[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 

Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Berta, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-1264.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 

an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested 

to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 

65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 

other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 

made before the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2021-OHIO-1264

LORAIN COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION v. BERTA.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Berta, Slip Opinion No. 

2021-Ohio-1264.] 

Attorney misconduct—Failure to adequately communicate basis or rate of hourly 

fees—Public reprimand. 

(No. 2020-1521—Submitted January 27, 2021—Decided April 15, 2021.) 

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 

Court, No. 2020-027. 

_______________________ 

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Respondent, David James Berta, of Elyria, Ohio, Attorney 

Registration No. 0063775, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1994. In 

a June 29, 2020 amended complaint, relator, Lorain County Bar Association, 

alleged that Berta had committed two ethical violations related to his fees in a 

single domestic-relations case. 
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{¶ 2} A three-member panel of the Board of Professional Conduct 

accepted the parties’ stipulations of fact and heard testimony from five witnesses, 

including Berta. After relator rested its case, Berta moved the panel to dismiss 

both of the alleged rule violations; the panel unanimously granted that motion 

with respect to one of the alleged violations. The panel later issued a report 

finding that Berta had failed to adequately communicate to his client the basis or 

rate of the fees and expenses that would be charged for the representation, and it 

recommended that he be publicly reprimanded and ordered to make restitution of 

$850. The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 

recommended sanction. The parties have filed a joint waiver of objections and 

request that the court adopt the board’s report in its entirety. 

{¶ 3} We adopt the board’s findings of misconduct and recommended 

sanction. 

Facts and Misconduct 

{¶ 4} The sole issue in this case is whether Berta adequately 

communicated to his client the basis or rate of the fee and expenses she would be 

responsible for. 

{¶ 5} Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(b) provides: 

The nature and scope of the representation and the basis or 

rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible 

shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before 

or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation

* * *. Any change in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses is 

subject to division (a) of this rule [which prohibits excessive fees] 

and shall promptly be communicated to the client, preferably in

writing. 
January Term, 2021 

3

{¶ 6} In July 2017, Kerri Johnson consulted with Berta about terminating 

her marriage. Berta did not present Johnson with a written fee agreement. 

Instead, he wrote “$2,500 flat” on one of his business cards and gave it to her. 

Johnson was not ready to proceed at that time, and she paid $200 for the 

consultation. She met with Berta a second time, in August 2017, and paid $1,500 

toward the quoted flat fee. 

{¶ 7} Although Berta drafted a petition for dissolution, discussions with 

Johnson’s husband soon broke down. Consequently, Berta filed a complaint for 

divorce on October 12, 2017. On December 15, 2017, Johnson paid the balance 

of the quoted flat fee plus the $280 filing fee. 

{¶ 8} From November 2017 through December 2018, Berta’s employer, 

the Spike & Meckler Law Firm, L.L.P., sent Johnson monthly billing statements 

itemizing the time that Berta and his secretary had spent on her case. Those 

statements stated that the case was a dissolution with a flat fee of $2,500 plus 

court costs of $280 and showed that no balance was due. 

{¶ 9} While Johnson’s divorce was pending, the proceeds from the sale of 

marital real property and other marital funds, totaling approximately $180,000, 

were deposited into Berta’s law-firm trust account. The court granted Johnson’s 

divorce on December 10, 2018, and awarded her a property division that included 

approximately $98,500 of the marital funds held in the trust account. In January 

2019, Johnson e-mailed Berta to inquire about the distribution of those funds. 

{¶ 10} On January 24, the law firm’s bookkeeper e-mailed Johnson a 

proposed distribution statement identifying the amounts due to each party. The 

statement deducted $7,730 from Johnson’s share for additional attorney fees, 

which had already been transferred out of the firm’s trust account. In response, 

Johnson sent the bookkeeper and Berta an e-mail identifying several errors or 

inconsistencies in the proposed distribution statement and stating the amount she 

believed was due to each party—with no deduction for the additional attorney 
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fees. Later that day, the bookkeeper sent Johnson an e-mail stating, “I’m guessing 

you didn’t know yet about the atty fees we subtracted,” and informing Johnson 

that she had mailed her an itemized billing statement detailing those fees. In 

addition to billing Berta’s services at $200 an hour, the statement included 

charges for secretarial services, which were billed at $50 an hour. Johnson emailed the bookkeeper again stating, “I was not aware I had any additional fees 

since I agreed to a flat fee upfront and every bill since I have paid that in full 

states my balance is ZERO. I would have thought that if I was getting charged 

more I would have been notified in writing and prior to this.” (Capitalization sic.) 

{¶ 11} On January 28, Berta sent Johnson an e-mail stating: “As I 

described at our initial meeting, the flat fee was for a no-fault divorce. As I also 

explained at the initial intake, cases filed as divorces are billed hourly.” He 

explained that he had just looked at his billing in her case for the first time, and he 

noted that the statements she had received did indicate “the time that was being 

billed, but the bookkeeper didn’t code the bill as hourly.” He indicated that the 

$200-an-hour rate was a discount from his usual hourly rate of $225 or $250 and 

instructed Johnson to let him know what she would like to do so that the 

bookkeeper could cut the checks. 

{¶ 12} At Berta’s disciplinary hearing, Johnson acknowledged that she 

had not responded to Berta’s e-mail explanation of the hourly billing and had 

accepted the distribution check that Berta’s bookkeeper prepared for her.1

 She 

explained that she did not further contest the matter at the time, because she 

needed access to her share of the marital funds to complete the purchase of her 

new home. 

 

1. The panel noted that it had previously dismissed an alleged violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(e) 

(requiring a lawyer in possession of funds in which two or more persons claim an interest to hold 

those funds in the lawyer’s client trust account until the dispute is resolved) because Johnson had 

not actively disputed the fee and accepted her distribution check. 
January Term, 2021 

5

{¶ 13} The panel heard conflicting testimony about whether Berta had 

informed Johnson that he would charge a different fee if her case proceeded as a 

divorce rather than a dissolution. Johnson testified that the only thing Berta told 

her about his fees during their initial consultation was that she would be charged a 

$2,500 flat fee plus court costs, and she said that he never mentioned that she 

would be charged $200 an hour if the case proceeded as a contested divorce. 

However, she admitted that it was possible that Berta had advised her that his fee 

structure would change if it was necessary to file a divorce on her behalf and that 

she simply could not recall that fact due to her emotional state when she first met 

with Berta. According to Johnson, at the time, she was suffering from debilitating 

anxiety and depression, was having trouble eating and sleeping, and was 

participating in an intensive, outpatient mental-health-treatment program. That 

said, Johnson maintained that the monthly statements she received from October 

2017 through December 2018 indicating a flat fee of $2,500 and showing a zero 

balance reinforced her understanding that Berta had agreed to handle her case for 

a flat fee. 

{¶ 14} In contrast, Berta maintained that he had informed Johnson of the 

different fee structures for dissolution and divorce cases during their initial 

consultation, and he produced his handwritten notes from that meeting, which 

appear to support his position. But Berta also acknowledged that Johnson was in 

an emotionally fragile state during that meeting and that that may have affected 

her ability to recall that part of the conversation. He stipulated that he had given 

her his business card with “$2,500 flat” written on the back, and he admitted at 

the hearing that he never informed her in writing that he would charge an hourly 

fee if the case proceeded as a divorce. Berta also claimed that in a telephone call 

he had had with Johnson before he filed her divorce complaint, he reminded her 

that his fee had converted to an hourly rate. But he never questioned Johnson 

about that alleged conversation during her hearing testimony. 
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{¶ 15} In addition, Berta admitted that he had never informed Johnson that 

she would be charged $50 an hour for secretarial services performed on her behalf 

because he had been unaware that his firm charged such fees, even though they 

were listed in the firm’s standard fee agreement. He did not dispute that Johnson 

had been charged $850 for such services. Furthermore, he admitted that he had 

not reviewed any of Johnson’s monthly bills until the dispute arose and that as a 

result, he had had no knowledge that for more than one year, his firm had sent 

Johnson monthly bills that showed secretarial time and a zero balance. 

{¶ 16} Citing Johnson’s emotional state at the time of her initial 

consultation, the time that elapsed between that consultation and the filing of her 

divorce complaint, and the monthly bills stating that Johnson had a zero balance 

on her account, the board found that it had been reasonable for Johnson, a 

layperson, to believe that she was being charged a flat fee. Therefore, the board 

determined that Berta had not adequately communicated to Johnson the basis or 

rate of the hourly fee for his services and those of the secretarial staff and that his 

conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(b). We adopt this finding of misconduct. 

Sanction 

{¶ 17} When recommending the sanction to be imposed for attorney 

misconduct, the board considers all relevant factors, including the ethical duties 

that the lawyer violated, the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar 

R. V(13), and the sanctions imposed in similar cases. 

{¶ 18} In this case, the board found that just one aggravating factor is 

present—Berta’s conduct harmed a vulnerable client. See Gov.Bar R. 

V(13)(B)(8). As for mitigating factors, the board found that Berta had no record 

of prior discipline and had lacked a dishonest or selfish motive, made full and free 

disclosure to the board and exhibited a cooperative attitude toward the 

disciplinary proceedings, and submitted evidence of his good character and 

reputation. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1), (2), (4), and (5). 
January Term, 2021 

7

{¶ 19} In determining the appropriate sanction in this case, the board

considered four cases in which we publicly reprimanded attorneys who had 

engaged in misconduct similar to Berta’s. For example, in Cincinnati Bar Assn. 

v. Mezher and Espohl, 134 Ohio St.3d 319, 2012-Ohio-5527, 982 N.E.2d 657, a 

law firm had advertised free consultations but then billed two clients for the 

second half of a one-hour meeting without explaining that the free consultation 

ended and a billable conference commenced as soon as the clients signed a 

written fee agreement. Noting that most laypersons would have viewed the 

meeting as one continuous consultation, we found that the attorney who met with 

the clients had violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(b) and publicly reprimanded him for his 

misconduct. Id. at ¶ 21, 25. And in Disciplinary Counsel v. Goldberger, 158 

Ohio St.3d 354, 2019-Ohio-4844, 142 N.E.3d 666, we publicly reprimanded an 

attorney who, among other things, had agreed to represent a woman in a dispute 

with her lender but had failed to communicate the nature and scope of his 

representation or the basis or rate of his fee to the client. 

{¶ 20} In accord with this precedent, the board recommends that we 

publicly reprimand Berta for his misconduct and order him to make restitution of 

$850 to Johnson for the secretarial fees that were neither properly nor timely 

disclosed to her. Having thoroughly reviewed the record and applicable precedent 

in this case, we agree that a public reprimand with an order of restitution is the 

appropriate sanction for Berta’s misconduct. 

Conclusion

{¶ 21} Accordingly, David James Berta is publicly reprimanded for the 

conduct described above and ordered to make restitution of $850 to Johnson 

within 90 days of the date of this order. Costs are taxed to Berta.

Judgment accordingly. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, 

and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
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_________________ 

O’Toole, McLaughlin, Dooley & Pecora Co., L.P.A., Matthew A. Dooley, 

and Michael R. Briach, for relator. 

Charles J. Kettlewell, L.L.C., and Charles J. Kettlewell, for respondent. 

_________________