[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 162 (Thursday, August 21, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 44494-44495]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-22178]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389]


Florida Power and Light Company, et al., St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 
and 2; Exemption

I

    The Florida Power and Light Company, et al. (FPL or the licensee) 
is the holder of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-67 and NPF-16, 
which authorize operation of the St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2. The 
licenses provide, among other things, that the licensee is subject to 
all rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter 
in effect.
    The facility consists of two pressurized-water reactors at the 
licensee's site located in St. Lucie County, Florida.

II

    Section 70.24 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 
``Criticality Accident Requirements,'' requires that each licensee 
authorized to possess special nuclear material (SNM) shall maintain a 
criticality accident monitoring system in each area where such material 
is handled, used, or stored. Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of 10 CFR 
70.24 specify detection and sensitivity requirements that these 
monitors must meet. Subsection (a)(1) also specifies that all areas 
subject to criticality accident monitoring must be covered by two 
detectors. Subsection (a)(3) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to 
maintain emergency procedures for each area in which this licensed SNM 
is handled, used, or stored and provides that (1) the procedures ensure 
that all personnel withdraw to an area of safety upon the sounding of a 
criticality accident monitor alarm, (2) the procedures must include 
drills to familiarize personnel with the evacuation plan, and (3) the 
procedures designate responsible individuals for determining the cause 
of the alarm and placement of radiation survey instruments in 
accessible locations for use in such an emergency. Subsection (b)(1) of 
10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to have a means to identify quickly 
personnel who have received a dose of 10 rads or more. Subsection 
(b)(2) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to maintain personnel 
decontamination facilities, to maintain arrangements for a physician 
and other medical personnel qualified to handle radiation emergencies, 
and to maintain arrangements for the transportation of contaminated 
individuals to treatment facilities outside the site boundary. 
Paragraph (c) of 10 CFR 70.24 exempts Part 50 licensees from the 
requirements of paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 70.24 for SNM used or to be 
used in the reactor. Paragraph (d) of 10 CFR 70.24 states that any 
licensee who believes that there is good cause why he should be granted 
an exemption from all or part of 10 CFR 70.24 may apply to the 
Commission for such an exemption and shall specify the reasons for the 
relief requested.

III

    The SNM that could be assembled into a critical mass at St. Lucie, 
Units 1 and 2, is in the form of nuclear fuel; the quantity of SNM 
other than fuel that is stored on site is small enough to preclude 
achieving a critical mass. The Commission's technical staff has 
evaluated the possibility of an inadvertent criticality of the nuclear 
fuel at St. Lucie, Units 1 and 2, and has determined that it is 
extremely unlikely for such an accident to occur if the licensee meets 
the following seven criteria:
    1. Only one fuel assembly is allowed out of a shipping cask or 
storage rack at one time.
    2. The k-effective does not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% 
confidence level in the event that the fresh fuel storage racks are 
filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and 
flooded with pure water.
    3. If optimum moderation occurs at low moderator density, then the 
k-effective does not exceed 0.98, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence 
level in the event that the fresh fuel storage racks are filled with 
fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and flooded with a 
moderator at the density corresponding to optimum moderation.
    4. The k-effective does not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% 
confidence level in the event that the spent fuel storage racks are 
filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and 
flooded with pure water.
    5. The quantity of forms of special nuclear material, other than 
nuclear fuel, that are stored on site in any given area is less than 
the quantity necessary for a critical mass.
    6. Radiation monitors, as required by General Design Criterion 63, 
are provided in fuel storage and handling areas to detect excessive 
radiation levels and to initiate appropriate safety actions.
    7. The maximum nominal U-235 enrichment is limited to 5.0 weight 
percent.
    By letter dated February 19, 1997, and supplemented July 10, 1997, 
the licensee requested an exemption from 10 CFR 70.24. In this request 
the licensee addressed the seven criteria given above. The Commission's 
technical staff has reviewed the licensee's submittals and has 
determined that St. Lucie, Units 1 and 2, meets the criteria for 
prevention of inadvertent criticality; therefore, the staff has 
determined that it is extremely unlikely for an inadvertent criticality 
to

[[Page 44495]]

occur in SNM handling or storage areas at St. Lucie, Units 1 and 2.
    The purpose of the criticality monitors required by 10 CFR 70.24 is 
to ensure that if a criticality were to occur during the handling of 
SNM, personnel would be alerted to that fact and would take appropriate 
action. The staff has determined that it is extremely unlikely that 
such an accident could occur; furthermore, the licensee has radiation 
monitors, as required by General Design Criterion 63, in fuel storage 
and handling areas. These monitors will alert personnel to excessive 
radiation levels and allow them to initiate appropriate safety actions. 
The low probability of an inadvertent criticality, together with the 
licensee's adherence to General Design Criterion 63, constitutes good 
cause for granting an exemption to the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24.

IV

    The Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 70.14, this 
exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or 
the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public 
interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants the Florida Power and 
Light Company, et al., an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 
70.24.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
granting of this exemption will have no significant impact on the 
environment (62 FR 43363).
    This exemption is effective upon issuance.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 14th day of August 1997.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 97-22178 Filed 8-20-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-U