United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 21-1937

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

HIRAM JOSÉ RUIZ-VALLE,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Jay A. García-Gregory, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Gelpí, Lynch and Thompson, 

Circuit Judges. 

Joanna E. LeRoy, Research & Writing Attorney, with whom Eric 

Alexander Vos, Federal Public Defender, Franco L. Pérez-Redondo, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Supervisor, Appeals Division, 

Jackson B. Whetsel, Assistant Public Defender, and Kevin E. Lerman, 

Research & Writing Attorney, were on brief, for appellant. 

David C. Bornstein, Assistant United States Attorney, with 

whom W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, and Mariana E. 

Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate 

Division, were on brief, for appellee. 

May 4, 2023
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GELPÍ, Circuit Judge. In 2016, Hiram José Ruiz-Valle

("Ruiz-Valle") pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a 

firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). 

Following his initial release from prison, Ruiz-Valle's supervised 

release has been revoked four times. 

Ruiz-Valle now appeals his latest revocation sentence on 

the ground that the district court erred by imposing in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) a twenty-four-month term of 

reimprisonment, and, by further imposing in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(h) a twelve-month term of supervised release to follow.1

1 We quote these statutes at some length because their terms 

are of significance to the disposition of the issue before us.

Section 3583(e)(3) provides that a district court may "revoke 

a term of supervised release, and require the defendant to serve 

in prison all or part of the term of supervised release" upon a 

finding "by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant 

violated a condition of supervised release." But it also says 

(emphasis ours) that 

a defendant whose term is revoked under this 

paragraph may not be required to serve on any 

such revocation more than 5 years in prison if 

the offense that resulted in the term of 

supervised release is a class A felony, more 

than 3 years in prison if such offense is a 

class B felony, more than 2 years in prison if 

such offense is a class C or D felony, or more 

than one year in any other case.

Section 3583(h) states that when a supervised-release term "is 

revoked and the defendant is required to serve a term of 

imprisonment that is less than the maximum term of imprisonment 

authorized under subsection (e)(3), the court may include a 

requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised 

release after imprisonment." But it also states (emphasis ours) 

that "[t]he length of such a term of supervised release shall not 

exceed the term of supervised release authorized by statute for 
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Moreover, he argues that § 3583(e)(3) is unconstitutional as 

applied to him. 

We affirm the sentence of reimprisonment imposed upon 

revocation; however, vacate the subsequent supervised-release

term. 

I. BACKGROUND

Ruiz-Valle pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a

convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 

924(a)(2). This offense carried a ten-year maximum imprisonment 

sentence,2 and is a Class C felony per 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(3) --

for which the maximum supervised-release term is 36 months per 18 

U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2). The district court ultimately sentenced RuizValle to an eighteen-month term of imprisonment, followed by a 

three-year supervised-release term. 

We next summarize the disposition of Ruiz-Valle's 

sentences following his multiple supervised release revocations. 

the offense that resulted in the original term of supervised 

release, less any term of imprisonment that was imposed upon 

revocation of supervised release." 

The importance of the highlighted language will be addressed 

later. 

2 References and citations to section 924(a)(2) in this 

opinion are to the provision as it existed at the time of 

Ruiz-Valle's charged conduct. These provisions have since been 

amended by the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 

117-159, § 12004, 136 Stat. 1313, 1329 (2022), which transposed

the penalty provision for section 922(g) from section 924(a)(2) to 

924(a)(8), providing for a longer maximum period of imprisonment. 

See United States v. Minor, 63 F.4th 112, 118 n.4 (1st Cir. 2023)

(en banc). 
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Given that the first three of these are not the subject of this 

appeal, we only indicate the outcome of each without tarrying into 

further detail. 

Ruiz-Valle's first revocation, in January 2019, resulted 

in reimprisonment of six months along with a new supervised-release 

term of three years. His second revocation, in October 2019,

resulted in another six-month imprisonment term plus two years of

supervised release. The third revocation, in December 2020,

resulted in ten months imprisonment and two years of supervised 

release. 

Ruiz-Valle was released from prison in May 2021. By 

then and upon completion of his third revocation sentence, 

Ruiz-Valle had collectively served twenty-two months in prison for 

his several violations. In August 2021, the U.S. Probation Office 

sought his arrest for new supervised-release violations, to wit, 

testing positive for cocaine use, failing to comply with his drugtesting condition, failing to appear at his counseling sessions, 

and breaching his family's peace as charged in a criminal 

complaint. 

At his fourth revocation hearing , defense counsel told 

the district court that he saw "three possible" sentencing 

"solutions" to Ruiz-Valle's latest supervised-release infractions: 

(1) "four months" in prison and "more treatment," (2) "two years" 

in prison and "no more supervision," or (3) "one year" in prison 
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and "no further supervision." Ruiz-Valle's sentencing memo 

requested option (1). But at the hearing his lawyer requested a 

"one year" prison sentence, with "no further supervision." In 

defense counsel's view, sentencing Ruiz-Valle to two years in 

prison -- after his client had already served twenty-two months in 

prison on his earlier revocations -- would be "excessive." But he 

also said that "before you would accumulate" already-served prison 

"time, now you don't accumulate" it. 

Opposing the defense's request, the government stated 

that it did not want Ruiz-Valle out "in a year" because he had "no 

interest in rehabilitating himself" and so releasing him too soon 

might lead to a "negative outcome." 

The district court classified Ruiz-Valle's violations as 

Grade C and his Criminal History Category as II, and calculated an 

advisory sentencing range of four to ten months imprisonment. The 

court, however, varied upward and imposed the statutory maximum 

sentence of two years in prison followed by one additional year of 

supervised release. 

Ruiz-Valle objected to the sentence imposed, arguing it 

was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. He first 

insisted that the district court "cannot impose supervision after 

it imposes [the] statutory maximum" because the sentence 

"exceeds . . . what is allowed by law" and offends "due process." 

He next claimed that the statutory-maximum prison term was 
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"excessive" and that "the lack of accumulation of the . . . prior 

sentences imposing revocation, again, violated his right to have 

a final sentence that is limited to the statutory maximum of . . 

. imprisonment on a revocation." He added that "any sentence over 

a total accumulated of 24 months . . . should not be allowed." 

And he concluded that "any sentence over a total accumulated of 

twenty-four months . . . should not be allowed. 

The district court noted Ruiz-Valle's post-sentence

objections. The government took no position as to the same. RuizValle timely appealed. 

II. DISCUSSION

Ruiz-Valle asserts that the district court erred under 

§ 3583(e)(3) by imposing a twenty-four-month term of 

reimprisonment without deducting the cumulative prison time served 

for all four violations. Alternatively, he argues that if 

§ 3583(e)(3) indeed authorizes his current twenty-four-month 

prison term, the same is unconstitutional. He then claims that 

the district court could not impose the new twelve-month term of 

supervised release under § 3583(h). We address each argument 

seriatim. 

A. REIMPRISONMENT UPON REVOCATION

Section 3583(e)(3) pertinently provides (emphasis ours) 

that "[a] defendant whose term is revoked under this paragraph may 

not be required to serve on any such revocation more than . . . 2 
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years in prison if such offense is a class C . . . felony." As 

Ruiz-Valle sees it, the district court had to -- but did not --

"subtract the aggregate length of prior imprisonment terms imposed 

upon revocation of supervised release when calculating the 

statutory maximum" for his last revocation. 

A dicta of ours indicates that Congress's 2003 addition 

of the phrase "on any such revocation" meant that the provision's 

statutory caps on post-revocation prison terms apply "afresh” to 

each new revocation. See United States v. Tapia-Escalera, 356 

F.3d 181, 185-86, 188 (1st Cir. 2004).3 And "every court of appeals 

to consider" whether the statutory caps reset with each new 

revocation "has determined" that the 2003 amendment abolishes "the 

credit for terms of imprisonment resulting from prior 

revocations." United States v. Sears, 32 F.4th 569, 574 (6th Cir. 

2022) (quotation marks omitted and collecting cases from the 

Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits); 

see also United States v. Cunningham, 800 F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th 

Cir. 2015) (per curiam) ("hold[ing], as have each of the circuits 

that have examined the question, that upon each revocation of 

supervised release a defendant may be sentenced to the felony class 

limits contained within § 3583(e)(3) without regard to 

3 Such statement is dicta because Tapia-Escalera addressed 

the proper reading of § 3583(e)(3)'s pre-2003 text. See id. at 

188. 
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imprisonment previously served for revocation of supervised 

release"). 

Ruiz-Valle responds with page after page of argument 

that the district court (and those other circuits, apparently) 

erred by misunderstanding § 3583(e)(3)'s text, context, and 

legislative history -- committing a constitutional error to boot. 

But the insurmountable problem for him is that he waived these 

arguments by arguing the opposite below.4 Noting that the

"statutory maximum" prison sentence for his revocation was "2 

years", Ruiz-Valle repeatedly told the district court that it could 

give him the maximum term. He did say that a new prison term of 

"two years after he's already served 22 months in other revocations 

. . . could be excessive" -- a claim he made after discussing his 

personal issues. But he conceded that he could not "accumulate" 

against the statutory maximum the "time" he had already spent in 

prison on the prior revocations. And by telling the district court 

that it could sentence him to 24 months in prison on his current 

revocation, he waived any claim that the court could not do so --

on either statutory or constitutional grounds. See United States

v. Chen, 998 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2021) (explaining that a party 

waives an issue by "purposefully abandon[ing] it, either expressly 

4 The Federal Public Defender for the District of Puerto Rico 

has represented Ruiz-Valle before the district court and now before 

us. 
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or by taking a contrary position" in the district court); see id.

(adding that "[a]n issue may also be waived if counsel's own 

conduct invited the [district court's] ruling") see also United 

States v. Gates, 709 F.3d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 2013) (emphasizing that 

"a party cannot concede an issue in the district court and later, 

on appeal, attempt to repudiate that concession and resurrect the 

issue").

Arguing against this conclusion, Ruiz-Valle reads his 

counsel's later statements as preserving these error 

claims-- statements like the "lack of accumulation of 

the . . . prior sentences imposing revocation, again, violated his 

right to have a final sentence that is limited to the statutory 

maximum of . . . imprisonment on a revocation" and that "any 

sentence over a total accumulated of 24 months . . . should not be 

allowed." We are unconvinced.

Counsel did not develop this "lack of accumulation" and 

"total accumulated" statements into an objection that the court 

could not impose the 24-month prison term. And counsel's words 

are not specific enough to preserve the error claims, particularly

since he conceded just moments earlier that he could not 

"accumulate" against the maximum term the "time" he had served in 

prison on his prior revocations. What is more, one can read 

counsel's statements as saying the district court could not impose 

supervised release after sentencing Ruiz-Valle to that prison 
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term. All of which cuts against Ruiz-Valle's preservation theory. 

That is because these statements were not "sufficiently specific 

to call to the district court's attention" that the prison term 

violated § 3583(e)(3). See United States v. Espinoza-Roque, 26 

F.4th 32, 36 (1st Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). And 

"[i]ssues not squarely raised in the district court will not be 

entertained on appeal." See United States v. Barnett, 989 F.2d 

546, 554 (1st Cir. 1993) (emphasizing that "[j]udges are not 

expected to be mindreaders" so "a litigant has obligation to spell 

out his arguments squarely and distinctly or else forever hold his 

peace" (quotation marks omitted)). Ruiz-Valle also offers no 

persuasive reason for relaxing the raise-or-waive rule (as it is 

known).

The bottom line is that Ruiz-Valle did not preserve any 

argument -- statutory or constitutional -- regarding the district 

court's sentence of imprisonment vis-a-vis § 3583(e)(3). Hence 

whatever views we may have on these precise issues must be left 

for another case on another day.

B. SUPERVISED RELEASE ON REVOCATION

Section 3583(h) relevantly provides (emphasis ours) that 

when the district court imposes a new term of supervised release 

"after imprisonment" upon revocation, that term "shall not exceed 

the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the 

offense that resulted in the original term of supervised release, 
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less any term of imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation." 

No one disputes that Ruiz-Valle's § 922(g)(1) violation is the 

crime underlying his original supervised-release term; that this 

violation is a Class C felony; and that the maximum authorized 

supervised-release term for that crime was 36 months. Because the 

district court sentenced him to an "aggregate term of [46] months" 

in prison on all his revocations, and because 46 months "exceeds" 

36 months, Ruiz-Valle argues that the court "erred in imposing 

additional supervision." 

Citing United States v. Maxwell, 285 F.3d 336 (4th Cir. 

2002), the government in its brief "concedes that once the district 

court sentenced Ruiz[-Valle] to 36 months of imprisonment on his 

revocations in this case, the court erred under § 3583(h) by 

imposing additional supervised release." The government insists, 

however, that Ruiz-Valle invited the error he now tries to 

challenge. Cutting through the parties' thrust and parry, we note 

that Ruiz-Valle argued -- ultimately and concisely -- for "no 

further supervision" and so reject the government's invited-error 

theory.

"[W]e ordinarily review sentences imposed following 

revocation of supervised release for abuse of discretion." United 

States v. Rodríguez-Meléndez, 828 F.3d 35, 38 (1st Cir. 2016). 

However, in this instance, even under plain-error review (which is 
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not defendant-friendly), Ruiz-Valle prevails.5 See United States

v. Tapia-Escalera, 356 F.3d 181, 183 (1st Cir. 2004). 

Every circuit to consider the question agrees that when 

imposing a term of supervised release following revocation of a 

previous term of supervised release, § 3583(h) requires that the 

term be reduced by all post-revocation terms of imprisonment 

imposed with respect to the same underlying offense. See, e.g., 

United States v. Rodríguez, 775 F.3d 533, 537 (2d Cir. 2014); 

United States v. Zoran, 682 F.3d 1060, 1063 (8th Cir. 2012); United 

States v. Hernández, 655 F.3d 1193, 1198 (10th Cir. 2011); United 

States v. Vera, 542 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 2008); Maxwell, 285 

F.3d at 342. The rationale is straightforward:

When the word "any" is properly read in its 

§ 3583(h) statutory context, Webster's Third 

New International Dictionary provides that the 

word "any" means "all." Specifically, 

5 Plain-error review requires the appellant to show "(1) that 

an error occurred (2) which was clear or obvious and which not 

only (3) affected the [appellant's] substantial rights, but also 

(4) seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings." United States v. Rivera, 51 

F.4th 47, 51 (1st Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). Pointing 

to United States v. Rivera-Carrasquillo, 933 F.3d 33, 55 (1st Cir. 

2019), the government insists that Ruiz-Valle waived any plainerror argument by not trying to satisfy his plain-error burden in 

his opening brief. But Ruiz-Valle argued there that he had 

preserved the § 3583(h) issue below. And after the government 

challenged preservation, he argued in his reply brief that the 

district court's error "is overwhelmingly plain" even if he had 

forfeited the issue. So Ruiz-Valle's case is very much unlike 

Rivera-Carrasquillo, where the defendant "admitted[]" in his 

opening brief that plain-error review applied but then 

inadequately briefed his plain-error theory. See 933 F.3d at 55-

56.
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Webster's Third New International Dictionary

provides that when the word "any" is "used as 

a function word to indicate the maximum or 

whole of a number or quantity," for example, 

"give me [any] letters you find" and "he needs 

[any] help he can get," the word "any" means 

"all." Here, the word "any" in the phrase 

"less any term of imprisonment that was 

imposed upon revocation of supervised 

release," § 3583(h) (emphasis added), is 

obviously used as a function word to indicate 

the maximum or whole of a number or quantity 

just as the word "any" is used in the 

dictionary examples quoted above.

Maxwell, 285 F.3d at 341 (some citations omitted). "Thus, a plain 

reading of the reference to 'any term of imprisonment' in the 

statute must include the prison term in the current revocation 

sentence together with all prison time served under any prior 

revocation sentences imposed with respect to the same underlying 

offense." Rodríguez, 775 F.3d at 537. Speaking for the Tenth 

Circuit, then-Judge (now-Justice) Gorsuch explained that 

§ 3583(h)'s "language -- left unamended in 2003 and thus quite 

unlike § 3583(e)(3) -- does (expressly) require a district court 

to aggregate and credit all prior prison terms when determining 

the maximum amount of supervised release it can impose for any 

revocation." See Hernández, 655 F.3d at 1198 (second emphasis 

added). "So as a defendant serves . . . more time in prison for 

each revocation, a district court can impose . . . less time on 

supervised release." Id. 
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The government's main response is that absent 

controlling cases on his side (from the First Circuit or Supreme 

Court, which all agree he does not have), Ruiz-Valle must show 

that his reading of § 3583(h) "is compelled by the statute's 

language itself." See United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 480 

F.3d 62, 70 (1st Cir. 2007). The government thinks that he has 

not made this showing. We do. After all, Rodríguez and Maxwell

both held on plain-error review that a "plain" reading of § 3583(h) 

requires aggregation. Rodríguez, 775 F.3d at 536-37; Maxwell, 285 

F.3d at 342. Maxwell actually called this an "obvious[]" reading. 

See 285 F.3d at 341. We agree. And we also find the government's 

position here passing strange, seeing how it conceded in Maxwell

that this kind of error is "plain for purposes of establishing" 

the clear-or-obvious "prong" of plain-error review. Compare 285 

F.3d at 342 (noting that "[t]he phrase 'less any term of 

imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of supervised 

release'" in § 3583(h)'s last sentence "is not reasonably 

susceptible to an interpretation which . . . ignore[s] any prior 

terms of imprisonment imposed as part of prior postrevocation 

sentences, for the same underlying offense"), with id. at 339 

(noting that "[a]lthough the government opposed Maxwell's argument 

in its appellate brief, at oral argument, the government candidly 
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and forthrightly conceded all issues in the appeal in favor of 

Maxwell").6

III. CONCLUSION 

The district court's prison sentence upon revocation is 

AFFIRMED, and the imposition of the one-year supervised-release

term to follow is REVERSED. Accordingly, we REMAND to the district 

court for the limited purpose of entering judgment without any 

additional term of supervised release in accordance with this 

opinion.

6 That the plain or obvious reading of the statute supports 

plain error distinguishes Ruiz-Valle's case from 

Caraballo-Rodríguez, an opinion the government relies on. See 480 

F.3d at 71 (observing that "[t]he dictionary definitions" of key 

statutory terms "do not prove [defendant's] claim"). It also 

distinguishes his case from United States v. Richards, another 

opinion the government cites to. See 243 F.3d 763, 771 (1st Cir. 

2000) (concluding that an "interpretation" pressed on appeal was 

not "obvious" under relevant statutory language).