National 

Transportation

Safety Board

Washington, D.C.

National Transportation

Safety Board

Washington, D.C. 20594

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NTSB

Permit No. G-200

Marine Accident Report

Capsizing of New York State-Certificated Vessel 

Ethan Allen, Lake George, New York

October 2, 2005

NTSB/MAR-06/03

PB2006-916403 National Transportation Safety Board

Notation 7755B 490 LíEnfant Plaza, S.W.

Adopted July 25, 2006 Washington, D.C. 20594
National Transportation Safety Board. 2006. Capsizing of New York State-Certificated Vessel 

Ethan Allen, Lake George, New York, October 2, 2005. Marine Accident Report NTSB/MAR-06/03. 

Washington, DC.

Abstract: On the afternoon of October 2, 2005, the New York State-certificated public vessel Ethan Allen,

with a state-licensed operator and 47 passengers on board, was on a narrated cruise of Lake George, New 

York. As the tour boat operator was beginning to make a turn to the right, a wave or waves generated by 

one or more vessels impacted the starboard side of the Ethan Allen. The public vessel rolled to port and 

overturned within seconds. The overturned vessel remained on the surface of the water several minutes 

before righting itself and sinking. Operators of recreational vessels nearby observed the accident, 

proceeded immediately to the site, and began rescuing survivors. Twenty passengers died, three received 

serious injuries, and six received minor injuries in the accident. The operator and 18 passengers survived 

without injury. 

Major safety issues discussed in this report include stability standards and procedures for passenger 

vessels; New York Stateís use of manufacturerís capacity plates to determine public vessel passenger 

loading; and regulation of New York Stateís public vessels.

As a result of its investigation of this accident, the Safety Board made safety recommendations to the U. S. 

Coast Guard and the State of New York.

The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency dedicated to promoting aviation, railroad, highway, marine, 

pipeline, and hazardous materials safety. Established in 1967, the agency is mandated by Congress through the Independent Safety Board 

Act of 1974 to investigate transportation accidents, determine the probable causes of the accidents, issue safety recommendations, study 

transportation safety issues, and evaluate the safety effectiveness of government agencies involved in transportation. The Safety Board 

makes public its actions and decisions through accident reports, safety studies, special investigation reports, safety recommendations, and 

statistical reviews.

Recent publications are available in their entirety on the Web at <http://www.ntsb.gov>. Other information about available publications also 

may be obtained from the Web site or by contacting:

National Transportation Safety Board

Records Management Division, CIO-40

490 LíEnfant Plaza, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20594

(800) 877-6799 or (202) 314-6551

Safety Board publications may be purchased, by individual copy or by subscription, from the National Technical Information Service. To 

purchase this publication, order report number PB2006-916403 from:

National Technical Information Service

5285 Port Royal Road

Springfield, Virginia 22161

(800) 553-6847 or (703) 605-6000

The Independent Safety Board Act, as codified at 49 U.S.C. Section 1154(b), precludes the admission into evidence or use of Board reports 

related to an incident or accident in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report. 
iii Marine Accident Report

Contents

Abbreviations and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

Factual Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Accident Narrative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Injuries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Damages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Personnel Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

New York State Vessel Operator Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Ethan Allen Operator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Vessel Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Lifesaving Apparatus and Safety Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Vessel Certification and Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Wreckage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Waterway Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Meteorological Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Medical and Pathological Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Medical Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Toxicology Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Survival Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Emergency Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Survivability-Related Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Tests and Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Raw Water Pump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

On-site Stability Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Postaccident Stability StudyóMethod . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Postaccident Stability StudyóResults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Other Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Stability Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Capacity Plates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Accidents Involving Out-of-Date Passenger Weight Standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

New York State Actions Since Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Exclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Cause of the Capsizing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Modifications Affecting Vessel Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Overloading Due to Out-of-Date Passenger Weight Criterion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Contents iv Marine Accident Report

Influence of Vessel Motions on Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Capacity Plates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Postaccident Actions by Regulatory Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

New York Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Coast Guard Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Postaccident Toxicological Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Survival Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Probable Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Appendixes

A: Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

B: Passenger Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

C: New York Press Release . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
v Marine Accident Report

Abbreviations and Acronyms

CAMI Civil Aerospace Medical Institute

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CO2 carbon dioxide

COI certificate of inspection

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization

LGFD Lake George Fire Department

OCMI (Coast Guard) Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection

SST simplified stability test

TCG transverse center of gravity

VCG vertical center of gravity
vi Marine Accident Report

Executive Summary

On the afternoon of October 2, 2005, the New York State-certificated public vessel 

Ethan Allen, with a New York State-licensed operator and 47 passengers on board,

departed the marina at Lake George, New York, for a cruise of the lake. The vessel 

proceeded northbound along the western side of the lake at an estimated speed of 8 mph. 

As it neared Cramer Point, the operator began a turn to the right. At the same time, the 

Ethan Allen encountered a wave or waves generated by one or more vessels on its 

starboard side. Within a few seconds, the Ethan Allen rolled to port and overturned. It 

began to sink about 15 minutes later. Operators of recreational vessels nearby observed the 

accident, proceeded immediately to the site, and began rescuing survivors. Twenty 

passengers died, three received serious injuries, and six received minor injuries in the 

accident. The operator and 18 passengers survived without injury. The resulting damage to 

the vessel and its components was estimated at $21,000.

The Safety Boardís investigation of this accident identified the following major 

safety issues:

ï Stability standards and procedures for passenger vessels;

ï New York Stateís use of manufacturerís capacity plates to determine public 

vessel passenger loading; and

ï Regulation of New York Stateís public vessels.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of 

the capsizing of the Ethan Allen was the vesselís insufficient stability to resist the 

combined forces of a passing wave or waves, a sharp turn, and the resulting involuntary 

shift of passengers to the port side of the vessel. The vesselís stability was insufficient 

because it carried 48 persons where postaccident stability calculations demonstrated that it 

should have been permitted to carry only 14 persons. Contributing to the cause of the 

accident was the failure to reassess the vesselís stability after it had been modified because 

there was no clear requirement to do so.

As a result of this investigation, the Safety Board makes recommendations to the 

U.S. Coast Guard and to the State of New York.
1 Marine Accident Report

Factual Information

Accident Narrative

About 14151 on October 2, 2005, members of a seniors tour group from Michigan 

began arriving at the loading dock for Shoreline Cruises, Inc., in Lake George Village, 

New York, for a 1-hour round-trip narrated boat cruise of historical and other sites along 

the lakeside. The tour group had chartered two public vessels: the Ethan Allen (figure 1) 

and its sister vessel, the de Champlain. 

Figure 1. The Ethan Allen, shown above after the accident, was a New York Statecertificated public vessel, a category of powered vessels that is permitted to transport 

passengers or freight for commercial purposes solely on state waters.

The Ethan Allen was scheduled to take the first group out at 1500. The tour boat had 

made two trips earlier in the day, and the vessel operators on those cruises later told 

investigators that the trips had been uneventful. The vessel operator said that, in preparation 

for his trips that day, he had checked the bilge area and did not observe any water.2

1 All times are eastern daylight time, based on a 24-hour clock.

2 Because of the antipollution restrictions for Lake George and the fines that boat operators were 

subject to, Shoreline Cruises required its boat crews to check the bilges before their cruises and manually 

remove bilge waste into shoreside containers to ensure that the onboard bilge pumps did not discharge into 

the lake during a trip.
Factual Information 2 Marine Accident Report

Members of the seniors group began to embark on the Ethan Allen through the 

portside door opening near the stern. In anticipation of viewing historical and other sites 

along the western shore, passengers began filling the eight three-person benches along the 

port side of the Ethan Allen. (See figure 2.) According to the passengers, only about seven to 

10 people had boarded when the boat began to list noticeably to port. One of their members 

shouted out that someone had to sit on the other side of the boat. The vessel operator also 

advised passengers to sit on the starboard side. As people filled the starboard benches, the 

vessel began to level out. One of the passengers said that those boarding filled in where 

sitting space was available and that ìwe had some large people in our group.î She added 

that the group ìdidnít seem to be balancedî across the boat when everyone was seated.3

The vessel operator extended an invitation to board to two more women; however, 

they later told investigators that they told the group they preferred to go shopping but they 

declined to board because they thought the boat looked ìcrowded.î Another woman said 

that while standing in line to board, she noticed the vessel listing to port. She stated, ìI 

decided it wasnít safe to be on, so I didnít get on. I told the others that I wasnít going.î

The vessel operator stated that before leaving the dock, he delivered a safety 

briefing to the passengers. All passengers who were interviewed said that they received no 

safety briefing. Most indicated, however, that at the time, they were talking with one 

another and that ìit was very noisy.î 

When the Ethan Allen ultimately sailed at 1430, the vessel had a total of 48 

occupants: the vessel operator and 47 passengers. The vessel operator told Safety Board 

investigators that the boatís trim was proper before it departed the dock.

After leaving the marina area, the operator increased the vessel speed from the 

5 mph maintained in the no-wake area of the lower lake to 8 mph, its standard speed on the 

lake. The operator told investigators that with as large a passenger load as he experienced 

on the accident cruise, the Ethan Allen was ìmaybe a bit slower to respond, [with] just 

minimalî differences in maneuverability between its fully and partially loaded conditions. 

He described vessel maneuverability as very good, even when fully loaded, and said that he 

had about ìnormalî freeboard.4 The operator told Safety Board investigators that he had 

taken the Ethan Allen out several times each season with a full load of passengers.

For the voyage, the vesselís windows, which opened inward, were in the up 

position and hooked to the underside of the wooden canopy (figure 2). The passengers 

described the conditions for the lake tour as ìbeautifulî and ìperfect.î The lake waters 

were ìcalm.î The operator indicated that vessel traffic was normal for a Sunday afternoon. 

Several members of the tour group had either recreational or commercial boating 

experience, and most of them indicated that the master operated the boat ìproperly.î They 

said that whenever a passing vessel caused a wake,5 the operator of the Ethan Allen would 

turn their boat so that the bow headed into the waves. 

3 Based on hospital records and interviews, the total weight of the passengers seated in the portside 

seats was 5,088 pounds and the total weight on those in the starboard-side seats was 3,434 pounds.

4 Distance from the vesselís deck to the surface of the water.

5 A track of waves caused by a vessel or object moving through the water.
Figure 2. Three views of Ethan Allen interior. The vessel had 19 slatted-wood, parkstyle benches whose metal legs were bolted to the deck. Eight benches designed to 

accommodate three people faced forward along the port side of the vessel and eight 

benches that accommodated two people faced forward along the starboard side. 

Three three-person benches were in the forward portion of the vessel. One bench 

was positioned so that its back was against the port bulkhead and one bench was 

against the starboard bulkhead. The nineteenth bench, positioned center forward, 

had a box beneath it that stored 10 child-size lifejackets.

Vessel interior, looking aft. Plexiglas side windows are in up 

position and hinged to canopy roof, as during accident voyage.

Close-up of operator’s station. Cabinet for adult lifejackets, 

shown without the door, is next to operator’s station.

Operator’s station

Hatch

Hatch

Exit Exit

Factual Information 3 Marine Accident Report

According to witnesses, the Ethan Allen operated without incident until it reached 

a cove near Cramer Point (figure 3). As the vessel neared Cramer Point, some passengers 

observed a vessel traversing the lake to the right of the Ethan Allen, creating a wave or 

waves that moved toward it. Witnesses varied in their identification of the particular vessel 
Factual Information 4 Marine Accident Report

and in their descriptions of the size of the wave or waves. One passenger described the 

wave as several inches high. A recreational boater, who observed the Ethan Allen from a 

50- to 75-yard distance, reported seeing no wave strike the vessel. The Ethan Allen 

operator said the wave was 2 1/2 to 3 feet high. The wave reportedly first contacted the 

starboard stern area and then moved forward along the side of the vessel, raising it 

upward. The operator told investigators that as he was turning to the right and proceeding 

out of the bay, he noticed ìthis wave coming at me, good-sized wave. And I started to cut 

into it Ö[but] it caught me on the right side, starboard side back by the stern corner, and 

flipped it [the vessel] over to the left side, the port side.î

Figure 3. The 1-hour tour of the Ethan Allen on Lake George began at Lake George 

Village and went north to Green Harbour, a distance of about 3 miles. The tour was to 

continue north along the west shore and enter Green Harbour before crossing the 

lake and heading back along the east shore. The accident occurred off Cramer Point, 

a point of land directly below Green Harbour.

9

9

9

TOWN PARK

Town Dock

Fort William Henry

Lake George

Village P.O.

Orcutt Bay

DUNHAMS BAY

Cannon

Pt.

Cooper Pt.

Cramer Pt.

Harman Pt.

Plum Pt.

Woods Pt.

Tea Island

Diamond Island

HEARTHSTONE PARK

PUBLIC CAMP SITE Vessel Route

Vessel Route

Green Harbour

Approximate Intended Route

N

Accident Site

Lake George

NEW YORK Albany
Factual Information 5 Marine Accident Report

A passenger seated in the last row on the port side said that she had extended her 

arm out the window during periods of the cruise, and when the vessel operator went into 

the sharp turn, the boat began to ìtipî [heel] to port. She said that she looked out the 

window and [her hand] appeared to be ìinches from the water.î She also felt the people 

sitting next to her begin ìsliding into me.î

Other survivors said that the passengers all shifted to the left in their seats and that 

two ìlarge ladiesî tumbled off their seats and slid to the port side of the vessel when the 

vessel made the turn. Another passenger stated that the vessel ìnever stopped rotating to 

the left along the axis of the boat.î As the vesselís list to port increased, more people 

sitting on the starboard side tumbled to the port side, in many instances, falling onto the 

passengers seated on the port benches. The vessel continued to roll over, and several 

passengers were swept out the open windows. Both the operator and the survivors 

estimated that the vessel capsized in a matter of seconds. 

The accident occurred about 1454. The Ethan Allen remained afloat upside down 

for several minutes. Several survivors described the conditions inside the Ethan Allen after 

it overturned as ìchaos underwaterî or ìtotal confusion.î In the darkness, people were 

ìstepping onî or ìcrawling onî one another. One woman said that when she attempted to 

swim toward the light, ìPeople were pulling on my legs to crawl up me, so they 

pulled me down.î 

Survivors said that they never had time to retrieve lifejackets; however, they also 

said that if people had donned lifejackets, more fatalities would have occurred because the 

only way for those trapped in the vessel to escape was to ìswim downî and go through the 

open windows, which were now below water. One passenger told investigators that she 

initially was blocked by a Plexiglas window but was able to swim under it to escape the 

vessel. Once the boat occupants escaped, they clung to the overturned vessel on the 

surface.

Several recreational boats were in the vicinity. Many of the boaters observed the 

capsizing and immediately proceeded to the site to render aid by throwing life preservers 

and flotation cushions to the survivors and rescuing them. The witnesses also called 911 

on their cell phones to report the accident. After several minutes, the overturned vessel 

righted itself and then sank to the bottom of the lake, coming to rest upright on its keel in 

59 feet of water.

Injuries

The injuries sustained in the Ethan Allen accident, shown in table 1, are 

categorized according to the injury criteria of the International Civil Aviation 

Organization (ICAO). The Safety Board uses the ICAO injury criteria in most of its 

accident reports, regardless of transportation mode. Passengers listed as seriously injured 

remained hospitalized for more than 48 hours.
Factual Information 6 Marine Accident Report

Table 1. Injuries to passengers and crew

Type of Injury Crew Passengers Total

Fatal 0 20 20

Serious 0 3 3

Minor 0 6 6

None 1 18 19

Total 1 47 48

Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 830.2 defines a fatal injury as any injury that results in death within 30 days of 

an accident. Serious injury means any injury which (1) requires hospitalization for more than 48 hours, commencing within 

7 days from the date the injury was received; (2) results in a fracture of any bone (except simple fractures of fingers, toes, 

or nose); (3) causes severe hemorrhages, nerve, muscle, or tendon damage; (4) involves any internal organ; or (5) 

involves second- or third-degree burns, or any burns affecting more than 5 percent of the body surface.

Damages

According to reports, the Ethan Allen sustained cosmetic damage to the hull and 

engine damage consistent with its being submerged. Repairs totaled about $21,000. See 

ìWreckageî section of this report for additional information.

Personnel Information

According to the Ethan Allenís state certificate of inspection (COI) authorizing it 

to operate on New York waters, the tour boat was required to have a crew of two: a master 

and a deckhand when the vessel carried more than 20 passengers. On the day of the 

accident, a deckhand did not accompany the tour group.

New York State Vessel Operator Regulations

New York guidance specifies three types of licenses for operators of public 

vessels. A ìmasterî license is required for the operation of a public vessel that exceeds any 

of the following criteria: 65-foot length, 50-ton displacement, or 65 passengers. A ìjoint 

pilot & engineerî license is required for anyone who operates smaller vessels that do not 

meet the vessel and carriage criteria for a masterís license. A deckhand or operator 

licensed as a pilot/engineer seeking a masterís license must first obtain an ìapprentice 

masterî license. To be issued a license, vessel operators are required to demonstrate both 

knowledge of vessel regulations and operating principles and proficiency in handling the 

vessel on the waters in which the vessel is operated.

Ethan Allen Operator

General. The Ethan Allen operator, age 74, had graduated from high school in 

upstate New York, enlisted in the Army, and later joined the New York State Police, where 

he had served as a trooper for 25 1/2 years. During his tenure with the state police, he had 

served in the marine unit on Lake George, operating a state police boat.
Factual Information 7 Marine Accident Report

In 1982, after retiring from the state police, he joined Shoreline Cruises, which 

provided him with qualifying training to operate all of the companyís vessels, small and 

large. In 1984, he obtained a New York State Masterís License to operate public vessels. 

His last license renewal was valid through June 20, 2006. The owner of Shoreline Cruises 

characterized the operator as a good worker who was ìa very conscientious person.î He 

further stated that the Ethan Allen operator ìwas always looking out for the safety of the 

public.î

Medical. The vessel operator said that he took prescription medications for high 

blood pressure and cholesterol, as well as several over-the-counter vitamins.

Work/Rest History. The vessel operator told Safety Board investigators that he 

had maintained the same schedule for several weeks before the accident, including the day 

of the accident. He arose by 0530, and typically left home for work around 0920 to arrive 

at the Shoreline Cruises office at least 30 minutes before his first scheduled cruise at 1030. 

He went to bed by 2100 or 2130. On October 2, he operated the Ethan Allen with a 

passenger load of two or three on his 1030 cruise.

Vessel Information

History

The vessel now known as the Ethan Allen was built in 1964 by Anchorage 

Shipyard of Warren, Rhode Island, for Whaling City Dredge & Dock Corporation 

(Whaling) of Groton, Connecticut. Whaling contracted for a fiberglass excursion vessel 

using the Dyer 40 hull design.6 The hull, the seventh in a series based on a design for 40-

foot fiberglass cruisers, was designated the Dyer 40-7. Because of the vesselís intended 

operation as a small passenger vessel, it was subject to Federal oversight. U.S. Coast 

Guard regulations pertaining to commercial vessels the size of the Ethan Allen are 

contained in 46 CFR Subchapter T, ìSmall Passenger Vessels (Under 100 Gross Tons).î7

The Coast Guard official with the oversight responsibility for ensuring compliance 

with marine safety standards, including the requirements in Subchapter T, is the Officerin-Charge, Marine Inspection (OCMI) at each Marine Safety Office, which is a local 

Coast Guard office having jurisdictional authority for a specific area. Any restriction or 

6 The first production Dyer 40 hull design was built in the early 1960s. The hull form has been used in 

a variety of other vessels as well, such as sport fishing vessels, lobster boats, yacht club tenders, cruisers, 

pilot boats, and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers utility boats.

7 Subchapter T was promulgated in 1957 as a result of Public Law No. 106-519, which was enacted by 

the U.S. Congress following the capsizing of the M/V Pelican off Long Island, New York. The small 

commercial fishing vessel, which was designed to safely accommodate 30 persons, was carrying 64 people 

when it capsized in heavy seas. Because of the vesselís overloaded condition, the sea state, and the failure of 

the boatís occupants to don lifejackets, 45 people died. Subchapter T stipulates that to operate a small 

passenger vessel, the owner/operator must have various programs and policies, maintain various documents, 

and install and maintain various navigation and radio equipment, lifesaving equipment, and firefighting 

equipment on that vessel.
Factual Information 8 Marine Accident Report

contingency that the OCMI deems necessary for the safe operation of a vessel is listed on 

its COI. In the case of the Dyer 40-7 excursion boat contracted by Whaling, the Coast 

Guard OCMI, Providence (Rhode Island), approved the initial construction plans for the 

vessel, which was to be named the Double Dolphin. 

Anchorage Shipyard did not do the finish work on the Double Dolphin. Rather, the 

excursion boat was delivered to Whaling for completion. Because the vessel was not fully 

completed at the time the vessel left the Anchorage Shipyard, the OCMI Providence did 

not issue a Coast Guard COI authorizing the Double Dolphin for operation.

According to documentation provided by Anchorage Shipyard, the Double 

Dolphin was in service for Whaling in 1965.8 In January 1966, Whaling contracted with 

Anchorage Shipyard for two additional vessels, requesting that the vessels be similar in 

construction, appearance, finish, and quality to the Double Dolphin. After the two sister9

vessels were delivered to Whaling, the company operated the three Dyer 40-model boats 

until spring 1979, when Shoreline Cruises, based in Lake George Village, purchased them.

Because Shoreline Cruises intended to operate the three Dyer 40-model boats 

solely on New York State waters, the vessels no longer fell under Coast Guard 

jurisdiction10 but became subject to state oversight. Chapter 37, ìNavigation Law,î New 

York State Consolidated Laws, governs vessels that operate solely on New York State 

waters. Excerpts from the regulations pertaining to commercial passenger vessel 

operations are published in separate study guides issued by the New York State Office of 

Parks, Recreation, and Historic Preservation (Office of Parks), which has oversight 

responsibility for public vessels.

When Shoreline Cruises acquired the vessels, the Double Dolphinís sister vessels 

were configured the same as when they were delivered by the boat builder to Whaling in 

1966. The Double Dolphin, however, had been modified by the installation of a canvascovered metal-truss-frame canopy. Additional information about the structural 

modifications to the three vessels appears in the section entitled ìVessel Certification and 

Inspection.î

Shoreline Cruises renamed all three vessels. The Double Dolphin became the 

Ethan Allen and the sister vessels became the de Champlain and the Algonquin. Table 2 

8 Draft press release circa May 1966.

9 The Coast Guard Marine Safety Manual provides the following guidance on the assignment of vessel 

sister status: ìthe proposed sister vessel should have been built within approximately 2 years from one 

another; the vessels must be built by the same shipyard; and the same basic drawings should have been used 

in the construction of both vessels.î

10 Vessels operating exclusively on inland waters that have not been determined to be ìnavigable waters 

of the United Statesî are not subject to Coast Guard inspection and regulation. The Coast Guard does not 

make such determinations about every body of water within the United States. Therefore, waters that have 

not been determined to be ìnavigable waters of the United Statesî fall under the jurisdiction of the state in 

which they are located. The Coast Guard has never determined Lake George to be ìnavigableî for Coast 

Guard regulatory or inspection purposes. 
Factual Information 9 Marine Accident Report

summarizes events pertaining to the construction and modification of the Ethan Allen and 

its sister vessels.

Table 2. Events in the history of the Ethan Allen and its sister vessels

Date Event

 1964 Anchorage Shipyard builds and delivers Double Dolphin to Whaling. Vessel 

comes under Coast Guard certification.

 1966 Anchorage Shipyard builds and delivers sister vessels to Whaling. 

 May 1966 Stability test may have been performed on Double Dolphin.

 1966-1979 Double Dolphin fitted with metal canvas canopy.

 May 28, 1976 Last COI issued to Double Dolphin by Coast Guard.

 May 1979 Double Dolphin and sister vessels sold to Shoreline Cruises.

 1979-1989 De Champlain and Algonquin fitted with metal canvas canopies by Shoreline. 

Ethan Allen (ex. Double Dolphin) and de Champlain fitted with Plexiglas windows.

 1989 Ethan Allenís metal canvas canopy replaced with a wooden canopy.

 1990 De Champlainís metal canvas canopy replaced with a wooden canopy.

 1991 Algonquinís metal canvas canopy replaced with a wooden canopy.

 April 2005 Last COI issued to Ethan Allen by New York State.

 October 2, 2005 Ethan Allen capsizes.

Construction

The main characteristics of the Ethan Allen at the time of the accident are listed 

below:

Registration: NY1267FP

Hull form: Dyer 40 fiberglass monohull

Canopy: Wood

Windows: Plexiglas

Length: 38 feet

Beam: 12 feet

Propulsion: Cummins diesel engine, model 6BT5.9M, 

210 horsepower

Propulsion type: Conventional single-shaft, three-blade 

propeller, single rudder

The belowdeck area was divided into four spaces: a forward space, which held a 

100-gallon fuel tank; the engineroom compartment; the lazarette, which contained the 

steering gear; and an aft port storage space. Hatch covers on the main deck allowed access 
Factual Information 10 Marine Accident Report

to the belowdeck areas. In addition, a side cover on the aft storage space permitted access 

to the lazarette.

The engine compartment was equipped with a bilge pump mounted on the port 

side of the forward bulkhead. The pump removed bilge water from either the engine 

compartment itself or the forward space, according to the setting on a selector valve. 

The Ethan Allen was not equipped with a bilge alarm to alert crewmembers of a 

high water level in the bilge area. New York state laws did not have a requirement for 

public vessels to be equipped with a bilge alarm.11

The Ethan Allen employed a ìwet exhaustî system. Water was pumped from the 

lake through the engineís cooling system and into the exhaust gas piping by the main 

engine raw water pump. The mixture of exhaust gases and cooling water exited the vessel 

stern through a common pipe.

Lifesaving Apparatus and Safety Equipment

New York State required the Ethan Allen to carry sufficient lifesaving equipment 

on board for 50 people. The vessel typically carried the following safety equipment:

Adult lifejackets 50 type I

Child lifejackets 5 type I

Fire extinguishers One portable 5-pound carbon dioxide (CO2) and one 

portable 44-pound CO2

Ring buoys One type IV throwable device

The adult lifejackets were stowed inside a cabinet near the operatorís console at 

the stern and secured by an unlocked latch. The childrenís lifejackets were inside a 

wooden box, the top of which formed the seat of a 36-inch-wide bench near the vesselís 

bow. Both adult and childrenís lifejacket storage locations were marked.12 The 5-pound 

fire extinguisher was near the operatorís console, and the 44-pound one was inside the 

engine compartment.13

11 New York has proposed a state requirement similar to the Coast Guardís current requirement that 

small passenger vessels have high level bilge alarms in engine spaces below the deepest load water. The 

legislation is pending. See ìAdditional Informationî for a discussion of the actions New York has taken 

following the accident. 

12 Coast Guard regulations (46 CFR 180.78) require that lifejackets be stored ìin convenient places 

distributed throughout accommodation spaces.î New York State Navigation Law 2 (67) requires life 

preservers to be located in ìconvenient, accessible places.î

13 Coast Guard regulations (46 CFR 181) require that a portable fire extinguisher used for an engine 

space be in a fixed location immediately adjacent to the entry door or hatch to the space. The New York 

ìPublic Vessel Operatorís Study Guideî in effect at the time of the accident specifies the number of portable 

extinguishers a vessel must carry based on its length. The guide indicates that at least one extinguisher must 

be located near the operatorís station, but is silent on where the other extinguishers should be located.
Factual Information 11 Marine Accident Report

Vessel Certification and Inspection

Stability Assessments. Coast Guard regulations specify the amount of stability a 

vessel must have, depending on its type and its service, as well as the methods of 

assessment for verifying its stability. An in-depth discussion of the stability concepts 

involved in the Coast Guardís passenger vessel standards appears in ìOther Information.î 

When the Ethan Allen (formerly Double Dolphin) was built, the September 6, 

1963, version of Subchapter T was in effect. These Coast Guard rules did not require 

stability tests for passenger vessels that were shorter than 65 feet in length and that carried 

fewer than 50 passengers.14 Rather, an OCMI certifying a vessel for operation could 

require that a stability test be performed if he or she considered it necessary that the 

vesselís stability be demonstrated. If the OCMI had required a stability test for the 

monohull vessel, the initial assessment typically would have been a simplified stability 

test (SST). The OCMI also could accept alternatives, equivalents, or departures from 

standards if the owner or operator could show they were warranted.

In the course of its investigation, the Safety Board researched Coast Guard, state, 

and company records on the Ethan Allen (formerly the Double Dolphin). Investigators 

found that few documents were on file for the period when the Double Dolphin had been 

subject to Federal oversight (1964 through 1979). Anchorage Shipyard provided a 

February 22, 1966, letter that it sent to the OCMI Providence stating that the shipyard had 

been contracted by Whaling to build two 40-foot excursion launches based on the 

previous Coast Guard approval of the Double Dolphin. Anchorage Shipyard also provided 

the March 1, 1966, response letter that it received from the OCMI Providence approving 

the submitted plans and recognizing the Double Dolphin as the original sister vessel. The 

OCMI Providence response letter indicates that the Double Dolphin would be given an 

SST in the near future.

Two Whaling employees who were interviewed said that they observed a stability 

test on one of the Dyer 40 excursion vessels, although they could not recall when the 

stability assessment occurred. No Coast Guard or Whaling company files contain any 

record of a stability assessment for the Double Dolphin. Shoreline Cruisesí files contained 

a copy of the Double Dolphinís May 28, 1976, COI issued by the OCMI New London. 

The Double Dolphinís 1976 COI references a stability letter dated May 28, 1966.15

Shoreline Cruisesí files also contained COIs for the two sister vessels acquired 

from Whaling. In the form block labeled ìStability letter (date and time),î the COIs for the 

two sister vessels contain no information.

New York Office of Parks officials indicated that when Shoreline Cruises applied 

for state certification of the Ethan Allen (formerly Double Dolphin), state officials based 

14 On March 10, 1996, the Coast Guard revised 46 CFR Subchapter T, requiring all small passenger 

vessels carrying more than six persons to pass an SST or to demonstrate compliance with the vessel stability 

requirements of Subchapter S.

15 The Safety Board was unable to find a copy of the stability letter, which would have indicated the 

date and type of stability test performed, as well as the results of the test. 
Factual Information 12 Marine Accident Report

their certification of the vessel, in part, on the Coast Guardís May 28, 1976, COI, and did 

not require the boat to undergo a stability assessment. The Coast Guardís COI permitted 

up to 48 passengers and required a master and second crewmember regardless of 

passenger carriage. New York Office of Parks officials indicated that the state COI 

permitted a maximum of 48 passengers on the Ethan Allen and required a master and also 

a crewmember when the tour boat carried more than 20 passengers.

Vessel Modifications. Federal regulations at 46 CFR 176.700 stipulate, in part, that 

modifications to a vessel that might affect its safety must not be made without the approval 

of the OCMI. New York State did not have regulations requiring vessel owners to notify the 

state in the event of a major vessel modification; however, a New York State study guide, 

ìPublic Vessel Operatorís Manual,î in effect at the time of the modification states, in part,

When major alteration to the structure of a public vessel is to be accomplishedÖit 

is the duty of the owner to promptly report the same to the [State] inspector, so 

that he may make a thorough inspection, if the condition or age of the vessel, in 

the judgment of the inspector renders such examination necessary.

The manual is silent on whether the owner or operator should notify the state 

inspector verbally or in writing.

As noted earlier, when Shoreline Cruises acquired the three Dyer 40 excursion 

vessels from Whaling, the two sister vessels built in 1966 had the same configuration as 

when they had been delivered by the boat builder, that is, with no canopy structure. The 

Double Dolphin, however, had been modified by the installation of a metal16 truss frame 

that supported a canvas canopy.

Shoreline Cruises then modified the de Champlain by installing a full canvas canopy 

with metal framework and the Algonquin with a partial canopy (figure 4). In addition, 

Shoreline equipped the Ethan Allen and the de Champlain with Plexiglas windows.

In 1989, Shoreline Cruises contracted with Scarano Boatbuilders, Inc., of Albany, 

New York, to modify the Ethan Allen by installing an all-wood canopy with Plexiglas 

windows that could be latched open. The finished canopy had six 36-inch-high windows 

along each side. Moving from stern to bow, three windows measured 58 inches wide, two 

measured 59 inches wide, and the forwardmost side window measured 50 inches wide. 

The bow area had three windows. A movable window measuring 26 inches wide by 38 

inches high was in the middle of the bow windows. On each side of the center window 

was a fixed window measuring 29 1/2 inches wide by 37 1/2 inches high. 

The wooden canopy that Scarano Boatbuilders installed was about 15 inches lower 

than the metal and canvas canopy it replaced, providing a smaller lateral surface area17

than the previous canopy.

16 There is no record of and no one interviewed recalled what type of metal was used in the frame. 

Materials traditionally used in such construction were steel pipe or aluminum tubing.

17 Lateral surface geometry is a factor in Coast Guard stability criteria. 
Figure 4. This circa 1980 photograph shows the canopies and metal framework on 

the de Champlain (foreground left), the Ethan Allen (foreground center), and the 

Algonquin (foreground right).

Factual Information 13 Marine Accident Report

According to Office of Parks representatives, state inspectors examine public 

vessels annually and require discrepancies to be corrected before the vessel is allowed to 

carry passengers. New Yorkís policy on records retention was to maintain a document for 

5 years and then discard it. The stateís file on the Ethan Allen contains no record of 

inspections and/or stability assessments performed between 1979 and 1991, when 

modifications to the vesselís canopy reportedly were accomplished.18 Office of Parks files 

indicate that the last state inspection of the Ethan Allen was conducted on May 20, 2005, 

and covered navigation, lifesaving, machinery, electrical, fire protection, firefighting, and 

documentation. Inspectors noted one deficiency, a chafed rubber inlet line on the raw 

water pump, which Shoreline Cruises replaced. 

Wreckage

Investigators examined the vessel after it was recovered from Lake George and 

observed no damage on the outside of the fiberglass hull, the rudder, the keel, the 

propeller, or the drive shaft components. One window at the port bow and one window on 

the starboard side were missing Plexiglas panes. The passenger benches were undamaged 

and still bolted to the main deck. The engine hatch cover was missing but was later 

recovered from the lake. The engine exterior was free of damage; however, further tests 

showed that the engine sustained internal damage after the vessel overturned and the 

inverted engine either ingested water or lost lubrication while it briefly continued to 

operate.

Investigators next had the vessel returned to the water and allowed it to float for 

about 20 minutes to determine whether the hull had any leaks. None were found. The 

engine exhaust pipe had several pinhole leaks and several weld beads suggestive of 

previous repairs to pinhole leaks.

The main engine raw water pump was bolted externally to the port forward end of 

the engine. This pump was located above the vesselís waterline when fully loaded with 

18 New York provided the Safety Board with records for the Ethan Allen from 1997 to 2005.
Factual Information 14 Marine Accident Report

passengers. Investigators found a gap measuring 0.076 inches at the widest point between 

the pump base and its impeller housing. When investigators removed the raw water pump 

from the engine, they noted that one of the two bolts on its mounting flange was backed 

out 0.063 inches and was loose to the touch. The on-scene investigative team subsequently 

sent the raw water pump to the Safety Boardís materials laboratory in Washington, D.C. 

for examination and arranged for an exemplar pump to be tested at the manufacturerís 

testing facility. The raw water pump previously installed on the Ethan Allenís engine was 

also acquired and sent to the materials laboratory for examination. See ìTests and 

Researchî later in this report.

Investigators observed no indications of engine damage, other than that to the raw 

water pump. Engine compartment hoses and piping showed no signs of wear, holes, or 

abrasions. The engine space and the engine exterior were coated with what appeared to be 

lubricating oil. The vesselís two 12-volt batteries were found cabled together and 

dislodged, resting over the exhaust pipe, about 3 feet aft of the engine.

The bilge pump selector was positioned to the forward space. Twenty-one lead 

blocks used for ballast, each weighing about 55 pounds, were found unsecured in the 

belowdeck forward space, near the 100-gallon fuel tank. Fourteen lead blocks were under 

the fuel tankís plywood support; the remaining seven were found in different locations on 

the port side of the space. The interior of the forward space had minor cosmetic damage 

from the blocksí moving during the capsizing event.

Waterway Information

Lake George, located at the southernmost end of New Yorkís Adirondack Park 

region, is 32 miles long and nearly 3 miles across at it widest point. The maximum lake 

depth is 195 feet. Over 10,000 boats of varying sizes operate on the lake each year. Public 

vessel operations on the lake are conducted under regulations established by the New York 

State Office of Parks. The Lake George Commission, which also issues marina and special 

activities permits, provides law enforcement services on the lake, as do the New York 

State PoliceñMarine Unit on Lake George and the Warren County sheriffís office.

Operations

General

Shoreline Cruises began in 1974 when the owner of the company began renting 

small recreational boats for the purpose of conducting sightseeing tours on Lake George. 

In 1979, the Shoreline Cruises owner purchased his own fleet of small passenger vessels 

(the Ethan Allen, the de Champlain, and the Algonquin) for the tours. He later acquired 

two additional vessels: the Horicon, an 85-foot vessel with a capacity of 200 passengers, 

in 1988; and the Adirondack, a 115-foot vessel with a capacity of 400 passengers, in 2004.
Factual Information 15 Marine Accident Report

The owner said that the year before the accident, an estimated 60,000 passengers 

had taken Shoreline Cruises sightseeing tours in its vessels. He said that at the height of 

the tourist season in 2005, the company transported about 300 passengers a day on 

sightseeing tours on its three small vessels, although he indicated that he would conduct a 

sightseeing cruise with as few as two passengers. The company recorded the number of 

passengers on its small vessels but did not retain those records, and therefore Safety Board 

investigators were unable to determine how many times the various vessels had sailed 

with a full load of passengers.

Maintenance

Shoreline Cruises had its own personnel maintain its vessels, except when 

extensive engine repairs were needed. The company required operators to check their 

vesselís engine fluids and bilge levels at the beginning of each day. Occasionally, 

company maintenance personnel would perform similar checks to verify vessel and 

engine status that the operators reported.

In July 2005, Shoreline Cruises replaced the Ethan Allenís main engine raw water 

pump at the recommendation of the companyís maintenance technician after he noticed a 

leak at the pumpís internal water seal during a routine check.

Meteorological Information

The Lake George water temperature was 68° F at the time of the accident. 

Witnesses described the lake water as calm, except for waves created by vessels.

The National Weather Service office in Albany, New York, issued no hazardous 

weather advisories for the area on the day of the accident. Weather observations at Floyd 

Bennett Memorial Airport in Glens Falls, New York, about 6 miles east-southeast of the 

accident site, were taken both before and after the accident. Weather observations 

recorded at 1353, 1453, and 1553, indicated that the wind was calm, visibility was 

unrestricted at 10 statute miles, the sky was clear, and the air temperature was 71° F.

Medical and Pathological Information

Medical Information

Autopsies were performed on each of the 20 fatalities in the accident, in 

accordance with New York State requirements. All victims were determined to have died 

as a result of asphyxia due to drowning. The Safety Board examined the results of the 

autopsies. Thirteen of the drowned passengers suffered significant traumatic injuries, 

including rib fractures and head and neck injuries. Of the seven drowned passengers who 

did not have significant injuries, five had evidence of significant heart disease, but only 
Factual Information 16 Marine Accident Report

two of these had age-associated atherosclerotic heart disease. The survivors either had 

minimal traumatic injuries or were uninjured.19

Toxicology Testing

At the time of the accident, New York State did not require postaccident 

toxicological testing of mariners as a matter of course; however, in the case of an accident 

in which a passenger was seriously or fatally injured, a law enforcement official or the 

local district attorney could request a state superior court judge to compel toxicology 

testing through a court order, if he or she believed this was warranted.

In this case, local and state officials did not ask the Ethan Allen operator to provide 

blood and urine samples, although he offered to submit to testing within an hour of the 

capsizing. The Warren County sheriff said that he observed the operator at close range 

shortly after the accident and noted no evidence of impairment. The operator then 

remained with the sheriff for several hours while he provided a statement pertaining to the 

accident events. The sheriff indicated that based on his observations, he did not ask that 

court-ordered toxicology samples be obtained.

On October 4, 2006, the Safety Board asked that a toxicological test of the 

operator be accomplished, and the operator voluntarily submitted blood and urine samples 

for analysis. He told Safety Board investigators that he had consumed a glass of wine with 

his dinner the evening of the accident but no alcohol after that time. Investigators sent the 

samples to the Federal Aviation Administration (FFA) Civil Aerospace Medical Institute 

(CAMI) in Okalahoma City, Oklahoma, for testing. The CAMI report indicated no 

positive results for legal and illegal drugs. The urine analysis indicated the presence of an 

alcohol metabolite.20

Survival Aspects

Emergency Response

Several people on boats and on shore saw the capsizing and called 911 on their cell 

phones. Warren County sheriffís office logs indicate that these calls took place at 1454. Lake 

George Fire Department (LGFD) records indicate that the first units were dispatched at 1456 

and arrived at 1504. The LGFD fire chief established an onshore incident command post 

near Cramer Point and served as the incident commander for the response to the accident.

A total of 49 emergency response vehicles and vessels were dispatched to the 

scene. In addition, recreational boaters who observed the accident immediately went to the 

scene to assist in the rescue. A group of divers at a Lake George dive school saw the 

19 Three survivors were hospitalized for more than 48 hours (all for less than 72 hours). One was 

admitted for a heart attack, one for water inhalation, and one to rule out the possibility of a heart attack.

20 The metabolite ethyl glucuronide can be detected in urine for up to 80 hours after the elimination of 

alcohol from the body.
Factual Information 17 Marine Accident Report

capsizing and called 911 to report the accident. They advised the dispatch center that they 

could assist in the rescue but needed boats to take them to the site. About 15 minutes later, 

a recreational vessel took five dive instructors to the site, where they assisted in recovering 

victims from the water and the sunken vessel.

Ambulances transported survivors to a hospital in Glens Falls, New York. The 

operator was uninjured and elected not to be taken to a hospital. Eighteen survivors were 

treated for minor injuries or exposure to cold and released the same day. One was admitted 

overnight, treated for stress and exhaustion, and released the next day; five were admitted 

and discharged after 2 nights; and three were discharged after 3 nights. Their injuries 

included water aspiration, hypothermia, possible myocardial ischemia, chest pain, and 

shoulder trauma.

Survivability-Related Rules

At the time of the accident, the Consolidated Laws of the State of New York and 

the study guide provided to public vessel operators were silent about crews providing 

passengers with a predeparture safety briefing or a safety card or pamphlet with safetyrelated information.21 In addition, New York laws did not specify minimum dimensions 

for means of escape.

Following the Ethan Allen capsizing, the Office of Parks issued a pamphlet, 

ìTechnical Guidance for the Public Vessel Operators,î which states that each level on a 

public vessel that is occupied by passengers should have two means of egress, and that the 

minimum opening for doorways should be 32 inches and for windows, 24 inches. In 

addition, state legislation has been proposed to require that all public vessels certified to 

carry 20 or more passengers be equipped with at least two means of exit on each deck.22

Tests and Research

Raw Water Pump

Exemplar Pump Tests at Cummins Facility. To test the effect of the gap that 

investigators found in the raw water pump housing and to avoid possible damage to the 

Ethan Allenís actual pump before it was subjected to Safety Board laboratory 

examination and analysis, investigators had operational tests performed on a same model 

and similarly configured raw water cooling pump at the engine manufacturerís facility on 

21 The Ethan Allen was not inspected by the Coast Guard and therefore was not subject to Federal 

regulations at 46 CFR 185.506, which require a vessel operator to ensure that, before getting underway, 

passengers receive an announcement or a pamphlet informing them about the location of emergency exits 

and ring life buoys, the locations of lifejackets, the proper method for donning or adjusting lifejackets, and 

the location of instruction placards for lifejackets and other lifesaving devices. The State of New York has 

since proposed regulatory changes, which are discussed later in this report.

22 See appendix C.
Factual Information 18 Marine Accident Report

December 20, 2005. The engine test cell was configured to replicate the operating 

conditions on the Ethan Allen in the following conditions:

ï The raw water temperature was matched to that of the lake at the time of the 

accident.

ï The raw water inlet plumbing was configured to replicate the theoretical raw 

water inlet restriction calculated from the Ethan Allenís actual plumbing.

ï The raw water inlet plumbing was configured to allow the adjustment of 

waterline height in relation to the pump centerline to simulate the unloaded and 

loaded vessel conditions.

ï The engine was coupled to a dynamometer to replicate the theoretical load on 

the engine at the time of the accident.

ï The engine with the installed exemplar pump was operated under several test 

conditions to assess its operational characteristics. Investigators then 

introduced a 0.076-inch gap in the pump housing that matched the gap found 

on the Ethan Allenís pump. The following results were obtained:

1. Initially, the engine was running with no gap in the pump. Immediately 

after the gap was introduced, the pump completely lost flow.

2. The pump was unable to establish prime when starting the engine with 

the gap in place.

3. While operating with no water flow, internal friction within the pump 

caused the impeller and housing to overheat and emit white smoke.

4. With the pump not supplying water flow through the engineís cooling 

system and the engine running within routine operational parameters, 

the engine operated 4 minutes before it overheated and had to be shut 

down because of high cooling water temperature.

The maximum leak rate during any testing phase was 0.2 to 0.3 gallons per minute.

Pump Examination at Safety Board Laboratory. Because of the observed gap in 

the raw water pump on the accident vessel, investigators removed it for disassembly and 

examination in the Safety Boardís materials laboratory. Technicians also examined the 

pump removed from the Ethan Allen by the Shoreline Cruises maintenance technician in 

July 2005 and the exemplar pump tested at the Cummins facility in December 2005 for 

comparison with the pump from the accident vessel.

Examination of the pump removed from the Ethan Allen following the accident 

revealed that all three pump housing bolts were loose and the lock washer was free to 

rotate on the bolt. Lock washer contact was observed around two of the three pump 

housing bolt holes located on the bearing housing. The lock washer contact face on the 

bolts displayed limited plating removal and circumferential scratches consistent with the 

bolt being in contact with the lock washer, but no indications that it had been loosened. As 
Factual Information 19 Marine Accident Report

a test, exemplar bolts and lock washers were torque-loaded in accordance with the 

manufacturerís specification and loosened. Examination under the head of the exemplar 

bolts revealed a radially oriented curl of material on the surface, consistent with the 

loosening action. Despite the gap between the pump and bearing housings, one side of the 

wear plate between them displayed a uniform imprint from the O-ring in the pump 

housing and the other side displayed a uniform imprint from the gasket between it and the 

bearing housing. The impeller contact face on the wear plate was severely discolored and 

significant wear was observed on the impeller tips. 

The examination of the three raw water pumps, conducted on January 10, 2006, 

revealed that the previously installed pump (removed in July 2005) had significant wear 

around the pump housing bolt holes, consistent with repeated tightening and loosening of 

the housing bolts. The impeller shaft was extremely loose in the bearing housing and the 

shaftís key slot, key, and impeller keyway showed significant wear. The impeller tips had 

negligible wear.

The exemplar pump used in the December 2005 tests at Cummins had loosening 

contact marks, from the lock washers, on all three pump housing bolts and wear on the 

impeller tips.

On-site Stability Assessment

Following the accident, Safety Board investigators had the Ethan Allen recovered 

from the water and transported to a hangar where it could be retained as evidence and 

examined to determine whether hull sections or equipment needed to be removed for further 

testing and analysis. To obtain a preliminary determination of whether stability, overloading, 

or both might have been factors in the capsizing, Safety Board investigators conducted a 

series of stability-related tests on the de Champlain, which investigators considered for test 

purposes to match the critical dimensions of the Ethan Allen.

23 The first test was an SST, 

conducted in accordance with 46 CFR 178.330, ìSimplified stability proof test.î24

The Coast Guard SST verifies a vesselís stability for carrying passengers. The 

number of passengers to be carried is initially determined before the test is conducted, 

based on a review of the vesselís drawings or physical measurements, using one of several 

criteria.25 The stability of the vessel is then assessed using the minimum number of 

passengers allowed based on the initial determination. An SST is conducted, based on 

Coast Guard criteria of 140 pounds per person for vessels to be operated on protected 

23 Safety Board investigators compared the two vessels and found the general arrangement and 

construction of the hulls to be the same with some minor differences in ballast, canopy structure, type of 

main engine, and outfitting noted and accounted for in the tests.

24 Coast Guard criteria were used because New York State applied Coast Guard stability requirements 

to public vessels.

25 Length of railóone passenger for each 30 inches of rail at the sides and stern. Deck areaóone 

passenger per 10 square feet of deck area, excluding spaces listed in 46 CFR 176.113, which include, among 

other areas, concession stands, toilets, lifesaving gear storage spaces, required aisle area, and fixed seating 

areas. Fixed seatingóone passenger for each 18 inches of fixed seating width.
Factual Information 20 Marine Accident Report

waters. The areas where the vessel operated as the Double Dolphin and Lake George are 

considered to be protected waters.

The SST protocol includes calculating wind and passenger heeling moments26 to 

determine whether a vessel, as built and proposed to be operated, has the required stability 

and reserve buoyancy. The greater of the calculated wind moment or the passenger 

moment is applied to the vessel, and the vesselís reduction in freeboard is then 

determined. The calculation of the passenger heeling moment is based on the beam of the 

vessel and the number of passengers carried, while that of the wind heeling moment is 

based on the projected lateral surface of the vessel exposed to wind pressure. Passenger 

heel and wind heel moments test conditions, as well as immersion of the freeboard, were 

calculated and are provided in table 3.

Table 3. On-site SST test conditions

Passenger Heel Wind Heel Allowable Immersion

Test Weight 

(calculated)

Moment Lateral Wind 

Area

Moment 14o Limit Angle of 

Heel

6,720 pounds 11,659 footpounds330 square feet 13,060 footpounds17.16 inches

Investigators initially filled 12 55-gallon barrels with water and positioned them 

on wooden blocks along the vesselís centerline. This test weight replicated loading 48 

passengers with an average per person weight of 140 pounds.27 The vesselís freeboard and 

the lateral area exposed to wind were then measured. To reach the maximum heeling 

moment of 13,060 foot-pounds, eight of the 12 barrels were emptied and repositioned 

against the vesselís port side, in a two-by-four combination, with the intent of refilling all 

eight barrels to produce the required heeling moment. However, after only three outboard 

barrels had been filled, which produced a heeling moment of about 7,164 foot-pounds, the 

vessel heeled to within 3 inches of the reference immersion mark. Investigators noted that 

the vessel felt tender28 and terminated the test rather than risk endangering the vessel and 

test personnel by filling the remaining empty barrels (figure 5).

The SST simulates a full vessel passenger load using the number of passengers 

allowed by the vessel design and the number of required crewmembers, multiplied by the 

weight standard. If the vesselís loss of freeboard from heel with this load is greater than 

that stipulated in the standard, it is not permitted to carry the number of passengers 

determined initially. The owner must then reduce the heeling moment to enable the vessel 

to pass the proof test, by reducing the maximum permitted number of passengers, 

26 In engineering terms, a ìmomentî is a force applied at some distance from a reference point. The 

distance may be referred to as a ìmoment armî or ìlever arm.î A moment may also be referred to as torque. 

If an object is not constrained, a moment will cause it to rotate.

27 The calculated wind heel was based on the SST conducted on the de Champlain.

28 A vessel is described as ìtenderî when its center of gravity is too high, making it top-heavy and 

ìconducive to capsizingî (International Maritime Dictionary).
Factual Information 21 Marine Accident Report

ballasting the vessel, or reducing the vesselís wind profile area, if possible. As an 

alternative to the SST, the owner can also show, by an inclining test and design 

calculations, that a vesselís loading and operation meet the stability criteria of 46 CFR 

Subchapter S.

Figure 5. De Champlain after on-site stability assessment was terminated.

29

Investigators then conducted an inclining test on the de Champlain to determine its 

weight and vertical center of gravity (VCG). The test measured changes in the equilibrium 

heel angle of the vessel after moving water barrels, each weighing 477 pounds, 

transversely to various positions on the main deck. The test also derived the vesselís 

lightship condition (displacement and vertical center of gravity).30 At the time of the 

inclining test, the wind was slack and wave action on the lake was minimal. The inclining 

experiment results on the de Champlain were conducted in accordance with ASTM 

Standard F 1321-91.31

29 Title 46 CFR 178.320 (e) allows an owner to perform rigorous stability calculations if the SST fails.

30 The lightship condition is when the vessel is complete in all respects but is without consumables, 

stores, cargo, crew, or passengers and has only operating fluids in the vesselís machinery. Both the vesselís 

lightship weight and the center of gravity are necessary if the vesselís stability is to be calculated according 

to 46 CFR Subchapter S standards. 

31 ìStandard Guide for Conducting a Stability Test to Determine the Light Ship Displacement and 

Centers of Gravity of a Vessel.î
Factual Information 22 Marine Accident Report

Both the de Champlain and the Ethan Allen were then placed in the water and 

freeboard measurements were taken around each vessel. The Ethan Allen measured a 

consistent 0.5 inch deeper in the water than the de Champlain. Both vessels were then 

placed on a New York State Police-certificated truck scale and weighed. The de 

Champlain weighed 14,870 pounds and the Ethan Allen, 15,400 pounds.

Postaccident Stability StudyóMethod

The Safety Board contracted with JMS Naval Architects and Salvage Engineers to 

derive the static and dynamic stability of the Ethan Allen in both the intact condition and 

the flooded condition.32 The contractor was to perform seven tasks:

1. Develop an accurate computer model of the Ethan Allen hull form.

2. Calculate the lightship weight and VCG of the Ethan Allen at the time of the 

accident, based on the inclining experiment conducted on the de Champlain.33

3. Calculate the Ethan Allen lightship weight and VCG for previous vessel 

conditionsóas delivered by the builder and with various canvas canopy 

configurations, or variants.

4. Determine the maximum passenger loading that would meet Coast Guard 

simplified stability criteria in 46 CFR 178.330, based on the lightship weights 

and VCGs found in tasks 2 and 3.

5. Determine the maximum passenger/crew loading that would meet the 

following Coast Guard passenger vessel stability criteria in 46 CFR 

Subchapter S34:

ï 46 CFR 170.170, ìCalculations Requiredî minimum GM35 with wind 

heeling moment [weather criterion],

ï 46 CFR 170.173(e)(2), ìCriterion for Vessels of Unusual Proportion 

and Formî (weather criterion), and

ï 46 CFR 171.050, ìIntact Stability Requirements for a Mechanically 

Propelled or a Nonself-propelled Vesselî minimum GM with passenger 

heeling moment [passenger loading criteria for large vessels].

6. Evaluate the effects of transverse passenger movement and internal flooding of 

the main engine and forward compartments on vessel stability.

7. Evaluate the dynamic effects of wave action on the vessel.

32 Static stability is a measure of a vesselís stability characteristics in calm water. Dynamic stability is a 

measure of a vesselís characteristics and response to external forces such as wind and waves. Intact stability 

assumes no damage to or flooding of the vessel.

33 See ìOn-site Stability Assessmentî section.

34 As required by 46 CFR 178.310 if the cognizant OCMI questions the stability of a small passenger 

vessel or if the owner chooses not to assess the vesselís stability by means of an SST.

35 GM or metacentric height is the measure of a vesselís ability to return to the upright position after it 

has experienced a heel from an external force.
Factual Information 23 Marine Accident Report

Before beginning its study, the contractor performed a laser survey of the Ethan 

Allen to determine the hull form. The contractor then used the results of the laser survey to 

generate a three-dimensional computer hull model to import into naval architecture 

software for use in the stability analysis.36 The vessel conditions analyzed were as follows:

1. As delivered from boat builder (without a canopy).

2. With a steel canopy installedóoperated in fresh water.

3. With a steel canopy installedóoperated in salt water.

4. With an aluminum canopy installedóoperated in fresh water.

5. With an aluminum canopy installedóoperated in salt water.

6. With a wood canopy installedóoperated in fresh water.

Postaccident Stability StudyóResults

The Ethan Allen hull form created by the contractor as task 1 is shown in figure 6.

Figure 6. Computer-generated Ethan Allen hull form.

Estimates of the Ethan Allenís lightship weight and longitudinal center of gravity 

at the time of the accident were based on the weight measured on the truck scale and from 

freeboard measurements taken while the vessel was afloat. The VCG was derived from the 

results of the de Champlain inclining test. The hydrostatic properties based on task 1 were 

used for both vessels.

36 Analysis used ìHECSALV,î proprietary software developed by Herbert Engineering Corporation.
Factual Information 24 Marine Accident Report

In tasks 3 through 5, the contractor calculated passenger vessel stability in 

accordance with Coast Guard regulations in 46 CFR Subchapters S and T, in various 

vessel configurations, three canopy designs,37 and salt and fresh water because the vessel 

had operated in both.

Lightship weights and centers of gravity of the five types of vessel configurations 

are shown in table 4. The de Champlain is included for comparison purposes, using the 

results of the October 5, 2005, inclining experiment.

Table 4. Lightship conditions of alternate vessel configurations

Item

Ethan Allen

1964

Ethan Allen

Steel Canopy

Ethan Allen

Aluminum 

Canopy

Ethan Allen

2005

De Champlain

2005

Weight (pounds) 12,759 14,590 13,542 14,689 14,315 

VCG (feet above 

baseline)

4.5 5.4 4.9 5.3 5.4 

The task 4 stability analysis showed that the only version of the Ethan Allen 

(formerly Double Dolphin) that could pass the SST with a 48-passenger load was the asdelivered variant from the boat builder, that is, the vessel without a canopy. All other 

variants failed the SST for any passenger loading. With the canopy installed, the wind 

heeling moment was found to govern over the passenger heeling moment.38

The results of task 5ómaximum passenger loading for Subchapter S criteriaóare 

shown in table 5. As noted, passenger counts were based on 140 pounds per person, the 

Coast Guard standard for operation in protected waters. As in the simplified criteria, no 

metal-framed canvas canopy was found to meet the wind heel criteria, regardless of the 

total passenger count. The wood canopy was found to meet the criteria with a reduced 

number of passengers because the height of the wood canopy was lower than the height of 

the canvas one, resulting in a lower vertical center of gravity and a smaller wind profile 

than for the canvas canopy.

37 Canvas canopy with steel frame, canvas canopy with aluminum frame, and wooden canopy.

38 That is, it became the more severe of the two stability criteria that the vessel had to meet. Thus, if the 

vessel met the wind heeling moment, it met the passenger heeling moment as well.
Factual Information 25 Marine Accident Report

Table 5. Maximum passenger/crew loading for Subchapter S stability criteria

Condition

46 CFR 170.170

Wind Heel

46 CFR 170.173

Unusual Form

46 CFR 171.050

Passenger Heel

Weight 

(pounds)

Passengers/Crew 

(number) 

Weight 

(pounds)

Passengers/Crew 

(number) 

Weigh 

(pounds)

Passengers/Crew 

(number) 

1 >21,000 >150 8,260 59 8,120 58

2 DID NOT PASS 1,540 11 6,860 49

3 DID NOT PASS 1,400 10 6,720 48

4 DID NOT PASS 5,180 37 7,560 54

5 DID NOT PASS 5,040 36 7,560 54

6 2,940 21 1,960 14 6,860 49

NOTE: Weight = total weight of passengers at 140 pounds per passenger.

In task 6, the Safety Board examined the effects of the three-by-two passenger 

seating configuration on the vesselís center of gravity, given the weight of those on board 

the vessel. The results indicate that the total passenger/crew transverse center of gravity 

was 0.2 foot to port of centerline and the longitudinal center of gravity was 0.36 foot 

forward of amidships, which created a 2.2o heel to port and 0.71-foot trim by the bow.

During interviews of survivors, investigators asked whether any passengers moved 

shortly before the onset of the accident, and every person said that no one stood up or 

moved from one side of the vessel to the other. Almost all said that passengers shifted in 

their seats and slid or fell toward the vesselís port side as the operator was attempting to 

turn starboard and the Ethan Allen began to roll to port. The Safety Board study analyzed 

the potential effect of the transverse movement of passengers and crew on the tendency of 

the Ethan Allen to capsize. In the accident condition, the righting arm was reduced to 

zero39 when the total passenger/crew weight load was shifted 1.0 foot off centerline, or 0.8 

foot from the initial loading condition. 

Task 7 was a roll sensitivity study, which was conducted to understand the 

dynamic behavior of the Ethan Allen under varying wave conditions. Simulations were 

completed using Oceanic Consulting Corporationís numerical seakeeping time-domain 

panel code MOTSIM.40

The characteristic waves in the wake of a vessel are governed by many factors, 

including vessel speed, hull size, hull shape, and whether or not the vessel in question is 

maneuvering. Consequently, there is no simple answer as to the height, steepness, or wave 

period (frequency) of the waves that will exist in a generated wake. The wake generated 

39 At zero righting arm, the boat has no righting energy to resist a vesselís heeling action, meaning it 

will capsize.

40 MOTSIM is a non-linear time-domain seakeeping simulation program that can predict vessel 

motions in six degrees of freedom in any wave condition.
Factual Information 26 Marine Accident Report

by a vessel can be assessed by means of a physical model test or by using numerical 

simulation. For the purposes of this report, it is sufficient to state that such generated 

wakes may have wavelengths as long as the Ethan Allen. Such waves generally last a few 

seconds. In the case of the Ethan Allen, its natural rolling period also was a few seconds. 

Without specific knowledge of which vessel(s) created the wave(s) that impacted the 

Ethan Allen, the actual wave conditions experienced by the Ethan Allen are unknown. It 

was therefore deemed appropriate to undertake a study using regular wave analysis to 

examine influences on the dynamic response of the vessel. 

Based on witness accounts of the Ethan Allenís movements and their descriptions 

of the waves encountered by the vessel as it turned and rolled and the resultant involuntary 

shifting of passengers and crew, this analysis examined a number of parameters in 

combination, shown in table 6. The 1-foot wave height was initially chosen based on 

passenger and operator observations. The parameters that were examined included vessel 

speed, heading, wave period, wave height, and passenger/crew transverse center of gravity 

(TCG41) position. The issue of turning was beyond the capability of the seakeeping code.

Table 6. Original motion analysis simulation parameters

Loading Conditions Speeds Headings Wave Height 

Passenger/crew TCG =

-0.2ft ACTUAL

6, 7 & 8 

mph

15°, 30°, 45°, 60°, 

75°, and 90°

1 foot 

None of the study simulations using the parameters in table 6 resulted in a capsize 

event, indicating that a wave height of greater than 1 foot would have been required to 

capsize the vessel for the load condition assessed. In simulations based on encountering a 

1-foot wave, the maximum roll response was about 8° to port. Maximum vertical and 

lateral accelerations tended to occur in beam seas (at all speeds). Lateral accelerations 

were also high at the 75° headings.

Investigators next examined the parameters outlined in table 7. A limited set of 

simulations was run at higher wave heights. Over the speed range examined, the analysis 

identified that vessel speed had little influence on the results, and additional simulations 

used a nominal vessel speed of 7 mph. The results illustrated that larger motions could be 

expected at wave headings that were closer to beam seas (that is, headings of 90°, 75°, or 

60°). The vessel response was not as pronounced at headings that were closer to following 

or stern quartering seas (that is, headings of 15°, 30°, or 45°).

The static stability study (task 6) had determined that the vesselís reserve righting 

energy was sensitive to the location of the center of gravity of the passengers and crew. 

41 The transverse location of the center of gravity of passengers/crew relative to the centerline of the 

vessel. The TCG = -0.2 foot represents the actual departure condition of the vessel and resulted in the 

vesselís initial 2.2° list to port. A TCG of ñ0.8 foot would produce a list of about 10° to port.
Factual Information 27 Marine Accident Report

Almost all survivors stated that as the vessel rolled to port during the turn toward 

starboard and encountered the wave(s) from the starboard direction, passengers slid to the 

low (port) side of the Ethan Allen. The simulations that considered shifts in 

passenger/crew TCG positions as well as increased wave heights showed that the 

maximum roll and pitch angles occurred at headings of 60°, 75°, and 90°, with a 

maximum roll response of about 16° to port. Over the range of frequencies that were 

examined, the peak responses (that is, largest roll angles) tended to occur at higher wave 

frequencies. These cases were where the wavelength equaled the boat length.

Table 7. Parameters for additional motion analysis simulations

Loading Conditions Speeds Headings Wave Height 

 Passengers/crew weight TCG= -0.2ft actual 7 mph 60°, 75°, 90° 1.5 foot

 Passengers/crew weight TCG= -0.2ft actual 7 mph 60°, 75°, 90° 2.0 foot

 Passengers/crew weight TCG= -0.4ft 7 mph 60°, 75°, 90° 1.0 foot

 Passengers/crew weight TCG= -0.6ft 7 mph 60°, 75°, 90° 1.0 foot

 Passengers/crew weight TCG= -0.8ft 7 mph 60°, 75°, 90° 1.0 foot

Maximum roll angles increased when wave height was increased. Maximum roll 

angles increased when the TCG was moved farther outboard. While no capsize event 

occurred, it was noted that some roll angles were substantial. 

The Safety Boardís stability study did not include a rigorous engineering 

evaluation of the vesselís roll response to the combined effects of wave action and turning 

because of limitations of the numerical seakeeping time-domain panel code MOTSIM. 

However, certain factors associated with a vesselís roll response actions are applicable to 

vessels such as the Ethan Allen. If an operator turns the vessel to starboard either in calm 

waters or in waves, the boat will experience a roll to port during the maneuver. 

Calculations performed in conjunction with other tasks showed that the Ethan Allen

operated with a 2.2° port list. When a listing vessel makes a turn, the added angle of roll 

further reduces the amount of righting energy available to counter the effects of passing 

waves and transverse weight shifts. Saunders discusses the heel angles associated with 

vessels in a turn in Hydrodynamics in Ship Design,

42 stating

Usually,Öthe center of gravity lies above the centers of pressure on the 

underwater hull and on the rudder, and the hull-lift force is greater than the rudder 

force, so that the resultant transverse moment created by these three forces causes 

the ship to heel outward while making a turn, despite the righting moment due to 

positive transverse metacentric stability. The heel due to the offset centripetal and 

centrifugal forces increases until the moment caused by them equals the righting 

momentÖ. 

42 Harold E. Saunders, Hydrodynamics in Ship Design, Vol. 3, ch. 4, ìShip Motion Involved in 

Maneuveringî (New York: Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, 1965), pp. 56-57.
Factual Information 28 Marine Accident Report

The heel may become dangerously large if the metacentric height and the range of 

positive transverse metacentric stability are both smallÖ. 

A boat or a ship with a surface waterplane which has fore-and-aft asymmetry 

changes trim as it lists or heels. There may be some disadvantage if this occurs 

during a turn. An everyday example is the craft with a wide transom stern which 

trims by the head as it heels, because it picks up more volume aft than forward 

with a given inclination.

The Safety Boardís stability study showed that in its accident condition, the Ethan 

Allen had a high center of gravity, and marginal righting energy and GM. With its transom 

stern and its fine bow, the vessel had a significant asymmetric water plane at its accident 

draft. In addition to the vesselís 2.2° list to port, it was trimmed by the bow almost 1 foot.

Other Information

Stability Concepts

A vessel that is floating upright in still water will heel when an off-center force or 

heeling moment is applied. Stability is the tendency of the vessel to return to its original 

upright position when the force is removed. In still water, a vesselís stability is a function 

of its underwater hull form and the distribution of mass of the vessel. The properties of 

stability are usually expressed in terms such as the magnitude of a heeling moment 

necessary to heel the vessel to a certain angle, the angle a vessel may heel to before 

capsizing, the amount of reserve energy available to return the vessel to its upright 

position, and other parameters that can be calculated. Coast Guard regulations and 

international standards specify the amount of stability a vessel must possess, depending on 

the type of vessel and its service. The requirements are usually expressed in terms that are 

easily calculated, such as GM, range of positive stability, righting energy, or other 

recognized technical measures. The specific stability characteristics of an individual 

vessel are determined based on the design drawings of its hull form (lines plan) and an 

inclining experiment of the vessel while afloat to determine its actual weight 

(displacement) and center of mass (center of gravity). 

Although obtained under stationary conditions, the stability characteristics 

represent the vesselís ability to return to the upright position when the vessel is in service 

and is subject to external forces such as wind and waves, people moving about, and from 

inertial effects resulting from the accelerations and motions of the vessel as it moves 

around on the waterís surface. Such dynamic influences on a vessel are random processes 

and can only be predicted statistically. Studies comparing the stability characteristics of 

vessels that capsized (inadequate stability) and vessels that did not capsize (adequate 

stability) form the basis of stability criteria that are in use today. To account for unknowns, 

uncertainties, and randomness of the physical environment and vessel response, large 

safety margins are built into the criteria. The stability criteria are generally recognized as 

providing an adequate level of safety for vessels that are operated prudently, which means 

not overloaded and not operating in dangerous conditions such as hurricanes.
Factual Information 29 Marine Accident Report

The stability analyses of most vessels involve substantial calculations that 

generally require the services of a naval architect. The calculations are based on an 

inclining experiment, in which very precise measurements are taken on board the vessel 

in order to determine its displacement and center of gravity. The inclining experiment 

and associated calculations and analysis cost several thousand to tens of thousands of 

dollars. For large oceangoing ships, the stability assessment is minor compared to the 

total cost, and is necessary in order to determine the maximum amount and stowage of 

cargo. In small passenger vessel design, stability is not optimized and usually exceeds the 

Coast Guard stability criteria. Because of the relatively high cost of an inclining 

experiment and full stability assessment, the Coast Guard permits an SST to be 

performed. The SST is quick, inexpensive, and more conservative than a full stability 

analysis. Being more conservative, the SST results in fewer passengers permitted than 

would be allowed based on a full stability assessment. Because the number of passengers 

permitted on a small passenger vessel is based on several criteria, such as deck area and 

seating capacity, stability is often not the governing criteria. In those cases, the SST is 

sufficient. However, the owner of a small passenger vessel might have space to carry 

more passengers than would be allowed by the SST, and so the cost of performing a full 

stability assessment with an inclining experiment is justified to show that additional 

passengers may be carried in compliance with the detailed stability regulations. 

The margin of safety built into the stability criteria is what provides the safety of 

the vessel against capsizing. The margin of safety is intended to accommodate all the 

things that happen with a vessel, such as rolling in waves, heeling due to wind, or listing as 

passengers move from one side to the other. The margin of safety is reduced if the vessel is 

operated in extremely high winds, surf, or is overloaded. The stability criteria are not 

intended for such conditions. In such extreme operating conditions, the margin of safety 

may be still adequate to keep the vessel upright, or it may not be adequate, resulting in a 

capsizing. In any case, if the intended margin of safety is not maintained, the vessel should 

not be considered seaworthy (safe), whether or not it capsizes.

Because of the nature of stability, and the randomness and variabilities associated 

with it, safety is not absolute. Not meeting stability standards does not mean a vessel will 

capsize; it only means the margin of safety is lower than what the regulations require. A 

vessel can operate for years in an overloaded condition that does not meet the stability 

standards; because the margin of safety is less than it should be, the probability of 

capsizing is higher, but it could still be remote. It would take other forces, such as high 

winds or large waves, to cause a vessel to capsize. The more a vessel is overloaded, the 

less the margin of safety for stability and the higher the probability of capsizing.

There is no obvious way to tell if a vessel fails to meet the stability criteria, other 

than through a stability test. This is why a stability test is required for all small passenger 

vessels. If something changes about the vessel, such as a structural modification that 

might affect the vesselís stability, another stability test and assessment should be 

conducted. After the stability assessment is completed, the results of the assessment and 

any limitations, such as number of passengers or limiting operating conditions, will be 

placed on the vesselís stability letter or COI.
Factual Information 30 Marine Accident Report

Capacity Plates

In the course of its investigation of the Ethan Allen accident, the Safety Board 

determined that the number of boats registered in New York as ìpublic vessels,î that is, 

vessels permitted to transport freight or passengers for commercial purposes on state 

waters, totaled 447. Of these, state officials had based the number of passengers that 382 

public vessels were permitted to carry on manufacturersí capacity plates.43 Investigators 

determined that of these 382 public vessels, 125 carried more than six passengers. 

The required display of capacity information on a plate in sight of the helm 

(steering area) is contained in 33 CFR 183, Coast Guard standards governing monohull 

noncommercial boats less than 20 feet long, except sailboats, canoes, kayaks, and 

inflatable boats. Information on the plate must include the maximum horsepower 

recommended for the boat, the maximum person capacity (listed both as number of people 

and as cumulative pounds), and the vesselís maximum carrying weight capacity (listed as 

the combined poundage of persons, motor, and gear). Vessels longer than 20 feet are not 

required to have a capacity plate; however, some manufacturers elect to install the plates 

on their vessels over 20 feet long.

As noted earlier, New York State did not have regulations governing stability 

assessments for public vessels. Office of Parks representatives indicated that the state 

accepted either a Coast Guard-approved stability assessment or a manufacturerís capacity 

plate as evidence of acceptable vessel passenger loading for public vessels. If a state 

inspector questioned a vesselís stability or if the owner made major modifications to the 

vessel, state officials required that a stability assessment be conducted using the testing 

protocol in Coast Guard regulations for small passenger vessels. 

The Coast Guard does not rely on capacity plate information for inspected small 

passenger vessels. All small passenger vessels that carry more than six passengers must 

comply with full certification and inspection requirements, including the stability criteria 

in Coast Guard regulations. 

Accidents Involving Out-of-Date Passenger Weight Standard

Following the March 6, 2004, capsizing of the pontoon-style small passenger 

vessel Lady D in Baltimore Harbor,

44 the Safety Board identified that the Coast Guardís 

passenger weight standard of 140 pounds used to assess the stability of vessels operating 

on protected waters posed a substantial safety risk for vessels carrying near the maximum 

number of permitted passengers. As a result, in advance of its final report on the accident, 

the Safety Board issued the following safety recommendation to the Coast Guard on 

December 20, 2004:

43 This category did not include the Ethan Allen, the de Champlain, or the Algonquin.

44 Capsizing of U.S. Small Passenger Vessel Lady D, Northwest Harbor, Baltimore, Maryland, 

March 6, 2004. Marine Accident Report MAR/06-01 (Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety 

Board, 2006).
Factual Information 31 Marine Accident Report

M-04-4

Revise your guidance to Officers in Charge, Marine Inspection, to 

determine the maximum occupant capacity of small passenger pontoon 

vessels either (1) by dividing the vesselís simplified stability proof test 

weight45 by the per person weight allowance for an average adult stipulated 

in Federal Aviation Administration Advisory Circular 120-27D (174 

pounds per person, assuming summer clothing and a 50-50 gender mix), or 

(2) by restricting (at the time of loading) the actual cumulative weight of 

passengers and crew to the vesselís simplified stability proof test weight.

In its April 7, 2005, response to this recommendation, the Coast Guard informed 

the Safety Board that it ìpartially concurred with this recommendation,î noting that it 

agreed with the premise behind ìoption 1î but did not agree with ìoption 2.î The Coast 

Guard stated, with regard to option 2:

The actions necessary to implement a change to the standard weight per person 

used in the simplified stability proof test for small passenger pontoon vessels go 

beyond a simple revision of guidance to OCMIs. The current weight standards are 

set in regulation at 46 CFR 178.330 and extend to all other types of small 

passenger vessels as well. Therefore, any change would, and realistically should, 

affect all other small passenger vessel types. However, passenger weight is only 

one of many variables in our vessel stability calculations.

The Coast Guard added that it had chartered a working group to analyze the 

passenger weight issue and assess the potential impact of regulatory changes on vessel 

stability determinations.

In the Safety Boardís final report on the Lady D accident, issued March 7, 2006, 

the Board agreed with the stated intent of the Coast Guard to address the passenger weight 

standard in the stability criteria for all domestic passenger vessels and classified Safety 

Recommendation M-04-4 ìClosedóSuperseded.î The Board noted however that if 

statistically representative average passenger weights were used, the Coast Guard needed 

to address how best to update the weight standard as needed. The Board further advised 

that even if the number of passengers permitted on board a vessel was based on a 

statistically representative average passenger weight, ìthe problem remains that a vessel 

can become overloaded if many of the passengers on board are heavier than the standard,î 

and that operators needed ìan easy way of identifying whether the passenger load they are 

intending to carry will compromise the stability of their vessels.î To address these 

passenger vessel stability concerns, the Safety Board issued the following safety 

recommendations to the Coast Guard:

45 Subchapter T contains a separate protocol for the pontoon vessel stability test (PSST).
Factual Information 32 Marine Accident Report

M-06-5

Revise regulations to require that passenger capacity for domestic 

passenger vessels be calculated based on a statistically representative 

average passenger weight standard that is periodically updated.

M-06-6

Identify a method for determining the maximum safe load condition of a 

small passenger vessel at the time of loading, such as a mark on the side of 

the hull, and require that the vessel owners implement that method.

On April 26, 2006, the Coast Guard published ìDomestic Vessel Passenger 

WeightsñVoluntary Interim Measuresî in the Federal Register.

46 The purpose of the notice 

was to advise owners and operators of small passenger vessels of prudent actions to take 

to address potentially unsafe operating conditions and to request comments on the 

measures. Several of the recommended measures addressed, in part, issues identified in 

the Safety Boardís report on the Lady D capsizing. 

In the voluntary interim measures, the Coast Guard asked owners and operators of 

small passenger vessels less than 65 feet long to reduce the total passenger capacity by 

using a per passenger weight standard of 185 pounds in calculating the number of 

passengers permitted on board the vessel. The Coast Guard said that if necessary, 

passengers should be weighed before boarding to verify that the vessel is not overloaded. 

The Coast Guard asked owners and operators of vessels for which stability was 

evaluated according to Coast Guard regulations in Subchapter S to review their stability 

guidance to ensure that they did not carry excessive passenger weight, or that increasing 

the per passenger weight to 185 pounds did not reduce vessel stability below Subchapter S 

requirements. It also recommended that owners and operators of all small passenger 

vessels notify the OCMI ìif any significant structural or equipment changes have been 

made to the vesselî since stability was ìevaluated by the owner and approved by the Coast 

Guard.î

The Coast Guard also suggested that owners and operators may consider 

voluntarily reevaluating a vesselís stability using a per passenger weight of 185 pounds. 

Finally, the Coast Guard noted that it would amend its regulations to ìaddress the stability 

issues caused by increases in passenger and vessel weight.î

New York State Actions Since Accident

Shortly after the accident, New York State legislation was proposed to address 

deficiencies noted in the stateís oversight of public vessels.47 In particular, the proposed 

legislation called for mandatory postaccident drug and alcohol testing of vessel operators 

and a reduction in passenger loads on public vessels to comply with the intent of Safety 

46 Federal Register, vol. 71, no. 80 (April 26, 2006), pp. 24732-24735.

47 See appendix C for more information.
Factual Information 33 Marine Accident Report

Recommendation M-04-04, which called for using a passenger weight standard of 174 

pounds when assessing vessel stability.

On March 2, 2006, the Governor announced a comprehensive legislative effort to 

address additional deficiencies in the stateís oversight of public vessels. Among the 

initiatives was legislation requiring:

ï Vessels carrying 20 or more passengers to have at least two exits on each deck.

ï Operators and engineers to crew vessels with the number of crewmembers 

specified in the vessel COI, under penalty of suspension or revocation of 

licenses, with owners facing misdemeanor charges for violations.

ï Owners to inform the state before modifying vessels in a way ìthat would 

affect the stability of the vesselÖ,î with owners also facing misdemeanor 

charges for violations.

ï Vessels carrying more than 49 passengers to be equipped with radar.

Several weeks thereafter, the Office of Parksí Marine Services Unit circulated to 

the owners and operators of public vessel two draft pamphlets that contained the proposed 

state regulatory changes that New York intended to enact. The first pamphlet, ìTechnical 

Guidance for the Public Vessel Operators,î addresses operations, primary and auxiliary 

vessel systems, emergency procedures (preparatory drills and safety briefings and 

response activities), and safety equipment carriage requirements. The second pamphlet, 

ìTechnical Guidance for the Public Vessel OperatorsñSimplified Stability Test,î discusses 

stability concepts, offers instructions for conducting a stability test, and provides a list of 

navigating precautions for avoiding a capsizing.
34 Marine Accident Report

Analysis

General

The analysis first identifies factors that can be eliminated as causal or contributory 

to the cause of the accident. It then discusses safety issues identified in the accident 

investigation. These include:

ï Stability standards and procedures for passenger vessels;

ï New York Stateís use of manufacturerís capacity plates to determine public 

vessel passenger loading; and

ï Regulation of New York Stateís public vessels.

This analysis also looks at survivability and toxicological testing in the Ethan 

Allen accident.

Exclusions

At the time of the accident, visibility was good, the winds were calm, and the 

temperature was moderate. The waves that were present on the lake were produced 

primarily by the activity of other vessels. Given the clear sky, moderate temperature, and 

calm winds, the Safety Board concludes that weather conditions were not a factor in this 

accident. 

The Safety Board examined the actions of the operator to determine what role, if 

any, he may have played in the cause of the accident. Passenger and witness reports were 

consistent that just before accident, the operator turned the vessel to starboard. He told 

investigators that he had begun to turn the vessel at Cramer Point to proceed along the 

route of the vesselís tour, and that he continued the turn when he saw a wave about to 

strike the vessel. The vessel operatorís sharp turn was an attempt to meet the wave head 

on, which would have enabled him to better handle the force exerted by the wave. Some 

witnesses reported that as the vessel turned starboard, the wave struck the vessel 

broadside, on its aft starboard quarter, before the vessel could be turned into the wave. 

Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that the attempt of the Ethan Allen operator turning 

the vessel into the oncoming wake before the capsizing was a normal reaction to the 

circumstances, but not timely enough to be effective. 

The Safety Board also considered personal factors that could have influenced the 

operatorís decision-making, including whether his physical condition was affected by a 

sleep deficit or the use of alcohol or drugs. The operator had maintained the same 

work/rest schedule for several weeks before the accident, which provided him 8 to 8 1/2 
Analysis 35 Marine Accident Report

hours of sleep nightly. Thus, he was not suffering from sleep deprivation. The Safety 

Board therefore concludes that operator fatigue was not a factor in this accident. 

Within an hour of the accident, the operator volunteered to provide samples for 

toxicological testing; however, New York law enforcement officials did not request the 

testing, based on their observations of him and his behavior. Upon arriving on scene, 

Safety Board investigators asked the operator to submit to testing. He freely agreed, and 

samples were obtained 2 days after the accident. The operator advised Safety Board 

investigators at the time of testing that he had had a glass of wine the evening before the 

accident. The analysis of the blood samples was negative for drugs; the urine analysis 

showed a metabolite of alcohol, which merely indicated that he had consumed alcohol at 

some point within 80 hours of giving the sample. Because of the timeliness of the testing, 

the findings as they relate to this accident are not conclusive. The Safety Board concludes 

that because drug and alcohol testing of the Ethan Allen operator was not done in a timely 

manner, the toxicological analysis was inconclusive. The issue of timely toxicological 

testing, including new Federal standards and proposed New York regulatory changes, is 

discussed later in this analysis.

Safety Board investigators examined the vessel after the accident and determined 

that the hull structure and propulsion and steering components were free of preexisting 

defects. The Safety Board therefore concludes that the Ethan Allenís hull structure and 

steering and propulsion components were not factors in this accident. 

The nature of the capsizing led investigators to question whether water had been in 

the hull, which might have degraded the stability of the vessel. The bilge was among the 

items that the operator was to check at the start of each day. He indicated that he checked 

the bilge that morning and found nothing unusual. He was the second operator to captain 

the Ethan Allen, and the bilge check he completed would have been the second one 

conducted on the vessel on the day of the accident. Consistent with the company 

requirement, the first operator also checked the bilge, and he said that he found nothing 

unusual.

During postaccident examination of the vessel components, investigators found a 

0.076-inch gap in the main engine raw water pump. They then measured the leak rate of 

the pump into the bilge to determine the amount of water that could have leaked into the 

bilge from the pump during the 20-minute accident voyage. Investigators observed that, at 

most, 6 gallons of water would have leaked in, assuming the highest leak rate possible. 

Given the low leak rate of the pump, the two independent checks of the bilge by the 

operator, and the lack of any other possible source of water ingress, it is unlikely that a 

noticeable amount of water was in the bilge at the time of the accident. Therefore, the 

Safety Board concludes that at the time of the accident, the bilge might have contained, at 

most, an insignificant amount of water, which would not have affected the Ethan Allenís 

stability. 
Analysis 36 Marine Accident Report

Cause of the Capsizing

The monohull-style small passenger vessel Ethan Allen (New York public vessel) 

was built in 1964 and had operated in commercial service for almost 40 years. According 

to the owner of Shoreline Cruises, in the 26 years that the Ethan Allen had operated as a 

passenger vessel on Lake George, it probably had made 14,000 trips and had never 

experienced a major incident. The Ethan Allen very likely had operated with a full load of 

passengers during various weather and wave conditions on Lake George. On the day of 

the accident, a sister vessel configured exactly like the Ethan Allen (the de Champlain) 

and carrying a full passenger load followed the route of the accident vessel but 

experienced no problems.

The Safety Board sought to determine what so greatly affected the stability of the 

Ethan Allen on the day of the accident that it capsized, and found that a combination of 

factors probably contributed to the vesselís overturning. The primary conditions that 

affected the stability of the Ethan Allen, listed below, are discussed in greater detail in the 

following sections.

ï Modifications affecting vessel stability

ï Overloading due to out-of-date passenger weight criterion

ï Influence of vessel motions on stability

Modifications Affecting Vessel Stability

Postaccident Test Findings. Following the accident, the Ethan Allen was 

recovered from the water and transported to a hangar where it was retained as evidence 

relating to the accident and its components could be examined and, if necessary, removed 

for testing and analysis. To obtain a preliminary determination of whether stability, 

overloading, or both might have been factors in the capsizing, the Safety Board 

investigators arranged an SST of the de Champlain. Like the Ethan Allen, the 

de Champlain and the Algonquin had been based on the Dyer 40 boat design and built for 

the same owner. They had originally been under the jurisdiction of the Coast Guard, which 

certificated each of them to carry 48 passengers in addition to two required crewmembers. 

When Shoreline Cruises purchased the vessels, they came under the jurisdiction of New 

York. State officials indicated that they established the same load restrictions (48 

passengers, two crewmembers) for the three vessels, based on the COIs issued by the 

Coast Guard.

After surveying the de Champlain and the Ethan Allen, investigators determined 

that the vessels were similar enough in design and construction that the de Champlain

would yield comparable results from a stability test. The assessment was then conducted 

in accordance with the Coast Guardís SST criteria found in 46 CFR 178.330, which New 

York officials indicated the state would require for a public vessel like the Ethan Allen if 

its stability were questioned.
Analysis 37 Marine Accident Report

Calculations for the SST indicated that the wind heeling moment and the 

passenger heeling moment were respectively 13,060 foot-pounds and 11,659 foot-pounds; 

thus the wind heeling moment was the governing criterion to use in the SST of the 

de Champlain. The magnitude of the required wind heeling moment was determined by 

the lateral wind area that included the vesselís large canopy structure.

The maximum heeling angle allowed during the SST was 14o. Testers placed 

twelve full test-weight water barrels on blocks along the vesselís centerline to replicate a 

load condition for 48 passengers. Using the water surface as the baseline, testers placed a 

freeboard mark on the outside of the hull that corresponded to 14o of list. Safety Board 

investigators next attempted to obtain the required maximum moment for wind heel by 

emptying eight of the barrels, placing them on wooden blocks along the vesselís port side, 

and then refilling them. Investigators had filled about three of the eight barrels when the 

waterline neared the reference freeboard mark on the listing de Champlain. In other 

words, only about half the required heeling moment was applied to the vessel before it 

neared the mark, meaning it would fail the SST for the carriage of 48 passengers. Safety 

Board investigators terminated the test because it was clear the vessel would not pass the 

SST, and they did not want to endanger the vessel or themselves. 

Because the de Champlain failed the stability proof test for the carriage of 48 

passengers on a protected route, the Safety Board had reason to question the intact 

stability of the Ethan Allen for the carriage of 48 passengers. Subsequent investigation 

revealed that during the 40-year history of the Ethan Allen, the de Champlain, and the 

Algonquin, all had been modified by the addition of various types of canopies, but new 

stability assessments had not been done to determine the effects of the modifications on 

the vesselsí stability. 

The Board contracted for a study to examine the static and dynamic stability of the 

Ethan Allen. The study used both the SST and Subchapter S criteria to evaluate possible 

variants48 of the Ethan Allen for its ability to carry passengers, including the vessel in its asdelivered condition without a canopy (1964), the vessel with a metal and canvas canopy 

(several versions beginning in 1979), and the vessel with a wooden canopy (1989).

For the SST, the number of passengers that a vessel can carry is calculated based 

on a review of the vesselís drawings or physical measurements of such features as rails, 

seating, or deck area and verified by a simple physical test involving the movement of test 

weights. Because of how the SST and stability criteria were developed, the SST is 

considered more conservative than the criteria in Subchapter S, usually resulting in a 

lower allowable passenger load.

The Subchapter S protocol begins with an inclining experiment on the vessel and 

is followed by stability calculations. Determining the allowable passenger capacity by 

48 The Safety Board was unable to find documentation on the materials used to fabricate the metal and 

canvas canopy installed on the Ethan Allen (formerly Double Dolphin) in Groton. The Board therefore 

examined the effects on the vessel of an aluminum canopy and a steel canopy because these construction 

materials respectively represented the lightest and the heaviest materials used at that time by the marine 

industry for a substantial marine canopy structure. 
Analysis 38 Marine Accident Report

using Subchapter S stability criteria is more costly than by using an SST because an owner 

usually has to hire a naval architect to conduct the inclining experiment and perform the 

rigorous calculations. However, the results of the evaluation may show that the vessel is 

capable of safely carrying more passengers than would be allowed based on an SST.

The SST results showed that the only configuration of the Ethan Allen that passed 

the SST with a 48-passenger load was the as-delivered vessel that did not have a canopy. 

All other variants of the Ethan Allen (formerly the Double Dolphin) failed the SST for any 

passenger loading because the canopy structure so greatly increased the lateral area 

projected to the wind that the required wind heeling moment calculated for the SST could 

not be accommodated.

For the Subchapter S evaluation, an inclining experiment was performed on the 

sister vessel de Champlain at Lake George on October 5, 2005, and witnessed by Safety 

Board investigators and representatives of the parties to the investigation. The findings 

from the experiment were then used to perform the stability analysis for the Ethan Allen.

The stability analysis showed that the original vessel configuration with no canopy 

could pass the stability criteria contained in Subchapter S for the carriage of 58 

passengers. In the cases of the variants with canopies, however, the calculations yielded 

dramatically different results for several reasons:

ï The weight of each canopy caused the vessel to ride lower in the water, which 

reduced its reserve buoyancy.

ï The higher center of gravity created by a canopy reduced the righting energy 

and GM of the Ethan Allen, reducing its ability to resist overturning moments 

from forces such as wind, waves, and passenger movement.

ï The wind profile created by each canopy, combined with that of the vessel 

itself, so greatly increased the overall projected lateral area and corresponding 

wind heeling moment of the Ethan Allen that it could not meet the required 

stability criteria.

By adding a canopy, the governing criterion for stability was no longer the 

passenger heeling moment, but rather the wind heeling moment, which was much larger 

than the passenger heeling moment.

None of the variants having metal frame canopies with canvas covers satisfied the 

Subchapter S stability criteria for the carriage of any passengers. The only variation of the 

Ethan Allen with a canopy that could accommodate any passengers at all was the vessel 

with a wooden superstructure. The Ethan Allen wooden canopy was heavier than both the 

canvas-covered steel frame and the aluminum frame canopy variants; however, because 

the wood superstructure was about 15 inches lower, it presented a smaller lateral wind 

profile and thus a smaller wind heeling moment. The Subchapter S calculations 

determined that the Ethan Allen with the wooden canopy could carry only 14 passengers, 

using the current regulatory standard of 140 pounds per passenger. 
Analysis 39 Marine Accident Report

The Safety Board therefore concludes that the addition, and subsequent 

modification, of a canopy changed the Ethan Allenís stability characteristics. 

Failure to Reassess Stability After Modifications. Documentation provided by 

Anchorage Shipyard and statements by former Whaling employees indicated that an SST 

may have been conducted in 1966 on the Double Dolphin. The Safety Board found no 

evidence to indicate that a stability evaluation using the tests in either Subchapter T or S 

was conducted after adding a metal frame canopy to the vessel while it was still in service 

in Groton and under Coast Guard jurisdiction. At the time, the regulations in Subchapter T 

concerning alterations and modifications did not specifically require testing the vessel 

after modifications.

In 1979, Whaling sold the Double Dolphin and its two sister vessels to Shoreline 

Cruises, and the three vessels became subject to New York State regulations. According to 

Office of Parks officials, New York based the vesselsí permitted passenger capacity on the 

Coast Guard COIs. At this time, canopies had not yet been added to the de Champlain and 

the Algonquin; consequently the passenger loads permitted on their state COIs were 

appropriate, based on the Coast Guard stability criteria. Shoreline Cruises subsequently 

added metal/canvas canopies to the de Champlain and the Algonquin. During the period of 

1989 to 1991, Shoreline Cruises contracted to replace the metal/canvas canopies on the 

three Dyer 40s with wooden canopies. 

Before this accident, state laws did not address stability assessments and state 

guidance documents contained vague language about assessments that were necessary if a 

public vessel was to be modified. Chapter 37 of the Consolidated Laws of the State of 

New York contains no regulation requiring vessel owners to notify a state inspector or 

inspectors if they intend to make or have made a modification to their vessels that might 

affect stability. The Office of Parks manual for public vessel operators that was in effect 

before this accident states that it is the duty of the owner to promptly report when a major 

alteration to a public vessel is to be accomplished so that a state inspector can determine 

whether a ìthorough inspectionî is necessary.

The Safety Board found no evidence to indicate that a stability evaluation using 

the tests in either Subchapter T or S was conducted after any of the canopy modifications 

at Lake George. If a stability assessment had been conducted after the canopy installations 

and modifications, it would have been necessary for Shoreline Cruises to reduce the 

passenger capacity and/or change the design of the canopies of the three vessels in order to 

pass the Coast Guard stability test criteria applied by New York State. 

The Safety Board concludes that although Coast Guard regulations and New York 

State guidance to vessel owners did not contain clear requirements pertaining to testing 

after modifications, the Double Dolphin/Ethan Allen should have undergone a stability 

reassessment after each canopy installation and modification. Moreover, because the 

Double Dolphin/Ethan Allen did not undergo stability assessments after the addition and 

modification of its canopies, it was certificated to carry too many passengers. Its COI 

permitted 50 persons, but stability criteria should have limited the number to 14 persons. 
Analysis 40 Marine Accident Report

The Ethan Allen and de Champlain were retrofitted alike; thus they were sister 

vessels, and the results of the Safety Boardís stability study applied to both vessels. 

Shoreline Cruises first installed a smaller metal canvas canopy on the Algonquin and then 

refitted it with a partial wooden deckhouse in 1991. Consequently, the Algonquin had a 

smaller lateral wind profile, its displacement was less, and its VCG was lower than that of 

the other two vessels. The reduction in its freeboard and stability would not have been as 

significant as that of the Ethan Allen and the de Champlain. The Safety Board concludes 

that although it was the Ethan Allen that was involved in this accident, the potential for 

capsizing was substantially the same for the de Champlain. 

Overloading Due to Out-of-Date Passenger Weight Criterion

From survivor interviews and its review of emergency room records, the Safety 

Board found that the average weight of the Ethan Allenís occupants on the day of the 

accident was almost 178 pounds, significantly more than the per person weight standard of 

140 pounds used to verify the allowable number of passengers in stability proof tests. The 

combination of the number of passengers permitted by the COI and the higher-thanassumed average weight of the people on board the Ethan Allen resulted in the vessel 

being significantly overloaded when it capsized.

The Safety Board stability study, which used the current regulatory weight standard 

of 140 pounds per passenger, determined that the maximum number of persons that should 

have been allowed for the Ethan Allen was 14, or a total occupant capacity of about 2,000 

pounds. On the day of the accident, however, the vessel carried 48 persons (1 crewmember 

and 47 passengers) averaging about 177.5 pounds each, or more than 8,000 pounds total 

weight, about four times its safe load carrying capacity. The additional weight caused the 

Ethan Allen to sit deeper in the water and significantly raised its center of gravity, which, in 

turn, reduced its reserve buoyancy, available GM, and righting energy necessary to resist 

overturning moments from forces such as wind, waves, and passenger movement.

There was no wind on the day of the accident. When the Safety Board analyzed the 

effect of transverse passenger movement in the Ethan Allen accident condition, the stability 

study found that the vesselís reserve righting energy was reduced to zero with only 6,800 

foot-pounds of passenger heeling moment to the port side.49 All survivors stated that no one 

stood up or moved before the onset of the capsize; however, the lack of righting resistance 

to passenger heel was indicative of the minimal stability of the Ethan Allen.

The Safety Board concludes that the combination of too many passengers, as 

permitted by the Ethan Allenís inappropriate COI, and the use of an out-of-date average 

weight standard for passengers on public vessels resulted in the Ethan Allen carrying a 

load that significantly reduced its stability, which made it more susceptible to capsizing on 

the day of the accident. 

49 The Ethan Allen had an initial 2.2o port list due to the asymmetrical bench seating arrangement that 

placed more passengers on the port side of the vessel.
Analysis 41 Marine Accident Report

Influence of Vessel Motions on Stability

The static stability analysis of the Ethan Allen on the day it capsized showed that 

while the vessel had marginal stability, it would not capsize without some other heeling 

force(s) or influence(s). The transverse movement of passengers, significant amounts of 

water in the bilges, the effects of lateral wind loading, or the grounding of the vessel could 

have reduced its stability, although the latter three factors can be ruled out in this case. The 

stability study calculated the stability sensitivity of the Ethan Allen to transverse 

passenger weight shifts; if enough passengers moved to one side of the vessel, a capsize 

could follow. This tenderness of the vessel, or lack of stability, was apparent when the 

passengers boarded the Ethan Allen at the dock, and then had to redistribute themselves to 

try to bring the vessel back on an even keel. 

When the overloaded Ethan Allen departed the dock, it already had a 2.2° list to 

port, which would have reduced the vesselís port freeboard and limited the maximum 

angle of roll to port that the vessel could sustain before the deck edge submerged. In 

addition, the vessel had almost 1 foot of trim by the bow when it sailed. In determining the 

cause of the capsizing of the Ethan Allen, the Safety Board looked at the effects of the 

following dynamic conditions that were reported:

ï The Ethan Allen encountered waves generated by passing vessels.

ï The operator of the Ethan Allen attempted to maneuver the vessel in a sharp 

starboard turn to head into these waves, but did not complete the maneuver 

before the wave or waves hit the vessel.

ï As the vessel rolled to port, passengers said that they fell to the low (port side) 

of the vessel.

Dynamic Response in Waves. At the time of the accident, the waves in the lake 

were produced by vessel activity. The Safety Board was unable to specifically identify the 

vessel or vessels that caused the particular wave or waves in question. Varying accounts of 

the size of the wave or waves were reported. Several passengers reported one wave that 

was less than a foot high, and some passengers and a boater reported seeing no wave at all. 

The operator estimated that the wake was 2 1/2 to 3 feet high. Because of the differences 

in their descriptions and the absence of other evidence, the Safety Board could not 

determine the precise height, frequency, and number of the waves in question. The Board 

therefore had simulations performed for varying heights of waves to determine their 

potential impact.

The dynamic response in waves of the 40-foot tour boat Ethan Allen was examined 

using Oceanic Consulting Corporationís time domain seakeeping panel code MOTSIM. 

For the conditions analyzed, a capsize event was not observed. However, the results were 

still useful in that they highlighted the influence of particular variables. For the conditions 

assessed, vessel speed was shown to be of minimal importance with respect to wavegenerated motion response. Motion response was greatest at headings that were near beam 

seas and was less at headings that were closer to quartering or following seas. Increasing 

wave height and increasing shifts in passenger/crew transverse center of gravity (TCG) 
Analysis 42 Marine Accident Report

positions increased the dynamic response of the vessel to waves. When the study looked at 

a passenger/crew weight shift of 0.6 foot to port with a 1-foot wave, the wave would have 

produced a vessel roll of almost 16° to port. This passenger/crew weight shift could be 

achieved if everyone on board moved 7 inches to port. The most significant roll angle 

reached from the effects of wave action alone was 14° to port.

While a capsize event was not produced in the simulation, the study results led to 

the conclusion that the actual capsize of the Ethan Allen resulted, in part, not from a single 

dynamic factor, but was probably from a unique set of dynamic factors that overwhelmed 

the vesselís marginal stability.

Dynamic Response in Turns. The Ethan Allenís characteristics on the day of the 

accident met criteria that would have predicted the vesselís rolling outboard as the operator 

turned the vessel into the approaching wave(s). The vesselís high center of gravity created a 

significant heeling moment that tended to roll the vessel outboard in a turn. In this condition, 

the vessel had low GM and reserve righting energy to resist heeling moments. The vessel was 

designed with a fine bow and full transom, and would have had a significant asymmetric water 

plane at the accident condition draft. This asymmetry would have caused the Ethan Allen to 

trim forward as it rolled to the side. This would have increased the bow-down aspect of the 

vessel with its existing 1-foot static trim. While the Ethan Allen rolled to port as a result of the 

operator turning the vessel to starboard, the magnitude of the roll is unknown.

Loss of Stability Due to Passenger Movement. The wave that impacted the 

Ethan Allen, together with the vessel rolling away from the turn, may have been large 

enough to capsize the vessel. However, according to testimony, the rolling action caught the 

occupants off guard. The point at which passengers lost their seating was determined by a 

number of factors such as their position in the vessel, their situational awareness, and the 

actions of passengers next to them. The survivors indicated that when the vessel turned, 

most passengers initially shifted to port in their seats. As the vessel continued to roll, first a 

few passengers and then the remaining passengers on the starboard side tumbled and slid to 

the low side of the vessel (port side). This shift in passenger weight shifted the overall TCG 

of the vessel to port, further compromising the vesselís stability. As one survivor described, 

the vessel rolled to port along it axis and continued to roll over until it capsized. 

The Safety Board concludes that the Ethan Allen capsized as a result of insufficient 

stability, which made it unable to right itself from the combined forces of a passing wave 

or waves, a sharp turn, and the resulting involuntary shift of passengers to the port side of 

the vessel.

Capacity Plates

During its investigation, the Safety Board determined that New York State officials 

used the manufacturersí capacity plates to establish the number of passengers permitted 

on 382 of 447 public vessels. Of the 382 public vessels with capacity plates, 125 carried 

more than six passengers. 
Analysis 43 Marine Accident Report

The display of capacity information standard, found in 33 CFR 183, requires boat 

manufacturers to rate the total number of persons their boats can safely carry. The standard 

specifically applies to noncommercial vessels under 20 feet in length and is not intended 

to be applied to a commercial passenger vessel carrying more than six passengers for hire. 

The Coast Guard requires that any commercial passenger vessel carrying more than six 

passengers comply with the small passenger vessel regulations found in 46 CFR 

Subchapter T. Consequently, the Safety Board concludes that New York Stateís reliance 

on manufacturersí capacity plate data to determine maximum passenger limits on public 

vessels that carry more than six passengers for hire is an inappropriate use of the Coast 

Guard noncommercial boat standard. Therefore, the Safety Board believes that New York 

State should discontinue the use of capacity plate data associated with the U.S. Coast 

Guardís noncommercial boating standards for determining passenger loading on public 

vessels that carry more than six passengers and adopt the Coast Guard small passenger 

vessel inspection standards.

Postaccident Actions by Regulatory Authorities

Following the Ethan Allen accident, New York State took prompt action, 

proposing legislation to address safety on its public vessels. The Coast Guard issued 

interim measures in advance of final rulemaking aimed at addressing stability issues for 

small passenger vessels. 

New York Actions 

On March 2, 2006, the Governor of New York proposed legislation to strengthen 

the stateís regulations governing public vessels, addressing such issues as stability (as it 

pertained to maximum passenger carriage), drug and alcohol testing, and manning. 

In the area of stability, the proposed legislation included increasing the state 

weight requirement to 174 pounds. The weight standard proposed by New York is based 

on an FAA weight standard identified in a safety recommendation (M-04-4) that the 

Safety Board issued to the Coast Guard in advance of the Boardís report on the 2004 

Lady D capsizing in Baltimore Harbor. The specific weight value was adopted in 2004 by 

the FAA, using the most current study findings at that time.50

In addition, the Governor directed the Office of Parks to take interim measures to 

ensure the safety of public vessels, which resulted in an immediate review of all existing 

COIs to ensure compliance with the proposed new weight standards and periodic 

certification of the weight capacity of all public vessels.

New Yorkís proposed legislation to update the average passenger weight standard 

is a positive step toward ensuring that a vessel is properly certificated for the number of 

50 In October 2004, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued the report, ìMean 

Body Weight, Height, and Body Mass Index, United States 1960ñ2002,î based on data collected annually 

since 1960 by the CDCís National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey program.
Analysis 44 Marine Accident Report

passengers it can safely carry. However, as current studies and sources show, weight is a 

variable that is subject to change. The Coast Guard now recommends that the passenger 

weight standard used in evaluating vessel stability be 185 pounds based on 2005 CDC 

studies. The Safety Board has asked the Coast Guard to periodically review national 

studies and update the weight standard as necessary. The Board suggests that New York 

monitor the regulatory changes made by the Coast Guard and update its state regulations 

accordingly.

Even if the number of passengers permitted is based on an increased average 

weight standard, the problem persists that a vessel can become overloaded if many of the 

passengers on board are heavier than the standard weight. Operators therefore need an 

easy way of identifying whether the passenger load they are preparing to carry will 

overload their vessels. If a mark were painted on the hull that corresponded to the 

waterline when the vessel was under maximum approved load, any crewmember could 

easily determine whether the vessel was overloaded simply by observing the vesselís draft 

in relation to that mark. The Safety Board concludes that New York State public vessel 

operators do not have a simple and ready means such as a mark on the hull to determine 

whether their vessels are overloaded. 

The legislation proposed by New York also attempts to address other issues that 

were not causal to the capsizing. Some of these proposed changes are discussed in the 

analytical sections ìPostaccident Toxicological Testingî and ìSurvival Issues.î 

Coast Guard Actions

The Coast Guard has been working to address the issues of an out-of-date weight 

standard since the capsizing of the pontoon-style small passenger vessel Lady D in 

Baltimore Harbor on March 6, 2004. The agency contracted for a 1-year study in 2005 to 

determine the potential impact on the marine industry that would result from increasing 

the passenger weight and size standards used when calculating the stability of domestic 

passenger vessels. The Coast Guard concurrently evaluated various weight studies, and on 

April 26, 2006, published voluntary interim measures for domestic passenger vessels in 

the Federal Register. The notice advised boat owners and operators that they should use 

185 pounds as the weight standard when evaluating a vesselís stability. The notice also 

reminded owners and operators that they are required by regulation to submit plans or 

specifications for any vessel changes to the cognizant OCMI. The Coast Guard asked for 

comments on the measures, advising the public that the changes were in advance of a final 

rulemaking effort. The Safety Board expressed its support of the Coast Guardís voluntary 

interim measures by stating that it was

pleased with the intended action of the Coast Guard and the direction of several 

measures. If adopted by vessel owners and operators, the measures can genuinely 

contribute to safeguarding the traveling public. The Board is aware that the Coast 

Guard intends to incorporate these measures into regulatory changes and is 

hopeful that this will be accomplished expeditiously.
Analysis 45 Marine Accident Report

The Safety Board was also encouraged by the Coast Guardís stated objective to 

establish an outreach program to vessel owners and operators to advise them of this notice 

and to seek the marine industryís support of the published voluntary safety measures. This 

is a proactive approach that could facilitate the adoption of final rules. The Coast Guardís 

efforts would benefit by enlisting the support of the state agencies that regulate commercial 

passenger vessels. As this accident demonstrated, New York had guidance and policies that 

were intended to provide the same measure of vessel safety as Coast Guard regulations; 

however, the language in some of the guidance was vague and did not provide clear 

instructions to vessel owners and operators about stability requirements. The Coast Guard 

can best assist the states in understanding the Coast Guardís stability standards. The Safety 

Board therefore believes that the Coast Guard should provide guidance to the states on 

Coast Guard standards for and assessment of stability of small passenger vessels.

Postaccident Toxicological Testing

As noted earlier in this analysis, New York law enforcement authorities did not 

obtain samples for toxicological testing, although the operator of the Ethan Allen

volunteered to submit to testing within a hour of the capsizing. New York State did not 

require compulsory postaccident testing for alcohol or drug use. There is no reason to 

suspect that the operator was under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs at the time of 

the accident. The Safety Board is nonetheless concerned that the operator was not tested as 

soon as possible after the accident.

Operators of passenger vessels engaged in commercial operations have an obligation to 

provide the highest levels of safety to their passengers and crew. For this reason, the Safety 

Board has worked with the Coast Guard for almost 30 years to improve the postaccident drug 

and alcohol testing requirements of vessel operators who have been involved in a serious 

marine incident. The Coast Guard recently adopted revisions to 46 CFR Part 4 that address 

postaccident chemical testing requirements. The new standard, which became effective on 

June 20, 2006, stipulates that alcohol testing must be conducted within 2 hours and drug testing 

must be conducted within 32 hours of the time of a serious marine incident.

The legislation proposed by New York state officials after the Ethan Allen accident 

would require that law enforcement officials immediately obtain samples for alcohol or 

drug testing from operators of public vessels that have been involved in an accident 

causing death, disappearance, or serious physical injury. The Safety Board supports the 

quick enactment of this proposed legislation.

Survival Issues

Twenty of the 48 persons on the Ethan Allen did not survive the accident. The 

majority of these individuals had significant traumatic injuries, which were most likely 

sustained either during the capsizing itself or during attempts to escape the capsized 
Analysis 46 Marine Accident Report

vessel. By contrast, survivors showed little evidence of significant traumatic injuries. 

Several survivors described considerable confusion during their escape due to vessel 

inversion, submersion, darkness, and the presence of a large number of other frightened 

passengers. Significant traumatic injuries sustained during the capsizing could have 

increased disorientation and appreciably decreased the probability of successful egress 

from the vessel. 

Seven drowned passengers did not have significant injuries, and five of these had 

significant preexisting heart disease. Any of these five individuals possibly had some sort 

of abnormal heart rhythm that resulted in loss of consciousness following the capsizing, 

accounting for their drowning without apparent injury. However, for the majority of the 

drowned victims, there is no evidence that preexisting medical conditions adversely 

affected their survival. Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that for almost all of the 

passengers, survivability was not adversely affected by the presence of preexisting 

medical conditions.

It is noteworthy that only two of the five drowning victims with preexisting heart 

disease had disease specifically associated with aging. The lack of an obvious 

association of age-related disease with survivability suggests that, for the most part, the 

age of the passengers per se did not affect passenger survivability. Passengers who were 

uninjured in the capsizing or in attempting to escape were generally able to be rescued 

and survive.

Survivability was enhanced by the proximity of recreational vessels to the accident 

site and the willingness of their operators both to notify emergency personnel of the 

accident and to actively assist in rescuing survivors. Warren County sheriffís office 

dispatch center logs indicate that emergency service personnel were informed quickly 

about the accident and that rescue vehicles, vessels, and personnel were dispatched to and 

arrived on the scene within minutes. Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that the 

emergency response was timely and effective.

Before this accident, the Consolidated Laws of the State of New York and the 

study guide provided to public vessel operators were silent about safety briefings being 

provided to passengers; consequently, the operator of the Ethan Allen was not obligated to 

provide one. In this case, the vessel operator said that he gave a safety briefing before the 

Ethan Allen departed the dock at 1430. All survivors reported that the operator did not 

perform a safety briefing; however, they admitted that they were all talking to each other 

while the boat was docked. Such a briefing, if done properly, would have included the 

location of lifejackets, the method of donning them, and emergency exit guidelines. 

Survivors also stated that although they never had time to retrieve lifejackets, they realized 

that if people had donned lifejackets, probably more fatalities would have occurred. In this 

case, the only way for those in the overturned vessel to escape was to ìswim downî and go 

through the open windows, which were below water.

Shortly after the accident, New York proposed legislation that would require 

verbal safety briefings for passengers to include descriptions of the use and location of 

personal flotation devices and other safety devices before commencing vessel operation. 
Analysis 47 Marine Accident Report

A draft of the stateís ìTechnical Guidance for the Public Vessel Operatorsî described the 

type of information to be included in a safety briefing, information that is consistent with 

Coast Guard requirements. The Safety Board supports this proposed regulatory change. 

In this accident, surviving passengers were able to escape the capsized Ethan Allen 

because the windows were latched in the open position or had become separated from the 

vessel during the capsizing. The vessel had two means of egress at the stern. In an 

emergency in which the vessel did not capsize, those most likely would have been 

sufficient for passenger egress. The March 2006 legislation proposed by New York State 

includes a requirement that public vessels certified to carry 20 or more passengers be 

equipped with at least two means of exit on each deck. The Safety Board supports this 

proposed legislation.

The Ethan Allen did not proceed with a second crewmember, in addition to the 

operator, as required by its COI. Shortly after the accident, the Governor of New York 

called for legislation to criminalize the operation of a public vessel with fewer than the 

required number of crewmembers specified in the COI or temporary permit. The Safety 

Board supports the regulatory proposal and looks forward to seeing it enacted into law. 

In sum, the Safety Board notes the timely efforts that New York State is taking to 

make regulatory changes related to stability, passenger carriage, postaccident 

toxicological testing, and manning. If adopted, the proposed changes should ensure a 

higher level of safety for travelers on public vessels. The Safety Board therefore concludes 

that the postaccident actions of New York State to improve the level of safety of public 

vessels were prompt and, if implemented, will address issues identified in the accident 

investigation. Once the regulatory changes are enacted, owners and operators need to 

promptly receive guidance on the new rules. The Safety Board therefore believes that New 

York State should address the safety deficiencies identified in the investigation of the 

Ethan Allen accident and issue technical guidance to vessel owners on inspection 

requirements for modified vessels, stability assessments and criteria, means for 

determining maximum safe load condition, drug and alcohol testing, manning, and safety 

briefings.
48 Marine Accident Report

Conclusions

Findings

1. Weather conditions were not a factor this accident.

2. The attempt of the Ethan Allen operator to continue turning the vessel into the 

oncoming wake before the capsizing was a normal reaction to the circumstances, but 

not timely enough to be effective.

3. Operator fatigue was not a factor in this accident.

4. Because drug and alcohol testing of the Ethan Allen operator was not done in a timely 

manner, the toxicological analysis was inconclusive.

5. The Ethan Allenís hull structure and steering and propulsion components were not 

factors in this accident.

6. At the time of the accident, the bilge might have contained, at most, an insignificant 

amount of water, which would not have affected the Ethan Allenís stability.

7. The addition, and subsequent modification, of a canopy changed the Ethan Allenís 

stability characteristics. 

8. Although U.S. Coast Guard regulations and New York State guidance to vessel 

owners did not contain clear requirements pertaining to testing after modifications,

the Double Dolphin/Ethan Allen should have undergone a stability reassessment after 

each canopy installation and modification.

9. Because the Double Dolphin/Ethan Allen did not undergo stability assessments after 

the addition and modification of its canopies, it was certificated to carry too many 

passengers. Its certificate of inspection permitted 50 persons, but stability criteria 

should have limited the number to 14 persons.

10. Although it was the Ethan Allen that was involved in this accident, the potential for 

capsizing was substantially the same for the de Champlain.

11. The combination of too many passengers, as permitted by the Ethan Allenís 

inappropriate certificate of inspection, and the use of an out-of-date average weight 

standard for passengers on public vessels resulted in the Ethan Allen carrying a load 

that significantly reduced its stability, which made it more susceptible to capsizing on 

the day of the accident.
Conclusions 49 Marine Accident Report

12. The Ethan Allen capsized as a result of insufficient stability, which made it unable to 

right itself from the combined forces of a passing wave or waves, a sharp turn, and the 

resulting involuntary shift of passengers to the port side of the vessel.

13. New York Stateís reliance on manufacturersí capacity plate data to determine 

maximum passenger limits on public vessels carrying more than six passengers for 

hire is an inappropriate use of the Coast Guard noncommercial boat standard.

14. New York State public vessel operators do not have a simple and ready means such as 

a mark on the hull to determine whether their vessels are overloaded. 

15. For almost all of the passengers, survivability was not adversely affected by the 

presence of preexisting medical conditions.

16. The emergency response was timely and effective.

17. The postaccident actions of New York State to improve the level of safety of public 

vessels were prompt and, if implemented, will address issues identified in the 

accident investigation.

Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of 

the capsizing of the Ethan Allen was the vesselís insufficient stability to resist the 

combined forces of a passing wave or waves, a sharp turn, and the resulting involuntary 

shift of passengers to the port side of the vessel. The vesselís stability was insufficient 

because it carried 48 persons where postaccident stability calculations demonstrated that it 

should have been permitted to carry only 14 persons. Contributing to the cause of the 

accident was the failure to reassess the vesselís stability after it had been modified because 

there was no clear requirement to do so.
50 Marine Accident Report

Recommendations

As a result of its investigation of the Ethan Allen accident, the National 

Transportation Safety Board makes the following recommendations.

To the U.S. Coast Guard:

Provide guidance to the states on U.S. Coast Guard standards for and 

assessment of stability of small passenger vessels. (M-06-15)

To New York State:

Address the safety deficiencies identified in the investigation of the Ethan 

Allen accident and issue technical guidance to vessel owners on inspection 

requirements for modified vessels, stability assessments and criteria, 

means for determining maximum safe load condition, drug and alcohol 

testing, manning, and safety briefings. (M-06-16)

Discontinue the use of capacity plate data associated with the U.S. Coast 

Guardís noncommercial boating standards for determining passenger 

loading on public vessels that carry more than six passengers and adopt the 

Coast Guard small passenger vessel inspection standards. (M-06-17)

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

MARK V. ROSENKER DEBORAH A. P. HERSMAN

Acting Chairman Member

KATHRYN OíLEARY HIGGINS

Member

Adopted: July 25, 2006
51 Marine Accident Report

Appendix A

Investigation

The Safety Board learned of this accident through media reports on the afternoon 

of October 2, 2005. A six-person investigative team as well as the Acting Chairman of the 

Safety Board and representatives of the Office of Public Affairs, the Office of the General 

Counsel, and the Office of Transportation Disaster Assistance were launched to the scene. 

The following investigative groups or technical specialists were assigned to the 

investigation: deck operations, survival factors, engineering, materials analysis, and naval 

architecture/stability. The on-scene investigation was completed on October 15, 2005.

The Safety Board investigated the accident according to its rules under the 

authority of the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974. The designated parties to the 

investigation were Shoreline Cruise, Inc.; New York State Office of Parks, Recreation and 

Historic Preservation; Warren County Sheriffís Office, Cummins MerCruiser Diesel; 

Hypro Pumps; and Scarano Boat Building, Inc.
52 Marine Accident Report

Appendix B

Passenger Information

Seat

No. Sex Age

Weight

(pounds) Fatal

Seat

No. Sex Age

Weight

(pounds) Fatal

1 F 75 189 No 26 F 74 190 No

2 F 58 110 No 27 F 76 129 No

3 F 67 144 No 28 M 81 146 No

4 F 77 141 No 29 F 78 135 No

5 F 76 185 No 30 F 82 176 Yes

6 M 87 194 Yes 31 F 89 204 Yes

7 F 75 180 Yes 32 M 79 170 No

8 M 82 211 Yes 33 F 77 142 No

9 F 76 128 Yes 34 F 78 210 Yes

10 F 75 135 No 35 F 74 180 No

11 F 79 141 No 36 F 67 155 No

12 M 69 205 No 37 F 68 217 Yes

13 M 79 200 No 38 F 67 198 Yes

14 F 77 164 Yes 39 F 74 126 Yes

15 F 76 150 No 40 F 64 247 Yes

16 M 77 170 No 41 M 80 173 Yes

17 F 73 194 Yes 42 F 80 155 Yes

18 M 67 260 No 43 F 73 165 No

19 F 62 165 No 44 M 77 175 No

20 F 67 137 No 45 M 76 235 Yes

21 F 79 198 Yes 46 F 74 230 No

22 F 54 195 No 47 F 65 268 No

23 M 83 158 Yes 48 M 74 170 No

24 F 78 204 Yes Total 8,522

25 F 78 170 Yes Average 177.5
53 Marine Accident Report

Appendix C

New York Press Release

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: March 02, 2006

GOVERNOR PROPOSES COMPREHENSIVE BOATING

REFORM LEGISLATION

________________________________________________________________________

Legislation Will Strengthen Laws to Improve Safety 

for Commercial Boat Passengers and Crews

Governor George E. Pataki today unveiled comprehensive legislation that would 

improve safety for commercial boat passengers and crews by strengthening the laws 

governing public vessel operation on the Stateís waterways.

The proposed bill follows legislation submitted by the Governor last Fall that 

requires operators of commercial boats involved in incidents -- where passenger(s) are 

severely injured or killed -- to undergo an immediate, mandatory chemical test to 

determine if an operator was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The Governor 

proposed the new legislation after a fatal incident with the tour boat Ethan Allen on Lake 

George, when 20 passengers were killed.

ìWe have worked to make New Yorkís boating laws among the strongest in the 

nation,î Governor Pataki said. ìBut we must do everything we can to prevent another 

tragedy like the Ethan Allen from occurring. Our comprehensive legislation will take the 

necessary steps to further strengthen New Yorkís boating laws and ensure that owners and 

operators of public vessels take all the necessary precautions to ensure the safety of both 

their passengers and crew.î

The Governorís comprehensive boating reform legislation would:

ï Require a minimum of acceptable marine protection and indemnity insurance 

for all public vessels operating on State waters, as follows:

Number of Passengers Minimum Amount of Insurance

1 to 10 $1,000,000

11 to 20 $2,000,000

21 to 50 $5,000,000

51 to 100 $7,000,000

More than 100 $10,000,000
Appendix C 54 Marine Accident Report

ï Require proof of insurance as part of the annual marine inspection by the 

Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation and make the operation 

of a public vessel without such insurance a misdemeanor;

ï Require all public vessels certified to carry 20 or more passengers be equipped 

with at least two means of exit on each deck and make it a violation for 

individuals who obstruct an exit;

ï Make it unlawful to operate a public vessel with less than the required 

crewmembers specified in the certificate of inspection or temporary permit, 

authorize the suspension or revocation of the license of any operator, pilot, or 

engineer who operates the vessel in this unlawful manner, and charge the 

vessel owner with a misdemeanor if found guilty of permitting operation;

ï Require that vessel owners report to Marine Inspectors prior to making any 

modifications that would affect the stability of the vessel including adjustments 

to the vessel structure or engineering plant, authorizes Marine Inspectors to 

inspect any vessel if deemed necessary, makes failure to notify a Marine 

Inspector a violation, and charges the vessel owner with a misdemeanor if 

found guilty of permitting operation of an un-inspected vessel;

ï Require that all public vessels certified to carry passengers be equipped with 

either a VHF radio or an operating cellular phone and require public vessels 

certified to carry more than 49 passengers to have radar;

ï Authorize the Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation 

Commissioner to adopt, amend and rescind rules and regulations concerning 

the regulation of public vessels.

In the aftermath of the Ethan Allen tragedy last year, the Governor proposed 

legislation that would make it mandatory for law enforcement officials to immediately 

administer a chemical test to all operators of public, or commercial, vessels that have been 

involved in a accident causing death, disappearance or serious physical injury. This would 

allow for the identification and/or elimination of alcohol or drugs as a factor in a boating 

accident in the earliest stages of an investigation.

In the event that an operator of a commercial boat fails to submit to a chemical test, 

the Governorís proposal calls for the immediate suspension of the operatorís boating 

privileges and the immediate revocation of any public boating licenses issued by the State. 

Together with a fine of not less than $2,500, this provision would be stronger than current 

federal regulations. In addition, the proposal allows for the refusal of an operator of 

commercial vessel to submit to a chemical test to be used as evidence at any subsequent 

criminal or administrative hearing.

In addition, the Governor directed the Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic 

Preservation to increase the State weight requirement to 174 pounds, exceeding the federal 

standard of 141 pounds, and called on the United States Coast Guard to expedite their 

adoption of a higher threshold for weight when determining capacity. The prior standard 
Appendix C 55 Marine Accident Report

used for capacity on lakes, rivers, and streams was based on the United States Coast 

Guardís rating of 141 pounds.

The Coast Guard is currently reviewing the weight requirement and the National 

Transportation Safety Board has also joined in the Governorís call for an increase in the 

Coast Guardís weight standards to 174 pounds.

State Parks Commissioner Bernadette Castro said, ìThe operation of public 

vessels on state waters has historically been a very safe and important industry within 

New York. This package of proposed reforms follows Governor Patakiís steps to 

strengthen existing statues and safety requirements. In the aftermath of the Ethan Allen 

accident and the tragic loss of life, it is imperative that we take an even closer look at these 

commercial boating ventures and the laws and regulations governing them.î

In addition, these proposed safety measures build upon a number of interim steps 

undertaken by the State Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation at the 

Governorís direction, which include, the immediate review all existing certificates of 

inspection to assure compliance with new weight standards; periodic recertification of the 

weight capacity of all public vessels; strengthened staff requirements for public vessels 

including experience and training requirements for crewmembers; mandatory verbal 

safety briefings for passengers on the use and location of personal flotation devices and 

other safety devices before commencement of vessel operation; increased penalties for 

owners and operators who fail to comply with statute, regulations and conditions of 

certificate of operation.