II 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1397 

To amend title 10, United States Code, to provide for an increase in the 

minimum end-strength level for active duty personnel for the United 

States Army, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JULY 14, 2005 

Mr. LIEBERMAN (for himself, Mrs. CLINTON, Mr. NELSON of Florida, Mr. 

REED, and Mr. SALAZAR) introduced the following bill; which was read 

twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services 

A BILL 

To amend title 10, United States Code, to provide for an 

increase in the minimum end-strength level for active 

duty personnel for the United States Army, and for 

other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘United States Army 

5 Relief Act of 2005’’. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

7 Congress makes the following findings: 

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1 (1) The 2004 National Military Strategy of the 

2 United States assigns the Army the task of oper3 ating with the other Armed Forces to provide for 

4 homeland defense, deter aggression forward from 

5 and in four different regions around the world, con6 duct military operations in two overlapping but geo7 graphically disparate major campaigns, and win de8 cisively in one of those campaigns before shifting 

9 focus to the next one. 

10 (2) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

11 General Richard Myers, has directed that the Army 

12 must be able to ‘‘win decisively’’ in one theater, even 

13 when it is committed to a number of other contin14 gencies. 

15 (3) While Congress lauds the current efforts by 

16 the Administration to reduce demands upon ground 

17 forces by continuing to pursue the transformation of 

18 the United States military as a whole, the recent ex19 periences of the Army in Iraq serve to underscore 

20 the fact that there is, as of yet, no substitute for 

21 having sufficient troops to conduct personnel-inten22 sive post-conflict missions. 

23 (4) The current force requirements posed by 

24 the ongoing operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 

25 elsewhere as part of the Global War on Terror are 

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1 unsustainable for the long term and undermine the 

2 ability of the United States military to successfully 

3 execute the National Military Strategy. 

4 (5) Although the burden may be a heavy one, 

5 we as a nation and as a people must not, will not, 

6 shy away from our engagement in world affairs to 

7 defend our interests and to defend those who are 

8 themselves defenseless. 

9 (6) Our engagement in Afghanistan, Iraq, and 

10 the greater Middle East is, as Secretary of State 

11 Condoleezza Rice stated, a ‘‘generational’’ one. 

12 (7) Although our commitments in this region— 

13 and around the world—are vital, the Army has been 

14 ‘‘overused’’ according to the Chief of the United 

15 States Army Reserve. 

16 (8) The Army currently has approximately 

17 499,000 active duty troops, and these are backed up 

18 by nearly 700,000 members of the Army National 

19 Guard and the Army Reserve. 

20 (9) This number is a third less than the force 

21 level on hand when the first Persian Gulf War was 

22 fought in 1991. 

23 (10) Approximately 150,000 of these troops are 

24 in Iraq. Nearly 10,000 troops are in Afghanistan. 

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1 1,700 serve in Kosovo. 37,000 serve on the Korean 

2 peninsula. 

3 (11) As of 2005 the relationship between the 

4 total number of troops and the number of operation5 ally deployed troops has resulted, as the com6 manding general of the 18th Corps of the Army at 

7 Fort Bragg remarked in 2004, in an active-duty 

8 force that is ‘‘stretched extraordinarily thin.’’ 

9 (12) A former Army Deputy Chief of Staff has 

10 stated that in light of the growing operational de11 mands upon it in the strategic environment after 

12 September 11, 2001, that the Army ‘‘is too small to 

13 do its current missions’’. 

14 (13) That former Army Deputy Chief of Staff 

15 further stated that the current size of the Army, 

16 coupled with the current demands upon it, has re17 sulted in a loss of ‘‘the resiliency to provide either 

18 strategic balance—what you need if some other 

19 thing flares up—or to be able to give a respite as 

20 the troops rotate back from overseas areas where 

21 they’ve been in combat.’’ 

22 (14) In its attempts to fulfill its missions with 

23 too few troops, the Army has risked ‘‘damaging’’ the 

24 force significantly or ‘‘even breaking it in the next 

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1 five years’’, according to a division commander dur2 ing Operation Desert Storm. 

3 (15) In a December 2004 letter to the Chief of 

4 Staff, United States Army, the Chief of the United 

5 States Army Reserve wrote that ‘‘the current de6 mands’’ of operations in the Middle East were 

7 ‘‘spreading the Reserve force too thin’’ and that his 

8 command ‘‘was in grave danger’’ of being unable to 

9 meet other missions abroad or domestically, and that 

10 the Army Reserve was ‘‘rapidly degenerating into a 

11 ‘broken force’ ’’. 

12 (16) The letter referred to in paragraph (15) 

13 was intended, the Chief of the United States Army 

14 Reserve wrote, not ‘‘to sound alarmist . . . [but] . . . 

15 to send a clear, distinctive, signal of deepening con16 cern’’ to his superiors. 

17 (17) In addition to hampering the ability of the 

18 Army to successfully complete the missions assigned 

19 to it, this ‘‘overuse’’ has significant consequences for 

20 domestic homeland security operations. 

21 (18) A disproportionate number of Federal, 

22 State, and local first responders are also members of 

23 the National Guard or Reserve. 

24 (19) At a time of strain for large municipalities 

25 struggling to secure their infrastructure against the 

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1 threat of terrorism, the drain on available personnel 

2 as well as budgets is unacceptable. 

3 (20) An increase of the end-strength of the 

4 Army is in the best interests of the people of the 

5 United States and their interests abroad, and is con6 sistent with the duties and obligations of Congress 

7 as set forth in the Constitution. 

8 (21) An increase of 100,000 troops over the 

9 permanently authorized level for the Army for fiscal 

10 year 2004 of 482,000 troops will provide a long11 term, lasting solution to the current operational con12 straints and future mission requirements of the 

13 Army. 

14 (22) Progress was made toward that solution 

15 when Congress authorized an increase of 20,000 

16 troops in the end-strength of the Army for fiscal 

17 year 2005 in the Ronald W. Reagan National De18 fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Pub19 lic Law 108–375). 

20 (23) An increase in the permanent authorized 

21 end-strength for the Army of 80,000 troops is re22 quired to meet the 100,000-troop increase level that 

23 will provide a lasting, long-term solution to per24 sonnel problems currently being experienced by the 

25 Army. 

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1 (24) This number will equip the Army with suf2 ficient personnel so that it may not only engage in 

3 a stabilization operation like Iraq, but so that it may 

4 do so while maintaining optimal troop rotation 

5 schedules. 

6 (25) This conclusion is supported by the No7 vember 2003 testimony of the Director of the Con8 gressional Budget Office, Douglas Holtz-Eakin, be9 fore the Committee on Armed Services of the House 

10 of Representatives. 

11 SEC. 3. INCREASE IN END-STRENGTH FOR THE ARMY. 

12 Section 691 of title 10, United States Code, is 

13 amended by adding at the end the following new sub14 section: 

15 ‘‘(e) Notwithstanding subsection (b)(1), the author16 ization for the number of members of the Army at the 

17 end of each fiscal year as follows shall be not less than 

18 the number specified for such fiscal year: 

19 ‘‘(1) Fiscal year 2006, 522,400. 

20 ‘‘(2) Fiscal year 2007, 542,400. 

21 ‘‘(3) Fiscal year 2008, 562,400. 

22 ‘‘(4) Fiscal year 2009, 582,400. 

23 ‘‘(5) Any fiscal year after fiscal year 2009, 

24 582,400.’’. 

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