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16-974-cr 

United States v. Horton 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed 

on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a 

document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an 

electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order 

must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 30th day of January, two thousand seventeen. 

PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 

ROSEMARY S. POOLER, 

GERARD E. LYNCH, 

Circuit Judges. 

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 16-974-cr 

v. 

LEVI HORTON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

 

FOR APPELLEE: MICHAEL S. BARNETT (Rajit S. Dosanjh, 

on the brief), Assistant United States 

Attorneys, for Richard S. Hartunian, 

United States Attorney, Northern District 

of New York, Syracuse, NY. 

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: JAMES P. EGAN (Lisa A. Peebles, Federal 

Public Defender, Courtenay K. McKeon, 

Research & Writing Attorney, on the brief), 

Office of the Federal Public Defender, 

Syracuse, NY. 
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Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of 

New York (Gary L. Sharpe, Judge). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the order of the District Court be and hereby is 

AFFIRMED. 

Defendant-appellant Levi Horton (“Horton”) appeals from a March 28, 2016 judgment of 

the District Court convicting him of violating the conditions of his supervised release. We assume 

the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on 

appeal. We reference the background of the case only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

On March 26, 2007, Horton pleaded guilty to one count of a five count indictment for 

possession of a computer containing images of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2252A(a)(5)(B). On August 1, 2007, the District Court sentenced Horton to a term of 

imprisonment of 120 months to be followed by a ten-year term of supervised release. Horton’s term 

of supervised release began on December 4, 2015. 

 On January 21, 2016, the United States Probation Office for the Northern District of New 

York filed a petition seeking revocation of Horton’s supervised release based on (1) the possession 

of child pornography; (2) failure to update his sex offender registration after obtaining two new 

email accounts; and (3) unauthorized possession of a cellular telephone with internet capability. The 

District Court held a final revocation hearing on March 1, 2016, during which it determined that 

Horton was guilty of failing to update his sex offender registration and of unauthorized possession 

of an internet-capable telephone.1

 The District Court also heard testimony from Horton’s probation 

officer, Kendra Rennie. Officer Rennie testified that Horton admitted he had saved and later deleted 

roughly fifteen images on his phone, and described the contents as including both naked adults and 

minors. Horton described to Office Rennie some of the pictures he had deleted, and told her he had 

viewed “child porn.” J.A. 82. The District Court, however, reserved decision on the alleged child 

pornography violation pending supplemental briefing. 

On March 22, 2016, the District Court resumed the final revocation hearing. It held that 

while none of the four recovered images from Horton’s cellular telephone were child pornography, 

Horton’s admission to Officer Rennie was sufficiently reliable to support a finding that he had 

 

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 Horton does not challenge on appeal either of these two findings. 
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violated the terms of his supervised release by possessing child pornography. The District Court 

sentenced Horton to five years of imprisonment, followed by a life term of supervised release. 

DISCUSSION 

We review a district court’s findings of supervised release violations for abuse of discretion. 

See United States v. Edwards, 834 F.3d 180, 199 (2d Cir. 2016). “A district court has abused its 

discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment 

of the evidence, or rendered a decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible 

decisions.” In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks, alteration, and 

citations omitted); see also In re City of New York, 607 F.3d 923, 943 n.21 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining 

that “abuse of discretion” is a nonpejorative “term of art”). 

Horton makes two arguments on appeal. First, he argues that the District Court abused its 

discretion in finding that Horton possessed child pornography because it relied solely on Horton’s 

admission to Officer Rennie. Second, he argues that his life term of supervised release is 

substantively unreasonable. Both arguments are without merit. 

First, sufficient evidence existed for the District Court to find by a preponderance of the 

evidence that Horton possessed child pornography. See United States v. Carthen, 681 F.3d 94, 99–100 

(2d Cir. 2012) (violations of supervised release need only be proven by a preponderance of the 

evidence). Horton admitted to Officer Rennie that he downloaded and deleted approximately fifteen 

images. Among those images, Horton specifically described a set depicting naked thirteen or 

fourteen year-old boys with their legs spread and penises erect. He also expressly stated that there 

was “child porn” on his cellular telephone. 

Horton’s argument that his admissions about possessing child pornography alone are 

insufficient to find that he violated his supervised release is mistaken. Although “[i]t is a long-settled 

principle that an accused may not be convicted on his own uncorroborated confession” under the 

beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, United States v. Bryce, 208 F.3d 346, 354 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal 

quotation marks omitted), we have held that uncorroborated confessions are sufficient to satisfy the 

preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, see United States v. Sasso, 59 F.3d 341, 353 (2d Cir. 1995) 

(“Armienti’s reliance on Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 89–90 (1954) . . . is misplaced, since that 

case dealt with the sufficiency of an uncorroborated confession to police to establish guilt at a 

criminal trial beyond a reasonable doubt, not with sufficiency to meet the preponderance standard 

applicable to sentencing.”). Accordingly, Horton’s admissions that he possessed child pornography 

were sufficient for the District Court to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he 

violated the conditions of his supervised release. The specificity of Horton’s image descriptions, 

along with the pedophilic narrative and search terms found on Horton’s telephone, provide further 

support for the District Court’s finding. 
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 Second, Horton’s life sentence of supervised release is substantively reasonable. In reviewing 

claims of substantive unreasonableness, we consider “the totality of the circumstances, giving due 

deference to the sentencing judge’s exercise of discretion,” and we “will . . . set aside a district 

court’s substantive determination only in exceptional cases where the trial court’s decision cannot be 

located within the range of permissible decisions.” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189–90 (2d 

Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). On the record before us, given 

the seriousness of Horton’s conduct and the speed with which he violated the terms of his 

supervised release, we find that the District Court’s sentence falls “within the range of permissible 

decisions.” Id. 

CONCLUSION 

We have reviewed all of the arguments raised by Horton on appeal and find them to be 

without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the March 28, 2016 judgment of the District 

Court. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk