R.L. Vallee Determination Request 

ENTRY REGARDING MOTION

Count 1, Municipal Other Civil Action (109-9-19 Vtec) 

Title: Motion to Dismiss (Motion 2) 

Filer: Town of Colchester 

Attorney: Brian P. Monaghan 

Filed Date: October 17, 2019 

Response in Opposition filed on 10/29/2019 by Attorney Jon T. Anderson for 

Appellant R.L. Vallee, Inc. 

Response in Opposition filed on 11/01/2019 by Attorney David L. Grayck for 

Interested Person Timberlake Associates, LLP 

Reply in Support filed on 11/12/2019 by Attorney Brian P. Monaghan for the 

Town of Colchester 

Further Reply filed on 12/05/2019 by Attorney Brian P. Monaghan for the Town of Colchester 

The motion is GRANTED. 

 This matter relates to a gas station proposed by Costco Wholesale Corporation (“Costco”) 

on property located as 218 Lower Mountain Drive in Colchester. R.L. Vallee, Inc. (“Vallee”) 

appeals from a letter sent by Sarah Hadd (“Ms. Hadd”), Director of Planning and Zoning for the 

Town of Colchester (“the Town”), indicating that the Colchester Development Review Board 

(“DRB”) would not hear an appeal of Vallee’s request for a determination from the Town Zoning 

Administrator. Presently before the Court is the Town’s Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Vallee is represented by Jon T. Anderson, Esq. and Alexander J. LaRosa, Esq. The Town is 

represented by Brian P. Monaghan, Esq. and Christian S. Chorba, Esq. Timberlake Associates, LLP 

(“Timberlake”) is participating as an interested person and is represented by David L. Grayck, Esq. 

Costco is an intervenor in this matter and is represented by Mark G. Hall, Esq. 

STATE OF VERMONT

SUPERIOR COURT ENVIRONMENTAL DIVISION

 Docket No. 109-9-19 Vtec
R.L. Vallee Determination Request Appeal, No. 109-9-19 Vtec EO on Motion to Dismiss) (May 12, 2020) Page 2 of 8. 

 In the interest of providing context and clarity to the pending motion, we provide the 

following background.1

 On August 27, 2015, this Court issued a Merits Decision granting Act 250, municipal site 

plan, and municipal final plat approvals to Costco for a gas station and other site improvements 

at its Colchester facility, subject to conditions.2 See In re Costco Stormwater Discharge Permit, 

Nos. 75-6-12 Vtec, 104-8-12 Vtec, 132-10-13 Vtec, 41-4-13 Vtec, and 59-5-14 Vtec (Vt. Super. Ct. 

Envtl. Div. Aug. 27, 2015) aff’d, 2016 VT 86. The approvals were conditioned on the completion 

by Costco of certain roadway improvements to mitigate traffic concerns. See id. at 13–14, 37–

38, 41–47. In 2018, Costco filed a request with the District #4 Environmental Commission 

(“District Commission”) to amend the Act 250 approval to allow operation of the gas station 

during certain “off peak” hours prior to the construction of the required traffic mitigation. The 

Court is aware that the District Commission has approved Costco’s permit amendment 

application, and that Valley has appealed that determination to this Court. 

 On July 22, 2019, Vallee’s counsel sent a letter to Lisa Riddle, the Town Zoning 

Administrator (“ZA”), requesting a ruling that “Costco must apply for and obtain an amendment 

to the Final Plat and Site Plan approval . . . prior to Costco opening its fueling station for limited 

hours as proposed to [the District Commission in the Act 250 process].” The ZA did not respond 

to Vallee’s request. The Court understands that Costco has not opened its gas station, even for 

abbreviated hours. 

 On August 29, 2019, Vallee’s counsel sent another letter to the ZA asserting that the 

failure to respond within 30 days constituted either (1) “deemed approval” of Vallee’s request 

pursuant to 24 V.S.A. § 4448(d) or (2) a decision subject to appeal to the DRB. Vallee enclosed a 

completed appeal form and a check for the filing fee. The same letter asked the DRB to rule, on 

appeal, that “a) Vallee’s request to [the ZA] is deemed approved, b) Costco must apply for and 

obtain an amendment to the [municipal approval], and c) such approval must be through the 

DRB process.” 

 Vallee received a reply letter from Ms. Hadd, the Town of Colchester Director of Planning 

and Zoning, on September 17, 2019. Ms. Hadd set forth the Town’s position that Vallee’s initial 

letter to the ZA was a “request for an advisory opinion regarding a hypothetical land use on 

another landowner’s property” and therefore the ZA was under no obligation to respond. In 

addition, Ms. Hadd stated that the DRB was “without jurisdiction to hear [Vallee’s] request for 

an appeal, and will not be taking any action on [Vallee’s] request.” She returned Vallee’s appeal 

and the check for the filing fee. 

 Vallee has appealed Ms. Hadd’s letter to this Court, asking that we: (1) hold that the 

rejection of Vallee’s appeal to the DRB was improper and that the appeal should have been 

docketed, (2) decide whether the ZA “has the power to determine whether or not Costco requires 

an amendment” to the municipal approvals “if Costco wants to open its fueling station under 

1

 The following is a summary of events leading up to this appeal, based in part on exhibits attached to the 

Notice of Appeal and certain allegations by Vallee. It is not intended to represent the findings or conclusions of the 

Court. 

2

 The decision encompassed other issues which are not relevant to the matter presently before us. 
R.L. Vallee Determination Request Appeal, No. 109-9-19 Vtec EO on Motion to Dismiss) (May 12, 2020) Page 3 of 8. 

limited hours prior to the construction of roadway improvements,” and, if we find that the Town 

was not required to docket the appeal with the DRB, (3) determine whether Costco needs an 

amendment to the municipal approvals “if Costco wants to open its fueling station under limited 

hours prior to the construction of roadway improvements.”3 See Notice of Appeal, filed Sept. 26, 

2019; Statement of Questions, filed Sept. 26, 2019. 

 The Town moves to dismiss Vallee’s Questions pursuant to V.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and pursuant to V.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. The parties have also exchanged cross-motions for summary 

judgment. 

 A motion to dismiss pursuant to V.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim may not be 

granted unless it is beyond doubt that there are no facts or circumstances that would entitle 

Vallee to relief. Colby v. Umbrella, Inc., 2008 VT 20, ¶ 5, 184 Vt. 1 (citation omitted). Solely for 

the purpose of reviewing this dismissal motion, we note that we are directed to take all wellpleaded factual allegations as true and “assume that the movant’s contravening assertions are 

false.” Alger v. Dep’t of Labor & Industry, 2006 VT 115, ¶ 12, 181 Vt. 309 (citation omitted). 

 When reviewing a V.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction, we similarly accept all uncontroverted factual allegations of the nonmovant as true 

and construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Rheaume v. Pallito, 2011 VT 

72, ¶ 2, 190 Vt. 245 (citation omitted). On a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction, “consideration of matters outside the pleadings is permissible.” Messier v. 

Bushman, 2018 VT 93, ¶ 12, 208 Vt. 261 (citation omitted). 

3

 Vallee Questions on appeal are as follows: 

1. Did Colchester violate Vermont law by rejecting Vallee’s appeal to the Colchester Development Review 

Board? 

2. Was Colchester required by law to refer Vallee’s appeal to the Colchester DRB? 

3. Was Director Hadd empowered to reject Vallee’s appeal to the DRB? 

4. Was Director Hadd empowered to issue a ruling as to Vallee’s July 22nd request to Zoning Administrator 

Riddle? 

5. Does the Colchester Zoning Administrator have the power to determine whether a permit amendment 

is required? 

6. Does the Colchester Zoning Administrator have the power to determine whether or not Costco requires 

an amendment to the Final Plat and Site Plan approval issued pursuant to the Environmental Court’s 

ruling in Docket No. 104-8-12 Vtec if Costco wants to open its fueling station in a manner different from 

which was approved and authorized under the above-described Final Plat and Site Plan approval? 

7. Since the Colchester Zoning Administrator did not act on Vallee’s request dated July 22, 2019 within 30 

days, is the request deemed approved pursuant to 24 V.S.A. § 4448(d)? 

8. If Colchester was not required to send the appeal to the DRB and this Court has jurisdiction over the 

substance of Vallee’s July 22, 2019 request, does Costco need an amendment the [sic] Final Plat and 

Site Plan approval issued pursuant to the Environmental Court’s ruling in Docket No. 104-8-12 Vtec if 

Costco wants to open its fueling station under limited hours prior to the construction of roadway 

improvements at Lower Mountain View Drive and Upper Mountain View Drive as was required by the 

Environmental Court in approving Costco’s Final Plat and Site Plan application in Docket No. 104-8-12 

Vtec? 
R.L. Vallee Determination Request Appeal, No. 109-9-19 Vtec EO on Motion to Dismiss) (May 12, 2020) Page 4 of 8. 

 The Town’s dismissal motion contains two primary arguments. First, the Town asserts 

that the ZA had no statutory authority or obligation to act on Vallee’s request for a determination 

or advisory opinion and therefore both the DRB and this Court lack jurisdiction to consider the 

matter. Second, the Town contends that Vallee’s request to the ZA was not deemed approved 

pursuant to 24 V.S.A. § 4448(d) because there was no pending application for any land use 

approval. 

At the outset, we note that Vallee’s subsequent filings indicate that it has withdrawn 

Question 7 regarding deemed approval. If not withdrawn, Question 7 must be dismissed because 

Vallee has not alleged or even suggested that the ZA “fail[ed] to act with regard to a complete 

application for a permit.” See 24 V.S.A. § 4448(d); see also In re Wood NOV & Permit Applications, 

2013 VT 40, ¶ 40, 194 Vt. 190 (noting that a “complete application” is required to trigger 

§ 4448(d)); Colby v. Umbrella, Inc., 2008 VT 20, ¶ 5 (discussing the standard for dismissal pursuant 

to V.C.R.P. 12(b)(6)). 

 At the heart of the Town’s motion is its argument that Vallee’s initial letter to the ZA 

amounted to a request for an advisory opinion which the ZA had no obligation or authority to 

render. As a result, the Town contends, Vallee’s subsequent appeals to the DRB and this Court 

present no actual case or controversy to be decided. See In re 232511 Investments, Ltd., 2006 

VT 27, ¶ 19, 179 Vt. 409 (“We must have an actual case or controversy before us to render a 

decision”) (citing Parker v. Town of Milton, 169 Vt. 74, 77 (1998)). This is a question of 

jurisdiction. Thus, at this stage we will consider all of Vallee’s uncontroverted allegations and the 

exhibits attached to its Notice of Appeal in the light most favorable to Vallee. See In re 

Bennington Sch., Inc., 2004 VT 6, ¶ 19, 176 Vt. 584 (“Our jurisdiction is limited to issuing opinions 

determining actual controversies between parties.”) (citation omitted); see also Rheaume v. 

Pallito, 2011 VT 72, ¶ 2; Messier v. Bushman, 2018 VT 93, ¶ 12. 

 Even when viewed in that most favorable light, the information Vallee puts forward shows 

a succession of requests for advisory opinions based on a hypothetical land use on someone 

else’s property that has not yet occurred and has not been presented to the Town in a land use 

application. To begin, Vallee’s initial letter to the ZA requested a ruling that Costco must obtain 

an amendment to preexisting municipal approvals “prior to” opening its gas station under 

modified hours. Vallee’s letter suggests that Costco’s proposed land use will be the same as the 

proposal Costco submitted to the Act 250 District Commission. See Notice of Appeal, Exhibit 2, 

filed Sept. 26, 2019. There is no mention of a proposal by Costco submitted to the Town, nor is 

there any allegation that Costco actually opened its gas station in violation of existing permit 

conditions or municipal bylaws. In effect, Vallee’s request to the ZA was the same as its Question 

8 before this Court: Vallee sought a determination that Costco must obtain an amendment to 

certain municipal approvals “if Costco wants to open its fueling station under limited hours.” See

Statement of Questions, filed Sept. 26, 2019 (emphasis added). 

 Zoning administrators have certain duties and powers prescribed by statute. A zoning 

administrator must “administer the bylaws literally and shall not have the power to permit any 

land development that is not in conformance with those bylaws.” 24 V.S.A. § 4448(a). If a zoning 

administrator “fails to act with regard to a complete application for a permit within 30 days . . . 

a permit shall be deemed issued on the 31st day.” 24 V.S.A. § 4448(d). Pursuant to 24 
R.L. Vallee Determination Request Appeal, No. 109-9-19 Vtec EO on Motion to Dismiss) (May 12, 2020) Page 5 of 8. 

V.S.A. § 4452, a zoning administrator must institute an enforcement action to prevent or abate 

identified municipal violations. 

 Vallee does not point to any statute or bylaw imposing a duty on the ZA to opine whether 

a future land use that may or may not occur on another’s property will require a permit or permit 

amendment. This is not a case where an applicant alleges that the ZA failed to act on a permit 

application. Cf. In re Bjerke Zoning Permit Denial, 2014 VT 13, ¶ 11, 195 Vt. 586 (considering 

whether a ZA complied with 24 V.S.A § 4448(d)). This is not a case challenging a permit approval 

or denial, or the issuance of a notice of an alleged zoning violation. Cf. In re Wood NOV & Permit 

Applications, 2013 VT 40, ¶¶ 5–10, 194 Vt. 190 (recounting a long procedural history of permit 

approvals, rejections, violations, and appeals). Nor is this a case seeking the enforcement of 

zoning bylaws with respect to a present land use. Cf. In re Charlotte Farm & Mills, 172 Vt. 607, 

607–608 (2001) (zoning administrator’s determination that a sawmill operation was consistent 

with an existing permit was appealable to the zoning board of adjustment) (mem.) 

 Vallee argues that it is within the power of a zoning administrator to give an opinion “as 

to whether a potential project would require any number of permits,” and the failure to do so 

constituted a “failure to act” which was appealable to the DRB and this Court. According to 

Vallee, the ZA could not fulfil her duty to “provide an applicant with forms . . . to obtain any 

[required] municipal permit or other municipal authorization” without first determining whether 

authorization is required. See 24 V.S.A. 4448(c). In making its argument, Vallee overlooks the 

simple fact that this case involves no applicant, proposal, or action in violation of a current permit 

or the current Bylaws. 

 Vallee also argues that this Court’s decision in In re Chamberlin implicitly ruled that zoning 

administrators may issue appealable advisory opinions. See In re Chamberlin, No. 123-7-04 Vtec 

(Vt. Envtl. Ct. May 31, 2005) (Wright, J.). This is so, Vallee contends, because the Chamberlin 

Court found that the Town of Northfield Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) lacked jurisdiction to 

render an advisory interpretation of a zoning ordinance “in the absence of an appeal . . . from 

the [ZA]’s initial interpretation.” See id. at 6. 

The facts of Chamberlin are not analogous to the situation here, and the case does not 

stand for Vallee’s proposition. In Chamberlin, a landowner filed a “[r]equest for interpretation 

of zoning ordinance” with the ZBA for the purpose of gaining permission to open a garage at his 

home. See id. at 2 (quotations omitted). As the Court explained, the landowner “could have 

raised his interpretation issue by applying for a zoning permit” with the ZA, but instead “he made 

a request directly to the ZBA for interpretation . . . and as the ‘relief requested’ sought 

‘permission to open a garage.’” See id. at 4–5. The Court’s ruling was that the ZBA had no 

jurisdiction to issue an advisory interpretation without an appeal from the ZA’s “initial 

interpretation or decision or an application . . . that is within the jurisdiction of the ZBA in the 

first instance.” Id. at 6. 

The Court’s decision was based largely on local ordinances which have no bearing here, 

and the implication, if any, is that the landowner should have obtained an interpretation of the 

zoning ordinance in the context of a proper permit application filed with the ZA. See id. at 4–6. 

Thus, the Chamberlin precedent which Valley references actually supports the opposite 
R.L. Vallee Determination Request Appeal, No. 109-9-19 Vtec EO on Motion to Dismiss) (May 12, 2020) Page 6 of 8. 

conclusion: that the ZA in the case at bar was not authorized to provide the impermissible 

advisory opinion that Valley once sought and is now seeking from this Court. 

 We agree that zoning administrators routinely provide informal advisory opinions to 

landowners and neighbors as to whether a hypothetical project requires a permit, but we can 

find no statutory obligation to do so. Mere guidance of this type, or the lack thereof, is not an 

appealable “decision or act taken by the administrative officer” pursuant to their statutory 

duties. See 24 V.S.A. § 4465(a); see also 24 V.S.A. § 4472(a) (“[T]he exclusive remedy . . . with 

respect to any decision or act taken, or failure to act, under this chapter . . . shall be the appeal 

to the appropriate [municipal] panel.”) (emphasis added). Such guidance has no legal impact on 

the rights of interested parties, absent a finding of reliance giving rise to estoppel. See In re 

Langlois/Novicki Variance Denial, 2017 VT 76, ¶¶ 26, 29, 205 Vt. 340 (where the application of 

equitable estoppel prevented a town from enforcing its zoning regulations when the landowner 

detrimentally relied on the ZA’s inaccurate conclusion that no permit was needed); see also In re 

Griffin, 2006 VT 75, ¶¶ 18–22, 180 Vt. 589 (discussing requirements for equitable estoppel). 

 Vallee’s final argument concerning the ZA asks this Court to apply the law which relates 

to jurisdictional opinions in the Act 250 context. In Act 250 matters, “any person may . . . request 

a jurisdictional opinion from the district coordinator concerning” the applicability of regulations 

to “an activity which might or might not” be subject to regulation. See 10 V.S.A. § 6007(c). Yet, 

as Vallee points out, “[a] request for a jurisdictional opinion is a unique procedure, since it in 

effect is a statutory authorization for a district coordinator, and this Court on appeal, to render 

an advisory opinion as to whether a proposed development requires a state land use permit.” In 

re WhistlePig, LLC Act 250 JO, No. 21-2-13 Vtec, slip op. at 11 (Vt. Super. Ct. Envtl. Div. Apr. 11, 

2014) (Durkin, J.). Vallee urges us to adopt a similar procedure here, giving municipal zoning 

administrators the power and obligation to render formal advisory opinions with legal effect. 

There is no statute providing for such a procedure in the municipal context, and we decline to 

create an entirely new system of municipal zoning review by judicial fiat. 

 The ZA was not obligated to respond to Vallee’s request for an opinion regarding a 

hypothetical land use on Costco’s property. Any determination from the ZA would have been 

purely advisory, since Costco had not opened its gas station, proposed to open its gas station, or 

applied for any approval to do so. Vallee’s appeal to the DRB, requesting a finding that Costco 

needed an amendment to its existing approvals before opening the gas station, was likewise a 

request for an unauthorized advisory opinion which would have no legal effect. See In re 232511 

Investments, Ltd., 2006 VT 27, ¶ 18, 179 Vt. 409 (DRB statements concerning what would be 

required “if the [landowner] applied to amend” a designation “had no effect” because the 

landowner “did not actually file such an application”). Finally, this Court lacks jurisdiction to 

consider Vallee’s request because “the question . . . is hypothetical, and any conclusion we might 

reach would be advisory.” See id. ¶ 19 (citing In re Bennington Sch., Inc., 2004 VT 6, ¶¶ 18–19, 

176 Vt. 584); see also In re Torres, 154 Vt. 233, 235 (1990) (“The reach of the superior court in 

zoning appeals is as broad as the powers of a zoning board of adjustment or a planning 

commission, but it is not broader.”); Parker v. Town of Milton, 169 Vt. 74, 77 (1998) (courts lack 

the power to issue advisory opinions) (citation omitted). 
R.L. Vallee Determination Request Appeal, No. 109-9-19 Vtec EO on Motion to Dismiss) (May 12, 2020) Page 7 of 8. 

 Vallee contends that we should remand the matter for consideration by the DRB 

regardless of the merits of the underlying request, because the Town improperly rejected the 

appeal by way of a letter from a Town official. Whether to issue a remand order is “an area of 

trial court discretion.” In re Maple Tree Place, 156 Vt. 494, 501 (1991). While we find the 

procedures employed at the Town somewhat concerning, a remand in this case would do nothing 

more than create a needless round of further appeals. The litigation surrounding Costco’s effort 

to open a gas station has persisted for many years in various forms, with procedural 

gamesmanship sometimes occurring on all sides. In this instance, no revision of substance has 

happened or even been proposed on the site. No decision from the DRB or this Court in relation 

to Vallee’s current request will change the position or rights of the parties. If, as Vallee suggests, 

Costco does decide to move forward with a modified proposal or a change in land use, there will 

then be opportunities to resolve any outstanding issues, either by way of a permit amendment 

application or a threatened zoning enforcement action.4 

 Furthermore, we recognize that trial courts are always under the “independent obligation 

to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists” in the legal issues presented. In 

re Verizon Wireless Barton Permit, No. 133-6-08 Vtec, slip op. at 8 (Vt. Envtl. Ct. May 20, 2009) 

(Durkin, J.) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006)). Thus, “[w]henever it 

appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject 

matter, the court shall dismiss the action.” V.R.C.P. 12(h)(3). 

 In this case, we conclude that we do not have jurisdiction to hear Vallee’s appeal. The 

Environmental Division is a Court of limited appellate jurisdiction; our authority is narrowly 

defined. Pursuant to 24 V.S.A. §§ 4471 and 4472, an interested person “may appeal a decision 

rendered . . . by an appropriate municipal panel to the Environmental Division.” See 24 V.S.A. 

§ 4471, 4472. In our de novo review of municipal decisions, this Court sits in the shoes of the 

relevant municipal panel. V.R.E.C.P. 5(g); In re Feeley Constr. Permits, Nos. 4-1-10 Vtec and 5-1-

10 Vtec, slip op. at 11–13 (Vt. Super. Ct. Envtl. Div. Jan. 3, 2011) (Wright, J.) (citing In re Maple 

Tree Place, 156 Vt. 494, 500 (1991)). Thus, our review is limited to those issues raised before and 

considered by the municipal panel below. See, e.g., In re Torres, 154 Vt. 233, 235 (1990) (“The 

reach of the superior court in zoning appeals is as broad as the powers of a zoning board of 

adjustment or a planning commission, but it is not broader.”); see also In re Maple Tree Place, 

156 Vt. at 500 (“[T]he superior court is limited to consideration of the matters properly warned 

as before the local board.”). 

 While Vallee’s notice of appeal follows the proper form, we note that it does not seek 

review of any “decision rendered” by the DRB. See 24 V.S.A. § 4471. Instead, Vallee seeks to 

appeal “the Decision(s) incorporated in a certain letter”5 from Ms. Hadd, a letter which stated 

quite clearly that the DRB would not hear Vallee’s appeal in the first instance. Vallee’s request 

for a ruling “that Colchester was required to docket Vallee’s appeal with the DRB” highlights the 

jurisdictional problem: the DRB itself never heard or considered Vallee’s appeal. In our appellate 

capacity, we cannot rule on issues which were never presented to or decided by the DRB. See In 

4

 We gather that resolution through negotiation between the parties is not realistic in this dispute. 

5

 See Notice of Appeal, filed Sept. 26, 2019; Statement of Questions, filed Sept. 26, 2019. 
R.L. Vallee Determination Request Appeal, No. 109-9-19 Vtec EO on Motion to Dismiss) (May 12, 2020) Page 8 of 8. 

re Maple Tree Place, 156 Vt. at 500. Whatever the merits of Vallee’s contentions, there is no 

decision of an appropriate municipal panel to appeal from. Vallee’s request for a remand further 

illustrates the problem. We cannot remand to a lower tribunal which never took up the matter 

in the first place. We recite these propositions as additional support for our decision to grant the 

Town’s motion. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we GRANT the Town’s motion to dismiss. The dismissal of this 

appeal renders the remaining cross-motions for summary judgment MOOT. 

This concludes the matter presently before the Court. A Judgment Order issues alongside 

this Entry Order. 

So Ordered. 

Electronically signed on May 12, 2020 at Brattleboro, Vermont, pursuant to V.R.E.F. 7(d). 

________________________________ 

Thomas S. Durkin, Superior Judge 

Environmental Division 

Notifications: 

Jon T. Anderson (ERN 1856), Attorney for Appellant R.L. Vallee, Inc. 

Alexander J. LaRosa (ERN 5814), Co-counsel for Appellant R.L. Vallee, Inc. 

Brian P. Monaghan (ERN 1186) and Christian S. Chorba (ERN 9179), Attorneys for 

the Town of Colchester 

David L. Grayck (ERN 4510), Attorney for Interested Person Timberlake Associates, LLP 

Mark G. Hall (ERN 2537), Attorney for Intervenor Costco Wholesale Corp. 

bcivilet