In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 04-3410

DAVID BALLANCE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS POLICE DEPARTMENT,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 02-C-3296—Jeanne E. Scott, Judge.

____________

ARGUED JUNE 6, 2005—DECIDED SEPTEMBER 19, 2005

____________

Before ROVNER, WOOD, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. David Ballance, a former police

officer, sued the Springfield Police Department for

race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., for matters arising

from his termination. The issue before us is whether the

district court erred by finding that no genuine issue of

material fact existed for trial on Ballance’s reverse race

discrimination claim. We find that although Ballance

has established his prima facie case, he has failed to satisfy

his burden of showing that the police department’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for terminating him were

pretextual, and therefore, affirm.
2 No. 04-3410

1 Ballance and his wife, Christine Ramsey (“Chris”), both dispute

that the domestic battery occurred. Ramsey initially reported the

alleged abuse, and then retracted her statement, stating that her

injuries were self-inflicted. Ramsey suffered the following injuries:

bleeding, scrapes on her elbows, bruising and swelling on her

body, two broken ribs, and blood in her urine.

I. BACKGROUND

We give a brief outline of the facts here, and will discuss

them in greater detail where relevant to our analysis.

Ballance, a white male, was a police officer with the

Springfield, Illinois Police Department from October 1989

until his termination on October 17, 2000 by then-police

Chief John Harris. Chief Harris stated that he terminated Ballance for three reasons: first, Ballance’s involvement in a July 27, 2000 event where he allegedly battered

his wife; second, Chief Harris’s finding that Ballance had

obstructed the internal affairs interview regarding this

domestic battery; and third, Ballance’s prior record of

disciplinary actions.1

 Ballance ultimately brought a reverse

race discrimination suit against the department in the

United States District Court for the Central District of

Illinois. Specifically, Ballance claims that the department

discriminated against him based on his race because Chief

Harris would not have fired an African-American officer for

the same reasons that he terminated Ballance.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor

of the police department, and Ballance timely appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary

judgment. Lamers Dairy Inc. v. United States Dep’t of

Agric., 379 F.3d 466, 472 (7th Cir. 2004); Ind. Family &
No. 04-3410 3

Soc. Servs. Admin. v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 476, 479 (7th Cir.

2002). Summary judgment is properly granted when “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 322 (1986). When determining whether a genuine issue

of material fact exists, we consider evidence in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587

(1986). Material facts are facts that “might affect the

outcome of the suit” under the applicable substantive law.

See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). A dispute over material facts is genuine if “the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

B. Ballance’s Reverse Race Discrimination Claim

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against

employees on the basis of sex or gender. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1) (2005). Plaintiffs in employment discrimination

cases can avert summary judgment by presenting either

direct or indirect evidence showing discriminatory intent by

the defendant or its agents. O’Regan v. Arbitration Forms,

Inc., 246 F.3d 975, 983 (7th Cir. 2001). Given that Ballance

does not provide any direct evidence of discrimination on

the basis of race, he must proceed under the familiar fourpart burden-shifting test established in McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and refined in Texas

Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248

(1981). Under the McDonnell Douglas scheme, the plaintiff

bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; O’Regan, 246 F.3d at

983.
4 No. 04-3410

Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff attempting to

establish a claim of race discrimination must establish four

prongs: first, that he is a member of a protected

class; second, that he was meeting his employer’s legitimate

performance expectations; third, that he suffered

an adverse employment action; and fourth, that he was

treated less favorably than similarly situated individuals

who are not members of his protected class. See Ineichen v.

Ameritech, 410 F.3d 956, 959 (7th Cir. 2005). It is well

settled law that the protections of Title VII are not limited

to members of historically discriminated-against groups.

McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273

(1976); Greenslade v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 112 F.3d

853, 863 (7th Cir. 1997). When analyzing reverse discrimination plaintiffs, we have held that in order to establish a prima facie case, in addition to meeting the second,

third and fourth prongs above, such a plaintiff must show

that “background circumstances” exist to show an inference

that the employer has “reason or inclination to discriminate

invidiously against whites” or evidence that “there is

something ‘fishy’ about the facts at hand.” Phelan v. City of

Chicago, 347 F.3d 679, 684-85 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Mills

v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 455-57 (7th Cir.

1999).

Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the

burden of production shifts to the defendant to provide

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the decision.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Ineichen, 410 F.3d

at 961. If the defendant satisfies its burden, the burden

shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s

explanation was pretextual. Id. at 961. Pretext requires

more than showing that the decision was “mistaken, ill

considered or foolish, [and] so long as [the employer]

honestly believes those reasons, pretext has not been

shown.” Jordan v. Summers, 205 F.3d 337, 343 (7th Cir.

2000). Pretext “means a dishonest explanation, a lie rather
No. 04-3410 5

than an oddity or an error.” Kulumani v. Blue Cross Blue

Shield Ass’n, 224 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir. 2000).

The police department argues that the district court erred

by finding that Ballance established his prima facie case.

We disagree. In this case, the district court was correct to

find that background circumstances existed to show an

inference that the police department may discriminate

against whites. The district court noted that the City of

Springfield commissioned Husch & Eppenberger, LLC, a

law firm, to investigate charges of racism in the police

department. Husch & Eppenberger produced a report which

stated in part:

Many expressed resentment that women and

minorities appeared to get special treatment . . .

Based upon several interviews, including Chief

Harris’, race and gender are taken into consideration at various stages, including hiring, work

assignments, promotion, and determination of

disciplinary action or determination of the need

for an internal affairs investigation.

Husch & Eppenberger Report at 58-59 (emphasis in original). We agree with the district court’s finding that this

report supports the inference that the police department,

through Chief Harris, gave preferences to minorities and

women in the disciplinary process.

We also agree with the district court’s analysis that

Ballance was meeting his employer’s expectations. Although

Ballance’s record shows that he was disciplined by the

police department (as we will examine more in detail in our

pretext analysis), he was also highly commended during his

career. Ballance received the police department’s Porter

Williams Award for bravery, as a result of an incident on

Thanksgiving Day 1995 when Ballance attempted to make

a traffic stop. The driver ran from the car and pointed a gun

at Ballance. Ballance shot and killed the driver in self-
6 No. 04-3410

2 Springfield Police Department Rule 27 provides:

A. Members will, upon the order of the Chief of Police

or his designee, truthfully answer all questions

specifically directed and narrowly related to the

(continued...)

defense. In 1999, Ballance found a baby that had been shot

in the head. Ballance immediately called emergency

medical personnel who took the baby to the hospital. The

baby ultimately survived. An independent commission

recommended that Ballance receive the police department’s

highest award, the Silver Suarez Award, for actions above

and beyond the call of duty. Chief Harris rejected the

recommendation of the commission but gave Ballance a

letter of commendation for his actions. The police department argues that Ballance’s disciplinary issues overshadow

any issue of material fact that he was meeting the police

department’s legitimate performance expectations. We

disagree. Although Ballance was disciplined (he received 31

days of disciplinary suspension time at different times in

his career while employed with the police department), the

award, letter of commendation, and nomination for the

top award in the police department help create a genuine

issue of fact concerning whether he was meeting his employer’s legitimate expectations.

The parties also disagree as to whether Ballance can show

that he was treated less favorably than African-Americans

at the police department. Ballance argues that Chief Harris

treated an African-American police officer, Larry Stelivan,

more favorably than he. Stelivan was arrested for domestic

battery after slapping his wife twice during a weekend

drive. In his motion opposing the police department’s

motion for summary judgment, Ballance presented evidence

that Stelivan lied during his internal affairs interview when

he denied slapping his wife. Lying during an internal

affairs interview is automatic grounds for dismissal for

violation of Police Department Rule 27.2

 Yet Stelivan was
No. 04-3410 7

2 (...continued)

scope of employment and operations of the Department which may be asked of them in the course of an

internal investigation.

B. Obstruction in any manner, or an attempt to obstruct an authorized internal investigation is a

serious disciplinary offense justifying dismissal.

C. Failure to truthfully answer questions or provide

requested material will be cause for dismissal from

employment. Such information gained is compelled

and may not be used in any criminal prosecution

of the member answering.

never charged with a Rule 27 violation.

Ballance was confrontational during his internal affairs

interview. However, according to Ballance, he answered all

of the questions truthfully. Yet, the police department

charged and terminated him for a Rule 27 violation. The

police department argues that Ballance and Stelivan

are not similarly situated, because although both Ballance

and Stelivan were arrested for domestic battery, Ballance

allegedly battered his wife more severely than Stelivan. The

police department notes that Ramsey, Ballance’s

wife, suffered broken bones and bleeding, while Stelivan’s

wife did not. This argument is unconvincing. Within this

particular set of facts, we find that domestic batterers

are comparable to each other, regardless of the degree of the

battery involved. The police department also argues that

Ballance’s disciplinary record is not comparable to

Stelivan’s. Again, the police department notes that Ballance

received 31 days of disciplinary suspension time while

employed with the police department, while Stelivan has

received 12 days of suspension while employed with the

police department, mostly, with the exception of three days’

suspension for the domestic incident with his wife, for
8 No. 04-3410

administrative violations. Yet, although Stelivan may have

been suspended for fewer days than Ballance, we find that

a jury could reasonably conclude that the police department

treated Stelivan more favorably than Ballance with respect

to the obligation and police department policy for officers to

tell the truth during internal investigation interviews. As

a result, we find that Ballance has established his prima

facie case.

Faced with Ballance’s prima facie case, the police department, through Chief Harris, presented three legitimate, non

discriminatory reasons for its decision to fire Ballance.

First, Chief Harris found that Ballance beat his wife.

Second, Chief Harris determined that Ballance, through his

behavior at the internal affairs interview, obstructed an

internal affairs investigation and thus violated Police

Department Rule 27. Third, Chief Harris terminated

Ballance because of his prior record of disciplinary actions.

We agree with the district court’s analysis that Ballance has been unable to prove that these reasons

were pretext for discrimination. Although Ballance argues that Chief Harris ultimately concluded that Ballance

did not beat his wife, and then changed his conclusion

simply to have some legitimate reason to fire Ballance, the

record simply does not support this view. Chief Harris

testified that he believed Ballance hit his wife, broke her

ribs, and bloodied her, as supported by the following:

Christine Ramsey’s sworn statement in her Order of

Protection petition reciting the abuse she allegedly suffered

during the July 27, 2000 event; Ramsey’s internal affairs

interview in which she clearly stated that Ballance beat her

and caused bodily injury; the physical evidence of her

injuries; and Heather Ballance’s (Plaintiff’s daughter)

testimony that corroborated Ramsey’s testimony. Heather

Ballance testified that on the night Ballance allegedly beat

his wife, she saw Ramsey on the ground outside of their

garage, severely beaten and upset, as Ballance sped away.
No. 04-3410 9

3 Police Department Rule 4 states, in part, that “All members

[of the police department] will obey the Constitution and laws

of the United States and of the State of Illinois, ordinances of

the City of Springfield, and law of any state and local jurisdiction in which they are present.”

In addition, Commander James Burton, the senior police

officer who investigated this incident, stated in his report to

Chief Harris, “In my mind, there is no doubt David Ballance

struck Chris Ballance after placing her in a ‘bear hug’

causing these injuries.” Also, Deputy Chief George Murphy

reviewed Ballance’s internal affairs investigative file, and

recommended Ballance’s termination. Ballance denied that

he caused these injuries, but could not explain how his wife

was so severely hurt. Based on this overwhelming evidence,

it is hard for Ballance to argue that Chief Harris initially

believed him.

Ballance speculates that Chief Harris believed his version

of the facts because he did not charge him with violation of

Police Department Rule 4, which is a Conformance to Law

Charge.3

 According to Ballance, if Chief Harris truly

believed that he had beaten his wife, he would have charged

him with this police violation since he broke the law.

However, Ballance fails to cite to any evidence in the record

to support this assertion. Such self-supporting assertions,

without factual support in the record, cannot be used to

defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Rand v. CF

Indus., Inc., 42 F.3d 1139, 1146-47 (7th Cir. 1994). Moreover, the overwhelming evidence of Ramsey’s injuries and

Ballance’s own explanation of the incident all lead us to the

conclusion that Chief Harris’s beliefs are not pretextual.

Ballance also argues that he did not obstruct the internal

investigation of his alleged battery. Again, based on the

record, we find that the district court did not err in concluding that Chief Harris honestly believed that Ballance
10 No. 04-3410

4 One portion of the internal affairs interview is as follows:

Internal Affairs: You know the victim, Chris,

indicates that you struck her

three times with your fist, did

you strike her?

Ballance: I already answered that.

Internal Affairs: I’m asking you again.

Ballance: I answered that question.

Internal Affairs: I’m giving you a direct order,

answer the question.

Ballance: What was the question again?

Another portion of the interview is as follows:

(continued...)

interfered with the internal affairs investigation. In

Commander Burton’s report to Chief Harris, he stated:

During the Internal Investigation interview David

Ballance on 9/15/2000, David Ballance is not cooperative with the investigator and has to be ordered

to answer the questions. It must of [sic] become so

tense, that Union President Don Kliment asked to

a [sic] recess to calm Ballance down. Ballance

would not answer the questions, but would ask a

question each time . . . I strongly believe that David

Ballance lied during this interview. I suggest that

Ballance be subjected to a polygraph examination

and again asked the questions concerning the

injuries to Chris Ballance.

The transcript from Ballance’s internal affairs interview

also could lead one to believe that Ballance indeed was

being obstructive, through the fact that he was argumentative, confrontational, and refused to answer questions.4
No. 04-3410 11

4 (...continued)

Internal Affairs: Do you have any reason or do

you know why she would have

[her injuries] notarized and

put in open court?

Ballance: Did she do it?

Internal Affairs: Signed and notarized?

Ballance: Did she do it?

Internal Affairs: I’m asking the questions here,

Dave. I’m not answering your

questions. I’m answering . . .

I’m asking you the question . . .

Ballance: Well you’re not answering

mine!

Internal Affairs: Dave, I’m only going to tell

you one . . .

Don Kliment

(Union Representative): . . . I need a time out here . .

.

Ballance uses the fact that he answered all of the questions

during the internal affairs investigation to indicate that he

fully cooperated during his internal affairs interview.

However, the record does not reflect that the beliefs held by

Chief Harris and Commander Burton, that Ballance

obstructed the internal affairs investigation, were not

honestly held by the command staff of the police department. See Bell v. E.P.A., 232 F.3d 546, 550 (7th Cir. 2000)

(“Plaintiffs cannot prevail at trial if the fact-finder finds

that the [employer] honestly believed in the nondiscriminatory reasons it offered, even if the reasons are foolish or

trivial or even baseless.” (quoting Hartley v. Wis. Bell, Inc.,

124 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 1997)).
12 No. 04-3410

Finally, Ballance argues that his disciplinary record

is comparable to Officer Stelivan’s, and thus indicative

of the police department’s supposed pretext for discrimination. The record does not support this conclusion.

Aside from the incident with his wife, in July 1994 Ballance

served a ten-day disciplinary suspension for an alleged offduty physical confrontation with a store owner of a local

business in Springfield. In July 1995, he lost one day of

vacation due to his involvement in an automobile accident

that the police department found to be avoidable. In 1996,

the police department charged Ballance with several rules

violations: one involved a verbal confrontation and threatened physical violence against his neighbor; a second

involved an alleged failure to report to work on four different days; and a third involved insubordination in which he

allegedly responded to an emergency call when he was told

by his commander not to do so. Ballance received three fiveday suspensions for these violations, but was allowed to

serve them concurrently. In 1997, Ballance served another

five-day suspension for allegedly challenging a 65-year old

man to a fistfight during a basketball game. Finally, in

1998, Ballance was fired for allegedly throwing a rock at a

passing car while he was off-duty. This termination went to

arbitration, and the arbitrator ordered that Ballance

be reinstated because the evidence did not sufficiently

establish that he threw the rock. Stelivan, on the other

hand, served a three-day suspension for an avoidable

vehicle accident, a one-day suspension for another avoidable

vehicle accident, and a seven-day suspension for conducting

personal business on duty. It would not be appropriate for

us to express a view as to whether the sanction imposed

against Ballance might be perceived by some individuals as

more severe than the infraction justified. Our only job is to

assess whether the justifications given by the police department for Ballance’s termination are honest. See Stewart v.

Henderson, 207 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2000). We do not sit

as a super-personnel department with authority to review
No. 04-3410 13

an employer’s business decision as to whether someone

should be fired or disciplined because of a work-rule

violation. Id. Based on the record as a whole, as well as

Ballance’s lengthy and egregious disciplinary record, we do

not find any reason to believe that the police department’s

reason for terminating him, based solely or partly on his

disciplinary record, is a lie.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s

order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the City of Springfield Police Department.

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—9-19-05