United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

March 1997 UNITED NATIONS

Limitations in Leading

Missions Requiring

Force to Restore Peace

GAO/NSIAD-97-34

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-259387 

March 27, 1997

The Honorable Jesse Helms

Chairman

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Foreign Relations

United States Senate

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman

Chairman

The Honorable Lee Hamilton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives

The founders of the United Nations intended the organization to play a

major role in maintaining international peace and security, using force if

necessary. During the Cold War, however, the United Nations did not have

many opportunities to carry out peace operations involving military force

because the superpowers vetoed most such U.N. actions. On two

occasions during that time, in the Congo and Lebanon, the Security

Council issued resolutions that required the missions to use some measure

of force to achieve their objectives. Since the end of the Cold War, the

U.N. Security Council has authorized a number of U.N. operations

involving the use of force to help restore or maintain peace. For example,

the Security Council authorized the use of force in Somalia and the former

Yugoslavia under chapter VII of the U.N. charter, which authorizes “action

with respect to threats to peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of

aggression.” Given the U.N.’s performance in leading peace operations

involving the use of force, some experts now question whether the United

Nations is an appropriate organization to lead such missions. Others,

including a former U.N. Secretary General, believe that the United Nations

may be an appropriate organization to lead such missions, but that

inadequate resources and operational structure have been the primary

factors limiting the U.N.’s effectiveness. We examined this issue, with

particular focus on

• what precedents there are for authorizing the United Nations to lead peace

operations requiring some measure of force to achieve their objectives and

• whether there are limitations in the U.N.’s ability to lead peace operations

calling for the use of force.

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This report is based on our studies of U.N. peace operations conducted

over the past 5 years,1

 as well as our current work that included (1) field

study at several locations where U.N. missions used force conduct

operations; (2) interviews at these missions with military commanding

officers, peacekeepers, civilian directors, and line staff; and (3) analysis of

U.S., U.N., North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and other

documents and situation reports on peace enforcement and peacekeeping

operations. We conducted this review under our basic legislative authority

and are addressing it to you because the matters discussed in this report

fall within your Committees’ jurisdiction.

Background According to U.N. reports and Security Council statements, peacekeeping

missions are operations in the field using military and/or civilian personnel

to help maintain international peace and security, but where the use of

force is not authorized except in self-defense. Such missions require

voluntary troop contributions from member states, since the United

Nations has no troops of its own, and are generally considered to be

authorized under chapter VI of the U.N. charter, although Security Council

resolutions mandating peacekeeping missions frequently omit specific

charter citations. According to the U.N. Secretary General, and based on

nearly 50 years of experience, three core principles guide peacekeeping

missions led by the United Nations: (1) obtaining the consent of the

warring parties to the peacekeeping mission, (2) ensuring the

peacekeepers remain neutral and impartial in their actions and do not

interfere in the nation’s internal affairs, and (3) using force only in

self-defense. Although peace operations have been increasingly used to

help resolve internal conflicts, these principles still apply.

In addition to peacekeeping missions conducted with the consent of the

parties involved in the conflict, the U.N. Security Council can also

authorize enforcement actions, under chapter VII of the U.N. charter, that

call for the use of force to maintain or restore peace. Such operations can

be large scale military efforts that obtain international sanction from the

United Nations but are led by individual nations or coalitions, such as the

actions in Korea (1950-53) and Iraq (1990-91). Or they can be smaller

operations led by the United Nations, such as in Somalia. These operations

are defined by the U.S. Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than

War as the application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally

pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with

1

A list of GAO Products on peacekeeping and peace enforcement is presented at the end of this report.

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resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore international

peace and order.2

 Consent by the warring parties is not required in these

operations and neutrality may not be relevant. Security Council

resolutions mandating such operations usually cite chapter VII of the U.N.

charter as their authority. (See app. I for background on the use of force in

the U.N. charter.)

Although the United Nations has considerable experience in leading

peacekeeping missions and an overall approach to conducting them, it has

not worked out accepted core principles and an overall approach to guide

operations calling for the use of force.

For this report, we use the term peace operation to refer to the entire

spectrum of U.N. activities aimed at maintaining or restoring peace and

security, ranging from traditional peacekeeping missions to chapter VII

peace enforcement to operations falling somewhere in between.

Results in Brief The U.N. Security Council has three precedents for mandating the United

Nations to lead peace operations where the use of force was authorized

under chapter VII of the U.N. charter—the missions in Somalia, Bosnia,

and Eastern Slavonia.3

 In four other U.N.-led operations, the Security

Council established mission objectives that required some measure of

force to be achieved, but did not explicitly authorize its use under chapter

VII. In these operations—the Congo, Rwanda, Lebanon, and Haiti—the

Security Council authorized the United Nations to lead missions and,

respectively, to use the means necessary to apprehend, detain, and deport

foreign forces; establish secure humanitarian zones; take measures to

assure the effective restoration of Lebanese sovereignty; and help ensure a

secure environment. (See app. II for operations authorized by the U.N.

Security Council).

Although the United Nations has improved its capability to support peace

operations, our study indicates there are, nonetheless, organizational

limits of the United Nations that increase the risk of U.N.-led operations

calling for the use of force. These limitations have been overcome when a

nation with sufficient military prestige, credibility, and the commitment of

military forces necessary to conduct operations has taken the lead role in

2

U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-07, June 16, 1995.

3

The U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission was authorized to redress small-scale violations of the

Demilitarized Zone, but is on such a small scale that it is not counted as one of the missions where the

use of force was clearly authorized.

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the U.N. operation. The limitations stem from the U.N.’s structure as an

organization of individual sovereign states, which provides the world

forum for international diplomacy. Because the United Nations is an

international political body, and as such, does not have the attributes of

sovereignty, it cannot conscript troops and arms from member states.

Similarly, because member states cannot or will not relinquish command

over their own troops, U.N. force commanders cannot always be sure their

orders will be carried out. This places the following three limitations on

operations calling for the use of force that are led by the United Nations.

• First, the United Nations cannot ensure that troops and resources will be

provided to carry out and reinforce operations as necessary, especially

since such operations are risky and nations volunteering troops and arms

may not have a national interest in the operation.4

• Second, the U.N. force commander cannot be assured his orders will be

carried out, particularly in dangerous situations where his authority over

national contingents may be questioned or second-guessed by national

authorities who do not relinquish command of their troops to the United

Nations.

• Third, because of the U.N.’s core principle of respecting national

sovereignty, it generally seeks the consent of all parties to the conflict in

conducting a peace operation and thus has not developed an overall

approach to guide operations calling for the use of force.

These three factors have limited the operational effectiveness of U.N.-led

peace operations calling for the use of force. For example, despite

Security Council approval, the United Nations was not able to obtain

adequate troops, equipment, and reinforcements to carry out the

operations in Rwanda (1993-96), Bosnia (1992-95), and Somalia (1992-95).

Nations were unwilling to provide the necessary troops, reinforcements,

and resources when requested. Limits on U.N. command and control

during actions in the Congo (1960-64), Somalia (1992-95), Bosnia

(1992-95), and Lebanon (1978 and ongoing) hindered U.N. commanders

from effectively deploying U.N. peacekeepers to mission-critical locations.

And the U.N.’s use of force in Somalia, Bosnia, and the Congo was

uncertain at key points and lacked credibility as the U.N. operations relied

heavily on the consent of the warring parties to conduct operations. (See

app. III for background descriptions of these operations.)

4

Article 43 of the U.N. charter provides for special agreements with member states to make armed

forces available on call to the Security Council. The United Nations has never entered into such an

agreement with any member state.

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In contrast, the second phase of the U.N. mission in Haiti

(UNMIH)—(1995-96) has been operationally effective, as has been the

operation in Eastern Slavonia to date (1996 and ongoing). For the second

phase of UNMIH, a nation with credible and respected military authority

provided leadership and command and control structures. The United

States acted as the lead nation for the second phase of UNMIH and

(1) ensured adequate resources were available for planning; (2) provided

the necessary information, troops, armament, and political influence; and

(3) used its command and control structure and its doctrine for operations

other than war to help guide operations. Under the U.S. doctrine, the core

principle of obtaining the consent of the parties was not the predominant

principle. In Eastern Slavonia, the operation is conducted as a variant of

the lead nation concept. The force commander is Belgian and his Belgian

military staff provide headquarters command and control and are assured

support by the NATO force in Bosnia.

Precedents for

U.N.-Led Use of Force

The United Nations has had considerable experience in conducting

peacekeeping missions, but has limited experience in leading operations

requiring the use of force to help restore or maintain peace. The United

Nations has led and completed two operations where the use of force was

explicitly authorized under chapter VII of the U.N. charter—Somalia and

Bosnia. The U.N. operation in Eastern Slavonia is also authorized to use

force under chapter VII, and, as of March 1997, it was still ongoing.

The distinction between peacekeeping and those operations authorized to

use force is not always clear in practice. As early as 1958, a U.N. report on

one of the first peacekeeping missions, the U.N. Emergency Force, noted

that a broad interpretation of self-defense might well blur the distinction

between peacekeeping and combat. The report concluded that the use of

force to defend U.N. personnel, property, and positions that the U.N.

commander ordered to be held, constituted self-defense and was

peacekeeping. Any use of force that was initiated to attain a forward

objective was not authorized.

In four operations, the Security Council mandates established objectives

that required some measure of force to be achieved, but the Security

Council resolutions did not state that the operations were authorized

under chapter VII of the U.N. charter. The Security Council resolutions for

U.N. Operations in the Congo (ONUC) stated that peacekeepers were to

take necessary steps to provide the government of the Congo with military

assistance in fulfilling their tasks. After ONUC was unable to accomplish its

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mandate, Security Council Resolution 169 authorized the U.N. operation to

take vigorous action, including the requisite measure of force, if necessary,

to apprehend, detain, and deport all foreign military and paramilitary

personnel, political advisers not under U.N. command, and mercenaries.5

The U.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was authorized to use

force for humanitarian purposes. Security Council Resolution 918 of

May 1994 directed the U.N. mission to contribute to the security and

protection of displaced persons, refugees, and civilians by establishing and

maintaining secure humanitarian areas, where feasible, and provide

security for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief

operations. The resolutions further noted that the 1993 killing of the

President of Burundi, as well as the massive exodus of refugees to

neighboring countries, constituted a humanitarian crisis of enormous

proportions and a threat to international peace and security. Therefore,

peacekeepers might be required to take action against groups threatening

civilians. In June 1994, the Security Council, acting under chapter VII, also

authorized France to protect civilians and mandated all countries to

enforce an arms embargo on Rwanda.

Security Council Resolution 425 established the U.N. Interim Force in

Lebanon (UNIFIL) and mandated it to confirm the withdrawal of the Israeli

army from Southern Lebanon and restore international peace and security

in the area. The Secretary General report (S/12611) implementing the

Security Council resolution stated that the interim force would, among

other things, use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and

ensure that its area of operation would not be used for hostile activity of

any kind. The U.N. operation was also given responsibility to “control

movement and take all measures deemed necessary to assure the effective

restoration of Lebanese sovereignty.” It was instructed to use force only in

self-defense. Self-defense was defined as including “resistance to attempts

by forceful means to prevent it (the U.N. force) from discharging its duties

under the mandate of the Security Council.”

After the first phase of UNMIH was unable to accomplish its mission, a

second phase of UNMIH was authorized. The second phase of UNMIH began

after a multinational force accomplished its mandate under Security

5

In an advisory opinion entitled Certain expenses of the United Nations (ICJ Reports, 1962, p. 151 ff.),

the International Court of Justice voted 9 to 5 that ONUC was “not an enforcement action within the

compass of Chapter VII of the (U.N.) Charter.” The opinion stated that “it must lie within the power of

the Security Council to police a situation even though it does not resort to enforcement action against

a State.” One of the five dissenting jurists noted in his opinion that U.N. planes bombed positions, used

antiaircraft batteries, engaged its forces in offensive maneuvers, and used deadly force in doing so. He

noted that this would qualify as a common-sense case of enforcement.

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Council Resolution 940, of using all necessary means under chapter VII to

“facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership. . . and the

restoration of the legitimate authorities.” Security Council Resolution 940

also authorized the second phase of UNMIH to (1) assist in sustaining the

secure and stable environment established by the U.S.-led coalition in

Haiti and (2) protect international personnel and installations.

Limits on U.N.-Led

Use of Force

As discussed, the United Nations had little experience leading operations

calling for the use of force prior to the end of the Cold War. Since then it

has undertaken several, most of which have been less than fully

successful. The United Nations and member states have studied these

operations and developed a series of lessons learned which they intend to

implement for future operations. They have also undertaken a broad range

of initiatives to improve the operational support for peacekeeping.

Nonetheless, there remain three limitations on the U.N. effectively leading

peace operations that call for the use of force. These are (1) the U.N.’s

inability to ensure that sufficient troops, armaments, and reinforcements

will be available to effectively use force in operations; (2) the uncertainty

that orders of the U.N. commander will be carried out by national

contingents in the field; and (3) the U.N.’s lack of an approach to guide the

use of force. However, these limits have been effectively dealt with when a

nation with sufficient credibility, prestige, and commitment has taken the

lead.

Limitations When Armed

Forces Are Needed

According to U.S. military doctrine, it is critical for missions to have

sufficient armed forces when needed, especially in situations where force

may be necessary. This not only provides a credible deterrent to

opposition, but also ensures adequate troops and armament to conduct

operations. However, U.N. operations, particularly those in which combat

may take place, do not have assurance of timely and adequate troops and

reinforcement. The United Nations must negotiate voluntary help from

member states. This process involves obtaining

• authorization from the Security Council,6

• voluntary force contributions from member states,7 and

6

This authorization includes receiving a draft operational plan from the Secretariat, approval of at least

9 of 15 Security Council members, and no veto from the 5 permanent members.

7

The contributors specify the number and type of forces provided, command and control

arrangements, and other troop-contributing agreements such as mission and area of operations.

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• approval by the General Assembly for the operation’s budget that is

usually paid for by member nations in addition to their regular U.N.

assessments.8

Although the United Nations has been working on standby force

arrangements to ensure the right troops and forces are available for

missions, nations could still refuse to provide these forces. Several

examples help illustrate that (1) the United Nations, as an organization

could not ensure troops, arms, and reinforcements would be available

when needed, particularly, in U.N.-led operations that called for the use of

force; whereas (2) lead nations have provided the resources, command,

and direction to make the U.N. force credible in carrying out operations

calling for the use of force.

Rwanda Civil war erupted in Rwanda beginning in 1990. In 1994, the United Nations

was mandated to protect civilians at risk and establish secure

humanitarian zones. But the United Nations could not obtain military

forces to do so. The U.N. Secretary General planned a deployment in three

stages during the spring of 1994. In the first stage, UNAMIR would

concentrate on providing security in the capital, Kigali, and escorting relief

convoys; in the second and third stages, troops would fan out across the

country and protect displaced persons and humanitarian organizations.

This deployment was estimated to take 31 days, or until mid-June 1994.

However, the United Nations fell far short of meeting this goal. UNAMIR,

which had been reduced to 444 troops in May 1994, did not begin to

receive additional forces until early August; it did not reach its full troop

strength until November. UNAMIR command officials who were in charge

during the eruption of civil war said UNAMIR had repeatedly requested

additional support, but no nation would volunteer troops as the war

escalated in and around Kigali. As a result, UNAMIR was not able to respond

to the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of civilians. In New York, the

Security Council did not authorize additional troops as it debated about

the mission’s objectives, about whether the objectives were practical and

politically feasible, and about whether member states would actually

provide the resources needed. (See app. II for background on the Rwanda

mission.)

Delays in UNAMIR’s budget approval process further illustrate the U.N.’s

basic limits in obtaining resources when needed. The General Assembly

did not approve the total budget for UNAMIR’s first 6 months of

8

This approval must include a draft budget prepared by the Secretariat and review by the Advisory

Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, which implies compromise on the activities

and overall cost.

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operation—October 5, 1993, to April 4, 1994—until April 5, one day after

the budget period had ended. To conduct its operations, UNAMIR received

funding in advance of formal approval, but the advance was 25 percent

less than requested. Similarly, the budget for UNAMIR’s next 8 months of

operation—April 5, 1994, to December 9, 1994—was approved just 10 days

before the end of the budget period. Further, the advance funds covered

only about 53 percent of the requested budget ($70 million of an approved

$132 million). According to U.N. officials, the lack of funds hindered the

procurement of needed vehicles, spare parts, food rations, and contracts

to airlift troop contingents to Rwanda. In addition, from October to late

November 1994, UNAMIR had neither advance funding nor an approved

budget and, consequently, operated without legal financial authority.

Bosnia In Bosnia, the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) could not obtain approval

for the number or range of fully equipped troops required to carry out the

operation. The U.N. Secretary General reiterated in March 1994 that 34,000

additional troops would be required to carry out its mandate to deter

attacks against 6 safe areas. However, the Security Council only

authorized an additional 7,600 troops. As a result, the United Nations

considered UNPROFOR’s troop strength insufficient to carry out the Security

Council mandates. The unavailability of troops meant that UNPROFOR could

not deploy sufficient troops in safe areas such as Gorazde. And, in Bihac,

troops without enough weapons and supplies were rotated in. Safe areas

were attacked on several occasions, and in July 1995 Srebrenica and Zepa

were overrun and, according to reports from the International Tribunal for

the Former Yugoslavia, possibly thousands of civilians and soldiers were

executed.

Somalia In Somalia, the U.N. Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) was not authorized

sufficient troops to carry out its mandate. Although UNOSOM II’s mandate

was broader both in terms of functions and area of deployment than the

U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF), 24 percent fewer troops were

authorized. Also, according to U.N. reports, troops were volunteered late,

and equipment was not provided in a timely manner and was inadequate.

Operations began in May 1993, and by July 20,000 of the 28,000 UNOSOM

II-authorized troops had been deployed; the full strength was only reached

by October 1993, 6 months after UNOSOM II’s mandate had been approved.

Moreover, some contingents arrived without appropriate weapons and

equipment, such as armored personnel carriers and communications

capability, and had inadequate intelligence. As a result, the factions on the

ground were emboldened to act. During a June 5, 1993, planned U.N.

inspection of militia weapons storage sites, U.N. forces, including

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Pakistanis and Nigerians, were attacked in incidents orchestrated by one

of factions. Because of a lack of common communications equipment,

neither the Pakistanis nor the Nigerians were able to request help directly

from the Italian brigade, which had armored vehicles. Twenty-four

Pakistanis were killed, 57 were injured, and 6 were missing.9

 In subsequent

reports, the U.N. Secretary General acknowledged that insufficient troop

strength and lack of proper equipment limited UNOSOM II’s ability to fulfill

its mandate.

Lebanon Several factors have prevented UNIFIL from effectively carrying out its

mandate of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, helping restore

Lebanese sovereignty and ensuring that its area of operation is not used

for hostile activity of any kind. A primary factor is that UNIFIL does not

have the support from U.N. member states to effectively carry out its

mission. The size of the force has in fact been reduced in recent years.

Despite UNIFIL’s mandate, which limits it to weapons of a defensive

character only, UNIFIL does not have sufficient armament and troops to

credibly deter the warring parties from violating Lebanese territory or to

deploy its forces in their designated areas of operation. For example, on

June 6, 1982, after worldwide Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)

attacks on Israeli civilians and officials, Israel invaded Lebanese territory

to retaliate against PLO strongholds in Lebanon. At some points, UNIFIL

attempted to deter the Israeli advance but, it quickly abandoned the effort

and the entire UNIFIL area of operation was soon completely behind Israeli

lines. In addition, UNIFIL has been unable to prevent attacks by Hezbollah

(the Islamic fundamentalist organization) on Israel and, according to the

Secretary General, has no right to impede Lebanese acts of resistance

against the occupying force.

While UNIFIL has not been able to accomplish its mandate, it remains

deployed as a signal of the international concern about the area, and its

humanitarian efforts contribute to providing order in the area as well as

providing a neutral authority to which the civilian population of southern

Lebanon can turn.

Haiti In contrast, UNMIH was able to marshal resources as needed because a

sovereign nation, the United States, declared restoration of democracy in

Haiti a national interest and led the operation. The United States ensured

adequate troops and resources were available to prepare the environment

for UNMIH, plan for the operation, and implement it. For example, the

9

Of the six missing Pakistanis one died in captivity and five were later released. Also injured were one

Italian and three U.S. soldiers.

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United States led a multinational force (MNF), committing over 20,000 U.S.

military personnel, including carrier battle groups, a special operations

task force, a marine air ground task force, and other support to ensure a

secure environment for UNMIH. In planning UNMIH, the United States

provided the United Nations with information, military logisticians, and

military planners. Of crucial importance was U.S. assistance during the

transition from the MNF to a U.N.-led operation. The United States

sponsored training programs on command and control, doctrine, and

operations for many of the UNMIH troop contingents and U.N. personnel.

Logistical support contracts for rations, supplies, and equipment already in

place were extended for UNMIH until formal U.N. bidding could take place.

And a quick reaction force of 1,500, including 550 special forces and

helicopters, remained to help provide security. According to DOD officials,

if reinforcements were needed, the United States would quickly make

additional resources available.

Eastern Slavonia The U.N. Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western

Sirmium (UNTAES) is tasked under chapter VII of the U.N. charter to

demilitarize the region (mainly of Serbian military and paramilitary forces)

and take other steps in returning the area to Croatia. UNTAES has NATO

commitment for military support when needed. UNTAES also obtained

credible force protection of its own, including four mechanized infantry

battalions, organized into monitoring and protection forces, one tank

company, one reconnaissance company, and transport and antitank

helicopter squadrons. Although UNTAES did not receive the troop level

requested by the Secretary General, it more importantly has NATO

commitment for close air support and further assistance from the NATO-led

force in Bosnia if needed. According to U.N. and U.S. officials, leadership

by NATO members is a critical factor in the operation’s effectiveness thus

far, given the former warring factions’ belief that a U.N.-led operation is

not credible in using force. Moreover, the former warring parties in the

region clearly understand that NATO will make resources and support

available to UNTAES if necessary. This support provides assurance that

resources will be available if needed and adds credibility to the UNTAES

operation.

Limits on Command and

Control

According to military experts, effective command and control of military

units is essential in peace operations calling for the use of force because

quick and consistent responses to orders are critical in combat. However,

reflecting the political reality of national sovereignty in the United Nations,

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command over national contingents—the right to issue orders concerning

all military aspects of missions—has not been given to the United Nations.

From the U.S. perspective, this point is made clear in The Clinton

Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations,

which describes Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), issued in 1994.

The paper strongly notes that no President has ever ceded command over

U.S. forces. It goes on to state that “[t]he sole source of legitimacy for U.S.

commanders originates from the U.S. Constitution, the federal law and the

Uniform Code of Military Justice and flows from the President to the

lowest U.S. commander in the field.”

PDD-25 does distinguish between command and operational control. It

states that under some circumstances it may be advantageous to place

U.S. forces under the operational control of a foreign commander and this

will be done if it serves the national interest. Similarly, the United Nations

makes a distinction between overall command, which sovereign states

exercise over their troops, and field command, which the U.N. commander

exercises in issuing operational orders.

However, member states even limit U.N. operational control through

agreements that specify their troops’ area of operation and acceptable

missions. Moreover, commanders of national contingents frequently

contact their national capitals for instructions on whether or how to

execute operational orders given by the U.N. commander. However, in the

two peace operations where respected sovereign member states took the

lead military roles, they provided strong leadership and had the credibility

and respect necessary to effectively control the national contingents

within their command. Several examples help illustrate the limits of U.N.

command and control and the greater control over operations by credible

lead nations.

Congo In the Congo, command and control was at times unclear. At the very

outset of operations, the U.N. force commander’s arrival was delayed and

a general from one of the troop contributing nations declared himself de

facto commander until the force commander arrived. According to U.N.

reports, this was a serious problem and the general had to be replaced

immediately by a U.N. official. In the field, some national contingents

worked outside of the U.N. chain of command. For example, one U.N.

contingent began to disarm elements of the Congolese national force

without authority to do so and had to return the weapons later. Another

contingent was ordered to apprehend mercenaries as authorized by

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Security Council Resolution 169. Nevertheless, the contingent refused to

carry out the order, saying it was beyond the contingent’s mandate.

According to analyses, a lack of unity of purpose existed among the

various troop contributing nations as some nations favored one faction

over another and there was a larger competition between the United

States and the Soviet Union. Each nation tried to gain a political advantage

in Africa and used the Congo to demonstrate it was interested in

decolonization and national sovereignty in Africa. According to expert and

U.N. reports, the lack of clear command and control hampered ONUC and

weakened its effectiveness in carrying out operations.

Somalia The situation in Somalia also illustrates the limits on U.N. command and

control. During operations in 1993, UNOSOM II troop contingents waited for

instructions from their national authorities before following orders from

the U.N. force commander. For example, one contingent did not follow

orders to remain in the capital, Mogadishu. Thus, when fighting erupted in

its sector, other national contingents were at a disadvantage. Further, the

contingent had begun independent negotiations with one of the warring

parties, refused to participate in certain actions in Mogadishu, and then

successfully requested redeployment. In a report to the Security Council,

the Secretary General said the structure of command and control in

UNOSOM II was weakened by the independent actions of some contingent

commanders. Some contingents appeared to act independently of the

directives and orders issued by the force commander.10

Bosnia and NATO Questioning an order also occurs when national contingents might be

endangered or there is doubt about the U.N. commander’s authority. In

Bosnia, such weaknesses limited UNPROFOR’s ability to carry out its

mandates. For example, one troop contingent was ordered to redeploy to

Mostar, where intense fighting was endangering the civilian population.

The troop contingent did not redeploy, saying that the order exceeded

UNPROFOR’s mandate. The issue was raised to higher levels and resulted in

an exchange of letters between the Security Council and the troop

contingent’s government. According to U.N. officials, the Security Council

believed the order to redeploy was a valid part of UNPROFOR’s mandate,

while the troop contingent’s government believed it was an unacceptable

risk and outside of its agreement. These delays and refusals to carry out

orders prevented UNPROFOR from providing security for the area and

limited its ability to deter further conflict.

10Another unit that supported UNOSOM II was the U.S. quick reaction force. Although actions were

coordinated with the U.N. special representative in Somalia, the quick reaction force was not under

U.N. command.

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Operations that NATO carries out face similar issues with command and

control in that member countries retain authority over their troops.

However, NATO has worked on its command and control arrangements for

nearly 50 years. It has an integrated command structure that builds each

participating nation into the command. Moreover, the organizational basis

of NATO has a unity of purpose. It is a military organization intended to

accomplish security objectives. U.N. operations, on the other hand, reflect

the organization’s emphasis on respecting the interests of all members.

The dual chain of command in the U.N.’s Bosnia operation provides a

telling example. In order to launch airstrikes against parties attacking safe

areas in Bosnia, both NATO and the United Nations had to provide

authorization. The United Nations insisted on the “dual key” system

because it had to take into consideration the interests of all member

countries, particularly those on the ground. On several occasions Bosnian

Serbs attacked areas declared safe by the United Nations and NATO

authorized airstrikes to deter the attacks. However, the United Nations

refused to give its own authorization. This refusal led to a loss of

credibility for the mission but preserved the U.N.’s core political concern

of ensuring its own neutrality and taking into account the concerns of

national contingents opposed to the airstrikes.

Haiti Unlike other U.N. operations, the second phase of UNMIH had clear and

effective control of troop contingents. Although UNMIH was a U.N.

operation, the U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) played a central role in

planning operations for both the MNF that preceded UNMIH and the

transition to a U.N. operation. The UNMIH force commander was a U.S.

Major General who reported to the U.N. special representative of the

Secretary General, but for military issues was directly responsible to

USACOM. There was a clear understanding that the Major General was in

command of military decisions. Operational orders were communicated to

all national contingents through a unit of 550 U.S. special forces troops

who had the communications equipment to act as liaisons with national

contingents. Further, about 40 percent of the UNMIH peacekeepers were

U.S. troops, and U.S. contingents were co-located with other national

contingents in key locations such as Port-au-Prince, Cap Haitien, and

Gonaives. The chain of command for military matters was clearly headed

by the U.S. commander, and operational orders were expected to be

carried out.

Eastern Slavonia Command and control of UNTAES is also clear and unambiguous. Both the

U.N. transitional administrator and the force commander are from NATO

member countries and, according to UNTAES officials, national contingents

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participating in UNTAES clearly accept their orders, authority, and control

of operations. The force commander is a Belgian Major General who has

adapted the NATO command and control structure for UNTAES, staffing key

positions on all shifts with Belgian military personnel. This ensures a unity

of command and direct communications links to NATO. The U.N.

transitional administrator is a U.S. foreign service officer, seconded to

UNTAES, who is responsible for political aspects, but leaves military

implementation to the military professionals. For example, unlike

UNPROFOR, which initially required extensive consultation between the

United Nations and NATO prior to close air support, authorization for air

support has been delegated directly to UNTAES and Allied Forces South (the

NATO command carrying out the airstrikes). Although there is technically a

dual-key arrangement, the strategic working relationship between the

commands of UNTAES and Allied Forces South and their uniformity with

NATO procedures makes command and control for air support efficient and

uniform. According to Department of Defense (DOD) officials, this clear

and unambiguous command and control arrangement is possible because

of NATO’s full commitment and support for the operation and because

UNTAES leadership is provided by NATO members.

U.N. Approach to Peace

Operations Limits the

Effective Use of Force

The importance of respecting the sovereignty of member states also

shapes the U.N. approach to conducting peace operations for operations

with objectives requiring the use of force. This limits the effective use of

force when it is needed. The U.N. basic approach to conducting peace

operations is to (1) obtain the consent of the warring parties for the U.N.

action and (2) maintain strict neutrality in carrying out operations.

According to U.N. documents, these principles recognize that a U.N.

operation is an intrusion into the domestic affairs of a nation. Therefore,

even when the use of force is authorized, the U.N. operation tries to obtain

the consent of whatever national authority exists.

In recent years, U.N. member states have debated the dimensions of

consent without agreeing on a doctrine for how consent fits into

operations calling for the use of force. The United Nations recognizes

there are limits to respecting sovereignty, particularly when violations of

human rights occur and national authority has broken down.11 In such

situations, humanitarian intervention to protect civilians and others at risk

11For example, in An Agenda for Peace, the Secretary General stated, “(t)he foundation-stone of this

work is and must remain the State. Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to

any common international progress.” But he also acknowledged that the time of absolute and

exclusive sovereignty had passed and the United Nations had a commitment to address brutal ethnic,

religious, and cultural strife.

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may override concerns of sovereignty and obtaining the consent of all

warring parties is not viable. Another issue advanced by some member

states is that legitimacy rather than consent is the right approach for

operations calling for the use of force. Legitimacy requires, first of all,

international sanction and support, based on a Security Council resolution

that has been debated and agreed upon by the Security Council.

Legitimacy, particularly when national authority has broken down, also

requires that order be firmly restored, rather than obtaining the consent of

all warring factions. Once order is restored, broad support for using force

to maintain order should be sought within the population. Despite these

debates, a U.N. doctrine or a basic approach has not yet been developed

for operations calling for the use of force, and in recent discussions, some

member states stress that all U.N. operations must respect the

fundamental sovereignty of member countries.

In UNMIH and UNTAES, the two instances where respected member states

provided strong military leadership, the member states used their own

doctrines to help guide the operations’ use of force. These doctrines

emphasized security for troops and personnel and the legitimacy of the

operations. In both cases, the approaches stressed that the international

resolutions, based on the overall consent for the operations, gave the

peace operations legitimacy to use force to carry out the mission. The

operations thus did not require the continuing consent of the warring

factions for their actions. Attaining the missions’ objectives was the

primary purpose rather than ensuring respect for sovereignty. This

approach differentiated UNMIH and UNTAES from other U.N. operations

calling for the use of force. Several examples illustrate how relying on

consent has placed limits on the operational effectiveness of U.N.-led

missions calling for the use of force.

Congo During ONUC’s initial phases, operations were carried out only with the

consent of the warring parties. U.N. member states were concerned with

balancing the need to restore order in the Congo with the need to avoid

interfering in its internal affairs. Obtaining consent from the warring

factions led to severe disruptions in building up troop strength and

redistributing forces within the country to carry out the mission’s

mandates. In the province of Katanga, which had broken away from the

rest of the Congo, the United Nations wanted to deploy greater numbers of

troops to restore civil order and expel foreign forces, particularly

European mercenaries who were supporting the Kataganese forces. In

negotiating with the Katanga provincial government, the United Nations

agreed to place troops in restricted locations and subject to a number of

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conditions. As a result, while troop deployment proceeded rapidly to

18,000 in the country, it took 2 years to reach sufficient troop strength in

Katanga. An average of 500 U.N. troops per month were deployed in

Katanga. Consequently, it took 2 years to build up to the authorized troop

strength and delayed the U.N. forces from building a credible presence.

Bosnia In Bosnia, UNPROFOR’s enforcement authority was expanded under 

chapter VII of the U.N. charter (particularly in U.N. Security Resolution

836) to deter attacks against safe areas and provide security for

humanitarian relief convoys. Nevertheless, UNPROFOR continued to

(1) obtain movement clearances for its vehicles from warring factions

before driving from one area to another, (2) acceded to roadblocks that

prevented delivery of both humanitarian aid and equipment and supplies

for its own troops, and (3) allowed warring factions to influence the

deployment of troops along confrontation lines. According to the director

of UNPROFOR’s civil affairs group, operations in Bosnia were carried out as

though it was a peacekeeping mission in which consent was required to

conduct operations, even though new mandates authorized the use of

force in certain situations.

Another example from Bosnia illustrates the U.N.’s emphasis on getting

consent and maintaining the appearance of neutrality even when the use

of force is authorized. During air, missile, and ground attacks on the safe

area of Bihac during November 1994, UNPROFOR tried to negotiate an end to

the bombardment by sending letters to Bosnian Serb authorities. When the

letters did not work, NATO flew numerous reconnaissance missions over

Bihac and pressed for U.N. authorization to launch broad airstrikes against

the Bosnian Serb positions threatening the area. The United Nations

denied authorization. The United Nations also insisted on providing

specific warnings of airstrikes to the offending party and debated with

NATO about providing the parties with the targets selected. NATO officials

believed providing such information was inappropriate and it not only

jeopardized its pilots but also weakened its credibility. Subsequently,

towns surrounding Bihac fell to the Bosnian Serb Army, and five

peacekeepers were wounded and one was killed. Regarding the airstikes,

U.N. officials were concerned that airstrikes would undermine U.N.

neutrality and hinder any cooperation it was receiving from the parties.

U.N. officials were also concerned that airstrikes against one of the

warring parties, even if they were carried out to enforce a Security Council

mandate, were acts of war, not peacekeeping, and had no place in a U.N.

mission. The Secretary General also said that airstrikes were not used

partly because of U.N. doctrine and partly because he was concerned

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about possible retaliation against UNPROFOR’s other ground forces

throughout Bosnia and Croatia. Military observers, civilian personnel, and

hundreds of peacekeepers from several nations were taken hostage or

detained during certain periods when U.N. action was being contemplated.

Somalia Somalia provides a similar example of how obtaining consent can limit

enforcement operations. Although UNOSOM II was authorized to use force

to achieve disarmament and the U.N. Secretary General regarded

disarmament as crucial for the overall success of the mission, UNOSOM II

initially sought to act with the consent of the parties. UNOSOM relied on the

warring factions to voluntarily disarm and store their weapons in areas

under their control. To verify compliance, UNOSOM provided the factions

with written notice of planned inspections of weapons storage sites.

Emphasizing the importance of cooperation and consent over effective

enforcement, debates within UNOSOM II focussed not on whether written

notice should be provided, but how much warning time should be given to

the factions before inspections. By mid-1993, the Secretary General

realized that requiring the consent and cooperation of the parties was

ineffective and inappropriate.

Haiti In contrast to other U.N. operations that relied on consent as the principal

operating approach in the field, the second phase of UNMIH (1995-96) used

the U.S. doctrine for operations other than war to help guide field

operations. The U.S. doctrine is based on six principles: (1) implementing

explicitly defined objectives, (2) emphasizing unity of effort, (3) ensuring

adequate security for itself, (4) exercising restraint, (5) being perserverant,

and (6) ensuring legitimacy. Under this doctrine, consent was an

important element in ensuring the legitimacy of UNMIH and the consent of

Haitian government authorities was obtained before the second phase of

operations began. But once there was consent on UNMIH’s mandate,

operations proceeded with vigor and certainty rather than by negotiation.

Moreover, legitimacy was only one portion of the doctrine. The second

phase of UNMIH also stressed security by retaining military, political, and

informational advantage over potential warring parties. UNMIH also adopted

robust rules of engagement that allowed it to be proactive and to take the

initiative in using force beyond self-defense. For example, in ensuring a

secure environment, UNMIH used roadblocks and searches and actively

disarmed Haitians in certain situations. UNMIH’s quick reaction force also

acted promptly and proactively to disturbances in November 1995.

Eastern Slavonia The Eastern Slavonia operation was authorized after Croatia and the local

Serb population requested the United Nations to implement the basic

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B-259387 

agreement to demilitarize and peacefully transfer the area from Serb to

Croatian control. However, once consent was obtained in the basic

agreement, UNTAES adopted NATO doctrine and rules of engagement to carry

out the operation. Under this doctrine, developed for the Implementation

Force in Bosnia,12 force protection and legitimacy are fundamental tenets.

Consent of the parties on the ground, as well as agreement from Serbia

and Croatia, was important in legitimizing the mission. However, consent

was obtained to use force if necessary to carry out the mandate. Thus

operations on the ground are carried out forcefully if necessary. On

several occassions, UNTAES made it clear that it would be reasonable in

implementing operations, but also that force would be used when needed.

For example, when the Scorpion paramilitary unit occupied oil fields in

Eastern Slavonia, UNTAES first expressed its concern and told the

paramilitary unit to withdraw. When it did not withdraw, an armored unit

was sent directly to the area and forced it to disperse.

Conclusion The United Nations has successfully led peacekeeping missions as part of

its mandate under the U.N. charter. However, its record in effectively

carrying out operations requiring the use of force has been less

noteworthy. This is due, in part, to several limitations of the organization:

the United Nations must rely on sovereign member states to volunteer the

means for carrying out missions; U.N. force commanders cannot always be

sure that orders will be carried out; and the U.N.’s core principles of

neutrality, impartiality, and seeking consent of warring parties have

limited effective action to restore peace. In Somalia, the former

Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Lebanon, and the Congo, U.N. missions had

operational problems because they lacked the necessary resources, did

not have an effective command and control structure, and did not have an

approach appropriate to conducting operations calling for the use of force.

However, in the cases of Haiti and Eastern Slavonia, the limitations were

overcome. In these situations, the prestige and credibility of the nations’

leading the operations and the assurance of adequate forces made it

possible to conduct effective operations, with all parties assured that force

would be used if necessary.

Given its limitations in leading operations requiring the use of force, the

United Nations may not be an appropriate vehicle for heading missions

where force is required to restore peace and order if vital U.S. national

interests are at stake, unless a nation or coalition with sufficient military

12The Implementation Force (IFOR) was the NATO operation that replaced UNPROFOR. IFOR’s

mission was to implement provisions of the peace settlement for Bosnia, also known as the Dayton

Accords. IFOR was authorized by the United Nations but has no U.N. involvement.

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B-259387 

capability and commitment leads the operation. In missions that do not

involve vital national interests but call for the use of force, the United

Nations will most likely still confront fundamental limitations as an

effective lead organization. Nonetheless, U.N. missions may still be an

appropriate vehicle in such situations. They can assist in the provision of

humanitarian relief, signal the international community’s concern, and

demonstrate a willingness to provide some level of support.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

The Department of State and DOD commented on a draft of this report. The

State Department generally concurred with the conclusions of the report.

DOD agreed with the conclusion of the report that, given its limitations, the

United Nations may not be an appropriate vehicle for heading missions

where force is required to restore peace if vital U.S. national interests are

at stake, unless a nation or coalition with sufficient military capability and

commitment leads the operation.

DOD further commented that the causal factors of success or failure are

many and diverse and indicated that geopolitical and other contextual

variables had affected the execution of the missions requiring the use of

force that were executed over nearly four decades. Moreover, DOD stated

that U.N. capabilities to carry out such operations are a function, in part,

of the organization’s institutional structure and the commitment of

member states. Finally, DOD indicated that lessons had been learned from

peace operations over the past few years and that as a result a more

effective approach to conducting peace operations had been developed by

the United Nations and member states.

We agree, and have previously indicated that geopolitical factors and a

variety of operational variables may affect the degree of success or failure

attributed to any specific U.N. operation.13 However, our analysis indicates

that missions requiring the use of force and led by the United Nations have

consistently had in common the three limiting factors we discuss in this

report. Moreover, our research led us to conclude that even if the specific

geopolitical and operational variables were to have been addressed for

each mission, the limitations discussed in this report would have

remained, thus placing at risk the missions’ success. This brought into

question whether the United Nations could be an effective vehicle for

implementing missions requiring the use of force. Clearly the factors we

point to—resources, command and control, and overall

13For example, in U.N. Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Recent Missions (GAO/NSIAD-94-9, Dec. 29,

1993), we discussed political feasibility and the importance of a comprehensive political framework.

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approach—weakened the day-to-day conduct of the operations and

compromised the U.N.’s ability to respond to the field challenges. The

impacts on operations are documented in U.N. reports and our prior

reports and are recognized in U.N. Security Council resolutions. We agree

with DOD’s comments that these factors are a function of the U.N.’s

institutional structure and member states’ commitment. As stated in our

report, the United Nations is at its core a political body of individual

members and not an organization that has independent resources and

power of its own.

Our review indicated that the United Nations and member states have

learned from recent missions that call for the use of force. We have

attempted to reflect this in the report, particularly in our discussion of the

decisions that were taken regarding the structure of the operation in

Eastern Slavonia. However, we believe that the fundamental lesson

learned is reflected in State’s and DOD’s concurrence that the United

Nations may not be the appropriate organization to undertake peace

operations requiring the use of force.

The Department of State and DOD provided technical comments, which we

have incorporated into the report as appropriate.

Scope and

Methodology

To assess the U.N.’s operational effectiveness and limitations in

undertaking peace missions, we analyzed the mandates of all U.N. peace

operations, reviewed Secretary General and field mission reports on these

operations, and synthesized information and analyses of our past reports

of these missions. Over the past few years, we have also conducted field

study at numerous peace missions while they were in operation, such as

those in Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Haiti, Rwanda, northern Iraq,

Cambodia, the Sinai, Cyprus, El Salvador, Honduras, and Syria. At these

peace missions, we observed operations and obtained data on casualties,

troop deployment, and civilian activities; situation reports; standing orders

for both civilian and military peacekeepers; force commander operations

orders; faxes and cables on operations; and other documentation. We also

interviewed U.N. officials and military observers, peacekeepers,

contingent commanders, and civilian staff from a full range of

participating countries in every region. From these interviews, we

obtained valuable international perspectives on peacekeeping and peace

enforcement. Among the officials we interviewed were the special

representatives of the Secretary General and the force commanders for the

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B-259387 

operations in Haiti, the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, and

Cambodia.

To obtain the U.N.’s perspective on the effectiveness of its peace

operations, we received from the U.N. Secretariat, official reports on

operations, operating procedures, manuals, budgetary documents, and

policy and planning documents. We also interviewed officials from the

U.N. Departments of Peacekeeping Operations, Administration and

Management, Humanitarian Affairs, and Political Affairs and the Office of

Legal Affairs. Among the officials we interviewed were the under

secretaries general of these departments and the professional line staff in

the offices implementing operations. For several of the missions, we were

updated by the U.N. Observation Center, which provides 24-hour coverage

of all U.N. peace operations.

Since refugee and humanitarian operations are such an important part of

peacekeeping and peace enforcement, we obtained detailed reports and

operational documents from the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees

(UNHCR) and interviewed UNHCR officials both in Geneva, Switzerland, and

in the field at several of the missions. We also spoke with officials and

representatives of many human rights and humanitarian organizations

both in the field and at their headquarters. Some of these included the

International Red Cross and Red Crescent, the International Committee

for the Red Cross, Human Rights Watch, the International Organization for

Migration, Doctors Without Borders, and the International Rescue

Committee.

To obtain U.S. perspectives on U.N. peacekeeping and enforcement

operations, we conducted work at DOD, the Departments of State and

Justice; the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); the U.S.

Mission to the United Nations; and the U.S. Mission to NATO. Some of the

State and USAID locations where we conducted work were Washington,

D.C.; New York, N.Y.; London, England; Paris, France; Brussels, Belgium;

Thailand; Cambodia; Israel; Egypt; Cyprus; El Salvador; Haiti; Croatia;

Bosnia; and Rwanda. We also conducted work at DOD locations, including

Washington, D.C.; the European Command in Stuttgary, Germany; and the

Atlantic Command in Newport, Virginia.

From the U.S. agencies, we obtained their regulations, doctrine, and

manuals on the conduct of peace operations; their situation reports on the

countries where peace operations were ongoing; their reports of the

security and political situations; and cables on the U.N. peace operations.

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We observed interagency working groups on several of the missions and

received security and political briefings from the agencies. We also

interviewed officials from the U.S. Departments of Defense and State,

USAID, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, and the U.S. Mission to

NATO about specific peace operations and obtained their perspectives and

analysis on the conduct of operations.

We also sought the views and opinions of scholars and researchers and

obtained comments on a draft of this report from those at the Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace, Thomas J. Watson, Jr., Institute for

International Studies, and the Henry L. Stimson Center, which we have

taken into consideration in finalizing this report.

We performed our review in accordance with generally accepted

government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking

Minority Members of the House and Senate Committees on

Appropriations, House Committee on National Security, and Senate

Committee on Armed Services. We are also sending copies to the

Secretaries of State and Defense, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the

United Nations, and the U.N. Secretary General. We will also make copies

available to others upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-4128 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in

appendix VI.

Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director

International Relations and Trade Issues

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-97-34 United Nations
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

U.N.’s Use of Force:

Its Basis in the U.N.

Charter

26

Appendix II 

United Nations Has

Precedent for Leading

Peacekeeping

31

Appendix III 

U.N. Experience in

the Use of Force

36

Appendix IV 

Comments From the

Department of State

51

Appendix V 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

52

Appendix VI 

Major Contributors to

This Report

54

Related GAO Products 55

Tables Table II.1: U.N. Peacekeeping and Other Peace Missions Since

1948

31

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-97-34 United Nations
Contents

Table II.2: U.N. Security Council Resolutions Authorizing Member

State Action

35

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

IFOR Implementation Force

MNF multinational force

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

ONUC U.N. Operation in the Congo

PDD-25 Presidential Decision Directive-25

PLO Palestinian Liberation Organization

RPF Rwanda Patriotic Front

UNAMIR U.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda

UNHCR U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees

UNIFIL U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon

UNITAF Unified Task Force

UNMIH U.N. Mission in Haiti

UNOSOM U.N. Operation in Somalia

UNPROFOR U.N. Protection Force (Bosnia)

UNTAES U.N. Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja

and Western Sirmium

USACOM United States Atlantic Command

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-97-34 United Nations
Appendix I 

U.N.’s Use of Force: Its Basis in the U.N.

Charter

The history of the United Nations shows that its founders intended the

world organization to be an effective instrument in maintaining world

security. The U.N.’s first purpose, as set forth in its charter, is to maintain

international peace and security and to collectively prevent aggression and

threats to peace. This fundamental purpose was born out of the

destructiveness of World War II and the determination by the allied forces

to construct an international organization capable of preventing further

wars. After conferences among the major powers in Cairo and Yalta, the

Prime Ministers expressed a common sentiment: “We affirm that after the

war a world organization to maintain peace and security should be set up

and endowed with the necessary power and authority to prevent

aggression and violence.”1

The U.N. charter sets forth the organization’s principles and builds further

the foundation for U.N. action to restore peace. Article 2(3), states that “all

members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in

such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not

endangered.” Expanding on this principle, article 2(4) states that “all

members shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial

integrity or political independence of any state. . . .” Article 24 gives the

U.N. Security Council primary responsibility to maintain peace and

security and authority to act on behalf of the other member states. Finally,

article 25 obligates member states to accept and carry out the decisions of

the Security Council.

With the foundation for forceful U.N. action, chapter VII of the U.N.

charter (articles 39-51) lays out the implementing framework and member

states’ obligations.2

 The Security Council can call upon U.N. member

states to impose complete or partial interruption of economic relations,

travel, and communication with nations endangering peace, or, under

article 42, may itself “take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be

necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.” Article

43 obligates member states to “undertake to make available to the Security

Council, on its call and in accordance with an agreement or agreements,

armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage,

necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and

security.” These agreements on the number and types of forces to be

1

Quoted from The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, ed. Bruno Simma (New York: Oxford

University Press, 1994), p. 8.

2

In chapter VI (articles 33-38) of the U.N. charter, measures are set forth to peacefully resolve disputes

likely to endanger international security, including mediation, arbitration, and investigation by the

United Nations. Although peacekeeping is not mentioned in the charter, chapter VI provides the basis

for U.N. peace operations not involving enforcement.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-97-34 United Nations
Appendix I 

U.N.’s Use of Force: Its Basis in the U.N.

Charter

provided “shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the

Security Council.” Any such agreement is subject to the constitutional

procedures of the contributing member state. Chapter VII of the U.N.

charter further establishes a military staff committee, composed of the

chiefs of staff of the five permanent members, to assist the Security

Council in planning and determining the strategic direction of U.N.

military action.

To date, no nation has ever arranged to provide armed forces to the United

Nations as called for under article 43. In 1946, an attempt was made to

establish ground rules for contributing military forces and armaments to

the Security Council, designating where the forces should be garrisoned,

setting a time limit for committing U.N. forces to an enforcement action,

and specifying what base facilities should be made available. This attempt

failed because of disagreement between the Soviet Union and the four

other permanent members of the Security Council and among the allies

themselves.

During ratification of the charter, U.S. Senators clearly recognized the

power potentially authorized to the United Nations to undertake peace

enforcement. According to Congressional Records at the time, one Senator

commented that article 43 was an “innovation in international law. . . .

Unlike the League of Nations, here is something that has teeth to keep the

peace of the world.”3

 Another Senator noted that “collective action to curb

the aggressor seems to be the only answer to this problem.”4

Nonetheless, the U.S. Congress expressed reservations about ceding

control of military forces to the United Nations. These concerns were

expressed in the U.N. Participation Act of 1945 as amended, and in the

debate about ratifying the U.N. charter. The U.N. Participation Act

authorizes the President to negotiate article 43 agreements with the United

Nations but expressly reserves approval to Congress. The act further

states that with regard to article 43, nothing within the act “shall be

construed as an authorization to make available to the Security Council for

such purpose armed forces, facilities, or assistance . . . .” The act also

prohibits the President from employing the armed forces under chapter VII

of the U.N. charter without prior congressional consent. In addition, it

limits other U.S. participation to 1,000 U.S. armed forces personnel.

3

Congressional Record (Vol. 91, S8021, 1945).

4

Congressional Record (Vol. 91, H7958, 1945).

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-97-34 United Nations
Appendix I 

U.N.’s Use of Force: Its Basis in the U.N.

Charter

Nations Insisted on

Autonomous Role

Although the U.N. charter gives the Security Council a central role in

maintaining international security, it also formally recognizes the inherent

right of individual and collective self-defense outside of the United

Nations. According to reports of the founding conferences, article 51 of

the U.N. charter (right of individual and collective self-defense) and

chapter VIII (Regional Arrangements, articles 52-54) were drafted to

address nations’ concerns that enforcement authority was too

concentrated in the Security Council.5

 The underlying debate reflected the

desire for a world body capable of maintaining peace versus the interests

of nations to retain power in their geographic regions. Article 51, for

example, explicitly recognizes the legitimate role of individual nations and

groupings in maintaining security.6

 It also recognizes the “inherent right of

individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a

Member of the United Nations.”

Numerous defense alliances have used article 51 to legitimize their

collective security outside the formal U.N. framework, and nations have

relied on it to justify their independent enforcement actions.7

 For example,

the North Atlantic Treaty states that an attack on any member of the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) shall be considered an attack against

all. The treaty further commits its members, acting under article 51 of the

U.N. charter, to take all measures, including the use of armed force to

restore the security of the North Atlantic area. Other security

arrangements, including the Western European Union, the South-East Asia

Collective Defense Treaty, and the Mutual Defense Treaty between the

5

For example, according to a State Department report, the Latin American and Arab states desired that

regional autonomy be preserved; the Soviet Union and the United States did not want a United Nations

dictating action in their spheres of influence, and smaller states generally expressed uneasiness over

the power of the Security Council.

6

In drafting the charter, national representatives recognized the necessity of individual or collective

response outside of the U.N. framework if a member state was attacked but a permanent member

vetoed Security Council action. Additionally, Latin American nations and others advocated the need

for autonomous collective action through regional security arrangements. Inclusion of the term

“collective” self-defense was to legitimize security arrangements in the Americas under the Act of

Chapultapec, which declared that an act of aggression against one American state shall be considered

an act of aggression against all. (U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin No. 297 [Mar. 3, 1945], p. 297.

7

Writing 12 years ago, Oscar Schachter went even further, stating, “We are bound to conclude that the

collective security system of the U.N. Charter has now been largely replaced by fragmented collective

defense actions and alliances founded on article 51.” Oscar Schachter, “The Right of States to Use

Armed Force,” Michigan Law Review, v. 82 (April/May 1984), pp. 1620-46. According to Schachter in

1996, there is now greater hope for the United Nations as a collective security system, but such a

system would certainly not be a panacea.

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-97-34 United Nations
Appendix I 

U.N.’s Use of Force: Its Basis in the U.N.

Charter

United States and Korea, rely on article 51 as a legal basis for their

collective security arrangements.8

Nations also broadly cite article 51 to legitimize the use of force outside

the formal U.N. framework. For example, in 1978, Uganda and Tanzania

made sustained attacks against each other along their common border,

justifying the inherent right of self-defense under article 51. Between

October 12 and 29, Uganda claimed it had repulsed Tanzania and

proceeded to capture several hundred square miles of Tanzania. Tanzania

waged retaliatory attacks and intervened in Uganda, claiming its action

was an act of self-defense under article 51 of the U.N. charter. These uses

of force took place outside of the U.N. apparatus but justified actions

based on the U.N. charter. Similarly, U.S. action in Grenada and Panama

were justified partly on the right of self-defense.

Chapter VIII of the U.N. charter explicitly recognizes the role of regional

organizations within the U.N. framework of collective security. Article 52

states that nothing precludes regional arrangements for dealing with the

maintenance of international peace and security as appropriate for

regional action, provided the actions taken are consistent with the U.N.

charter. Article 53 continues: “The Security Council shall, where

appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for

enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be

taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the

authorization of the Security Council.”

Although the U.N. charter authorizes regional organizations to help

maintain international security within the U.N. framework, they can also

act autonomously under article 51. For example, the League of Arab

States, a regional organization with observer status at the United Nations,

asserts that armed aggression directed against one of its members is

directed against them all. The members are to undertake all means

available, including armed force, to repel the aggression. In its Treaty of

Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation, the League cites article 51 of

the U.N. charter and the right of legal defense as its standards. Other

regional organizations, such as the Organization of American States, the

Organization of African Unity, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the

Commonwealth of Independent States, and the Economic Community of

West African States, have similar arrangements.

8

Considerably more security arrangements, both active and defunct, cited article 51 of the U.N. charter

to legitimize their security arrangements. These treaties, such as the Australia, New Zealand, United

States Security Treaty; the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance; and the Gulf

Cooperation Council are all justified explicitly or implicitly on the basis of article 51.

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-97-34 United Nations
Appendix I 

U.N.’s Use of Force: Its Basis in the U.N.

Charter

Regional organizations have also undertaken independent initiatives under

article 51. For example, in August 1990, the Economic Community of West

African States sent a monitoring force to Liberia to help bring about a

cease-fire in its civil war. Fighting had begun in 1989 when Liberia’s

National Patriotic Liberation Front launched an attack against the forces

of the President of Liberia; by August 1990, a third party, the United

Liberation Movement of Liberia, entered the fight. In subsequent fighting,

over 150,000 civilians were killed, 700,000 became refugees, neighboring

Sierra Leone was used as a rebel base and invaded by one of the factions,

and the peacekeeping force became involved in enforcement measures

against the warring factions. The Security Council was not consulted nor

had it approved the peacekeeping action before it took place. Nonetheless,

in January 1991, the President of the Security Council commended the

peacekeeping action, and in November 1992 the Security Council passed

its first resolution in support of the Economic Community of West African

States.

Regional organizations have also cooperated with the United Nations in

peacekeeping and other operations. Subsequently, the Security Council

and General Assembly have passed several resolutions encouraging

further cooperation with regional organizations to undertake

peacekeeping and other operations.

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-97-34 United Nations
Appendix II 

United Nations Has Precedent for Leading

Peacekeeping

From its inception in 1945, the United Nations has led peacekeeping

operations to help maintain international order. In 1946, military observers

attached to a field mission established by the Security Council investigated

allegations by Greece that neighboring states were making cross-border

incursions. From 1948 to March 1997, the United Nations led 42 peace

operations—34 peacekeeping, 4 authorized in whole or in part under

chapter VII of the U.N. charter, and 4 where the mandates implied force

was to be used to conduct operations. According to U.N. documents, over

750,000 military, civilian, and police personnel have participated in these

missions. Table II.1 lists the peacekeeping and other missions led by the

United Nations since 1948.

Table II.1: U.N. Peacekeeping and Other Peace Missions Since 1948

Mission Location Years

Mandate and key U.N. authorizing

documents

The following are Peacekeeping missions (consent of parties; force authorized only in self-defense)

U.N. Trace Supervision Organization Palestine 1948-ongoing Supervise observance of truce in Palestine

and various ceasefires. (Security Council

Resolutions—S/Res/50, 73, 101, 236, 339)

U.N. Military Observer Group in India and

Pakistan

India/Pakistan 1949-ongoing Supervise observance of ceasefires and

agreements. (S/Res/47, 91, 201)

U.N. Emergency Force I Egypt/Israel 1956-67 Secure and supervise ceasefire. (General

Assembly Resolutions GA 998, 1000, 1001,

1125)

U.N. Observation Group in Lebanon Lebanon 1958-58 Ensure no illegal infiltration of arms and

personnel across Lebanese border.

(S/Res/128)

U.N. Security Force in West Guinea Indonesia 1962-63 Monitor ceasefire and help ensure order

under U.N. supervised transfer of national

administration from Netherlands to

Indonesia. (GA 1752)

U.N. Yemen Observation Mission Yemen 1963-64 Observe disengagement between

Saudi-Arabia and Yemen. (S/Res/179)

U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus Cyprus 1964-ongoing Use best efforts to prevent recurrence of

fighting and contribute to maintenance and

restoration of law and order; supervise

ceasefire. (S/Res/186; Aide-memoire of the

Secretary General S/5653)

U.N. India Pakistan Observer Mission India/Pakistan 1965-66 Supervise ceasefire. (S/Res/211)

Mission of the Representative of the

Secretary General in the Dominican Republic

Dominican Republic 1965-66 Observe and report on violations of

ceasefire among warring parties.

(S/Res/203)

(continued)

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-97-34 United Nations
Appendix II 

United Nations Has Precedent for Leading

Peacekeeping

Mission Location Years

Mandate and key U.N. authorizing

documents

U.N. Emergency Force II Egypt/Israel 1973-79 Supervise implementation of ceasefire and

redeployment of forces. Use best efforts to

prevent recurrence of fighting. (S/Res/340

and 341; Secretary General

Report—S/11052 Rev.1)

U.N. Disengagement Observer Force Israel/Syria 1974-ongoing Use best efforts to maintain ceasefire and

its observance. (S/Res/350; S/11302/ADD.1)

U.N. Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan

and Pakistan

Afghanistan/

Pakistan

1988-90 Assist personal representative of the

Secretary General in ensuring

implementation of agreements. (S/Res/622,

647)

U.N. Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group Iran/Iraq 1988-91 Verify, confirm, supervise ceasefire and

withdrawal of forces. (S/Res/598, 619, 631,

642, 651)

U.N. Transition Assistance Group Namibia (Angola,

Cuba, South Africa)

1989-90 Help ensure cessation of hostilities, troop

confinement to bases; supervise and

ensure conditions for free and fair elections.

(S/Res/435, 632)

U.N. Angola Verification Mission I Angola 1989-91 Verify redeployment and withdrawal of

Cuban troops. (S/Res/626)

U.N. Observer Group in Central America Central America 1989-92 Verify agreement to cease arms and troop

infiltration. Facilitate voluntary

demobilization of Nicaraguan Contras.

(S/Res/644, 650, 653)

U.N. Advance Mission in Cambodia Cambodia 1991-92 Assist parties to maintain ceasefire.

(S/Res/717, 728)

U.N. Angola Verification Mission II Angola 1991-95 Verify and monitor ceasefire; observe and

monitor electoral process and elections.

(S/Res/696, 747)

U.N. Observer Mission in El Salvador El Salvador 1991-95 Monitor, observe, and verify all aspects of

agreements—human rights, cessation of

armed conflict, and security situation, and

elections. (S/Res/693, 729, 832)

U.N. Mission for the Referendum in Western

Sahara

Western Sahara 1991-ongoing Monitor and verify ceasefire, demobilization,

prisoner exchanges; organize and ensure

free and fair referendum. (S/Res/690, 907)

U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia Cambodia 1992-93 Ensure implementation of Comprehensive

Political Agreement; organize free and fair

elections; oversee disarmament,

reconstruction, repatriation, and control of

government. (S/Res/745, 860, 880)

U.N. Operation in Somalia I Somalia 1992-93 Monitor the agreed ceasefire, provide

security for humanitarian relief operations,

and assist in establishing security.

(S/Res/751, 775, 794)

(continued)

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-97-34 United Nations
Appendix II 

United Nations Has Precedent for Leading

Peacekeeping

Mission Location Years

Mandate and key U.N. authorizing

documents

U.N. Operation in Mozambique Mozambique 1992-94 Help implement peace plan, including

monitoring and verifying the ceasefire and

demobilization of troops, monitoring

elections, and help in the provision of

humanitarian aid. (S/Res/797, 850, 879, 957)

U.N. Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda Ugandan side

of the border

1993-94 Monitor/verify that no military assistance

crosses Rwanda-Uganda border.

(S/Res/846, 872, 891, 928)

U.N. Mission in Haiti—initial phase Haiti 1993-96 Help implement provisions of the

Governor’s Island agreement; assist in

modernizing armed and police forces

(S/Res/867, 905, 933)

U.N. Observer Mission in Georgia Georgia 1993-ongoing Monitor and verify implementation of

ceasefire agreement and observe situation;

act as liaison with ongoing CIS peace

missions. (S/Res/849, 854, 858, 881)

U.N. Observer Mission in Liberia Liberia 1993-ongoing Monitor peace agreement in cooperation

with ECOWAS peace operation. (S/Res/866,

911, 950, 972)

U.N. Aouzou Strip Observer Group Chad 1994-94 Verify withdrawal of Libyan forces from

Aouzou Strip between Libya and Chad.

(S/Res/915)

U.N. Mission of Observers in Tajikistan Tajikistan 1994-ongoing Assist in monitoring the implementation of

the ceasefire and cessation of hostile acts

and act as liaison with ongoing peace

operations. (S/Res/968, 999, 1030, 1061)

U.N. Angola Verification Mission III Angola 1995-ongoing Assist in compliance of the Lusaka Protocol,

including ceasefire and humanitarian

assistance. (S/Res/976, 1008, 1045)

U.N. Preventive Deployment Force Macedonia 1995-ongoing Monitor and report on situation in border

area. (S/Res/983, 1027, 1046)

U.N. Confidence Restoration Operations in

Croatia

Croatia 1995-ongoing Assist in implementation of ceasefire

agreement between Croatia and Serbia and

controlling movement over Croatia’s

international borders. (S/Res/981, 990)

U.N. Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosnia and

Herzegovina

1995-ongoing Assist and monitor law enforcement

activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(S/Res/1035)

U.N. Mission of Observers in the Prevlaka Croatia 1996-ongoing Observe and monitor situation along a

narrow strip of land separating Croatia and

Bosnia. (S/Res/1038)

U.N. Special Mission in Haiti Haiti 1996-ongoing Assist the government of Haiti in

maintaining a secure environment and

professionalizing the civilian police.

(S/Res/1063; S/1996/813)

(continued)

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-97-34 United Nations
Appendix II 

United Nations Has Precedent for Leading

Peacekeeping

Mission Location Years

Mandate and key U.N. authorizing

documents

The following missions have mandates with objectives requiring some measure of force to be accomplished.

U.N. Operations in the Congo Congo

(now Zaire)

1960-64 Take necessary steps to provide

government of Congo with military

assistance in fulfilling their tasks. Use

requisite measure of force, if necessary, to

apprehend, detain, and deport all foreign

military and paramilitary personnel.

(S/Res/143, 145, 146, 169)

U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) Lebanon 1978-ongoing Confirm withdrawal of Israeli forces; restore

international security; assist government of

Lebanon regain authority. Use best efforts

to prevent recurrence of fighting and ensure

area of operation is not used for hostile

activity of any kind. Control movement and

take all measures to assure the effective

restoration of Lebanese sovereignty.

(S/Res/425, 426; S/12611)

U.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda Rwanda 1993-96 Contribute to the security of Kigali; monitor

ceasefire agreement. Assist in humanitarian

relief. Contribute to security and protection

of refugees and civilians at risk; establish

secure humanitarian areas, where feasible;

provide security for humanitarian relief

operations. (S/Res/872, 918, 925)

U.N. Mission in Haiti—second phase Haiti 1995-96 Assist in sustaining the secure and stable

environment; protect international personnel

and installations, and professionalize armed

forces and police. (S/Res/940, 975)

The following missions were authorized under chapter VII to use force to carry out some objectives.

U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission Iraq-Kuwait 1991-ongoing Observe and, by its presence, deter

violations of demilitarized zone. Take

physical action to prevent or redress

small-scale violations of DMZ. (S/Res/687,

806)

U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) Former Yugoslavia

(Bosnia)

1992-95 Provide security for humanitarian relief;

deter attacks against 6 safe areas, using air

power from regional organizations, if

necessary. (S/Res/764, 776, 836)

U.N. Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM) Somalia 1993-95 Use enforcement measures to ensure a

secure environment, disarm the warring

factions, and ensure the delivery of

humanitarian aid, and assist in rebuilding

Somali institutions. (S/Res/814)

U.N. Transitional Administration for Eastern

Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium

(UNTAES)

Eastern Slavonia 1996-ongoing Supervise demilitarization of Eastern

Slavonia and organize elections.

(S/Res/1037, 1043)

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-97-34 United Nations
Appendix II 

United Nations Has Precedent for Leading

Peacekeeping

The U.N. Security Council has authorized member states or coalitions to

lead several actions where the use of force, embargo, or sanctions were

authorized. Table II.2 lists several important actions.

Table II.2: U.N. Security Council Resolutions Authorizing Member State Action

Location and initial

date Leader and action

Main Security

Council resolutions

Korea 1950 U.S.-led coalition defended South Korea against invasion by North Korea. S/Res/83, 84, 85

Rhodesia 1965 British naval vessels imposed embargo and prevented ships from unloading oil in

Rhodesia.

S/Res/217, 232, 253

South Africa 1977 All states impose arms and economic embargo International economic embargo without

specific leadership.

S/Res/418

Iraq 1990 All states impose economic embargo on Iraq and Iraq forces in Kuwait; impose air and

maritime embargo. U.S.-led coalition enforced Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait.

S/Res/661, 665,

670, 678

Iraq 1991 U.S.-led coalition undertook humanitarian intervention (Operation Provide Comfort) to

ensure security for Kurds in Iraq. Imposed a no-fly zone.

S/Res/688

Former Yugoslavia

1991

NATO countries lead a maritime, arms, and economic embargo on Serbia and

Montenegro.

S/Res/757, 787

Libya 1992 All states impose economic sanctions on Libya. S/Res/742

Rwanda 1992, 1994 International community imposes arms embargo on Rwanda. France uses all necessary

means to protect safe areas and provide humanitarian relief.

S/Res/918, 929

Somalia 1992-1993 All states impose and arms embargo on Somalia. U.S.-led coalition uses all means

necessary to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief.

S/Res/733, 794

Liberia 1992 All states impose a weapons embargo on Liberia. S/Res/788

Bosnia 1993 NATO enforces no-fly zone; and uses air power, with U.N. concurrence, to deter attacks

against safe areas.

S/Res/816, 824

Haiti 1993, 1994 United States imposes maritime embargo against Haiti; leads multinational force to

restore rightful authority to Haiti and provide secure environment.

S/Res/841, 873,

875, 917, 940

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-97-34 United Nations
Appendix III 

U.N. Experience in the Use of Force

This appendix provides information on U.N. peace missions in Somalia,

the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Lebanon, the Congo, and Haiti.

Somalia The United Nations established UNOSOM I in April 1992, in response to civil

war and the death of an estimated 500,000 Somalis. UNOSOM I was

authorized to monitor a cease-fire, which had been negotiated among

Somalia’s warring clans, and escort relief convoys to feed the starving

population. Within months, however, the U.N. Secretary General

concluded that clan leaders were using force and the threat of force to

prevent UNOSOM’s deployment—only 564 of the authorized level of 4,219

troops had been allowed into Somalia by the end of 1992.

Accordingly, in December 1992, the United Nations authorized a U.S.-led

mission, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), under chapter VII of the U.N.

charter, to create a secure environment for the humanitarian relief effort.

With 37,000 troops, UNITAF opened the airport and seaport, repaired roads

and airfields, and protected international agencies and nongovernment

organizations. The Secretary General reported in January 1993 that UNITAF

had escorted convoys delivering 25,000 tons of food. UNITAF also undertook

limited disarmament by banning and confiscating heavy weapons and

arms in its area of operations. However, UNITAF was deployed only in

central and southern Somalia. Although UNITAF relied for the most part on

a credible show of force to achieve its objective, it responded aggressively

to occasional incidents of armed opposition. For example, when one

faction violated the cease-fire by attacking another faction, UNITAF

destroyed the heavy weapons of the aggressor and forced the faction to

withdraw. In another incident, Nigerian forces under UNITAF repelled an

attack by militias in Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu.

The United Nations resumed leadership of operations in May 1993 with

UNOSOM II. UNOSOM II was authorized under chapter VII to establish a secure

environment throughout Somalia, disarm warring factions, assist in

political reconciliation, and foster social and economic reconstruction. Its

authorized troop level was 28,000 and, in addition, the United States

provided a quick reaction force.

However, in transferring the mission from U.S. command to U.N.

command, there were unresolved issues: the United States and United

Nations did not agree on (1) the meaning of UNITAF’s mandate, (2) the

criteria for its withdrawal, or (3) the timing of the transition. The Secretary

General expected UNITAF to create a secure environment throughout

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-97-34 United Nations
Appendix III 

U.N. Experience in the Use of Force

Somalia by “neutralizing heavy weapons, disarming irregular forces and

gangs, and inducing individuals to hand in their weapons.” However,

UNITAF did not interpret its mandate as including coercive or large-scale

disarmament of the Somali factions. Also, UNITAF established security not

throughout the country, but only in the hardest-hit areas of central and

southern Somalia. In regard to timing, the United States expected UNITAF to

be a quick turnaround operation, with a U.N. takeover immediately as

UNITAF withdrew. The Secretary General expected the transition to be

gradual—but by the date of the transfer—May 4, 1993—most of the U.S.

troops and senior civilian personnel had already been withdrawn.

Resource Constraints Although UNOSOM II had a broader mandate than UNITAF in providing a

secure environment and disarming the warring parties throughout the

country, it was authorized 25 percent fewer troops. By July 1993, only

20,000 of the 28,000 authorized troops had been deployed. It was not until

October 1993—6 months after UNOSOM II’s mandate had been

approved—that full troop strength was reached. Furthermore, some

contingents did not have armored personnel carriers and radio equipment

capable of communicating directly with other contingents.

As a result, on June 5, 1993, barely 1 month after the transition, UNOSOM II

troops were unable to respond adequately when faced with attacks from

Somali factions during a planned U.N. arms inspection. Assaults were

launched against the recently deployed Pakistanis, Nigerians, and Italians.

The Pakistanis and the Nigerians were unable to contact the Italian

brigade to ask for help. In those attacks, 24 Pakistanis were killed.

Command and Control

Issues

A number of incidents revealed the limits on U.N. command and control,

particularly in regard to following orders issued by the U.N. force

commander. Waiting for instructions from their own national authorities,

U.N. contingents sometimes did not adhere to orders from the force

commander. For example, in one instance a contingent did not follow

orders to remain in its area of responsibility in Mogadishu. Therefore,

when fighting commenced in the contingent’s area, other national

contingents were in a disadvantageous position. Moreover, the contingent

appeared to act autonomously, starting negotiations with one of the

warring Somali factions, declining to be a part of actions in Mogadishu,

and successfully seeking to redeployment in another region of the country.1

1

For an analysis of Somalia operations see U.N. Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Recent Missions

(GAO/NSIAD-94-9, Dec. 29, 1993).

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-97-34 United Nations
Appendix III 

U.N. Experience in the Use of Force

On October 3, 1993, a U.S. force not under U.N. command executed a

military strike against the stronghold of one of the faction leaders believed

responsible for the killing of the peacekeepers. After the U.S. force came

under extreme hostile fire, an extraction operation was mounted that

included armored units from UNOSOM units. But the operation was not

successful and the incident resulted in the deaths of 18 U.S. soldiers and a

consequent U.S. announcement that it would withdraw the bulk of its

troops by March 31, 1994. Other nations also decided to remove their

contingents but provided a holding action until March 1995, when all U.N.

troops were removed.2

U.N. Approach to

Conducting Operations

Although UNOSOM II was authorized to use force, it relied on the militias to

voluntarily disarm and store their weapons in areas under their control.

UNOSOM also provided the militias with written notice of planned

inspections of weapons sites. However, when one such inspection on

June 5, 1993, provoked attacks on the U.N. troops, UNOSOM beginning on

June 12 launched a series of air and ground offensive operations against

the militias. After 1 month, the Secretary General decided to return to

peaceful disarmament of all factions and militias. However, the militias

continued offensive operations and in November 1993, the Secretary

General acknowledged the failure of this approach and further attempts to

disarm the rival factions were halted.

UNOSOM II did not achieve major aspects of its mandate. It did not enforce

the cease-fire, disarm the factions, or successfully repel attacks against its

own troops. Clan fighting, looting, and banditry continued, attacks against

relief organization personnel increased, and anti-UNOSOM propaganda was

widely used.

However, UNOSOM II aided the delivery of humanitarian relief by escorting

humanitarian convoys and providing security for humanitarian

organizations and activities. UNOSOM II also facilitated discussion among

the Somalis to promote national reconciliation, conducted field surveys

and inspections for demining projects, refurbished office buildings and

repaired court and prison facilities, certified district and regional councils,

trained judicial personnel, and helped to establish a police force.

The Former

Yugoslavia

Fighting began in the former Yugoslavia in 1991 when Serbia, the largest of

the republics, forcibly attempted to prevent Croatia from becoming an

2

For a discussion of the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia see, Peace Operations: Withdrawal of U.S.

Troops from Somalia (GAO/NSIAD-94-175, June 9, 1994).

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-97-34 United Nations
Appendix III 

U.N. Experience in the Use of Force

independent nation. After fierce fighting, Croatia and Serbia signed a

cease-fire. The Security Council established UNPROFOR in February 1992 to

help (1) supervise the withdrawal of Serbian forces and demilitarize

disputed areas and (2) return displaced persons to their homes and

monitor human rights.

Bosnia, another republic, voted for independence in March 1992, and

fighting broke out between the new Bosnian government and Bosnian

Serbs, who were opposed to independence from Serbia. In June 1992, the

United Nations recognized Bosnia as an independent nation, and

UNPROFOR’s mission was extended to Bosnia. Over the following 3 years,

UNPROFOR in Bosnia was mandated under chapter VII of the U.N. charter to

(1) facilitate and protect the delivery of humanitarian aid and (2) use

necessary means, including air power from regional organizations, to deter

attacks against six areas declared safe. Over the course of its existence,

UNPROFOR gradually increased in size to an authorized strength of nearly

58,000 in June 1995. It was further supported by the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO), which agreed to provide airstrikes to carry out

UNPROFOR mandates and give close air support to defend UNPROFOR troops

coming under hostile fire.

Overall, UNPROFOR had limited effectiveness in carrying out its enforcement

mandates. In Bosnia, UNPROFOR did not effectively (1) deter attacks on the

six safe areas or (2) protect its troops and staff from being taken hostage.

Sarajevo, 1 of the 6 safe areas, was bombarded regularly by Bosnian Serbs,

resulting in an estimated 10,000 killed or missing and 60,000 wounded

between 1992 and February 1995. Bihac, another safe area, was attacked in

November 1994, with airstrikes and missiles launched from an airbase in

Croatia. The Security Council authorized limited NATO airstrikes on the

airfield, but Bosnian and Croatian Serbs continued their attacks on the

ground and nearly overran Bihac. During this time, UNPROFOR troops were

taken hostage. On successive days in early December 1994, between 316

and 439 UNPROFOR personnel became hostages.3

Lack of Resources The inability to obtain Security Council approval for troops to carry out

the U.N.’s mandate to deter attacks against the six safe areas hindered

U.N. efforts in Bosnia. In January 1994, the U.N. Secretary General had

stated that 34,000 additional troops would be necessary to fulfill the

mandate. The Security Council, however, responded by authorizing only

3

For an analysis of U.N. operations in Bosnia see, Peace Operations: Update on the Situation in the

Former Yugoslavia (GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR, May 8, 1995) and Humanitarian Intervention: Effectiveness

of U.N. Operations in Bosnia (GAO/NSIAD-94-156BR, April 13, 1994).

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Appendix III 

U.N. Experience in the Use of Force

7,600 more troops. Thus, the United Nations did not deploy armed forces

sufficient to deter attacks against the safe areas of Bihac, Gorazde,

Srebrenica, and Zepa.

Issues of Command and

Control

Problems also occurred with command and control of the troops in

Bosnia, limiting UNPROFOR’s ability to fulfill its mandates. Similar to the

incident in Somalia, one troop contingent refused to redeploy to Mostar,

saying that the order exceeded UNPROFOR’s responsibilities. When the

matter was discussed by the Security Council and the troop contingent’s

government, it became clear that a difference in interpretation of the

mandate was at issue. According to U.N. officials, the Security Council

considered the order to redeploy to be a valid part of UNPROFOR’s mandate;

on the other hand, the troop contingent’s government regarded

redeployment as an unacceptable risk and outside of its agreement.

U.N. Approach to the Use

of Force

Although UNPROFOR had authority under chapter VII to use force to carry

out some of its tasks, it still sought consent from the warring parties to

take certain actions. UNPROFOR asked for permission for its vehicles to

move from one area to another, agreed to the imposition of roadblocks

that impeded the delivery of humanitarian aid as well as equipment for its

forces, and permitted warring parties to have a say in where troops would

be placed along confrontation lines. Thus, according to the director of

UNPROFOR’s civil affairs group, Bosnian operations functioned as

peacekeeping missions (where consent is a requirement) despite the

mandates’ authorization of enforcement authority. UNPROFOR was also

reluctant to call for NATO airstrikes to help it deter attacks against areas

declared safe by U.N. mandates.

In July 1995, Croatian Serb forces crossed the Bosnian border to join with

Bosnian Serb troops for another attack on the Bihac pocket. But Bihac did

not fall. In July 1995, the safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa were attacked

and fell to Bosnian Serb forces, resulting in the flight of thousands of

inhabitants and the killing of others, as confirmed in July 1996

investigations of mass gravesites near Srebrenica.

In response to such attacks, the Security Council authorized a rapid

reaction force composed of heavily armed troops, artillery, and

helicopters. The rapid reaction force reported to the U.N. command but

operated under robust rules of engagement and did not wear the

traditional blue helmets signifying peacekeeping or paint its vehicles white

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Appendix III 

U.N. Experience in the Use of Force

as did other UNPROFOR units. Following the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa, the

North Atlantic Council further agreed to take more vigorous steps to

prevent further Bosnian Serb aggression and stated that airstrikes would

be carried out under existing Security Council resolutions and did not

need further U.N. authorization. In December 1995, UNPROFOR ended its

mission and was replaced with a peace enforcement mission led by NATO.

Although UNPROFOR did not achieve its enforcement mandates in Bosnia, it

did help the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other

humanitarian organizations provide vital humanitarian aid for three

winters. UNPROFOR provided logistical support, security, and escorts. It also

operated Sarajevo airport from 1992 to 1994, which allowed Sarajevo to

receive most of its food when road access was cut off. Finally, UNPROFOR

helped deter banditry and undertook confidence-building measures, such

as joint patrols to facilitate the federation between Bosnian Muslims and

Croats; helped negotiate arrangements to reduce fighting in besieged

enclaves such as Maglaj and Vitez; and arranged for the demilitarization of

hundreds of kilometers of confrontation lines.

Rwanda A 3-year civil war between Rwanda’s two main ethnic groups—the Hutu,

who led the Rwandan government, and the Tutsi, who led the Rwanda

Patriotic Front (RPF)—ended in August 1993 when the two sides signed the

Arusha Peace Agreement. Two months later, the U.N. Security Council

established the U.N. Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to monitor

the cease-fire, contribute to the security of Kigali, and coordinate

humanitarian assistance.

The civil war resumed after the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi were

killed when their airplane was shot down on April 6, 1994. Hutus began

massacring Tutsis. In response, the RPF launched a military offensive, and

the government collapsed. The Security Council withdrew all but 440 of

the 2,486 UNAMIR troops and adopted a second mandate on April 21,

directing UNAMIR to act as an mediator between the warring parties. As

ethic and political violence intensified, the Secretary General reported that

an estimated 250,000 to 500,000 people had been massacred and well over

1 million had either been internally displaced or had become refugees in

neighboring countries. On May 17, 1994, the Security Council approved a

third mandate, establishing UNAMIR II and authorizing it to (1) protect

displaced persons, refugees, and civilians under threat, using force to

establish safe zones and (2) provide security for the distribution of

humanitarian aid.

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U.N. Experience in the Use of Force

Lack of Resources The U.N. Secretary General had planned a deployment of U.N. military

forces in three stages during the spring of 1994. This deployment was to

take 31 days, or until mid-June. Nevertheless, full troop strength did not

occur until November, despite UNAMIR’s repeated requests. During this

time, the Security Council debated about whether member states would

actually provide the needed resources. Because of this delay, UNAMIR was

not able to provide security to the hundreds of thousands of displaced and

endangered civilians.

During the month of July, the RPF defeated the Rwandan government army,

unilaterally declared a cease-fire, and established a new government,

effectively ending the civil war. However, as a result of the RPF’s advance

in the northwest, about 1.2 million Hutus began to flee toward the

southwest and crossed into Zaire. An estimated 10,000 refugees per hour

went over the border and entered the town of Goma, Zaire. This massive

influx of refugees created a severe humanitarian crisis. In November 1994,

the Security Council approved UNAMIR’s fourth mandate, adding to its

existing tasks the responsibilities of (1) providing security for the U.N.

International Tribunal for Rwanda4

 and human rights officers and

(2) assisting in training a national police force.

Although UNAMIR was not authorized under chapter VII of the U.N. charter,

its mandates to protect displaced persons and refugees as well as establish

secure sanctuaries for endangered civilians implied that force was to be

used to carry out the mandate. However, UNAMIR was not able to prevent or

significantly mitigate the ethnic and political violence during the civil war.

Weak command and control as well as the absence of a U.N. enforcement

doctrine were not major factors in the Rwandan situation. According to

the U.N. officials and representatives of humanitarian organizations, an

estimated 500,000 men, women, and children—or over 45 percent of the

Tutsi population—were murdered during the conflict. Estimates are that

from 200,000 to 300,000 of them were killed after UNAMIR II’s mandate was

approved.

After a Rwandan government was reestablished in late July 1994, UNAMIR

had only limited success in fulfilling its mandate. The operation did not

protect displaced persons and refugees from government soldiers and

other armed groups. For example, UNAMIR was unable to protect refugees

enroute to their home communes, according to the Secretary General’s

reports. In January and April 1995, UNAMIR did not protect displaced

4

On November 8, 1994, the U.N. Security Council established an international tribunal to prosecute

persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law

committed in Rwanda and neighboring countries.

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-97-34 United Nations
Appendix III 

U.N. Experience in the Use of Force

persons at two camps in southwest Rwanda when government soldiers

opened fire on the camps, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of

people—including women and children. Finally, UNAMIR has not been able

to create a secure environment within Rwanda to facilitate the repatriation

of the refugees. According to U.N. reports, the security situation continues

to deteriorate, the number of people detained by the government for their

alleged involvement in the genocide remains high, reports of government

executions and torture persist, and banditry as well as other acts of

violence against civilians have occurred.

The operation has, however, provided security to human rights monitors,

the International Tribunal, U.N. specialized agency personnel, and

nongovernmental organizations; escorted humanitarian convoys; helped

resettle thousands of displaced persons; and trained candidates for

Rwanda’s national police force.

Lebanon The United Nations established UNIFIL in 1978 after an Israeli incursion into

South Lebanon in response to a Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

attack near Tel Aviv that killed 37 and wounded 76. UNIFIL had three major

objectives: (1) confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces to the international

border, (2) restore peace and security to South Lebanon, and (3) help the

government of Lebanon restore its authority there. To that end, UNIFIL was

directed to establish and maintain an area of operation in South Lebanon

to serve as a buffer between the combatants, supervise and monitor the

established cease-fire, and ensure the “peaceful character” of its area of

operations by making certain that no unauthorized armed personnel

entered and by controlling movement within. UNIFIL was authorized to use

force only in self-defense, which included resistance to attempts by

forcible means to prevent UNIFIL from accomplishing its mandated

objectives. UNIFIL was directed to take all measures deemed necessary to

assure the effective restoration of Lebanese sovereignty. As the daunting

nature of its task became apparent, the United Nations increased UNIFIL’s

size from 4,000 to 6,000 personnel in 1978, and to 7,000 in early 1982.

Currently, UNIFIL has about 4,500 U.N. peacekeepers.

According to U.N. reports, UNIFIL was unable to accomplish its mandate

from its inception, in part because the Israeli government and PLO

authorities never fully accepted it. UNIFIL could not establish a clear and

effective area of operation in South Lebanon. Israeli and PLO authorities

were unable to agree on the tasks UNIFIL should undertake, and so could

not consent to an area of operation. In addition, Israeli forces did not

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Appendix III 

U.N. Experience in the Use of Force

withdraw fully from South Lebanon and turned some positions over to the

“de facto” forces (the Christian militia, led by Major Saad Haddad and later

known as the South Lebanon Army) instead of UNIFIL. The de facto forces,

which were financed, trained, and equipped by Israel, at times denied

UNIFIL units freedom of movement in South Lebanon and subjected them to

severe harassment. Israeli, de facto, and PLO forces also opposed any

movement of the Lebanese Army into parts of South Lebanon, preventing

the government of Lebanon from restoring its authority in these areas.

As a result, intense exchanges of fire and infiltration continued after UNIFIL

deployed. Attempting to reduce infiltration, UNIFIL units were redeployed

and efforts were made to improve its surveillance capabilities. However,

given the difficulty of the terrain, the lack of clear enforcement powers,

and the noncooperation of the parties, the United Nations recognized that

it was virtually impossible to prevent infiltration attempts. In June 1982, in

response to worldwide PLO attacks on Israeli civilians and officials, Israel

again invaded Lebanon. UNIFIL forces attempted to delay the Israeli

advance, but lightly armed UNIFIL units were no match for heavily armed

Israeli forces. The entire UNIFIL area of operation was soon completely

behind Israeli lines.

Lack of Resources Part of the problem in restoring order in Lebanon is that no political

consensus has emerged on how to deal with the situation. Consequently

no nation has been willing to provide the troops and equipment necessary

to effectively carry out the mandate. UNIFIL has lacked the forces to

prevent Hezbollah (the Islamic fundamentalist group) from attacking

Israel. Nevertheless, UNIFIL stands as a symbol of U.N. resolve to provide

humanitarian assistance to the local Lebanese population.

Regarding command and control, weaknesses in this area remain. These

weaknesses inhibit UNIFIL’s ability to coordinate actions and most

effectively deploy U.N. forces. However, the underlying operational issue

is the lack of clear international will and consensus to effectively carry out

the U.N. mandates.

In a January 1996 report, the Secretary General stated that the situation in

Lebanon was unchanged, with Southern Lebanon still occupied and

UNIFIL’s mandate to help restore Lebanese sovereignty unfulfilled. This

situation was underscored in April 1996, when Hezbollah launched rocket

attacks on northern Israel from locations near UNIFIL headquarters. In

retaliation, Israel fired artillery fire at the locations, and several days of

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Appendix III 

U.N. Experience in the Use of Force

exchanges ensued. During one of the exchanges, over 100 Lebanese

civilians were killed in the compound area of one of the UNIFIL contingents.

The Congo The U.N. Operations in the Congo5

 (ONUC) was not authorized under

chapter VII of the U.N. charter but stands as the earliest example of a large

U.N. peacekeeping effort that used force in carrying out its mandate. The

Congo, an area the size of the United States east of the Mississippi River

and with 14 million people, became independent of Belgium in June of

1960, but was ill prepared for this responsibility. Belgium had allowed little

freedom in the Congo, with rights to free speech and a free press

permitted just 6 months before independence. Thus, the Congolese lacked

the political traditions to function as a nation state. Belgium agreed to

assist in the transition by providing administrators and technical

assistance. Belgium also agreed to help maintain security for the transition

to independence and was to continue to command the 24,000-man

Congolese national police. Just days after independence and the election

of the first President, the police force rioted after promotions and pay

increases were denied by the Belgian commander. Belgium subsequently

sent in troops to protect its citizens from the general breakdown of order.

On July 14, just 2 weeks after the police revolt, the first of six U.N.

mandates for intervention was adopted. The two main goals of this early

phase were to (1) establish law and order and (2) facilitate the withdrawal

of the Belgian forces. The Security Council viewed the Belgian and other

foreign mercenary presence as a threat to decolonization. However,

Belgium insisted it had no further territorial designs on the Congo, and the

official Belgian troops left speedily. As the U.N. intervention proceeded,

the new government suffered a civil and constitutional crisis: the

resource-rich Katanga province seceded, with the help of foreign

mercenaries. In addition, the President and Prime Minister of the newly

organized government emerged as combatants, using their own forces and

supporters to fight each other.

Lack of Resources At its peak strength in July 1961, ONUC numbered over 19,800 troops.

According to U.N. military officials at the time, the total number of forces

were insufficient to provide security for a country as large as the Congo.

Nevertheless, according to U.N. and other studies, this lack of troops was

5

The former Congo, or Leopoldville, changed its name to Zaire in 1971. The country now known as the

Congo is a small neighbor that has never been the subject of peacekeeping.

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U.N. Experience in the Use of Force

not as great a problem as the inability to deploy them to strategic

locations.

Command and Control Regarding weaknesses in command and control, some national

contingents operated outside of the U.N. chain of command to bolster

their own national interests. For example, one U.N. contingent disarmed

parts of the Congolese police and were later told they had acted beyond

their mandate and had to return the weapons. Another contingent was

ordered to apprehend mercenaries as called for under Security Council

Resolution 144. However, the contingent resisted this order, saying it

exceeded the contingent’s mandate.

In another instance during operations in Katanga, ONUC troops executed a

plan to both eliminate the foreign mercenaries and secure ONUC’s

unimpeded movement throughout the country. After successfully

advancing and executing phases of the plan, ONUC troops were ordered to

halt. However, they continued to advance and secured the town of

Jadotville, a major stronghold of one of the political factions. The failure

to halt operations was blamed on a communication failure. However, a

report explained “The commanding officer in the field decided that

militarily, at any rate, he had no choice but to deal with the military

situation before him. In this decision he had in mind, particularly, his

military training; the security and morale of his troops; the scorched-earth

threats of Mr. Tshombe; the information obtained from two captured

mercenaries that Mr. Tshombe had just been exhorting them to hold up

the ONUC advance for three days after which world public opinion would

force the United Nations to withdraw . . .6

Approach to Conducting

Operations

Because of concerns about intruding into the Congo’s domestic sovereign

affairs, ONUC operated with the consent of the warring factions and this

limited its ability to effectively conduct operations. Disruptions in building

up troop strength and redistributing forces throughout the country

occurred. The United Nations, in dealing with the provincial government

in Katanga, agreed to restrictions and introduced about 500 U.N. troops

per month to the area, leading to a 2-year buildup to full strength. Further,

ONUC assented to its troops being placed in restricted locations.

Thousands were killed and atrocities occurred, but ONUC could not prevent

many of the human rights violations in Katanga. Further, the U.N. forces

6

Report of the Secretary General, S/5053/Add. 14, Annex XXXIV.

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Appendix III 

U.N. Experience in the Use of Force

were viewed by some as intrusive and partisan and sometimes exceeded

their mandate by either taking action or refusing to take action. The

Security Council issued further mandates in an effort to deal with the

complex, evolving situation, first authorizing ONUC to use of “force in the

last resort” to prevent civil war in February 1961. Later mandates included

wording, such as “to bring Congolese forces under control,” that led to a

severe breakdown in U.N.-Congolese government relations. The President

of the Congo accused the Secretary General of duping him into agreeing to

a U.N. force and claimed the international attorneys had deceived him.

Indeed, disgruntled by ONUC’s actions, the various factions attacked the

U.N. forces. In one incident in April 1961, 44 Ghanian peacekeepers were

killed in an ambush by ANC troops and in November 1961, 13 Italian

peacekeepers were killed.

ONUC finally did help restore security and end the secession of Katanga

province, but many other elements in the ONUC mandate were incompletely

fulfilled or not fulfilled at all. For example, the Congolese police force was

not reformed. The deaths of 234 peacekeepers and of U.N. Secretary

General Dag Hammarskjold and the disputes about whether member

states were obligated to pay for the Congo action resulted in a political

and financial crisis for the United Nations.

Haiti The crisis in Haiti began in September 1991, when the democratically

elected President Jean Bertrand Aristide went into exile after being

deposed in a military coup led by General Raoul Cedras. In June 1993,

following nearly 2 years of human rights abuses by the coup leaders, the

U.N. Security Council imposed economic and political sanctions on Haiti.

In July, President Aristide and General Cedras met at Governors Island,

New York, and signed an agreement for President Aristide’s return to

power in October 1993. In September 1993, the Security Council

authorized UNMIH to implement the provisions of the Governors Island

Agreement. However, armed groups of individuals prevented UNMIH

contingents from landing in Port-au-Prince, Haiti’s capital. The Security

Council reimposed sanctions, but political assassinations and human

rights abuses continued.

Then, in July 1994, the Security Council passed Resolution 940 under

chapter VII of the U.N. charter and mandated a multinational force (MNF)

led by the United States to use the means necessary to (1) facilitate the

departure of the military leadership and to restore the legitimate

government to power and (2) establish and maintain a secure and stable

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Appendix III 

U.N. Experience in the Use of Force

environment during the transition. In September 1994, hours before the

MNF planned to intervene in Haiti, General Cedras stepped down.

Consisting of approximately 20,000 troops from more than 25 countries,

the MNF quickly established itself throughout Haiti. The majority of troops

were in the two major cities, Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien, but MNF

special forces teams were also based in 27 towns and operated in about

500 locations. The MNF disbanded the Haitian army and took control of its

heavy weapons. Army officers above the rank of major remained in place

without function until the beginning of 1995, when they were dismissed by

President Aristide. In addition, the MNF disbanded paramilitary groups and

confiscated about 33,000 weapons—20,000 from seizures, including heavy

weapons from the Haitian army units—and more than 13,000 from a

buy-back program. Both the U.N. and the Haitian government expressed

concerns that weapons were still in the hands of government opponents.

However, the MNF found no evidence of remaining weapons caches,

although it had conducted confiscation raids and instituted traffic

checkpoints in the capital. According to the Organization of American

States, the United Nations, and local human rights organizations, a

significant decrease occurred in political violence and human rights

abuses compared to previous levels.

Resources Because the United States considered actions in Haiti to be in the national

interest, the second phase of UNMIH was able to call on U.S. resources as

needed. The United States led the MNF that preceded UNMIH, committing

18,000 U.S. military personnel, helicopters, and naval support. In addition,

the United States gave the United Nations considerable information and

provided military logisticians and planners. When the MNF made its

transition to a U.N.-led activity, the U.S. sponsored training programs on

command and control, doctrine, and operations for many of the UNMIH

troops and civilians. Valuable logistical support contracts for rations,

supplies, and equipment already in place were supplied to the second

phase of UNMIH until the U.N. bidding process could begin. Of considerable

assistance, too, was the quick reaction force of 1,500, including 550 special

forces and helicopters, that stayed in place to bolster security. And it was

clear that should trouble reoccur, further U.S. resources would be close at

hand.

By March 1995, the MNF had successfully completed its mandate and

returned control of operations to UNMIH, which under its second phase was

authorized 6,000 troops and 800 civilian police. Although UNMIH was

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Appendix III 

U.N. Experience in the Use of Force

authorized under chapter VI of the U.N. charter, its expectations were to

ensure a secure environment while the Haitian government resumed full

civilian control. By the end of March, the United Nations had successfully

deployed nearly all its troops and most of its senior civilian staff to Haiti.

About 70 percent of UNMIH had been part of the MNF, and the United

Nations had to arrange for the additional deployment of contingents from

seven countries. Five of these had arrived by the transition date—only two

small contingents had not yet come.7

 Similarly, the U.N. civilian staff

landed in Haiti according to plan, as the 50-person advance team in the

country since November 1994 was gradually augmented. With its military

and civilian leadership in place, the United Nations commissioned the

United States to conduct a week-long training course for military and

civilian officials in early March to foster implementation of command and

control arrangements, common understanding of rules of engagement, and

coordination between military and civilian components of the mission.

Command and Control While the second phase of UNMIH was a U.N. operation, the U.S. Atlantic

Command (USACOM) was a primary actor in planning maneuvers for both

the MNF and the transition to U.N. command and control. The UNMIH force

commander was a U.S. Major General who reported to the U.N. special

representative of the Secretary General; however, for military issues, he

was directly responsible to USACOM and in command of military decisions.

All other national contingents received their operational orders through

coordination with the U.S. special forces troops, who had the

communications equipment to ensure that orders were accurately relayed.

In addition, about two-fifths of the UNMIH forces were U.S. troops. These

troops were placed with other national contingents in such important

areas as the Haitian capital, Cap Haitien, and Gonaives. While UNMIH was

clearly a U.N. operation, the chain of command for military matters was

led by the U.S. commander. Furthermore, operational orders were

expected to be carried out through the liaison process led by U.S. special

forces.

Approach to Conducting

Operations

In the second phase of the UNMIH operation, an accepted, clear doctrine

was present. This doctrine relied on six principles: (1) implementing

explicitly defined objectives, (2) emphasizing unity of effort, (3) ensuring

adequate security for itself, (4) exercising restraint, (5) being perserverant,

and (6) ensuring legitimacy. The United States employs these principles in

operations other than war. While obtaining the consent of the warring

7

Negotiations were continuing for the possible deployment of a small contingent from a third country.

Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-97-34 United Nations
Appendix III 

U.N. Experience in the Use of Force

parties was an important element in ensuring the legitimacy of UNMIH, it

was only one portion of the doctrine. Stressing a united team effort and

security, UNMIH retained military, political, and informational advantage

over potential warring parties. UNMIH also was proactive and took the

initiative in using assertive actions when necessary to carry out the

mandate. For example, UNMIH used roadblocks and searches, actively

disarming Haitians in certain situations in order to ensure a secure

environment.

From April to July 1995, UNMIH assisted the government of Haiti in

sustaining a secure and stable environment, professionalizing the armed

forces, creating a separate police force, and establishing an environment

conducive to the conduct of free and fair elections. Since the MNF had

destroyed military opposition to the government, criminal and vigilante

activity was the major threat to public safety. During March, there were

101 reported murders; this number dropped to 79 in April, 75 in May, and

63 in June. The June 1995 local and parliamentary elections were held in a

relatively secure environment. However, election rallies and meetings of

the opposition were disrupted, and 94 vigilante murders occurred between

March and June, including the assassinations of prominent Haitian

politicians and former members of the disbanded Haitian armed forces.

To maintain a secure environment for run-off elections and the

presidential election in December, UNMIH increased patrols and provided

greater protection for the President of Haiti. However, in November, an

attack on two supporters of the President caused violent demonstrations.

The quick reaction force was proactive in responding to the

demonstrations, and UNMIH increased patrols in the area to stabilize the

situation. Nevertheless, following an emotional funeral speech by the

President, violence broke out, particularly in Port-au-Prince, Gonaives,

and Cap Haitien. At least seven people were killed. UNMIH again

reestablished control, but the violence underscored the fragile security

situation. In December 1995, presidential elections were held in a secure

and generally peaceful environment.8

The gradual withdrawal of UNMIH’s contingents began in December 1995,

and the final U.S. contingent of UNMIH withdrew from Haiti in April 1996.

The Secretary General, however, recommended UNMIH continue with a

small force to help ensure a peaceful transition. In April 1996, a force of

1,500 troops and 250 police was approved by the Security Council and

remains in place.

8

See Haiti: U.S. Assistance for the Electoral Process (GAO/NSIAD-96-147, July 5, 1996).

Page 50 GAO/NSIAD-97-34 United Nations
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of State

Page 51 GAO/NSIAD-97-34 United Nations
Appendix V 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-97-34 United Nations
Appendix V 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 53 GAO/NSIAD-97-34 United Nations
Appendix VI 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Joseph C. Brown

Rona Mendelsohn

Zina D. Merritt

Tet Miyabara

Office of General

Counsel

Mark C. Speight

Page 54 GAO/NSIAD-97-34 United Nations
Related GAO Products

Bosnia: Costs Are Uncertain but Likely to Exceed Estimates

(GAO/NSIAD-96-120BR, Mar. 14, 1996).

Peace Operations: U.S. Costs in Support of Haiti, Former Yugoslavia,

Somalia, and Rwanda (GAO/NSIAD-96-38, Mar. 6, 1996).

Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on

Unit Capability (GAO/NSIAD-96-14, Oct. 18, 1995).

Peacekeeping: Assessment of U.S. Participation in the Multinational Force

and Observers (GAO/NSIAD-95-113, Aug. 15, 1995).

Peace Operations: Update on the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia

(GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR, May 8, 1995).

Peace Operations: Estimated Fiscal Year 1995 Costs to the United States

(GAO-NSIAD-95-138BR, May 3, 1995)

Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response to

Regional Conflicts (GAO-NSIAD-95-51, Mar. 8, 1995)

Peace Operations: Information on U.S. and U.N. Activities

(GAO/NSIAD-95-102BR, Feb. 13, 1995).

United Nations: How Assessed Contributions for Peacekeeping Operations

Are Calculated (GAO/NSIAD-94-206, Aug. 1, 1994).

Humanitarian Intervention: Effectiveness of U.N. Operations in Bosnia

(GAO/NSIAD-94-156BR, Apr. 13, 1994).

Peace Operations: Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Somalia

(GAO/NSIAD-94-175, June 9, 1994).

U.N. Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Recent Missions (GAO/NSIAD-94-9,

Dec. 29, 1993).

Haiti: Costs of U.S. Programs and Activities Since the 1991 Military Coup

(GAO/NSIAD-93-252FS, Aug. 5, 1993).

U.N. Peacekeeping: Observations on Mandates and Operational Capability

(GAO/T-NSIAD-93-15, June 9, 1993).

Page 55 GAO/NSIAD-97-34 United Nations
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