THE UNITED STATES

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

VIR

A

IBUS M RI VICTORIA
Cover

The Naval War College complex on

Coasters Harbor Island, in a photograph

taken about 2000, looking roughly northeast. In the center foreground is Luce

Hall, with Pringle Hall to its left and

Mahan Hall hidden behind it; behind

them, to the left, are Spruance, Conolly,

and Hewitt halls. In the center, partly obscured by Conolly Hall, is McCarty Little

Hall. On the extreme right in the foreground is Founders Hall, in which the

College was established. In recent years

the College has expanded into parts of

several buildings of the Surface Warfare

Officers School Command, on the northern part of the island. In the middle distance are facilities of Naval Station

Newport (the decommissioned aircraft

carriers ex-Forrestal and ex-Saratoga are

visible at Pier 1) and, beyond that, of the

Naval Undersea Warfare Center. In the

far distance can be seen parts of the towns

of Portsmouth and Tiverton, Rhode

Island.

Photograph 2008 by Onne van der

Wal Photography, Inc.

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Friday, December 12, 2008 9:23:30 AM
U.S. Naval Strategy in the 198

Selected Documents

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Newport, Rhode Island

Edited with an Introduction by

John B. Hattendorf, D.Phil.

Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime H

Naval War College

and

Captain Peter M. Swartz, USN (Ret.

CNA

THE UNITED STATES

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

VIR

A

IBUS M RI VICTORIA

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Wednesday, December 17, 2008 11:37:38 AM
Naval War College

Newport, Rhode Island

Center for Naval Warfare Studies

Newport Paper Thirty-three

December 2008

President, Naval War College

Rear Adm. James P. Wisecup, USN

Provost

Amb. Mary Ann Peters

Associate Provost and Dean of Academics (Acting)

William R. Spain

Dean of Naval Warfare Studies

Robert C. Rubel

Naval War College Press

Director: Dr. Carnes Lord

Managing Editor: Pelham G. Boyer

Telephone: 401.841.2236

Fax: 401.841.1071

DSN exchange: 948

E-mail: press@nwc.navy.mil

Web: www.nwc.navy.mil/press

Printed in the United States of America

The Newport Papers are extended research projects that the

Director, the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies, and the

President of the Naval War College consider of particular

interest to policy makers, scholars, and analysts.

The views expressed in the Newport Papers are those of the

authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the

Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Correspondence concerning the Newport Papers may be

addressed to the Director of the Naval War College Press.

To request additional copies, back copies, or subscriptions

to the series, please either write the President (Code 32S),

Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, RI

02841-1207, or contact the Press staff at the telephone, fax,

or e-mail addresses given.

Reproduction and printing are subject to the Copyright Act

of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States. This

document may be freely reproduced for academic or other

noncommercial use; however, it is requested that

reproductions credit the author and Newport Papers series

and that the Press editorial office be informed. To obtain

permission to reproduce this publication for commercial

purposes, contact the Press editorial office.

ISSN 1544-6824

ISBN 978-1-884733-56-7

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Wednesday, December 17, 2008 11:38:37 AM
Contents

Foreword, by Carnes Lord 

Acknowledgments 

Introduction 

DOCUMENT ONE Maritime Strategy Presentation (for th

Secretary of the Navy, 4 November 1982

DOCUMENT TWO The Maritime Strategy, 1984 

DOCUMENT THREE The Amphibious Warfare Strategy, 1985 

DOCUMENT FOUR The Maritime Strategy: Global Maritim

Elements for U.S. National Strategy, 198

DOCUMENT FIVE The Maritime Strategy, 1986 

DOCUMENT SIX Looking beyond the Maritime Strateg

DOCUMENT SEVEN The Maritime Strategy: The Maritime 

Component of the U.S. National

Strategy, 1988–1989

DOCUMENT EIGHT Maritime Strategy for the 1990s 

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms 

Index 

About the Editors 

The Newport Papers 

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Foreword

U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents is the thirty-third in the Nav

College Press’s Newport Papers monograph series, and the third in a projected fo

volume set of authoritative documents relating to U.S. Navy strategy and strategi

planning during and after the Cold War. Edited by John B. Hattendorf, a distingu

naval historian and chairman of the Maritime History Department at the Naval W

College, this volume is an indispensable supplement to Professor Hattendorf ’s un

informed narrative of the genesis and development of the Navy’s strategy for glo

war with the Soviet Union, The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 19

1986, Newport Paper 19 (2004). It continues the story of the Navy’s reaction to th

growing Soviet naval and strategic threats over the decade of the 1970s, as docum

in U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s: Selected Documents, Newport Paper 30 (2007)

sets the stage for the rethinking of the Navy’s role following the demise of the So

Union at the end of the 1980s, as presented in U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s: Se

Documents, Newport Paper 27 (2006). Both of these volumes were also edited by 

Hattendorf. A fourth volume, of documents on naval strategy from the 1950s an

1960s, will eventually round out this important and hitherto very imperfectly kn

history.

This project will make a major contribution not just to the history of the United 

Navy since World War II but also to that of American military institutions, strate

and planning more generally. Including as it does both originally classified docum

and statements crafted for public release, it shows how the Navy’s leadership not 

grappled with fundamental questions of strategy and force structure but sought 

to translate the strategic insights resulting from this process into a rhetorical form

suited to the public and political arenas.

Finally, it should be noted that all of this is of more than merely historical intere

October 2007, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead, unveiled 

presentation to the International Seapower Symposium at the Naval War College

Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” the first attempt by the sea serv

this country to articulate a strategy or vision for maritime power in the contemp

security environment—a new era of protracted low-intensity warfare and growin

global economic interdependence. It is too early to tell what impact this docume

have on the Navy, its sister services, allies and others abroad, or the good order o

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better place to begin than with the material collected in this volume and its forthcoming successor.

CARNES LORD

Director, Naval War College Press

Newport, Rhode Island

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Acknowledgments

The explanatory notes and introduction to this book of documents from the 198

to its predecessors on the 1990s and the 1970s are all adaptations and extensions 

information initially gathered by Captain Peter M. Swartz, USN (Ret.), of the Ce

for Naval Analyses (CNA), Alexandria, Virginia, which he used in developing a

PowerPoint presentation covering the history of the U.S. Navy’s strategic docume

over the thirty-eight-year period between 1970 and 2008. The version used for re

ence in this work was that dated 24 July 2008.*

Captain Swartz presented his briefing widely, extensively circulating it during its 

opment and garnering new insight and information at each iteration over more t

three years. Additionally, in order to support our work in preparing this volume, 

2006 and 2007 CNA strategy conferences devoted considerable time to the strate

documents included in this volume. We are particularly grateful to Christine Fox 

Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt of CNA for their permission and encouragemen

use and to elaborate upon these materials.

In essence, the introduction and the explanatory notes in this volume are a comp

and the editors’ attempt to reconcile the various recollections and comments of a 

ety of the participants who shaped the process of writing these documents. As su

this volume is only a limited contribution toward a complete and detailed history 

naval thinking in this decade, one that will need to be written in the light of the a

tional documents and materials that will progressively become available in the fu

for historical research and open publication.

We are grateful to all who have provided their insights at various points about str

development during the 1980s, either in terms of the evolution of Peter Swartz’s 

ing, during the CNA conferences, or in subsequent e-mail correspondence with o

the other of us, including Captain Roger Barnett, USN (Ret.), Captain Joe Bouch

USN (Ret.), Captain Linton Brooks, USN (Ret.), Commander Mitch Brown, USN

(Ret.), Captain John Byron, USN (Ret.), Hon. Seth Cropsey (CNA), Colonel Geo

Dallas (MCCDC chief of staff), Captain Tom Daly, USN (Ret.), Commander Stev

* Peter M. Swartz, principal author, with graphics by Karin B. Duggan, “US Navy Capstone Str

& Concepts (1970–2008): Insights for the US Navy of 2009 and Beyond,” version of 24 July 

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HQMC), Captain Dick Diamond, USN (Ret.), Commander John Dickmann, USN

(Ret.), Commander Tom Disy, USN, Captain Will Dossel, USN (Ret.), Captain Mike

Dunaway, USN (Ret.), Dr. Norman Friedman, Dr. Hank Gaffney (CNA), Mr. Mike

Gerson (CNA), Commander Neil Golightly, USNR (Ret.), Captain Robby Harris, USN

(Ret.), Captain Bradd Hayes, USN (Ret.), Rear Admiral Jerry Holland, USN (Ret.),

Admiral James Holloway III, USN (Ret.), Dr. Tom Hone, Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr.,

USN (Ret.), Captain W. Spencer Johnson, USN (Ret.), Mr. Mike Markowitz (CNA),

Captain Rod McDaniel, USN (Ret.), Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, USN (Ret.)

(CNA), Captain Kenneth McGruther, USN (Ret.), Mr. Edward S. Miller, Captain Vance

Morrison, USN (Ret.), Captain Judy (Holden) Myers, USN (Ret.), Commander Paul

Nagy, USN, Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer, Mr. Ron O’Rourke, Dr. Michael Palmer, Commander T. Wood Parker, USN (Ret.), Rear Admiral Bill Pendley, USN (Ret.), Dr. David

Perin (CNA), Dr. Peter Perla (CNA), Hon. Robin Pirie, Commander Michael Pocolyko,

USN (Ret.), Dr. Bruce Powers, Mr. Fred Rainbow, Commander Steve Recca, USN (Ret.)

Dr. David A. Rosenberg, Captain Pat Roth, USN (Ret.), Mr. Jeffrey Sands, Captain Larry

Seaquist, USN (Ret.), Vice Admiral Joseph Sestak, USN, Dr. Francis Shoup, Rear Admiral James Stark, USN (Ret.), Admiral James Stavridis, USN, Rear Admiral Joseph

Strasser, USN (Ret.), Captain George Thibault, USN (Ret.), Vice Admiral Pat Tracey,

USN (Ret.), Commander Jim Tritten, USN (Ret.), Admiral Carlisle Trost, USN (Ret.),

Dr. Scott Truver, Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN (Ret.), Dr. Harlan Ullman, Commander Stan Weeks, USN (Ret.), Mr. Mark Werner, Hon. Francis J. West, Jr., Major

General Tom Wilkerson, USMC (Ret.), Captain Jay Williams, USNR (Ret.), and Colonel Bob Work, USMC.

Our special thanks are due to CNA’s Michael Gerson and OPNAV N3/N5’s Vice Admiral John Morgan, Commander Paul Nagy, and Lieutenant Brian Kawamura—especially

Lieutenant Kawamura—for their vision, tenacity, and bureaucratic skill in obtaining

the declassification of all the versions of the Maritime Strategy.

At the Naval War College, we thank Captain Richard Suttie, USN (Ret.), and Dr. Carne

Lord, who suggested undertaking this series of volumes for the Naval War College

Press; Mrs. Alice Juda, reference librarian in the Henry Eccles Library at the Naval War

College, who provided valuable assistance in locating copies of the documents published here; Pelham Boyer, managing editor of the Naval War College Press, who under

took a myriad of tasks in connection with the production of this volume; and Ken

DeRouin, Susan Meyer, Albert Fassbender, and Shannon Cole for the typesetting and

proofreading.

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Introduction

The decade of the 1980s was the decade of “the Maritime Strategy,” the U.S. Navy

widely known and publicly debated statement that was associated with President 

ald Reagan’s buildup of American defense forces and Secretary of the Navy John

Lehman’s efforts to create “the six-hundred-ship navy.” The strategy is most wide

understood only in terms of the Navy’s January 1986 public statements published 

the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings and summarized in testimony that the Navy’s 

ers had given to Congress. This volume is designed to complement and extend th

previously published history of The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strateg

1977–1986,1

and to present publicly for the first time the detailed changes and de

ments that occurred during the decade in the five (now declassified) official versi

the strategy and three directly associated unclassified public statements by succes

Chiefs of Naval Operations that were made in the years between 1982 and 1990.

At the outset, it is important to understand that all the internal versions of the M

time Strategy were designed as secret-level classified briefings, using a prepared t

that was linked to graphics and presented to groups through Vu-Graph slides pro

on a screen. All of these statements involved the use of graphics that contained im

words, and short phrases carrying the outline of the meaning of the prepared tex

internal secret-level publications that were published and distributed within the 

for official use were printed copies of these same presentations. Beyond this, ther

no other overarching, conceptual, or analytical statements at the classified level, b

there was some activity at higher levels of classification to deal with certain aspec

intelligence information and perception management. There were also a number 

important explanatory and supplementary thoughts that were included in the pu

statements of Secretary Lehman, Admiral James Watkins, General P. X. Kelley, an

Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost in the key articles published in Proceedings and that 

included among the eight documents presented in this volume.

The purpose behind creating the Maritime Strategy in the 1980s was primarily to

inform the U.S. naval officer corps and to provide a consistent and widely agreed

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realistic operational basis, built upon a careful analysis of intelligence on current naval

threats, with which to make force-structure decisions and budgetary plans. The strategy was designed to show the Navy’s role in a global campaign in terms of geography a

well as in its sequential and cumulative effects. It was designed to be inclusive of a wide

range of naval functions. While it explained how the U.S. Navy would actually be used

in the event of a third world war in global-scale, forward operations against the Soviet

Union (not merely the Soviet navy), it also involved three phases in such a war with

options for horizontal escalation. In addition, the strategy also dealt with peacetime

operations, crises management, and war-termination issues.

Intelligence analysis and technical assessments of the Soviet navy and its capabilities

played an essential role in creating the Maritime Strategy. This work was initially done

in several places, including at the Vice Chief of Naval Operations level. There Admiral

William Small and his executive assistant, Captain William Studeman, coordinated

through the Advanced Technology Panel (ATP), and the ATP’s Soviet Strategy Study

Group, created in 1982, with Captain Linton Brooks and others initially involved at the

Office of Naval Warfare (OP-095), headed by Vice Admiral Kinnard R. McKee; the

Office of Naval Intelligence, under Rear Admiral Sumner Shapiro, with Captain William H. J. Manthorpe, Jr., and Commander Stephen Kime; Captain Thomas A. Brooks

at the newly established Fleet Operational Intelligence Office at Fort Meade; “Team

Charlie” in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-009J), with Rich Haver and

Alf Andreassen; the Center for Naval Analyses, with James M. McConnell; and the

Naval Intelligence Detachment in the War Gaming Department at the Naval War College.2

The process of creating the strategy took place in 1982–84 through a series of everchanging briefing slides that summarized as well as elicited opinions, information, and

judgments that began to develop a consensus from existing theater war plans, concepts

of operations, intelligence, the results of war-gaming experiences, the results of operations, fleet experience, exercise results, and advanced training as well as the perceptions

of the Navy’s strategic thinkers and debates on the subject in unofficial fora within the

Navy, such as Secretary of the Navy Lehman’s “Young Turk” lunches in the early 1980s,

U.S. Naval Institute symposia organized by Proceedings editor Fred Rainbow, Center for

Naval Analyses symposia, and the Navy Discussion Groups convened by Commander

James Stark in the middle and late 1980s. This initial and lengthy process eventually

produced a document signed by the Chief of Naval Operations in May 1984. As this

document began to go through further changes, refinements, and improvements, in

both classified and unclassified versions, the Maritime Strategy developed an additiona

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public release of information.

The U.S. Navy’s strategic thinking of the 1980s can be traced to the experience, dev

ments, and perceptions that accumulated throughout the 1970s. Specifically, in t

context it was a direct outgrowth and extension of initiatives that Admiral Thomas 

Hayward had begun as Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (1977–78) and Chief of Na

Operations (1978–82), and of the SEA PLAN 2000 study commissioned by thenSecretary of the Navy Graham Claytor and then–Under Secretary of the Navy Jame

Woolsey.3

The U.S. Navy’s strategic thinking of the 1980s was not a sudden revela

thrust upon the naval services by the political leadership of the day but rather pa

an evolution of strategic thinking within the naval services, an evolution facilitat

the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations’ policy guidance and objectiv

As the documents in this volume show, the Maritime Strategy was not an orchest

public relations campaign designed solely to justify a large naval force but rather 

series of initiatives of the Navy and Marine Corps, in the context of the day, to al

naval forces within the framework of a joint and cooperative national military st

that would make effective use of them. The purpose was to achieve national obje

and align all aspects of the naval services, from procurement and force levels to t

ing and operations, with policy and strategic guidance, in order to create realistic 

achievable expectations for the naval contribution to national defense.

Although the staff officers supporting naval leaders, as well as the naval leaders th

selves, were making every attempt to cast the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s in b

national terms as the maritime component of a national military strategy and as 

consolidation of the Navy’s generally accepted thinking on the employment of n

forces, the fact that it was a product of the Department of the Navy made other s

suspicious. Outside the Navy, many assumed, without careful consideration of th

stance of the strategy, that the arguments of the Maritime Strategy were visionar

made at the expense of the other services. In part this was due to the fact that the 

services had not yet put into place similar or complementary approaches to their 

strategic thinking; also, at the same time that the Navy had momentarily moved i

the lead with such an approach, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman was making 

public statements critical of the initiatives that eventually led to the passage of th

Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1 October 1986.

This resulted in fierce public debates over congressional resource allocations to t

Navy and Marine Corps versus the Air Force and the Army. This also raised simil

debates about the utility of naval forces, the optimal operations for the defense o

sea lines of communications, deterrence versus provocation, nuclear stability,

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Some criticized it as an old idea with no innovative ideas, while others characterized it

as too radical and as giving away too much information publicly.

The reputation of the Maritime Strategy during the past two decades has alternated. By

the mid-1990s, later strategists characterized all these earlier attempts to conceptualize

naval strategy as obsolete in the post–Cold War period, while at the same time, the U.S

Marine Corps momentarily moved away from concentration on such closely integrated, strategic, high-end warfighting cooperation with the Navy to develop more

independent or Marine Corps–led operational concepts focused on lower-intensity

regional contingencies. Within the Navy, however, the Maritime Strategy became a

standard against which later strategic capstone documents were judged. Subsequent

U.S. naval capstone statements have cited the Maritime Strategy, such as The Navy Policy Book (1992);4

Naval Warfare, Naval Doctrine Publication 1 (1994);5and Sea Power

21 (2002–2003). The official background information for the U.S. Navy’s most recent

strategic statement, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (October 2007),

states that “the world has changed since 1986 when the last maritime strategy was

developed.”6

When the process of strategic development had been fully developed in the mid-1980s,

a number of people within the Navy saw the process that lay behind the Maritime

Strategy as a significant historical development in naval thinking. It appeared to mark a

renaissance in maritime strategic thinking within the U.S. naval officer corps and was a

clear and comprehensive statement that drew together for the first time many past and

contemporary strands of thinking. Among the new aspects that it presented were

detailed discussions of the roles of the U.S. Coast Guard, military sealift in support of

naval operations, and the employment of allied and friendly tactical aviation. The 1984

version first identified terrorism as an issue for naval forces to be concerned about. The

1988 version first identified drug trafficking as a naval threat and also mentioned for

the first time the U.S. Navy’s capability for humanitarian support operations. All of

these have continued to be part of American naval strategic thinking since that time.

The Navy Staff ’s desire to record the development of the Navy’s strategic development

in these years proceeded in two ways. The first was to measure, record, and learn from

public response and debate about the strategy. The second was to record the internal

process by which the strategic thinking process had developed and record it for future

development.

Captain Peter Swartz—the action officer for the Maritime Strategy in the Strategic

Concepts Branch (OP-603) between 1982 and 1984 and on the staff of Secretary of the

Navy John F. Lehman, Jr., in the Office of Program Appraisal in 1984–86—took up the

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Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:28:32 AM
effects and provide a means for the U.S. Navy to learn from them. This resulted i

series of cumulative bibliographies that Swartz published in 1986,71987,81988,9

and 2004.11 In addition, Swartz extended this task to a broader project in a Power

presentation in which he attempted to summarize naval strategic thinking throu

series of capstone documents between the 1970s and 2007, as a tool for educatin

rent and future staff officers in the process. This PowerPoint presentation evolve

a number of years in several expanding iterations, and it has been the starting po

this series of documentary volumes.

In addition, there was a desire to try to make a concurrent analytical historical re

of the events. To do this, Captain Larry Seaquist, then Head, Strategic Concepts B

recommended to Vice Admiral James A. Lyons, Jr., Deputy Chief of Naval Opera

for Plans, Policy and Operations (OP-06), that he commission Professor John

Hattendorf of the Naval War College to undertake this task. As a result, Vice Adm

Lyons wrote the President of the Naval War College, Vice Admiral James E. Servi

asking that Hattendorf be assigned to this task.12 Seeing this as a particularly chal

ing assignment at a point when a number of senior and influential figures were e

claiming to be the sole “father of the Maritime Strategy,” Hattendorf requested a

granted the authority to reach his own academic conclusions in regard to the dev

ment of the strategy, based on the historical evidence. When Hattendorf complet

history in 1988, President of the Naval War College Rear Admiral Ronald J. Kurth

requested authority from Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost 

the Naval War College Press be granted permission to publish an article-length, u

sified version.13 Admiral Trost personally approved the Naval War College’s reque

and the article appeared in the Naval War College Review.15 The Naval War Colleg

published the full history in 1989, in a series of classified papers. This classified d

ment was declassified and published in 2004 with additional supplementary mat

Additional historical insights into and details of the process used for the Maritim

Strategy were recorded in articles by Captains John Byron and Peter Swartz17 and 

David Alan Rosenberg.18 None of these efforts were conducted in isolation; there 

extensive collaboration among Hattendorf, Swartz, Byron, Rosenberg, Linton Bro

and others on these and related projects throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.

To understand the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s, it is essential to place it in the 

text of its time and examine the manner in which that same changing context inf

enced its evolution. Three different levels of thematic focus are essential to this

understanding: the changing world situation of the 1980s, national security deve

ments within the United States during the 1980s, and developments within the U

Navy during the 1980s.

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The Changing World Situation of the 1980s

The world of the 1980s, as the Maritime Strategy characterized it, was an era of violent

peace.19 The global scene was dominated by the bipolar ideological, political, military,

and economic rivalry between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. At the outset of the 1980s,

the Cold War appeared to be deepening, with the Soviet navy showing significant

growth, increasing strength, and more tendencies toward belligerence at sea. The

nuclear balance remained stable, with no further nuclear proliferation during the

1980s. One modifying influence in the tension was the success of nine years of negotiation during the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III)

and its conclusion of the multilateral United Nations law of the sea convention of 1982

establishing new legal regimes governing general as well as specific sea areas. In retrospect, it appears that after a long period of steadily increasing tension in the Cold War

at sea, this situation began to relax in the middle of the 1980s with the appointments o

Mikhail Gorbachev as general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

and Admiral Chernavin as Admiral Gorshkov’s replacement in 1985, and with the

beginning of the Soviet naval arms control offensive from 1986 onward. To contemporary American naval eyes, however, the Soviet success in producing increasingly quiet

submarines; the Soviet navy’s increasing use of the former U.S. naval base at Cam Ranh

Bay, Vietnam; and the revelation of the major loss of secret and highly sensitive U.S.

naval information to the Soviets through the Walker spy leak in 1986 gave the U.S.

Navy reasons for pause. This was followed between 1989 and 1991 by major changes in

Soviet and Warsaw Pact leadership and policies, changes that resulted in dramatic

deterioration of the Soviet naval threat.

In Asia, the People’s Republic of China demonstrated high economic growth and was,

at that point, energy sufficient. In the mid-1980s, the Chinese government had

decided that the Soviet Union was no longer a threat. The People’s Liberation Army

Navy changed its posture from one of anti-Soviet coastal defense and announced

instead a naval doctrine of “Offshore Defense” with operations farther out to sea. By

1987, the Chinese had deployed their first nuclear-power ballistic-missile submarine

(SSBN). While this was going on, Taiwan was isolated but showed increasing economic

growth and political liberalization. In 1989, the Chinese government showed its hold

on the country during the Tiananmen Square incident. On the Korean Peninsula, the

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea under Kim Il Sung continued to receive Soviet

support; it had organized the assassination of Republic of Korea officials in Burma. At

the same time, Muslim separatist insurgencies remained active in Mindanao and the

southern Philippines.

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ness in the Bekaa Valley in 1982, and the Arab-Israeli situation remained at statu

with the Palestinian intifada developing from 1987 onward. In Iran, following th

of the shah in 1979 and the U.S. hostage crisis of 1979–80, the Iranian theocracy

remained hostile to the West. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein continued in power with 

support, while the Iran-Iraq War continued for most of the decade between 1980 

1988, including a “tanker war” component. In Afghanistan, civil war raged from 

until 1989, during which U.S.-backed insurgents fought the communist governm

and Soviet forces, which became increasingly bogged down.

In Africa, General Siad Barre continued to rule in Somalia and in 1989 an anti-U

Islamic army faction came to power in Sudan. In Libya, the anti-Western Gadhaf

regime continued in power and was responsible for backing terrorist bombings, 

ing the bombing of a Pan American Airlines plane over Scotland in 1988. In 1986

United States conducted air strikes on Libya, but most of America’s NATO allies 

not support these operations and denied the U.S. base access and overflight perm

In the Western Hemisphere, Fidel Castro’s Cuba remained antagonistic to the Un

States. The United States invaded the Caribbean island of Grenada in 1983, to ou

Cuban-backed government. In Haiti, “Baby Doc” Duvalier was ousted, and civil u

followed in 1986.

In other dimensions of the global scene, there was a slow rise in reported climati

natural humanitarian disasters across the world. Reports of piratical attacks on m

chant shipping were beginning to be heard from places like the Strait of Malacca

they appeared insignificant at this point.

National Security Developments within the United States during the 1980s

The 1980s were predominantly the years of Republican president Ronald Reagan

first term of office, from 1981 to 1985, was marked by initiatives against the Sovi

Union, while his second term, from 1985 to 1989, was marked by a gradual relax

of the anti-Soviet stance. His Republican Party successor from 1989 to 1993, Pres

George H. W. Bush, was principally concerned with managing the end of the Col

era and the transition to the follow-on period. During most of this period there w

divided control of the Congress, with the Democrats controlling the House of Re

sentatives and the Republicans controlling the Senate from 1981 to 1987.

Reagan’s presidency was marked by the resurgence of strong domestic popular su

for the U.S. armed forces, but with the end of the Cold War in sight by the late 19

there developed a strong popular desire for a “peace dividend,” to be found in cu

the funding for national defense.

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In 1981, the Department of Defense’s expenditure represented 5.1 percent of the gross

domestic product; the department’s total overall allocation was $422 billion (as

expressed in constant Fiscal Year 2009 dollars). This rose in 1983 to 6 percent, with an

allocation of $495 billion, and was at 5.9 percent, the highest allocation of the decade,

$539 billion, in 1985. From that point, these figures gradually decreased to 5.6 percent

in 1988, $514 billion in the last year of Reagan’s presidency, and 5.1 percent, with $489

billion, in 1990.

The overall approach of the United States to its national security situation in the 1980s

was initially to continue its focus on one overarching global threat from the Soviet

Union and the Warsaw Pact. The administration’s initial goal was to oppose and even

roll back the Soviet Union through greatly increased U.S. defense spending that

involved significant military pay raises in 1980 and 1981. In this, the Department of

Defense placed its primary focus for planning and force sizing on the contingency of

having to deal with the Soviets in the European theater and supporting NATO. At the

same time, the Department of Defense had come to agree with the Navy’s opinion that

Presidents

Ronald Reagan, 20 January 1981–20 January 1989

George H. W. Bush, 20 January 1989–20 January 1993

Secretaries of Defense

Caspar Weinberger, 21 January 1981–23 November 1987

Frank C. Carlucci III, 23 November 1987–20 January 1989

Richard B. Cheney, 21 March 1989–20 January 1993

Secretaries of the Navy

John F. Lehman, Jr., 5 February 1981–10 April 1987

James H. Webb, Jr., 1 May 1987–23 February 1988

William L. Ball III, 28 March 1988–15 May 1989

Henry L. Garrett III, 15 May 1989–26 June 1992

Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

General David C. Jones, USAF, 21 June 1978–18 June 1982

General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, 18 June 1982–30 September 1985

Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., USN, 1 October 1985–30 September 1989

General Colin Powell, USA, 1 October 1989–30 September 1993

Chiefs of Naval Operations

Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, 1 July 1978–30 June 1982

Admiral James D. Watkins, 30 June 1982–30 June 1986

Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost, 1 July 1986–29 June 1990

Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, 29 June 1990–23 August 1994

Key Figures for National Security and Naval Policy, 1981–90

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Defense Department’s planning scenario postulated that the war would start in S

west Asia and spread, but the Navy felt that such a scenario was an ill-advised on

which to concentrate exclusively. At the same time, the U.S. intelligence commun

was unusually confident and united in its assessment of the Soviet naval threat, a

expressed in National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 11-15-82D of 15 November 19

Some of the strategic problems and ideas that eventually emerged in the Maritim

Strategy were already being discussed at the highest levels of the government. As 

as 18 May 1982, President Reagan recorded in his personal diary,

Lunched with Joint Chfs of Staff and Cap W[einberger]. It was a good meeting with a sound d

sion of strategic problems—for example—the importance of the sea above Norway and what 

means in the Navy strategy should there be conflict on the NATO front. 21

As the United States conducted a variety of different small-crisis operations duri

decade—in Grenada, Lebanon, Panama, Central America, Libya, and the Persian

Gulf—the confrontation between the United States and Iran continued. The Uni

States showed some preference for supporting Iraq in the parallel Iran-Iraq War. 

ing the 1980s the Defense Department also made some small improvements in it

counterinsurgency capabilities. In other areas, in response to Soviet deployment 

mobile medium- and intermediate-range missiles, the United States deployed Pe

II intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and BGM-109G Gryphon groun

launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) to Europe in 1983–84, but this deployment wa

reversed by the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty negotiations in 1985–87

the 1980s, the United States resisted proposals for conventional naval arms contr

led with proposals for the establishment of a voluntary international Missile

Technology Control Regime (MTCR). In terms of new defense technological dev

ments, the Chief of Naval Operations, his staff (OPNAV), and naval research and 

opment played a major role in the Reagan administration’s ballistic-missile defen

policy and the development of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

As terrorism incidents began to rise and require responses from the United States, th

Department fine-tuned its 1979 list of state sponsors of terrorism, which at that poin

included Libya, Iraq, South Yemen, and Syria. In 1982, it dropped Iraq and added Cu

1984 it added Iran; and in 1988, it listed the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China began to 

malize in the years following the U.S. formal recognition of China in 1979 and th

same year the Taiwan Relations Act, which required the United States to maintain 

capacity to protect Taiwan. U.S. military assistance to Taiwan was henceforth lim

only to defensive arms. By the mid-1980s, Washington was providing assistance f

mainland Chinese military modernization.

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ments that fundamentally changed Department of Defense command relationships.

Most important among them was the enhancement of the roles of the regional and

functional unified and specified joint combatant commanders in chief at the expense

of the service chiefs, including the Chief of Naval Operations. The act also enhanced

the advisory powers of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the expense of the

individual service chiefs and created a new four-star position for a vice chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Additionally, it mandated joint duty for all officers, including

naval officers, and mandated a requirement for the president to provide Congress with

an annual Presidential National Security Strategy Review.

Along with these changes came a series of major changes in the combatant and Navy

component commands. The first of these was the establishment of the U.S. Central

Command in 1983, with its naval component command, to deal with the geographical

areas that stretched from Egypt and Israel, over the Red Sea, the Arabian Peninsula, and

the Persian Gulf, to Pakistan. At the same time, Africa south of the Sahara remained the

responsibility of the U.S. European Command, with its naval component. These

changes were followed in 1985 with the reestablishment of a naval component for U.S.

Southern Command to deal with Latin America. In 1985, the U.S. Space Command

was also established, with its naval component, Naval Space Command. In 1987, the

U.S. Special Operations Command was established, with its naval component, Naval

Special Warfare Command. Also in 1987, the U.S. Transportation Command was estab

lished, bringing under it the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and the Forces Command. Most of these changes were opposed by the Navy, which saw them as threats to

the necessary operational autonomy of naval commanders. All of these changes had a

direct impact on the Navy, which itself saw numerous internal developments.

Developments within the U.S. Navy during the 1980s

In the 1980s, the U.S. Navy was clearly the world’s strongest naval force, but it was chal

lenged by a very strong Soviet navy. Throughout the decade, the U.S. Navy continued

extensive, varied global operations and exercises. At home, the Navy’s budget allocation

rose incrementally until the middle of the decade, after which it remained steady befor

beginning to decline from 1988. In total funding allocation, the Navy Department

(including the Marine Corps) usually received incrementally more than the

departments of the Army or Air Force, but its allocation was closely matched by the Ai

Force’s, which exceeded the Navy’s in 1984 and 1985.

In the period between 1981 and 1988, the U.S. Navy’s force structure goal was the “sixhundred-ship navy,” which would comprise fifteen carrier battle groups (CVBGs), four

battleship surface action groups, one hundred nuclear-powered attack submarines

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(SSNs), ballistic-missile submarines, amphibious-force ships capable of carrying 

landing a Marine amphibious force (MAF) as well as a Marine amphibious briga

(MAB), one hundred to 110 frigates, and thirty-one mine countermeasures ships

sufficient auxiliary support ships, such as repair tenders, fleet oilers, and supply s

for a force of this size. In addition, the plan called for fourteen active carrier air w

(CVW) of aircraft and two reserve carrier air wings.

Both the Carter and Reagan administrations funded large new fast sealift and

prepositioning forces to support global Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps oper

especially in Southwest Asia. Included in the new sealift force were two T-AH ho

ships, designed for wartime duty but capable of peacetime and crisis response op

tions as well. The 1987 maiden transoceanic cruise of USNS Mercy (T-AH 19) wa

fact, a humanitarian assistance deployment.

The nation’s basic naval deployment strategy was similar to that of the preceding 

decades—to have two permanent ready fleets in home waters, one on each coast, 

could surge forward if required, and two permanent forward fleets, one that was 

ward deployed (in the Mediterranean) and the other forward based (in the weste

Pacific). The Navy planned aggressive forward operations with its SSNs and depl

its SSBNs within range of their wartime targets. During this period, the Navy—

together with the Coast Guard—also developed a renewed focus on defense of ho

1981 $ 57,446,000,000

1982 $ 68,607,000,000

1983 $ 81,534,000,000

1984 $ 81,709,000,000

1985 $ 99,015,000,000

1986 $ 96,113,000,000

1987 $ 93,500,000,000

1988 $100,281,000,000

1989 $ 97,675,000,000

1990 $ 99,977,000,000

Source: www.history.navy.mil/library/online/budget.htm. Statistics for 1981 through 1984 are taken from the “Appropr

Summary” in the February 1985 edition of U.S. Navy Dept., Historical Budget Data (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Governmen

Office for the Office of the Comptroller, 1985), pp. 4–5. Statistics from 1985 to 1990 are taken from the “Department 

fense—Budget Authority by Component” tables in the 1989, 1992 annual reports of the secretary of defense.

Budget of the U.S. Navy, 1981–90: Budget Authority

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TYPE 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985

Battleships - - 1 2 2

Carriers 12 13 13 13 13

Cruisers 27 27 28 29 30

Destroyers 91 89 71 69 69

Frigates 78 86 95 103 110

Submarines 87 96 98 98 100

SSBNs 34 33 34 35 37

Command ships 4 4 4 4 4

Mine warfare 25 25 21 21 21

Patrol 1 4 6 6 6

Amphibious 61 61 59 57 58

Auxiliary 101 117 103 120 121

Surface warships 196 202 195 203 211

Total active 521* 555 533 557 571

TYPE 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

Battleships 3 3 3 4 4

Carriers 14 14 14 14 13

Cruisers 32 36 38 40 43

Destroyers 69 69 69 68 57

Frigates 113 115 107 100 99

Submarines 101 102 100 99 93

SSBNs 39 37 37 36 33

Command ships 4 4 4 4 4

Mine warfare 21 22 22 23 22

Patrol 6 6 6 6 6

Amphibious 58 59 59 61 59

Auxiliary 123 127 114 137 137

Surface warships 217 223 217 212 203

Total active 583 594* 573 592 570

*The high (1987) and the low (1981) total figures for active warships.

All figures are shown as of the end of the fiscal year for each year: 30 September.

Source: Naval Historical Center, “Navy Active Ship Force Levels, 1917–Present,” www.history.navy.mil/

branches/org9-4.htm#1979.

U.S. Navy Active-Ship Force Levels, 1981–90

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waters. In addition, a forward hub of operations was developed in the Indian Oc

maintain permanent, combat-credible presence in that area of operations.

Fleet operations during the 1980s were greatly enhanced by the experience gaine

the Navy in operating the numerous transformational new ship, aircraft, and wea

systems that had entered and were entering the fleet from the mid-1970s on: F-1

S-3 aircraft; Los Angeles– and Ohio-class submarines; Nimitz-class carriers;

Ticonderoga-class cruisers, Spruance-class destroyers, and Perry-class frigates; the

Tarawa-class general-purpose landing helicopter amphibious assault ships (LHA

the air-cushioned landing craft (LCAC); and Aegis and Tomahawk missile system

name only the most prominent). To fight all these new systems required revoluti

new operational methods, especially the Composite Warfighting Concept. This c

cept’s categorization of naval operations at sea by warfare task was also reflected 

new naval “warfare appraisal” process back in Washington, similarly organized a

aimed at influencing the Navy’s program and budget decisions, as well as in the

organization of several versions of the Maritime Strategy.

Among the services, the Navy’s strength in manpower increased slightly across th

decade, to more than five hundred thousand total active-duty men and women, b

then began to decrease from 1989. The active manpower strength of the Marine C

remained relatively constant at under two hundred thousand during the decade, 

the Coast Guard remained steady at around forty thousand.

During most of the decade, the Navy and Marine Corps maintained close relations

carried out routine operations together, as well as crisis-response operations with

YEAR

TOTAL

INVENTORY

TOTAL

OPERATING

1981 6,327 4,314

1982 6,269 4,492

1983 6,118 4,382

1984 6,025 4,500

1985 6,060 4,495

1986 6,222 4,275

1987 6,338 4,343

1988 6,313 4,356

Source: “Allowances and Location of Naval Aircraft,” OPNAV Notice C3310, 31 March 1988, table 2. These reports we

discontinued with this report, and the information is unavailable for 1989 and 1990. All figures shown are for 31 Marc

year. See www.history.navy.mil/a-record/allow-lo/1981-88/3-1988.pdf.

Inventory of Active Aircraft, 1981–88

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forward-deployed Marine Corps units in U.S. Navy ships. Both services focused on the

NATO flanks and the Soviet Far East in their operational planning. Their close relationship

was further demonstrated when both services opted to buy and fly F/A-18 C/D aircraft.

This allowed for an easy collaboration on the early versions of the Maritime Strategy

between 1982 and 1986, with Marine Corps Commandants General Robert Barrow and

General P. X. Kelley working closely with their counterpart Chiefs of Naval Operations,

Admiral Thomas Hayward and Admiral James Watkins. These early versions of the Maritime Strategy reflected the Marines’ development of over-the-horizon assault and

prepositioning concepts that culminated in the Amphibious Warfare Strategy of 1985

and General Kelley’s article in the Proceedings Maritime Strategy insert of January 1986.

Toward the end of the decade, the U.S. Navy and the Marine Corps began to drift apart

As the global scene began to change, the Marine Corps Commandant from 1987 to

1991, General Al Gray, refocused the Marine Corps on warfighting contingencies in the

third world to replace the earlier focus on anti-Soviet operations in NATO and northeastern Pacific campaigns. Emphasizing these changes of focus in 1988, the Marine

Corps replaced the term it used to describe its own forces, shifting from “amphibious

forces” to “expeditionary forces.” Its Marine expeditionary units (MEUs) became “special operations capable,” but unlike the U.S. Navy’s SEALs, the Marine Corps was not

included in the new U.S. Special Operations Command. In 1989, the Fleet Marine

Force Manual 1, Warfighting, shifted its focus to maneuver warfare. Additional changes

showed the Marine Corps desire to increase its autonomy from—and equality with—

YEAR OFFICERS NURSES ENLISTED

OFFICER

CANDIDATES TOTAL

1981 64,580 2,713 466,388 5,541 536,509

1982 66,579 2,661 475,147 5,582 547,308

1983 68,764 2,744 489,495 5,361 563,620

1984 70,382 2,896 497,837 5,298 573,517

1985 71,079 2,951 503,072 5,443 579,594

1986 72,890 3,029 510,713 5,662 589,265

1987 74,064 3,078 523,071 5,608 602,743

1988 74,115 3,055 523,106 5,395 602,616

1989 74,374 2,989 526,018 5,410 605,802

1990 74,557 3,020 525,159 5,707 605,423

Source: “Personnel Strength of the U.S. Navy: 1775 to Present,” derived from the Bureau of Naval Personnel’s quarterly Navy

Military Personnel Statistics. See www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq65-1.htm.

U.S. Navy Personnel Strength, 1981–90

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commander, as well as the renaming and reorganization of the Marine Corps De

ment and Education Command to be the Marine Corps Combat Development C

mand in 1987. Subsequently, a new Marine Corps University was established in 1

and a new Marine Corps War College in 1990.

In the early 1980s, the U.S. Coast Guard was under the Department of Transport

and did not participate in the Reagan administration’s big defense-budget and

military-manpower increases. Nevertheless, the historical link between the two se

had not been forgotten. In 1980, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Thomas Ha

and Coast Guard Commandant John B. Hayes initiated the establishment of a Na

Coast Guard board for policy coordination. In 1984, a memorandum of agreeme

signed between the two services to establish Maritime Defense Zones (MARDEZ

port security, harbor defense, and coastal warfare. When activated in wartime, th

Coast Guard area commanders would report to the U.S. Navy’s fleet commander

MARDEZ commanders. The development of joint Navy–Coast Guard counterdr

operations, with Coast Guard personnel deployed in U.S. Navy ships starting in 1

facilitated increasing cooperation and interrelationships between the two service

the end of the decade in 1989, Coast Guard flag officers were leading drug-interd

joint task forces under both the Atlantic and Pacific commanders in chief. The N

and Coast Guard also worked together dealing with the boatloads of refugees fro

Cuba in May 1980; the recovery operations following the Soviet shooting down o

Korean Airlines flight KAL-007 in September 1983; and the Exxon Valdez oil spil

Alaskan waters in March 1989.

The decade of the 1980s saw increased dialogue and cooperation between the Na

the Air Force, with memorandums of agreement on various subjects being signed

between the two services in 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1988. Many in the Air Force—

cially in the Pacific—saw the Maritime Strategy as complementary to their own e

ing concepts. Nevertheless, the Navy of the 1980s strongly preferred to plan for a

exercise coordinated, cooperative, and deconflicted (but separate) sea-based anti

strike campaigns rather than integrated tactical aviation (TACAIR) over-land an

sea operations under one powerful central operational theater air commander, w

would probably often be, in many important scenarios, a U.S. Air Force officer.

In 1986, in the most significant joint operation between the Vietnam War and th

wars, the Navy and the Air Force conducted simultaneous joint strike operations 

Libya. In that operation, the Navy, Marine Corps, and the Air Force made geogra

cally separate strikes under separate commands, but care was taken to deconflict 

service’s operations from interfering with one another. In 1987–88, during Opera

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operating over the Gulf and Air Force transport aircraft carried Marine Corps units to

forward positions. In 1985–89, Air Force B-52 aircraft based at Loring Air Force Base in

Maine and Anderson Air Force Base on Guam became fully capable of using the Harpoon air-to-surface antiship missile. As joint commands began to proliferate, key supporting components of the U.S. Navy came under Air Force general officers, with the

Naval Space Command under Commander in Chief, U.S. Space Command and the

MSC under Commander in Chief, U.S. Transportation Command.

In the 1980s, oceangoing sea transport for the armed forces had become an important

issue for the Navy. In 1981, the position of Commander, Military Sealift Command,

was restored to three-star rank and in 1984 Secretary of the Navy Lehman declared tha

military sealift was a distinct naval function, along with sea control and power projection. As military development and control for military cargoes became in this period

the favored approach over the earlier reliance on subsidized commercial shipping, a

new Strategic Sealift Office (OP-42) was established in the Office of the Chief of Naval

Operations. While there was an increase in government and privately owned American-flag

ships suitable for military cargoes as plans moved ahead to create a fast sealift fleet with

thirty-seven vessels and to expand prepositioned fleets, the Navy also planned to continue to use allied shipping. A preposition force was established in the Indian Ocean in

1980, with seven ships on station at Diego Garcia and an afloat staff. In 1983, plans

were made for three Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) squadrons to support the

Marine Corps, with additional ships for support of the Army and Air Force. In the

early 1980s, the Navy took a number of additional steps to support these moves. These

included converting containerships to crane ships (T-ACSs), which were placed for

future use in the Maritime Administration’s Ready Reserve Force, and developing other

sealift-enhancement features to adapt containerships for military use.

In 1981, the Maritime Administration was moved from the Department of Commerce

to the Department of Transportation. The total number of ships in the National

Defense Reserve Fleet (renamed a Force in 1982) rose from 303 in 1980 to a high of 386

in 1984, and then began to fall, reaching 329 in 1990. At the same time, the ships within

that force designed for rapid sealift deployment rose steadily from twenty-four in 1980

to sixty-five in 1985 and ninety-six in 1990. Beginning in 1983, the Office of Management and Budget encouraged government reliance on the commercial sector.22 This

development was paralleled by the continued transfer of the Navy’s Combat Logistics

Force ships to the Military Sealift Command’s civilian-manned naval fleet auxiliary

force, contracting out the operation of MSC special mission ships, and placing into ser

vice eighteen Military Sealift Command Ocean Surveillance (T-AGOS) ships between

1984 and 1990. In October 1989, the new Bush administration issued National Security

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shipping industry.23

A depression in merchant shipping continued until late in the 1980s with the U.S

commercial merchant marine comprising only 4 to 5 percent of world fleet tonn

steadily declining from 849 oceangoing vessels of over a thousand gross tons in 1

748 in 1985 and 635 in 1990. At the same time, merchant shipping effectively un

U.S. control also declined precipitously, dropping from 466 vessels in 1982 to 326 

1986 and to 228 in 1989, as a 1986 tax law acted to reduce American investment 

U.S.-owned foreign-flagged vessels. Paralleling this, the overall number of Ameri

merchant mariners also continued to drop, from 19,600 in 1980 and 13,100 in 198

11,100 in 1990. These trends caused concern within the Navy, as the activation of t

Ready Reserve Force was contingent on the availability of American civilian merch

mariners.

Additionally, the American shipbuilding industry was also in decline. Although t

Navy was building ten to twenty-three ships each year during the 1980s, the cons

tion of merchant shipping in the United States dropped sharply, from some twen

ships in 1980 to none between 1988 and 1990.

The Maritime Strategy of the 1980s was produced by officers of the U.S. Navy in 

context of international events and through a careful appreciation of the capabil

the Soviet naval threat in that decade, along with American national security con

and developments within the U.S. Navy and its sister services and agencies. It wa

product of the complex interaction of many broad forces affecting the Navy, both

externally and internally. The Maritime Strategy established a general approach t

most effective use of naval forces in the context of a range of specific maritime si

tions that American naval planners considered the most likely if a major war wit

Soviet Union were to occur in the 1980s. In their time, the maritime-strategy doc

ments created for the Navy a consensus approach that filled a need for clarity and 

solidation of thinking in a way that naval leaders found well aligned with thinkin

within the Navy and Marine Corps, as well as with national defense policies.

Notes

1. John B. Hattendorf, The Evolution of the U.S.

Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986, Newport Paper 19 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War

College Press, 2004).

2. See ibid., chap. 2. See also Rear Adm.

Thomas Brooks, USN (Ret.), and Cap

liam Manthorpe, USN (Ret.), “Settin

Record Straight: A Critical Review of 

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Quarterly 12, no. 2 (April 1996).

3. See Hattendorf, Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s

Maritime Strategy, and John B. Hattendorf,

ed., U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s: Selected

Documents, Newport Paper 30 (Newport,

R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2007).

4. Reprinted in John B. Hattendorf, ed., U.S.

Naval Strategy in the 1990s: Selected Documents, Newport Paper 27 (Newport, R.I.:

Naval War College Press, 2006), p. 39.

5. Reprinted in ibid., p. 101.

6. “Seapower Fact Sheet,” Maritime Strategy

Fact Sheet—Nov 9, 2007, www.navy.mil/

maritime.

7. Capt. Peter M. Swartz, USN, “Contemporary

U.S. Naval Strategy: A Bibliography,” in The

Maritime Strategy supplement, U.S. Naval

Institute Proceedings (January 1986), pp.

41–47.

8. Capt. Peter M. Swartz, USN, Addendum to

“Contemporary U.S. Naval Strategy: A Bibliography” (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, April 1987). This version was

summarized in Swartz, “The Maritime Strategy in Review,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (February 1986), pp. 113–16.

9. Capt. Peter M. Swartz, USN, The Maritime

Strategy Debates: A Guide to the Renaissance

of U.S. Naval Strategic Thinking in the 1980s

(Monterey, Calif.: Naval Postgraduate

School, 24 February 1988).

10. Capt. Peter M. Swartz, USN, and Jan S.

Bremmer, The Maritime Strategy Debates: A

Guide to the Renaissance of U.S. Naval Strategic Thinking in the 1980s, with James J.

Tritten (Monterey, Calif.: Naval Postgraduate

School, 30 September 1989).

11. Capt. Peter M. Swartz, USN, “The Maritime

Strategy Debates: A Bibliographical Guide to

the Renaissance of U.S. Naval Strategic

Thinking in the 1980s,” app. 2 in Evolution

of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, by

Hattendorf, pp. 185–277.

12. Vice Adm. James A. Lyons, to Vice Adm.

James Service, 23 November 1984.

13. Rear Adm. Ronald J. Kurth, to Adm. Carlisle

A. H. Trost, Ser 5-4, 13 February 1988.

14. Adm. Carlisle A. H. Trost, to Rear Adm.

Ronald J. Kurth, 11 May 1988.

College Review (Spring 1988), pp. 7–28,

but through a printer’s error two pairs of

pages were exchanged inadvertently. The Re

view issued an erratum notice pointing out

that the text on page 18 should have been on

page 17, page 17 should have been page 18,

and that the text on page 22 should have

been on page 21, while that on page 21

should have been on page 22. A fully corrected version with an updated bibliography

and small changes appeared in John B.

Hattendorf, Naval History and Maritime

Strategy: Collected Essays (Malabar, Fla.:

Krieger, 2000), pp. 201–28. This corrected

version should be used in preference to the

original version.

16. Hattendorf, Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s

Maritime Strategy.

17. John Byron and Peter M. Swartz, “Make the

Word Become the Vision,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (November 1992).

18. David Alan Rosenberg, “Process: The Realities of Formulating Modern Naval Strategy,”

in Mahan Is Not Enough: The Proceedings of 

Conference on the Works of Sir Julian Corbett

and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, ed. Jame

Goldrick and John B. Hattendorf (Newport,

R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1993), pp.

141–75, with pertinent commentary and additional information contributed by conference participants, pp. 177–209.

19. The phrase “violent peace” was one that resonated with many from Maritime Strategy

statements. Notably, it has been used in boo

titles, including James Cable, Navies in Violent Peace (London: Macmillan, 1989); and

Lisle A. Rose, Power at Sea: A Violent Peace,

1946–2006 (Columbia: Univ. of Missouri

Press, 2007).

20. Declassified and published as appendix 1 to

Hattendorf, Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s

Maritime Strategy pp. 101–83.

21. Douglas Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries

(New York: HarperCollins, 2007), p. 85.

22. Office of Management and Budget, Performance of Commercial Activities, Circular No

A-76 (Washington, D.C.: 4 August 1983).

23. The White House, National Security Directiv

on Sealift, NSD 28 (Washington, D.C.: 5 October 1989)

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Maritime Strategy Presentation (for the

Secretary of the Navy, 4 November 1982)

This document comprises the original prepared text and Vu-Graph slides for the f

major briefing of the Maritime Strategy, on 4 November 1982.* Vice Admiral Ar

Moreau, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy, and Operations) (OP-

gave the secret-level briefing to Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, Chief of Nav

Operations Admiral James Watkins, and Marine Corps Commandant General R

Barrow.

The idea to prepare such a briefing can be traced to a series of three memorandum

by Vice Chief of Naval Operations Admiral William N. Small.† The first, in Dece

1981, was addressed to the director of Navy Program Planning and suggested tha

Navy needed to change its planning process so that a clear strategic plan drove th

cess for ships and weapons acquisition instead of the kind of analysis that stressed 

worst-case scenario. Then, on 1 March 1982, Admiral Small sent a memorandum 

director of the Office of Naval Warfare (OP-95), Rear Admiral William R. Smedb

and OP-06, then Vice Admiral Sylvester Foley, in which he pointed out that strat

thinking seemed to be dormant in the Navy but that type of thinking might chang

rent assumptions about future needs and should be a shared responsibility betwee

two offices. Reacting to this, Smedberg and Foley agreed that Foley’s office should 

the lead in preparing a briefing on maritime strategy and fleet employment optio

the event of a war. While these memos created consensus about the need for such 

tegic vision, Admiral Small signed on 2 August 1982 another memo that directly 

in the preparation of this briefing. This memo, drafted by Rear Admiral John A. B

in Systems Analysis Division (OP-96), was sent to all four flag officers directly co

with developing the forthcoming annual program objective memorandum, or PO

which set the Navy’s budget objectives. In this memo Admiral Small repeated his 

DOCUMENT ONE

* This document was approved for declassification by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operatio

Information, Plans, and Strategy (N3/N5) on 16 July 2007.

† For a more detailed explanation of the background to this document, see John B. Hatten

The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986, Newport Paper 19 (Newp

Naval War College Press, 2004), pp. 65–74.

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and objectives. As the draft memorandum went through the chain of command en route

to Small’s signature, Vice Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost, the director of Navy Program

Planning (OP-090), commented on the route-slip, “We really need this to get the entire

OPNAV [i.e., Chief of Naval Operations] Staff moving in the same direction.”*

The memo was passed to the Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603), headed by Captain

Elizabeth Wylie. Within that office, she selected Lieutenant Commander Stanley Weeks

as the action officer. Taking it on initially as another routine chore, he soon found that it

was turning into a massive project to connect national strategy with defense programming. As the complexity and scope of the project became plain, Commander W. Spencer

Johnson was assigned, so as to create a team effort. Johnson was the officer within OP-06

who coordinated the policy issues with the programs and budget process with the Joint

Staff and the Department of Defense, while Weeks had recently staffed Secretary of the

Navy Lehman’s Posture Statement to the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee on 8 February 1982. For Weeks and Johnson, Lehman’s concept of a six-hundredship Navy based around fifteen carrier battle groups provided background, but it was no

the sole source for the briefing they developed. A number of other concepts were involved

including the current war plans that the various fleet commanders in chief had developed, the basic directives on current national defense policy, and up-to-date intelligence

estimates of the Soviet threat. In developing this briefing, Johnson and Weeks received

inputs from a variety of people, including Captain William H. J. Manthorpe, Commander Kenneth McGruther, and later Commander Thomas Marfiak.

Before this briefing was given on 4 November 1982, early versions were briefed to the

OPNAV Program Development Review Committee and the Chief of Naval Operations’

Executive Panel. Meanwhile, the new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John

W. Vessey, Jr., called each joint commander in chief to come to Washington and brief him

on the concept of operations that lay behind the war plans for each respective theater.

Johnson and Weeks were able to obtain the briefings for the Atlantic and Pacific and thu

to understand the essence of the latest thinking of each operational commander in chief

for his area; they were able to work relevant ideas into their maritime strategy briefing.

At the annual conference of the fleet commanders in chief, which took place at the Naval

War College on 26–29 October 1982, the fleet commanders in chief collectively agreed

that the maritime strategy brief should be presented to the Secretary of the Navy, the

Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Warmly received

at the 4 November briefing, the document took on a new life of its own. As a result, a

project that had begun two months before to produce merely another document to support the budgetary program and planning process was suddenly catapulted into recognition as the U.S. Navy’s strategy. ✒

* Quoted in ibid., p. 67.

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purpose of this presentation is to provide a framework for subsequent discussion 

maritime strategy.

3 This vugraph outlines the major elements of today’s discussion. The first pa

provide the overall national guidance within which we must construct our marit

strategy.

4 (NSDD-32) Our approved National Strategy is contained in two principal d

ments, NSDD-32 and the Defense Guidance.

NSDD-32 is the presidential directive which establishes our global objectives and 

ities and was issued by the president on 20 May of this year. The global strategy o

tives it contains are displayed here.

5 (NSDD-32) As you see, in NSDD-32 the likelihood of any war with the Sov

being a global war is explicitly acknowledged, but due to our limited capabilities 

resource constraints, planning for prioritized, sequential operations is directed. I

MARITIME STRATEGY

OUTLINE

• NATIONAL STRATEGY REQUIREMENTS

• NATIONAL STRATEGY GUIDANCE

• CURRENT FORCE MARITIME STRATEGY FOR GLOBAL WAR

• CINCS WARPLANS/PREFERENCES

• GLOBAL WARFIGHTING STRATEGY

• ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS

• NOTIONAL FORCE EMPLOYMENTS

• COMPLICATING FACTORS

NSDD-32 (20 MAY 82)

GLOBAL OBJECTIVES OF US NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

• DETER MILITARY ATTACK BY SOVIETS AND ALLIES

• STRENGTHEN EXISTING ALLIANCES AND FORM NEW COALITION

• CONTAIN AND REVERSE SOVIET EXPANSION

• LIMIT SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES BY:

• STRENGTHENING US MILITARY

• PURSUING VERIFIABLE ARMS CONTROL, AGREEMENTS

• PREVENTING FLOW OF TECHNOLOGIES TO USSR

• ENSURING US ACCESS TO FOREIGN MARKETS

• ENSURING US ACCESS TO SPACE AND THE OCEANS

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by default.

6 (NSDD-32) The regional priorities for wartime planning are shown here.

In considering these priorities it is important to note that, first, these priorities for

planning have been established by presidential directive and are the same as those contained in the DG. Secondly, the documents acknowledge that the political and military

situations at the time of war will bear heavily on strategic decisions that may alter these

priorities. Now let’s go to the defense guidance.

7 (DG P27–28) The defense guidance provides more detailed guidance from the

Secretary of Defense on our military priorities and objectives. It also provides both

peacetime and wartime strategic guidance. The peacetime strategy guidelines contained

in the DG are summarized in this vugraph. The emphasis on forward deployment of

our forces and surge deployment capabilities underscore the fact that US strategy is a

forward one.

NSDD 32

PRIORITIES FOR

WARTIME RESOURCE ALLOCATION

“DUE TO THE GLOBAL MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE INTERRELATIONSH

OF STRATEGIC THEATERS, THE LIKELIHOOD THAT ANY US SOVIET CONFLICT WOULD EXPAND BE

YOND ONE THEATER TO OTHER THEATERS MUST BE RECOGNIZED AND PLANNED FOR. THIS DOE

NOT MEAN THAT WE MUST HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO SUCCESSFULLY ENGAGE SOVIET FORCES S

MULTANEOUSLY ON ALL FRONTS. RATHER, THIS MEANS PROCURING BALANCED FORCES AND ES

TABLISHING PRIORITIES FOR SEQUENTIAL OPERATIONS AMONG THEATERS TO ENSURE THAT WE, I

CONJUNCTION WITH OUR ALLIES, APPLY OUR MILITARY POWER IN THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY.”

NSDD 32

REGIONAL PRIORITIES

FOR WARTIME PLANNING

• NORTH AMERICA

• NATO AND SUPPORTING LOCS

• ACCESS TO OIL IN SWA

• DEFENSE OF PACIFIC ALLIES AND LOCS FOR IO AND PACIFIC OCEAN

• DEFENSE OF FRIENDLY NATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA AND AFRICA

CAVEAT: POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATIONS AT THE TIME OF WAR WILL BEAR HEAVILY ON

STRATEGIC DECISIONS

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8 (DG P30) The DG provides wartime strategic guidance in three categories: 

conflict not involving Soviet forces; (2) conflict involving the USSR; and (3) glob

conflict. In a conflict not involving Soviet forces we see emphasis placed on limit

scope of the conflict, a dependence on our allies to provide combat forces, and a 

reluctance to introduce US ground combat forces. Navy, Marine and air forces, o

other hand, play a significant role.

9 (DG P30–31) For a conflict involving the Soviet Union, shown here, two s

categories are defined: first aggression in areas of US advantage and, second, in a

Soviet advantage. In the latter case, emphasis is placed on counter offensive oper

and war-widening options. The likelihood that such a conflict would become glo

nature is acknowledged in the next to last objective.

DEFENSE GUIDANCE

PEACETIME STRATEGY GUIDELINES

• CONVENTIONAL FORCES

• FORWARD DEPLOYMENT EMPHASIZED

• ABILITY TO RAPIDLY DEPLOY WHERE NECESSARY

• STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES: SUFFICIENT FOR RETALIATION AFTER SOVIET FIRST STRIK

• THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES:

• FORWARD DEPLOYED

• CAN PLAN FOR FIRST USE, RELEASE WILL BE NEITHER IMMEDIATE NOR AUTOMATIC

• CW: DETER BY DEVELOPING CAPABILITY TO RETALIATE IN KIND AND TO OPERATE

IN CONTAMINATED ENVIRONMENT

DEFENSE GUIDANCE

CONFLICT NOT INVOLVING

SOVIET FORCES

• LIMIT SCOPE OF CONFLICT, AVOID INVOLVEMENT OF SOVIET FORCES

• THREATENED REGIONAL ALLIES PROVIDE COMBAT FORCES

• US PROVIDES AIR, NAVAL, LOGISTIC, AND ADVISORY SUPPORT

• US GROUND COMBAT TROOPS DEPLOYED IF NECESSARY

• US COMBAT FORCE PARTICIPATION MAY INVOLVE

• DEMONSTRATION OF FORCE

• PROTECTION OF US LIVES OR CRITICAL RESOURCES

• INTERPOSITION BETWEEN CONTENDING PARTIES

• DIRECT COMBAT

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10 (DG P32) The global conflict strategy guidelines contained in the DG are provided in order of the regional planning priorities. We see that naval forces have a key

role to play in our own hemisphere, a role made more difficult by the growing capabili

ties of a strategically located Soviet proxy in Cuba, the unstable nature of Central

America, and the great distance to the South Atlantic SLOCs.

11 (DG P32) In the NATO-European theater, naval and air forces have, as first order

of business, the control of the North Atlantic SLOCs. A key role is assigned in securing

the flanks of the Northern and Southern region, affecting the weight of attack the Sovi

ets may bring to bear on the Central Front.

DEFENSE GUIDANCE

CONFLICT INVOLVING USSR

• SOVIET AGGRESSION IN AREAS OF US ADVANTAGE

• DEPLOY FORCES TO AREA TO SIGNAL COMMITMENT AND DETER

• CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS (WITH REGIONAL ALLIES) TO DEFEAT SOVIET AGGRESSION DECISIVELY

IF DETERRENCE FAILS

• PREPARE FOR GLOBAL US-SOVIET CONFRONTATION

• SOVIET AGGRESSION IN AREAS OF SOVIET ADVANTAGE

• DEPLOY MILITARY FORCES TO AREA RAPIDLY

• CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS WITH ALLIES

• TAKE MILITARY ACTIONS TO THREATEN SOVIET VULNERABILITIES

• INITIATE MOBILIZATION MEASURES TO PREPARE FOR GLOBAL US-SOVIET WAR

• IF NECESSARY, PREPARE COUNTEROFFENSIVES AT OTHER FRONTS

DEFENSE GUIDANCE

GLOBAL CONFLICT

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

• NEUTRALIZE SOVIET AND OTHER HOSTILE FORCES IN CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA.

• DEFEND PANAMA CANAL.

• SECURE GULF PORTS AND CONTROL LOCS IN CARIBBEAN AND SOUTH ATLANTIC.

DEFENSE GUIDANCE

GLOBAL CONFLICT

NATO

• US STRATEGY CONSISTENT WITH AGREED STRATEGY (MC 14/3) OF FORWARD DEFENSE

• NAVAL FORCES WILL GIVE FIRST PRIORITY TO CONTROL OF NORTH ATLANTIC SLOCS

• ATTACK AND DESTROY ENEMY NAVAL AIR FORCES

• DEFENDING MILITARY CONVOYS AND KEY ISLAND BASES

• IN NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN REGIONS, EMPLOY AIR, LAND AND NAVAL FORCES TO

SUPPORT NATO ALLIES

• OFFENSIVE MOVES AGAINST FLANKS TO DIVERT PACT FORCES FROM CENTRAL FRONT

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air and sea superiority, confront the Soviet attack, and defend Arabian Peninsula 

resources.

13 (DG P31-32) In the Pacific, the SLOCs from the West Coast to the Persian 

must be controlled. Offensive operations to tie down Soviet forces in a defensive 

would be undertaken, and counter-offensives against Vietnam, the Soviet coast an

North Korea staged.

14 (DG P34) In Africa, naval and air forces would again carry a major burden 

rying out our strategy.

[Presentation omits items 15 and 16.]

DEFENSE GUIDANCE

GLOBAL CONFLICT

SOUTHWEST ASIA

• ESTABLISH NAVAL AND AIR SUPERIORITY IN REGION

• SPECIAL OPS FORCES IMPEDE SOVIET ADVANCE UNTIL US GROUND FORCES INTRODUC

• US FORCES RAPIDLY PROJECTED TO CONFRONT SOVIET ATTACK AND ASSIST

REGIONAL ALLIES IN DEFENSE OF OIL FIELDS AND ARABIAN PENINSULA

DEFENSE GUIDANCE

GLOBAL CONFLICT

PACIFIC

• DEFEND ALASKA, HAWAII AND CONUS LOCS

• NAVAL AND AIR FORCES CONTROL EAST AND SOUTH CHINA SEA AND LOCS TO PERSIAN 

• CONDUCT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS TO EXPLOIT SOVIET VULNERABILITIES

• EXPLOIT OPPORTUNITIES FOR COUNTEROFFENSIVES AGAINST N. KOREA, VIETNAM, AND

SOVIET COASTAL AREAS

DEFENSE GUIDANCE

GLOBAL CONFLICT

AFRICA

• EMPLOY AIR AND NAVAL FORCES TO NEUTRALIZE SOVIET OR HOSTILE FORCES IN

STRATEGIC LOCATIONS.

• PROTECT ACCESS TO AND DENY SOVIET USE OF RESOURCES, KEY FACILITIES, AND LOC

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Navy planning guidance goals. The force planning section of the DG recognizes that

our limited current force capabilities lag significantly the ambitious strategy goals we

have just reviewed. The DG Navy planning guidance goals, shown here, lay out the

requirements for our naval forces—these will also bound our global maritime strategy.

18 (DG P43) More specific DG planning guidance is shown in this vugraph.

19 From the foregoing, it is apparent that our force limitations require a prioritization of our strategic objectives and a sequencing of our offensive operations—a fact

that the DG recognizes as necessary and the JCS continue to reiterate. This completes

DEFENSE GUIDANCE

NAVY PLANNING GUIDANCE GOALS

FULL ACCESS TO SLOCS AND SUPPORTING CAMPAIGNS ON LAND:

• SEEK OUT AND DESTROY ENEMY NAVAL FORCES

• CONTROL VITAL SEA AREAS AND PROTECT VITAL SLOCS

• PROVIDE SEALIFT FOR POWER PROJECTION AND MOBILITY

• ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN LOCAL SUPERIORITY

• SEIZE AND DEFEND ADVANCED NAVAL BASES

• CONDUCT LAND OR AIR OPERATIONS AS ESSENTIAL TO SUCCESS OF NAVAL

CAMPAIGN

• PROVIDE REINFORCING FIREPOWER TO LAND FORCES

• SUPPRESS ENEMY SEA COMMERCE

DEFENSE GUIDANCE

NAVY FORCE PLANNING GUIDANCE

• OBJECTIVE IS REGAINING ESSENTIAL MARGIN OF MARITIME SUPERIORITY

• FORCES SHOULD BE SIZED ON THE BASIS OF WARFIGHTING REQUIREMENTS

• PROCUREMENT PLANS BASED ON:

• 14 CVBG

• BB

• REQUISITE SSNS AND SURFACE COMBATANTS

• AMPHIBIOUS LIFT FOR AE OF MAF PLUS MAB

• ESSENTIAL SUPPORT SHIPS

• READINESS AND SUSTAINABILITY TOP PRIORITY

• SWA FORCE REQUIREMENTS SPECIFIED

• UP TO 3 CVBG

• MPS/NTPS FOR 2 MAB BY END FY 84; 3 MAB BY FY 87

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ation of war plan requirements and current naval force employment.

The gap that our CINCs must bridge is between that “reasonable assurance” nava

of 22 deployed carriers, derived from the CINCs’ requirements statements, and th

real-world force of 13 deployable carriers, only 11 of which (6 Atlantic, 5 Pacific) 

actually available in the first weeks of conflict. Our presentation assumes full readi

for our deployable forces and the degree of sustainability necessary to ensure the

fighting capability for a protracted period.

This vugraph summarizes how we will assume that the Soviets posture their threa

global scale. (Read)

MARITIME STRATEGY

OUTLINE

• NATIONAL STRATEGY REQUIREMENTS

• NATIONAL STRATEGY GUIDANCE

• CURRENT FORCE MARITIME STRATEGY FOR GLOBAL WAR

• CINCS WARPLANS/PREFERENCES

• GLOBAL WARFIGHTING STRATEGY

• ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS

• NOTIONAL FORCE EMPLOYMENTS

• COMPLICATING FACTORS

AVAILABLE FORCES

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This vugraph summarizes the likely contribution of allied naval forces in a global conflict. Despite the real assistance these allied forces provide in covering their local or

regional waters they may contribute only modestly to the U.S. Navy’s forward offensive

counter to the global Soviet blue-water threat. (Read) Nevertheless, we must ensure

that our allies’ capabilities are strengthened insofar as possible and their forces fully

integrated into our plans and operations.

The CINCs are responsible for developing their general war plans, based on the taskings

and force allocations in the JSCP. Although all three principal CINCs are presently

tasked to provide war plans without augmentation, until very recently each CINC’s

general warplan has been based on conflict originating in his theater, with augmentation by swing forces from other theaters.

SOVIET NAVAL FORCE POSTURE

PACIFIC: CONTROL SEA OF JAPAN/SEA OF OKHOTSK. OPERATE IN NW PACIFIC (PROTECT SSBN

OPAREAS/HOMELAND. ATTACK THREATENING ALLIED FORCES). SOVIET FORCES IN VIETNAM POS

TION TO INTERDICT SLOCS TO IO. NORTH KOREAN FORCES THREATEN REGIONAL SLOCS.

IO: POSITION TO ATTACK US NAVAL FORCES/SLOCS.

MED: CONCENTRATE IN EAST MED. AUGMENT BY BLACK SEA FLEET FORCES. SOVIET FORCES OPER

ATING FROM LIBYAN BASES.

NORTHERN FLEET: CONTROL BARENTS/GREENLAND/NORTHERN NORWEGIAN SEA. PROTECT SSBN

OP AREAS/HOMELAND; SSN’s MOVE DOWN TO AND BEYOND GIN GAP, RESOURCES PERMITTING.

BALTIC FLEET: OPERATE IN BALTIC TO SUPPORT LAND CAMPAIGN, THEN MAY ATTEMPT TO JOIN

NORTHERN FLEET FORCES.

ALLIED NAVAL CONTRIBUTIONS

• OVERALL: ALLIED NAVAL CONTRIBUTIONS ASSIST IN COVERING LOCAL AND REGIONAL

DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS.

• PACIFIC: JAPANESE (NEAR HOME WATERS) ASW, ESCORT, MCM; ASSIST MINING OF

SOJ EXITS. ANZUS ALLIES ASW, ESCORT, TACAIR CONTRIBUTION IN SE ASIA, SOUTH

PACIFIC.

• INDIAN OCEAN: LIMITED ASW/ESCORT AUGMENTATION FROM ANY IN-PLACE FRENCH, UK,

AUSTRALIAN, NEW ZEALAND FORCES.

• ATLANTIC/BALTIC: ASW, ESCORT, AND MCM IN EASTLANT/ENGLISH CHANNEL/

NORWEGIAN SEA. FRG/DENMARK MINING OF BALTIC EXITS, SS OPS IN BALTIC.

• MEDITERRANEAN: POTENTIAL FRENCH CV SUPPORT AND SS OPS IN WESTMED. SPANISH,

ITALIAN, GREEK, TURKISH SURFACE, SUBSURFACE, AND MCM CONTRIBUTION IN OWN

REGIONS OF MED. TURKISH MINING OF BLACK SEA EXITS.

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Adding up (on the diagonal in the orange) the CINCs’ existing general war plans

these augmentation forces, we find a total of 10 carrier battle groups in Europe, 3 

SWA, and 9 in the Pacific to fight a global war. We don’t have this total of 22 carri

tle groups, and in fact have only 11 of the 13 shown in the JSCP available in the fi

weeks of conflict. Thus, our current force maritime strategy for a near-simultaneo

global war cannot be simply the sum of existing CINCs’ general warplans.

The Joint Chiefs have recently emphasized the need to plan for a war which woul

idly become global. CINCLANT and CINCPAC have now been tasked to supplem

their current general war OPLANs with OPLANs for the employment of unaugm

forces. However, naval forces required for operations in the IO will have to come 

LANT and PAC assets.

First we will review each CINC’s strategy and perspectives in his theater.

This vugraph summarizes the force deployments in the current CINCLANT gen

warplan. (Pause) CINCLANT emphasizes early establishment of sea control in t

Atlantic and the key role that the defense of Iceland and Norway assumes in this 

egy. Note the importance of early deployment to Iceland of Marine ground forc

additional Air Force fighter squadrons and AWACS. Keeping the majority of Sov

forces confined north of the GIN Gap is essential to limit our own force require

CONCLUSION

MARITIME STRATEGY FOR NEAR-SIMULTANEOUS GLOBAL

WAR IS NOT THE SUM OF CINCS’ CURRENT PLANS.

FORCE ALLOCATIONS FOR GLOBAL CONFLICT

(FY 83 JSCP)

CONFLICT ORIGIN EUR/LANT SWA PAC

EUROPE/ATLANTIC *10 CVBG

** 3 MAF

0 3 CVBG

1 MAF

SWA 6 CVBG

1 MAF

3 CVBG

1 MAF/1 MAB

4 CVBG

1 MAF/1 M

PACIFIC 4 CVBG

1 MAF

0 * 9 CVBG

*** 3 MAF

*INCLUDES 3 CVBG “SWING” FROM CINCPAC OR CINCLANT. 9 CG AND 44 DD/FF/DDG/FFG TYPES FROM PACOM

MAY ALSO “SWING”

**INCLUDES 31 PACOM AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS

***INCLUDES 27 LANTCOM AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS

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Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:28:36 AM
The force employment concept for CINCLANT’s CVBGs is highlighted here. (Pause)

CINCLANT’s convoy strategy depends initially on independent sailing on the southern

route, followed by convoy escort from Madeira north. This southern route strategy is

necessary because of an escort shortage of 65 to 103 ships. Admiral Trost* recently

highlighted this shortage in forwarding the escort requirements study. Defense of the

CCGOS

• INTRATHEATER DEPLOYMENTS

• CVBGS:

• 3 TO GIN GAP

• 4TH CVBG TO N. ATLANTIC FOR SLOC PROTECTION

• 5TH AND 6TH CVBG JOIN WHEN AVAILABLE

• ICELAND

• 1 MAB

• 2 USAF F-4 TFS (NEED USAF F-15s, ADDITIONAL AWACS)

• 1 ARMY BRIGADE

• SAG TO CARIBBEAN TO DETER CUBA

• ASSAULT ELEMENT OF II MAF TO EUROPE

• OTHER ASSIGNED FORCES FOR SHIPPING/SLOC PROTECTION

• INTRATHEATER (“SWING”) DEPLOYMENTS

• MAF FROM PACOM

• 1 CV, 6 CG, 29 DD/FF, 31 AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS FROM PACOM TO LANTCOM

• 2 CV, 3 CG, 15 DD/FF TRANSIT THE LANTCOM AREA ENROUTE MED.

CINCLANT FORWARD DEFENSE

• DEFENSE OF ICELAND/NORWAY CRITICAL TO LANTCOM SEA CONTROL

• CONFINE MAJORITY OF SOVIET FORCES NORTH OF GIN

• MUST CONTROL G-I-N GAP

• IF SCENE OF BATTLE SHIFTS TO ATLANTIC, MANY MORE FORCES WILL BE REQUIRED TO DEFEAT SOVIETS

CINCLANT CVBG EMPLOYMENT

• IN BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF GIN GAP, POSITION FOUR CVBGS TO INTERDICT SOVIET FORCE

TRANSITING S. NORWEGIAN SEA

• ESTABLISH CLEAR AIR SUPERIORITY IN NORWEGIAN SEA/NORTH ATLANTIC WITH:

• EARLY ARRIVAL OF 2 CVBGS SOUTH OF GIN GAP

• DELAYED ARRIVAL OF 3RD CVBG (AFTER CUBAN/CARIBBEAN/SOLANT TASKING)

• 4TH CVBG (DEPENDENT ON MED/IO/PACOM TASKING).

CONVOY STRATEGY

• AZORES ESSENTIAL

• ELIMINATE SOVIET AIR AND SUB THREAT SOUTH OF 40 DEGREES NORTH

• ALLOWS INITIAL SHIPPING TO SAIL INDEPENDENTLY TO MADEIRA, THEN CONVOYS NORTH

• WHEN PACOM AUGMENTATION (6 CGS, 29 DD/FF/DDG/FFG) RECEIVED, CONVOYS FROM PUERTO RICO TO

MADEIRA, THEN NORTH

* Vice Adm. Carlisle A. H. Trost was then serving as director of Navy Program Planning (OP-090).

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Azores, as a vital base to support our sea and air LOCs, and holding the Soviet a

sub threat north of 40 degrees are prerequisites to this LOC defense strategy. He

see CINCLANT’s concerns about prompt neutralization of Cuba. (Pause)

CINCLANT’s strategic priorities for support of his Atlantic maritime strategy a

summarized here.

In the Mediterranean and southern region of NATO, these are CINCUSNAVEUR

tasks. (Pause) Here is CINCUSNAVEUR’s concept of maritime operations to carr

those tasks. Note the importance of early Marine and Air Force TACAIR and AW

deployments, as well as potential allied land-based TACAIR support, to help attr

Soviet air threat. This concept emphasizes early positioning of CVBGs in the cen

CUBA

• PREVENT CUBAN ATTACK OF VITAL SHIPPING

• HALF OF INITIAL SHIPPING TO NATO FROM GULF PORTS

• NEUTRALIZE CUBAN THREAT EARLY

• PERMITS TRANSIT OF SHIPPING, RELEASES FORCES

• WORST CASE IS CUBA DECLARES NEUTRALITY, WAITS UNTIL US FORCES REDEPLOYED, THEN ATTACKS

• CINCLANT FORCES AVAILABLE:

• NAVAL FORCES DIVERTED FROM OTHER TASKS

• 2 USAF B-52 SQUADRONS

CINCLANT’S STRATEGIC PRIORITIES

1. SUPPORT FOR ICELAND AND NORWAY

2. SUPPORT FOR MID-ATLANTIC LOCS (AZORES)

3. PROTECTION IN THE CARIBBEAN REGION

4. PROTECTION OF SOUTH ATLANTIC

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Med, then moving east for offensive operations as the Soviet threat is attrited. Note the

threat posed by Soviet forces operating from Libyan bases—a threat that only the Sixth

Fleet is prepared to counter since Libya lies south of NATO planning boundaries.

(Pause) The ability of our Mediterranean forces to fulfill the strategy requirements in

the southern region are shown here. Note that CINCUSNAVEUR desires 4 CVBGs or

additional land based TACAIR augmentation to operate with two or three CVBGs in

the eastern Mediterranean.

MARITIME TASKS IN THE

MEDITERRANEAN

• DESTROY SOVIET NAVAL FORCES

• TACAIR AND AMPHIBIOUS SUPPORT TO ALLIES

• CONTROL GIBRALTAR, TURKISH STRAITS, SUEZ

• SECURE SLOCS TO REINFORCE/RESUPPLY SOUTHERN REGION

• OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS TO REGAIN INITIATIVE

CINCUSNAVEUR CONCEPT OF MARITIME OPERATIONS

• POSITION CVBGS IN CENTMED

• USMC/USAF TACAIR TO TURKEY/GREECE/ITALY

• LOCATE AND TRAIL SOVIET SSNS

• TURKISH CLOSURE OF STRAITS

• COUNTERATTACK IMMEDIATE SOVMEDFLT THREAT

• AWACS/US AND ALLIED LAND-BASED TACAIR/SAM BARRIERS ATTRITE AIR THREAT

FROM CRIMEA

• NEUTRALIZE SOVIET FORCES IN LIBYA IF REQUIRED

• DESTROY RESIDUAL SOVMEDFLT THREAT

• SECURE MED LOCS

• OFFENSIVE AIR/AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT TO SUPPORT LAND CAMPAIGN

CINCUSNAVEUR COMMENTS ON ABILITY

TO EXECUTE STRATEGY

• 2 CVBGS CANNOT SUSTAIN COMBAT OPERATIONS IN HIGH THREAT ENVIRONMENT O

EASTMED WITHOUT EITHER:

• EARLY CVBG AUGMENTATION

• EARLY DEPLOYMENT OF USAF LAND-BASED TACAIR/AWACS TO GREECE, TURKEY, AND SOUTHERN ITALY

• OTHERWISE, 4 CVBGS NEEDED TO OPERATE IN EASTMED WITH “HIGH CONFIDENCE”

• ALSO NEED ADDITIONAL SSN AND MPA

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CINCPAC stresses the importance of defense of the Aleutians. Soviet seizure of o

the Aleutian airfields could bring Hawaii and the US West Coast within easy Sov

attack range. The early dispatch of Marine ground and land based air forces for t

defense of these key islands must preclude this eventuality. Recent and future com

arms exercises in the northern Pacific will underscore the importance of defendi

strategic area. Elsewhere, CINCPAC must destroy or confine Soviet naval forces i

northwest Pacific, assist our allies in Korea and Japan, control vast reaches of SLO

and operate in support of any SWA action. In CINCPAC’s recent presentation of 

strategic concepts to the JCS, he concluded that “swing”, by redeploying over half 

carriers, cruisers, destroyers and all but six of his amphibious ships, would jeopa

even the capability to defend the US. Likewise, CINCPAC also concludes that the

CINCPAC GENERAL WARPLAN

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

• DEPLOY PACOM FORCES TO ALEUTIANS, JAPAN, ROK

• DESTROY SOVIET NAVAL FORCES

• ASSIST IN DEFENSE OF JAPAN AND ROK

• CONDUCT OFFENSIVE/DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS TO MAINTAIN SECURITY OF HAWAII, ALE

GUAM, LOCS

• CONDUCT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST USSR

• DEPLOY MARINE, ARMY AND AMPHIBIOUS FORCES

• SWA/IO: PROTECT ESSENTIAL LOCS AND, WITH OTHER CINCS, COUNTER SOVIET AGGR

IMPORTANCE OF ALEUTIANS

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the NW Pacific.

In fact, CINCPAC prefers a different strategy approach, and has developed an alternative strategy which would carry out the four strategic priorities shown here. Basically,

the SWA SLOC protection mission would be deferred in favor of engaging Soviet Far

East forces well forward. The objective would be to keep Japan and Korea as active

allies, maximize our own use of Korean and Japanese forces and bases and, at a minimum, deny the use of these bases to the Soviets. Early offensive strikes on the Soviets

would support these key allies, strike at areas of exposed Soviet weakness and keep the

Soviets preoccupied with homeland defense. CINCPAC’s sequence of operations,

shown here, highlights the initial importance of the Aleutians, additional USAF

TACAIR to northern Japan followed at some point by offensive mining, and strikes on

Soviet client bases. In the initial operations phase, the IO CVBG would attack the

Soviet Indian Ocean squadron as it redeployed out of the IO. A force of 3 CVBGs

would generate in the vicinity of Guam and begin to sweep key SLOCs and position for

subsequent strike operations. Korean and Japanese forces make major contributions in

self-defense in this phase, while our own offensive naval operations confine and attrite

Soviet Far East forces. In the subsequent offensive operations phase, the forces would

help stabilize the situation in Korea. Then they would move forward to further increase

the pressure on the Soviets, adding to their perception of our resolve to bring the consequences of aggression home to them until the war is terminated. This strategy

CURRENT OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

CINCPAC CONCLUSIONS

• SWING “. . . IGNORES THE INCREASED SOVIET THREAT IN THE PACIFIC AND EXACERBATES TH

INADEQUACY OF FORCES CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO PACOM.”

• “DEFENSE OF NE ASIA ALLIES AND THE PACOM LOCS SHOULD BE GIVEN HIGHER PRIORITY

THAN ENSURING ACCESS TO SWA OIL IN A GLOBAL WAR SCENARIO.”

• DIFFERENT APPROACH PREFERRED.

• NO “SWING” ASSUMED

• PRIORITY TO NE ASIA ALLIES

CINCPAC PREFERRED STRATEGY

• DEFEND US

• FORWARD DEFENSE IN NE ASIA & NW PACIFIC

• INDIAN OCEAN OPS DEFERRED (EXCEPT TRANSIT STRIKES)

• EARLY STRIKES ON SOVIET FAR EAST TO SUPPORT OVERALL DEFENSE

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Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:28:41 AM
down significant Soviet forces.

This CINCPAC alternative strategy would suggest a change in the current preside

and SECDEF regional prioritization of access to SWA oil over the defense of Paci

allies. Also, CINCPAC would require the full use of his 5 initially available carrier

well as some additional USAF force tactical fighter and B-52 squadrons.

Up to this point, you’ve seen the national strategy requirements and the regional

taskings and perspectives of the CINCs. Now we will review an overall maritime 

egy for the employment of current forces in a near-simultaneous global war. We 

tried to tie together the strategic requirements and the key aspects of the CINCs’ 

rent strategy preferences into a logical and balanced strategic concept employing 

and combined forces.

The essence of our national strategy is global forward deterrence. Sequential empl

ment of our global maritime force is necessary. But we do not have the luxury of 

any major region to the Soviets by default—even SWA. The forward aspect mean

CINCPAC PREFERRED STRATEGY

• INITIAL DEPLOYMENTS/STRIKES

• USMC GROUND/TACAIR TO ALEUTIANS

• TACAIR TO N. JAPAN

• MINE JAPANESE STRAITS

• UW/AIR STRIKES ON SOVIETS IN VIETNAM/PDRY/ETHIOPIA

• INITIAL OPERATIONS

• IO: CVBG ATTACK SOVIET IO SQUADRON, REDEPLOY TO NW PACIFIC

• SOUTH CHINA SEA: TRANSIT STRIKE BY REDEPLOYING CVBG

• JAPAN/KOREA: MAJOR CONTRIBUTION IN SELF-DEFENSE

• SOVIET FAR EAST: ATTRITE NAVAL THREAT, SUB BARRIER OPS, STRIKE VULNERABILITIES

• SUBSEQUENT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

• KOREA: STABILIZE DEFENSE, MAXIMIZE DAMAGE TO N. KOREAN FORCES

• JAPAN: CVBGS ADVANCE UNDER COVER OF INCREASED AIR DEFENSE SHADOW OF JAPAN

• STRIKE OPS: JOINT AIR STRIKES, UW STRIKES

FULL FORWARD PRESSURE

MARITIME STRATEGY

BASIC PREMISES

• ESSENCE OF NATIONAL STRATEGY GLOBAL FORWARD DETERRENCE

• GLOBAL: CEDE NO REGION TO SOVIETS BY DEFAULT

• FORWARD: KEEP OPEN SLOCS TO EURASIA, FULL COOPERATION WITH US FORWARD DEPLOYED FORCES AND 

• DETERRENCE: TO DETER IS TO THREATEN. REQUIRES CONTINUING PRESSURE ON SOVIET CORE VALUES (HO

BASES, CONVENTIONAL AND STRATEGIC FORCES).

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and support fully our other services and allies. The third element—deterrence—must

be viewed not only in its peacetime or strategic nuclear context, but also in terms of

our threatening pressure on the Soviets which reinforces or restores deterrence in crisis

or wartime. Continuing pressure on Soviet core values such as their homeland, bases,

conventional and strategic forces is essential to our military and political strategy

objectives. We want to ensure the maritime strategy contributes to our objective of war

termination on favorable terms. First, we must keep sufficient offensive pressure on the

Soviets to convince them of no gain in continuing their aggression. Second, we minimize the attraction of the escalation option to the Soviets by having in being strategic

nuclear forces to provide a secure reserve, and sustained capabilities in our conventional forces. Third, we use our inherently flexible and mobile battle group and

amphibious forces to carry the fight to the enemy, to gain or regain territory and strike

Soviet vulnerabilities. The result desired is to gain some negotiating advantages of our

own and preclude the Soviets just “sitting on” their initial territorial gains.

We will now discuss a notional force employment reflecting current forces centered on

11 initially available, fully ready, carrier battle groups. Over the POM period, the additional carrier battle group and other programmed force enhancements and force multipliers would augment obvious needs but probably would not change the essence of the

CINCs’ strategy or basic force employments. This force employment is based on a

striking symmetry between key elements of the LANT and PAC strategy. Both CINCs

FULL FORWARD PRESSURE

MARITIME STRATEGY

BASIC PREMISES

• OBJECTIVE OF WARFIGHTING IS WAR TERMINATION ON TERMS FAVORABLE TO US

• WAR TERMINATION REQUIRES SUFFICIENT PRESSURE ON SOVIETS TO CONVINCE THEM OF NO GAIN IN CONTINUIN

AGGRESSION

• FAVORABLE TERMS TO US MEANS:

• SOVIETS SEE NO ADVANTAGE IN FURTHER ESCALATING CONFLICT

• REQUIRES SECURE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR RESERVE

• REQUIRES SUSTAINED CAPABILITIES OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES

• CARRY FIGHT TO ENEMY TO:

• GAIN/REGAIN TERRITORY

• NORWAY/JUTLAND?

• THRACE?

• KOREA?

• STRIKE VULNERABILITIES

• STRATEGIC RESERVE?

• SOVIET AIR DEFENSES?

• SOVIET C3?

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place fundamental importance on a forward defense pivoted on keystone northe

islands that control access to the U.S. and lie above the vital transoceanic sealanes. 

islands are lost, the roof collapses on our links with NATO and the key Pacific allie

forward U.S. and allied land based TACAIR helps attrite the air threat while the s

rine and surface threat is confined and attrited by early forward SSN barriers and

offensive mining by the US and its allies. Note how early offensive mining of cho

points would play a vital role in holding back the enemy’s numerical weight to en

3 CVBGs

OFFENSIVE MINING

SSN BARRIERS

ISLAND KEYSTONES

ATLANTIC/PACIFIC STRATEGY SYMMETRY

CINCLANT AND CINCPAC STRATEGY SYMMETRY

• KEEP SOVIET THREAT AWAY FROM CONUS AND SLOCS BY EARLY FORWARD DEFEN

ATTRITION:

• DEFEND ISLAND “KEYSTONES” (ICELAND, ADAK)

• EARLY FORWARD SSN BARRIERS (NORTH OF GIN; NW PACIFIC)

• OFFENSIVE MINING OF CHOKE POINTS (BALTIC/BLACK SEAS; TSUSHIMA, TSUGARU, SOYA)

• OFFENSIVE PRESSURE ON SOVIETS ESSENTIAL TO DEFEND VITAL FLANK ALLIES (NORWAY

KOREA).

• PRESERVE BASES FOR US USE

• AT MINIMUM, DENY BASES TO SOVIETS

• BLUNT INITIAL ATTACK THEN USE FULLY GENERATED FORCES (CVBGS, USMC) TO “S

LAND WAR”.

• 4 CVBGS DESIRED IN FORWARD POSITIONS (GIN GAP; NW PACIFIC).

• “BOTTOM LINE” IS 3 CVBGS IN FORWARD POSITIONS

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our own forces’ ability to quickly move the offense forward. As shown here, our allies

can play a key role, and their capabilities factor heavily in our choke-point mining

plans. SSNs with mining capability would be the primary means to mine Soviet ports

like Petropavlovsk and heavily defended coastal areas, while TACAIR, P-3s, and B-52s

would be used to lay mine barriers in lower threat areas and oceanic choke points. The

early offensive pressure on the Soviets is essential to defend the vital flank allies and

deny their bases to the enemy. Then once the initial attack is blunted, we would hope to

use our Navy/Marine Corps team to bring decisive offensive pressure on the enemy from

forward positions, leading to war termination on favorable terms.

DAVIS

STRAIT

GIN

GAP

KOLA INLET

WHITE SEA

PORTS

BALTIC

EXIT

BLACK SEA

EXITS

SEA OF JAPAN

EXITS

PETROPAVLOVSK

SOYA

TSUGARU

TSUSHIMA

{

MINEFIELDS FOR CONFINEMENT OF SOVIET FLEETS

CURRENT ALLIED MINE INVENTORIES

ASTRIDE RELEVANT STRAITS

BALTIC EXITS NUMBER OF MINES

GERMANY 10,000

DENMARK 6,600

BLACK SEA EXITS

TURKEY 9,900

GREECE 3,900

SEA OF JAPAN

JAPAN 6,900

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With this symmetry of the existing LANT and PAC CINCs’ strategies in mind, let

at a notional current force employment in the Atlantic and Pacific to support an 

strategy. The length of the prehostilities phase is critical, and will allow insertion 

land-based TACAIR in such crucial areas as Iceland, the Aleutians, Japan, SWA, a

as Europe and Turkey. If we have even a week of prehostilities movement, it mak

second phase of blunting the initial attack much easier. But, an extended prehost

phase might become a double-edged sword for us if the Soviets should contradic

assumptions about holding back the bulk of their submarine forces and, instead, 

these south into our sealanes.

Our strategy keeps forward pressure on the Soviets to blunt the initial attack and 

to conduct offensive operations. (Pause). First we support our own and allied for

stabilize the land battle. (Pause). Then our Navy/Marine Corps team carries the f

the enemy to exploit enemy vulnerabilities and to gain or regain territorial areas 

tial to our war termination leverage.

The precise timing of the commitment of our carrier battle groups to the land ba

both these phases is a critical but highly scenario-dependent decision. We must

FORCE EMPLOYMENT

ATLANTIC/PACIFIC

• PREHOSTILITIES

• I&W, SURVEILLANCE

• EARLY USMC GROUND/USAF (F-15) TACAIR TO ICELAND/ADAK

• SSNS TO FORWARD BARRIERS

• CVBGS (3 TOTAL) TO FORWARD POSITIONS SOUTH OF GIN/EAST OF JAPAN

• OFFENSIVE MINING PREPARATIONS

• INITIAL SEALIFT TO EUR/MED SAIL INDEPENDENTLY

FORCE EMPLOYMENT

ATLANTIC/PACIFIC

• BLUNT INITIAL ATTACK/SUPPORT LAND BATTLE

• BARRIER SSNS PRESSURE SOVIETS/ATTRITE SUB THREAT

• USAF, USMC, AND ALLIED LAND-BASED TACAIR/SURVEILLANCE ASSETS ATTRITE SOVIET AIR THREAT.

• CVBGS MANEUVER IN FORWARD POSITIONS TO ATTACK UNATTRITED AIR AND SUBMARINE THREATS,

MAINTAIN SEA CONTROL

• CVBGS THEN PRESS FURTHER FORWARD AS REQUIRED TO:

• HELP BLUNT LAND ATTACK

• KEEP PRESSURE ON SOVIET FORCES/HOMELAND

• CARRY FIGHT TO ENEMY

• MAINTAIN/INCREASE FORWARD OFFENSIVE PRESSURE ON SOVIET VULNERABILITIES

• NAVY/MARINE CORPS OFFENSIVE MOVEMENTS TO:

• REGAIN TERRITORY FROM SOVIETS (NORWAY, JUTLAND, KOREA?)

• GAIN TERRITORY (S. KURILES, N. KOREA?)

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to make the strategic difference.

Turning from the Atlantic and Pacific to the Mediterranean and SWA, we are dealing

with situations in which our maritime forces are primarily supporting non-maritime

CINCs. The key issue in both regions is somewhat similar: how early do we need to

control the SLOC’s in more limited areas? This overall strategy would concentrate

initially on denying the Soviets sea control in the eastern Mediterranean and Indian

Ocean. But we do not interpret sequential operations to mean uncontested withdrawal

from the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean regions.

Maintaining our initially deployed battle groups in the central Mediterranean and the

Indian Ocean has two benefits: First, we complicate the Soviet ability to rapidly shift

and concentrate their backfire threat in either region. Second, in Southwest Asia such

in-place forces are likely to have a decisive effect on the Soviet decision to continue their

initial aggression. Our national interest is not in Iran, per se, but in maintaining access

to the oil of the Arabian Peninsula. We might do well, then, to avoid getting our strategy thinking bogged down in debates over regional priorities and accept the fact that

the SWA region will be contested to the extent possible, with the Navy/Marine Corps

forces available to the region at the outset of conflict playing the key initial role militarily and signalling our political resolve to counter Soviet aggression in the region.

In the worst scenarios, our one deployed carrier battle group, MIDEASTFORCE, and

7th MAB/NTPF may initially have to carry out the SWA regional mission without augmentation. Despite the great risk, they may have to destroy Soviet naval forces in the

BLUNT INITIAL ATTACK/SUPPORT LAND BATTLE

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Oman.

With more prehostilities time, we would have the option of surging a second carr

into the IO, to cover the insertion of limited land based TACAIR into at least Om

and surging additional SSNs and MPA support.

In summary, a global war scenario may require us to execute a limited strategy in 

with in-place maritime forces. This strategy recognizes the need to engage Soviet 

early on with US forces in place at that time, and would keep offensive pressure o

Soviets and position our forces to eventually regain access to Persian Gulf oil.

Our force employment strategy in the Med recognizes the priority given to prote

the trans-Atlantic SLOC’s to the Med with our 3 CVBG forward pressure strategy 

the North Atlantic, the realities of only 6 Atlantic CVBGs available, and the need 

neutralize any threat posed from Libya. We would augment the deployed Med CV

FORCE EMPLOYMENT

SOUTHWEST ASIA

• FORCES IN-PLACE: 1 CVBG/MEF/NTPF

• POSSIBLE AUGMENTATION FORCES:

• 2ND CVBG

• LAND-BASED TACAIR TO OMAN

• ADDITIONAL SSN/MPA SUPPORT

• MUST DESTROY SOVIET IO FORCES

• OPTION FOR REGIONAL LODGEMENT

FORCE EMPLOYMENT

MEDITERRANEAN

• PREHOSTILITIES

• POSITION 2 CVBGS IN CENTMED

• USMC/USAF TACAIR/AWACS TO ITALY/GREECE/TURKEY

• LOCATE AND TRAIL SOVIET SSNS

• BLUNT THE ATTACK/SUPPORT LAND BATTLE

• TURKS MINE STRAITS

• USAF, USMC, AND ALLIED LAND-BASED TACAIR/SURVEILLANCE HELP ATTRITE SOVIET AIR THREAT

• CVBGS IN CENTMED AREA ATTACK UNATTRITED SUB/AIR THREATS, MAINTAIN SEA CONTROL

• 2 CVBGS, WHEN JOINED BY THIRD CVBG, MIGHT RISK MOVE FORWARD IN EAST CENTRAL MED FOR OFFENSIVE 

• HELP BLUNT LAND ATTACK

• KEEP PRESSURE ON SOVIET SOUTHERN FLANK/FORCES

• CARRY FIGHT TO ENEMY

• NAVY/MARINE CORPS THRUSTS TO GAIN OR REGAIN TERRITORY (THRACE, ADRIATIC)

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to SACEUR at NATO SIMPLE ALERT. The third battle group for the Med might well

be required to delay enroute to conduct transit strike on Cuba.

If we then elect to move forward into the eastern Med with the 3 available CVBGs to

control the SLOCs, support the land battle, and bring pressure closer to the Soviet

homeland we would do so at higher risk.

I will now conclude this review of our forward offensive maritime strategy with a consideration of two factors that complicate our force employment requirements.

First, Cuba poses a threat to both the continental United States and to over half of our

initial reinforcement/resupply shipments to Europe. There are no naval forces specifically allocated in the JSCP to neutralize Cuba, yet it must be neutralized early to ensure

scheduled transit of reinforcement shipping. CINCLANT’s force employment preference would be to use USAF B-52 squadrons and land-based attack aircraft to strike a

crippling blow on Cuban air and naval bases at the outset of the war. One deploying

carrier battle group could also participate in a coordinated initial strike with the Air

Force. If required, the last of the carrier battle groups deploying to the Med or North

Atlantic could participate in other coordinated follow-on strikes.

Thus, the need for early neutralization of the Cuban threat, and the need to minimize

the diversion of our CVBGs from their forward offensive roles suggests an innovative

COMPLICATING FACTORS

CUBA

• THREAT TO CONUS AND HALF OF INITIAL RE/RE SHIPPING TO EUROPE

• CINCLANT: MUST NEUTRALIZE CUBA EARLY

• NO NAVAL FORCES ALLOCATED SPECIFICALLY FOR CUBA (JSCP)

• 2 B-52 SQUADRONS ALLOCATED

COMPLICATING FACTORS

CUBA

• OFFENSIVE FORCE EMPLOYMENT:

• EARLY USE OF USAF B-52 SQUADRONS, LAND-BASED ATTACK A/C TO ELIMINATE THREAT TO SHIPPING WITH MINIMUM

CVBG DIVERSION.

• CVBG PARTICIPATE IN COORDINATED INITIAL STRIKE (DEPENDENT ON SCENARIO/INITIAL LOCATION)

• LAST CVBGS DEPLOYING TO NORLANT/MED PARTICIPATE IN BRIEF COORDINATED FOLLOW-ON STRIKE IF REQUIRED

• OBSERVATIONS:

• NEED INNOVATIVE JOINT PLANNING FOR CUBA IN GLOBAL WAR CONTEXT.

• LAND-BASED TACAIR/SURVEILLANCE.

• AIR FORCE TACAIR COVER FOR PHMS, OTHER SURFACE ASSETS (SLOC DEFENSE).

• INCREASED EXERCISES WITH USAF.

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cooperation with the Air Force. Air Force air cover for our PHM and other surfa

assets can contribute greatly to continual protection of the SLOCs in this Caribb

area where we may not have battle group forces to allocate.

The second complicating factor is Soviet forces operating from Vietnamese bases

three battle group forward offensive pressure on Soviet forces in the NW Pacific 

prevent the Soviets from augmenting their forces in Vietnam. This would help us 

dealing with a finite threat from Soviet forces. This Soviet South China Sea threa

vital umbilical SLOCs from the Indian Ocean must be eliminated at the outset of 

flict. The strategy would coordinate our surveillance and strikes with USAF B-52 

tance from Philippine and Guam bases, using an additional CVBG enroute to the

Indian Ocean for an early strike if possible.

The strategy and force employment presented illustrates clearly that the U.S. Nav

making a major strategic difference in our peacetime deterrent posture and will m

major strategic impact in the conduct of wartime operations. In order to ensure 

latter, we must learn how the Soviets think, tactically and strategically, and use su

tactics and strategy to maximize the warfighting capability of our smaller naval f

We must ensure that our current forces are ready to fight, across the board, now—

that the necessary sustainability items are there to keep them in battle for extend

periods. We must pursue short term objectives that enhance our warfighting cap

ties—force multipliers—to bridge the gap between current and required force lev

best we can. We must work in complete concert with the other services and our a

ensuring that their contributions to maritime operations are not overlooked or m

used. The achievement of the foregoing, along with the force structure growth an

modernization we need, will further ensure that our Navy and Marine forces will 

tinue to make the strategic difference.

COMPLICATING FACTORS

VIETNAM

• THREAT OF SOVIET FORCES/FACILITIES

• KEEP SOVIET THREAT FINITE BY FORWARD OFFENSIVE PRESSURE IN NW PACIFIC

• DESTROY SOVIET SOUTH CHINA SEA FORCES AT THE OUTSET

• OFFENSIVE FORCE EMPLOYMENT:

• EARLY COORDINATED USAF/USN SURVEILLANCE/STRIKE

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The Maritime Strategy, 1984

The 1984 Maritime Strategy was the first that was made into a formal publicatio

circulated throughout the Navy. From its initial development in 1982 until 4 May 

when the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James D. Watkins, issued this publ

it had only been an evolving and unsigned staff briefing, as the key figures had al

at the conclusion of a briefing on 4 November 1982.* In Admiral Watkins’s letter 

tribution, he noted that “it [the Maritime Strategy publication] outlines the Nav

in our national military strategy, especially in the event of a global conventional 

with the Soviet Union.” In addition, he declared, “It has formed the basis for the de

ment of [the] Navy POM-86 [Program Objectives Memorandum 1986], testimony 

port of Navy budgets and programs, and joint and allied cooperative planning effor

The development of the publication began in 1983 with the appointment of Capt

Roger Barnett as head of the Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603) and, within th

office, Commander Peter Swartz as action officer for the Maritime Strategy, to rep

both Lieutenant Commander Stanley Weeks and Commander W. Spencer Johnso

went on to new assignments. These changes coincided with the beginning of a new 

of congressional testimony to support the Navy’s budget and programs in the POM

process. At this juncture, Vice Admiral Arthur Moreau, the outgoing Deputy Chie

Naval Operations (Plans, Policy, and Operations) (OP-06), took great and direct 

in the plans for the next step to the strategy. In particular, he wanted to advance 

ceptual underpinning of the strategy and to move from an emphasis on carrier ba

groups so as to include other types of naval forces, allied navies and air forces, and 

U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force strategy. In addition, the new version was to be mo

closely connected with the intelligence community’s understanding of Soviet nava

egy in both crises and in wartime.‡ In general, it included the need to include wh

DOCUMENT TWO

* For a more detailed explanation of the background to this document, see John B. Hatten

The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986, Newport Paper 19 (Newp

Naval War College Press, 2004), pp. 74–81.

† Letter attached to Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAV Publication 60 P-1-84, serial 00/4S3

May 1984, paras. 2 and 3. This publication was approved for declassification by the Depu

Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans, and Strategy (N3/N5) on 7 February 

‡ See Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Naval Strategy and Programs through the 1990s, N

Intelligence Estimate 11-15-82/D, in Evolution, by Hattendorf, pp. 101–84.

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Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:28:48 AM
had been thinking about in terms of northern Norway and the Mediterranean in relationship to naval support of NATO, the strategic relationship of naval operations to the

European Central Front, the role of Pacific Fleet battle forces, and the importance of the

sea lines of communication in both the Atlantic and Pacific areas.

As the action officer for the Maritime Strategy, Swartz’s principal task was to meet Vice

Admiral Moreau’s requirements as well as to turn the Weeks-Johnson briefing into a

publication. In this, he wanted to represent the collective thought of the U.S. Navy’s high

command, to flesh out the initial concepts with additional information on the national

strategic, joint, and allied aspects of the strategy. Meanwhile, he sought to preserve and

build upon the essence of Lieutenant Commander Weeks and Commander Johnson’s

pathbreaking effort. As he approached this task, he was influenced by the concepts contained in Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie’s 1967 book Military Strategy: A General Theory of

Power Control and particularly by Wylie’s view that military control cannot be isolated

from other factors.*

After looking through the materials available to him, Swartz concluded that Admiral

Robert Long’s Pacific Command campaign plan—one of the plans that the joint commanders in chief had recently briefed to General Vessey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs

and which had been consulted and used by Lieutenant Commander Weeks—provided a

model that he could apply in global terms. This choice reemphasized the line of thought

that had arisen, in its turn, from concepts that Admiral Thomas Hayward had develope

in his “Project Sea Strike” as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and that Admiral Long

as Vice Chief of Naval Operations overseeing the work on SEA PLAN 2000, had also

applied. Both Barnett and Swartz were familiar with these documents from earlier

Washington assignments. In addition, Barnett had written his doctoral dissertation on

Soviet military thought and had studied the issue of Soviet strategic reserves; Swartz had

conducted predoctoral research on U.S. Navy–NATO navy relationships and plans.†

Swartz’s expansion of the Maritime Strategy into a publication with an intentionally

eye-catching bright yellow cover was developed through the summer and autumn of

1983 as a result of pointed feedback from a succession of briefings and “murder-board

sessions” at the working level of strategically minded commanders and captains. Among

key people who provided input to Swartz at this time were Commander James R. Stark,

who had worked on SEA PLAN 2000 in 1977–78, and Lieutenant Colonel Thomas

Wilkerson and Major Tony Wood at Marine Corps Headquarters.

* See J. C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control, introduction by John B.

Hattendorf and postscript by J. C. Wylie, Classics of Sea Power (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute

Press, 1989).

†

Roger W. Barnett, “Soviet Military Thought: Exploring Soviet Intentions” (PhD diss., University

of Southern California, 1977). See also Barnett, “Soviet Strategic Reserves and the Soviet Navy,”

in The Soviet Union: What Lies Ahead? ed. Kenneth M. Currie and Gregory Varhall (Washington

D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), and “U.S. Maritime Strategy: Sound and Safe,”

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 43, no. 7 (September 1987), pp. 30–39.

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Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:28:48 AM
60), gave the first major briefing of this new version to Admiral Watkins and six f

Chiefs of Naval Operations and other key figures on board USCGC Chase (WHE

during the America’s Cup race off Newport, Rhode Island, on 13 September 1983

October, it was briefed to the OPNAV Program Development Review Committee 

CNO Executive Board. On 19 January 1984, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman 

Admiral Watkins presented the briefing to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinbe

Then, on 14 March, Secretaries Weinberger and Lehman presented the briefing t

Seapower Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Between 13 Se

ber 1983 and 4 May 1984, when the final version was signed, the draft publicatio

evolved through seventy-five detailed briefings, some to allied chiefs of navy, represe

of other American armed services, and war college students.

Barnett and Swartz felt that the 1984 publication achieved a number of things. F

they had made connections with key staff members who worked war plan issues o

various commanders in chief ’s staffs and were confident that the 1984 strategy w

contrary to their thinking and would not be opposed for those reasons. Second, th

sion of the strategy was the first to mention and to lay out in any detail the role o

forces in the direct defense of the American coasts and ports, in what would later 

be called homeland defense, and cited the assets of the U.S. Coast Guard and the 

Reserve as the primary tools for these operations. This theme was picked up and c

ued through all the following versions of the Maritime Strategy. Third, this versio

the first capstone document specifically to identify terrorism as a threat that nava

could help to counter. From this point onward, terrorism remained listed as a thr

although it was not given the highest priority as long as the Soviet Union held tha

tion. Fourth, they had organized the strategy by warfare tasks, which related to th

posite Warfare Commander concept that governed the way in which naval officer

tended to think about operations and to the categories by which the Warfare App

portion of the Navy’s program-planning process was organized. Fifth, they chose 

tinctive map projection to illustrate the strategic ideas. Instead of using separate t

maps, they chose a single map that placed the Soviet Union in the center of the pr

tion, thereby stressing the global nature of the strategy while simultaneously show

key flanking oceanic areas in the Norwegian Sea and in the Northwest Pacific. At 

same time, constant repetition of this particular map projection throughout each 

provided a single clear picture that showed how the Navy made a strategic differe

future war. Finally—building on the concept of “complicating factors” introduced 

Lieutenant Commander Weeks and Commander Johnson—they had institutiona

“uncertainties” section within the strategy, emphasizing the contingent nature of 

of the strategy’s assumptions, and stressing the importance of critical thinking in 

menting the strategy. ✒

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the best overall conventional maritime strategy for global war today. It is the Navy’s

preferred strategy, considering national and coalition guidance, the threat, force levels,

and trade-offs among conflicting aims. It is a baseline strategy, around which our other

strategic options are centered.

Before discussing the role of the Navy in a conventional global war, it must be emphasized that the Navy serves the U.S. government across the entire range of conflict possibilities: from peacetime presence through strategic nuclear war. While the strategy outlined

here focuses on global conventional war, the Navy’s role in it cannot be understood completely without some mention of other kinds of conflict. Therefore, it will initially focus

briefly on the Navy’s two other major roles: peacetime presence and crisis response.

The Navy’s peacetime presence is constant and worldwide. While naval units naturally

spend much time operating in the Western Atlantic and Eastern Pacific, a major presence is also maintained in the Western Pacific. Permanent deployments, in force, are

made to the Mediterranean, the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea, and the Indian

Ocean. The Northeast Atlantic and North Pacific are also not neglected, since those are

vital areas from which naval forces must be prepared to fight.

At any point in time, over 110 thousand Navy men and women are at sea, in many

parts of the world, plus three to four thousand civilian mariners providing afloat logistics support.

Naval forces underline American commitments and interests around the globe every day.

Their forward presence is a physical demonstration of our will; encouraging allies and

friends; deterring and reducing the influence of enemies; influencing neutrals; and

USES OF NAVAL POWER

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asserting and reinforcing principles of international law and freedom of the seas 

continuous basis.

Throughout the year naval forces participate in a demanding series of peacetime 

cises. Dozens are held each year; often with allies and other services. This chart sh

only some of the most important ones last year, the largest being FLEETEX 83-1 

North Pacific and the sequence UNITED EFFORT/OCEAN SAFARI in the Atlan

These exercises contribute to alliance cohesion, enabling U.S. naval units to oper

routinely with sister services and allied forces, and to test and update joint and co

bined procedures.

U.S. NAVY

MAJOR EXERCISES FY83

(IN THOUSANDS OF SHIP DAYS)

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One measure of the Navy’s peacetime presence role is the number of diplomatic port

visits. Note that the dots on this chart only represent countries visited—over 65. To

show the individual ports themselves would be impossible on such a small chart.

These routine port visits are conducted not only to ensure adequate crew rest and

relaxation; but also to promote better relations between the United States and the

allied, friendly, and neutral countries visited; and to demonstrate American military

strength, professionalism and support.

Crisis response is the next major U.S. Navy role. Since World War II, the U.S. Navy ha[s]

been used for this purpose more often than any other service: over 200 times, in more

than 80 percent of the crises in which the United States has been involved.

Carrier battle groups and amphibious forces have been the primary instruments of

naval crisis response, but most other types of naval forces can also be so used. Naval

USES OF NAVAL POWER

()

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with allied forces, and then usually outside formal alliance frameworks.

U.S. Navy crisis response can range from varying deployment patterns to express 

cific concern and support, through clear demonstrations of warfighting capabilit

the actual use of force in support of national objectives. Naval forces can be used 

the full spectrum of responses to crises, from countering acts of state-supported 

ism, to engaging in single-theater wars.

During the last year alone, U.S. naval forces were used at least six times, as part of 

U.S. national response to crises: off Central America, in Grenada, off Libya, in Leba

off Korea in response to the assassination of the Korean Government officials in Bu

and off Northern Japan to help locate the Korean airliner downed by the Soviets.

U.S. NAVY/SOVIET NAVY

CRISIS RESPONSE CY 83

FORCE EMPLOYMENT

MAJOR ELEMENTS JAN–MAR 84

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tions, while preparing for the possibility of global war, because of their great mobility

and flexibility. This chart shows the movements of major U.S. naval forces during just a

3-month period this past winter.

Under the FLEXOPS deployment concept, naval commanders have completely reordered their methods of peacetime scheduling. This allows for more realistic

multicarrier and amphibious operations, greater flexibility for theater commanders,

and far more useful training; while at the same time reducing the time out of homepor

for Navy and Marine Corps personnel. This new concept of operations made it possibl

for naval units to undertake the major peacekeeping operation in Lebanon and the

regional security operation in Grenada without disrupting or reducing peacetime

deployments elsewhere in the world.

Peacetime Deployments and Crisis Response, while lower in intensity than the Navy’s

global warfighting role, nevertheless affect the strategy for carrying out that role. The

Navy continually tests and evaluates the Maritime Strategy through exercises, war

games, and from “lessons learned” from crisis and single-theater war operations, such

as those that took place in the Middle East and the Falklands. More importantly, the

Navy’s global deterrent and warfighting strategy influences its peacetime and crisis

activities.

THE MARITIME STRATEGY:

A DYNAMIC CONCEPT

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and weaknesses of the current naval force structure and, in turn, influences resea

and development and procurement plans. Conversely, actual procurement—the 

available—acts to bound the strategy, as shall be seen.

The primary concern here is the U.S. Navy’s baseline strategy for fighting a global c

tional war with the Soviets. At the conclusion, some of the implications of escalat

nuclear war, both theater and strategic, will be examined.

This is an overview of what is to follow. The first portion underscores the relation

between the Maritime Strategy and national strategy. The Maritime Strategy is in

to our national strategy, for if the United States must go to war, it must go to sea

Maritime Strategy, however, is not an independent strategy, although it can be desc

independently.

USES OF NAVAL POWER

MARITIME STRATEGY OUTLINE

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Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:29:00 AM
tive to Soviet strategy. It is not determined, but it is definitely bounded, by force capability. Consideration of these factors, therefore, is necessary as a prelude to discussing

the strategy itself. Before concluding, the uncertainties inherent in this strategy will be

considered. The uncertainties are very difficult to predict. They may well prevent the

strategy from being implemented as preferred.

Those who say that the United States has no national strategy are simply wrong. The

national strategy is constructed upon this foundation: deterrence first, but if this fails,

then defense as far forward as possible, worldwide, in conjunction with our allies.

The sources of our national strategy are diverse. This is a list of the most important of

them as they relate to the maritime strategy.

The NSDD’s are presidential decisions on national strategy. The DG is annual Secretary

of Defense guidance on strategy and programs. The JSPD and JSCP are annual JCS

documents which recommend strategy to the National Command Authority, and provide guidance to the unified and specified commanders, respectively.

The Navy contributes to the development of these documents, and naval forces are

among those responsible for their execution.

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

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NSDD-32, a national security decision directive signed by the President, is the ba

document setting forth the national strategy. Essential points have been extracted 

It is a clear, direct document, with which naval strategic thought is largely in har

In it, the importance of global, conventional, balanced, and forward deployed force

highlighted.

Within the Department of Defense, the Secretary promulgates guidance annually

primary purpose is to guide the annual Program Objectives Memorandum.

NSDD-32 (20 MAY 82)

“US NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY”

DEFENSE GUIDANCE (DG) FY 86–90

DG 86–90

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It contains, however, a global war planning scenario that has the war commencing with

a Soviet attack in Southwest Asia, and then spreading to Europe and Korea sixteen days

later.

What troubles the Navy is that this scenario can be used to influence planning and

programming to an unwarranted degree. Actually fighting a global war against the

Soviets the way the scenario depicts would be very unwise.

This year’s Defense Guidance has updated the listing of earlier regional priorities for

general Department of Defense planning. The Secretary of Defense has now placed

defense of our Pacific allies and lines of communication on an equal footing with access

to oil in Southwest Asia. He has also clarified the position of friendly Caribbean and

Central American states as part of North America, our top defense priority.

DG 86-90 provides the Navy with clear force planning guidance warfighting goals,

emphasizing destruction of the enemy fleet, control of vital sea areas (highlighting the

Norwegian Sea and Northwest Pacific), power projection ashore, and sealift.

DG 86–90 PRIORITIES FOR GENERAL PLANNING

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It commits the Department to a goal of Maritime Superiority.

Another source for the national military strategy is the Joint Strategic Capabilitie

(JSCP), which constitutes Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) near-term planning guidance 

unified and specified commanders (CINCS). The current JSCP, signed in the spr

1984, derives from NSDD-32 and the current DG. It apportions Fiscal Year (FY) 

forces for use in war planning.

DG 8690 NAVY FORCE PLANNING GUIDANCE GOALS

JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN

JSCP FY 85

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These include, as in the DG, a global war originating in Southwest Asia; but also global

wars originating in Europe and in the Pacific. JSCP CINC force apportionments for

each scenario differ.

Besides these strictly national documents, we also have alliances, treaties, and formal

agreements that together form the skeletal frame of global coalition warfare, another of

the bases for our national military strategy. It is a fundamental tenet that by defending

our allies, we defend ourselves.

In addition to the states shown here with which we have formal defense treaty relationships, there are others with whom we have common military interests and which affect

the maritime strategy. These will be discussed later. The maritime strategy takes the

requirements of coalition warfare fully into account.

ALLIANCES, TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS

THE MARITIME STRATEGY: GOALS

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implement these that the Maritime Strategy has been developed.

Next, Soviet strategy must be considered. This is a necessity, since strategy is not a 

of solitaire.

This chart shows Soviet worldwide force levels. Note especially the size and comp

tion of the Northern and Pacific Fleets, the position of Soviet SSBN’s, and the wo

wide disposition of the Soviet Navy. Approximately 15 percent of the Soviet Navy 

normally deployed away from home waters.

MARITIME STRATEGY OUTLINE

SOVIET NAVY ACTIVE GLOBAL PEACETIME POSTURE (FY 84)

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ships, the most militarily adaptable merchantmen in the world, also deployed globally.

They are supplemented in the Baltic by the Polish and East German fleets and in the

Black Sea by the Romanian and Bulgarian Navies.

The highlights of the agreed National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Soviet naval strategy, presented here, illustrate the best current agreed estimate by the U.S. intelligence

community, including the Director of Naval Intelligence. The Soviets believe that war

between the coalitions will be global in scope. There is an emphasis upon strategic

strike, including defense of their SSBN force and of the maritime approaches to the

USSR, as primary tasks. Support for ground operations and interdiction of the midocean sea lanes are seen as secondary tasks.

Therefore, according to the NIE, only a relatively few forces—primarily diesel submarines—would probably be allocated to open ocean SLOC interdiction roles in the early

days of a global war.

It should be noted that Soviet maritime strategy, like our own, is executed as part of an

overall unified military strategy, and cannot be properly understood outside that

context.

SOVIET NAVAL STRATEGY

NIE 11-15-82D MARCH 1983

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Initial estimated Soviet operating areas are composed of sea denial zones out to 2

kilometers, which contain within them sea control zones. The sea denial zones en

most of our forward deployed ground and air forces and several of our allies, exten

far out into “blue water”. They would, if achieved, sever the vital sea lines of

communications.

In the sea control areas, the Soviet threat would be multi-platform; in the sea den

zones, largely air and subsurface; beyond the sea denial zones, largely subsurface.

While the essentials of Soviet naval strategy are not seen as changing appreciably 

the next 15 to 20 years, their ever increasing capabilities mean that, by the next ce

the zones would possibly extend out to 3000 kilometers.

That the Soviet Navy has some capabilities in excess of their zone defense needs is c

but this represents the best current estimate of their intentions. The implications 

what could happen if they adopt a different strategy will be discussed later. In an

event, the Soviets intend, without doubt, to challenge our forward strategy.

The Soviets have optimized their force capabilities for operations within their desi

control and sea denial zones, and are a formidable foe. Yet they are not invulnera

and have weaknesses that can be exploited during war.

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Our current force posture is a significant portion of the basis for the Maritime Strategy.

The U.S. Navy is, of course, the centerpiece, but all U.S. military services, of necessity,

contribute to the strategy, and the allies play an important role as well.

The Maritime Strategy—like CINC war planning—addresses current forces, that is,

those available at the end of Fiscal Year 84. This avoids uncertainties as to the

attainability of forces now planned or programmed for out-years, while not—as will be

discussed later—appreciably affecting the shape of the anticipated future strategy.

SOVIET NAVY

MARITIME STRATEGY OUTLINE

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The major FY 84 Navy and Marine Corps general purpose forces are assigned to fle

commanders and are normally deployed as shown. In accordance with national s

egy, a significant portion—about a third—is routinely forward deployed. The for

els include units in overhaul, but not in the Service Life Extension Program (SLE

It is initially assumed here that all hulls and airframes could be usefully employe

warfighting. Readiness, sustainability, availability, and attrition decrements will b

addressed later. The Tomahawk weapons system, a significant change to our strik

anti-surface warfare posture, continues to begin to phase in during this period in 

anti-ship (TASM) and nuclear land attack (TLAM-N) forms. Conventional land 

weapons (TLAM-C), however, do not enter the fleet until after the period discus

here.

The previous chart depicted the worldwide mobility of U.S. Navy and Marine Co

forces. The more theater-oriented U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force also play importa

roles in the development of the Maritime Strategy. Shown here are some aspects 

their worldwide postures, as they relate to that strategy. In addition to the Army

MAJOR UNITS FY 84

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Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:29:29 AM
posture, it shows Air Force tactical fighter squadrons and AWACS aircraft, and those

B-52 squadrons with a current secondary mine-laying and anti-surface missile

capability.

The U.S. Army is not only a main beneficiary of the Navy’s achieving maritime superiority in vital ocean areas, but also has essential roles to perform in securing island keystones and littoral areas. These roles are important to the prosecution of the Maritime

Strategy.

The U.S. Air Force can also be a significant asset in the strategy, especially its potential anti-air warfare (AAW) capability in forward areas. In drawing up the current

Navy–Air Force Memorandum of Agreement on maritime operations, the Navy identified AAW as the most important area in which the Air Force can make contributions at

sea. The Air Force is also concerned with enhancing its anti-surface warfare capability.

There are other benefits to be derived, however, as shown here. They are being pursued

[as] well.

Dependence on and utilization of the forces of sister services must, however, be tempered with the realization that they are not optimized for maritime support operations.

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Their geographical emphases often differ, as do their warfare priorities. And they

the Navy—have serious force level deficiencies in critical warfare and support are

The U.S. global alliance force structure must also be counted when the naval force

able to fight are tallied up. Full commitment of all allies to the war effort is assum

here, including the French, Japanese, and others.

OTHER SERVICES: QUALIFICATIONS

USN-USAF MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT (MOA) (9 SEP 1982): J

EFFORTS TO “ENHANCE USAF CONTRIBUTION TO MARITIME OP

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This chart and table show the current peacetime disposition of those allied naval forces

that could be expected to play a significant role in a global war. Note the predominance

of the smaller blue-water surface combatants and mine counter-measures vessels. Note

also that the bulk of our allies’ forces are in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean theaters. Although we have no formal allies in the Indian Ocean area save Australia, some

British and French naval units are continuously assigned there.

Allied merchant marine assets will be required. In certain areas (like Norway, Turkey,

and Japan), allied coastal defense forces would also be helpful. Certain allies, notably

the British and Dutch, possess limited amphibious assault forces.

Certain forward land-based allied air superiority and air defense forces could help signif

icantly in reducing the air threat to our maritime efforts. NATO air forces could assist

on the European flanks, as could the Japanese and Koreans in East Asia and the French

squadron at Djibouti in the Indian Ocean.

Allied airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft—RAF Shackletons and Nimrods, NATO

AWACS, and Japanese E2’s—could provide us with additional search and targeting

capabilities. Allied ground radar systems—the NATO, UK, and Basic (Japanese) Air

Defense Ground Environments (ADGE)—could do the same.

ALLIED NAVAL FORCES FY 84

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Likewise, the British and French have significant aerial refueling capabilities whic

could assist U.S. naval air operations if made available.

As with the other U.S. services, our consideration of allied forces is not without q

cation. They must adhere to their own national duties, and even the more advanc

them have limitations. In the Falklands, for example, the Royal Navy exhibited fa

fleet airborne early warning, air defense in depth, and damage control capabilitie

ANTI-AIR WARFARE (AAW) FORCES FY 84

ALLIED FORCES: QUALIFICATIONS

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Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:29:42 AM
cant naval and air forces in the Falklands, forces that degrade the ability of the Royal

Navy and Royal Air Force to support naval operations in the Eastern Atlantic.

Also, as was shown, the naval forces of the allies are concentrated largely in the North

Atlantic and Mediterranean areas, putting a greater relative responsibility on U.S. naval

forces in the Pacific.

To summarize the three topics discussed to this point, they comprise an architecture for

building a maritime strategy. National policy gives it direction, but Soviet strategy and

the size and capability of U.S. and allied forces provide the boundaries. The product is a

full forward pressure strategy.

The strategy itself will now be developed, after which the important uncertainties—

many already noted—will be addressed. They result in more reservations about the

strategy than would be wished.

SUMMARY

STRATEGIC ARCHITECTURE

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The Maritime Strategy is designed to help achieve the national objective of war t

nation on favorable terms, in the event deterrence fails. Our national strategy to

accomplish that—like all strategies in response to aggression—can take four for

(1) We can meet force with like force at the point of attack; (2) We can escalate th

intensity of the conflict; (3) We can alter the geographic scope of the conflict; and

We can control the duration of the fighting.

Holding at the point of attack does not by itself generate pressure to end the war

lation is an effective deterrent option, but if used is fraught with enormous risk. 

the last two dimensions that give flexibility and maneuver options to the national m

tary strategy, and at the heart of these two dimensions is the Navy–Marine Corps 

Our primary objective early on is to limit expansion of any conflict. If it cannot b

ited, however, or catastrophic loss impends, then careful attention to scope and d

will become necessary. These are the two forms of response in which a Maritime 

egy makes the strategic difference.

Making the strategic difference by altering the geographical breadth of the conflic

means that—with maritime superiority—we can deny the Soviets any advantage

through expansion, and permits us, if we choose, to take the conflict to an area o

where they do not want to fight.

The Maritime Strategy is a mobile, forward, flanking strategy of options. While th

tle is joined in Central Europe, the Maritime Strategy enables the Western allianc

MARITIME STRATEGY OUTLINE

RESPONSES TO AGGRESSION

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secure the sea lines of communications, defeat attacks on the European flanks and in

the Far East, and to carry the fight to the enemy there. This will hurt Soviet ability to

reinforce the center, while ensuring the buildup of U.S. and allied countervailing power

there. Moreover, in the Far East, the possibility of Chinese involvement in the war is

fostered by the existence there of strong and credible U.S. maritime forces.

The Maritime Strategy breaks out into three phases. There are deliberately no time

frames attached to them, since they represent the direction in which the Navy prefers to

go, not a timetable.

MARITIME STRATEGY

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How the Transition to War is addressed is significantly influenced by the various

sources of the national military strategy discussed earlier. Competing—and often 

flicting—interpretations are contained in the DG, the JSCP, the U.S. Reply to the N

Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ), and the preferred concept of operations 

each unified commander. Some have explicit scenarios, and all imply them in the

apportionment of forces for planning to subordinate commanders in the field.

Unified Commander (CINC) preferred concepts diverge, for example, on the relativ

importance of the various theaters in a global war; on the amount of time assum

available for pre-hostilities measures; and on the number of current force CVBG

THE TRANSITION TO WAR

MARITIME STRATEGY

PREFERRED CURRENT CINC CONCEPTS OF OPERATIONS

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opment of the global campaign.

For example, there are only 13 deployable battle groups available to the CINCs—11 in

the first few months—yet their current expressed bottom line requirements add up to 15

The Maritime Strategy must be consonant with the JSCP and current CINC war planning, but because of overlapping requirements must transcend an uncritical compilation

of these preferred concepts of operations. The 15-CVBG/600-ship Navy is the minimum

requirement, but it will not be available until the end of the decade. The Maritime

Strategy must therefore look elsewhere in the near term for augmenting forces to

achieve war termination on favorable terms.

What the Maritime Strategy does is to meld the frequently divergent approaches in the

DG, the JSCP, the DPQ, and CINC concepts, and present a central preferred baseline

strategic course of action, starting with the Transition Phase. It is assumed initially, for

example, that there would be at least two weeks of transition to global war. That there

are serious implications if a greater or lesser period is assumed, will be addressed later.

Phase I, the Transition Phase, includes rising tensions, and could include one or more

crises, and/or a regional war involving U.S. or Soviet forces. Here are the general princi

ples that guide the strategy in this phase. Clearly we would prefer this phase to be the

final phase, by controlling a crisis or keeping a “small war” from spreading.

The principles will be tempered by the obviously conflicting demands of each, and

tradeoffs are inevitable. Since early warning and sufficient reaction time are vital, timely

political decisionmaking will be crucial.

THE TRANSITION TO WAR

MARITIME STRATEGY PHASE I

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threat areas, given the large and sophisticated forces of many third-world states.

In this phase we would expect the Soviets to sortie into their sea control and sea de

areas. They could also reinforce their Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and/or South

China Sea forces, especially with submarines, and intermingle in those areas with 

and allied naval forces. We would probably detect all this movement fairly early o

have about two weeks warning before their initial worldwide attacks came.

Their aviation strike forces would redeploy to their dispersal bases, and the Black 

Baltic Sea fleets and the four other Warsaw Pact navies would prepare to support 

operations ashore. The Soviet merchant fleet would chop to naval control, to pro

intelligence and lift. The Soviets, in short, would posture for global war, world-wid

U.S. naval forces would redeploy as well, forward. This chart illustrates some time

involved in considering moving naval afloat forces into position, and is helpful in 

cussing what follows.

Note also that whereas total U.S. and allied naval and air orders of battle were lis

earlier, some 18 to 24 percent of the units mentioned would probably be unavail

the early months of the war due to conversions, overhauls, and shakedowns.

PHASE I: TRANSITION TO WAR

SOVIET MARITIME POSTURE

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Throughout the Transition to War there would be global forward movement of U.S.

naval forces, a complex operation. SSN’s would move into far forward positions, including the Arctic, deep in the Soviet sea control and sea denial areas. Battle groups would

begin to form into multi-carrier battle forces, since a single carrier battle group would

almost never be operated in a major forward theater by itself in wartime. Forward

deployed forces would increase readiness, demonstrating that no major region would be

ceded to the Soviets.

(20 KNOTS SPEED OF ADVANCE)

PHASE I: TRANSITION TO WAR

MOVEMENT OF USN/USMC FORCES

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warfare groups would move out. VP would redeploy forward, worldwide, and int

surveillance.

Regarding mining plans, the CINCs would have to make hard trade-offs, assignin

mining missions to scarce multi-role platforms, and commencing mine loadout.

Forward deployed amphibious task groups would increase readiness, and lead po

of a Marine Amphibious Brigade would fly to Norway to join their prepositioned

equipment. Other Marine Air-Ground Task Forces would begin loadout. Sealift o

multi-service reinforcements would commence.

During the Transition Phase, activation of reserves is anticipated. Twelve modern 

Guard high-endurance cutters would be made available to the CINCs for SLOC pr

tion duties, and other Coast Guard units would prepare for coastal defense dutie

Marine Reserves would also be activated, under CINCLANT. This table shows only 

major Coast Guard and Naval Reserve ships and aircraft, and does not depict the to

of the important contribution that Coast Guard and Reserve personnel would mak

Our key allies would increase their readiness and, in accordance with plans, deplo

some of their forces. The NATO Standing Naval Forces in the Atlantic and the Ch

PHASE I: TRANSITION TO WAR

MOVEMENT OF FORCES: COAST GUARD AND RESERVES

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would increase readiness, and the Naval On-call Force, Mediterranean would be consti

tuted. The Royal Navy would send SSN’s forward and a British ASW task group, centered around at least one carrier, would put to sea in EASTLANT. French carrier task

groups and submarines could be expected to put to sea in the Western Mediterranean.

The West German Navy would move to conduct forward operations in the Baltic, and

the Turkish Navy, especially its submarines, would do the same in the Black Sea. The

Italian Navy would deploy in the North Central Med, and a Spanish ASW carrier task

group would also get under way in the Atlantic.

British and Dutch Marines would reinforce Norway. The Japanese and other allies

would sortie also. On a worldwide basis, combined ASW tracking by maritime patrol

aircraft (MPA) would intensify, and readiness would be increased. NATO and other

allies would begin to marshal sealift assets, to support U.S. and other reinforcement

movements.

U.S. and allied armies and air forces would be active as well in moving to support the

Maritime Strategy.

While the U.S. Army’s central focus would be on reinforcement by airlift and sealift of

the European Central Region, it is envisioned that active or reserve Army infantry

MOVEMENT OF FORCES: KEY ALLIED NAVIES/MPA

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brigades would reinforce the Aleutians and Iceland, and an Army military police 

ion would reinforce the Azores. Army air defense missile batteries would reinforc

land and the Azores. Retaining control of these islands is vital to the success of the

Maritime Strategy. There are allied army deployments important to the Maritim

egy as well, including movement of the British Mobile Force and the Canadian A

Transportable (CAST) Brigade Group to Norway.

U.S. Air Force TACAIR would also focus on the Central Region, but it is anticipat

some reinforcements would go as well to the NATO flanks, Iceland, the Azores, Ja

and Korea. Some U.S. Air Force fighters would probably deploy to Southwest Asi

Canadian and British TACAIR would reinforce Norway; and U.S. and Allied AEW 

craft (AWACS, NATO AWACS, Nimrods, Shackletons, and E-2’s) would take up s

tions. The U.S. AWACS in Saudi Arabia would probably redeploy to Europe.

With enemy and allied forces moving into place globally, at some point a major S

attack could occur and actual large-scale warfare between the Soviet Union and t

U.S. would commence. If so, it would probably spread among a number of theater

cially at sea.

Strategically, one side or the other would find it to its advantage to expand the w

graphically—either to concentrate its forces or to prevent its enemy from doing s

hard to visualize U.S. naval units from Yokosuka and Soviet ships from Vladivost

example, proceeding to the Indian Ocean or beyond without incident, while figh

was occurring elsewhere.

MOVEMENT OF FORCES: US/ALLIED ARMY/AIR FORCE

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This is Phase II, in which the Navy would seek to seize the initiative, as far forward as

possible. It is preparatory to carrying the fight to the enemy.

The war at sea cannot be discussed without some consideration of the land/air battle.

This chart shows the likely Soviet initial land/air attack posture once the situation

clearly transitioned to global war. The primary Soviet thrust would be in Central

Europe. Smaller attacks would also occur to attempt to seize Northern Norway and the

Turkish Straits. A limited offensive is also possible in Eastern Turkey, to try to draw off

forces defending the straits.

In the Far East, the Soviets would pressure the Japanese to deny the U.S. the use of

naval and air facilities. Failing in this, if the U.S.-Japanese alliance holds (as the Maritime Strategy assumes), they would attack Japan, initially by air. North Korea might

take the opportunity to attack the South. The Soviets would seek not to provoke the

SOVIET INITIAL WARTIME

MAJOR LAND/AIR AREAS OF OPERATIONS

MARITIME STRATEGY

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Even if the Chinese came in, however, the Soviets’ focus would nevertheless rema

Europe.

The Soviets are unlikely to initiate hostilities in Southwest Asia as a precursor to g

war, and any hostilities which might occur there during a global war would likely

involve mainly unreinforced and less capable forces.

At sea, should the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact and other allies attack, our i

course of action would be to counter that attack, attrite enemy forces, and seize th

tiative. Vital sea lines of communication would be defended as far forward as pos

Mine warfare (MIW), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and anti-air warfare (AAW

would assume primary importance, at this stage, in destroying enemy forces, and

ensuring the protection of our own forces and of U.S. and allied reinforcement a

resupply shipping, in anticipation of Phase III.

Note that while this strategy describes each warfare task separately, they would ac

be implemented more or less simultaneously. Also, while operations in one geogr

theater may continue in Phase II for a considerable period, those in another may 

move to Phase III very quickly. These considerations confirm that the geographic

focus of the Maritime Strategy must always be global, avoiding treatment of any 

theater exclusively.

Fundamental to our eventual success is destruction of the Soviet submarine fleet, a

forward as possible. As shown here, a coordinated anti-submarine warfare (ASW)

MARITIME STRATEGY

PHASE II

SEIZE THE INITIATIVE

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initiative is a complex undertaking, involving a wide variety of platforms, weapons systems, and tactics.

Forward and barrier ASW operations would have as their goal the destruction of Soviet

submarines operating in the Soviet sea control and sea denial areas as well as those

seeking to break out to attack reinforcement and resupply shipping farther out. SSNs

would conduct ASW operations far into the Soviet sea control zone, against the range

of available targets, requiring operations under the Arctic ice cover. Allied task groups

would perform area ASW operations. U.S. and allied mine and submarine barriers

would be initiated at key choke points. Selective mining of Soviet port area approaches

would also be implemented.

Forward-positioned maritime patrol aircraft, in conjunction with SOSUS, and augmented by mobile passive acoustic systems, would operate, especially in barrier operations, to the extent they could without suffering unacceptable attrition, and without

interfering with SSN operations. Sonobuoy availability is an important uncertainty

here.

Failure to provide adequate forward ASW protection early on in the war would open up

reinforcement and resupply shipping to direct attacks, such as happened in World War

II to Japan in the Pacific and to the U.S. in the Atlantic (depicted here, at the height of

the U-boat campaign against U.S. shipping).

()

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During that time frame over 450 merchant ships were lost in the Atlantic to a Ge

force that at the time averaged just 50 operational boats, with only 14 on patrol i

Western Atlantic.

The requirement for concomitant close-in ASW protection will be addressed late

JANUARY–JULY 1942

PHASE II: SEIZE THE INITIATIVE

ANTI-AIR WARFARE

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the initiative, engaging Soviet air attacks as far forward as possible in outer air battles, to

cause maximum attrition. Available land-based TACAIR would complement these

efforts in the Norwegian Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Northwest Pacific. The MAB

in Norway, for example, would probably include two F-4 squadrons. Joint CVBG/

USMC/USAF operations would also be possible in the Indian Ocean to meet any threat

there. Land-based TACAIR could also address any Cuban air threat, if necessary.

It should be noted that our 1984 AAW capabilities are enhanced by the presence of the

two initial Aegis cruisers in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean.

The French carriers would probably operate in the Western Mediterranean, possibly

securing Western Mediterranean SLOCs and providing backing for the U.S. carriers

moving east, while retaining their primary national theater nuclear reserve role.

The initial intermingling of Soviet and U.S. and allied forces in the Mediterranean and

Indian Oceans would ensure early and intense anti-surface warfare (ASUW) engagements in those areas. Effective rules of engagement (ROE) and innovative tactics should

be utilized to complicate Soviet targeting and seize the initiative. In the Indian Ocean,

the Middle East Force would probably chop to the battle group commander, but other

surface action groups may be constituted elsewhere.

West German naval and naval air forces would make immediate contact with Soviet

and Warsaw Pact forces moving across the Baltic. Surface action group and/or PHM

battles may occur in the Caribbean, and similar surface clashes are possible elsewhere.

PHASE II: SEIZE THE INITIATIVE

ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE (ASUW)

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men sunk as targets of opportunity.

U.S. and allied surface, subsurface, and air assets would be engaged, including AS

equipped allied TACAIR. U.S. Navy submarines, mines, and Harpoon-equipped P

although primarily engaged in ASW, could contribute—especially TASM-equipp

SSN’s. TASM will also be available on a few surface combatants. If Harpoon-equi

B-52’s are made available, they could contribute as well, if required.

Even though the campaign would still be in Phase II and the massed power of th

rier battle forces and amphibious forces would not yet be in a position to strike t

Soviets far forward, certain initial projection operations could nevertheless occur. 

chart shows various options that could be mounted from the maritime theaters in 

phase.

Should it be necessary, air strikes and offensive mining may be conducted against 

Libya, Vietnam and Korea, possibly by CVBF’s enroute to higher threat areas. Str

will be necessary to support forces repelling Soviet attacks in Norway, Thrace, an

Japan.

USAF and allied support would be particularly useful here, and in the Pacific agai

Soviet dispersal bases and allies. Soviet targets in Asia are more accessible to direc

attack than those in Europe at this stage.

PHASE II: SEIZE THE INITIATIVE:

INITIAL PROJECTION OPTIONS

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SPECWAR surveillance, intelligence and raiding options, for instance against C3 sites,

would be valuable supplements. U.S. and allied Marine operations in Norway and—

possibly—amphibious insertions elsewhere are also options.

Success in Phase II would allow the Navy to carry the fight to the enemy.

In this third phase the tempo of strike, amphibious, and unconventional warfare operations would be accelerated, while anti-submarine warfare, anti-air warfare, and forward

anti-surface warfare would be continued. Again, some geographic theaters may see

movement into Phase III operations more quickly than others.

The goals are quite straight-forward. Sustainability and attrition are the critical variables, of course, and will be addressed later.

MARITIME STRATEGY

MARITIME STRATEGY PHASE III:

CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY

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Heavy strikes on the flanks culminating in attacks on Soviet territory would be con

as battle forces massed and moved farther forward with reduced risk and higher 

dence of success. In accordance with DG 86-90 policy, in Europe the Navy would 

be projecting power ashore in support of the land battle; and in East Asia denyin

the Soviets a secure flank.

Of the 13 deployable FY-84 CVBG’s, two would be in overhaul and 11 at sea. Ther

three or four would probably be available for Norwegian Sea battle force operatio

similar number for the Northwest Pacific; two or three (plus the French) for the 

terranean; and zero to one for the Arabian Sea. Thus full global pressure would be

applied.

This assumes, however, no attrition, and all units capable of contributing to the w

effort. Delayed and sequential operations would be necessary if we have lost battle

groups, or if enemy threats from Cuba, Libya, Vietnam, or Korea have complicat

equation. Sequential operations are also likely if early destruction of the Soviet

INDRON and its support facilities leads to redeployment of most U.S. naval forc

from the Indian Ocean to the Northwest Pacific.

The combined assets available in our amphibious ships and follow-on Military S

Command shipping provide a capability to conduct Marine Amphibious Brigade

assault operations in two forward ocean areas simultaneously. Assault operations re

ing an entire Marine Amphibious Force, however, would require the concentration 

STRIKE OPS/ASUW

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amphibious ships in one forward ocean area or the other. This justifies the high priority

accorded defense of the Panama Canal and its approaches in DG FY 86–90.

Additionally, Marine Amphibious Brigade operations utilizing the Near-Term

Prepositioned Force and newly deployed Maritime Prepositioning Ships could be conducted in appropriate theaters. Some allies, especially the British, have small amphibious assault capabilities to supplement ours.

The two battleship surface action groups could be employed to good advantage in a

naval gunfire support role. Surface combatants, construction battalions, and special

operations and mine warfare forces have important roles to play here as well. Amphibious operations would have the purpose of gaining leverage for war termination, securing strategic choke points, or recovering territory lost to Soviet attack.

In all three phases, the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) would be utilized to support

the total war effort. Sealift from CONUS to deployed U.S. forces is, of course, central to

American and allied success. Over 95 percent of the American reinforcement and resupply dry cargo and 99% of the petroleum must go by sea. Also, the oil and other economic shipping SLOCs are important for long-term prosecution of the war, especially

by the allies. These SLOCs must be defended.

The primary defense would be made well north of the major transoceanic SLOCs, as has

been shown, but a certain close-in threat would always be present, especially predeployed submarines and those that slip through U.S. and allied forward and barrier

operations. Without close-in support, even a small number of submarines operating in

the SLOCs can pose a serious threat, as World War II showed.

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE/SPECWAR OPTIONS

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The routing of the major military reinforcement and resupply SLOCs depicted h

also seeks to minimize the risk of Soviet land-based air attack. Should the forwar

AAW and ASW battles go favorably, the SLOCs could be shifted northward.

GLOBAL WAR: STRATEGIC SEALIFT:

1030+ SHIPS

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the U.S. Military Sealift Command nucleus fleet, the Ready Reserve Fleet, other ships o

the U.S. National Defense Reserve Fleet, merchant ships requisitioned by the Department of Transportation, and allied vessels.

Also, rapidly deployable, prepositioned equipment aboard the Near-Term Prepositioning

Force (NTPF) and Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) remains an important ingredient in our forward strategy. Thirteen NTPF ships are concentrated at Diego Garcia

with one at Guam, two at Subic Bay, and one in the Mediterranean. The first set of four

MPS ships will be prepositioned in EASTLANT. If no major threat materializes in

Southwest Asia, as seems likely, then Marine-dedicated NTPF and MPS ships would be

used to support the introduction of Marine Forces in Europe, the Atlantic, and/or the

Pacific. The remaining depot ships would sustain Army, Air Force, and Navy units.

Support functions for these prepositioning ships have been assigned in large measure

to Naval Reserve forces.

Economic shipping would also need to flow. Not only oil, but also strategic minerals and

industrial products would have to pass by sea to support the western alliances.

In peacetime, the United States imports over 12 percent of its gross national product;

the figures for allied nations are considerably higher. To illustrate, the table shows U.S.

GLOBAL WAR: WARTIME ECONOMIC SHIPPING

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time dependency vary, but what is clear is that some level of imports would be nece

becoming increasingly more vital as a war progressed. These imports would have 

come across a number of SLOCs with—if peacetime patterns hold—more impor

coming in from East Asia than from either Europe, the Mideast, or Latin Americ

To successfully defend this shipping is to give the U.S. and its allies the upper han

determining how long a war would last.

Currently envisioned responsibilities for close-in protection and control of militar

ping along these SLOCs are as shown. Naval protection of shipping (NPS) against 

marine, air, and surface attack could include a variety of options: not only convo

(which are escort-intensive), but also protected lanes, independent sailings for fas

steamers, etc. U.S. forces required are primarily destroyers and frigates (active an

reserve), Coast Guard high endurance cutters, and maritime patrol aircraft.

U.S. responsibilities would be focused upon the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbea

Western and Central Atlantic, the Central Pacific, and the Northern Indian Ocea

allies would have similar responsibilities in adjacent areas. They do not, however

sufficient escort forces. Encouraging the allies to fulfill—and expand upon—thei

rent escort commitments and force levels is a major on-going USN task.

GLOBAL WAR

NAVAL CONTROL AND PROTECTION OF SHIPPING (NCAPS)

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nel playing the major U.S. Navy role.

Besides the threat of open-ocean attack, a major threat to these SLOCs would be mines

at the terminals. The primary mine countermeasures campaign will be as far forward as

possible, targeting delivery platforms to prevent mines from being sown at all. For those

that get through and must be swept, envisioned U.S. and allied mine countermeasures

responsibilities are depicted here. It is anticipated that the allies would bear the lion’s

share of the task.

There are clearly not enough U.S. or allied assets to clear all our areas of responsibility

simultaneously. Also, many additional critical choke points and ports would be uncovered as well. Any threats to those areas would have to [be] countered by redeployment

of scarce assets from elsewhere.

Other threats to the SLOC terminals—small submarines and surface craft, special warfare teams, saboteurs, etc.—must also be dealt with. The allies would secure their own

inshore waters. For the United States, coastal defense responsibilities would fall to unit

of the U.S. Naval Reserve and U.S. Coast Guard, operating in Maritime Defense Zones

under the Fleet Commanders.

GLOBAL WAR MINE COUNTERMEASURES

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Mobile, flexible naval combat operations cannot be sustained at great distances, o

high rates of engagement, without mobile and shore-based forward logistics supp

backed up by sealift and bases in CONUS.

U.S. and allied mobile logistics support force ships would be formed into Underw

Replenishment Groups (URGS), supported in turn by military sealift “Consol” tan

Tenders would be deployed forward. U.S. and allied surface combatants would be

required as escorts.

Current forward bases would be reinforced with Advanced Base Functional Com

nents (ABFC’s) to provide battle group logistics support; sustain P-3 operations; 

U.S. NAVAL FORCES: AFLOAT/ASHORE

COMBAT LOGISTICS SUPPORT FOR U.S. NAVAL FORCES: AIRLIFT

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have to be established in Western Europe. Host nation support would be used, worldwide, to the maximum extent possible, especially to provide cargo handling and port

services. U.S. Navy and Naval Reserve Cargo Handling Battalions would also be

required. Advanced forward bases, especially for P-3’s and Marines, would require

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (SEABEE) Support.

The Navy and Naval Reserve provide the primary carrier onboard delivery (COD) and

intra-theater airlift support to our forward combat forces.

Primary inter-theater air logistics support would be provided by the Military Airlift

Command along these notional routes, supplemented by U.S. and allied civilian aircraft. This will be especially critical for VP support, mine countermeasures helicopter

and SPECWARGRU deployments, and critical spare parts and personnel movements.

Thus the U.S. and allied cargo airlift asset shortfall could degrade the Maritime

Strategy.

The desired culmination of this strategy is war termination on favorable terms. This

requires putting sufficient conventional pressure on the Soviets to convince them that

they would have no gain in continuing aggression and in fact should retreat, while giving them no incentives to escalate to nuclear war. For the Navy, this means neutralization or destruction of the Soviet Navy and of ground and air forces on the Eurasian

flanks; sea control; and intervention in the land battle.

What happens at sea is important primarily as it can contribute to the land battle ashore

or to a favorable settlement of the conflict. For example, Pacific operations should prove

critical to keeping Japan in the war, defending Korea, and ensuring that China

THE GOAL: WAR TERMINATION ON FAVORABLE TERMS

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ties down considerable Soviet forces which could otherwise move West.

The outcome of the land war is problematical; superior seapower must be correc

employed in order to make the strategic difference. While a loss in Central Europe 

be catastrophic for the U.S., loss of control of the sea would be fatal.

The strategic difference that the Navy makes is, as has been shown, multi-faceted.

The Navy provides the visible and essential linkage between ourselves and our fo

allies and forces, and bolsters the position of neutrals. The Navy, by foreclosing o

and multiplying uncertainties for the Soviets, forces them to focus on only a narr

range of strategic choices. The Navy precludes Soviet flanking operations, surrog

support, and SLOC interdiction, and protects against attacks on our shores.

The Navy likewise forces the Soviets to commit resources to the defense of otherw

secure flanks, against the entire range of naval offensive capabilities; and the Nav

meets any Soviet attacks on the flanks as well. This all hinders redeployments of 

forces to the center.

Moreover, the Navy is also the service that provides the nation with the ability to 

tinue the war for as long as the National Command Authority desires, as well as l

age at war’s end.

It must, however, be reiterated that this strategy demands more than the U.S. Nav

forces now at hand for high confidence of success. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have

THE U.S. NAVY: MAKING THE STRATEGIC DIFFERENCE

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recommended “Planning Forces” in JSPD 86-93. The difference between the Navy

“Planning Force” and the Navy “Current Force” is a discrete measure of our strategy-force

mismatch. The CINC “Minimum Risk Force” and the “Program Force” are points of

comparison.

This table emphasizes that carrying out the strategy with current forces will be risky,

and that pursuit of additional forces or army, air force, and allied force multipliers must

be tenacious.

Also, while achievement of the “Program Force” will certainly fill quite obvious needs, i

will not appreciably change the essence of the Maritime Strategy.

STRATEGY-FORCE MATCHMAKER OPTIONS

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down the strategy appears unacceptable if defeat of the Soviet Union remains the 

Increasing capability will take time, and the Navy will, in fact, reach its minimum 

of a 600-ship, 15 CVBG Navy by the end of this decade.

Sequential operations is the approach taken in NSDD-32, the DG, the JSCP, and—

certain extent—the Maritime Strategy. Such operations would enable most U.S. n

forces to be moved out of the Indian Ocean to assist in the Northeast Asia campa

then possibly back in again. They would also ensue if Cuba, Vietnam, Libya, or N

Korea were to enter the war. Other inter-theater sequential operations, however, 

lengthy swings and are risky; they could, in some cases, cede critical initiatives to 

Soviets and cause allies to waver or fall. It is strongly preferred not to sequence N

Atlantic, North Pacific, and Mediterranean operations.

The primary approach taken by the Navy in the Maritime Strategy has been not o

sequence some operations, but also to maximize use of the assets of other services an

allies, while pushing hard for increased future capability.

It now remains to take a hard look at the uncertainties inherent in the strategy as i

been outlined.

MARITIME STRATEGY OUTLINE

WAR = UNCERTAINTY

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with items set aside earlier. Some the Navy can control somewhat, and is striving to do

so. Most it cannot. They are not listed in any particular order of priority.

To the extent that these uncertainties work in the Navy’s favor, it will be able to execute

the strategy with greater confidence. To the extent that they go against the Navy, naval

commanders will have to revert to more defensive, more sequential actions. The Navy

tries, in its planning and in its procurement, to hedge against a range of possibilities in

each area of uncertainty. Resource and time constraints, however, prevent the Navy

from being able to meet all contingencies with an equal degree of confidence.

At the top of the list of uncertainties is escalation to nuclear war, including nuclear war at

sea. This is a great uncertainty for the Navy, one it clearly would like not to have to deal

with.

Since nuclear war at sea would be disadvantageous to the United States, it would proba

bly not initiate one. And if the Soviets were to attack the United States at sea, it is U.S.

policy that nuclear war would not necessarily remain limited to the sea.

Any nuclear exchange at sea, however, would probably result from land battle decisions.

E.g.: If the Soviets are doing well ashore, they will probably not want to escalate there,

and therefore will not do so at sea either.

Also, the Flexible Response strategy of NATO is likely to put U.S. naval forces in a

bind. If the U.S. and its allies were to initiate land-based theater nuclear strikes, in

accordance with NATO strategy, then U.S. and allied naval forces at sea would almost

certainly suffer in any retaliatory Soviet nuclear attack.

Consequently, the Navy must have the defensive measures, offensive systems, and tactics to hedge against such an attack. Naval commanders must be alerted early should

UNCERTAINTY: ESCALATION: THEATER NUCLEAR WARFARE

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is difficult to project exactly what course the war might take.

The possibility of still further escalation exists. The ultimate deterrent to such es

tion lies with the U.S. strategic forces, particularly the invulnerable SSBN force (3

the Atlantic and four in the Pacific).

The Soviets are not believed to consider that the destruction of potential strategic

assets, such as SSBN’s, during conventional war would by itself trigger an escalati

the use of nuclear weapons. Decisions, however, to use U.S. naval forces to attack 

strategic nuclear forces or the Soviet homeland carry—or may be seen by the Natio

Command Authority to carry—some measure of risk of escalation. Thus they wo

subject to tight control by the National Command Authority.

This would also apply to any conventional use of B-52’s, since this might also be 

sidered as open to Soviet misinterpretation.

The Maritime Strategy assumes about two weeks of warning time and a period o

sition to full global war.

The war plans, however, assume more compressed timeframes. There would prob

be sufficient warning time, but uncertainties as to timing of political decisions le

UNCERTAINTY: WARNING/REACTION TIME

UNCERTAINTY: NUCLEAR ESCALATION; STRATEGIC WARFARE

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and combat beginning simultaneously (M=C=D).

There are other areas of concern here as well, especially regarding sensor utilization

and vulnerability, and the adequacy and consistency of our peacetime rules of engagement (ROE) in the transition to war.

It has been assumed so far that current peacetime guidance will hold during the war. A

mentioned earlier, there are tradeoffs, implicit in the response to crises and the transition to war, that the National Command Authority must make. Additionally, changes to

the guidance may be made.

Some issues susceptible to policy changes are listed here. Will the nation, for example,

in fact execute a reserve call-up, and in time for it to support the strategy? And how

quickly will civilian lift assets be requisitioned?

UNCERTAINTY:

POTENTIAL WARTIME CHANGES TO PEACETIME NATIONAL POLICY

UNCERTAINTY: SOVIET UNPREDICTABILITY

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necessary just to carry out the intentions attributed to them in NIE 11-15. The N

describes how the Soviets think they would initially operate if the war goes in acc

dance with their expectations. If this does not occur, the NIE judgements could b

nullified.

Should they operate in a manner different than that anticipated, it would provid

challenges, although it would also yield new opportunities to exploit.

Would the Soviet European satellites stay in the Soviet camp? More importantly 

Maritime Strategy, would certain key pro-Soviet states participate in the Warsaw P

campaign?

Any of the states shown here at the bottom has the capability to seriously degrade 

strategy—especially if they also allow the Soviets to work from them—while forc

the reallocation of scarce U.S. and allied assets urgently needed elsewhere, i.e. seq

tial operations. Threats to U.S. and allied naval forces and to reinforcement, resu

and economic shipping are possible.

An imaginative mix of forceful joint and allied diplomatic and military incentive

applied early on will be necessary. To be successful ultimately in the global war, m

time forces must avoid being deflected from their primary operational theaters.

UNCERTAINTY: ASSISTANCE & OPPORTUNISM

SOVIET ALLIES, FRIENDS, AND SURROGATES

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vice participation, using economy of force so as to have the least impact on the war else

where. The U.S. Air Force, for example, would have a key role in operations against

Cuba, while French and Italian forces would be useful against Libya.

The uncertainty as to Army and Air Force contributions is of crucial importance to the

viability of the Maritime Strategy. Without these contributions, sequential—and therefore late—operations, or abandonment of commitments, are unavoidable. And yet

there are real shortfalls in Army and Air Force capabilities, some of which have already

been noted.

For example: the recent planned replacement of Marine reinforcements by the Army in

the critical islands results in a degradation of previously planned air defense capabilities.

AWACS and air superiority TACAIR squadrons have a number of threats to deal with, no

only those threatening our naval forces. The Military Airlift Command has nowhere near

enough lift assets to satisfy CINC requirements, especially early in the war. The NCA may

well not release B-52’s for mining and ASUW roles. Although that will not greatly

degrade overall ASUW capabilities, they are badly needed for Mine Warfare.

It is clear that the other services may not be able to meet all their maritime requirements.

To the extent they cannot, the risk to our forces and the likelihood of more sequential

operations increases.

The United States’ own alliances require consideration, and the intent and capability of

those not aligned must be assessed. The stance assumed by France and Japan, for exam

ple, will be pivotal. Any allies that choose not to join in the war effort will weaken total

capabilities to carry out the strategy. In addition, antagonisms among some allies could

UNCERTAINTY:

OTHER SERVICE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MARITIME STRATEGY

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degrade their ability to completely commit themselves to a common cause. Allied 

capability deficiencies have already been addressed.

Returning to the discussion of escalation, both France and Britain have naval stra

and naval theater nuclear forces, and reserve the right to escalate unilaterally. Th

course, presents both the U.S. and the Soviets with substantial uncertainty.

Regarding the neutrals, the Maritime Strategy counts on China and the European 

trals to exercise—at a minimum—an armed neutrality, and to oppose vigorously 

violation of their territory. The defense of North Norway, for example, becomes 

more problematic if the Soviets are allowed to transit Sweden unopposed; and So

west Asia may increase in importance if Iran collapses and the Soviets move in.

UNCERTAINTY: SUPPORT FROM STATES FRIENDLY TO THE UNITED STATES

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non-aligned states with which the United States enjoys close military relations and com

mon interests, and which therefore may prove of great help in a global war with the

Warsaw Pact.

None of them possesses a blue-water fleet capable of contributing significantly to the

maritime campaign. Many, however, could afford U.S. Navy units valuable access to

facilities and strategically placed choke points. Some—especially Israel—possess landbased air arms which could prove helpful in maritime anti-air warfare.

It was noted earlier that sufficient readiness and sustainability, and no attrition, were

assumed in discussing the strategy. This is, of course, unrealistic. Yet readiness,

sustainability, and attrition factors accurate enough to be useful are largely scenariodependent.

What is certain, is that the Navy does not have enough sustainability assets. Assessments

of the size of the deficiency, however, depend upon assumptions about the intensity of

combat—not necessarily the Navy’s choice—and the effectiveness of U.S. Navy weapons, as well as upon the admittedly insufficient stocks on hand.

The Navy needs to continue increasing these stocks, but naval commanders would, in

time of war, prioritize, pool, share, substitute and otherwise manage their limited assets to

achieve results.

UNCERTAINTY:

READINESS/SUSTAINABILITY/ATTRITION

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As an illustration of the extent of the sustainability problem regarding stocks on ha

this graphic compares Navy ordnance assets to the Navy programming objective. 

evident, POM-86 investment will provide dramatic improvement in sustainabilit

the present position is still seriously deficient. Note also that the apparent impro

ments seen here will be delayed in reaching the fleet because of the two year proc

ment lag time.

Likewise, serious deficiencies in the aviation consolidated allowance list (AVCAL

in aviation weapons handling equipment are also addressed in POM-86. For now

ever, there is only enough AVCAL for ten out of thirteen deployable carriers, with

spreading the deficiency across the board.

POM-86 NON-NUCLEAR ORDNANCE

ASSETS Vs PROGRAMMING OBJECTIVE

UNCERTAINTY:

PERSONNEL READINESS

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trained well enough? Will they have exercised in the right locations, in the right force

packages, and under the right conditions? Responsibility in this area is split among the

Navy, the unified and specified commanders, the Defense Department, and the

Congress.

To conclude, this is a recapitulation of the major points of the Maritime Strategy.

That strategy is consistent with national and coalition policy and provides the flexibility of response that has always been expected of the U.S. Navy. Full forward pressure is

required of the Navy. It is risky, but it is doable.

The Navy must, however, have the forces, the sustainability assets, and the assistance of

allies and the other U.S. services.

In that event, the Navy will make the strategic difference.

MARITIME STRATEGY

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The Amphibious Warfare Strategy, 1985

The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General P. X. Kelley, and the Chief of Na

Operations, Admiral James D. Watkins, jointly promulgated “The Amphibious W

Strategy”*on 26 June 1985.† In their joint letter, the two service chiefs announced 

the purpose of this document was

to outline the role of amphibious forces in support of the Maritime Strategy as set forth i

erence [i.e., “The Maritime Strategy, 1984,” see chapter 2], and by extension, the contrib

[that] naval forces can make to the execution of the national military strategy. The Amph

Warfare Strategy addresses the uses of naval amphibious forces across the spectrum of con

while focusing on a global conventional war with the Soviet Union.‡

Turning to the future development of the ideas in the document, General Kelley a

Admiral Watkins noted:

It is envisioned that this document will continue to be developed by an iterative process i

junction with the . . . Maritime Strategy. The objectives in so doing are twofold: (1) To de

Amphibious Warfare Strategy that is both a subset of and fully complementary to the Ma

Strategy and; (2) To provide a basis for future program development, a baseline referenc

in support of testimony concerning budgetary matters and a primary source for ongoing 

allied cooperative planning efforts.§

In addition, they intended that this document would be revised on the same sche

that for the Maritime Strategy, soliciting comments and suggestions for the next rev

The principal staff drafters of the strategy were Captain Larry Seaquist, USN, as 

the Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603), and Colonel Phil Harrington, USMC, a 

assistant to the Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Operations, Lieute

General Bernard E. Trainor, USMC. Under Seaquist’s leadership, the officers in t

tegic Concepts Branch had begun to consider a number of different possible

DOCUMENT THREE

* OPNAV 60 P-2-85/NAVMC-2790. This document was declassified by the Commanding 

Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 24 July 2007, and the Deputy Chief of 

Operations for Information, Plans, and Strategy N3/N5, on 17 July 2007.

† Joint Letter of Distribution: CNO 3340 Ser 00/5S300245 and CMC 3340 of 26 June 1985

‡ Ibid., para. 2.

§ Ibid., para. 3.

** Ibid., para. 4.

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developing an Army-Navy strategy, an Air Force–Navy strategy, a special operations

strategy, and a logistics strategy. But among them, only the amphibious strategy reached

fruition as a formal document involving substantive strategic planning.*

An important impetus for undertaking the project for a Navy–Marine Corps amphibiou

strategy in the context of the Maritime Strategy can be traced back to the work of Strategic Studies Group III, working at the Naval War College, in August 1983 to June 1984.

Seaquist had been a member of that group, along with Marine colonel Edward Badolato

When that group briefed the initial results of their studies on third-world crisis management to the naval commanders in chief ’s conference at Annapolis, Maryland, in the

spring of 1984, Admiral Watkins had commented as an aside to the Group that, with the

Maritime Strategy, he had nearly everything that he needed to testify to Congress to

explain everything that the Navy needed and how much it needed. But what he lacked

was a similar explanation for the relationship of the Marine Corps to the Navy and the

reasons why the Navy invested in an amphibious capability. Watkins mused about the

need for this but gave no direct order to have the work done. Nevertheless, when Seaquis

and Badolato were assigned to participate in the Global War Game in the summer of

1984, they took it upon themselves to think further about Watkins’s challenge.†

Seaquist and Badolato led a large support group that operated in parallel with the main

Global War Game. Located adjacent to, but separate from, the main players in the game

this group had a variety of functions. Among them was to look at alternative employment of amphibious operations. At any one time, the group had some twenty or more

Marine and amphibious warfare specialists from the staffs of the various naval commanders in chief, OPNAV, and Marine Corps Headquarters.

This group explored alternative campaigns involving amphibious operations in three

separate geographical areas: the eastern Mediterranean; the North Atlantic flank, with a

focus on Scandinavia and the Baltic approaches; and the northwest Pacific flank, with a

focus on the southern Kurile Islands and Sakhalin Island.

The northwest Pacific issue provided the initial impetus, based on the assumption that in

the case of a World War III, Japan might have a primary interest in recovering the south

ern Kuriles, which it had lost at the end of World War II. With this in mind, those working in this unit gamed out the thought that the United States could possibly coordinate

with the Japanese, forestall a Soviet attack on Hokkaido by preempting the Soviet

attempt to make a preemptive attack on Japan, and reach over Japanese operations to

take and hold Sakhalin Island with the southern Kuriles. The group’s gaming suggested

* This and the following paragraphs are based on Captain Larry Seaquist, USN (Ret.), e-mail to

Swartz and Hattendorf, 12 August 2007, with attachment by Seaquist, “Notes on the Origins &

Impact of Phibstrat.”

† For a summary of this war game, see Robert H. Gile, Global War Game: Second Series, 1984–1988

Newport Paper 20 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004), pp. 17–34.

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Okhotsk for American naval operations against the Soviet submarine bastion tha

believed to be located in that area.

While the unit’s examination of potential amphibious operations in the eastern M

ranean did not reveal any issues that could result in a war-winning move, its exa

tion of possible amphibious operations in the North Atlantic did. The unit’s mem

focused on a scenario in which Warsaw Pact forces initiated an attack through th

tral Front, and they examined what amphibious operation that allied forces could 

deflect or to spoil a subsequent Soviet move to turn northward and to envelop an

tralize allied positions in Scandinavia, including the naval forces at sea carrying 

tions of the Maritime Strategy. The members of the unit who participated in gam

these ideas generally concluded that the Marines could be inserted skillfully and q

at the base of the Jutland Peninsula. This, they saw, identified a major decision fo

commanders to face in the early stages of World War III. It would be a high-risk 

tion in which a major part of the Marine Corps might be lost but that, if successf

the potential to change Soviet perceptions of the dynamics of the Central Front, a 

principle and main intent behind the Maritime Strategy.

Upon completion of his participation in this work in Newport, Colonel Badolato 

on to become Deputy Assistant Secretary of Energy (1985–89), while Captain Sea

stayed in the maritime strategy business and moved to Washington, D.C., to take 

new assignment as Head, Strategic Concepts Branch.* In this job, his main focus wa

complete the next iteration of the Maritime Strategy, but before that document was

released in November 1985 he and colleagues in the Marine Corps were able to bui

cooperative effort required to complete the Amphibious Warfare Strategy and have 

signed in June 1985, five months ahead of the new version of the Maritime Strategy

The Amphibious Warfare Strategy of 1985 later helped to form the basis of two ea

1990s documents, “. . . From the Sea”† and “Forward . . . from the Sea,”‡ providin

starting point for later discussions between the Marine Corps and the Navy for th

eration that resulted in those two important documents.§ ✒

* Captain Seaquist relieved Commander James R. Stark, who in turn had briefly relieved C

Roger W. Barnett

† Printed as chapter 3 in John B. Hattendorf, ed., U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s: Selected 

ments, Newport Paper 27 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2006), pp. 87–99.

‡ Printed in ibid., chap. 5, pp. 149–58.

§ For a broad overview of amphibious operations, see Carter A. Malkasian, Charting the P

to OMTFS: A Historical Assessment of Amphibious Operations from 1941 to the Present, C

D0006297.A2/Final July 2002 (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 2002). On the 

face between the Marine Corps and Navy on amphibious force ships, with key documen

Matthew T. Robinson, Integrated Amphibious Operations Update Study (DoN Lift +2): A 

History of the Amphibious Lift Requirement, CRM D0005882.A3/Final July 2002 (Alexand

Center for Naval Analyses, 2002).

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tion of the best overall conventional Amphibious Warfare Strategy for global war today

It is the naval services’ preferred strategy, given current national and coalition guidance, the threat, force levels and trade-offs among conflicting aims. This strategy is

intended to flow from and be fully complementary to the Maritime Strategy—the base

line strategy around which the other strategic options for naval forces are centered.

This strategy concentrates on amphibious forces: the Navy–Marine Corps Team. Its

central focus is on operations that involve the use of amphibious shipping with battle

group support; however, the strategy contains options for the uni-service employment

of Marine forces. The strategy is further focused on naval warfare today and addresses

only current forces and capabilities, although some recognition of evolving capabilities

is made.

Finally, it should be recognized at the outset that amphibious forces are a national strategic asset—as such they should be considered to be a valuable, mobile national force

and employed accordingly. That is to say, that the optimum employment of amphibious forces may not be achieved through their commitment to sustained operations

ashore.

This is an overview of what is to follow. The first portion underscores the relationship

between the Amphibious Strategy and the Maritime Strategy, with emphasis on the

precept that the Amphibious Warfare Strategy is an integral part of the Maritime Strategy. Accordingly, the Amphibious Warfare Strategy is not to be considered as an independent strategy, although it can be described independently.

The Amphibious Warfare Strategy flows from and contributes to the Maritime Strategy. It is not determined, but it is definitely bounded, by force capability. Consideration

of these factors, therefore, is necessary as a prelude to discussing the strategy itself.

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY:

The current military strategy acknowledges that the United States is already engaged in

peacetime competition with the Soviet Union and that a war with the Soviets would probably

be global and may be lengthy. Emphasis is directed toward limiting a United States–Soviet

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY OUTLINE

• MARITIME STRATEGY OVERVIEW

• AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY OVERVIEW

• CURRENT FORCE POSTURE

• GLOBAL CONVENTIONAL AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY

• SUMMARY

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confrontation to conventional means while strengthening and integrating appropriat

nuclear and chemical deterrents. The strategy provides reasonable assurance that, sho

deterrence fail, the Soviets will not increase their territorial domination without incu

extreme risks and unacceptable costs to them. In a global war, the Soviets and their al

will be isolated from the rest of the world, their vulnerabilities exploited and the full 

trum of U.S. military capabilities mobilized, built-up and applied until U.S. objective

attained. Because our forces are insufficient to achieve all military objectives simultan

the strategy has an inherent degree of risk and will require difficult choices involving

sequential operations. Many of those choices cannot be made in advance because the

dependent on the political and military situation at the time. While this strategy, by b

timing and force levels, supports many existing national and coalition plans, its devel

ment is not driven by requirements to support specific plans.

The foundation for the Maritime Strategy is the national military strategy, which 

based upon policy directives from the NCA, the Defense Guidance and appropria

planning documents. This is as it should be: It is our intent to employ all naval fo

in such a way as to fully execute the national military strategy.

In large measure, the present composition of naval forces is designed to be consis

with the foundation of the Maritime Strategy as set forth herein. That is to say:

MARITIME STRATEGY

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OVERVIEW*

• NATIONAL MILITARY OBJECTIVES:

THE OVERALL NATIONAL DEFENSE OBJECTIVE IS TO PREVENT WAR, PARTICULARLY NUCLEAR WAR. INCLU

WITHIN THIS OVERALL OBJECTIVE ARE THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES:

• DETER MILITARY ATTACKS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND ITS VITAL INTERESTS

• PREVENT POLITICAL COERCION OF THE UNITED STATES, ITS ALLIES AND ITS FRIENDS BY ANY ENEMY

• IF DETERRENCE FAILS, FIGHT AT THE LEVEL OF INTENSITY AND FOR THE DURATION NECESSARY TO ATTAIN U.S. 

OBJECTIVES

* Source: FY 87–90 Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD).

MARITIME STRATEGY: GOALS

• DETERRENCE

• IF DETERRENCE FAILS:

• FORWARD DEFENSE

• GLOBAL CONVENTIONAL COALITION WARFARE

• DESTROY ENEMY MARITIME FORCES

• PROTECT US/ALLIED SEA LINES

• SUPPORT US/ALLIED LAND BATTLES

• SECURE FAVORABLE WAR TERMINATION

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deterrence first, but if this fails, then defense as far forward as possible, worldwide, in

conjunction with our allies.

These are the Navy’s present force planning warfighting goals. They emphasize destruc

tion of the enemy fleet, control of vital sea areas (highlighting the Norwegian Sea and

Northwest Pacific), power projection ashore and sealift.

These Navy force planning goals are designed to serve as objectives of the Maritime Campaign in the event of a global conventional war with the Soviet Union. The Amphibious

Warfare Strategy is in consonance with these objectives. Indeed, many of them cannot be

accomplished without the proper application of the power extant in amphibious forces.

These objectives commit the United States to a goal of maritime superiority.

Key to an understanding of our own Maritime Strategy is an analysis of Soviet naval

power. In examining the force structure, deployment posture, strategic precepts and

strengths/weaknesses of the Soviet Navy, U.S. naval efforts at the global and theater levels can be placed in context and the opportunities for the effective employment of

amphibious forces then become more apparent.

DG 86-90 NAVY FORCE PLANNING GUIDANCE GOALS*

• SEEK OUT AND DESTROY ENEMY NAVAL FORCES

• EVEN IN HIGH THREAT AREAS

• CONTROL VITAL SEA AREAS AND PROTECT VITAL SLOCS

• DENY VITAL AREAS TO ENEMY

• ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN LOCAL SUPERIORITY IN AN AREA OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

• SEIZE AND DEFEND ADVANCED NAVAL BASES

• CONDUCT LAND AND AIR OPERATIONS ESSENTIAL TO SUCCESS OF NAVAL CAMPAIGN

• BLUNT ENEMY GROUND ATTACK BY DIRECT ACTION

• PROVIDE REINFORCING FIREPOWER TO FORCES ASHORE

• PROVIDE SEALIFT FOR POWER PROJECTION/FORWARD/ALLIED FORCE RESUPPLY

• SUPPRESS ENEMY SEA COMMERCE

• ASSURE THE ESSENTIAL MARGIN OF ALLIED MARITIME SUPERIORITY

* Source: FY 86–90 Defense Guidance.

MARITIME STRATEGY

SOVIET NAVAL POWER

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This chart shows Soviet worldwide force levels. Note especially the size and compo

of the Northern and Pacific Fleets, the position of Soviet SSBN’s and the worldwid

position of the Soviet Navy. Approximately 15 percent of the Soviet Navy is norma

deployed away from home waters.

These naval forces are supplemented by more than 1700 ocean-going Soviet mer

ships, the most militarily adaptable merchantmen in the world, which are also

deployed globally. They are supplemented in the Baltic by the Polish and East Ge

fleets and in the Black Sea by the Romanian and Bulgarian Navies.

The highlights of the agreed National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Soviet nava

egy, presented here, illustrate the best current agreed upon estimate by the U.S. in

gence community, including the Director of Naval Intelligence. The Soviets belie

war between the coalitions will be global in scope. There is an emphasis upon str

strike, including defense of their SSBN force and of the maritime approaches to t

USSR, as primary tasks. Support for ground operations and interdiction of the m

ocean sea lanes are seen as secondary tasks.

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Therefore, according to the NIE, a small but significant number of forces would probably be allocated to open ocean SLOC interdiction roles in the early days of a global war

It should be noted that Soviet maritime strategy, like our own, is executed as part of an

overall unified military strategy and cannot be properly understood outside that context.

Initial estimated Soviet operating areas are composed of sea denial zones out to 2000

kilometers, which contain within them sea control zones. The sea denial zones engulf

SOVIET INITIAL WARTIME AREAS OF OPERATION

SOVIET NAVAL STRATEGY

NIE 11-15-82D MARCH 1983

NIE 11-15-84 FEBRUARY 1985

• WAR WITH WEST GLOBAL AND ESCALATORY

• CRISIS ANYWHERE

• LEADS TO CONVENTIONAL WAR IN EUROPE

• SPREAD TO FAR EAST LIKELY

• NUCLEAR WAR LIKELY

• PRIMARY SOVIET TASKS

• STRATEGIC STRIKE

• SEA CONTROL IN PERIPHERAL WATERS

• GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES PROTECT SSBN’s

• STRATEGIC DEFENSE

• SEA DENIAL OUT TO 2000 KM

• ALL NORFLT /PACFLT SURFACE/AIR; THREE QUARTERS OF SUBS

• SECONDARY TASKS

• SUPPORT LAND BATTLE (BALTIC/BLACK SEA FLTS)

• SLOC INTERDICTION

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far out into “blue water.” These zones, if occupied, would sever the vital sea lines 

communications.

In the sea control areas, the Soviet threat would be multi-platform; in the sea den

zones, largely air and subsurface; and beyond the sea denial zones, largely subsur

While the essentials of Soviet naval strategy are not seen as changing appreciably 

the next 15 or 20 years, their ever-increasing capabilities mean that, by the next c

tury, the zones would possibly extend out to 3000 kilometers.

That the Soviet Navy possesses capabilities in excess of their zone defense needs i

but this represents the best current estimate of their intentions. In any event, the 

ets intend, without doubt, to challenge our forward strategy.

The Soviets have optimized their force capabilities for operations within their de

sea control and sea denial zones and are a formidable foe. Yet they are not invuln

and have weaknesses that can be exploited during wartime.

A detailed analysis of Soviet goals and capabilities, when combined with the obje

of our National Military Strategy, provides a firm foundation for the constructio

the Maritime Strategy.

MARITIME STRATEGY

• PHASE I: DETERRENCE/TRANSITION TO WAR

• PHASE II: SEIZE THE INITIATIVE

• PHASE III: CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY

SOVIET NAVY

• STRENGTHS TO BE ATTRITED/AVOIDED/NEUTRALIZED

• DEFENSE IN DEPTH WITHIN 2000 KM OF HOMELAND

• THEATER NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

• ASUW

• MINES

• C3

• WEAKNESSES TO BE EXPLOITED:

• AIR DEFENSE OUTSIDE LAND-BASED AIR RANGE

• SSBN/SOME SSN VULNERABILITY

• ASW

• ANTI–CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE

• GEOGRAPHY

• FLEET FRAGMENTED

• LONG TRANSIT TIMES TO OPEN OCEAN

• CHOKE POINTS

• SUSTAINABILITY

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The Maritime Strategy breaks out into three phases. There are deliberately no time

frames attached to them, since they represent the direction in which the Navy–Marine

Corps Team prefers to go, not a timetable.

Phase I, the Transition Phase, includes rising tensions and could include one or more

crises and/or a regional war involving U.S. or Soviet forces. These are the general principles that guide the strategy in this phase. Clearly we would prefer this phase to be the

final phase, by controlling a crisis or keeping a “small war” from spreading.

The principal objective during this phase is political: persuading the Soviet leadership

that escalation to general war is not in their best interest. In order to contribute to creating this perception in the minds of the Soviet leadership, the strategy envisions that

naval forces should rapidly displace to forward operating areas. The presence of naval

forces capable of threatening the Soviet flanks accrues the added benefits of reassuring

our key allies and providing a clear signal of U.S. resolve.

MARITIME STRATEGY

PHASE II

SEIZE THE INITIATIVE

• GOALS:

• ATTRITION OF THE ENEMY

• FORWARD PROTECTION OF THE SLOCS

• SURVIVAL OF USN/OTHER SERVICES/ALLIES

• FAVORABLE POSITIONING

• MAINTAIN INITIATIVE

• TASKS:

• PRIMARY: MIW ASW AAW ASUW

• SECONDARY: STRIKE AMPHIBIOUS SPECWAR

MARITIME STRATEGY

PHASE I

• WIN CRISIS/SMALL WAR

• DETER ESCALATION

• PREPARE FOR GLOBAL WAR

• POSITION FORWARD

• INCREASE READINESS

• AVOID MALDEPLOYMENT

• HUSBAND RESOURCES

• MAXIMIZE WARNING TIME

• CEDE NO VITAL AREA BY DEFAULT

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inevitable. Since early warning and sufficient reaction time are vital, timely politi

decisionmaking is crucial.

This is Phase II, in which the Navy would seek to seize the initiative as far forwar

possible. Our actions during this phase must be complementary to and preparato

our subsequent moves in Phase III.

At sea, should the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact and other allies attack, our i

course of action would be to counter that attack, attrite enemy forces and seize th

tiative. Vital sea lines of communication would be defended as far forward as pos

Anti-surface warfare (ASUW), mine warfare (MIW), anti-submarine warfare (AS

and anti-air warfare (AAW) would assume primary importance at this stage in d

ing enemy forces and ensuring the protection of our own forces and of U.S. and 

reinforcement and resupply shipping, in anticipation of Phase III. Strike, amphib

and special warfare options would be executed, as required, to support our Phase 

goals. For example, amphibious forces could seize an advanced naval base that co

then be used by naval aircraft to prosecute the ASW campaign, execute the initia

options, if required, or to replenish ships tasked with seakeeping missions.

Note that while this strategy describes each warfare task separately, they would ac

be implemented more or less simultaneously. Also, while operations in one geogr

theater may continue in Phase II for a considerable period, those in another may 

MARITIME STRATEGY

PHASE III:

CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY

GOALS:

• PRESS HOME THE INITIATIVE

• DESTROY SOVIET FORCES

• RETAIN/REGAIN TERRITORY

• KEEP SLOCS OPEN

• SUPPORT LAND/AIR CAMPAIGN

TASKS:

• CONTINUE MIW

• CONTINUE ASW

• CONTINUE AAW

• ACCELERATE STRIKE OPS

• ACCELERATE AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE

• ACCELERATE SPECWAR OPS

• COMMENCE FORWARD ASUW

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focus of the Maritime Strategy must always be global, avoiding treatment of any single

theater exclusively.

Success in Phase II would allow the Navy to carry the fight to the enemy.

In this third phase the tempo of strike, amphibious and unconventional warfare operations would be accelerated, while anti-submarine warfare, anti-air warfare and forward

anti-surface warfare would be continued. Again, some geographic theaters may see

movement into Phase III operations more quickly than others.

Having conducted a brief overview of the Maritime Strategy, we will now turn to a gen

eral overview of the Amphibious Warfare Strategy itself.

These are the basic goals of the Amphibious Warfare Strategy. The scope of these goals

precludes their simultaneous pursuit. Appreciation of the broad range of actions

required to attain these goals confirms the sequential character our naval operations

will have to adopt. It is to pursue these goals in maritime theaters and to fully support

the Maritime Strategy that this strategy has been developed.

THE AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY: GOALS

• DETER WAR/ESCALATION

• IF DETERRENCE FAILS

• DESTROY ENEMY MARITIME FORCES

• AID IN STRIKING/SEIZING SOVIET/WP TERRITORY

• AID IN PUTTING SOVIETS ON DEFENSE

• NEUTRALIZE REMAINING TROUBLE SPOTS

• PROTECT U.S./ALLIED SEA LANES

• BOLSTER ALLIES AND FRIENDLY STATES

• INFLUENCE NEUTRALS

• WIDEN SOVIET STRATEGIC PROBLEM

• CONTRIBUTE TO ATTAINMENT OF MARITIME SUPERIORITY

• SUPPORT U.S./ALLIED LAND BATTLES

• ASSIST IN RESTORATION OR DEFENSE OF ALLIED TERRITORY

• SECURE FAVORABLE WAR TERMINATION

• GAIN LEVERAGE TO TERMINATE HOSTILITIES

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY OUTLINE

• MARITIME STRATEGY OVERVIEW

• AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY OVERVIEW

• CURRENT FORCE POSTURE

• GLOBAL CONVENTIONAL AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY

• SUMMARY

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positioning forward to create pressure at either a single point of decision or alon

tiple axes. In so doing, we intend to seize and hold positions well within the Sovi

control/denial areas. Success in forward positioning at points of our choosing wi

the early stages, allow us to disrupt the correlation of forces and ultimately gain n

leverage for use in war termination.

These Marine Corps force planning goals have been extracted from the FY 86–90

Defense Guidance and are designed to serve as objectives of the amphibious cam

in the event of global conventional war with the Soviet Union. The nature of the 

goals speak to the unique contribution that amphibious forces can make in supp

the Maritime Strategy.

Having taken a brief look at both the goals of the Amphibious Warfare Strategy a

warfighting objectives assigned to amphibious forces, the following section will f

on those contributions that amphibious forces can make in a peacetime or crisis 

ronment by full exploitation of their current posture.

Before discussing the role of amphibious forces in a conventional global war, it m

emphasized that those forces serve the U.S. government across the entire spectru

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY OUTLINE

• MARITIME STRATEGY OVERVIEW

• AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY OVERVIEW

• CURRENT FORCE POSTURE

• GLOBAL CONVENTIONAL AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY

• SUMMARY

MARINE CORPS FORCE PLANNING GOALS

• CONDUCT FORCIBLE ENTRY OPERATIONS

• SEIZE AND DEFEND ADVANCED NAVAL BASES

• CONTRIBUTE TO SLOC DEFENSE

• ASSIST IN EXTENSION OF CONTROL OVER SEA AREAS OF OPERATIONS

• REINFORCE ALLIES BY PROJECTION OF POWER AGAINST THE LITTORALS

• SEIZE AND CONTROL STRATEGIC OCEANIC CHOKEPOINTS

• SEIZE AND ESTABLISH LODGEMENTS FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF FOLLOW-ON FORCES

• IMMEDIATELY RESPOND TO AND CARRY OUT PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

• CONDUCT OPERATIONS WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO THE SUCCESS OF THE LAND CAMPAIG

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conflict possibilities: from peacetime presence through strategic nuclear war. While the

strategy outlined herein focuses on global conventional war, the role of amphibious

forces in it cannot be understood completely without some mention of other kinds of

conflict. Therefore, it will initially focus on two other major roles for amphibious

forces: peacetime presence and crisis response.

The peacetime presence of amphibious forces is constant and worldwide. This presence

underlines U.S. commitments and interests around the globe on a daily basis. This forward presence is a physical demonstration of our national will, encourages allies and

friends, deters and reduces the influence of potential foes, influences neutrals and reinforces the principles of international law and freedom of the seas so vital to our

national interests.

The Maritime and Amphibious Warfare Strategies, like CINC war planning, address

current forces, that is, those available at the end of Fiscal 85. This avoids uncertainties

as to the attainability of forces now planned or programmed for the out-years, while

not appreciably affecting the shape of the anticipated future strategies. It should be

noted that while this chart depicts only naval forces, all U.S. military forces of necessity

will contribute to the strategy and the allies play an important role as well. The major

FY 85 Navy and Marine Corps general purpose forces are assigned to fleet commander

and are normally deployed as shown. In accordance with the Maritime Strategy, a significant portion of these forces, approximately one third, are routinely forward

deployed.

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One measure of the peacetime presence role that amphibious forces play is the n

of port visits routinely conducted each year. Note that the dots on this chart only 

resent countries visited, over 45 of them. Many of these countries received visits 

more than one port-of-call.

These routine port visits promote better relations between the United States and 

allied, friendly and neutral countries visited and demonstrate American military

strength, professionalism and potential support in time of crisis.

PEACETIME PRESENCE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE PORT VISITS (FY 84)

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Throughout the year amphibious forces participate in a demanding series of peacetime

exercises. Dozens are held each year, often with allies and other services. This chart

shows some of the most important peacetime exercises held on a continuing basis, the

largest being RIMPAC in the North Pacific and SOLID SHIELD in the Atlantic.

These exercises contribute to alliance cohesion, enable U.S. naval units to operate routinely with sister services and allied forces, and to test and update joint and combined

operational procedures.

Central to our ability to execute the strategy is the requirement to conduct large scale

amphibious exercises, as well as joint/combined exercises, in every clime and place we

may be expected to fight in war. Development of an exercise program within the context of the strategy will allow us to: (1) Test/refine the strategy, (2) identify future

requirements, which in turn will, (3) influence the direction of Research and Development efforts and (4) serve as a visible signal of U.S. resolve to support friends and

oppose foes.

Crisis response is the next major role of amphibious forces. Crisis responses by amphibious forces can range from varying deployment patterns to express specific concern and

support, through clear demonstrations of warfighting capabilities, to the actual use of

force in support of national objectives. Amphibious forces can be used across the entire

spectrum of responses to crises, from a show of force, through the countering of acts o

state-supported terrorism, to engaging in single theater wars. In addition, MPS MABs

offer a significantly increased capability to rapidly respond to a crisis situation with a

credible force when employed as a preconflict deterrent or to reinforce ongoing

amphibious operations after the outbreak of hostilities. Most recent examples of a

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maritime response to crises can be seen in the use of amphibious forces in both L

non* and Grenada.†

With the foregoing as a backdrop, we will now turn to a discussion of the strateg

In the event deterrence fails, both the Maritime and its component Amphibious 

fare Strategy are designed to help achieve the national objective of war terminati

favorable terms. Our national strategy to accomplish that, like all strategies in res

to aggression, can take four forms: (1) We can meet force with like force at the po

attack; (2) We can escalate the intensity of the conflict; (3) We can alter the geogr

scope of the conflict; and/or (4) We can control the duration of the fighting.

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY OUTLINE

• MARITIME STRATEGY OVERVIEW

• AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY OVERVIEW

• CURRENT FORCE POSTURE

• GLOBAL CONVENTIONAL AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY

• SUMMARY

* For details of this operation, see Benis L. Frank, U.S. Marines in Lebanon, 1982–1984 (Wash

D.C.: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1987) [Editor].

† For details of this operation, see Ronald H. Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and E

of Joint Operations in Grenada, 12 October–2 November 1983 (Washington, D.C.: Joint His

fice, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997) [Editor].

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Holding at the point of attack does not by itself generate pressure to end the war. Escalation is an effective deterrent option, but if used is fraught with risk. It is the last two

dimensions that give flexibility and maneuver options to the strategies and at the heart

of these two dimensions is the Navy–Marine Corps Team.

Our primary objective early on is to limit expansion of any conflict. If it cannot be lim

ited, however, or catastrophic loss impends, then careful attention to scope and duration will become necessary. These are the two forms of response in which the

Amphibious Warfare Strategy can complement the Maritime Strategy in making the

strategic difference.

Maritime superiority will allow us to alter the geographical breadth of the conflict and

deny the Soviets any advantage through expansion. This strategic difference will also

permit us, if we choose, to take the conflict to an area or areas where the Soviets do not

THE NAVY–MARINE CORPS TEAM: MAKING THE STRATEGIC DIFFERENCE

RESPONSES TO AGGRESSION

• MEET FORCE WITH LIKE FORCE HEAD-ON

• ESCALATE INTENSITY OF THE CONFLICT

ALTER GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT

CONTROL DURATION OF THE CONFLICT

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plished in isolation. To take full advantage of the synergism that that accrues from

coordinated, mutually-supporting combat actions, the employment of naval forc

include power projection forces, must be done in full concert with all U.S. and al

forces.

The Amphibious Warfare Strategy Component, like the Maritime Strategy, is a mob

forward, flanking strategy of options. While the battle is joined in Central Europe, 

strategy enables the Western alliance to secure the sea lines of communications, d

attacks on the European flanks and in the Far East, and to carry the fight to the e

there. This will influence the Soviets’ decision to reinforce the center, while ensur

the buildup of U.S. and allied countervailing power at the strategic point(s) of de

Moreover, the roles and influence of the Chinese in the war will be, in part, influe

by the strong and credible actions of U.S. maritime forces.

Presently, the Maritime Strategy frames the conflict within three phases. The pha

shown here are not constrained by specific timelines, nor should they be. Indeed

anticipated that a global, conventional war with the Soviet Union may be of prot

duration. This assumption, in turn, exposes additional Soviet vulnerabilities to b

exploited by allied forces in the later stages of the conflict. As will be shown, the j

cious application of naval power at key points of Soviet vulnerability can contrib

pressing home the strategic advantages accrued and, along with other coalition f

bring about war termination on terms favorable to this Nation and its allies.

PRINCIPLES

• THE AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY IS A COMPONENT OF THE MARITIME STRATEGY

• AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS ARE VITAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THE MARITIME CAMPAIGN

• THE AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY MUST BE CAPABLE OF GLOBAL, FLEXIBLE RESPO

• THE AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY MUST SUPPORT NATIONAL POLITICAL OBJ

THROUGHOUT ALL PHASES OF THE CONFLICT

THE PHASES OF WAR

• PHASE I: TRANSITION TO WAR

• PHASE II: SEIZE THE INITIATIVE

• PHASE III:

• CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY

• PRESS HOME THE ADVANTAGE

• WAR TERMINATION

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egy, it will be articulated in the same manner: the war and the strategy will be subdivided into phases characterized by the level and type of conflict.

The combat power of an amphibious task force, with attendant Carrier Air, Mine

Countermeasure and Naval Surface Fire Support, when employed in concert with allied

forces, provides for flexible response across a wide range of options. If properly

applied, amphibious operations can make a vital contribution to both the conduct of

maritime and land operations, and in so doing, contribute to the successful execution

of the Maritime Strategy.

The Amphibious Warfare Strategy is a global strategy which emphasizes full forward

pressure in all phases of a global conventional war. It employs the flexibility of respons

which has always characterized naval forces. Our response options must include both

sequential and simultaneous operations conducted in one or more theaters.

The Amphibious Warfare Strategy is designed to support the national objectives of

deterrence or war termination on favorable terms. We will attempt to accomplish this

by offering strategic options which may alter the scope and duration of the war. Furthermore, the employment of amphibious forces should be exercised within the context of the overarching strategic requirements that may emerge as the conflict expands.

That is to say, that amphibious forces must be available to contribute to the attainment

of the ultimate objective of war termination on favorable terms. Additionally, amphibi

ous forces must be postured in such a way to respond to changing national aims which

may call for the maximum application of naval power at various junctures across the

breadth of the conflict. It is critical that these individual decision points take into

account that the employment of amphibious forces at a given place and time may foreclose the option of their employment at another place and time.

In the global war scenario upon which this strategy is based the most efficient use of

amphibious forces is for the projection of power along the Soviet flanks or Rimland. While

our focus will be on amphibious operations along the flanks, our strategy must provide

options that strike against the Soviet Heartland or, at a minimum, allow for incursions into

the strategic centers of Warsaw Pact and Soviet surrogate states, if required.

PRINCIPLES

• FOCUS OF STRATEGY IS ON APPLICATION OF FORCE AGAINST THE FLANKS (RIMLAND)

• THE STRATEGY MUST SUPPORT MULTI-THEATER OPERATIONS

• AMPHIBIOUS FORCES MAY BE CALLED UPON TO SWING FROM ONE THEATER TO ANOTHER

• MARINE FORCES MAY DEPLOY AS MABs, BUT WILL FIGHT AS MAFs WHEREVER AND WHENEVE

REQUIRED

• THE STRATEGIC MOBILITY OF MPS MABs WILL BE FULLY EXPLOITED

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forces and to support the goal of exerting full forward pressure, amphibious warfare

options must address multi-theater operations, both simultaneously and sequentially

To accomplish the foregoing, the “swing” of amphibious shipping, Marine forces 

other supporting naval forces cannot be arbitrarily ruled out. However, the risk i

ent in the intertheater swing of naval forces, with the attendant loss of options in 

theaters, should not be taken without an assessment of the strategic advantages t

accrue from such a decision.

Close examination of the potential threat suggests that whenever and wherever p

a minimum of a MAF-sized force will be required to conduct forcible entry oper

However, an assessment of our present lift capability indicates that little more th

MAB’s worth of lift is extant in each ocean. We cannot tie ourselves to only seque

operations and, therefore, must be prepared to conduct MAB-size amphibious op

tions simultaneously with or without MPS reinforcement, in remote or single th

when a strategic advantage may accrue by doing so. In this employment sequenc

amphibious MAB may well serve as the lead element of the ultimate amphibious 

Within the context of general war, the strategy must provide a range of options f

deployment/employment of the MPS Squadrons and their associated MABs whic

cover the spectrum from pre-hostility insertions to reinforcement of amphibious

MAGTFs or the massing of multi-MAB forces, under a single MAF Headquarters

the conduct of independent operations.

Phase I is a transition phase characterized by rising tensions, regional crises, regi

wars involving either the U.S. or Soviets and positioning our forces for a possible 

eral war. Our objectives during this period are three: first to terminate the conflic

winning the small war or managing a crisis and thereby prevent escalation, secon

prepare for general war through increases in readiness and deploying forces as fa

PHASE I

TRANSITION TO WAR

• OBJECTIVES:

• DETER SOVIETS/CLIENTS FROM ESCALATING THE CONFLICT

• PREPARE FOR GENERAL WAR

• BOLSTER ALLIES AND FRIENDLY STATES

• TASKS:

• OCCUPATION OF STRATEGIC CHOKEPOINTS

• DENIAL OF KEY ISLANDS AND BASES TO ENEMY FORCES

• INTEGRATION WITH ALLIED NAVAL, GROUND AND AIR FORCES AT KEY GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATIONS

• STABILIZATION THROUGH PRESENCE, OF AREAS KEY TO THE CONTROL OF GLOBAL SEA LINES OF COMMUNIC

• ENHANCEMENT OF KEY ALLIED DEFENSIVE POSTURES

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friendly states. Competition between these objectives is inevitable: early national-level

decisionmaking is crucial to the attainment of adequate force levels and to avoid

maldeployment of naval forces prior to the conclusion of this phase.

Throughout the Transition to War there would be global forward movement of U.S.

naval forces, SSNs would move into far forward positions, including the Arctic, deep in

the Soviet sea control and sea denial areas. Battle groups would begin to form into

multi-carrier battle forces. Forward deployed forces would increase readiness, demonstrating that no major region would be ceded to the Soviets.

Forward deployed amphibious task groups would increase readiness and lead portions

of a Marine Amphibious Brigade would fly to Norway to join their prepositioned

equipment.* Other Marine Air-Ground Task Forces would begin loadout. Sealift of

multi-service reinforcements would commence.

Amphibious forces may not be engaged in combat during Phase I. Nonetheless, there are

actions that must be taken early in order to produce the capability to fight immediately, if

required or be prepared for engagement with enemy forces early in the following phases.

PHASE I

TRANSITION TO WAR: MOVEMENT OF POWER PROJECTION FORCES

* When completed in FY 89, the Norway Prepositioning Program will include major items of equip

ment and 30 days of sustainability for a MAB specifically tailored to accommodate the mission, ter

rain, environment and perceived threat. In the interim, essential equipment and supplies not ye

prepositioned will deploy with this MAB.

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both in deterrence/conflict limitation and in positioning/preparation for general 

As early as possible, a MAB configured for the Norway prepo mission would be

airlanded to Norway prepared for subsequent employment.* The two MABs curr

associated with the MPS Squadrons can be airlifted into regions such as: (1) the J

Peninsula to aid in the defense of Denmark, (2) Greek or Turkish Thrace to add 

ity to the area and to deter the opening of a second front by the Soviets, (3) to str

straits and choke points, e.g., the Dardanelles, Hormuz, (4) to strategic forward b

or islands, (5) to forward locations such as the United Kingdom or Japan to prep

subsequent operations, (6) reinforce ongoing amphibious operations or (7) estab

stabilizing presence in peripheral crisis areas. Additionally, the massing of the tw

MABs in a single theater, under a MAF Headquarters, if the tactical situation dic

is a capability that should be considered.

Amphibious forces will increase readiness, commence embarkation and move fo

during Phase I. Atlantic Fleet amphibious shipping will embark the Marine Force

available to II MAF while Pacific Fleet amphibious ships are embarking the maxi

number of Marines from I and III MAF. The 4th Division–Wing Team may be ac

vated, as well as Selected Reservists from various Navy amphibious warfare units 

may be called up and embarked with deploying Amphibious Task Forces. Additio

those commercial/USNS ships earmarked for use as Assault Follow-on Echelon

(AFOE) shipping will sail for ports of embarkation, load out and sail in trace of 

PHASE I

TRANSITION TO WAR

* FOC in FY 89.

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respective assault echelons. Finally, forward deployed and overseas homeported

amphibious units will move to join those amphibious forces sailing to forward

positions.

A significant range of strategic options emerge which are directly attributable to the

flexibility inherent in amphibious forces. II MAF forces may be initially employed to

stabilize crisis situations developing in locations such as: the Caribbean Basin or the

Mediterranean littoral, sail to critical forward positions in the island chains of the G-IN Gap, to ports in Great Britain, to ports on the continent or, indeed, swing their force

into the Pacific Ocean. Likewise, I and/or III MAF forces may sail directly to Japan, into

the Indian Ocean, or swing their forces into the LANTCOM Area of Operations.

Finally, forward deployed forces may rendezvous with ATF’s underway from CONUS

ports, egress from potential Mare Clausum, e.g., Med Sea, Sea of Japan or sail independently to positions in the vicinity of friendly ports to aid in reinforcing our deterrent posture or avoid/create a perception of the potential for escalation.

In the final analysis, the strategic moves decided upon must commence early in Phase I

Since our principal objectives in this phase are to deter war and if that fails to be in

optimum position to commence hostilities, amphibious forces must be in position to

engage at the point(s) of decision around the globe. At a minimum, the following force

disposition should be expected: (1) an airlanded MAB will be in position in Norway,*

(2) an amphibious MAB positioned forward in each ocean or in transit to form a MAF

TRANSITION TO WAR

* FOC in FY 89.

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in a single theater, (3) sustaining AFOEs steaming in trace or positioned in close 

imity to their assault echelons, (4) MPS Squadrons moving to potential offload/

employment locations and (5) the balance of active forces commencing closure o

major theaters of operation.

The key to success during Phase I of the Amphibious Strategy is readiness: readin

ships and Marine units to embark and move forward on short notice, of selected 

reserves to support early movement of MPS MABs and of the command structur

make the early decisions which permit amphibious forces to assume their critica

important forward positions.

PHASE II

SEIZE THE INITIATIVE

• OBJECTIVES:

• CONTRIBUTE TO ATTAINMENT OF MARITIME SUPERIORITY

• DEFEND ALLIED TERRITORY

• TASKS:

• SEIZURE, OCCUPATION, AND DEFENSE OF ADVANCED NAVAL BASES

• OCCUPATION, NEUTRALIZATION OR STABILIZATION OF TERRAIN VITAL TO THE SECURING OF A NAVAL FLAN

• CONTRIBUTE TO DEFENSE OF KEY ALLIED TERRITORY

TRANSITION TO WAR

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engage worldwide, has been achieved, and the Soviets have initiated an attack on U.S.

and/or allied forces. The arrival in theater(s) of amphibious MABs, MPS Forces, MAF

Headquarters Elements, AFOE shipping, residual Marine units and reserves will permit

the organization of Composite MAFs forward.

Amphibious forces, if far enough forward to seize the initiative, will be positioned to

accomplish their Phase II objectives. Prepositioned forces can assist in the attainment

of maritime superiority by securing naval flanks and/or occupying and defending

advanced naval bases. Selected aviation assets of the employed MAGTF(s) can assist in

the attainment of maritime objectives by supporting Strike and TASMO operations.

The MAB positioned in Norway,* along with allied forces, will be fully engaged in

defense of allied territory. Additionally, these Marine forces can directly contribute to

the attainment of maritime superiority in the Norwegian/Barents Seas area by denying

the use of airspace to Soviet surveillance aircraft engaged in fixing/targeting U.S. surface fleets.

Uncommitted but ready amphibious forces will succeed in complicating the Soviets’

strategic equation. Depending on the levels of sea control established in proximity to

selected littorals, amphibious forces, up to MAF-size, will be capable of assault operations at key points of decision; thereby causing the Soviet forces to withhold reserve

forces which could otherwise be better employed by contributing to the conduct of

their theater offensive.

During the initial stages of Phase II, the forward posture of amphibious forces constitute a direct threat to the Soviets by increasing the level of uncertainty and severely

complicating the Soviet decisionmaking process. Depending on the deployment

sequence chosen, the Soviets will be required to react to the possible simultaneous

deployment of amphibious forces on their Northern, Southern and Eastern Flanks.

Such deployments represent the potential for the conduct of amphibious operations

which may lead to the introduction of U.S./allied follow-on forces.

PHASE II

SEIZE THE INITIATIVE

• OBJECTIVES:

• WIDEN THE SOVIET STRATEGIC PROBLEM

• AID IN PUTTING THE SOVIETS ON THE DEFENSE

• TASKS:

• CONTRIBUTE TO AIR DEFENSE OF WATERS ADJACENT TO OCCUPIED LITTORALS

• CONDUCT ASSAULT OPERATIONS TO SEIZE KEY TERRAIN FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF U.S./ALLIED FOLLOW-ON FORCE

* FOC in FY 89.

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Strategic options available to amphibious forces as Phase II unfolds range from limi

objective amphibious raids, up to MAB-sized in scale, to near MAF-sized amphibio

assaults to secure territory adequate for the introduction of other service or allied f

on forces or reinforcement of engaged ground forces. This capability may becom

cal if we are unable to effect the bilateral agreements necessary to sustain our nav

forces or, for whatever reason, an existing agreement is abrogated.

Depending on our ultimate force disposition during this Phase, the aforemention

options could be executed against the Soviet Rimland in such diverse locations a

North Norway, the Southern Kuriles, both the North and South coasts of the Me

ranean Sea, the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean littoral or Southeast Asian havens for 

combatants.

Coordination with other U.S. services, with NATO and with the armed forces of 

allied or associated nations is critical as we begin to conduct amphibious operati

Amphibious warfare forces will have to exercise this coordination on a continuou

basis regardless of whether or not they are engaged in joint/combined operation

As the Soviet offensive is gradually contained, allied forces will have the opportunity 

launch decisive counterattacks to seize the strategic initiative and to begin the progre

rollback of Soviet/WP forces. Beginning during Phase III and continuing until the en

the war, amphibious warfare is a primary task for maritime forces. Amphibious warf

accelerates and builds on the success achieved previously to prosecute the campaigns

SEIZE THE INITIATIVE: INITIAL PROJECTION OPTIONS

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initiated during Phase II. The objectives for amphibious forces are broad and permit consideration of an ever-widening series of options. Objectives are to regain lost territory, to

ensure that critical SLOCs remain open or to seize and occupy Soviet territory in a series of

war termination actions. During this phase, sufficient attrition of Soviet forces may have

occurred to permit assaults, or the threat thereof, directly into the homeland.

It is from the early stages of Phase III through the termination of hostilities that the

value of amphibious forces as a strategic reserve becomes clear. While these forces were

most probably insufficient to decisively affect the early outcome of a European war,

their potential for shifting the strategic center of gravity against a battered and

exhausted Soviet force is enormous. The level of uncertainty created by such a mobile

force and the threat of its employment in assaults on the vulnerable Soviet pressure

points combine to make amphibious forces a valuable tool in gaining leverage for war

termination on favorable terms. Accordingly, the selection of employment options dur

ing phases I and II should consider retaining the capability for decisive use of amphibious forces throughout the duration of Phase III.

Execution of the stated tasks is largely contingent upon the residual air and ground

combat power resident in previously engaged, but now massed amphibious forces.

Their success is dependent upon the availability of carrier and/or land-based Navy and

Marine Corps aircraft, naval surface fire support platforms, integrated C3

I systems,

PHASE III

CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY:

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE TASKS

• CONDUCT AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULTS TO RESTORE KEY NAVAL FACILITIES TO ALLIED CONTROL

• SUPPORT U.S./ALLIED COUNTEROFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

• CONDUCT AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT OPERATIONS TO ASSIST IN THE RESTORATION OF ALLIED

TERRITORY

• CONDUCT AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF U.S./ALLIED OPERATIONS TO

SEIZE SOVIET/WP TERRITORY

• REDEPLOY TO STABILIZE REMAINING TROUBLE SPOTS

PHASE III

CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY

• OBJECTIVES:

• ASSIST IN RESTORATION OF ALLIED TERRITORY

• ENSURE THAT CRITICAL SLOCs REMAIN OPEN

• AID IN STRIKING/SEIZING SOVIET/WP TERRITORY

• GAIN LEVERAGE TO TERMINATE HOSTILITIES

• POLICE REMAINING TROUBLE SPOTS

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sustainability resident in both AFOE shipping and follow-on strategic lift assets.

Finally, large scale employment of amphibious forces must be taken under the um

of coalition warfare. That is to say, amphibious operations must be conducted in 

cert with, supporting of, and supported by, available U.S./allied forces. Moreover

selection of employment options during the early phases should consider retaini

capability for decisive use of amphibious forces late in the war; although this rete

should not preclude forward deployment of amphibious forces at the earliest pra

ble opportunity.

As previously noted, the combined assets available in our amphibious ships and 

on Military Sealift Command shipping provide a capability to conduct MAB-size

assault operations in two forward ocean areas simultaneously. If an early decision 

concentrate available amphibious shipping in a single theater has been taken, the

massing of amphibious shipping to conduct a MAF-sized amphibious assault is c

possible.

Additionally, MAF or MAB-sized operations utilizing the Near-Term Preposition

Force and newly deployed Maritime Prepositioning Ships could be conducted in 

priate theaters. Some allies, especially the British and South Koreans, have limite

amphibious assault capabilities that may be used to supplement our own.

PHASE III

CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY: AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE OPTIONS

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surface fire support role. Surface combatants, construction battalions, special operations and mine warfare forces have important roles to play here as well.

In addition to the execution or exploitation of the range of options outlined previously

the effects of mobilization on both the industrial base and the manpower pool now

allow for large scale offensive naval operations.

Among the strategic options available to accomplish our objectives during the later

stages of Phase III are MAF-sized amphibious assaults on such diverse geography as the

Kola Peninsula, Sakhalin Island, the Baltic littoral of the Warsaw Pact states, restoral of

BENELUX ports to allied control or, in conjunction with an allied counteroffensive,

direct incursions into the Soviet homeland, such as: an attack through the Bosphorus

and Dardanelles into the Black Sea. Exercise of these options could accrue such benefit

as: (l) Blocking Soviet/WP ability to apply pressure on allied flanks, (2) Assist in rolling

back or amputating Soviet reach, (3) Seizing or disrupting activity at key logistical

chokepoints, thereby degrading the Soviets’ ability to resupply WP units, with the

resultant potential to fragment WP solidarity/combat effectiveness and (4) contributing to warfighting objectives in the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan.

Most particularly in these later phases of the conflict, naval forces must be fully prepared to fight in concert with active and reserve forces of all U.S. services and friendly

PHASE III

CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY: AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE OPTIONS

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fined, set by the civilian leadership of U.S., allied and friendly forces.

Having presented the Amphibious Warfare Strategy, the following will provide a 

summary of the key points set forth within the strategy.

It is critical that the Amphibious Warfare Strategy remain fully complementary t

Maritime Strategy. This precept is vital if we are to translate these strategies into 

gramming and planning documents that will allow the Navy–Marine Corps Team 

both apply resources to its warfighting deficiencies and develop plans and policie

which are in consonance with national warfighting objectives and force capabilit

The Amphibious Warfare Strategy, as it is translated into operational policies, tac

plans, force disposition and closure sequences, must take into account the consid

support amphibious forces require from other naval forces; support that may no

forthcoming until the accomplishment of other missions these forces must carry 

either prior to or in conjunction with the introduction of amphibious forces. Ac

ingly, amphibious planning must be carefully integrated into all warfighting stra

at the theater level.

The most valuable characteristic of amphibious forces in a global war is the flexib

way in which they can respond to accomplish missions across a wide spectrum a

geographically-dispersed areas. This Amphibious Warfare Strategy seeks to explo

flexible response capability by offering a wide range of strategic options while av

foreclosure on a given option due to malpositioning, ineffective early employmen

less productive expenditure of this national strategic asset.

SUMMARY

• THE AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY IS A COMPONENT OF AND COMPLEMENTARY 

MARITIME STRATEGY

• THE STRATEGY IS SUPPORTED BY AND SUPPORTIVE OF NAVAL FORCES AND THEIR AS

TASKS AND MISSIONS

• AMPHIBIOUS PLANNING MUST BE INTEGRATED INTO WARFIGHTING STRATEGY AT THE

THEATER LEVEL

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY OUTLINE

• MARITIME STRATEGY OVERVIEW

• AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY OVERVIEW

• CURRENT FORCE POSTURE

• GLOBAL CONVENTIONAL AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE STRATEGY

• SUMMARY

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The execution of the Amphibious Warfare Strategy hinges on the readiness of amphibi

ous forces to forward deploy, their ability to sustain themselves while engaged, and

their capability to operate in consonance with other naval, sister service and allied

forces. Continued emphasis on these areas, along with the attendant application of

resources to insure their maintenance or future enhancement, will ensure that this

strategy remains a viable one.

Amphibious forces must be continuously postured to respond to changing national aims

Therefore, it is critical that at every decision point in which the deployment/employment

of amphibious forces is considered, such decisions must be taken within the context of

the power projection/amphibious assault requirements that may emerge at any point

along the continuum of conflict.

A global war fought against a determined and able Soviet foe will be a conflict of

unprecedented ferocity requiring the total and unswerving commitment of the Western

alliance if eventual victory is to be achieved. Amphibious forces can make a material

contribution to the early success of Allied efforts by threatening vulnerable Soviet

flanks and causing a resultant divergence of enemy forces from the main focus of effort

in Central Europe. With the stabilization of the front on the European Continent,

Navy–Marine Corps amphibious task forces will play a key role in seizing the strategic

initiative by striking at key points of Soviet weakness to liberate conquered territory

and, if need be, carry the fight to the doorstep of Russia itself. By assisting in the attain

ment of Alliance goals, U.S. naval forces and the hammer of decision resident in its

amphibious striking arm, can truly make the strategic difference.

SUMMARY

• OPPORTUNITY COSTS AND RISKS: EARLY AND LATE EMPLOYMENT

• AMPHIBIOUS FORCES IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER NAVAL FORCES CAN MAKE THE

STRATEGIC DIFFERENCE BY CONTRIBUTING TO THE SEIZURE OF THE STRATEGIC INITIATIVE

AND SUCCESSFUL ATTAINMENT OF ALLIED WAR GOALS

SUMMARY

• THE STRATEGY OFFERS A WIDE RANGE OF FLEXIBLE GLOBAL RESPONSE OPTIONS THAT TAKE

FULL ADVANTAGE OF SOVIET VULNERABILITIES

• THE STRATEGY IS FOUNDED ON READINESS, SUSTAINABILITY AND JOINT/COMBINED

INTEROPERABILITY

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The Maritime Strategy

Global Maritime Elements for U.S. National Strategy, 

On 1 November 1985 the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James D. Watkins, 

the letter distributing a new version of the Maritime Strategy that superseded the 

circulated a year and a half earlier, in May 1984.* In forwarding the 1984 versio

ral Watkins had announced his intention to do this, noting that “comments and s

tions for the FY 85 revision are requested. It is anticipated that the FY 85 revision 

presented initially at the beginning of the next programming cycle in October 198

briefed at the October 1984 Fleet Commanders in Chief Conference.”†

In August and September 1984, work began on the new version.‡ By that time, ro

officer rotation had begun to bring in a new team in the Office of the Chief of Na

Operations to deal with the Maritime Strategy issues. Commodore T. J. Johnson h

become Deputy Director of the Strategy, Plans and Policy Division (OP-60), Cap

Larry Seaquist had become Head, Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603), and Com

mander T. Wood Parker was the new action officer for the Maritime Strategy.

At this point, a number of the commanders in chief were becoming critical of the 

egy. When Commodore Johnson had given the briefing at the October 1984 Fleet 

manders in Chief Conference he had received some negative reactions, comments 

dismissed it as “brochuresmanship,” a “PR job—not a strategy,” “not executable,” 

“lacking operational insight.” While having great respect for what had already be

done—and being determined to leave its basic structure (and map projection) in

Seaquist and Parker agreed on three principal goals: to enhance the substance of 

strategy; to get both the Navy and Marine Corps headquarters staffs to use the M

Strategy as the common starting point for all their efforts in policy, strategy, tacti

DOCUMENT FOUR

* Letter attached to Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAV Publication 60 P-1-85, serial 00/5

1 November 1985. This document was approved for declassification by the Deputy Chie

Naval Operations for Information, Plans, and Strategy (N3/N5) on 16 July 2007.

† Letter attached to Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAV Publication 60 P-1-84, serial 00/4S

4 May 1984, para. 4.

‡ For a more detailed explanation of the background to the 1985 document, see John B.

Hattendorf, The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986, Newport Pap

(Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004), pp. 83–91.

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spread briefings and writings.

Parker’s goals, as action officer, in reaction to the criticism were to get greater involvement from the fleet commanders in chief for the next version; to describe more effectively

the idea of “war termination on favorable terms”; to expand on the portions that dealt

with peacetime operations, crisis-control operations, and transition to war; to include

both anti–Soviet SSBN operations and U.S. Navy SSBN operations as part of the overall

concept for the strategy; to deal with questions of time phasing and nuclear war that had

been omitted earlier; and to explain further the uncertainties involved in the strategy.

At the same time, Vice Admiral James A. Lyons—Vice Admiral Moreau’s successor as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans and Policy (OP-06)—came up with the idea of

“strategy stoppers”: procurement problems and issues that, if not funded, would weaken th

strategy or make it difficult to execute. The point was to reinforce the strategy as a source of

basic guidance and cohesiveness for the entire program acquisition process.

As the discussions continued, however, Seaquist and Parker concentrated on combating

the misperception that the Maritime Strategy was merely a budget document designed to

increase the size of the Navy, explaining it as rather the maritime component of the

national strategy, complementing the other services. As part of this effort, Admiral Lyons

and Commander Parker briefed the Senate Armed Services Committee and members of

the House Subcommittee on Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials, effectively

explaining the issues to some of the Navy’s most difficult critics.

Seaquist and Parker had completed the main work of revision by July 1985, at which

point Commander Albert C. Myers relieved Parker. Myers’s task was to compile the final

recommendations and changes emerging from a conference of working-level OPNAV and

fleet staff planners and then submit the final draft document up the chain of command

for Admiral Watkins to sign. In the letter circulating this third version of the Maritime

Strategy, Admiral Watkins pointed out that this version “has been refined to address

more fully: (a) Contributions of our allies and sister services, (b) Uncertainties associated with the execution of our strategy, (c) Strategic lift in all phases.”*

Going farther, Watkins emphasized, “The Maritime Strategy is the cornerstone of our

profession. It describes our role in executing national military strategy, is the basis for th

development of the Navy POM, for testimony in support of Navy budgets and programs,

for joint and allied cooperative planning efforts and for tactical development and

warfighting plans in the Fleet.”† Finally, he pointed out that “for the Maritime Strategy

to remain dynamic, our leaders must understand it; therefore, the strategy must be subject to study and continued evaluation.”‡ ✒

* Letter attached to Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAV Publication 60 P-1-85, para. 1.

† Ibid., para. 2.

‡ Ibid., para. 3.

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egy. It is the Navy’s preferred Maritime Strategy. It considers national and coalitio

guidance, the various threats, force levels, and the inevitable trade-offs which occ

during crisis and non-crisis operations. It is a baseline strategy that is the nucleus 

which our other strategy options emanate.

Why do we have a Maritime Strategy? What are its purposes? Primarily, it provides a 

view of fleet operations, for deterrence and crisis control. Should deterrence fail, it is th

baseline integrated naval strategy for a global conventional war with the Soviet Union

war termination on terms favorable to the U.S. and its allies. (The Maritime Strategy 

foundation for the development of the annual naval program and budget submission.) 

also the foundation for the U.S. Navy’s day-to-day fleet operations: routine fleet depl

ments; exercises; war games; and frequent requirements from the national command

authority for response in times of international crises. The strategy is also the basis fo

MARITIME STRATEGY—PURPOSES

• GLOBAL VIEW OF FLEET OPERATIONS FOR DETERRENCE

• INTEGRATED NAVAL STRATEGY FOR GLOBAL WAR

• BASIS FOR WARFARE APPRAISALS

• FOUNDATION FOR NAVAL PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

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development programs and the complex decisions regarding force structure.

The Maritime Strategy is derived from and contributes to our national policy and strat

egy. The Soviet threat poses a constant challenge to our national strategy and its maritime component. Embedded within the Maritime Strategy are the plans and concepts

of the unified commanders and their naval component commanders.

The strategy is based on several key concepts. It is important to consider what is meant

by “strategy.” Strategy is a design for applying means to ends. In the Maritime Strategy

the means are military forces. These are forces which are not only available today, but are

also those which are seen to be available in the foreseeable future. This point is important

because the Maritime Strategy is a real-time strategy. It can be executed today, with existing forces. The additional importance of the strategy is that its fundamental tenets will

remain valid for years to come. Therefore, the Maritime Strategy can not only be based

on current forces and the present-day threat, but it can also serve as the basis for the

development of the POM which looks toward future forces and threats.

The objectives of the Maritime Strategy are deterrence across the range of conflict possibilities and escalation control. If deterrence fails and conflict between the West and the

Soviet bloc occurs, the objectives of the strategy then become war termination on term

favorable to the U.S. and our allies.

MARITIME STRATEGY—KEY CONCEPTS

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incorporating the forces of our allies and sister services. It is designed to achieve 

national objectives using conventional means while simultaneously avoiding nucl

war. Should deterrence fail, the strategy assumes a protracted, conventional war. It 

based on the concepts of forward posture, high readiness and the advantages of ad

technology. The strategy also exploits (to the maximum extent possible) the inher

attributes of naval force flexibility and mobility.

The Maritime Strategy framework has four parts. The first underscores the relationsh

between the Maritime Strategy and the national strategy. The Maritime Strategy is int

to our national strategy, because if the United States must go to war, it must go to sea

The second part addresses Soviet Strategy. The Maritime Strategy is not develope

support the operations desired by the U.S. Navy. Rather, it was developed as a cou

to the strategy of the Soviet Union.

With these two areas in mind, we then proceed to the third part, the developmen

the actual strategy, which includes analyses of peacetime and crisis operations as 

global conventional war with the Soviet Union if deterrence fails. Some of the imp

tions of conventional forces to nuclear deterrence are also examined.

The fourth part of the Maritime Strategy framework considers the uncertainties inhe

the strategy. Uncertainties are not only difficult to predict, but they are also issues ove

which we have very little, if any, control.

MARITIME STRATEGY FRAMEWORK

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Now to the relationship between the Maritime Strategy and our national strategy. The

essential elements of our national strategy are deterrence, and if this deterrence fails,

defense as far forward as possible in a posture of global coalition defense.

There are two principal sources for our development of national strategy: National

Security Decision Directives (NSDDs), which are presidential decisions on national

strategy; and the alliances, treaties and agreements we have with countries around the

world.

Several other documents or sources which reflect the national strategy are also illustrated here. The Defense Guidance (DG) is the biennial Secretary of Defense guidance

on strategy and programs. The Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) and the

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) are annual JCS documents that recommend

strategy to the National Command Authority (the President and the Secretary of

Defense), and provide guidance to the unified and specified commanders, respectively.

The concepts and plans of those commanders describe the strategy for their respective

theaters and functions.

The Navy and Marine Corps contribute to the development of these documents, and

naval forces are among those responsible for their execution.

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

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One of the principal National Security Decision Directives is NSDD-32, signed by Pr

Reagan in May 1982. It is the basic document setting forth the current national strate

NSDD-32 indicates that our principal threat is from the Soviet Union and that a 

with the Soviets would likely be global in scope. The importance of global, conven

balanced and forward deployed forces is highlighted, as is the vital importance of 

allies in our national strategy.

Sequential operations in different theaters may be necessary because we do not h

the superiority of forces and resources, particularly in view of the capabilities of 

Soviet forces, necessary to do everything we need to do, everywhere, simultaneou

“Sequential” in this context also applies to intratheater operations. The idea of “

the enemy back” in a sequential manner will become clear as the Maritime Strat

discussed.

The Maritime Strategy is in harmony with NSDD-32, but the strategy is not limi

the threat of the Soviet Union. There are other NSDDs which address regional th

and other concerns, and the Maritime Strategy also takes them into account.

US NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVES

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The first of the documents reflecting the national strategy which will be discussed is

the Defense Guidance. The Defense Guidance (DG) is published biennially by the Secretary of Defense with the primary purpose of guiding the development of the annual

Program Objectives Memorandum (POM).

The DG also establishes regional priorities for general Department of Defense planning. Our top defense priority is North America including the Caribbean Basin. The

remaining regional priorities in descending order are: NATO and its lines of communications; then, the coequal priorities of access to oil in Southwest Asia, security of our

Pacific allies, and the security of Pacific and Indian Ocean lines of communications;

followed by the security of friendly nations in South America and Africa; and then in

other parts of the world.

The DG contains only one global war planning scenario. It has the war commencing

with a Soviet attack in Southwest Asia, then spreading to Europe and the Pacific sixteen days later. The DG scenario is useful in sizing certain U.S. forces and establishing capability requirements driven by the most demanding distance-related scenario,

DEFENSE GUIDANCE

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Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:31:35 AM
that this scenario can be used to influence planning and programming to an un

ranted degree.

The current Defense Guidance is very positive in its guidance on maritime po

It provides the Navy with clear force planning guidance and warfighting goals. 

emphasizes destruction of the enemy fleet (even in high threat areas), control of 

sea areas (highlighting the Norwegian Sea, Northwest Pacific), sealift, and powe

jection ashore. It commits the Department of Defense to a goal of allied maritim

superiority.

The Maritime Strategy does not purport to tell the regional CINCs how to figh

their respective theaters. The actual execution of the war will be carried out by 

CINCs and Major NATO Commanders (MNCs). The Maritime Strategy, theref

provides a set of global maritime options that could be executed by the CINCs 

MNCs.

The Maritime Strategy must be in consonance with the JSCP and current CINC w

planning, but because of overlapping requirements it must transcend an uncritic

compilation of these preferred concepts of operations. The Maritime Strategy m

the frequently divergent approaches in the DG, the JSCP, the DPQ, and CINC co

and presents a central, preferred baseline strategic course of action.

MARITIME STRATEGY—GLOBAL MARITIME OPTIONS

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also have alliances, treaties and formal agreements with countries around the world.

These alliances and treaties together form the skeletal frame of global coalition warfare,

another of the bases for our national military strategy. It is fundamental that by

defending our allies, we defend ourselves.

In addition to the seven formal defense treaties which include forty-three separate

nations, we have common military interests with other countries which affect the

Maritime Strategy. For example, there are nineteen other countries outside the formal alliance system with which we have significant Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

agreements. These defense treaties and other agreements result in a set of global commitments and interests for the United States. The Maritime Strategy takes these commitments and interests and the requirements of coalition warfare and combined

operations fully into account.

ALLIANCES, TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS

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An exceptionally important part of our coalition strategy is, of course, NATO Str

NATO’s overall strategic concept is contained in a NATO Military Committee do

ment known as MC 14/3. The primary goal of this NATO Strategy is to preserve 

peace through the credible deterrence of any threatened or actual aggression aga

the North Atlantic Treaty Signatories from covert war to nuclear war. If deterren

NATO’s first objective is to counter the aggression without escalation and preserv

restore the integrity and security of the NATO area. The NATO Strategy also stat

NATO must be prepared to escalate to nuclear weapons if necessary.

The Concept of Maritime Operations (CONMAROPS) of the three Major NAT

Commanders—SACLANT, CINCHAN and SACEUR—is designed to counter th

time operations of the WARSAW PACT and to support the land battle with carri

strikes and amphibious assaults. The protection of the vital sea lines of commun

is emphasized throughout the document, with the ultimate goal being to “win 

new peace.”

NATO STRATEGY

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The Maritime Strategy is based on the concept of joint and combined operations. To be

successful against the combined forces of the Soviet Union, it is essential that U.S. and

allied air forces, land forces and naval forces operate jointly. Naval operations support

land forces, and land and air operations support maritime forces. There is one common, unifying goal for all of our forces—favorable war termination.

Illustrative of the progress the United States is making in the area of joint operations is

this listing of the United States interservice cooperation initiatives. The Memorandum

of Agreement (MOA) between the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force addresses the maritime

roles of the U.S. Air Force especially in air defense, but also in aerial mining and antisurface warfare. The Navy-Army MOA discusses the overall subject of sealift. The

Army–Air Force MOA contains eleven initiatives in which the Navy is actively involved

with the ultimate objective being enhanced interoperability. The Navy–Coast Guard

MOA establishes the United States Maritime Defense Zones (MDZ).

MARITIME AND LAND CAMPAIGNS INTERRELATED

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All of the guidance the Navy has received can be reduced to a few basic goals for t

Maritime Strategy. This strategy has been developed to implement these goals.

The operations within the Maritime Strategy must be planned and executed in cl

conjunction with our allies and sister Services.

The Maritime Strategy was developed as a counter to the strategy of the Soviet U

In order to understand the Maritime Strategy, a review of Soviet strategy is essen

MARITIME STRATEGY FRAMEWORK

DRAWN FROM NATIONAL & NATO STRATEGY GUIDANCE

MARITIME STRATEGY OBJECTIVES

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This chart shows Soviet worldwide force levels today. The orders of battle for the four

principal fleets and a representative order of battle for each of the Soviets’ normal out

of area deployments are illustrated. The patrol areas of Soviet SSBNs and SSGNs off

the U.S. coasts are notionally represented, and the normal operating areas of other sub

marines, surface ships and aviation forces are also shown. Note especially the Soviet

worldwide disposition.

The Soviet Navy continues to increase in size and capabilities. Its aviation strike forces

are supplemented by the Soviet Air Force (SAF) which can also be used for strikes

against carrier battle forces or other forces in the maritime theaters. Soviet naval forces

are supplemented by more than 1700 ocean-going Soviet merchant ships, the most mil

itarily adaptable merchant fleet in the world, deployed globally. Soviet naval forces are

supported in the Baltic by the Polish and East German fleets, in the Black Sea by the

Romanian and Bulgarian navies, and elsewhere by other forces friendly to them.

The Soviets have learned to employ their Navy to exert political influence in peacetime,

and they are doing it effectively. The Soviet Navy, with its increasing capabilities for

global operations, has been an important factor in the Soviet Union’s long range and

heretofore successful strategy of encroachment throughout the world.

FY-85 OOB

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Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:31:46 AM
The current National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Soviet naval wartime strategy illu

the best current agreed estimate by the U.S. Intelligence Community. The Soviets bel

that war between the coalitions will be global in scope. They state that nuclear escalat

likely, because they believe that NATO will escalate. However, the Soviets also believe t

prolonged conventional war is possible.

The NIE states that the Soviets primarily emphasize strategic strike, including the 

general purpose naval forces to defend their SSBN force, and strategic defense in d

of the maritime approaches to the USSR, as primary tasks of the Soviet Navy. Sup

for ground operations and interdiction of the sea lanes are seen as other, initial ta

Therefore, according to the NIE, relatively few forces would be allocated to open

SLOC interdiction at the beginning of a global war.

Soviet naval strategy, like our own, is part of an overall unified military strategy a

cannot be properly understood outside that context.

SOVIET NAVAL STRATEGY

SUBORDINATE TO INTEGRATED MILITARY STRATEGY

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Initial estimated Soviet wartime operating areas provide for Sea Denial Zones to 2000

kilometers. Within these Sea Denial Zones are Sea Control Zones. The Sea Denial

Zones engulf most of our forward deployed ground and air forces and those of several of

our allies, as they extend far out into “blue water.” If secured, the zones sever the vital

sea lines of communication.

In the Sea Control areas, the Soviets would present a multi-platform threat. In the Sea

Denial Zones, the threat would largely be air and subsurface. Beyond the Sea Denial

Zones, the threat would largely be subsurface.

While the essentials of Soviet naval strategy should not appreciably change over the

next 15 to 20 years, the Sea Denial Zones will probably extend another 1000 kilometers

to 3000 kilometers by that time.

It is clear that the Soviet Navy has capabilities in excess of their current sea control/sea

denial zone defense needs, but the NIE represents the best current estimate of their doctrine. The implications of what could happen if they adopt a different strategy and the

question of what their strategy will be as the conflict unfolds will be discussed later in

this presentation. But there is no doubt that the Soviets intend to challenge our forward strategy.

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The Maritime Strategy is designed to defeat the strategy of the Soviets by preclud

their successes, interrupting their time lines, attriting their forces, and exploiting 

sensitivities and vulnerabilities.

The Soviets have optimized their force capabilities for operations in their desired S

Control and Sea Denial Zones. They are a formidable foe. Several of their strengt

listed here. In addition to their large numbers of forces and their design for a com

arms defense in depth, the Soviets possess and utilize an offensive operational men

Their objective is to seize the initiative, or to gain an advantage over an adversary

through deception, initiative and massive strikes. Their offensive operations plan 

execute their primary tasks of providing a secure strategic strike force and defend

the maritime approaches to the homeland. The Soviets attempt to anticipate ever

tingency, then carefully and completely plan their operations to meet those conti

cies. Their training programs are closely orchestrated to ensure the preparation o

naval forces to carry out those plans.

But the Soviets are not invulnerable, and they have weaknesses that can be exploited 

ing war. We define sensitivities as those things about which the Soviets are especially c

cerned, and vulnerabilities as the weaknesses that we perceive to be particularly troub

to the Soviets. The objective of our Maritime Strategy is to exploit Soviet sensitiviti

vulnerabilities so that the Politburo will stop its military actions, reevaluate its inte

analyze whether it can achieve its objectives through military means, and desist fro

tiating additional actions and from continuing or escalating the conflict.

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The strategy itself will now be developed. Although the focus of the Maritime Strategy

includes a careful examination of global conventional war with the Soviet Union, the

strategy encompasses the applications of naval power in peacetime and during crisis

response operations as well.

Maritime forces serve the U.S. across the entire range of conflict possibilities, from peace

time presence to strategic nuclear war.

APPLICATIONS OF MARITIME POWER

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time operations are enhancing deterrence, supporting the diplomatic objectives of 

U.S., and sustaining the high readiness and rapid response capability of the overall s

The Navy’s peacetime presence is an important counter to the strategy of the Sov

Union—encroachment. The Maritime Strategy recognizes this process and addre

in the U.S. Navy’s peacetime presence operations.

Similarly, the U.S. Navy’s forward peacetime operations are designed to deter act

state sponsored terrorism, and if that deterrence fails, to be positioned to respond 

rorist acts rapidly and effectively.

Naval forces underscore American commitments and interests around the globe da

Their forward presence is a physical demonstration of U.S. will, encouraging alli

friends, deterring and reducing the influence of enemies, influencing neutrals, an

asserting and reinforcing principles of international law and freedom of the seas 

continuous basis.

Why does the U.S. Navy go to sea? The foremost reason is that it has numerous comm

ments requiring forward operations around the world. Some of these commitments a

illustrated here. The circled numbers represent thousands of ship operating days at se

MAJOR PEACETIME NAVAL COMMITMENTS

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ing the various commitments.

Because of training requirements, naval units naturally spend much time operating in

the western Atlantic and eastern Pacific. A major presence is also maintained in the

western Pacific. Permanent deployments, in force, are made to the Mediterranean, the

Caribbean Sea, the Western Pacific, and the Indian Ocean. Naval operations are also

conducted in the northeast Atlantic and north Pacific, because those are vital areas to

places where naval forces must be prepared to defeat the enemy.

At any point in time, a full third of the fleet is at sea with over 110 thousand Navy men

and women. In addition to Navy operations in many parts of the world, there are three

to four thousand civilian mariners providing afloat logistics support.

Satisfying the multitude of commitments and other requirements demands a naval

presence that is forward and mobile. The global mobility of naval forces is illustrated

here with the order of battle of the major FY 85 Navy and Marine Corps forces. These

forces are assigned to Fleet Commanders and are normally deployed as shown. These

force levels include units in overhaul, but not in the Service Life Extension Program

(SLEP).

PEACETIME PRESENCE—ACTIVE USN/USMC FORCES

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those available at the end of Fiscal Year 85. This avoids the uncertainties concern

attainability of forces now planned or programmed for the future.

The Tomahawk cruise missile weapons system enhances the capabilities of the fo

depicted here. It is a significant change to our strike and anti-surface warfare pos

Tomahawk continues to be phased in during FY 85 in its anti-ship (TASM) and n

land attack (TLAM-N) forms. The USS New Jersey will soon have an Interim Op

tional Capability (IOC) for employment of the conventional land attack version

(TLAM-C).

In addition to the commitments already addressed, naval forces annually particip

a demanding series of peacetime exercises. Dozens are held each year, often with a

and other services. This chart shows only a few of the most important ones cond

last year. The largest of them were the Fleetex’s in the Pacific and the sequence So

Shield/Teamwork in the North Atlantic.

These exercises enable U.S. naval units to operate routinely with sister services an

allied forces, and also to test and update joint and combined procedures. The exe

MAJOR U.S. NAVAL EXERCISES

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ness, and demonstrate joint and combined capabilities which enhance deterrence.

A previous slide depicted the worldwide mobility of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps

team. The more theater-oriented U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force also play important

roles in the development of the Maritime Strategy. A significant number of their forces

are stationed overseas. Shown here are some aspects of their worldwide posture, as

they relate to the Maritime Strategy. In addition to the Army posture, it shows Air

Force Tactical Fighter Squadrons, AWACS Aircraft, and B-52 Squadrons with a current

minelaying or anti–surface missile capability.

There is a close interrelationship between maritime and land campaigns. Naval operations support land forces, and land/air operations support maritime forces. For

example, the U.S. Army reinforces the Aleutian Islands, Iceland and the Azores during a global crisis with the Soviet Union. Maintaining control of these strategic locations would be crucial to successful maritime operations in a global war.

PEACETIME POSTURE—ACTIVE U.S. ARMY/AIR FORCES

FY 85

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The U.S. global alliance force structure must also be included when the naval force

available to fight are counted. Full commitment of all allies is assumed here, inclu

the French, Japanese, and others.

This chart and table show the current peacetime disposition of those allied naval f

that could be expected to play a significant role in a global war. There is a predom

nance of smaller blue-water surface combatants and mine counter-measures ship

bulk of our allies’ forces are in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean theaters.

When viewed in isolation, it could be concluded that the naval forces of our allie

mainly at the lower end of the capabilities spectrum. But when they operate in co

junction with U.S. naval forces, there is a synergistic effect, and allied naval force

exceptionally important contributions to the overall Maritime Strategy.

Certain forward land-based allied air superiority, air defense, airborne early warnin

ground radar forces could help significantly in reducing the air threat to the mari

effort. NATO Air Forces and ground radars could assist in the European flanks, a

FY 85

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Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:32:01 AM
could assist in the Indian Ocean.

Allied merchant marine assets will be also required. In certain areas (like Norway, Turkey, and Japan), allied coastal defense forces would be important. Certain allies, notably

the British and Dutch, possess limited amphibious assault forces.

This chart illustrates the normal peacetime operating areas of both the U.S. and Soviet general purpose naval forces, including those areas in which the two Navies “overlap.” Also

indicated are calendar year 1984 diplomatic port visits. These port visits are an important

aspect of our peacetime naval presence. The dots represent only countries visited—108. To

show the individual ports themselves would overwhelm such a small chart.

Routine port visits are conducted not only to ensure adequate crew rest and relaxation

but also to promote better relations between the United States and the allied, friendly,

and neutral countries visited. Additionally, the visits demonstrate American military

strength, professionalism and support.

IN PEACETIME—GLOBAL, FORWARD NAVAL PRESENCE

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The Maritime Strategy is designed to meet the national commitments assigned to 

Navy, provide the forward presence called for by our national strategy, bolster dete

across the spectrum of conflict possibilities, counter Soviet encroachment, and re

force alliance cohesion.

Crisis response is the next major U.S. Navy role. Since World War II, the U.S. Navy 

been used for this purpose more often than any other service: In the past forty yea

Navy has participated in approximately 80 percent of the crises in which the Uni

States has been involved.

Carrier Battle Groups and Amphibious Forces have been the primary instrume

naval crisis response, but most other types of naval forces could also have been 

Naval forces are sometimes employed in crises in conjunction with other U.S

vices, and to a lesser extent allied forces, usually outside formal alliance

frameworks.

The objectives of the strategy are to support national policy objectives, protect Ame

interests, provide flexible options to the National Command Authority, and contro

lation of the crisis.

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This chart locates many of the over 200 crises in which U.S. Naval forces have been

involved since World War II. The majority of these crises have occurred in the Middle

East and Caribbean/Central America regions. Regrettably, we live in an era of “violent

peace” in which crises and armed conflicts, especially in the Third World, will continue

Naval forces are forward, ready and mobile, and they provide a broad range of strong

options to the National Command Authority. Navy crisis response can range from

varying deployment patterns to express specific concern and support, through

clear demonstrations of warfighting capabilities, to the actual use of force in support of national objectives. Naval forces can be used across the full spectrum of

responses to crises, from countering acts of state-supported terrorism, to engaging

in single-theater wars.

The Maritime Strategy is designed to respond quickly to crises, avoid maldeployment of

forces when responding to a crisis, control the crisis and ensure that it does not escalate,

and apply the lessons learned in all crisis operations to ensure that the strategy is validated continuously.

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From peacetime presence and crisis response operations, the U.S. Navy’s baseline 

egy for fighting a global conventional war with the Soviets can be developed. The st

is designed first to deter such a war. If deterrence fails, the objectives are to fight s

fully, prevent nuclear war, and contribute to the war’s termination on favorable ter

At the conclusion, some of the implications for escalation to nuclear war will be discu

The Maritime Strategy is separated into three phases. Phase I is a period of rising ten

crises, or a serious confrontation between the superpowers. The operations envisione

the strategy during Phase I are for the purpose of deterrence. The objective in Phase I 

control escalation of the crisis and to deter the outbreak of outright hostilities.

MARITIME STRATEGY

CONFRONTATION/WAR WITH THE SOVIETS

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Phase II, during which U.S. and allied maritime forces would operate to seize the initiative. The objective during Phase II is the establishment of maritime superiority in key

ocean areas.

Success in Phase II will enable the United States to move into Phase III, when maritime

forces can take the fight to the enemy. The objective of Phase III is war termination on

favorable terms. War termination is by no means restricted to Phase III. If the war can

be stopped on favorable terms during Phase II, it will be, of course, terminated as soon

as possible.

There are deliberately no time frames attached to these three phases, because they repre

sent the general direction in which the Navy would prefer to go, not a timetable.

Phase I, the deterrence or transition phase, includes rising tensions and could include

one or more crises, a serious confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union,

and/or a regional war involving U.S. or Soviet forces. The goals of the strategy are listed

on the left and the tasks to achieve those goals are listed on the right. Clearly we would

prefer this phase to be the final phase, by controlling a crisis or keeping a “small war”

from spreading.

PHASE I

MARITIME STRATEGY

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positioning forces forward and ensuring no maldeployment could be mutually ex

sive. The point to be made is that in a Phase I situation, tough decisions will have 

made and tradeoffs are inevitable.

Timely and firm political decision making will be crucial. The U.S. National Comm

Authority (NCA) and the leadership of the allies will probably be attempting to m

decisions in very ambiguous circumstances. Nonetheless, in a grave crisis which m

result in open conflict between the West and the Soviet Bloc, speed and decisiven

essential if all the available political-military incentives are to be brought to bear 

control the crisis and deter conflict. Several items that will be especially importan

the early forward movement of naval and air forces, timely activation of reserves, im

mentation of Maritime Defense Zone plans, requisition of civilian sealift and airlift 

and consistent alliance cohesion.

For deterrence to be successful, our national and coalition leadership will have to 

quickly and collectively, exerting maximum political-military leverage. All of the 

matic and military options will have to be closely and effectively coordinated.

In this phase we would expect the Soviets to sortie into their Sea Control and Sea Deni

areas. They could also reinforce their Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and/or South Ch

Sea forces, especially with submarines. We would probably detect all this movement f

PHASE I

SOVIET MARITIME POSTURE

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their initial worldwide attacks.

Soviet aviation strike forces would redeploy to their dispersal bases, and the Black and

Baltic Sea Fleets and the four other Warsaw Pact Navies would prepare to support joint

operations ashore. The Soviet Merchant Fleet would chop to naval control to provide

intelligence and lift. The Soviets, in short, would posture for global war, world-wide.

U.S. Naval forces would reposition as well, forward. This chart illustrates some

timeframes involved in considering moving naval afloat forces into position, and is

helpful in discussing what follows.

The important implication of these closure times is that timely political decisions are

essential. The canals are important in Phase I, and the forward posture of our naval

forces is vital in terms of rapid response to crisis.

The NCA may desire to move forces forward during conditions of ambiguity. Phase I

may be just such a condition. One approach may be to conduct a no-notice naval exercise, moving forces to forward locations without the constraints that might otherwise be

imposed. The unique mobility of naval forces makes this option particularly desirable

when in ambiguous and dangerous circumstances.

Although U.S. and allied naval and air orders of battle were depicted previously, some

18 to 24 percent of the units mentioned would probably be unavailable in the early

months of the war due to conversions and overhauls in progress.

GLOBAL USE OF MOBILE, FLEXIBLE FORCES

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Throughout the deterrence or transition to war phase there would be global forw

movement of U.S. Naval forces, a complex operation. SSNs would move into far fo

positions, including the Arctic, deep in the Soviet Sea Control and Sea Denial are

Battle Groups would begin to form into multicarrier battle forces to prepare to m

forward at the proper time. Forward deployed forces would increase readiness, d

strating that no major region would be ceded to the Soviets.

Battleship and other surface action groups, the Patrol Hydrofoil Squadron, and S

Warfare Groups would move out. Land based patrol aircraft (VP) would repositi

ward, worldwide, and intensify surveillance. Regarding mining plans, the CINCs 

have to make hard trade-offs, assigning mining missions to scarce multi-role plat

and commencing mine loadout. Forward deployed amphibious task groups wou

increase readiness, and lead portions of a Marine Amphibious Brigade would mo

Norway to join their prepositioned equipment. Other Marine Air-Ground Task F

would begin loadout, and sealift of multi-service reinforcements would commen

Rapidly deployable, prepositioned equipment aboard the Maritime Prepositionin

Ships (MPS) and other pre-positioned ships is an important ingredient in our fo

strategy. MPS Squadron One is pre-positioned in EASTLANT, and MPS Squadro

will be set up in Diego Garcia. Several former NTPF ships (now called Afloat

DETERRENCE OR TRANSITION TO WAR—MOVEMENT OF USN/USMC FORCE

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Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:32:10 AM
up in Guam outside the time frame covered by this document.

Again, the purpose of this global forward movement is deterrence, but if deterrence

fails, naval forces need to be forward to transition to warfighting rapidly.

Because of the seriousness of the scenario envisioned, activation of reserves is anticipated during Phase I. The Army and Air Force are much more dependent on reserve

activation than the Navy, but the Maritime Strategy relies to a significant degree on the

capabilities and contributions of the Naval Reserve, as well as on protection of U.S.

harbors and coastal Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) by the Maritime Defense

Zone (MDZ) commands. Reserve patrol aircraft squadrons and the U.S. Naval Reserve

surface combatants move forward, and Reserve Minesweepers prepare for mine countermeasures in U.S. ports, harbors and coastal areas. The reserves perform several other

critical functions such as cargo handling and Naval Control of Shipping.

The question of whether the 100,000 Reserve personnel call-up would be adequate

would depend upon the circumstances at the time. Timely activation of reserves is

crucial.

Twelve modern Coast Guard High-Endurance Cutters would be made available to the

CINCs, and other Coast Guard units would prepare for coastal defense duties. The

PHASE I: DETERRENCE OR TRANSITION TO WAR

MOVEMENT OF COAST GUARD AND RESERVES

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Maritime Defense Zone Atlantic and Pacific, responsible to Navy Fleet Command

in-Chief, will implement their plans for conducting coastal defense and for protec

coastal SLOCs.

Marine reserves would also be activated, under CINCLANTFLT. This chart show

the major Coast Guard and Naval Reserve ships and aircraft, and does not depict 

totality of the vital contribution that Coast Guard and Reserve Personnel would 

U.S. and allied armies and air forces would be active as well in moving forward in 

junction with operations supporting U.S. national military strategy.

While the U.S. Army’s central focus would be on reinforcement by airlift and seal

the European Central Region, it is envisioned that active or reserve Army infantr

gades would reinforce the Aleutians and Iceland, and an Army military police bat

would reinforce the Azores. Retaining control of these islands is vital to the success 

Maritime Strategy. Allied Army deployments are also important to the Maritime 

egy including movement of the Ace Mobile Force, UK/NL Amphibious Brigade, 

the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade Group to Norway.

U.S. Air Force TACAIR would also focus on the Central Region, but it is anticipat

some reinforcements would go to the NATO flanks, Iceland, the Azores, Japan, an

Korea. Some U.S. Air Force fighters would deploy to Southwest Asia, the Aleutian

Islands, and Florida (opposite Cuba). Canadian and British TACAIR would reinf

Norway. U.S. and Allied AEW aircraft (AWACS, NATO AWACS, Nimrods, and E-

PHASE I: DETERRENCE OR TRANSITION TO WAR

MOVEMENT OF US/ALLIED ARMY/AIR FORCES

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to Europe.

Our allies would probably increase their readiness and, in accordance with plans,

reposition some of their forces in accordance with agreements in force. The NATO

Standing Naval Forces in the Atlantic and the Channel would increase readiness, and

the Naval On-call Force, Mediterranean would be constituted. The Royal Navy would

send SSN’s forward and a British ASW task group, centered around at least one carrier,

would put to sea in EASTLANT. French carrier task groups and submarines could be

expected to put to sea in the Western Mediterranean.

The Federal Republic of Germany’s Navy would move to conduct forward operations

in the Baltic. The Turkish Navy, especially its submarines, would do the same in the

Black Sea. The Italian Navy would deploy in the north central Mediterranean, and a

Spanish ASW carrier task group would get under way in the Atlantic, positioned near

Gibraltar.

British and Dutch Marines would reinforce Norway. The Japanese and other allies

would also sortie. On a worldwide basis, combined ASW tracking by maritime patrol

aircraft (MPA) would intensify, and readiness would be increased. NATO and other

PHASE I: DETERRENCE OR TRANSITION TO WAR

MOVEMENT OF ALLIED NAVIES/MPA

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movements.

Mobile, flexible naval combat operations cannot be sustained at great distances w

mobile and shore-based forward logistics support. This support is essential in all t

phases of the strategy.

To support the forces that are forward deployed during Phase I, U.S. and Allied m

logistics support force ships would be formed into Underway Replenishment Gro

(URGs), supported by strategic sealift and shuttle shipping.

Forward bases would be reinforced with Advanced Base Functional Components

(ABFC’s) to provide battle group logistics support; to sustain P-3 operations and 

provide hospital, repair, and construction support. Host nation support would b

worldwide, to the maximum extent possible, especially to provide cargo handling 

port services. U.S. Navy and Naval Reserve Cargo Handling Battalions would also 

required. Advanced forward bases, especially for P-3’s and Marines, would requir

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (SEABEES) support. Also illustrated is the 

sive sealift that would be necessary if full reinforcement of Southwest Asia was

required.

PHASE I: DETERRENCE OR TRANSITION TO WAR

STRATEGIC LIFT AND LOGISTICS

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The result of all of the reinforcements and forward movement of forces is as depicted.

Mutually supportive land and air forces converging at strategic locations in conjunction with a wide range of options provided by forward positioned maritime forces produce strong leverage to control crises, and simultaneously, full preparedness for war if

these deterrent actions fail.

Note the northern Arctic areas in which U.S. and allied nuclear powered attack submarines would be operating, as well as the notional depiction of Poseidon and Trident

SSBNs that would be providing the essential strategic nuclear deterrent backdrop to th

overall crisis.

The growth of the Soviet Pacific Fleet has been constant and significant, and that

growth is continuing. Given the relative lack of U.S. forces in the Alaskan area, the

growth of the Soviet Pacific Fleet poses an increased threat to the Aleutian Islands.

Thus, an important objective is to increase the size and capabilities of the forces that

are assigned to defend the Aleutian Islands.

The purpose of the operations envisioned by the Maritime Strategy in Phase I is deterrence of war; we hope this is the final phase.

FULL DETERRENCE AND PREPAREDNESS FOR WAR

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With enemy and Allied forces moving into place globally, at some point a major 

attack could occur. In that event, actual large-scale warfare would commence. If 

would probably spread among a number of theaters, especially at sea.

It is the Soviet Union’s aversion to multi-theater war which enhances the deterre

resented by the global presence of U.S. forces in peacetime. If we withdraw forces 

key theaters, confining the conflict may be possible, but the likelihood of the con

occurring would also be dramatically increased.

This is Phase II, in which the Navy would seek to seize the initiative, as far forwar

possible. The objective of operations in Phase II is the establishment of maritime s

ority in key ocean areas. Protection of U.S. harbors and coastal SLOC’s through M

time Defense Zone commands is an important supportive element in achieving t

objective. Phase II is preparatory to carrying the fight to the enemy.

The war at sea cannot be discussed without consideration of the land/air/battle. T

chart shows the likely Soviet initial land/air attack posture once the situation

MARITIME STRATEGY

CONFRONTATION/WAR WITH THE SOVIETS

GLOBAL WAR

SOVIETS INITIATE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

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Smaller attacks would also occur to attempt to seize Northern Norway and the Turkish

Straits.

In the Far East, the Soviets would attack U.S. forces in the Pacific. They would also

pressure the Japanese to deny to the U.S. the use of naval and air facilities. If they fail

because of the U.S.-Japanese alliance (as the Maritime Strategy assumes), they would

attack Japan, initially by air. North Korea might take the opportunity to attack South

Korea. The Soviets would seek not to provoke the Chinese into entering the war against

them but would not let their guard down in Asia. Even if the Chinese attacked the Sovi

ets, however, the Soviet focus would nevertheless remain on Europe.

The Soviets are unlikely to initiate hostilities in Southwest Asia as a deliberate precursor

to global war. Any hostilities which might occur during such a war would involve

mainly unreinforced and less capable forces.

At sea, should the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact and other allies attack, our initial

course of action would be to counter that attack, attrite enemy forces, and seize the initiative. Vital Sea Lines of Communication would be defended as far forward as possible.

Protection of U.S. harbors and coastal SLOCs would be provided by Maritime Defense

Zone commands. Naval forces would improve their positioning as they move forward

throughout Phase II ready to move into Phase III in the event that favorable war termination was not achieved.

PHASE II

MARITIME STRATEGY

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task separately, each would actually be implemented, more or less, simultaneousl

While operations in one geographic theater may continue in Phase II for a consid

period, operations in another area may well move to Phase III very quickly. The p

ity of warfare tasks would depend on the theater and the circumstances at the tim

These considerations underscore the fact that the geographical focus of the Mari

Strategy must always be global, avoiding exclusive treatment of any single theater

The destruction of the Soviet submarine fleet, as far forward as possible is fundame

our eventual success. As shown here, a coordinated anti-submarine warfare (ASW

tiative is a complex undertaking, involving a wide variety of platforms, weapons s

tems, and tactics.

Forward and barrier ASW operations would have as their goal the destruction of S

submarines operating in the Soviet sea control and sea denial areas and submarin

seeking to break out to attack U.S. reinforcement and resupply shipping further o

SSNs would conduct ASW operations far into the Soviet sea control zone against 

range of available targets, requiring operations under the Arctic ice cover. Allied 

groups would perform area ASW operations. U.S. and allied mine and submarin

riers would be initiated at key choke points. Selective mining of Soviet port area

approaches would also be implemented.

PHASE II: SEIZE THE INITIATIVE

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

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mented by mobile passive acoustic systems, conduct ASW operations to the maximum

extent possible, without interfering with SSN operations.

In the initial anti-air warfare (AAW) campaign, as our carrier battle forces move forward, they would be attacked by Soviet Long Range and Naval Aviation Strike Forces.

The carrier battle forces will seize the initiative, engaging Soviet air attacks as far forward as possible in outer air battles, to cause maximum Soviet attrition. Land-based

TACAIR would complement these efforts in the Norwegian Sea, the Mediterranean,

and the Northwest Pacific.

The AAW campaign is not limited to defeating air and missile attacks against carrier battle

forces. The Soviets will, of course, conduct strikes against land targets as well. Joint and

combined CVBF/USMC/USAF/Allied operations will be necessary in all theaters to counte

these strikes. Land-based TACAIR could also address the Cuban air threat, if necessary.

Maritime operations in the various theaters pose problems to the Soviet leadership, in

that the Soviets will have conflicting demands as to where they should send their aviation reserves.

French carriers would probably operate in the western Mediterranean possibly securin

western Mediterranean SLOCs and providing backing for U.S. carriers moving east,

while they retain their primary national theater nuclear reserve role.

PHASE II: SEIZE THE INITIATIVE

ANTI-AIR WARFARE

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When hostilities commence there will be a number of early and intense anti-surf

warfare (ASUW) engagements, especially in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean

Effective rules of engagement and innovative tactics will be used to complicate S

targeting and to seize the initiative. As U.S. and allied maritime forces move forw

they will continue to attrite opposing Soviet surface forces.

The Federal Republic of Germany’s Navy, naval air force and air forces would ma

contact with Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces moving across the Baltic. Battleship s

action group and/or PHM Battles may occur in the Caribbean. Similar surface cl

are possible elsewhere. The U.S. objective will be to eliminate all out of area Sovi

forces. Soviet intelligence gathering ships (AGIs) as well as combatants would be

sought out and destroyed, and merchantmen will be sunk as targets of opportun

U.S. and allied surface, subsurface, and air assets would be engaged, including AS

equipped allied TACAIR. U.S. Navy submarines, mines, and Harpoon-equipped P

although primarily engaged in ASW, could contribute—as could TASM-equippe

SSN’s. TASM will also be available on a few surface combatants. Harpoon-equipp

52’s, if made available, could also contribute.

ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE (ASUW)

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Even with the campaign still in Phase II, and the massed power of carrier battle

forces and amphibious forces not yet in a position to strike the Soviets far forward,

certain initial projection operations could nevertheless occur. This slide shows various options that could be mounted from the maritime theaters in this phase to support the major land action in progress.

If necessary, air strikes and offensive mining may be conducted against Cuba, Libya,

Vietnam and Korea, possibly by CVBF’s enroute higher threat areas. Strikes may be

necessary to support forces repelling Soviet attacks in Norway, Thrace, and Japan.

USAF and allied support would be particularly useful, especially in Asia. Soviet targets in Asia are more accessible to direct U.S. attack than those in Europe at this

stage.

SPECWAR surveillance, intelligence and raiding options, for instance, against C3

sites, would be valuable supplements. U.S. and allied Marine operations in Norway

and—possibly—amphibious insertions elsewhere are also options.

INITIAL PROJECTION OPTIONS

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Mine Warfare (MIW) includes both offensive mining and mine countermeasures 

ations. The U.S. and allied offensive minefields illustrated here are almost exclusi

employed against Soviet submarines in choke points or in their SSBN patrol area

The primary mine countermeasures campaign will be as far forward as possible, tar

delivery platforms to prevent mines from being sown at all. For those that get thro

and must be swept, envisioned U.S. and allied mine countermeasures responsibil

are depicted here. It is anticipated that the allies would bear the lion’s share of th

Besides the threat of open ocean attack, a major threat to the SLOCs would be m

the terminals. The allies would secure their own inshore waters. For the United S

coastal defense responsibilities would fall to units of the U.S. Naval Reserve and U

Coast Guard, operating in Maritime Defense Zones under the Fleet Commander

There are clearly not enough U.S. or allied assets to clear all our areas of responsi

simultaneously. The slide also indicates many additional critical choke points an

considered to be of interest to the Soviets and where shipping could be disrupted 

them. Any threats to those areas would have to be countered by redeployment of 

assets from other areas.

MINE WARFARE

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The Soviets recognize that U.S. Naval forces will generally be moving forward in the

three ocean areas as depicted here. Their Soviet Ocean Surveillance System (SOSS) is

global in scope and is used to detect, locate and track the movement of U.S. naval

forces. Several of the elements of the SOSS are listed.

The neutralization of the SOSS is extremely important for the success of U.S. and allied

air, surface and subsurface naval operations. C3

I countermeasures programs and operations are designed to confuse, deceive and disrupt the SOSS, thereby precluding its effectiveness and making the targeting of naval forces much more difficult. Some of the

options available to the on-scene commander include force dispersal, emission control

deception, decoys, and the destruction of AGIs and tattletales as well as the neutralization of Soviet C3

I nodes.

C3

I COUNTERMEASURES

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The importance of space in the Maritime Strategy is inexorably increasing. All nav

warfare missions depend to a degree on the use and control of space for essential 

reconnaissance, command and control, navigation, weather and environmental d

executing all phases of the Maritime Strategy.

Because of Soviet capabilities, the focus of strategy vs. strategy must have a space 

ponent. The Soviets view space as an extension of terrestrial theaters of operation

one to control and dominate. Soviet current capabilities include an ocean reconn

sance and targeting system (RORSAT, EORSAT, SALYUT), a global command an

trol network, a worldwide navigation system, and an anti-satellite system. They a

have a quick launch system for mission essential naval warfighting C3

systems.

The objective of a “space strategy” is to exploit the unique benefits of space and con

through all levels of conflict, ensuring force enhancement and denying the effect

of space to the Soviets.

LARGEST MILITARY USER OF SPACE SYSTEMS

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The use of the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) would continue to be critical

throughout Phase II. Sealift from CONUS to deployed U.S. forces is central to American

and allied success. Over 95 percent of the American reinforcement and resupply dry

cargo and 99 percent of petroleum resupply must go by sea. Also, the oil SLOCs are

important for long-term prosecution of the war, especially by the allies. Because of

stockpiles and conservation measures that would be implemented, the oil SLOCs would

not become critical until approximately D+60 to D+90.

Reinforcement and resupply sealift for all services and our allies would be provided by

the U.S. Military Sealift Command nucleus fleet, the Ready Reserve Fleet, other ships o

the U.S. National Defense Reserve Fleet, merchant ships requisitioned by the Department of Transportation, and allied ships.

All of these SLOCs must be defended. The primary defense would be made well north of

the major transoceanic SLOC, as has been shown, but a certain close-in-threat would

always be present, especially from Soviet pre-deployed submarines and those that slip

through U.S. and allied forward and barrier operations. The defense against this close

in threat will be discussed later.

WARTIME MILITARY SHIPPING—CRITICAL SLOCS

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seeks to minimize the risk of Soviet land-based air attack. Should the forward AA

and ASW battles go favorably, the SLOCs could be shifted northward to reduce th

transoceanic distances involved.

The intended results of Phase II operations are illustrated here. U.S. and allied m

time forces would have achieved forward sea control inside the sea denial and sea 

trol zones of the Soviets. These forward operations are the most effective means 

protecting the SLOCs and assisting in repelling Soviet attacks on the flanks. They 

vital factor in keeping the alliances intact. As a result of the attrition suffered by t

Soviet Navy, plus the improved position of U.S. and allied maritime forces, the Sov

options are diminished and the combat stability of their forces is threatened and the

willingness to continue the war could start to be questioned. U.S. and allied mari

forces are now in a position to provide sustained power projection according to th

directions of the NCA and the joint and combined commanders.

PHASE II: SEIZE THE INITIATIVE

RESULT: FORWARD SEA CONTROL

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Success in Phase II will enable U.S. and allied maritime forces to carry the fight to the

enemy. The objective throughout Phase III is to provide conventional pressure and

leverage against the Soviet Union in order to force war termination on terms favorable

to the U.S. and its allies. Disruption of Soviet willingness to continue fighting is a purpose of the Maritime Strategy.

In this third phase the tempo of strike and amphibious warfare operations would be

accelerated. Special warfare, anti-submarine warfare, anti-air warfare, and forward

MARITIME STRATEGY

CONFRONTATION/WAR WITH THE SOVIETS

PHASE III

MARITIME STRATEGY

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movement into Phase III operations more quickly than others.

The goals are quite straightforward, including the ultimate objective, favorable w

termination.

Heavy strikes on the flanks culminating in possible attacks on Soviet territory would 

conducted as battle forces massed and moved farther forward with reduced risk a

higher confidence of success. In accordance with DG-87-91 policy, in Europe the 

would now be projecting power ashore in support of the land battle. In East Asia 

Navy would be denying to the Soviets a secure flank.

Of the 13 deployable FY-85 CVBGs, two are assumed to be in overhaul at the beg

of the conflict. The strategy assumes that these two carriers would be available du

Phase III. Therefore, four or five would be available for Norwegian Sea or North 

battle force operations; four to six for the Northwest Pacific; two or three (plus th

French) for the Mediterranean; and zero to one for the Arabian Sea. In this way, f

global pressure would be applied.

This assumes, however, that there is no attrition of carriers and that all units are 

ble of contributing to the war effort. Delayed and sequential operations would be 

sary if we have lost battle groups, or if enemy threats from Cuba, Libya, Vietnam

Korea complicate the equation. Sequential operations are also likely with early de

tion of the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron and its support facilities, leading to

PHASE III: CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY

STRIKE OPS/ASUW

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or the North Atlantic.

The combined assets available in our amphibious ships and follow-on Military

Sealift Command shipping provide a capability to conduct Marine Amphibious

Brigade–sized assault operations simultaneously in two forward ocean areas. Assault

operations requiring more than a brigade, however, would require the concentration of

amphibious ships in one forward ocean area or the other. This justifies the high

priority accorded defense of the Panama Canal and its approaches in DG FY 87–91

Additionally, Marine Amphibious Brigade operations utilizing the Maritime

Prepositioning Ships and other prepositioned ships could be conducted in appropriate

theaters. Some allies, especially the British, have small amphibious assault capabilities

which can supplement ours.

The two battleship battle groups and other surface action groups could be employed to

good advantage in a naval gunfire support role. Construction battalions, special operations forces, and mine warfare forces have important roles to play as well. Amphibious

PHASE III: CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE/SPECWAR OPTIONS

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operations would have the purpose of gaining leverage for war termination, secur

strategic choke points, or recovering territory lost to Soviet attack.

Phase III would see the continuation of sealift, airlift and shuttle shipping f

the throughput ports to battle force positions. Maritime Defense Zones woul

a key role in keeping U.S. harbors and coastal SLOCs open. Also, notionally

shown here are forward deployed tenders for mobile maintenance and forwa

rearming and battle repair. Protection for these tenders will be an importan

consideration.

Forward and intermediate bases will be used for repair and refit facilities for battl

age and the receipt and distribution of supplies. These facilities, as well as hospit

construction support, will increase in importance as the conflict progresses. New 

bases would probably have to be established in Western Europe.

SUSTAINED COMBAT LOGISTICS

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Currently envisioned responsibilities for close-in protection and control of military ship

ping along the SLOCs are as shown. Naval protection of shipping (NPS) against submarine, air, and surface attack could include a variety of options: not only convoys (which

are escort-intensive), but also protected lanes, independent sailings for fast steamers,

and so on. U.S. forces required would be primarily of the destroyer and frigate classes

(active and reserve), Coast Guard high endurance cutters, and maritime patrol aircraft.

U.S. responsibilities would be focused on the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean, the

Western and Central Atlantic, the Central Pacific, and the Northern Indian Ocean. Our

allies would have similar responsibilities in adjacent areas. They do not, however, have

sufficient escort forces. Encouraging the allies to fulfill—and expand upon—their current escort commitments and force levels is a major on-going USN task.

Naval Control of Shipping (NCS) is a worldwide allied effort, with Naval Reserve personnel fulfilling the major U.S. Navy role.

NAVAL CONTROL AND PROTECTION OF SHIPPING (NCAPS)

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If the conflict is of a long duration, international mobilization would become inc

ingly important. This effort would require continuation of economic shipping and

therefore, the protection of economic SLOCs as shown here. Not only oil, but als

tegic minerals and industrial products would have to pass by sea to support indu

production and the war effort of the free world. In addition to providing the too

equipment for warfighting, mobilization would provide much-needed additiona

power to the battlefields.

In peacetime, United States imports account for over 12 percent of the gross nati

product. The figures for allied nations are considerably higher. Estimates of U.S. 

allied wartime import dependency vary, but it is clear that some level of imports w

be necessary, and that imports would become increasingly more vital as a war pro

gressed. These imports, including weapons systems components, would have to c

across a number of SLOCs. If peacetime patterns hold more imports [will be] co

from East Asia than from either Europe, the Mideast, or Latin America. Therefor

Maritime Strategy must provide for protection of vital Pacific SLOCs.

As discussed earlier, it is projected that the import of strategic materials would n

become critical until approximately six months into the conflict. An ongoing tas

encouraging our allies to build up their strategic reserves of raw materials so that 

requirement for early protection of economic shipping would be further reduced

WARTIME ECONOMIC SHIPPING AND INTERNATIONAL MOBILIZATION

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causing them to pursue a negotiated settlement should deterrence fail.

It is important to point out that although the Maritime Strategy is a conventional

warfighting strategy, the theater nuclear weapons of the U.S. Navy are a very important

part of the strategy. They are available on a large number of different types of naval

combatants—attack submarines, Tomahawk capable surface ships, and aircraft carriers

The combination of the threat posed by these weapons, when combined with the attrition of the Soviet fleet and the forward sea control achieved by the Maritime Strategy,

discourages the Soviets from escalating to the use of nuclear weapons and is viewed as

an important factor in encouraging the Soviets to accept a negotiated termination.

The Soviets are very conscious of the nuclear capabilities of individual U.S. naval combatants. Indeed, they still view U.S. aircraft carriers as strategic nuclear strike platforms

With their own at-sea nuclear capabilities markedly diminished as a result of the attrition suffered by their fleet, the Soviets will then recognize that U.S. naval forces can

employ theater nuclear weapons against not only air and naval targets in the maritime

theaters, but also, because of the TLAM(N) weapon, against a wide range of targets

ashore. The deterrent effect of these theater nuclear weapons is considerable.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES

LINKED TO NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

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The desired culmination of this strategy is war termination on terms favorable to 

U.S. and its allies. This requires putting sufficient conventional pressure on the So

convince them that they would have no gain in continuing aggression and that th

should in fact cease hostilities, while simultaneously giving them no incentives to 

late to nuclear war. For the Navy, this means neutralization or destruction of the 

Navy and of ground and air forces on the Eurasian flanks; sea control; and interv

in the land battle. In this way, maritime forces provide strong leverage for the Sov

Union to accept a negotiated termination of the conflict.

At the end of the conflict, from the Soviets’ perspective, the operations envisioned 

Maritime Strategy would defeat their strategy and amputate their global reach by ne

izing or destroying their fleet. The Communist Party would remain in control of th

Soviet Union, and the homeland would be intact, although it would now be threatene

From the viewpoint of the U.S. and its allies, the Maritime Strategy would have been 

cessful, the alliance would be intact, and the strategic reserve (strategic nuclear strike 

marines) would also be intact. The United States would also have viable general pu

naval forces in being at the end of the conflict. These forces would be very importan

any envisioned post-war world because of the likely continued East-West tensions 

heightened Third World instability. These forces would sustain a global forward pr

to deter further conflicts and support the interests of the U.S. and its allies.

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What happens at sea is important because of its contribution to the land battle ashore

or to a favorable settlement of the conflict. If the operations of the strategy are successful, maritime forces will contribute significantly to making a strategic difference in a

war with the Soviet Union.

Naval forces provide the visible and essential linkage between ourselves and our forward allies and forces. They also bolster the position of neutrals. In addition to providing strong incentives for deterrence, naval forces, by foreclosing options and

multiplying uncertainties for the Soviets, force them to focus on only a narrow range o

strategic choices. Naval forces preclude Soviet flanking operations, surrogate support,

and SLOC interdiction, and protect against attacks on our shores.

Naval forces force the Soviets to commit resources to the defense of otherwise secure

flanks against the entire range of naval offensive capabilities. Pacific operations should

prove critical to keeping Japan in the war, defending Korea, and ensuring that China

maintains at least an aggressively neutral posture. These operations, in conjunction

with operations in the Norway region, tie down considerable Soviet forces which could

otherwise redeploy to the Central Front.

Moreover, naval forces provide the nation with the ability to continue the war for as

long as the National Command Authority desires, as well as contributing important

leverage at war’s end.

MAKING A STRATEGIC DIFFERENCE

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We will now take a hard look at the uncertainties inherent in the strategy as it has 

outlined.

A key feature of the framework provided by the Maritime Strategy is its addressa

uncertainty. No strategy can address all the unknowns which will certainly be en

tered in crises or war.

This final section of the strategy outlines the five broad areas of uncertainty iden

to date. Each of the following slides identifies an area of uncertainty, suggests the

WAR EQUALS UNCERTAINTY

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shows how the strategy is designed to positively counter the uncertainty.

The framework of the strategy and the associated CINC-executed operations include

uncertainties. Strategy Stoppers are factors which may preclude us from executing the

full Maritime Strategy as designed, but ones over which we can exercise some control

and thereby reduce the risk. This is a list of the potential Strategy Stoppers developed fo

the POM-88 programming cycle. This list of current potential Stoppers includes bilateral arrangements that would enable us to move forces forward during a crisis even if

the multilateral political decisionmaking process were lagging.

There are also a number of potential Stoppers that need Naval programming and budgetary attention to improve our capabilities in several areas. They include strike effectiveness, lethality of weapons systems, long range reconnaissance, targeting and battle

damage assessment (BDA), mine warfare, tactical nuclear and chemical capabilities,

sustainability, physical and operational security, and interoperability.

The range of options that are available includes decisions to reduce our effort, maintain the present level of commitment, or to increase the level of commitment to reduce

risk. In other words, the Maritime Strategy is executable now, but we must keep improving to reduce the risk.

POTENTIAL STRATEGY STOPPERS

POM-88

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In addition to the Strategy Stoppers, there are four other sets of uncertainties ove

which we have little control. The first of those involves timely political decisions.

The Maritime Strategy assumes approximately two weeks of warning time and a t

tion to global war. Although the intelligence system will probably provide excelle

I&W to the National Command Authority, the overall environment would be rep

with uncertainty and ambiguity. In such a situation, the timeliness and decisivene

political decisions will be a major concern. For example, will the NCA permit the 

forward positioning of forces and the timely activation of reserves? Will the NCA m

tain a global perspective during a grave crisis or conflict with the Soviets, or will t

limit their view to a particular theater of operations? Finally, will the political lea

ship of the U.S. and its allies maintain the political will and the cohesion of effort 

objectives that will be crucial to the interests of the Free World?

The range of uncertainties runs from slow and uncertain decisions to fast and fir

ones. The Maritime Strategy assumes rapid and firm political decisions, although 

strategy recognizes that NATO as a collective body will probably lag the decision

by the U.S. or other individual allied governments.

Naval forces provide strong, positive and executable options to the NCA, even in th

ambiguous circumstances that may preclude our national leaders from the fast an

decisions postulated. For example, the forward movement of forces in Phase I an

afterwards will be a strong enhancer of alliance solidarity.

TIMELY POLITICAL DECISIONS

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Would the Soviets act as we anticipate they will? The unpredictability of the Soviets is

another uncertainty, both in terms of their strategy at the initiation of conflict and

their strategy as the conflict unfolds. The questions surrounding their initial strategy

include the purpose or goals of their actions in precursor crises as well as the questions

about what role, if any, their surrogates or clients might play.

There is also considerable uncertainty concerning their follow-on strategy as the conflict progresses. One question that is particularly troublesome is whether and when the

Soviets will mount an anti-SLOC campaign primarily using their large submarine and

mining forces.

The range of uncertainties for the Soviets’ strategy goes from immediate use of nuclear

weapons to an early flush of many conventional forces into the open oceans. The

National Intelligence Estimate concludes that the Soviets will adopt an echelon defense

strategy with some out of area forces. The Maritime Strategy limits the options available

to the Soviets by (1) deploying forward early and thereby precluding the Soviets from

flushing large numbers of ships and submarines to the open ocean; and (2) defeating

their chosen strategy head-on and destroying large numbers of their maritime forces,

thereby precluding a later breakout.

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The Maritime Strategy focuses on conventional war with the Soviet Union, while 

deters escalation to theater and strategic nuclear war. Because nuclear war at sea 

be disadvantageous to the United States, the U.S. would in all probability not init

one at sea. The use of nuclear weapons at sea would probably result from prior S

decisions based on campaign progress ashore. If the Soviets do choose to preemp

nuclear weapons, they would do so on a massive scale.

The areas of uncertainty include the question of whether our efforts to deter nuc

war would be successful. A corollary question is whether the operations of the M

time Strategy would provoke the Soviets to escalate. For example, would the use 

naval forces to attack Soviet nuclear forces or the Soviet homeland produce escal

actions by the Soviet leadership? All of these operations would be subject to tight 

trol by the National Command Authority.

One particular issue that is an important facet of this uncertainty is the subject of a

against Soviet SSBN submarines. The U.S. intelligence community is clear in its jud

ment. The Soviets are not believed to consider that the destruction of potential stra

assets, such as SSBNs, during conventional war would by itself trigger an escalation 

use of nuclear weapons. Indeed, they would expect to lose a number of SSBNs.

Other areas of uncertainty are the questions of whether U.S. and allied naval forc

could survive nuclear strikes, and whether the forward operations of the Maritim

Strategy would remain viable in a nuclear environment. The likelihood of Soviet 

ESCALATION TO WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

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great concern to naval forces in the open ocean, but chemical and biological weapons

are definitely important in terms of amphibious operations and protection of advanced

naval bases.

The Maritime Strategy raises the nuclear threshold by achieving its objectives through

conventional means while deterring escalation. In addition to the deterrent provided by

U.S. and allied ballistic missile submarines and the nuclear-armed Tomahawk missiles

and aviation weapons, maritime forces can alter Soviet perceptions of the nuclear balance, or to use their term, the correlation of nuclear forces, by destroying their SSBNs

and other platforms. The strategy, therefore, discourages escalation and encourages wa

termination by reducing Soviet confidence in the combat stability of their sea based

nuclear strike forces.

Finally, how will the war be terminated? There has not been a global war between the

superpowers in the nuclear age. The duration of the conflict, the character of military

operations during negotiations, and the final transition from fighting to the “new

peace” are all areas of uncertainty.

Furthermore, the post-war environment is uncertain. East-West tensions would probably continue, and instability in the Third World would probably continue as well. The

importance of the Free World having viable naval forces in being at the end of the war

is again apparent. These forces will be instrumental in deterring further conflicts and

in supporting the interests of the U.S. and its allies.

UNCERTAINTY: WAR TERMINATION

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escalation to nuclear weapons. Thus, the assumption of the strategy is that the ac

ment of war termination will fall, within a range of possibilities, somewhere betw

Soviet victory and Soviet total surrender.

This model summarizes the Maritime Strategy, illustrating that it is a dynamic co

The Navy’s peacetime presence and crisis response operations, while lower in int

than the Navy’s global warfighting role, nevertheless affect the strategy for carryi

that role. In close coordination with the FLEET CINCs and the Naval War Colleg

Navy continually tests and evaluates the Maritime Strategy through exercises, war

games, and from “lessons learned” from crisis and single-theater war operations, 

as those that took place in the Middle East, Grenada, and the Falklands. Addition

the Navy’s global deterrent and warfighting strategy influences its peacetime and 

activities.

The Maritime Strategy provides the context for evaluating the strengths and wea

nesses of the Navy’s force structure, and for driving priorities in plans for researc

development and procurement.

SUMMARY

THE MARITIME STRATEGY: A DYNAMIC CONCEPT

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U.S. national policy, Soviet strategy and the Maritime Strategy comprise a strategic

architecture. The national policy gives direction to the global maritime elements of U.S.

national military strategy. Based on deterrence, the strategy is global, forward, and cede

no vital area by default.

The Soviet Union is the principal threat to the United States and the interests of the

Free World, and the Maritime Strategy is designed to contribute to countering that

threat. The bottom line product for the United States and its allies is a full forward pres

sure strategy for the employment of maritime forces.

This summary recapitulates several of the major points of the Maritime Strategy, the

Global Maritime Elements of U.S. National Military Strategy.

That strategy is consistent with U.S. and coalition policy, and it provides the flexibility

of response that has always been expected of naval forces. Full forward pressure is

required of maritime forces. It is risky, but it is doable. The Navy must, however, have

the forces, the sustainability assets, and the assistance of allies and the other U.S.

services.

The Soviets are a very formidable foe, but they are not invincible.

The Maritime Strategy addresses the full spectrum of threats, from peace to crisis to

global war. The contributions of the forces of our allies and the other U.S. military

MARITIME FORCES MAKE A STRATEGIC DIFFERENCE

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favorable war termination as the goals.

If the operations envisioned by the strategy are successful—and we are confident 

they will be—then maritime forces will make a strategic difference.

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The Maritime Strategy, 1986

This document is the widely distributed, unclassified version of the Maritime Stra

that appeared as a special supplement to the U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings.* 

forty-eight-page pamphlet included four articles, of which the first three are inclu

here:

• Admiral James D. Watkins, USN, “The Maritime Strategy”

• General P. X. Kelley, USMC, and Major Hugh K. O’Donnell, Jr., USMC, “The

Amphibious Warfare Strategy”

• John F. Lehman, Jr., “The 600-Ship Navy”

• Captain Peter M. Swartz, USN, “Contemporary U. S. Naval Strategy: A

Bibliography.”†

In first presenting this collection to the public, the Naval Institute’s executive dire

Captain James A. Barber, Jr., wrote:

Naval Strategy has recently received more attention than in any peacetime era since Alfre

Thayer Mahan dominated the scene. This unusual prominence stems from the Navy’s att

think through and spell out a maritime strategy within the national military strategy. Be

the best developed and most detailed statements of “The Maritime Strategy” have been a

only in classified versions, public debate between supporters and detractors has often suff

from misinterpretations or exaggerations.

This supplement provides the most definitive and authoritative statements of the Mari

Strategy that are available in unclassified form. They are the nearest thing to a British “W

Paper”—that is, an official statement of policy—that we are likely to encounter in the Am

political system.‡

DOCUMENT FIVE

* The Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, Md. U.S. Naval Institute, January 1986), pp. 2–17.

† Revised, updated, and expanded versions of the bibliography that Captain Peter Swartz i

prepared in 1986 were published in 1987, 1988, and most recently included as appendix 

John B. Hattendorf, The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986, Newp

Paper 19 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004), pp. 185–277. The bibliography 

attempt to gauge reactions to the strategy and its effectiveness in explaining U.S. naval s

roles in the public arena.

‡ The Maritime Strategy, p. 1.

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ography of these comments has been more recently published.

Captain Roger Barnett and Commander Peter Swartz completed a draft of an unclassified version at the same time that they were completing the 1985 classified version (see

document 2). Admiral Watkins approved them both at the same time in May 1984, but

this unclassified version was not cleared for release at that point. The OPNAV Security

Office recommended that it first be cleared for release by the Department of Defense, the

Joint Staff, and the other services, since the document made reference to joint warfare,

the Army, and the Air Force. The document never cleared this review, as the other agencies saw it as only a parochial force-building argument for the Navy.*

The idea to publish an unclassified version of the Maritime Strategy arose again between

January and June 1985, a period when Admiral Watkins was very closely and personally

involved with the development and “selling” of the strategy. At this period, the staff officers of the Chief of Naval Operations’ (CNO) Executive Panel (OP-00K) were assigned

the task of drafting another unclassified version. As the form of the booklet began to take

shape, a variety of other influences, events, and people became involved in the drafting

and preparation of the various sections that eventually appeared.

In May 1985, the Naval War College sponsored a conference on the Maritime Strategy.

One of the participants in that conference, Dr. John J. Mearsheimer of the Political Science Department, University of Chicago, gave a highly critical assessment of the Maritime Strategy.† Another participant in the conference, Captain Linton F. Brooks, at that

point assigned to the CNO Executive Panel, came back to Washington from Newport an

recommended to Admiral Watkins that an unclassified version would help to offset such

criticism. Brooks then went ahead to prepare a rebuttal to Mearsheimer’s remarks that

eventually appeared side by side with Mearsheimer’s article later that year in the journa

International Security.

‡

Energized by Brooks’s report from Newport, Admiral Watkins moved ahead with

renewed plans for an unclassified version. Meanwhile, Major Hugh K. O’Donnell,

USMC, an officer in the Marine Corps programming office—and a Maritime Strategy

“insider”—had been attending a graduate-level course at night at Georgetown University, for which he wrote a paper on the Northern Flank aspects of the Maritime Strategy.

O’Donnell’s paper earned high academic marks, and his instructor, Dr. Philip Karber,

recommended that he try to publish it. Accepted immediately for publication by the

Naval Institute, the paper laid out the general ideas of the Maritime Strategy. It

* Peter Swartz, e-mail to Hattendorf, 18 July 2008.

† A revised version of the paper given at the Naval War College was published as John J.

Mearsheimer, “A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe,” International Security, 11, no. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 3–57.

‡ Linton F. Brooks, “Naval Power and National Security: The Case for the Maritime Strategy,”

International Security, 11, no. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 58–+88.

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cles, O’Donnell’s article explained the Maritime Strategy for the first time in pub

although it concentrated just on the Northern Flank aspects of the strategy.*

About the time O’Donnell’s article appeared in print, the chairman of the House 

Services Committee, Democratic representative Les Aspin of Wisconsin, planned 

hearings on the six-hundred-ship navy. Anticipating that this might become a ho

series of hearings for the Navy, the chairman of the House Armed Services Comm

Seapower Subcommittee and Aspin’s rival for the chairmanship of the main comm

Democratic representative Charles E. Bennett of Florida, convened his own series 

hearings in 1985. The hearings began with Secretary of the Navy Lehman, Admi

Watkins, and General Kelley, followed by both critics and supporters, to become a 

prehensive public statement of official views.† These hearings gave Lehman, Wat

and Kelley their first opportunity to read and hear each other’s strategic concepts 

extended detail. All three came away from the hearings with a feeling that they h

jointly delivered a powerful and synergistic message. Admiral Watkins immediat

cluded that his statement before the committee could form the basis for the uncla

version of the strategy that he had long wanted circulated.

When Secretary Lehman heard of Watkins’s intentions, Lehman wanted to parall

Watkins’s statement with one of his own. Captain Peter Swartz, by then a staff m

in the Secretary’s Office of Program Appraisal, recommended that additional stat

be included from both the Commandants of the Marine Corps and the Coast Gua

in the end, only General Kelley’s statement was added.

For this new statement, Admiral Watkins decided to make public for the first tim

logic and rationale for the anti-SSBN campaign that was part of the Maritime St

Captain Linton Brooks, then serving as director of Defense programs on the staff 

National Security Council, and Commander R. Robinson Harris, on the staff of t

CNO Executive Panel, began to draft the unclassified text for Admiral Watkins, w

Brooks playing a key role in dealing with the subject of the anti-SSBN campaign.

Remarkably, this aspect of Watkins’s article was the first time that any Maritime 

document at the secret level of classification or below had discussed this subject, e

the most cryptic fashion.

Dr. Harvey Sicherman and Captain Peter Swartz collaborated to support Secreta

the Navy John Lehman’s work as Lehman became personally involved to create hi

statement on the six-hundred-ship navy. Major Hugh K. O’Donnell worked direc

General Kelley on the Marine Corps Commandant’s piece while serving as Joint

* Major Hugh K. O’Donnell, USMC, “Northern Flank Maritime Offensive,” U.S. Naval Ins

Proceedings, 111 (September 1985), pp. 42–57.

† U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Seapow

Strategic and Critical Materials, Hearings: The 600-Ship Navy and the Maritime Strategy, 

98th Cong., 1st sess.

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under Major-General Thomas Morgan.* Meanwhile, Captain Swartz and Fred Rainbow

at the Naval Institute worked together to select the illustrations and wrote the captions

that complemented the written texts, with prominent images that included U.S. Coast

Guard cutters, British aircraft carriers, U.S. Air Force tankers, and other images to demonstrate interservice and allied components of the strategy that were not being explicitly

mentioned in the articles.

By the end of 1985, Secretary Lehman, Admiral Watkins, and General Kelley had all

ensured that the draft statements met their own needs and criteria as well as reflected

the policies and views of President Ronald Reagan, Secretary of Defense Caspar

Weinberger, and the administration. With that done, each submitted the final version of

his article to the Naval Institute Proceedings for publication in early January 1986.

When this group of articles appeared in the Naval Institute’s Maritime Strategy booklet,

they formed an extremely important statement that clearly demonstrated how very

closely the Navy and the Marine Corps were in their strategic thinking. On top of this,

Secretary Lehman’s article clearly demonstrated the fundamental interrelationship

between the Navy’s goals in force development and the strategy that such a force was

designed to carry out, as well as the affordability measures the Navy was undertaking

to demonstrate its effective stewardship of the increased resources granted to it by the

Reagan administration. ✒

The United States is inevitably a maritime nation, and the United States and its Navy

have inescapable global responsibilities. A carefully designed strategy has always been

an imperative, but the need for a sound strategy has grown all the more important as

the Soviets developed a formidable blue-water Navy able to challenge U.S. interests

worldwide. Accordingly, three years ago, we reviewed our extant strategy—a strategy

with broad contours reasonably well understood, but one which had not been submitted to the rigor inherent in codification. The result of that effort was the Maritime

Strategy.

The Maritime Strategy, the maritime component of the National Military Strategy,

helps us think and plan intelligently for the global use of naval forces from peacetime

through global war to war termination. It is a strategy for today’s forces, today’s capabilities, and today’s threat. It also is a dynamic concept. We continually gauge its adequacy through our everyday operations, exercises, and war games, and we apply the

lessons learned from these experiences to improve and enhance the strategy.

Before discussing the strategy in detail, it is important to define its bounds and perspective. The Maritime Strategy is firmly set in the context of national strategy,

* E-mail from Hugh O’Donnell to Hattendorf, 13 August 2008.

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with our sister services. Moreover, the Maritime Strategy recognizes that the unif

and specified commanders fight the wars, under the direction of the President an

Secretary of Defense, and thus does not purport to be a detailed war plan with fi

timelines, tactical doctrine, or specific target sets. Instead, it offers a global persp

to operational commanders and provides a foundation for advice to the Nationa

mand Authorities. The strategy has become a key element in shaping Navy progr

matic decisions. It is of equal value as a vehicle for shaping and disseminating a

professional consensus on warfighting where it matters—at sea.

National Military Strategy and the Maritime Role

Our national military strategy is designed: to preserve this country’s political ide

framework, and institutions; to protect the United States, including its foreign as

and allies; to foster the country’s economic well-being; and to bolster an internat

order supportive of the vital interests of this country and its allies. To achieve the

ends, our national strategy is built on three pillars: deterrence, forward defense, a

alliance solidarity.

Deterrence simply means convincing a potential aggressor that the risks involved 

aggression are greater than its possible benefits. The Soviets, or any other potenti

aggressors, will not be deterred by empty threats and rhetoric. A credible deterre

must have ready and capable forces behind it and the commitment to use them i

essary. Our formal alliances and treaties with 43 nations also require forward pos

to reaffirm United States resolve and bolster alliance solidarity, which redounds t

credibility of our deterrence.

As the naval component of the National Military Strategy, the Maritime Strategy 

designed to support campaigns in ground theaters of operations both directly an

indirectly. Its success depends on the contributions of our sister services and allie

Accordingly, we place great emphasis on joint operations. In addition to our hist

relationship with the Marine Corps, we have strengthened our partnerships with 

Air Force, Army, and Coast Guard in the planning, exercising, and executing of jo

operations.

An important part of our cooperative effort has been the Memorandum of Agree

I signed with the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, in September 1982. This agreem

accelerated such ongoing efforts as routinely including Air Force units in fleet ex

developing doctrine and procedures for employment of AWACS and B-52s in ma

missions, and identifying aerial refueling requirements. It also led to several new

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training ranges.

A similar example of cooperative efforts to correct combat deficiencies is the Memorandum of Agreement with the Coast Guard establishing Maritime Defense Zones.

Under this agreement, Coast Guard units combined with naval forces, both active and

reserve, will defend harbors and shipping lanes along our coasts in time of war.

The Navy has also identified 11 areas in a Memorandum of Agreement signed last year

between the Army and Air Force where we can contribute to enhanced joint operational effectiveness, and we are pressing ahead to do so. Efforts like these complement

vigorous Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) initiatives including JCS-directed joint exercises

and pilot projects on tactical and strategic air support to maritime operations.

The Era of Violent Peace

Preparation for global war is the critical element in ensuring deterrence, but our peace

time operations and response in time of crisis are also crucial contributions to deterrence and stability. Therefore, while the peacetime presence and crisis response

components of our Maritime Strategy are less detailed and formal than the warfighting

component, they are no less important. In fact, the volatility of today’s international

situation suggests that we must expect to employ these elements of our Maritime Strat

egy in an expanding set of the world’s trouble spots. To understand the scope of their

worth, we must recognize the chief characteristic of the modern era—a permanent

state of what I call violent peace.

The Soviets do not desire a superpower confrontation, for two principal reasons. First,

they recognize that there would be no easy victory and the costs would be high. Equally

important, though, and consistent with Marxist-Leninist doctrine, they believe that

history is on their side and that the West will collapse because of the “natural dialectic.”

To channel the course of history, the Soviets foster evolutionary—as well as revolutionary—

change, and support proxies and surrogates—such as Cuba, Libya, Angola, and North

Korea—who do their bidding. This results in worldwide challenges to the United States

and our allies. We may be technically at peace, but the period since 1945 can be characterized as an era of violent peace.

A principal feature of this era is the continuing and widespread existence of localized

conflicts and crises, mostly in the Third World, but often with global implications. Thi

profusion of crises and conflicts has been a feature of the international environment

since World War II. In 1984, millions of people were involved in more than 30 armed

conflicts throughout the world. These ran the gamut from civil unrest in Sri Lanka, to

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between states in the Persian Gulf.

These conflicts and other crises with the potential to break into hostilities freque

involve U.S. and allied interests. Transcending the interests of states directly invo

these confrontations often serve as backdrop for potentially more serious conflic

between major powers. A fundamental component of the nation’s success in dete

war with the Soviet Union depends upon our ability to stabilize and control esca

in Third World crises.

As a result, our Navy devotes much of its effort to maintaining this stability. Pote

crises and the aftermath of crises have increasingly defined the location and char

of our forward deployments. We now maintain a continual presence in the India

Ocean, Persian Gulf, and Caribbean, as well as our more traditional forward depl

ments to the Mediterranean and the Western Pacific. Although we are not at war 

our operating tempo has been about 20% higher than during the Vietnam War. T

indicates increased need for forces-in-being during peacetime, a need made mor

by the probability that, should war come, there will be only a brief time for mobi

tion. In this age of violent peace, the Navy is on the front lines already, and will b

the foreseeable future.

The international setting is complicated by the proliferation of modern, high-techn

weaponry in the Third World. Certainly the most alarming aspect of this prolifer

is the growing numbers of nations in positions to acquire mass annihilation wea

chemical, biological, and even nuclear. Even in the absence of such weapons, imp

conventional arsenals possessed by Third World nations pose an immediate conc

While these weapons do not fundamentally change the causes of instability, they 

change the nature of conflict and the threats we face. Naval forces must be prepa

encounter high-technology, combined-arms threats in virtually every ocean of th

world.

The rise of state-sponsored terrorism is a new and disturbing phenomenon. Its u

dictability, worldwide scope, and anonymity render it one of the most insidious t

we face today. Terrorism is not new, but the threat has increased because terroris

in some cases, become a preferred arm of state action. If not countered, it can be 

tive against targeted forward-deployed forces. By placing at risk forward-deploye

forces, terrorists (and their state sponsors) hope to be able to intimidate us into w

drawing, thereby undermining our credibility.

At the same time, the Soviets exploit instability in the Third World to promote go

ments that support Soviet ideology, improve the Soviet strategic position, and re

Western influence. Soviet methods include support and encouragement of limite

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their own forces.

Since 1948, the Third World has been the most common arena for United States–Sovie

competition, and this pattern will continue. U.S. interests and commitments are worldwide, and increasingly focus on the Third World. Our economy and security require oi

from the Persian Gulf and Caribbean, and strategic minerals from southern Africa. Ou

trade with nations of the Pacific Basin now surpasses that with Europe. Obviously, we

have vital stakes in what happens in these and other key areas.

As the challenges to peace and stability increase, so do the Soviets’ capabilities for

global military reach. Their military airlift and sealift have grown significantly. The

Soviet Navy, with a large deck aircraft carrier under construction, is increasingly capable of sustained distant operations. In addition, the Soviets continue to expand and

improve their attack submarine force, making it a formidable global threat. They also

have enhanced their access to air and naval facilities in key strategic locations, including Ethiopia, South Yemen, Cuba, and Vietnam.

Moscow recently established its first fully developed overseas base at Cam Ranh Bay,

Vietnam. These facilities can support a large concentration of Soviet naval forces,

maintaining a permanent naval force astride key sea-lanes to our Pacific allies and

friends. From this base Soviet forces can strike key United States and friendly forces

and installations as far north as Hong Kong.

Improved power projection forces and global access provide the Soviets a growing

capability to intervene militarily in the Third World. They steadily improve their ability

to sever vital sea lines of communication, while improving their ability to counter U.S.

crisis reaction moves. Responding effectively to Third World crises may well require

that U.S. Navy units bring the range of capabilities necessary to deal with Soviet as well

as Third World threats.

Soviet Military Strategy

The Soviet Union has an integrated strategy which seeks to use all Soviet military

forces in a coherent fashion to meet Soviet national goals. While we are uncertain of

the details of Soviet strategy, its broad outlines are clear. The Soviets appear to

assume a future war with the West will be global in scope, violent, and decisive. In

such a war the total military power of the state will be expected to serve clearly defined

political goals.

Even in such a war the Soviets would not use nuclear weapons lightly, preferring to

achieve their goals with conventional means. Nuclear weapons nonetheless have a central place in Soviet military thought. A war between the superpowers may not involve

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sense that the nuclear balance is constantly examined and evaluated in anticipati

possible escalation. Because of this aspect of Soviet doctrine, the Soviets place a h

priority on changing the nuclear balance, or as they term it, the nuclear correlati

forces, during conventional operations.

The probable centerpiece of Soviet strategy in global war would be a combined-a

assault against Europe, where they would seek a quick and decisive victory. As pr

military planners, the Soviets would, of course, prefer to be able to concentrate o

single theater; a central premise of U.S. strategy is to deny them such an option.

Soviet overseas clients and surrogates outside the Warsaw Pact may join in an att

Figure 1 shows that some of these clients sit astride critical sea lines of communi

Any Western strategy must, of necessity, hedge against such third country involve

Naval forces are ideally suited to provide such a hedge. Routinely forward deploy

the vicinity of these nations, naval forces possess the required warfighting capabi

accomplish the task and move on to more demanding requirements.

While Soviet ground and air forces conduct a massive offensive, a critical Soviet N

role in a future conflict would be to protect the Soviet homeland and their ballist

missile submarines, which provide the Soviets with their ultimate strategic reserv

Consistent with its overall stress on the nuclear balance, Soviet doctrine gives hig

ority to locating and destroying Western sea-based nuclear assets, including aircr

carriers, ballistic missile submarines, and Tomahawk-equipped platforms. The So

FIGURE 1

Soviet Clients and Surrogates

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the antisubmarine warfare capability to implement such a mission. Other roles, such as

interdicting sea lines of communication or supporting the Soviet Army, while important, will probably be secondary, at least at the war’s start.

This view of the Soviet Navy’s role in overall Soviet strategy suggests that initially the

bulk of Soviet naval forces will deploy in areas near the Soviet Union, with only a small

fraction deployed forward. Soviet exercises confirm such an interpretation. Figure 2

shows the areas in which these exercises take place. It is important to recognize that

these arcs encompass Japan, Norway, and Turkey. Thus, the option some advocate, of

holding our maritime power near home waters, would inevitably lead to abandoning

our allies. This is unacceptable, morally, legally, and strategically. Allied strategy must

be prepared to fight in forward areas. That is where our allies are and where our adversary will be.

The Maritime Strategy: Peacetime Presence

Sea power is relevant across the spectrum of conflict, from routine operations in peace

time to the provision of the most survivable component of our forces for deterring

strategic nuclear war. The Maritime Strategy provides a framework for considering all

uses of maritime power. Among the greatest services we can provide the nation is to

operate in peacetime and in crises in a way that will deter war. Figure 3, which illustrates the spectrum of conflict, draws attention to the importance of the lower levels of

violence where navies are most often the key actors.

FIGURE 2

Soviet Naval Exercise Areas

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By its peacetime presence throughout the world, the Navy enhances deterrence d

Our forward deployments maintain U.S. access on fair and reasonable terms to o

other necessary resources, and markets, and deter and defend against attempts at 

cal denial of sea and air lines of communications critical to maintenance of the U

and allied economies. They provide a clear sign of U.S. interest in a given nation 

region, and of U.S. commitment to protect its interests and its citizens.

One key goal of our peacetime strategy is to further international stability throug

support of regional balances of power. The more stable the international environ

the lower the probability that the Soviets will risk war with the West. Thus our pe

time strategy must support U.S. alliances and friendships. We accomplish this th

a variety of peacetime operations including naval ship visits to foreign ports and 

ing and exercises with foreign naval forces.

In 1984, for example, the Navy and Marine Corps visited 108 countries and cond

joint exercises with 55 foreign countries. Often taken for granted, port visits and 

training and exercises have a material impact around the world in stabilizing pea

reminding friend and foe alike that we are able and have the will to defend the in

of ourselves and our treaty allies.

The Maritime Strategy: Crisis Response

The heart of our evolving Maritime Strategy is crisis response. If war with the So

ever comes, it will probably result from a crisis that escalates out of control. Our 

to contain and control crises is an important factor in our ability to prevent glob

conflict.

The Spectrum of Conflict

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1946 and 1982, in some 250 instances of employment of American military forces,

naval forces constituted the principal element of our response in about 80% of the crises. Reasons for selecting naval forces as the instrument of choice for crisis management and deterrence of conflicts are illuminating:

• Forward-deployed posture and rapid mobility make naval forces readily available at

crisis locations worldwide, providing significant deterrent value and reducing the

likelihood of ambiguous or short warning.

• Naval forces maintain consistently high states of readiness because of forward

deployments, ensuring operational expertise and day-to-day preparedness.

• Naval forces increasingly operate with friendly and allied armed forces and sister

services.

• Naval forces can be sustained indefinitely at distant locations, with logistics support

relatively independent of foreign basing or overflight rights.

• Naval forces bring the range of capabilities required for credible deterrence.

Capabilities demonstrated in actual crises include maintaining presence, conducting

surveillance, threatening use of force, conducting naval gunfire or air strikes,

landing Marines, evacuating civilians, establishing a blockade or quarantine, and

preventing intervention by Soviet or other forces.

• Perhaps most importantly, naval forces have unique escalation control

characteristics that contribute to effective crisis control. Naval forces can be

intrusive or out of sight, threatening or non-threatening, and easily dispatched but

just as easily withdrawn. The flexibility and the precision available in employing

naval forces provide escalation control in any crisis, but have particular significance

in those crises which might involve the Soviet Union.

The peacetime and crisis response components of the Maritime Strategy are evolving,

robust, and designed to foster a stable international setting. This is important for deter

rence. Although deterrence is most often associated with strategic nuclear warfare, it is

a much broader concept. To protect national interests, we must deter threats ranging

from terrorism to nuclear war. This requires a credible peacetime and wartime capability at the level of conflict we seek to deter. Our national interest also requires an

extended deterrent capability. Perhaps most importantly, protecting national interests

while preventing war requires the ability to control escalation, and naval forces and our

peacetime strategy are ideally suited for that purpose.

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likely to fail. Deterrence can fail, however, and we must consider how the Navy w

be used in a global war against the Soviets.

The Maritime Strategy: Warfighting

Should war come, the Soviets would prefer to use their massive ground force adv

against Europe without having to concern themselves with a global conflict or w

actions on their flanks. It is this preferred Soviet strategy the United States must 

ter. The key to doing so is to ensure that they will have to face the prospect of pro

longed global conflict. Maritime forces have a major role to play in this regard. T

strategy setting forth their contribution consists of three phases: deterrence or th

transition to war; seizing the initiative; and carrying the fight to the enemy. Ther

no fixed time frames associated with these phases; they provide a broad outline o

we want to accomplish, not an attempt to predict an inherently unpredictable fut

Phase I: Deterrence or the Transition to War: The initial phase of the Maritime Str

would be triggered by recognition that a specific international situation has the p

tial to grow to a global superpower confrontation. Such a confrontation may com

because an extra-European crisis escalated or because of problems in Europe. In 

event, this phase of the Maritime Strategy deals with a superpower confrontation 

ogous to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, where war with the Soviet Union is a r

possibility.

The goal of this phase is deterrence. Through early, worldwide, decisive use of se

power we—along with sister services and allies as appropriate—would seek to wi

crisis, to control escalation, and, by the global nature of our operations, to make 

our intention to cede no area to the Soviets by default and to deny them the opti

engage in hostilities on their terms. While seeking to enhance deterrence at the b

war, we must also consider that deterrence may fail. Thus preparing for the trans

to war, specifically to global war, is an integral aspect of this phase.

Keys to the success of both the initial phase and the strategy as a whole are speed 

decisiveness in national decisionmaking. The United States must be in position t

the Soviets’ “battle of the first salvo” or deal with that if it comes. Even though a 

stantial fraction of the fleet is forward deployed in peacetime, prompt decisions a

needed to permit rapid forward deployment of additional forces in crisis. Table 1 

cates the times required for illustrative movements of combatants and support sh

throughout the world and illustrates the importance of the Panama and Suez Ca

facilitating repositioning. Such early deployment is reversible and not necessarily

provocative.

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The need for forward movement is obvious. This is where the Soviet fleet will be,

and this is where we must be prepared to fight. Aggressive forward movement of

anti-submarine warfare forces, both submarines and maritime patrol aircraft, will forc

Soviet submarines to retreat into defensive bastions to protect their ballistic missile

submarines. This both denies the Soviets the option of a massive, early attempt to

interdict our sea lines of communication and counters such operations against them

that the Soviets undertake.

Early embarkation of Marine amphibious forces takes advantage of their flexibility and

would be matched with forward movement of maritime prepositioning ship squadrons

toward most likely areas of employment. Moving one Marine amphibious brigade by

air to rendezvous with its prepositioned equipment and reinforce Norway provides a

convincing signal of alliance solidarity.

Early forward deployment of sea-based air power also is essential to support our allies,

particularly Japan, Norway, and Turkey. Early forward movement of carrier battle

forces provides prudent positioning of our forces in order to support the requirements

of the unified commanders and to roll back Soviet forces, should war come. It does not

imply some immediate “Charge of the Light Brigade” attack on the Kola Peninsula or

any other specific target.

FROM TO STEAMING DAYS

U.S. East Coast Northern Atlantic 7

U.S. East Coast Mediterranean 10

U.S. East Coast Indian Ocean 241

U.S. West Coast Northern Atlantic 312

U.S. West Coast Western Pacific 9

U.S. West Coast Indian Ocean 24

Mediterranean Northern Atlantic 6

Mediterranean Indian Ocean 213

Indian Ocean Northern Atlantic 24

Western Pacific Indian Ocean 14

1. Subtract 6 days by using Suez Canal

2. Subtract 13 days by using Panama Canal

3. Subtract 15 days by using Suez Canal

Note: Based on closure times at 20-knot speed of advance.

Combatant Repositioning Steaming Times

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Pacific directly enhance deterrence, including deterrence of an attack in Europe, 

providing a clear indication that, should war come, the Soviets will not be able to

ignore any region of the globe. Should deterrence fail, such deployments tie down 

forces, especially strike aircraft, limiting the Soviets’ ability to concentrate their for

Central Europe. Thus, even in its earliest phase, the Maritime Strategy, by exerting 

pressure on the Soviet Union, can help ease the burden for NATO forces in Europe

In addition to allowing rapid deployment, speed and decisiveness in national

decisionmaking are crucial to the strategy’s overall execution. As more functions 

transferred to the reserve forces, execution of the President’s authority to call up

reservists (currently limited to 100,000 in number) becomes increasingly crucial 

cessful implementation of the strategy. Virtually the entire Navy cargo-handling 

bility, for example, and all Navy combat search and rescue capability depend on

reservists. Their prompt call-up is imperative. In a similar fashion, an early decis

place the Coast Guard under Navy command and control will have a major impa

the rapidity with which the strategy can be implemented.

An important aspect of the strategy’s initial phase is sealift. In 1984, the Secretary 

the Navy established sealift as the third primary mission of the Navy, along with 

control and power projection. This increased emphasis recognizes the importanc

both economic and military resupply. By the end of the decade, we will have adeq

sealift for the movement of military forces. But we will neither be able to tolerate 

tion typical of World War II nor provide adequate dedicated sealift to transport t

strategic raw materials we will require. For this reason, early and effective uses of 

ing sealift are essential.

Phase II: Seizing the Initiative: We cannot predict where the first shot will be fired

should deterrence fail, but almost certainly the conflict will involve Europe. If wa

comes, we will move into the second phase of the strategy in which the Navy will 

the initiative as far forward as possible. Naval forces will destroy Soviet forces in 

Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and other forward areas, neutralize Soviet clients i

required, and fight our way toward Soviet home waters.

Seizing the initiative is vital for several reasons. First, it demonstrates to our allie

country’s determination to prevail and thus, contributes to alliance solidarity. Se

the history of war tells us that gaining the initiative is the key to destroying an op

nent’s forces. Finally, seizing the initiative opens the way to apply direct pressure 

Soviets to end the war on our terms—the new goal of our strategy once deterren

failed. Indeed, it is possible that, faced with our determination, the Soviets can be

induced to accept war termination while still in this phase.

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to maintain a defensive posture elsewhere. Instead, we must dilute their effort, divert

their attention, and force them to divide their forces. We must control the type and

tempo of conflict, making sure the Soviets understand that they can take no area for

granted. To accomplish this, maritime forces must counter a first salvo, wear down

the enemy forces, protect sea lines of communication, continue reinforcement and

resupply, and improve positioning. We must defeat Soviet maritime strength in all its

dimensions, including base support. That converts to classic Navy tasks of antisubmarine warfare, antisurface warfare, counter command and control, strike operations, antiair warfare, mine warfare, special operations, amphibious operations, and

sealift. Each is essential if the strategy is to succeed.

One of the most complex aspects of Phase II of the Maritime Strategy is antisubmarine

warfare. It will be essential to conduct forward operations with attack submarines, as

well as to establish barriers at key world chokepoints using maritime patrol aircraft,

mines, attack submarines, or sonobuoys, to prevent leakage of enemy forces to the

open ocean where the Western Alliance’s resupply lines can be threatened. Maritime air

and anti-submarine warfare units will be involved, along with offensive and defensive

mining. As the battle groups move forward, we will wage an aggressive campaign

against all Soviet submarines, including ballistic missile submarines. This aggressive

action ensures that we prevent such losses as the Germans inflicted on allied shipping

FIGURE 4

U-Boat Victories, January– July 1942

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sunk 450 ships, as illustrated in Figure 4.

Antiair warfare is equally complex and equally important. It demands both offen

defense in depth, long-range indication and warning, long-range interception an

veillance, and base neutralization, and is an area where the contribution of our a

and sister services is particularly important. The overriding goal is to counter the 

ets’ missile-launching platforms, to shoot the archer before he releases his arrows

only is it easier to destroy bombers than missiles, but the bomber destroyed toda

not return with more missiles tomorrow. Our strategy envisions making extensiv

of jamming, deception, and decoys to counter the enemy’s targeting capability. A

defensive weapons will deal with in-bound missiles or, in some cases, aircraft tha

through our offensive thrust. No single approach will be sufficient; countering th

Soviet air threat through offensive antiair warfare demands a layered approach.

Antisurface warfare involves carriers, submarines, cruise missile–equipped surfac

ships, and land-based forces eliminating forward-deployed Soviet surface ships a

outset of conflict. This requires appropriate rules of engagement at the brink of w

avoid losing the battle of the first salvo which is so important in Soviet doctrine. 

allies also have a critical role to play in antisurface warfare. Germany, for exampl

bear the brunt of the campaign in the Baltic while the Turks will be key players in 

Black Sea. As our forces move forward, antisurface warfare will continue, with as 

the elimination of the Soviet fleets worldwide.

Successes in antiair, antisubmarine, and antisurface warfare are crucial to effectiv

prosecution of offensive strike warfare. The battle groups are central to defeating 

air, submarine, and surface forces. To apply our immense strike capability, we mu

move carriers into positions where, combined with the U.S. Air Force and allied f

they can bring to bear the added strength needed on NATO’s Northern or Southe

flanks, or in Northeast Asia. Further, selective use of naval forces on the Central F

could have an important stabilizing impact. The strike power of carrier battle for

can also be augmented with conventional land-attack Tomahawks launched from 

marines or surface ships. All of these would be brought to bear as the unified com

manders direct. The strategy does not envision automatic attacks on any specific

targets, but the main threats to our fleet during this phase are the “Backfires” and 

missile-carrying aircraft of Soviet Naval Aviation. The United States cannot allow 

adversary to assume he will be able to attack the fleet with impunity, from inviol

sanctuaries.

The nature of these battle force operations is not always understood. One often h

self-appointed strategic experts suggest that elimination of a carrier battle group 

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explain the evolution of battle force formations since World War II, I sometimes use

pictures like Figure 5, showing the Eastern United States on the same scale as the

56,000 square miles that a typical carrier battle group formation might occupy.

In amphibious warfare, the United States has the flexibility of conducting a Marine

amphibious brigade size raid or forcible entry by the 55,000 men of a Marine amphibious force. Such operations could be conducted alone or in conjunction with the allied

marine forces, as directed by the unified commanders. The principal requirement

would be to seize a beachhead for the introduction of follow-up forces, either from

other services or from other countries.

Mine countermeasures form yet another important aspect of the strategy. The West

must be ready to clear mines whenever and wherever necessary. Mine warfare provides

a striking example of the importance of our allies to the Maritime Strategy. The Commander, Mine Warfare Command, executes a very aggressive cooperative program with

our allies, traveling to roughly 40 nations every year to ensure that we integrate both

allied mine-clearing and allied offensive mine-laying operations.

In addition to these traditional combat tasks, implementing Phase II of the Maritime

Strategy depends on other efforts. It is crucial that we counter the Soviets’ capability

both to control their forces and to locate and target ours. Maritime forces, working

with other assets, must confuse, deceive, and disrupt Soviet command and control.

FIGURE 5

Carrier Battle Group Dispersed Formation

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jamming, dispersal, and emission control.

Finally, we must support our forces as we fight. Mobile logistic support forces, su

tained sealift, and the use of Navy Seabees to establish advanced bases all play a r

a forward logistic support concept which is a prerequisite for seizing the initiativ

Logistics and sustainability are integral to the success of any strategy; they are esp

cially vital in one such as ours which demands aggressive, sustained, forward

operations.

Phase III: Carrying the Fight to the Enemy: The tasks in this phase are similar to th

earlier phases, but must be more aggressively applied as we seek war termination 

terms favorable to the United States and its allies. Our goal would be to complete 

destruction of all the Soviet fleets which was begun in Phase II. This destruction 

us to threaten the bases and support structure of the Soviet Navy in all theaters, w

both air and amphibious power. Such threats are quite credible to the Soviets. At 

same time, antisubmarine warfare forces would continue to destroy Soviet subm

including ballistic missile submarines, thus reducing the attractiveness of nuclea

lation by changing the nuclear balance in our favor.

During this final phase the United States and its allies would press home the initi

worldwide, while continuing to support air and land campaigns, maintaining sea

and keeping sea lines of communication open. Amphibious forces, up to the size 

full Marine amphibious force, would be used to regain territory. In addition, the 

weight of the carrier battle forces could continue to “roll up” the Soviets on the f

contribute to the battle on the Central Front, or carry the war to the Soviets. The

tough operations close to the Soviet motherland could even come earlier than th

phase.

I have discussed various tasks separately, but they must be implemented simultan

on, over, and under the sea. Our forces combine in a synergistic way, both to dete

to win if deterrence fails. One of the truly unique aspects of naval warfare is its a

some complexity, as forcefully portrayed in Figure 6.

The complexity of the tasks makes it essential that we not attempt to micro-man

war from Washington, but rather that we provide options and broad concepts to 

the unified commanders in implementing their detailed plans. Command, contro

communications, and intelligence combine to form the glue that binds this entir

together. And space is an essential factor in command, control, communications, 

intelligence. The Navy is the number one tactical user of information from space

recover the information, fuse it in real time, and continuously disseminate it to a

tical users at sea. Although we have long understood the importance of space

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intuitively, the Maritime Strategy clarifies the essentiality of space for a Navy with

global responsibilities.

Maritime Strategy and War Termination

The goal of the overall Maritime Strategy, particularly of Phase III, is to use maritime

power, in combination with the efforts of our sister services and forces of our allies, to

bring about war termination on favorable terms. In a global war, our objectives are to:

• Deny the Soviets their kind of war by exerting global pressure, indicating that the

conflict will be neither short nor localized.

• Destroy the Soviet Navy: both important in itself and a necessary step for us to

realize our objectives.

• Influence the land battle by limiting redeployment of forces, by ensuring reinforcement

and resupply, and by direct application of carrier air and amphibious power.

• Terminate the war on terms acceptable to us and to our allies through measures

such as threatening direct attack against the homeland or changing the nuclear

correlation of forces.

The Complexity of Modern Naval Warfare

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time before nuclear weapons have been used. Maritime forces can influence that 

lation, both by destroying Soviet ballistic missile submarines and by improving o

own nuclear posture, through deployment of carriers and Tomahawk platforms a

the periphery of the Soviet Union. Some argue that such steps will lead to immed

escalation, but escalation solely as a result of actions at sea seems improbable, giv

Soviet land orientation. Escalation in response to maritime pressure serves no us

purpose for the Soviets since their reserve forces would be degraded and the Unit

States’ retaliatory posture would be enhanced. Neither we nor the Soviets can rul

the possibility that escalation will occur, but aggressive use of maritime power ca

make escalation a less attractive option to the Soviets with the passing of every d

The real issue, however, is not how the Maritime Strategy is influenced by nuclea

weapons, but the reverse: how maritime power can alter the nuclear equation. As 

maritime campaign progresses, and as the nuclear option becomes less attractive

longing the war also becomes unattractive, since the Soviets cannot decouple Eur

from the United States and the risk of escalation is always present. Maritime forc

provide strong pressure for war termination that can come from nowhere else.

Our strategy is not without risk. The strategy depends on early reaction to crisis 

the political will to make difficult decisions early. It will require flexibility to mee

inevitable changes in Soviet strategy. To some, that aspect of the strategy which f

on altering the nuclear balance may seem dangerous. But the risks exist for both 

that is the nature of deterrence.

Executing the Maritime Strategy

Strategy is a design for relating means to ends. The ends are clear: deterrence or—

should deterrence fail—war termination on terms favorable to the United States 

allies. The means are also clear: the 600-ship Navy. The warfighting capabilities o

ships, aircraft, and submarines, and the immense advantage of American sailors 

their well-known pride and professionalism, provide powerful means. But can th

design work? Will the means be sufficient? My answer to both questions is yes.

I am confident that we can succeed if put to the test because of the vast intelligen

experience that has been brought to bear in the Maritime Strategy’s development

based on the collective professional judgments of numerous flag officers, especia

those in command positions in the fleet. It has benefited from the efforts of the S

gic Studies Group, top-performing Navy and Marine Corps officers who spend a 

in Newport working directly for me in refining and expanding our strategic hori

It has been reviewed, examined, and improved by military and civilian scholars in

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ment of the very best thinkers.

I also have confidence in the Maritime Strategy because we test it in exercises, in war

games, and in real-life scenarios. In 1984, for example, the Navy participated in 106

major exercises, 55 of which involved our allies. Such exercises are an integral part of

our deterrent strategy and a major source of my confidence that, should deterrence fail

maritime forces will have the skill, capability, and experience to prevail.

We augment these exercises with war-gaming, especially at the war-gaming center in

Newport. These games stress the combined-arms nature of war and involve our allies

and our sister services. Recently, for example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sponsored a crisi

war game in which all the joint chiefs and all unified commanders personally

participated.

Finally, I am confident we can implement our strategy because we measure it against

the real world. For example, recent lessons from the Falklands, air action in the Bekka

Valley, Grenada, and the mining of the Red Sea have all been incorporated in our

dynamic approach to strategy implementation. To give but one example, in 1984 Secre

tary Lehman and I instituted the Naval Strike Warfare Center (“Strike University”) in

recognition of our need to develop more aggressive strike capabilities in implementing

our forward strategy.

Summary

The basic strategy of the United States, fully supported by the Maritime Strategy, is

deterrence. Through worldwide peacetime operations and the ability to react in crisis,

maritime forces play a major role in binding together alliances in preventing escalation

If we continue to do our job properly, our strategy for global conventional war will

remain a theoretical topic.

In establishing the maritime component of national strategy, we have been guided by

several principles:

• Maritime Strategy is derived from national military strategy and is an integral

component of that strategy. The purpose of our strategy is deterrence; should

deterrence fail our strategy relies on forward defense and allied cooperation to bring

about war termination on terms favorable to ourselves and our allies.

• Maritime Strategy must counter Soviet strategy and deny the Soviets the luxury of

fighting the type of war they choose. Our strategy must accomplish the difficult feat

of using sea power to influence the result of a land battle, both directly and

indirectly. To do this, the Maritime Strategy effectively integrates all elements of

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possible contribution to the unified commanders’ mission.

• Maritime Strategy must consider the nuclear balance even during the convent

phase of the war. Our strategy must seek war termination leverage; maritime 

may be the only source of such leverage.

Despite the violent peace which characterizes our age, we have been able to main

our security while avoiding confrontation with the Soviet Union. Deterrence has

worked. Our goal is to ensure that it continues to do so. Should deterrence ever f

maritime power, imaginatively employed, can help bring about war termination 

restore the freedom and security of the United States and our allies.

THE REAL REFORMERS

The development and application of maritime strategy profoundly affect today’s Navy in many ways. Perhaps the most important of these is

the way in which our revitalized emphasis on strategy provides a focus

for substantial reform of the Navy from within. The Navy has changed;

the Navy is changing; and the Navy will continue to change. This

change, however, is neither mindless or directionless, nor is it a defensive reaction to criticisms from outside the Navy. The evolution of our

Navy is today based on the recently developed Maritime Strategy, consciously adopted by the Navy’s leadership. We are, in fact, the real

reformers.

It appears, however, that these fundamental and substantial developments are invisible to those outside the profession. Public perceptions

frequently seem to be shaped by the superficially appealing manifestos

of self-proclaimed civilian defense reformers, who assert that those of

us in uniform have become bureaucrats rather than strategists and tacticians, that we have no strategy, and that we are incapable of reforming ourselves from within. To be sure, we carefully and repeatedly rebut

unfair criticisms and specific arguments which we find objectionable.

But to many people, our rebuttals seem to show us to be against a great

many things without being for anything other than the status quo.

There is a real danger that our critics have gained the intellectual high

ground, too often causing us to appear defensive and reactive, rebutting their arguments in the perceived absence of clearly enunciating an

alternative vision.

This is why it is important to understand the nature of reform itself, and

the relationship of change and continuity in the naval profession. Reform is almost by definition a good thing, and continual reform is essential to the vitality of the Navy. Indeed, most naval officers can point with

pride to some reforms in which they have personally participated, ranging from changes in the way a particular ship or squadron is run, to major changes in the Navy as a whole.

But continuity and stability are also important. We cannot lightly undertake reforms and endure a high percentage of failures. The consequences of failed reforms are not simply economic; they can manifest

themselves in personnel and organizational turbulence that may persist

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paredness. Some Navy experiences of the early 1970s provide object

lessons in damage caused by well-meaning reforms that failed in

execution.

Further, tradition and continuity are crucial to our organizational culture

and identity, and to our ability to perform consistently. Our professional

ethic, standards, and codes of behavior are the legacy of 200 years of naval tradition. We depend on this legacy to provide us perspective, help us

through difficult periods, and bind together the community of seagoing

men and women. Over the past several years, we have seen the payoff of

programs to rebuild a once mislaid sense of pride and professional competence. Interestingly, most of these programs were simply a return to our

traditional values and ideals.

Recent emphasis on the Maritime Strategy as the focus for our profession

represents a significant change in the contemporary naval establishment

and a continuation of the traditions of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan and

the great naval reformers of a century ago. It is worthwhile to consider

how reforms have been tied to the strategy.

The most striking and far-reaching trend within the naval profession in recent years has been the emphasis on strategy as the focus of naval

thought, planning, resource allocation, and operational employment.

Since its beginning, development and application of the Maritime Strategy

have been and continue to be efforts by naval officers. After decades of

abdicating strategic thinking to civilian academicians and armchair strategists, naval officers are again at the forefront of developing strategy and

strategic concepts.

Further, development of the Maritime Strategy has been an internally generated, active effort to understand new global realities, and to relate

means and resources to national objectives in a changing world. In struggling with this formidable task, the Maritime Strategy has developed several important characteristics, some of which represent a substantially

changed strategic vision from that which existed five or ten years ago:

• The Maritime Strategy is fully consistent with the

national strategy documents and directives of this

administration which emphasize the importance of

maritime superiority to our national defense.

• It is a global strategy designed to meet a global and

diverse threat, embracing all possible theaters of

operation and their complex interrelationships, in

peace, crisis, or war.

• It is a forward strategy, keeping with the national

policy of forward defense and drawing on the

forward-deployed posture and rapid mobility of

naval forces.

• It emphasizes the importance of alliances and coalitions, relying on their major contributions to national security. Further, the Maritime Strategy

recognizes the crucial role that naval forces play in

binding together our alliances and coalitions.

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our sister services, an emphasis reflected in exercises and operations, and in a growing number of

interservice memoranda of agreement.

• It focuses primarily on the central strategic issue of

deterring and, if deterrence fails, fighting a global

war against the Soviet Union.

• It increasingly grapples with the issue of diversified

violence in an era of violent peace, and considers

how to provide deterrence across the entire spectrum of possible conflicts.

• It presents a cohesive menu of global options for

controlling escalation, drawing on the flexibility

and range of capabilities inherent in naval forces,

avoiding reliance on nuclear weapons, and recognizing potential impacts of altering the balance by

conventional means.

Clearly, the Maritime Strategy has generated substantial interest in maritime forces both within the naval profession and beyond. It has helped us

explain the Navy’s purposes to a number of audiences. Most important, it

has produced substantial—though not highly visible—reform of the Navy

from within. These reforms can be divided into three general categories.

Program development. First, the Maritime Strategy has rationalized, disciplined, and focused Navy program development, budgets, and procurement to a degree that would have seemed remarkable five years ago. Since

1982, the annual Navy program development cycle has commenced with

a presentation of the Maritime Strategy. Strategy now drives the entire

process and the resulting procurement and research and development decisions. The strategy presentation raises a number of key issues that must

be resolved in the budget process. The strategy also provides the foundation for subsequent warfare appraisals, which identify critical requirements to execute the strategy in terms of antiair warfare, antisubmarine

warfare, and other warfare areas as well. Finally, the strategy provides a

clear framework against which all budget proposals are judged and a common reference point for all related discussion.

This process of applying the Maritime Strategy to program development

has produced a number of important organizational and programmatic

spinoffs. For example, we recently consolidated responsibility for all electronic warfare programs into a single office under the Director of Naval

Warfare. The impetus for this reform came from appraisals of electronic

warfare requirements to execute the Maritime Strategy. These appraisals

had clearly shown the need for a cross-platform viewpoint—one that

avoided piecemeal solutions.

Another example is the recent Master Antisubmarine Warfare Strategy. A review of long-range antisubmarine warfare requirements to execute the Maritime Strategy showed the need for a comprehensive reexamination of our

antisubmarine warfare programs to deal with the rapidly advancing Soviet

submarine threat. This process has already led to significant changes in antisubmarine warfare research and development programs, and will provide the

rationale for our assignment of cross-platform organizational responsibilities.

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based systems to maritime forces. For too many years, we viewed space as

a technological and scientific playground outside the mainstream of naval

warfare. But the process of developing a global, forward strategy and using it to drive Navy programs has brought into sharp focus the essential

tactical contributions of space-based systems across all mission areas and

platforms. This awareness led to the establishment of the Naval Space

Command to direct space-related operations, the formation of a Space

and Naval Warfare Systems Command to manage procurement and research and development, and formulation of programmatic actions to develop new systems and make better tactical use of existing ones.

Strategic and tactical thought. The Maritime Strategy has produced significant reform in a second fundamental way, by stimulating strategic and tactical thinking among the Navy’s leaders. Strategic matters now infuse the

informal, everyday discussions among senior naval officers. This simply

was not the case five years ago, and it represents a noteworthy change in

our organizational culture.

Further, we are building institutional reinforcements for this revival of strategic thinking. Many involve the Naval War College, which once again is

the crucible of strategic and tactical thought that it was a century ago.

Within the past several years, we began sending virtually all of our commanding officers to the Naval War College on completion of their command tours. This enables these officers to reflect on strategic issues in light

of their recent operational experience, and also offers the benefits of their

experience to students in other programs.

We have also invigorated the Wargaming Center at the Naval War College.

This is the most advanced such facility in the world, and allows us to test

alternative strategies and tactics. It is heavily used both by shore- and seabased organizations.

Also important is the work of the Strategic Studies Group, associated with

the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College. During the

past five years we have selected a small group of Navy captains and Marine

Corps colonels who have distinguished themselves as strategists and tacticians. These officers deal with major issues of direct relevance to Maritime

Strategy for a full year. They report directly to me and have full access to

top Navy leaders, including the fleet commanders-in-chief. Through this

interaction, their work has materially affected the ongoing development

of the strategy.

The Naval War College’s role in strategic thinking illustrates an important

point. Development of the Maritime Strategy has consistently benefited

from a wide variety of opinions and perspectives from multiple and disparate centers of thought. The operating Navy—commanders-in-chief and

fleet commanders—has contributed as much as the Washington headquarters and such research centers as the Naval War College. This plurality

of perspective and the resulting competition of ideas have made for a robust strategy—one that recognizes and reflects the complexity of strategic

issues and the validity of multiple perspectives. This experience is directly

relevant to the development of national strategy and the Joint Chiefs of

Staff reform issue. The process of national strategy development and advice must involve multiple centers of thought and plurality of advice if the

resulting thinking is to be truly vigorous and reflective of the complexity of

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American. It works, and it must be preserved.

Emphasis on warfighting. A final way in which the Maritime Strategy has

served as a focus for reform is by shaping an emphasis on tactics and

warfighting at the operational level. For too many years, our fleet exercises

suffered from a lack of realism and focus, and our routine operations

seemed to be lacking in purpose. But the Maritime Strategy now forms a

framework for planning realistic, purposeful exercises, and provides a strategic perspective for daily fleet operations in pursuit of deterrence.

Largely as a result of the Maritime Strategy, we have begun emphasizing

exercises with multiple carrier battle forces, which would be required in a

major war. We have increased our exercises in the Northern Pacific and

Norwegian Sea, to build our base of experience in these key areas. We

have begun exercising our submarines in Arctic waters, where they might

be called upon to execute portions of the Maritime Strategy.

Thus, the Maritime Strategy has produced substantial reform. It has focused Navy program development, stimulated strategic and tactical thinking, and engendered an emphasis on tactics and warfighting in the fleet.

The Navy can take considerable pride in the substance of these reforms,

and in the strategic vision that they represent. We can also take

pride in the fact that these reforms are clearly ours. We initiated

them, and we sustain them—without much hoopla and without the

help of self-appointed military reformers outside our profession, who are

more adept at criticism than at proposing realistic solutions.

We have met the real reformers, and they are us. We have implemented,

and will continue to implement reforms, to meet new realities based on a

continuously evolving strategic vision. Our critics may take issue with our

strategy. We welcome such debate. But they cannot argue that we have

no strategy, or that we are not capable of reform.

The Maritime Strategy is a powerful statement of what we stand for, and a

focus for reform that is in keeping with our finest traditions.

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The Amphibious Warfare Strategy

GENERAL P. X. KELLEY, COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS, AND

MAJOR HUGH K. O’DONNELL, JR., U.S. MARINE CORPS

I also predict that large-scale amphibious operations will never occur

again.

—GENERAL OMAR N. BRADLEY, 19 OCTOBER 1949

When these words were uttered by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before a

House Armed Services Committee hearing on unification and strategy, many in the

audience must have concluded that the day of the amphibious assault, and perhaps of

the Marine Corps, was fast drawing to a close. General Bradley’s pronouncement not

only carried the credibility of his position as the nation’s senior military officer, but

was reinforced by the fact that he had led the great amphibious assaults onto the

beaches of Sicily and Normandy.

Omar Bradley’s prediction mattered little to General Douglas MacArthur when his

United Nations forces were being pummeled by the North Korean Army less than one

year later. Within days of the outbreak of the Korean Conflict, MacArthur knew that an

amphibious assault in his enemy’s rear would create the opportunity for decisive victory that a frontal offensive could never offer. On 15 September 1950, the hastily

assembled First Marine Division spearheaded MacArthur’s landing at Inchon, breaking

the back of the North Korean offensive and reaffirming the effectiveness of the Navy–

Marine Corps amphibious striking arm in support of the national military strategy.

The 35 years since Inchon have reverberated with echoes of Bradley’s words from other

corners, mostly characterized by a cynical scorn for a form of warfare which these critics deride as being outmoded or suicidal in the modern age. Some of these wolves have

even tried to don sheep’s clothing by maintaining that the Marine Corps didn’t need to

be tied to the Navy and that there was plenty for the Corps to contribute in the battles

for Central Europe without being shackled to an amphibious mission. Absent such a

change in mission and focus, we were told, the Marine Corps would become strategically irrelevant.

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reawakening to the strategic need for both U.S. naval power and its capability to 

duct amphibious forcible entry operations. Where once Marine participation in 

training exercises was only thinly tolerated, we now have Marine air-ground task 

(MAGTFs) exercising in Norway, Denmark, Italy, and Turkey, on a regular basis. 

once there were no new amphibious assault ships scheduled for construction—to

replace a rapidly aging and deteriorating fleet—we now have a solid program of 

building that will give us an expanded and modernized amphibious lift capability 

the mid-1990s. Where once there were initiatives that would have “heavied-up” t

Marine Corps to create a mechanized clone of existing Army divisions, today we 

the middle of an expansive modernization program that will allow MAGTFs to b

lethal and mobile, but still light enough to maintain their amphibious character.

What has caused this resurgent emphasis on maritime and amphibious power? W

naval forces now being viewed as central—rather than secondary—elements of ou

tary strategy? What role will the Navy–Marine Corps amphibious team be called u

play in the execution of this strategy across the spectrum of conflict? Is the Marine 

capable of fulfilling the requirements a maritime-oriented strategy has thrust upon 

We believe that an examination of the issues underlying these questions will illum

the reasons behind the rediscovery of the strategic utility inherent in the Navy–M

Corps team. Although the demands and responsibilities of our strategic role are 

Marines have been long accustomed to the challenges and hazards associated wit

being our nation’s force-in-readiness. We would have it no other way.

The World Environment

The greatest threat to the security and well-being of the Western Alliance lies in t

quest for world domination by the Soviet Union. Emerging from the devastation 

valiant and costly victory over the German Wehrmacht in 1945, the Soviets have 

structed a military machine that is equaled only by our own. This gives substanti

credibility to their stated goal of eventual global conquest.

The Soviet military effort has gone through a number of stages since the end of W

War II. Until the time of Stalin’s death, the focus was on relearning the lessons of 

Great Patriotic War, building massive conventional armies, and playing catch-up 

development of nuclear weapons. Soviet deficiencies in nuclear armaments and n

power caused them to fear the might of the U.S. Strategic Air Command and the 

ble striking power of U.S. amphibious forces above all other possible threats.

Khrushchev dispensed with much of Stalin’s political style and brought radical re

to the arena of military affairs, as well. Believing that nuclear weapons had made

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formation of the Strategic Rocket Forces; cut the numbers of ground formations; and

brought a halt to the construction of new naval warships. As a consequence—lacking

the naval capability to counter a U.S. maritime blockade—the Soviets suffered the

humiliation of having to withdraw their missiles from Cuba. Dissatisfied with the

entire focus of a nuclear-only defense program, the Russian military subsequently

played a central part in the removal of Khrushchev from power in 1964.

The changes in Soviet military strategy since 1965 have been both profound and troubling. Continuing Khrushchev’s expansion of strategic nuclear forces, Brezhnev also

launched a massive modernization program for both ground and naval forces. While

the United States had its attention focused on Vietnam, the Soviets soon surpassed us

in the numbers of nuclear launchers and warheads and boosted the existing imbalance

of conventional forces even more in their favor. Huge naval complexes in the Kola Peninsula and the Northwest Pacific indicated that the Soviets intended to use their new

fleet to actively contest American maritime supremacy on the high seas.

After Vietnam, as America withdrew into an isolationist shell, forever foreswearing any

future foreign involvements, a new and distinctly more ominous Soviet capability

began to appear: power projection. No longer satisfied with being a “continental”

power, the Soviets began to use their navy for the battles of political influence that have

come to characterize the Cold War. Naval bases in Cuba, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Libya, and

Angola provided stark reminders that the Russian bear had gone to sea and was prepared to use his naval power—both in general war and for crisis leverage—much as we

had for the previous 30 years.

The picture that confronted the West in the late 1970’s was not at all comforting.

Somewhat belatedly, we realized that we were faced with a multidimensional superpower with ambitions beyond the continent of Europe and with the military means to

carry them out. Without the element of nuclear superiority, which we had enjoyed

until 1970, the conventional might of the Soviet Union, now including its expansion to

the world’s oceans, took on a menacing import that demanded serious consideration

by Western military planners.

Related to the extension of Soviet global military reach has been the growing number

of conflicts in the Third World. Wars of national liberation, whether in Central America, the Middle East, or Asia, have received varying degrees of support and encouragement from the Soviets. We may have been soured by our Southeast Asian experiences,

but we still recognize the fact that many of these countries are important to the economic health of the West. We have also recognized the need for a means of rapid U.S.

response, should a developing crisis in one of these countries worsen.

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terrorism as a means of achieving political ends. The shocking murders during th

Munich Olympics in 1972 were a foretaste of the wanton violence we have subse

quently witnessed in Europe and the Middle East. Whether seeking political anar

homeland to call his own, or the overthrow of a hated regime, the international t

ist has exhibited a devotion to his cause (even unto death) that respects neither s

mores nor rules of law. His reach is global, and his targets are rarely involved in t

immediate resolution of his struggle. The demonic unpredictability of this threat

makes it perhaps the most difficult and frustrating of all to counter and negate.

How, then, has the world environment changed as it relates to Western interests? 

are now engaged in competition with a Soviet Union that has emerged from a lan

locked view to stake a credible claim for its interests, through a global military ca

ity. Soviet instigation of revolutionary fervor in the Third World also threatens k

Western economic interests, and aids the expansion of Russian power and influen

one adds the “wild card” of terrorism to this already worrisome picture, the abso

requirement for a rapidly deployable and flexible U.S. military capability become

self-evident.

National Military Strategy

As World War II came to a close in September 1945, the Marine Corps could look 

satisfaction and pride on its contribution to the Allied victory in the Pacific. Succ

amphibious assaults by both Marine and Army forces had led the way to Tokyo

through the Central and Southwest Pacific theaters. The development and use of 

atom bomb signaled a new era in military affairs, but—at the time—few would h

questioned the utility of maritime/amphibious power in the postwar defense of t

Free World.

As soon as the guns went silent, however, a new and radically different slant on A

ica’s strategic needs began to emerge. Atomic weapons delivered by long-range b

ers would provide our principal means of defeating future aggression. This becam

strategy with some measure of appeal in an era of American nuclear monopoly.

Dependence on strategic assets soon called into question the need for convention

forces, and particular attention was directed toward the Marine Corps. Army and 

Force leaders questioned the need for a “second land army” and recommended th

Marine Corps be limited—both in size and responsibilities—to a police force

equivalent.

It was well for the defense of the nation that the Congress and the American peo

were somewhat more farsighted than the President and his military leaders in sen

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Security Act of 1947, Congress ensured that there would be no piecemeal destruction

or limitation of Marine Corps roles, functions, and missions:

The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall include land combat and

service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized,

trained, and equipped to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, together with supporting air

components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the

conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.

This new legislation went on to assign principal responsibility to the Marine Corps for

the development of amphibious tactics, techniques, and equipment. An additional

charge, unique to the Marine Corps, required the performance of “such additional

duties as the President may direct: Provided, that such additional duties shall not

detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily

organized.”

The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 served notice to the proponents of atomic

strategy that not all wars would entail direct confrontation between the major powers.

Despite Omar Bradley’s belief that atomic weapons had made amphibious operations

obsolete, MacArthur’s brilliant landing of a combined Marine Corps/Army force at

Inchon clearly countered the limited vision of such dire pessimists. Marine units went

on to fight effectively as part of the United Nations command for the next three years,

performing these additional non-maritime duties at the direction of the President.

American national strategy continued to emphasize the massive use of nuclear weapons in the aftermath of the Korean War. The United States still had a substantial measure of nuclear superiority through the 1950s and ground force levels overseas were

reduced to provide a minimal conventional “trip wire,” to trigger massive nuclear retaliation. Congress had amended the National Security Act in 1951, to mandate that a

minimum of three combat divisions and three air wings would be actively maintained

by the Marine Corps. Without this legislative floor, the “New Look” proponents may

have turned their force-cutting cleaver on the Marine Corps as well.

The 1960s brought forth a revision to the national military strategy, initiated by a rejec

tion of the rigid nuclear orientation of the massive retaliation policy. The two-andone-half war basis of the new strategy of flexible response called for the maintenance

of a nuclear deterrent force, along with the conventional capability to fight major wars

in Europe (against the Soviets) and Asia (against the Red Chinese) simultaneously with

a smaller war at another unspecified location. Due note was taken of the proliferation

of revolutionary wars around the world, and concrete programs were instituted to deal

with these conflicts at the lower end of the spectrum as well.

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not forever be discharged through the threat of nuclear Armageddon, particularl

light of rapidly growing Soviet strategic capabilities. A truly global strategy requi

ability to dominate the world’s oceans, and the flexibility of force employment th

only naval forces can provide.

The two-and-one-half war strategy ran aground in the 1960s when America beca

involved in the fight for South Vietnamese independence. In seeking to quell wha

have started as a revolutionary war, we became involved in a large-scale conflict w

siphoned off significant numbers of our conventional forces, bringing into seriou

doubt our ability to support simultaneously major conflicts against the Soviets a

Chinese. Though initially employed in an amphibious expeditionary mode, Mari

forces were once again to engage successfully in sustained land combat at the dir

of the President.

The Nixon Doctrine of the early 1970s reduced the scope of our strategy from a t

and-one-half to a one-and-one-half war commitment. The United States would 

pared to fight a major war in Europe and a minor conflict elsewhere. Our intenti

to train and equip regional surrogates to defend our interests in areas outside of

Europe. The cry of “No more Vietnams” had found its reflection in this narrow,

ostrich-like strategic world view which all but abandoned historic, economic, an

tegic ties. In seeking defense on the cheap, we basically told many of our allies an

friends that they were “on their own.”

Making a case for an offensively oriented Navy and Marine Corps is not an easy u

taking if Europe is the primary U.S. area of interest. By the middle 1970s, the Nav

role was cast primarily in terms of sea control and convoy escort for the reinforc

flow to Europe. Talk of maritime superiority was roundly discounted as the Unit

States opted to abandon its geostrategic naval advantages in order to combat the 

ets on the continental ground of their own choosing.

The Marine Corps was also subject to the ordeal of justifying its existence as an

amphibious force, while our Europe-oriented strategy demanded more armored 

mechanized divisions. Several noted pundits proclaimed that never again would 

have interests worth defending in the Pacific, and that Vietnam had made expedi

ary forays a politically unacceptable option to the American people. We were told 

too gently that we had better abandon our identity as a naval service, buy some m

armored vehicles, bring our MAGTFs home from the Pacific, or risk being viewe

useless anachronism.

By the late 1970s many national security analysts had come to the conclusion tha

one-and-one-half war strategy was fatally flawed. Colin Gray and John Erickson

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the Northwest Pacific, as an indication that the Russians were prepared to take the war

to sea on a major scale. Soviet gains in Angola, Ethiopia, Vietnam, and Cambodia were

indicative of a power that was clearly seeking a global sphere of influence. The fall of

the Shah, the seizure of American hostages by the Iranian revolutionary government,

and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan finally alerted our leaders to the fact that

Europe was not the only region whose loss could pose a threat to the United States and

its allies.

The proclamation of the Carter Doctrine in January 1980, declaring the oil supplies of

the Persian Gulf to be a vital American interest, was the first step along a continuing

path that has led to the revalidation of a global military strategy for the United States.

While trying to form a Rapid Deployment Force to implement the Carter Doctrine, ou

governmental leaders soon found that carrier battle groups and amphibious forces

were the only military assets capable of establishing an American presence in the Arabian region. The equipment for a Marine amphibious brigade (MAB) was quickly put

aboard a set of near-term prepositioning ships and rushed off to Diego Garcia. Budgets

for the naval services, which had previously been cut to fund a ground buildup in

Europe, were now increased significantly in recognition of their capability to protect

our global interests.

The military strategy that has evolved over the last five years recognizes the importance

of Europe and the Pacific—and the energy resources of Southwest Asia—to U.S. security interests. Wrapped around the principles of deterrence, forward positioning of

forces, and coalition operations with our allies, our strategy has come to recognize,

once again, the necessity for a maritime nation to control vital sea lines of communica

tion through naval superiority. Though our primary threat may come from the Soviet

Union, modern and ready Navy-Marine forces give our decision makers the capability

to address a wide spectrum of possible challenges, from an all-out Soviet attack to a

hostage seizure in a Third World country. Clearly, it is the unexpected crisis that

presents us the greatest difficulties and most urgently requires rapid application of

the discreet power inherent in naval forces.

That our strategy has once again returned to its maritime focus is no surprise to those

of us in the naval services. For the Marine Corps, our refusal to renounce our naval

heritage and our amphibious nature has been more than vindicated by the renewed

confidence and trust our leaders feel in having a uniquely ready, hard-hitting, and sustainable forcible entry capability from the sea.

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The development of strategic concepts for the employment of naval forces is an o

ing joint effort by the Navy and Marine Corps. Three years ago, the first edition o

has come to be called “The Maritime Strategy” addressed the role of naval forces 

execution of the National Military Strategy. Though classified in its initial iterati

Maritime Strategy has now been publicly briefed to the Congress and has been p

lished in an unclassified form in open sources.

Derived from pertinent policy and strategic directives and taking into account th

warfighting requirements of the unified and specified commanders-in-chief (Cin

the Maritime Strategy provides a planning and programming baseline for the em

ment of naval forces in a global conventional war with the Soviet Union. Current

divided into three phases, this strategy provides a coordinated, sequential framew

which seeks to:

• Deter war, if at all possible.

• If deterrence fails: destroy enemy maritime forces; protect allied sea lines of

communication (SLOCs); support the land campaign; and secure favorable le

for war termination.

In June 1985, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine

Corps approved the publication of the Amphibious Warfare Strategy. Developed 

subset of the Maritime Strategy, the Amphibious Warfare Strategy outlines the em

ment of Navy-Marine amphibious forces in support of our global National Milit

Strategy. Though oriented to address the phased employment of amphibious for

global conventional conflict, the Amphibious Warfare Strategy fully recognizes th

ity of these forces in the unexpected and more likely crisis scenarios at the lower 

the conflict spectrum.

Low-Intensity Conflict: B. H. Liddell Hart, the great British military thinker, expre

the following thoughts on the effectiveness of amphibious forces in low-intensity

conflict:

Since Russia has developed nuclear weapons in quantity to match America’s, a nuclear stalem

developed. In such a situation, local and limited aggression becomes more likely, and amphibi

forces become more necessary, both as deterrent and as a counter to aggression—a counter wh

be used without being suicidal and a deterrent which is therefore credible.

The role of the Marine Corps in the realm of low-intensity conflicts makes maxim

use of the inherent flexibility amphibious forces offer to the National Command

Authorities. Congress had this fully in mind when, in passing the 1951 act which 

tated the current Marine Corps force structure, it directed that the Marine Corps

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disturbances short of large-scale war.” It is from these roots that the term “force-inreadiness” first appeared, and it is in this arena of rapid and effective crisis suppression

that amphibious forces can perform perhaps their greatest service in preventing minor

conflicts from growing into major confrontations.

The forward peacetime presence of amphibious ready groups (ARGs) with their

deployed MAGTFs in the Mediterranean and Pacific/Indian oceans serves as a visible

and credible indicator of American capability to react to sudden, unforeseen crises

involving U.S. interests. These groups possess the combined ground/air combat power

of a Marine amphibious unit (MAU), which can provide a rapidly available military

presence, to put out a brushfire incident before it has a chance to spread.

The advantages which these amphibious groups enjoy over forces which must be

deployed from the United States—or be permanently based in the region—are obvious

Many Third World governments are understandably reluctant to grant permanent basing rights to U.S. forces because of the destabilization it could cause to the ruling

regime. Without regional bases, forces deploying from the United States must deal with

long flight times en route, limited lift capacity for support units and their equipment,

and refueling and overflight clearances.

Amphibious forces, on the other hand, can be stationed over the horizon at sea, need

no basing or overflight clearances, and provide their own sustainment. A MAU can

fight its way ashore if required and can be swiftly extracted back to the waiting ships of

the ARG. Often, however, the mere presence of the ARG offshore is enough to deter a

would-be aggressor from initiating trouble.

A new and innovative development in the crisis response arena has been the procurement and fielding of three squadrons of maritime prepositioning ships (MPS), each

carrying equipment and supplies to sustain a MAB for 30 days. Strategically positioned

in the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans, MPSs will add a significant expansion to

our response capability when the program reaches completion this year. When married

with its airlifted troops and organic aircraft, an MPS-MAB can provide another means

of demonstrating American resolve, when employed either preemptively into a friendly

port/airhead or as reinforcement for a forward-deployed ARG.

An additional asset worthy of note is the capability of our deployed MAUs to conduct

naval/amphibious special operations. Amphibious raids and other special naval missions have always been a part of the Marine Corps repertoire and may well become

likely assignments for deployed MAUs in this era of international terrorism and instability. We intend in the near future to include the training for such missions in the

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MAU (Special Operations Capable).

These force projection options from the sea provide a flexible and valuable natio

asset, in the effort to address and contain potential strife at the low end of the co

spectrum. The frequency with which we recently have had to face incidents of th

shows that the investment of our defense dollars into amphibious forces is a wise 

scarce resources.

Phase I—Deterrence or the Transition to War: The first phase of the Amphibious W

fare Strategy postulates a growing crisis between the United States and the Soviet

Union. At the first sign of deepening tension or possible preparation for a Soviet 

eral attack, U.S. and allied naval forces would surge from their home ports and d

as far forward as possible. Carrier battle groups and attack submarines would att

to position themselves for maximum advantage in the event that deterrence faile

objective of this phase, however, is to assume a deterrent posture so convincing t

Soviets that they would abandon any plans for a general offensive.

Marine forces will be extremely active in this initial phase, and can contribute sig

cantly to the credibility of our deterrent efforts. The very regularity of our amph

exercises enables us to load our available amphibious ships and deploy them from 

United States early in the crisis buildup, without unduly arousing suspicion. This 

allow for the massing of amphibious assets in the Atlantic and Pacific to at least M

size, and will thus give the CinC an in-theater capability for amphibious forcible 

While our amphibious forces are sailing to their forward operating areas, MPS sq

rons will be repositioning themselves to best support anticipated requirements. T

airlifted MAB elements could be joined with their equipment at a preliminary sta

location or could be employed as a follow-on element to reinforce the massing

amphibious MAGTFs.

Although our Norway land prepositioning program—for a MAB set of equipme

supplies—will not be completed until 1989, the Marine Corps will nonetheless d

a MAB via amphibious shipping to assist in the defense of Norway. The importan

this region to the defense of the North Atlantic SLOC and its reinforcing flow to 

tral Europe could dictate the eventual employment of a Marine amphibious forc

(MAF) to NATO’s Northern Flank.

The deployment of amphibious task forces from the United States, movement of 

to crisis areas, and the commitment of a MAB to the defense of Norway will mat

assist other Western efforts to dissuade the Soviets from launching a general war. 

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sor far forward and to blunt his assault.

Phase II—Seize the Initiative: Should the Soviets commence a full-scale invasion of

Central Europe, the initial NATO strategy will be to counter the attack, to wear down

the enemy, and to seize the initiative. Attack submarines will quickly engage Soviet

naval forces in the Norwegian and Barents seas, the Mediterranean, and the Pacific

Ocean. Carrier battle groups will seek to negate or neutralize Soviet surface and air

threats, while allied antisubmarine warfare forces will seek out and destroy the Soviet

subsurface force.

The naval battle at sea will be fought to keep forward pressure on the Soviet flanks in

the northern region of Europe, the Mediterranean, and in the Pacific, thereby preventing any significant shift of Soviet forces to Central Europe or interdiction of NATO’s

reinforcing SLOCs. Allied naval superiority in these maritime theaters, gained through

the destruction of Soviet naval forces, will set the stage for a series of counteroffensives

aimed to ease the pressure on the land battle in the central region.

Amphibious forces could play many parts in this phase. One likely mission could be th

seizure of advanced naval bases. Amphibious raids of MAB size or full-scale MAF

amphibious assaults could be conducted for the follow-on introduction of U.S. and

allied forces. Although deployments may initially be made by MABs, every effort will

be made to combine amphibious, MPS, and follow-on MAGTFs so that employment

will be on a MAF scale.

NATO’s Northern Flank will be the scene of tense drama, in which amphibious forces

can play a key role. As allied naval forces fight for control of the Norwegian Sea, they

will be supported by the air component of MAGTFs ashore. As the Soviet invader is worn

down, opportunities will develop for amphibious assaults along the Norwegian coast to

his rear, to reclaim any airfields and ports that may have been lost in the war’s initial days

Other areas that may lend themselves to amphibious operations are the North and Baltic seas, the Mediterranean, and the Northwest Pacific. Operations in these areas offer

possible opportunities to exert pressure on the Soviet Rimland, which might in turn

divert Soviet energies from the struggle for the heartland of industrial Europe.

While NATO’s armies are containing the assault in Central Europe, every effort will be

made to retain amphibious forces for employment at the decisive point and time when

the Soviets have lost their momentum and are therefore most vulnerable. This does not

preclude the use of MAGTFs to support a NATO defense which is in extremis on the

English Channel coast. As always, Marines will fight where they are needed most. We

believe, however, that the employment of amphibious MAGTFs in a sustained land

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should be avoided.

Phase III—Carry the Fight to the Enemy: Exhausted and contained by a stout NAT

defense in the central region, stripped of his naval forces through a bold and dec

allied maritime campaign, and harried by NATO pressure on his flanks, the Sovie

invader will now be pounded by a succession of NATO sea, air, and land

counteroffensives.

Massed naval task groups will undertake attacks on Soviet forces and their suppo

infrastructure in Eastern Europe and the Soviet homeland. Naval offensives into 

Kola Peninsula and Northwest Pacific regions could attack key Soviet military tar

thus helping to induce a measure of fear, uncertainty, and paralysis into the Sovie

warfighting machine.

Amphibious forces will once again play a prominent part in this final phase. Mas

amphibious task forces, together with supporting battleship surface action group

now undertake landings to retake conquered territory and to seize key objectives 

Soviet rear. Operating as a component of the naval campaign, MAGTFs could lan

the North Cape, the eastern Baltic or the Black Sea coasts, in the Kuriles, or on Sa

Island—thereby adding a crucial measure of leverage to the successful conduct o

maritime campaign.

The ultimate objective of our Alliance efforts is to bring the Soviets to the negoti

table as quickly as possible, on terms that are favorable to the West. Maritime for

offer the opportunity to avoid a long, costly, and uncertain land effort to push th

ets back in Central Europe. Naval operations on the exposed Rimland flanks pres

the option of striking quickly at key Soviet pressure points in a campaign of naut

maneuver. Used in this manner, our naval forces can make the strategic differenc

The Amphibious Team

No matter how pressing the need or sound the strategy may be, the lack of a read

well-equipped, and professional amphibious force will make all else irrelevant. T

profession of arms is a very unforgiving taskmaster. Good intentions count for fa

than does superior battlefield performance.

The Amphibious Warfare Strategy is a viable and meaningful concept because of 

Navy–Marine Corps amphibious team that will put it into execution. Improveme

our amphibious capability in the last six years allow us to be supremely confiden

about the health of this much-needed and frequently used military capability.

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higher. Our ranks are filled with well-educated, physically fit, and spirited young men

and women who are proud of the important role they play in the country’s defense.

The victors of Iwo Jima, Inchon, and Khe Sanh would be proud to serve with today’s

young Americans in the uniform of their country.

Forces: The amphibious assault fleet of today is in its best shape, in recent memory, and

it is going to get even better. Six years ago, not a single amphibious ship appeared in the

Navy’s five-year defense program. Today, we are well into the production of the LSD-41

and LHD-1 classes of amphibious assault ships and have sound programs for the main

tenance and upgrading of the amphibious ships currently serving with the fleet. By the

mid-1990s, we will have a total of 76 amphibious ships, which will be capable of lifting

the assault echelons of both a MAF and a MAB. The combination of the increase in

strategic lift we will realize from both an expanded amphibious fleet and our MPS

squadrons will significantly enhance our capability for global response.

Naval surface fire support for the landing force is critically needed in the early hours of

an amphibious assault, before our artillery is established ashore. The reactivation of th

four Iowa (BB-61) class battleships, along with programmed improvements in the

accuracy and lethality of our naval gunfire munitions, will ensure that Marines hitting

an enemy-held shoreline will have the accurate and responsive gunfire support they

require.

The Navy has made major commitments to improve the readiness and availability of

amphibious assault support forces. Construction battalions, cargo-handling groups,

and fleet medical support are often overlooked when novices discuss amphibious operations; the professionals know how easily an operation can founder without these nava

support elements.

We in the Marine Corps are looking to improve the effectiveness of our MAGTF concept through the establishment of permanent headquarters. Instead of creating

MAGTF headquarters by drafting personnel from subordinate units on an “as-needed”

basis, we are now assigning Marines to our MAGTF headquarters on a permanent

basis, so that the teamwork and experience we gain will not be lost after every series of

exercises. Based on the feedback received from several recent exercises, this concept is

already proving its worth and will markedly improve our capabilities for effective command and control of amphibious operations in the coming years.

Equipment: If our amphibious forces are to triumph over a tough and determined foe,

they must be provided with effective and modern tools of war. Our modernization pro

gram is geared to satisfy long-standing warfighting requirements for present and future

battlefields.

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shore will be realized with the acquisition of the landing craft air cushion (LCAC

the MV-22A “Osprey” tilt-rotor aircraft. These platforms will allow for a much m

rapid closure to the beach, giving the amphibious task force the option of operat

from over the horizon, out of the range of many enemy weapon systems.

In addition, because the LCAC rides on a cushion of air, many beaches that were 

ously unsuitable for assault landings can now be considered. The significant strat

impact of this development is that it considerably widens the range of possible la

sites that an enemy must defend.

We have modernized the assault rifle, artillery, mortars, and the prime movers or

to the MAGTF. In the next several years, we will be introducing a new tank and a 

of light armored vehicles which will improve the mobility and firepower of our

MAGTFs without making them too heavy to retain their expeditionary character

The cumulative impact of our modernization initiatives will result in a MAGTF t

will be light, mobile, and lethal.

Doctrine: Although we have sound joint doctrine for amphibious operations, we 

constantly seeking to develop and refine improved operational concepts that will 

the best use of our modern warfighting systems. The formulation of an operatio

and tactical framework for amphibious operations from over the horizon is a h

priority project, combining the efforts of Navy and Marine Corps planners. We h

chosen some of our brightest, most operationally experienced, and talented offic

work on this endeavor. Their initial proposals show considerable promise and wi

subjected to operational validation in future amphibious exercises.

Boldness and innovation accurately describe the Marine heritage in putting forth 

warfighting concepts. Our development of amphibious doctrine in the 1920s, clo

support for ground troops during World War II, and the use of the helicopter for 

cal envelopment in the 1950s are prime examples of this desire to develop new an

imaginative solutions to battlefield problems.

So too, today, Marines are working on the refinement of tactics that will increase 

effectiveness of the MAGTF ashore. Our schools have become hotbeds for the de

ment of new initiatives, and the volume and quality of the tactical debate in our 

tary journals indicate that the scope, depth, and enthusiasm of this effort runs de

throughout our Corps. We take pride in the fact that our Marines have taken seri

their responsibility to enhance and advance the amphibious art. They have had, a

will continue to have, a positive impact on the combat effectiveness of our MAGT

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tic and demanding training exercises. An increase in funding to support a high operational tempo has enabled Navy–Marine Corps amphibious forces to conduct dozens of

exercises around the world, with frequent participation by our allies and by other

services.

Conducted in the cold and snows of Norway and Alaska, the heat and sand of Oman

and Somalia, and the jungles of Honduras and the Philippines, these exercises allow for

the validation of our operational concepts, tactics, and procedures. Feedback from

these exercises shows where our concepts are sound and where they require additional

attention.

For the MAGTF ashore, our Combined Arms Exercises at our desert base at

Twentynine Palms, California, provides the Marine air-ground team with the most

realistic live-fire training short of actual combat. Since their inception in 1975, these

exercises have broadened in scope from an initial MAU orientation to the point where

we now conduct live-fire training on the MAB level.

Readiness: The payoff we get from having superior people, necessary levels of force

capability, modern equipment, sound doctrine, and meaningful training is a Navy–

Marine Corps amphibious team that truly is a force-in-readiness. Tasked to respond to

a wide range of possible missions, from a show-of-force to a full-scale assault into a

hostile beachhead, amphibious forces must be prepared to respond rapidly and effectively when the seemingly hypothetical suddenly becomes reality. The Navy–Marine

Corps amphibious team is ready, eager, and able to accept that challenge.

Renaissance and Revolution

A global Soviet menace, Third World instabilities and threats to key U.S. allies or trading partners, and the specter of international terrorism have combined to force a

readdressal of our National Military Strategy. Though we tried to pretend during the

decade of the 1970s that European security was our only vital overseas interest, we have

since relearned that a maritime nation in an ever-shrinking world has vital interests in

nearly every region. The protection of our allies and access to key economic resources

demand that we command the seas and possess the capability for maritime power

projection.

The National Military Strategy recognizes the requirement for a Navy and Marine

Corps capable of reacting quickly to a myriad of possible threats across the entire spectrum of conflict. Deployments in low-intensity or crisis situations are the most likely

happenstance. The Navy–Marine Corps team has been the force of choice in Lebanon

in 1958 and 1982, Thailand in 1962, the Dominican Republic in 1965, and Grenada in

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but we are prepared to contribute in a meaningful way to the attainment of allied 

tory should that unhappy conflict be forced upon us.

The importance of an amphibious forcible entry capability and its role in nation

strategy were eloquently described by Liddell Hart:

The history of warfare shows that the basic strategic asset of sea-based peoples is amphibious f

ity. In tackling land-based opponents, they can produce a distraction to the enemy’s power of 

tration that is advantageously disproportionate to the scale of force they employ and the resou

they possess.

When reviewing the plans for the invasion of Sicily in 1943, General George Mar

said to have commented that a landing against an organized and highly trained o

nent is “probably the most difficult undertaking which military forces are called 

to face.” The conduct of forcible entry from the sea remains to this day an exactin

complex endeavor, in which our central goal is most often the seizure of an objec

whose value is just as clearly evident to the defender as it is to us.

It is only through the dynamic synergism of the Navy–Marine Corps amphibiou

brotherhood that risks are minimized, obstacles are overcome, and victory is ach

Those who seek to put Marines on the front in Central Europe or in other sustain

inland roles as land force division equivalents not only demonstrate their total la

appreciation for the effectiveness of our Marine air-ground team; they also conve

most profound misunderstanding of the proper use of maritime power, the dept

our naval heritage, and the pride with which we bear the title of “Soldiers of the 

Though some military commentators regard World War II to be the high point i

development and conduct of amphibious warfare, we take a very different view. W

believe that there is ample evidence to suggest that we have entered a renaissance

period in the evolution of amphibious operations, with the broadening of our vi

through the introduction of the LCAC and Osprey yet to come. Indeed, the incre

tal advances we have experienced in the art of amphibious warfare will soon be g

way to an exciting era—in which the rapid pace of strategic, operational, and tac

improvements will transform the current renaissance into nothing less than an

amphibious revolution.

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The 600-Ship Navy

JOHN F. LEHMAN, JR.

Clemenceau once declared that war was too important to be left to the generals. But if war

is too important to be left to the generals, it is also too important to be left to the civilian

experts. In the United States, with our constitutionally mandated civilian control of the

armed forces, we forget sometimes that hard-earned military experience must leaven the

theories of civilians if our system is to work.

We would do well to keep this in mind as we near our goal of a 600-ship Navy. Mediaanointed experts have raised questions about the size, character, and complexity of the

Navy: Do we really need so many ships? Are the Navy and Marine Corps effective in helping

to deter Soviet aggression—across the full spectrum of violence, from terrorism to nuclear

war? Do we have a strategy that guides the planning and training of our forces? Is it the cor

rect strategy? If it is, are we building the right types and numbers of ships to execute it?

Finally, can this nation afford to sustain a 600-ship fleet—not only well-equipped but prop

erly manned—for the long term? When defense restrictions become law in the zero-growth

1986 budget, and retrenchment is the theme of the hour, the answers to these questions tak

on added significance.

Why 600 ships?

To understand how we arrived at the size of our planned fleet of ships, we must begin by

discarding the idea that this number has sprung, full blown, from the brow of some wouldbe Napoleon of the high seas.

Since World War II, maritime force planners have found themselves at the mercy of three

enduring elements. First is geography. Water covers three quarters of the world; and the

United States is an “island continent” washed by the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.

Second are the vital interests of the United States, expressed in the web of more than 40

treaty relationships that bind us to mutual defense coalitions around the world. These relationships shape our national security requirements—together with the energy and commercial dependencies that support our economy in peace and in war.

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postwar expansion has created an offense-oriented blue water force, a major elem

the Soviet Union’s global military reach that supports expanding Soviet influence 

Nicaragua to Vietnam to Ethiopia. From the Baltic to the Caribbean to the South 

Sea, our ships and men pass within yards of Soviet naval forces every day. But fam

ity, in this case, is breeding a well-deserved respect.

The Navy’s recently updated Understanding Soviet Naval Developments provides t

facts about the Soviet Navy. Every American should be aware, for example, that S

nuclear submarines operate continuously off our coasts. “Victor”-class nuclear a

submarines are routinely found lurking near many of our principal naval ports. S

surface units are now making regular deployments to the contentious and vulner

chokepoints of the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico. Worldwide, we find the So

Navy astride the vital sea-lanes and navigational chokepoints, through which mo

the Western world’s international trade must pass.

This is the new reality. The pattern of Soviet naval deployments has revealed itsel

only the last several years. These deployments constitute a post–World War II ch

the global military balance of power that has been surpassed only by the advent o

thermonuclear weapons. No planner, civilian or military, can ignore the growing

dimensions of Soviet maritime power.

Geography, alliances, and the Soviet threat combine to dictate the actual number

ships—the “size of the Navy”—required to fulfill our commitments in each of ou

maritime theaters. Before reviewing in detail the forces we need in each theater, s

observations are in order:

• Any view of the global disposition of the U.S. Navy reveals that we often deploy 

peacetime very much in the same manner as we would operate in wartime. For

purposes of deterrence, crisis management, and diplomacy, we must be present 

areas where we would have to fight if war broke out. Of course, the operational 

is different—a roughly three-to-one ratio in wartime, as compared with peaceti

We also train as we intend to fight. A full-scale general war at sea would rarely 

carrier battle group operating alone. So we train often in multiple carrier batt

forces in such exercises as FLEETEX, READEX, and NATO exercises, like Nort

Wedding, which we conduct in the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea.

• Our maritime security depends on significant assistance from allies in executi

missions. Fortunately, we count among our friends all of the world’s great nav

save one. Clearly, in areas such as diesel submarines, frigates, coastal patrol cr

minesweepers, and maritime patrol aircraft, allies of the United States have as

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the Eastern Atlantic and the waters surrounding the United Kingdom, our allies

supply a significant portion of the antisubmarine capability to counter the Soviet

threat. In fact, if we could not count on our allies, we would require a U.S. fleet

much larger than 600 ships, to deal with the 1,700 ships and submarines that the

Soviets can deploy against us. But the world’s greatest navies are on our side, and

this gives a tremendous advantage to the U.S. Navy and a significant cost savings to

the U.S. taxpayer.

• America’s increasing commercial and energy interdependence with Asia, and the

growth of the Soviet Pacific Fleet—now the largest of the four Soviet fleets—have

negated the so-called “swing strategy” of the Sixties and Seventies, which planned to

reinforce the Atlantic Fleet with combatants from the Pacific in time of crisis. Today

the United States has an Asian orientation at least equal to its historic engagement

in Europe. Existing treaty relationships in the Pacific have been augmented by

growing commercial connections. For example, in 1980, the value of U.S. trade with

the Pacific rim nations was roughly equal to trade with the country’s Atlantic partners

Four years later, Pacific trade exceeded that with Western Europe by $26 billion.

Similarly, oil dependencies have shifted tremendously in the last five years. This forces

America to reconsider the priorities of naval deployments in the Northern Pacific and

Caribbean regions. The reorientation of U.S. sources for crude oil—on a hemispheric

axis—is a long-term geopolitical reality that has gone largely unnoticed. Western

dependency on Middle Eastern oil is still debated at length, for its impact on our military thinking and force planning. But we must also take into account that, in 1985, the

United States imported eight times as much oil by sea from the Western Hemisphere as

it received from the entire Middle East. Oil from Mexico has increased to almost 25%

of our imports, while oil from Saudi Arabia has dropped to only 2.6% of the U.S.

import market. We no longer depend primarily on the Middle East and Persian Gulf

supply for our vital energy needs. Instead, the locus of our oil trade is in the Western

Hemisphere: Alaska, Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, and the Caribbean area.

With these observations as background, let us review our forces in the main geographic

areas: the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Pacific, and Indian Ocean–Persian Gulf. The

numbers used are “notional.” They illustrate force packages constructed for peacetime

tasks now assigned to our naval forces. But they are capable of expansion or contraction, should war break out—a flexibility characteristic of naval power.

The Atlantic: The large Atlantic theater encompasses the North Atlantic, the Norwegian

Sea, the Northern Flank of NATO including the Baltic throat, the South Atlantic, the

Caribbean, and the Gulf of Mexico. It includes the coasts of South America and the

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ranean and the Middle East.

The U.S. Navy operates in the Atlantic theater with two fleets, the Sixth and the S

The Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean is the principal fighting force of the NATO 

ern Europe Command and provides strike, antiair superiority, antisubmarine, an

close air support for the entire Southern Flank of NATO—a principal makeweigh

the balance in the Central Front.

In addition, the Sixth Fleet is the principal naval force that supports our friends an

in the Middle East. The threat there is significant. The Soviets maintain a fleet in 

Black Sea and a deployed squadron in the Mediterranean. In wartime, we expect 

also Soviet naval strike aircraft, aircraft carriers, a formidable number of diesel and n

submarines, and a full range of strike cruisers, destroyers, and other smaller combata

To deal with this threat, as we do in all our planning, we start with a base of allied

forces in the areas under consideration. The navies of our allies are good. For exa

we count on them to provide about 140 diesel submarines, which are effective fo

coastal and area defense, for establishing and maintaining barriers, and for certai

other useful missions.

In wartime, purely U.S. forces in the Sixth Fleet would have to include three or fo

carrier battle groups, operating to meet NATO commitments. We would also nee

deploy a battleship surface action group and two underway replenishment group

peacetime, we average over the year one and one-third carrier battle groups depl

the Mediterranean.

The Second Fleet is the heart of the Atlantic strike fleet for NATO. It is responsib

naval operations in the North Atlantic, the Eastern Atlantic, Iceland, the Norweg

Sea, the defense of Norway, and the entire Northern Flank including the North S

Baltic throat. It must simultaneously accomplish any naval missions required in t

Caribbean, where we now face a very large Soviet and Cuban naval presence; in t

South Atlantic, where we have vital sea-lanes; and along the West African sea-lan

where the Soviets now deploy naval forces continuously.

For the Second Fleet, in wartime, we must plan to have four or five carrier battle

groups, one battleship surface action group, and three underway replenishment g

This is the equivalent firepower of 40 World War II carriers and can deliver accur

strike ordnance on target equal to 800 B-17s every day. In peacetime, we generall

higher than this, because most of our principal training occurs in the Second Fle

operating areas.

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another. We have exercises underway with our NATO allies, with our South American

and Central American allies, and with other nations, on an ad hoc basis, in every season of the year.

The Pacific: Clearly, our increasing commercial interests and historic security ties in the

Pacific impact on our naval planning for the area. If we are to protect our vital interests, we must have forces available to deploy—not only to the Atlantic theaters and the

Sixth and the Second fleets—but also to the Pacific simultaneously, to the Seventh and

the Third fleets and the Middle East Force of the Central Command. We cannot abandon one theater in order to deal with the other. The great paradox of the 1970s was the

reduction of the fleet’s size so that it could only be employed in a swing strategy—just

as that strategy was being rendered obsolete by trade, geopolitics, and the growth of the

Soviet Navy.

The Seventh Fleet is our forward Western Pacific fleet, which meets our commitments

to Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and Thailand, and in the criti

cal straits of Southeast Asia, as well as the Indian Ocean. In wartime, we would need to

deploy five carrier battle groups to the Seventh Fleet, two battleship surface action

groups, and four underway replenishment groups. In peacetime, we average over the

year the equivalent of one and one-third carrier battle groups in the Western Pacific.

That, of course, helps us maintain a peacetime fleetwide operational tempo that provides for at least 50% time in home port for our people and their families.

We do not have a separate fleet in the critical area of Southwest Asia, the Indian Ocean,

and the Persian Gulf, although some have proposed the re-creation of the Fifth Fleet

for that purpose. In peacetime, we have the Middle East Force of the Central Command

and elements of the Seventh Fleet, normally a carrier battle group.

In wartime, we plan for two of the Seventh Fleet carrier battle groups to meet our com

mitments in the Indian Ocean, Southwest Asia, East Africa, the Persian Gulf area, and

Southeast Asia. Notionally, a Seventh Fleet battleship surface action group and one

underway replenishment group would also be assigned to operate in these areas.

The Third Fleet has responsibility for operations off Alaska, the Bering Sea, the Aleutians, the Eastern Pacific, and the Mid-Pacific region. In wartime, there would be considerable overlapping and trading back and forth between the Seventh and Third fleets

This happened in the Pacific during World War II. To cover that vast area, we must

assign two carrier battle groups and one underway replenishment group.

These requirements compel us to deploy a 600-ship Navy as outlined in Table 1. In

peacetime, we deploy in the same way to the same places we must control in war, but at

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month deployment lengths and 50% time in home ports. Looked at either way, w

require the same size fleet to meet peacetime deployments as we do to fight a war

Taken together they add up to the following:

• Fifteen carrier battle groups

• Four battleship surface action groups

• One-hundred attack submarines

• An adequate number of ballistic missile submarines

• Lift for the assault echelons of a Marine amphibious force and a Marine amph

brigade

When escort, mine warfare, auxiliary, and replenishment units are considered, ab

600 ships emerge from this accounting—a force that can be described as prudent

PEACETIME MARITIME STRATEGY WARTIME MARITIME STRAT

Sixth Fleet

CVBG 1.3 4

BBSAG .3 1

URG 1 2

Second Fleet*

CVBG 6.7 4

BBSAG 1.7 1

URG 4 3

Seventh Fleet*

CVBG 2 5

BBSAG .5 2

URG 1 4

Third Fleet*

CVBG 5 2

BBSAG 1.5 —

URG 4 1

*Includes forces in overhaul

**Includes Indian Ocean forces

Note: CVBG = carrier battle group; BBSAG = battleship surface action group; URG = underway replenishment group.

TABLE 1

Current Navy Force Requirements

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fleet that threatens them. Unless Congress reduces our commitments or the Soviet

threat weakens, there is no way to reduce the required size of the U.S. fleet and still

carry out the missions assigned to the Navy.

Does the Navy have a role in the national strategy?

While the Carter administration questioned whether the Navy could influence a “short

war” in Central Europe, such a proposition is indefensible today. The coalition of free

nations bound together in NATO must have maritime superiority as a prerequisite for

any defense strategy. Maritime superiority alone may not assure victory but the loss of

it will certainly assure defeat—and sooner rather than later. The chronicles of warfare

from the classical era forward are a consistent testament to the influence of sea power

upon history, in which great continental powers do not long prevail against an opponent with mastery of the seas. Today, continental defense in NATO rests on early

achievement of maritime superiority. The Soviet Union, as evidenced by its ongoing

naval expansion, understands the experience of history far better than our trendier mil

itary reformists.

Does the Navy have a strategy? Is it the right one?

Now, consider the charge leveled by some parlor room Pershings that our current nava

buildup lacks an underlying strategy.

Not since the days of Theodore Roosevelt have the Navy and Marine Corps exhibited

such a strong consensus on the comprehensive strategy which now forms our naval

planning. Briefly stated, our strategic objectives are the following:

• To prevent the seas from becoming a hostile medium of attack against the United

States and its allies

• To ensure that we have unimpeded use of our ocean lifelines to our allies, our forward

deployed forces, our energy and mineral resources, and our trading partners

• To be able to project force in support of national security objectives and to support

combat ashore, should deterrence fail

To achieve these objectives, we need a strategy at once global, forward deployed, and

superior to our probable opponents. Global, because our interests, allies, and opponent

are global; forward deployed, because to protect those interests and allies, and to deter

those opponents, we must be where they are; superior, because if deterrence fails it is

better to win than lose.

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understanding of the role of strategy. Strategy is not a formula for fighting each 

and deploying each tank in the battles that may take place around the world. Tha

not the function of the military establishment inside the Washington Beltway. Su

the proper function only of the theater commander who is given the responsibili

carry out the defense objectives set by the national command authorities.

Beyond the central concept of global, forward-deployed, and superior naval forc

strategy’s role is to give coherence and direction to the process of allocating mon

among competing types of ships and aircraft and different accounts for spare par

missile systems, defense planning, and the training of forces. It provides guidelin

aid us in allocating both resources and shortages.

Title 10 of the U.S. Code charges the Secretary of the Navy with ensuring the hig

level of training appropriate to the responsibilities placed upon both the Marine 

and the Navy. That is what strategy provides to us—a framework within which to 

For example, U.S. naval forces recently conducted a major training exercise, “Oce

Safari 85,” with our NATO allies and the U.S. Coast Guard and Air Force. The “Sa

assembled off the East Coast of the United States and fought its way across the A

moved north of England and east of Iceland, and ended up in the Norwegian Sea

Approximately 155 ships and 280 fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters operated fo

weeks in this environment, against 19 real Soviet ships and submarines and 96 So

aircraft sorties.

That is very effective training, and it is being carried out as part of a coherent tra

operational plan—linked to the way that the theater commanders intend to fight 

One will search in vain, however, for a Navy cookbook that tells those on-scene c

manders when to move aircraft carriers, or how or where to move attack submar

Aegis cruisers at any given point after a conflict commences. There should never 

such cookbook and certainly it should never come from Washington. Those who 

cize our strategy for being the wrong cookbook or for not having a cookbook do 

understand strategy.

Other critics argue that our Navy should be less global, less forward-deployed, or 

superior, with the resources saved to be poured into a stronger continental defen

be less global means to abandon some area of our vital interests. To believe that i

case of the Northern Flank of NATO, for example, a “passive” defense line throw

across the Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom Gap will somehow protect our s

lanes or defer an engagement with Soviet forces demonstrates a lack of understan

of the fundamental mechanics of war at sea and the workings of NATO and the S

own operational requirements. No coalition of free nations can survive a strategy

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suggest that naval support of Norway or Turkey is too dangerous because it must be

done close to the Soviet Union is defeatist. To suggest that such a strategy is provocativ

of the Soviets just indicates the lengths to which some critics will go, in order to portray Soviet intentions as solely defensive.

As for strengthening our continental defenses, we and our allies are also doing just that

To discard maritime superiority in an attempt to match the larger Soviet ground forces

however, would give us neither conventional deterrence on land nor secure access by

sea unless the Western democracies are prepared to militarize their societies to an

unprecedented, and unwise, degree.

Are we buying the ‘right’ Navy for the strategy?

Because research and development projects span decades, and ships take many years to

build, the makeup of our fleet can not change radically with each administration.

Instead, the fleet evolves over time with policy and technology. The fleet today reflects

the wisdom of the deck plates, the labs, and lessons learned from our exercises. The size

and design of our ships and weapons reflect the inputs of sailors in contact with Soviet

“Victor” submarines, Kiev-class carriers, and “Bear” aircraft. The wisdom of common

sense and the highest available technology are tremendous advantages, brought to the

design of today’s Navy and Marine Corps.

Of course, there are many kinds of ships not in the fleet today that could do very well.

The British Invincible-class vertical or short takeoff and landing (VSTOL) carriers are

quite capable antisubmarine warfare ships. It would be nice to have some of them in

the U.S. Navy. There are many attractive European frigate designs, and we could make

good use of them. There are also diesel submarines in our European alliance navies tha

fulfill very effective roles.

If the taxpayers of our allies around the world were not buying these vessels, the burden would fall upon us. But happily, they are carrying a considerable share of the cost

of naval defense and American taxpayers do not have to fund a Navy greater than abou

600 ships.

Perhaps the most debated issue on newspapers’ front pages and television talk shows is

whether our aircraft carriers should be large or small. There is no absolute answer to

this question, but in my view, the evidence still seems overwhelmingly in favor of the

Nimitz (CVN-68)–class carrier of 90,000 tons as the optimum size and design for

putting air capability at sea.

Could we gainfully employ more mid-size carriers like our 64,000-ton Midway (CV-41

and Coral Sea (CV-43)? Yes, indeed. They would be very useful. The Navy would like to

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smaller carriers steaming in the force for a long time to come.

Similarly, with our nuclear attack submarines, we could buy more of them if we 

promised on their capabilities. But our tremendous edge in technology is a perm

potential built into the nature of our culture and our economic system compared 

the Soviets. We must build to this advantage, and not trade it away for cheaper, s

less capable ships built in greater numbers, which is the forte of a totalitarian, ce

ized, Gosplan economy.

It would be a great mistake for us to adopt a defense strategy at sea—any more th

land—that attempts to match totalitarian regimes in sheer numbers of cheap rep

ducible items. Time and again, the high-tech solution has proved to be the wisest

investment, and by far the most advantageous one for the United States and its a

This is true of our missiles, our aircraft, and our ships. We have the world’s finest 

ing equipment.

So we are getting the “right” Navy. Although there are plenty of other kinds of sh

would like to have, and we could certainly use the larger Navy long advocated by 

Joint Chiefs, we have stayed consistently with the 600-ship fleet because we are p

pared to bet that our allies will continue to maintain modern, effective navies an

forces. We are prepared to accept the risk that our nation will make the right dec

to prevent losses of forces early in a conflict, and we think that that is a prudent r

run in order to have an affordable Navy.

Can we afford the Navy this nation needs?

Numerous studies and surveys, among them a tome by the Congressional Budge

Office, suggest that we cannot afford to sustain, or properly man, a 600-ship Nav

the reverse is true. Consider the facts. We have now, under construction and fully

funded, all of the ships necessary to attain a 600-ship Navy centered on 15 carrie

groups, four battleship surface action groups, and 100 nuclear-powered attack

submarines.

Our long-term plans in a “zero growth” budget for fiscal year 1986 now reflect re

tions in our shipbuilding and aircraft procurement programs. These reductions w

to levels we call the sustaining rate for the 600-ship Navy, an average 20 ships a y

new construction. The actual number will be higher or lower in a given year, dep

on the block obsolescence of various types of ships.

The 20-ship average is a sound basis for planning, in part because of improved m

nance and the corresponding increase in longevity. Instead of the average 26 year

life that we realized from our ships in the 1960s and the 1970s, we are now gettin

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log of overhauls, and the higher technology that we are putting into our ships.

This “good news” should not blind us to the requirements of the future. A steady 20-

new-ships-a-year average will require 3% budget growth. A future of zero-growth budgets would mean that we will be unable to sustain a 600-ship Navy—or for that matter,

a capable defense. We know from painful experience in the 1970s that the damage done

by no-growth funding is far greater than the mere percentage budget loss would indicate. With zero- or negative-growth budgets, the industrial infrastructure vital to fleet

construction and support shrinks dramatically. The result is a loss in competitive bidding and a return to sole-sourced monopolies. Rates of production must then be cut,

individual unit costs increase dramatically, productivity falls, and, in the final accounting, the American taxpayer gets much less “bang for the buck.” Even worse is the

decline in the quality and morale of the people who man the fleet, as we saw in the late

1970s.

Is 3% real growth beyond our means? Throughout the past two decades, many commentators favoring a reduced defense effort have repeatedly predicted that the American people will not support sustained defense growth. That refrain is now put forward

by some, including the Congressional Budget Office, as a fact of life. While it may

express their hopes, it is not supported by history. That view takes as its norm the flat

or even declining figures of the immediate post–Vietnam War period. In fact, except

for those years, post–World War II naval budgets maintained growth commensurate

with our national economy. The middle and late Seventies, by contrast, are now being

seen as an anomaly in U.S. history. It is not apparent, the Congressional Budget Office

notwithstanding, that the American people wish to “restore” that aberrant pattern of

declining numbers of ships, morale, and readiness.

In procurement, we should not assume that Congress will refuse to make the necessary

legislative changes in the way we in the Department of the Navy are permitted to conduct our business. Indeed, I suggest that, in the current aura of public concern over

budget deficits and government spending, there would be few more cost-effective and

money-saving moves that Congress could undertake than the removal of excessive regulations and red tape that characterize the environment in which the Navy operates

today. For example, there repose in the Library of Congress today no less than 1,152

linear feet of statutory and regulatory law governing procurement alone! That is the

real Washington Monument!

Along with over-regulation, we are faced with excessive, layered bureaucracies, and the

accretion of authority without concomitant responsibility into a confusing labyrinth o

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dous inefficiencies.

The Congressional Budget Office staffers and others who look at the Navy’s futur

assume that just because this bloated, inefficient congressional-executive system 

been in place it will remain in place. I do not accept that. Moreover, we have show

the Navy a historic reversal of the trend of inevitable cost increases.

Today, for example, the last contract that we signed for a follow-on Aegis cruiser 

$900 million. Four years ago, these cruisers cost more than $1.2 billion each, and 

projected to reach $1.6 billion by the end of 1985. It did not happen, though, bec

we brought competition into the program. Both producing yards brought in new 

ciencies and instituted strict cost discipline, while we in the Navy applied a new a

cism to our gold-plating lusts. All of our shipbuilding programs show the same p

We have gone from only 24% competition in 1981 to 90% competition in 1985, p

ducing an average of $1 billion in cost underruns for each of the last four years.

Contrary to what the nay-sayers predicted, the costs of Navy aircraft have been g

down, not up. This is a sea change, a break with 30 years of uninterrupted cost es

tion in naval aircraft procurement. During 1976–1981, growth in aircraft unit pr

averaged about 10% in constant fiscal year 1980 dollars. In 1981, we implemente

orous cost management programs which emphasized competition, no design cha

and firm fixed-price contracts. These efforts have paid off in reduced aircraft pri

every year since 1982.

For example, we reached agreement with McDonnell Douglas on a fiscal year 198

away price of $18.7 million for the F/A-18 strike fighter. In terms of fiscal year 19

dollars, this is a price 32% below that paid in 1982. Purchases in 1985 represent a 

ings to the taxpayer of $126 million for that year alone.

So, there is nothing inevitable about escalating costs and overruns in defense pro

ment. During the last four years we proved that it can be just as consistent to hav

underruns. And so if we just make prudent assumptions, not even optimistic assu

tions, there is no question that we can maintain the size and the current mix of o

force through the rest of this century with a 3% growth budget.

Just as significant, we can also maintain the tremendous turn-around in readines

we have achieved with President Ronald Reagan’s 7% growth budgets. During th

four years, the readiness of our ships and aircraft has increased nearly 40%. Even 

statistics do not do justice to the palpable difference in the fleet itself, in morale, 

readiness, and in safety—i.e., uncrashed airplanes and unbroken equipment and 

tion of tragic accidents.

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we can maintain this record of success with the size budgets that are currently envisioned by the President.

The German military philosopher Clausewitz once observed that in the balance of

power among nations, battle is to deterrence as cash is to credit in the world of commerce. One may live entirely by paper transactions only when there is no doubt about

one’s ability to settle accounts with hard currency when challenged.

Similarly, there must be no doubt in the minds of Soviet leaders that the United States

and its allies can and will settle accounts, on both land and sea, if challenged. The

600-ship Navy is an essential element in this credibility. We can, and must, afford the

naval power that will sustain the defense of this country’s allies and interests around

the world.

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Looking beyond the Maritime Strategy

On 1 July 1986, Admiral Carlisle Trost succeeded Admiral James Watkins to beco

twenty-third Chief of Naval Operations; he would serve in that position until 29 

1990 and the end of the Cold War. This short, unclassified article was published i

January 1987 issue of the Naval Institute USNI Proceedings,* exactly a year afte

unclassified version of the Maritime Strategy had been published, and when Tros

been in office for just six months.

The article was an important public statement about the Maritime Strategy. The 

affirmed Trost’s backing of his predecessor’s earlier statement by briefly restating 

Maritime Strategy’s fundamental ideas on deterrence, forward defense, and allia

darity, as well as its global view and adherence to the fundamental flexibility of t

national military strategy. However, it went farther than the earlier statements in 

cussing the role of antisubmarine warfare.

The first article had its origins in Admiral Trost’s preparations for his 1987 testim

Congress in support of the Navy’s programs and budget.† At that point, following 

high expenditure in the first years of the Reagan administration, Congress was in 

to cut the defense budget. Through his private discussions with members of Cong

senior staff members, Trost realized that there was a perception that the Maritim

egy was confined to dealing with the existing threat posed by the Soviet navy’s inc

ingly capable naval forces. To counter that misperception, Trost explained,

I planned to focus my [congressional] testimony on the broader applications of naval pow

support of U.S. national interests. My staff suggested that it would be useful to reiterate t

sense of the Maritime Strategy to a wider audience by means of a USNI [Proceedings] a

* Adm. Carlisle A. H. Trost, USN, “Looking beyond the Maritime Strategy,” U.S. Naval Ins

Proceedings (January 1987), pp. 13–16.

† See U.S. Senate, Committee on the Armed Services, Hearings on the Department of Defen

Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, 100th Cong., 1st sess.; an

Senate, Committee on the Armed Services, Hearings on National Security Strategy, 101st 

1st sess., January–April 1987.

DOCUMENT SIX

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build.*

Admiral Trost had had a long association with the development of the Maritime Strategy. As a vice admiral in 1982 and 1983, he had been Director of Navy Program Planning (OP-090), and had personally engaged in and contributed to the development of

the first and second iterations of the Maritime Strategy (see documents 1 and 2). In preparing this article, Admiral Trost provided an outline and verbal instructions to Captain

Anthony Maness, who was the executive director of the CNO Executive Panel (OP-00K)

from September 1986 to July 1988. This article was drafted by officers assigned to the

CNO Executive Panel staff, who were simultaneously preparing Trost’s annual posture

statements and policy and strategy papers, among their other duties.†

Significantly, this article gave priority to antisubmarine warfare. No other version of the

Maritime Strategy, before or after, gave priority to any one warfare task, although carrier strike and amphibious assault were always identified as the culminating tasks.

Trost’s highlighting of antisubmarine warfare was significant, given his own submarine

service background and the effects of the discovery and breakup of the espionage ring run

by Chief Warrant Officer John A. Walker, Jr., and Jerry Whitworth in May 1985. Their

espionage had passed vast amounts of information to the Soviet Union on American

naval communication, submarine, and surface operations. The United States had realized in the mid-1980s that Soviet submarines seemed to be becoming more aggressive

against Western sea lanes of communication.‡

As expected, this article also brought further public comment and discussion,§

appearing as it did in the wake of the pubic discussion that began in late 1985 and

early 1986. At this point, the relations between the Navy and the Marine Corps

remained very close. On the world scene, China appeared to be a potential ally against

the Soviet Union and an economic partner with the United States. At this juncture,

Trost’s article was designed to continue the move forward by adding further to the

momentum already in progress. ✒

Much has been said and written over the years about U.S. Maritime Strategy that has

touched off exceptionally vigorous discussions. As a side effect, some of those discussions have left the province of professional strategists—naval officers and civilians—to

parade with other defense issues in the shooting gallery of defense criticism. Watching

this happen, I am reminded of a comment by Mark Twain in his memoir, Life on the

* Letter from Adm. C. A. H. Trost to Hattendorf, dated 2 September 2007.

† Ibid.

‡ Owen R. Cote, Jr., The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy’s Silent Cold War Struggle with

Soviet Submarines, Newport Paper 16 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2003), pp. 72–73

§ See, for example, “Comment and Discussion,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 113 (July 1987),

pp. 19–20.

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moon talk by a poet who has not been in the moon is likely to be dull.”

In the last several years, there has been a lot of moon talk about the Maritime Str

much of it confuses our Maritime Strategy with employment of forces, campaign

plans, or the local strategy of battle force or theater commanders. Some of it ove

plain fact and even plainer common sense.

In this article, I would like to share with you my perspective on the subject.

The Global View: The transcendent fact of modern American history is the emer

of the United States as a world power, with worldwide interests and responsibilit

we ignore only at our peril. The wishful view of a “Fortress America,” secure with

insular shores, ignores reality. Vital alliances, trade, communications, the travel o

American citizens, and even our generous spirit and idealistic nature compel us t

overseas.

At the same time, our interests are being contested by a confederation of powers 

highest priority is to replace all free and democratic societies with totalitarian sta

The threat to the security of the Free World is global, capable, and growing daily. 

of it is directed from a center of power in the Soviet Union. Some of it is directed 

same general end by fanatics in other countries.

The Soviet Union, a land power, enormous, sprawling, self-contained, operates o

rior lines of communications which require virtually no intercourse with other c

tries. It doesn’t need a large navy to be secure within its borders, but it has one an

a fine navy, larger than our own. Although we have always enjoyed a qualitative a

tage over the Soviets, in the talents of our people, their training, their winning tr

tion, and in the superiority of our technology, that advantage is shrinking. The S

are getting better fast. They have operated in proximity to our Navy for many yea

have watched and learned, and they have improved. And what they haven’t been 

earn for themselves, they have tried—successfully in the case of Walker-Whitwor

others—to steal.

That navy is out on the oceans every day. It does its level best to influence the dec

of any government with maritime interests. It poses a direct threat that it can bac

its demands with airplanes overhead, troops on the beaches, or missiles inbound

doesn’t care about the human element or about the niceties of civilized behavior

didn’t stop to pick up the boat people of Southeast Asia; it steamed right by them

doesn’t respect territorial boundaries, a fact to which millions of Swedes can atte

after repeated sightings of Soviet submarines in Swedish home waters.

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surrogates have stationed the largest armies and air forces in the world. The people are

good, the equipment is even better, and you see it everywhere you look, for hundreds of

miles. They train every day, and they practice not defensive maneuvers, but attack, the allout assault.

Elsewhere in the world, in many cases inspired by the Soviets and in most cases equipped by

them, are governments of fanatics whose national policy is to destroy what they consider

“The Establishment”—the U.S. and our allies. There have always been governments like thi

(the entrance of Libyan bandits onto the world stage appears to be a cyclical phenomenon)

but the difference today is that they have access to technology nearly as good as our own,

and they are less inhibited about using it than the people who supply it to them. Like the

Soviets, the fanatics move in wherever they perceive a weakness. They use terrorism as an

instrument; they use it coldly and deliberately. In many ways these governments are an even

more visible threat to us than the Soviets who manipulate and succor them.

Every naval officer understands the reality of the global situation—the reality of a world

where the vital interests of the United States extend into every region, the reality of a world

where even the smallest and most innocent presence of things American is at considerable

risk. The challenge is to get everyone to understand.

In our modern life we are confronted with a spectrum of violence that ranges from the real

to the potential, from isolated terrorist bombings and kidnappings, to communist insurrections in friendly countries like the Philippines, to the threat of all-out assaults in Europe or

Asia. As Senator Patrick Moynihan said in his book about the United Nations, the world is

truly “a dangerous place.”

National Defense Strategy: Given the situation, our country needs and has a national strategy—a number of directives signed by the President and a body of thought that supports

them—whose purpose is to help guide policymakers, civilian and military, in carrying out

the responsibilities of the United States in the world today. Our national strategy has consis

tently rested on three pillars: deterrence, forward defense, and allied solidarity. Obviously,

our number one responsibility is to deter war. That has been the centerpiece of American

policy for more than 40 years. We have been successful in deterring general war because we

have been strong. By the same token, we have been more or less successful in deterring limited conflicts depending on how strong and resolute we were perceived to be in the region a

the time.

While we deter war, our strategy is to control crises as they come up, and to support our

allies. Both objectives require us to maintain a forward presence. For this reason, we do

things such as stationing garrison forces in Europe and Korea and deploying naval forces in

international waters, where they can be available at a moment’s notice.

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would go to war if deterrence were to fail. This is not a case of gazing into the fut

but one of considering our own interests and those of our allies, the importance 

ance solidarity, the geopolitical situation, the capabilities of the threat, and our

resources-in-being to deal with that threat. Among those resources we include ou

economy, our industrial base, the advantages of our own geography, the utility o

forward positions from which we are operating, and our national resolve. That is 

egy: a way of looking at the world situation. It is not a “game plan” with the first 

plays already charted.

Sea Power in the National Defense: In this world situation, there is a particular n

for American sea power. We are not a fortress, but an island nation, dependent 

other countries for vital raw materials. The sea lines of communications are our 

blood. Water is all continuous. The oceans of the world give us the opportunity t

tect our interests through forward-deployed ships—but by the same token, these 

provide the only barriers to threats from overseas. Twice in this century an enem

power has brought war home to our shores. In 1915, the sinking of the liner Lusita

shook this country out of its reverie. In 1942, Americans could look out to seawa

from the Boardwalk in Atlantic City and see the fires of ships burning from Germ

submarine attacks.

To avoid such a debacle in the future, we need to maintain a ready, capable Navy, 

can bring to bear against any problem—or against several problems at once—su

force to carry out our national strategy of deterrence, crisis control, and support 

allies. We have such a Navy today. It is the finest, readiest instrument that I have s

my more than 37 years of service. It does the job wherever and whenever the assi

ment takes it, and then if necessary it steams away to do another job somewhere 

Operating in international waters, it enjoys the unique advantage of being able to 

menace without violating sovereignty, and once the need is past, of being able to sa

the horizon without signalling retreat. For this reason, the Navy has been the force 

choice in the overwhelming majority of the 200-plus crises our country has faced s

World War II.

But the Navy has not always been so capable. Just a few years ago, our worldwide 

mitments were more than the Navy could meet. The ships were operated until th

apart, and they couldn’t be repaired because there weren’t enough spare parts an

wasn’t enough money for overhauls. Even more important than the ships was the 

sonnel situation. Sooner or later a feed pump can be replaced, but the human be

operate it is a perishable commodity. He must be educated in the civilian sector,

recruited into the Navy, trained, challenged to excel, coordinated with others, giv

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period of enlistment is over, retained as a professional. If he leaves the Navy, years of

investment go with him, and his replacement is not someone one can hire off the street

Just five or six years ago, people were leaving the Navy by the thousands, and we had

ships that weren’t safe to operate simply because they didn’t have enough trained sailors on board. Our capabilities were contracting. At the same time, the Soviets were carrying out a long-prepared program of expansion.

Now we have turned that situation around, and the difference is well understood

beyond our own shores. Credit goes to everyone concerned: to our people on the deck

plates, whose performance has stirred so much admiration; to those in support, from

whom many resources have been diverted to meet the requirements of the fleet; to the

planners, who have gotten the most out of every dollar appropriated; and finally, to the

Congress, entrusted with their constitutional responsibility for raising and maintaining

a capable Navy.

The Development of the Maritime Strategy: The rebirth of American sea power and the

origins of an American Maritime Strategy have been mutually supportive events. It is

hard to distinguish between the two, and it is dangerous to think that one exists without the other. As we were developing a ready, capable Navy, structured to meet the

threat with all its variety, taking into account such things as overseas commitments,

personnel and operational (out of homeport) requirements, called PERSTEMPO/

OPTEMPO, and the level of risk of having a reduced force structure with limited reten

tion of trained/skilled personnel—as we were creating an appropriate capability, we

continued to ask ourselves how this revitalized instrument met the national security

objectives.

This was not a new question, and when it was asked in the late 1970s, we weren’t asking

it for the first time. Over the years our Maritime Strategy has been very much like the

British Constitution—unwritten but thoroughly understood by those who must practice it. Even in the years when we had a so-called written strategy, for example, the

Rainbow plans just before World War II, the strategy was fluid and had to be adapted to

events. Had there not been a Douglas MacArthur in addition to a Chester Nimitz, there

wouldn’t have been a twin-track offensive in the Pacific. And had we not had the ships

and airplanes to support the offensive, we would have had to come up with a new set o

plans. In those days the strategy recognized what we were capable of doing—both the

Navy and the industrial base behind it—and where we needed to go. Strategies always

do this. In the late 1970s, as we began to evolve the present Maritime Strategy, capabilities and requirements went hand in hand.

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cific and a general threat, we were reviewing the mission of the Navy in support o

national security objectives. Out of this review came the Maritime Strategy. It wa

not—and is not—a force-builder, and it was certainly not the origin of the 600-s

Navy. Most of the Maritime Strategy is simple common sense. It is not great liter

(although the stacks of criticism about it would do justice to Shakespeare), but it 

make good reading if one wants to understand our country’s worldwide commit

and the Navy’s vital contribution to their defense.

The Maritime Strategy represents a consensus of professional opinion and carrie

acceptance of both the U.S. Government and the governments of our allies. It rep

sents a consensus because, for the most part, naval officers, experienced and know

edgeable in their profession, wrote and revised it. It has been accepted by the Pre

and the Secretary of Defense and by our allies, whose local security interests depe

integrated, common defense plans with the United States. The Maritime Strategy 

intellectual counterpart to those plans, but is not subordinate to them.

The Essence of the Maritime Strategy: Although it is a brief concept, the Maritime 

egy contains several elements that should be looked at as unexceptionally Americ

First, it deals with the forces we have at our disposal today. It is not a “wish list.” A

cans play the hand they’ve been dealt. In the Navy, carrying out one’s assignment 

best of one’s ability with the resources at hand is an almost sacred tradition. As w

a more capable Navy, we built the strategy to address it. Subsequent revisions alw

take into account what forces are available.

Second, it is a forward strategy, forward in the sense of meeting our treaty obliga

and other commitments by operating away from our own shores. This is typicall

American as well, as the history of the 20th century shows us. It reflects an Amer

attitude that the best way to solve a problem is to go right to the heart of it. “The 

defense is a good offense,” we say; or as General Nathan Bedford Forrest put it in 

Civil War, “I always make it a rule to get there first with the most. . . .” We operate 

ward because this is where the action is, where our allies are, and where they need 

To this end, we are fortunate because our people and technology give us every co

dence that we can operate and win in the forward areas. This was clearly demons

during the recent air attack on Libya, in which one of the world’s best air defense 

tems, alerted both by a high level of diplomatic tension and by rumors of impen

attack, was unable to achieve a single hit upon our aircraft from the more than 1

high-quality missiles fired. Aegis antiair warfare cruisers, the F-14/E-2C combina

and our outstanding submarines, along with many other factors, give us confiden

that our forward strategy would be highly effective in the event of hostilities. Du

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course, a forward presence is equally advantageous.

Third, the strategy is operative worldwide. In any conflict, Europe would be the vital

arena: our culture tells us that. But even then we would have responsibilities in the

North Pacific, the South Pacific, the Indian Ocean, the Caribbean, and the South Atlan

tic—anywhere that naval forces can operate in support of our national interests. As

Secretary of the Navy John Lehman has pointed out, trans-Pacific communications are

currently the most active in the world, and this region is a rival to the Atlantic for our

attentions.

Finally, the strategy is flexible, as strategies always must be to be effective. It is not a

game plan. Many people who have assailed various aspects of it have confused strategy

with employment of forces. The Maritime Strategy discusses a framework of forward

operations; anyone who wishes to dispute the correctness of such a framework, assuming that he wishes to challenge a basic tenet of our national outlook, can certainly do

so. But to talk about numbers of carrier battle groups or submarines in the context of a

particular scenario is misleading. The basis for deterrence is the creation of doubt in

the enemy’s mind as to what we would be capable of achieving if he breaks the peace.

We have undoubtedly been successful at this. If deterrence fails, what our actions would

be at that time is a matter for the commanders involved to determine at that time. War

are not fought by automatic, preprogrammed responses under the direction of a video

game computer. Right now, we can’t say what our exact response would be to a Soviet

attack. It would depend on where, when, and how big it was, and who was involved.

Even if we knew, we wouldn’t tell. The same message should be understood by any

evilly disposed country. Let them worry about what we are capable of doing, and let us

not give them any easy assurances ahead of time. The Maritime Strategy reserves the

employment of forces to the absolutely indispensable element of the evaluative process

Antisubmarine Warfare—Mining the Mother Lode: The Maritime Strategy is a part of

our overall national strategy to exactly the same extent that sea power is a part of

national security. The doctrine of the strategy is a product of the equation that contains our nation’s worldwide interests and responsibilities, the worldwide threat, and

the resources at our disposal to meet that threat.

In the same way, the Navy’s missions support national strategy by employing sea power

One mission area of vital importance, in which the challenge of the future is particularly pressing, is antisubmarine warfare (ASW). If we are going to enjoy the advantages

of sea power in the 21st century, we must maintain our lead in this area.

The threat is particularly formidable—more than 350 Soviet submarines. When we

consider what the Germans were able to achieve in two world wars and what we were

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each case the number of submarines available at the start of the conflict was from 

fifth to one-tenth the size of today’s Soviet submarine force, we have to respect th

potential of the Soviet Navy to disrupt the sea lines of communications linking u

our allies.

Until now, our antisubmarine capabilities have maintained a comfortable lead ov

Soviet submarine capabilities because of superior individual quality: again, peop

technology. Passive acoustic detection has been the “mother lode” of ASW ever s

the advent of the nuclear submarine. Today, our sensors are able to detect and tra

Soviet submarines at ranges much beyond those at which they themselves can be

detected; we have much better sea-legs and endurance than the Soviet submarine 

and we think our weapons are the best in the world. But the advantages are decre

Soviet submarines are getting quieter and harder to detect. At some point in the 

it can be postulated that they will become as quiet as the ambient sea, and then w

have to turn to other methods of detection. In the meanwhile, we must continue 

mine the mother lode wherever that takes us. We must not relax our present stro

commitment to the ASW challenge, and we must continue to make good decisio

about the kind of ASW forces we want in the future. This will be one of my princ

priorities as Chief of Naval Operations, part of my overall goal of retaining the g

Navy that we enjoy today.

In the same way, the Maritime Strategy, a good concept already, will become bett

we continue to develop our capabilities. The debate over what those capabilities s

be is a healthy one, and I welcome it. But those who would use this one concept t

prove some separate hypothesis—perhaps a political hypothesis—about the state 

America’s defenses, need to look beyond the strategy to the reality of the dangero

world in which we live.

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The Maritime Strategy

The Maritime Component of the U.S. National Strateg

1988–1989

The original plans to revise the Maritime Strategy on an annual basis did not com

fruition, and several years elapsed after the publication of the 1985 version before 

version appeared. Revisions had been considered in the fall of 1986 and again in 

of 1987, but in neither instance had come to fruition. By early 1988, the last versi

the strategy no longer fully reflected the emerging circumstances with regard to th

Soviet navy. In addition, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman had left office in Ap

1987 and had been succeeded briefly by James Webb, who in February 1988 resig

protest that the administration would no longer support the six-hundred-ship go

further budget declines in the offing, the Navy needed to have a revised strategy t

more closely fit the political realities at home and the changing circumstances in 

world.

Two versions of the Maritime Strategy appeared in close succession, one in Decem

1988* and another in February 1989.† Both versions were signed by Admiral Carlis

Trost, as Chief of Naval Operations. The two versions are very close in content, bu

tain some significant changes in wording and small additions. In the following te

1989 version has been used as the basic text with annotations that point out the d

ences from the 1988 version.

In distributing the new document superseding the 1985 strategy, Admiral Trost u

prefatory letter to explain the main differences between the new version and the 1

version.

* The Maritime Strategy, revision IV, OPNAV 60 P-1-88, distributed by CNO letter serial 0

8U500502, dated 20 December 1988. This publication was approved for declassification 

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans, and Strategy (N3/N5) on 7 Fe

2007.

† The Maritime Strategy, revision IV, OPNAV 60 P-1-89, distributed by CNO letter serial 0

9S500091, dated 23 February 1989. This publication was approved for declassification by 

on 7 February 2007.

DOCUMENT SEVEN

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in peace, crisis, and war. In this revision greater emphasis is placed on the Pacific region and low

intensity conflict,[*] without[†

] subtracting from the validity of the Maritime Strategy as it

applies to other regions. Within the Maritime Strategy the basic concepts of forward posture and

movement, seizing the initiative and directly pressuring the enemy remain valid. The present

updated version has been refined to address more directly:

a. Soviet intentions and capabilities, as well as,

b. The current security environment and major trends which will shape our Navy in the

future.‡

In the following paragraph, Trost’s letter stated: “The Maritime Strategy serves as the

basis for tactical development and provides the intellectual underpinning for the development of Fleet warfighting plans as well as representing our contribution to joint and

allied cooperative planning efforts. Additionally, it is the basis for the development of the

Navy POM and testimony on Navy programs and budget.”§ The letter concluded: “Strat

egy cannot be written in a vacuum, nor can it remain dormant without risk to those wh

must, of necessity, be its implementors. Your comments and discussion are invited. They

should be submitted to Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy and Operations) (Op-06).”**

In the late spring of 1988, the action officer in the Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603),

Commander Richard “Mitch” Brown had completed a new draft and sent it up the chain

of command for final approval and release by Admiral Trost. In the routing, Vice Admiral Henry C. Mustin, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Opera

tions, reviewed the document and made a number of changes to it before forwarding it t

the Chief of Naval Operations on 2 or 3 June 1988. The CNO’s executive assistant, Captain Thomas Paulson, held the document without taking any action on it until Mustin’s

replacement, Vice Admiral Charles R. Larson, arrived nearly four months later. At that

point, the document was returned to the action officers for its reconsideration. Commander Brown and others in OP-603 removed most of the additions that had been mad

by Vice Admiral Mustin and added some new items from both the Marine Corps and

others. Admiral Trost approved this version and issued it in December 1988.††

The 1988 version only lasted a few days, and its distribution was limited. Upon reviewing it, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Al Gray, asked Admiral Trost to

rescind it and strengthen the sections on contemporary strategic thinking with additiona

information about revised Marine Corps plans and operations. Acting on this request,

Admiral Trost immediately recalled the December 1988 version and requested a newly

* The 1988 version of the letter used the phrase “low level conflict.”

† The 1988 version had an additional phrase here: “in any way.”

‡ Paragraph 2.

§ Paragraph 3.

** Paragraph 4.

†† Prof. Mitch Brown, e-mail to Peter Swartz, 14 March 2008.

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Commander Brown, also added some additional themes on the global security en

ment to the version published on 23 February 1989. These changes were also subs

quently reflected in the Navy’s response to the new George H. W. Bush administra

National Security Review (NSR) 12 of March 1989.*

This final version of the Maritime Strategy made the first mention in any of the N

post–Vietnam War capstone documents of humanitarian assistance operations, d

trafficking threats, and nonstate actions as categories for naval operations. Since 

time, all have remained at some level of importance in naval strategic planning.

In addition, the 1988 and 1989 versions of the Maritime Strategy, through both g

and wording, began to shift emphasis from a mainly Eurocentric focus to a more 

anced emphasis on the Pacific as well as the Atlantic theater. While service-direct

pling to national intelligence estimates regarding the Soviet threat kept this versio

classified, its sections on contemporary strategic thinking, the future global securi

ronment, and defense implications show, on reflection, that it was in reality a tra

strategy that showed the need to refocus on post–Cold War issues.†

In the text that follows, the insertions “This section is new” and “End of new sect

show the 1989 additions to the 1988 version. ✒

* National Security Review 12 of 3 March 1989. See www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsr/nsr12.pd

† Fax message from Mitch Brown to Hattendorf, 25 August 2008.

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This is the Maritime Strategy, describing the global contribution of the Navy and the

Marine Corps in carrying out U.S. National Security Strategy across the entire spectrum of conflict.* It is a statement of the application of U.S. seapower through a cogen

Strategy. It represents the collective judgment of the senior leadership in the Navy and

Marine Corps as to how best to employ U.S. naval forces to meet our national objectives in peacetime, crisis, and war. The Maritime Strategy adapts and evolves to accommodate new threats and capabilities.

[END OF NEW SECTION]

The Maritime Strategy is the maritime element of a national security strategy based on

deterrence, forward defense and alliance solidarity. It is a concept of employment of

maritime forces that can be applied across the full spectrum of conflict. It calls for early

global positioning of maritime power both to deter war and to achieve U.S. war aims

should deterrence fail. It prescribes aggressive forward operation of naval forces to

complicate Soviet planning, best ensure access to Eurasia, help cement alliances, deny

the Soviets free access to the open oceans, provide useful offensive options to the

National Command Authorities (NCA) and best protect the sea lines of

communication.

[1 PARAGRAPH DELETED HERE:]

The Maritime Strategy represents the collective judgment of senior Navy and Marine

Corps leaders about how best to employ U.S. naval forces in response to national

* This introductory passage is substantially expanded over the 1988 version.

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war. The Maritime Strategy adapts and evolves to accommodate new threats and

capabilities.

[END OF DELETED PARAGRAPH]

The Maritime Strategy is drawn from both U.S. and alliance strategies. It is a usefu

terpoint to Soviet strategy. In particular, it attacks the Soviets’ preferred one-front w

strategy, while at the same time remaining flexible enough to deal with Soviet capa

should they change their own strategy. It is accepted as valid within the NATO allia

itself. The strategy is executable now, in the professional judgment of the theater C

It emphasizes the global capabilities inherent in a strong maritime posture, and i

ticular, provides the perspective to consider other theaters beyond just the Centr

Region in Europe.

The Maritime Strategy has several purposes. Primarily it provides a global view o

operations, for deterrence and crisis control. Should deterrence fail, it shows how 

operations can be integrated for a global conventional war with the Soviet Union

also provides a context for the day-to-day U.S. fleet operations: routine fleet

MARITIME STRATEGY

• GLOBAL VIEW OF FLEET OPERATIONS

• INTEGRATED CONCEPT FOR GLOBAL WAR

• CONTEXT FOR WARFARE APPRAISALS/BASIS FOR REQUIREMENTS

• FOUNDATION FOR NAVAL PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

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response in times of international crises. The strategy also acts as a framework for

operational requirements which shape the Navy and Marine Corps inputs to the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). These in turn drive the priorities of

our research and development programs and govern decisions regarding future force

structure. As such, the Maritime Strategy is a dynamic concept which both influences

and reacts to fleet operations and budgetary issues.

The Maritime Strategy supports our national security goals. It is the nation’s and the

Navy’s global architecture for naval force employment.

Principal sources of U.S. national military strategy are National Security Decision

Directives (NSDDs), which are Presidential decisions on national security policy, and

our alliances, treaties and agreements.

Several other sources are also illustrated here. The Defense Guidance (DG) is the Secre

tary of Defense’s biennial direction on strategy and programs. Through the Joint Strategic Planning System, the JCS recommend strategy to the NCA and provide planning

guidance to the Unified and Specified Commanders. The concepts of operations and

operational plans of the CINCs reflect this strategic guidance.

[THIS SECTION IS NEW]

Coalition defense, represented by alliances and treaties, is an essential part of our strategic thinking. U.S. Maritime Strategy is consistent with the December 1988 Revision

to NATO’s Tri-MNC of Concept of Maritime Operations (CONMAROPS) which was

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

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allies in every theater are increasingly important to maintaining our overall milit

capability in this era of constrained defense resources.

[END OF NEW SECTION]

The Strategy flows from alliances, treaties and other formal agreements with cou

around the world. These alliances and treaties together form a global coalition de

one of the essential elements of our national military strategy. It is fundamental 

defending our allies, we defend ourselves.

We have seven formal defense treaties with forty-three separate nations, and we h

common military interests with a number of other countries. These result in a se

shared global partnerships and interests among the United States and most other 

tries throughout the free world.

[THIS SECTION IS NEW]

Forward presence of naval forces visibly demonstrates U.S. commitment to hono

alliances and partnership agreements. Conducted on a regular basis, our routine 

visits and multinational exercises are integral to this coalition structure.

[END OF NEW SECTION]

ALLIANCES, TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS

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Our national strategy is based on joint and combined operations. To succeed against the

combined forces of the Warsaw Pact in the event of war, it is essential that U.S. air, land and

naval forces operate jointly and in conjunction with our allies. The Maritime Strategy explicitly recognizes this imperative.

In peacetime, the Department of the Navy has strengthened its partnership with the Air

Force, Army, and Coast Guard in the area of joint operations through interservice cooperative initiatives.

To improve interoperability in peacetime, the Department of the Navy pursues multiservice

procurement programs in the areas of weapons systems and command and control.

Through foreign military sales and such programs as NATO armaments cooperation, we

increase commonality and cooperation with our allies. Similarly, we have greatly increased

participation in joint and combined exercises to develop the tactics necessary to operate

with our sister services and allies.

[THIS SECTION IS NEW]

The payoff has been evident in recent successful joint operations throughout the world, where

naval forces routinely operate in combined, joint task forces, such as in the Persian Gulf today

The ability of naval forces to operate successfully in a joint and/or combined environment will significantly determine the outcome of future U.S. military involvement in

regional conflicts, as well as global war.

[END OF NEW SECTION]

JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS

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National and NATO commanders are responsible for military operations in supp

national and alliance defense objectives in peace and war. [THIS SECTION IS N

The strategy provides a conceptual framework for the warfighting CINCs to emp

naval forces and execute operations on a global scale, commensurate with NCA d

tion. [END OF NEW SECTION]

[THIS SECTION (INCLUDING BULLETED LIST) IS NEW]

Strategy must address the perception of the threats to our security interests. Base

our assessment of the probable future international security environment, there 

two distinct categories of threats that must be considered.

“Glasnost”, “perestroika”, and “reasonable sufficiency” notwithstanding, war with 

Soviet Union remains the worst-case scenario for which we must plan. Our Strat

and warfighting capabilities will continue to be gauged against the requirements 

unlikely, but possible, occurrence.

At the same time, we must recognize that more probable challenges will face us a

levels of conflict. Regional conflicts, as well as non-state actions, such as internat

THREATS TO U.S. AND ALLIED INTERESTS

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deter and defend against a wide range of diverse challenges must be considered in

establishing priorities for the 1990’s.

[END OF NEW SECTION]

The Soviet Union poses the greatest challenge to the security of the United States. Traditionally a strong land power, over the past 20 years the Soviets have built a balanced

“blue water” naval force, capable of accomplishing a broad range of wartime and

peacetime tasks. Today the Soviet Union possesses the largest navy in the world. And it

continues to grow and modernize at a rate that surpasses all reasonable defensive

requirements.

As shown above, the Soviet Navy is organized into four fleets which provide wartime

defense-in-depth for the sea approaches to the USSR. In peacetime, the Soviet Navy

maintains a continuous out-of-area presence in the Mediterranean Sea, the Indian

Ocean, the South Atlantic (off West Africa) and the South China Sea. They also deploy

to the Caribbean once or twice a year. Their peacetime operational posture and the

patrol areas of Soviet missile-firing submarines off the U.S. coasts are notionally represented above.

Soviet out-of-area naval operations support friendly regimes, expand their influence in

the Third World (especially in areas of Western sensitivity), balance or eliminate Western presence, and expand foreign involvement.

PEACETIME SOVIET MARITIME POSTURE

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presence also enhances the perception of Moscow as an expanding power whose 

ests must be considered globally. Concurrently, Soviet intelligence and warning (

capabilities are strengthened through an expanded network of intelligence gathe

early warning and support facilities.

Soviet naval forces deployed out-of-area could not by themselves influence the o

come of a general war with the West, and they are not a significant factor in over

Soviet general staff planning. They do, however, have a growing capability to com

cate U.S. military planning and to impede, disrupt, or delay Western military ope

tions at the outset of war. Moreover, they constitute a day-to-day presence that h

be considered in every aspect of U.S. defense planning.

Soviet naval forces are complemented by the more than 1700 globally deployed ocea

Soviet merchant ships. This is the most militarily adaptable merchant fleet in the wo

These merchant ships have access to virtually all the major world ports and can p

form intelligence collection and a variety of other missions against Western secu

interests.

The current National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Soviet naval wartime strateg

the agreed upon, best estimate by the U.S. intelligence community. According to 

estimate, the Soviets believe war with the West would be global in scope. Althoug

SOVIET WARTIME STRATEGY

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escalation is likely, because they believe NATO would escalate.

Accordingly, the premier elements of the Soviet military are strategic nuclear forces.

The Soviet Navy’s contribution to this strategic capability is its powerful ballistic missile nuclear submarine (SSBN) force. The main wartime task for the Soviet Navy, there

fore, is to deploy this strategic offensive force and to protect it with general purpose

forces. The Soviets expect NATO to come after these submarines in a conventional

phase, just as they plan early conventional attacks on our nuclear capabilities during

the opening phase of conflict. Thus we see no evidence of a “use it or lose it’’ mentality

that means escalation automatically if their SSBNs are attrited!

Other initial tasks for general purpose forces include defending the maritime

approaches to the USSR from sea and air strikes—which includes attacking NATO’s

nuclear forces—support of ground force operations from seaward flanks, and interdiction of the enemy’s sea lines of communications (SLOCs). The Soviet Navy’s strategic

offensive task, however, takes precedence over all other missions.

Soviet wartime operating areas include sea control areas ranging out to 1000 kilometers and sea denial areas to 2000 kilometers from the Soviet homeland. Over the next

15 to 20 years, these areas will probably be extended to 3000 kilometers. The sea denial

areas already engulf most of our forward deployed ground and air forces and those of several of our allies, as they extend far out into “blue water.” If secured by the Soviets, the

net result would sever our vital sea lines of communication and undercut our ability to

reinforce/resupply our allies worldwide.

The Soviet Navy has made great quantitative and qualitative strides in all warfare areas

naval construction programs emphasize modern ships with increased endurance and

advanced weapons and electronic systems. The most significant improvement has been

in undersea warfare, where submarine quieting and sensor improvements have reduced

the acoustic advantage previously enjoyed by western navies. Soviet sea control capabil

ity will be enhanced by new cruiser, destroyer, and frigate classes expected to join their

fleets between now and the year 2000. They are also building a new class of aircraft car

rier which will eventually carry catapult-launched, high performance aircraft. Finally,

the introduction of more and better Backfire bombers and Fencer fighter-bombers will

increase the complexity of the maritime air battle.

U.S. Maritime Strategy must be sufficiently flexible to counter whatever strategy the

growing Soviet capabilities enable them to choose. If we focus solely on intentions,

however firmly grounded, and ignore enemy capabilities, the history of war tells us tha

we would be inviting defeat. Thus, while our strategy is designed to counter the Soviet

strategy as we understand it, our force structure—which includes units that may

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ceived Soviet intentions and Soviet capabilities. Moreover, that same force structu

to be capable of dealing with low intensity conflicts, which are not necessarily a l

included case of the Soviet problem.

The Maritime Strategy emphasizes our traditional and enduring strengths—sea p

geography, and American leadership in technology.

The Soviets are a formidable foe. Several of their strengths are listed here. They ha

large force designed for combined arms operations. Their preferred tactics feature

deception, surprise and massive strikes.

But the Soviets are not invulnerable, and they have weaknesses that can be exploit

define sensitivities as those things about which the Soviets are especially concerne

vulnerabilities as the weaknesses that we perceive to be particularly troublesome t

Soviets. Our objective is to exploit Soviet sensitivities and vulnerabilities in ways 

promote extended deterrence, even in crisis situations.

ATTACKING THE SOVIET STRATEGY

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This chart shows how maritime forces support U.S. interests across the conflict

spectrum.

The U.S. Navy routinely deploys about 100 ships in day-to-day operations around the

globe, and the Marine Corps approximately one third of its Fleet Marine Forces outsid

of CONUS. These forces are at a high level of readiness, as demonstrated in recent

naval operations off Libya and in the Persian Gulf. The objectives of this peacetime

posture are to achieve deterrence, meet alliance and treaty commitments, support

national diplomatic objectives, and to be ready for the rapid response essential to meet

the requirements of our overall strategy.

The U.S. Navy peacetime posture is key to conventional deterrence. We see about 20 categories of commitments that require naval force on scene worldwide, 24 hours a day.

[THIS SECTION IS NEW] Also an essential element of naval peacetime posture is its

contribution to worldwide surveillance and intelligence collection. Forward-based

naval collection facilities, aircraft, ships and submarines provide critical coverage in

support of our national intelligence collection effort. [END OF NEW SECTION]

Our forward presence is a visible demonstration of U.S. political will that encourages

allies and friends, deters and reduces the influence of enemies, influences neutrals, and

asserts and reinforces the principles of international law and freedom of the seas.

Low intensity conflict (LIC) is a limited political-military confrontation to achieve

political, social, or economic objectives. It usually involves protracted struggles and

events ranging from diplomatic and economic pressures through terrorism and

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of general war, generally involving regional conflict, normally in the Third World

ther “low intensity” nor “lower level” translates to either “low tech” or “low viole

The general proliferation of high technology weapons world-wide means that th

ference between naval forces designed to fight the Soviets and naval forces design

fight anyone else has narrowed significantly. Moreover, planning to deal with Thi

World regional and low intensity conflicts underscores one of the most significan

geostrategic changes of the past few years—the decrease in American (and Western

access to bases and overflight rights around the world. For example, the U.S. had 

in about 100 countries right after World War II; today we have bases in fewer tha

And we see more problems on the horizon, with NATO countries and the Philipp

raising thorny base negotiation issues. All of this, in turn, will limit the U.S. optio

cope with Third World or terrorist threats with military means other than naval 

Throughout the conflict spectrum, a bedrock requirement of naval forces is strat

deterrence. As the most survivable element of the U.S. strategic nuclear triad, the 

SSBN force provides that strategic deterrence that forms the backdrop for [SENT

REWORDED] all other activity in support of our national security interests.

This slide shows the five key areas in which the fleet operates today. Hot spots are 

lighted. These same areas are also key in wartime, that is, the U.S. Navy and Mari

Corps train in peace where they must operate in war. The Soviet Navy, which also

DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES

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in war.

Continuing naval presence is maintained in the Mediterranean, the Western Pacific, the

Northeast Atlantic, North Pacific, Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. Those are region

where the U.S. Government has determined it needs forces to protect its interests. Due

to political constraints affecting the use of land-based forces, in many areas naval force

are the only forces that can conduct these missions. Roughly one third of the fleet with

over 110 thousand sailors and 30 thousand marines are either at sea or forward-based

on the average day. Our global commitments and alliance responsibilities result in

increased demands for naval forward presence, particularly in developing world areas.

The Navy and Marine Corps do not generate these commitments, they execute them.

Another element of the Maritime Strategy in peacetime involves global employment of

naval forces in military exercises. Dozens are conducted each year, enabling U.S. naval units

to operate with sister services and allied forces to update joint and combined tactics and

procedures. This chart depicts only a few of the more important scheduled exercises.

These exercises provide the U.S. and its allies the opportunity to evaluate current tactics and doctrine. They strengthen alliance cohesion, enhance interoperability, and

improve combat effectiveness. [THIS SECTION IS NEW] In addition, these vigorous

demonstrations of the credibility of our naval capability is possibly our greatest deterrent to potential adversaries. [END OF NEW SECTION]

MARITIME FORCES

JOINT AND COMBINED EXERCISES

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Contingency response is a major role for U.S. naval forces. Due to their flexible for

structure and forward posture, U.S. Navy and Marine Corps forces have been use

more frequently in this role than those of any other service. In so many crises in r

years, the first question asked was, “Where are the carriers?” During contingency 

ations, forward-deployed naval forces fulfill the dual missions of sustaining the U

deterrent posture and supporting national policy objectives. They provide flexibl

tary options to the NCA. Naval carrier battle groups and amphibious forces have 

served as the primary instruments of national contingency response policy. The u

characteristics of these forces provide leverage to control escalation, often under 

cult circumstances. This use affords the NCA unmatched military options to cou

any perceived Soviet encroachment aims and similarly, to counter and respond to 

sponsored terrorism. Naval forces are often employed in crisis in conjunction wi

other U.S. services, and to a lesser extent with allied forces, usually outside the no

alliance framework. The recent setup in the Persian Gulf, in which our NATO all

made major force commitments well beyond the NATO boundaries, is a good ex

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This chart shows some of the over 200 crises in which U.S. naval forces have been

involved since World War II. The majority of these crises have occurred in the Middle

East (including the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf), Western Pacific, and Caribbean/Central

American regions. Third World regional and low intensity conflicts are likely to continue. [THIS SECTION IS NEW] The special characteristics of naval forces make them

uniquely well-suited to protect U.S. interests in this lower range of the conflict spectrum. [END OF NEW SECTION] Naval contributions to these lower level and low

intensity conflicts aim to reduce Soviet influence, discourage terrorism, provide effective counter-strategies to drug trafficking and insurgencies, and promote favorable eco

nomic growth conditions in the Third World. Forward, ready and mobile, U.S. naval

forces provide a broad range of options for the NCA. These forces, operating without

restriction in international waters, are able to demonstrate U.S. and/or alliance commitment and display military power without the political problems of violating territo

rial sovereignty. The global disposition and characteristics of naval forces in peacetime

allow timely response with the right level of force to match whatever requirements our

NCA might have.

[THIS SECTION (INCLUDING FIGURES) IS NEW]

Highly versatile, mobile naval forces operating routinely in forward deployment areas

can adopt a wide range of military profiles in support of diplomatic initiatives. The

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broad spectrum of discriminate force employment options they offer are unique

suited to match NCA requirements across the lower levels of conflict.

These capabilities extend from providing military presence, forward surveillance 

tions and demonstrating a show of military force to the evacuation of noncomba

civilians and the conduct of other humanitarian support operations. When requ

naval forces can also establish sea-based quarantine or blockade operations or co

power projection missions ashore through use of naval gunfire, cruise missiles, a

strikes, or expeditionary forces.

Capability improvements in naval weaponry and battle force management enabl

NCA to direct naval forces to achieve local air superiority, suppress defenses and 

duct either coastal raids or deep penetration air and cruise missile attack mission

tually anywhere in the world in support of vital U.S. interests. A particular streng

using maritime forces for such purposes is the ability to rapidly constitute the re

forces in a forward area and maintain the perceived threat of direct military actio

an extended period of time. This can be done with minimal impact on friendly h

nations for support. Most significantly, maritime forces can be withdrawn unilat

when that serves national policy objectives, without incurring heavy political cos

associated with other primarily land-based force options.

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Finally, along the conflict spectrum, the strategy articulates the key roles played by

Navy and Marine Corps forces in the event of serious confrontation or global war with

the Soviet Union. Although deterrence remains the foremost objective, should deterrence fail, maritime forces must be capable and ready to fight successfully and defeat

the enemy. Once hostilities have commenced, deterrence of unintentional nuclear use

during a conventional conflict remains a prime objective, while seeking early and favor

able war termination.

[END OF NEW SECTION]

MARITIME STRATEGY

CONFRONTATION/WAR WITH THE SOVIETS

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unfolding in three general phases. Phase I can be considered as a period of rising 

sions. Operations during Phase I would be conducted for the primary purpose o

deterrence. The objective in Phase I is to control escalation of a crisis and to dete

outbreak of hostilities.

If deterrence fails, we believe the Soviets would initiate hostilities, which would s

entry into Phase II. During this phase U.S. and allied maritime forces would seize 

initiative. The objective during Phase II is to establish maritime superiority in ke

ocean areas through the conduct of naval campaigns.

In Phase III, maritime forces would take the fight to the enemy. The objective of 

III operations is war termination on favorable terms as soon as possible.

There are no timelines associated with the three notional phases: they simply des

the general direction in which the Navy and Marine Corps senior leadership thin

should go. We have no timetable; actual wartime decisions and phasing of operat

would be determined by warfighting commanders.

Phase I deals with reinforcing deterrence and contains options while simultaneou

addressing transition-to-war actions.

A period of rapidly rising tensions would be marked by considerable ambiguity.

Although indications and warning (I&W) centers would probably send copious

PHASE I

SOVIET MARITIME POSTURE

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interpret them. Naval forces are ideal for such uncertain conditions—they can rapidly

be sent forward in number without crossing any borders, and they can be withdrawn

just as fast and as easily.

In this phase we would expect Soviet naval forces to sortie into their sea control and sea

denial areas. They could also reinforce their Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and/or

South China Sea forces, particularly with submarines. We would detect such movements fairly early, and expect about two weeks warning before the Soviets would be

fully ready to conduct initial worldwide attacks.

Soviet aviation strike forces would redeploy to dispersal bases, and the Black and Baltic

Sea fleets and the four other Warsaw Pact navies would prepare to support joint operations ashore. The Soviet merchant fleet would chop to naval control to provide intelligence, lift, and other functions as directed. The Soviets, in short, would posture their

forces for global war.

During Phase I, we envision one or more crises, a serious confrontation between the

U.S. and the Soviet Union, or an escalation of low intensity conflict involving U.S. or

Soviet forces. Deterrence goals are listed on the left, while actions to transition to war

are shown on the right. This phase might very well be the final phase, effective responses

might be able to defuse a crisis or prevent a limited war from spreading.

Tough decisions will have to be made during Phase I. Even a 600 ship navy is not sufficient to accomplish every required wartime task simultaneously, so we will be forced to

conduct key operations sequentially. This means that during Phase I, the U.S. must

PHASE I

DETERRENCE/TRANSITION TO WAR

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forces accordingly. Some tradeoffs are inevitable.

Timely political decision-making will be crucial. The NCA must act decisively to 

no vital areas are ceded by default, probably under very ambiguous warning. Wit

political speed and decisiveness, all possible military and political incentives cann

brought to bear to control the crisis. Key actions during Phase I will include:

• Early forward movement of naval and air forces.

• Increased combat readiness, mobilized reserve forces.

• Enforcement of U.S. maritime defense zones.

• Requisition of civilian airlift and sealift assets.

• Early reinforcement by ground forces and land-based tactical air.

• Expansion of advanced logistic support, with activation of host nation suppo

agreements.

• Maximum I & W/countersurveillance/countertargeting.

• Conduct of other deterrent options.

PHASE I

DETERRENCE/TRANSITION TO WAR

FORWARD MOVEMENT OF U.S. NAVAL FORCES

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yield the maximum political and military leverage to forestall U.S./Soviet conflict.

In Phase I there would be a global forward movement of Navy and Marine Corps forces, a

complex and demanding operation. Some of our SSNs would challenge Soviet sea control

and sea denial zones, thereby placing Soviet naval forces, including SSBNs, at risk. Forward

deployed battle groups and surge forces from U.S. ports would form into multi-carrier battle forces. Battleship and surface action groups, amphibious task forces, land-based maritime patrol aircraft and special warfare units would intensify surveillance, increase

readiness, and execute other deterrent options in support of the balanced fleet. Maritime

defense zones would be activated, with the Coast Guard transferred to the Navy, for coastal

defense duties and protection of coastal SLOCs and ports. Forces would be positioned by

the CINCs in readiness to execute forward mining and mine-countermeasure plans. While

forward deployed amphibious task groups would increase their readiness, air-landed elements of Marine expeditionary brigades would begin moving to join pre-positioned equipment [THIS SECTION IS NEW] aboard Maritime Pre-positioning Ships or stored ashore.

[END OF NEW SECTION] Sealift would be assembled to start moving components of all

Services to carry out the warfighting CINCs’ reinforcement plans.

The surge in maritime deployments would underpin the full range of our deterrent

options. Again, the purpose of this global forward movement would be to strengthen

deterrence, but if deterrence should fail, forward naval forces can rapidly shift to a

warfighting posture.

PHASE I

DETERRENCE/TRANSITION TO WAR

MOVEMENT OF USA/USAF AND ALLIED FORCES

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begin moving. U.S. reinforcements and their allied counterparts would move by 

and sealift to join units already forward deployed, in accordance with U.S. and al

war plans. While the primary focus will be on reinforcement of NATO in Europe

ning to support a surge of ground and air forces underpins the forward defense c

cept in all theaters, commensurate with the potential threat projections.

As shown, an essential pre-condition for this movement is the recall and requisit

U.S. and allied merchant shipping, which is normally dispersed world-wide in co

mercial trade. Availability of this shipping pool is an absolute requirement for th

forcement of forward deployed units—approximately 95 percent of reinforceme

material must travel by sealift. The time required to assemble these merchant shi

the proper ports of embarkation also drives the need for timely political decision

making.

On a worldwide basis, ASW tracking would intensify and readiness could be incr

The result of all the reinforcements and forward movement, simultaneously conv

at strategic locations and providing mutual combined arms support, would creat

strong, focused leverage to control crises. However, should these deterrent actions 

insufficient, the resultant movements of U.S. and allied forces during this phase w

also lead to full preparedness for coalition defense.

This chart shows some illustrative times involved in moving forces into position, 

highlights the importance, as has been emphasized, of timely political decisions. 

GLOBAL MOVEMENT OF MARITIME FORCES

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substantially reduces closure times. The ability to achieve a strong forward posture any

where on the globe, by employing both forward-deployed and surge maritime forces,

provides unmatched crisis response and escalation dominance capabilities. [THIS SEC

TION IS NEW] The key to success during Phase I is readiness: readiness of naval force

to move forward quickly on short notice. [END OF NEW SECTION]

Naval combat operations cannot be sustained at great distances without support from

both mobile and shore-based forward logistics forces. Such support is essential in all

three phases of the strategy. The logistical components depicted show the notional

requirements needed to support high tempo operations.

Afloat logistics support consists of navy combat logistics forces, supported by strategic

(or inter-theater) air and sealift and by intra-theater lift—shuttle shipping and COD/

VOD aircraft. These afloat logistics forces, just like naval power projection forces, can,

if necessary, operate largely independent of peacetime ports of entry, shore bases, and

inland lines of communications such as railroads and highways. As U.S. access to overseas bases continues to diminish, the self-sustainability of naval logistics support for

seabasing becomes increasingly important.

PHASE I

DETERRENCE/TRANSITION TO WAR

FORWARD LOGISTICS SUPPORT TO NAVAL FORCES

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ervoirs of critical commodities, staging and transhipment facilities, and repair an

maintenance capabilities. Wartime host nation support agreements would be act

worldwide for support such as medical care and repair facilities. A large percenta

the personnel who would operate this forward logistics infrastructure are compr

naval reserve units. These would be among the first reservists called to active dut

the President.

The war at sea cannot be isolated from the land battle. This chart shows the likely S

initial combined arms attack posture in global war. While the primary Soviet thr

would likely be in Central Europe, attacks could also occur elsewhere on the Sovie

periphery, such as attempts to seize Northern Norway, Iran, the Turkish Straits, or

Northern Italy. The Soviets may also attempt to attack/seize Iceland to deny West

or extend their own air defense umbrella.

The Pacific Basin is the one region in which major change in the world balance o

power will occur in the next 20–30 years. As a result, Soviet planners face in the P

a more complex strategic problem than anywhere else in the world. The Soviets m

deal with other major powers, namely, the United States, Japan, PRC, and South 

The relatively few, widely separated, key Soviet facilities in the Far East are more

PHASE II

GLOBAL WAR

SOVIETS INITIATE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

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East, there exists no buffer zone comparable to Eastern Europe.

Japan and South Korea can contribute to denying the Soviets control of the Sea of

Japan and naval egress to the Pacific Basin. This factor, coupled with the prospect of

direct attack by very capable U.S. maritime and air forces from additional threat axes,

must be factored into Soviet planning. Another uncertainty is the potential threat of

nuclear-capable and manpower-intensive Chinese military forces.

In the event of war, the Soviets would attack U.S. forces in the Pacific while simultaneously pressuring the Japanese and South Koreans to deny U.S. use of naval and air

facilities. If this were unsuccessful, they would probably attack these facilities, initially

by air. Other possible Soviet attacks could be conducted against U.S. facilities in the

Philippines and in Alaska (Aleutians). The Soviets would not seek to provoke the Chinese into entering the war against them, but could not afford to discount that factor in

determining wartime force reallocation decisions.

The objective in Phase II is to seize the initiative, with the overall goal of establishing

forward maritime superiority.

The strategy’s priority actions then would be to counter all attacks on friendly forces,

destroy enemy forces, and to protect vital U.S. and allied sea lines of communications

(SLOCs) by establishing sea control as far forward as possible. This is a critical prerequisite to ensuring that forward deployed forces receive required reinforcement and

resupply. Throughout this period naval forces would improve their positioning, thereby

achieving a forward posture for Phase III.

PHASE II

SEIZE THE INITIATIVE

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stering our flexible response capability, to which dual-capable (nuclear) naval ass

make an important contribution. This is interlinked with the mission task of ach

forward sea control in those water areas where forward-positioned naval forces al

offer the CINCs potent options for power projection. Achievement of forward sea 

trol using this approach also permits us to continue strategic sealift and reinforce

which began in Phase I.

Aggressive maritime operations as part of theater naval campaigns in Phase II co

ute directly to alliance cohesion by demonstrating U.S. commitment to alliance d

in forward maritime areas, including key waters linking our allies, which might o

wise be effectively ceded to Soviet control.

The same maritime operations will contribute to allied air and land campaigns b

complicating Soviet decision making, assuring vital supplies and reinforcements 

readily flow to the NATO Central Front and other land campaigns, and by streng

ing the ability of alliance forces in key flank areas to mount a sustained defense. T

combined effects of forward maritime operations in Phase II would generate stra

leverage by demonstrating to the Soviets that the war could not be confined simp

preferred single theater of operations.

PHASE II

SEIZE THE INITIATIVE

SEA CONTROL AND STRATEGIC SEALIFT

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CONUS is essential to success. Over 95% of the American reinforcement and resupply

dry cargo and 99% of petroleum resupply must go by sea. Additionally, the oil SLOCs

would remain important for long-term prosecution of any war, especially by our allies.

Conduct of forward ASW and AAW is axiomatic to successful sea control. Ceding the initia

tive at sea to the Soviet Union, thereby enabling them to choose the times and places of

engagement, would spell disaster for numerically inferior Western forces. Ultimate control

of the transatlantic SLOCs, for instance, will be determined in the Norwegian Sea. As

USCINCLANT/SACLANT told NATO and the U.S. Congress in 1987, if we fight the next

“Battle of the Atlantic” in the Atlantic, we may lose that battle. If we lose the Atlantic—and

its SLOCs —we will ultimately lose the land war in Europe.

The destruction of the Soviet submarine fleet is fundamental. A coordinated ASW

effort is a complex undertaking, involving a wide variety of platforms, weapons systems, and tactics—all properly the purview of the responsible CINCs. In general, forward and barrier ASW operations would have as their goal the destruction of Soviet

submarines which could break out to attack U.S. reinforcement and resupply shipping.

Similarly, key goals of the carrier battle forces would be to provide the necessary air

umbrella for surface and air ASW forces to form combined arms units with our submarine

well forward, and to support the land campaign early.[THIS SECTION IS NEW] Marine

Corps land-based aviation will support coordinated fleet defense as necessary. Marine aviation command and control assets can be used to integrate maritime and land-based

TACAIR, thus adding depth to the maritime battlefield. [NEW SECTION ENDS HERE]

Land-based joint and combined force tactical aircraft could complement these efforts to a

degree, but that would depend on the flow of the land battle. Concurrent maritime operations in various theaters would present the Soviet leadership with competing demands for

commitment of forces. These demands may disrupt timelines for preplanned use of

reserves or alter previously intended theater priorities.

The success of U.S. and allied maritime forces in achieving forward sea control and assur

ing safe transit for strategic sealift would help maintain alliance cohesion. As an example,

early introduction of the air-landed MEB in Norway and carrier air power can make the

difference between winning and losing the defensive campaign in North Norway.

Early U.S. and allied maritime successes may also help influence decisions in neutral

states, as well as effectively deny the use of global sea lines of communication to the

Soviet Union. This latter effort would restrict or forestall many Soviet actions which

would otherwise be underwritten by the wide-ranging Soviet merchant marine and

fishing fleets that increasingly dominate global shipping and trade patterns.

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As a result of attrition, and the improving position of U.S. and allied maritime fo

Soviet options will have been diminished and the combat stability of their forces

threatened. Therefore, their willingness to continue the war may be subject to int

reevaluation. U.S. and allied maritime forces would now be in position, to provid

tained power projection according to the directions of the NCA and the CINCs.

A critical objective is to afford the CINCs the means to exploit potent convention

capabilities through the leveraged use of dual-capable CVBGs, BBBGs and SSNs, 

with Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) and special warfare units. These 

time operations would provide critical defensive capabilities to Pacific and NATO 

allies, responsive military options for neutralizing threats from Soviet surrogate o

ent states, and build on sea control–related efforts to effectively raise the nuclear

threshold. Taken as a whole, maritime forces provide the means to begin controll

the pace and timing of military campaigns at the times and places of our choosin

The objective in Phase III is to carry the fight to the enemy. Priority actions would

include keeping the initiative seized during Phase II operations, destroying Sovie

forces, and retaining or regaining allied territory. The SLOCs must be kept open 

SEIZE THE INITIATIVE

POWER PROJECTION AND STRATEGIC DETERRENCE

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reinforcement and resupply while maritime forces increase their support of land and

air campaigns. Finally, Phase III operations must continue emphasis on raising the

nuclear threshold, thereby discouraging the Soviets from escalating to the use of

nuclear weapons.

PHASE III

“CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY”

PHASE III

CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY

WAR TERMINATION LEVERAGE

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landmass to increase strategic leverage as the long-term correlation of forces grad

tilts to the West.

Maritime contributions to war termination leverage stem from several Phase III 

The first is thwarting Soviet desires for short war: naval power provides a means 

fighting a protracted conventional war, in which the Soviets are explicitly denied t

preferred strategy of a single-theater conflict. The strategy amputates Soviet glob

reach, thus reducing their threat options against the U.S. and its allies, while simu

neously enforcing the isolation of client states from their Soviet support. In the e

of a protracted non-nuclear war, forward sea control, which will enable full acces

global markets and materials using secure sea lines of communications, can be th

means for victory.

Although maritime capability underwrites a credible conventional warfighting str

the nuclear weapons of the U.S. Navy also play an important role in nuclear dete

The U.S. SSBN force is the linchpin of deterrence and stability. Our SSBN force w

sea is the most survivable and cost-effective leg of the triad and will remain so. Fif

cent of our national on-line strategic nuclear warheads are at sea, with the cost o

warheads comprising only one-fourth of the DOD defense budget allocated for s

gic assets. The existence of a secure U.S. strategic nuclear strike force capable of t

ening key Soviet military, industrial, and leadership targets deters nuclear war, im

Soviet incentives to continue a nuclear conflict once begun, and provides strong 

tary leverage for war termination. With a START agreement, remaining nuclear f

must meet the criteria of cost-effectiveness, survivability, flexibility, mobility, resp

siveness and hard target kill capability. The SSBN force satisfies all of these

requirements.

THE MARITIME STRATEGY IN NUCLEAR WAR

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become increasingly vital in a post-INF threat environment. Carrier-based, dualcapable tactical aircraft, ballistic missile submarines and sea-launched cruise missile–

capable surface combatants and submarines, which are not included in the INF treaty,

remain available for employment in NATO’s strategy of “flexible response.” Not tied to

garrisons ashore or subject to host government approval to operate from overseas

bases, naval forces are highly leveraged for alliance support while remaining free to

respond quickly and unilaterally to crises that threaten NATO or U.S. national interests

The key value of the Navy in theater nuclear war lies in its ability to mount credible nuclear

land strikes from the sea—principally through available CV aircraft nuclear striking powe

and from TOMAHAWK land attack nuclear cruise missiles (TLAM/N). If theater nuclear

war is initiated on land, dual-capable naval forces positioned on the Soviet flanks are

available forward to strike enemy targets in support of the land battle. Deterrence is there

fore strengthened by forward employment of our survivable, flexible theater strike forces

because additional uncertainty is forced into Soviet planning—sea-based nuclear weapons can be considered to be the ultimate mobile system.

Soviet writings, exercises and doctrine show that they do not intend to initiate nuclear

war at sea unless nuclear war already has been initiated on land. If they chose to do so,

our alerted, dispersed and mobile naval theater nuclear warfare forces are extremely

difficult to locate and attack. Soviet attempts could widen usage—hence escalation,

because our sea based forces could strike new targets deep in the Soviet Union from

multiple axes. This prospect of more U.S. nuclear counterattacks ashore is the prospect

which concerns them most. Hence, the threat of sea-based nuclear strike operations

can favorably influence the land battle as well as provide additional incentive to keep a

nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union limited.

• POLITICAL DECISIONS

• SOVIET STRATEGY

• NUCLEAR ESCALATION

• WAR TERMINATION

• DEFENSE FUTURE/TRENDS

KEY UNCERTAINTIES

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have considered five broad areas of uncertainty.

We assume approximately two weeks of warning time and a transition to global w

Difficult decisions will have to be made in an environment replete with uncertain

and ambiguity. In such a situation, the timeliness and decisiveness of political de

will be a major concern. Early forward positioning of naval forces can reinforce d

rence and signal firm commitment in the absence of full alliance political consen

The unpredictability of the Soviets is another uncertainty. Questions include the

tions to precursor crises, the role their surrogates might play, use of nuclear weap

and an early flush of their naval forces into the open ocean. National intelligence 

mates conclude that the Soviets will adopt an echelon defense strategy while still 

taining some out-of-area forces. The Maritime Strategy shows how one could lim

options available to the Soviets by moving our forces forward early, which would 

powerful disincentive to initially flushing large numbers of their forces into the o

ocean.

The Maritime Strategy addresses, predominantly, conventional war with the Sovi

Union because it seeks to offer non-nuclear alternatives and avoid escalation to n

war. The areas of uncertainty include the question of whether NATO can or will, 

fact, sustain a conventional war of long duration; whether Soviet technological

advances (e.g., improved submarine quieting) will result in modification or repla

ment of the bastion concept, and what effects the major change in the balance of 

among the Soviets and the U.S., the PRC, Japan, and South Korea will have on th

come of conflict in the Pacific theater.

How will the war be terminated? The duration of conflict, character of military o

tions during negotiations, and the transition from fighting to the “new peace” all

remain areas of uncertainty. The nature of any post-war environment is inherent

uncertain. The assumption is that whatever the outcome of a land campaign in N

Europe, the United States will endeavor to remain the dominant politico-military 

in both the Atlantic and Pacific theaters.

Finally, the world is changing rapidly, with major trends emerging which will alte

future global security environment. An overall smaller U.S. military force structu

may be dictated due to fiscal realities. At the same time, the security demands for 

forward presence and capability worldwide will increase, despite declining access 

overseas bases. Additionally, U.S. involvement in Third World and regional confl

will likely increase in the future. The Maritime Strategy recognizes these emergin

trends and will continue to evolve in this changing world. The flexibility, mobilit

versatility of maritime forces will continue to provide multiple options against d

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threats. Forward deployed naval forces, capable of applying discriminate force on a

global scale, bolster deterrence and reinforce our various commitments worldwide,

thereby enhancing global stability.

U.S. defense planning has centered for many years on a foundation of these three elements: nuclear deterrence, forward deployment of U.S. forces, and alliances with key

nations around the globe.

Two general planning scenarios have tended to dominate U.S. notions about the kind

of war we should plan to fight—as well as ideas about force structure development.

These scenarios focus primarily on:

• A massive, bolt-from-the-blue Soviet nuclear attack against many targets overseas

and in the U.S., and

• A massive conventional Warsaw Pact attack on Central Europe.

These two scenarios, no matter how they are refined or repackaged, do not adequately

take into account a world in which nuclear weapons are becoming relatively less and

less a factor in Soviet decision making and in which high technology weaponry is proliferating in a more regionally volatile world. Simply put, the two “worst case” scenario

listed above have led to a disproportionate focus on NATO’s Central Front. They have

fostered neglect of NATO’s flanks as well as critical areas outside of NATO. These

areas—in particular, the Pacific Basin, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America—wil

loom even larger in the future U.S. security environment.

CONTEMPORARY STRATEGIC THINKING

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The basic national strategy of forward-deployed forces, backed by strong reserve

maintenance of a credible nuclear threat to protect our allies will remain valid. B

long range strategy must take into account the realities of changing conditions an

threats.

Major trends emerging to alter the future security environment will change some 

fundamental assumptions upon which our national military structure has been d

oped. These trends include:

• A major shift in balance of economic power, as Asian economic growth rates

continue to outpace all others. And we know economic strength underpins mili

strength.

• As a result of virtual equivalence in nuclear capabilities, a form of nuclear gri

has evolved which has decreased the credibility of nuclear weapons. All trends

indicate, however, that such weapons, along with high tech accurate ordnance 

chemical weapons, will spread in the Third World.

• U.S. involvement in the more likely Third World and regional conflict scenari

likely to grow, resulting in increased diversion of U.S. security efforts and reso

• A reduced sense of threat, especially in Europe, is likely, where “glasnost” has b

most effective in reviving a spirit of detente. A weakening of military commitm

and vigilance in the Western alliance could result.

FUTURE GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

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proposals seek to limit the capability and mobility of U.S./NATO maritime forces.

These proposals aim at maintaining Soviet military advantages in ground forces

while negating NATO’s maritime edge and eliminating U.S. forward presence,

particularly in the Northern European region.

• Geopolitical realities will increasingly foreclose the overseas basing infrastructure

from which U.S. land and air forces operate, and

• Finally, fiscal constraints will beset U.S. and NATO defense budgets, in particular,

which will reinforce the imperative for a military force structure that is flexible and

capable of performing a variety of missions.

These changes and emergent challenges in the security environment will have enormous impact on basic American military strategy. The changing balance of world

power will mean that the Pacific will compete increasingly for U.S. commitments—

while at the same time the U.S. must be concerned that there is no erosion of our coupling to NATO. Instability and conflict in the Third World will require greater U.S.

involvement—while the declining access to overseas basing could, in general, force

greater limits on our range of options for land based force projection. The result is that

maritime forces may increasingly be called upon to ensure regional stability and protect U.S. worldwide interests.

The emerging security environment and U.S. strategic objectives have profound

implications for U.S. defense planning. U.S. strategic objectives will continue to

encompass the following:

• Deter war, and should deterrence fail, fight as far forward as possible.

• Foster robust alliances to preserve Western political identity and institutions,

maintain international stability, and prevent hostile domination of vital areas.

• NUCLEAR DETERRENCE REMAINS A BEDROCK REQUIREMENT

• MUST MAINTAIN WORLDWIDE LINKS TO ALLIES

• ENHANCED ALLIED SUPPORT/CAPABILITIES ESSENTIAL

• MUST EXPAND HORIZONS OF NATO AND PACIFIC ALLIES

• FLEXIBLE FORCE STRUCTURE REQUIRED

DEFENSE IMPLICATIONS

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ensure the continued economic health of that region is protected.

• Ensure global stability, especially in cases where Third World conflicts affe

Western interests.

Key defense implications are as follows:

It remains essential that deterrence of a U.S. (NATO)/Soviet (Warsaw Pact) confl

remains intact. Indeed, as we pursue the nuclear reductions intended by the INF 

and START negotiations (50 percent reduction in ICBMs/SLBMs), the importanc

survivable nuclear capability increases to help offset conventional force imbalance

to foreclose the possibility of nuclear blackmail by the Soviets or anyone else.

This imperative must be met in the face of declining access to overseas bases and 

flight rights. The U.S. must maintain secure links to allies worldwide in order to 

with the defense realities of increasing economic interdependency (particularly i

Pacific) and to reinforce/resupply smaller sized U.S. ground and air forces overse

when required. Enhanced allied support and capabilities will be essential to ensu

coalition capabilities are not diminished, particularly in an era of increasing fisca

straints. The U.S. must persuade our NATO and Pacific allies to confront change

global security environment from a unified alliance perspective. The fact is that e

outside the geopolitical “boundaries” of NATO (e.g., in Southwest Asia and the P

Basin) can have direct and dramatic impact on the alliance.

Finally, these defense implications should emphasize the requirement for a U.S. f

structure that is more mobile, flexible and interoperable. The capability for the wo

wide employment of joint forces, often on very short notice in the face of ambigu

MARITIME COMPONENT OF U.S. NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

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United States’ most recent uses of military force [THIS SECTION IS NEW] and must

not be allowed to atrophy. [END OF NEW SECTION]

The world environment will continue to undergo change—global military and economic power shifts will be increasingly affected by economic and social factors, particularly those emanating from the Third World. The strategic concepts embodied within

the Maritime Strategy will remain valid for U.S. National Security Strategy within this

complex global arena. Maritime forces are uniquely suited to provide the flexible

options needed by U.S. security interests.

In peacetime, crisis, and war, the Maritime Strategy provides a design for deterrence. It

describes the Navy’s view of how best to deploy the maritime forces that we have, using

their unique abilities to confront potential aggressors with a broad range of options for

military action at the conventional level. At the same time, the strategy recognizes the

continuing requirement to assure flexible response across the conflict spectrum,

including deployment of survivable, enduring nuclear forces at sea. The flexible strategic design to employ forces across a broad scope in geography, time, and intensity,

inherently complicates the Soviet strategic problem. Maritime forces offer a means to

preserve U.S. linkage with strong NATO defenses as we simultaneously contend with

the demands of diverse national commitments throughout the world.

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Maritime Strategy for the 1990s

This article appeared in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings on 1 May 1990,* ju

months before Admiral Carlisle Trost retired as Chief of Naval Operations. This w

last important official public statement about the Maritime Strategy, and it reflec

both the recent revisions to the classified versions of the strategy (see document 7) 

the first reactions to the changes in the world order.

At the time, the Soviet Union was pushing the United States for agreements on na

arms control, but American officials had varying reactions to this. Secretary of D

Richard Cheney in the new administration of President George Bush still saw the 

as the enemy, while the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powe

them no longer as the major threat they had been. By this time, it was clear that 

gress would not fund the plans for the six-hundred-ship navy. At the same time, t

Marine Corps had turned away from the world-war scenario, and the Command

General Alfred M. Gray, Jr., seeking more autonomy and equality for the Marine 

within the Department of the Navy, had moved the Marine Corps to thinking ab

third-world contingencies rather than general war.

Admiral Trost had this article prepared for his signature as a reaction to growing 

pressure for a “peace dividend” that some thought should be found in cutting the 

existing force structure. Significantly, this article was written after Admiral Trost 

become the first U.S. Chief of Naval Operations to visit and to lecture in the Sovi

Union, in October 1989. In this May 1990 article Trost was attempting to reach t

who neither fully understood nor appreciated the U.S. Navy’s continuing roles an

sions as an instrument for international stability and crisis control, even when th

threat was declining, the Berlin Wall was down, and the Warsaw Pact was beginn

collapse. As Trost explained, “I was determined to maintain our posture at a leve

would permit us to meet our continuing mission responsibilities.”†

DOCUMENT EIGHT

* Adm. Carlisle A. H. Trost, U.S. Navy, “Maritime Strategy for the 1990s,” U.S. Naval Instit

ceedings (May 1990), pp. 92–100.

† Adm. C. A. H. Trost, letter to Hattendorf, 2 September 2007.

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an outline and verbal instructions to the CNO Executive Panel staff (OP-00K), then

headed by Captain Michael McDevitt, who served as its director from September 1988 t

February 1990, and Captain James R. Stark, who was director from February 1990 to

May 1992.* This article was drafted at the CNO Executive Panel by staff officers who,

among other duties, had also prepared Trost’s annual posture statements and policy and

strategy papers.† By the time this article appeared, the available unclassified literature o

the Maritime Strategy was already quite widespread. ✒

We have all seen the images in the news media in recent months. They remind us that

the world is a constantly changing place. The U.S. Navy must change with it but guard

against changing too quickly.

Each week Eastern Europe seems to experience changes that just a year ago would have

been only distant hopes for the future: the democratization of previously totalitarian

regimes, the opening of the Berlin Wall, the new openness in international communications, the emergence of independent political parties, and the new tack in Soviet foreign and domestic policy. In addition, an emerging spirit of cooperation between East

and West offers the greatest opportunity to move beyond the Cold War since it began.

We have witnessed a declining perception of the Soviet threat, both at home and

among our allies, adding to the already strong desire to reduce the defense budget. We

cannot, however, afford to react precipitously to the euphoria that these events inspire.

We cannot forget that the United States faces a very real threat from regional conflicts,

international terrorism, narcotics, and a variety of other challenges that fall outside the

scope of the U.S.-Soviet balance.

Clearly, the nature of our political and military environment is changing, and we need

to examine closely how we will proceed as the United States moves into the 1990s.

From a naval perspective, one of the most important aspects of this examination is the

degree to which the Maritime Strategy will remain valid as a key component of our

national military strategy in a security environment shaped by continuing changes

overseas.

Although the Maritime Strategy has become a major topic of public discussion only in

the past few years, its origins predate the Cold War. While most notably associated with

a strategy for global war with the Soviet Union, the Maritime Strategy is designed to

support the entire spectrum of actions needed to represent U.S. global interests as a

maritime nation and a world superpower.

* E-mail messages from Rear Admiral McDevitt and Rear Admiral Stark to Hattendorf and

Swartz, dated August 2008.

† Trost, letter to Hattendorf.

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tions rather than a war plan. It is based upon three broad principles governing th

global employment of naval forces.

The first of these is deterrence. We want to convince any potential adversary that 

attack on the United States or our allies would result in unacceptable consequenc

the aggressor. This requires a strategic nuclear force, the capability to defend our

in a global conventional war, and a crisis-response capability to deal with lower l

of conflict that are localized or regional in nature.

Second is the principle of forward defense. It enhances deterrence by ensuring tha

naval forces are in a position to respond to crises quickly, and it maximizes our

response options should deterrence fail. Many of our allies and trading partners 

located on the periphery of the Eurasian landmass. If the United States is to part

effectively in the mutual defense of our own interests and those of our allies, it is

imperative that we have forces deployed in the regions where those interests lie.

Third, the strategy rests firmly upon a network of alliances. Since World War II, t

United States has established agreements with more than 40 countries—in Europ

in the Pacific—to provide mutual security. By defending our allies we defend our

Each individual nation benefits from the combined strength of all the alliance pa

Keeping a Watchful Eye . . . : Arguing for a strong defense in the face of the destru

of the Berlin Wall can seem like shouting into a strong wind. Yet the thawing of t

Cold War has been accompanied by other more sobering and tragic events such a

Tiananmen Square massacre; the murder of Marine Lieutenant Colonel William 

Higgins; the drug war; attempts to overthrow democratic governments and the d

cratic process in the Philippines, Panama, Colombia, and El Salvador; and contin

attacks by terrorists around the world. As we plan for the future, we need to cons

all aspects of the global political and economic environment.

Despite all the changes we see around us, certain facts endure. The United States 

essentially an island nation. It is the leader of a global maritime coalition for an a

of allies, trading partners, and political interests across the oceans. Global econom

interdependence is a fact of life. The majority of our trade routes, our economic 

political lifelines, are oceanic. Over 70% of our total trade by value and 99.7% of 

overseas export and import tonnage move by sea. Our economic well-being has b

made possible by and depends upon political stability.

Maintaining our maritime alliances will be increasingly important as power and 

ence become more diffuse globally. In the 1990s, the two superpowers will remai

first among equals, but they will not be as dominant as they have been. Political a

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systems will become more political than military in their orientation.

Low-intensity conflicts must be considered; they can involve protracted struggles or

sharp outbreaks of violence. They run the gamut from terrorism to regional wars with

limited objectives. As we saw in the Persian Gulf and are seeing today with drug interdiction efforts, regional conflicts affect our vital interests and those of our friends and

allies. We must be prepared to act in support of U.S. interests throughout the world if

we are to protect our citizens and economic prosperity.

The most worrisome aspect of the increasing diffusion of global political and military

power is the accompanying spread of high-technology weaponry. The availability of th

most modern weapons and the growth of indigenous arms industries add a new

dimension to the security calculations of these regional powers, and our own as well.

Today, 41 Third World nations collectively possess more than 250 attack submarines,

102 have antiship cruise missiles, 41 have a sophisticated naval mining capability, and

40 are arms producers.

The threat to U.S. and allied maritime interests is not exclusively naval. A number of

Third World nations that are potentially hostile to western interests are well situated to

pose a land-based maritime threat. Survival in such an environment requires advanced

electronics and weapon systems and does not allow the luxury of “low-mix” platforms.

The “hi-tech,” advanced military capability of the world’s nations is underscored by the

British experience in the South Atlantic and our own in the Persian Gulf.

The spread of arms technology becomes even more sobering in view of the development of nuclear and chemical weapons by emerging regional powers. By the year 2000,

at least 15 nations will be producing, or will have acquired ballistic missile technology,

and at least six are actively developing nuclear weapons. Fourteen now possess chemical weapons or the capability to produce them, and 11 more are suspected of developing the capacity. As the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War shows, some of

these nations are willing to employ such capabilities despite international

condemnation.

With or without superpower involvement, low-intensity conflicts will be increasingly

violent and involve high technology. The proliferation of sophisticated weapons worldwide means that the types of naval forces designed to prevail in the most technically

sophisticated and modern threat environment, exemplified by Soviet capabilities, are

increasingly the same types of naval forces required to fight anyone else. The main difference is in the number of ships and aircraft that must be brought to bear, rather than

their individual combat capability.

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national strategic focus in the past few years. The decrease in American access to 

and overflight rights around the world has further underscored the versatility an

capabilities of our naval forces. At the end of World War II, the United States had 

in about 100 countries; today we have bases in fewer than 40. Moreover, more red

tions are on the horizon in both Europe and the Pacific. As U.S. access to oversea

diminishes, naval forces and their afloat logistic support become increasingly im

tant. They can demonstrate military power without raising sensitive political issu

territorial sovereignty, a natural outgrowth of dependence upon overseas base an

overflight rights.

. . . And Our Powder Dry: From a military perspective, we must consider a potent

enemy’s capabilities as well as his intentions. This is especially true for naval force 

ning. We must respond to crisis and wartime tasking to a large extent with the sh

hand. The time required to build a modern warship (as much as seven years for a

nuclear-powered aircraft carrier) and our highly consolidated national shipbuild

industry would effectively preclude new-construction ships from joining the figh

any future war. Simply put, future wars will be “come-as-you-are” affairs for nav

forces.

The Soviet Union represents the most severe military threat addressed by the Ma

Strategy. As welcome as the possibilities presented by General Secretary Mikhail

Gorbachev’s restructuring and openness might be, prudence and history dictate 

we continue to gauge our strategy and war-fighting capabilities against this least 

but ultimately most potent threat.

The Soviet Union today possesses an impressive ocean-going navy that continues 

modernize. The most significant Soviet naval improvements have been in unders

warfare. Soviet submarine quieting and sensor improvements have dramatically

reduced our ability to localize and track their submarines. The tactical edge in an

marine warfare that we have enjoyed for the past three decades continues to erod

our first priority is to find the most effective means to counter the submarine thr

our sea lines of communication.

The Soviets are also improving in other areas. Their sea control capability is bein

enhanced by the development of better integrated air defenses, supported by new

cruiser, destroyer, and frigate classes that will join their fleet between now and 

year 2000. They are also building a new class of aircraft carrier which will carry h

performance fixed-wing jet aircraft in both fighter and attack configurations. Fin

the addition to the Soviet naval inventory of land-based Blackjack and improved 

fire bombers, Fencer fighter-bombers, and Mainstay AWACS (airborne warning a

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munication in both the Atlantic and the Pacific.

Thus, despite Soviet pronouncements of naval force cutbacks, Soviet naval capabilities

are improving. Under the guise of arms reductions, they are scrapping old units that

have limited military utility. Having addressed the problem of block obsolescence, the

Soviet Navy will emerge as a smaller, but thoroughly updated and modern force, more

sustainable and extremely difficult to defeat.

While we applaud the direction of recent political developments within the Soviet

Union, and find encouraging the Soviets’ pronouncements of a defensive national

strategy, intentions are influenced by both world and domestic events and can change

very quickly. We need to see where Soviet internal political developments lead, assure

ourselves that openness and democratization are permanent features of Soviet international behavior, and carefully assess both Soviet military capabilities and political

intentions before making any major course changes in our own maritime programs.

We must remember, as we have learned so many times in the past, that political intentions can change overnight, while naval force structure, once relinquished, takes much

longer to rebuild.

Aspects of Deterrence: The Maritime Strategy articulates in broad terms how American

naval forces are able to support national policy across this entire spectrum. While supporting nuclear deterrence, the strategy also provides a structured framework for the

day-to-day peacetime business of the Navy and Marine Corps—routine fleet deployments, exercises, and frequent response to regional and international crises. It integrates balanced fleet operations with our sister services and allies in peacetime to

achieve deterrence of conventional conflicts and, if deterrence fails, to fight a conventional war in a global context.

Nuclear Deterrence: Nuclear deterrence is the keystone on which the rest of our conven

tional strategy depends. Soviet doctrine leads us to expect that nuclear weapons would

be used at sea only in conjunction with their use in a land war. Nevertheless, other

nations also are capable of using nuclear weapons at sea, and current trends suggest

that such threats will continue to proliferate. Declaratory U.S. doctrine states that

enemy initiation of nuclear war at sea will not limit a U.S. response to the use of

nuclear weapons at sea, but may include their use against appropriate land targets.

Therefore, we expect naval forces to retain their critical role in both strategic and tactical nuclear deterrence for the foreseeable future.

The U.S. force of ballistic missile submarines is and will remain the most survivable leg

of the nuclear triad. As such, it is a significant factor in strategic stability. Fifty percent

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the total strategic force.

As we move with the Soviet Union to reduce our strategic nuclear arsenals, rema

nuclear forces must be cost-effective, survivable, flexible, responsive, and have ha

target kill capability. The fleet ballistic missile force satisfies all of these requirem

Similarly, U.S. naval forces also contribute to deterrence of theater nuclear warfa

through their ability to mount credible nuclear land strikes from the sea. We hav

persed strike assets that were previously concentrated only in manned aircraft on 

carriers. Today, submarines and surface combatants armed with nuclear-capable 

range cruise missiles are also available to support the strategy of flexible response

Guarding the Peace: The objectives of the peacetime posture of the U.S. Navy and

Marine Corps are to achieve deterrence, meet alliance and treaty commitments, s

port national diplomatic objectives, and to be ready for the rapid response essent

deal with any crisis. These global commitments and alliance responsibilities requ

substantial degree of forward naval presence to protect our interests in troubled 

Roughly one third of the fleet, with over 110,000 sailors and 30,000 Marines, is e

sea or forward deployed on an average day. Because these forces have the necessa

combat capability and are at a high level of readiness, we can influence events thr

out the world—as demonstrated in naval operations in the 1980s off Libya, Leba

and in the Persian Gulf.

Pressure to reduce defense spending has been a fixture in our budget debates for 

time; however, in the past it has been counterbalanced by the Soviet threat. A dec

ing Soviet threat would add impetus to budgetary pressures to reduce the size of 

military forces. Smaller naval forces will of necessity affect our deployment postu

Consequently, responding to the reduced Soviet threat, naval forces could be dep

within key overseas theaters to provide a nearly continuous flexible forward prese

Although military response times may be less prompt and involve an increased d

of risk, we believe this is acceptable in a worldwide environment of reduced supe

power tensions.

Additional factors, such as expansion of the naval services’ role in drug interdicti

a decrease in force levels to meet fiscal constraints, will require further adjustmen

our traditional forward-deployed global presence in order to maintain personne

bility and fleet readiness.

In the late 1970s, as we concentrated forces in response to events in Iran, the nuc

aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) spent 247 days of a 252-day

deployment at sea. This was an extreme case of what was happening throughout 

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lowed by short turn-around times resulted in equipment breakdowns, personnel turmoil, and a loss of experienced enlisted personnel at the end of their obligated service.

By the late 1970s we had a middle management shortfall of 22,000 petty officers, and

overall fleet readiness was only half of what it is today.

In order to avoid a repetition of that experience, we have established personnel and

operational requirements that define employment limits. The Secretary of Defense and

the Secretary of the Navy, recognizing that this policy ultimately preserves our personnel and warfighting readiness, strongly support these guidelines. The turn-around

ratios for forward-deployed units guard our most precious asset, our highly skilled and

trained naval personnel, but they also affect our ability to meet national peacetime

naval commitments.

Being There—the Value of Presence: Just as the forward presence of U.S. naval forces has

contributed to the deterrence of conflict with the Soviet Union, it has also enabled us

to promote regional stability throughout the world. This is especially apparent in the

Pacific. Apart from the primarily land oriented military stalemate on the Korean peninsula, the Pacific is essentially a naval and air theater. Since the Vietnam war, U.S. mili

tary presence there has been represented most visibly by forward deployed naval forces

Carrier and battleship battle groups, along with forward-deployed Marines, have come

to represent the commitment and resolve of the United States to preserve regional stability and freedom of the seas for all nations.

This role is distinct from the requirement to counter any potentially hostile naval

power in the Pacific. While Asian nations are concerned with the Soviets because of

geographical proximity, they are also concerned with purely regional issues. Local

objectives—unrelated to East-West issues—could disrupt the regional stability so necessary for the expansion of free markets and the growth of democracies. The countries

of the region accord substantial credit to the United States for having maintained a

potent and visible presence and thus fostering the Pacific basin stability needed for eco

nomic prosperity. The U.S. Seventh Fleet has played a crucial role in maintaining the

peace and security of the Western Pacific.

Crisis Response Roles and Capabilities: Despite the documented deterrent value of forward naval presence, crises do occur. As demonstrated so many times in the last 40

years, forward-deployed naval forces are particularly well suited for limiting the expansion of a crisis and facilitating a return to normalcy. They can move into position rapidly and in strength without violating any borders or raising national sensitivities over

territorial sovereignty. If the situation warrants, our Navy and Marine forces, in concer

with those of our allies and friends, can apply appropriate force to protect our

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ally without giving the appearance of retreat.

Naval forces have proven to be the military force of choice for Presidents in more 

50 crises in the last decade, and in nearly 200 instances since World War II. This r

sents more than 80% of the crises which the United States has faced during this p

In order to ensure that naval forces will be available to provide appropriate optio

crisis response, we have operated our fleets around key “deployment hubs” where 

majority of these crises have occurred: the Mediterranean, Western Pacific, India

Ocean, and Caribbean.

There is no indication that crisis response requirements in these crucial areas wil

diminish in the future. In fact, the move toward increasing politico-military

multipolarity and the expanding counter-narcotics effort may well increase nava

taskings. Overseas regional powers, terrorists, and drug smugglers would be bols

rather than deterred were we to withdraw naval forces from forward positions an

operate closer to home ports in the United States. Being present in the immediat

region enables naval forces to provide a timely response at the outset of future cr

Consequently, only by maintaining a balanced fleet that is forward deployed and 

bat ready can we fulfill the role of providing regional stability while preserving U

economic and foreign policy interests.

Combat Readiness . . . : When a crisis confronts the nation, the first question ofte

asked by policymakers is, “What naval forces are available and how fast can they 

station?” This requires that we maintain our forces in a high state of readiness, po

tioned as close to the scene of action as possible. Readiness is the key factor in th

equation. Sending units that are poorly trained, undermanned, or equipped with 

equately maintained, obsolete equipment is an invitation to disaster. Our forces m

not only be there, they must also be capable of conducting successful combat

operations.

In order to maintain high levels of readiness and combat capability, we actively p

pate in a host of joint and combined exercises. In fiscal year 1989, for example, U

naval forces participated in more than 300 major and minor exercises, of which 1

were joint exercises with other services and 121 were combined exercises with ou

and friendly navies. These strengthen alliance cohesion, enhance inter-operabilit

our allies and sister services, and improve combat effectiveness.

. . . And Capabilities: While we have had naval forces in the Persian Gulf continuo

since 1948, our recent operations there in response to the Iran-Iraq War served a

pointed illustration of naval capabilities in crises. Whether tracking air contacts 

the Gulf, escorting U.S.-flag tankers, sweeping mines, or engaging in military stri

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instrument of national policy.

Operations in the Persian Gulf before and after the 1987 decision to escort re-flagged

tankers were oriented around our forward-deployed naval forces, but significant

interservice cooperation and interoperability were hallmarks of the entire effort. Fleet

Marine Forces were represented by a special Marine air-ground task force embarked

aboard an air-capable amphibious ship. Army helicopters and Air Force AWACS, recon

naissance, and tanker aircraft contributed significantly to the success of the entire

operation.

International cooperation was also extensive. We worked well in coordinated operations with a number of our western allies. Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, and the

Netherlands all had military forces operating in the Persian Gulf. The North Atlantic

Treaty Organization duties of the deployed allied units were performed by other allies.

Examples of this maritime cooperation included the deployment of West German frigates to the Mediterranean and Norwegian minehunters to the North Sea.

This demonstration of how naval forces operate in distant locations, in support of air

and ground forces and in conjunction with allies, is a clear example of the flexibility

that the regional application of our global Maritime Strategy provides in times of crisis

and contingency response.

The Worst Conventional Case—Global War: Since the end of 1945, the United States

and its allies, despite numerous crises and regional conflicts, have been able to prevent

a major war with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. This very success has sometimes been used as an argument for reducing military forces and avoiding the necessity

to “think the unthinkable.” Nevertheless, the reality is that for the past four decades it

has been our strong military capabilities, the cohesion of our alliances, and our

strength of will that have preserved a world free from the horror of global war. We

must continue to maintain sufficient combat-ready forces to prevail in a major conflict

The degree to which we are able to do this is, in fact, the real measure of our future

deterrent capability.

The changes occurring today in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have lowered

superpower tension and hold the promise of achieving significant reductions in the

forces facing each other in Europe. These developments require a careful reassessment

of our defense planning in such areas as warning time, mobilization capability, reinforcement requirements, available base structures, and overall opposing force levels.

Yet, in looking at the nature of any potential or future major war, several elements will

remain constant.

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the only single power with the ability to threaten the continued existence of the U

States. Whatever the eventual level of Soviet military and naval forces, and howev

greatly the superpowers reduce their conventional and strategic nuclear forces in 

immediate future, the Soviet Union will almost certainly remain our most dange

potential adversary.

Second, the basic principles that have guided our naval war-fighting strategy thro

the Eighties will remain valid during the Nineties. This means reliance upon dete

rence, forward defense, and global coalition warfare. In the event of regional or g

conflict, U.S. and allied fortunes would continue to depend on our ability to con

the seas. Maritime forces would be relied upon to support and resupply our allie

deployed forces as far forward as possible. In any conflict, we would seek leverage 

achieve early favorable conflict resolution, while taking every measure to avoid c

the nuclear threshold unless such a step were forced upon us.

Maritime Superiority: While naval forces alone cannot win a war against a predom

nantly continental power, maritime superiority makes two contributions that are 

essary for victory by a maritime nation.

The first is that maritime superiority, and the unimpeded use of the seas which i

antees, provides a means of fighting a protracted conventional war overseas. Mos

cially, the sea-lanes must be kept open for the reinforcement and resupply of forw

deployed U.S. and allied ground and air forces. Successful forward sea control ca

secure sea lines of communications, and thereby ensure full access to global indu

and resources in order to fuel the wartime economies of the maritime coalition.

Second, maritime superiority enables us to deny an opponent the option of a sin

theater strategy in a global war. It would make no sense to allow an opponent to 

us at a point of his choosing without moving to threaten him in areas where he m

more vulnerable. Naval forces allow us to enforce the enemy’s isolation and expa

own strategic options. It is hard to imagine warships passing peacefully in the nig

while we are engaged in a shooting war ashore.

This does not imply that the Navy and Marine Corps would proceed simultaneous

forward maritime campaigns throughout the world’s oceans. We do not have suffic

forces to do that today, and we are unlikely to have them any time in the foreseea

future. Instead, we would concentrate our forces in sequential maritime campaig

order to exploit our own mobility and the vulnerabilities of any would-be enemy, w

in conjunction with our allies, keeping any adversary engaged wherever he may b

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vent enemy interdiction of our sea lines of communication, destroy his navy, and force

him into a defensive posture. In addition, the ability of naval power projection forces to

threaten large areas of an enemy’s homeland, whether or not they are ever actually

employed against it, ensures that he must tie down large numbers of forces in response

This limits his options to mass forces in support of main offensive and defensive

operations.

Naval operations in support of this forward strategy will require significant contributions from our allies and the other U.S. military services, particularly the Air Force.

Naval forces have operated in three traditional dimensions—air, surface, and undersea—and increasingly in space, which provides important new warfighting advantages.

The use of space will become more significant to the United States as other countries

enter this realm as users and potential competitors, and interservice cooperation will

be particularly important in this area. We will also rely heavily upon our allies in a host

of areas.

Just what does this mean for the actual wartime employment of our naval forces? In th

most basic terms, we must attempt to position our forces forward early—prior to any

hostilities, if possible. Forward positioning, combined with other measures, may extend

deterrence and forestall the outbreak of war. If deterrence fails, we must quickly gain

unfettered use of the seas once hostilities are initiated against us, in order to support

the land war and as a precursor to possible strike operations ashore.

The forward movement of our forces in the early stages of a crisis serves two purposes.

First, it adds to deterrence by signaling national political resolve, showing support for

local allies, and demonstrating readiness. Second, it gets our forces into position so

they are not caught in port during the critical early stages of a war, reduces our transit

times, severely complicates an enemy’s targeting problem, and ensures that we can

immediately begin to affect the course of the war.

If deterrence fails, we must establish sea control as far forward and as early as possible.

Control of the narrow seas through which an enemy must transit in order to reach the

open ocean is a strategic necessity, a force multiplier that exploits geography to our

advantage. At sea, the best defense remains a good offense. Taking the fight to the

enemy as far from our own shores as possible is a basic tenet of the Maritime Strategy.

We want any adversary to react to our initiatives, rather than the other way around.

Although often portrayed as separate from sea control, power projection and the initia

campaign to gain control of the seas are actually complementary and closely linked. Ai

strikes, forcible entry amphibious operations, and the destruction of the enemy fleet

and naval air arm are essential elements of the initial sea control campaign.

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and allied naval forces can step up the pace of their campaign against targets ash

Carrier battle groups will support the land battle, augmented by Marine Corps e

tionary aviation operating from forward land bases. In addition, Marine aviation 

mand and control assets can be used to integrate sea- and land-based tactical air 

adding depth ashore to the maritime operating area in both the sea control and p

projection missions. Air Force and allied tactical aircraft may also be available to 

plement these efforts.

The coalition warfare goal of these forward operations is the support of our expo

allies. An additional important advantage is their role in disrupting enemy time l

for the preplanned commitment of reserves. This diminishes his ability to concen

on a single theater of operations, and complicates his calculation of allied intenti

and force balance.

Strikes against the enemy’s homeland remain an option open to the President an

allied decision-makers. The far-reaching political and military ramifications of s

decision are obvious. Our potential to place an enemy’s homeland at risk in a con

tional conflict, and our publicly stated willingness to consider this option, are int

to reap significant strategic benefits. Regardless of whether we would ever decide 

employ such a capability, the enemy would be forced to allocate scarce resources 

protect its own exposed flanks. Most importantly, such a capability adds marked

deterrence.

Conclusion: This discussion began by asking whether the Maritime Strategy woul

remain valid during the coming decade in light of the momentous changes we se

occurring today. Without question, developments in Eastern Europe and the Sov

Union are encouraging and may drastically alter the politico-military environme

we have known since 1945. On the other hand, trends toward a more multipolar, 

tious, and turbulent political environment elsewhere in the world mean that we w

continue to face difficult challenges. Additionally, all this must be viewed against 

background of a tightened fiscal climate and severe budgetary strictures.

Our examination of the Maritime Strategy has established several salient points. 

the strategy is flexible. Rather than laying out a set course of action, it is a genera

frame of reference to guide our decisions in an uncertain future. Second, the stra

rests upon a solid bedrock of sound facts and principles that will remain valid ev

our political and economic surroundings change. Geography and geopolitics stil

mine our maritime character, deterrence and crisis management remain critical

national security imperatives, and our global ties and alliances still require that w

port our friends in distant regions. Finally, the military principles that have guid

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flexible forward deployments, and close cooperation with our allies as part of a global

coalition.

Maritime Strategy has helped to provide the security and stability we have enjoyed

these last 40 years, and has brought us to the beginning of a new era. As I look at this

next decade, I am convinced that the Maritime Strategy and the balanced forces we

have built to execute it provide a solid foundation for the future. Maritime superiority

has made the “strategic difference.” The Navy and Marine Corps of the 1990s continue

on watch, standing ready to protect the values and interests of the United States, our

allies, and friends into the next century.

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

A AAA antiair artillery

AAW antiair warfare

ABFC Advanced Base Functional Component

ADCON administrative control

ADGE Air Defense Ground Environments

AE afloat element [of MEF/MAB]

AEW air early warning

AGI intelligence collector (auxiliary) [Soviet]

ANZUS Australia, New Zealand, United States [alliance]

ARG amphibious ready group

ASAT antisatellite system

ASCM antiship cruise missile

ASM antiship missile

ASUW antisurface warfare

ASW antisubmarine warfare

ATSS auxiliary training submarine

AVCAL aviation consolidated allowance list

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

B BB battleship

BBBG battleship battle group

BBSAG battleship surface action group

BW biological warfare

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C C3 command, control, and communications

CASREP Casualty Report

CAST Canadian Air-Sea Transportable [Brigade]

CENTMED central Mediterranean Sea

CGN guided-missile cruiser (nuclear powered)

CINC [CinC] commander in chief

CINCEUR Commander in Chief, Europe

CINCLANT

[or USCINCLANT]

Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command

CINCLANTFLT Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet

CINCPAC Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command

CINCPACFLT Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

CINCUSNAVEUR Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe

CNO Chief of Naval Operations

CNOR command not operationally ready

COD carrier onboard delivery

COMIDEASTFOR Commander, Middle East Force

COMSEVENTHFLT Commander, Seventh Fleet

COMSIXTHFLT Commander, Sixth Fleet

CONMAROPS concept of maritime operations

CONUS continental United States

COR command operationally ready

CTOL conventional takeoff and landing

CV aircraft carrier

CVA attack aircraft carrier

CVAN aircraft carrier (nuclear powered)

CVBF carrier battle force

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CVV aircraft carrier (vertical takeoff)

CW chemical warfare

D DAS direct air support

DD destroyer

DE destroyer escort

DG defense guidance

DLG guided-missile frigate [destroyer leader]

DLGN guided-missile frigate [destroyer leader] (nuclear power

DON Department of the Navy

DPQ Defense Planning Questionnaire [NATO]

E EASTLANT Eastern Atlantic [NATO]

EASTMED eastern Mediterranean Sea

EMPSKD employment schedule

F FBM Fleet Ballistic Missile [program]

FER Fleet Employment Planning Operational Data Report

FLEETEX fleet exercise

FLEXOPS flexible operations

FLTCINC fleet commander in chief

FMS foreign military sales

FRG Federal Republic of Germany

FY fiscal year

FYDP Five Year Defense Program

G GIN [G-I-N] Greenland-Iceland-Norway [gap]

GLCM ground-launched cruise missile

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H HUMINT human intelligence

I I&W indications and warning

ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile

INDRON Indian Ocean squadron [Soviet]

INF Intermediate Nuclear Force

IO Indian Ocean

IOC initial operational capability

IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile

J JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

JSPD Joint Strategic Planning Document

L LAMPS Light Airborne Multipurpose System

LANT Atlantic [Ocean]

LANTCOM [U.S.] Atlantic Command

LCAC landing craft (air cushion)

LHA assault ship

LHD assault ship/dock landing ship

LIC low-intensity conflict

LLC lower-level conflict

LOC line of communications

LPD landing platform dock

LSD landing ship dock

M MAB Marine amphibious brigade

MAF Marine amphibious force

MAGTF Marine air-ground task force

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MC Military Committee [NATO]

MCM mine countermeasures

MDZ maritime defense zone

MEB Marine expeditionary brigade

MEF Marine expeditionary force

MEU Marine expeditionary unit

MIDEASTFORCE Middle East Force

MIW mine warfare

MK mark

MLSF Mobile Logistics Support Force

MNC major NATO contingency [or commander]

MOA memorandum of agreement

MOVREP Movement Report

MPA maritime patrol aviation

MPF Maritime Prepositioning Force

MPN Military Procurement (Navy) [account]

MPS Maritime Prepositioning Ship [or Squadron]

MSC Military Sealift Command

MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime

N NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAVFORSTAT Naval Force Status [report]

NCA national command authorities

NCAPS naval control and protection of shipping

NCCS Navy Command and Control System

NCS naval control of shipping

NIE national intelligence estimate

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NORLANT northern Atlantic Ocean

NPS naval protection of shipping

NRF Naval Reserve Force

NSDD national security decision directive

NSOF Naval Status of Forces [database]

NTPF Near-Term Prepositioning Force

NWP naval warfare publication

O O&M Operations and Maintenance [account]

OOB order of battle

OPAREA operating area

OPCON operational control

OPFLT operational fleet commander

OPLAN operations plan

OPNAV Navy Staff

OPTEMPO operational tempo

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

OTH-T over-the-horizon targeting

OVHL overhaul

P PAC Pacific [Ocean]

PACOM [U.S.] Pacific Command

PERSTEMPO personnel tempo

PG patrol gunboat

PGH patrol gunboat (hydrofoil)

PGM patrol gunboat (missile)

PHM patrol hydrofoil (missile)

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movement

PPBS Planning, Programming and Budgeting System

PRC People’s Republic of China

R R&D research and development

READEX readiness exercise

RE/RE resupply/reinforce

RFS ready for sea

RFT refresher training

RN Royal Navy [U.K.]

ROE rules of engagement

ROH regular overhaul

ROK Republic of Korea

S SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe [NATO]

SACLANT Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic [NATO]

SAG surface action group

SAM surface-to-air missile

SCN Ship Construction, Navy [account]

SDI Strategic Defense Initiative

SECDEF Secretary of Defense

SIGINT signals intelligence

SIMA shore intermediate maintenance activity

SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile

SLEP Service Life Extension Program

SLOC sea line of communication

SNA Soviet Naval Aviation

SOA speed of advance

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SOLANT South Atlantic

SOSS Soviet Ocean Surveillance

SOSUS Sound Surveillance System

SPECWAR special warfare

SPECWARGRU special warfare group

SS submarine (conventional)

SSBN ballistic-missile submarine (nuclear powered)

SSGN nuclear-powered guided-missile submarine

SSN attack submarine (nuclear powered)

START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

SUBROC submarine rocket

SWA Southwest Asia

T TACAIR tactical aviation

T-ACS crane ship [MSC]

TAD temporary additional duty

T-AGOS ocean surveillance ship [MSC]

T-AH hospital ship [MSC]

TAO [T-AO] oiler [MSC]

TAP [T-AP] transport [MSC]

TASM theater antiship missile

T-ATF fleet tug [MSC]

TFS tactical fighter squadron

TLAM-C theater land-attack missile (conventional)

TLAM-N

[TLAM/N]

theater land-attack missile (nuclear)

TYCOM type commander

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U UCP Unified Command Plan

ULMS Underwater Long Range Missile System

UNCLOS III Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea

URG underway replenishment group

USA U.S. Army

USAF U.S. Air Force

USCG U.S. Coast Guard

USMC U.S. Marine Corps

USN U.S. Navy

USNR U.S. Naval Reserve

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

V VISTA Volunteers in Service to America

VOD vertical onboard delivery

VP maritime patrol [squadron]

VSS VSTOL support ship

VSTOL [V/STOL] vertical/short takeoff and landing

W WESTMED Western Mediterranean Sea

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Index

A

AAW See anti-air warfare

ACCURATE TEST 157

Adak 37

Adriatic 41

Advanced Base Functional Components

(ABFC’s) 91

advanced bases 221

advanced logistic support bases 295

Advanced Technology Panel (ATP) 2

Aegis cruisers 13, 82, 265

Afghanistan 7, 236

afloat positioning ships 167

Africa 22, 56, 144, 210, 304

Africa south of the Sahara 10

Defense Guidance 25

agreements 146, 275

air defense 67, 113, 159

Air Force (U.S.) 3, 11, 15, 29, 35, 42, 43, 45, 63,

64, 83, 88, 100, 148, 158, 168, 172, 204, 206,

207, 219, 276, 293, 318, 321

USAF Memorandum of Agreement 65

Air Force Base

Anderson 16

Loring 16

air strikes 178

air superiority 159

airborne early warning 66, 159

aircraft 243

active, 1981–1988 13

aircraft carrier 63, 119, 190, 249

USS Coral Sea (CV 43) 254

USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69

USS Midway (CV 41) 254

USS Nimitz (CVN 68) 254

Alaska 25, 56, 244, 248, 296

Aleutian Islands 33, 34, 35, 39, 77, 158, 

172, 296

alliance cohesion 161, 207, 272, 284, 29

alliances 100, 146, 159, 275, 311

allied naval contributions

Australia 28, 66, 89, 159, 250

Denmark 28, 38, 127, 231

Greece 28, 32, 38, 41, 127

Italy 28, 32, 41, 76, 100, 170, 231, 29

New Zealand 28, 89, 159, 250

Turkey 28, 32, 38, 39, 41, 66, 76, 78, 

160, 170, 212, 216, 231, 259

United Kingdom 28, 66, 67, 68, 76, 

89, 127, 128, 133, 160, 169, 170, 186

318

allies 55, 58, 66, 81, 83, 100

America’s Cup 47

amphibious assault ships 13, 242

amphibious forces 29, 33, 36, 50, 84, 10

161, 221

amphibious ready groups 51, 119, 155, 

amphibious ships 11, 12, 30, 63, 66, 11

amphibious warfare 86, 132, 186, 220

Amphibious Warfare Strategy 105, 230

Anderson Air Force Base 16

Andreassen, Alf 2

Angola 208, 232, 236

Annapolis, Maryland 106

anti-air warfare 65, 67, 79, 82, 102, 176

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anti-SSBN campaign 205

antisubmarine warfare 79, 80, 81, 113, 115,

175, 216, 218, 266, 293, 298

Antisubmarine Warfare Strategy 227

antisurface warfare 65, 82, 113, 115, 177, 219

ANZUS Treaty 146, 275

applications of maritime power 154, 161, 282

Arabian Peninsula 10, 25, 40

Arabian Sea 85, 185

Arctic 80, 126, 167, 172

Argentina 89

ARGs See amphibious ready groups

arms control 9

Army (U.S.) 3, 11, 33, 45, 63, 64, 76, 88, 100,

148, 158, 168, 169, 172, 204, 207, 276, 293, 318

Asia-Pacific 9, 232

Aspin, Les 205

ASUW See antisurface warfare

ASW See antisubmarine warfare

ASWEX 49

Atlantic 28, 29, 39, 40, 48, 82, 88, 89, 120, 128,

170, 188, 216, 238, 248, 249

Eastern Atlantic 68, 170

North Atlantic 24, 41, 66, 68, 95, 106, 107,

159, 186, 216, 247

northeast Atlantic 156, 284

South Atlantic 248, 266, 278

attack submarines 63, 240

attrition 217

Australia 28, 66, 89, 159, 250

auxiliary support ships 11

AWACS (airborne warning and control

system) 158, 313

Azores 30, 77, 158, 169

B-52 43, 97, 158

Badolato, Edward 106, 107

Baldwin, John A. 19

BALIKATAN/TANGENT 49

Ball, William L., III 8

ballistic missile nuclear submarine 11, 12, 97,

113, 151, 155, 172, 197, 280, 292

SSBN force 301

ballistic-missile defense 9

ballistic-missile submarines 11, 211, 218, 251

Baltic Sea 28, 37, 38, 60, 67, 73, 76, 82, 106,

111, 134, 150, 166, 170, 177, 219, 247, 290

BALTOPS 157

Barber, James A., Jr. 203

Barents Sea 130, 240

Barnett, Roger W. 45, 46, 47, 204

Barre, Siad 7

Barrow, Robert H. 14, 19, 21

baseline strategy 48

bastion 303

battle group 36, 155, 291, 316

battleship 12, 26, 63, 119, 242

battleship surface action groups 10

BB See battleship

BEACON FLASH 157

BEACON SOUTH 49

Bekaa Valley 7, 224

Belgium 318

BENELUX 134

Bennett, Charles E. 205

Berlin Wall 311

BGM-109G Gryphon ground-launched cruise

missiles 9

bibliography 5, 203

Black Sea 28, 37, 38, 73, 111, 134, 150, 166,

170, 219

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Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:33:31 AM
blockade 214, 232

Bosphorus 134

Bradley, Omar N. 230, 234

Brazil 89

BRIGHT STAR 49, 157

Brooks, Linton F. 2, 5, 204, 205

Brooks, Thomas A. 2

Brown, Richard “Mitch” 270, 271

budget 45, 138, 139, 227, 236, 246, 256, 258, 259

DoD 8, 10, 239, 301, 356

Navy 10, 11

Bulgaria 60, 150

Bulgarian Navy 111

Burma 6, 51

Bush, George H. W. 3, 7, 8, 271, 309

Byron, John 5

C

Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam 6, 210

Cambodia 236

Canada 77, 89, 169, 248

Canadian 77

capabilities 317

Caribbean 24, 30, 43, 48, 56, 82, 89, 128, 144,

156, 162, 177, 188, 209, 210, 247, 248, 266, 278,

286, 317

Carlucci, Frank C., III 8

carrier 12, 27, 66, 83, 159, 316

Nimitz class 13, 254

carrier air wings 11, 75, 124

carrier battle forces 81, 85, 219

carrier battle group 10, 20, 26, 27, 29, 31, 36,

39, 40, 45, 50, 51, 161, 220, 240, 251, 266, 321

carrier onboard delivery (COD) 92

carry the fight to the enemy 85, 86, 113, 115, 123,

132, 133, 185, 186, 189, 215, 221, 241, 299, 300

Carter, Jimmy 11

Center for Naval Analyses 2

Center for Naval Warfare Studies 228

Central America 9, 24, 51, 56, 162, 209

286

Central Command See U.S. Central

Command

Central Europe 65, 69, 78, 136, 217, 21

239, 240, 304

Central Front 24, 46, 107, 192, 219, 221

Chad 209

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 8

46, 230, 309

See also individual names

Crowe, William J., Jr. 8

Jones, David C. 8

Powell, Colin 8, 309

Vessey, John W., Jr. 8, 20, 46

Cheney, Richard B. 8, 309

Chernavin, Vladimir 6

Chief of Naval Operations 3, 8, 9, 10, 1

20, 45, 105, 106, 137, 267

See also individual names

Hayward, Thomas B. 3, 8, 14, 15, 46

Kelso, Frank B., II 8

Trost, Carlisle A. H. 1, 5, 8, 20, 30, 2

269, 270, 309

Watkins, James D. 1, 8, 14, 19, 21, 4

105, 137, 138, 203, 205, 206

Chief of Naval Operations’ (CNO) Exec

Panel (OP-00K) 20, 204, 260, 310

Chief of Naval Operations’ (CNO) Stra

Studies Group 46

Chief of Naval Operations, Office of th

Naval Warfare, Office of (OP-95) 2

Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603

45, 105, 107, 137, 270

Strategic Plans, Office of (OP-60) 4

“Team Charlie” in the Office of the 

of Naval Operations (OP-009J) 2

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Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:33:31 AM
009J) 16, 26, 137

Chile 89

China 6, 92, 101, 174, 192, 260, 295, 296, 303

Chinese 70, 123

choke points 86, 90, 102, 125, 127, 179, 187, 218

CINC See Commander in Chief

CINCLANT See Commander in Chief,

Atlantic Fleet

CINCPAC See Commander in Chief, Pacific

Fleet

CINCUSNAVEUR See Commander in Chief,

United States Naval Forces, Europe

Clausewitz, Carl von 258

Claytor, Graham 3

Clemenceau, Georges 246

CNO Executive Board 47

coalition defense 274

coalition warfare 58, 109, 200

Coast Guard (U.S.) 4, 11, 13, 15, 75, 89, 90,

148, 168, 179, 188, 206, 207, 208, 217, 276, 292

coastal defense 90, 169

COBRA GOLD 49, 157

Cold War 6, 259

COLD WINTER 157

Colombia 311

combat readiness 317

combatant repositioning steaming times 216

command, control, communications, and

intelligence 221

C3

I countermeasures 180

command relationships 10

Commandant of the Marine Corps 14, 20,

105, 270

Commander in Chief 145

fleet commanders in chief 20, 138

Fleet Commanders in Chief Conference

20, 137

Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet 3, 29, 33,

46

Commander in Chief, United States Naval

Forces, Europe 31

Commander in Chief, U.S. Space Command

16

Commander in Chief, U.S. Transportation

Command 16

commerce 110

Defense Guidance 26

Commerce, Department of 16

complexity of modern naval warfare 222

Composite Warfighting Concept 13

Concept of Maritime Operations

(CONMAROPS) 147, 274

Congress 7, 106, 256, 264, 298

Congressional Budget Office 256, 257

construction battalion 86, 134, 171

contingency response 282, 285

conventional 163

conventional deterrence 282

conventional forces 55, 141, 190

conventional war 287, 301, 303

convoy 30

Convoy Strategy 31

Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower

A (October 2007) v, 4

Coral Sea (CV 43) 254

counter offensive operations 23

counterdrug operations 15

countermeasures

C3

I 180

mine 66, 90, 124, 168, 220

counter-offensive 25

crane ships 16

crisis response 50, 51, 52, 118, 121, 139, 141,

161, 162, 213, 214, 215, 316, 318

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Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:33:32 AM
cruise missile 302

cruiser 12, 63, 66, 119, 159

Ticonderoga class 13

Cuba 7, 9, 24, 31, 42, 82, 83, 85, 95, 99, 100,

176, 178, 185, 208, 210, 232

Cuban Missile Crisis 215

CVBG See carrier battle group

CVW See carrier air wings

D

Dardanelles 127, 134

defense

ballistic-missile 9

offshore 6

Defense, Department of 204

defense budget 8, 10, 259, 301, 306

Defense Guidance 21, 22, 54, 55, 56, 71, 110,

117, 142, 144, 145, 186, 274

Africa 25

allies 23

commerce 26

forward deployment 23

NATO 24

Navy force planning 26, 144

nuclear forces 23

Pacific 25

Southwest Asia 25

Western Hemisphere 24

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

See Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of

Denmark 28, 38, 127, 231

deployment 196, 283

deployment hubs 317

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Energy (1985–

89) 107

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans,

Policy, and Operations) (OP-06) 5, 19, 45, 138

Operations 105

Deputy Director of the Strategy, Plans a

Policy Division (OP-60) 137

destroyer 12, 63, 66, 119, 159

Spruance class 13

detente 305

deterrence 35, 36, 58, 69, 109, 113, 116

141, 142, 154, 155, 161, 163, 168, 170, 1

184, 190, 192, 200, 207, 214, 215, 217, 2

227, 239, 258, 266, 272, 284, 288, 290, 2

294, 302, 306, 311, 320

aspects of 314

conventional 282

nuclear 141, 297, 306, 314

deterrence or transition to war 114

DG See Defense Guidance

Diego Garcia 16, 88, 167, 236

diplomacy 154

Director of Naval Intelligence 60, 111

Director of Naval Warfare 227

Director of Navy Program Planning (O

260

DISTANT DRUM 49

DISTANT HAMMER 157

Djibouti 66, 160

doctrine 243

Dominican Republic 244

DPQ 145

drug smugglers 317

drug trafficking 4

drug trafficking threats 271

Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) 315

E

E-2C 265

East Asia 85, 89, 185

East German 111

East Germany 60, 150

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Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:33:32 AM
EASTLANT See Atlantic

economic power 305, 308

economic shipping 88, 189

Egypt 10

El Salvador 311

electronic warfare 65

enemy’s capabilities 313

English Channel 170, 240

equipment shortages 102

Erickson, John 235

escalation 36, 197, 214, 223

escalation control 163, 184

Ethiopia 210, 232, 236, 247

Europe 9, 29, 30, 39, 58, 76, 77, 88, 185, 187,

189, 210, 240

European theater 8

exercise 49, 120, 139, 206, 224, 247, 253, 284

exercise areas 212

Exxon Valdez 15

F

F-14 265

F-14/E-2C 265

F/A-18 C/D aircraft 14, 257

Falklands 52, 67, 224

Far East 123

Fifth Fleet 250

flank areas 70, 304

FLASH PH III 49

Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, Warfighting 14

Fleet Operational Intelligence Office 2

FLEETEX 247

FLEETEX 83-1 49

flexibility 52, 245, 266, 272

flexible force structure 306

flexible response 96, 124, 235, 302

Foley, Sylvester 19

force allocation 29

Atlantic 29

Europe 29

Pacific 29

SWA 29

force employment 39

Atlantic 39

Pacific 39

force levels 59

force losses 102

force planning 26

force planning goals 117

force posture 108

force structure 10, 43

Forces Command 10

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 146

Forrest, Nathan Bedford 265

Fortress America 261

forward bases 127

forward defense 30, 109, 142, 200, 207, 272

Norway 30

forward deployment 74, 214, 216, 217, 272

forward logistics 294, 295

forward movement 291, 320

forward operations 28, 218

forward presence 161, 306

forward protection 114

France 28, 66, 67, 76, 81, 82, 85, 89, 100, 159,

160, 176, 185, 318

French 100

frigate 11, 12, 63, 66, 119, 159, 247

Perry class 13

“ . . . From the Sea” 107

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Garrett, Henry L., III 8

general purpose forces 63

geography 62, 69, 113, 175, 246, 321

geopolitics 250, 306, 321

Georgetown University 204

Germany 38, 76, 82, 170, 177, 219

Gibraltar 32, 170

glasnost 277, 305

GLCMs See BGM-109G Gryphon groundlaunched cruise missiles

global

coalition 142

conventional war 50, 53, 118, 213, 282, 288

economic interdependence 311

forward deterrence 35

forward movement 292

Global War Game 106

movement of maritime forces 293

partnerships 275

security environment 305

view 261

war 188, 303, 318

goals 109

Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization

Act of 1986 3, 10

Gorbachev, Mikhail 6, 313

Gorshkov, Sergei 6

Gray, Alfred M. 14, 270, 309

Gray, Colin 235

Greece 28, 32, 38, 41, 127

Greenland 28, 128

Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom Gap 253

Grenada 7, 9, 51, 121, 224, 244, 276

Guam 33, 34, 43, 88

Gulf of Mexico 48, 89, 188, 247, 248

Gulf wars 15

Haiti 7

Harpoon (missile) 177

Harrington, Phil 105

Harris, R. Robinson 205

Hattendorf, John B. v, 5

Haver, Rich 2

Hawaii 25, 33, 56

Hayes, John B. 15

Hayward, Thomas B. 3, 8, 14, 15, 46

Higgins, William R. 311

high-endurance cutters 75

Hokkaido 106

homeland 36

Honduras 244

Hong Kong 210

Hormuz 127

hospital ships 11

House Armed Services Committee 20, 2

House Subcommittee on Seapower and

Strategic and Critical Materials 138

humanitarian assistance 4, 7, 11, 271

I

I&W See indications and warning

Iceland 9, 28, 29, 30, 37, 77, 128, 158, 1

253, 295

Inchon 230, 242

Indian Ocean 4, 13, 28, 34, 40, 41, 43, 4

73, 77, 82, 85, 89, 95, 144, 156, 160, 165

177, 185, 186, 188, 209, 216, 217, 238, 2

266, 278, 284, 286, 290, 317

indications and warning 65, 195

INF treaty See Intermediate Nuclear Fo

Agreement

initiative 70

intelligence 20

intelligence gathering ships 83, 177

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Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:33:32 AM
Intermediate Nuclear Force Agreement 9, 307

International Seapower Symposium v

International Security 204

inter-theater air logistics support 92

Invincible class 254

Iowa (BB 61) 242

Iran 7, 9, 40, 236, 295, 317

Iraq 7, 9, 317

IRBMs See Pershing II intermediate-range

ballistic missiles

Israel 10, 102

Italy 28, 32, 41, 76, 100, 170, 231, 295, 318

Iwo Jima 242

J

JADE TIGER 49

Japan 33, 35, 38, 39, 51, 66, 76, 77, 78, 83, 89,

92, 100, 106, 127, 159, 160, 174, 178, 212, 216,

250, 295, 296, 303

Japan-U.S. Treaty 146, 275

Japanese 34, 66

Johnson, T. J. 137

Johnson, W. Spencer, III 20, 45, 46

Joint Chiefs of Staff 8, 10, 20, 46, 93, 208, 224,

230, 255, 309

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 42, 57, 71, 72,

142, 145

joint strategic planning document 54, 94, 109,

142

Jones, David C. 8

JSCP See Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

JSPD See joint strategic planning document

Jutland 39, 107, 127

K

KAL-007 15

Karber, Phillip 204

Kelley, P. X. 1, 14, 105, 203, 205, 230

KERNEL POTLATCH 49

KERNEL USHER 49, 157

Khe Sanh 242

Khrushchev, Nikita 231

Kim Il Sung 6

Kime, Stephen 2

Kola Peninsula 134, 216, 236

Korea 6, 34, 35, 36, 39, 51, 66, 77, 83, 85, 89,

92, 133, 160, 169, 178, 185, 192, 250, 295, 296,

303

Republic of Korea–U.S. Treaty 146, 275

Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of 9, 25,

39, 95, 99, 174, 208, 210

Korean Airlines flight KAL-007 15, 51

Korean Conflict 230

Korean War 234

Kurile Islands 39, 106

Kurth, Ronald J. 5

L

land battle 39, 85, 92

land/air battle 78

landing craft air cushion 243, 245

Larson, Charles R. 270

Latin America 22, 24, 89, 189, 304

LCAC See landing craft air cushion

Lebanon 9, 51, 121, 244

Lehman, John F., Jr. 1, 2, 3, 8, 16, 19, 20, 21,

203, 205, 206, 224, 246, 266, 269

leverage 300

LHAs See amphibious assault ships

Library of Congress 256

Libya 7, 9, 15, 28, 32, 41, 51, 83, 85, 95, 99,

100, 178, 185, 208, 210, 232, 262, 265, 276, 282

Liddell Hart, B. H. 237, 245

Life on the Mississippi 260

limited war 50, 118, 213, 282

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Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:33:32 AM
logistic support forces 221

logistics 91, 106, 171, 294

Long, Robert 46

Loring Air Force Base 16

lower level conflict (LLC) 283

low-intensity conflict (LIC) 237, 282, 286,

287, 305

Lusitania 263

Lyons, James A. 5, 138

M

MAB See Marine amphibious brigade

MacArthur, Douglas 230, 264

Madeira 30

MAF See Marine amphibious force

MAGTF See Marine air-ground task force

Mahan, Alfred Thayer 203, 226

maldeployment 162, 164

Management and Budget, Office of 16

Maness, Anthony 260

Manila Pact 146, 275

manpower strength 13

Manthorpe, William H. J., Jr. 2

MARDEZ See Maritime Defense Zone

Marine air-ground task force 229, 231, 243

Marine amphibious brigade 11, 85, 86, 126,

167, 220, 236

Marine amphibious force 11, 63, 119, 221, 239

Marine amphibious unit 119, 238

Marine Corps (U.S.) 3, 11, 13, 14, 29, 33, 39,

40, 41, 74, 75, 83, 107, 172, 207, 235, 271, 292,

315

Marine Corps Combat Development

Command 15

Marine Corps Development and Education

Command 15

Marine Corps Headquarters 106

Marine Corps War College 15

Marine expeditionary units 14

Maritime Administration’s Ready Reser

Force 16

Maritime air 218

Maritime Defense Zone 15, 90, 148, 16

173, 174, 179, 187, 208

maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) 159, 17

247

Maritime Prepositioning Force 16

Maritime Prepositioning Ships 86, 88, 

133, 186, 238, 292

Maritime Superiority 57, 319

Marryott, Ronald F. 47

MAU See Marine amphibious unit

MC 14/3 147

McConnell, James M. 2

McDevitt, Michael 310

McDonnell Douglas 257

McKee, Kinnard R. 2

MDZ See Maritime Defense Zone

Mearsheimer, John J. 204, 205

Mediterranean 11, 28, 32, 40, 41, 46, 48

68, 73, 76, 82, 85, 88, 95, 106, 128, 156, 

165, 177, 185, 209, 216, 217, 240, 248, 2

290, 317, 318

merchant shipping 17, 293

merchant ships 60, 81, 88, 150

MEUs See Marine expeditionary units

Mexico 248

Middle East 7, 52, 89, 162, 189, 232, 24

286, 304

Middle East Force (MIDEASTFORCE) 

250

Midway (CV 41) 254

military airlift 210

Military Airlift Command 92, 100

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Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:33:32 AM
Military Sealift Command 10, 16, 87, 88, 133,

182

military shipping 182

Mindanao 6

mine countermeasures 66, 90, 124, 168, 220

mine countermeasures ships 11, 134, 159,

318

mine warfare 28, 37, 38, 65, 79, 80, 86, 113,

115, 179, 194

Mine Warfare Command 220

minesweepers 75, 168, 247

Missile Technology Control Regime 9

MIW See mine warfare

mobile, flexible forces 166

mobile LOG 66, 159

mobile naval forces 286

mobility 52, 156, 214

mobilization 189

Moreau, Arthur 19, 45, 46

Morgan, Thomas 206

movement 167

movement of forces 74

Moynihan, Patrick 262

MPF See Maritime Prepositioning Force

MPS See Maritime Prepositioning Ships

MSC See Military Sealift Command

MTCR See Missile Technology Control Regime

Mustin, Henry C. 270

MV-22A 243

Myers, Albert C. 138

N

National Defense Reserve Fleet 16, 87, 88, 182

National Defense Strategy 262

National Intelligence Estimate 9, 60, 111, 151,

152, 279

NIE 11-15 99

206, 207, 224, 233, 237, 244, 274

National Security Act of 1947 234

national security decision directives (NSDDs)

54, 142, 274

NSDD-28 16

NSDD-32 (20 MAY 82) 21, 22, 55, 143

National Security Review (NSR) 271

National Security Strategy See U.S. National

Security Strategy

national strategy 54

NATIONAL WEEK 157

NATO 6, 8, 14, 22, 24, 31, 37, 42, 46, 56, 66, 96

144, 147, 159, 169, 217, 219, 231, 239, 240, 241

247, 248, 249, 253, 275, 280, 293, 297, 298, 299

303, 306, 307, 318

Defense Guidance 24

Standing Naval Forces 75, 170

Naval Control and Protection of Shipping

(NCAPS) 188

naval control of shipping (NCS) 90, 168,

188

Naval Doctrine Publication 1 (1994) 4

naval fleet auxiliary force 16

Naval Institute 206

Naval Intelligence, Office of 2

Naval Intelligence Detachment 2

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 92

Naval On-call Force, Mediterranean 76, 170

naval protection of shipping (NPS) 89, 188

Naval Space Command 16

Naval Special Warfare Command 10

Naval Strike Warfare Center (“Strike

University”) 224

naval surface fire support 124, 134, 242

Naval War College 5, 20, 46, 106, 224, 228

Naval War College Review 5

Naval Warfare 4

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Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:33:32 AM
roles of the 4

Navy Discussion Groups 2

Navy force planning 26, 144

Navy planning guidance goals 26

Navy Policy Book (1992) 4

Navy Program Planning 19, 20, 138, 270

Navy–Coast Guard board 15

Navy’s Combat Logistics Force 16

Near-Term Prepositioning Force (NTPF) 88

Netherlands 66, 76, 160, 169, 170

neutrals 101

New Jersey 157

New Zealand 28, 89, 159, 250

Nicaragua 247

NIE See National Intelligence Estimate

Nimitz (CVN 68) 254

Nimitz, Chester 264

Nimitz class 13

Nixon Doctrine 235

non-aligned states 102

nonstate actions 271

North America 22, 56, 144

North Atlantic Treaty 146, 275

North Korea See Korea, Democratic People’s

Republic of

North Sea 185, 249

Northeast Asia 219

Northern Flank 204, 239, 240, 248, 249, 253

Northern Fleet Forces 28

NORTHERN WEDDING 247

Norway 9, 28, 29, 30, 36, 39, 46, 66, 75, 77, 78,

83, 101, 126, 128, 130, 160, 167, 169, 170, 174,

178, 192, 212, 216, 231, 239, 244, 249, 254, 295,

298, 318

Norwegian Sea 85, 110, 130, 145, 185, 240,

247, 248, 249, 253

decision directives (NSDDs)

nuclear

attack 304

balance 225

deterrence 141, 297, 306, 314

escalation 302

land attack missile 63, 157, 190, 302

proliferation 6

reserve 36

war 96, 211, 213, 282, 287, 301

weapons 190, 197, 223, 304

nuclear-powered attack submarines 10

126, 247, 255, 292

SSN barriers 37

O

OCEAN SAFARI 49, 157

OCEAN SAFARI 85 253

Ocean Surveillance (T-AGOS) ships 16

O’Donnell, Hugh K. 203, 204, 205, 230

offensive mining 83, 178

“Offshore Defense” 6

Ohio class 13

oil 22, 25, 35, 41, 56, 86, 87, 88, 144, 18

248, 297

Olympics 233

Oman 41, 244

operating tempo 209

Operation EARNEST WILL 15

Operation PRAYING MANTIS 16

OPNAV See Chief of Naval Operations

of the

options 131, 133, 178

orders of battle 150

Osprey 243, 245

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Pacific 4, 22, 28, 29, 33, 34, 39, 40, 48, 58, 68, 88,

89, 128, 144, 188, 238, 240, 248, 250, 303, 304

Defense Guidance 25

North Pacific 95, 120, 156, 248, 266, 284

northwest Pacific 82, 85, 106, 110, 145,

185, 186, 232

South Pacific 266

western Pacific 11, 156, 209, 216, 217, 250,

284, 286, 317

Pacific allies 56

Pacific Fleet See Commander in Chief, Pacific

Fleet

Pakistan 10

Panama 9, 215, 311

Panama Canal 24, 86, 186, 216, 294

Parker, T. Wood 137, 138

passive acoustic detection 267

patrol craft 12, 247

Patrol Hydrofoil Squadron 167

patrol squadrons 63, 75

Paulson, Thomas 270

peace dividend 309

peacetime

deployments 52

exercises 157

naval commitments 155

posture 158, 282, 315

presence 48, 50, 118, 119, 154, 155, 213

People’s Liberation Army Navy See China

People’s Republic of China See China

perestroika 277

Perry class 13

Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic

missiles 9

Persian Gulf 9, 10, 25, 41, 209, 210, 236, 248,

250, 276, 282, 284, 286, 312, 317, 318

personnel strength 14, 103

Philippines 6, 43, 244, 250, 262, 296, 311

Philippine-U.S. Treaty 146, 275

Planning, Programming and Budgeting

System (PPBS) 274

Poland 60, 111, 150

POM See program objective memorandum

port visits 50, 119, 160, 213

ports 31

Powell, Colin 8, 309

power projection 145, 297, 299

power projective options 287

PRC See China

presence 282

President 8, 207, 265

Bush, George H. W. 3, 7, 8, 271, 309

Reagan, Ronald 3, 7, 8, 9, 11, 15, 206, 257

Presidential National Security Strategy Review

10

Proceedings 1, 2, 14, 206, 309

Program Appraisal, Office of 4, 205

program development 227

Program Development Review Committee 20, 47

program objective memorandum 19, 140

Program Objectives Memorandum 1986 45

programs 259

“Project Sea Strike” 46

protection of coastal SLOCs 169

Puerto Rico 30

Q

quarantine 214

R

Rainbow, Fred 2, 206

Rainbow plans 264

Rapid Deployment Force 236

READEX 247

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Ready Reserve Fleet 87, 182

Ready Reserve Force 17

Reagan, Ronald 3, 7, 8, 9, 11, 15, 206, 257

Red Sea 10, 224

research and development 120, 254

reserve forces 217

resource allocation 22

RIMPAC 120, 157

Rio Pact 146, 159, 275

risks 136

Roberts, Casey 105

roles of the U.S. Navy See U.S. Navy, roles of

Romania 60, 111, 150

Roosevelt, Theodore 252

Rosenberg, David Alan 5

Roughead, Gary v

Royal Air Force 67, 68

rules of engagement (ROE) 82, 177

S

Sakhalin Island 106, 134

Saudi Arabia 77, 170

Scandinavia 106, 107

scenario 39, 58, 144, 145, 224, 266, 304

SDI See Strategic Defense Initiative

sea control 40, 61, 92, 93, 112, 152, 165, 167,

183, 279, 280, 296, 297

sea denial 61, 112, 152, 165, 167, 279, 290

sea lines of communication (SLOCs) 70, 79, 86,

115, 125, 168, 174, 182, 211, 263, 280, 296, 301

Sea of Japan 28, 38, 128, 134

Sea of Okhotsk 28, 107, 134

SEA PLAN 2000 3, 46

Sea Power 21 (2002–2003) 4

sealift 26, 72, 75, 87, 145, 165, 171, 210, 217,

294, 296, 297

Seaquist, Larry 5, 105, 106, 137, 138

Secretary of Defense 8, 207, 265, 309, 3

See also individual names

Carlucci, Frank C., III 8

Cheney, Richard B. 8, 309

Weinberger, Caspar 8, 9, 47, 206

Secretary of the Navy 8, 20, 217, 266, 3

See also individual names

Ball, William L., III 8

Claytor, Graham 3

Garrett, Henry L., III 8

Lehman, John F., Jr. 1, 2, 3, 8, 16, 19

21, 203, 205, 206, 224, 246, 266, 269

Webb, James H., Jr. 8, 269

seize the initiative 78, 80, 81, 82, 83, 11

115, 123, 131, 163, 175, 176, 177, 178, 1

182, 183, 184, 215, 217, 240, 296, 299

Senate Armed Services Committee 47, 

sensitivities 153

sequential operations 40, 55, 85, 95

Service, James E. 5

Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) 

Seventh Fleet 250, 251, 316

Shapiro, Sumner 2

ship force levels 12

amphibious 12

auxiliary 12

battleships 12

carriers 12

command ships 12

cruisers 12

destroyers 12

frigates 12

mine warfare 12

patrol 12

SSBNs 12

submarines 12

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surface warships 12

total active, 1981–90 12

ships

amphibious 11, 12, 30, 63, 119, 242

amphibious assault 13, 242

auxiliary support 11

crane 16

hospital 11

mine countermeasures 11, 134, 159, 318

Navy Combat Logistics Force 16

Nimitz class 13

Ocean Surveillance 16

patrol hydrofoil 167

Perry class 13

prepositioning 87

Spruance class 13

surface 12, 190

T-ACSs 16

T-AGOS 16

Tarawa class 13

Ticonderoga class 13

show of force 50, 118, 213, 282

Sicherman, Harvey 205

six-hundred-ship Navy 1, 10, 20, 203, 223,

246, 265, 269, 290

Sixth Fleet 249, 251

Small, William N. 2, 19

Smedberg, William R., IV 19

SOLID SHIELD 49, 120, 157

Somalia 7, 244

sonobuoy 80, 102

SOSUS 80

South America 144, 209

South China Sea 25, 43, 73, 165, 247, 278, 290

South Korea See Korea

Southeast Asia 261

Southern Flank 249

Southwest Asia 29, 39, 40, 41, 77, 79, 88, 144,

307

Defense Guidance 25

Southwest Asia region 25

Soviet Strategy Study Group 2

Soviet Union 8, 59

AGI See intelligence gathering ships

Air Force (SAF) 150

global maritime presence 150

maritime posture 278, 289

military capabilities 21

arms control limit 21

space limit 21

Military Strategy 149

Naval Aviation 219

naval deployments 247

naval force posture 28

Greenland 28

Iceland 28

Libya 28

Norway 28

Naval Strategy 112, 151

Navy 111

Ocean Surveillance System (SOSS) 180

sensitivities 281

strategy 59, 141, 196, 281, 302

strengths 153, 281

submarine bastion 107

submarines 261

vulnerabilities 281

wartime strategy 279

worldwide force levels 111

Soya 37

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Spain 28, 76, 170

Spanish 76

special operations 14, 86, 106, 134

special warfare 65, 74, 83

spectrum of conflict 13, 286

Spruance class 13

Sri Lanka 208

SSBN See ballistic missile nuclear submarine

SSN See nuclear-powered attack submarines

Stark, James R. 2, 107, 310

Strait of Malacca 7

strategic architecture 200

Strategic Defense Initiative 9

strategic deterrence 299

strategic difference 93

strategic lift 171

strategic nuclear war 50, 118

strategic options 128, 131

Strategic Rocket Forces 232

strategic sealift 164, 297

Strategic Sealift Office (OP-42) 16

Strategic Studies Group 106, 223, 228

strategy 140

Strategy Stoppers 195

strategy-force mismatch 94

strike 84

strike fighter 257

Strike University 224

Studeman, William 2

Subic Bay 88

submarines 12, 60, 66, 79, 159, 165, 177, 190,

216, 218, 221, 247, 249, 251, 266

ballistic-missile 11, 211, 218, 251

Los Angeles 13

nuclear 267

Ohio class 13

Soviet 261

Suez Canal 32, 215, 216, 294

superiority 55, 110, 145, 163, 184, 319

maritime 57, 319

supremacy 232

surface action groups 83, 86, 155, 251

surface combatant task group 51

surface combatants 75, 86, 134

surface ships 12, 190

surveillance 50, 65, 118, 213, 282

sustainability 103

SWA See Southwest Asia

Swartz, Peter M. 4, 5, 45, 46, 47, 203, 

205

Sweden 101, 261

“swing” deployments 30, 34, 125

Syria 9

T

TACAIR See tactical aviation

T-ACSs See crane ships

tactical aviation 4, 15, 31, 32, 34, 37, 81

100

Taiwan Relations Act 9

Tarawa class 13

TASM See theater anti-ship missile

TEAM SPIRIT 157

technology 255

territorial sovereignty 286

terrorism 154, 155, 262, 317

Thailand 244, 250

theater anti-ship missile 63, 157, 177

theater nuclear war 50, 118, 282

Third Fleet 250, 251

Third World War See World War III

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Tiananmen Square 6, 311

Ticonderoga class 13

TLAM-C 63, 157

TLAM-N See nuclear: land attack missile

Tomahawk 13, 63, 157, 190, 211, 223, 302

training 244, 253

Trainor, Bernard E. 105

transition to war 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77,

113, 123, 125, 128, 129, 167, 168, 170, 171, 215,

239, 291, 294

Transportation, Department of 15, 16, 88

treaties 146, 275

Trost, Carlisle A. H. 1, 5, 8, 20, 30, 259, 269,

270, 309

Tsugaru 37

Tsushima 37

Turkey 28, 32, 38, 39, 41, 66, 76, 78, 127, 160,

170, 212, 216, 231, 254

Turkish Navy 170

Turkish Straits 32, 78, 174, 295

Twain, Mark 260

Twentynine Palms, California 244

U

U-boats 81, 219

uncertainty 98, 99, 100, 101, 103, 141, 193,

195, 196, 197, 198, 302

uncertainty: nuclear escalation 97

UNCLOS III See United Nations Conference

on the Law of the Sea

unconventional warfare 84

Understanding Soviet Naval Developments 247

Underway Replenishment Groups (URGS) 91,

171

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics See Soviet

Union

UNITAS 157

UNITAS 24 49

United Kingdom 28, 66, 67, 68, 76, 77, 86, 89

127, 128, 133, 160, 169, 170, 186, 248, 264,

318

United Nations Conference on the Law of the

Sea 6

University of Chicago 204

Uruguay 89

U.S. Central Command 10, 250

U.S. European Command 10

U.S. National Security Strategy 272, 308

U.S. Naval Reserve 90

U.S. Navy, roles of 4

U.S. Southern Command 10

U.S. Space Command 10, 16

U.S. Special Operations Command 10, 14

U.S. Transportation Command 10, 16

USAF See Air Force (U.S.)

USCGC Chase 47

use of force 118, 213, 282

uses of naval power 48, 53, 118

USNS Mercy (T-AH 19) 11

V

VALIANT USHER 157

VECTOR SOUTH 157

Venezuela 248

Vessey, John W., Jr. 8, 20, 46

Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 10

Vice Chief of Naval Operations 2, 19, 46

Vietnam 25, 28, 43, 83, 85, 95, 99, 178, 185,

210, 232, 236, 247, 256

Vietnam War 15, 209, 256

violent peace 162, 208, 227, 286

Vladivostok 77

vulnerabilities 36, 153

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Walker, John A., Jr., spy leak 6, 260

War

Gulf 15

Vietnam 15, 209, 256

war games 139, 206, 224

War Gaming Department at the Naval War

College 2

war planning 20, 29, 30, 33, 72, 97, 118, 272

Aleutian 33

Caribbean 30

Europe 30

Guam 33

Iceland 30

Japan 33

war termination 36, 69, 86, 92, 109, 123, 139,

163, 164, 184, 185, 187, 191, 198, 206, 222, 223,

300, 302

Warfare Strategy

amphibious 105, 230

antisubmarine 227

warfighting 215, 229, 301

warfighting goals 145

warfighting plans 138

warning/reaction time 97

Warsaw Pact 6, 8, 79, 107, 115, 124, 134

166, 174, 211, 276, 290, 304, 307, 318

wartime economic shipping 189

Watkins, James D. 1, 8, 14, 19, 21, 45, 4

137, 138, 203, 205, 206

weapons of mass destruction 197

Webb, James H., Jr. 8, 269

Weeks, Stanley 20, 45, 46

Weinberger, Caspar 8, 9, 47, 206

West Africa 278

Western Hemisphere 248

Defense Guidance 24

Whitworth, Jerry 260

Woolsey, James 3

World War II 86, 217, 218, 220, 230, 23

World War III 2, 106, 107

Wylie, Elizabeth 20

Wylie, J. C. 46

Y

Yokosuka 77

“Young Turk” lunches 2

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About the Editors

Professor Hattendorf, chairman of the Naval War College’s new Maritime History

Department, has served since 1984 as the College’s Ernest J. King Professor of Mari

History. His service to the U.S. Navy extends over three decades—as an officer with 

bat experience at sea in destroyers, at the Naval Historical Center, and as both a un

formed and a civilian Naval War College faculty member. He earned his master’s d

in history from Brown University in 1971 and his doctorate in war history from th

versity of Oxford in 1979. Kenyon College, where he earned his bachelor’s degree in 

awarded him an honorary doctorate in 1997, and the National Maritime Museum,

Greenwich, awarded him its Caird Medal in 2000 for his contributions to the field 

maritime history. From 1988 to 2003 he directed the Advanced Research Departme

the Center for Naval Warfare Studies. He is the author of numerous articles and au

coauthor, editor, or coeditor of more than forty books on British and American m

history, including Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the Naval War Col

studies on Alfred Thayer Mahan and Stephen B. Luce, and America and the Sea: A M

time History. His most recent works include coediting War at Sea in the Middle Age

the Renaissance (2002); a major exhibition catalog for the John Carter Brown Libra

Boundless Deep: The European Conquest of the Oceans, 1450–1840 (2003); The Evolu

the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986, Newport Paper 19 (2004); U.S. Nava

egy in the 1990s: Selected Documents, Newport Paper 27 (2006); and U.S. Naval Stra

the 1970s: Selected Documents, Newport Paper 30 (2007) and the Oxford Encycloped

Maritime History (2007).

Peter M. Swartz is a senior research analyst at the CNA, in Alexandria, Virginia. H

a U.S. naval officer, retiring as a captain in 1993. During the Vietnam War he serv

two tours in-country as an adviser and was Special Assistant to the Chairman of 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, during the first Gulf War. He holds an 

degree from the Johns Hopkins University Nitze School of Advanced Internation

Studies and an MPhil from Columbia University. He is the author of numerous a

and studies on naval strategy, policy, and operations.

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The Newport Papers

Major Naval Operations, by Milan Vego (no. 32, September 2008).

Perspectives on Maritime Strategy: Essays from the Americas, edited by Paul D. Tay

(no. 31, August 2008).

U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s: Selected Documents, edited by John B. Hattendor

30, September 2007).

Shaping the Security Environment, edited by Derek S. Reveron (no. 29, August 200

Waves of Hope: The U.S. Navy’s Response to the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia, by 

A. Elleman (no. 28, February 2007).

U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s: Selected Documents, edited by John B. Hattendor

27, September 2006).

Reposturing the Force: U.S. Overseas Presence in the Twenty-first Century, edited b

Carnes Lord (no. 26, February 2006).

The Regulation of International Coercion: Legal Authorities and Political Constrain

James P. Terry (no. 25, October 2005).

Naval Power in the Twenty-first Century: A Naval War College Review Reader, edi

Peter Dombrowski (no. 24, July 2005).

The Atlantic Crises: Britain, Europe, and Parting from the United States, by William

Hopkinson (no. 23, May 2005).

China’s Nuclear Force Modernization, edited by Lyle J. Goldstein with Andrew S.

Erickson (no. 22, April 2005).

Latin American Security Challenges: A Collaborative Inquiry from North and Sou

edited by Paul D. Taylor (no. 21, 2004).

Global War Game: Second Series, 1984–1988, by Robert Gile (no. 20, 2004).

The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986, by John Hattend

(no. 19, 2004).

Military Transformation and the Defense Industry after Next: The Defense Indust

Implications of Network-Centric Warfare, by Peter J. Dombrowski, Eugene Ghol

Andrew L. Ross (no. 18, 2003).

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Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:33:33 AM
by Thomas G. Mahnken and James R. FitzSimonds (no. 17, 2003).

The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy’s Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines, by Owen R. Cote, Jr. (no. 16, 2003).

International Law and Naval War: The Effect of Marine Safety and Pollution Conventions during International Armed Conflict, by Dr. Sonja Ann Jozef Boelaert-Suominen

(no. 15, December 2000).

Theater Ballistic Missile Defense from the Sea: Issues for the Maritime Component Commander, by Commander Charles C. Swicker, U.S. Navy (no. 14, August 1998).

Sailing New Seas, by Admiral J. Paul Reason, U.S. Navy, with David G. Freymann (no. 13,

March 1998).

What Color Helmet? Reforming Security Council Peacekeeping Mandates, by Myron H.

Nordquist (no. 12, August 1997).

The International Legal Ramifications of United States Counter-Proliferation Strategy:

Problems and Prospects, by Frank Gibson Goldman (no. 11, April 1997).

Chaos Theory: The Essentials for Military Applications, by Major Glenn E. James,

U.S. Air Force (no. 10, October 1996).

A Doctrine Reader: The Navies of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and

Spain, by James J. Tritten and Vice Admiral Luigi Donolo, Italian Navy (Retired) (no. 9

December 1995).

Physics and Metaphysics of Deterrence: The British Approach, by Myron A. Greenberg

(no. 8, December 1994).

Mission in the East: The Building of an Army in a Democracy in the New German States,

by Colonel Mark E. Victorson, U.S. Army (no. 7, June 1994).

The Burden of Trafalgar: Decisive Battle and Naval Strategic Expectations on the Eve of

the First World War, by Jan S. Breemer (no. 6, October 1993).

Beyond Mahan: A Proposal for a U.S. Naval Strategy in the Twenty-First Century, by

Colonel Gary W. Anderson, U.S. Marine Corps (no. 5, August 1993).

Global War Game: The First Five Years, by Bud Hay and Bob Gile (no. 4, June 1993).

The “New” Law of the Sea and the Law of Armed Conflict at Sea, by Horace B.

Robertson, Jr. (no. 3, October 1992).

Toward a Pax Universalis: A Historical Critique of the National Military Strategy for the

1990s, by Lieutenant Colonel Gary W. Anderson, U.S. Marine Corps (no. 2, April 1992).

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Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:33:33 AM
Christopher C. Harmon (no. 1, December 1991).

Newport Papers from 16 on are available online (Acrobat required) at www.nwc.

.mil/press/newportpapers/newportpapers.aspx.

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Tuesday, December 16, 2008 10:33:33 AM