maintenance periods 

shortened due to demand, but improper procedures were used after blackouts to restart sensitive components. 

SIGIR interview with Al Herman, Senior Consultant for Electricity, February 28, 2008. 

4 Stuart Bowen, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Testimony before the House Committee 

on Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs, 

September 7, 2005; and SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 2006, 4-5. For examples of SIGIR sustainment inspections see SIGIR Inspection PA 07-116, “Nassriya Water Treatment Plant, 

Nassriya, Iraq,” April 28, 2008; and SIGIR Inspection PA 08-137, “Kirkuk to Baiji Pipeline Exclusion Zone – 

Phase 3, Kirkuk, Iraq,” July 24, 2008; and SIGIR Inspections PA 06-082, PA 06-083, PA 06-084, PA 06-085, PA 

06-086, “Electrical Substation Sustainment, Basrah, Iraq,” January 10, 2007. 

5 SIGIR defines sustainment “as the ability of the Iraqi government to support IRRF-funded projects and 

facilities for an extended period of time after U.S. financial, managerial, and technical assistance is terminated.” 

SIGIR Audit 05-022, “Managing Sustainment for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Programs,” October 

24, 2005, i. SIGIR defines capacity development as “an activity or multiple activities that lead to the transfer of 

knowledge, skills, and abilities across a range of functions over a period of time.” SIGIR Audit 06-045, “Status of 

Ministerial Capacity Development in Iraq,” January 30, 2007, 3. 

6 One Iraqi employed by the Coalition recalled experiences working for the former regime in which Ba’athist 

enforcers would identify missing inventory from state factories, and then mete out punishment by shooting employees at random. SIGIR interview with Babil PRT Iraqi employee, August 2008. Individual ministries during 

the Hussein era also maintained their own prison networks, designed to incarcerate suspected employees and 

enforce a culture of fear. SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, April 17, 2006.

7 For a history of Saddamist management practices, see Kanan Makiya, Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern 

Iraq (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); and Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 2nd edition 

(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003).

8 Bearing Point, USAID contract RAN-C-00-03-00043-00, July 18, 2003, http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/pdf/BearingPoint.pdf.
• 436 •

• Endnotes•

9 SIGIR Audit 08-007, “Efforts to Implement a Financial-Management Information System in Iraq,” January 

25, 2008.

10 GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight 

Issues,” June 2004, 14.

11Bechtel, USAID contract EEE-C-00-03-00018-00, April 17, 2003, 14, http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/pdf/Bechtel.pdf.

12 SIGIR interview with Robert MacLeod, USAID Chief Technical Officer, January 20, 2006.

13For example, a critical deterioration of the port equipment at Umm Qasr took place between the summer 

months of 2003, when the port was rehabilitated, and December 2003. Visits by USAID officials revealed that 

work on maintaining the equipment had been stalled by local managers who were waiting for Baghdad to initiate repairs. SIGIR interview with Robert MacLeod, USAID Chief Technical Officer, January 20, 2006.

14 Bechtel, USAID contract SPU-C-00-04-00001-00, January 5, 2004, http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/

pdf/Bechtel_II.pdf.

15 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management,” March 2007, 54-55.

16 James Stephenson, former USAID Mission Director, email to SIGIR, August 2, 2006.

17 SIGIR interview with Robert MacLeod, USAID Chief Technical Officer, January 20, 2006; and James 

Stephenson, former USAID Mission Director, email to SIGIR, August 2, 2006.

18 James Stephenson, former USAID Mission Director, email to SIGIR, August 2, 2006.

19 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, March 17, 2008.

20 SIGIR interview with Thomas Wheelock, former Chief of Party for USAID’s contractor International 

Resource Group, January 5, 2006.

21 SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, February 9, 2006. 

22 For example, SIGIR found that, three years after their graduation from Bechtel University, a handful of 

engineers were leading infrastructure reconstruction programs in Baghdad under the auspices of USAID’s 

second Local Governance Program. SIGIR interviews with members from RTI Baghdad and RTI Green Zone 

compounds, August and September 2007.

23 SIGIR interview with Thomas Wheelock, former Chief of Party for USAID’s contractor International 

Resources Group, January 5, 2006.

24 SIGIR interview with Bruce Parmelee, Community Action Plan program officer, March 2, 2007. For a more 

recent example, see SIGIR Inspection PA 07-116, “Nassriya Water Treatment Plant, Nassriya, Iraq,” April 28, 

2008.

25 SIGIR Audit 05-022, “Managing Sustainment for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Programs,” October 

24, 2005.

26 IRMO, “Iraq Reconstruction Program Framework for Sustainable Operations,” May 18, 2005, 4. 

27 For a discussion of the capacity problems associated with frequent ministry personnel turnover during this 

period, see SIGIR Audit 06-045, “Status of Ministerial Capacity Development in Iraq,” January 30, 2007, 1. 

28 Nationwide electricity production in June of 2004, for example, was recorded at approximately 3,900 

megawatts, slightly less than Iraq’s pre-war generation of 4,400 megawatts, and far below the CPA’s goal of 

6,000 megawatts by summer. Daily crude export, meanwhile, was at 1.2 million barrels per day, almost half of 

its pre-war peak. Other services were also underperforming. The Brookings Institution, “Iraq Index: Tracking 

Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq,” June 21, 2004, 20-21. 

29 SIGIR interview with David Satterfield, former Deputy Chief of Mission, April 14, 2008.

30 PCO, “Iraq Capacity Development: PCO Management and Interface Plan,” November 22, 2004, 3; and 

SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management,” March 2007, 119-120. 

31 SIGIR interview with Sheryl Lewis, PCO Capacity Development officer, December 1, 2007; and SIGIR 

Inspection PA 07-116, “Nassriya Water Treatment Plant, Nassriya Iraq,” April 28, 2008.
• 437 •

• Chapter 24 •

32 Most of these tracking data are now held in PCO-GRD capacity development and subcontractor databases. 

Each database reports on twelve contract deliverables relevant to capacity development, as well as on various 

general requirements and award fee criteria. See PCO briefing, “Capacity Development and Sustainability 

Program,” March 2007.

33 Department of the Army, PCO/USACE-GRD, “A Report on Iraq Reconstruction,” January 2004 - 

September 2006, 16.

34 PCO briefing, “2005 Capacity Development and Sustainment,” PCO Training Center Map, 2005.

35 SIGIR interview with Sheryl Lewis, PCO Capacity Development officer, December 1, 2007.

36 IRMO, “Iraq Reconstruction Program Framework for Sustainable Operations,” May 18, 2005.

37 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2005, 16-20.

38 GAO Report 08-117, “Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Efforts Need 

an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage Risk,” October 2007, 14.

39 GAO Report 08-117, “Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Efforts Need 

an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage Risk,” October 2007, 6-7, 14-15.

40 SIGIR interview with Daniel Speckhard, former IRMO Director and Deputy Chief of Mission, April 29, 

2008.

41 SIGIR interview with Sheryl Lewis, PCO Capacity Development officer, December 1, 2007. 

42 SIGIR interview with Daniel Speckhard, former IRMO Director and Deputy Chief of Mission, April 29, 

2008.

43 SIGIR interview with Robert Tillery, former National Coordination Team Chief of Staff, January 11, 2008.

44 SIGIR interview with Robert Tillery, former National Coordination Team Chief of Staff, January 11, 2008.

45 GAO Report 08-117, “Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Efforts Need 

an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage Risk,” October 2007, 8-9.

46 Only the ministry of electricity, which had a long history of working simultaneously with different components of the U.S. mission, successfully integrated the Ministerial Assistance Team concept. SIGIR interview 

with Robert Tillery, former National Coordination Team Chief of Staff, January 11, 2008.

47SIGIR Audit 06-045, “Status of Ministerial Capacity Development in Iraq,” January 30, 2007, 10-11; and 

SIGIR interview with Robert Tillery, former National Coordination Team Chief of Staff, January 11, 2008. 

48A SIGIR audit found that, in its first four months of operation, the task force was primarily occupied with 

cataloging the various capacity-development activities throughout the reconstruction program. It also found 

that individual relationships with ministries tended to define capacity-development efforts, rather than an 

overall strategy. SIGIR Audit 06-045, “Status of Ministerial Capacity Development in Iraq,” January 30, 2007, 

12; SIGIR interview with Robert Tillery, former National Coordination Team Chief of Staff, January 11, 2008; 

and SIGIR interview with Sheryl Lewis, PCO Capacity Development officer, December 1, 2007. 

49USAID, “Tatweer Project: Developing National Capacity in Public Management,” Quarterly Progress 

Report No.1 (August-October 2006), November 30, 2006, ii, 1.

50 USAID, “Tatweer Project: Developing National Capacity in Public Management,” Quarterly Progress 

Report No. 2 (November-December 2006), January 30, 2007, 7.

51GAO Report 08-117, “Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Efforts Need 

an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage Risk,” October 2007, 19; and SIGIR Audit 06-045, 

“Status of Ministerial Capacity Development in Iraq,” January 30, 2007, 2. 

52 SIGIR conversations with Rick Olson, former Office of Provincial Affairs official, Spring 2008.

53 SIGIR interview with Joseph Saloom, former IRMO Director, April 21, 2008. 

54 Rick Olson, former Office of Provincial Affairs official, email to SIGIR, November 19, 2008.
• 438 •

• Endnotes•

55IRMO’s Presidential charter, National Security Presidential Directive 36, originally defined the office as a 

temporary organization without an explicit expiration date. National Security Presidential Directive 36, “United 

States Government Operations in Iraq,” May 11, 2004.

56 SIGIR interview with Joseph Saloom, former IRMO Director, April 21, 2008. 

57 The U.S. Embassy formally dropped this effort in July 2007. GAO Report 08-117, “Stabilizing and 

Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide 

Efforts and Manage Risk,” October 2007, 16. For a discussion of the difficulty associated with performing capacity building as ministries constantly changed hands, see SIGIR Audit 06-045, “Status of Ministerial Capacity 

Development in Iraq,” January 30, 2007, 1.

58GAO Report 08-117, “Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Efforts Need 

an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage Risk,” October 2007, 19.

59 SIGIR interview with Jeremiah S. Pam, former Treasury attaché, September 9, 2008.

60 SIGIR interview with Daniel Speckhard, former IRMO Director and Deputy Chief of Mission, April 29, 

2008.

61 SIGIR interview with Joseph Saloom, former IRMO Director, December 2, 2007; and Jeremiah S. Pam, 

former Treasury attaché, September 9, 2008. For further background on Iraq’s financial reconstruction, 

see Jeremiah S. Pam, USIP Special Report 216, “The Treasury Approach to State-Building and InstitutionStrengthening Assistance: Experience in Iraq and Broader Implications, October, 2008. 

62 Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, vetting comments to SIGIR, October 27, 2008.

63 SIGIR interviews with Joseph Saloom, former IRMO Director, December 2, 2007; and Jeremiah S. Pam, 

former Treasury attaché, September 9, 2008.

64SIGIR interview with Muhannad Esheiker, Ministry of Planning fusion cell member, August 25, 2007.

65 Conflicting budget execution data exist. SIGIR January 2008 Quarterly Report cites a White House report 

putting this number at 24 percent, a Treasury Department report showing 15 percent, and a GAO report showing 4.4 percent. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 2008, 124.

66 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 2008, 142-144.

67 SIGIR interview with Jeremiah S. Pam, former Treasury attaché, September 9, 2008.

68 SIGIR interview with Henry Clarke, former director, Office of Provincial Affairs, August 17, 2007; and Mat 

Bouldin, Diyala PRT member, August 9, 2007.

69 That many of the advisors had no prior background in development may also be a factor. GAO Report 08-

117, “Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated 

Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage Risk,” October 2007, 19.

70 SIGIR interview with David Satterfield, former Deputy Chief of Mission, April 14, 2008.

71 SIGIR Audit 06-006, “Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq: Management of the Transfer 

of IRRF-funded Assets to the Iraqi Government,” April 29, 2006; SIGIR Audit 06-007, “U.S. Agency for 

International Development: Management of the Transfer of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to 

the Iraqi Government,” April 29, 2006; and SIGIR Audit 06-017, “Transition of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction 

Fund Projects to the Iraqi Government,” July 28, 2006. Follow-on audits include SIGIR Audit 07-004, 

“Transferring Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Capital Projects to the Government of Iraq,” July 25, 2007; 

and SIGIR Audit 08-017, “Transferring Reconstruction Projects to the Government of Iraq: Some Progress 

Made but Further Improvements Needed to Avoid Waste,” April 28, 2008.
• 439 •

• Chapter 25 •

72 SIGIR Audit 06-006, “Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq: Management of the Transfer 

of IRRF-funded Assets to the Iraqi Government,” April 29, 2006; SIGIR Audit 06-007, “U.S. Agency for 

International Development: Management of the Transfer of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to 

the Iraqi Government,” April 29, 2006; and SIGIR Audit 06-017, “Transition of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction 

Fund Projects to the Iraqi Government,” July 28, 2006. Follow-on audits include SIGIR Audit 07-004, 

“Transferring Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Capital Projects to the Government of Iraq,” July 25, 2007; 

and SIGIR Audit 08-017, “Transferring Reconstruction Projects to the Government of Iraq: Some Progress 

Made but Further Improvements Needed to Avoid Waste,” April 28, 2008.

73 SIGIR Audit 06-017, “Transition of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi Government,” 

June 28, 2006, ii, 10.

74 SIGIR Audit 08-017, “Transferring Reconstruction Projects to the Government of Iraq: Some Progress 

Made But Further Improvements Needed to Avoid Waste,” April 28, 2008, 7.

75 SIGIR Audit 06-006, “Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq: Management of the Transfer 

of IRRF-funded Assets to the Iraqi Government,” April 29, 2006; SIGIR Audit 06-007, “U.S. Agency for 

International Development: Management of the Transfer of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to 

the Iraqi Government,” April 29, 2006; and SIGIR Audit 06-017, “Transition of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction 

Fund Projects to the Iraqi Government,” July 28, 2006. Follow-on audits include SIGIR Audit 07-004, 

“Transferring Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Capital Projects to the Government of Iraq,” July 25, 2007; 

and SIGIR Audit 08-017, “Transferring Reconstruction Projects to the Government of Iraq: Some Progress 

Made but Further Improvements Needed to Avoid Waste,” April 28, 2008.

76 SIGIR Audit 06-017, “Transition of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi Government,” 

June 28, 2006, 6-7.

77 SIGIR Audit 08-017, “Transferring Reconstruction Projects to the Government of Iraq: Some Progress 

Made But Further Improvements Needed to Avoid Waste,” April 28, 2008, 3.

78 Republic of Iraq, Board of Supreme Audit, “Report on Projects Funded by U.S. Funds,” November 25, 2007.

79 SIGIR Audit 08-017, “Transferring Reconstruction Projects to the Government of Iraq: Some Progress 

Made But Further Improvements Needed to Avoid Waste,” April 28, 2008. The State Department notes that, 

as of October 2008, the asset transfer policy is under active consideration by the Council of Ministers. DoS, 

written comments to SIGIR, October 28, 2008.

80 SIGIR interview with David Satterfield, former Deputy Chief of Mission, April 14, 2008.

81SIGIR interview with Joseph Saloom, former IRMO Director, December 2, 2007.

82SIGIR interview with Joseph Saloom, former IRMO Director, December 2, 2007.

83 SIGIR interview with Henry Clarke, former director, Office of Provincial Affairs, August 17, 2007.

84 GAO 04-902R Report, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight 

Issues,” June 28, 2004, 14. 

85 GAO Report 08-117, “Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Efforts Need 

an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage Risk,” October 2007, 3, 9.

86 GAO Report 08-117, “Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Efforts Need 

an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage Risk,” October 2007, 1-5.

87 Mat Bouldin, Diyala PRT member, email to SIGIR, August 17, 2007.

88GAO 08-117 Report, “Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Efforts Need 

an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage Risk,” October 2007, 25-26.

Chapter 25

1 Ellen Knickmeyer and Bassam Sebti, “Toll in Iraq’s Deadly Surge: 1,300; Morgue Count Eclipses Other 

Tallies Since Shrine Attack,” Washington Post, February 28, 2006; and White House Press Release, “Fact Sheet: 

Combating Terrorism Worldwide,” August 6, 2007.
• 440 •

• Endnotes•

2 International Committee of the Red Cross, “Civilians without Protection: The Ever-worsening Humanitarian 

Crisis in Iraq,” April 11, 2007.

3Ron Redmond, “Iraq Displacement,” UN High Commissioner for Refugees Briefing Notes, November 3, 2006.

4DoD, Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq, May 2006, 33; and James D. Fearon, “Iraq’s Civil War,” Foreign 

Affairs 86, no. 2 (March/April 2007). 

5A total of 1,313 murders/executions versus 173 deaths from vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices. 

Major General Rick Lynch, “Iraq Operational Update Briefing,” March 30, 2006; and MNF-I, “Operations 

Summary 18 Mar-24 Mar 06,” March 30, 2006, 5.

6Victor Tanner and Anonymous, “Revenge Killings in Iraq: Nature and Extent of the Problem,” USAID Office 

of Transition Initiatives, 2004, as cited in: Ashraf al-Khalidi and Victor Tanner, “Sectarian Violence: Radical 

Groups Drive Internal Displacement in Iraq,” Brookings Institution, October 2006; and Kanan Makiya, 

Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), originally published in 1989 under the pseudonym Samir al-Khalil.

7 “U.S. Envoy ‘Calls for New Iraqi PM,” British Broadcasting Corporation, March 28, 2006.

8Ashraf al-Khalidi and Victor Tanner, “Sectarian Violence: Radical Groups Drive Internal Displacement in 

Iraq,” Brookings Institution, October 2006, 3.

9 Ashraf al-Khalidi and Victor Tanner, “Sectarian Violence: Radical Groups Drive Internal Displacement in 

Iraq,” Brookings Institution, October 2006, 19.

10Robert Perito, “Reforming the Iraqi Interior Ministry, Police, and Facilities Protection Service,” USIP 

Briefing, February 2007; and Robert Perito, USIP Senior Program Officer, Testimony before the House Armed 

Services Committee Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, March 28, 2007.

11SIGIR interview with Jon Shumard, Advisor to the Ministry of the Interior, June 21, 2006.

12 General (Ret.) Barry R. McCaffrey, Adjunct Professor of International Affairs, West Point, memorandum to 

Colonel Michael Meese, U.S. Military Academy Department of Social Sciences, “After Action Report - General 

Barry R. McCaffrey USA (Ret), Visit Iraq and Kuwait 9-16 March 2007.

13Institute for War & Peace Reporting, “Checkpoints-Baghdad’s Russian Roulette: Security-aware Iraqis try to 

minimize the risks as they negotiate their way through Baghdad,” Iraqi Governance Report, August 2007, 4-6; 

and Ashraf al-Khalidi and Victor Tanner, “Sectarian Violence: Radical Groups Drive Internal Displacement in 

Iraq,” Brookings Institution, October 2006

14Many of these maps circulated on websites at different times. See, for example: IraqSlogger, “Baghdad Death 

Map,” 2006, http://www.iraqslogger.com/index.php/post/3398/The_Baghdad_Death_Map, accessed June 

30, 2007.

15 Color-coded maps showing safe and unsafe convoy routes, off-limits areas, and significant incident data are 

produced daily by the Reconstruction Operations Center of the Gulf Region Division, and distributed widely 

among reconstruction personnel. See for example: USACE-GRD Reconstruction Operations Center, G2 

Cell, “Route Status Map,” September 22, 2007; USACE-GRD “GRD Battle Update: MNF-I SIGACTS Last 

24 Hours – GRN,” September 20, 2007; and AEGIS, “Route Status Advisory,” August 30, 2007.

16 For then-Brigadier General William McCoy personally, the difference was immediate. Twice in the month 

after the Samarra bombing, his vehicle was hit by improvised explosive devices, each time as he was on his way 

to assess progress on a public health clinic. SIGIR interview with Major General William H. McCoy, former 

Commander, USACE-GRD, June 5, 2008.

17 SIGIR interview with Major General William H. McCoy, former Commander, USACE-GRD, June 5, 2008.

18 SIGIR Audit 06-011, “Management of the Primary Healthcare Centers Construction Projects,” April 

29, 2006; and SIGIR Project Assessments PA-05-021, PA-05-022, PA-05-023, PA-05-024, “Border Forts 

Numbered 602, 604, 628, and 634 Sulaymaniyah, Iraq,” January 31, 2006.

19 SIGIR interview with Major General William H. McCoy, former Commander, USACE-GRD, June 5, 2008.
• 441 •

• Chapter 25 •

20 International Committee of the Red Cross, “Iraq: No Let-up in the Humanitarian Crisis,” March 2008, 8; 

and SIGIR interview with Jon Bowersox, Senior Advisor for Health, November 1, 2006. GRD notes that “while 

there may have been a question over the timeliness of information, USACE-GRD reports from the period demonstrate that there was awareness of projects that were behind schedule. The security environment did impact 

the ability to access work sites, however Area and Resident Offices were located across Iraq and it is not correct 

to say that projects were centrally managed from Baghdad without some oversight in the field.” USACE-GRD 

vetting comments to SIGIR, November 5, 2008. 

21 SIGIR interview with Mat Bouldin, Diyala PRT member, August 9, 2007.

22SIGIR interview with George “Ged” Smith, Director of the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Technical Assistance, 

August 20, 2007.

23The Brookings Institution, “Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam 

Iraq,” June 29, 2006.

24For estimates of civilian deaths, see Hannah Fischer, Congressional Research Service Report RS22537, 

“Iraqi Civilian Death Estimates,” November 22, 2006; Iraq Body Count, “Incidents,” http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/download/ibc-incidents.php, accessed January 12, 2007; and UN Assistance Mission for 

Iraq, “Human Rights Report,” July1-August 31, 2006, and September 1-October 31, 2006.

25SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, former Commander of MNC-I, February 19, 

2008. For a commentary on Maliki’s coming to power, see Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the 

War, Losing the Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 443-54.

26 Sunni ministers engaged in various protests that culminated in members of Tawafiq —the largest Sunni 

block—leaving government entirely in August 2007. They ultimately re-joined in July 2008. Campbell 

Robertson and Sabrina Tavernise, “Sunnis End Boycott and Rejoin Iraqi Government,” New York Times, July 

20, 2008.

27 Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, vetting comments to SIGIR, October 27, 2008.

28 George W. Bush, “Press Conference of the President,” June 14, 2006.

29 For an assessment of how the Joint Reconstruction Operations Center improved the integration of CERP 

projects with broader reconstruction activities, see SIGIR Audit 07-006, “Management of the Commander’s 

Emergency Response Program in Iraq for Fiscal Year 2006,” April 26, 2007.

30 Edward Wong, “Iraqis Plan to Ring Baghdad with Trenches,” New York Times, September 16, 2006.

31World Public Opinion, “The Iraqi Public on the U.S. Presence and the Future of Iraq,” conducted by 

Program on International Policy Attitudes, September 1-4, 2006.

32Senator Susan Collins, Chair, Statement before Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, August 2, 2006; and SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 

2006, 3.

33SIGIR interview with Lieutenant Colonel Otto Busher, Baghdad PRT member, June 25, 2006.

34 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant Colonel Otto Busher, Baghdad PRT member, June 25, 2006.

35 GRD notes that “a critical factor that led to the rush was that the Ambassador had earlier implemented 

a review of IRRF that lasted over six months and held up a large number of awards and therefore causing a 

substantial backlog in work.” USACE-GRD written comments to SIGIR, November 5, 2008. Ambassador 

Khalilzad’s staff notes that, for his part, he “was not hammering on the obligation side. Quite the contrary, he 

was arguing for more analysis before funds were obligated on any projects and always questioning the validity 

of our assumptions on the benefits of our reconstruction program and priorities.” He consistently held up programming until he was confident that money was being spent well, and he even ignored those that told him he 

could not cancel projects and demanded that this be done in cases where cost overruns had become egregious 

or results inadequate.” Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, written comments to SIGIR, October 27, 2008.

36SIGIR Audit 06-037, “Interim Audit Report on Improper Obligations Using the Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund (IRRF 2),” September 22, 2006; and SIGIR Audit 06-040, “Improper Obligations Using 

the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF 2),” January 30, 2007.
• 442 •

• Endnotes•

37SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2006, 3, 18-19. 

38SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2006, 17, 21; and IRMO, Weekly Status 

Report, October 3, 2006. 

39IRMO, Weekly Status Report, October 3, 2006. 

40SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2006, 17. 

41 IRMO Action Memorandum, “Recommended Solutions to Relieve the Ministry of Oil from Hampering 

Budgetary, Spending, and Procurement Constraints,” July 29, 2006, 3, as cited in SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the 

United States Congress, October 2006, 35.

42 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2006, 45.

43Oxfam International, “Rising to the Humanitarian Challenge in Iraq,” Briefing Paper, July 2007, 3-4; and 

Megan Greenwell, “A Dismal Picture of Life in Iraq,” Washington Post, July 31, 2007. 

44 DoD, Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq, August 2006, 17.

45Ellen Knickmeyer, “U.S. Has End in Sight on Iraq Rebuilding,” Washington Post, January 2, 2006.

46David Streitfeld, “Iraq: Contractor Bechtel Leaves Disintegrating Iraq Short of Goal,” Baltimore Sun, 

November 4, 2006.

47 David R. Baker, “Bechtel Ends Iraq Rebuilding After a Rough 3 Years,” San Francisco Chronicle, November 

1, 2006.

48 SIGIR Inspection PA 06-054, “Nasiriyah Prison Facility: Nasiriyah, Iraq,” June 24, 2006, ii.

49 SIGIR Audit 07-006, “Management of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Iraq for Fiscal 

Year 2006,” April 26, 2007, 1.

50 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, former Commander of MNC-I, February 19, 

2008. For CERP data from fiscal year 2006, see SIGIR Audit 07-006, “Management of the Commander’s 

Emergency Response Program in Iraq for Fiscal Year 2006,” April 26, 2007, 8.

51 SIGIR Audit 07-006, “Management of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Iraq for Fiscal 

Year 2006,” April 26, 2007, 8. SWET is also variously known as SWET-F (adding fuel) or SWEAT (adding 

academics).

52 SIGIR interview with Gordon England, Deputy Secretary of Defense, March 28, 2008.

53 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, former Commander of MNC-I, February 19, 2008.

54 SIGIR interview with David Satterfield, former Deputy Chief of Mission, April 14, 2008.

55 More than 28 percent of obligated CERP funds—or $537 million of the $2.3 billion Congress appropriated—went to water projects. SIGIR Audit 08-006, “Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Iraq 

Funds Many Large Scale Projects,” January 25, 2008, ii.

56 SIGIR Audit 08-006, “Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Iraq Funds Many Large Scale 

Projects,” January 25, 2008.

57 SIGIR interview with Heidi Silvey, USAID OTI Chief of Party, June 6 and July 1, 2006; and SIGIR interview 

with Megan Holleran, OTI Acting Chief of Party, June 19, 2006.

58 USAID, “Focused Stabilization in Strategic Cities Initiative (FSSCI),” http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/pdf/AI3-FocusedStabilizationofStrategicCitiesInitiative.pdf.

59DoS, “Advancing the President’s National Strategy for Victory in Iraq: Funding Iraq’s Transition to SelfReliance in 2006 and 2007 and Support for the Counterinsurgency Campaign,” February 2006.

60 Interagency Stabilization Task Force, “Focused Stabilization: An Interagency Operational Concept,” 

PowerPoint brief, July 4, 2006. 

61Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq Handbook,” version 1.5, 56.

62 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, former Commander of MNC-I, February 19, 2008.
• 443 •

• Chapter 25 •

63 USAID Press Release, “USAID Awards Community Stabilization Program in Iraq,” August 11, 2006.

64 Dana Eyre, former USAID consultant, comments to SIGIR, October 5, 2008.

65 Public Broadcasting Service, “Interview with Philip Zelikow,” FRONTLINE, February 6, 2007.

66 Public Broadcasting Service, “Interview with Philip Zelikow,” FRONTLINE, February 6, 2007; and Dana 

Eyre, former USAID consultant, comments to SIGIR, October 5, 2008.

67SIGIR interview with Lieutenant Colonel Christian Shomber, MNF-W Economics Liaison Officer, June 30, 

2006.

68SIGIR interview with Lieutenant Colonel Christian Shomber, MNF-W Economics Liaison Officer, June 30, 

2006.

69 Richard Steelman, “USAID Iraq Sectoral Consultation: Agriculture/Marshlands,” December 2, 2004; and 

DoS, comments to SIGIR, October 28, 2008.

70 USAID Press Release, “USAID Awards Contract for Agricultural Reconstruction and Development,” 

October 21, 2003.

71 USAID Audit E-267-07-002-P, “USAID/Iraq’s Agriculture Reconstruction and Development Program,” 

January 22, 2007, 2; and USAID Report RAN-C-00-04-00002-00, “Final Report: Agriculture Reconstruction 

Development Program for Iraq,” December 2006.

72 The exported goods included both foodstuff, such as rice, and agricultural technology, such as tractors. See 

also: Richard Steelman, “USAID Iraq Sectoral Consultation: Agriculture/Marshlands,” December 2, 2004. 

73 USAID Audit E-267-07-002-P, “USAID/Iraq’s Agriculture Reconstruction and Development Program,” 

January 22, 2007, 2; and USAID Report RAN-C-00-04-00002-00, “Final Report: Agriculture Reconstruction 

Development Program for Iraq,” December 2006, 337.

74 USAID, “A Transition Plan for the Agricultural Sector in Iraq,” Final Report Vols. I and II, April 2004.

75 USAID, “A Transition Plan for the Agricultural Sector in Iraq,” Final Report Vols. I and II, April 2004, ix.

76 U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Agricultural Programs in Iraq,” December 2006.

77 USAID, “Assistance for Iraq: Agriculture,” updated May 16, 2007; and USAID Audit E-267-07-002-P, 

“USAID/Iraq’s Agriculture Reconstruction and Development Program,” January 22, 2007, 4.

78 USAID Audit E-267-07-002-P, “USAID/Iraq’s Agriculture Reconstruction and Development Program,” 

January 22, 2007, 4-5.

79 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 2008, 130.

80 USAID Press Release, “USAID Awards Inma Agribusiness Program in Iraq,” May 16, 2007.

81 MNF-I, “Provincial Iraqi Control,” updated January 10, 2008, http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.

php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1469&Itemid=78.

82 President George W. Bush, “President Addresses the Nation, Discusses Iraq, War on Terror,” White House 

Press Release, June 28, 2005.

83 P.L. 109-234, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2006, June 15, 2006; P.L. 109-289, 

Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2007, September 29, 2006; P.L. 110-28, U.S. Troop 

Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2007, 

December 21, 2007; and P.L. 110-161, Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2008, December 26, 

2007.

84 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2008, 19; and DoS, Section 2207 Report, 

July 2008, Status of Funds.

85 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2006, 59.

86 SIGIR conversations with Terrence K. Kelly, former JSPA director, September, 2008.

87 General (Ret.) James L. Jones, Chairman, “Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces 

of Iraq,” September 6, 2007, 103.
• 444 •

• Endnotes•

88 The Joint Committee to Transfer Security Responsibility was set up to develop requirements for readiness 

for the handover. Members included Iraqi government officials, U.S. and UK embassy staff, and MNF-I 

leaders. MNF-I, “Provincial Iraqi Control,” updated January 10, 2008, http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.

php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1469&Itemid=78.

89 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 2008, 125.

90 General (Ret.) James L. Jones, Chairman, “Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces 

of Iraq,” September 6, 2007, 125.

91 General (Ret.) James L. Jones, Chairman, “Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces 

of Iraq,” September 6, 2007, 47-48.

92 General (Ret.) James L. Jones, Chairman, “Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces 

of Iraq,” September 6, 2007, 50.

93 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey, former commander of MNSTC-I, April 8, 2008.

94 DoS, Section 2207 Report, October 2006, I-2.

95 DoS, Section 2207 Report, October 2006, I-1; and DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, October 

2005, 30.

96 DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, November 2006, 27-29.

97 DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, November 2006, 31.

98 General (Ret.) James L. Jones, Chairman, “Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces 

of Iraq,” September 6, 2007, 49.

99 SIGIR Audit 08-022, “Government of Iraq Increasingly Funding Iraqi Security Forces Infrastructure 

Development, but Substantial U.S. Support Remains,” July 26, 2008, 12; SIGIR Audit 06-032, “Iraqi Security 

Forces: Review of Plans to Implement Logistics Capabilities,” October 28, 2006; and General (Ret.) James L. 

Jones, Chairman, “Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq,” September 6, 2007, 

36.

100 Bob Woodward, State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 396; and 

Public Broadcasting Service, “Interview with Philip Zelikow,” FRONTLINE, February 6, 2007.

101 Robert Perito, “Policing Iraq: Protecting Iraqis from Criminal Violence,” USIP Briefing, June 2006.

102 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2006, 72.

103 General (Ret.) James L. Jones, Chairman, “Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces 

of Iraq,” September 6, 2007, 94-95, 98.

104 Robert Perito, “Iraq’s Interior Ministry: Frustrating Reform,” USIP Report, May 2008.

105 General (Ret.) James L. Jones, Chairman, “Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces 

of Iraq,” September 6, 2007, 44, 88.

106 General (Ret.) James L. Jones, Chairman, “Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces 

of Iraq,” September 6, 2007, 43-45, 88, 112.

107 General (Ret.) James L. Jones, Chairman, “Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces 

of Iraq,” September 6, 2007, 44, 88, 112-15.

108 General (Ret.) James L. Jones, Chairman, “Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces 

of Iraq,” September 6, 2007, 86, 88, 90.

109 General (Ret.) James L. Jones, Chairman, “Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces 

of Iraq,” September 6, 2007, 90-91.

110 DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, October 2005, 38; DoS Report ISP-IQO-05-72 and 

DoD-IG Report IE-2005-002, “Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training,” July 15, 2005, 34; and DoD, 

Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, July 2005, 20.
• 445 •

• Chapter 25 •

111 General (Ret.) James L. Jones, Chairman, “Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces 

of Iraq,” September 6, 2007, 97.

112 General (Ret.) James L. Jones, Chairman, “Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces 

of Iraq,” September 6, 2007, 99-101.

113 DoS Audit ISP-IQO-06-01, “Inspection of Rule-of-Law Programs, embassy, Baghdad,” October 1, 2005.

114 SIGIR interview with James Santelle, former Rule of Law Coordinator and Resident Legal Advisor, July 22, 

2008.

115 DoS, Weekly Status Report, August 3, 2005.

116 SIGIR interview with James Santelle, former Rule of Law Coordinator and Resident Legal Advisor, July 22, 

2008.

117 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2006, 70.

118 General (Ret.) James L. Jones, Chairman, “Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces 

of Iraq,” September 6, 2007, 106.

119 SIGIR interview with James Santelle, former Rule of Law Coordinator and Resident Legal Advisor, July 22, 

2008.

120 DoS Audit ISP-IQO-06-01, “Inspection of Rule-of-Law Programs, embassy, Baghdad,” October 1, 2005, 

48.

121 SIGIR interview with James Santelle, former Rule of Law Coordinator and Resident Legal Advisor, July 22, 

2008.

122 SIGIR interview with Stephen Andersson, Baghdad PRT Rule of Law advisor, August 26, 2007.

123 SIGIR interview with former Iraqi judge and Coalition Rule of Law advisor, August 26, 2007. Three days 

after this interview, the Judge’s house was burned to the ground and he was taken to a safe house in the Green 

Zone. Wilson Myers, Baghdad PRT legal advisor, email to SIGIR, August 31, 2007.

124 SIGIR interview with Chief Judge Kamel Abd Al-Majeed Yousif, al-Rusafa Appellate District Court, 

August 23, 2007; and Stephen Andersson, Baghdad PRT Rule of Law advisor, “Meeting of Special Inspector 

General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) Stuart W. Bowen Jr, and his Deputy, Michael J. Boisvenue, and Chief 

Judge Kamel Abd Al-Majeed Youisf of the al-Rusafa Appellate District Court,” August 23, 2007.

125 SIGIR interview with James Santelle, former Rule of Law Coordinator and Resident Legal Advisor, July 22, 

2008.

126 SIGIR interview with former Iraqi Judge and coalition Rule of Law advisor, August 26, 2007. 

127 SIGIR interview with former Iraqi Judge and coalition Rule of Law advisor, August 26, 2007.

128Ministerial Coordination Team, “Ministerial Coordination Team: Briefing for SIGIR,” June 2006.

129DoD, Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq, November 2006, 17-18, 24.

130 USIP, “Iraq Study Group,” http://www.usip.org/isg/.

131 USIP, “Iraq Study Group Fact Sheet,” updated December 20, 2006, http://www.usip.org/isg/fact_sheet.

html.

132 Thomas E. Ricks, “Pentagon May Suggest Short-Term Buildup Leading to Iraq Exit,” Washington Post, 

November 20, 2006; and Bob Woodward, The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008 (New 

York, Simon & Schuster, 2008), 231-247.

133 James A. Baker, III and Lee Hamilton, co-chairs, “The Iraq Study Group Report,” December 6, 2006, 20.

134James A. Baker, III and Lee Hamilton, co-chairs, “The Iraq Study Group Report,” December 6, 2006, 49.

135 James A. Baker, III and Lee Hamilton, co-chairs, “The Iraq Study Group Report,” December 6, 2006, 23, 

57-59.
• 446 •

• Endnotes•

136 Frederick W. Kagan, “Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq: Phase I Report,” A Report of the Iraq 

Planning Group, AEI, January 5, 2007; and Public Broadcasting Service, “Interview with Philip Zelikow,” 

FRONTLINE, February 6, 2007.

Essential Services – Transition from Khalilzad to Crocker

137 IRMO, Electricity Daily Units Performance Report, March 2007; and ITAO, Monthly Import, Production 

and Export, response to SIGIR data call for the Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 2008. 

DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, March, 2007, 25; IRMO, Weekly Status Report, March 

13, 2007, 22; Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, “U.S. Deaths By Month,” updated September 2008; SIGIR, 

Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 2007, 11, 108; Iraq Body Count, “Documented civilian 

deaths from violence,” updated August 24, 2008; P.L. 109-102, Appropriations for the Department of State 

for Fiscal Year 2006, November 14, 2005; P.L. 109-148, “Appropriations for the Department of Defense for 

Fiscal Year 2006, December 30, 2005; P.L. 109-234, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal 

Year 2006, June 15, 2006; P.L. 109-289, Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2007, 

September 29, 2006; and Government of Iraq, “2006 Budget” written into law December 2005; and U.S. 

Treasury, response to SIGIR data call for the Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 4, 2008.

138 IRMO, Electricity Daily Units Performance Report, March 2007

139 Joseph A. Christoff, GAO International Affairs and Trade Director, Statement before the House 

Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittees on the Middle East and South Asia and International 

Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, July 18, 2007, 13-14.

140 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2007, 79.

Chapter 26

1 Marc Santora, “U.S. and Iraqis Hit Insurgents in All-Day Fight,” New York Times, January 10, 2007.

2 White House Press Release, “President’s Address to the Nation,” January 10, 2007.

3 White House Press Release, “Fact Sheet: New Way Forward in Iraq,” January 10, 2007; and NSC, “Highlights 

of the Iraq Strategy Review,” January 2007, 11.

4 White House Press Release, “Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials,” January 10, 2007.

5 White House Press Release, “Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials,” January 10, 2007.

6 SIGIR Audit 07-014, “Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program Expansion in Iraq,” July 25, 

2007, i-ii. 

7 DoS, “The New Way Forward: Funding Iraq’s Transition to Self-Reliance and Stabilization in the President’s 

2007 Supplemental and 2008 Requests,” February 2007, 5; and USAID, “Assistance for Iraq: Acquisition and 

Assistance Activities,” updated December 17, 2007.

8 USAID, “Assistance for Iraq: Community Stabilization Program,” updated November 23, 2007. 

9 The President also requested funding for an expansion of existing reconstruction programs in the Fiscal 

Year 2007 supplemental and regular Fiscal Year 2008 budget request Funding went to Iraqi Provincial 

Reconstruction Development Councils, USAID’s Local Governance and Community Action Programs, the 

Rule of Law Program, and various ongoing capacity development and sustainability initiatives. DoS, “The 

New Way Forward: Funding Iraq’s Transition to Self-Reliance and Stabilization in the President’s 2007 

Supplemental and 2008 Requests,” February 2007.

10 The plan more closely resembled a strategy advocated by the American Enterprise Institute. See Frederick 

W. Kagan, “Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq: Phase I Report,” A Report of the Iraq Planning 

Group, AEI, January 5, 2007.
• 447 •

• Chapter 26 •

11 SIGIR interviews with Colonel John R. Martin, Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, Colonel Michael Meese, 

Dr. Kirk Johnson, and Dr. Terrence K. Kelly. Early in 2007, General Casey reportedly said, “The longer we in 

the U.S. forces continue to bear the main burden of Iraq’s security, it lengthens the time that the government of 

Iraq has to take the hard decisions about reconciliation and dealing with the militias. And the other thing is that 

they can continue to blame us for all of Iraq’s problems, which are at base their problems.” Quoted in David E. 

Sanger, Michael R. Gordon, and John F. Burns, “Chaos Overran Iraq Plan in ’06, Bush Team Says,” New York 

Times, January 2, 2007.

12 Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5, December 2006.

13 For an articulation of U.S. strategy in 2005, see White House Press Release, “President Outlines Strategy for 

Victory in Iraq,” November 30, 2005. 

14 SIGIR interview with General David Petraeus, Commander of MNF-I, March 2, 2008; and Dexter Filkins 

and John F. Burns, “Mock Iraqi Villages in Mojave Prepare Troops for Battle,” New York Times, May 1, 2006.

15 Thomas E. Ricks, “U.S. Counterinsurgency Academy Giving Officers A New Mindset: Course in Iraq 

Stresses the Cultural, Challenges the Conventional,” Washington Post, February 21, 2006.

16 SIGIR interview with Colonel Michael Meese, Economic and Reconstruction advisor to General David 

Petraeus, August 30, 2007.

17 Major General William B. Caldwell IV, “MNF-I Situation Update,” February 21, 2007; DoD News 

Transcript, “Joint Press Conference with Secretary Gates, U.S. Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus,” 

June 16, 2007; and Brookings Institution, “Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in 

Post-Saddam Iraq, April 24, 2008, 6. 

18 DoD News Transcript, “News Briefing with Major General Fil from Iraq,” February 16, 2007. 

19 USACE-GRD, comments to SIGIR, November 5, 2008.

20 Edward Wong and David S. Cloud, “U.S. Erects Baghdad Wall to Keep Sects Apart,” New York Times, April 

21, 2007.

21 SIGIR interview with Colonel John R. Martin, Senior Advisor to General David Petraeus; and Ylber 

Bajraktari, Commander’s Initiative Group, August 27, 2007.

22 SIGIR interview with Colonel John R. Martin, Senior Advisor to General David Petraeus; and Ylber 

Bajraktari, Commander’s Initiative Group, August 27, 2007.

23 Condoleezza Rice, “Announcement on Presidential Nominations for U.S. Permanent Representative to the 

United Nations and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq,” January 8, 2007; and Department of State, “Biography: Ryan C. 

Crocker,” March 29, 2007, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/81479.htm. 

24 Condoleezza Rice, “Appointment of Tim Carney as Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq,” January 

12, 2007.

25 SIGIR interview with Ambassador Timothy Carney, former Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq, 

April 5, 2008; and Timothy Carney, “We’re Getting In Our Own Way,” Washington Post, June 22, 2003.

26 SIGIR interview with Colonel Michael Meese, Economic and Reconstruction advisor to General David 

Petraeus, August 30, 2007; Michael Meese, Economic and Reconstruction advisor to General David Petraeus, 

memorandum for the Commanding General, MNC-I, “How to Think About Current Economic Activity in 

Iraq,” undated; and Michael Meese, Economic and Reconstruction advisor to General David Petraeus, memorandum for the Commanding General, MNC-I, “How to Think About Oil and Electricity in Iraq,” February 28, 

2007.

27 The Joint Strategic Assessment Team was co-chaired by the State Department’s David Pierce, JSPA’s Chris 

Schnaubelt and Colonel H.R. McMaster, who had pioneered the successful retaking of Tal Afar. Other members included Steve Biddle, from the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations; Great Britain’s Andrew Rathmell and 

Toby Dodge; Australian David Kilcullen, on loan from the U.S. State Department; the U.K. Army’s Colonel 

Jim Richardson; and Colonel John R. Martin, late of the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War 

College. SIGIR interview with Colonel John R. Martin, Senior Advisor to General David Petraeus; and Ylber 

Bajraktari, Commander’s Initiative Group, August 27, 2007.
• 448 •

• Endnotes•

28 SIGIR interview with Colonel Michael Meese, Economic and Reconstruction advisor to General David 

Petraeus, August 30, 2007.

29 Michael Meese, Economic and Reconstruction advisor to General David Petraeus, memorandum for the 

Commanding General, MNC-I, “How to Think About Current Economic Activity in Iraq,” undated.

30 SIGIR interview with Ambassador. Timothy Carney, former Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq, 

April 5, 2008.

31 SIGIR interview with Ambassador Timothy Carney, former Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq, 

April 5, 2008.

32 SIGIR interview with Ambassador Timothy Carney, former Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq, 

April 5, 2008.

33 DoS, “Biography: Ryan C. Crocker,” March 29, 2007, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/81479.htm.

34 SIGIR interview with Ambassador Timothy Carney, former Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq, 

April 5, 2008.

35 SIGIR interview with Ambassador Timothy Carney, former Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq, 

April 5, 2008.

36 SIGIR Audit 07-005, “Fact Sheet on Sources and Uses of U.S. Funding Provided in Fiscal Year 2006 for Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction,” July 27, 2007, Appendix B.

37 SIGIR interview with General David Petraeus, Commander of MNF-I, March 2, 2008.

38 SIGIR interview with Celeste Ward, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations 

Capabilities, September 9, 2008.

39 Robert Perito, “Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams,” USIP Briefing, March 2008.

40 SIGIR interview with Colonel Michael Meese, Economic and Reconstruction advisor to General David 

Petraeus, August 30, 2007.

41 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Winton, First Brigade Combat Team, Third Infantry 

Division, September 12, 2007.

42 SIGIR interview with Sgt. Friedman, Ramadi Civil Affairs and ePRT, September 12, 2007.

43 SIGIR interview with David Atteberry, USAID officer, Rasheed ePRT, September 3, 2007.

44 SIGIR site visits to PRTs, 2006-07.

45 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Winton, First Brigade Combat Team, Third Infantry 

Division, September 12, 2007.

46 The need for a more comprehensive civilian and military integration was highlighted by the strategic review 

performed by Negroponte and Casey in July 2004, and its follow-on analysis by General Luck in August 2004. 

See Henry W. Stratman, “Orchestrating Instruments of Power for Nationbuilding,” Joint Force Quarterly

41 (2nd quarter 2006), 33-34; and Leonard R. Hawley, “An Analysis of the DCS for Political and Economic 

Effects,” August 2004. 

47 SIGIR interview with Mike Antoine, Rasheed ePRT, September 3, 2007.

48 SIGIR interview with David Atteberry, USAID officer, Rasheed ePRT, September 3, 2007.

49 SIGIR interview with Mike Antoine, Rasheed ePRT, September 3, 2007.

50 USAID-IG Audit E-267-08-001-P, “Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Community Stabilization Program,” March 18, 

2008, 6-10.

51 SIGIR interview with David Atteberry, USAID officer, Rasheed ePRT, September 3, 2007.

52 SIGIR interview with Timothy Zuniga-Brown, Team leader, Rasheed ePRT, September 3, 2007.

53 USAID-IG Audit E-267-08-001-P, “Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Community Stabilization Program,” March 18, 

2008, 21.
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54 SIGIR interview with Timothy Zuniga-Brown, Team leader, Rasheed ePRT, September 3, 2007.

55 SIGIR interview with David Atteberry, USAID officer, Rasheed ePRT, September 3, 2007.

56 SIGIR interview with David Atteberry, USAID officer, Rasheed ePRT, September 3, 2007.

57 Ginger Cruz, Deputy Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Testimony before the House 

Armed Services Committee, September 5, 2007. For background on the protest by bi-lingual, bi-cultural 

advisors (BBAs) on alliance with Sunni tribes, see SIGIR interview with Timothy Zuniga-Brown, Team leader, 

Rasheed ePRT, September 3, 2007.

58 SIGIR interview with Mike Antoine, Rasheed ePRT, September 3, 2007.

59 SIGIR interview with Timothy Zuniga-Brown, Team leader, Rasheed ePRT, September 3, 2007.

60 SIGIR interviews with David Atteberry, USAID officer, Rasheed ePRT; and Timothy Zuniga-Brown, Team 

leader, Rasheed ePRT, September 3, 2007.

61 Paul A. Brinkley, “Restoring Hope: Economic Revitalization in Iraq Moves Forward,” Military Review

(March-April 2008), 9.

62 SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, February 9, 2006; and SIGIR 

interview with Thomas Wheelock, former Chief of Party for USAID’s contractor International Resource 

Group, January 5, 2006. For background, see DoD News Briefing, “DoD News Briefing with Secretary Gordon 

England, Paul Brinkley and Minister Fawzi Hariri at the Pentagon, Arlington, VA,” September 4, 2007.

63 Joint Contracting Command-Iraq response to SIGIR data call, September 19, 2007.

64 MNF-I Press Release, “MNF-I Iraqi First Program Surpasses $1 Billion for Year,” July 16, 2007.

65 MNF-I Press Briefing, “Operational Update: Rear Adm. Smith, Rear Adm. Dussault,” February 24, 2008. 

66 Early attempts at direct contracting with Iraqi firms include the Accelerated Iraq Reconstruction Program in 

early 2004, Rapid Construction Initiative and Direct Contracting Initiative in late 2004 and the PW-90 Small 

Scale Potable Water Program in 2004. John Daley, Gulf Region Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, comments to SIGIR, October 22, 2008.

67 Paul A. Brinkley, “A Cause for Hope: Economic Revitalization in Iraq,” Military Review (July-August 2007), 

2-11; and Paul A. Brinkley, “Task Force to Support Improved Business and Stability Operations in Iraq,” DoD 

Discussion Document, November 18, 2006.

68 SIGIR interview with Gordon England, Deputy Secretary of Defense, March 28, 2008.

69 Paul A. Brinkley, “A Cause for Hope: Economic Revitalization in Iraq,” Military Review (July-August 2007), 

2-11; Paul A. Brinkley, “Restoring Hope: Economic Revitalization in Iraq Moves Forward,” Military Review

(March-April 2008), 8-17; and DoD, “Task Force to Improve Business and Stability Operations-Iraq,” http://

www.defenselink.mil/tfbso/.

70 SIGIR interview with Ambassador Timothy Carney, former Coordinator for the Economic Transition in 

Iraq, April 5, 2008; and Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Defense Skirts State in Reviving Iraqi Industries,” Washington 

Post, May 14, 2007.

71 SIGIR interview with Gordon England, Deputy Secretary of Defense, March 28, 2008.

72 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2007, 95. 

73 Paul A. Brinkley, “Task Force to Support Improved Business and Stability Operations in Iraq,” DoD 

Discussion Document, November 18, 2006.

74 SIGIR, Quarterly Reportto the United States Congress, October 2007, 95; and SIGIR Audit 08-024, 

“Information on a Special Department of Defense Program to Foster Economic Recovery in Iraq,” July 29, 2008. 

75 USACE-GRD, “Program Review Board,” PowerPoint presentation, March 10, 2008.

76 SIGIR interview with David Leach, GRD Deputy Director; and Dennis Plochmeyer, GRD Senior Advisor, 

March 18, 2008.
• 450 •

• Endnotes•

77 SIGIR interview with David Leach, GRD Deputy Director; and Dennis Plochmeyer, GRD Senior Advisor, 

March 18, 2008; and USACE-GRD, comments to SIGIR, November 5, 2008.

78 SIGIR interview with Ambassador Ryan Crocker, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, February 24, 2008.

79 Executive Order 13431, “Establishment of Temporary Organization to Facilitate United States Government 

Assistance for Transition in Iraq,” May 9, 2007. 

80 ITAO, “ITAO Manning Document,” January 25, 2008.

81 Correspondence between SIGIR, ITAO, Political and Economic Sections, and the office of the Deputy 

Chief of Mission, March 2008.

82 Patrick F. Kennedy, “American Embassy Baghdad: Organization and Staffing Report,” May 23, 2007, 24.

83 Patrick F. Kennedy, “American Embassy Baghdad: Organization and Staffing Report,” May 23, 2007, 18. 

For further detail about the inadequate circulation of PRT reporting, see SIGIR interview with Allison Monz 

and Cathy Westley, Political Officers, August 23, 2007.

84 SIGIR Audit 07-008, “Fact Sheet on the Roles and Responsibilities of U.S. Government Organizations 

Conducting IRRF-Funded Reconstruction Activities,” July 26, 2007, 2. 

85 Michael Meese, Economic and Reconstruction advisor to General David Petraeus, memorandum for the 

Commanding General, MNC-I, “How to Think About Current Economic Activity in Iraq,” undated.

86 SIGIR interview with Colonel Michael Meese, Economic and Reconstruction advisor to General David 

Petraeus, August 30, 2007.

87 SIGIR interview with Christopher King, Senior Advisor to the Commission on Public Integrity, June 19, 

2006.

88 SIGIR site visit, August-September, 2007.

89 SIGIR interview with James Kunder, USAID Acting Deputy Administrator, February 15, 2008.

90 SIGIR interview with General David Petraeus, Commander of MNF-I, March 2, 2008.

91 Problems in reporting chains on reconstruction projects were noted by a recent SIGIR audit. SIGIR Audit 

09-007, “Improvements Needed in Reporting Status of Reconstruction Projects to Chief of Mission,” October 

28, 2008, i-ii.

92 SIGIR interview with Ambassador Timothy Carney, former Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq, 

April 5, 2008.

93 For a brief description of program activities, see USAID, “Assistance for Iraq: Community Stabilization 

Program,” updated November 23, 2007. 

94 USAID-IG Audit E-267-08-001-P, “Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Community Stabilization Program,” March 18, 

2008, 1.

95 SIGIR interview with Joel Sandefur, USAID Regional Legal Advisor, and a panel of staff from the USAID 

Community Stabilization Program, September 7, 2007.

96 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 2008, 52-54; and USAID-IG Audit E-267-

08-001-P, “Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Community Stabilization Program,” March 18, 2008, 13.

97 USAID-IG Audit E-267-08-001-P, “Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Community Stabilization Program,” March 18, 

2008, 13.

98 SIGIR interview with Joel Sandefur, USAID Regional Legal Advisor, and a panel of staff from the USAID 

Community Stabilization Program, September 7, 2007.

99 SIGIR interview with Vijay Samaraweera, Senior Policy Advisor for Regional Government, RTI 

International, August 16, 2007.

100 SIGIR site visit, August-September, 2007.

101 SIGIR site visit, August-September, 2007.
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102 Patrick F. Kennedy, “American Embassy Baghdad: Organization and Staffing Report,” May 23, 2007, 26.

103 SIGIR site visit, August-September, 2007.

104 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 2008, 50; and GAO Report 09-86R. 

“Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan,” October 1, 2008.

105 Stephen D. Andersson, Rule of Law Coordinator, Baghdad PRT, email to SIGIR, September 4, 2007.

106 U.S. Embassy Baghdad memorandum, “Guidelines for Administration of the PRT/ePRT Quick Response 

Fund,” v.1, August 12, 2007; and U.S. Embassy Baghdad memorandum, “Quick Response Fund SOP#1: Grant 

Submission and Approval Process,” v.1, September 3, 2007.

107 SIGIR site visit, August-September, 2007.

108 Stephen D. Andersson, Rule of Law Coordinator, Baghdad PRT, email to SIGIR, September 4, 2007; and 

SIGIR site visit, August-September, 2007.

109 The original procedures were to check the names against the Office of Foreign Assets Control “Specifically 

Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons” list. Stephen D. Andersson, Rule of Law Coordinator, Baghdad 

PRT, email to SIGIR, September 4, 2007.

110 Stephen D. Andersson, Rule of Law Coordinator, Baghdad PRT, email to SIGIR, September 4, 2007; 

and Regional Security Office, U.S. Embassy Baghdad, official form, “U.S. Embassy Baghdad Security 

Certification Request,” undated. See “Instructions: In order to initiate vetting, complete the following information, attach the requested documents, and make an appointment to submit fingerprints. Failure to provide 

this information or any supporting documents will result in suspension of action and return of your case.”

111 Stephen D. Andersson, Rule of Law Coordinator, Baghdad PRT, email to SIGIR, September 4, 2007.

112 SIGIR interview with Steve Connolly, QRF Coordinator for DAI, March 3, 2008.

113 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2008, 84. 

114 An estimated 9 percent of IRRF 1 funds remained unobligated. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United 

States Congress, January 2008, 55.

115 Expenditures by each of these contractors through the end of 2007 ranged from $932 million to $501 million, respectively. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 2008, 57-58.

116 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 2008, 20-22, 122.

117 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 2008, 49-52.

118 SIGIR, Quarterly Reports to the United States Congress, The Human Toll, April, July, and October 2006, 

and January and April 2007. A total of $30 million in funds was de-obligated from the Infrastructure Security 

Program by the State Department in order to pay for refugee assistance, bringing the allocation down from the 

original $247 million to $217 million. USACE-GRD vetting comments to SIGIR, November 5, 2008.

119 SIGIR Audit 09-004, “Iraq Reconstruction Project Terminations Represent a Range of Actions,” October 

27, 2008, i, 5.

120 GAO Report 07-677, “Rebuilding Iraq: Integrated Strategic Plan Needed to Help Restore Iraq’s Oil and 

Electricity Sectors,” May 2007; and SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2007, 34-35.

121 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2007; and DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2007.

122 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2007; and DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2007.

123 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2007; and DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2007.

124 SIGIR Inspection PA-07-116, “Nassriya Water Treatment Plant, Nassriya Iraq,” April 28, 2008.

125 SIGIR interview with Ambassador Ryan Crocker, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, February 24, 2008.

126 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 2008, 29-30.

127 SIGIR interview with Colonel Mark Martins, former MNF-I Staff Judge Advocate, July 24, 2008.
• 452 •

• Endnotes•

128 For a comprehensive account of the building and initial performance of the Baghdad Rule of Law complex, 

see MNF-I Staff Judge Advocate’s Office, “Report to the Ministerial Committee for Rule of Law and Detention 

on The Rule of Law Complex in Rusafa: June to December 2007,” January 2008. 

129 SIGIR interview with Colonel Mark Martins, former MNF-I Staff Judge Advocate, July 24, 2008.

130 The State Department notes that these 5,000 guards are contracted to the Iraqi Facilities Protection 

Service, and that because their effectiveness is suspect an effort is underway to form either a federalized Judicial 

Protection Service under the employ of the Iraqi judiciary or have guards provided by the Ministry of the 

Interior. State Department, comments to SIGIR, October 28, 2008.

131 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2008, 86-88.

132 Prime Minister Gordon Brown, official correspondence to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, official correspondence, July 29, 2007.

133 Suleiman al-Khalidi, “Iraq Needs $100-150 Bln for Reconstruction: Finance Minister,” Reuters, August 20, 

2007. 

134 Alissa J. Rubin, “Sunni Sheik Who Backed U.S. in Iraq is Killed,” New York Times, September 14, 2007.

135 DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, September 2007, 21.

136 DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, June 2007, 21.

137 P.L. 110-28, U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability 

Appropriations Act, 2007, May 25, 2007. 

138 NSC, “Initial Benchmark Assessment Report,” July 12, 2007. 

139 GAO Report 07-1195, “Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most 

Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks,” September 2007; David M. Walker, Comptroller General, 

Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, September 4, 2007; and White House Press 

Release, “Benchmark Assessment Report,” September 14, 2007.

140 General David Petraeus, MNF-I Commander, Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign 

Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services, September 10, 2007; and Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, U.S. 

Ambassador to the Republic of Iraq, Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 

Committee on Armed Services, September 10, 2007.

141 International Compact with Iraq, “About the Compact,” updated June 8, 2008, http://www.iraqcompact.

org/en/about.asp.

142 Daniel Kaufman, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, “Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators 

1996-2006,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. 4280, July 2007; and SIGIR, Quarterly Report to 

the United States Congress, April 2008, 34.

143 BBC News, December 18, 2008, “Iraq economy ‘on track’ says IMF.”

144 DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, June 2008.

145 Jay Price, “Calmer Iraq a Big Boost to RTI’s work,” News and Observer, July 16, 2008. 

146 SIGIR interview with Jeremiah S. Pam, former Treasury Attaché, September 9, 2008.

147 Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Iraq, Testimony before the Senate 

Armed Services Committee, April 8, 2008.

148 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 2008, 24.

149 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 2008, 3.

150 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2008, 6.

151 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 2008, 32.

152 SIGIR conversations with Terrence K. Kelly, former JSPA director, September 2008.
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• Chapter 27 •

153 News organizations, brigades and some USAID programs have each at different times produced data on a 

variety of measures. See, for instance: ABC News, USA Today, BBC and ARD, “Opinion Poll: Conducted Feb 

25-March 5, 2007,” March 19, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/graphics/iraqpoll_pdf/iraq_poll.pdf; 

and World Public Opinion, “What the Iraqi Public Wants,” conducted by the Program on International Policy 

Attitudes, January 31, 2006, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jan06/Iraq_Jan06_rpt.pdf. Fuel 

delivery includes benzene, diesel, liquefied petroleum gas, and kerosene.

154 DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, reports for 2006 and 2007.

155 Secretary Rice is quoted in Michael R. Gordon, “The 2000 Campaign: The Military; Bush Would Stop U.S. 

Peacekeeping in Balkan Fights,” New York Times, October 21, 2000.

156 Yochi J. Dreazen, “New Rebuilding Plan in Iraq Stirs Debate about Tactics,” Wall Street Journal, April 19, 

2007. 

157 SIGIR interview with Iraqi team leader employed by a USAID program, August 2007.

Essential Services Overview – After the Surge 

158 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2008, 11, 14-20, 58-60, 64; DoD, Measuring 

Stability and Security in Iraq, June 2008, 35; SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 

2008, 68; World Bank Operations in Iraq, “Status of Projects in Portfolio,” February 29, 2008; Iraq Coalition 

Casualty Count, “U.S. Deaths By Month,” updated September 2008; and Iraq Body Count, “Documented 

civilian deaths from violence,” updated August 24, 2008; P.L. 110-28, U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, 

Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2007, May 25, 2007; P.L. 110-92, 

P.L. 110-116, P.L. 110-137, P.L. 110-149, 2007 Foreign Assistance Continuing Resolutions, December 21, 

2007; P.L. 110-161, Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2008, December 26, 2007; and P.L. 110-

252, Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2008, June 30, 2008.

159 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2008, 64; and International Compact with Iraq, 

“A New Beginning: Annual Review,” May 2007-April 2008, 50.

160 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2008, 60-62.

Chapter 27

1 SIGIR interview with James Kunder, USAID Acting Deputy Administrator, February 15, 2008.

2 SIGIR interview with General (Ret.) Colin Powell, former Secretary of State, February 4, 2008.

3 Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense, letter to Stuart Bowen, Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction, April 4, 2008. 

4 Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, Statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, February 13, 

2008. 

5 NBC interview with Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, December 21, 2008.

6 SIGIR interview with Lt. General (Ret.) Ricardo Sanchez, former CJTF-7 Commander, October 26, 2007.

7 SIGIR Audit 09-005, “Agencies Need Improved Financial Data Reporting for Private Security Contractors,” 

October 30, 2008, i, 3, 6.

8 For a cumulative analysis of SIGIR inspections and audits, see SIGIR PA 08-139, “Summary of Project 

Assessments Through April 2008,” July 24, 2008; and SIGIR Audit 08-020, “Key Recurring Management 

Issues Identified in Audits of Iraq Reconstruction Efforts,” July 27, 2008.

9 SIGIR Audit 07-008, “Fact Sheet on the Roles and Responsibilities of U.S. Government Organizations 

Conducting IRRF-Funded Reconstruction Activities,” July 26, 2007, 2. 

10 For a detailed analysis of the history of Army contracting, see Jacques S. Gansler, Chairman, “Urgent Reform 

Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting,” Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in 

Expeditionary Operations, October 31, 2007, 17, 29.
• 454 •

• Endnotes•

11 The number of government employees has fallen from 4,058 in 1980 to 2,200 in 2008. Brian J. Atwood, M. 

Peter McPherson, and Andrew Natsios, “Arrested Development: Making Foreign Aid a More Effective Tool,” 

Foreign Affairs 6 (October-November 2008).

12 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, “Remarks at Landon Lecture, Kansas State University,” November 26, 

2007.

Afterword

1 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2008, 9.

2 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Human Capital Management,” January 2006; SIGIR, “Iraq 

Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006; and SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: 

Lessons in Program and Project Management,” March 2007.

3 S. 3001, “Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for 2009,” Title XVI: Reconstruction and 

Stabilization Civilian Management.

4 S. 3001, “Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for 2009,” Sec. 1605.

5 S. 3001, “Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for 2009,” Sec. 1605.

6 National Security Presidential Directive 44, “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction 

and Stabilization,” December 7, 2005. For an overview of State Department actions in response to NSPD 

44, see DoS, Office of the Spokesman, “President Issues Directive to Improve the United States’ Capacity to 

Manage Reconstruction and Stabilization Efforts,” December 14, 2005.

7 Office of Management and Budget, “Appendix to the Budget of the United States Government for Fiscal 

Year 2009,” 771-772. In February 2008, the Administration requested almost $649 million for the Civilian 

Stabilization Initiative (CSI) to develop “a coordinated capacity across the 15 United States Government 

civilian agencies and the Department of Defense for a ‘Whole of Government’ response to emergent 

Reconstruction and Stabilization crises.” DoS, Congressional Budget Justification Fiscal Year 2009, 531-533. 

TheCongress later appropriated around $75 million to support the CSI. Nina M. Serafino, Congressional 

Research Service Report RL32862, “Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background 

and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and 

Reconstruction Capabilities,” updated September 18, 2008, 2.

8 For a review of the government’s reform efforts to date, see GAO Report 08-39, “Stabilization and 

Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the 

Civilian Reserve Corps,” November 2007.

9 Project on National Security Reform, “Ensuring Security in an Unpredictable World: The Urgent Need for 

National Security Reform,” Preliminary Findings, July 2008, 60-61; and Derek Chollet, Mark Irvine, Bradley 

Larson, “A Steep Hill:Congress and U.S. Efforts to Strengthen Fragile States,” CSIS, March 2008, 27-29.

10 DoD Directive 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) 

Operations,” November 28, 2005, 2.

11 Michael A. Alexander, Army War College Report A270974, “The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Support of 

Combatant Commands,” March 15, 2008, 5.

12 FM 3-07, “Stability Operations,” Department of the Army, October 2008.

13 Jacques S. Gansler, Chairman, “Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting,” Commission 

on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, October 31, 2007, 2-4; and 

Robert Gates, “Report to Congress on the Implementation of DoD Directive 3000.05 Military Support for 

Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” April 1, 2007.

14 SIGIR interview with General David Petraeus, Commander of MNF-I, March 2, 2008.

15 Project on National Security Reform, “Ensuring Security in an Unpredictable World: The Urgent Need for 

National Security Reform,” Preliminary Findings, July 2008, 30, 32.

16 Robert Gates, “Remarks before the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign,” July 15, 2008.
• 455 •

• Annex B •

Annex A

1 The Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction was created by Congress in 2003 as 

the Office of the Inspector General of the Coalition Provisional Authority. The CPA-IG was created by the 

Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan 

(P.L. 108-106, Section 3001), enacted November 6, 2003, in order to provide for independent and objective 

conduct and supervision of audits and investigations relating to the programs and operations of the Coalition 

Provisional Authority. The Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (P.L. 

108-375), enacted October 28, 2004, redesignated the CPA-IG as SIGIR. 

2 P.L. 108-106, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq 

and Afghanistan for Fiscal Year 2004, Section 3001(a)2(A), November 6, 2003.

3 For previous lessons learned reports, see SIGIR, “Initiatives: Lessons Learned,” http://www.sigir.mil/initiatives/lessonslearned.aspx.

Annex B

1 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2008, 16; and GAO Testimony 08-568T, 

“Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Address Inadequate Accountability over U.S. Efforts and 

Investments,” March 11, 2008, 1.

2 The Department of Treasury Office of Inspector General also issued one report reviewing the agency’s activities in Iraq. See Treasury OIG Audit 06-029, “International Assistance Programs: Review of Treasury Activities 

for Iraq Reconstruction,” March 23, 2006.

3 Commission on Wartime Contracting, “Background Information and Chronology,” http://webb.senate.

gov/pdf/wtcontractbg.pdf. 

4 Duke of Wellington, letter to the Foreign Office, 1812 as cited in: Clive Grace, “The Rapidly Changing World 

of Audit and Inspection,” Public Management and Policy Association, October 11, 2004. 

5 SIGIR interview with Joseph Farinella, Acting Assistant Inspector General for USAID, October 31, 2005.

6 P.L. 108-106, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq 

and Afghanistan for Fiscal Year 2004, November 6, 2003.

7 USAID OIG, “Iraq Information: Reports to Management,” http://www.usaid.gov/oig/iraq_information_

rptsmemos.html; and SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2008, Appendix N.

8 GAO, “Topic Collection: Iraq and Afghanistan,” http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/oif.html; and 

SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2008, Appendix N.

9 DoS OIG, “Office of Inspector General: Iraq & Afghanistan,” http://oig.state.gov/c26058.htm. For a list of 

completed audits, reports, and testimonies of various oversight agencies see SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the 

United States Congress, October 2008, Appendix N.

10 DoD OIG Report D-208-086, “Challenges Impacting Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom 

Reported by Major Oversight Organizations Beginning FY 2003 through FY 2007,” July 18, 2008, i.

11 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2008, Appendix N.

12 DoD OIG Report D-2008-086, “Challenges Impacting Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom 

Reported by Major Oversight Organizations Beginning FY 2003 through FY 2007,” July 18, 2008, 1-2, 5.

13 For a list of completed USAAA audits, see SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 

2008, Appendix N.

14 SIGIR, Quarterly Reports to the United States Congress, October 2005, 104; April 2006, 216; July 2006, 

Appendix L; January 2007, Appendix K; and April 2007, Appendix L.

15 SIGIR, Quarterly Reports to the United States Congress, July 2007, Appendix L; and October 2008, 

Appendix M.

16 DCAA, “DCAA History,” http://www.dcaa.mil/.
• 456 •

• Endnotes•

17 DoD OIG Report D-2004-057, “Acquisition: Contracts Awarded for the Coalition Provisional Authority by 

the Defense Contracting Command-Washington,” March 18, 2004, iii. 

18 DCAA Audit 3311-2004K17900055, “Report on Audit of Proposal for Restore Iraqi Oil Task Order No. 5,” 

October 8, 2004. 

19 James Glantz, “Army to Pay Halliburton Unit Most Costs Disputed by Audit,” New York Times, February 

27, 2006.

20 P.L. 108-106, “Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq 

and Afghanistan for Fiscal Year 2004,” Title III, Section 3001, November 6, 2003. 

21 SIGIR Audit 05-004, “Oversight of Funds Provided to Iraqi Ministries through the National Budget 

Process,” January 30, 2005, 9-11. 

22 Congressional Record–Senate, “Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Iraq and Afghanistan Security 

and Reconstruction , 2004-Continued,” Amendments 1846 and 1847, October 15, 2003, S12585-S12589; and 

P.L. 108-106, “Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq 

and Afghanistan for Fiscal Year 2004,” Title III, Section 3001, November 6, 2003.

23 George W. Bush, “Statement on Signing the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense 

and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 39 

(November 6, 2003), 1549.

24 P.L. 108-106, “Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq 

and Afghanistan for Fiscal Year 2004,” Title III, Section 3001, November 6, 2003. The legislation stated that: 

“The Office of Inspector General shall terminate six months after the authorities and duties of the Coalition 

Provisional Authority cease to exist.”

25 P.L. 108-375, “Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization for the Fiscal Year 2005, October 28, 

2004.

26 SIGIR, “Audits,” http://www.sigir.mil/audits/Default.aspx. 

27 SIGIR, “Inspections,” http://www.sigir.mil/inspection/Default.aspx. 

28 SIGIR Audit 08-020, “Key Recurring Management Issues Identified in Audits of Iraq Reconstruction 

Efforts,” July 27, 2008, ii.

29 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, “SIGIR Summary of Performance,” January 2009.

30 SIGIR, “Initiatives: Lessons Learned,” http://www.sigir.mil/initiatives/LessonsLearned.aspx.

31 110th Congress, 1st Session, S.680, “An Act: To ensure proper oversight and accountability in Federal 

contracting, and for other purposes,” passed the Senate November 7, 2007.

32 SIGIR, “Reports: Quarterly Reports to Congress,” http://www.sigir.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/default.

aspx.