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1

38–369 2008

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–35]

HEARING

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED

PROGRAMS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FROM U.S. EUROPEAN

COMMAND AND JOINT FORCES COMMAND

HEARING HELD

MARCH 15, 2007

(II)

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii

MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas

ADAM SMITH, Washington

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California

RICK LARSEN, Washington

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam

MARK UDALL, Colorado

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana

NANCY BOYDA, Kansas

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa

KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida

KATHY CASTOR, Florida

DUNCAN HUNTER, California

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina

KEN CALVERT, California

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia

JEFF MILLER, Florida

JOE WILSON, South Carolina

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey

TOM COLE, Oklahoma

ROB BISHOP, Utah

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona

THELMA DRAKE, Virginia

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director

JULIE UNMACHT, Professional Staff Member

STEPHANIE SANOK, Professional Staff Member

MARGEE MECKSTROTH, Staff Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2007

Page

HEARING:

Thursday, March 15, 2007, Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization

Act—Budget Request from U.S. European Command and Joint Forces Command ..................................................................................................................... 1

APPENDIX:

Thursday, March 15, 2007 ...................................................................................... 37

THURSDAY, MARCH 15, 2007

FISCAL YEAR 2008 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FROM U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND JOINT FORCES

COMMAND

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Ranking Member,

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 4

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1

WITNESSES

Craddock, Gen. Bantz J., Commander, United States European Command,

U.S. Army ............................................................................................................. 4

Smith, Gen. Lance, Commander, Joint Forces Command, U.S. Air Force ......... 7

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Craddock, Gen. Bantz J. .................................................................................. 41

Smith, Gen. Lance ............................................................................................ 96

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Mr. Cummings .................................................................................................. 128

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 127

Mr. Kline ........................................................................................................... 128

Mr. Larsen ........................................................................................................ 127

Mr. Taylor ......................................................................................................... 127

(1)

FISCAL YEAR 2008 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FROM U.S. EUROPEAN

COMMAND AND JOINT FORCES COMMAND

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Thursday, March 15, 2007.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:09 a.m., in room

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman

of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED

SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We welcome General Craddock, General Smith. It is certainly

good to see both of you, and I want to thank you for your leadership as well as thank the troops that you do lead.

General Craddock, this is your first time before our committee as

the commander of European Command (EUCOM) and as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commander and I want to congratulate you on your new position. You have your work cut out for

you.

The European Command faced a number of critical security challenges pressing NATO and our allies. To significantly increase the

contributions to security and stability is at the top of the list. I am

personally frustrated with the fact that they have not offered more

troops, despite the fact that the request has been made, and that

a good number of their troops are limited in the scope of what they

can do. And hopefully you can address that this morning. But I am

doubly frustrated because of those two issues.

In a short time, we are anticipating a so-called spring offensive

and there is a prediction the opium harvest this year will be at an

all-time high in Afghanistan. And yet General Eikenberry recently

testified before our committee that NATO’s actual contribution of

troops and equipment leave the approved NATO requirement seriously under-fulfilled.

I am convinced, General Craddock, that Afghanistan is winnable.

Using the phrase of your predecessor, there is light at the end of

the tunnel there. But our partners must seriously step up with

more troops and more aid.

Afghanistan is not only a central front in the war on terrorism,

but the outcome there could well determine the future of the NATO

alliance. Think about it. One thing could lead to another. If we are

not successful there, if NATO is not successful there, it could be

2

seen as an impotent organization and the fallout from that could

be devastating.

And then ask yourself, who benefits from NATO’s unsuccessful

efforts if it were to become a skeletal—no pun intended—but if it

were to become a skeletal organization. You can’t let that happen.

That is why they must step up to the plate in Afghanistan.

A special welcome, General Smith. It has been quite a while

since the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) has appeared before our

committee in a posture hearing, and we are glad to have the command back because of the importance we place on your command.

Joint Forces Command provides training to ready forces for our

warfighters. It develops the joint warfighting concepts that will

posture our forces in the 21st century. And we look forward to

hearing about those concepts and the progress of your work. It is

vital for us here in Congress to understand in order to help us consider the future challenges, authorizations and appropriations that

Congress must give.

So, General Smith, we thank you for your work and for your consideration today.

We are interested in your work in joint training. As you sit next

to General Craddock today, we would like to hear about your role

in the allied command transformation. That is a big task, big

words, but I look forward to your comments on that.

Without further adieu, I ask my friend, Mr. Kline, if he has any

comments at this moment.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for yielding the

time and for holding this hearing.

Thanks to our witnesses today and to the Marines and airmen

and soldiers and naval officers that are backing them. It is good

to see you all this morning.

Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence, I am going to read the

opening comments of the ranking member, Mr. Hunter, in his absence. I am not going to presume to try to edit them in real-time.

So these are Ranking Member Duncan Hunter’s words, not mine,

although my suspicion is that I am going to be concurring wholeheartedly.

‘‘Today this committee will consider the challenges and opportunities of the U.S. European Command, the U.S. Joint Forces Command and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The range of

possible topics today is as broad as the vast reach of General

Craddock’s area of responsibility (AOR).

‘‘Thank you both for joining us today to update us on your operations and initiatives and to explain how these efforts relate to the

President’s budget proposal.

‘‘I especially hope that we can talk about how our global partners, particularly nations with the European Command are stepping up to commit their military forces to coalition operations and

invest in their own military capabilities.

‘‘I am also interested in hearing how U.S. forces are working

with other partners, such as interagency players and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to advance U.S. national security interest around the world.

‘‘While he was the commander of European Command and the

Supreme Allied Commander in Europe’’—my own parenthetical

3

note, that is always an amazing title to me, General Craddock. I

am sure that has sunk in on you as well, Supreme Allied Commander—‘‘General Jim Jones predicted that 2006 would be a pivotal year for NATO.’’

Mr. HUNTER [Off-mike.]

Mr. KLINE. Just look at his face and I will continue to read so

we don’t have to do this real-time editing.

‘‘And indeed, the alliance has entered a new era. It has launched

and sustained the significant deployment outside of Europe. It has

taken the lead for security and stability operations in the entirety

of Afghanistan. Some 37 countries are working together to help

build a peaceful and stable Afghanistan through the International

Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

‘‘Generals, both of you have key roles to play in our important

NATO alliance. I will be very interested in hearing your perspective regarding allied views on this critical effort. In particular,

what will be NATO’s role with respect to Afghanistan’s long-term

security requirements?

‘‘Understanding the important impact of counternarcotics and alternative livelihood efforts on the security situation, what is and

what should be NATO’s role in these efforts? What are we doing

to persuade other nations to reduce or eliminate the caveats that

they have placed on the use of their forces in Afghanistan?

‘‘NATO has also answered the call in Iraq. Earlier this week, I

returned from a tour of U.S. operations in Fallujah, Ramadi and

Baghdad. This trip only strengthened my strong conviction that a

successful handoff of security responsibilities to the Iraqi Army and

police forces, allowing U.S. forces to rotate out of the battlefield, is

possible. But Iraqi forces must be ready and willing to accept such

responsibilities.

‘‘The NATO training mission in Iraq has helped professionalize

Iraqi Army officers toward this end. It is gratifying to see NATO

demonstrate its continuing commitment to the common values of

freedom and democracy even as it proves its flexibility and its continuing relevance. I would appreciate your thoughts on how our

NATO allies and partners view their current and future role in addressing long-term security, stability, transition and reconstruction

needs in Iraq.

‘‘On the topic of investment, I find it interesting that despite

NATO’s requirement that allies spend at least two percent of their

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on their militaries, only a handful

of nations actually do so. Over the last several years, many of our

allies have argued that the European Union’s (EU) growing focus

on security and defense could result in increased military spending

and improved capabilities of member nations.

‘‘However, it appears that fiscal realities have not supported this

argument. Moreover, it seems that the alliance’s emphasis on

transformation, including leveraging the experience and expertise

of joint forces command, has not resulted in noticeable increases in

expenditures or capabilities. In fact, NATO nations have recognized

a significant shortfall in strategic airlift, yet these nations’ combined acquisition of C–17s relies in large part on U.S. contributions.

4

So, I wonder, how can we more effectively persuade our friends

to transform and modernize their militaries?

‘‘Finally, we will all be watching with interest the development

of Africa Command (AFRICOM). As we have seen, ungoverned and

under-governed spaces can become safe havens for terrorists. By

partnering more closely with nations on the African continent, we

can help to develop more secure borders, more responsible and capable military forces and security institutions that are more responsive to national governments and that can help to close the

doors of any safe havens located there.

‘‘I note that General Craddock’s predecessors in European Command had worked with these nations. I look forward to hearing

how standing up a new command may expand upon those efforts

without creating dangerous seams with existing commands along

the important security corridors found along the Mediterranean

and the Horn of Africa.

‘‘Generals, this is a pivotal time for the men and women under

your command. Their work will continue both to strengthen U.S.

military forces and capabilities and to foster the United States’

vital relationships with multinational organizations, other nations

bilaterally and non-governmental organizations.

‘‘I thank you,’’ speaking as Mr. Hunter. And I thank you as myself.

Mr. HUNTER. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. KLINE. The gentleman would be proud to yield.

STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON

ARMED SERVICES

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I just wanted

to thank him for making this opening statement. That is one of the

best statements I have ever made. [Laughter.]

I thank my good friend from Minnesota.

The one point that I would hope that you would go to is the prospect for developing a formula for NATO participation, where we at

least have a goal in terms of the amount of resources that nations,

based on their gross domestic product, devote to NATO, to the organization.

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

In consultation with Mr. Hunter, the last time we had a posture

hearing, we will reverse the order in which we call upon the members of the committee. But I will remember to let the witnesses do

their opening statements before that. Thank you very much.

General Craddock.

STATEMENT OF GEN. BANTZ J. CRADDOCK, COMMANDER,

UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND, U.S. ARMY

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative

Hunter, distinguished members of the committee. It is indeed my

privilege to appear here before you today for the first time as commander of the United States European Command, EUCOM.

5

Mr. Chairman, I have submitted a written statement that I ask

be made a part of the official record.

Before I continue, I would like to——

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, each of the written statements

will be made part of the record.

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, sir.

Before I continue with my remarks, if I could, I would like to acknowledge here my wingman, Lance Smith. As you said earlier, we

are the two supreme commanders, if you will, at the strategic level

for NATO. It is a pleasure to be with him here today. And as much

as we work routinely closely together, we will do so here today.

So, Lance, thank you.

And also, if you would permit me, I would like to introduce my

senior non-commissioned officer in European Command, Command

Sergeant Major Mark Farley. He is my battle buddy.

Mark, stand up, if you would.

And I think it is important that he is here today, because he represents all of the soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines, and he is

continually out and about in the command, checking on the quality

of life, training conditions, and is very essential to what we do

every day.

[Applause.]

Since taking command of EUCOM, I have been struck by the

command’s expanse and diversity, the dedication and quality of our

service members, the transformation of NATO in the 21st century

and our Nation’s commitment to this great alliance.

EUCOM is conducting a broad range of activities to assure both

EUCOM’s and NATO’s continued relevance. I will provide a brief

overview of our activities, highlighting the vital role EUCOM service members play in this vast theater.

While support for the global war on terror (GWOT) is our overarching priority, EUCOM is also focused on sustaining Europe as

a global partner and furthering the U.S. security relationship with

Africa.

European Command’s strategy of active security seeks to defeat

transnational terrorist entities and violent extremists who threaten

the United States, its allies and our interests. We will do that by

denying our enemies freedom of action and access to resources and

by building partner nation capabilities that promote stability.

Security cooperation remains the cornerstone of this strategy.

Our programs represent a proactive approach to building able partners. From airborne training to non-lethal weapons, education,

EUCOM personnel and facilities provide practical and state-of-theart education and training that assists our allies, our partners, in

developing their capabilities to conduct effective peacekeeping and

contingency operations with well-trained, disciplined forces.

These efforts mitigate the conditions that lead to conflict, prepare

the way for success and reduce the need for substantial U.S. involvement. Security cooperation programs, such as the International Military Education and Training (IMET), foreign military

financing (FMF), foreign military sales (FMS), the Georgia

Sustainment and Stability Operations Program and the Section

1206 Security Assistance Program are just a few of the critically

important tools you support that provide the resources to execute

6

our security cooperation activities throughout Europe, Eurasia and

Africa.

European Command’s ongoing transformation initiatives highlight the military effectiveness of forward-based and rotational

forces that are powerful and visible instruments of national influence. Since 2002, our transformation plans have ensured that operational forces and pre-positioned logistics are postured to meet current and potential contingencies.

The current plan retains two brigade combat teams, one in Germany and one in Italy, along with eight fighter aircraft squadrons

in the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy. Additionally, we will

maintain a rotational brigade in Romania and Bulgaria as Joint

Task Force East, sourced using the global force management process.

In addition to our conventional forces, special operations forces

are essential. They enable EUCOM to develop and maintain trust

and long-term relationships with partner nations as we help to

build their capabilities and capacities.

NATO remains an alliance committed to the collective security of

its member states and increasingly to a broader and more comprehensive view of security in an interdependent world where the

threats are increasingly non-traditional and more global in nature.

While political consultations among the 26 NATO nations helps

sustain a unity of purpose, the men and women of the alliance plus

17 other troop-contributing nations are redefining NATO’s role by

their actions in operations across Afghanistan, the Balkans, Mediterranean, Iraq, the Baltics and Africa. Today over 50,000 NATO

military forces are deployed in support of NATO operations. This

is a visible and effective demonstration of NATO resolve to meet

both European and out-of-area security challenges.

In the current strategic environment, collective security is an essential factor in achieving national security. NATO, with the proper resources and political will, remains the preeminent security alliance in the world. It is in our national interest to ensure that

NATO succeeds. The leadership and the capabilities our Nation

contributes to the NATO alliance remain fundamental to preserving the transatlantic partnership.

Continued Congressional support for our efforts is essential to

ensure that the European Command remains capable of effective

engagement throughout our area of responsibility, that we can provide sustained support to the NATO Alliance and to our regional

partners and that EUCOM meets the broad task set forth in the

national military strategies.

The dedicated men and women of the United States European

Command are committed to achieving our national goals and objectives.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing, and I look

forward to addressing the committee’s questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Craddock can be found in

the Appendix on page 41.]

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly. Thank you.

General Smith.

7

STATEMENT OF GEN. LANCE SMITH, COMMANDER, JOINT

FORCES COMMAND, U.S. AIR FORCE

General SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members. I am honored to testify today. It has been a long time, as the

chairman indicated, since Joint Forces Command has held forth in

this committee.

It is also a great pleasure and honor to testify with my friend,

John Craddock. Our relationship, besides going back a ways, it is

critical not just between our two NATO hats but also with our

Joint Forces Command hat and our European Command hats, and

we work closely in that.

I have also brought with me the senior enlisted member for Joint

Forces Command, my very trusted adviser but also one of those individuals you don’t see very often because he is constantly out with

the services and with the other combatant commanders to get the

temperature of the water in the enlisted force and to make sure

that we are meeting the training needs and the requirements of

those combatant commanders that use the enlisted force so greatly.

So, Mark, if you wouldn’t mind standing up.

Sergeant Major Mark Ripka.

[Applause.]

Sir, as you have accepted my statement, I would like to just say

a few words and then look forward to taking questions.

My message is really one that Joint Forces Command wakes up

every morning to really do several things. Our first and foremost

responsibility is to successfully pursue the war on terror, the global

war on terror. We work every day to strengthen our joint

warfighting capabilities. We have an entire group, but the entire

command is committed to ensuring that the forces that we provide

to the combatant commanders are trained and ready and try to

keep a proper balance between the day-to-day business of Joint

Forces Command.

The providing of force is the other thing that we do. But really

to balance that with a look at the future, to make sure that we continue down the road toward transformation for the entire force.

I would also add that I have spent a fair amount of time visiting

troops around the world in General Craddock’s region, in Afghanistan, and throughout the Persian Gulf, and everything that I have

seen during my visits has been impressive. In fact, awe-inspiring.

The service and devotion and resolve of the troops that I meet

every day is incredible and something I think we can all be proud

of.

Just last week I visited Fort Stewart in Georgia and Fort Bragg

at North Carolina in an effort to look at their training as they get

ready to go into Iraq. One of those units is doing home station

training of the Third Brigade, or the Second Brigade of the Third

Infantry Division. And to watch what they are doing in preparation

of the war and their progress as they practice to be the last unit

of the surge. They will go over in May.

And I can report that your support and the support of the Nation

is truly turning out the best-trained and the best-led force that I

have ever seen in my professional career. I do consider it a privilege to serve with young men and women of that caliber in this

critical time in our nation’s history.

8

Mr. Chairman, thanks for this opportunity. I will be pleased to

answer any questions. And I do want to take the opportunity to invite all the members down to Norfolk and Suffolk to see both the

Joint Forces Command facilities and our Joint Futures Labs and

the things that we are doing there, but to meet with the men and

women of Allied Command Transformation, the NATO part of my

job at Norfolk.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of General Smith can be found in the

Appendix on page 96.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General Smith.

Per our previous discussion, we will reverse the order and call

on Mr. Cummings first, please.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Just let me remind the folks that the five-minute

rule is hovering over us.

Thank you.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And General Craddock and General Smith, I want to thank you

all for your service. And on behalf of all of us in the Congress, we

hope that you will extend our appreciation to the men and women

who valiantly serve our Nation and the world.

General Craddock, you noted in your testimony, in your written

testimony, that Western Europe is the home to some of our oldest

and closest allies, and there has been a moving trend in which the

defense budgets of these same NATO allies steadily fall to a level

that jeopardizes their ability to make long-term strategic military

commitments to meet the alliance’s 21st century ambitions.

In this same vein, as our allies continue to lessen their budgets

and commitments, we have seen a steady flow of announcements

from our allies of withdrawal plans from combat zones. Notably,

British Prime Minister Tony Blair, back on February 21st, announced his plans for the imminent withdrawal of around 1,600 of

his country’s troops from Iraq. And then Denmark also plans to

withdraw 460 coalition troops by August.

The question is, what efforts are being made to ensure that other

allies do not allow the lead of Denmark and Great Britain and

withdraw from Iraq or Afghanistan? And when do you think that

the United States might be left alone, if you think they might be

left alone, as a coalition of the willing?

General CRADDOCK. Well, thank you, sir.

Tough question. But the fact is, that right now the 26 NATO nations, with a goal of two percent of GDP apportioned to the defense

establishment, only six meet the goal. And the trends, as you state,

are negative. And those obviously are political decisions made by

the nations, based on their priorities.

Now, with regard to the trends, indeed the United Kingdom announced they were going to withdraw troops from Iraq. At the

same time, however, they announced that they were going to send

additional troops to the ISAF mission, International Security Assistance Force, in Afghanistan of some 1,400.

Now, that is in addition to the some 800 troops they announced

they would add to the ISAF mission earlier in the year. So there

is indeed a significant plus-up there.

9

I think what we are seeing—and I don’t know the cause of this

other than I am an observer, and Central Command has the coalition, if you will, in Iraq. So I am not privy to the inside baseball

there. But it appears to me that some nations, when they have

made the judgments of where they want to contribute their forces,

are moving forces from Iraq and at the same time creating head

space and force availability to contribute to the NATO mission in

Afghanistan.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, I would hope that would be the case, if

they have got to leave.

Considering that we began our efforts in Afghanistan in October

of 2001, what are the long-term and short-term goals of NATO and

ISAF military presence in attaining stability in Afghanistan? And

how would you define stability and success in that nation?

Just these few questions.

What are NATO, ISAF and those immediate concerns that stifle

it from meeting these goals? Are we prepared for the spring offensive that the Taliban is expected to launch? Why do many of the

nations that are part of NATO and ISAF force maintain national

caveats that limit what their troops can do in Afghanistan?

And are Afghanistan’s security forces capable of independently

maintaining stability in Afghanistan? And how would you characterize their level of training, equipment and readiness?

General CRADDOCK. Okay, let me try to get some of those here.

What is the ISAF purpose, if you will, or mission? It is to create

a secure and stable environment so that reconstruction and development can occur. The fact of the matter is, you cannot get reconstruction and development without a level of security that assures

the safety, if you will, of the international organizations, the nongovernmentals, who are chartered to do that.

On the other hand, you cannot have lasting, enduring security

without investment which yields to opportunities, employment, development of infrastructure. So they go hand in hand.

What NATO has chartered to do here in the authorization of the

North Atlantic Council is to conduct security operations to enable

reconstruction and development of that country. At the same time,

we recognize that it is essential that the Afghan National Security

Forces (ANSF) be trained and developed over time to be capable of

assuming their own security mission and ensuring both the public

security, the police and the national security, the army of that nation.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Conaway, from Texas.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, gentleman.

Command Sergeant Majors, thank you both for being here.

And, Generals, thank you both for coming.

General Craddock, as we talk about the two percent goal for

NATO nations to contribute, do we put that in the context as what

an overall NATO mission would look like and what our responsibilities would look like, and if the two percent is not there, where are

the gaps and what NATO’s capabilities would be if two percent of

all of the countries had the two percent versus where they are

10

right now? And are those gaps that in all likelihood the United

States would be asked to make up the difference for if called upon?

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, sir.

I think the manifestation of the lack of the two percent falls in

two areas. One is transformation of that force from what largely

these nations have had in the past, which are territorial forces at

their borders ensuring that no other nation invades. They are

largely heavy forces, if you will. The transformation to deployable,

agile, capable forces.

And again, General Smith, through the Supreme Allied Command Transformation, is a part of working with that. That is the

first place that suffers.

The second place that suffers is every decision to support the

ISAF mission with forces boils down to a fiscal decision, and it

costs the Nation to provide the forces, to sustain the forces, to

equip the forces. Those are national responsibilities. And without

that budget authority then, they have to weigh that in their decision authority to do that.

The fact is, the NATO level of ambition for these operational missions is not matched by its political will.

Mr. CONAWAY. You mentioned earlier in your statement about

the political will to keep NATO viable. Is that our political will or

the member nations’ political will?

General CRADDOCK. No, it is the political will of the member nations.

Mr. CONAWAY. How does the growth in NATO—does that help or

hurt this military capacity that NATO has?

General CRADDOCK. From the willingness to participate, it is

very helpful.

These nations, those who for so long were under the Soviet

Union, have not had the opportunities of freedom and democracy

that others may have had in years past, are very forthright. They

are eager to sign up and participate. They are looking for capability

of development.

On the other hand, they do not have to the extent that they will

in the future large budgets, and it is very difficult for them then

to generate the resources to do this.

But I find that we continually—I am amazed by the opportunities they create and the will they have to participate. We have to

find ways to enable that in the future.

Mr. CONAWAY. Given the commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan,

are you resource-constrained with respect to your new command?

Have you had a chance to evaluate where you are thin and where

you need resources?

General CRADDOCK. With regard to European Command, as I

said, our transformation strategy, the theater transformation strategy which we began in 2002, was postulated on some assumptions

that we made then. And in the intervening almost five years now,

there has been changes in the geopolitical environment. There has

been forces that are assigned to EUCOM that are part of the global

force structure that are moved into Iraq and Afghanistan on a routine basis.

I think, and I have directed the EUCOM staff to go back and let

us do an assessment of the assumptions we made in 2002 to see

11

how they fit today, are they still valid, and if not, what needs to

be revised. And then let us look at the geopolitical environment of

what has transpired in the global war on terror, what has transpired in the overall force structure, if you will, because the Army

is going to have an increase in its force structure of some number

of brigades, and let us validate the posture, because it may well be

that our ability to support the national military strategy and the

plan we made in 2002 with the numbers of forces may need adjustment.

I don’t know the answer, but I think it is worthy of investigation.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The gentlelady from Kansas, Ms. Boyda.

Mrs. BOYDA. Thank you very much.

And thank you for your service—and, Sergeant Majors, for yours

as well, too. Being there with the troops is really what is so important in getting that feedback. Thank you so much.

We have heard so many times that our troop strength is really

being stretched very thin, and clearly that must be what you are

going through as well. You have alluded to it, and with the change

of mission or the geopolitical change, just how comfortable do you

feel about our strategic readiness, if an event were to happen in

Europe or under the EUCOM command?

What is your specific readiness like, where the U.S. Command

stands or—what am I trying to say? I have asked the question. But

within EUCOM, where are you with regard to readiness for an

event that, quite honestly, isn’t on the radar screen today?

General CRADDOCK. Thank you.

I don’t know if it is an issue of readiness or capacity. I think because the U.S. forces assigned to the European Command are in

the global force pool, and not only the Army but the Air Force and

Naval forces are being rotated into Operation Iraq Freedom (OIF),

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), into ISAF, the NATO mission

on a routine basis, they are very ready.

Now, obviously, it is cyclic.

Mrs. BOYDA. They are or they aren’t?

General CRADDOCK. No, they are ready. They train up for the

mission. They deploy for a year, sometimes longer, based on the situation. And then they come back and they retrain.

So the readiness, I mean, this is an incredibly talented veteran

force. They are very, very good. And they take this in stride. The

question is one of capacity. If something else arises and the forces

assigned to European Command are engaged in those missions,

then I would have to go back to the chairman with a request for

forces. And then falls into another process where the forces must

be generated and assigned.

Mrs. BOYDA. Generally, in your years of command do you find

that there is generally some capacity there to take care of events

that were not planned? Are we in a different position than we were

3 years ago, 6 years ago, 10 years ago? And what level of comfort

or discomfort do you have with your strategic readiness levels?

General CRADDOCK. I can only speak with regards to my comfort

level with the capacity from the European Command. And we have

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very little capacity left after we source the global force pool, if you

will, for these ongoing.

My concern is this: that what we do, essentially, in our active

strategy, is we try to shape the environment for the future. And

that is by engagement, that is by theater security, cooperation—not

assistance, but we cooperate. We send our forces and they cooperate and train and exercise with partner nations.

Our ability to do that now is limited because we don’t have the

forces available since they are in the rotation to the other——

Mrs. BOYDA. I appreciate your candor.

Let me ask one other question. When we are talking about

NATO forces and it is a lack of political will, we believe, what do

you think is the cause of that lack of political will?

General CRADDOCK. I think it is varied, depending on nations. To

a certain extent, I believe there is the phenomena that if you

haven’t felt the pain of the global war on terror, then you may not

realize that it is real and it is here and it is a threat today and,

I think, into the future.

Second, I think that many nations have a notion that the defense

against terrorism is a public security issue, read police, internal to

a nation, as opposed to a national security issue, which would

mean military, potentially abroad, not in the nation.

Mrs. BOYDA. Would you say there is a disconnect between how

governments feel and leadership feels versus people? Or is it both

that are on the same page? Or is this a public opinion phenomena?

Or basically leadership? Or both?

General CRADDOCK. I am really not qualified to make that judgment since I am hearing and seeing and feeling it from a certain

perspective.

Mrs. BOYDA. All right, thank you very much.

I yield back my time.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

I am going to ask Ms. Drake to proceed and hopefully we can get

your five minutes in before we break, gentlemen, for our, it looks

like two votes.

Ms. Drake.

Mrs. DRAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I would like to thank both of you for being here with us

today and for your service to our nation.

General Smith, as you know, I have visited you in Norfolk. I

have been in your headquarters. I certainly remember the very

poor condition of that building, the World War II era building that

you are using as your headquarters. And this committee was, I

think, very pleased to authorize the $13 million for your new headquarters. And unfortunately, what happened with that bill in 2007,

that money was not left in there.

So I wondered, from your perspective, if you could tell us, based

on the importance of Joint Forces Command and its lead role in the

training and transformation of our 21st-century military, what

your perspective is on what can we do to help ensure that our

warfighters have a modern headquarters that meets the requirements and the demands of Joint Forces Command.

General SMITH. Thank you, Congresswoman Drake.

13

You are indeed right. The location of part of my staff on the Norfolk side is in a converted Navy hospital. It was built over 60 years

ago. And they suffer from electrical problems, water problems and

the like.

And, frankly, it impacts the day-to-day ability to do business as

well as the morale of the troops, and I can see a complete difference between that and the staff that is over on the Suffolk side

in much better facilities.

The other part, they are living right next to the NATO headquarters, which is a considerably nicer building with considerably

better facilities. So the U.S. folks are in the lesser facilities there.

The fact is, they will do what good soldiers always do, and they

will go to work every day and they will work hard. But the fact

that they do not have the connectivity, they don’t have the facilities

they need to be able to do the job, has an impact. And I know why

the money didn’t show up, because it was a new start and the

Navy made a determination of that, and we very much appreciate

your support and hope that we can get the funding as soon as possible so we can move down to getting the new facilities they deserve.

Mrs. DRAKE. Thank you for that.

And I would also like to ask you if our current strategy for modeling and simulation is deficient to meet warfighter requirements

and the evolution toward interagency involvement. Or, in other

words, we talk a lot in this committee about how do we do a Goldwater-Nichols for interagency and what can JFCOM do to help

move us in that direction.

General SMITH. Well, first of all, the modeling and simulation

piece, the headway that we have made in modeling and simulation

is just extraordinary. And it is a wonderful partnership in that

area, because we have a relationship with industry and with Old

Dominion University, Virginia Tech and University of Virginia

(UVA), all who are engaged in modeling and simulation. In fact,

Virginia is building its modeling and simulation center just down

the road from our facilities in Suffolk.

The next step I think to the modeling and simulation piece is

being able to get it out in the field. So, we are using it wonderfully

in the training arena, but it has application to the warfighter in

the field as well, and that is our next step. And that will be a large

step.

Through the whole training experience, we have seen more and

more involvement by the interagency as well as an increase in the

level of people that are coming. I mean, it used to be that the new

guy on the block that would show up at exercises, and today we

are seeing much more senior people from across the staff.

The beauty of modeling and simulation and distributed kind of

things is that you don’t have to all go to the same place to be able

to do that. And as we make progress down that road, I think we

will see more interagency involvement. It is not because they don’t

want to participate. It is because oftentimes they don’t have the

time or the capacity and they are one-deep in almost everything

that they do.

Mrs. DRAKE. Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

14

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

And we will have a recess, gentlemen, until we come back from

the vote. Thank you.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come back to order.

Thank you for your indulgence. We made the vote.

Ms. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you to both of you for being here. Thank you for your

extraordinary service, as well.

I wanted to follow up with the last question on interagency coordination and I think you said that we don’t have the time or the

capacity to focus our resources as we should on that, despite the

fact that we do have the modeling, the simulation, that are being

developed, and I certainly appreciate that. We all do. I mean, that

is a beginning step.

But how much of our resources are we actually contributing to

that? How many people are focusing on how we do that? And I am

really not suggesting that it is all in the military. I think our great

frustration has been that you have shouldered the entire burden

for this, and we need to expand that.

What suggestions do you have? Is it a matter of your really committing more resources to it and moving across those lines? What

do you see as the Congress’ responsibility in this?

General SMITH. Well, I mean, obviously, there is consideration

out there for a Goldwater-Nichols II kind of thing for the interagency. Now, regardless of what you call it, I think anything that

will tie us together closer I think is important and would be of benefit to everybody.

When I said we don’t have the forces or the whatever to do it

as much as we would like, I was really referring to the agencies

more than anything else. I mean, the, you know, the State Department oftentimes is one-deep and when somebody goes off—we have

the luxury within the military of having a two-week exercise and

a week to plan the month before and stuff like that. Many agencies

really don’t have the time to be able to do that, and the demands

that we make on them are pretty widespread.

So I would want them to participate in a joint exercise in Norfolk. General Craddock would want them to, you know, take part

in an exercise in European Command. When he was down at

Southern Command, he wanted them to take part in exercises

down there. And they just go, ‘‘We would love to. We do have other

jobs to do.’’

So it is not for lack of wanting to do it. So I think part of the

answer in my view is the whole business that we are doing with

the state coordinator for reconstruction and stabilization, Ambassador John Herbst, and his desire to build a state reserve corps of

people who I think would have time and would have expertise to

be able to participate in such things. That would help.

Now, having said that, we are also doing—I was at Fort Bragg

on Friday, looking at provincial reconstruction team training that

is going on down there for the troops or the people going into Afghanistan, and there were two U.S. Department of Agriculture people there doing part of the training and others taking part of the

15

training. There were two Department of State people and there

were two United States Agency for International Development

(USAID) people, senior people, all taking part in this training.

So we are much further down the road than we, I think, ever

have been. At the same time, by the way, Foreign Service Institute

is setting up training for Department of State for provincial reconstruction team members going into Iraq, and we are actively participating in the training with them.

There are opportunities now that are presenting themselves that,

I think, all speak positive, but we have to have more opportunities

and more capacity to do this.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. But it is not enough at this point?

General SMITH. Yes.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Could you share with me as well

that—getting a sense, really, of how active NATO has been in providing the training, equipping and technical assistance to Iraqi personnel there in Iraq. How many Iraqi forces is NATO currently

training through this mission and how many NATO trainers are

there?

General SMITH. I think that is a mixed question for both General

Craddock and I.

My responsibility for training with my Allied Command Transformation hat on for Iraqis is coordinating the effort outside of

Iraq, for instance at the NATO school in Oberammergau or at the

other institutions that the nations have to do that. That is what

I do, and we do it at the request and approval of the Iraqi government.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Could I ask General Craddock, do

you have a number, a sense, how many are actually engaged in

that?

General CRADDOCK. The number varies. Right now, it is about

200.

It has been a little more than that in the past because we had

some missions that involved training the trainer. What we had to

do was train the Iraqi leaders in specialized courses. It is not unit

training, it is individual, such as a staff training. And the intent

there was to train those leaders while we trained instructors, then

turn over the training to instructors, and so we have drawn down

a little because we didn’t need all of our instructors. We needed

mentors for their instructors.

At the same time, there has been opportunities for new training.

We will soon send—my headquarters will send the North Atlantic

Council a proposal for police training done by the Italian

carabinieri. They have made the visit. They want to do it. We have

to get the authority from NATO headquarters. That will push the

numbers back up as we start to train police leaders.

So it has been back and forth fungible. I think some 3,200-plus

Iraqi officers and non-commissioned officers have been trained to

date.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Gingrey.

Dr. GINGREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Craddock, General Smith, thank you very much for

being here with us today and, of course, discussing European ComVerDate 22-MAR-2001 11:33 Nov 21, 2008 Jkt 038369 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-35\074000.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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mand, Joint Forces Command and NATO. You certainly have a tremendous area of responsibility.

And as I look at the AOR, the map, and of course look at Russia,

and think about the fact that some 70,000 troops, I think, have

been rotated out of the European Command—and I think about the

European Union, of course. They are the ones that traditionally I

would think have a military that can give more support to NATO

than the more recent entries, such as Romania and Bulgaria and

Slovakia and the Baltic States, but yet the European Union is talking about forming their own defense headquarters, their own military mission. That frightens me in regard to what effect that is

going to have on NATO.

I am also very frightened by the rhetoric coming out of President

Putin lately in regard to our thoughts of having a missile defense

system in Poland or maybe another European country that would

welcome that. But Putin begins to make threatening remarks and,

of course, he has been quite friendly to Iran in regard to the development of their nuclear program.

So I would like for both of you to address those issues and tell

the committee how you feel about that. Do you share my concerns?

And as we discuss your budget, what are your needs and how do

you feel about moving 70,000 troops out of the European Command?

General CRADDOCK. I will go ahead and start first, if I could, sir.

The theater strategy is ongoing. As I said earlier, the concern I

have is the ability to conduct the missions that we have been given

in European Command with the forces available, because the forces

are in this force pool and they’re moving into Iraq and Afghanistan

on a rotating basis.

That is why I directed a study, because I am concerned and I

don’t know, but I am skeptical that we have adequate forces available without having to come back and request forces to be sent over

to us on a rotational basis.

Now, when you build relationships, theater security cooperation,

one of the valuable opportunities is to build enduring relationships.

And if we rotate our forces over for exercises and engagements and

they go back and they could be active duty from Fort Bragg today

and next year they are active duty from Fort Carson or a reserve

component, we don’t build the enduring relationships.

So even though we are doing it, the quality, if you will, suffers,

and we don’t optimize, I think, on the intent of the strategy. So we

are going to take a look at it with a view toward making a determination. Do we have adequate troops available for the task we

have been assigned?

With regard to the E.U., I think there was an agreement, Berlin

Plus, where there was an arrangement between NATO and the European Union with regard to development of defense organizations.

That is a good arrangement if it is followed. I think there is room

for the European Union to develop niche capabilities while NATO

retains a security role.

We must work together to avoid duplication, because at the end

of the day the units are the same units. They have a different hat.

The Putin rhetoric, I think that it has already been stated by the

secretary of state and I agree, there has been many meetings,

17

much engagement. We have had fair and open and transparent discussions with regard to the antimissile capability in Poland; the

Czech Republic we are looking at, and I think that that is either

miscommunication or potentially just deliberately overstating the

case. We will continue to engage and make the point.

General SMITH. I share your concerns. General Craddock and I

were both in Munich when Mr. Putin made those remarks, and the

next day the minister of Foreign Affairs for Czechoslovakia stood

up and said, well, he wanted to thank Mr. Putin for the speech, because it absolutely validated why Czechoslovakia joined NATO.

My concern is, yes, we are talking with Russia and the like, but

there is an impact on the other nations. You see some concern on

the part of Poland and hence some discussions about bilateral relationships with the United States based on their concerns about

what they are looking at to the east. And that is what the rhetoric,

I think, is causing, more than anything else.

Dr. GINGREY. Thank you, Generals.

And I see my time has expired. I yield back.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

We are nearing the list of those that arrived before the gavel.

Mr. Ortiz.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.

General Craddock, General Smith, good to see both of you, and

you are accompanied by a group of old friends that are with you

today. Thanks for joining us.

Now, I was just wondering, what is your assessment of your command’s ability to effectively deal with the range of security concerns and responsibilities within the European Command? And

how is your command affected by having units from Europe deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan?

And I ask this question because we have so many hot spots all

over the world, sometimes I wonder that even when we, you know,

raised our end strength by 65,000 people, sometimes I wonder

whether we have enough.

And I am just wondering, you mentioned a few moments ago that

you do not have enough capacity. Maybe you can elaborate a little

bit on that, as well.

General CRADDOCK. Well, thank you, sir, for the question.

Obviously, it is a challenge, because we want to, in this enormous theater with 92 countries in the area of responsibility, we

want to be able to engage. And the key here is, one, we have got

forces available that are ready for any contingency. Second, we

need to build partner nation capacity. And to do that, that is where

theater security engagement opportunities exist.

Where we are unable to do it because of a lack of forces available, then it slows the progress. We have to more finitely and discretely prioritize what it is we do in order to get the greatest advantage or to partner and create the greatest opportunity and capacity in that nation that we are working with, to look for what

they will be able to do in return. So it exacerbates the problem.

Now, we are still doing it to the extent that we have the forces

available, but I will tell you that I reviewed all of the engagement

opportunities over the last two years, the exercises that we do, and

18

ask for a listing of everything we had to cancel and why. And it

was surprising in its volume. In other words, there was more there

than I expected.

What is the reason? Because first of all, we have got headquarters and troop units involved in our rotation for the priority

mission. It is the GWOT, and we understand that. At the same

time, then, we have to very carefully pick and choose those events

that we need to do.

Last, what we do is we request rotational forces from here, from

the continental United States, and go over to engage on an episodic

basis, not there for the duration, which will work, but it is in my

judgment suboptimizing the opportunity to be able to have these

long-term enduring relationships.

I just recall, when I was a division commander and assistant division commander in Germany in years past, those relationships

that you established were very important, and they provided access, they provided trust and confidence. And the capacity building,

I believe, moved along much faster.

Mr. ORTIZ. General Smith, I know that you are working with the

coalition forces in Europe. I know we sometimes question about the

ability of the Iraqi soldiers, whether they are prepared, you know,

to go to war with us and whether they have the right equipment

and so on.

Are you satisfied? Do you think that if something came up, a conflict somewhere, that you could depend on those troops? That they

would not only join us, but that they have the right numbers of

personnel, the right support forces and the right equipment?

And my concern is that I worry about the—we mentioned before

the preposition stock. You know, not only do we worry about the

preposition stock, we worry about sustainability, in case we do go

into a long war, like we are now. For how long can we sustain it?

Maybe both of you can share with your answer.

General SMITH. Well, you know, that is the million-dollar question, but it really depends on what level of effort you need or you

determine you need to engage in.

We are taking some risk in our ability to operate in other parts

of the world because of the commitment we have to Iraq and Afghanistan. I look at that on a pretty regular basis. At least twice

a year we do a special assessment to look, to evaluate our ability

to support plans in other parts of the world.

And indeed, as we go into the surge and take some of those

preposition stocks, that does have an impact for our ability to operate elsewhere.

I think our time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

We now have completed those who have arrived before the gavel,

and we will go to those who have arrived after the gavel.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And General Craddock, General Smith, thank you very much for

being here today.

I was particularly struck by the AOR, to see your areas of responsibility, to think that you have from the Azures to Vladivostok.

But I look at it in a very positive way. I served in the Army NaVerDate 22-MAR-2001 11:33 Nov 21, 2008 Jkt 038369 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-35\074000.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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tional Guard 31 years. I remember well studying Fulda Gap. I remember my National Guard unit preparing in the event of World

War III to be deployed to resist a Soviet tank invasion of Greece.

How far we have come. It is particularly exciting—to me, it is a

dream come true to see the newly liberated countries of Central

Europe and Eastern Europe, to have visited Liberia, seen the return of democracy to Liberia. I believe all of this is due to peace

through strength of the American military. And so I want to thank

you.

And in particular, the expansion and growth of NATO, I am the

co-chair of the Bulgaria Caucus. I visited there 17 years ago, saw

their first free elections, and now I have seen them become a member of NATO, develop into a free market democracy. And on January 1, they became part of the European Union.

Can you tell me about the plans for bases in the Republic of Bulgaria?

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, Congressman.

The plans right now is what we call Joint Task Force East,

where we are going to make some investments in both Romania

and Bulgaria in order to provide facilities for a small forward headquarters that will be the command and control headquarters, then

to accommodate rotational forces rotating continuously through

both Romania and Bulgaria.

It is a joint operation. We have got U.S. Air Force Europe involved in that. They are already earmarking and providing forces

for that capability.

The timelines are such that it appears that we will finish the Romanian side of it first and then with the fiscal year 2008 military

construction (MILCON) submission that we have, that will, once

approved, be able then to provide the in-state cooperative security

location facilities that we will have—correct, the forward operating

site facilities that we will have in Bulgaria.

We originally planned for about what we call a 1–0 presence,

which means we will always have some level of rotational forces

forward. We may not be able to do that. We may have to back it

off a little bit based upon force availability.

I am looking and discussing the situation with both U.S. Army

Europe, U.S. Air Force Europe, that if we have to, we may be able

to forward deploy on a rotational basis our forces out of Europe as

a proof of principal early on, to build to capacity, ensure that the

facilities are right, and then continue.

I might also add, Bulgaria is a good NATO partner. Recently, as

I have worked through our statement of requirements and tried to

get more troop units and more capacity capability into Afghanistan,

there was a need for a certain type of capability at the Khandahar

Airfield.

We were working very diligently in trying to get someone to take

that on, and just two days ago I received information from the chief

of defense of Bulgaria that he would do that. So they volunteered.

It is greatly appreciated. And that is the type of ally that we have

got to depend on.

Mr. WILSON. It is just awesome to see the changes. In fact, I visited with the commander of Bulgarian forces in Kabul. What an extraordinary opportunity. And I also visited ten years ago in RomaVerDate 22-MAR-2001 11:33 Nov 21, 2008 Jkt 038369 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-35\074000.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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nia, where they expressed their dream and hope and vision one day

to be part of NATO, and who would ever imagine just within a couple of years this would come to fruition?

In terms of NATO expansion, for both of you, what is the prospects for Georgia and Ukraine?

General CRADDOCK. Very quickly, obviously, political decisions,

we are working both very close, with regards to military relationships, to ensure that there are defense sector reforms and the conditions are set there from a military perspective.

I think right now with the recent announcement the Georgians

are going to participate in the OIF in a significant way with providing troops and also potentially for Afghanistan, that is a plus.

I think that in Ukraine, obviously there is a political situation

there with regards to the receptivity of the people as to whether

or not they want to be NATO members at this time. So we will

have to watch that political development.

Mr. WILSON. And a final question. Back in Darfur, I visited

there, and you are training African Union (AU) troops. What is the

success? I was impressed by the troops of Ghana.

General CRADDOCK. I think that the training opportunity is fruitful. It is helping them establish the staff-level competencies that

are needed.

I think there is much more to do, and the turnover, of course,

is one that will have to continue to train in order to offset that. But

we must continue, in my judgment, to build the A.U. capacity and

depth in their competency.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Meek.

Mr. MEEK. Thank you so very much, Mr. Chairman.

General Smith and General Craddock, I am glad you were able

to join us this morning.

On the line of questioning that you have just closed off on, I was

more concerned about the training of A.U. troops and in talking,

I know that African Command will be up and going pretty soon.

I had an opportunity about a week and a half ago to travel to

Ghana as part of the Speaker’s official delegation to celebrate their

50th anniversary of their independence. And I can’t help but say

that, as you know, the growth of terrorism is going to grow in that

neck of the woods and other areas.

I have had some conversations with some folks in the White

House and some other folks that are a little apprehensive about

getting involved in what is going on in Darfur due to the fact that

there would be another Muslim country that the U.S. could be involved in.

But we had a major crisis that we haven’t seen since the Holocaust that is going on there right under our noses, and we are the

country set to be responsible for making sure that others are responsible. And when historians look back at this time, they are

going to look at our contribution, what we did and what we did not

do.

Framing it that way, the Speaker recently put me on the

NATO—made me one of the representatives from the House, as it

relates to the parliamentary.

21

I know we are doing training. I know we are providing some

moving troops in that area. I want to hear from both of you on

what more can we do to assist not only A.U. troops but to hopefully

turn the tide in Darfur.

General CRADDOCK. I will go first and try to be quick.

I think there are a couple issues. One, we probably need to continue the airlift of the African Union troops in. Second, we need to

continue the training of the African Union command and control

capacity, the capability there, the management of the troops. And

to the extent we need to make sure that the global peacekeeping

operations initiative (GPOI), the ACOTA, the African Contingency

Operations Training, continues, where that builds then the capacity of the contributing nations.

That is ongoing. That ACOTA gets a large percentage of the

GPOI funding and in my judgment it is essential that it continues

to do that, so that that capacity is built.

Now, from a NATO perspective, there will have to be a political

decision for NATO to become involved. Oftentimes, as I said earlier, levels of ambition exceed political will. I think that NATO will

watch the United Nations closely to see what the United Nations

lead is and where the United Nations may turn for that intervention.

With regards to the European Command, I think we can continue to support, as we have. If there is a call for greater intervention, U.S. forces involvement, then European Command would have

to come back. Obviously, we will put the plan together and request

forces, then, from the Department of Defense.

Mr. MEEK. General Craddock, one of the questions that has surfaced out of your response, I am familiar with NATO’s involvement,

and I think as it relates from a U.S. standpoint, I was reading of

the—well, the briefing, the country briefing on my way flying over.

Is it true that we are training—I am talking about we, the

United States, we are training 60 percent of the peacekeeping

troops or soldiers, African soldiers, in Africa? Is that under your

command?

General CRADDOCK. It is. Well, I am responsible for Africa.

I don’t know that we are in the—ACOTA is the African Contingency Training effort.

Mr. MEEK. Right.

General CRADDOCK. That is being funded under the global peacekeeping operations. About 60 percent of the funding of that program goes to ACOTA. So from us, it is 60 percent of our effort.

Now, is there anyone else doing that? I don’t know if any European nations are providing any discreet peacekeeping training to

specific nations on a bilateral basis.

Mr. MEEK. Okay.

General CRADDOCK. But pretty much, what is being trained is

United States.

Mr. MEEK. General, I see my time is getting ready to run out.

I am going to let you know that I am very interested in knowing

what we can do. I believe that we can do more. I think the deck

is going to be shuffled politically as it relates to Iraq, Afghanistan

and while that deck is being shuffled, maybe we can look at how

we can play a greater role in curbing the violence in Darfur.

22

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ORTIZ [presiding]. Thank you.

Do you need a response?

Mr. MEEK. Well, General Smith was going to respond.

Mr. ORTIZ. Yes, go ahead.

Mr. MEEK. Thank you.

General.

General SMITH. Actually, I don’t have a lot to add to what General Craddock said. I mean, we are part of the training effort, but

in a very small way.

Mr. MEEK. Okay.

General SMITH. I am talking about the NATO side of my responsibilities.

Mr. MEEK. On the NATO side.

And usually, Mr. Chairman, we are going to be the lead as it relates to a number of these issues dealing with Darfur, and I am

just trying to find out how this committee could be a part of the

solution.

I feel that we should be doing more. I don’t know if—the answer

may not be boots on the ground. It may be the very support that

we are already doing, but intensifying it and leading that effort in

the NATO spirit.

Thank you.

General SMITH. I would say, it has not been ignored and the

United Nations has not specifically asked NATO to go in, as General Craddock said. The E.U., I think, is debating and discussing

how they can participate as well.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you.

My good friend from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Craddock, I thank both of you for being here.

I am curious, what if anything could be done diplomatically to

entice our NATO allies to get further involved in the effort in Iraq,

in your opinion? Do you hear anything in conversations with your

peers from Europe that might change things?

Because I happen to think that in retrospect, one of the things

that worked so well in Bosnia is the international tone to the intervention.

General CRADDOCK. Well, thank you, Congressman.

That may be the $64 question here. It is difficult. It is tough.

First of all, you know, the trend is just the opposite. They are

pulling out the support. I, in discussion issues with chiefs of defense, my counterparts, equivalent of the chairman of the Joint

Chiefs, I do not hear any appetite or any discussion of greater involvement. On the contrary, the discussion is what they can do for

NATO in Afghanistan, oftentimes at the expense of participation in

Iraq, the offsets, if you will.

A couple of things. I think that, one, the success in Bosnia by

NATO then kind of led to the European Union saying they have

got this thing under control to the point we can probably finish it

up and do that. It may well be that success and improving security

environment in Iraq will entice some of that same type of thought.

I think it is a long shot, but I would not rule it out.

23

But right now, there are nations that are risk averse. I think

that has manifested, as we see caveats in Afghanistan, and I think

I don’t see that trend being reversed any time soon.

General SMITH. Could I add on that?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir, General.

General SMITH. The fall of the Prodi government in Italy did not

help the atmosphere at all in Europe either, because they fell in

good part because of the Administration’s support for Iraq.

Mr. TAYLOR. To what extent have the insurgent successes at destroying High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs)

with mines—to what extent has that migrated to Afghanistan? And

this is a leading question to how many HMMWVs do you have in

Afghanistan and is there any plan to transition them to some variant of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP).

General CRADDOCK. I don’t have the number of M114, 1114

HMMWVs. I can get that for you for U.S. forces. And the NATO

nations all bring in various types of armored vehicles, and we will

provide that for the record, if that is acceptable.

With regard to the Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), what

we are seeing in Afghanistan is we are seeing an increase in the

use of IEDs, because of its terror effect and it is asymmetrical effect.

The Taliban, the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) forces, are not

going to stand and fight. They tried that last year, and it was devastating. So they now are moving more into these asymmetric attacks. We see more suicide IEDs, both vests and vehicles. We don’t

see right now a lot involving high-tech IEDs. But there are more

numbers and there are more suicide bomber-type events.

We have been successful in being able to find some of the IEDmakers, but it is still hit and miss.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 127.]

Mr. TAYLOR. Are the suicide bombers—I can only imagine the

difficulty in trying to after the fact figure out who did it, but I am

sure you try. Can you track where they come from? Are they Afghan? Are they from around the world? Is there a trend there?

General CRADDOCK. Generally speaking, they are trained in

Pakistan, in the tri-border Waziristan area. They are equipped and

they are coming in after being indoctrinated there.

Some are Afghans who have lived in Pakistan for years. Some

are Afghans who moved across the border to get their training,

their instruction, and moved back in to detonate the bomb.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank both of you, Generals, for being here.

Mr. ORTIZ. The lady from Florida, Ms. Castor.

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today.

I want to continue the line that my colleague, Mr. Taylor, started

on. Can you drill down and provide us greater detail with the reasoning what our allies are saying about why they will not commit

more to the mission in Afghanistan? What reasons are they giving

you?

General CRADDOCK. This is an ongoing debate. I think there are

a couple of reasons.

24

First of all, there is a cost reason. They, as I said, six of the nations meet the two percent benchmark for two percent of GDP

going to defense/security means. So the rest are on a shoestring.

Any commitment they make, then, to send and support and train

and equip their forces in Afghanistan comes out of an already tight

top line.

Many of those nations, large, large percentages of those budgets

go to personnel salaries. So there is very little flexibility. So that

is the first thing I think that comes in as a problem area.

Second, I will tell you that to a great extent, they are already

committed and not only internally but externally in other missions.

We do, in NATO, what we call a defense planning questionnaire,

where we every year and sometimes more often send out and ask

the nations to declare their forces available for NATO missions and

then we take that data back, and that is what we use when we decide who to ask for what. Because we target our requests. We just

don’t throw it out in the newspaper and hope somebody bids on it.

I mean, we kind of figure out who has what capability.

The goal, if you will, is that 40 percent of the nation’s military

capacity is available for deployment by NATO and that at any one

time NATO has about 8 percent deployed. And that is the benchmarks we use. So I would tell you that it varies among nations. I

send letters, ‘‘You need to step up your contribution. It is costly.’’

Second, as I said earlier, some of these nations look at this as,

well, in the beginning it was a peacekeeping operation and now it

has changed, so we don’t want to be a part of that. Or if we do it,

we are going to caveat it. It is unhelpful. It restrains the commander. It restricts flexibility. And we continually, on a daily basis,

work with nations to try to reduce and eliminate to the extent we

can those constraints.

General SMITH. The word I hear the most at the most senior levels is it lacks public support. And they fear for their government

positions and the like because of that.

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you.

And then back to Africa, with the new regional combatant command in Africa, can you explain what the long-term vision is, what

your understanding of the long-term mission is? And where are we

spending funds now? And where will the request come in the future?

General CRADDOCK. With regards to Africa Command, the recognition of the fact is that Africa today has a much greater level

of strategic interest to the United States and this command, I

think, will be unique in terms of both its structure and application.

The challenges and the problems in Africa today cannot be solved

by military means, okay. We believe that is fact. Now, there are

terrorist issues in parts of that country because of the ungoverned

spaces. But by and large, the challenges are not of the terrorist nature. They are of an economic nature. They are health with incredible endemic disease.

Ms. CASTOR. So will we see more requests for the indirect type

of action and civilian——

General CRADDOCK. That is exactly the structure we are approaching for Africa Command, trying to make it an interagency

command with greater civilian representation. And not only from

25

Department of State, but Energy, Department of Health and

Human Services (HHS) and others, because that is where the

power, the knowledge, the capacities come from, so that, again, opportunities can be created, development, investment, and then this

terrorism level of security, we think we can deal with from our

classical approaches to security.

Mr. ORTIZ. My friend from Arkansas, Mr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Generals, I am sorry I was not here earlier. We had a ten Veterans Committee markup also, and I couldn’t be here.

I wanted to pursue a little bit this issue of the Africa Command.

I remember the general, I don’t know, it must have been a decade

ago now, when in response to questions would wish that he had

more resources for dealing with Africa. And then General Jones

was a big proponent of more involvement with Africa. In fact, he

talked very eloquently several years ago before this committee

about why he thought we needed to do more in Africa.

So I really appreciate the things you are saying, General

Craddock.

It seems to me we have some issues, though, that are going to

hold back the effectiveness of an Africa Command. I will just throw

a couple of those out there. I think you talked a little bit about it

earlier in response to Ms. Susan Davis from San Diego.

But, you know, the State Department for some years has had

problems staffing some of the more difficult posts, the hardship

posts. I think they are getting better on their personnel policies,

but their personnel policies actually did not contribute very well to

getting these things staffed up.

We have issues of coordination that still go on. I think there is

a very strong interest on the part of a lot of us of having some kind

of a Goldwater-Nichols-type study done imminently, if possible,

that could deal with looking at this kind of coordination.

I will give you one specific example I saw several years ago. I

went to Sierra Leone, this was shortly after the U.N. was moving

in to take over at the end of the civil war, and there was a Brit

team there, about 200 Brits, military, that were doing training of

the new Sierra Leone Army.

We had three troops there, one Air Force, who coincidentally was

from Little Rock Air Force Base, one Marine and one Army, is my

recollection. And the Marine, I guess because I was a former Marine, came to me and said, ‘‘You all have to do something.’’

He said, ‘‘This is literally what happened.’’ He said, ‘‘I arrived

here on a helicopter with an American woman who was in her late

60’s, wearing a neck brace because she had neck and back problems. She worked for a private non-governmental organization

(NGO). We got off the helicopter, she got into a car and was taken

somewhere out in rural Sierra Leone, some hours away, by drive.’’

He said, ‘‘Under the rules that we had at that time, I did not

have permission to leave Freetown after dark, even with the ambassador’s desire,’’ and he did have that desire.

And, you know, we got that thing straightened out when I got

back, but it just seems like we have got a lot of issues with regard

to this coordination. And maybe the standing up of this new Africa

Command will really help us work on those issues, because I don’t

26

think it is just a problem for Africa. I think it is a problem all

around the world.

As you pointed out, the kind of success we want to have in Africa

is not going to be primarily because of military. I mean, we hope

it is not because of military operations. We hope it is because of

a whole lot of other things. But that is true of almost every place

in the world. We hope that, you know, diplomatically and economic

development and political development, democracy development

and the rule of law and civilian control of military, all those kinds

of things, will be what makes the world a better place.

I hope that as you run into problems as you are standing up this

Africa Command, and whoever the first Africa commander is, I

think you are going to run into legislative areas where it is not

going to go as well as you want.

And there is a lot of interest in this Congress in looking at that,

because this is really brought home in the whole issue of what is

going on in Iraq right now, where the State Department had to

come to Secretary Gates and say, ‘‘We can’t get people to go to Iraq.

We need you to provide 130 staff people to staff up the provincial

reconstruction teams, because we can’t get State Department people to go.’’ And I think that really brought home the challenge that

we have.

If you have any comments about that, that would be fine. But

the one specific question I want to ask is I also think another thing

that pulls us back in terms of our national security is our American

propensity to disregard foreign language training.

I had three students from the People’s Republic of China in my

office a couple of hours ago who are in an exchange program with

Hendrix College, in Arkansas. They said that they all started

learning English in junior high. But they said that there has been

big changes. She said now the kids are learning English in elementary school. And I am not sure I could find a school, a high school

or a junior high in Arkansas, that teaches Chinese or Farsi or Arabic.

Would you comment on this general issue of language skill in our

military and how that might be helped or if there is anything we

might do as a Congress?

General CRADDOCK. I will take a shot at it.

Dr. SNYDER. Those weren’t very military questions, were they?

General CRADDOCK. Well, no.

First of all, the language. You are absolutely right. In talking to

some long-serving U.S. civilians in Afghanistan, who have been

there for several years, before 2001, came back right after, and I

said, ‘‘What is the greatest problem that we have?’’ And the answer

was, ‘‘U.S. forces are not as culturally sensitive as NATO forces.

One, they don’t do any language. They don’t even try.’’

Well, it is true, and it is unacceptable. But it is what it is. And

we have got to, I think, as a nation invest in some language requirements, as you said, starting very young. Not everybody will be

able to do it, but we have got to try. And I think it is telling everywhere I go that that is the case.

Part two, with regard to interagency, I already see it in terms

of trying to put together this structure of a headquarters. I think

that headquarters should be at least 40 percent civilian, guys in

27

ties, if you will, or whatever the case may be. And right now, that

is not the case, because we are having a hard time getting subscribers to sign up.

I am probably being too harsh, but the question always is, one,

what is in it for me and, two, who is going to pay the bill. And we

have got to get by that and we have got to try something new, to

see if this thing will make the difference that we need to make.

General SMITH. There are some good military programs out there

to try and at least get basic conversational kind of things that we

are doing as we embed people into Iraq, into the training transition

teams, as well as Afghanistan. But it is the only place they are getting it. They are not getting it—I think there is one college in the

United States that teaches Urdu or Pashtun or something like

that. The opportunities aren’t out there.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Craddock, General Smith, thanks for coming and helping us out.

My questions are really for General Craddock regarding missile

defense.

I think in the next few weeks, our subcommittee on strategic

forces will be looking at the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) budget

and a variety of the needs there. So I wanted to get some perspective from you regarding European Command and missile defense.

If you could address some of these questions, what is your assessment of the impact of the missile defense program on our relationship with our European allies and partners and with Russia?

If you can discuss at least your assessment of some of the hurdles

that we may face as we try to move forward in Europe in placing

a theater missile defense or regional missile defense system there.

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, Congressman.

First of all, with regard to theater missile defense, the Missile

Defense Agency’s initiative, I think that NATO has looked at that

and has endorsed that concept. The secretary-general has said so

even recently after the comments that have come back from Russia.

There is already and has been for some years talk, discussion,

and looking at how one could integrate missile defense in Europe.

There is some short-range capability. Very little intermediate or

long-range. The consultations, the discussions, have been ongoing

for some time.

Now, with this latest response from Russia, I think there has

been a new viewpoint. We saw, I think, in the last couple of days

the chancellor of Germany now has said there needs to be a debate,

a discussion, a greater debate and discussion in NATO with regard

to the MDA approach for basing of radars and interceptors in the

Czech Republic and Poland.

I think that discussion will occur. I think that, again, there has

been fair and complete disclosure by the United States with regard

to the intent and so I would see personally a successful conclusion

to that.

And at the end of the day, as General Smith said, we heard from

the Czech foreign minister, it is their call. It is a bilateral decision

28

on their part. But they stand by the fact that it is a sovereign decision.

I think, again, there will be political controversy back and forth.

But the facts are the facts, and I think once laid out in a very intellectual way and we get by the emotion of this, that there should

be positive progress. And I think that the European partners and

the nations will understand what this entails and what the threat

is. That is the key aspect of it.

Mr. LARSEN. Do you think our European partners understand

that, I want to be careful. I don’t want to offend any of our partners here. But do you think Russia will understand that? That is,

is it your assessment that if the decision is made by Czechoslovakia, Poland and so on that they want to be a partner in this

and we move forward, that that is the end of the discussion?

General CRADDOCK. Congressman, I would submit to you that

the facts are so compelling that there will in my judgment be no

military misunderstanding of that concept, missile defense, theater

missile defense. I think that the issues will be political in nature,

and that is where the disagreements will be.

Mr. LARSEN. So it becomes our problem?

General CRADDOCK. In a manner of speaking, sir.

Mr. LARSEN. Sure. Sure.

Can you chat a little bit about Medium Extended Air Defense

System (MEADS) and the management structure of MEADS? Do

you think it needs changing? Do you think it is going to work and

is working and is going to work?

There seems to be some—we are going to explore this in a couple

of weeks in a hearing, but I am just getting the impression that

a relationship with Germany and Italy on MEADS isn’t going as

smoothly as possible and I wonder if you have an opinion on that.

General CRADDOCK. I am not enough of an expert to be able to

make a judgment at this time. I am understanding a little bit of

the history and how we got to where we are, and obviously with

changing political considerations, then the relationships and agreements are going to change also. So I wouldn’t want to do that now.

However, I would be quite happy to provide something for the

record, a response, to give you an assessment of where we think

it is to the extent that we can today, if that would be acceptable.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 127.]

Mr. LARSEN. That is fine. Fair enough answer. I appreciate that

very much. That is good enough for me.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much.

Mr. Franks.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank all of you, witnesses and those attending them, for,

again, let me never miss telling you how grateful we are for all

that you do for this country and for just the cause of human freedom.

I think that your testimony today, both your written and spoken

testimony, has reminded us all that the warfighters in this country

and across the world do indeed protect us from very real threats.

29

Just the most recently confession in Guantanamo Bay by Khalid

Sheikh Mohammad should be prime facie evidence in that regard.

Although it is a little hard to know about the credibility of a known

terrorist, it is interesting that he confessed, among other things,

that he was involved in other attacks and planning of other attacks

and he did not have, because of all of you having the capability to

interdict his plans, he did not have the chance to proceed with

those plans in Panama Canal, the Sears Tower in Chicago, the

New York Stock Exchange, the U.S. nuclear power plants, London’s

Heathrow Airport and Big Ben.

Mohammad said he shared responsibility also for planning the

assassination of Pope John Paul in the Philippines. This should remind us all that the enemies we face are indeed very real and that

the successful processes of the judicial process created by Congress

in Guantanamo Bay continues to be needed.

Having said that, may I just shift gears and ask you, General

Craddock, on a non-related issue to missile defense, you said in

your testimony that an important aspect of EUCOM’s strategy of

active security is to defend against threats posed by emerging ballistic missile capabilities in Southwest Asia.

You mentioned that there is a planned acquisition and projected

deployment of missile defense systems in the Czech Republic and

Poland which will be funded through the MDA. Can you talk a little more specifically about the missile defense requirements for a

European site?

General CRADDOCK. The negotiations will occur in the future

with the specificity of who will be responsible for what. In discussions with the director of the MDA and EUCOM’s equities and responsibilities, it appears that in each location the operational requirements, the investments, the MILCON required to build the

sites themselves, would be responsibility for MDA to fund now and

into the future.

The initial investment made for the facilities needed for the personnel to man the site, if you will, initially, would be MDA, and

then it would have to be placed into service, program objective

memorandums, the POMs, for future years.

We don’t know the extent yet of what that will be. We don’t have

a full grasp of whether it will be DOD active duty, contractor, so

the total investment or vulnerability has yet to be determined. So

that is the context in which we made that statement.

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, sir.

Are there any missile defense capability systems or deployment

within either of your scope of knowledge or purview that you think

should be accelerated?

General CRADDOCK. Well, I think with regards to theater missile

defense, and this issue by the Missile Defense Agency, it has got

to be harmonized against missile development capacity from these

rogue states. We talk about Iran specifically for the European theater.

So I think that is the timeline against which the acceleration

must occur.

Second, we would, from a short-range perspective in the European Command, we have short-range capability there, we would

30

want to modernize that short-range capacity as quickly as possible,

upgrade to a higher capable interceptor.

Mr. FRANKS. General Smith, could I shift over to you, sir, and

ask you pretty much the same question. Are there missile defense

deployments, either planned or that are in place now, that you

would like to see accelerated?

General SMITH. I really don’t know. That is not part of the stuff

that I am doing as a force provider, yet. It perhaps will be, but it

is really in the range of strategic command.

Mr. FRANKS. I understand.

Well, Mr. Chairman, if it is all right, I would like to go ahead

and submit a few questions for the record.

And again, thank all of you for your courage and your commitment.

Mr. ORTIZ. If you can, whenever, you know, respond to the gentleman’s questions for the record, then, with no objection, so ordered.

The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Forbes.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, General Craddock and General Smith, for being

here.

I apologize. Mr. Franks and I have been down in the Judiciary

Committee voting on a markup today, and we couldn’t be in two

places at one time.

But for the record, General Smith, I have two questions. I would

like to throw them both out at you, if I could. And then just let

you take my time to respond to those two questions.

The first one I have is, in fiscal year 2007, the Joint Forces Command took reductions of approximately $38.4 million in Research,

Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) accounts and $30 million in operations and management (O&M) account. Could you just

elaborate to us what the impact of those reductions to JFCOM

were?

And, second, I understand that the LAA, the Limited Acquisition

Authority, is designed to allow you as the commander of U.S. Joint

Forces Command to develop and acquire urgent requirements for

combatant commanders and that these requirements can include

equipment for battle management command, intelligence and other

equipment necessary for the use of Joint Forces in military operations.

As I understand it, under current legislation the LAA is set to

expire September 30, 2008. Do you believe the LAA should be extended beyond this date? And if so, what changes, if any, would

you recommend to improve the authority?

General SMITH. Thank you, Congressman Forbes. Let me hit the

last one first, if it is okay.

Limited Acquisition Authority does not come with money. It is

strictly an authority and it gives us the ability in the joint world

to bridge the gap between programs that are out there and the

needs of the combatant commander. And the successes are pretty

interesting.

Right now, we have a capability to deliver joint precision airdrop

from a parachute with a 2,000 pound pallet through the weather

in Afghanistan that was a capability that was out there, but beVerDate 22-MAR-2001 11:33 Nov 21, 2008 Jkt 038369 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-35\074000.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
31

cause Special Operations Command wanted to move it quickly, we

worked with them to pull it ahead 3 years and use our limited acquisition authority to get it moving. And now we have given them

10 of the systems. Central Command has 50. And we are working

on a 10,000 and a 20,000 pound model.

That is the kind of things that we can do with the authority. And

I would like to see it made permanent. I have not come to the point

yet where I have determined that we absolutely need money with

it. There is some—it is elegant sometimes that I have to go with

a tin cup and ask somebody with money to support it. But having

said that, that also keeps rigor in the system, to make sure that

it is a product that somebody really does want and are willing to

pony up some money for.

On the other hand, if we use it more than we are using it right

now, then I would like to see some money attached to it later on,

just so we have some flexibility to move the things rapidly.

The impact on our RDT&E cuts had some impacts in a variety

of areas. It impacted some of the things that we were talking about

earlier, our ability to exercise and experiment with the interagency

to some degree, because we had to back off some of the exercises

and experiments that were looking out toward the future.

And while it has not always the case, often we end up having to

pay for interagency people. Certainly we pay for non-governmental

and international organizations to come down to participate in exercises with us. And that is where we usually are oftentimes end

up taking the cuts out of that.

So the impact is the exercises and the experiments, we are less

able meet our goals and objectives, and that is what happened in

2007, and it moved a number of these programs to the right that

I think are pretty critical.

The thing when Joint Forces Command gets cut, when money

gets cut out of our budget, it doesn’t really impact Joint Forces

Command. It impacts my ability to support General Craddock in

his needs and his programs, of which we are doing considerable

support for the type of stuff that he is doing. Supporting Africa and

the like, he had the responsibility for that and we provided people

to help look at how we would do the interagency piece and do the

mix.

These kinds of cuts, when they are mixed like that, they don’t

destroy programs, but they move them to the right and make them

more difficult to accomplish.

Mr. FORBES. My time is up, but if you have any response to the

questions I had for General Smith, if you would either offer them

or submit them, either one would be fine.

General CRADDOCK. Okay. Thank you. I agree with him, but I

will submit them for the record.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 127.]

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General.

Thank you both for what you do.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much.

I have one more question. And I think that this has been a very

informative hearing this morning.

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General Craddock, I was just wondering if you could elaborate on

NATO’s involvement in Iraq. I understand that NATO is training

Iraq’s military personnel. And if so, you know, maybe, how many

forces are they training and how many NATO trainers are there?

And if you can just elaborate so that those members who are here,

we are very few, but we will take it all in, okay?

General CRADDOCK. All right. Thank you, sir.

The NATO training mission in Iraq was initially designed to provide niche or unique training opportunities that was not being provided by the coalition.

What is that? Well, it is staff officer training, if you will, much

like a general staff college, non-commissioned officer training, also,

has been one of the areas where we have provided this. It has been

ongoing for a few years, I think going on three now.

And the concept was that NATO would provide a cadre of trainers to do this professional development training, if you will, of individuals. This was individual training, not unit collective training.

And that over time, the Iraqis would develop a cadre of their own

trainers and that NATO would work with and mentor, and then we

would turn over the training responsibility to these Iraqi trainers

and NATO would step back and reduce numbers then and mentor

them to make sure the standards were maintained throughout the

training.

Now, that has happened. So originally, at times, we have had upwards of 300. I think now there is approximately 200, because as

classes begin and the Iraqis take over more responsibility, we reduce numbers because our mentors go into effect, not our trainers.

We have to date I think around 3,200, maybe a few more than

that, Iraqi leaders, if you will, both officer and NCO, have gone

through the training and have graduated.

Now, there are two things happening. The numbers of NATO

trainers are down because, as I have said, we have transitioned

some of the responsibility to the Iraqis.

Second, the numbers of classes and class sizes have reduced because the Iraqis have made a conscious decision to put many of the

students who would have been in school back with their unit because of the security crisis they are in now in Baghdad and other

places. So they are reducing their school subscription rate right

now. So we have had to, we believe temporarily, bring down the

numbers of trainers we have.

Now, a new initiative, again, will be subject to approval by the

North Atlantic Council, and that is the Italians have done a survey

and it appears they are going to offer to NATO to provide police

training from their carabinieri, a constabulary police force, very

competent, very capable. We think, as do the Iraqis, that that is

a capability they need.

The site survey is done. The proposals are being formulated now.

And we think that probably by mid-May we will deliver, in conjunction with General Smith, a proposal to North Atlantic Council to

authorize the Italian carabinieri to do that. And that will be, we

think, a big plus.

So our effort has been up and down, and we work it with the

numbers of Iraqis, the numbers of classes, the depth of the people

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that are available, and also this transition to let them take this

over.

Mr. ORTIZ. Does this include both officers and NCOs? Is it a combination of them?

General CRADDOCK. Yes, it is a combination, in different classes.

But we do have a non-commissioned officer professional development component to it.

Mr. ORTIZ. So in your opinion, you think this is working?

General CRADDOCK. We get good reports from it, both from the

trainers and from the Iraqis. I will tell you that because of the security situation there, and they have pulled these people back right

now, we hope that they see this to fruition, that the security situation gets better and they can send these students back. We think

it is helpful.

We also do some training outside of Iraq in NATO schools. The

numbers are much smaller, but still it is ongoing, and that now

again has become problematic because of the need to keep those

leaders in the country during this turbulent period.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much.

Mr. Wilson, do you have any other questions?

General SMITH. Congressman, I might add to that that we have

coordinated about 1,030 out-of-country Iraqi courses, and the positive piece is we have had to upgrade the quality of the courses and

the content of the courses because the Iraqi officers, and it is mostly officers, are much more capable and they understand and have

a lot better grasp of what they are doing than they did a year ago

or two years ago or three years ago.

That is also a place that the other nations can contribute that

don’t support us inside Iraq. And they do do that.

Mr. ORTIZ. That is good news to hear.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Again, this is good news. And I have had the privilege of visiting the police training facilities in Jordan, and indeed

I was impressed by the training there. But additionally, the training in Europe is extraordinary. And then your training, too, of the

provincial reconstruction teams for Afghanistan, indeed, also is

making a difference. I visited with a joint U.S.-Korean and U.S.-

Dutch personnel.

And so, thank you again for your service.

Mr. ORTIZ. I guess we have one very valuable member of this

committee.

Mr. Sestak, do you have a question, sir?

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you.

I am sorry. I swore when I came to Congress I would be at every

single hearing, and I had three simultaneously. I apologize, sirs.

If I could, I was curious, a question on U.S. FORCECOM, the

flow of forces. It is a shared responsibility between Transportation

Command (TRANSCOM) and FORCECOM. Is that correct?

JFCOM, I apologize.

General SMITH. It is.

Mr. SESTAK. As you are working toward this global force management approach, there are some that believe that TRANSCOM

should have it all, you know, from the beginning to the end, to fend

for everything. And there have been several instances in the past

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of this desire or approach, which I am sure you are familiar with,

sir.

Do you think that is the best approach, particularly in the way

that we flowed forces—although unusual, but we flowed forces in

the build up to Iraq?

General SMITH. I don’t think that that is the way to go. The relationship that we have with General Schwartz as TRANSCOM commander, being the joint distribution process owner, and me being

the joint deployment process owner, works very well.

What that really means is that I have the responsibility to identify the forces for the secretary and ensure that they are notified

and ready to go up to the point where Transportation Command

takes on the actual physical execution and movement.

Now, he gives up responsibility for them when they are in theater. But as the deployment process owner, I am responsible for

making sure I understand their readiness in theater and their

needs in theater as well as when they will rotate out and how to

get them out.

So I am more responsible for the policy and the decision level

piece, or at least recommending to the secretary, and he does the

actual execution.

Mr. SESTAK. And just, General, for you, for our forces in the

former Yugoslavia, are we about to take away or have we taken

away that combat duty?

General CRADDOCK. I am not aware of any change in the status

or the entitlements.

Mr. SESTAK. Would you support taking away combat duty status

for them?

General CRADDOCK. I am not sure what you mean by combat

duty status. I think right now the situation there is such that the

entitlements that have been there should remain until the future

status proposal is announced and we see responses. Because as you

know, three weeks ago there was a violent demonstration and part

of the Kosovo force had to be employed in that, and I think the situation is a bit turbulent to be making any changes now from that

perspective.

Mr. SESTAK. So you would continue to support their status of

what they are receiving?

General CRADDOCK. I don’t know what is proposed, but without

knowing that I would not support a change at this time. It is too

uncertain.

Mr. SESTAK. General, I forgot what the process is called that you

are intimately involved with down in J8, as they look at the joint

warfare with the joint capability warfare approach down there.

What is the name again?

General SMITH. The joint combat developers is what they do.

Mr. SESTAK. Do you see, as have you been assigned some duties

particularly in the command and control and interoperability area,

do you think budget-wise that you should have greater control of

the assets in the budget toward that?

General SMITH. I don’t know that we at Joint Forces Command

need more control over the budget in regards to the Joint Command and Control portfolio. That is what you are talking about.

Mr. SESTAK. Yes.

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General SMITH. What we do need is visibility into the money.

Mr. SESTAK. Into——

General SMITH. Into the money. Where the money is being spent.

Not so we can get into the service Title 10 responsibilities, but

frankly the services as well as everybody else does not want to

build a system that once they get at the 80 percent level, they have

to then figure out how to make them talk to each other.

Mr. SESTAK. So the reason I ask that, is it just seems as though

if you are having a problem with the transparency, from here it is

even more difficult. It is hard to find where the heart is within our

Armed Services Committee of Command, Control, Communications,

Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR),

the real transformation of the military. And so therefore he who

has the money has the power and the say, should it be more transparent, more centralized? Particularly since that is your mission?

General SMITH. I think it should be more transparent, absolutely.

But the vehicle we have, through me as the Joint Command and

Control portfolio manager, and the process we have through the

deputies working group, which has all the vice chiefs of the services on it as well as combatant command representative and

chaired by the deputy secretary of defense, have the ability to

make financial decisions to move money back and forth across the

services to make sure that we do look at this from a holistic view.

Mr. SESTAK. You are saying you would like to have that?

General SMITH. No. We do have that in the experimental phase.

Mr. SESTAK. In the experimental phase.

General SMITH. In the experimental phase, through the Sec Def’s

authority.

Mr. SESTAK. And how much money is that?

General SMITH. The portfolio right now is $4.4 billion. If we expanded it to the the whole Joint Command and Control arena, it

would be over $100 billion.

Mr. SESTAK. Last question is—that was my last? Was that the

gavel?

Mr. ORTIZ. Yes, I am pretty sure that—we both have another

meeting.

Mr. SESTAK. That is fine.

Mr. ORTIZ. But go ahead and ask your question.

Mr. SESTAK. Are you sure?

Expanding Joint Force headquarters, as what was proposed

three years ago, the number, and where are we on achieving that

and is it being adequately funded and manned?

General SMITH. It depends on the command. Now, in my command, we have two standing Joint Force headquarters. One we

have dedicated to Central Command because they don’t have the

capacity really inside their headquarters to do that, and it is been

used quite effectively a number of times.

The other standing Joint Force headquarters, which was really

for global responsibilities as well as homeland defense, it is the

standing Joint Force headquarters that deployed for Katrina, that

we took a cut in our operations budget, so that will take another

six months or so to get funded. And the Navy has agreed to use

the Navy Reserve to help man it.

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So the outlook on that, though I would rather we didn’t have it

kicked to the right like we did, is bright.

Now, General Craddock, when he was at SOUTHCOM, his

standing Joint Force headquarters was stood up and rapidly working toward having deployable joint command and control capability

and a lot of other things, and that was moving in a nice direction.

His standing Joint Force headquarters in European Command is a

little bit different and there is nothing wrong with that and I will

defer to him on that.

The movement, we are right now in the con ops phase, and we

had a lot of feedback from the combatant commanders on the direction we were going. I am an absolute believer in it, especially in

the way that we have used it within my command, and I think it

is a positive direction to go.

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much for your leadership. Thank you

for being with us.

We thank your soldiers, your troops, for doing a great job, and

hopefully we can do something to make it better for the lives, not

only your lives, but the lives of your families as well.

Thank you so much.

This hearing stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MARCH 15, 2007

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE

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MARCH 15, 2007

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR

Mr. TAYLOR. To what extent have the insurgent successes at destroying High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) with mines—to what extent has

that migrated to Afghanistan? And this is a leading question to how many

HMMWVs do you have in Afghanistan and is there any plan to transition them to

some variant of the MRAP?

General CRADDOCK. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) attacks are the most effective enemy casualty producing tactic in both Iraq and Afghanistan (AFG). IEDs

are the Islamic Terrorist and Insurgent’s primary Fire-Support System and have

been since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. However, migration of specific

IED tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) from Iraq to AFG have been fairly

low. The two primary migrations are Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices

(VBIEDs) and Suicide Bombers (Vest and Vehicle). Both of these TTPs are al Qaeda

(AQ TTPs. AQ is operating in both Combined Joint Operations Areas (CJOAs). NonAQ IED TTPs (EFPs, etc.) have not migrated to AFG (yet). Radio-controlled IED

and Pressure-plate IEDs (pseudo-mines) are also common to both Combined Joint

Operating Areas and have developed at the same time in each (specific TTPs for

these IEDs are not common between CJOAs).

The number of M114 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) in

Afghanistan:

TOTAL 1,937

CJTF–82 1,345

TASK FORCE PHOENIX 592

CJSOTF–A 175

With regards to any plan for transitioning HMMWVs to some variant of the Mine

Resistance Ambush Protective (MRAP) vehicle, the Joint Requirements Oversight

Committee (JROC) determined U.S. forces in AFG will get a small number (∼375)

of the overall MRAP systems that are produced. Once the MRAP production schedule is finalized, will we know when AFG will get their allocation.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN

Mr. LARSEN. Can you chat a little bit about Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) and the management structure of MEADS? Do you think it needs

changing? Do you think it is going to work and is working and is going to work?

General CRADDOCK. According to the Department of the Army, the MEADS program is experiencing some challenges, but no uncharacteristic delays or overruns

considering it’s an international cooperative development program. The Design and

Development phase is U.S.-led, providing greater control of day-to-day operations as

opposed to previous phases which were led by Italy and Germany. In addition,

changes in key NATO MEADS Management Agency (NAMEADSMA) management

personnel are envisioned with the next six months to enhance the NAMEADSMA

management teams’ efficiency and effectiveness.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES

Mr. FORBES. In fiscal year 2007, the Joint Forces Command took reductions of approximately $38.4 million in Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E)

accounts and $30 million in O&M account. Could you just elaborate to us what the

impact of those reductions to JFCOM were?

General CRADDOCK. The impacts of budget cuts to JFCOM support to EUCOM

have been primarily related to exercise support. JFCOM, as the global force provider has refocused much of their effort to add joint context to the training of

CONUS-based forces. Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) is the construct/

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ability to execute Live-Virtual-Constructive joint training as part of an exercise.

JNTC is oriented to interoperability training for CONUS based forces. It is critical

to EUCOM training and exercises in support of component certifications and AFRICA COMMAND stand-up that JNTC funds continue to support IA role players.

JFCOM’s eagerness to support AFRICA COMMAND is welcomed, since AFRICA

COMMAND Headquarters activities will likely be all about integrated operations.

Proper support for the stand-up will require increasing the training budget and accelerating the development and timing of exercises due to the aggressive timeline

to full operational capability.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KLINE

Mr. KLINE. The Department of Defense is currently conducting a world-wide review to determine whether current Imminent Danger Pay (IDP) and Combat Zone

Tax Exclusion (CZTE) designations are appropriate. Do you feel the current IDP

and CZTE designations for the KFOR mission in Kosovo is appropriate? Do you support the continued IDP/CZTE designation for the KFOR mission?

General CRADDOCK. Yes, the current Imminent Danger Pay (IDP) and Combat

Zone Tax Exclusion (CZTE) designations for the Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission in

Kosovo are appropriate. Eliminating the associated special pay and benefits would

have a significantly negative impact on both the existing mission and on the morale

of U.S. service members performing duties in the Balkans under Operation Joint

Guardian in Task Force Falcon. These service members are upholding the requirements of United Nations Resolution 1244. An analysis of the dangers of the mission

in Serbia (Kosovo) demonstrate that this area is close to active hostility between the

indigenous ethnic groups while uniformed service members face dangerous situations on a routine basis during vehicle checkpoint duty, cordon and search operations, and smuggling interdiction.

At this time, I do support the continued IDP/CZTE designation for the KFOR mission.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CUMMINGS

Mr. CUMMINGS. General Craddock, you noted in your testimony that ‘‘Western Europe is home to some of our oldest and closet allies’’ and there has been a moving

trend in which, the defense budgets of these same NATO allies steadily fall to ‘‘a

level that jeopardizes their ability to make long-term strategic military commitments to meet the Alliance’s 21st Century ambitions.’’ In this same vein, as our allies continue to lessen its budgets and commitments, we have seen a resulting

steady flow of withdrawal plans from some of our key partners. Notably, British

Prime Minister Tony Blair on Wednesday, February 21st announced his plans for

the imminent withdrawal of around 1,600 of his country’s troops from Iraq in the

coming months. The remaining British troops will simply support training efforts

for Iraqi security forces; Denmark also plans to withdraw 460 coalition troops by

August of this year. a. Recognizing the decreasing allied support, can the United

States European Command be able to effectively and efficiently man the vast 21

million square mile area that includes 92 diverse nations in Europe, Eurasia and

Africa along side, an already overstretched system due to the ongoing conflicts in

Iraq and Afghanistan? b. In consideration of the clear decline in allied support, what

efforts are being made to ensure that other allies do not follow the lead of Denmark

and Great Britain in our efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and Iraq along with, areas

throughout Africa and elsewhere?

General CRADDOCK. In response to your first question, European Command

(EUCOM) has felt the impact of 9/11 on the ability to support security cooperation

activities. For example, the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance

(ACOTA) program is one of the United States’ most effective programs in Africa,

providing peacekeeping training and non-lethal equipment to 19 partner nations

willing to send peacekeepers to United Nations or African Union peace support operations. Prior to 9/11, EUCOM Components provided 20–40 Service members for

each ACOTA training cycle; now, two contract organizations provide the majority of

training. EUCOM continues to support ACOTA through supplementing contractor

with a handful of military ‘‘mentors,’’ normally sourced from Reserve and National

Guard forces.

The ACOTA program also offers EUCOM the greatest opportunity to engage with

Allies to support U.S. efforts in Africa. Therefore, at every opportunity, EUCOM

works with Allies and friends to increase involvement in ACOTA and match European military expertise with specific ACOTA Partner Nation training requirements.

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Both Belgium and the United Kingdom have sent military training teams to work

along side EUCOM military ‘‘mentors’’ at ACOTA training events. As well, EUCOM

regularly supports the Department of State ACOTA Program Office efforts to

deconflict training methodologies, technical language, and organizational structures.

For example, U.S. and French trainers met to consolidate military terminology and

phase training modules to best meet Senegalese requirements to prepare troops for

peacekeeping missions.

In addition to increasing peacekeeping capability across the African continent,

building African maritime security and maritime domain awareness are priorities

for EUCOM in Africa. With a continuing strain on Global Naval Force Presence, the

opportunity for naval engagement is limited, with fewer ships available to support

direct military-to-military contact in Africa. As a result, EUCOM intends to focus

available naval assets on security cooperation aimed at building capacity and increasing maritime domain awareness in the Gulf of Guinea. Eventually, this effort

will expand to include the Southwest Indian Ocean region as well.

In response to your second question, it is important to point out that while the

United Kingdom announced they were going to withdraw troops from Iraq, at the

same time they announced that they were going to send additional troops to ISAF.

This ISAF troop augmentation will add to the approximately 800 augmentation the

United Kingdom (UK) announced earlier this year. It does appear that some nations

are shifting forces from Iraq and in doing so freeing up forces that can be contributed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mission in Afghanistan.

EUCOM representatives at all levels regularly participate in trilateral meetings

with counterparts from France and the United Kingdom. Trilateral meetings address both operational missions and security cooperation activities. Through this

forum, EUCOM has been able to strengthen non-combatant evacuation operations

coordination and address capacity building for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union to create, support, and sustain

standby forces. In the realm of traditional security cooperation activities, in-depth

information sharing facilitates best utilization of each nation’s limited resources in

order to meet security cooperation requirements in Africa.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Considering that we began our efforts in Afghanistan in October

of 2001, what are the long-term and short-term goals of NATO/ISAF military presence in attaining stability? What are NATO/ISAF most immediate concerns that stifle it from meeting these goals?

General CRADDOCK. In 2003 the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

assumed the mission to establish and maintain a secure environment in order to

facilitate the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. ISAF’s long term goal

for this mission is to leave the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) capable of providing its own security. The short-term goal is to establish the security required to enable stability operations. Stability operations include ISAF forces conducting short

term reconstruction projects to create the conditions where the citizens of Afghanistan quickly recognize the benefits of maintaining a peaceful environment. With a

stable environment, Afghan reconstruction and development can be conducted more

effectively.

Critical to ISAF achieving its long term objective is building a trained and capable

Afghan National Army (ANA). Therefore, as ISAF continues its mission, it’s most

immediate concern is having adequate NATO forces and equipment to maintain security as well as to train, equip and mentor the ANA.

Of equal concern to NATO is ISAF’s inability to stem the flow of Taliban and

other opposing militant forces (OMF) across the Pakistan border. As long as a safe

haven exists for OMF in Pakistan, providing long term security in the southern and

eastern regions of Afghanistan remains problematic.

Mr. CUMMINGS. You stated in your submitted testimony that ‘‘Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction are among the United States European Command Area of

Responsibility (EUCOM AOR) highest priorities’’ since the majority of the world’s

nuclear powers are located in this area. In addition, you also noted that ‘‘on the periphery of the EUCOM AOR is Iran’s continued nuclear program’’ which, is clearly

a risk to U.S., NATO and partner interests. What further efforts in the Proliferation

Security Initiative are being coordinated to protect the U.S. and our NATO partners

from these risks?

General CRADDOCK. United States European Command (EUCOM) continues to

support on-going Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) exercise planning and execution. We recently participated in Exercise ANATOLIAN SUN. This exercise, led by

Turkey, involved U.S. Navy ships working in conjunction with other Proliferation

Security Initiative (PSI) participating nations and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners, to conduct interdiction training in the Mediterranean.

EUCOM also coordinated other U.S. Interagency activities with their counterparts

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in the government of Turkey. Planning is underway for Exercise EXPLORING

HYPERION, a United Kingdom led PSI exercise focused on maritime interdiction

planned for the Fall of 2007. We are in discussions with several other PSI nations

to attend their upcoming exercises as either participants or observers. We participate in PSI Operational Experts Group (OEG) planning and coordination conferences on a quarterly basis. EUCOM continues to assist the Department of State

in reaching out to those nations in our AOR who have not yet joined the PSI in

order to encourage them to sign on to this valuable initiative. Our ultimate goal is

to encourage other countries to develop their own Weapons of Mass Destruction

(WMD) interdiction capabilities and to agree to work together in support of the goal

of preventing WMD proliferation.

There have been successful interdictions of related WMD materials and technologies in EUCOM’s Area of Responsibility. PSI provides a useful framework to

further develop and enhance partner nation interdiction and counter proliferation

capabilities. Because WMD proliferation will continue to be a global challenge that

requires a coordinated global approach, we view PSI as a critical component of our

overall Combating WMD efforts.

In addition to PSI, we participate in the International Counter Proliferation Program, Cooperative Threat Reduction, Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention

Initiative, WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative, Caspian Guard and Black Sea

Initiatives, and Operation Active Endeavor. These programs help support the goals

of counter proliferation in the United States European Command Area of Responsibility (EUCOM AOR).

Through all the these programs and initiatives, EUCOM, in support of broader

U.S. government efforts and in cooperation with our partners and allies, is actively

working to secure WMD stockpiles in the Area of Responsibility; to facilitate the destruction of WMD stockpiles; to deny terrorists access to WMD weapons, materials,

and technologies; and to prevent the transfer of WMD weapons, materials, and technologies to state and non-state actors of concern.

Mr. CUMMINGS. On March 11th, a report in the New York Times and the French

Press illustrated the ongoing problem of drug trafficking in Afghanistan. Specifically, the article detailed an Afghan man who was arrested at the central post office

in Kabul when he tried to mail a coat to London. Unfortunately, the lining of this

coat was filled to capacity with eight pounds of heroin. Given that NATO/ISAF officers traditionally concentrate its efforts in combating opium production and trafficking, what efforts are being made to counter other narcotics trafficking? In addition,

how are our NATO allies assisting us in these efforts?

General CRADDOCK. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) efforts relative to countering the illegal narcotics trade in Afghanistan are limited to a supporting role to the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) and other sanctioned counter

narcotics (CN) organizations operating in Afghanistan. NATO’s authorized the

International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) to provide logistical support to

the international communities CN agencies, intelligence support, information campaign support, and in extremis security support to the GoA and other international

organizations as they conduct CN operations. ISAF forces cannot directly participate

in the seizure of narcotics or the apprehension of suspected narcotics traffickers unless they are encountered incidental to the conduct of other routine military operations.

The GoA is responsible for the design and execution of CN operations within their

border. The GoA’s Ministry for Counter Narcotics develops policy with regard to CN

and the Ministry of the Interior is responsible for the execution and enforcement

of CN policies. NATO Alliance nations support to Afghan CN efforts is provided in

varying direct and indirect means. The United Kingdom is the G8 nation lead for

CN operations in Afghanistan, tasked with providing support to the GoA with regard to the policy development, planning, resourcing, and execution of CN operations. The U.S. and UK provide alternative livelihood support to former opium

poppy farmers. The Italian Government is the lead G8 nation working judicial reform, which is an essential element in countering the illicit narcotics trade. The

German Government serves as the lead nation for the development of the Afghan

police force. Additionally, many Alliance nations have bilateral agreements with the

GoA which directly support CN efforts.

Mr. CUMMINGS. As of the October 16th the Department of Defense announced its

plan to resume mandatory anthrax vaccination after a nearly two-year hiatus. Since

that time, our service members have been required to be injected with this potentially debilitating and deadly vaccine. More recently, I was made aware that many

of our veterans have made complaints to their superior officers in the Army, Air

Force and National Guard concerning how this understudied vaccine has caused

burns, extreme bodily pain that limits or totally defrauds them of mobility, paralysis

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or their death. a. General Caddock, what steps have been made to conduct further

tests to ensure that this vaccine really is safe and effective? b. Considering that the

U.S. appears to be the only nation in the world that forces its military personnel

to take the anthrax vaccine, how concerned should we be about the threat of anthrax being used as a form of terrorism? c. These same service members that complained of the debilitating side effects of the anthrax vaccination also, noted the lack

of health benefits made available to them. One particular Veteran of the Army suffers from extensive mobility problems as a result of his vaccination. Specifically, he

went from scoring merits of physical achievement in his training to not being able

to walk down the hallways of Rayburn without the help of a cane. This veteran further noted that the Army rated him at 20% which, resulted in him receiving a mere

$221.00 in benefits in order to support himself, his children and disabled wife. i.

What measures are being taken to ensure that our service members are being supplied with adequate healthcare along with, a fair and effectively physical evaluation

in order to determine their health benefits? ii. What measures are currently in place

for individuals to appeal the physical evaluation results particularly, for our men

and women in Iraq and Afghanistan?

General CRADDOCK. Congressman Cummings, since the answer to this question

is outside the scope of day-to-day operations of United States European Command

(EUCOM) and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), I would like

to refer you to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs for a response

to this question.

Mr. CUMMINGS. General Craddock, you noted in your submitted testimony that

‘‘refugees from the conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan have created a humanitarian catastrophe. In many areas of Central Africa, such as the vast interior of the

Democratic Republic of the Congo and the northern sections of Chad, there is very

little military or police presence, and often no central government influence. These

problems, aggravated by difficult terrain and a lack of infrastructure, have allowed

smuggling and conflict to flourish.’’ Indeed, as of January 2007, approximately two

million displaced people live in camps in Darfur and at least 232,000 people have

fled to neighboring Chad, where they live in refugee camps. In addition to the people displaced by the conflict, at least 2 million other people are considered ‘‘conflictaffected’’ by the UN and many need some form of food assistance because the conflict has damaged the local economy, markets, and trade in Darfur. a. How effective

has the EUCOM’s contribution been to date in the efforts to stabilize and protect

the people of Darfur? b. What efforts have been made to train African troops to date

that have received training under the EUCOM initiative in securing this region? c.

Overall, in assisting in the stabilization of the vast continent of Africa, how costly

do you believe these efforts will be? In addition, how will our allies assist us in bearing the burden?

General CRADDOCK. In response to your first question, United States European

Command’s (USEUCOM’s) contribution is only a part of the overall U.S. effort for

Darfur and includes actions we have been directed to do in support of U.S. policy.

EUCOM has supported the African Union Mission in Sudan since 2004 by providing airlift support twice per year to rotate the three Rwandan Battalion peacekeeping contingents to/from Darfur as part of, I should emphasize, an overall North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led support effort to transport peacekeeping

forces into Darfur. Previous EUCOM support has included the provision of airlift

with both military aircraft and contracted commercial carriers.

EUCOM provided one officer to support the U.S. delegation to the Darfur Peace

Agreement negotiations. This officer was on hand at the 5 May 06 signing of the

Darfur Peace Agreement by the Government of Sudan and one of the rebel factions.

EUCOM subsequently sent a team of three officers for 90 days to the African Union

Mission in Sudan headquarters in Al Fashir, Sudan, with the duty of assisting the

African Union (AU) with the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement. As of

today, implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement remains incomplete because

of the continually deteriorating political and security situation.

EUCOM provided military planner support to the United Nations and the Joint

Staff in February and March 2006 to develop military options to support the African

Union Mission in Sudan. At this point, options are limited by the reluctance of the

Government of Sudan to permit international Western elements into Darfur.

In response to your second question, EUCOM actively supports the Global Peace

Operations Initiative (GPOI). GPOI is a Department of State program, planned in

consultation with and implemented by Department of Defense (DoD) to train and

equip peacekeepers. In Africa, GPOI funds supplement the existing Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program to provide training,

equipment, and logistical capability to meet United Nations peace operations standards. The bulk of GPOI activities in EUCOM are within the framework of ACOTA,

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which assists 19 ACOTA ‘‘partner countries’’ in developing the ability to participate

in peace support operations.

In the coming months, the ACOTA program will provide multilateral battalion

and brigade-level training for African sub-regional organizations. It will also increase training support to the AU staff and forces in joint operations. At the tactical

level, USEUCOM will continue to increase its participation in the ACOTA program,

providing military mentors and advisors to the Department of State contractor-led

training effort, wherever possible. ACOTA remains a crucial African engagement

program, directly supporting U.S. national objectives of promoting stability, democratization, and military professionalism in Africa. GPOI funding sustains African

peacekeeping forces to enable these units to address the multiple crises on the African continent.

In response to your third question, because the challenges in Africa are not confined to a single nation, EUCOM takes a regional approach at analyzing this strategic environment. On the Continent of Africa, we face a complex environment with

enormous challenge and potential. While Africa is rich in both human potential and

mineral resources, it has historically struggled with relatively unstable governments, internal political strife, and economic problems. Many states remain fragile

due to a variety of factors, including corruption, endemic and pandemic health problems, historical ethnic animosities, and endemic poverty. Security Cooperation (SC)

programs remain the cornerstone of our Strategy of Active Security to promote common security, which ultimately supports national objectives in the global war on terror (GWOT). Our SC programs represent a proactive approach to building partnership capacity with the aim of enabling emerging democracies to defend their homelands, address and reduce regional conflicts, defeat terrorist extremists, develop

common economic and security interests, and respond to emerging crises. From airborne training to non-lethal weapons education, EUCOM personnel and facilities

provide practical and state of the art training. Assisting our allies and partners in

developing their capabilities to conduct effective peacekeeping and contingency operations with well-trained, disciplined forces helps mitigate the conditions that lead

to conflict, prepares the way for success, and reduces the potential burden of U.S.

involvement.

EUCOM Security Cooperation efforts require consistent, predictable investment in

order to impact the multitude of strategic, security, economic, and political challenges we face.

We recognize that many of the challenges in Africa’s stability exceed the capacity

of any one nation to resolve and that today’s threats require a comprehensive approach by the international community, involving a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments. EUCOM’s efforts are coordinated and complementary with a

broad range of national, international and regional actors.

Mr. CUMMINGS. General Smith, earlier I addressed a question to General

Craddock (see question 1 for General Craddock) involving the steady downstream

of long-term strategic military commitments and defense budgets of our allies that

has stifled the ability to meet our 21st Century ambitions. Recognizing the need of

our allies to ‘transform’ its capabilities in order to meet the ever growing challenges

of modern security issues, a. What measures are being taken to ensure our allies

are properly adapting to this continually changing environment? b. How differentiated are these approaches to ‘‘transformation’’ amongst our allies?

General SMITH. a. NATO’s ongoing transformation reflects cultural and institutional change on a grand scale as the Alliance and member nations explore and

adopt new capabilities that will enhance their ability to meet the challenges of today

and the future in a new and uncertain strategic environment. The process encompasses reorganization and re-equipping and introduces innovative ways of looking

at challenges through the lens of capabilities. It is more than new technology; transformation includes the need to embed a culture of innovation and managed risk into

our thinking. It is driven ever forward by the increasing requirement for NATO’s

forces to be multinational and joint by design, deployable wherever and whenever

needed and coherently interoperable in thought and action.

— NATO created Allied Command Transformation (ACT) as the Alliance’s dedicated instrument to co-ordinate, harmonize and pursue the process of transformation. NATO has seven transformation focus areas: Information Superiority,

NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC), Effective Engagement, Joint Maneuver, Enhanced Civil-Military Co-operation, Expeditionary Operations and Integrated

Logistics. As an example, NNEC seeks to enhance capabilities by employing Information Age to facilitate the delivery of military effects with unparalleled speed and

accuracy. It will allow Nation’s forces to network together and the Allied Commander to conduct operations with real time information, confident in his situational awareness and coordination with others.

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— In regard to output, NATO has already made considerable impact. ACT has

provided several Member Nations with detailed and comprehensive assessments of

their national defense programs, and has incorporated experiments into various

NRF exercises and increased experimentation at the political/military level with

plans to address the challenge of multinational and interagency engagement. Within

the research and technology field, ACT is moving forward to develop concepts for

the employment of Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUV) and Joint Intelligence,

Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) technologies. Within Command and Control

(C2), ACT delivered a NATO Network-Enabled Capability Foundation Document

that provided an overarching concept and a roadmap for delivery of near-term initiatives, while progress continues on the development of a coherent and highly

adaptive C2 capability for the NRF that will encompass the strategic environment.

In resources and logistics, ACT is engaged in Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)

experiments to provide NATO commanders with capabilities to track the flow of

supplies between support facilities in Europe to 19 remote operational areas such

as Afghanistan. ACT’s delivery of a new multinational logistics concept has been

agreed to by the Nations. ACT personnel are in Iraq providing support to the training of Iraqi Security Force personnel as well as providing support to their training

at the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany. Likewise, ACT also provides specialized training to NATO’s deployable Joint Task Force staffs in preparation for Afghanistan operations.

— A primary vehicle for evaluating new concepts and capability improvements

is the NATO Response Force (NRF). A highly trained and technologically advanced

operational military force, the NRF is ideally suited to identify new capabilities and

concepts, through lessons learned, and then serve as a test-bed for their analysis.

The NRF can deploy as a stand-alone force for Article 5 (collective Defence) or nonArticle 5 crisis response operations such as evacuation operations, support disaster

consequence management (including chemical biological, radiological and nuclear

events), humanitarian crisis situations and counter terrorism operations; it can deploy as an initial entry force facilitating the arrival of larger follow-up forces; or it

can deploy as a demonstrative force to show NATO’s determination and solidarity

to deter crises (quick response operations to support diplomacy as required). I think

the key point here is the word ‘‘deploy,’’ an example of the change that has occurred

within NATO since the end of the Cold War, when the 16 nations of the Alliance

were focused on fighting in place from well defended, fixed bases.

— I think the most important example that should assure us that the Alliance

is adapting to a continually changing environment is its support of the International

Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

— Ten of the NATO and PfP nations have formal bilateral agreements with

USJFCOM that establish liaison officers across the Command to collaborate on efforts in support of greater interoperability and transformation. Overall, there are 47

nations (NATO, PfP and others) with an opportunity to interact with JFCOM in

some manner, either as part of additional duties while assigned to other organizations in the local area, or fully integrated within the JFCOM structure. They are

partners in training and experimentation and work together to find common areas

for improving the quality of their armed forces. We had over 25 Ministers of Defense

and Chiefs of Defense visit both Norfolk last year—this shows the importance individual countries place on what is happening with USJFCOM and ACT. We believe

these efforts provide the synergy needed to ensure our Allies understand requirements for transformation.

b. There are many different approaches to transformation within NATO—there is

not one way or one path. This is what has made NATO so enduring. The Cold War

capabilities of the United States were expeditionary by nature—the battleground

was going to be Europe and U.S. was geographically separated. Our incredible logistic capabilities were born during the throes of the Second World War, and were built

up over the next 50 years—at a significant investment cost. Our Western European

Allies did not have this capability. They did not require an expeditionary culture,

but they are now developing one with some innovative transformation programs. It’s

also important to note that NATO is bigger, having gained new members from Eastern Europe that did not have common experiences with the Alliance during its evolution in the last half of the last century. It is a cultural shift for the entire Alliance—that will require development over time, but I think our partners have made

much progress.

— NATO is not just the United States and Europe—it’s the United States and

25 other nations, with the U.S. and Canada the only ones not in Europe. The unique

challenge for NATO’s transformation is that it is attempting this ‘revolution’ in an

Alliance of 26 sovereign Nations. Addressing different military cultures, different caVerDate 22-MAR-2001 11:33 Nov 21, 2008 Jkt 038369 PO 00000 Frm 00137 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\110-35\074000.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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pability starting points, different geographical and historical perspectives, unique

national security issues and domestic law and budgetary constraints are not subjects for the faint-hearted. The agreed intent among all the Member Nations to invest in more agile forces, to collaborate widely in the requirements and procurement

process, to share information and best business practices openly, will result in greater efficiencies on an Alliance-wide scale. Regular interaction between Nations’ defense and acquisition planners and NATO’s transformation organization will help

ensure streamlined and targeted military infrastructures, forces and processes.

— Across the Alliance, we are seeing different levels of effort and different approaches to change, all dependent on each nation’s internal budgets, economies, politics, and capabilities. In the long term NATO members, we’re seeing a focus on

shifting to capabilities-based approach to defense planning and acquisition reform.

Modernization of existing equipment is also an area of considerable effort. This is

critical to achieve the greater interoperability that is required on the missions that

NATO is involved in now—missions that require much political commitment but a

leaner and more agile fighting force able to bolt on to infrastructure provided by

other nations or for other nations. Creative solutions, such as partnering together

to create a strategic airlift capability, are also being developed, thus allowing the

Nations to expand their contributions to Coalition forces worldwide. The newer

members of NATO face a different set of problems to achieve transformation, yet

many times we find them the most eager for change. These nations are struggling

to move from a heavy land-based force to a more mobile and flexible professional

force. This capability requires organic medical, mobility, security, and logistic elements than they’ve had in the past. Additionally, they must transform their overall

military culture away from Soviet era doctrine, training, and tactics to NATO standards and practices that are consistent with our international security assistance

policies and, ultimately, the United States’ national security policy.

— One of the best catalysts to NATO transformation is having Allied Command

Transformation and Joint Forces Command collocated in Norfolk, Virginia, with one

person in command of both. Because of this, we are able to leverage capabilities

across both commands to develop best practices. JFCOM’s experimental and training infrastructures provide benefit not only to U.S. forces, but NATO Allies and

other multinational partners, in order to develop solutions to problems that confront

the international community. Additionally, we have strong linkages between commands within JFCOM—the Joint Warfighting Center, Joint National Training Capability, and Joint Center for Operational Analysis and Lessons Learned—with like

functions in ACT such as the Joint Warfare Center in Norway the Joint Force

Training Center in Poland, and the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center in

Portugal.

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