S. HRG. 110–394, PT. 7

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR

APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

S. 3001

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009 FOR MILITARY 

ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL 

YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

PART 7

STRATEGIC FORCES

MARCH 4, 12; APRIL 1, 2008

(

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009—Part 7

STRATEGIC FORCES

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42–635 PDF 2008

S. HRG. 110–394 PT. 7

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR

APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

S. 3001

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009 FOR MILITARY 

ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL 

YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

PART 7

STRATEGIC FORCES

MARCH 4, 12; APRIL 1, 2008

(

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia, 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida 

ROGER WICKER, Mississippi 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

MICHAEL V. KOSTIW, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

BILL NELSON, Florida, Chairman 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMS

MARCH 4, 2008

Page 

Payton, Gary E., Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for Space Programs ..................................................................................................................... 3

Kehler, Gen. C. Robert, USAF, Commander, Air Force Space Command .......... 7

Shelton, Lt. Gen. William L., USAF, Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Space, United States Strategic Command ........................ 16

Deutsch, RADM Kenneth W., USN, Director, Warfare Integration, Office of 

the Chief of Naval Operations ............................................................................ 18

Chaplain, Cristina T., Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, Government Accountability Office ............................................................................. 21

STRATEGIC FORCES PROGRAMS

MARCH 12, 2008

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS

APRIL 1, 2008

Young, Hon. John J., Jr., Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Department of Defense ................................................... 141

Obering, Lt. Gen. Henry A., III, USAF, Director, Missile Defense Agency ........ 143

Campbell, LTG Kevin T., USA, Commanding General, United States Army 

Space and Missile Defense Command ................................................................ 155

McQueary, Dr. Charles E., Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Department of Defense ............................................................................................. 161

Francis, Paul L., Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, Government Accountability Office .................................................................................. 163

(III) 

(1)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2009

TUESDAY, MARCH 4, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMS 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in room 

SR–232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Bill Nelson 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin 

Nelson, Sessions, and Thune. 

Majority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel. 

Minority staff member present: Robert M. Soofer, professional 

staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Brian F. Sebold. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Todd Stiefler, assistant to Senator 

Sessions; and Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON, CHAIRMAN 

Senator BILL NELSON. Good afternoon. The hearing will come to 

order. After this open session, we will adjourn to S–407 of the Capitol, where we will continue this on the classified level. 

I’m going to forgo a statement and put it in the record. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Nelson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

Welcome to all of our witnesses this afternoon for the Strategic Subcommittee’s 

hearing on military space programs. General Kehler, it is a pleasure to welcome you 

to the committee in your capacity as the new Commander of the Air Force Space 

Command. 

This afternoon we have, as I have mentioned, General Kehler, Commander Air 

Force Space Command; Lieutenant General Shelton, in his capacity as the Strategic 

Command Joint Functional Component Commander for Space; Rear Admiral 

Deutsch, Director, Warfare Integration Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; Gary Peyton, the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for Space Programs; and Ms. Cristina Chaplain, from the Government Accountability Office. 

Many years of space experience are represented on this panel and we look forward 

to a good discussion. 

With the launch of the first Wideband Global Satellite last October, the first 

launch of the GPS–2F satellite scheduled for early next year, and the news that the 

first Space-based Infrared System HEO sensor is performing remarkably, the reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:11 Dec 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\42635.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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capitalization of space systems is clearly underway. The extensive space recapitalization efforts come with many challenges, however, including the new problems 

with the Spaced-based Infrared System GEO satellite, the delay in the T-Sat program, and concerns about the scope of the GPS III program. In addition, we continue to be concerned about improving space situational awareness and making sure 

that space protection efforts are fully coordinated. 

Last year, the National Defense Authorization Act contained a provision directing 

development of a joint space protection strategy, with the hope that this would be 

a first step toward ensuring that space protection is fully coordinated. Hopefully 

there is good progress on this strategy. 

There is good news as well, the EELV program continues its string of successful 

launches with a significant number of launches scheduled in 2008 and 2009. 

Progress is also being made in the area of operationally responsive space and the 

standup in May of last year of the new ORS Joint Program Office. 

We have a large number of witnesses this afternoon and you all have submitted 

prepared statements, which, without objection will be included for the record. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, at about 4 p.m., we will move to room S–407 

of the Capitol and receive some classified briefings at the SCI level. All members 

and appropriately cleared staff are invited. 

As I mentioned, each witness has provided substantial statements that have been 

included in the record, so now I would like to hear, briefly, from each of you about 

your most important issue or the one about which you worry the most, and take 

the opportunity to discuss those issues in a conversational style. We have found that 

these sessions are much more useful approached as a conversation. 

With that Mr. Peyton, will you begin, and then we will go to General Kehler, 

Lieutenant General Shelton, Admiral Deutsch, and Ms. Chaplain.

Senator BILL NELSON. When Senator Sessions gets here, we’ll do 

whatever he wants. I am going to put into the record each of your 

opening statements, and we are not going to take the time for you 

to sit here and read to me your statement, it’s in the record, we’ll 

move directly to questions. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Sessions follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

Mr. Chairman, I join with you in welcoming today’s Air Force, Navy, Strategic 

Command, and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) witnesses as we examine the state of U.S. military space programs, particularly with respect to the fiscal 

year 2009 budget request. 

The past year has been a good one for our military space professionals. They 

should take great pride in providing daily space support to our forces operating 

abroad, and for continuing to provide the backbone for our Nation’s strategic nuclear 

deterrent. 

Air Force Space Command continues to add to its record of successful national security payload launches, with a total of 56 consecutive launches, including five successful launches of the Evolved Expendable Launch vehicle last year. 

Air Force space acquisition programs, though heavily criticized in the past, appear 

to be moving in the right direction. Our GAO witness notes that recent actions 

taken by the Air Force and the Department of Defense (DOD) to address acquisition 

problems ‘‘are a good first step.’’ That the back-to-basics policy and Operationally 

Responsive Space represent significant shifts in thinking about how space systems 

should be developed. 

The fiscal year 2009 budget request for space programs—almost $9 billion—represents approximately 7 percent of the $117 billion Air Force budget, and 21 percent 

of the Air Force Modernization and Recapitalization budget request of $41 billion. 

Despite these significant sums, the Air Force and the DOD still felt it necessary 

to reduce funding for critical military satellite communications programs over the 

Future Years Defense Program, and provided only a modest increase in funding for 

space protection programs. 

The subcommittee will want to better understand how the Air Force and the Department rationalize these choices. 

I thank the witnesses for their service to the country and look forward to hearing 

their testimony.

3

STATEMENT OF GARY E. PAYTON, DEPUTY UNDER 

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR SPACE PROGRAMS 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Payton follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GARY E. PAYTON

INTRODUCTION

It is an honor to appear before this Committee as the Deputy Under Secretary 

of the Air Force for Space Programs, to discuss with you our National Security 

Space activities. I support the Secretary of the Air Force with his responsibilities 

as the Service Acquisition Executive for Space Programs and the Department of Defense (DOD) Executive Agent for Space, where his role is to ‘‘develop, coordinate, 

and integrate plans and programs for space systems and the acquisition of DOD 

space Major Defense Acquisition Programs to provide operational space force capabilities to ensure the United States has the space power to achieve its national security objectives.’’

The U.S. relies upon space capabilities not only to meet the needs of joint military 

operations worldwide, but to underpin our Nation’s diplomatic, informational, and 

economic strengths as well. Because of this, it is important to ensure that our National Security Space (NSS) systems and our space professionals are integrated 

across our peacetime and wartime operations—providing robust and responsive 

space capabilities around the globe—particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Americans also rely on the access and use of space capabilities in many areas of 

everyday life. Whether using satellites for navigation, communications, or the forecasting of severe weather, America increasingly depends on its space systems. To 

ensure the availability of these systems, the NSS community continues to program, 

and provide, for continuity in key mission areas, while simultaneously working to 

modernize and recapitalize our aging satellite constellations and supporting infrastructure. 

At the same time, the global rate of change for technology and the number of nations directly engaged in space continues to increase. As a result, the ability of an 

adversary to contest our space capabilities is growing. In such an environment, we 

must improve our space situational awareness (SSA)—enabling a better understanding of objects and their activities in space. 

We must ensure mission continuity in several key space capabilities, such as: 

Strategic Communications; Missile Warning; Launch; and Positioning, Navigation, 

and Timing (i.e., the Global Positioning System (GPS)), while pursuing increased 

Space Protection. Over approximately a 2-year period, beginning with the Wideband 

Global SATCOM (WGS) launch in October 2007, we will deliver five ‘‘first of’’ satellites. These include: WGS; Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF); Space 

Based Space Surveillance (SBSS); GPS IIF; and Space Based Infrared System 

(SBIRS) geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) satellites. 

Always seeking ways to improve, we look forward to the recommendations of the 

congressionally-directed Independent Review and Assessment of DOD Organization 

and Management for National Security in Space. In the interim, I offer that the Secretary of the Air Force should remain the DOD Executive Agent for Space, and that 

this position has been critical in aligning space efforts across the DOD and other 

government agencies. 

BACK TO BASICS IN SPACE ACQUISITION

We continue to institutionalize our ‘‘back-to-basics’’ acquisition philosophy, which 

emphasizes increased discipline in the development and stabilization of requirements, resources, engineering practices, and management. It also promotes a more 

deliberate acquisition planning strategy, firmly focused on mission success and delivering on our commitments. 

Our acquisition philosophy can be viewed as a continuous process with five distinct but interdependent stages. The first stage is science and technology (S&T), 

where we conduct basic research and explore the possibilities of new technologies. 

In the second stage, technology development, we mature technologies into proven 

components and subsystems exploiting discoveries made in the S&T stage. The third 

stage is systems development. Here, we take the most promising technologies and 

mature them to higher technical and manufacturing readiness levels as part of integrated systems which can be produced in operational platforms in the fourth stage, 

system production. Thus, technology is matured through the first three stages. We 

are emphasizing early technology development to ensure mature component technology is available for our production systems. Entering the system production 

4

phase with mature technology reduces cost, schedule, and performance risk. This allows confidence in predicting which new capabilities can be delivered when. The 

fifth stage is Sustainment, where the goal is increasing systems availability while 

reducing Operations and Support costs. Integration of acquisition and sustainment 

early in life-cycle development is key to achieving these goals. 

A block approach acquisition strategy delivers systems through discrete, valueadded increments which reduces production risk, delivers incremental capabilities 

to the warfighter sooner, and maintains continuity of service. This concept is consistent with current policy specifying ‘‘evolutionary acquisition as the preferred 

strategy’’ for DOD acquisitions. Specific capability increments are based on a balance of warfighter needs, delivery timeline, technology maturity, and budget. Welldefined increments help reduce many of the potential instabilities in requirements, 

budget, and workforce. An overarching goal is increased confidence, both in terms 

of cost and schedule, for our space acquisition programs. Therefore, I ask for your 

continued support, not only for the current generation of satellites and supporting 

technologies, but for the next generation technology development and the generation 

after next S&T, to ensure that we are able to continue this block approach strategy. 

UPDATE ON SPACE

Today, I would like to briefly discuss some of the achievements we have had over 

the last year and some of our NSS initiatives. 

Launch 

Over the past year, we launched the last Defense Support Program satellite, our 

first Wideband Global SATCOM satellite, two additional GPS IIR–M satellites and 

extended our string of consecutive, successful NSS launches. 

The December 10, 2007 launch of a National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) satellite marked the 56th consecutive, successful launch of a NSS Medium or Heavy 

payload—extending an incredible record. This unprecedented string of launch successes, which started in 1999, is a testament to the knowledge, skill, and commitment of our space professionals—particularly in the areas of Mission Assurance and 

attention to detail. 

Missile Warning 

Our Nation continues to rely on space-based missile warning—and for over 35 

years, our legacy space-based sensors, in conjunction with ground-based radars, 

have done an excellent job of meeting the Nation’s missile warning needs. On November 11, 2007, the 23rd, and final, Defense Support Program satellite (DSP–23) 

was successfully launched. This legacy constellation, however, continues to age, 

while threats such as the proliferation of theater ballistic missiles and advanced 

technologies continue to grow. These threats are driving the need for the increased 

coverage and resolution that will come with the SBIRS. 

SBIRS supports four mission areas: missile warning, missile defense, technical intelligence, and battlespace awareness, and will be comprised of both GEO satellites 

and highly elliptical orbit (HEO) payloads. The first HEO payload was launched in 

2006, and its on-orbit performance is exceeding expectations. Launches of the first 

SBIRS GEO satellite and the second HEO payload are both scheduled in fiscal year 

2009. 

Our funding request supports the procurement of three GEO spacecraft, two additional HEO payloads, plus the necessary ground elements. We continue to work 

with our industry partners to resolve challenges on the SBIRS GEO–1 spacecraft, 

specifically with respect to the Flight Software Subsystem, to ensure the successful 

launch of this critical capability. Our budget request also funds the Third Generation Infrared System program to develop wide field-of-view technologies. This is the 

technology development necessary reduce cost, schedule, and performance risks for 

the next generation of missile warning satellites. 

Communications 

Satellite Communications (SATCOM) is another critical space capability for which 

we must ensure mission continuity. The U.S. military is a highly mobile and dispersed force that relies heavily on wideband, protected, and narrowband SATCOM 

for command, control, and coordination of forces. SATCOM also enables forces to receive real-time images and video of battlefield and targets, thereby accelerating decision-making from the strategic to the tactical levels. These images and video often 

come from Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) controlled via SATCOM links, allowing the UAVs to fly far beyond the line of sight and to collect information without 

endangering U.S. forces. 

5

On October 11, 2007 we successfully launched the first WGS satellite as part of 

the Department’s constellation of wideband satellites, significantly increasing the 

on-orbit capacity—a single WGS satellite has greater capacity than the entire legacy 

Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) III constellation. This success 

represents the first step in the Department’s transition from its aging DSCS satellites to an increased capability for the effective command and control of U.S. forces 

around the globe. The Department also signed a Memorandum of Understanding 

with the Department of Defence of Australia on November 14, 2007, forming a partnership for the production, operation, and support of the WGS constellation. Our 

funding request supports the launch and on-orbit check out for two WGS satellites 

in fiscal year 2009. 

In the protected SATCOM portfolio, this year we are scheduled to launch the first 

AEHF system—the follow-on to the Department’s current Milstar satellites. This 

initial AEHF launch will complete the worldwide Medium Data Rate (MDR) ring, 

increasing the data-rate for these low probability of intercept/detection and anti-jam 

communications from tens-of-kilobytes per second to approximately a megabyte per 

second. Our funding request supports the procurement of four AEHF satellites. 

The next generation of SATCOM satellites, the Transformational Satellite (TSAT) 

Communications System, will support both wideband and protected requirements. 

We are continuing with TSAT technology development and risk reduction efforts, 

and this past year we completed the Systems Design Review (SDR). In 2007, an 

independent Technology Readiness Assessment determined the program is prepared 

to enter the next phase of development. With the addition of the fourth AEHF satellite, the Department is currently conducting a MILSATCOM investment review to 

ensure the program’s overall affordability and synchronization with user platforms. 

Positioning, Navigation, and Timing 

The U.S. GPS continues to be the world standard for positioning, navigation, and 

timing (PNT). As a result, GPS has been incorporated into military, commercial, and 

civilian applications, to include navigation, agriculture, banking, cartography, telecommunications, and transportation. Last year the GPS Program Office seamlessly 

implemented the Architecture Evolution Plan upgrade to the existing GPS Operational Control System. This upgrade increased sustainability and provided the ability to control the new GPS IIF satellites. Perhaps most notably, these upgrades 

were implemented with no impact to day-to-day operations and did not require any 

modifications to existing user equipment. 

Later this year, there are three GPS IIR–M launches scheduled and we will begin 

to launch the next generation, GPS IIF, satellites in fiscal year 2009. These satellites, along with their ground control system and associated user equipment, continue to ensure constellation sustainment, increase the number of on-orbit M-code 

capable satellites, and introduce the ‘‘L5’’ civil signal. At the same time, the Air 

Force is developing the next generation of PNT satellites through the GPS III program. 

GPS III will offer significant improvements in navigation capabilities by improving interoperability and jam resistance. The procurement of the GPS III system is 

planned for multiple blocks, with the GPS IIIA portion currently underway. GPS 

IIIA includes all of the GPS IIF capability plus up to a 10-fold increase in signal 

power, a new civil signal compatible with the European Union’s Galileo system, and 

a new spacecraft bus that will allow a growth path to future blocks. As for the development of the ground infrastructure, we recently awarded two contracts for the 

System Definition and Risk Reduction phase for the associated ground segment, 

OCX. These two OCX contracts will each deliver prototypes and lead to a competitive selection of a single contractor in late fiscal year 2009. 

Space Situational Awareness 

Mission continuity is critical for persistent space based PNT, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, strategic communications, and global environmental monitoring. As nations, and non-nation state actors, demonstrate both the capability and 

will to disrupt our space operations, we risk losing that continuity. Anti-jam 

SATCOM technologies, higher power GPS M-Code navigation signals, radiation 

hardened technology, on-orbit reconstitution, and dispersed ground segments are all 

part of our improved space survivability. We must also account for the possibility 

that new capabilities to deny, damage, or destroy our on-orbit assets will be arrayed 

against us. We are expanding our SSA to provide the ability to fully characterize 

and understand these new threats as they mature, as well as clearly discriminate 

between a hostile act and a naturally occurring event. In parallel, we are developing 

the organizational, operational, and technical enablers that will allow us to react 

swiftly and decisively when these threats materialize. 

6

New systems that will contribute to SSA include the Rapid Attack Identification 

Detection and Reporting System (RAIDRS) program, the Space Fence, SBSS, and 

the Integrated Space Situational Awareness (ISSA) program. 

RAIDRS develops ground based systems that rapidly detect, locate, characterize, 

identify, and report interference with DOD-owned and DOD-used space assets, and 

it is being developed via a block approach. In the next year, Block 10 will provide 

initial capabilities that detect and geo-locate SATCOM interference via fixed and 

mobile ground systems. Future development of the Block 20 system will provide 

automated data access/analysis, data fusion, and detection support capabilities. 

The Space Fence is planned to replace the aging Air Force Space Surveillance 

System with a higher radio frequency system to detect and track smaller sized space 

objects, and provide worldwide coverage for the first time. It expands the terrestrial 

based detection and tracking capability, supporting SSA while working in concert 

with other networked sensors. 

The SBSS program is planned to deliver optical sensing satellites to search, detect, and track objects in earth orbit—particularly those in geosynchronous orbit—

building upon the success of the Space-Based Visible (SBV) technology demonstration. Surveillance from space will augment our ground sensors, and the initial SBSS 

Block 10 will replace the aging SBV sensor in 2009. 

To combine all of the various inputs and provide a single picture for decisionmakers, we are also pursuing the ISSA program. When delivered, ISSA will have 

the capability to acquire, process, integrate, and fuse SSA data to create the awareness we need, with an ability to attribute actions. Currently, our operators and 

warfighters must assemble an understanding of the global space picture from many 

disparate sources, including telephone calls, classified chat rooms, intelligence web 

sites, and imagery feeds. We have acknowledged this shortcoming and have initiated 

programs to bring data together, filter it for relevance, and aid the commander in 

making a timely decision that could attribute an attack or malfunction, preserve 

health of a constellation, or re-task sensors to track a new launch. The cornerstone 

program for this is the ISSA program, which will interact with the space command 

and control (C2) system to provide automated decision tools supporting decisionmaking on a timescale appropriate for today’s and tomorrow’s challenges in space. 

The space operating environment is becoming increasingly complex; we need to 

equip our Nation’s space operators with the tools necessary to characterize space activities and accurately attribute actions. 

Operationally Responsive Space 

Another key initiative is Operationally Responsive Space (ORS), and I thank you 

for your continuing support for this program. On May 21, 2007, the Operationally 

Responsive Space Office was stood up at Kirtland AFB, NM, to develop, acquire, and 

deploy a tiered capability consisting of responsive spacecraft, launch vehicles, and 

ground equipment. The ORS Office is a jointly manned entity that reports to the 

DOD Executive Agent for Space, and will have representation from the defense, intelligence, civil, and international communities—to include Air Force, Army, Navy, 

and Marines, personnel from NASA, NSA, NRO, and Sandia National Laboratory—

and we are pursuing allied partner representatives. Many other organizations, while 

not providing direct staff in the office, are planning to establish liaison relationships 

with the ORS Office to ensure synergy and close coordination. 

Through a series of tactical satellite (TACSAT) operational experiments, we are 

exploring affordable and responsive launch, checkout, and theater integration of 

space systems to better support the needs of the combatant commanders. TACSAT 

experiments will test concepts such as common interfaces, subsystems, new payloads, and new concepts of operations. The 2009 request for the ORS program element funds the TACSAT–4 launch and development of TACSAT–5, a plug and play 

spacecraft bus. Additionally, responding to urgent warfighter requirements, vetted 

by U.S. Strategic Command, the ORS office is initiating communications and SSA 

programs in 2008 and 2009. 

WORKFORCE

Our DOD space professional workforce includes our military Active, Reserve, and 

Guard components, and our civil service personnel. We are currently coordinating 

a new DOD Directive that will clearly outline responsibilities within the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense and the Services for the education, training, and management of these critical space professionals. 

Looking beyond the DOD, a healthy space industrial base is one of our top priorities. The Space Industrial Base Council (SIBC) which is co-chaired by Secretary 

Wynne, as the DOD Executive Agent for Space, with the Director of the NRO, Scott 

Large, brings together stakeholders from across government and industry to coordiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:11 Dec 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\42635.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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nate actions on critical space industrial base issues. The SIBC has taken a quantitative look at the health of U.S. companies and how they are balancing competitiveness and security concerns. We are all committed to protecting sensitive space 

technology while allowing our companies to compete internationally. We will continue to strengthen our understanding of the U.S. space industrial base to ensure 

that it remains viable in the future—we cannot afford to lose this national capability. 

I would also like to thank the committee for its support of the National Defense 

Education Program (NDEP), which supports scholarships in Math, Science, Engineering, and Foreign Language, with a focus on critical skills for clearable people. 

The NDEP began in fiscal year 2006 with $10 million, and is funded at $44 million 

in fiscal year 2008. The Department is requesting $69 million for this program in 

fiscal year 2009, and I solicit your continued support to ensure we can continue to 

attract and retain these professionals. 

CONCLUSION

We must ensure continuity of service for critical missions such as Missile Warning, Strategic Communications, Launch, and Positioning, Navigation and Timing; 

while improving our SSA. Our strategy over the recent years is showing promising 

results, as we continue toward securing the world’s best space capabilities today and 

ensuring the same for our Nation’s future generations. 

Our Nation prefers to deter or dissuade potential adversaries, and space systems 

are critical to this strategy. When deterrence and dissuasion are not adequate, we 

too often must employ our military—and our space systems are even more critical 

then. Fortunately, our systems are the envy of the world. Our infrared surveillance 

satellites are able to detect missile launches anywhere in the world. Our strategic 

communications systems allow the President precise and assured control over our 

nuclear forces in any stage of conflict, and our wideband SATCOM systems rapidly 

transmit critical information between the continental U.S. to our front line forces. 

Our weather satellites allow us to accurately predict future conditions half a world 

away as well as in space, while our GPS constellation enables position knowledge 

down to centimeters and timing down to nanoseconds. These sophisticated systems 

make each deployed soldier, sailor, marine, and airman safer, and more capable. 

The space constellations that deliver these capabilities are a critical asymmetric 

advantage. We must ensure the recapitalization and health of these constellations. 

While these systems are expensive, not having these space capabilities could be 

even more expensive, both in terms of lives lost and our national defense. 

I look forward to continuing to work with this committee and thank you for your 

continued support of NSS.

STATEMENT OF GEN. C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF, 

COMMANDER, AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND 

[The prepared statement of General Kehler follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, Senator Sessions, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today as an Airman and, for the first 

time, as the Commander of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC). 

I am proud and humble to lead and represent over 39,000 Active Duty, Guard, 

and Reserve airmen; government civilians; and contractors who deliver space and 

missile capabilities to America and its warfighting commands 24 hours a day, 7 

days a week, 365 days a year. We do this as an integral part of the United States 

Air Force (USAF)—an Air Force which operates in and through air, space, and 

cyberspace in order to deliver Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power for 

America. Assuring the Nation’s access to space, protecting our freedom to operate 

in space, and providing joint warfighting capabilities from space are core Air Force 

missions. 

The men and women of AFSPC serve around the globe. From AFSPC Headquarters, Fourteenth Air Force (14 AF), Twentieth Air Force (20 AF), Space and 

Missile Systems Center (SMC), Space Innovation and Development Center (SIDC), 

and a host of deployed and forward locations, our space professionals are organizing, 

training, equipping, and providing the space capabilities needed to fight and win the 

global war on terror. Today, I can report confidently that the space and missile caVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:11 Dec 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\42635.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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pabilities acquired with your help and support and delivered by the airmen of 

AFSPC to the Commander, United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) are 

helping to maintain America’s freedom, security and prosperity. 

Last month, I visited a number of units and commanders in the United States 

Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR). At one stop I received 

a mission briefing from a B–1B Lancer bomber pilot. He reflected that while preparing for the briefing, he came to realize that space capabilities were embedded 

throughout the planning, execution and debriefing phases of his mission. His bomber crew planned their missions using intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

(ISR) terrain mapping and weather data from space systems; the aircraft carried 

Global Positioning System (GPS)-aided Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs); 

when they were flying, real-time updates from a variety of space-based and other 

sources flowed to them over satellite communications (SATCOM) data links; the 

tanker and bomber crews coordinated air-refueling operations using GPS; and strike 

assessment was conducted. This pilot also knew that a combination of space, air, 

and terrestrial assets would immediately come to his assistance if his crew came 

down in hostile territory. In effect, space assets would take the search out of search 

and rescue. In the AOR, I saw first-hand how space plays a crucial role in virtually 

every mission and every operation. Every commander I visited confirmed this assessment. 

Space power gives America’s joint forces a decisive advantage and has shaped the 

‘‘American way of warfare.’’ Today, America’s joint forces are interconnected, have 

global cognizance, and can produce swift and precise effects providing overwhelming 

and decisive results with minimum collateral damage. Our friends and adversaries 

alike have noted this decisive advantage. As a result, having witnessed or learned 

the cost of challenging the United States head-on, would-be adversaries are actively 

pursuing asymmetric strategies to challenge our advantages in air, space and cyberspace. The evidence is clear and convincing. 

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, we experienced GPS jamming and since then we 

have witnessed a worldwide proliferation of technology that can be used against our 

space systems. Our space capabilities face a wide range of threats including radio 

frequency jamming, laser blinding and anti-satellite systems. The emergence of 

these threats requires a broad range of capabilities, from diplomatic to military, to 

protect our interest in space. 

Our National Space Policy acknowledges that space is vital to our national security. We are not alone in our use of space. Today, 28 foreign militaries operate in 

space. 

We can no longer take freedom of action in any of our warfighting domains for 

granted. From this point forward, we should expect to be challenged not only in the 

air, but in and through space and cyberspace as well. We clearly recognize that no 

future conflict will be won without the ability to achieve air, space, and cyberspace 

superiority when and where required and we face significant challenges as we look 

to the future. Therefore, it is crucial that we develop and resource a strategy that 

protects our space advantages and ensures we remain a world leader in space. 

It is my distinct pleasure to define the strategic way forward for AFSPC and to 

describe for you our plan to conceive, acquire, employ and execute Air Force space 

and missile capabilities in an increasingly complex, dynamic and challenging global 

environment. I will present our mission and vision, affirm the guiding principles 

that characterize our approach, highlight some of our recent successes and describe 

how the fiscal year 2009 budget request supports our strategic way ahead. 

As always, AFSPC undertakes our important mission with three USAF priorities 

in mind—win today’s fight, take care of our people and prepare for tomorrow’s challenges. We look forward to working with your committee and Congress to achieve 

our goals. 

Mission 

Deliver space and missile capabilities to America and its warfighting commands

Our mission is clear. For over 50 years, the Air Force has led the Nation’s military space efforts and AFSPC continues that heritage as we deliver space power to 

STRATCOM, Joint Force Commanders around the globe, the Services, the Intelligence Community (IC), civil agencies, commercial entities and Allies. 

Vision 

America’s space leaders . . . delivering responsive, assured, decisive space power

The USAF provides air, space and cyberspace power as part of a joint warfighting 

team. As we look to the future, the military space power element must become more 

responsive to the warfighter, it must remain assured under stressing conditions, it 

must contribute decisively as an integral piece of the larger whole, and it must be 

9

developed and wielded by space professionals who are recognized leaders in both the 

space domain and in joint warfighting operations. 

Guiding Principles 

The following principles shape our approach and underpin our mission and vision.

• The USAF space mission serves joint forces, our Nation, and the world 

at large. The Nation has entrusted the Air Force and AFSPC with advocating, acquiring, and operating capabilities that are vital to our national 

security, economic growth, public safety, and welfare. The men and women 

of AFSPC help defend our homeland and our global interests abroad with 

space and ground-based missile early warning systems; connect national 

leaders and the military with secure global satellite communications; assure 

access to space for military, intelligence, civil and commercial purposes with 

medium and heavy space lift and range capabilities; keep watch over the 

space domain by tracking thousands of space objects; provide planners and 

commanders with critical environmental information; and deliver persistent 

position, navigation and timing signals to worldwide users from GPS, which 

provides multiple military benefits as well as a free, international utility. 

Many of these space systems are also called upon for help in disaster relief 

and search and rescue operations, at home and abroad. Additionally, our 

Nation places trust and confidence in AFSPC to secure, maintain, operate 

and support America’s land based strategic deterrent, the Intercontinental 

Ballistic Missile (ICBM) force. 

• Nuclear forces underwrite our Nation’s security. Nuclear deterrence remains the ultimate backstop of our security by dissuading our opponents 

and assuring our Allies through extended deterrence. Our Nation’s security 

relies heavily on the responsive and stabilizing attributes of AFSPC’s ICBM 

force. 

• Space is one of three interdependent USAF warfighting domains. Air 

Force operations extend across the mutually-supporting and reciprocally-enabling domains of air, space and cyberspace. Thus, airmen who are experts 

in the space domain play a key role in integrating capabilities to create a 

decisive joint military advantage. Cross-domain integration is the key. 

• Space and ICBM forces are global in their effect. AFSPC delivers capabilities that transcend national and military boundaries and are intrinsically and simultaneously tactical and strategic, local and global. As a result, 

the men and women of AFSPC have a global perspective that influences the 

command and control of our forces and the way we provide and present 

them to STRATCOM. At the same time, we recognize the unique space requirements of U.S. Geographic Combatant Commanders around the world, 

and know that we must provide Joint Force Commanders with the space 

capabilities they need to see, know, and decisively act. 

• Like air power, space power shapes the U.S. approach to warfare. Our 

increasingly net-centric Joint expeditionary force operates with smaller forward footprints and a greater dependence on reachback organizations. 

Space capabilities are inextricably embedded in an ever-more effective arsenal of modern weaponry and are threaded throughout the fabric of the Joint 

warfighting network. Without space, military operations would be far less 

precise, focused, timely, coordinated or efficient and much more costly in 

every respect. 

• Space is a challenging, demanding, and contested domain. Space 

acquirers, developers, and operators must be technically astute and 

tactically competent to ensure mission success in the space domain. While 

necessary, technical competence alone is not sufficient to meet 21st century 

challenges. Today, AFSPC people must be adequately prepared to operate 

space assets and assure space capabilities in an increasingly contested environment. 

• Airmen are the core of America’s space team. The airmen and civilian 

space professionals of AFSPC serve a national mission and our skills and 

expertise are national assets. Since the beginning of the space age, airmen 

have contributed significantly to the national space enterprise. While airmen are serving the military space mission today in AFSPC, many other 

airmen are working elsewhere in the government within national security 

and civil space organizations. Commercial space companies and the space 

industry also abound with space professionals who gained training and experience while serving our Air Force.

While these principles shape our views, our sights are set directly on supporting 

the Air Force commitment to provide forces across the range of military operations 

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to protect U.S. interests and values; to assure Allies; to dissuade and deter potential 

adversaries; and if deterrence fails, to defeat those who choose to become our enemies. In answering this call, with congressional support, the space professionals of 

AFSPC last year delivered space and missile capabilities with great success. 

A YEAR OF SUCCESSES

AFSPC activities in 2007 supported the Expeditionary Air Force, delivered and 

demonstrated space and missile capabilities, improved relationships across the 

space enterprise, and cared for our airmen and their families. We are also optimistic 

that we have made progress toward solving our systemic acquisition problems with 

our back-to-basics approach. Here are several of our key accomplishments.

• We forward-deployed nearly 4,000 airmen—further developing a strong 

bond between AFSPC and the airmen, soldiers, sailors, and marines who 

rely on our capabilities. 

• The end of 2007 marked 5 consecutive years without premature failure 

of any AFSPC on-orbit system—many of our satellites are lasting years beyond their original predicted life spans and are exceeding expectations 

every day. 

• AFSPC added to our all-time record which now stands at 56 successful 

national security payload launches in a row—we continued a string of excellence with 19 out of 19 successful operational launches using the Atlas V 

and Delta IV Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELVs). 

• In November, AFSPC conducted the first operational launch of a Delta 

IV Heavy EELV which carried the last Defense Support Program (DSP) satellite into orbit. 

• Without interruption of services, AFSPC completed the transition of the 

GPS ground control segment to the new Architecture Evolution Plan (AEP) 

system—replacing a 20-year-old command and control (C2) architecture 

with one that enables responsive Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) 

services. 

• Last year, AFSPC launched Glory Trip-193 to certify the use of the Mk 

21 Safety Enhanced Reentry Vehicle (SERV) on the Minuteman III (MM 

III) ICBM. Additionally, this test demonstrated the capability of our ICBM 

force. 

• AFSPC and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) further solidified 

our operational relationship. 

• In addition, AFSPC sustained and expanded use of the Total Force. Last 

year, at Minot Air Force Base, ND, we stood-up the first-ever Air National 

Guard unit to support intercontinental ballistic missile field security forces. 

At Schriever Air Force Base, the AFSPC Reserve Forces are growing with 

the transition of the 310th Space Group to wing status. 

• We privatized nearly 2,500 military family housing residences at Peterson, Schriever, Los Angeles and Vandenberg Air Force Bases. Additionally, 

351 AFSPC families moved into newly-privatized units at Buckley Air Force 

Base. 

• Finally, AFSPC experienced one of the safest years in its 25-year history—we lost no airmen in off-duty accidents. Moreover, AFSPC has had 

zero major weapons mishaps in over 4 years, zero major flight mishaps in 

8 years and zero major space mishaps in over 2 years.

As proud as we are of our success, AFSPC’s strategic way forward is to focus on 

delivering the space and missile capabilities needed today and tomorrow by balancing recapitalization and modernization investments, implementing organizational and cultural changes and maturing our space professionals. 

THE WAY AHEAD

To defend America and provide needed capabilities to the joint team, AFSPC solidified over the last year a deliberate approach to confront the challenges of a dynamic strategic environment. The fiscal year 2009 budget request carefully balances 

a number of critical priorities.

Maintain perfection as the standard for nuclear operations, maintenance, security, 

and support.

In AFSPC, we are absolutely committed to providing a credible, safe and secure 

strategic deterrent. At any given moment, about 1,200 of the nearly 10,000 airmen 

in 20 AF are on duty in the Nation’s MM III ICBM missile fields in Montana, North 

Dakota, Wyoming, Nebraska, and Colorado. These young professionals understand 

the awesome responsibilities entrusted to them and will never take those responVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:11 Dec 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\42635.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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sibilities or the Nation’s trust and confidence for granted. This year we will continue 

to sustain the Minuteman ICBM system as we selectively improve security measures and implement any necessary recommendations resulting from various nuclear 

reviews.

• Standards. We have defined perfection for ourselves through tough standards—which have been tested and proven for five decades. We follow these 

standards to the letter and focus on structured, intensive training for our 

maintenance, security, and operations personnel. 

• Minuteman Life Extension. The fiscal year 2009 budget request continues the congressionally-approved $6.7 billion life extension programs that will 

sustain the MM III to 2020 as we work to identify further investments that 

may be required to sustain the MM III force to 2030. In January 2008, we 

completed deployment of the Guidance Replacement Program (GRP) which 

replaced some of the 1960s generation electronics in the guidance system. 

Currently the Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP), which replaces 

aging motors and propellant as well as environmentally unsafe materials 

and components, is 82 percent complete. The remaining MM III modification programs (the SERV and the Propulsion System Rocket Engine Life 

Extension Program (PSRE LEP) upgrade) are still on target for completion 

by 2012 and 2013 respectively. The SERV program enables the use of the 

Mk 21 reentry vehicle on MM III missiles, providing STRATCOM planners 

with increased targeting flexibility and enhanced safety. The PSRE LEP is 

extending the design life of this subsystem by replacing components originally produced in the 1970s. 

• Security Modernization. AFSPC is also continuing to field robust capabilities funded under the ICBM Security Modernization Program (ISMP). Last 

year, we completed the installation of concrete headwork barriers at all 

operational launch facilities (LFs) to ensure the safety and security of our 

nuclear arsenal. In 2008, we are continuing to improve real-time situational 

awareness for our security forces through the Remote Visual Assessment 

(RVA) program. AFSPC is also replacing LF access doors with ones that enable our personnel to more quickly secure the silo hatch in case of a security threat during maintenance operations. In addition, we are also increasing the physical protection of our LFs with better technology and more effective tactics. AFSPC is also taking additional steps within our budget this 

year to add security surveillance cameras at our Missile Alert Facilities 

(MAFs) and to add GPS tracking capability to Payload Transporter (PT) 

vans. 

• Prompt Global Strike (PGS). Looking to the future, the fiscal year 2009 

budget request responds to STRATCOM’s PGS needs by developing and 

demonstrating critical concepts and technologies for a conventional strike 

alternative. To increase our deterrence and conventional strike capabilities, 

AFSPC is investing in research and development of technology for guidance, 

reentry vehicle and propulsion systems with the ICBM Demonstration/Validation (ICBM DEM/VAL) program and are aligning these initiatives with 

the results of the recently completed PGS Analysis of Alternatives and with 

the congressionally-directed DOD-wide investment account.

Ensure mission success while delivering planned capability improvements.

Joint Force Commanders and the forces they lead rely on the capabilities provided 

by AFSPC and our operational commitment to deliver those capabilities to them 

every day can not falter. In addition to this operational commitment, we must also 

meet our aggressive program commitments to field and sustain leading-edge space 

capabilities on time and on cost. AFSPC is on final approach to deliver several 

major new Military SATCOM (MILSATCOM); PNT; and ISR capabilities over the 

next 18 to 24 months.

• MILSATCOM. The demand for satellite communications and bandwidth continues to grow. Aged in many cases beyond their design, Milstar and Defense 

Satellite Communications System-III (DSCS-III) continue to provide critical 

communications services for much of the Nation’s daily secure and unsecure 

military and diplomatic activities as we deploy the next generation of advanced 

MILSATCOM capabilities.

• The Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) program provides communications 

capabilities greater than the entire constellation of DSCS-III satellites and 

increases coverage, capacity and connectivity for deployed tactical forces. In 

2007, AFSPC launched WGS–1 and the Air Force negotiated a partnership 

with Australia to use the constellation and fund the procurement of a sixth 

WGS satellite. The fiscal year 2009 budget request funds continued operVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:11 Dec 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\42635.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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ation of WGS–1, on-orbit checkout and operation of WGS–2, and launch 

technical support and on-orbit checkout of WGS–3. WGS–4 and WGS–5 are 

currently in fabrication. 

• Our Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) program affords strategic and tactical users with secure, survivable anti-jamming and anti-scintillation communications. Each AEHF satellite has about ten times the capacity of Milstar II. The fiscal year 2009 budget request supports the 

launch and on-orbit checkout of AEHF–1; completion of integration and 

testing of AEHF–2 for launch in 2009; continued assembly, integration and 

testing of AEHF–3; contracting of AEHF–4; and work on the Mission Control Segment.

• Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT). AFSPC is delivering PNT capabilities which are providing critical military benefits as well as a free international 

utility. Our GPS is the centerpiece of global PNT services and the GPS constellation enables an ever-increasing arsenal of precise munitions from the 

mainstay JDAM to the Air Force’s new Small Diameter Bomb and from the 

Army’s Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System to its Excalibur 155mm artillery 

round. Airmen in C–130 and C–17 aircraft are resupplying ground combat units 

in nearly impossible-to-reach places in Afghanistan by using the remarkable 

Joint Precision Air Drop Systems which have steerable parachutes with GPS 

guidance.

• Last year, AFSPC launched two modernized GPS IIR–M satellites configured with new signals for increased anti-spoofing and anti-jamming capabilities for military users and more robust capabilities for civil users. With 

five of eight GPS IIR–M satellites on-orbit, AFSPC is launching the remaining three in 2008. 

• The follow-on block is GPS IIF which will have an extended design life 

of 11 years, include additional civil signals for improved accuracy and safety-of-life services and increased power to reduce vulnerability to signal jamming. The ground segment includes a master control station and a worldwide network of dedicated antennas and monitoring stations. The fiscal 

year 2009 budget request supports launch and support of two GPS IIF satellites and delivery of the final architecture evolution plan. 

• In concert with upgrades in the GPS space segment, we are also improving the GPS ground segment. AFSPC launched the last two GPS IIR–Ms 

using the new Launch, Anomaly Resolution and Disposal Operations system; replacing an obsolete command and control system with a more modern and sustainable one.

• Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. Our Nation has relied on Air 

Force space-based missile warning systems since the early 1970s.

• AFSPC’s Defense Support Program (DSP) provides missile warning, missile defense, battlespace awareness and technical intelligence collection capabilities. 

• The SBIRS program provides missile warning, missile defense, intelligence and battlespace awareness capabilities and will replace DSP. The 

SBIRS constellation will consist of four Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO) 

satellites and two Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO) payloads. 

• The first on-orbit SBIRS–HEO payload continues to exceed expectations 

in its checkout phase resulting in approval for early use in December 2007 

and is on track to reach full operational acceptance in mid-2008. Additionally, HEO–2 has been built. On SBIRS GEO–1, AFSPC is correcting a safety issue in the flight software and is planning a launch in 2009. The fiscal 

year 2009 budget request for SBIRS funds development, integration and 

test of GEO–1 and GEO–2 satellites and ground system; funds initial HEO 

operations; fully funds HEO–3 and GEO–3 procurement; funds HEO–4 advanced procurement; and funds HEO ground system modifications and upgrades. The HEO–3 and HEO–4 payloads are designated as constellation 

replenishment assets.

• Launch, Ranges and Networks. Delivery of space capabilities begins with a 

successful launch. Our two space launch ranges at Patrick and Vandenberg Air 

Force Bases continue to be the lynchpin for America’s assured access to space.

• At our Eastern and Western Ranges, AFSPC supported 23 successful 

military, civil and commercial launches in 2007. The fiscal year 2009 budget request supports sustainment and modernization of our launch ranges. 

• This year, AFSPC is deploying a new Air Force Satellite Control Network 

(AFSCN) antenna at Vandenberg Air Force Base which will facilitate over 

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30 satellite contacts per day. The AFSCN continues to be the Nation’s backbone for satellite operations. AFSPC is upgrading antennas with the Remote Tracking Station Block Change to ensure command and control of onorbit capabilities is efficient and more accurate. The fiscal year 2009 budget 

request funds the operation and gradual modernization of the AFSCN.

Increase space protection capabilities.

The USAF and AFSPC play a key role in defending the Nation’s military, intelligence, civil and commercial space capabilities. The Air Force is uniquely charged 

with mission responsibilities to provide forces to defend United States space capabilities. Our strategy and investment approach balances the need for space situational awareness, protection of space capabilities and protection of terrestrial forces 

from threats posed by adversary use of space against our interests.

• We must increase space situational awareness (SSA) while we address 

operational and physical vulnerabilities in our space, ground and link segments. The challenge is to find an affordable pathway to protect space capabilities that strikes the right balance among awareness, hardening, countermeasures, reconstitution and alternate means. 

• The Integrated SSA (ISSA) program provides STRATCOM, Joint Functional Component Command for Space (JFCC–SPACE) and the joint community with an integrated source of current and predictive space events, 

threats and space activities. By employing a near real time, net centric construct, AFSPC is achieving higher accuracy space surveillance through fusion of other SSA elements. Funding from the fiscal year 2009 budget request increases our ability to characterize the space domain by focusing on 

space event processing and analysis to include high accuracy conjunction 

assessments and rapid maneuver processing. 

• AFSPC is also planning to field ground and space based sensors to improve space surveillance capabilities. The Space Fence program provides 

the capability to find, fix and track small objects in Low and Medium Earth 

Orbits (LEO and MEO) using three ground sites. The fiscal year 2009 budget request for this program supports development awards to at least two 

contractors. Additionally, the Space-Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) program offers the ability to detect and track space objects; primarily those in 

GEO. With the fiscal year 2009 budget request, AFSPC is completing development of SBSS Block 10, launching the satellite in fiscal year 2009 and 

working towards development of SBSS Block 20. 

• The Rapid Attack Identification Detection and Reporting System 

(RAIDRS) Block 10 program detects and geolocates satellite communications interference via fixed and transportable ground systems. In 2007, 

AFSPC activated the 16th Space Control Squadron at Peterson Air Force 

Base to operate RAIDRS and we deployed one system to the CENTCOM 

Theater to protect over 400 SATCOM links. The fiscal year 2009 budget request continues funding for the RAIDRS Block 20 update which is introducing an automated means to characterize anti-satellite (ASAT) and directed energy attacks on space systems and services. 

• Building a comprehensive SSA picture includes a fully collaborative, netcentric space command and control architecture that links JFCC–SPACE to 

the joint fight. AFSPC improved our Nation’s global space C2 infrastructure 

in 2007 when the 614th Air and Space Operations Center, the core of 

STRATCOM’s Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) transitioned to an 

expanded facility at Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA. This effort modernized 

the JSpOC, streamlined operations, and more than doubled its physical size 

allowing for expanded missions and creating a platform for the future. With 

the fiscal year 2009 budget request, AFSPC is furthering development of a 

comprehensive SSA picture via the Space C2 program. 

• AFSPC is committed to improving protection of ground, link and space 

segments. While some of our space capabilities are well protected, AFSPC 

is taking into account that we will likely face a wider range of threats in 

the space domain and on the ground through links that control these systems. As we move forward to modernize and recapitalize, the nature of 

these threats means we are going to engineer space protection into our new 

systems. 

• To help us make informed decisions about how best to preserve space capabilities, AFSPC is establishing the Space Protection Program. This program will focus our efforts and provide decision makers with strategic recommendations on how to best protect our space systems and stay ahead of 

14

the threat. We are already strengthening and unifying relationships across 

the defense and Intelligence Community.

Attract, develop, and retain space professionals.

While AFSPC is developing and wielding remarkable capabilities, the source of 

our tremendous accomplishments is our space professionals. Our challenge is to continue attracting, developing and retaining airmen with the skills necessary to maintain our competitive advantage. AFSPC is working with our partners in Air Education and Training Command (AETC), academia and elsewhere, to educate, train 

and cultivate experts in the space domain who are both technically and tactically 

competent, and who are skilled in integrating with other warfighting domains.

• Since 1996, the United States Air Force Weapons School (USAFWS) has 

graduated 180 space instructors from a pool of AFSPC’s best and brightest. 

Last year, AFSPC and the USAFWS continued their partnership in developing and delivering world-class graduates to expertly employ space and 

missile capabilities and to instruct the next generation of space operators. 

• The tactical mindset is also evolving on the nuclear side. AFSPC is operating a world-class center focused on training nuclear security professionals. To ensure we are providing the most secure nuclear deterrent, 20 

AF operates the Nuclear Space Security Tactics Training Center at Camp 

Guernsey, WY. In 2007, this facility trained over 1,700 security forces on 

nuclear security and expeditionary tactics. 

• AFSPC’s National Security Space Institute (NSSI) is establishing itself as 

America’s premier campus for superior space professional training and education. Last year, the NSSI taught 71 courses to 1,700 students—a 17 percent increase from 2006. Over 350 of those students were from other Services and for the first time, NSSI instructors taught our Allied partners. In 

2008, AFSPC is partnering more closely with Air University (AU) as we 

look to transition more classes to AU in 2009. 

• In 2007, AFSPC competitively selected twenty officer and enlisted space 

professionals for a fully-funded University of Colorado at Colorado Springs 

(UCCS) Space Certificate pilot program consisting of five courses focused on 

space and space systems, engineering management, information and communications systems and space policy. This year, AFSPC is selecting our 

second class and is using this pilot program as a catalyst for a master’s degree.

Sustain AFSPC’s enduring missions and mature emerging missions.

To better meet 21st century challenges, AFSPC will recapitalize its force to sustain enduring space force enhancement capabilities while designing a future force 

to ensure flexible, responsive capabilities in a contested domain. Fully recognizing 

we do not currently have a capability to perform maintenance or repairs on orbital 

assets, we are committed to protect and reinvigorate satellite constellations to provide the level of utility expected by users all over the globe. Additionally, AFSPC 

will work with appropriate government agencies to explore opportunities for enhanced commercial, Allied and international partnerships.

• Transformational Satellite (TSAT) Communications System. Since last 

year, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) validated requirements for increased worldwide protected communications capabilities to extend the ground-based Global Information Grid (GIG) to deployed and mobile forces and to support Comm-on-The-Move, the Army’s Future Force Initiatives, the Navy’s ForceNet, and the Marine’s X-Net warfighting visions. 

AFSPC is pursuing transformational communications capabilities and is 

studying a future MILSATCOM architecture investment strategy in response to congressional direction to procure a fourth Advanced Extremely 

High Frequency (AEHF) satellite. The fiscal year 2009 budget request continues technology maturation and design of TSAT. 

• Global Positioning System III (GPS III). With GPS III, AFSPC is planning to further enhance military and civilian PNT capabilities by providing 

higher power, increased anti-jamming capability, and compatibility with 

European Galileo signals. By implementing a block approach, AFSPC will 

use the fiscal year 2009 budget request for GPS III Block A development 

and preliminary design review, capability insertion for Blocks B and C and 

risk reduction and concept development of the control segment. 

• Third-Generation Infra-Red Surveillance (3GIRS). In addition, AFSPC is 

planning to continue the critical space-based infrared warning systems into 

its third generation. With the fiscal year 2009 budget request, we will conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:11 Dec 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\42635.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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tinue wide field of view sensor testing and technology maturation activities 

along with development of an integrated test bed. 

• Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR). AFSPC is also embracing 

emerging missions such as missile defense. Last year, our UEWR program 

achieved several milestones when STRATCOM operationally accepted two 

UEWRs. As a key player in a recent Missile Defense Agency (MDA) flight 

test, the Beale UEWR and its crew acquired and tracked a flight-test target 

reentry vehicle launched from Alaska; enabling the successful destruction 

by an interceptor launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base. The fiscal 

year 2009 budget request supports sustainment and operation of the Beale 

and Fylingdales UEWRs. 

• Operationally Responsive Space (ORS). Last May, AFSPC successfully 

teamed with our sister services and interagency partners to stand up the 

ORS Office. AFSPC is working closely with the ORS Office to develop innovative acquisition approaches and capabilities to prepare the United States 

to respond to a contested space domain, to better respond to urgent 

warfighter needs and to deploy small satellites and associated launch and 

control systems. AFSPC is continuing to work with the ORS Office to develop ORS as a national strategic capability and to export concepts to the 

broader Air Force space enterprise. The fiscal year 2009 budget request 

supports the launch of TACSAT–4 and continues the development of the 

first ORS spacecraft and enabling capabilities.

Improve the strategic acquisition, delivery, and sustainment of space capabilities.

In today’s world of rapid technological advancement and proliferation, we cannot 

afford to do business as usual when it comes to delivering space capabilities. We 

require a new strategy for how we develop, deliver and sustain space systems that 

is more than an incremental progression of acquisition processes and management 

methods. Such a strategy requires a paradigm shift with an end-state that deploys 

needed space capabilities more quickly than in the past while still executing efficient, business-like acquisition practices.

• To effect organizational and cultural changes, AFSPC is reviewing and 

adjusting our organization construct and processes. At the beginning of 

2008, we reorganized Headquarters AFSPC activities, functions and relationships to enhance our ability to act as a single, integrated organization. 

• Our next step is fostering external relationships. AFSPC is clearly articulating our needs for science and technology, research and development, acquisition, sustainment and training to Air Force Materiel Command 

(AFMC) and AETC. We are also intensifying collaboration with Air Combat 

Command (ACC), including the USAF Warfare Center (USAFWC). Furthermore, AFSPC is supporting other major commands with space expertise 

and analysis. 

• We are also working on proper alignment of development, acquisition and 

sustainment activities. We continue to build a more powerful and effective 

partnership with AFMC and SMC through better definition of roles, responsibilities and authorities. 

• Finally, we have chartered a special study group to examine alternative 

acquisition strategies and recommend ways to shorten the time it takes to 

put space capabilities in the hands of the warfighter.

Improve integration across the air, space, and cyberspace domains.

Integration across air, space, and cyberspace is more than combining and disseminating data among interrelated architectures. If air, space and cyberspace power 

each have a value of one, the sum of these capabilities is far greater than three. 

AFSPC is working with the other Air Force major commands and domain experts 

to develop shared strategic plans, operational concepts and architectures, doctrine, 

as well as tactics, techniques and procedures for the next conflict—one where 

emerging technologies in air, space and cyberspace domains can be leveraged and 

mutually supported within a joint construct.

• AFSPC is teaming extensively with the USAFWC and STRATCOM to increase space scenarios across the full spectrum of exercises. In March 2007, 

AFSPC conducted the most comprehensive space wargame to date with 470 

participants, including 74 flag officers or equivalents and 38 Allied partners. This wargame focused on the future and explored global space system 

architectures, technologies and C2 relationships; tackled concepts for integrating space with other warfighting domains; and examined potential policy trends and their implications. We look forward to the next game in 

2009. 

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CONCLUSION

The Total Force AFSPC team plays an important role in delivering space and missile capabilities to America and its warfighting commands. These capabilities provide a decisive advantage for our national security and prosperity. With the continued support of Congress, AFSPC is postured to continue to maintain a crucial leadership role as we realize our vision of delivering responsive, assured and decisive 

space power.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. WILLIAM L. SHELTON, USAF, COMMANDER, JOINT FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND FOR 

SPACE, UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND 

[The prepared statement of General Shelton follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY LT. GEN. WILLIAM L. SHELTON, USAF 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Sessions, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am honored to be here today for my second opportunity to appear before you as United States Strategic Command’s (STRATCOM) Commander of the 

Joint Functional Component Command for Space (CDR JFCC SPACE). 

It’s a distinct privilege to address you on our space posture, and to represent the 

men and women of JFCC SPACE who employ space capabilities around the globe 

every day. These soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are a dedicated and innovative joint force, working hard to conduct efficient and effective space operations. 

Their professionalism ensures our joint forces can exploit space-based capabilities to 

the maximum extent. 

I know this subcommittee is fully aware of the growing importance of space capabilities to our national security, as well as to our national economic element of 

power. So rather than belabor those points, today I will focus on our efforts to improve employment of our vital space capabilities, and identify some of the challenges 

we face as we work to meet national and combatant commander objectives. 

EMPLOYMENT OF SPACE CAPABILITIES

CDR JFCC SPACE is designated by Commander, STRATCOM, as the single point 

of contact for military space operations. As such, I am tasked to provide tailored, 

responsive, local and global space effects to the various combatant commanders. My 

STRATCOM-delegated authorities include Global Space Coordinating Authority, 

which makes me the primary interface with supported joint commanders for operational-level planning and execution to provide space effects in support of those 

Combatant Commanders’ objectives. CDR JFCC SPACE also is assigned Operational Control and Tactical Control authorities for designated worldwide space 

forces. These authorities provide STRATCOM a single, globally focused component 

commander to enhance functional integration of space capabilities for the joint 

warfighter and for the Nation. 

Over the last year, JFCC SPACE made huge strides in operational space employment by consolidating previously separated elements of the Joint Space Operations 

Center (JSpOC). The centerpiece was the move of the 1st Space Control Squadron 

(1 SPCS) and Unified Space Vault from Cheyenne Mountain to Vandenberg AFB. 

1 SPCS, in particular, plays a key role in Space Situational Awareness (SSA) by 

planning, tasking, and directing the Space Surveillance Network as part of the 

JSpOC. This transition, coupled with the JSpOC’s relocation to a new facility, created opportunities to integrate the total package of space command and control 

functions and lays the foundation for future modernization. The payoff from these 

moves was clearly demonstrated during the recent NRO satellite intercept as planning and direction of ground radars and space assets resulted in seamless integration to provide target vectors for the shooter, and enabled quick characterization 

and reporting of the success of the event. We continue to vigilantly track the debris 

generated by the intercept, which will allow us to predict its reentry and ensure safe 

launch and on-orbit operations. 

CHALLENGES

Our number one operational need is for improved SSA capabilities. SSA is the understanding of the space medium to include tracking all manmade objects in space, 

discerning the intent of others who operate in space, knowing the status of our own 

forces in real-time, and understanding the natural environment and its effect upon 

space operations—simply stated, SSA is foundational for all space operations. By 

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fusing intelligence on potential adversaries, space surveillance information on all 

space systems in orbit, status of friendly systems, and space weather, we will be 

able to not only know what objects are in space and where, but we will also understand the purpose of these objects, their capabilities, and their owners’ intent. This 

comprehensive knowledge enables decisionmakers to rapidly and effectively select 

courses of action to ensure our sustained freedom of action in space. 

The January 2007 Chinese test of an anti-satellite (ASAT) capability continues to 

shape our future planning by tangibly demonstrating the potential vulnerability of 

our space assets. This irresponsible space operation by the Chinese left over 2,300 

pieces of orbital debris that we’re still tracking, and tens of thousands of likely 

smaller pieces our sensors can’t track. Only 25 items have reentered so far, with 

the remainder expected to be in orbit for decades. This debris will slowly decay due 

to natural forces and will remain a hazard to manned and unmanned spaceflight 

in low earth orbit, or transiting low earth orbit on the way to higher orbits. In contrast, over 99 percent of the debris from the recent intercept of the NRO satellite 

will reenter the atmosphere within approximately 3 months. 

We’ve derived many lessons from the Chinese ASAT event, chief among them 

being the tremendous wealth of SSA data available, albeit in many disparate systems and security channels. It took the heroic efforts of many to manually assemble 

this information ad hoc, then pass it to senior decisionmakers. While we were very 

successful in this case due to the outstanding cooperation between the intelligence 

and operations communities, we clearly need improved processing and analytic systems that continually compile and automatically fuse SSA information in real-time 

to keep us abreast of space events. Our lessons learned from the Chinese test will 

continue to guide our future improvements and developmental efforts for the 

JSpOC. 

Every significant military operation uses space capabilities in some way—these 

ubiquitous capabilities are truly integral to military operations in the 21st century. 

Also, there is a tremendous national economic impact from commercial space systems that provide many crucial services to the American public—services the public 

relies on and has come to expect. However, it is clear our operating environment 

is changing. 

Access to space and space products becomes cheaper and more widely available 

every year. The commercialization of space has allowed many developing nations 

and non-state actors to acquire space-based capabilities such as imagery and satellite communications that were previously the exclusive purview of superpowers. 

With more space players, space is more crowded than ever—we currently track over 

18,000 manmade objects, to include everything from active satellites to debris. The 

potential for a catastrophic collision in space increases as the number of objects increase. Finally, the kinetic ASAT threat is not the only threat to our space assets. 

The capacity to jam satellite communications links is within the capability of many 

nations, as well as non-state actors. Space-related ground sites can be damaged by 

direct attack. Several nations are working on high-energy lasers that could damage 

or destroy our satellites. The potential proliferation of nuclear weapons is also a 

threat to space systems. Such a device could cripple our space assets with the persistent effects of an exo-atmospheric electromagnetic pulse. With the exception of 

the high-energy laser, all of these threats to our satellites exist today. Clearly, we 

can no longer view space as a sanctuary. 

Our Nation’s growing dependence on space-based capabilities, coupled with the increasing risks we face, creates corresponding potential economic and military 

vulnerabilities. Therefore, we must protect our space assets against intentional and 

unintentional acts in order to preserve our essential space capabilities. Solid protection also requires us to have the ability for rapid recognition and attribution of 

space events—the prerequisite that enables full consideration of response options. 

Thus, the basis for an adequate protection capability is robust SSA. In the future 

a decisionmaker’s ability to quickly answer the ′′who, what, when, where, how, and 

why′′ questions will not only help determine the proper course of action, but is the 

necessary foundation for deterring potential adversaries from hostile acts against 

our space assets. 

Other needed improvements to our SSA capabilities include networked sensors 

and information systems that seamlessly share information to more effectively use 

our current resources, and allow future sensors to ‘‘plug and play.’’ Our array of 

radar and optical space surveillance sensors around the world provide acceptable 

coverage in the northern hemisphere, but we have an exploitable lack of coverage 

in the southern hemisphere. This gap greatly increases the time required to characterize new payloads and maintain awareness, or ‘‘custody,’’ of maneuvering spacecraft. Finally, we need the ability to track and assess smaller objects if we are to 

keep pace with the potential threats that stem from the emergence of small satellite 

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technologies, and to gain better awareness of the hazards posed by small space debris. For the reasons cited above, SSA improvements are a top priority within Air 

Force Space Command. 

The increasingly threatened, highly dynamic environment of space requires us to 

build more automated, net-centric capabilities to command and control space forces. 

Along with essential SSA, we will need the ability to act rapidly. Events in the 

space domain unfold quickly, often at the speed of light. Our playbook must be 

ready to go, with modeling and simulation tools, decision aids, and operator alerts 

forming the automated solutions. Rather than the labor-intensive command and 

control processes we currently use, machine-to-machine interfaces must enable decisionmakers to quickly and accurately assess the situation, and promptly direct actions. 

CONCLUSION

The nature of space operations is rapidly evolving. The United States’ absolute 

dependence on space across our military, civil, and commercial sectors, coupled with 

the increased and diverse threats to our space assets, requires improved SSA and 

command and control capabilities to ensure our ability to effectively operate in an 

increasingly dynamic environment. This is an exciting time in the evolution of Joint 

Space Operations and I am truly honored to be leading such a talented group of 

men and women as they expertly tackle the challenges we face every day. I thank 

the subcommittee for your continued strong support as we work to preserve our 

vital space capabilities for the Nation.

STATEMENT OF RADM KENNETH W. DEUTSCH, USN, DIRECTOR, WARFARE INTEGRATION, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF 

NAVAL OPERATIONS 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Deutsch follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY RADM KENNETH W. DEUTSCH, USN 

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, as the Director of 

Warfare Integration on the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) staff, 

I am honored to appear before you today to address Navy space activities. I am the 

Navy’s resource and requirements sponsor for Space. This sponsorship includes the 

Mobile User Objective System (MUOS), the new Joint Narrowband Military Satellite Communication System. I am also the Navy’s Subject Matter Expert for Space, 

responsible for reviewing and approving navy space systems being reviewed by the 

Joint Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC) as part of the Joint Capabilities 

Integration Development System (JCIDS). The committee has asked several specific 

questions which I would like to address, one of which is a request for Navy’s 

thoughts on the organization and management of space, including Navy’s role therein. 

SPACE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT, AND NAVY’S ROLE IN SPACE

Space systems are a critical enabler for maritime operations. The Navy has a long 

and proud history in space, having developed a number of technological breakthroughs. The list of Navy advances in space is expansive and includes: the first 

space communications used for operations; the first controllable space launch vehicle; the first satellite tracking system; the first successful electronic intelligence reconnaissance satellite; the first space object tracking system; the first demonstration 

of on-orbit atomic clocks; the first military broadcast satellite; and the first astronauts to orbit the earth, orbit the moon and crew the Space Shuttle. The 20 February interception of a nonfunctioning National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) satellite illustrates Navy’s continued critical role in Space and Space Control. The Navy 

AEGIS warship, U.S.S. Lake Erie (CG–70), fired a single modified tactical Standard 

Missile-3, hitting the satellite approximately 133 nautical miles over the Pacific 

Ocean as it traveled in space at more than 17,000 miles per hour. 

Today, the Air Force, as the Department of Defense (DOD) Executive Agent (EA) 

for Space has DOD-wide responsibilities for planning and acquisition of most DOD 

major Defense space acquisitions. In addition, the NRO is responsible to both the 

Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence for national space reconnaissance activities. While the Navy continues to serve as the Program Manager 

for DOD narrowband ultra-high frequency (UHF) satellite communications systems, 

which includes the new MUOS and the UHF Follow-on system, and conducts smaller space-based experiments, most large-scale national security satellite programs 

19

will be developed through the Space EA and NRO. With limited funding and more 

narrowly defined scope, Navy has focused energy on leveraging existing space capabilities and aggressive engagement within the requirements and acquisition processes to ensure maritime operational needs are met. 

Satellites provide global access and enable the Navy to establish global presence. 

The process for designing, building, launching and operating modern satellite systems has increasingly become both a lengthy and an expensive proposition lasting 

decades, meaning a new satellite program that is currently in the concept phase 

could remain in service well into the 2020–2030 timeframe. Unlike other major 

DOD programs, however, satellites cannot be modified or repaired once they are 

placed into orbit. Due to the long lead times involved, it is therefore critical that 

naval requirements and maritime missions be factored into the pre-launch design 

and planned in-orbit operation of all future satellite systems being considered for 

acquisition through the DOD EA for Space, the NRO and the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Without active Navy involvement 

today in ongoing deliberations over future satellite programs, the Navy risks operating in future scenarios with multi-billion dollar National Security Space systems 

sub-optimized for the maritime environment, which is increasingly important as 

Maritime Domain Awareness requirements are developed. 

The Navy remains heavily reliant on space systems to conduct its wartime and 

humanitarian missions. A wide array of national, joint and commercial satellites 

currently provide Navy commanders with essential communication capabilities, position, navigation and timing support, missile warning, meteorological data, and overthe-horizon surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities on a worldwide basis. Future U.S. satellite programs are now being developed that could provide additional 

benefit and capabilities to Navy warfighters. Many of these programs, however, face 

technological and budgetary hurdles which could force future capability trade-offs 

affecting the maritime environment and could ultimately impact their utility to the 

Navy. For these reasons, the Navy will actively engage with key national and joint 

space-related entities at the appropriate levels to ensure current and future Navy 

needs in space are identified, understood, resourced and protected. This requires 

close cooperation between the Navy and various space-related entities within the 

DOD, the National Intelligence Community (IC), the NOAA, as well as those commercial partners who develop and manage satellite systems. 

The various U.S. satellites and space support systems that constitute National Security Space generally fall under six distinct mission areas, all of which directly or 

indirectly support Navy operations. Furthermore, virtually each of these mission 

areas involves one or more future satellite systems currently in the design or development phase. The six mission areas are Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance, 

Communications, Position/Navigation/Timing, Space Control, Ballistic Missile Warning/Defense and Metrological and Oceanographic. One of the primary goals contained within the Department of Navy Space Policy is to shape the outcome of joint 

deliberations on future space capabilities these mission areas to maximize combat 

effectiveness and to ensure supremacy of the naval force. Within the Navy, various 

space-related functions and responsibilities are distributed among different commands, but jointly constitute a functional ‘‘Navy Space Team’’ which works collaboratively to advance Navy’s many goals in space. The Navy Space Team is composed 

of several Navy organizations that span the full spectrum of Navy warfighting and 

have key roles to play in advancing the Navy’s role in space:

a. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) for Communication Networks (CNO N6) is responsible for leading the overall Navy Space Team, 

developing Navy space requirements, making resource recommendations, 

funding designated space acquisition programs, and coordinating with the 

National Security Space Office; 

b. The Deputy CNO for Manpower, Personnel, Training and Education 

(CNO N1) is responsible for managing and developing a core group of Active Duty and Reserve enlisted, officer, and civilian personnel with specialized space expertise known as ‘‘Navy Space Cadre;’’

c. The Director of Naval Intelligence (CNO N2) is responsible for incorporating space capabilities into the larger Navy-wide ISR strategy, advocating Navy’s space-related requirements within IC and joint ISR programs, 

and representing the OPNAV staff within key IC and joint space-related forums; 

d. The Deputy CNO for Integration of Capabilities and Resources (CNO 

N8) is responsible for making resource decisions on relevant Navy space assets, and incorporating space capabilities into Navy campaign/mission modeling and simulation efforts; 

20

e. The Oceanographer of the Navy (CNO N84) is responsible for coordinating space-related portions of the Navy’s Oceanography and Navigation 

programs with appropriate commands, agencies and commands outside the 

Navy; 

f. The Office of Naval Research is designated as the Navy Space Scientific 

and Technical Executive; and 

g. The Program Executive Office Space Systems (PEO Space) is responsible for acquiring space systems for the Navy, and for working with PEO 

Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) and 

Space for acquiring Navy space-related terminals.

A number of other space-related Navy organizations and offices play key roles in 

supporting the primary Navy Space Team. These key organizations include:

a. Navy-NRO Coordination Group: Responsible for coordinating Navy 

space-related issues between the OPNAV Staff and key Navy personnel 

working within the NRO, and linking ongoing Navy-related activities at the 

NRO with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for C4I/Space; 

b. Navy Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Office: Responsible 

for conducting rapid prototyping involving national reconnaissance satellites and related systems in support of Navy operations; and 

c. Naval Research Laboratory’s Naval Center for Space Technology: Exploits and develops space-related technologies in support of DOD, Navy, 

and other agencies.

Additionally, the Navy maintains a key flag-level joint billet at the NRO. This 

senior officer oversees a team of Navy Space Cadre members, who collectively provide invaluable support to the Navy Space Team on a number of space-related 

issues. 

MOBILE USER OBJECTIVE SYSTEM

The committee has requested a clearer understanding of the MUOS. The Navy’s 

major space segment responsibility to the joint community is the narrowband satellite communications constellation. Today it consists of UHF Follow-on (UFO) and 

two residual Fleet Satellites (FLTSATs) and one Leased Satellite (LEASAT) which 

will begin to be replaced by MUOS in 2010. MUOS will provide communicationson-the-move at high data rates (up to 64 kbs per access) to disadvantaged users 

such as handheld terminals, aircraft, missiles, UAVs, and remote sensors. Additionally, MUOS will provide these capabilities in such challenging environments as double canopy foliage, urban environment, and high sea state. MUOS will bring a 4-

fold increase in the number of accesses (1997 vice 500) and a 20-fold increase in 

throughput (39.2 Mbps, total system capacity vice 2 Mbps) in comparison to the legacy UFO constellation. MUOS is the common denominator for command and control 

providing the capability to communicate from tactical to theater levels and between 

defense and non-defense agencies. MUOS will allow a more comprehensive and coordinated approach to regional engagement, providing the capability to synchronize 

efforts with other Services, agencies, and allied nations. 

MUOS is critical to satisfying the demand for tactical satellite communications. 

During Operations Enduring freedom and Iraqi Freedom, UFO, FLTSAT, and 

LEASAT 5 were only able to support 80 percent of the narrowband tactical UHF 

satellite communication requirements. Additionally, in the 2010 timeframe, 

LEASAT 5 will reach its end of service life, and the UFO constellation is expected 

to reach an unacceptable level of availability in May 2009. We have a mitigation 

plan to minimize the operational impact of a potential gap in capability (seven operational satellites vice the required eight) before MUOS is operational and MUOScapable terminals are available. It includes the use of commercial bandwidth and 

the dynamic management of existing bandwidth as mentioned previously. A 

‘‘Sources Sought for Additional UHF Capabilities’’ was released on 09 August 2007 

with the objective of supplementing the current UHF SATCOM resources with additional commercial services. Of the six options presented by four vendors in response 

to this RFI, Navy chose Intelsat’s Skynet leased services and is initiating a competition for a hosted payload option. Navy has identified funding in PB09 to fund both 

of these mitigation plans. Intelsat’s Skynet services will supplement UHF resources 

in fiscal years 2009–2010 while the hosted payload option will tentatively be available beginning in 2010. Today, UFO supports approximately 500 simultaneous accesses worldwide. Based on evolving future war fighting concepts in support of the 

Guidance for Development of Forces, UHF SATCOM access requirements are expected to grow by at least a factor of four and MUOS, as designed, will be able to 

support that requirement. 

21

The MUOS program is currently preparing for the October 2009 Follow-On Buy 

Decision. MUOS’ advanced capabilities can only be realized with the fielding of 

MUOS-capable Joint Tactical Radio System terminals or by upgrading existing UHF 

legacy software programmable terminals to MUOS capability. 

Lastly, the committee asked for Navy’s thoughts on Space Protection Strategies. 

The Navy continues to work with U.S. Strategic Command, the Joint Staff and 

other Services to ensure appropriate means of Space Control Protection are addressed systematically as space systems are being developed. Navy supports Space 

Control Protection becoming a mandatory JCIDS Key Performance Parameter. This 

will ensure the warfighter and the JROC understand and approve the trade offs between advance performance and enduring protection. Navy also advocates the National Security Space Office standing up a Space Control Functional Integration Office (FIO) using the current Communications FIO as the model. 

SUMMARY

Navy’s mission of keeping the air and sea lanes open and ensuring the security 

of our citizens at home and abroad requires a global reach and persistent presence. 

We must be constantly ready, whether it is to deliver on a mission of mercy or more 

lethal measures to respond to a specific threat. Our ability to respond, as well as 

work with our coalition and other maritime partners, will depend on space capabilities for the necessary flexibility and speed to support our worldwide responsibilities. 

Navy’s ability to leverage DOD and IC space capabilities, and to have an impact 

on future space developments is critical in ensuring its ability to successfully conduct maritime operations and in fulfilling Navy missions. 

We look forward to delivering MUOS for the joint warfighter. Finally, we intend 

to be an important contributor toward the development and implementation of space 

protection strategies. 

Thank you for the opportunity to share our efforts with you today.

STATEMENT OF CRISTINA T. CHAPLAIN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Chaplain follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY CRISTINA T. CHAPLAIN

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Defense’s (DOD) space 

acquisitions. Each year, DOD spends billions of dollars to acquire space-based capabilities to support current military and other government operations as well as to 

enable DOD to transform the way it collects and disseminates information, gathers 

data on adversaries, and attacks targets. In fiscal year 2009 alone, DOD expects to 

spend over $10 billion to strengthen space-based capabilities and $7.6 billion of this 

amount is targeted for selected major space acquisition efforts. At the same time, 

however, DOD’s space system acquisitions have experienced problems over the past 

several decades that have driven up costs by hundreds of millions, even billions, of 

dollars; stretched schedules by years; and increased performance risks. In some 

cases, capabilities have not been delivered to the warfighter after decades of development. Today, we are here to comment on what problems affecting space acquisitions still persist, what actions DOD has been taking to address these problems and 

what remains to be done. In general, we found this year that space programs that 

have been troubled in recent years still face problems that are driving up costs and 

schedule. At the same time, senior leadership has remained committed to reducing 

technology risks and ensuring newer programs are more affordable. Investment 

prioritizing, realistic cost estimating, policy changes, and other actions we identify 

can help this commitment take further hold. 

SPACE ACQUISITION PROBLEMS PERSIST

The majority of major acquisition programs in DOD’s space portfolio have experienced problems during the past 2 decades that have driven up cost and schedules 

and increased technical risks. Several programs have been restructured by DOD in 

the face of delays and cost growth. At times, cost growth has come close to or exceeded 100 percent, causing DOD to nearly double its investment in the face of technical and other problems without realizing a better return on investment. Along 

with the increases, many programs are experiencing significant schedule delays—

as much as 7 years—postponing delivery of promised capabilities to the warfighter. 

22

Outcomes have been so disappointing in some cases that DOD has had to go back 

to the drawing board to consider new ways to achieve the same, or less, capability. 

As figures 1 and 2 below indicate, five programs that were begun in the late 1990s/

early 2000s to replenish aging constellations of satellites have incurred substantial 

cost growth and schedule delays, including the:

(1) the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) communications 

satellite program, 

(2) the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS), which DOD is jointly developing with the National Oceanic 

and Atmospheric Administration, 

(3) the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS), which detects missile 

launches, 

(4) the Wideband Global Satellite Communications (SATCOM) (WGS), another communications satellite, and 

(5) the Global Positioning System (GPS) IIF program. Last year we reported that AEHF and WGS had worked through the bulk of their technical 

problems.

Since our testimony, the first WGS satellite was launched, but the AEHF program 

experienced technical problems with hardware components that have pushed back 

its first launch date by 6 months. Also, this year, as described below, we found that 

NPOESS and SBIRS still face very high risks, even after recent replanning efforts. 

Further, GPS IIF has experienced additional technical problems.

• SBIRS continues to face cost and schedule setbacks. Software problems 

have recently delayed the first satellite launch by about a year, which will 

likely increase the program’s overall delay to roughly 7 years. Correcting 

the problems may necessitate hardware and software changes that could, 

according to the Air Force, also drive cost increases up to $1 billion, which 

would be in addition to the $6 billion cost growth already incurred. Management-reserves expenditure continues at an unsustainable rate. Program 

officials acknowledge that management Reserves set aside to fix unexpected 

problems will likely be depleted in early 2009, even though the Reserves 

were intended to last through 2012. Given the complexity of the SBIRS satellites, it is possible that further design flaws may be discovered, leading 

to more cost and schedule increases. If management Reserves are depleted 

and not replenished, the program will likely experience further cost and 

schedule problems. 

• In July 2007, the NPOESS program finalized its restructure in response 

to a Nunn-McCurdy (10 U.S.C. § 2433) program acquisition unit breach of 

the critical cost growth threshold. The restructure included about an additional $4.1 billion, or about a 49 percent, life-cycle cost increase for fewer 

satellites to be acquired, delays in satellite launches, and deletions or replacements of satellite sensors. The restructure also included removing 7 of 

the original 14 critical technologies from the program. Furthermore, three 

of the remaining technologies remain immature and the program continues 

to experience development problems, increasing risks of further problems. 

At this point, the program has seen a 153 percent unit cost increase. 

• The GPS IIF program has faced technical challenges in completing development and production, causing another schedule delay in the launch of the 

first IIF satellite—over a 2-year slip from the original launch date of December 2006 to February 2009. Moreover, the program continues to face 

cost increases due to these technical problems. Specifically, the program 

has requested over $100 million for fiscal years 2008 and 2009 to cover the 

estimated cost overruns to complete production of the first three space vehicles. In addition, program officials are concerned that additional funds may 

be needed to complete this program if additional delays are incurred—the 

program has already spent $1.2 billion to date, which represents about 77-

percent of the total cost originally estimated for the program. (Note: The 

chart below reflects a larger cost because it includes estimates for the GPS 

IIR, IIR–M, and IIF blocks of the GPS program.) 

23


304str1.eps
24

Not all of DOD’s space programs are facing the problems being experienced by 

GPS, NPOESS, and SBIRS. For example, the Navy’s Mobile User Objective System 

(MUOS), another communications satellite program, is meeting cost and schedule 

goals. Further, as discussed later in this testimony, newer Air Force acquisition efforts such as the Transformational Satellite (TSAT) Communications System and 

Space Radar have been taking actions to ensure they can meet their cost and schedule goals, though their funding has been reduced in light of overall affordability of 

space acquisitions. These two efforts were highly complex and ambitious and were 

predicted to be the most expensive military satellite developments ever. 

In addition, in December 2005, the Air Force was directed to begin efforts to develop competing capability in parallel with the SBIRS program; this effort was previously known as the Alternative Infrared Satellite System (AIRSS). We reported 

in September 2007 that DOD had not positioned the AIRSS effort for success. DOD 

agreed, and revised the effort’s development strategy to reflect best practices. The 

effort has a new name, the Third Generation Infrared Surveillance (Third Gen), and 

is now a follow on to the SBIRS program. The first sensor prototypes are expected 

later this month. 

Lastly, our annual weapons system assessment this year will be reporting on 

challenges faced by the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program, as the 

two providers—Boeing and Lockheed Martin—undertake a joint venture that will 

provide U.S. government launches of medium- to heavy-lift rockets. The consolidation of production, engineering, test, and launch operations under the joint venture, 

called the United Launch Alliance or ULA, is expected to yield cost savings in the 

future, but when and how much remains unknown. ULA expects the consolidation 

to be nearly complete by the end of 2010, but there are preliminary indications that 

some elements of the consolidation are falling behind schedule. 

Furthermore, the Air Force revised its acquisition and contracting strategy for 

EELV in 2005, which among other things increased program office oversight responsibilities. The change in contracting strategy created new data analysis activities for 


304str2.eps
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the program and expanded the types of expertise needed by the program office to 

utilize the new information provided by contractors. Despite its increased responsibilities, the program office is experiencing staff reductions and expects staffing vacancies to continue in the near term. The current military staff lacks some of the 

technical expertise needed to fully analyze contractor performance data now being 

collected under the new contracting strategy. 

CAUSES OF ACQUISITION PROBLEMS IN SPACE PROGRAMS

Our work has identified a variety of reasons for this cost growth, most notably 

that weapons programs are incentivized to produce and use optimistic cost and 

schedule estimates in order to successfully compete for funding. We have also found 

that DOD starts its space programs too early, that is, before it has assurance that 

the capabilities it is pursuing can be achieved within available resources and time 

constraints. 

We have also tied acquisition problems in space to inadequate contracting strategies; contract and program management weaknesses; the loss of technical expertise; 

capability gaps in the industrial base; tensions between labs that develop technologies for the future and current acquisition programs; divergent needs in users 

of space systems; diffuse leadership; and other issues that have been well documented in DOD and Government Accountability Office (GAO) studies. 

Many of these underlying issues affect the broader weapons portfolio as well, 

though we have reported that space programs are particularly affected by the wide 

disparity of users, who include DOD, the intelligence community, other Federal 

agencies, and in some cases, other countries and U.S. business and citizens. Moreover, problematic implementation of an acquisition strategy in the 1990s, known as 

Total System Performance Responsibility, for space systems resulted in losses of 

technical expertise and weaknesses in contracting strategies that space programs 

are still dealing with the effects of. 

ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS SPACE AND WEAPON ACQUISITION PROBLEMS

Over the past decade, we have identified best practices that DOD space programs 

can benefit from. DOD has taken a number of actions to address the problems that 

we have reported on. These include initiatives at the department level that will affect its major weapons programs, as well as changes in course within specific Air 


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Force programs. Although these actions are a step in the right direction, additional 

leadership and support are still needed to ensure that reforms that DOD has begun 

will take hold. 

Our work—which is largely based on best practices in the commercial sector—has 

recommended numerous actions that can be taken to address the problems we identified. Generally, we have recommended that DOD separate technology discovery 

from acquisition, follow an incremental path toward meeting user needs, match resources and requirements at program start, and use quantifiable data and demonstrable knowledge to make decisions to move to next phases. We have also identified 

practices related to cost estimating, program manager tenure, quality assurance, 

technology transition, and an array of other aspects of acquisition program management that space programs could benefit from. Table 1 highlights these practices; appendix II provides more detail. 

CONSTRUCTIVE ACTIONS ARE BEING TAKEN

DOD is attempting to implement some of these practices for its major weapons 

programs. For example, we recently reported that DOD released a strategy to enhance the role of program managers in carrying out its major weapon system acquiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:11 Dec 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\42635.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB

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sitions. As part of this strategy, DOD established a policy that requires formal 

agreements among program managers, their acquisition executives, and the user 

community intended to set forth common program goals. In addition, DOD plans a 

variety of actions to enhance development opportunities, provide more incentives, 

and arrange knowledge-sharing opportunities for its program managers. Within this 

strategy, the department also acknowledged that any actions taken to improve accountability must be based on a foundation from which program managers can 

launch and manage programs toward greater performance, and must include an 

overarching strategy and decisionmaking processes that prioritize programs based 

on a match between customer needs and available resources. DOD highlighted several initiatives that, if adopted and implemented properly, could provide such a 

foundation. Some of these include establishing an early decision gate to review proposed programs at the concept stage, testing portfolio management approaches in 

selected capability areas and using capital budgeting accounts for programs in development. 

Additionally, as we reported previously, the Air Force adopted a ‘‘back-to-basics’’ 

policy for space designed to reduce technology risk and ensure programs were more 

executable. Specifically, for its TSAT and Space Radar acquisition efforts, the Air 

Force committed to delaying product development until critical technologies could be 

demonstrated to work in a relevant environment. This stood in sharp contrast to 

previous programs, started with immature technologies, such as NPOESS and 

SBIRS. 

The Air Force also committed to deferring more ambitious technology efforts associated with these efforts to science and technology organizations until they are 

ready to be added to future increments. TSAT, for example, deferred the wide-field 

of view multi-access laser communication technology, and contributed about $16.7 

million for ‘‘off-line’’ maturation of this technology that could be inserted into future 

increments. It laid out incremental advances in other capabilities over two increments. Space Radar has deferred lithium-ion batteries, more efficient solar cells, 

and onboard processing for its first increment, and like TSAT, contributed toward 

their development by space and technology organizations. Further, both efforts have 

used systems engineers to help determine achievability of requirements. 

In our experience, the Navy has tended to follow good acquisition practices for its 

space programs, especially in relation to keeping technology risks out of programs. 

The Navy’s MUOS is an example. Specifically, the MUOS acquisition effort began 

development with almost all of its critical technologies mature. Additionally, about 

95 percent of design drawings had been completed at the critical design review milestone in March 2007. Since MUOS’s development start in September 2004, the program has been meeting its overall cost and schedule goals, with the first satellite 

expected to become operational in March 2010. 

Furthermore, the Air Force, U.S. Strategic Command, and other key organizations 

have made progress in implementing the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) initiative. This initiative encompasses several separate endeavors with a goal to provide short-term tactical capabilities as well as identifying and implementing longterm technology and design solutions to reduce the cost and time of developing and 

delivering simpler satellites in greater numbers. ORS provides DOD with an opportunity to work outside the typical acquisition channels to more quickly and less expensively deliver these capabilities. In performing a review of ORS for this committee, we found that DOD has made progress in putting a program management 

structure in place for ORS as well as executing ORS-related research and development efforts, which include development of low-cost small satellites, common design 

techniques, and common interfaces. 

Other parts of DOD are also moving towards space programs with less risk and 

that have a greater chance of being more successful. The Missile Defense Agency’s 

Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) program office is seeking an operational constellation that would be easier to produce than originally envisioned for 

the constellation. The new development approach for the constellation would involve 

no technology breakthroughs or scientific discovery, and the program office wants 

to scale the system design so that it will only require only a 5- to 6-year build cycle. 

DOD has also pushed back the decisions to start the TSAT and Space Radar acquisitions so it could reformulate their acquisition schedules and approaches to 

make them more affordable within DOD’s overall space portfolio. For example, 

TSAT is currently being assessed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 

to better ensure that proposed future funding levels for TSAT are affordable in the 

near term. In the meantime, the program office is continuing to fund risk-reduction 

efforts between two separate contractors to further reduce overall risk in TSAT. 

Similarly, the Space Radar program office told us that it is adjusting its acquisition 

approach to better balance affordability through incremental evolution of the Space 

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Radar capability. In both of these cases, DOD will likely be better positioned with 

acquisition programs that are more affordable and executable in terms of meeting 

cost, schedule, and performance goals. 

ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED

The actions that the Air Force and OSD have been taking to address acquisition 

problems are good first steps. The back-to-basics policy and ORS, in particular, represent significant shifts in thinking about how space systems should be developed 

as well as commitment from senior leadership. But, there are still more, significant 

changes to processes, policies, and support needed to ensure reforms can take hold. 

First, while DOD pilot initiatives related to portfolio management are targeted at 

addressing funding pressures, there has not been a real commitment to prioritizing 

investments across DOD. For the past several years, we have emphasized that DOD 

starts more space and weapon programs than it can afford, creating a competition 

for funding that encourages low cost estimating, optimistic scheduling, overpromising, suppressing of bad news, and, for space programs, forsaking the opportunity 

to identify and assess potentially better alternatives. Programs focus on advocacy 

at the expense of realism and sound management. Invariably, with too many programs in its portfolio, DOD is forced to continually shift funds to and from programs—particularly as programs experience problems that require additional time 

and money to address. Such shifts, in turn, have had costly, reverberating effects. 

This year, significant cuts were made to several major space programs including 

TSAT, Space Radar, and STSS largely in light of the realization that new, expensive 

programs were not affordable at a time when DOD was attempting to upgrade other 

capabilities and still contending with problematic programs like SBIRS. In the case 

of TSAT, resulting delays in capability could have a dramatic effect on other new 

programs, such as the Army’s Future Combat System, which were counting on 

TSAT-like capabilities to enhance their performance. 

Second, as we have testified before, space programs are facing capacity shortfalls. 

These include shortages of staff with science and engineering backgrounds as well 

as staff with program-management and cost-estimating experience. Several of our 

reviews of major space programs have cited shortages of personnel as a key challenge that increases risk for the program, specifically in technical areas. In addition, 

during our review of DOD’s space cost estimating function, Air Force space cost-estimating organizations and program offices said that they believed their cost-estimating resources were inadequate to do a good job of accurately predicting costs. 

Because of the decline in in-house cost-estimating resources, space program offices 

and Air Force cost-estimating organizations are now more dependent on support 

contractors. We recognize that there are actions being taken to strengthen the space 

acquisition workforce, but we have not yet seen the condition get much better at 

the individual program office level. 

Our past work has also pointed to capacity shortfalls that go beyond workforce. 

For example, in 2006, we reported that cost-estimation data and databases are incomplete, insufficient, and outdated. In previous testimonies, we pointed to limited 

opportunities and funding for space technologies, and the lack of low-cost launch vehicles. The ORS initiative is designed to help alleviate shortfalls in launch and testing resources, but one concern raised in interviews with launch providers was that 

there was still not enough investment being directed toward low-cost launch. 

Furthermore, policies that surround space acquisition need to be further revised 

to ensure best practices are instilled and sustained. For example, DOD’s space acquisition policy does not require that acquisition efforts such as TSAT and Space 

Radar achieve a technology readiness level (TRL) 6 (that is, testing in a relevant 

environment) or higher for key technologies before being formally started—key decision point B (KDP B). Instead, the policy suggests that TRL 6 be achieved later—

at preliminary decision review (KDP C) or soon after. In fact, the back-to-basics policy that was adopted by the Air Force has not been incorporated into the space acquisition policy. Given that there are many pressures and incentives that are driving space and other weapon programs to begin too early and to drive for dramatic 

rather than incremental leaps in capability, DOD needs acquisition policies that ensure programs have the knowledge they need to make investment decisions and that 

DOD and Congress have a more accurate picture of how long and how much it will 

take to get the capability that is being promised. In addition, although the policy 

requires that independent cost estimates be prepared by bodies outside the acquisition chain of command, it does not require that they be relied upon to develop program budgets. Officials within the space cost-estimating community also believed 

that the policy was unclear in defining roles and responsibilities for cost estimators. 

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1DOD policy provides for the tenure of program managers of major defense acquisition programs to last until the completion of the major milestone that occurs closest in time to the date 

on which the person has served in the position for 4 years. 

grain the shift in thinking about how space systems should be developed, but to ensure that the changes current leaders are trying to make can be extended beyond 

their tenure. 

Last, while DOD is planning many new practices that will provide program managers with more incentives, support and stability, the overall environment within 

which program managers perform their work is very difficult to change simply with 

policy initiatives. Policies similar to the one DOD issued in 2007 to increase accountability of program managers have existed for some time, but according to DOD 

and Air Force officials, they have not always been practiced. For example, while 

DOD policy provides for program managers of major defense acquisition programs 

to serve as close to 4-year tenures as practicable,1 many serve for only 2 years. One 

example is the SBIRS program, which has had six program managers in 12 years. 

In fact, our work has shown that rather than lengthy assignment periods between 

key milestones as suggested by best practices, many of the programs we have reviewed had multiple program managers within the same milestone. 

CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, senior leaders managing DOD’s space portfolio are clearly working 

in a challenging environment. There are pressures to deliver new, transformational 

capabilities, but problematic older satellite programs continue to cost more than expected, constrain investment dollars, pose risks of capability caps, and thus require 

more time and attention from senior leaders than well-performing efforts. To best 

mitigate these circumstances and put future programs on a better path, DOD needs 

to continue with the actions it has begun undertaken. However, these measures 

should be complemented by realistic estimating of what it will take to complete 

space programs, prioritizing programs for investment, and strengthening DOD acquisition policy for space. At the same time, DOD should ensure its ORS program 

is well-supported and focused on alleviating capability gaps as well as developing 

longer-term solutions for space programs. Taken together, such actions, with the 

support of Congress, should help senior leaders negotiate acquisitions in a challenging environment and ensure their commitments to reform can be sustained into 

the next administration. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I will be happy to answer any questions that you have.

Senator BILL NELSON. Let us just get right on into the questions. 

We constantly hear about the spiraling need for communications. 

Let’s talk about the transformational satellite (TSAT). It’s supposed 

to address some of the growing communications requirements and 

has been described by the Air Force as the linchpin for the 21st 

century net-centric warfare. TSAT was, at one point, supposed to 

launch in 2012. Congress removed $130 million from the program 

and then in the next year $150 million, mostly to allow technologies to mature so that the program wouldn’t be high risk. 

When the fiscal year 2008 budget was submitted, the first launch 

was supposed to be in the first quarter of 2016. The fiscal year 

2009 budget request completely undermines the program. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Air Force have pulled $3.6 billion out of the program through fiscal year 2013 and have delayed 

the first launch until 2018 at the earliest, and the requirements for 

TSAT haven’t changed. So what’s going on? 

Mr. PAYTON. Mr. Chairman, perhaps I could address that. The 

TSAT spacecraft will be an immensely capable vehicle. It will serve 

a large number of users, first and foremost perhaps is protected 

strategic communications for our nuclear command and control systems. Additionally, it will serve relay for airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconaissance (ISR) assets like Global Hawk, and 

also space-borne ISR assets. It will serve fleets on the high seas. 

30

It will serve communications on the move for our land forces, and 

of course, it is closely related with the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS). 

As we move to Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF)–4, 

the fourth AEHF spacecraft, that vehicle completes a global ring of 

geosynchronous satellites for protected strategic communications. 

With the fourth AEHF spacecraft, we now have no longer that first 

immediate schedule driver for the first TSAT spacecraft. With that 

as a fact, we are now looking at that first block of TSAT spacecraft 

and how we can best marry its capabilities to the schedules of its 

users. 

Again, with AEHF–4 filling the ring for protected strategic communications, we can now rephase the TSAT capabilities so that it 

can service the most important users first, again, amongst all the 

large number of different users it will have. 

We are taking this time from December until this spring to 

rephase the first block of TSAT capabilities and redefine that. We 

are not necessarily married to a 2018 launch. Again, that is part 

of the trade space to link up TSAT capabilities with its users. 

Senator BILL NELSON. What you have said is that part of the cut 

in TSAT is justified by the Air Force as a payment for the fourth 

AEHF, and I guess there were other higher DOD priorities. So I 

go back to the initial question. If TSAT is still the linchpin for the 

21st century net-centric warfare, what is the higher DOD priority? 

Mr. PAYTON. Sir, again, it is a program-management, programrisk perspective of properly marrying and fielding the TSAT capabilities with its next immediate users. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Did you say that you were on a 2018 

launch date instead of a 2016 launch date? 

Mr. PAYTON. No, sir. We do not know yet what the first spacecraft launch schedule is like until we define the content of that 

first block of spacecraft. 

Senator BILL NELSON. So you don’t even know that you are on 

a 2016 launch date? 

Mr. PAYTON. Any schedule prediction right now is premature, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. That is some new information. 

Mr. PAYTON. We are currently in work with both the user communities, the Marines, the Army, the Navy, the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff to identify the schedules for their top users. We are working 

with the technology folks, obviously. We have spent several years 

proving the technology readiness at the subsystem level. So, we are 

again in the process of re-architecting that first block of TSAT capabilities. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Tell me, if we are going to have this kind 

of delay, is there also going to be a requirement to buy more wideband global satellite communications (SATCOM) systems? 

Mr. PAYTON. That is part of the analysis that is in work this 

spring. Yes, sir. 

General KEHLER. Mr. Chairman, if I could also add something to 

what Mr. Payton is saying? Sir, you said it exactly right when you 

said the requirement for warfighting capabilities that are promised 

through TSAT have not gone away. 

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lons, which allows them to communicate in a protected way on the 

move, and that really is one of the key drivers to go beyond where 

we are right now with the Wideband Global Satellite (WGS) and 

AEHF. 

But we should not lose, sir, sight of the facts, sir, that we have 

just launched the first of what will now be six WGS satellites, 

which are a quantum leap in wideband communications. 

We are about to launch within the next year, we believe, the first 

of now four AEHF satellites, which again are in a quantum sense 

far more capable than the systems that they replace. 

Military satellite communications remain a top priority for the 

combatant commanders. We understand that it does. We think that 

the steps that we are taking right now are giving them vastly improved communications. What this does allow us to do with the insertion of the fourth AEHF is to take the investment that we have 

had in TSAT so far, particularly in the ground system, which we 

will have to continue regardless, and it allows us now to take the 

next couple of months to assess what the pace and scope of TSAT 

needs to look like. 

That is the pathway that we are on. There is a study underway. 

It is not a brand-new study. We have looked at this a lot of different ways, and we owe you some answers on this. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Admiral, what does the Navy think about 

the delay on TSAT? 

Admiral DEUTSCH. Sir, obviously, we have stated our requirements for protected communications a number of times, and how 

those protected communications are delivered to our sea base and 

our fleets at sea is certainly important. But as long as they are delivered, that is the most important thing. 

We are very concerned that the protected communications remain available and that they are in sufficient capacity to allow us 

to have the reach-back that we need based upon the way we intend 

to fight the future conflicts. 

Senator BILL NELSON. You said as long as they deliver it, but the 

question is ‘‘when?’’ 

Admiral DEUTSCH. Yes, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. So what do you think about that? 

Admiral DEUTSCH. Sir, we certainly are interested in more protected communications available as soon as possible. With the current schedule, we believe that the sea base will remain viable. We 

would like to see more. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Ms. Chaplain, GAO has been critical of 

this acquisition path for TSAT. What is your assessment of this 

progress, and what is your assessment of this new information that 

we just got today? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. I think everything that has been described today 

is actually good in that some actions are being taken to make the 

TSAT program more executable, more affordable, and also to ensure that there are no capability gaps in the upcoming years. 

But I have always said that this investment needs to be looked 

at in the context of the DOD-wide systems portfolio, not just space 

because, as you said, it is the linchpin for the future global information grid. There are a lot of huge systems depending on this to 

achieve their kinds of capabilities. I think it is not just FCS. So I 

32

think when we talk about priorities, they need to be discussed in 

the context of the whole portfolio of weapon systems and just not 

the space portfolio. 

In terms of dates being in question, I think it is important to go 

back to all of these major systems and really get a good sense of 

what are their schedule delays. They are also facing delays themselves. So is any TSAT revised schedule still in synch with schedules like the FCS program, and what are their backup plans if 

TSAT is not available? 

I don’t think just saying we can rely on other assets may be totally an answer for them. They probably need certain capabilities 

in the TSAT program to do what they are supposed to do. 

Mr. PAYTON. Mr. Chairman, I may have left an improper impression. The 2018 date is based on the classic analysis if you take so 

much money out of the program in these years, it will then slip the 

program so many years in the future. We are looking at something 

a little more granular than that or something a little more than 

just dollars out and schedule slipped. We are looking at the actual 

content. Clearly, protected communications is the top priority for 

the TSAT program. 

I am just not accepting 2018 and the analysis that led to the 

2018 as being thorough enough. It could be earlier than 2018. 

Again, depending on the needs of the warfighters and the TSAT’s 

many, many different customers. 

Senator SESSIONS. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. I went to the other 

room, and I had been told you were here. I should have remembered that. 

Senator BILL NELSON. I went to the wrong room also. 

Senator SESSIONS. General Shelton, what is your take, Strategic 

Command’s (STRATCOM) view of the TSAT delay? 

General SHELTON. Senator, STRATCOM has polled—as General 

Kehler has said, all the other combatant commanders (COCOMs), 

and the other COCOMs have military SATCOM very high on their 

priority lists. So STRATCOM is awaiting this analysis that is being 

conducted right now, anxious to see what the output of that analysis will be. 

Clearly, AEHF–4 is a priority now because of the slip to TSAT, 

but we are anxious to see what this analysis in the spring will 

yield. 

Senator SESSIONS. General Shelton, again, can you tell us what 

role the U.S. space assets and space personnel played in the recent 

successful intercept of our out-of-control National Reconaissance 

Office (NRO) satellite? Was that a joint operation? What lessons 

are we learning from this operation about command and control 

and integration of space assets? 

General SHELTON. Yes, sir. It was very much a joint operation. 

In fact, STRATCOM was lead for planning for this event, not only 

for the intercept itself, but also the consequence management and 

dealing with the aftermath of the intercept. 

So assets included, of course, the——

Senator SESSIONS. Did you decide that the Navy’s SM–3 was the 

right vehicle to utilize to take out that satellite? 

33

General SHELTON. Sir, that was General Chilton, in consultation 

with the Joint Staff and, ultimately, the national leadership that 

decided that that was the proper weapon. Yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. Did I cut you off there? I’ll let you finish? 

General SHELTON. Let me just say that between Navy assets, 

Missile Defense Agency (MDA) assets, Air Force assets, a tremendous joint effort, probably a national effort pulled off in a very 

short period of time. It is almost unprecedented. 

Senator SESSIONS. I felt it was a good surprise test for the entire 

effort. It tested a lot of different things, including your ability to 

coordinate. I understand the Air Force had a role. What was their 

role in the process? 

General SHELTON. Air Force assets were used to track the target 

satellite. 

Senator SESSIONS. To track the satellite? 

General SHELTON. Track the satellite and produce a very precise 

vector on where that satellite would be, because when it broke the 

horizon for the Aegis shooter, it needed to be in a certain size box. 

We were well inside that box. So it gave a very good target for the 

shooter. The shooter was able to lock on, and the results speak for 

themselves. 

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Payton, maybe you can comment on that, 

and did the Air Force incur costs in the course of what they were 

doing? Have they had to defer any other work as a result of that? 

Mr. PAYTON. The tracking sensors that General Shelton referred 

to are something that the Air Force has going on 24–7, 365. So 

there’s perhaps some overtime for analysts, I honestly don’t know. 

But there were no extra immediate costs for the Air Force to participate in this exercise. 

Senator SESSIONS. Are you satisfied with the coordination and cooperation of so many entities that were involved in this? Did we 

learn anything that we could do better? 

Mr. PAYTON. I came from MDA before my current job, and this 

was executed as in a similar fashion as many MDA operations, 

where they do rely on several different assets from the Air Force, 

from the Army, from the Navy, to execute their mission. So this 

was just another routine exercise from the perspective of the coordination that was conducted. 

General SHELTON. Senator, let me make one other comment on 

that in terms of lessons learned, if I could? The Chinese Anti-Satellite (ASAT) test as well applies here. But there is a tremendous 

amount of data that is available, but because of the way we are 

architected right now, you have to pull all of that data together ad 

hoc. It is different networks. It is different levels of security. There 

are many different problems in pulling that data together. 

Yet again, we did it this time. But what we need is a system that 

pulls this together on a routine basis, and that is exactly what we 

are working for: integrated space situation awareness. 

Senator SESSIONS. I will ask whoever, I am not sure who the appropriate person is. But one of the things that I know we were concerned about is that the Chinese attack on the satellite was 450 

miles up above the International Space Station, and it was going 

to create space debris that could endanger space activity for years 

to come. 

34

This was about 100 miles up, I believe, and we thought that the 

debris would re-enter the atmosphere. That is below the Space Station, of course. Did those facts bear out, and how are we doing with 

the debris situation? Were you accurate in your projections that the 

debris would not threaten the Space Station? 

General SHELTON. Sir, for both the Chinese ASAT test as well as 

the intercept, the models that predicted the debris field did a pretty good job. Chinese ASAT test produced debris up at 850 kilometers, the engagement altitude, and that debris will literally rain 

down, naturally decay over decades. 

The test that was done occurred at 247 kilometers. That debris 

will probably, 90-plus percent of it, will be down within the next 

2 months. What we can track right now is 10 centimeters, roughly. 

We are tracking about 193 pieces left on orbit right now, and that 

will rapidly decay. 

So very different not only in terms of motivation for the event, 

but very different in terms of debris fallout. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Admiral, let us go to another program, the 

Multiple User Objective System (MUOS), ultra-high frequency 

(UHF)-band communication satellite. It is scheduled to launch 

around March 2010. What is the current status on this? Is its 

launch still on? 

Admiral DEUTSCH. Senator, I would like to say that it is doing 

fairly well on schedule. As a matter of fact, I think the schedule 

performance index is at about .97 right now. So we are still doing 

very well on schedule. 

Sir, I think the actual launch will be in December 2009, with initial on-orbit capability of March 2010. There is pressure on the 

schedule. I won’t sit here and promise you that that will definitely 

be the date that it will launch. We are now in single-line flow, and 

with your experience, you are well aware of what happens at that 

time. 

That is where you get into the situations where, if you have a 

problem, you may have to stop and redesign a component. We have 

had a couple of components that have had some issues and have 

eaten up some of the margin. Having said that, we have successfully solved those component issues, and we believe that we are 

still on track for the initial launch in the winter of 2009. 

Senator BILL NELSON. There have been technical issues with the 

ultra-high frequency follow-on (UFO) satellite, so that there is likely to be a gap in UHF capability. What is your analysis of this gap? 

Admiral DEUTSCH. Senator, the gap that you referred to is the 

gap between the likelihood or the probability of eight functioning 

satellites on orbit, eight UFOs, if you will. That has been established by STRATCOM, in consultation with the COCOMs, to be a 

70 percent figure is what is desired. 

As of this month, the likelihood that there will be 70 percent of 

the satellites still on orbit, that date is now within 9 months of the 

on-orbit capability of the first MUOS. So we have about a 9-month 

gap between the 70 percent availability and then a replacement 

satellite capability, which each MUOS not only carries a MUOS 

package, but also a UHF legacy package as well. So about a 9-

month gap right now, sir. 

35

Senator BILL NELSON. Now that capacity, is that the commercial 

UHF capability? 

Admiral DEUTSCH. No, sir. The commercial capability not only 

the leased satellite (LEASAT) that is currently up and its fuel is 

expected to remain through about 2010, that is not factored into 

the 70 percent availability, nor is the commercial UHF capability 

that we are working on providing as part of the President’s submit 

to Congress. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Has the Navy started the process to acquire commercial UHF? 

Admiral DEUTSCH. Yes, sir. Not only leasing, but also a hosted 

payload option. The leasing is besides what we have right now on 

LEASAT, as I just mentioned, we also are working on with 

Intelsat’s Skynet. We have money programmed in the 2009 submittal for fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2010 leases. We are also 

in the pre-solicitation synopsis release phase for the hosted payload. 

We have an industry day this month, as a matter of fact, to talk 

to industry about potentially hosting a payload. In our submittal 

to you, sir, we have money dedicated towards that. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. The Chinese counterspace program by all accounts represents a significant commitment on their part. Yesterday, DOD released its 2008 report: ‘‘The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China.’’ It highlighted their growing counterspace 

capability, which includes nuclear-tipped missiles; direct ascent 

ASATs, which we have seen; jammers; ASAT lasers; and radio frequency weapons. They are also building a domestic capability for 

the production of micro satellites, which could be used as space 

mines or space parasites. 

I will just ask this to you, and I am not sure who should be in 

priority to answer it. What value does China see in these 

counterspace weapons? How would they use them in a conflict? 

What do you think their ultimate objective is in terms of size and 

scope of the program? General Kehler? 

General KEHLER. Sir, let me try this on. As a force provider for 

STRATCOM, which is what Air Force Space Command is, we wind 

up having to provide the STRATCOM space capabilities that can 

operate during times of conflict, and so this is a big issue for us. 

Let me start by saying, though, that as we look at the space domain today, the evidence that we see looks to be pretty clear. We 

have to expect that the space domain will be contested in any future conflict. We see evidence that potential adversaries and others 

are preparing to deny us the advantages that we have in space in 

lots of different places. The Chinese are one of those. 

As we look at them, the answer to the questions that you posed, 

though, is probably the most puzzling to us, and that is we don’t 

know. It isn’t clear to us what their intent really is. In terms of 

their acquisition, in terms of the ASAT test that they conducted a 

little over a year ago, and what those implications are for us for 

the future. 

What we believe we have to do, though, is be prudent. Therefore, 

we are preparing to have to continue to provide our space capabilities in a contested environment. We are working very hard on that, 

36

and so, sir, I can’t answer for you directly—I am not sure anyone 

can answer directly where we think the Chinese are going here. 

I did read the report from yesterday. Fundamentally, it is information that we have been reporting to Congress in various venues. 

The key question, I think, and the report poses this question is 

‘‘why?’’ What is it that they are doing, and what is their intent behind the visible activity that we can see? 

I can tell you that it is concerning to us, and those of us that 

are forced to prepare to provide military capability in conflict have 

to take account of the fact that we see the kinds of things that 

were shown in the report that was issued again yesterday. I believe 

that we are on a good pathway to address those. I also want to suggest to you that the Chinese are not the only folks that we watch 

with concern. 

Senator SESSIONS. I am sure that is true. What about Operationally Responsive Space (ORS)? It seems to me that throughout our 

DOD procurement, we need to be looking for capabilities that are 

less expensive and have substantial volume and a quick response 

time and ability to deploy promptly. 

I had a professor in college that talked about before it became, 

I guess, so common to think about the Russian tanks and the German tanks. The German tanks had leather interior and cost a fortune. But, as he argued, all it was was a piece of metal with a gun 

that could hit his target. You get more of them, you are better off. 

So it could be less attractive and superb in a lot of ways, but still 

to be able to do the job that we need to be doing. 

So let me ask this, General Kehler first. What are we starting 

to learn from the TSAT–2 experiment that we had in terms of, one, 

developing small technology satellite technology; two, improving 

our acquisition approach to satellites and launch vehicles; and, 

three, operational concepts related to warfighter? Would you start 

off with that, and I will ask anybody else to contribute? 

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. First of all, I believe you are referring 

to Tactical Satellite (TACSAT)–2, and let me say at the outset that 

improving our responsiveness across the board is something that 

we think is critically important. 

Senator SESSIONS. What do you mean by ‘‘responsiveness,’’ for 

someone who might be listening in and not know what you are 

talking about? 

General KEHLER. It covers a range of things for us, as a matter 

of fact. We have chunked this up, if you will, into three tiers’ worth 

of what we think about responsiveness. The first is how do you 

make your existing capabilities more responsive? My colleagues 

and I believe that helping ourselves on the ground—which may 

sound a little odd here—is the first step to being more responsive. 

That is, how do we make more responsive the things that are on 

orbit today? 

In many cases, the way we have to go about that is by making 

the ground systems more responsive, using those platforms that 

are on orbit in better and more efficient ways and handing information, in many cases, directly from the platforms to the 

warfighters, which is something that the warfighters have always 

demanded. 

37

So the first step for us is to make sure the existing systems are 

more responsive, and largely, that is something——

Senator SESSIONS. More responsive basically to the warfighter? 

General KEHLER. More responsive to the warfighter in terms of 

being more timely and handing product over to them, whether that 

is imagery or whether that is communications product, whatever. 

Getting that farther down into the warfighting echelon sometimes 

is helpful as well. 

Then the second step for us is how do we make in big terms acquisition more responsive to the warfighter needs. As the GAO 

points out, it takes us too long to put things on orbit, and we have 

been addressing those issues. Part of our back-to-basics approach, 

for example, in acquisition, part of acquisition corrections that were 

made as a result of decisions we made in the 1990s, et cetera, all 

apply here. I believe that we can even do more in terms of coming 

up with a strategy that helps us to deploy capability sooner. 

In fact, we have people off looking at that and maybe we can 

come back and have a discussion with you at some point about the 

strategy that we have been on, the relatively small number of large 

platforms versus a large number of small platforms. Your tank 

analogy, if you will. I think that is a great question for us to ask 

ourselves. 

Of course, ORS. Then how can we position ourselves to have the 

ability as a national strategic capability to put platforms on orbit 

maybe within months as opposed to years? That is what ORS is all 

about. How do we make that affordable? How do we make that 

achievable? How do we make all of that feasible? 

To come full circle to your question, I think what TACSAT–2 

showed us, which was really the first of the experiments that we 

put on orbit that tries to follow a more rapid, smaller way of conducting our business, what that showed us more than anything 

else, more than the technical capability of the platform was it validated the concept. 

It validated for us that this makes sense for us to have in our 

toolkit as we try to improve our responsiveness across the board 

that at the one end of our ability to deploy capability, we want to 

have something that can put a smaller platform up there, maybe 

has a single purpose, doesn’t last more than a couple of years, applies its output directly to the warfighter, is controlled by the 

warfighter, and is something that we could have as a replenishment, for example, capability if, in fact, we take losses on orbit or 

augmentation to supplement some capability that is up there. 

It is very, very promising to us, and I believe that the output of 

TACSAT–2 was a validation of the concept, not as much about the 

technology, that, we will get better at as time goes on. There were 

technologically good things about TACSAT as well, but I think, 

more importantly, it was a validation of the concept. It also helped 

us understand better where the gaps were in the concept. So, it 

helped us come back and address where those are and get those 

closed. 

Senator SESSIONS. I guess we know that there is a threat to any 

satellites we put up, that a lot of nations have the capability, if 

they put their mind to it, to threaten those capabilities. One reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:11 Dec 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\42635.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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sponse to it would be to be able to put another one back up on a 

very short notice, would it not? Would you agree with that? 

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. So I guess my question is, are we moving? We 

talk about it, but my question is, are we moving to have a low-cost 

launch system? Are we going to have a low-cost satellite that would 

meet just those qualities and capabilities you mentioned for the 

warfighter and make sure that at least the people we have in 

harm’s way are able to maintain the capabilities of our FCSs that 

all require satellite capability? 

General KEHLER. The answer, Senator, is, yes, sir, we are. 

Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Payton, do you want to comment? 

Mr. PAYTON. One of the critical elements of shortening that timeframe to be more responsive to the COCOM is to shorten the 

amount of time it takes to assemble the spacecraft and put the requisite payload sensors on that spacecraft. That is called plug-andplay spacecraft. 

We currently have four TACSATs that have been defined. One 

has been launched. The other three are in different stages of preparation for launch. The fifth TACSAT will fly that conceptual plugand-play spacecraft, a demonstration where we can plug together 

a spacecraft similar to the way laptop computers are plugged together after you phone the company and say, ‘‘I need this kind of 

hard drive and this kind of memory and this kind of display.’’ They 

plug-and-play a laptop for you. That is the same construct that we 

will demonstrate on TACSAT–5. 

Senator SESSIONS. It seems to me we would want to have in inventory some satellites that, I don’t mean weeks, I mean within 

days, could replace one that fails or is damaged in some fashion. 

Is that part of your vision? 

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. Again, we are headed in that direction. 

I would describe the current ORS effort, though, in crawl, walk, 

and run terms. We are crawling. I believe we are about to start 

walking. 

When we cross those thresholds, what we are doing with the 

ORS program right now is we are essentially developing the piece 

parts that allow you to get to a more and more and more responsive solution. When you get there, I believe you are then to the 

point where if you decide, some things may go on the shelf for immediate use, some things may be assembled and purchased within 

months, which may be sufficient to respond to warning. We will 

have the capability——

Senator SESSIONS. I see the fiscal year 2009 through the fiscal 

year 2013 budget calls for $550 million for ORS. It appears to me 

to be modest. Who wants to comment on that? You are required to 

answer. What do you think? 

Mr. PAYTON. I will give that a shot, Senator. Again, we have to 

crawl, walk, run. Our first investments are into what we call 

enablers, like the plug-and-play spacecraft, like a spacecraft control 

center that can handle more than one kind of satellite constellation 

at a time, a multi-mission spacecraft operations center, where one 

person flies a certain kind of satellite in the morning and that 

same person is trained and qualified to fly a different kind of satellite in the afternoon. 

39

Additionally, we have to improve some of our ground support 

equipment. Right now, there is a launch vehicle called the 

Minotaur. We can only process one Minotaur at a time. Now we 

may need to be in the business of processing a Minotaur up in Kodiak, AK, for a launch and at the same time, one out of Wallops 

Island here in Virginia. 

So we have to invest in some of the fundamental enablers that 

sometimes are exotic, but typically are not. Those are where we are 

putting our money right now. Equally important, we are working 

with STRATCOM, who represents the combatant warfighters—the 

geographical combatant warfighters in this case—and quantifying 

what sort of capabilities, what sort of needs do those theater 

COCOMs have for systems like ORS. So, we are in the business operations side of it, quantifying what the theater commanders need, 

while additionally in parallel, we are working on those enablers 

that allow us to migrate from crawl to walk to run. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Admiral, with regard to this ORS, are you 

satisfied you are part of this? You have at least one senior scientist 

in the office. 

Admiral DEUTSCH. Yes, sir, we are satisfied. We would like to 

play a larger role. We certainly would like the Naval Research Laboratory, which has a pretty distinguished history in space and has 

a lot of talent, to also play a larger role. We are working it through 

the requirements process. 

Of note, like the fellow Services, we are strongly in favor of making the ORS office a joint office with a rotating director. This year, 

we will nominate an individual to perform as the director of the 

ORS office. So if we are lucky, we would certainly like to have that 

individual serve, and we look forward to, as General Kehler and 

Secretary Payton mentioned, advances in ORS. 

We think there is a need for it within Navy’s requirements. 

There will be a growing need, as recent events have shown, in the 

future to be able to rapidly replenish and to put capability on orbit. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Do any of you all need any new authority 

to make the office more efficient, more effective? 

Mr. PAYTON. We looked at that closely. Initially, we thought 

there were all sorts of inhibitions to an organization like we have 

in Albuquerque. Come to find out the single largest benefit would 

be if their money were all research and development (R&D) money, 

instead of being divided up into procurement or operation and 

maintenance or science and technology (S&T) money. If all of their 

budget were single color money, R&D money, that adds a lot of 

flexibility to how rapidly they can respond to warfighter needs. 

Senator BILL NELSON. There was an issue about the electronic 

intelligence payload on TACSAT–2. What was the issue, and what 

was the resolution, and what was the lesson learned? 

General SHELTON. Senator, the problem was signal intelligence 

operational tasking authority, and that is the purview of the National Security Agency (NSA). So getting that authority had not 

been worked out ahead of time. That is one of the key lessons 

learned from TACSAT–2. That, I am confident, will never happen 

again. We will work that well ahead of time and get the NSA’s permission to have that operational tasking authority that is needed. 

40

Senator BILL NELSON. TACSAT–1 is supposed to launch this 

June or July. Are you ready to go? Are all of the issues resolved? 

General SHELTON. To my knowledge, Senator, we are ready to go. 

I think it is more of a booster problem than anything. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Ms. Chaplain, GAO has been looking at 

the standup of the ORS office. What do you say? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. As you can hear the talk about ORS today, you 

realize that there are a lot of efforts involved with this program. 

Many on the short-term side, which involve developing these 

TACSATs and launching them, and also addressing potential capability gaps in some of the acquisition programs. 

There is also a very long-term effort to ORS to get to this vision 

of having satellites on the shelf ready to go at any moment. In addition to plug-and-play, that includes having common interfaces, 

having well-understood common design practices, and also having 

low-cost launch. Our concern, while we thought the ORS effort is 

doing a pretty good job of standing up the program office and getting staff and progressing with these S&T efforts, our concern is 

that over the long run, there is a chance that some of these shortterm demands may end up overwhelming the long-term effort. 

So we have to keep our eye on things like getting low-cost launch 

and keeping up with the design effort and things like interfaces. 

So, in our review, we are going to be recommending that there be 

an investment strategy to help guide this program office. It is a 

small office. It doesn’t have longstanding clout, like a huge acquisition program has. So it may have trouble negotiating a lot of the 

demands being placed on it if it doesn’t have strategy and good 

support from above. 

General KEHLER. Sir, if I could add something to that? Inside Air 

Force Space Command, we now have the Space and Missile Systems Center, the large acquisition house. A key issue for us all 

along here for ORS has been how do we attach the ORS office so 

that it can leverage the capabilities that are brought in, the money 

that is brought by the Space and Missile Systems Center. 

We are still working our way through that. The way we have 

done it today is that we have dual-hatted the director of the ORS 

office. So not only is he the director of the ORS office, but he also 

has a role in the Space and Missile Systems Center. 

That has been very helpful to us. It is a joint office. So, regardless of where we go with the leadership, we intend to make sure 

that relationship remains in whatever way we can make that happen because GAO is exactly right, that there has to be some attachment here for a smaller organization that will have to leverage the 

larger organization. We are committed to making that happen. 

Mr. PAYTON. Speaking on organizations, again, the ORS office 

has Air Force, Army, and Navy people onsite in Albuquerque. Additionally, there is a NASA representative onsite in Albuquerque 

from NASA Johnson Space Center, and even an NSA person is assigned there now, again to help us with the lessons that we learned 

from the first TACSAT–2. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Back on the issue of debris, General 

Shelton, what is your modeling and simulation roadmap? 

General SHELTON. Right now, Senator, we have an Aerospace 

Corporation effort that provides that modeling and simulation caVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:11 Dec 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\42635.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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pability for debris. That is also peer reviewed by some NASA work, 

and I think there are very consistent results between NASA’s modeling efforts and aerospace’s modeling efforts. So I think we have 

the best of all worlds here, where we have experts in DOD, experts 

in NASA whose results agree very closely. 

Of course, NASA is focused on the manned spaceflight side of 

things, and DOD is focused on the broader issues of spaceflight. 

But to have that agreement, I think we are doing very well on debris modeling. 

Senator BILL NELSON. On this same issue, we had to move some 

satellites to avoid debris from the Chinese. Has there been any satellite that has been damaged by the debris? 

General SHELTON. Not to our knowledge, Senator. We have 

moved a couple, as you are aware. But neither of those resulted in 

damage, nor anything that we have seen to date that we can track 

that back to debris from the Chinese ASAT test. 

Senator BILL NELSON. All right, and what have your models 

shown that the Chinese debris is no longer going to pose a risk? 

General SHELTON. It will be decades before all of that debris is 

down. Now, having said that, the models put the overall spaceflight 

risks on the order of 10 to the minus 6, which is 1 in 1 million. 

But that is if you take great solace in probabilities. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay, I am going to go to the Space-Based 

Infrared System next. Senator Ben Nelson, did you want to get in 

on any of these issues we have discussed thus far? 

Senator BEN NELSON. I am not sure I know all of the ones that 

have been discussed so far, but I do have a couple of questions. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Go ahead, and then you finish and we will 

let you take off. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, I want to welcome all of you here today. Thanks for your 

service, and much of what you are involved with today is clearly 

going to assist us in this global war of terrorism. 

My first question relates to the recapitalization and modernization. General Moseley has already said that the Air Force needs to 

recapitalize and modernize its fleet of both air-breathing and space 

systems. Of course, we are familiar with the new fighters, new 

bombers and tankers, and everything that is on the drawing board 

as well as those that have not been financed so far. 

But as we look at the Space Command, what space systems 

might be old and failing? I am thinking in part about all of the assets that are in the ground out in Nebraska and other areas, the 

missile systems that are there. Consequently, would that be part 

of the recapitalization to try to extend the life 20 to 30 years of 

some of those assets that are already in the ground there? 

I guess I would ask you, Secretary Payton? 

Mr. PAYTON. Yes, sir. We have a plan to go to 2020 with our 

Minuteman fleet, and we have just finished a series of significant 

upgrades to that fleet. As we conduct aging tests with the technology in that fleet, we will be able to judge more accurately, but 

we think the technology improvements we have made recently can 

probably go to 2030. 

So we do know certain areas of the missile system that will need 

upgrading—avionics in the guidance package, for instance—but we 

42

are confident that we can get at least to 2020 and high likelihood 

to 2030 with the upgrades that we have just finished for the Minuteman. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Do the generals agree with that? 

General KEHLER. Sir, let me put a little bit finer point on what 

Mr. Payton has said. The Air Force Space Command does, in fact, 

have responsibility for the Nation’s land-based intercontinental ballistic missile force. Congress has approved, over the last 5 or more 

years now, almost $7 billion in service life extension, if you will, 

to Minuteman. We are getting to the end of that time. 

We are very confident that we can take Minuteman to 2020. This 

has been service life extension of the boosters, the guidance system, 

the bus that carries the payloads if the need should arise, et cetera. 

We have also made some substantial investment in security improvements with additional concrete on the launch facilities, remote cameras, and other things. So we are very confident we can 

go to 2020. 

You in Congress have asked us about going from 2020 to 2030, 

and quite honestly, we are still looking at that very hard. There is 

one school of thought that says that we can go to 2030, and I tend 

to think that is possible. But what I don’t know is what additional 

investment will be required to do that, and so, we owe you some 

answers on that. 

We owe ourselves some answers on that as well. I am not ready 

to stand up and say that system definitely can go to 2030. It looks 

like the work that has been done and the congressional support 

that has gone on so far puts us in a good position for that, but I 

think it is fair for us to take a harder look. 

We have never gone there before, sir, and much like some of our 

aging aircraft that we had some issues with, we don’t know what 

Minuteman as a system behaves like when it gets over the age of 

50 or 60 or approaches 70. So, that is something that we are going 

to have to come back and tell you. 

Senator BEN NELSON. In that regard, 5 years ago, the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense signed out a policy letter designating the Air 

Force as the executive agent for space. That seems to have been 

successful for us because at least the back-to-basics approach 

seems to generate what we would hope in the way of expertise as 

well as a plan. 

But the position of the Under Secretary of the Air Force is vacant, and I guess, Mr. Secretary, what is the Air Force’s view regarding that position, if you know? Will it remain vacant until the 

end of the administration’s time, and is the Air Force’s view of the 

executive agent still operative today? 

Mr. PAYTON. Yes, sir. The DOD instruction, the DOD document 

that empowers the executive agent for space says that the Secretary of the Air Force is the executive agent for space. That individual can delegate that to the Under Secretary of the Air Force. 

The Under Secretary position is vacant right now. I cannot predict 

if it will be filled. It is a nominative, confirmed position. 

But we are fortunate in that Secretary Michael W. Wynne, the 

Secretary of the Air Force, is extremely knowledgeable in the space 

business, both launch vehicles and ground control segments and 

satellites, due to his background. 

43

Senator BEN NELSON. I certainly wouldn’t suggest that he is not 

knowledgeable. I guess my concern is that without that position 

being filled, that he already has enough to do without taking on 

the Under Secretary’s position. Or if he could do it, maybe we don’t 

need the position of the Under Secretary? 

I am just hopeful that we won’t saddle the Secretary with more 

than we should. 

Mr. PAYTON. Yes, sir. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Based on the fact that position is there. 

Mr. PAYTON. Sir, again, I cannot project into the future if there 

will be any nominees or anyone that——

Senator BEN NELSON. Maybe I should call him and ask him, 

huh? I won’t tell him you suggested that. It was my idea. 

One final thing, with the end of the Cold War, there seems to 

have been a pause in our investment in the U.S. nuclear community. So, in a February 10th LA Times article, the U.N.’s chief 

watchdog, Dr. Mohammed El Baradei, warned that the most imminent threat is not a new nation joining the nuclear club, but rather 

deadly material falling into the hands of extremists. 

With the risk of extremists pursuing dirty bombs, as we know, 

and also concern about anti-proliferation, are we in a position 

where we need to reinvest in new personnel and in new technology 

and new assets in this area? I guess I would ask you, General 

Kehler. 

General KEHLER. Sir, first of all, proliferation concerns us very 

much. Attempts at counterproliferation, of course, are ongoing at 

all levels. In terms of our own nuclear forces, I can speak for, 

again, land-based strategic deterrent inside Air Force Space Command. When I took my job in October, the first question that I had 

was are we being good stewards of the Nation’s land-based strategic deterrent? The answer that I came to was, yes, we are. 

I did that in a combination of visits to our field commanders, 

some assessments that our field commanders had done. The fact 

that we went back and reviewed the standards that we have for 

our nuclear activities, which, by the way, have been in existence 

for over 50 years now and, in some cases, since the end of the Cold 

War, have gotten more stringent. 

But what has changed since the end of the Cold War, there are 

some things out there that concern me. One is security. The good 

news is that the number of weapons since the end of the Cold War 

have declined drastically, and that is good. That is the way all of 

us wanted—

Senator BEN NELSON. That is assuming that we know where the 

decline, where those that have declined are resident right now. Is 

that right? 

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. We certainly do. We know where ours 

are. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Yes, but I am obviously concerned about 

where ours are. 

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. 

Senator BEN NELSON. But I am less concerned about that than 

perhaps where the others are. 

General KEHLER. That is the proliferation issue. What we have 

seen, again, in our own house is certainly with the decline in numVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:11 Dec 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\42635.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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bers came the decline in number of people associated with the nuclear mission, which inherently in that decline in the number of 

people, we have a decline in experience, and that is what concerns 

me. 

So we have done a number of studies in the Air Force, and those 

outside the Air Force have helped us look at this, in the last 6 

months or so. There have been a number of recommendations made 

that we are now in the process of implementing to try to make sure 

that our experience base is firm, that we have made the investments that we need to make, that we are complying with our 

standards, that we have not taken our eye off of this most important, in my view, of all the balls that we have. 

So, we are addressing some recommendations at this point in our 

command that get to, for example, even increased security beyond 

where we find ourselves today. It gets to some changing in operating concepts and the way we do our business in the missile complexes to put security and surety first. So, I am very comfortable 

that we are on the right paths. 

I will remain concerned about our experience level. We have gone 

back to basics on that as well. We are going to make sure that we 

have done everything we can do to grow people with the appropriate experience, and we will pay attention to that and are already paying attention to that in many different ways. 

So the long answer to your question is I believe that we can have 

high confidence in the way we are operating our land-based deterrent force today. I am concerned about proliferation. Of course, that 

is a concern across the board with us, and we do have some issues 

to go address in light of some of the reviews that we have done recently, and we will go address those. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Will the authorization request that we 

have, and are looking at, adequately handle the staffing requirements that you are talking about with developing the new expertise or the expertise in light of where we are today, and is at all 

adversely affected by the reduction in end strength within the Air 

Force? 

General KEHLER. Again, speaking from within my command, I do 

believe we are adequately addressing this. This is largely the use 

of the people that we have, and it is making sure that we are fostering the development of certain folks who, from second lieutenant 

all the way up, are going to be developed as nuclear experts. I 

think we have a commensurate concern with the laboratories and 

elsewhere across the nuclear enterprise of whether we have the appropriate experience, whether we have the appropriate industrial 

capacity here to do what we need to do, and I think those are all 

good questions that are being addressed. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Okay, as long as the budget request is 

adequate for that. Because what I don’t want to find is that, for 

example, the Air Force budget for planes and so forth is inadequate 

to the tune of $20 billion per year for each of the next 5 years, 

which is outside the budget and not part of the authorization request at all, but we are going to be presented with trying to deal 

with that. 

I hope there are no surprises of that kind dealing with the nuclear arsenal and the space issues. 

45

General KEHLER. Sir, again, I can’t speak outside my command. 

I can tell you that inside the command, I believe that we are adequately resourced. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Okay, all you can do. 

General KEHLER. I will also add, though, if I may? One of my 

concerns in extending Minuteman from 2020 to 2030 is beyond the 

boosters, et cetera, it also goes to the weapons and whether we will 

have the appropriate industrial capacity to do everything we need 

to do for the weapons. 

Senator BEN NELSON. When will you know what would be required? 

General KEHLER. Those assessments go on all the time. In terms 

of the stockpile, the warhead stockpile, those assessments are going 

on constantly. What we don’t know yet is what we don’t know 

about how some of these things age. 

Again, there are other efforts underway to make sure that we 

don’t find ourselves in a very awkward position, and there are 

other folks besides me working with other committees here on the 

Hill to take a hard look at the weapons complex itself. I can’t speak 

for that here other than as a consumer, as a customer of that, making sure that we are addressing it. 

Senator BEN NELSON. I understand. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You have been very tolerant. Thank 

you. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Senator Thune? 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you all very 

much for your service and for being here today. 

I know the Chairman is anxious to move into closed session, but 

I wanted to find out and maybe these are questions that could be 

asked in that setting if they can’t be answered in open session. But 

I wanted to get to this issue of the shootdown of the malfunctioning 

spy satellite a few weeks ago. I applaud the Navy’s successful 

shootdown, but I also, at the same time, want to touch a little bit 

on the cost of a malfunctioning satellite because, obviously, whenever we shoot down something like that, we are blowing up a large 

amount of money on that particular item. 

So, I guess to the extent that you can discuss this in open session, I am curious to know, do we know what the malfunction was? 

What caused it? What is the cost of losing that satellite? Perhaps 

then maybe the question about how do we hold the contractor accountable? Do they reimburse the Government? Those sorts of 

questions, if anybody, Mr. Secretary, can answer that? 

Mr. PAYTON. I believe what we can say at this juncture is that 

it is an NRO satellite that was the target, and that is the limit of 

what we can say in this forum. 

Senator THUNE. Okay, so those are all questions for another 

time. 

Senator BILL NELSON. If you can go with us to S–407? 

Senator THUNE. That is where we are going to go next? 

Senator BILL NELSON. Yes. Ask that same question there. 

Senator THUNE. Okay. 

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. However, I would just add one other 

thing here. None of us sitting here represent the National Reconnaissance Organization (NRO) today. 

46

Senator THUNE. Right. 

General KEHLER. So I know I can’t answer the specifics of your 

question. So I don’t want to create an impression that we can go 

somewhere else and answer. I can’t, and I don’t think anybody else 

at the table can either. 

Senator THUNE. Okay, let me ask, Mr. Secretary, last month the 

Chinese and Russians put forward a treaty proposal that would 

ban space programs. I am wondering if you could comment on that 

proposal and what the administration’s position is on the general 

principle of a space weapons ban? 

Mr. PAYTON. Yes, sir. The presidential policy from August 2006 

on space says that arms control agreements or restrictions must 

not impair the rights of the United States to conduct research, development, testing, or operations in space. That is founded on a 

couple of principles. As a military acquisition group, we respond to 

what the President would say, clearly. But some of the difficulties 

of a space treaty of some sort would revolve around definitions and 

verification. 

Some of the best strategic treaties in recent memory have been 

founded on trust, but verify. So the verification regime would be 

very difficult for space weapons. For instance, a routine satellite 

that is up there doing a normal job could, toward the end of its life, 

as its last act, run into another satellite and, therefore, become an 

ASAT. 

So it is how do you verify that it won’t do that? How do you define an ASAT in the first place? Early in the Shuttle era, the Soviet 

Union was concerned that the Space Shuttle was an ASAT, which, 

of course, it could not be. So the basic fundamentals of trust, but 

verify would be fundamentally impossible to do in space. 

Senator THUNE. I know you have exhausted the Chinese ASAT 

test last year, and you talked, I think before I got here, maybe a 

little bit about the whole issue of proliferation. But I am curious 

to know if the panel could discuss how the notion of prompt global 

strike fits into countering those types of ASAT attacks. General? 

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. I will take a stab at this, again, as a 

force provider for STRATCOM. The commander of STRATCOM has 

asked us to participate with both the Navy and the Army in investigating technologies and how we might give to him a capability to 

do prompt global strike. The objective is deterrence. 

At least from our perspective, as we would be looking to provide 

such capability to STRATCOM, the objective would be to enhance 

our deterrent posture. In any ways that we can enhance our deterrent posture, we think that we are preventing, hopefully, a conflict 

to begin with. If we can prevent a conflict, then we are into this 

discussion of a contested space domain as part of a conflict. 

So our view is that this has potential to contribute to our deterrent posture and in that way gives the commander of STRATCOM 

another arrow, if you will, in the quiver to use potentially in a conflict and, therefore, could hold some very important things around 

the world at risk. Whether that is a proliferating weapon that we 

discover somewhere or whether those are other kinds of targets, 

the commander of STRATCOM has seen the need to be able to hold 

those risks. 

Senator THUNE. Okay. 

47

General SHELTON. Senator, as we think through the threats to 

our space systems, some of them are ground based, some of them 

are space based. But in dealing with the ones that are ground 

based, our only option right now seems to be a kinetic strike 

against that ground-based asset that is engaging our space assets. 

That leads you down that road of prompt global strike. You also 

could consider a non-kinetic computer network attack or something 

like that, if you could get into the network, if they were even reliant upon a network, which is a huge intelligence challenge to start 

with. But as we think about either reconstituting or augmenting, 

you have to consider that that threat is still extant and deal with 

that threat on the ground before you put something into space and 

put it at risk just like the thing that was just taken out. 

So it is a complex problem, and as General Kehler said, dealing 

with that threat on the ground with some sort of weapon has to 

be a priority for us if we are going to consider contested domain 

as part of a conflict. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, all. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Secretary Payton, are you going to be able 

to answer his question in classified session? 

Mr. PAYTON. I am not knowledgeable on the details of the NRO 

spacecraft. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Now, your boss would be the Assistant 

Secretary, would he not? 

Mr. PAYTON. I work for Secretary Wynne. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Right. The Assistant Secretary position is 

vacant, isn’t it? 

Mr. PAYTON. Under Secretary is vacant, yes, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Under Secretary. That is the one that is 

dual-hatted? 

Mr. PAYTON. When the Under Secretary job is vacant, Mr. 

Wynne is dual-hatted. 

Senator BILL NELSON. He is also the Secretary of the Air Force 

and the Executive Agent for Space? 

General KEHLER. I think he is talking about NRO. 

Mr. PAYTON. NRO. No, the dual-hatted position for both military 

space and NRO, that dual-hatted position evaporated in 2005. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. So to get Senator Thune’s question 

answered, are you saying that there is nobody in your bailiwick, including the Secretary of the Air Force, that can answer that question, that we would have to go to the head of the NRO? 

Mr. PAYTON. That is accurate. Yes, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Would the Director of National Intelligence be able to answer the question? 

Mr. PAYTON. If he could not answer it immediately, he could get 

it for you, to be sure. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay, and is there anybody in DOD that 

could get it? Could the Secretary of Defense get it? 

Mr. PAYTON. I could ask the question and run down the answer 

for you. But again, the spacecraft was an NRO responsibility. 

General KEHLER. Senator, it isn’t about us being able to get the 

answer. I just wanted to point out to you that those of us sitting 

at the table don’t have the answer. 

48

Senator BILL NELSON. The head of NRO jointly reports to the 

DNI and the Secretary of Defense. 

Mr. PAYTON. Yes, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. So we could get it from either one of them. 

All right. What we need to do is to move quickly to S–407, and we 

will resume in classified session. We will submit written questions 

for the record that we haven’t had time to ask here. We are adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

EVOLVED EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE

1. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, I recognize that this 

has to be a rough ballpark estimate as each launch will carry different satellites 

and booster configurations, but we need some rough estimate to determine if there 

are really savings to be achieved from the creation of United Launch Alliance 

(ULA). What is your best estimate as to what an average evolved expendable launch 

vehicle (EELV) launch costs? 

Mr. PAYTON and General KEHLER. There are five classes of launch vehicles with 

a corresponding cost for each class used in the budget. The fiscal year 2009 EELV 

Launch Services costs follow:

[In millions of dollars] 

Class Fiscal Year 

2009 

Medium ....................................................................................................................................................................... 85.614 

Intermediate 

Small ................................................................................................................................................................. 102.405 

Medium .............................................................................................................................................................. 124.792 

Large ................................................................................................................................................................. 146.060 

Heavy .......................................................................................................................................................................... 207.624 

Costs associated with EELV missions are distributed between two contract structures: EELV Launch Capability (ELC) provides the minimum capability required for 

the United States to maintain assured access to space and EELV Launch Services 

provides for booster production, materials and touch labor. 

ELC is a ‘‘must-pay’’ bill and provides a minimum national capability for space 

launch. This allows the Air Force to comply with the direction of the National Space 

Transportation Policy. The ELC contract funds both families of launch vehicles to 

a basic minimum capability (support four launches, surge to five launches, per family each year).

2. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, when do you expect to 

see the beginning of savings from the creation of ULA, and is the advertised 25 percent cost savings realistic? 

Mr. PAYTON and General KEHLER. The formation of ULA will result in cost savings to the Government. The fiscal year 2008 President’s budget reflected savings 

beginning in fiscal year 2011 as the ELC contract budget line was reduced by $105 

million (the Air Force share of $105 million annual savings to the total program 

based on a 70/30 cost ratio between the Air Force and the National Reconnaissance 

Organization (NRO)) as shown in the table below. As far as projected ULA cost savings being realistic, the proposed savings are currently being evaluated by Defense 

Contract Management Agency and Defense Contracting Audit Agency. 


304str6.eps
49

Historically, the 25 percent savings, as defined in the EELV Operational Requirements Document (ORD), was used to measure savings for EELV over heritage 

launch costs. The program is currently exceeding the 25 percent savings. The program has always met this objective with the current savings at ∼45 percent.

USING THE ESPA RING

3. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, the March 2007 Air 

Force Space Test Program (STP) launch was the first time the EELV secondary payload adapter (ESPA) ring was used and with remarkable success, launching seven 

satellites from the adapter ring. This seems to be a ready option for more space test 

launches or for operationally responsive space (ORS) launches that should be used 

whenever possible. What are the plans to use the ESPA ring on future EELV 

launches? 

Mr. PAYTON and General KEHLER. The Air Force has a goal to launch at least 

one ESPA ring mission per year beginning in fiscal year 2012. Implementation of 

the ESPA ring program is an important milestone in our efforts to provide affordable access to space for scientific, research, and development efforts. This secondary 

mission is contingent on missions with excess margin and appropriate launch profiles, spacecraft availability, funding availability, and acceptable operational mission 

risk.

4. Senator BILL NELSON. General Shelton, do you think the ESPA ring could be 

used for more ORS launches? 

General SHELTON. ESPA rings could enable more ORS launches. ESPA rings on 

all EELVs would reverse the downturn in the size of the Secondary Test Program 

(STP) launch manifest that has declined mostly as a result of fewer space shuttle 

opportunities. For example, the percentage of Navy STP experiments lifted into 

space declined from 2000 when 23 percent were launched, to 2005 when only 5 percent launched. 

ORS could use the ESPA for S&T/R&D development in the same manner as STP 

does. ORS could also use ESPA for other activities provided the schedule and orbit 

are flexible, and the capability can be achieved with less than 200kg.

5. Senator BILL NELSON. Admiral Deutsch, would the Navy be able to utilize or 

have an interest in using the ESPA ring for small satellite launches? 

Admiral DEUTSCH. Yes, increased use of EELVs equipped with EELV ESPA rings 

would help reverse the downturn in STP launch manifest slots resulting primarily 

due to declining space shuttle opportunities. 

Navy STP experiments reaching space declined from 2000 when 23 percent were 

launched, to 2005 when 5 percent were launched. The EELV program will have 

thousands of pounds of excess throw weight. The smart use of this excess EELV capability would help to reinvigorate Navy space S&T. At least nine Navy current 

payloads have weight and orbital parameters that are compatible as a secondary 

payload for an ESPA-class launch.

OPERATIONALLY RESPONSIVE SPACE

6. Senator BILL NELSON. General Shelton, a lot has happened with ORS since last 

year. The ORS office was stood up in May and the Strategic Command 

(STRATCOM) issued an initial concept of operations. From a STRATCOM perspective, what are the goals and requirements for ORS? 

General SHELTON. STRATCOM’s intent is to assure and enhance the space contribution to joint warfare by enabling timely support to emergent needs of Joint 

Force Commanders (JFCs) and other users. STRATCOM has expressed three desires 

with regard to ORS: first, to rapidly exploit and infuse space technological or operational innovations; second, to rapidly adapt or augment existing space capabilities 

and when needed to expand operational capability; and third, to rapidly reconstitute 

or replenish critical space capabilities to preserve operational capability.

7. Senator BILL NELSON. General Shelton, is there anything—capabilities, experiments, or analysis, etc.—that you want to see the office do that is not planned now, 

either in the future or in addition to what the office is doing now? 

General SHELTON. I believe the ORS office is on track with their approach to pursuing responsive capabilities. We work closely with the ORS office, and provide 

50

them operational needs and operational perspective as they pursue initiatives. 

Clearly this is still a work in progress, but the vector is certainly positive.

8. Senator BILL NELSON. General Kehler, what is your organizational vision for 

the ORS office? 

General KEHLER. The ORS office currently operates under the authority, direction, and control of the Department of Defense (DOD) Executive Agent (EA) for 

Space. The Director of the ORS office reports directly to the DOD EA for Space for 

program execution. Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) is posturing itself to meet 

ORS expectations of executing projects under highly accelerated timelines. DOD understands the benefits and limitations of the current organizational structure and 

is prepared to reanalyze the organization of ORS after an appropriate amount of 

time has passed to observe ORS execution. 

The ORS concept is maturing and will continue to develop throughout the first 

few years of execution. The current focus of ORS is developing architectural concepts and enabling technology for responsive space. A joint office with an abbreviated chain of command provides a great opportunity to maximize the contributions 

of the Services and agencies. 

At some point in the future, the responsive space concept will need to shift from 

the technology demonstration phase into fielding operational systems. The Services, 

and in particular the Air Force, are charged with the responsibility for organizing, 

training, and equipping joint military forces for space operations. AFSPC takes this 

Service responsibility seriously and intends to work closely with the ORS office to 

plan for the transition of the concepts they develop into the Air Force organizational 

structure. We believe that the right place for a jointly staffed responsive space program office is as part of AFSPC. We look forward to fully integrating responsive 

space concepts into our portfolio of space programs.

9. Senator BILL NELSON. General Kehler, are you getting cooperation from other 

entities? 

General KEHLER. Yes, we are getting cooperation on ORS. Each of the Services 

and several government agencies have provided representatives to the ORS office. 

The two recent examinations of urgent STRATCOM requirements in communications and space situational awareness (SSA) involved the joint participation of all 

the different defense space organizations. We achieved superior responses to these 

needs by capitalizing on the different institutional capabilities.

10. Senator BILL NELSON. Admiral Deutsch, I understand that the Navy has at 

least one senior scientist in the ORS office. What else can ORS bring to the Navy 

and can the Navy bring to ORS? 

Admiral DEUTSCH. What can Navy bring to ORS? Navy recently transferred an 

0–5 Space Engineering billet to the ORS office and Navy is working to find the best 

qualified individual to fill the position given constraints on the force due to other 

commitments such as global war on terror and sea duty demands. The ORS office 

should avail itself of the work performed by the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory 

(NRL) and continue to use NRL’s proven ability to develop and transition operationally-relevant capabilities as they have done over the last 50 years using integrated 

government and industry teams. NRL also has exceptional assets, such as Blossom 

Point Ground Station, which have capacity and many of the characteristics needed 

to support ORS. 

What can ORS bring to Navy? Being forward deployed, naval forces are often the 

first responders in a crisis and are heavily dependent on space capabilities to support planning and operations. The ability to augment and reconstitute space capabilities, especially in denied areas, is critical to winning in maritime-dominated 

major conflict operations. ORS can help meet warfighter end-to-end needs for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) programs, communications, 

battlespace management, command and control, position, navigation and timing 

(PNT), and meteorological support. ORS resources could provide Navy with flexible 

options to protect and extend space capabilities in denied and restricted environments, reducing the impact of satellite vulnerability and reducing risk in strategic 

and tactical warning.

11. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, General Shelton, Admiral 

Deutsch, and Ms. Chaplain, are there any new authorities that the ORS office needs 

to operate more efficiently or effectively? 

Mr. PAYTON and General KEHLER. The ORS office does not currently require any 

additional authorities to achieve the desired results. However, the greatest benefit 

to the program would be to receive all funding as research and development (R&D) 

51

funding instead of being divided into procurement or science and technology (S&T) 

funding. Having the ORS budget as R&D would add flexibility and speed in responding to warfighter needs. 

General SHELTON. From a STRATCOM perspective, the ORS office has the authorities required for success. As the staffing levels mature in the ORS office, we 

expect their efforts and effectiveness will increase commensurately. 

Admiral DEUTSCH. Navy believes the ORS office has the appropriate level of authority at this time. 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. The ORS initiative is just getting underway so it is premature at 

this point to definitively answer whether new authorities are needed. The joint ORS 

office intends to leverage off existing contracting and acquisition authorities of other 

organizations, as well as their resources, in meeting unmet space requirements. The 

office expects these leveraging efforts to streamline the overall process for delivering 

capabilities as soon as possible.

12. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, General Shelton, Admiral 

Deutsch, and Ms. Chaplain, TACSAT–1 is scheduled to be launched in the JuneJuly timeframe and also has an electronic intelligence payload. Are the issues all 

resolved with TACSAT–1 so that there are not similar problems? 

Mr. PAYTON and General KEHLER. The DOD will ensure needed authorities are 

in place prior to future TACSAT and ORS launches. TACSAT–1 was scheduled for 

launch in 2004 on a SpaceX Falcon-1 launch vehicle. Since the Falcon-1 launch capability is still not available, the ORS office is evaluating options for how to best 

use the existing TACSAT–1 space vehicle hardware. 

General SHELTON. TACSAT–1A has been developed in response to a STRATCOM 

and ORS office request to upgrade the payload, utilizing lessons learned from 

TACSAT–2. One of the lessons learned was that SIGINT Operational Tasking Authority (SOTA) needed to be fully justified and approved for all appropriate future 

ORS projects. This will ensure authority for tasking, as well as allowing data to be 

released for processing. All parties involved in TACSAT–1A understand the importance of SOTA approval as a precursor to operations. 

Admiral DEUTSCH. Navy defers to STRATCOM. 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. The joint ORS office expects to have a decision by July 2008 regarding the sensors that are to be incorporated on TACSAT–1. Two issues surrounded the operation of TACSAT–2. First, the encryption device that was to be 

used in conjunction with the electronic intelligence payload on TACSAT–2 failed 

after launch. This caused concern regarding how to securely transmit information 

between platforms, for example, from satellite to aircraft. The second TACSAT–2 

issue pertained to the potential for misuse of the automatic identification system 

(AIS). While AIS is used to identify and locate ships, there was some concern that 

this sensor could be used to collect space intelligence information. Regarding 

TACSAT–1, it will not host an encryption device like TACSAT–2, so these satellites 

could not share this same problem. As for AIS, currently there is no sponsor willing 

to pay to add the AIS sensor to TACSAT–1. Without a funding source for AIS and 

commensurate operations and maintenance activities, AIS will not pose an issue to 

ORS.

JOINT SPACE OPERATIONS CENTER

13. Senator BILL NELSON. General Shelton, the Joint Space Operations Center (J–

SPOC) stood up at Vandenberg Air Force Base (AFB) in 2005 and is currently completing a move into its permanent space at Vandenberg. Based on a J–SPOC fact 

sheet, the center ‘‘provides a focal point for the operational employment for worldwide space forces’’ and that it ‘‘creates a single integrated space picture.’’ Part of 

this responsibility, as I understand it, is to track all objects in space, including debris and understanding what the objects are doing. Modeling and simulation capabilities are key to presenting this space picture and to have the necessary SSA. My 

assumption is that your capability to do this is limited. What is your modeling and 

simulation roadmap? 

General SHELTON. AFSPC’s Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC), as well as 

Air Force Materiel Command’s Electronic Systems Center (ESC), has the responsibility for developing the tools we need to modernize the J–SPOC. This modernization effort will enable command and control of space forces, and provide the SSA 

necessary to underpin all space operations. We need tools that combine vast 

amounts of data into decision-quality information, that help us analyze trends, and 

that provide decision aids for our operators. SMC and ESC are currently working 

with the Air Force Research Laboratory to accelerate work on prototype tools that 

52

will improve our capabilities while reducing the risk for the Integrated SSA and 

Space C2 acquisition programs. Additionally, AFSPC and AFRL have engaged with 

Department of Energy (DOE) modeling and simulation experts via technical interchange meetings to leverage DOE’s considerable expertise in this area.

SPACED-BASED INFRARED SYSTEM

14. Senator BILL NELSON. Ms. Chaplain, with the recent delay in the Space-Based 

Infrared System (SBIRS) program it appears that management reserves for SBIRS 

will likely be depleted in early 2009, several years earlier than intended when the 

program was restructured in 2006. If this is true, what, in your view, are the Air 

Force and the DOD going to have to do to address the problem? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. To keep the SBIRS program on track to meet schedule milestones, 

DOD will likely have to provide additional funds to address unanticipated problems, 

given the high complexity of the integration that remains on the first satellite, and 

the recently identified design flaw on the flight software. If DOD decides not to replenish management reserves once they deplete, unanticipated problems will consume these resources much earlier than planned, causing SBIRS to suffer additional 

schedule slips.

15. Senator BILL NELSON. Ms. Chaplain, is the Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) planning to assess the efforts to resolve the software problems on the first 

SBIRS Geostationary (GEO) satellite? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. Yes, we have recently initiated an effort to determine the events 

and circumstances that contributed to the SBIRS flight software problem as a follow 

up to this committee’s earlier request to review SBIRS. Through this effort, we intend to determine what software plans and alternatives DOD is considering, and the 

commensurate risks of each, as well as an approach for resolving the software problems. In addition, we will determine whether DOD has identified the cost and 

schedule implications to the SBIRS program as a result of the problems encountered 

with the flight software.

SCHEDULE AND NEED FOR FOLLOW-ON PROGRAM

16. Senator BILL NELSON. Ms. Chaplain, in the fiscal year 2008 budget request, 

the Air Force submitted a request for a program called the Alternative Infrared Satellite System (AIRSS) which was an alternative infrared program to SBIRS. By the 

time the budget request was submitted, the reason for the program was largely 

overtaken by events and Congress directed that the program be restructured. In the 

fiscal year 2009 budget request, the AIRSS program is gone and a new program 

called Third Generation Infrared Surveillance (3GIRS) is in the budget. This is supposed to be the follow-on to SBIRS. Have you had a chance to review the request 

for this third generation follow-on to SBIRS to determine if the program is appropriately timed and structured to address technology risk and readiness, and to meet 

the requirement for missile warning systems? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. We have not been requested to conduct an in-depth review of the 

3GIRS, but we plan to continue to work informally with the program office to keep 

apprised of its overall plans and progress.

17. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and General Shelton, what 

is the need date for a follow-on program and in this instance, is there an advantage 

to continue with the SBIRS program? 

Mr. PAYTON and General KEHLER. Continuing to procure the SBIRS through 

GEO–4 is the lowest risk approach for continuity of service to meet critical national 

defense needs of missile warning, missile defense, battlespace awareness, and technical intelligence. SBIRS is the successor to the Defense Support Program (DSP) 

with increased capabilities to meet the four mission needs. The first SBIRS Highly 

Elliptical Orbit (HEO) payload is on orbit and test results are exceeding performance specifications. SBIRS GEO–1 satellite is making integration and test progress 

and the program is resolving flight software issues. GEO–1 is baselined for a December 2009 delivery. The infrared (IR) sensors for GEO–2 are proceeding well in 

thermal vacuum testing, and the GEO–2 satellite delivery is baselined for December 

2010. The fiscal year 2009 budget has procurement funding for GEO–3 in fiscal year 

2009, and funding GEO–4 beginning with advanced procurement in fiscal year 2010. 

We will still require space-based infrared surveillance continuity of mission after 

SBIRS GEO–4. The 3GIRS program, which is currently focused on full-earth staring 

IR technology maturation and system definition, is also in our fiscal year 2009 budgVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:11 Dec 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\42635.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
53

et. There is adequate funding in the fiscal year 2009 budget request for 3GIRS to 

complete technology maturation and system definition activities. These efforts will 

inform the DOD to make a system design decision in late fiscal year 2010 and proceed with system design and development of 3GIRS. 

General SHELTON. The missile warning, technical intelligence, and battlespace 

characterization missions that DSP and SBlRS perform are critical to the United 

States. The sensor sensitivity that SBIRS will provide will greatly improve our 

battlespace characterization, thereby increasing the value of this infrared data to 

our warfighters. As we consider a future that will see further proliferation of ballistic missiles with shorter burn times and lower heat signatures, our sensor capabilities need to keep pace. STRATCOM will continue to advocate for robust, capable 

IR sensors in space.

18. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and General Shelton, what 

are the disadvantages? 

Mr. PAYTON and General KEHLER. The key disadvantages of continuing to build 

SBIRS GEO satellites are parts obsolescence, older technology, and complex designs 

resulting in high recurring costs. The evolution to 3GIRS would result in smaller, 

lighter, and mechanically simpler IR payloads to maintain the continuity of critical 

mission areas (missile warning, missile defense, technical intelligence, and 

battlespace awareness). 

General SHELTON. From STRATCOM’s operational perspective, a continuing 

strong IR sensor development program is needed. Whether that is accomplished 

under the rubric of the SBIRS program or some other avenue, it’s clear that we 

must continue the research to constantly improve our space-based IR capability. 

Missile defense, missile warning, battlefield characterization, and technical intelligence are all enhanced by improved IR sensors in space.

SYNCHRONIZATION OF EQUIPMENT

19. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, General Shelton, Admiral 

Deutsch, and Ms. Chaplain, user equipment to allow troops to use the special new 

military signal on Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites—the M code—is not 

yet available and may not be available until after all M code satellites are on orbit. 

Is the equipment to utilize the capabilities of other new satellites as they become 

available, such as the Wideband Global Satellite (WGS), Advanced Extremely High 

Frequency (AEHF) satellite, and the Multiple User Objective System (MUOS), on 

track to utilize the new satellites as soon as they become available? 

Mr. PAYTON and General KEHLER. Terminal and satellite deployments, which for 

the Air Force include WGS and AEHF, are programmed to enable users to operate 

on the new systems as follows:

(1) With the submission of the fiscal year 2009 FYDP, the Air Force has 

synchronized the development of M-Code receiver technology with the onorbit availability of M-Code service. 

(2) At first WGS launch, over 885 currently fielded, joint terminals, will 

be able to use the system’s legacy X-band capability. At the time of the 

sixth and final WGS launch, 4,586 joint terminals are programmed to be 

fielded to take advantage of the new WGS Ka-band capability. 

(3) At first AEHF launch, over 1,290 currently fielded, joint terminals, 

will be able to use the system’s legacy MILSTAR-like capabilities. At the 

time of the fourth and final AEHF launch, 83 percent of the joint terminals 

planned to take advantage of the new AEHF waveform are programmed to 

have been fielded.

General SHELTON. The WGS Ground Multi-band Terminal started fielding last 

year before the launch of the first WGS. The initial fielding of these terminals will 

be complete by the end of fiscal year 2011 (FOC by fiscal year 2014). There are currently a significant number of terminals already in the field which have already 

been passing communications over the satellite. 

The first AEHF satellite will be launched in January 2009 with only the Low 

Data Rate and Medium Data Rate capability, so AEHF is backward compatible with 

existing Milstar terminals. Once the second AEHF satellite is launched in fiscal 

year 2010, the Extended Data Rate capability will be made available to users; however, there will be limited terminals available initially (approximately 80), but increasing as the Services field the new terminals through fiscal year 2016. 

The first MUOS satellite will be launched in December 2009, and it is backward 

compatible with the legacy UHF terminals. The legacy terminals, however, cannot 

54

fully utilize the increased channel capacity until the new terminals are fielded beginning in fiscal year 2011. 

STRATCOM emphasized terminal synchronization via our Integrated Priority List 

for fiscal years 2010–2015. 

Admiral DEUTSCH. Navy terminals for WGS and MUOS advanced waveforms are 

lagging behind the current satellite launches. WGS Ka capability is also being incorporated into the NMT terminal, and therefore, lags behind the WGS constellation 

IOC, however, the WSC 6 SHF SATCOM terminals are being upgraded to access 

the WGS Ka capability and finding for this has been programmed for procurement 

and installation beginning in fiscal year 2009. The Joint Tactical Radio System 

(JTRS) Airborne, Maritime/Fixed Station (AMF) terminal, required to access the 

MUOS constellation, has experienced delays and will lag the satellite by approximately 4 years. 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. We have expressed concerns about synchronization of ground assets for these systems in previous reports and believe those concerns are still valid. 

We plan to provide your staff with more detailed concerns in briefings later this 

spring.

20. Senator BILL NELSON. Ms. Chaplain, has GAO looked at the issues and problems associated with matching up user equipment and satellites, and if so, what are 

your recommendations for fixing this problem? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. As stated above, we are aware of sonic of the potential synchronization problems that may be occurring in the area of matching user equipment with 

satellite development. While we are currently studying this issue as part of an ongoing review of the GPS program, we have not been requested to perform other indepth reviews matching user equipment development with space segment development for other space programs. Consequently, we are not ready at this point to 

make any recommendations on this issue.

21. Senator BILL NELSON. General Kehler and General Shelton, it appears the 

backup ground station will control SBIRS rather than the main mission control station. The main control station for SBIRS, which also operates the DSP satellite, was 

supposed to begin operating SBIRS as soon as the HEO sensor was certified. Now 

it appears that the backup station will control SBIRS. We need an explanation of 

the schedules and funding for the mission control stations. Can you explain the 

schedule for the mission control station for SBIRS? 

General KEHLER. The Mission Control Station (MCS) has command and control 

of the DSP satellite constellation under Increment 1 of the SBIRS program. The 

plan is for the SBRS MCS to control and report on all of the SBIRS assets, DSP, 

SBIRS HEO, and SBIRS GEO except for the period when the MCS is upgraded for 

SBIRS Increment 2. 

The Mission Control Station Backup (MCSB) is planned to be the primary peacetime backup to the MCS. To meet 1996 SBIRS ORD and CJCSV National Security 

Space Policy directives, the MCSB must have the same global and theater missile 

warning, missile defense, and battlespace awareness mission processing; ground station control; communications; satellite and payload command and control; and mission planning capabilities as the MCS. 

Since June 2004, the SBIRS ground baseline has included the MCSB HEO 

(MCSB–H) as the prime facility to operate and process data from the SBIRS HEO 

payloads. The MCSB–H will process HEO mission data and create HEO-only track 

data for the SBIRS MCS to fuse with DSP event data. The MCS will then report 

the consolidated event messages to the combatant commanders worldwide. A 

NORAD-STRATCOM operational acceptance decision and certification for HEO is 

currently scheduled for October 2008. 

The primary MCS is scheduled to be upgraded (hardware/software/communications) for Increment 2 mission operations (consolidated DSP, HEO, and GEO) in fiscal year 2013. The Command will address potential MCSB–H upgrades in future 

budget submissions. 

General SHELTON. The MCS at Buckley AFB is scheduled to be upgraded to perform the SBIRS HEO mission by first quarter fiscal year 2012. During the upgrade, 

residual DSP and SBIRS GEO mission processing will be done at the training facility at Buckley, and SBIRS HEO processing will remain at the MCSB at Schriever 

AFB. Following that upgrade the DSP, SBIRS GEO, and SBIRS HEO mission processing all will be performed at the MCS. The MCSB will be upgraded to provide 

a backup capability by third quarter fiscal year 2012.

55

SPACE WEATHER

22. Senator BILL NELSON. General Kehler, General Shelton, and Admiral Deutsch, 

a February 11, 2008, article in Space News discusses the NASA Advanced Composition Explorer (ACE) Satellite. This satellite, which transmits information about 

space weather and solar wind, is now 10 years old. According to the article, it could 

fail any day and there are no plans to replace it. What are your concerns if this 

satellite should stop functioning? 

General KEHLER. The DOD has a long history of partnering with other U.S. agencies such as NOAA and NASA to meet the Nation’s space environmental support 

needs. To avoid duplication of effort and to achieve least-cost solutions, these partnerships have routinely involved the sharing of data obtained by one agency, but 

used by all agencies. The data obtained by the NASA ACE satellite falls into this 

category. The ACE spacecraft is a key national asset providing data exploited by 

both the DOD, civil, and international operational and research communities. This 

data is essential to providing DOD SSA. 

As a Nation, theses partnerships between the DOD, NOAA, and NASA are essential to the success of our space environment support infrastructure. No single agency has the manpower or fiscal resources to complete this task alone. By better institutionalizing strong partnerships to leveraging one another’s resources, we look to 

develop near-term mitigation strategies for ACE, while building a comprehensive 

long-term strategy to obtain environmental capabilities to meet evolving SSA requirements. 

General SHELTON. We view space weather information as an essential piece of 

SSA. The ACE provides important information that offers a timely warning on approaching solar activity and gives our satellite operators 30–180 minutes lead time 

before our satellites experience the impacts of space environmental events. The loss 

of ACE would result in decreased forecast accuracy and reduced warning time of 

solar events for our satellite, ground radar, and communications system operators. 

Currently, there is no near-term program to replace ACE. STRATCOM will continue 

to advocate to replace this vital capability as we continue to utilize the remaining 

space and ground space weather sensors. 

Admiral DEUTSCH. If the ACE satellite stops functioning, the resulting degraded 

ability to predict the onset of geomagnetic storms will prevent operational space 

weather forecasters from providing accurate predictions, alerts, and warnings of 

harmful environmental conditions. The resulting reduced time available for operators and engineers to safeguard assets, invoke protective measures, engage backup 

network systems, and retain SSA during solar storms would severely compromise 

military operations for missile defense radars and GPS-guided munitions.

23. Senator BILL NELSON. General Kehler, General Shelton, and Admiral Deutsch, 

the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (N–POES), a joint 

Department of Commerce-DOD satellite program, was supposed to carry a sensor 

that would help GPS satellites maintain accuracy in the face of solar activity that 

can disrupt GPS accuracy. This satellite is no longer on the N–POES manifest. 

What are the plans to get this capability in the future? 

General KEHLER. The sensors you are referring to are part of the NPOESS Space 

Environmental Sensor Suite (SESS). These sensors are designed to sense conditions 

in the near-Earth space environment that can impact space services such as GPS 

and UHF SATCOM. These same capabilities have contributed to our space environmental situational awareness for the past 2 decades with similar sensors on our Defense Meteorological Satellite Program weather satellites and were expected to continue on NPOESS. SESS was demanifested during the NPOESS Nunn-McCurdy 

process. To address potential sensing gap shortfalls, AFSPC is working with Air 

Force Weather Agency, Air Force Research Agency, and our national partners to examine alternative options such as purchasing sensors to fly on other agency platforms. Other alternative concepts include examining small satellite sensor packages 

that can take advantage of room on ESPA and commercial satellites. This analysis 

effort is focused on examining the entire space environmental architecture supporting SSA operations and is expected to be completed in time for input into the 

2012 POM. 

General SHELTON. STRATCOM is working with AFSPC to advocate for a replacement program for those sensors canceled from the NPOESS program. 

Admiral DEUTSCH. Navy defers to Air Force’s response.

56

ACQUISITION

24. Senator BILL NELSON. Ms. Chaplain, could you please give a brief summary 

of where progress has been made on improving acquisition programs for space systems and where you think there is still improvement needed? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. Progress has been forthcoming on improving acquisition programs 

for space systems, particularly in approaches to technology development for programs such as TSAT. However, progress has been somewhat slow due in large part 

to the fact that DOD is still suffering the consequences of historical problems in its 

space portfolio and is not prioritizing investments in a concerted fashion. As I commented in my statement, there are also critical shortages in technical and program 

management skills. It is also not clear to what extent improvements have been 

made in cost estimating for space. We previously reported that program assumptions were optimistic in areas such as technology readiness, industrial base capabilities, reliance on heritage systems, complexity of software, etc.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION OPPORTUNITIES

25. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Payton, recently the United States and Australian 

governments announced that Australia would participate in the WGS communication satellite system and that an additional sixth satellite would be purchased. This 

is really a win-win situation. Are there other opportunities to partner with allies 

and friends in satellite communications? 

Mr. PAYTON. The Air Force, in partnership with the National Security Space community, actively explores opportunities to build and expand partnerships on current 

and future satellite communications programs. As we continue to assess future satellite communications requirements and capabilities, we will explore opportunities 

for building and expanding our partnerships with friends and allies.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

26. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, General Shelton, Admiral 

Deutsch, and Ms. Chaplain, the Services, the Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency (DARPA), and other agencies invest in basic research for space and related 

technologies. How do program requirements shape S&T expenditures? 

Mr. PAYTON and General KEHLER. The Air Force S&T community works closely 

with system developers and operational users to identify those technologies that 

could enable future warfighting capabilities, thus shaping S&T investment and expenditures. AFSPC prepares the ‘‘AFSPC Science and Technology Guidance for the 

Air Force Research Lab’’ each year to provide recommendations in the context of 

programmatic guidance and Air Force priorities. The latest guidance, dated April 

2007, includes the integrated space technology needs of STRATCOM and other Combatant Commands in support of their operational requirements from the Future 

Years Defense Program through fiscal year 2030. The Air Force then balances these 

needs with other Air Force needs to pursue integrated technology capabilities that 

support our warfighters’ highest priorities. 

General SHELTON. STRATCOM works with DARPA and the Services’ S&T organizations to ensure they understand our longer term operational needs. The Services’ 

acquisition agencies determine actual program requirements and drive the priorities 

for S&T expenditures. STRATCOM provides general advocacy for needed space technologies by hosting Senior Warfighter Forums and creating an Integrated Priority 

List, which informs both the S&T and acquisition processes. Additionally 

STRATCOM participates in prototyping and rapid development processes, such as 

sponsoring Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations. 

Admiral DEUTSCH. Basic and applied research goals tend to focus on enabling fundamentally new capabilities and are usually not tied to existing program requirements. As investments move into more advanced technology areas, they are rooted 

more and more closely to programs of record. These investments are often in capabilities ‘‘within reach’’ of being proven in the near-term and transitioned to the operational community. NRL is Navy’s corporate laboratory for basic and applied research. NRL leadership rigorously reviews proposals every year with the Office of 

Naval Research (ONR) and the resulting investments make up the NRL ‘‘Base Program’’. These investments are made typically made based on the potential for enabling new foundational understanding and/or breakthrough capabilities; they are 

not tied to program of record requirements. Navy’s decades-long investment in developing clocks for precision time which enabled the GPS is a space-based example 

of this process. 

57

ONR invests broadly in S&T for the Navy. ONR divides S&T investments into 

categories described as Discovery and Invention, Innovative Naval Prototypes, and 

Future Naval Capabilities. The Future Naval Capability (FNC) program focuses on 

providing Enabling Capabilities (ECs) to close warfighting gaps. A three-star Navy 

and Marine Corps Board of Directors, the Technical Oversight Group, approves the 

FNCs based on their contribution to closing a warfighting capability gap. The FNCs 

must provide measurable operational improvement within 5 years and are inherently the S&T investments most closely tied to existing programs of record. ONR’s 

recent and current space S&T investments were made within the Innovative Naval 

Prototype category; this investment is often called the ‘‘Space INP’’. While the Space 

INP did not require an operational program sponsor prior to investment, the Space 

INP prototypes selected for development (i.e. TACSAT–4) were directly traceable to 

either naval analysis of needs (such as data exfiltration from buoys) or to jointlyvalidated requirements known to be only partially met. 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. We have previously reported that there are mechanisms within the 

space community and DOD designed to ensure S&T efforts are coordinated and are 

focused on achieving broader goals and that redundancy is minimized. For example, 

within the space community, a forum called the Space Technology Alliance was established in 1997 to coordinate the development of space technologies with an eye 

toward achieving the greatest return on investment. At the DOD-wide level, there 

was also a Joint Warfighting S&T Plan, which ties S&T projects to priority future 

joint warfighting capabilities identified by higher-level documents. These overall 

plans, in turn, are used by DOD laboratories to direct investments in S&T. Further, 

in 2004, DOD was directed to develop a strategic plan for space S&T investments 

to further tie S&T efforts to program requirements. However, while there are processes in place to link program requirements to S&T expenditures, our work has generally found that large space acquisition programs tend to conduct the technology 

development needed to achieve desired capabilities.

27. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, General Shelton, Admiral 

Deutsch, and Ms. Chaplain, several years ago, at congressional direction, a space 

S&T roadmap was prepared. Has this roadmap ever been used to guide investments? Is there a need for an updated roadmap? 

Mr. PAYTON and General KEHLER. The 2004 DOD Space S&T Strategy was prepared in response to congressional direction for a space S&T roadmap. Supporting 

this strategy are four S&T Vector Roadmaps used to guide investments. The Vector 

1 Roadmap identified and estimated costs for technologies to enable next generation 

launch capability and continues to guide technology investments. The Vector 2 

Roadmap established the initial technical guidance for the ORS office, while the 

Vector 3 Roadmap has been used to guide investments in space control technologies 

focused on SSA and defensive counterspace capabilities. Finally, the Vector 4 Roadmap identified and estimated costs for enabling technologies for Command, Control, 

Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

(C4ISR) capabilities. From an Air Force perspective, updated roadmaps would be 

beneficial and the Air Force is currently developing a Research and Development 

Strategic Plan that will provide a space S&T roadmap to guide investments in this 

area. 

General SHELTON. I would defer to the Air Force to answer this question. 

Admiral DEUTSCH. The space S&T roadmap was developed in 2003/2004 and did 

help guide S&T investments. The roadmap also helped validate existing investments. Two of the four roadmap vectors were related to ORS. The jointly-developed 

Plan for ORS, submitted to Congress in April 2007, intended for the management 

of these two vectors to be tasks for the Joint ORS Office. These vectors are specific 

to the most recent roadmap. Updating the roadmap has inherent value due to the 

increased communication that occurs within the S&T community as each organization explains their priorities and current investments. 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. If done effectively, roadmaps can lay out an incremental path toward achieving significant advances in capabilities, and help ensure overall investments in technology development are affordable. The space S&T roadmap was an 

outgrowth of the DOD space S&T strategy, which DOD was directed to develop in 

2004. We found that the strategy provided a foundation for enhancing coordination 

among space S&T efforts since it specified overall goals and established several 

mechanisms to help senior leaders gauge whether investments were focused on 

those goals. Moreover, the development of the strategy itself helped spur collaboration within the DOD space S&T community since it required diverse organizations 

to come together, share knowledge, and establish agreement on basic goals. Since 

the strategy had only recently been issued, it was too early to assess whether the 

direction and processes outlined in the strategy would be effective in supporting and 

58

guiding future space S&T efforts. Additionally, DOD officials were still working out 

the details of some implementation mechanisms, including the roadmap. Since our 

January 2005 report, we have not conducted any subsequent reviews of DOD’s utilization of the space S&T strategy or efforts to update it.

28. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, General Shelton, Admiral 

Deutsch, and Ms. Chaplain, transitioning successful S&T efforts is always difficult. 

What in your view leads to better transition? 

Mr. PAYTON and General KEHLER. The Air Force’s ‘‘back-to-basics’’ concept and 

Block Approach, work to deliver systems through discrete, clearly defined increments, based on sound systems engineering principles. This approach reduces development and production risk by maturing technologies prior to system development, 

deferring some capabilities to later increments when their technologies are mature. 

The Air Force has also increased its emphasis on technology transition and is using 

knowledge management tools and databases to track promising technologies and determine how they might impact current programs. Additionally, the Air Force is exploring ways to better achieve advanced technology/manufacturing readiness levels 

through prototyping to demonstrate capabilities in an operational environment. 

General SHELTON. Successfully transitioning technology requires significant interaction among the operational, acquisition, and S&T communities. A regular, ongoing 

dialogue helps focus the efforts on compelling, future operational needs. In the space 

arena, designing experiments with residual operational capability in mind certainly 

eases the transition. 

Admiral DEUTSCH. Transition is always a delicate process because managers of 

formal programs have not budgeted to assume responsibility for capabilities that 

evolve from S&T efforts of an outside office. Navy experience with transition suggests two steps are crucial for this process: (1) as soon as a S&T project shows serious potential to satisfy an operational need, make candidate long-term sponsors 

aware of it and attempt to get them involved in the development process, and (2) 

obtain strong support, in writing, from operational commands that want the capability. 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. We have found through our acquisition best practices work that 

leading commercial companies use three key techniques for successfully developing 

and transitioning technologies, with the basic premise being that technologies must 

be mature before transitioning to the product line side.

• Strategic planning at the corporate level: Strategic planning precedes 

technology development so managers can gauge market needs, identify the 

most desirable technologies, and prioritize resources. 

• Gated management reviews: A rigorous process is used to ensure a technology’s relevancy and feasibility and enlist product line commitment to use 

the technologies once the labs are finished maturing them. 

• Corroborating tools: To secure commitment, technology transition agreements solidify and document specific cost, schedule, and performance 

metrics labs need to meet for transition to occur.

We found that DOD had taken steps to improve its technology transition processes, but it lacked many of the techniques that are hallmarks of leading companies’ 

ability to transition technology smoothly onto new products. From a strategic perspective, we found that the Department lacked strong influence at the corporate 

level to guide the Department’s technology investments. In addition. DOD was not 

using a gated process with criteria that would allow lab and program managers to 

know when a technology was ready to transition. Consequently, technologies were 

often not ready when needed and acquisition programs pulled the technologies into 

their programs too early, leading to inefficiency during product development, and 

cost and schedule increases. Furthermore, we found that while the military Services 

were using technology transition agreements, use of these agreements was low.

29. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, General Shelton, Admiral 

Deutsch, and Ms. Chaplain, DARPA launched and successfully demonstrated Orbital Express to show that a satellite could be refueled on orbit. Does this demonstration play a role in future acquisition decisions? 

Mr. PAYTON and General KEHLER. The lessons learned and capabilities demonstrated by Orbital Express (OE), particularly the ability to service a satellite onorbit, will help inform future plans for the development and fielding of responsive 

space systems. In the near-term, DARPA is developing the Front-end Robotics Enabling Near-term Demonstration (FREND) program. FREND is a follow-on project to 

OE that allows for interaction with military and commercial spacecraft in a GEO 

with the potential to extend spacecraft service life. 

59

General SHELTON. OE helped demonstrate the art of the possible. The remaining 

questions center on the operational utility of the concept. On the surface, on-orbit 

refueling and/or servicing is appealing. But the cost-benefit trades must consider 

satellite components that either age or are outdated (e.g., computers, solar panels 

reaction wheels), calling into question life extension by refueling. Designing component replaceability into the satellite also is questionable, given the current nature 

and design of satellites. In fact, it may prove more cost-effective to launch a new 

satellite rather than design in repair on orbit capability. An exception may be satellites that would be highly maneuverable by design, for any number of reasons. In 

this case, on-orbit refueling might be desirable. Much more trade study is required 

to fully explore these concepts. 

Admiral DEUTSCH. We believe the capabilities demonstrated by OE will inform 

space acquisition programs to consider employing them in future space vehicles. 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. Though the concept behind OE is one that is believed to be a key 

enabler for more responsive, self-maintaining space systems, we do not know yet 

whether or how this particular DARPA project will enable future acquisition efforts. 

It is not currently a key enabling capability for the ORS initiative’s conceptual construct.

30. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, General Shelton, Admiral 

Deutsch, and Ms. Chaplain, much of the work of the S&T community is focused on 

high risk concepts, where as much is learned from failure as from success. Are the 

space capabilities being looked at in the high risk programs generally the sort of 

capabilities in which the acquisition community is interested? 

Mr. PAYTON and General KEHLER. Yes, space capabilities are reviewed by the 

Space S&T Council, which meets twice a year to assess investments and provide for 

a coordinated space S&T program. The Air Force S&T community works closely 

with system developers and operational users to identify those technologies—whether high risk or lower risk—that could enable future warfighting capabilities and in 

which the acquisition community is interested. The S&T program strives to reach 

a Technology Readiness Level that supports Product Center prototyping, 

productization, and tech insertion into systems development. The Air Force continues to rebalance and focus its core S&T competencies to aggressively pursue high 

payoff technologies directed towards countering the new threats of today, while 

modernizing weapon systems for tomorrow. 

General SHELTON. I would defer to the Air Force to answer this question. 

Admiral DEUTSCH. Naval space S&T investment, while often using some aggressive Technology Readiness Level items, tends to focus on operational prototyping to 

prove system level performance and demonstrate operational capability. S&T investments of lower risk are generally targeted toward moderate enhancements to current capabilities and are part of ONR’s FNC investments. FNCs are expected to 

transition in the near-term and therefore involve the acquisition community from 

the start. In general, the higher the risk of the S&T investment, the further from 

transition to the acquisition community the capability is. 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. It is appropriate that the acquisition community be focused on 

technologies that can be matured in the near-term rather than technologies that are 

still in their nascent stages. Including such high-risk development in an acquisition 

program would likely render cost, schedule, and performance estimates unreliable.

COORDINATION ACROSS SERVICES

31. Senator BILL NELSON. Admiral Deutsch, do you see any areas where the Services and other agencies could improve cooperation in providing space capabilities, 

including coordination in planning for terminals and user equipment? 

Admiral DEUTSCH. The Services look for every opportunity to develop satellite capabilities based upon validated requirements. The Joint Capabilities Integration and 

Development System process provides a means to coordinate requirements between 

Services.

SPACE INDUSTRIAL BASE STUDY

32. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, General Shelton, Admiral 

Deutsch, and Ms. Chaplain, the DOD recently completed a space industrial base 

study that looked at, among other things, the space workforce. This study identified 

some alarming gaps in the space technical design, integration, and systems engineering disciplines. Are you familiar with the study and what can be done, or are 

you doing, to address some of these problems? 

60

Mr. PAYTON and General KEHLER. A DOD Space Industrial Base study to include 

the space workforce was recently finalized. The study identified gaps in the space 

technical design, integration, and systems engineering disciplines. DOD and AFSPC 

concerns are in the following specific disciplines: science, technology, engineering, 

and mathematics (STEM). Excellence in STEM disciplines provides an asymmetric 

advantage to DOD, AFSPC, and all warfighters. 

DOD, with AFSPC support, is taking steps to address workforce issues through 

the National Defense Education Program (NDEP). NDEP is striving to meet the 

challenge of educating, training, recruiting, and retaining workers in the STEM disciplines. NDEP encourages K–12 students’ interest in science and math and funds 

scholarships and fellowships in critical DOD research areas. 

The scholarships and fellowships are provided through a program within NDEP 

called Science, Math, and Research for Transformation (SMART). This program provides graduate education in science and engineering areas. In turn, the graduates 

incur a DOD service commitment. 

The NDEP also funds scholarships and fellowships in research areas critical to 

DOD. The SMART is the largest program in the NDEP portfolio. In place since fiscal year 2005, SMART provides graduate level schooling in 15 different science and 

engineering disciplines in return for a DOD service commitment. The first of the 

SMART graduates are now entering the DOD workforce and making important contributions to our Nation’s defense. 

NDEP and SMART are important initiatives in addressing education issues and 

experience levels in our workforce today. However, we must continue to concentrate 

on the human capital challenges in the space workforce. 

General SHELTON. I would defer to the Air Force to answer this question. 

Admiral DEUTSCH. Navy provided inputs to the National Security Space Office 

(NSSO) on the Space Industrial Report. Navy understands the importance of the 

recommendations in the report and continues to implement programs to address our 

concerns with the space industrial base. 

The Navy is an active participant in the K–12 STEP program. Our leadership 

across the space enterprise consistently completes community outreach in this area. 

Navy commands such as Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) 

and NRL have college internship programs where students can participate in the 

space system design process. The Naval Academy’s Aerospace Engineering Department offers an astrospace track where approximately 40 students graduate each 

year. As students, they collaborate with industry, the NRO and NRL on small satellite and system design. Some of their systems are selected to be manifested for 

flight with the DOD’s STP. The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) plays a critical 

role in the development of this Nation’s space professionals. The Space Systems Engineering and Operations curricula provide robust technical education to officers 

and government civilians of all Services. Additionally, NPS offers distance learning 

opportunities for officers, enlisted personnel, and civilians to earn a Masters in 

Space Systems Operations or a 4-course certificate in Space Operations. 

The Navy is lock-step with the NSSO as they prepare the way ahead for a National Security Space Cadre. The Navy Space Cadre Office participates in the Space 

Professional Working Group (SPWG) where the roadmap is developed and refined. 

The Navy has identified its officer billets and personnel and is working with the 

SPWG to find a DOD solution to identifying the civilian space workforce. 

All Navy acquisition personnel are held to the high standards of Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) and complete continuous education from 

the Defense Acquisition University and acquisition curricula at the NRO, SPAWAR, 

Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), and Naval Sea Systems Command 

(NAVSEA). Additionally, the Navy depends on the NRO and the National Security 

Space Institute for additional space training ensuring that its acquirers have a wellrounded space and acquisition foundation. 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. We are aware of this particular study but have not been provided 

a copy or briefed on it. However, our work has also identified gaps in technical and 

program management skills in space programs and made numerous recommendations for closing these gaps. These include recommendations to the Air Force to conduct a zero-based needs assessment of its space acquisition workforce, recommendations to DOD to adopt best practices to support program managers and hold them 

accountable, and recommendations to DOD to address critical skill shortages in the 

area of cost estimating. We are happy to brief your staff further on this work as 

well as the scope and methodology of ongoing work we are doing for the committee 

on broader acquisition workforce issues.

[Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.] 

(61)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2009

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 12, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

STRATEGIC FORCES PROGRAMS 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m. in room 

SR–232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Bill Nelson 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin 

Nelson, Inhofe, Sessions, and Graham. 

Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; 

and Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican 

staff director; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Robert 

M. Soofer, professional staff member; and Kristine L. Svinicki, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Ali Z. Pasha. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew R. Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator 

Pryor; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; and Todd 

Stiefler, assistant to Senator Sessions. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON, CHAIRMAN 

Senator BILL NELSON. Good morning. Thank you all for being 

here today. 

We are starting out with the first of two panels, and we are privileged to have General Chilton, the Commander of Strategic Command, with us. 

General, we will put your written statement in the record. 

General CHILTON. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Senator Sessions’ and my written statements will be in the record so that we can get right into questions. 

[The prepared statements of Senator Bill Nelson, Senator Sessions, and General Chilton follow:]

62

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

I would like to welcome our witnesses this morning. On the first panel we have 

General Kevin Chilton, the new Commander of the Strategic Command. On the second panel we have with us Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael Vickers; General 

Weber, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Air, Space, and Information Operations; Admiral Stephen Johnson, Director Strategic Systems Programs; 

and Tom D’Agostino, Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration. We welcome all of you and look forward to a good conversation this morning. 

We will move to the second panel at around 11:00 or so. 

General Chilton we welcome you this morning in your new role at the Strategic 

Command. 

Both panels have submitted statements that will be included in the record, so 

there is no need to read formal opening statements. 

The record will remain open until close of business Monday for any additional 

questions for the record. 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

We meet today to receive testimony from two panels on strategic forces programs 

in review of the National Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2009 and 

the Future Years Defense Program. For the first panel, we welcome General 

Chilton, who is making his first appearance before the subcommittee as Commander 

of U.S. Strategic Command. General Chilton, you are now responsible for assisting 

this subcommittee in our evaluation of whether our U.S. strategic forces and policy 

are appropriate to the post Cold-War security environment in which we find ourselves. We are pleased to be working with you in this capacity as we examine these 

important efforts. 

The second panel will provide an opportunity to delve more deeply into the various service plans and programs for strategic forces as well as examine plans for 

revitalizing our nuclear infrastructure. Witnesses on the second panel include Mr. 

Vickers, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity 

Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities; Major General Webber, USAF; Rear Admiral Stephen Johnson, USN; and Mr. D’Agostino, the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), an element of the Department of 

Energy. 

This hearing is an opportunity to assess the progress our Nation has made toward 

adapting our strategic forces and deterrence doctrine to a new security environment 

characterized by terrorist groups and rogue nations—groups against which traditional deterrence approaches may not work—as well as the need to defend our interests against more traditional threats and peer competitors. 

The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) established a conceptual framework for 

thinking about deterrence in this new strategic age, and serves as a useful guide 

for understanding the relationship between offensive and defensive strategic forces, 

as well as the relationship between nuclear and conventional weapons—all of which 

must play a role in deterring strategic attacks against the United States, its forces, 

and its friends and allies. If we examine how well we have done in drawing down 

our nuclear forces while simultaneously improving our conventional strike capabilities, fielding missile defenses, and securing a responsive nuclear infrastructure that 

hedges against future changes, I assess that our progress has been mixed. 

While the nuclear-drawdown appears to be proceeding in good order, the same 

cannot be said about the fielding of the advanced conventional strike capabilities 

necessary to reduce reliance on nuclear strike forces. We lack today the capability 

to deliver prompt, conventional strikes against fleeting, high value targets at extremely long ranges. The development of this capability, sometimes referred to as 

‘‘Prompt Global Strike,’’ lagged in the past due to a lack of consensus between Congress and the administration over the administration’s preferred approach, known 

as the Conventional Trident Modification. Congress, however, has demonstrated a 

willingness to consider alternative approaches to PGS, and has provided funding in 

a defense-wide account to do so. We look forward to hearing from the witnesses 

about their respective PGS candidate solutions. 

The most impressive change in our strategic posture since the NPR lies in the 

area of missile defense. In 2001, we could count only upon our Patriot batteries to 

provide limited missile defense protection against short range ballistic missiles. 

Today, we deploy over 24 ground-based interceptors for the defense of the United 

States against long-range North Korean ballistic missiles; a similar number of SM–

3 missiles are available for deployment on some 17 Aegis BMD ships to defend 

against short to medium range ballistic missiles; and the Army deploys thousands 

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of improved Patriot PAC–3 missiles to defend our forces against short-range threats. 

Supporting these interceptors is a global system of upgraded early warning and 

tracking radars and the command and control system necessary to link together 

these multiple sensors and interceptors. We must continue to field missile defense 

capabilities in numbers sufficient to address the threat, while ensuring sufficient 

testing and improvements to these systems to stay ahead of adversary capabilities. 

Additionally, we must continue to extend missile defense coverage to our allies, who 

arc now under increased risk of ballistic missile attack; by doing so, we preserve 

alliance cohesion and freedom of action in defense of our combined national interests. 

The NPR also called for a threat and capabilities-based approach in the area of 

nuclear weapons. Specifically, the NPR called for a transition from a nuclear stockpile with large numbers of deployed warheads to a smaller stockpile augmented 

with a responsive infrastructure which would be capable of responding to emerging 

threats and to changes in the global security environment. Although the concept of 

a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) emerged after the development of the NPR, 

the RRW was—and perhaps still is—viewed as a key enabler on the path to this 

smaller stockpile. This committee, on a bipartisan basis, authorized funding to continue the study of the RRW but the final Omnibus Appropriations Bill for Fiscal 

Year 2008 did not provide funding. In spite of that outcome, I am pleased that the 

administration has requested funding, once again, in fiscal year 2009 for continuing 

the design definition and cost study for the RRW. 

General Chilton, in a speech you gave in January, you addressed the topic of 

RRW in very plain terms. You said, ‘‘This is not a problem that we can push down 

the road to another generation to worry about. This is a problem that we have to 

face today. . . . I don’t say we need a decision right now, but we ought to be spending the resources to answer the questions . . . that are on the table today. A decision on which way we are going to go to make sure we have the most capable nuclear deterrent . . . that we can provide for the citizens of this country for the remainder of this century. . . . These are century-long decisions. I say let’s get on 

with it.’’

I agree with your comments, General, and hope the committee will again this 

year—as it has done in the past three authorization bills, support funding for the 

RRW. 

The subcommittee will also hear today from Mr. D’Agostino, on the progress being 

made in developing the ‘‘responsive infrastructure’’ called for in the NPR. My own 

assessment is that metrics of responsiveness were slow to be developed; that 

progress against existing metrics was not rigorously exercised or measured; and as 

a result, progress has been largely unrealized. Last year, Los Alamos successfully 

re-established the capability of manufacturing plutonium pits for use in the stockpile. Prior to this achievement, however, the Nation had been without the capability 

to manufacture this essential nuclear component for over 18 years. I take nothing 

away from the hard work it took to achieve this milestone. I ask only if this is the 

pace of progress that was contemplated in the NPR and if not, what can we do to 

move toward a more responsive infrastructure. 

The NNSA has also embarked upon an analysis of alternatives for what it calls 

‘‘Complex Transformation.’’ The objective of this transformation is to make the nuclear weapons complex smaller, more responsive, efficient, and secure by consolidating operations and relocating activities among sites. These consolidations would 

result in a reduction in total facility square footage of approximately 9 million 

square feet. I believe that it is important to size our nuclear weapons complex for 

the stockpile we are supporting while maintaining the essential capabilities. I hope 

that this important initiative will be sustained over time. 

I look forward to discussing these and other topics with our witnesses today. I 

thank them for their service to our Nation. 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. KEVIN P. CHILTON, USAF 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and distinguished members of the 

subcommittee: 

Thank you for the invitation to be here today. This is my first opportunity to appear before you as Commander of United States Strategic Command 

(USSTRATCOM). I look forward to further strengthening our relationships in pursuit of our common enduring goal of protecting this great Nation. The men and 

women of USSTRATCOM are committed to achieving this goal as well. They have 

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performed superbly over the last year, demonstrating dedication across the breadth 

of our assigned missions both at home and abroad. 

Under the superb leadership of my predecessor, USSTRATCOM underwent remarkable change in a very short period of time to stand up new organizations to 

address a broad range of mission assignments. USSTRATCOM is now in the process 

of maturing these organizations with an increased focus on day-to-day operations 

and integration. I am here today to provide my thoughts on the challenges we face, 

and to ask for your assistance to ensure USSTRATCOM possesses the means to accomplish our missions. 

NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES

Many of our national security structures, processes, and capabilities were developed during the Cold War, shaped by DOD’s focus on a singular, symmetric threat. 

The dangers of the past have evolved and are complicated by new sources of conflict 

and challenges to stability. These new and evolving challenges defy the primarily 

force-on-force solutions of yesterday; requiring more complex, and in some cases, elegant solutions tuned to each adversary and circumstance. 

Our Nation faces four persistent and emerging global challenges. First are the 

challenges posed by established nation-states, some resurgent, others emerging, who 

seek to undermine or subvert U.S. policy objectives. 

Second, we note the continued rise of non-state actors, predominantly in the form 

of global terrorists rooted in extremist and violent ideologies. These new adversaries 

are distributed, networked, and fleeting. Enabled by information technology and financial support, they are able to maintain a global presence by recruiting, training, 

inciting, and directing attacks in a variety of ways, including through cyberspace. 

Third, we continue to face the potential catastrophic use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). We believe the most dangerous threat to the U.S. today is that 

of non-state terrorist groups acquiring and subsequently using WMD against the 

U.S. 

Finally, we see both state and non-state actors attempting to supplant our advantage in various operational domains. The ‘‘global commons’’ of space and cyberspace 

are vitally important to our way of life. Our civil, military, and commercial activities 

are dependent upon access to cyberspace and space-based capabilities, and we can 

expect future adversaries to attack these dependencies. Our dependence on these capabilities and their associated vulnerabilities requires us to focus our efforts to ensure U.S. freedom of action in these domains. 

ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMAND

Following my confirmation, I conducted a review of USSTRATCOM’s roles, missions, capabilities, and priorities. I discovered a command working arduously to execute a diverse set of global missions, each vital to the security of our Nation. On 

advice from Members of Congress, I toured our National Laboratories to better understand our nuclear stockpile. I also met with a number of Members of Congress 

and their staffs to determine how we might work together to resolve outstanding 

deficiencies in critical capabilities. 

I believe USSTRATCOM’s missions can be divided into two major categories. In 

the first category are global missions that require us to operate across physical and/

or functional boundaries. The three mission areas within this category are Strategic 

Deterrence Operations, Space Operations, and Cyberspace Operations. We have 

forces assigned to USSTRATCOM in each of these mission areas that execute operations every day. All of these missions are global in nature and are insensitive to 

lines drawn on a map. 

The second category is comprised of those global missions where our purpose is 

not to operate across boundaries, but rather to knit together seams between boundaries. Today, USSTRATCOM is not assigned operational control of any forces within 

this category of missions. However, we have dedicated teams addressing the challenges of fielding and advocating for an integrated Missile Defense system; integrating Department of Defense (DOD) planning and advocacy efforts to better combat the threats posed by WMD; managing the allocation of DOD’s high demand/low 

density Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets; and integrating 

Information Operations (IO) in support of all combatant commands. As our missions 

develop, we are placing emphasis on readiness, detailed planning, command and 

control, and execution; supported by robust, realistic, and periodic command-wide 

exercise programs. 

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STRATEGIC DETERRENCE

During the Cold War, the U.S. model for deterrence was based upon a robust capability to employ nuclear weapons via aircraft, intercontinental ballistic missiles 

(ICBMs), and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Known classically as 

‘‘nuclear deterrence’’, this original Triad was designed to deter the Soviet Union. 

When combined with razor-sharp readiness and a bilateral dialogue that stressed 

both a mutual understanding of one another’s capabilities and decisionmaking processes, the Triad underpinned the U.S. deterrence posture that successfully kept the 

peace for over 50 years. 

Although the strategic landscape has dramatically shifted since the end of the 

Cold War, the concept of deterrence and the need to deter adversaries from attacking our vital interests is just as important in the 21st century as it was in the last 

century. However, today’s more complex strategic landscape demands excellence and 

nuance across a much broader set of national security challenges. To address these 

challenges, our model for deterrence has evolved. Today, strategic deterrence is embodied by a new Triad borne of the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review. The Triad now 

emphasizes the integration of offensive capabilities, both nuclear and conventional; 

defensive capabilities; and a responsive defense infrastructure, all enabled by intelligence, planning, and global Command and Control (C2). These efforts are ably led 

by our Joint Functional Component Command (JFCC) for Global Strike and Integration (JFCC–GSI). 

The nuclear capability of the original Triad remains a vital part of our deterrence 

strategy. In light of this, USSTRATCOM is re-examining our oversight role of the 

Nation’s strategic nuclear forces. We reviewed the U.S. Air Force report of the Minot 

weapons transfer incident, as well as other independent investigative reports, and 

have implemented organizational and oversight changes to refocus USSTRATCOM 

on our nuclear mission responsibilities. We also intend to increase the oversight of 

Operational Readiness and Nuclear Surety Inspections of our assigned or gained 

units. 

While our nuclear capability remains vital, our ability to integrate conventional 

long-range precision weapons is every bit as important. Although our conventional 

forces are second to none, we no longer have these forces forward-deployed permanently throughout the world. Therefore, it is prudent to have the ability to defeat 

attacks and eliminate high value targets at global ranges on short notice. We have 

a Prompt Global Strike delivery capability on alert today, but it is configured only 

with nuclear weapons, which limits the options available to the President and may 

in some cases reduce the credibility of our deterrence. 

The capability we lack is the means to deliver prompt, precise, conventional kinetic effects at intercontinental ranges. The ability to hold at risk sites in otherwise 

denied territory is a key element of our strategic deterrent capability. At present, 

the complex and evolving threat environment necessitates the rapid development 

and demonstration of a prompt conventional global strike capability. I appreciate 

past congressional discussions concerning the need to fill our Prompt Global Strike 

(PGS) capability gap and wish to thank Congress for providing the fiscal year 2008 

resources as we continue to address this capability shortfall. The Air Force, Navy, 

and Army are coordinating with USSTRATCOM and the DOD Office of Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics to conduct research, development, test, and evaluation of 

technologies which hold the greatest promise for new capability development. While 

we are making progress, we must place emphasis on a near-term solution to fill a 

gap that exists today. 

Reliability, Safety, and Security of the Nuclear Stockpile 

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and DOD share responsibility for the reliability, safety, security, and effectiveness of the Nation’s stockpile 

of nuclear warheads, and for the quality and responsiveness of the enterprise necessary to sustain it. I want to assure the committee that as a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), I appreciate the concerns expressed by Congress 

with respect to both the status of our nuclear stockpile and the role nuclear weapons will play in our Nation’s defense in the 21st century. Congress has directed a 

number of activities in the coming year which will provide opportunities to further 

the national dialog on our strategic posture. We look forward to participating in this 

national discussion. 

Our strategic nuclear forces have stood watch over the Nation for over 50 years, 

always prepared to conduct a mission we all hoped would never be necessary. Supported by weapons and infrastructure that were as modern as we could make them, 

and military and civilian personnel that were ready 365 days a year, 24 hours a 

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day, we succeeded in deterring our adversaries, assuring our allies, and preserving 

the peace. 

Our Nation has invested heavily in increasing our scientific understanding and 

extending the life of nuclear weapons designed during the Cold War. To date, these 

efforts have successfully provided confidence in the reliability of our weapons without the need to conduct nuclear tests. Today the Stockpile Stewardship Program 

(SSP) is working—our nuclear stockpile remains reliable, safe and secure. Our assessment is based upon a solid foundation of past nuclear testing and augmented 

by cutting-edge scientific and engineering experiments and analysis, advanced computing and simulation, and extensive flight tests of warhead components and subsystems. 

However, we are not confident that the SSP, or any conceivable weapon’s life extension program will provide future USSTRATCOM Commanders the same level of 

confidence that I am pleased to express to you today. We recognize the current path 

of indefinitely relying on legacy nuclear weapons refurbished through a series of life 

extension programs entails accepting significant future risks to reliability, safety, 

security, and maintainability, as well as considerable expense. 

Our legacy weapons were designed to maximize destructive capability while minimizing weight and volume, facilitating long range weapons delivery with great effect 

to deter a threat with a similar symmetric capability. Weapon performance margins, 

maintainability, and longevity, while important design criteria, were made a lower 

priority in the manufacture of these weapons to facilitate higher yield to weight ratios. These design trade-offs were acceptable at the time for several reasons. First, 

our Nation maintained a robust nuclear weapons production infrastructure that was 

able to quickly fabricate large numbers of weapons. Second, we produced successive 

generations of nuclear weapons every 15–20 years. Finally, we were able to routinely test our weapons. 

As the threat to our Nation has evolved, so have the requirements driving nuclear 

weapons design. Emergent states seek a nuclear weapons capability and non-state 

actors and terrorists seek to acquire nuclear weapons. Other declared nuclear powers continue to modernize their nuclear weapons, delivery platforms, and infrastructure. Conversely, the U.S. has effectively eliminated its nuclear weapons production 

capacity and allowed its infrastructure to atrophy. We no longer produce successive 

generations of nuclear weapons and we have discontinued underground testing. Current U.S. policy is to retain the fewest number of operationally deployed nuclear 

weapons required to meet national security objectives. 

Over time, the environment degrades the functionality of both non-nuclear and 

nuclear weapons components, negatively impacting extremely tight performance 

margins that exist in our weapons today, thereby reducing weapon reliability. The 

highly optimized designs of our legacy weapons limit opportunities to improve safety 

and security standards through a warhead life extension strategy. A broad suite of 

modern safety and security features that were not available during the design and 

development of our legacy systems are available today and could be used to help 

prevent exploitation by terrorists, rogue nations or criminal organizations. Modern 

design technology will dramatically increase the maintainability of our stockpile 

which will serve to maximize long term reliability while minimizing long term costs. 

Finally, modern warhead designs offer a high potential for avoiding future nuclear 

testing. 

In light of these changes in the strategic environment and the aging of our stockpile and its supporting infrastructure, we recommend pursuing an alternate weapon 

modernization strategy. This strategy should focus on improved weapon reliability, 

safety, security, and maintainability. These are the priorities for 21st century nuclear weapon design, not the 20th century criteria of maximizing destructive capability and minimizing weight and volume. 

If the Nation is going to maintain a nuclear deterrent, the capabilities that support this deterrent should be second to none. We must care for the stockpile whether 

we possess one weapon or thousands. It is important to note that improvements to 

our aging infrastructure will be required whether or not we decide to pursue an improved warhead design. This cannot be accomplished without investment in requisite infrastructure and human capital. The last nuclear design engineer to participate in the development and testing of a new nuclear weapon is scheduled to retire 

in the next 5 years. The transition to a more modern stockpile will re-invigorate the 

design and engineering technology base—especially its human resources—and enable a more responsive and cost-effective infrastructure. A revitalized infrastructure 

will facilitate a reduction of the large inventory of weapons we maintain today as 

a hedge against strategic uncertainty and weapon reliability concerns, and will 

allow us to sustain our nuclear capability and expertise throughout the 21st century. 

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Some contend that an effort to modernize our nuclear stockpile would lead to increased proliferation. We assert a modern stockpile designed to provide a reliable, 

safe, and secure nuclear umbrella will serve to dissuade and deter our adversaries, 

and assure our allies, reducing their perceived need for an indigenous nuclear program. 

To facilitate an informed national debate of all of these issues, USSTRATCOM 

supports the continuation of the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) Design Definition and Cost Study to explore a replacement for aging warheads in the stockpile. 

Completion of this study during fiscal year 2009 in parallel with the planned Nuclear Posture Review will provide Congress and the administration the information 

needed to effectively evaluate alternative strategies for the long-term maintenance 

of the Nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile. The information from this study is critical 

to developing a comprehensive nuclear strategy that meets future national security 

requirements. 

National Command and Coordination Capability (NCCC) 

The strategic environment is fundamentally more complex than it was when our 

current point-to-point nuclear command and control (C2) system was developed 

more than 50 years ago. For example, the threat that some states will acquire and 

deploy ICBM technology, combined with our ability to counter these threats with 

missile defense systems, demands a C2 capability that rapidly and efficiently provides assured and responsive connectivity between national leaders. This scenario 

reduces our decision time to mere minutes and calls for a C2 capability that extends 

beyond legacy Cold War systems and capabilities. We have set a course to modernize our single-purpose and aging C2 system to allow for secure, enduring, and 

continuous communications under current scenarios as well as those emerging 

threats that we are likely to confront. 

Our strategy is to sustain our legacy nuclear C2 system while expanding our capabilities to address a broader scope of military challenges. We are transforming the 

circuit-based, point-to-point communications systems that comprise our legacy nuclear command and control capability to a system that fully leverages new information technologies. Furthermore, we are focusing resources and efforts to implement 

a C2 architecture that provides global C2 capabilities, as well as systems that can 

be seamlessly integrated with the broader, national capabilities that support the 

President and senior leaders. We are working diligently to ensure our ability to provide end-to-end C2 under the most stressful scenarios envisioned. 

Our concept of operations calls for the enduring and survivable ability to conduct 

operations from geographically dispersed locations through collaborative access to 

data, services, and information. The evolution of our legacy nuclear command and 

control system will undergo careful evaluation and review to ensure no reduction 

in capability. It is imperative that as we assess and deploy our new systems and 

capabilities, they be subjected to rigorous testing to ensure interoperability with 

other ongoing initiatives to enhance national and senior leader communications capabilities. 

SPACE OPERATIONS

During the 20th century, the Nation approached space as a new frontier. Our 

focus was to win the exploration race and to understand and develop our capabilities in this ultimate high ground. Today, we depend upon space-based capabilities 

to conduct commerce, advance our interests, and defend our Nation. To this end, 

USSTRATCOM’s Joint Functional Component Command for Space (JFCC–SPACE) 

conducts space operations on a daily basis. 

Increasingly, space-based capabilities enable all other war-fighting domains. In 

the 21st century, the mindset of space as purely an ‘‘enabler’’ must change. We must 

view our activities in the space domain in the same way we regard activities in the 

domains of land, sea, air, and cyberspace. As space-based capabilities provide critical support to forces in other domains, space operations must also receive support 

from forces outside the space domain. 

The Chinese kinetic antisatellite test (ASAT) conducted in early 2007 made it 

clear that space is not a sanctuary. We can expect similar challenges in the future. 

To ensure our freedom of action in space we need to maintain an acute awareness 

of the objects in space, and the terrestrial threats that could interrupt or deny our 

space operations. Our adversaries understand our dependence upon space-based capabilities, and we must be ready to detect, track, characterize, attribute, predict, 

and respond to any threat to our space infrastructure. 

Space protection requires robust Space Situational Awareness (SSA). While sustaining our current space surveillance systems, we need to simultaneously improve 

our sensor coverage of the space domain with a mix of ground and space-based senVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:11 Dec 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00073 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\42635.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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sors, and improve the data transmission architecture and equipment necessary to 

fuse the data we collect into useable information. Additionally, we must continue 

to foster collaborative datasharing with our allies to enhance global coverage. The 

analogy of a 1,000 ship navy built through a coalition of nations can be applied to 

space, and the ability to leverage and expand space partnerships with our allies 

holds the potential to dramatically improve Space Situational Awareness. 

Global satellite communication to include nuclear command and control, uninterrupted position, navigation, and timing, missile warning, intelligence collection, and 

environmental observation are essential space-based capabilities required by the 

warfighter and the Nation. These existing space-based capabilities must remain viable while conducting research, development, and fielding of replacement capabilities. 

We must also ensure that the current space-based capabilities we provide to the Nation can be either adequately defended or delivered by alternate means in times of 

crisis. We ask for funding support to ensure there is no interruption in the provision 

of these capabilities to our warfighters and our Nation. 

Assured access to space will remain an imperative for the U.S. Today, the dominant threat to access does not come from an external threat, but from the need to 

properly sustain and modernize our launch ranges at Vandenberg and Cape Canaveral. We ask for continued attention to and appropriate investment in these mission 

assurance programs. 

We must also continue to make investments in the human capital that will enable 

USSTRATCOM to face the challenges of tomorrow. These challenges require the development of a cadre of space professionals, in all Services, with the requisite skill, 

talent, training, and focus that will ensure our ability to develop new or improved 

capabilities and operate and defend them in the future. 

CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS

Like space, cyberspace is a unique global domain in which the U.S. must maintain 

freedom of action. It serves as a worldwide neural network, a conduit that links 

human activity and facilitates the exchange of information at speeds measured in 

milliseconds. Potential adversaries recognize the U.S. reliance on the use of cyberspace and constantly probe our networks seeking competitive advantage. 

In this emerging warfighting domain, USSTRATCOM, through the Joint Task 

Force for Global Network Operations (JTF–GNO) and the Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare (JFCC–NW), in partnership with the Joint 

Staff is leading the planning and execution of the National Military Strategy for 

Cyberspace Operations. In this role, we coordinate and execute operations to defend 

the Global Information Grid (GIG) and project power in support of national interests. 

Over the last year, the Defense Department has sought to enhance the security 

of the GIG by improving personal identification and authentication measures, standardizing operational security procedures and software, and reducing access to nonmission essential web sites. While generally effective, these defensive measures require augmentation to defeat sophisticated adversaries. As the cyber attack on Estonia demonstrated, the Defense Department must also plan and train to operate the 

GIG while under attack. USSTRATCOM is actively planning and executing operations to detect and counter attacks on the GIG while coordinating responses with 

other DOD and interagency elements. 

For as much as USSTRATCOM has accomplished in this domain, cyberspace operations is the least mature of USSTRATCOM’s operational mission areas. Our challenge is to define, shape, develop, deliver, and sustain a cyber force second to none. 

We pledge to continue to work with Congress as we continue to develop future resource and manpower requirements. As we continue to define the necessary capabilities to operate, defend, exploit, and attack in cyberspace, we ask for increased 

emphasis on DOD cyber capabilities. Our most immediate challenge is adequately 

trained personnel. USSTRATCOM needs a dedicated and highly trained force provided by the Services to conduct network warfare. As we continue to develop our 

cyberspace capabilities, we look forward to the day when we have trained and 

equipped Service organizations (e.g. brigades, battalions, wings, groups, and squadrons) assigned to USSTRATCOM to conduct network warfare. 

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

The Joint Information Operations Warfare Command (JIOWC) remains the center 

of excellence for DOD IO. Through JIOWC, USSTRATCOM has refocused our IO efforts to reinforce and support our three global missions of strategic deterrence and 

space and cyberspace operations. Specifically, we shifted from regionally focused efforts centered on individual combatant commands to concentrate on integrating 

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Strategic Communication planning, Operations Security (OPSEC), Military Deception (MILDEC), and Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities to enable 

USSTRATCOM’s global mission sets. Additionally, USSTRATCOM recognizes that 

controlling the use of the electromagnetic spectrum and ensuring its constant availability to friendly forces is not only of fundamental importance to all three of our 

operational missions, but to every other combatant command. To that end, we have 

undertaken a DOD-wide effort to identify joint EW effects requirements, highlighting Service-level EW capabilities and gaps in order to provide joint solutions 

for ensuring global electromagnetic spectrum access. 

MISSILE DEFENSE

Missile technology continues to proliferate, thereby increasing the need for a credible missile defense capability as an essential element of America’s National Security Strategy. Missile defense systems raise our adversaries’ ballistic missile development costs by reducing their systems’ effectiveness. In addition, our missile defenses enhance deterrence by denying adversaries the benefits they might seek by 

threatening the U.S. or our forces and allies with a missile attack. 

Our missile defense systems must be ready to defend against a missile that 

launches and lands in the same combatant commander’s region; a missile that 

launches from one region and lands in an adjacent region; or is launched from one 

region, overflies an adjacent region and lands in a third region. It is our responsibility to ensure concepts of operations, the design and integration of sensor suites, 

missile warning systems, and the mechanics of battle management systems all address these scenarios. 

As we move forward in the next year, USSTRATCOM, through our Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC–IMD) is leading 

a collaborative effort with geographic combatant commanders to develop a global integrated missile defense concept of operations that will lay the groundwork for our 

future Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Command and Control architecture. 

We are also examining the merits of incorporating cruise missile defense capabilities 

into the BMDS Command and Control architecture to address this growing threat 

in a cost-effective manner. We continue to support DOD and Department of State 

efforts to deploy the BMD mid-course radar and Ground-Based Interceptor capabilities in Europe, which are an integral part of the transition from limited defensive 

operations against a North Korean ICBM attack to an architecture capable of defending the U.S. and Europe from missile attacks originating from Southwest Asia 

as well. 

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) had an excellent year. In 2007, MDA conducted five successful AEGIS Standard Missile flight tests (one in conjunction with 

the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force) and four Terminal High Altitude Area 

Defense (THAAD) flight tests. Additionally, they conducted one Near-Field Infrared 

Experiment (NFIRE) test on-orbit, and one Network-Centric Airborne Defense Element (NCADE) air-to-air test. In September 2007 a successful ground-based midcourse interceptor test was conducted using operational crews. In July 2007, the 

early warning radar at Fylingdales Royal Air Force base completed a major hardware and software upgrade to improve detection, object classification, and precision 

tracking of ballistic missiles launched against the U.S. This site, along with the site 

at Beale AFB is now equipped with the Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR), 

making both sites critical components of the BMDS. These modernizations contribute significantly to the accuracy, and hence effectiveness, of missile defense 

tracking information and provide a single configuration that will enhance the sustainability of these radars. 

The BMDS was exercised extensively throughout 2007. Between April and August, operational warfighters exercised missile defense operations in six joint and 

combined combatant command level exercises. These efforts dramatically increased 

the level of operational warfighter involvement in the development and fielding of 

the BMDS. 

In the coming year, multiple BMDS exercises and tests, complemented by the development of the global integrated missile defense concept of operations will serve 

to validate our ability to ensure the efficient, coordinated, and prioritized use of limited missile defense resources. In support of the development of critical capabilities, 

USSTRATCOM has also continued to perform its advocacy responsibility for the 

global missile defense mission area, in full collaboration with the MDA and the combatant commanders. 

As our missile defense system continues to mature, it will continue to influence 

our adversaries’ perception of the economic and political cost they must incur to pursue missile technologies. While missile defense as a defensive shield is important, 

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its ability to assure allies, dissuade competition, and deter adversaries is equally 

vital. To achieve these goals, we need your continued support. 

I would like to emphasize that the recent successful operation to intercept the decaying satellite was not a test of our missile defense system. Some components of 

the system underwent a one time modification to facilitate accomplishment of this 

mission. However, these components are being returned to their original configurations to continue defending against the ballistic missile threat. 

COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (CWMD)

For more than half a century we lived in a world in which a few major powers 

possessed nuclear, chemical, and/or biological weapons. The U.S. has led efforts to 

encourage nuclear-capable nations to secure their materials and technology, as well 

as encourage those nations retaining chemical and biological weapons to disavow 

them as the major powers did long ago. While we have had some successes, such 

as Libya, and more recently, progress with North Korea, a number of nations continue to possess or seek WMD. Additionally, some nations with WMD capability are 

experiencing political unrest, thus placing their weapons at risk of capture by those 

hostile to the United States and our allies. 

Presidential direction, the National Strategy to Combat WMD, and the recently 

publicized Inspector General report on DOD Initiatives for CWMD made it clear the 

U.S. requires an integrated approach to deterring our adversaries and protecting 

our Nation from those who would employ WMD against us. 

While every regional combatant command is assigned the mission to counter 

WMD in its geographic area of responsibility, it is USSTRATCOM’s responsibility 

to integrate the family of DOD CWMD plans and to advocate within DOD for desired CWMD capabilities from a global perspective. We do this through the 

USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (SCC). Last 

year the Department’s concept plan to integrate and synchronize CWMD operations 

and activities was approved by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). This plan provides the blueprint to coordinate worldwide CWMD operations by supplying an effects-based template for regional combatant commanders to use in tailoring their regional CWMD plans, operations, and activities. USSTRATCOM has enhanced DOD’s 

operational capability suite by initiating the standup of a Joint Elimination Coordination Element (JECE) to conduct operational level WMD-Elimination planning (including deliberate, crisis action, and adaptive planning), joint training, command 

and control, and elimination operations exercises in support of joint force commander requirements. The JECE focuses on the activities and operations necessary 

to train and prepare joint forces and command and control elements to conduct 

WMD-Elimination missions. Recently deployed in support of U.S. Pacific Command’s 

major force exercise, Ulchi Focus Lens, the JECE performed admirably, supporting 

the formation of the first Joint Task Force Headquarters for the elimination of 

WMD. 

In our advocacy role, leveraging the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s (DTRA) 

WMD expertise, SCC completed the CWMD Joint Integrating Concept (JIC) outlining the future integrated architectures and capabilities (2015–2027) for the 

CWMD mission. We have used this visionary document as the foundation for development of the first CWMD Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 

(JCIDS) requirements document which provides a holistic prioritization of current 

combatant command capability needs. 

Over the past year, Congress supported our top two capability needs; technologies 

for detecting shielded nuclear materials at standoff distances, and a joint effort with 

United States Special Operations Command to develop a CWMD intelligence predictive assessment capability. USSTRATCOM continues to support DTRA through 

the integration of interagency activities with the Departments of Energy, State, 

Homeland Security and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to accelerate research and development efforts for critical standoff detection capabilities. 

Timely response to nuclear and radiological events through enhanced sample collection, packaging, transport, and precise data analysis is required to establish attribution, thus contributing to deterrence. 

We ask for your continued support in helping us build on the successes realized 

through Proliferation Security Initiative programs and the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative 

Threat Reduction initiative, the DTRA CWMD mission portfolio, and the Chemical/

Biological Defense Program. These programs enhance the capacity and capability of 

partners and allies to better secure and govern their own countries. By building 

global partnerships, the U.S. enhances the development of resident counterproliferation capabilities. This strategy facilitates the interdiction and elimination of 

71

WMD by other nations, promotes regional stability, presents a consolidated front to 

the threat, and enhances U.S. security by eliminating threats far from our shores. 

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

In 2007 USSTRATCOM and our Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JFCC–ISR) led ISR planning in support 

of the operational surge in Iraq. The planning, allocation, execution, and assessment 

of ISR missions have been vital to the improvement of the security situation in that 

region. We continue to improve our global ISR management processes. As the sophistication and volume of warfighter ISR needs continue to grow, so does the need 

to employ DOD’s limited ISR assets in close coordination with the rest of the Nation’s surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, as well as those of our allies. 

To that end, we have invested significant effort in strengthening DOD’s internal 

and external organizational relationships to enable more efficient ISR operations. 

When we assessed strategies to achieve a more efficient ISR enterprise, the need 

to integrate national and Defense ISR capabilities to satisfy the Nation’s intelligence 

requirements became clear. In October 2007, the DOD took a major step toward improving the Defense ISR Operations Enterprise by integrating the functions performed by JFCC–ISR and the Defense Joint Intelligence Operations Center to form 

the Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center (DIOCC). The DIOCC 

serves as the primary focal point for interface with the recently established National 

Intelligence Coordination Center and is part of a strategy to help ensure our limited 

surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities are aligned with the Nation’s and the 

Department’s strategic priorities. These changes reflect the direction, concurrence, 

and collaboration of the SECDEF and the Director of National Intelligence. 

In addition to improving our organizational approach, we are reviewing 

USSTRATCOM’s intelligence structure. When USSTRATCOM established joint 

functional component commands, some of its key intelligence functions were divested. We are reviewing our intelligence support requirements at the component 

and headquarters level to better posture intelligence support for each of 

USSTRATCOM’s mission areas. 

CONCLUSION

We live in a world where threats to our safety and security emerge and change 

daily. USSTRATCOM’s missions and capabilities support our national objectives of 

protecting and defending the homeland, assuring our allies, dissuading undesirable 

competition, and deterring and when necessary, defeating our adversaries. The men 

and women of United States STRATCOM form a responsive warfighting command 

with a global perspective that is in the fight today, and perhaps even more importantly, is uniquely positioned to anticipate, prepare for, and deter future crises. 

I appreciate the opportunity to share my thoughts with you and I look forward 

to partnering with you in the future as we work together to ensure our Nation is 

secure. Thank you.

Senator BILL NELSON. I want to give the courtesy of turning that 

opportunity over to Senator Sessions for his questioning. I’m going 

to have to step out of the room for just a minute, and will be back 

in, so Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Senator Nelson. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS 

Senator SESSIONS [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and 

thank you for your leadership and commitment to the subject of 

our subcommittee. It’s an important subcommittee. 

General Chilton, thank you for being here. We value your leadership. 

Senator Inhofe, I know you have another committee hearing, at 

this very moment. If you’d like to go first or—I will be pleased to 

yield to you—if that would be convenient with your schedule. 

Senator INHOFE. Here’s the observation I want to make, and I 

wanted to do it when the chairman was here. We actually have two 

hearings going on at the same time now, the Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee and this one. I was looking forVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:11 Dec 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00077 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\42635.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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ward to hearing the opening statement of General Chilton, and 

what I’d like to do is get an opinion from General Chilton on the 

three phases of missile defense: the boost phase, the midcourse 

phase, and the terminal phase and to get, in your opinion, your 

thoughts on where we are on each one. 

This is one of the major areas of misunderstanding by the American people. I can remember people introducing amendments on the 

floor of the Senate that we never did consider. But, they were 

there, saying, well, we don’t need to have redundancy in midcourse, 

for example, and we don’t need to be putting money into kinetic energy booster, would, in fact, on the boost segment we’re pretty 

much negative right now, we don’t have anything that’s out there 

working. 

So, I’d just like to have you give us a little update on where you 

think we are—what our timing is, and what is really important 

that is coming along in these three phases of progress. 

General CHILTON. Senator, I’m happy to discuss that. I’ll caveat 

my comments, first, by saying that, of course, the Missile Defense 

Agency (MDA) is the technical expert in this area. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. 

General CHILTON. But as a warfighter, when I look at missile defense, writ large, I do look at it in those three phases that you described, for the following reasons. Again, I’ll tell you, I’m a little 

colored by my youth, where my father worked, actually, on the 

Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system, way back in the early 1970s, 

and I remember him telling me, as a young man, he said, ‘‘Son, the 

best way to get these things is in the boost phase,’’ he says, ‘‘because that’s when they’re hot, the thrust is coming out, you can see 

them,’’ he says, ‘‘but it’s a challenge, because you have to get a little closer. The hard part is the later you get into the flight.’’ That 

wisdom of my father has not changed. 

Boost phase: you have the rocket coming off the pad, it’s a limited 2- to 3- to 4-minute time period, where it’s very visible and 

trackable and discernible, and it’s very vulnerable. The key there 

is to be able to bring effects to bear against it, ordnance to bear 

against it. There’s the issue of being close enough and having a 

weapon that can do that. It’s an area that we are probably least 

mature in. I’d say we are, as you look at what’s deployed today. 

But, an area we want to continue to work very strongly, because 

every warfighter will demand that. 

The midcourse phase we’re talking about is when the rocket 

quits and before the reentry vehicle enters the atmosphere, so it’s 

actually in space as it’s transiting space at this phase. It’s another 

time when, if you can get at the threat early in that phase, that’s 

desirable. It’s also, obviously, desirable to develop and field technologies to interdict in this phase. The ground-based missile defense system that we have deployed in Alaska and in California addresses this. 

Envisioned improvements to the sea-based system will add another weapon system that can address this phase, and it’s an 

equally important phase. What gets hard in this phase is you go 

from tracking a really hot booster to a very cold reentry vehicle up 

in space. So different sensors are needed, and it’s a different chalVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:11 Dec 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\42635.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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lenge, but one that we’ve worked through pretty successfully with 

our deployed systems. 

Probably our most mature, if you think about how long we’ve had 

them deployed, is the terminal phase. Now you’re talking about the 

reentry vehicle as it starts coming down through the atmosphere 

into the local area. We’ve started that, back in 1991, in Operation 

Desert Storm, with the improvements to the Patriot system, and 

we’ve advanced those with PAC–3. That is your last effort, last opportunity to do it. 

The terminal systems are not particularly capable, if at all, 

against intercontinental-range missiles, but they are more capable 

against—theater-based short-range to medium-range missiles. So, 

when you look at the threat in total, whether it be that you’re concerned about defending the United States of America from an intercontinental attack or a region, forces deployed in a region from a 

short- or medium-range attack, I think the approach that we’re 

taking, the layered approach of trying to address the vulnerabilities 

of these systems in boost, midcourse, and terminal is the right approach to take. 

Senator INHOFE. I think the greatest deficiency to work with 

right now is the boost phase. 

General CHILTON. It’s the most challenging, for sure, Senator. 

Senator INHOFE. Senator Sessions and I have been around long 

enough to remember when this all started, and fighting the battle 

that’s been in a continuous fight, particularly through the 1990s. 

We even had one veto of a defense authorization bill, in 1996. The 

reason was that we don’t need to be moving as fast as we’re moving 

on this whole system. 

If you’re going to get into this cyber thing, this might be a good 

time to do it, because I was fascinated by his discussion, there. 

Senator BILL NELSON [presiding]. You all go ahead and continue 

your questions, both of you. 

Senator SESSIONS. Since Senator Inhofe has another committee 

at the same time, but——

Senator BILL NELSON. Sure. 

Senator SESSIONS. Why don’t we follow up a little, for the record, 

on the discussion we had about cybersecurity. 

I would just note that, World War II, decisive events occurred 

when we were able to break the Japanese and German codes and 

have information that was critical to the war, and saved lives, and 

assisted us dramatically. We’re so committed, as a nation, to computer systems: our Future Combat System (FCS) for the Army, and 

our Air Force and Navy systems are all computerized. 

First, to what extent is maintaining security of those systems 

your responsibility, General Chilton? Can you tell us whether or 

not you have a plan in place, that you’re moving forward with, that 

will provide us confidence in the security of this system? If you 

haven’t gotten it, how close are you to getting it? 

General CHILTON. Thank you, Senator. 

You’re exactly right, there’s good analogies to the World War II 

time period and to now and the future, when we think about how 

we protect that critical information to our military operations. 

When I think about where we are in computers, I just put it in respect that we’ve transitioned from the ways that we used to transVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:11 Dec 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\42635.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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mit and store information, which was in file drawers and paper 

and through, maybe, radio frequency communications, to this network that we’re involved with now, where we store information on, 

and transmit information. 

Senator SESSIONS. Could I ask a question on that? 

General CHILTON. Sure. 

Senator SESSIONS. Would one difference in today and in World 

War II be that in World War II you had to intercept the message 

while they were being sent, which is a very short period of time, 

but today so many of these messages are permanently recorded, if 

you could penetrate the system, you could recall those messages 

years before? 

General CHILTON. That’s a great point, Senator. If what we’re 

seeing today, in the taking of information from networks, or storage devices on the network, is akin to what? I would say espionage. 

So, in your analogy, in the old days, you would have to go and 

break into those files with a flashlight in your teeth and a camera, 

or take them away. Now you can do that from the comfort of your 

desk and your access to a computer system, or attempt to go into 

stored information on the network. So we have to be very cognizant 

of that vulnerability. 

What Strategic Command (STRATCOM) has been chartered to 

do, with regard to the network, is to operate and defend the Department of Defense (DOD) portion, which you’ll hear it referred to 

as the Global Information Grid. That’s another coined phrase to 

talk about the set of addresses that end in .mil, for military, or 

.smil, for classified military. 

What we’re not chartered to defend—and I think this is important to understand—is the .gov—so, probably the domain that you 

operate in quite frequently on the Hill—or any other agency within 

the government; the .edu, which our science and university systems 

exchange a lot of information on, and we actually go out and get 

information whether it be through Google or whatever search engine; or the .com networks that a lot of our financial systems or 

other systems throughout the infrastructure of the country rely on 

for their operations. STRATCOM is not chartered to defend those. 

Senator SESSIONS. Who defends those? 

General CHILTON. The Department of Homeland Security is chartered to do that. The President’s initiative that was just signed out 

in his recent National Security Presidential Directive is the kickoff, 

really, of a large effort to go off and address that. 

Senator SESSIONS. Are you responsible for the Services—Army, 

Air Force, Navy, Marines? 

General CHILTON. We’re responsible for the network, and they 

use that network: .mil and .smil. So we have set up a construct, 

under the Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations, under 

the command of General Charles Croom, who reports to me, to operate that military network and to promulgate orders to bring 

unity of command and effort, to make sure we’re configuring it 

using the right defensive systems, the right procedures, to protect 

that DOD portion of the network. 

But, it’s not just enough to build defenses, in my mind; because 

no defense will ever be impenetrable. I think, as we think about 

defending this vital domain, we have to go from the high end of 

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technology investments all the way down to the lowest end, which 

is your newest recruit coming in, and he’s going to get on and use 

that system, whether he be a soldier, sailor, airman, or marine, 

and to make sure that individual knows that the way he behaves 

and utilizes his or her computer on their desk can affect the entire 

system. They can create vulnerabilities by not following the correct 

procedures. They can also be a defender, even though they may be 

a maintenance officer working on airplanes, or enlisted person 

working in administration, they can be part of a network of people 

who are watching out for people misusing or abusing that network. 

So when I think about our responsibilities, and I think about it 

from a very low to a very high-end continuum, and I’m very encouraged by the seriousness with which the Services are taking 

this issue, and the attention they’re bringing to it, to address it 

across the spectrum. 

Senator SESSIONS. There’s an article, recently, indicating that 

our networks are increasingly under attack. Can you, in this open 

forum, share some of the things that——

General CHILTON. Yes, Senator, and I would characterize them 

not ‘‘under attack’’ as much as being exploited. When I say that, 

to go back to what I talked about earlier, from an espionage perspective. There are individuals or entities coming into the networks 

and downloading vast quantities of information. Now, that doesn’t 

impede the way we work, day in and day out, but it’s a collection 

of unclassified information that, if you put those pieces together, 

you can, maybe, discern certain things about the way we operate 

or uncover certain vulnerabilities in the way we might operate. 

You’re doing that without having to actually train someone to infiltrate the United States of America and get access to files in a file 

cabinet. 

Senator SESSIONS. You could do that from a foreign nation. 

General CHILTON. You could, and so, that to me is different than 

an attack. I think what we saw in Estonia, previously, was more 

of an attack, where there was an effort by an unknown entity or 

group of people to come in and actually slow down the network and 

the responsiveness of the Estonian network. That was more of an 

attack, rather than espionage. But you have to worry about both. 

We have to be worried about both. 

Senator SESSIONS. General Chilton, I don’t think this would 

break the defense budget. I think it is very important. My personal 

view is that you should have the money and the personnel needed 

to do this job. In the scheme of things, it would be a small investment that could be exceedingly important to us, because there’s 

just no doubt, if our adversaries have figured out a way to penetrate our systems, the costs could be far greater than we would 

have to expend to make them more secure. 

General CHILTON. Senator, I would agree with you, but I would 

also add that it’s not just operating and it’s not just defending. We 

have to make sure we have the focus on operating, because I’m convinced, after the Estonia incident, that we’ll never build the perfect 

defense. We will be attacked in time of war, and we need skilled 

people who understand, and that can train to continue to operate 

that system and make it fight, even though it’s under attack, just 

like we do in every other domain. We don’t shut down our airfield 

76

operations just because we’re under attack. We keep working 

through it, and we have the right equipment, et cetera, to do that. 

So, we need to be thinking about that. 

But, we also need to be thinking about offense through this domain. The New Triad talks about having strike capabilities that include kinetic nuclear, kinetic non-nuclear, and nonkinetic. This is 

the perfect domain to conduct nonkinetic attack in the event of war 

in the future, and to have those capabilities. This is the area, I 

would say, where we are least mature or robust in manpower, expertise, and focus. We at STRATCOM right now, are doing studies 

with the Services and with our partners at the National Security 

Agency (NSA), who are a big part of this program, in bringing capabilities to understand exactly what we need as we go forward in 

this century. I expect that, when we come in, in the fiscal year 

2010 budget, the 2010 Program Objective Memorandum, we’ll have 

laid out those requirements and started to see the investments in 

the offensive part of this domain, which is equally important, in my 

view, to the defense. If for no other reason, it’s because we’ve always looked as having offense as part of any good defense in any 

domain. 

Senator SESSIONS. That’s well said. 

Mr. Chairman, I’ll be glad to turn back to you. I have a few more 

questions, but I’ll be glad to follow up. 

Senator BILL NELSON. As a courtesy to the Senator from Nebraska, and rather than hold you up, I’ve flipped it to our colleague 

from Alabama. Just be mindful that we have to finish the first 

panel in 30 minutes, and I have a stack of questions. 

So, the other Senator Nelson is recognized. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I’ll be 

mindful of the time requirements. 

Thank you, General Chilton. We are very pleased that you’re at 

the helm for the STRATCOM. With all the elements that are required to be on both offense and defense, we believe that you’re 

well positioned to do it. We want to make certain that you have 

all the financial tools and other tools necessary to be able to do 

that. 

If we think about Cold-War legacy, and you’ve indicated this before—that we can’t just maintain that deterrent that we’ve enjoyed 

in the past indefinitely by extensions and by life-extension programs. At what point in time, in your opinion, do we reach a tipover, where we just are only trying to extend the life of that deterrence? Then, number two, what is your sense of the importance of 

the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) as a key component of 

both land-based and sea-based deterrence, respectively? 

General CHILTON. Thank you, Senator, for that question. I want 

to begin by thanking the chairman for some advice he gave me as 

I was leading up to confirmation hearings. Senator Nelson, I think 

you’ll remember an office call, where you asked me some questions, 

and used some acronyms that I confessed ignorance to, and you 

commended that I go out and immerse myself in the nuclear enterprise early in my command. I have done that, sir, and I’ve learned 

a lot. 

Senator BILL NELSON. There’s the expert, right over there. 

General CHILTON. I know. 

77

I have gotten to know Secretary D’Agostino very well. But, I 

have done that, Senator, and I’ve formed some views, and also 

some concerns. Your first question would be one of my concerns 

that I’ve come to appreciate better. 

Every year, STRATCOM is required to certify the reliability, 

safety, and security of our current nuclear stockpile. Every year, 

that stockpile gets older, and we do this on 1-year increments. The 

program put in place, the Stockpile Stewardship Program has been 

a tremendous thing for the United States of America. It’s identified 

issues with our old weapons early enough for us to start working 

on them, and that has led to the Life Extension Programs that 

we’re seeing, particularly in the W–76 right now. 

What I can’t get comfortable with is you know there’s an edge 

out there that you’re creeping toward with regard to these weapons, because they were designed to be 15- to 20-year-life weapons. 

Because of the way we made them, and our whole architecture that 

was in place in the Cold War, which was based on: if you have a 

problem, test or make a new one; and when you had an infrastructure that could produce thousands a year, that was a reasonable 

way to approach it. Now we don’t want to test, and we don’t have 

an infrastructure that can really produce anything. That makes me 

nervous, as you go forward, about any problems that might develop 

in the current old inventory. 

I try to pin down the scientists, but they will not be pinned 

down, because they are very objective about this, and rightfully so. 

I liken it to approaching a cliff, and I don’t know how far away 

from that cliff I am, and that gives me discomfort with regard to 

continuing a strategy of life extension. 

I think there’s an economic side of that, too, that I’m probably 

not the best to speak to, but I liken it to trying to maintain our 

40-year-old automobile vanishing vendors, parts, and technologies, 

suppliers change. Not only that, these 40-year-old automobiles 

were not designed to be maintained, they were designed to be replaced at about 15- to 20-year intervals. That gives me pause, as 

you go down a life-extension approach. 

That said, I think we need to answer these critical questions, and 

address them. 

As we look to the future, I support a modernization of the weapons that we put on top of these delivery platforms, which I think 

the Services have done a very good job in modernizing and sustaining. But, they do us no good if we don’t have a warhead on top 

of them to provide the deterrent for the future. I believe that deterrent will still be required in the 21st century. I believe we need a 

modern weapon that’s designed with 21st century requirements, as 

opposed to 20th century Cold-War requirements, that can meet 

those future requirements. Those are some of the conclusions that 

I’ve drawn on that. 

Senator BEN NELSON. If we look at the fiscal year 2009 funding 

as it is at the moment, do you think it’s sufficient to complete the 

Phase 2A study? Is it possible to get us some idea of what the costs 

might be in order to do that, particularly if this budget’s not sufficient to do that, because I agree with Senator Sessions that we 

want to make certain you have the tools that are necessary to carry 

out the responsibilities for deterrence. 

78

General CHILTON. Senator, the funds to do the Phase 2A study 

are in Dr. D’Agostino’s portfolio. I don’t want to speak for him, and 

he will be on the second panel, and will perhaps address them 

more specifically. What I can tell you, in the 2008 submission there 

is an estimate in the order of around $60 to $80 million, if my 

memory refreshes me, to complete that study. I think that is still 

a valid number required somewhere near the high 60s or high 

70s—million dollars—and he can give you the exact number—that’s 

needed to finish the study. What’s important about doing that 

study is, it’s not a decision to go down the path; it will inform a 

decision for the next administration, next year. My concern as the 

warfighter is, as I look at the enterprise, in general and across the 

needs to the future, it’s just clear to me that this is a problem 

that’s been brewing for a while, and now is the time to address it, 

now is the time to answer the questions, so that we can come to 

a decision in the next administration, preferably early, and move 

out, both to guarantee our security posture for the future, but to 

make sure we’re heading down the correct business path for the 

country to achieving that. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Whether it’s the airplane life extension or 

whether it’s the life extension of the weapons, there has to be a 

point where it’s no longer either economically feasible to do it, nor 

is it possible to get that extension, indefinitely. So, that’s why I 

think it’s extremely important that we know what it’s going to 

take, and some idea of what kinetic nuclear and kinetic non-nuclear warheads are going to be required as a replacement, over 

some period of time, of what we currently have. 

General CHILTON. I couldn’t agree more, Senator. Thank you for 

the question. 

Senator BEN NELSON. As probably a lot of people know, western 

Nebraska hosts the balance of the missile fields of the 90th Space 

Wing, the Mighty Ninety. Last year, the Air Force was directed to 

extend the life of its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) fleet 

from 2020 to 2030. I’m assuming, based on what you’ve said, that 

we’ve been able to modernize and keep the lift instrument in a 

modern state of preparation. Is that fair? 

General CHILTON. Senator, there’s two parts to that. One is the 

security of those systems, and the other is their capability to 

launch. I bring a bias to this, I’ll admit to you, because my job was 

to make sure both of those were adequately supported in my last 

job. But I think the record will show that the Air Force has made 

substantial investments in improving the security of the launch facilities and the training of the forces that protect those facilities, 

and I think they’re moving in the correct direction there. 

With regard to the life extension of the Minuteman III, the big 

issue last year was not having enough test resources to be able to 

certify its readiness to the 2030 time period, and that was addressed in the funding, and supported. 

We knew, at the time, though, that, since the rest of the infrastructure was set for a 2018–2020 comfort level, that there would 

probably be additional investment required in some areas. This 

would be in support equipment, like transporters that move the 

missiles to and from the field, or when you have to pull one out 

for maintenance, various test equipment in the back shops, that, 

79

maybe in the past, if you said, ‘‘I only had to get to 2018, I don’t 

need to put any more money into these, but now, if I’m going to 

go to 2030, there’ll be some level of modernization or refreshment, 

or at least sustainability for another 10 years, that’s required.’’ 

So, I anticipate that the Air Force will take a real hard look at 

that to make sure that they’ve crossed the t’s and dotted the i’s in 

their investments to be able to get out 2030 across the spectrum. 

That’s important to do. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General. 

General CHILTON. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator BILL NELSON. General, share with the subcommittee 

what you think is the most significant management issue and the 

programmatic issue that you’re concerned about. 

General CHILTON. Yes, with regard to all the programs across 

STRATCOM? 

Senator BILL NELSON. STRATCOM. 

General CHILTON. I have two that come to mind, Senator, if I 

might say two. One would be the—and it’s not quite a program 

yet—and I’ve already referred to it—and this is the modernization 

effort for our warheads. I think the investments need to be made 

to answer the tough questions now. 

For an established program, the Transformational Satellite Communications (TSAT) program, I would say, comes to mind, Senator. 

Where we are on that program in this submission is the Air Force 

is going off and restudying the program, with responses to be provided in the April time period, as far as the way ahead for that program. As the combatant commander (COCOM), I hesitate to champion any one particular system. My charter, I think, is to talk to 

capability. So, Senator, what I’d like to address is my capability 

concerns here, that I’ve felt that particular program was addressing. Now I ask: So, how do we get there from here? 

Senator BILL NELSON. Let me just ask you, right there since it 

looks like it’s going to be delayed to 2018, what are the options? 

General CHILTON. Sure. I shared that same question with the Air 

Force, Senator. Because here’s what I’m worried about: one is, our 

nuclear command and control relies on a survivable and secure 

connection that runs through the satellite constellation belt in the 

Extremely High Frequency (EHF) radio frequence spectrum. We 

get that today through Military Strategic and Tactical Relay 

(MILSTAR). It will be replaced by the Advanced EHF (AEHF) satellite system. In the last design construct, the TSAT system, that 

would be one element of the TSAT system that would continue that 

capability. 

This capability is one that I would lump with Global Positioning 

System, I’d lump with weather, I’d lump with intelligence gathered 

from space, as a capability we have just become used to and we 

just don’t envision ever having to tolerate a gap in these capabilities. We wouldn’t want to plan for it, that’s for sure. 

So, the risk in that EHF connection was always on the back end, 

because we were only getting three Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellites, and you really needed four. What was 

the fourth? TSAT was a vision. The acquisition of the fourth 

AEHF, kind of, addresses that back-end concern, but only sort of. 

80

Here’s where I have my concern. We’re still going to launch the 

very first one in calendar year 2008—by the schedule, early fiscal 

year 2009. So, it only lasts so long. So, you have to be looking long 

range, out in the 2018 time period, the 2020 time period there, on 

how you’re going to continue this connection. I haven’t seen a complete storyline of how you’re going to do that for that capability. 

Now that’s a STRATCOM parochial perspective. 

The second area where I’m chartered to look across all COCOMs 

needs would be the ever-increasing bandwidth demand that we see 

coming down the road, whether it be for our increased investment 

and fielding of systems like the Global Hawk, full-motion video systems like Predator, et cetera, of envisioned space architectures that 

will demand higher bandwidth, of systems like the Army FCS that 

demands higher bandwidth. In that regard, it’s not so much a uninterrupted capability that I worry about, it’s a step up in capability 

that seems to be—on the horizon to be demanded. So, probably like 

you, I await, anxiously, for the Air Force’s report back, in April, to 

see what they’re going to do with the remainder of the money in 

the program, how they’re going to reconstruct that to address these 

capability issues that I’m concerned about. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, they delayed the program between 

2008 and 2009. I’d like to know, for the committee, were you consulted when $3.6 billion was removed from the program in the 

2009 budget request? 

General CHILTON. Senator, as far as the 2008 reduction and time 

schedule, I was part of that. So I was very aware of that, and the 

development of it, and I believe I testified to this—I was comfortable with a 2016 initial launch date, because it, classically, 

takes about a year and a half, a year, to check out the first satellite 

on orbit—a year. I like that extra year of pad to support what we 

envision as a 2018 need date if you didn’t have an AEHF–4, which 

was not in the program then, and so I was comfortable with that. 

Now we have an AEHF–4, and the question is, how long does 

AEHF–1 last? Are we comfortable with that? When does the fifth 

element, whether it’s TSAT or something else, come onboard? Is 

2018 the right time period? 2020? That’s the decision space we’re 

in. 

With regard to the reduction in the program that was taken 

when it was and I was not consulted when that decision was made. 

Senator BILL NELSON. I think that’s significant. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

On the TSAT, my understanding of the concept was that we 

needed to transition to a more capable satellite, and the TSAT 

would replace the fourth, and would put us on the road of increased capabilities. That’s the leap-ahead technology that President Bush talked about, and others have. So, the sooner you can 

do this, the better. But, if we can’t get there, we need to know that. 

How do you see that possibility of—occurring now? 

Have we given up? I mean, we’ve basically made a decision not 

to go with a fourth? 

General CHILTON. Sir, I’ve heard no one say that, with regard to 

giving up, in any conversation I’ve had. I’ve had multiple conversations since this——

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Senator SESSIONS. Giving up, in terms of——

General CHILTON. Going to the next level, at some point. 

Senator SESSIONS. But, didn’t we originally plan to do it with the 

fourth satellite? 

General CHILTON. That was going to be the beginning of the next 

level, because, really, to get there, you have to add more than just 

the one new satellite. Most every constellation we have requires 

three to four to complete the global-nature capability of this. That 

first satellite’s schedule was primarily being driven by the first 

need that I said STRATCOM has, which was to make sure we 

could sustain that command-and-control network that I needed in 

STRATCOM for our nuclear command-and-control mission. But, it 

was also the first step up in capability to a new approach to moving information around. 

Senator SESSIONS. Has that slipped? I know we’ve been discussing that. Is it still possible that we can bring TSAT online—

I mean, I guess what I’m saying is, if you’re going to put a—launch 

a satellite—AEHF, I guess, is what we call it. But you could put 

a TSAT instead of that, then you’ve begun the new system, and 

have greater capability, instead of our bringing up a fourth older 

satellite system and always slipping that. 

General CHILTON. Yes. What the Air Force is going to answer for 

us in April is what the actual schedule impacts and capability impacts. I’m not sure which way they’re going to go, if they’re going 

to reduce the delivery time or the capabilities, or whatever. They’re 

going to have to make some decisions, though, because of the reduction. 

But, when you think about it, AEHF is a tremendous step up 

from where we are today. I mean, it’s a tenfold increase. So, don’t 

get me wrong on my support for that program. I’m excited about 

AEHF coming up, and the increased bandwidth that’ll provide to 

the warfighter. 

TSAT, though, was a whole different approach. I use the analogy 

from the old Laugh-In days, when Lily Tomlin was sitting there, 

plugging in telephone calls. That’s kind of the way our satellites 

work today. You have to have dedicated switching between the two 

people that are communicating. The promise of TSAT was, it would 

take us to the way our Internet works today, where you don’t have 

to dial up somebody, you can just message, and it’ll get to them 

through the network system. If you want to get information from 

the system, you don’t have to have a specific phone number, you 

can search and find a menu of opportunities, and pull that information down. That’s the vision of TSAT as we move into that new 

technology in space, that we really enjoy today in our networks on 

the ground today. 

Again, I’d reiterate, I’ve heard no one in the Services say we 

want to step back from moving to that step. They are my concern’s 

as I’ve described them. 

Senator SESSIONS. Let me follow up on your study on the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). We need to make a decision 

about that. I think you are correct that now’s the time to do so, and 

we’re not prepared to make it, because we don’t have enough information and we haven’t studied the issue sufficiently. Is that correct? 

82

General CHILTON. That’s fair, Senator. I think what the RRW–

2A proposed study was to answer questions, to tee us up for a decision. 

Senator SESSIONS. Now, you just indicated it would take $60 to 

$80 million to complete that study. That’s the best estimate we 

have? 

General CHILTON. I would defer the exact number, to the next 

panel. But, my understanding is around $66 million to complete 

that study. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, our difficulty, Senator Nelson, is, the 

President’s budget is only a $10-million request, and we have some 

members in the House that are not supportive, and that may have 

had some impact on the budget request they made. I just think this 

is, in the scheme of things, a real important decision, and we might 

as well do it now and not put it off. If the report comes back and 

says, ‘‘RRW is not the best way to go,’’ so be it. But, to continue 

to muddle on with life-cycle improvements or trying to keep these 

systems going is worrisome to me. So, that’s just something I think 

we’re going to have to confront. Are we going to put the money up 

and make this decision, or are we going to let it go without the 

kind of analysis that ought to be given to it? 

On the RRW, we’re drawing down nuclear weapons now, according to our Moscow Treaty we signed, and we will dramatically reduce the numbers to, what, 1,700 to 2,200——

General CHILTON. That’s correct, Senator. 

Senator SESSIONS.—warheads, and there are fewer types of warheads in our inventory, in the stockpile. All of these warheads will 

also have exceeded their designed lifetimes, and some have aged to 

multiples of their designed lifetime. 

So, now, do you do the certification of the warhead? 

General CHILTON. A group that does report to me, and then I certify the reliability and safety and security of the stockpile. 

Senator SESSIONS. So, it’s the fact that concerns over the age of 

these warheads. Now that we have a lot fewer of them, so if a defect appears, we have a problem. We don’t have, at this time, an 

ongoing system to build any warheads. We may be the only nuclear-power country in the world that does not have an ongoing 

manufacturing system. Is that correct? 

General CHILTON. I’ll take that for the record, Senator. 

[The information referred to follows:]

All other declared nuclear weapon states, to include Russia, China, Pakistan, 

India, United Kingdom, and France are continually improving their nuclear delivery 

systems, weapons infrastructure, weapons, testing facilities, and technologies. Since 

the early 1990s the Presidential moratorium on nuclear testing and suspension of 

new warhead development, the U.S. no longer maintains the continuous cycle of 

new development, production, deployment and retirement of warheads that other 

nuclear weapon states sustain. Our current focus is on extending the lives of existing warheads in the stockpile well past their original design lives. We currently only 

have the capability to produce individual replacement components and are currently 

producing about 10 plutonium pits per year in a converted research and development lab to replace pits destroyed during surveillance testing. This lack of production capability and responsive infrastructure forces the U.S. to maintain a larger 

stockpile than necessary as a hedge against a technical failure of a weapon or unforeseen geopolitical risk. The result is the U.S. is the only nuclear weapon state 

that is not modernizing its weapons to increase their performance margin confidence, security, safety, and maintainability.

83

General CHILTON. But, your assessment, I would not call what 

we have today any kind of a manufacturing capability. We have a 

laboratory-type environment that can produce, at best, eight, my 

understanding, a year. So I don’t consider that it’s certainly not robust, and I don’t consider that a manufacturing capability. 

Senator SESSIONS. So all of these factors that lead you to believe 

it’s time for us to do a study and make a decision about the future 

needs and other factors that you’ve mentioned? 

General CHILTON. That’s correct, Senator. 

Senator SESSIONS. Have you personally reviewed this, as commander of STRATCOM—do you favor moving to an RRW, based on 

what you know today? 

General CHILTON. Senator, based on what I’ve learned over the 

last several months, and my look at this, I won’t pick a design 

here, but I’ll tell you, as a COCOM and as someone who’s chartered 

to provide a nuclear deterrent for this Nation, in the future, I 

would say we need a modernized nuclear warhead that has high 

reliability, safety and security features that are improved over 

what we currently have, and maintainability of design, which we 

absolutely do not have in the basic design today. Those would be 

my capability requirements for our warheads. In the safety and security area, they are safe and secure today, by 20th-century standards. But, I think we are responsible to look forward, and a lot has 

changed since 2001 with regard to threats to these weapons from 

terrorist-type organizations that didn’t exist before. 

The reliability issue is important, because, as I stated earlier, 

these weapons were designed in a time period where you would refresh them about every 20 years, you could produce thousands in 

a year, and you could test, if you had a question. So reliability was 

pretty low on the design criteria for these weapons, as compared 

to where it needs to be today, which is right up at the top, if you 

don’t want to test. 

Then the maintainability issue, I’ve said also, I think they were 

not designed to be maintained, and, as we look to the future, both 

from an economic standpoint and from a standpoint of being able 

to make sure we can continue to preserve the capability, we need 

to put that in the design criteria right upfront. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I thank you for that, and just mention 

one question, and our time is running short. I know we need to get 

to the second panel. Some notable strategic experts, such as former 

Secretary of Defense William Perry and former Secretary of State 

Henry Kissinger, have written an article calling for the United 

States to set nuclear disarmament as a goal. Perry and others believe that the goal of nuclear disarmament accords the United 

States the high moral ground for its nonproliferation initiatives. On 

the other hand, such a goal makes it more difficult for the United 

States to achieve a national consensus on nuclear weapons policy, 

because compromise is unattainable between those who support 

and reject that goal. 

How would you assess the strategic implications of a world in 

which the United States does not possess nuclear weapons? 

General CHILTON. Senator, first, I do not consider those to be 

diametrically opposed positions. As a father, and someday, hopefully, a grandfather, I would, of course, love to envision a world 

84

free of nuclear weapons. But, I also envision, and desire to envision, a world that is free for my children and grandchildren to grow 

up in, a country that is free to do that. Unilateral disarmament 

will not preserve that in a world where other countries possess nuclear weapons, particularly in quantities enough that could destroy 

our way of life, if they should decide to use them against us. 

Senator SESSIONS. So, if a country had a few nuclear weapons, 

and let’s say, they knew we considered them a rogue state, and we 

were to abandon our nuclear weapons, would it not be in their interest to seek to achieve checkmate potential by expanding their 

production of nuclear weapons? 

General CHILTON. Well, I think that’s good logic. I think the possession of nuclear weapons by other countries demands that the 

United States have a nuclear deterrent. I would like to see that 

day when there aren’t any, but I don’t envision that, personally, 

from a practical sense, in the remainder of this century. Given that 

position, and given the, I think, very important mission that this 

command has been given, to preserve our strategic deterrence for 

the preservation of this country, it is time for us to make the hard 

decisions and the investments to answer the questions of: how are 

we going to posture ourself for this century, while, at the same 

time, working to achieve that other goal? I don’t think that it’s an 

either/or. I think we need to dream and work toward the day, with 

other countries, hand in hand, not unilaterally, to achieve that vision someday. But, at the same time, we cannot let our guard 

down, so long as they’re a threat to this country. 

Senator SESSIONS. You have to go on. You just made me recall 

the late William Buckley, I think, on Firing Line with Norman 

Cousins on the Saturday Review. He was editor, I think, of that, 

at the time. Cousins waxed eloquent on the need to reach out and 

be peaceful and create a world in which a war didn’t take place. 

Buckley listened patiently and concluded, saying, ‘‘Well, Norman, 

I’m glad you’re working for those goals, and I’m very supportive, 

but I hope you won’t mind if I take care to preserve and protect 

the security of the United States while you’re working all this out.’’ 

I think it’s fine for people to talk about ideas, but I want to see 

if it’s going to work before I buy into it. I think perhaps we’ve overinterpreted, perhaps, what they were saying. I don’t think they expected us to act in any reckless way. But we need to confront these 

issues, deal with them effectively, make our plans for the future. 

I can’t imagine it would result in the elimination of warheads, although we are drawing down the number dramatically. 

General CHILTON. Dramatically. 

Senator SESSIONS. If we’re going to maintain warheads, should 

there be a newer, safer, more reliable warhead, or can we continue 

the whole stockpile? Those are the questions that we need to be 

making now, I think and answers that we need to be getting. 

General CHILTON. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator BILL NELSON. General, let me pose a series of questions, 

here, to you, and let’s get them on the record, and then we’ll get 

on to the second panel. 

General Cartwright had said, when he was the Strategic Commander, ‘‘It’s very important to me, the expansion of the system beyond the long-range ICBMs, to start to address those that hold at 

85

threat our forward deployed forces, our allies, and our friends.’’ 

Those are more in the short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, 

things that Patriot and Standard Missile II and III will be able to 

address, and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), as it 

comes on. Do you agree? 

General CHILTON. I do, Senator. I would say that I’m much encouraged by the block approach that MDA has taken. I think it has 

added clarity to the investment, and also helps us focus on how 

we’re moving forward. Block one being initial capability to defend 

against North Korea; and block two focused on the regional area 

and increasing investments there; and block three, for steps to take 

to defend to the United States against Iran; four, to expand that 

defensive capability to include our allies; and five, to flesh out the 

second major contingency approach to the regional threat. So, as 

you see that, we have fielded the North Korean portion of that already, and I think we are taking the appropriate emphasis in block 

two right now, while working in each of the blocks across the 

board. 

Senator BILL NELSON. All right. There’s something called the 

Joint Capability Mix (JCM) Study. Now there’s a second version. 

It suggests that we need more THAAD and Standard Missile III 

interceptors than envisioned in the first study. Is that correct? 

General CHILTON. Senator, I’m not sure that that has reported 

out formally; let me take that for the record, to get back to you on 

that, because I want to be absolutely certain. 

[The information referred to follows:]

Senator, the recently completed study, which I believe you refer to as the second 

version, was a sensitivity analysis on the Joint Capability Mix (JCM) Study II called 

JCM II Plus. With this additional information, the Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council validated the JCM II Study recommending an increase in minimum quantity of upper tier interceptors needed beyond those programmed in the President’s 

budget 2008.

General CHILTON. I have heard the same reports that you have 

had on that, but I have not seen the second JCM study that would 

say that. It wouldn’t surprise me. I think it’s certainly recognized 

in the block approach by MDA, that’s saying that, no, what we’re 

today is not going to be adequate for the long term. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, when you find out, then, we want 

to be briefed on that second version of the study, as well. 

General CHILTON. Absolutely, Senator. I’d be happy to. 

Senator BILL NELSON. All right. Now, your command had the 

lead for planning the shootdown of the satellite that just came 

down. I need you to be brief, because we need to change panels, 

here, but I want you to explain the process, which started back in 

December, including when the decision was made that it was possible to get it, and the agencies involved. 

I want you to do that right now, and then I want you to provide, 

for the record, the modifications that were made to the Aegis Ballistic Missile System to enable to do that, those modifications that 

you made on the software and all that. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, go on and answer that quickly. 

General CHILTON. Sure. 

Senator, I’d like to provide, for the record, a written portion of 

what you asked for, for me to do quickly, verbally, here, because 

86

I’m sure I’ll not be able to do it very fast, because it was pretty 

extensive, all the work that was done there. 

Let me begin by saying first, how proud I am of STRATCOM and 

all the agencies that participated in this. Just to be a part of that, 

it was such a humbling experience to watch this Government, this 

Nation, come together in the fashion that it did to solve this problem as quickly. 

It began before Christmas, when the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) expressed a concern about the frozen 

hydrazine aboard this satellite, his concern that it could endanger 

the populace on the ground, and his question to the Director of 

MDA, ‘‘Is there anything you can do?’’ I was brought into the loop 

immediately, when those questions were asked, in a phone call 

from General Obering to me that said, ‘‘Here, take a look at this. 

We’ll get back to you after Christmas.’’ Between Christmas and 

New Year’s. I received a call from General Obering, and he says, 

‘‘We’re not there yet, but so far, on where we’ve looked at this, our 

experts say they don’t see any showstoppers. This is going to be 

challenging. The schedule’s going to be an issue, because we knew 

about when the satellite was going to come down.’’ Essentially, 

they had 6 weeks to do what they would normally do in 6 months. 

We knew, at STRATCOM, there was going to be a lot of information brought together to help advise a decision on even—if we determined was technically feasible; in parallel, we had to be building 

a decision package to decide even if you could do it, ‘‘Assuming you 

could do it, would you do it? What are the pros and cons of that?’’ 

Sir, that took the great support of the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration, the NRO, Air Force Space Command, contractor workforce, MDA, to do that. 

But, as this moved forward to the culmination of this event, the 

United States Navy was obviously at the tip of the spear there and 

did a marvelous job. It was a complete joint-service approach and 

interagency, too. If you numbered them all up, I think we counted 

16 different organizations in our Government, from organizations 

like Federal Emergency Management Agency, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, et cetera, that helped us be successful in mitigating this threat to the people of the world. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. Now, why isn’t that an antisatellite 

capability (ASAT)? 

General CHILTON. Well, Senator, I think we approached this completely—and the analogies have been made in the press, ‘‘What’s 

the difference between you, and what you did, and the Chinese?’’ 

I think they’re absolutely, completely apples-and-oranges in the description of them. 

First of all, we told the world what the problem was and what 

we were going to do. We did extensive analysis and research, and 

have been very transparent on what our estimations of the increased risk to on-orbit vehicles would be as we approached the decision, and we’ve continued to publish exactly what’s happened as 

a result of that. The Chinese, on the other hand, didn’t tell anybody what they were going to do, they didn’t advise anybody of the 

risks they were going to increase. We took steps to make sure that 

we mitigated the risks, not only to the populace of the planet, 

which was our mission and why we did this, but we were worried 

87

about on-orbit capability, and we took this intercept at an altitude 

that would ensure that that problem would go away in short order. 

The Chinese effort will be and the consequences of that effort will 

be with us for estimates of up to a century, the risk that that will 

pose. 

Their intentions on why they developed this system have not 

been stated. Our intentions have been clearly stated, and our 

transparency in what we have done and our modification of a system to do this, and our intent to unmodify those systems and go 

back to what they’re originally intended to do, has been very transparent, I think, Senator. 

Senator BILL NELSON. The bottom line is that the Chinese have 

left tens of thousands of pieces up there, at least 250 miles high 

and higher, that are going to be up there, as you say, for decades, 

and that pose a threat to everybody else’s space assets; whereas, 

our intent, in shooting this down, was exactly the opposite, at 

about 120 miles high, get it so it’s going to degrade faster and it’s 

going to have a more predictable landing, and you’re going to bust 

up that thousand pounds of hydrazine. 

General CHILTON. That’s correct, Senator. I’d only just make one 

minor correction. I would have liked to have waited til it was down 

to 120, because our vision of shooting it as low as possible. What 

turned out to be as low as possible was around 150 nautical miles. 

But, that said, our pre-shot estimates were tracking very closely, 

if not better, to those estimates, because the intercept was so successful, it really fractured the satellite dramatically, and we think 

the size of pieces that we can trace will all be down in the next 

60 days, and the modeling of the pieces that are too small for us 

to see will be down before the end of the year. So I think that’s 

a dramatic statement, that we took that level of interest and sensitivity into the mission that we executed. 

[The information referred to follows:]

Previous testimony addressed the meetings and discussions that occurred during 

the December 2007 timeframe between Mr. Large (Director, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)), Lieutenant General Obering (Director, Missile Defense Agency 

(MDA)), and General Chilton (Commander, U.S. Strategic Command 

(CDRUSSTRATCOM)) which lead to the initial planning efforts. 

The planning team met in early January 2008 to determine potential options for 

presentation to the NSC. This team included personnel from USSTRATCOM and its 

Joint Functional Component Commands, NRO, MDA and Aegis-MDA. In mid-January CDRUSSTRATCOM presented the concept brief for satellite engagement to the 

President and received direction to focus on a course of action involving intercept 

with an SM–3 missile. 

This direction permitted MDA to begin software and system modifications enabling the SM–3 to execute the intercept. MDA spent months altering software to 

permit optimal target recognition. Target characterization and desired aim point determination were key parameters to be addressed by the software. 

In late January, CDRUSSTRATCOM presented the refined course of action and 

was directed to begin operational planning for the satellite intercept. MDA continued to work on ship and missile system modifications necessary for successful engagement. 

All modifications and deliveries took place on schedule in the first half of February 2008. In mid-February, CDRUSSTRATCOM presented the Operational Intercept Plan to the NSC; received Presidential authorization for intercept which culminated in a Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Execution Order. 

Following this execute order, CDRUSSTRATCOM began rehearsals for the intercept operation. Six days after being directed to intercept the satellite, all engagement parameters were favorable and the satellite was successfully intercepted on 

February 20, 2008.

88

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, congratulations to you and to all 

your team and all the multiple agencies that were involved on this. 

General CHILTON. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator BILL NELSON. As you look at the Minot-Barksdale problem, do you think that your command is going to have the oversight and the inspections to see that we have this nuclear security 

for the future? 

General CHILTON. Yes, Senator. We’ve taken some steps since 

then. Now, what I’ve found out is that, over years gone by, the 

STRATCOM went from actively participating, in the days of Strategic Air Command, before STRATCOM, to the migration through 

the post-cold-war period, had stepped back from, obviously, conducting, because that was no longer their job, but to even monitoring, kind of, over-the-shoulder, if you will, these inspections. 

That was reinstituted immediately after the Minot incident. So, all 

the inspections then—and we intend to move forward, to have a 

member of our inspector general team, not conducting the inspection—that’s not our job—but, to be there when they’re done, and 

make and report back to me about how comfortable they are with 

the way these inspections are being conducted: Are they standardized? Are we satisfied with the level of scrutiny being taken? That’s 

only a minor step that we have done, but important. 

Additionally, we’ve increased focus, up to the commanders level 

in STRATCOM, on the status of our nuclear forces. It’s part, in my 

immersion in the weapons side that we’ve discussed already here, 

but weekly I am briefed on our entire nuclear force structure, all 

our task forces, their readiness, any issues that may come up; and 

those are done to—a weekly briefing to me and the entire staff, 

that everyone is aware of. That’s new. 

In addition to that, we’ve set up a construct within the headquarters that will report up to the vice commander of STRATCOM, 

on a quarterly basis originally, that is chartered from a colonels 

working group, general officer intermediate group, to take a look 

at the entire nuclear enterprise, so that we’re not only watching security of the weapons, we’re watching security of the facilities, 

we’re paying attention to the health of the launch platforms and 

delivery platforms, as well as the weapons. So, an across-the-board 

enterprise examination that will address issues that, maybe, before 

were understood at lower levels, but not being elevated to the appropriate levels in the command. These are a few of the steps we’re 

taking. 

I’ll tell you, we’re also going to robust our exercise program in 

this area. We had devolved to—I believe, into a kind of a checklist 

or command-post-type exercise when we exercised these systems. 

I’m a little bit from Missouri on this. If you tell me you can do this, 

I’m going to ask you, on occasion, through exercises, to show me 

that you can still do that. That’s above and beyond the safety and 

security inspection; this is more of an operational focus. So, we’re 

going to increase that emphasis in the command, as well. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. Last question, and then we’ll bring 

the other panel up, and the record will remain open for any questions that we want to submit in writing. 

We have this little conflict here between the warfighter in the 

area of title 10 military authority and title 50 intelligence authority 

89

as we look at this cyberspace operation and responsibility. So, can 

you give your thoughts of what you think it’s going to take to resolve this quandary? Could you tell us if you think legislative action is needed? 

General CHILTON. Right. Senator, I do not think legislative action is needed. I think there’s honest disagreement among some 

people, but pretty good agreement among others. I’ll give you an 

example. I mean, title 50 is an important law that we have, that 

protects the citizens of the United States from intelligence—the intelligence collection that is rightly targeted at adversaries. There 

are some who think, because of that, that only people with title 50 

organizational responsibilities, that those organizations should be 

in charge of anything that would have title 50 associated with it. 

But, we have examples today where we maintain that protection of 

the U.S. citizens, we maintain the rules of title 50, but we actually 

use the title 50 assets in combat operations. The examples I would 

use would be the RC–135 platform, which is stationed at Offutt Air 

Force Base, the U–2 platform, a unit that I used to command, 

where we have people that have title 50 authorities, that examine 

the intelligence collected by those platforms, but day-in and dayout, they’re deployed, working for the CENTCOM commander, and 

they’re using that information to conduct combat operations. At the 

same time, the title 50 chain-of-command authority has to certify 

that they are following the rules, and that they’re trained and certified to do that. So, there you see a classic case of title 10 combat 

operations being closely supported by people with title 50 authorities, that are certified and kept—and held to be accountable to 

those laws, that’s in a very effective application of those two titles. 

I think that, as we look forward into the cyber domain, is a 

model that I would advocate for. 

The tension today is based, in a lot of areas, on the limits of resources that we have. As I spoke with Senator Sessions earlier in 

the testimony, growing and—for us, identifying the requirements 

and growing those capabilities, which is primarily human capital 

for the future, is very important for us in this stage of development 

of the cyberspace domain and how we think about how we would 

conduct warfare in the future there. They’re just aren’t quite 

enough people that we need in some areas; in other areas, it’s a 

matter of focus. There are talents that we can use, and we just 

need to bring them to bear to this command. As a COCOM, I need 

to demand the Services provide those resources so that I can conduct the mission that I’ve been assigned. The Services, we’ve had 

good dialogue with them and they are excited about doing that. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, thank you, General. We appreciate 

it. Thank you for your service to our country, and you are always 

welcome in this committee. 

General CHILTON. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator BILL NELSON. We look forward to the continuing very 

good relationship. 

May I call up the second panel, please. 

General CHILTON. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you. [Pause.] 

We’re pleased to have Assistant Secretary of Defense, Michael 

Vickers. We’re pleased to have Major General Richard Webber, who 

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is the Assistant Deputy Chief, Operations, Plans, and Requirements; Rear Admiral Stephen Johnson, Director of Strategic Systems Programs for the Navy; and the Honorable Dr. Thomas 

D’Agostino, Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration. 

Each of your statements will be put in the record. 

[The prepared statements of Mr. Vickers, Major General Webber, 

Rear Admiral Johnson, and Mr. D’Agostino follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. MICHAEL G. VICKERS

OPENING REMARKS

Chairman Nelson, Senator Sessions, and distinguished members of the subcommittee: I welcome the opportunity to describe our progress in transforming the 

Nation’s strategic capabilities to meet 21st century security challenges. I know that 

you understand the importance of this effort, and I want to thank the members of 

the subcommittee for your support. Successful transformation of our strategic capabilities will require a sustained partnership between the Department of Defense 

(DOD) and Congress. 

IMPLEMENTING THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW (NPR)

The NPR determined that the Cold War Triad of nuclear strike systems is not 

adequate to address the range of potential challenges in the new security environment. Accordingly, the NPR established a New Triad possessing broader capabilities, including offensive strike systems (nuclear, non-nuclear, and non-kinetic); defenses (active and passive); and a revitalized defense infrastructure, supported by 

enhanced Command and Control, Intelligence, and adaptive planning capabilities. 

Though not explicitly addressed in the NPR, capabilities in the areas of space and 

Information Operations are clearly among those needed to meet current and future 

security challenges. 

We have had mixed progress to date in fielding these capabilities. We have had 

significant success in achieving an initial capability to defend the United States 

against the emerging long-range ballistic missile threat from North Korea and the 

Middle East, and in fielding defenses to protect U.S. deployed forces and those of 

our coalition partners. Much more challenging has been the effort to sustain nuclear 

force capabilities and revitalize the nuclear infrastructure, and to develop a prompt, 

non-nuclear global strike capability. 

NUCLEAR FORCES AND A RESPONSIVE INFRASTRUCTURE

We continue to draw down the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear 

warheads, as well as our supporting stockpile of nondeployed warheads, to the lowest level consistent with our national security requirements and commitment to allies. That said, nuclear forces remain the ultimate deterrent capability that supports 

U.S. national security. Even as they decline in numbers, nuclear weapons are an 

essential and enduring element of the New Triad, and they underpin these New 

Triad capabilities in a fundamental way. 

The extended nuclear deterrence commitment the United States provides is key 

to assuring allies and friends of the credibility of U.S. security commitments. U.S. 

nuclear weapons deter potential adversaries from the threat or use of weapons of 

mass destruction against the United States, its deployed forces, and its allies and 

friends. In the absence of this ‘‘nuclear umbrella,’’ some non-nuclear allies of the 

United States might perceive a need to develop and deploy their own nuclear capability. 

At present, the United States is the only recognized nuclear weapons state that 

does not have the ability to produce new nuclear weapons in quantity. Accordingly, 

the lives of existing warhead types are being extended through refurbishment. Successive programs to extend the service life of the current inventory of warheads, 

however, can decrease our confidence in their performance as these warheads deviate from their baseline designs validated using nuclear test data. 

Our long-term goal is to rely more on a revived infrastructure and less on the 

nondeployed warhead stockpile to respond to unforeseen events. We seek replacement of existing warheads with Reliable Replacement Warheads (RRW) of comparable capability to our current weapons that would be less sensitive to manufacturing tolerances or to aging of materials. They would be certifiable without nuclear 

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testing, and have advanced safety and security features that can not be built into 

our current weapons. 

Safety and security take on enhanced importance in the post-September 11 world. 

While our current systems are safe and secure, RRW will incorporate improved, 

state-of-the-art safety and security features that will reduce still further any chance 

of unauthorized use. 

The desired size of a responsive nuclear infrastructure, measured in terms of the 

number of warheads it could produce or refurbish per year, would depend on a number of key variables; but once RRWs are deployed in significant numbers, many of 

the warheads now retained in the stockpile as a hedge against reliability problems 

could be retired. Until a truly responsive nuclear infrastructure is operational, however, the United States will need to retain an appropriate inventory of nondeployed 

warheads to manage geopolitical, technical, and operational risks. The Department 

will soon provide a white paper, ‘‘National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 

21st Century,’’ discussing the considerations behind U.S. requirements for nuclear 

weapons in greater detail. This paper will help inform the Nuclear Posture Review 

to take place next year. 

NON-NUCLEAR PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review highlighted an important gap in prompt, 

long-range conventional (non-nuclear) strike capabilities. Land-based conventional 

forces, such as fighter and bomber aircraft, could take hours to days to deploy and 

strike a target. Prompt Global Strike capabilities may be needed for time-sensitive 

operations such as interdicting the transfer of WMD to terrorists, or preventing a 

rogue state from launching a ballistic missile armed with a WMD payload. Today, 

nuclear-armed ballistic missiles are the only means the United States possesses for 

engaging distant, fleeting targets promptly (within about an hour from the time of 

an execution decision). 

Last year, in response to our request for funding for the Conventional Trident 

Modification program, Congress appropriated funds for research and development of 

technologies that could be applied to a wider range of concepts that might provide 

a prompt, non-nuclear, global strike capability. I want to thank the members of this 

subcommittee for your support of Prompt Global Strike. DOD accordingly will continue to develop and propose options to expand the range of our strategic capabilities in this area. 

MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES

Missile defense remains a top priority for the administration. Missile defenses 

constitute an essential element of our overall national security strategy to dissuade 

and deter states of concern from acquiring or using ballistic missiles, and to protect 

our citizens from the threat of missile attack should deterrence fail. We greatly appreciate the strong support this subcommittee has provided toward developing and 

procuring this critical capability. 

We continue to make good progress in providing an initial capability to protect 

our population and territory against the emerging long-range ballistic missile threat 

from North Korea and the Middle East. At the same time, through deployment of 

Aegis SM–3 and PAC–3 systems, and continued development of Theater High Altitude Area Defense and the airborne laser, we are ensuring we can protect our forward-deployed forces and those of our coalition partners against shorter-range missile threats. 

We have already seen the benefits of the initial defense against long-range missiles when we activated the system during the North Korean ballistic missile tests 

in July 2006. The capability to engage a missile launched in the direction of the 

United States allowed U.S. leaders to consider a wider range of options than would 

have otherwise been available. This capability also serves to devalue any future 

North Korean attempt to use its missiles to threaten or coerce the United States. 

INTERNATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION

The United States is committed to working with allies and friends to strengthen 

our collective capabilities to deal with the dangers of WMD and ballistic missiles. 

Our largest missile defense cooperation partner is Japan. Facing a direct threat 

from North Korean missiles, Japan is acquiring both Aegis SM–3 interceptors and 

PAC–3 batteries. Japan achieved a major milestone in December 2007, when its destroyer Kongo successfully intercepted a ballistic missile target with an SM–3 interceptor—a first for an allied naval vessel. In March 2007, Japan deployed its first 

PAC–3 firing unit, which together with the Kongo affords the Japanese a layered 

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developing the SM–3 Block IIA interceptor, a more capable version of the current 

sea-based interceptor, and we are developing operational plans to share information 

and to integrate our systems more effectively. 

Another important area of missile defense cooperation is our work with Israel. We 

continue to cooperate on the Arrow missile defense system and have begun to explore with Israel options for addressing ballistic missile threats that exceed the Arrow’s defensive capability. An important component of our missile defense cooperation is an ambitious bilateral exercise program over the next 2 years that will realistically test our joint capability to address ballistic missile threats. 

EUROPEAN MISSILE DEFENSE SITES

In January 2007, the President directed us to proceed with negotiations on basing 

U.S. missile defense elements in Poland and the Czech Republic. These defenses are 

intended to counter the emerging threat both to the United States and to friends 

and allies in Europe posed by Iranian development of longer-range ballistic missiles. 

We have had several rounds of negotiations with Poland on a draft agreement to 

base ground-based missile defense interceptors on its territory. These sessions have 

been productive, and we have made good progress on a draft text. While the new 

Polish Government has emphasized its position that the agreement should result in 

a net benefit to Poland’s security, it recognizes the growing ballistic missile threat 

to Europe and the contribution these missile defense assets can make to the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) security. 

In parallel, we have had a number of rounds of negotiations with the Czech Republic on an agreement to base a missile defense tracking radar on its territory. 

These talks have also made great progress and we are in the process of addressing 

a small number of issues that, once resolved, will allow us to finalize the draft text. 

Czech officials have shared our commitment to concluding these agreements, while 

at the same time ensuring that U.S. missile defense assets in Europe will be interoperable with, and complementary, to ongoing NATO missile defense efforts. 

MISSILE DEFENSE AT NATO

In addition to pursuing bilateral cooperation programs in missile defense, we are 

working within NATO on the Alliance’s response to the growing ballistic missile 

threat. We are pleased with the progress being made in the NATO Active Layered 

Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program, which will provide the Alliance’s deployed forces a defense against short- and medium-range missiles. 

To protect the indivisibility of Allied security, it is important for the rest of the 

Alliance to be protected against ballistic missile attack. NATO Heads of State and 

Government recognized the technical feasibility of missile defense at the 2006 Riga 

Summit, and NATO continues to make progress in this area. While the planned 

U.S. sites in Poland and the Czech Republic will be important contributions to Allied security, these elements will not protect Allies in southeastern Europe from 

shorter-range ballistic missile threats. It is our hope that at the Bucharest summit 

in April, the Alliance will be in a position to recognize the growing missile threat; 

support territorial defense as a means of addressing that threat; and welcome the 

contribution that European-based U.S. missile defense assets will make in protecting most Allies against long-range ballistic missiles. NATO also continues to cooperate with Russia in the NATO-Russia Council on Theater Missile Defense, and 

we have expressed our willingness to work with Russia on broader Missile Defense 

in the NATO context. 

MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA

Because we are building a new security relationship with Russia whose foundation does not rest on the prospect of mutual annihilation, and because we believe 

that Russia also faces an emerging ballistic missile threat from states such as Iran, 

we have invited Russia to join us in a cooperative effort to pursue missile defense. 

U.S. and Russian missile defense experts have met a number of times over the 

last year to share intelligence assessments of the Iranian ballistic missile program; 

discuss transparency and confidence building measures that could address Russia’s 

concerns about our planned missile defenses in Europe; and seek ways in which we 

could work jointly with Russia to address ballistic missile threats. We have proposed 

cooperation in such areas as modeling and simulation; sharing of early-warning 

data; building a joint regional missile defense architecture; and conducting joint exercises and wargames. Missile defense also featured prominently in last October’s 

‘‘2+2’’meeting in Moscow, where Secretaries Gates and Rice discussed a number of 

strategic issues with their Russian counterparts. We remain committed to showing 

through our continued discussions, and through our concrete proposals, our sincere 

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desire to work with Russia to address an emerging threat that affects us all while 

demonstrating that our missile defense program poses no threat to Russia. 

SPACE CAPABILITIES

We rely on services provided by space capabilities in all facets of our daily lives, 

and these capabilities are vital to our national security and the global economy. At 

the same time, potential adversaries continue to seek means to counter the advantages we obtain from space and to use space capabilities against us. Our space capabilities face a wide range of threats such as radio frequency jamming, laser blinding, 

and anti-satellite systems, including the anti-satellite capability demonstrated by 

China last year. In this regard, we are working to assess the strategic implications 

of such counter-space capabilities for our vital interests in space, and are carefully 

factoring the results of our assessments into our architecture planning efforts and 

investment priorities. 

U.S. National Space Policy is based on a number of longstanding principles. The 

U.S. rejects claims of sovereignty by any nation over space; rejects limitations on 

the fundamental right to operate in or acquire data from space; and retains the 

right of free passage through and operations in space without interference. Consistent with these principles, the U.S. views purposeful interference with its space 

systems as an infringement on its rights and will take those actions necessary to 

preserve its freedom of action in space. 

U.S. National Space Policy directs the Secretary of Defense to develop capabilities, 

plans, and options to ensure freedom of action in space, and if directed, to deny such 

freedom of action to adversaries. The Department’s investment strategy for space 

and space-related activities seeks to balance a number of requirements. We need to: 

modernize space situational awareness capabilities to ensure ample warning of hostile acts; improve protection plans to ensure required capabilities are available in 

a contested space environment; develop architectural solutions, including Operationally Responsive Space concepts, to ensure capabilities are available when needed; 

establish an operations posture, to include appropriate planning and exercises, to 

respond to attacks on U.S. space interests; and ensure the ability to deny adversaries the use of space capabilities to harm our forces or our homeland. 

The DOD further implements our National Space Policy by supporting efforts to 

promote safe and responsible use of space. We seek mutually beneficial international cooperation on space activities, and support commercial and foreign space 

surveillance needs to ensure safe space operations. DOD seeks to promote compliance with existing legal regimes, acceptance of international debris mitigation 

guidelines, and development of additional voluntary guidelines for safe and responsible space operations. We also do our best to protect mutual security interests related to dual-use space technology and services. 

INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND CYBERSPACE

Providing our combatant commanders the capability to integrate into their planning the various elements of Information Operations—computer network operations, 

electronic warfare, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security—has become even more important in the information age. Our potential adversaries, both nation-states and non-state actors, continue to seek ways and means 

to counter the advantages we obtain from our use of information, and to turn those 

same advantages against us in both conventional and in unconventional ways. We 

are assessing the strategic implications of our potential adversaries’ capabilities in 

this regard, and factoring those results into our planning and investment priorities 

for information operations. 

We are continuing to develop deterrence strategies to address potential adversaries’ attempts to counter our information advantages. We are working closely with 

our interagency partners, to define this domain in terms that will allow us to scope 

the missions that we will be asked to conduct. This domain crosses the physical 

boundaries within which we operate—space, air, land, and sea—as well as the organizational boundaries—military, civil and commercial—making this a complex problem. It is imperative that we understand our roles, both active and supporting, so 

as to provide the best possible options for the Nation. 

The ability to operate freely within cyberspace is critical to military operations 

and U.S. national security, but the threats to our computer networks are real and 

growing. Numerous organizations, such as the Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations, the Defense Information Systems Agency, U.S. Strategic Command, and 

the National Security Agency’s Information Assurance Directorate are working together to defend our Global Information Grid. But while these significant resources 

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sions on a daily basis, technology changes, and so do the threats. We recognize that 

this will be a long-term effort, and while much remains to be done in this area, we 

are making progress. 

CONCLUSION

Transformation of our Nation’s strategic capabilities to meet the uncertainties and 

challenges ahead depends critically on a sustained partnership between DOD and 

Congress. We need to continue the progress on missile defense; sustain our nuclear 

capabilities through the RRW program and revitalization of the nuclear infrastructure; develop and deploy a conventional, prompt Global Strike capability; ensure 

continuity of service of our space systems as we recapitalize and modernize these 

capabilities; and protect our ability to operate freely within the information environment while preventing adversary use of information against our interests. I look forward to working with you to achieve these goals. 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MAJ. GEN. RICHARD WEBBER, USAF 

I. INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the 

opportunity to discuss our Strategic Nuclear posture. Your Air Force is fully engaged around the world fighting terrorism and insurgents in the global war on terror and fulfilling our roles as Airmen for the joint team. Simultaneously, we stand 

prepared for rapid response to conflict around the globe as our Nation’s strategic 

Reserve. Air forces succeed when they have the resources to shape the future strategic environment and prepare for tomorrow’s challenges. Air forces succeed when 

they remain focused on their primary mission as an independent force that is part 

of an interdependent joint team. Above all, the U.S. Air Force delivers sovereign options for the defense of the United States and its global interests: To fly and fight 

in air, space, and cyberspace. 

II. WIN TODAY’S FIGHT

Supporting U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and the global war on terror is 

a portion of what your Air Force does for our Nation’s defense. Your Air Force is 

prepared to respond across the entire spectrum of conflict from rapid humanitarian 

aid to major combat operations. 

Fighting and winning the global war on terror is the number one priority; however, it is important to focus on protecting our Nation from other potential enemies, 

both traditional and nontraditional. 

Air Force engagement in CENTCOM is only the tip of the iceberg. Your Airmen 

operate around-the-clock and around-the-globe to provide all Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) with critical capabilities. Over 40 percent of the total force and 

53 percent of the Active-Duty Force are directly engaged in or supporting COCOM 

operations everyday. On any given day, the Air Force has approximately 206,000 

airmen (175,000 active duty plus an additional 31,000 Guard and Reserve) fulfilling 

COCOM tasks. This includes approximately 127,000 airmen conducting activities 

such as operating and controlling satellites, standing alert in our Intercontinental 

Ballistic Missile (ICBM) facilities, operating unmanned aerial vehicles, launching 

airlift and tanker sorties, providing intelligence assessments, and many other functions critical to each of the COCOMs. Also included are 57,000 airmen stationed outside the continental United States in direct support of the Pacific Command and European Command missions. Finally, a portion of the above forces plus an additional 

22,000 airman from the current AEF rotation are made available for deployments 

in support of other COCOM requirements. At any given time, 34,000 of these airmen are deployed with 25,000 of them deployed to the CENTCOM AOR of which 

approximately 6,600 are in-lieu-of (ILO) taskings. Since 2004, we have deployed approximately 24,000 airmen to perform ILO taskings. 

III. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

The United States Air Force has underwritten the national strategy for over 60 

years by providing a credible deterrent force, and we continue to serve as the ultimate backstop, dissuading opponents and reassuring allies by maintaining an always-ready nuclear arm. Airmen continue to stand silent sentry around-the-clock to 

protect our national security, and respond to any adversary should deterrence fail. 

Since the weapons-transfer incident of 30 August 2007, we have initiated multiple 

levels of review to ensure we have not only investigated the root causes of the inciVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:11 Dec 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00100 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\42635.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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dent, but more importantly taken this opportunity to review Air Force policies and 

procedures in order to improve the Air Force’s nuclear capabilities. The Commander 

of Air Combat Command commissioned a Commander Directed Investigation (CDI), 

a tactical level investigation that focused on the facts of the incident and determined 

accountability. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) commissioned the Blue 

Ribbon Review, an operational-level review that focuses on the entire Air Force enterprise including both the aircraft and ICBM and reviews policies, procedures. The 

Secretary of Defense commissioned the Defense Science Review Board (DSB) review, 

a strategic-level independent review that focuses on the Department of Defense 

(DOD) enterprise and joint organizations. The Air Force takes its nuclear obligations seriously, and will continue to take any measure necessary to deliver this strategic capability safely. Consequently, we have identified the actions required to both 

enhance our strengths and correct those areas needing improvement. We have also 

submitted the Air Force unfunded requirements list to the House Armed Services 

Committee with a number of nuclear surety and security initiatives for consideration. The United States Air Force is committed to the nuclear mission. 

Air Force Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 

Minuteman is and will remain the Nation’s land-based strategic deterrent 

through 2030. 

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2007 mandated 

that the Air Force modernize Minuteman III (MM III) ICBMs in the United States 

inventory as required to maintain a sufficient supply of launch test assets and 

spares to sustain the deployed force of such missiles through 2030. The Air Force 

is currently analyzing MMIII missile and ground systems to determine what activities are required to sustain the force through 2030. The Air Force has ongoing lifeextension programs designed to extend ICBM service life beyond 2020. 

During the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Defense Department 

agreed with the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) recommendation to reduce the ICBM force from 500 to 450. The USSTRATCOM analysis concluded a 450 

Minuteman III force was sufficient to assure allies and deter potential adversaries. 

Headquarters Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) recommended and the USAF 

agreed that the 564th Missile Squadron (564 MS) at Malmstrom AFB, MT, was best 

candidate for deactivation. The 564 MS increased logistics sustainment costs because of its unique operating system versus other Minuteman III squadrons. Reduction of 564 MS also standardized the unit size and configuration at three bases. 

The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to the Congressional Defense Committees ‘‘. . . on the feasibility of establishing 

an association . . .’’ between the 120th Fighter Wing, Great Falls, MT (Air National 

Guard) and the 341st Space Wing, Malmstrom AFB, MT (Active Duty Air Force). 

The Air Force must submit the report 15 days before removing the 41st missile from 

the 564th Missile Squadron. The report is currently in coordination and anticipated 

delivery to Congress is April 2008. 

AFSPC commenced deactivation activities within the 564 MS in June 2007. The 

Air Force will retain and modernize the 50 removed ICBMs for use in the Force Development Evaluation (FDE) program. Conversion of the 50 missiles for use as flight 

test, replacement and aging/surveillance assets meets congressional direction to extend Minuteman operations through 2030. 

ICBM Life Extension Programs (LEP)s 

1. Guidance Replacement Program: 

Replaces guidance set electronics on MMIII and improves reliability on the ground 

and in flight. The replacement program calls for 652 kits: 450 are fielded; 180 are 

used for tests, spares, etc.; the final 32 will be delivered in fiscal year 2009. 

2. Propulsion Replacement Program: 

Extends booster life through 2020 by re-pouring stages one and two, and re-manufacturing stage three. The replacement program calls for 605 kits: 376 are fielded; 

173 are used for tests, spares, etc.; the final 56 will be delivered in fiscal year 2009. 

3. Propulsion System Rocket Engine Program: 

Refurbishes seven components and assemblies in the liquid propulsion post-boost 

vehicle. The Air Force installed 154 kits and will purchase 96 additional kits in fiscal year 2009. The future installation of 574 total kits will complete the program. 

4. Safety Enhanced Reentry Vehicle (SERV): 

Enables MMIII to carry the more advanced Peacekeeper MK 21 Reentry Vehicle 

(RV) while retaining the powerful MMIII MK 12A RV multiple independently retargetable RV (MIRV) capability. Retirement of the older MK 12 RV is now possible, 

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avoiding a costly $1 billion LEP. The Air Force fielded 75 kits and will purchase 

the 111 additional kits in fiscal year 2009. The fielding of 570 total kits completes 

the program. Deployment of the MK 21 RV enhances nuclear safety because the MK 

21 RV design incorporates three additional safety features: Insensitive High Explosive, Fire Resistant Pit, and Enhanced Nuclear Detonation Safety, which the Drell 

Commission recommended, but not incorporated in the older MK 12 RV design. The 

Insensitive High Explosive and Fire Resistant Pit features reduce the likelihood of 

plutonium dispersal in cases of inadvertent impact or accident. The Enhanced Nuclear Detonation Safety design protects those electrical components critical to detonation from sources of unintended energy in order to prevent premature arming in 

abnormal environments. The Air Force is continuing to deploy SERV, with 75 kits 

already fielded, and will purchase 111 additional kits in fiscal year 2009. The program will procure 570 kits total. 

5. Environmental Control System: 

Modernizes cooling system equipment in the Minuteman launch facilities and missile alert facilities. The Air Force installed 71 launch facility kits and 6 missile alert 

facility kits and will purchase 126 kits in fiscal year 2009. Deployment of 499 total 

kits to all the launch facilities, missile alert facilities, and training sites will complete the program. 

6. ICBM Security Modernization Program: 

This three-part program consists of concrete enhancements, a fast-rising secondary personnel access hatch, and a Remote Visual Assessment (RVA) camera. 

This comprehensive program began in fiscal year 2004. The Air Force completed 

concrete enhancements at all 450 launch facilities in 2007, more than a year ahead 

of schedule and 35 percent under budget. The Air Force installed fast-rising secondary personnel access hatches at 21 launch facilities. The Air Force also installed 

RVA at 5 missile alert facilities and 50 Launch Facilities. The $10.5 million Congressional increase in fiscal year 2008 allowed the Air Force to purchase 90 additional RVA kits, enough to complete deployment at the first wing. Taken together, 

these programs give responding security forces situational awareness and adequate 

time to deny adversarial access to our launch facilities. In fiscal year 2009, the Air 

Force will purchase 100 fast-rising secondary personnel access hatches and 147 RVA 

kits. 

Helicopters 

The primary AFSPC helicopter mission, flown by UH–1N platforms, provides security forces with a continuous contingency response capability for the National 

ICBM complex. The Air Force District of Washington (AFDW) and several other 

MAJCOMS also use the UH–1N as an Operational Support Airlift/Very Important 

Person Special Air Mission (OSA/VIPSAM) platform. The UH–1N has noted deficiencies in payload, speed, range, endurance, battle space awareness, survivability, 

and adverse weather operations. 

Your average Air Force UH–1N airframe is 39 years old and some aircraft in the 

inventory exceed 13,000 flight hours. The UH–1N fleet shows its age with fatiguerelated cracks in the tail boom and is currently undergoing its second tail boom replacement that will enable it to meet flight safety standards. 

The Common Vertical Lift Support Platform (CVLSP) is an Air Force effort to replace these UH–1Ns. AFSPC is the designated lead command and is in the process 

of finalizing the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to scope the available pool of platforms capable of accomplishing the multiple missions required by all users of the 

UH–1N. Following the AoA, AFSPC anticipates a final Capability Development Document (CDD) in early fiscal year 2009. Once the Joint Requirements Oversight 

Committee and the Office of the Secretary of Defense approve all requirements, the 

Air Force will develop an acquisition strategy to field this capability. 

Nuclear Cruise Missiles 

The Air Force analyzed current and future roles for nuclear cruise missiles during 

the 2005 QDR and the fiscal year 2007 budgeting cycle. The Defense Department 

issued guidance on 20 December 2005 directing USSTRATCOM and the Air Force 

to study the nuclear cruise missile force structure, including the Air-to-Ground Missile (AGM) –86, Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), and the AGM–129 Advanced 

Cruise Missile (ACM). The guidance also directed the Air Force to build a retirement schedule for the missiles. 

The USSTRATCOM/Air Force study examined considerations such as cruise missile inventory, operational capability, reliability, DOD direction and COCOM requirements. Based on these factors, the study recommended that the Air Force retire all ACMs, reduce the ALCM force to 528, retire all excess ALCMs, consolidate 

97

the ALCM force at Minot AFB, and retain ALCMs in the inventory through at least 

2020, possibly 2030. On 12 April 2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense accepted 

the study recommendations. On 23 June 2006, the Commander of USSTRATCOM 

sent a letter to the Secretary of Defense supporting the study’s findings and advocating adoption of the ALCM/ACM force structure recommendations. The Joint 

Chiefs of Staff and National Security Council endorsed the study recommendations 

as they pertained to the Air Force. On 17 October 2006 the Secretary of Defense 

directed the Air Force to retire the ACM and reduce the ALCM fleet to 528 missiles. 

The Air Force is removing from service, demilitarizing and destroying all ACMs 

and the excess ALCM missile bodies at the rate of 6 ACMs and 12 ALCMs per 

month. We forecast completion of demilitarization for excess ALCMs in fiscal year 

2011 and all ACMs in fiscal year 2013. The remaining nuclear cruise missile force 

will be consolidated at Minot AFB, North Dakota. These cruise missile force structure changes are part of a balanced force reduction that supports both the President’s direction to reduce the active nuclear stockpile, and the United States’ obligation under the 2002 Moscow Treaty to reduce the number of operationally deployed 

strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700–2,200 warheads. 

Warhead Replacement and Refurbishment 

A viable program of warhead replacement and refurbishment is essential to sustain a nuclear weapons stockpile of any size. Warhead replacement concepts continue to show promise for increasing long-term confidence in warhead reliability, 

and this strategy offers other advantages when compared with refurbishment. For 

example, a replacement warhead could incorporate improved safety and security features not considered feasible in a refurbished weapon, and replacement weapons 

could be better designed to interface with modern delivery platforms such as the 

Joint Strike Fighter. Decisions must be made very soon if we are to find the most 

cost-effective strategy to meet current and projected requirements. To that end, it 

is imperative that we pursue and complete the studies needed for informed decisions. 

In the absence of a replacement warhead, the Nuclear Weapons Council commissioned a 1-year phase-one study to define concepts for refurbishment of existing 

warheads for current and future air-delivered systems in November 2006. We are 

reviewing the findings of this study, and expect to recommend further studies to the 

Nuclear Weapons Council. 

Strategic Bombers 

A new bomber is critical to upgrading the Nation’s long-range strike capability to 

ensure range and payload, and ability to hold any target anywhere at risk. The Air 

Force has a three-phased approach to meet the Nation’s long-range strike requirements. The first phase is to continue with the modernization of legacy bomber fleet 

to ensure sustainability and increase combat effectiveness. The 2008 NDAA mandated that the Air Force maintain a 76 Total Aircraft Inventory (TAI) for B–52s. 

This inventory includes 44 combat-coded, 15 training, 4 test, 11 backup, and 2 attrition reserve B–52s. Additionally, the Air Force is complying with congressional language, which directs that no funds be obligated or expended for retiring any of the 

93 B–52H aircraft 60 days after the Secretary of the Air Force submits a bomber 

force structure report prepared by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA). The 

IDA will deliver its report to the Air Force later this month and the Secretary of 

the Air Force will subsequently forward the report to Congress. The Air Force will 

retain the B–2 fleet at the current TAI. The second phase of the Air Force’s approach is to leverage near-term technologies to field a next-generation long-range 

strike (NGLRS) capability to replace the oldest B–52s by 2018. This could include 

beginning the divestiture of legacy bombers as the NGLRS bomber reaches initial 

operational capability. The final phase consists of a quantum leap in technology and 

capability that employs a system of systems technology push for advanced improvements in speed, range, accuracy, connectivity and survivability in the 2035 timeframe. 

IV. CLOSING

The United States Air Force continues to serve as the ultimate backstop, dissuading opponents and reassuring allies by maintaining an always-ready nuclear 

arm. Airmen continue to stand silent sentry around-the-clock to protect our national 

security, and respond to any adversary should deterrence fail. 

Your Air Force is preparing to dominate in the 21st century strategically, operationally, and tactically. Air Force strategic forces, the bulwark of our strategic deterrent capability, give us the means to ensure Global Vigilance, Global Reach, 

Global Power, and worldwide Expeditionary Combat Support by providing sovereign 

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options for the defense of the United States and its global interests: These capabilities are essential to the joint fight and are a critical component of the future joint 

force. The Air Force is committed to advancing strategic capabilities to fully support 

the joint team. In order to maintain our strategic dominance, the Air Force must 

recapitalize and also be allowed to divest itself of outdated, excess platforms. Divesting excess platforms will provide the means to shift vital funds to recapitalization 

and modernization of the Air Force and to maintain a strategic deterrent second to 

none. Your Air Force appreciates your continued support in turning our vision into 

an operational reality. Above all, our Nation must invest today to ensure tomorrow’s 

air, space, and cyberspace dominance. 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY RADM STEPHEN JOHNSON, USN 

Chairman Nelson, Senator Sessions, distinguished members of the Strategic 

Forces subcommittee. Thank you for affording me the opportunity to appear before 

you to discuss our Navy’s deterrent fleet and the ongoing efforts to ensure the continued reliability of our submarine strategic forces. The men and women of Strategic 

Systems Programs (SSP) are committed to maintaining the high reliability of our 

deployed Ohio class submarines with their Trident II D5 Missiles and to supporting 

emerging requirements of our combatant commanders. I am pleased to report to you 

that the Trident Strategic Weapons Systems continues to exceed the operational requirements established for the system. On 29 November 2007, U.S.S. Henry M. 

Jackson (SSBN 730) conducted the 120th consecutive successful missile launch as 

part of her Demonstration and Shakedown Operation. This record is unmatched by 

any previous missile launch system. 

Our 14 Trident Submarines, 8 of which are deployed in the Pacific and 6 in the 

Atlantic fleet, continue to provide an affordable and credible sea base deterrent for 

our national leadership. Two of our submarines, U.S.S. Alabama (SSBN 731) and 

U.S.S. Alaska (SSBN 732), are undergoing Engineering Refueling Overhauls. U.S.S. 

Henry M Jackson has completed her overhaul and post availability testing and is 

preparing for her strategic outload and return to the operational cycle. 

D5 LIFE EXTENSION

The Trident II missile continues Life Extension on schedule and on budget. The 

Life Extension program procures an additional 108 missiles and redesigns missile 

and guidance electronics due to obsolescence to meet long-term inventory requirements which will ensure that our Ohio class submarines are fully out loaded 

throughout their service lives. 

The first Life Extended missile will be delivered to the Navy in fiscal year 2011. 

Testing of all components has gone well. Continued production of rocket motors has 

proven to be successful in maintaining our capability to field these critical assets. 

In Partnership with the United Kingdom, the Navy is evaluating a follow-on platform to replace the current Ohio Class SSBNs. The U.S. lead-ship will occur in fiscal year 2019. 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECURITY

SSP continues to pursue technologies which will provide credible, cost effective security for the nuclear assets entrusted to our watch. Our Marines and Navy Masters 

at Arms are providing an effective and integrated elite security force at both of our 

strategic weapons facilities. We will soon begin construction on our Limited Area 

Production Security Complex at Strategic Weapons Facility Pacific, Bangor, WA. 

When complete, this facility will provide a significantly higher degree of security for 

our ashore operations. 

The first of our Maritime Protection Force Units has been commissioned at Kings 

Bay Georgia in support of the Transit Protection System (TPS). The recently commissioned United States Coast Guard Cutter Sea Dragon will comprise a major part 

of our TPS, providing a security umbrella for our Ohio class submarines as they deploy and return from their deterrent patrols. The United States Coast Guard has 

been an exemplary partner in this essential mission. 

PHASE 2 STUDY IN SUPPORT OF THE RELIABLE REPLACEMENT WARHEAD (RRW)

The Strategic Systems Program chaired and coordinated the RRW Phase 2A design definition and cost study until the suspension of work by our national laboratories in accordance with congressional direction. The first order analysis of mass 

properties for the entire system are satisfactory, which means a modern warhead 

approach will fit within the space and weight constraints of our missile. At the stop 

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work point, the directors of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos 

National Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratories remain confident that a 

modern warhead design:

• Can be certified without underground testing; 

• Will significantly improve safety and security; 

• Will significantly reduce the use of toxic material; and 

• Can significantly improve manufacturability.

It is important this study or one similar be resumed so that the next administration has the information it needs to complete, as mandated by Congress, a timely 

review of its nuclear posture. We should be developing the technologies needed for 

a modern warhead approach now, regardless of specific program application, in 

order to make these safety and security capabilities sufficiently mature for future 

application. 

SSGN

The flexibility of this new capability was clearly demonstrated in May 2007 when 

U.S.S. Florida launched two Block IV Tomahawks from the same tube. The following day one Block IV and Block III were launched, demonstrating system capabilities of the Attack Weapons System including in-flight updates and retargeting, 

the first time this had been done from a submerged submarine. All missiles flew 

their complete profiles flawlessly to target. All four submarines have completed 

their conversion to SSGN Attack and Special Operating Force Platforms, with 

U.S.S. Georgia being returned to service later this month. U.S.S. Ohio (SSBN 726) 

has recently conducted the first operational SSGN deployment in the Pacific and is 

on her second deployment. U.S.S. Florida has completed her initial load out of 

Tomahawk missiles and is making final preparations for her first deployment. 

PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE

SSP will leverage our successes with ongoing programs such as our Reentry Systems Applications and Guidance Applications programs and collaborate with other 

services as we participate in a new Defense Wide Conventional Prompt Global 

Strike Initiative to deliver a new conventional strike option to the combatant commanders. SSP continues to investigate technologies which will become viable for use 

on future Prompt Global Strike weapons systems which could be tailorable and 

adaptable into several platforms across the Department. Technologies such as thermal protection, navigation guidance and control, and advanced fuzing concepts must 

be further developed. 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this subcommittee, I sincerely appreciate your continued support of Strategic Systems Programs and our Deterrent 

Fleet. Your efforts will ensure the continued credibility and reliability of our Trident 

II Weapons System and its remarkable Trident II D5 Missile, maintaining an unmatched record of success by any missile system. The men and women of Strategic 

Systems Programs are committed to the highest standards of safety, surety, and reliability of this remarkable system. Thank you again for the opportunity to appear 

before you today. 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY THOMAS P. D’AGOSTINO

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to discuss U.S. nuclear weapon policies and programs. My remarks focus on our efforts to transform the nuclear weapons complex into a 21st century national security enterprise. I will address why we 

believe that the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) concept should be pursued 

notwithstanding the recent decision by Congress not to fund completion of the RRW 

design definition and cost study. 

Before I begin, I want to remind you of the tremendous progress made over the 

past few years in reducing the size of our nuclear weapons stockpile. As you recall, 

in 2002, President Bush and President Putin signed the Moscow Treaty, which will 

reduce the number of our operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 

1,700 to 2,200 by 2012. In 2004, the President issued a directive to cut the entire 

U.S. nuclear stockpile—both deployed and Reserve warheads—in half by 2012. But 

this goal was later accelerated and achieved 5 years ahead of schedule in 2007. As 

of the end of 2007, the total stockpile was almost 50 percent below what it was in 

2001, when the President took office. 

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On December 18, 2007, the White House announced the President’s decision to 

reduce the nuclear weapons stockpile by another 15 percent by 2012. This means 

the U.S. nuclear stockpile will be less than one-quarter its size at the end of the 

Cold War—the smallest stockpile in more than 50 years. 

My Department of Defense (DOD) colleagues are prepared to address fundamental 

questions of why in the post-Cold War era we continue to need nuclear forces and 

why, although dramatically reduced, we need the number of nuclear warheads in 

the stockpile that we plan to have. My testimony will focus more narrowly on our 

efforts to ‘‘transform’’ the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and supporting infrastructure. In this regard, further stockpile reductions rest on: (1) our ability to transform 

the nuclear weapons complex into a more responsive enterprise, (2) ongoing efforts 

to understand challenges to the stockpile and modern means of addressing these 

challenges such as the RRW, and (3) efforts between successive administrations and 

Congress to restore a consensus on the future nuclear deterrent, force posture and 

resulting nuclear weapons stockpile. 

TRANSFORMING THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX

The Nuclear Weapons Complex is at a crossroads—maintaining the status quo is 

not an option we can afford. Delay and inaction will only increase the costs and elevate the risks associated with maintaining an aging stockpile. Regardless of stockpile transformation plans, these facilities need to be upgraded. The challenge for us 

will be to move from an aging nuclear weapons complex designed for the Cold War 

to a smaller 21st century national security enterprise that is integrated, modern, 

cost-effective, and that eliminates unnecessary redundancy, but that is also at the 

forefront of science and technology and responsive to future national security requirements. 

Complex transformation is more than simply replacing an aged physical infrastructure, it includes transforming our contracting, procurement and management 

practices to embrace the best in business and human capital practices. We also seek 

to leverage our core competencies in nuclear weapons design and engineering to advance our leadership in counterterrorism, nonproliferation, physical security, cyber 

security and support of the Intelligence Community. Our transformation strategy relies on four pillars:

• Transform the nuclear stockpile through the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) in partnership with the DOD. 

• Transform to a modernized, cost-effective nuclear weapons complex to 

support needed capabilities in our physical infrastructure. 

• Create an integrated, interdependent enterprise that employs best business practices to maximize efficiency and minimize costs. 

• Advance the science and technology base that is the cornerstone of our 

nuclear deterrence and essential to our national security.

Infrastructure improvements are a major part of complex transformation and we 

have made important progress in this area. For example, with the support of this 

committee, in 2007, we produced tritium for the first time in 18 years, and the Tritium Extraction Facility at Savannah River is now online. Still, some major facilities 

date to the Manhattan Project and cannot easily meet today’s safety and security 

requirements, and the capabilities they provide must be restored. Let me cite two 

key examples: 

Plutonium ‘‘Pit’’ Production: 

A sufficient capacity to produce plutonium pits for nuclear warheads is an essential part of a responsive national security enterprise and is required for as long as 

we retain a nuclear deterrent. Currently, we have a very small production capacity 

at Los Alamos National Laboratory (about 10 pits per year in Technical Area 55 

(TA–55). This capacity took 10 years to reconstitute, using aging scientific and manufacturing facilities. It is insufficient to support the stockpile for the long term and, 

if not redressed, requires maintaining a larger stockpile than would otherwise be 

desired. There are two key reasons why this is so:

• Depending on warhead type, our best estimate of minimum pit lifetime 

is 85–100 years. While this lifespan exceeds previous estimates, degradation from plutonium aging still introduces uncertainty in overall system 

performance, particularly for lower margin systems. As the stockpile ages, 

we must plan to replace many pits in stockpiled weapons. 

• As the stockpile continues to be reduced, we must anticipate that an adverse change in the geopolitical threat environment, or a technical problem 

or development, could require manufacture of additional warheads on a relatively rapid schedule. Currently, if we found a major system-wide problem 

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in the stockpile requiring pit replacement, we have insufficient capacity for 

a timely response.

As part of our transformation, the National Nuclear Security Administration 

(NNSA) has evaluated a variety of future pit production alternatives. NNSA’s preferred alternative is to retain and build on the existing production facilities at Los 

Alamos. Whether we continue on our existing path or if we move towards an RRW 

based stockpile, we will need a capacity to produce about 50–80 pits per year. To 

do this, we would use existing facilities in TA–55 with the addition of a new Chemistry and Metallurgy Research-Replacement (CMRR) Nuclear Facility. In addition to 

its role in pit production, the CMRR will be the sole facility where we will be able 

to carry out pit surveillance, essential to maintaining the existing stockpile, as well 

as plutonium and actinide research and analysis. Our approach would provide sufficient production capacity to support smaller stockpile sizes, particularly when coupled with potential reuse of pits. A production capacity of 50–80 pits per year is less 

than one-tenth of Cold War levels, when we were producing not 10 or 100, but thousands of warheads a year. 

Uranium Component Production: 

As with plutonium, regardless of the type of stockpile we maintain, we will require a responsive capability and capacity to produce uranium components. Our uranium component production facilities date to the Manhattan Project. Securing these 

facilities from terrorism threats we face after September 11 is increasingly difficult 

and costly, as is operating them to modern safety standards. Every warhead, whether refurbished or replacement, will require uranium component manufacture. Construction of the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility at the Y–12 National 

Security Complex in Oak Ridge will allow us to consolidate uranium storage with 

a significantly reduced security ‘‘footprint.’’ 

Although our emphasis has been on maintaining the stockpile by embarking on 

complex transformation and examining the potential promise of RRW, we have not 

lost focus on meeting our commitments to the Defense Department and to other customers. As I pointed out earlier, last year we reconstituted a limited plutonium pit 

manufacturing capability and produced new pits for the W88 warhead. This year we 

will continue to produce new W88 pits and begin installing equipment to increase 

pit production capacity to 30–50 pits per year by 2012–2014. In 2006 and 2007, respectively, we delivered the first refurbished B61–7 and B61–11 bombs to the Air 

Force. We intend to maintain on-time delivery of these weapons to the Air Force 

in 2008. 

In addition, our 21st century national security enterprise will continue to leverage 

the scientific underpinnings of its historic nuclear weapons mission to respond to 

a full range of national security challenges beyond nuclear weapons. Indeed, the scientific capabilities and infrastructure developed for nuclear weapons are already 

being utilized by the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security, and by the 

Intelligence Community, and are recognized as essential to fulfilling the responsibilities of these organizations. For example, the NNSA laboratories have participated 

jointly with other government agencies in addressing a wide range of national security challenges—all of which leverage NNSA’s core mission of nuclear weapons development and sustainability. Recent examples include:

• Supporting warfighter needs in Iraq with modeling, analysis and systems 

to counter improvised explosive devices (IEDs). 

• Supporting the DOD and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in emergency render-safe and post-event technical nuclear forensics. 

• Aiding the Intelligence Community in its counterterrorism and nonproliferation efforts by drawing upon our nuclear weapons expertise. 

• Developing and deploying integrated systems for countering biological releases and bio-decontamination technologies. 

• Developing and deploying portal detector technology to prevent smuggling 

of special nuclear materials.

Our challenge is to maintain these scientific and technical capabilities, which 

evolved from the weapons program when budgets were expansive, into the future 

when resources will be relatively constrained. We must find ways to leverage key 

capabilities by developing and strengthening strategic relationships with other Federal agencies in meeting our Nation’s security needs. 

Our plan for transforming our physical infrastructure, released this past December and detailed in the draft Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact 

Statement as required by the National Environmental Policy Act, will consolidate 

special nuclear materials to fewer sites and locations within the nuclear weapons 

complex, close or transfer hundreds of buildings that are no longer required for the 

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NNSA mission, and reduce NNSA’s overall footprint by as much as a third. Over 

10 years, we expect to eliminate at least 9 million square feet, or the equivalent 

of almost 200 football fields of floor space! Additionally, by eliminating multi-site 

redundancies and consolidating both mission and capability at our sites, we expect 

to dramatically improve efficiency and cut costs. 

EVOLUTION OF OUR STRATEGY FOR SUSTAINING THE NUCLEAR STOCKPILE

Let us turn to the problem of stockpile stewardship and recall how we got to 

where we are today. In the years following the end of the Cold War, budgets for 

nuclear weapons programs were in ‘‘free fall’’—funding was simply not available to 

sustain both research and development (R&D) and production capabilities. A strategic decision was made to emphasize R&D to ensure future capabilities to certify 

the stockpile while neglecting production—we mortgaged the present to ensure the 

future. 

That future was seen as science-based stockpile stewardship and life extension of 

our Cold War legacy warheads. When the U.S. stopped nuclear testing in 1992, it 

sought to replace this critical tool with a new SSP that: (1) emphasized science and 

technology coupled with a vigorous experimental program as a means to understand 

better the physics and chemistry of nuclear weapons and their operation, and (2) 

provided enhanced warhead surveillance tools so that we would have a much better 

chance of detecting the onset of problems in the stockpile. 

The goal of the SSP was to predict the effects of aging in our warheads so that 

we could replace aging components before they degraded overall system reliability. 

The end of the Cold War provided this opportunity—our focus was no longer on a 

continuous cycle of fielding new warheads to provide new military capabilities, but 

on sustaining existing nuclear capabilities. 

We call this ‘‘life extension’’—the process of observing the aging of individual components of warheads and replacing them before they fail. Consider this challenge. 

Your vintage 1965 Ford Mustang—maintained as a collector’s item—has been sitting in your garage for 40 years. You monitor it for such items as a clogged carburetor, corrosion in the engine block, battery discharge, and you replace parts when 

you deem it necessary. But you don’t get to start the engine and take it for a test 

drive. The trick is to assure that if you do need it right away—to take your wife 

(or husband) to the hospital in an emergency—that it would work with certainty. 

That’s sort of what we have to do with nuclear weapons LEPs. 

Following the administration’s Nuclear Posture Review, in 2003 we ‘‘took stock’’ 

of 10 years of the SSP and came to some important conclusions. 

First, the SSP is working—today’s stockpile remains safe and reliable and does 

not require nuclear testing. This assessment is based on a foundation of past nuclear tests augmented by cutting edge scientific and engineering experiments and 

analysis, and improved warhead surveillance. Most importantly, it derives from the 

professional (and independent) judgment of our laboratory directors advised by their 

weapon program staffs. 

Second, as we continue to draw down the stockpile, our laboratory directors are 

concerned that our current path—successive refurbishments of existing warheads 

developed during the Cold War to stringent Cold War specifications—may pose unacceptable risks to maintaining high confidence in warhead performance over the 

long-term absent nuclear testing. 

These concerns arise as we move further and further away from designs certified 

with underground nuclear tests, resulting from inevitable accumulations of small 

changes from a continuous process of aging, and refurbishment of aging components, 

over the extended lives of these highly-optimized systems. 

So, while we are confident that the SSP is working and that today’s stockpile is 

safe and reliable, it is only prudent to explore alternate means to manage risk in 

seeking to ensure stockpile reliability over the long term. 

This is, in part, the impetus for our proposed work to study reliable replacement 

concepts: to ensure the long-term sustainment of the military capabilities provided 

by the existing stockpile, not to develop warheads for new or different military missions as is often portrayed. 

Specifically, we have examined the feasibility of providing replacement warheads 

for the legacy stockpile. By relaxing Cold War design constraints that sought maximum yield in a minimum size/weight package, it would allow design of replacements that are easier and less costly to manufacture, are safer and more secure, 

eliminate most environmentally dangerous materials, and increase design performance margins, thus ensuring long-term confidence in reliability without nuclear testing. 

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Finally, we need to transform our complex with or without RRW. That said, we 

believe that RRW would offer means to transform to a more efficient and responsive, 

much smaller, and less costly nuclear weapons R&D and production infrastructure. 

URGENCY OF RRW

We are often asked: If today’s stockpile is safe and reliable, why do we believe 

it is important to start on RRW now? Why not wait a few years when you know 

more? There are four main reasons why I believe it is important to complete the 

reliable replacement study now. 

First, the study will provide critical information to insure that the next administration, as well as the bipartisan commission established by this committee, can 

complete a timely review of U.S. nuclear posture as mandated by Congress. 

Second, as I raised earlier, there are concerns about our ability to ensure the longterm safety and reliability of today’s stockpile absent nuclear testing. For example, 

the first RRW was intended to replace a portion of W76 warheads deployed on the 

Trident SLBM system. That warhead comprises a large fraction of today’s, and an 

even larger fraction of our future strategic deterrent force. It has no ‘‘back up.’’ Although we have not uncovered any problems with the W76, it is prudent to hedge 

against a catastrophic failure of that system by introducing a significantly different 

warhead design into the SLBM force. Our ability over the next 15 years to produce 

new plutonium parts is limited—the sooner we start the sooner we could achieve 

this diversity. 

Third, after September 11 we realized that the security threat to our nuclear warheads had fundamentally changed. The security features in today’s stockpile are 

commensurate with technologies that were available during the Cold War and with 

the threats from that time. Major enhancements in security are not easily available 

via retrofits in the life extension programs. The car analogy is again relevant. Today’s Mustang remains a high-performance automobile, has about the same dimensions and weighs only a few hundred pounds more than the first Mustangs, and has 

all the modern safety and security features we expect today—air bags, anti-lock 

brakes, GPS navigation, satellite radio, theft deterrent, and alarm systems. The 

1965 version had none of these features, not even seat belts! We deploy warheads 

today that have 1970–1980’s safety, security, and anti-terrorism features. It does 

not mean that these warheads are not safe and secure, but we can do better and 

we should do better. Based on our initial assessments, I believe that RRW provides 

opportunities to incorporate the latest technological advances for precluding unauthorized use in a post-September 11 threat environment. 

Fourth, the RRW effort thus far has provided a critical opportunity to ensure the 

transfer of nuclear design and engineering skills from the generation who honed 

these skills with nuclear testing to the generation who will replace them. These 

skills are absolutely vital to the Nation, not just for sustaining our deterrent but 

in such areas as nuclear counterterrorism which will become even more important 

in the future. In a few years, nearly all of the older generation will be retired or 

dead. Without this opportunity coming at this time (and not 5 years hence), we 

would not be able to sustain key capabilities. 

RESPONSE TO ARGUMENTS AGAINST RRW

A number of concerns have arisen in our deliberations with Congress and others 

about the RRW program. Specifically, critics argue that:

• RRW will undermine the nonproliferation regime either by providing incentives for states to acquire or improve their nuclear arsenals, or by impeding U.S. leadership in pursuing a strengthened nonproliferation regime. 

• RRW will cause us to carry out an underground nuclear test. • More broadly, the U.S. ‘‘doesn’t have its nuclear act together’’—its nuclear policies are not clearly embedded in a broader international security 

framework. At minimum, it hasn’t communicated its nuclear policy clearly 

to Congress. Until it does, some would argue, we should delay RRW and 

Complex Transformation.

On that last point, the United States has a coherent and rationale policy overarching nuclear weapons programs as reflected in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review 

(NPR), the Presidential directive (NSPD–28) addressing command and control and 

safety and security of U.S. nuclear forces, and the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plans 

issued annually by the President, among others. But we have not done as good a 

job as we should communicating these policies to Congress and the public. We are, 

however, doing better and I will return to this at the end of my statement. 

How is our proposed reliable replacement strategy consistent with nonproliferation and arms control? Some of you may be convinced that there might be valid reaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:11 Dec 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00109 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\42635.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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sons for going forward but are concerned that these reasons do not outweigh an 

overriding concern that such efforts could undermine U.S. leadership in the fight 

against proliferation. I appreciate such concerns, but ask that you consider the following points:

• The RRW, by design, would not provide a new role for nuclear weapons 

or new military capabilities, but rather would help sustain the military capabilities of the existing arsenal. 

• Fielding the RRW would not increase the size of the nuclear stockpile, 

rather it would enable further stockpile reductions. Once a transformed production complex demonstrates that it can produce replacement warheads on 

a timescale responsive to technical problems in the stockpile, or adverse 

geopolitical changes, then many Reserve warheads could be eliminated—

further reducing the nuclear stockpile and reinforcing our commitment to 

Article VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty. 

• Because replacement warheads would be designed with more favorable 

performance margins, and therefore less sensitive to incremental aging effects, introducing them into the stockpile would reduce the possibility that 

the United States would be faced with a need to conduct a nuclear test to 

diagnose or remedy a stockpile problem. This supports overall U.S. efforts 

to dissuade other nations from conducting nuclear tests. 

• By incorporating modern security features, RRW would strengthen security of U.S. nuclear weapons against unauthorized use (e.g., in the event 

of a terrorist attack on one of our storage facilities). 

• Finally, a safe, secure, and reliable U.S. nuclear deterrent, credibly extended to our allies, supports U.S. nonproliferation efforts because allies 

confident in U.S. extended nuclear deterrence guarantees will not be motivated to pursue their own nuclear forces. This nonproliferation role of U.S. 

nuclear weapons is often underestimated. Indeed, the nuclear weapon programs of North Korea and Iran have made our nuclear guarantees to allies 

such as Turkey, South Korea and Japan take on renewed importance.

In summary, our vision to transform the nuclear stockpile and supporting infrastructure through reliable replacement concepts is complementary to, not inconsistent with, our nonproliferation policies and with the long-term goal of global nuclear weapons elimination. 

NUCLEAR TESTING

Let me turn in more detail to the nuclear testing issue. I am most concerned 

about some misunderstandings expressed in the public sphere about our views on 

the possible need for nuclear testing. Let there be no doubt: Today’s nuclear weapons stockpile is safe and reliable and has not required post-deployment nuclear testing to date, nor is nuclear testing currently anticipated or planned. But keeping this 

stockpile healthy is becoming an increasingly difficult challenge. Periodically we 

identify problems with warheads that in the past would have been resolved with nuclear tests. Our SSP has worked well so far to help us to avoid that prospect. The 

considered judgment of the national weapons laboratories directors, however, is that 

maintaining certification of the finely-tuned designs of an aging Cold War stockpile 

through the LEP effort and absent nuclear testing involves increasing risk. 

An alternative path is a stockpile based on replacement warheads that, unlike 

Cold War legacy warheads, would be designed for certification without additional 

nuclear tests. Indeed, our experts best technical judgment today is that it will be 

less likely that we would need nuclear testing to maintain the safety, security, and 

reliability into the future of the nuclear stockpile if we pursue a reliable replacement path employing all the tools of the SSP, including advanced quantitative 

means, than if we continue to rely on today’s legacy warheads. In December, I provided Congress classified information giving further details on these matters. 

Why then do we think it’s feasible to field an RRW without nuclear testing? There 

are four basic reasons:

• First, replacement warhead designs would provide more favorable reliability and performance margins than those currently in the stockpile, and 

would be less sensitive to incremental aging effects or manufacturing 

variances. 

• Second, feasible replacement designs would be firmly rooted in the past 

nuclear test data base. 

• Third, by pursuing reliable replacement designs now, we would be able 

to fully utilize the experience of those remaining designers and engineers 

who successfully fielded our current stockpile during the period of nuclear 

testing. 

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• Fourth, the SSP over the past decade has provided improved scientific 

and analytic tools, including advanced supercomputer simulation and sophisticated experimental capabilities, which were not available to the previous generation of designers/engineers. These tools have led to a much better understanding of the intricacies of nuclear weapons physics and engineering. Indeed, we know more about the complex issues of nuclear weapons performance today than we ever did during the period of nuclear testing.

These four factors, taken together, provide a solid foundation for our confidence 

that we can certify RRW designs without nuclear tests. 

FACTORS AFFECTING FUTURE ADJUSTMENTS TO OUR NUCLEAR POSTURE

It is important for us to describe how our concept for transformation—in light of 

evolving geopolitical threat environments—could provide opportunities for further 

stockpile reductions. In this regard, the current plan for the nuclear force posture—

developed in the 2001 NPR—established objectives for a range of deployed nuclear 

warheads, a nuclear force structure, and nuclear stockpile for 2012 as well as a general approach to sustain this force beyond 2012. Future administrations will of 

course adjust, refine and make changes to our posture in response to future events 

and circumstances. These changes might be unilateral or taken in concert with 

other nuclear powers. In any case, these changes will be governed by three basic 

factors: (1) the future geopolitical threat environment, (2) the success of technical 

efforts underway to ensure a safe, reliable and credible nuclear deterrent for the 

foreseeable future and to transform the nuclear weapons R&D and production infrastructure that supports it, and (3) our progress in fielding other strategic capabilities, including missile defenses and conventional precision strike. 

Geopolitical uncertainties are likely to dominate future considerations of an adjusted force posture. Will Russia succeed in transforming to a democratic society 

with rule-of-law, respect for human rights, and integration, both economic and political, with the west? Will China’s military modernization and political trajectory affect the ability of the United States to protect key interests in the Pacific region? 

Will nuclear programs of North Korea, Iran, or emerging proliferants cause a proliferation ‘‘cascade’’ in which U.S. allies and friends in key regions contemplate 

‘‘going nuclear’’? How such questions evolve over the next decade and more will affect how future administrations assess national security needs—including plans for 

assurance of allies—and adjust the level of deployed nuclear warheads (up or down), 

the composition of deployed nuclear forces, or both. 

There are other major uncertainties that are largely domestic in nature, and related to our efforts to sustain and, as necessary, modernize our forces. With regard 

to nuclear delivery systems, the planned force of 450 Minuteman III ICBMs will 

begin to reach end-of-life in 2018. Will there be support to develop and deploy a follow-on capability to the Minuteman III ICBM? If so, when and how many will we 

deploy? If the ICBM force is not replaced at its end-of-life but retired, other nuclear 

force elements may need to be bolstered to take its place. There are comparable decisions regarding a possible next generation long-range bomber (sooner) and/or replacement of nuclear ballistic missile submarines (later) that will factor in as well 

to considerations of adjusting the future nuclear posture. 

With regard to the development of U.S. non-nuclear strategic capabilities, there 

is another set of uncertainties. Will prompt, long-range conventional global strike 

weapons be developed and deployed? 

How many? What types? With what effects? What will be the future direction and 

scope of ballistic missile defenses? What technical advances/breakthroughs (e.g., 

hypersonic delivery systems) by the U.S. or potential adversaries will occur? Could 

these affect the military balance? Answers to these questions will determine whether such capabilities could complement nuclear strike capabilities or conceivably replace nuclear weapons for certain missions and thus lead to further adjustments in 

our posture. 

With regard to the nuclear warheads themselves, our long-term goal is to rely 

more on the capabilities of the infrastructure and less on Reserve warheads in the 

stockpile to respond to unforeseen events. Until we are confident that we have the 

capability to respond to unexpected developments, however, we will need to retain 

more Reserve warheads than otherwise would be desired. Specifically, our inability 

to produce plutonium pits in sufficient quantities means that additional warheads 

are kept in Reserve to hedge against technical problems that could arise in the 

stockpile or adverse geopolitical changes. 

If we have an opportunity to realize the benefits of the RRW program, and a more 

responsive infrastructure that the RRW could facilitate, there will be opportunities 

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for additional stockpile reductions. We are examining a series of potential milestones, reflecting progress on RRW and a responsive infrastructure, that would 

allow consideration of further adjustments to the Reserve stockpile. Accomplishing 

these milestones would represent levels of confidence gained, or uncertainties reduced, as we proceed forward with stockpile and infrastructure transformation. At 

various points, accumulated progress would be assessed to see if further adjustments to the Reserve stockpile are warranted. To the degree that geopolitical trends 

evolve in more favorable directions, opportunities exist to consider options for lower 

deployed as well as Reserve Forces. 

CURRENT STATUS OF THE RRW PROGRAM

As I said at the beginning of my statement, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 

2008 did not fund completion of the RRW design definition and cost study. The Departments of Defense and Energy continue to believe that the warhead features 

characteristic of the RRW are the right ones for ensuring the future of our Nation’s 

nuclear deterrent. Moreover, Congress specifically requested that the administration 

continue related work in fiscal year 2008 in three key areas: 

• First, the act provided $15 million for a new ‘‘Advanced Certification’’ 

campaign designed to address issues raised in the recent JASON’s study of 

the feasibility of certifying reliable replacement designs without nuclear 

testing. 

• Second, the act added $10 million to the Enhanced Surety campaign ‘‘to 

increase the safety and security of weapons in the existing stockpile and develop new technologies for incorporation into potential future systems.’’ This 

is fully consistent with efforts to apply state-of-the-art technology to replacement warhead designs to enhance security and prevent unauthorized 

nuclear weapons use by terrorists. 

• Third, Congress appropriated $15 million in the National Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2008 for the U.S. Navy to carry out studies 

related to the integration of an RRW warhead with the Trident SLBM reentry system.

NNSA’s fiscal year 2009 budget request continues and extends fiscal year 2008 

related activities in the following areas:

Advanced Certification ($20 million request): To continue efforts begun in 

fiscal year 2008 to review, evaluate and implement key recommendations 

from the JASON’s RRW study regarding approaches to establishing an accredited warhead certification plan, without nuclear testing, in an era 

where changes to nuclear components will occur due to aging or design defects. 

RRW ($10 million request): To enable maturation of the RRW design in 

order to address questions raised by the JASON’s review of RRW feasibility 

study activities. Design refinement is necessary to establish parameters for 

potential impacts on certification. It will also facilitate documenting the 

work that has been completed through 2007 to support future administration decisions on options for our nuclear weapons stockpile.

Completion of the RRW study was not funded in part due to concerns that the 

administration had not fully communicated its policies which guide nuclear forces, 

posture and programs, including the RRW program. The administration will shortly 

provide to Congress a second paper to accompany its white paper on nuclear policy 

transmitted to Congress in July 2007 by Secretaries Rice, Gates, and Bodman. This 

second paper outlines in detail the overall strategy which guides nuclear weapons 

programs including the size of the nuclear weapons stockpile and operationally-deployed strategic forces, and how we manage the risk of a less-than sufficient warhead production infrastructure. Our goal is to restore a consensus with Congress to 

complete the reliable replacement study as a means to ensure that the next administration, as mandated by Congress, can complete a timely review of its nuclear posture. 

Let me conclude my statement here. I thank the chairman and the committee for 

the opportunity to discuss these critical issues for our Nation. 

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Senator BILL NELSON. Senator Sessions, I’ll certainly turn to you, 

if you want to go ahead, depending on your time schedule. 

Senator SESSIONS. Please go first, Mr. Chairman. I’ll be here, 

and thank you for the courtesy. 

Senator BILL NELSON. All right. 

Secretary Vickers, when your position was reorganized, the position picked up new areas of responsibility. These areas included 

the strategic and nuclear matters, missile defense, and space policy. This is pretty large and diverse. What do you do to manage all 

of that diversity? Do you have any recommendations for changes? 

Mr. VICKERS. Sir, I believe the reorganization which created Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities is actually working quite well. We’ve had extensive discussions with the Government Accountability Office about this. What 

it has provided is a single senior civilian official for—to have oversight of the—from a policy perspective, the Department’s operational capabilities, from strategic to conventional to special operations and irregular warfare. It’s enabled us to bring this together 

at a higher level in the Department than we had before, for integrated documents, such as the Guidance for the Development of the 

Force, which is the Department’s strategic plan for capabilities out 

to 2020 and beyond. 

My portfolio, as you said, is rather extensive. It divides between 

oversight of current operations worldwide, and then responsibility 

for the future force, but I believe it is consistent with the responsibilities of other assistant secretaries. I do have four excellent deputies—Brian Green being one of them, who does strategic capabilities. I try to concentrate my efforts among the different Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense (DASDs) in high-priority items; for 

example, our space protection strategy and space control in the 

strategic area, which has a lot of attention since the Chinese ASAT 

test; our cyber policy, and particularly cyber deterrents; and the 

issue you just raised earlier about the division of labor between 


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Title 50 and Title 10, while monitoring our missile defense efforts 

and our nuclear modernization efforts. Brian, for instance, has 

been taking the lead on negotiations in Europe in support of the 

State Department and Acting Under Secretary John Rood, and 

then do that correspondingly with the other areas, as well. But, 

strategic capabilities gets every bit as much of my attention as the 

other areas, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Senator Graham, we just started the second panel. As a courtesy to you, Senator Sessions and I would 

defer, if you have a few questions. We’re going to be here and we 

have a long list of questions. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you very much. I’ll be short. 

One, I appreciate you both allowing me to do this. Senator Sessions has been a great help with the mixed oxide (MOX) program. 

My questions will be to Tom, over here. 

The MOX program, Mr. Chairman, in case you’re not familiar 

with it, we entered into an agreement with the Russians, many 

years ago now, during the Clinton administration, to take 34 tons 

of excess weapons plutonium that’s not needed to maintain our nuclear arsenals, that’s very dangerous weapons-grade plutonium, 

and convert it to commercial fuel. This is called MOX, and we’re 

going to do that at Savannah River site. It will allow us to take 

34 tons off the market, save hundreds of millions of dollars in storage costs, because it would go from being stored in an indefinite 

period to becoming commercial fuel. It’ll go from swords to plowshares. We’re building that facility at Savannah River site, and the 

House constantly cuts funding for this program. I think it’s a huge 

nonproliferation effort by both countries to take weapons plutonium off the market, and turn it into commercial fuel. 

Tom, could you give us an update of construction on MOX and 

where we stand financially? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Certainly. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the committee, and Senator Graham, for your question. 

The MOX program is incredibly important to the United States 

Government and, I believe, the citizens of this country, because it 

will not only eliminate the 34 tons that you described, sir, but, I 

feel, provides an opportunity actually to eliminate additional tonnage of plutonium that we feel is not needed for national security 

purposes——

Senator GRAHAM. How much money would we save if we don’t 

have to store this forever? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Well, it’s as you described. From a life-cycle-cost 

standpoint, right now we spend $750 million a year in the National 

Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to protect the weapons 

that we have and the material that we hold. Now, not all of that 

is for just plutonium, but a significant chunk of that is. It’s spread 

out, as you described, across a few sites—Los Alamos, Livermore, 

and the Pantex plant. So a good chunk of those hundreds of millions of dollars that we spend would have to continue to be spent, 

out in the future, even if you immobilize it, because it still has to 

be protected. We feel, as you’ve described, it’s much better to actually extract the resources out of that material. This country has invested a lot of money to make that material, we don’t want to conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:11 Dec 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00121 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\42635.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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tinue to spend hundreds of millions of dollars indefinitely out into 

the future. We’d like to extract the financial resource and the gain 

out of that material for the benefit of the citizens of this country, 

which, clearly, the MOX plant will do. 

It’s a demonstrated and proven technology. The French have 

been doing it for multiple decades without any safety incidents. We 

feel that, as General Chilton looks at the stockpile out into the future, we’ve already declared an additional 9 metric tons, that there 

may be opportunities to add more material to that inventory to be 

downblended and ultimately used to generate electricity. 

Senator GRAHAM. Where do we stand in terms of construction? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The design is well over 90 percent complete, so 

we have a very good handle on the costs and schedule of this 

project. Constructionwise, overall, both design and construction, 

we’re well over 20 percent on the construction path. We have already put down many thousands of metric tons I should say, cubic 

yards of concrete; the foundation is in, the construction is well underway. It’s looking marvelous, actually. 

Senator GRAHAM. In the House budget, what does it do to our 

construction schedule? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. As a result of what we have right now in the 

omnibus, we will have an impact on the construction schedule. I 

can’t tell you exactly, because we’re going to do a detailed cost. 

What we would have to do is rebaseline the project. But we did lose 

more than $100 million out of that project. That will have to be 

added onto the project, unless, of course, it gets restored in the future 2009 budget. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I’m very concerned that it adds to the cost. We 

don’t think it’s an optimal way to put together a large project, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Now, the nonproliferation aspect, it was under 

the nonproliferation part of the Government, and that’s been 

moved. Is that a good idea? 

It is a nonproliferation program. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. In my view, it’s a nonproliferation program. It’s 

a program that this administration should, and will, take credit for 

as a nonproliferation activity. My focus is to get the project built. 

I mean, I think that’s what we have to do. Clearly there’s energy 

benefits to it, but it’s primarily conceived of as a nonproliferation 

program to eliminate this material from further use in a warhead, 

either by this country or any other country. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, anything you could provide to this committee about the importance of this program. 

Mr. Chairman and ranking member, South Carolina has agreed 

to accept 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium that exist in different sites around the country, consolidate it at South Carolina, 

save a lot of money over time, take this excess plutonium, build a 

MOX plant, turn it into commercial-grade fuel that can never be 

used in bombs again, and it can go into our commercial reactors 

to provide power. South Carolina has agreed to do this, and we’re 

a couple of years behind schedule, so anything this committee can 

do to get this program moving forward would be a great benefit to 

the country, because the Russians have agreed to do the same 

thing. You know, 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium is a large 

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amount of plutonium existing here and in Russia, and if we can 

turn that sword into a plowshare, I think the world will be safer. 

We’re willing to do that in South Carolina, save the system billions 

of dollars over the life of this plutonium, but we just need to get 

it moving. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. So thank you for the opportunity to put that 

on the record. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Tomorrow at 2:30, the Emerging Threats 

and Capabilities Subcommittee is having a hearing on this subject, 

and they will go into detail. So, you might make a note of that. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Sessions was great, last year, making sure we keep this 

thing on track. 

Thank you, Senator. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Senator Sessions, go ahead. 

Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Vickers, can you bring us up to date 

on the Department-wide activities to implement the Prompt Global 

Strike concept? This is the concept that we would be able to strike, 

globally, within minutes, without using a nuclear warhead, just a 

conventional-type missile, and maybe even an inert warhead. The 

plan had originally been to convert Trident submarine missiles for 

this project, and Congress has not approved that. Where are we 

heading on that? 

Mr. VICKERS. I’d be happy to, sir. 

As you noted, the near-term operation of Conventional Trident 

Modification (CTM) has moved into a defense-wide account to look 

at a broader range of technologies, from hypersonics to conventional ICBMs to new reentry vehicles that could be used in our seabased platforms. Common aerospace vehicle is another air option 

that’s under consideration. So, there’s a fairly wide range of technologies that have different characteristics, in terms of overflight, 

but still meet the Prompt Global Strike requirement. 

The key aspect of that is that they are in the research-and-technology phase, and they’re basically oriented at the midterm efforts, 

so 2015 CTM remains our, really, only near-term option in the next 

3 years, so we continue to pursue, as aggressively as we can, this 

wide range of technologies, and that’s where we are right now. 

Senator SESSIONS. Admiral Johnson and General Webber, would 

you describe your services’ ideas and alternatives that you’re looking at? 

General WEBBER. I’ll go first. 

Yes, Senator Sessions. On the Air Force side, again, it’s a technology effort. We are working carefully with a program that started 

off under the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, called 

hypersonic technology. We’re looking at a potential test in the fiscal 

year 2009 timeframe, to start making sure that we understand and 

are properly developing that technology. But, it’s a technology effort, at this time. 

Admiral JOHNSON. Sir, the Navy has proposed several technologies to Secretary Vickers and the team that’s working the defense-wide account. We think that there are a wide range of opportunities, including scaling up the Flechette warhead that was the 

previous research and development effort that the Navy did. That 

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warhead’s been tested at 5,000 feet per second and a little over 

7,000 feet per second. It’s particularly effective for the purposes, 

and it can be used in a wide range of applications, other than 

Navy. So, we would propose two flight tests, one to meet the necessary range safety requirements, whether it would be a ballistic 

missile or some other Air Force options, but it would be a common 

range-safety approach; and then further tests on warheads. 

Mr. VICKERS. Senator Sessions, if I could just add one point and 

this is very important. We talked about the technology options that 

we have in the midterm—it’s a very important capability, to give 

future presidents additional options for this Prompt Global Strike 

requirement that we don’t have today, for terrorists transferring 

nuclear material, a ballistic missile launch, or perhaps a space control ASAT launch, or something else, where we have, essentially, 

nuclear-only options for Prompt Global Strike today. 

Senator SESSIONS. I agree that this is an alternative to nuclear 

weaponry. It’s a concept that is really part of a drawdown of our 

nuclear stockpile. It’s something that we need to work out. I offered 

the amendment—which lost—to convert our Trident missiles—conventional Trident missile modification that we talked about, and so 

I’m worried about it. 

It’s not any large change, except we can go longer distances, 

quicker. I mean, if we’re having aircraft in the air, and they could 

use a missile to strike a target if they happened to be there, and 

they happened to be close—so, this is—in terms of—if it doesn’t 

have a warhead on it, it’s really no different than that, is it, Secretary Vickers? 

Mr. VICKERS. It is not, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. Now, General Webber, the Air Force concept 

concerns me, because it seems to run afoul of the same criticisms 

that Congress, who didn’t agree with me, the majority, found fatal 

with the conventional Trident modification. Can you tell us, is this 

a concept that would in any way be more palatable than what we 

have now? 

General WEBBER. Senator, absolutely. I think it starts to get at 

the issues of ambiguity that Congress was concerned about. First, 

you worry about, where did this item launch from? Is it coming 

from a platform that’s a declared strategic platform or from a location on the Earth, like an ICBM field, that’s a declared strategic 

location? So, this concept could be moved to a different location. 

The second step is, when it launches out, what does that profile 

look like, in terms of the flyout of the trajectory? What does it look 

like to sensors, in terms of the kind of missile it is, how hot it 

burns, et cetera? We’re looking at profiles, trajectories, and missiles 

that would be completely different from declared strategic platforms. So, you’d have a different location and a different profile. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think we need to look at that, Mr. Secretary, 

because, rightly or wrongly, if our colleagues here think that’s 

going to somehow implicate the same risk that we had before, that 

it might be misinterpreted, then we don’t have enough money to do 

everything we’d like, so we’re going to have to be careful about 

that. 

General WEBBER. Yes, sir. 

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Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Vickers, the European site—I won’t go 

into detail about that. I had the opportunity to meet with the 

Czech ambassador last night. We know the President has met with 

the Polish leadership. Can you give us any update on the current 

status of the negotiations between Poland, the Czech Republic, and 

the United States with regard to establishing what I think to be 

very important—a strategic missile defense site in Europe? 

Senator BILL NELSON. We are going to have General Obering 

here on April 1. 

Senator SESSIONS. All right. 

If you’ll be brief on that——

Mr. VICKERS. I will, sir. We’re very close with the Czechs, we believe we essentially have concluded negotiations for the remaining 

environmental issue. With the Poles, we are a bit further behind. 

It has been brought up with modernization issues, with the discussion the President’s just had with Prime Minister Tusk. But, we’re 

very optimistic that we can conclude both agreements this year. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I think that’s important, and I think we 

need to do our part, in the U.S. Congress. It’s going to protect the 

United States and would keep our allies in Europe far safer than 

they would be, far less subject to intimidation and threats from a 

nation like Iran, who continues to develop missile systems. 

Thank you. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Secretary, the Defense Science Board 

Nuclear Task Force report on this Minot-Barksdale fiasco, one of 

the main conclusions of the task force was a decline in nuclear 

focus, and I quote, ‘‘characterized by embedding nuclear mission 

forces in non-nuclear organizations.’’ The criticism was aimed at 

both the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. One 

of the recommendations was that there should be an Assistant Secretary for the nuclear enterprise. 

What say you? 

Mr. VICKERS. Well, I have extremely high regard for General 

Welch. I respectfully disagree about the Assistant Secretary. It is 

true that, across the enterprise, nuclear weapons issues have been 

embedded with other organizations. Before, it was with regional, 

Europe and Russia. Today, it is more of a capabilities focus. But, 

we’ve always had a DASD under various names—forces policy, 

strategic capabilities—that has had oversight of those capabilities; 

Brian Green being the current one today. I believe the capabilities 

approach provides a better approach than the regional approach. 

Assistant secretaries are fairly scarce to deal with problems like 

China, for example, and to integrate it with other capabilities, 

where we want to bring to bear space, information, or conventional 

strike options—for instance, next-generation bomber is a subject 

near and dear to my heart, both a conventional platform and a 

strategic platform; it’s vital for both. So no organizational arrangement is perfect. I believe the current one provides good oversight 

over strategic policy and operational capabilities across the board. 

But, again, I have the highest regard for General Welch. 

Senator BILL NELSON. All right. 

General Webber, that same task force took to task the structure 

of the Air Force, because they recommended that a single technical 

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rectly to the Chief, and I quote, ‘‘that has full responsibility and accountability with the Air Force for, and only for, nuclear systems 

and procedures.’’ 

What do you think, and what’s the status? 

General WEBBER. Sir, we have moved out smartly on all of these 

recommendations. When you take the Commanders Directed Initiative, the Commander-Directed Investigation, the Blue-Ribbon Review, and the Defense Science Board, and if you roll them up together, 128, roughly, recommendations, and we are tracking that 

with an Air Force general officer, a Nuclear General Officer Steering Group that has resulted in these activities. We’ve upped from 

a one-star to a three-star to oversee how we work out all of these 

recommendations. Of 128, all but 3 were directly for the Air Force, 

and those other 3 might be things that were going to go to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), but we’re going to follow 

how we hook up with those changes in processes. 

Now, turning specifically to what we’ve already changed, in addition to a three-star now leading the General Officer Nuclear Steering Group, we have made the decision to have a two-star-led director for plans, operations, and requirements on the air staff, that 

would be a direct-report to my boss, Lieutenant General Darnell. 

So that will be the rollup of all of the nuclear responsibilities. 

Also, within the Air Force, on the technical side, we have now 

combined, under a one-star—it used to be a colonel—all of our nuclear weapon activities in the Nuclear Weapons Center. So, now 

you have cradle-to-grave responsibilities for Air Force nuclear 

weapons in one single activity. 

Senator BILL NELSON. So, the Defense Science Board recommendation that the commander of the Air Combat Command 

should ensure that the 8th Air Force has the full authority for the 

daily B–52 operations, both nuclear and conventional, that’s not 

being adopted by the Air Force, is what you’re saying. 

General WEBBER. Sir, that is not correct, and that recommendation was dealing very specifically with the skip-echelon relationships that 8th Air Force had with Air Combat Command Headquarters, in terms of day-to-day responsibilities. That is one of the 

activities that’s already been changed, and those responsibilities 

are now aligned under the 8th Air Force commander, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. How about the B–52 initial training 

course at Barksdale and the B–52 weapons school course? Will the 

flight training include the nuclear mission? 

General WEBBER. Yes, sir. Those are also items that have already been fixed. We now will have a nuclear curriculum in the B–

52 weapons school curriculum—that’s already been added—as well 

as, the flight training unit now has a simulator of—both classroom 

and simulator profiles that involve the nuclear mission. 

Senator BILL NELSON. The Air Force and the nuclear community 

categorizes accidents and incidents involving nuclear weapons, depending on the nature and the severity of the accident. The lowestlevel category is a ‘‘dull sword’’ followed by ‘‘bent spear,’’ ‘‘broken 

arrow,’’ ‘‘empty quiver,’’ and ‘‘nuke flash.’’ Has this MinotBarksdale incident been so categorized? 

General WEBBER. Yes, it has, sir, and I am not familiar with how 

that was categorized. I can provide that for the record. 

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[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, it appears that over 200 ‘‘dull 

swords’’ have been categorized since 2001. How many ‘‘dull swords’’ 

have occurred since the Labor Day incident involving this MinotBarksdale incident? 

General WEBBER. I’m not aware of that, and will provide that for 

the record, sir. 

[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. 

Admiral Johnson, on to the RRW. The first warhead to be replaced under the original schedule was the W–76. Now, with the 

schedule change, what is the decision with respect to the W–76? 

Are they going to undergo a life extension? 

Admiral JOHNSON. Yes, sir. The W–76 life-extension program is 

ongoing. When we met, last year, on these same subjects, we were 

about to go into production on the arming, fusing, and firing circuits, which are provided by the Navy. We have done that. We are 

in production on that portion. The warhead section, which is done 

by Mr. D’Agostino’s team at the Department of Energy (DOE), is 

about to go into production. The W–76, one program, life-extension 

program, will move forward, even if we work on RRW or some 

other variation of a modern warhead. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, it’s run into some technical problems. Have you been involved in the resolution of the technical 

issue? 

Admiral JOHNSON. Yes, sir. Mr. D’Agostino’s probably best qualified to answer the details of that. 

Senator BILL NELSON. All right, I’ll get to him in a minute. 

Admiral JOHNSON. Yes, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Has it been resolved yet? 

Admiral JOHNSON. No, sir, although I believe we are about to resolve our production issues. It’s an example of restarting a vendor 

base and a capability that existed years ago and has been shut 

down. I think, from my perspective, we’re experiencing reasonable 

and relatively predictable delays, although you don’t know exactly 

where they’ll show up, in restarting production. I would think we 

will find similar but different kinds of delays, if Congress chooses 

to life-extend other programs. 

Senator BILL NELSON. All right. Is it going to impact the schedule of having the first life-extended W–76 ready in early fiscal year 

2009? 

Admiral JOHNSON. I don’t know for sure. If we stick with early 

in 2009, I think it’s likely that we’ll make that, or mid-2009. Most 

of our decision meetings are, maybe, 60 days from now, and we can 

give you a joint technical answer with more skill then. Part of 

this—and we’re in an open hearing, but part of the material issues 

that we’re talking about require time to do tests. Of course, concrete takes 21 days to set. You can’t make it set faster than that. 

Although this isn’t a concrete material, it has that kind of time-related testing that goes with it. So, I think we’ll know pretty well 

in 60 days. 

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We see no delay whatsoever in our ability to operate the W–76 

warhead series. We have a great deal of flexibility on schedule, and 

although it’s an important subject, I don’t consider it a crisis, by 

any means at all. It’s, I think, normal for a restart. 

Senator BILL NELSON. So we’re looking at the middle of 2009 for 

the life extension at the earliest. 

Admiral JOHNSON. At the earliest. Yes, sir. 

Sir, I lost track of whether you said fiscal year or calendar year, 

but I’ll go with calendar year—shortly after the new year, I think, 

would be about the earliest. 

Tom, you’re more qualified than I. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Go ahead, Mr. D’Agostino. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Okay. Certainly. Admiral Johnson was actually 

right on the money. We are continuing the tests on this particular 

material. If the tests continue, hopefully, as we expect they will, 

we’ll be able to make a decision, on being able to use this material, 

within the next few months, as part of our production cycle, which 

takes us probably to April 2009 to actually get that first production 

unit up and out the door. 

I would note that, of the hundreds of different types of materials 

and parts that need to be made, this was the one that really hung 

us up, and it’s very important, as Admiral Johnson mentioned, that 

it really demonstrates the issues associated with trying to re-establish a capability that was established many decades ago, and build 

things exactly the way we did it during the cold-war era. That is 

the type of thinking that we want to make sure that this administration, but, more importantly, future administrations, aren’t hampered by our inability to replicate the past perfectly. So, this provides us an opportunity to study different approaches. That was 

one of the main ideas behind looking at reliable replacement concepts, is there a better way, now that we know that we have different priorities on importance, to do things, out in the future? 

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, another reason was the safety and 

surety. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Now, given the fact that, in creating one 

of the newest warheads, the W–88, there was a conscious decision 

not to use all the available safety features—how can you assure us, 

in this RRW, that we’re going to have all of the safety in that or 

the life-extension program? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. It’s a great question. The W–88 was designed 

and fielded in—basically, starting in the late 1970s, early 1980s 

time period. So, the design effort actually goes back to a point in 

time, as the General described, where we were constantly in a cycle 

of designing and building and replacing warheads, and we weren’t 

as concerned about whether these things would have the longevity, 

because we expected, at least, if the trend would continue, that we 

would take that system out of the stockpile and would replace it 

with new. Now that we are looking at a different strategic environment, now that we know a lot more—we have these supercomputers that tell us a lot more about materials and how things age—

now that we have a security environment that’s dramatically different than we had during the cold war, to evaluate options to 

input into future systems, safety features like insensitive high exVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:11 Dec 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00128 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\42635.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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plosives, security features that would be important, and we could 

discuss in a closed session, that reflect future threats. We think it’s 

important to study those and those are important things for a future deterrent. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Last year, you had some requests scattered throughout several budget lines in the NNSA budget for the 

work in support of the RRW. So, tell us, what’s the scope of the 

work in support of it? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Certainly. Last year, we submitted one line, ac- tually, for RRW. It wasn’t—about $88 million, as General Chilton 

described earlier. We felt that it capitalized on work that we had 

been doing for the Nation, actually, in looking at enhanced surety, 

or enhanced safety and security for future systems. 

What we’ve proposed in the 2009 budget is activities consistent 

with congressional direction, which is to do work in advanced certification, which is to answer this whole question of: certification—

can you deploy a warhead without underground testing?—which is 

a key factor, for me personally, as well as for this administration, 

and, I believe, future administrations, to examine that question, 

and also to put in these safety and security features. So, we have a budget line for advanced certification, of $20 mil- lion. We have an additional $10 million for enhanced surety, which 

is the safety-and-security piece. Then, we have this $10 million requested for RRW in order to be able to answer the questions that 

the JASONs asked and that Congress has asked us to answer. 

Realistically, the only work on RRW-type system—type work, which is specific to the joint Navy/DOE project is this $10-million 

effort, and it is focused on answering the questions that Congress 

had asked of us. 

Senator BILL NELSON. General Webber, on ICBM security, one 

measure was the remote visual assessment cameras at the sites, to 

monitor them. Yet, the Air Force hasn’t funded this. They put it 

on their unfunded list, and then, Congress has to add the funds. 

So, again, the same thing has happened in your budget, just 

$300,000 on the unfunded list, to sustain this system and install 

what you all say has high military utility and avoids a lot of security personnel. What should we assume? 

General WEBBER. Sir, I would take a different perspective. We 

are very excited about what remote visual assessment is doing for 

us, so much so that in my previous job, before coming here, I was 

working with the folks on what the requirements would be for 

block one of the capability, so that we could actually get it out 

there faster. 

We now have 5 missile alert facilities and 50 launch facilities installed. What you see in that 2009 unfunded line is the fact that 

we bought the hardware and installed the hardware. We didn’t program because we were moving it as fast as we could, we didn’t program the satellite access that would take the pictures and move 

that back to the missile alert facilities. So, that’s why it showed up 

in the fiscal year 2009 unfunded requirements list. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, you don’t have any money in there 

to run them. 

General WEBBER. That’s what I’m talking about, sir. We purchased them through a contract, and the contract folks are—they’re 

124

paid for to buy the kits, and install and maintain the kits. What 

we didn’t purchase was the satellite access fees to move the picture 

back to the missile alert facility. 

Senator BILL NELSON. So, you want us to do that for you. 

General WEBBER. We put that on the list. But, it’s going to be 

programmed, from 2010 on out. The fact that we were able to 

break the program into a block approach and move capability forward meant that we got out of our own synchronization. 

Does that answer your question, sir? 

Senator BILL NELSON. Often, we see things that are put on the 

unfunded list that you expect Congress to bail you out. It looks like 

this is one. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. D’Agostino, I have just a few brief questions. If we develop a new RRW, will it be your agency that supervises the production of that? 

Would DOE be the entity that procures it? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. We would be the agency that procures it. Before 

we would get to that point, we would finish the study to tee up for 

a future administration whether or not to develop——

Senator SESSIONS. You’re right. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. But, the Navy actually has the lead—on the 

joint project team, to get that study completed. Then if it gets to 

production, then we would produce it for——

Senator SESSIONS. All right. With regard to maintaining our current stockpile—you are in charge of that, and you put out the 

money to pay for that, right? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir. That’s correct, Senator. 

Senator SESSIONS. Now, the money you put out does not come 

from the DOE, does it? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The money that I put out to maintain the stockpile comes from the DOE. It is part of the NNSA budget. 

Senator SESSIONS. Is that Defense Department budget or is it 

Energy? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. It’s Energy budget, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. So, the maintenance of the warhead would be 

Energy budget? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The maintenance of the stockpile—I mean, we 

do it there but it’s not completely Energy. The majority of it is Energy; however, we provide components to the Department of the 

Navy and to the Air Force, components that have to be switched 

out. So, the Services also have a maintenance activity——

Senator SESSIONS. My time’s running out—but, with regard to 

any new systems, would that come from the Defense budget or Energy budget? Our RRW, let’s say that were approved. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. With regards to that, we’re in charge of producing and providing it to the Defense Department. That part 

would come from the Energy Department budget. Then, once the 

warhead is in the Services’ custody, they have an obligation and it 

depends on the warhead itself, of how often certain parts have to 

get switched out, so there’s a joint responsibility for maintenance, 

which comes out of both budgets. Once the Services are done, they 

provide it back to the DOE, and we have 100-percent maintainability requirement. 

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There’s a period of time in the warhead’s life where there is a 

joint responsibility for maintaining the warhead itself. During that 

time, we integrate quite closely to provide parts. 

Senator SESSIONS. It’s a DOE budget request, but it’s a Defense 

050 budget category on the Federal budget. Is that correct? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. That part is correct. I’m not sure about the 050 

part, but I think that’s correct, yes. 

Senator SESSIONS. I just want to point out that there are a number of instances in this whole process in which Defense Department 

needs something, and Energy delivers. I’ll just be frank with you, 

I sense Energy lacks the intensity of interest in keeping costs down 

because it’s really coming from another source other than your 

budget. If the Air Force needs an aircraft, and they can save money 

on it, they can generally spend that money on other priorities the 

Air Force needs. You don’t have that intensity of interest. So, I’d 

encourage you, because these projects are nuclear, not to yield—not 

to accept any bid—any costs we hear about it. I think we’re paying 

too much for some of these things, and DOE needs to be very aggressive in containing costs. Just my two-cents worth. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. We’re going to wrap up here pretty quick. 

I just have a couple of questions. 

Mr. Secretary, you heard me talking to the STRATCOM commander earlier about THAAD and the Standard Missile 3. Were 

you consulted on the 1-year delay of the THAAD program? 

Mr. VICKERS. My staff was aware of it, I was not personally consulted. I believe the program is now back on track from the delays 

of the four firing units; 6 months and 12 months, respectively, is 

the latest information I have. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, the information we have is that the 

Department has not gone beyond planning for 96 THAAD missiles 

and 147 SM–3 interceptors, and that the MDA has delayed the 

next version of the SM–3, and the budget request would produce 

a 1-year delay in the THAAD system. 

Mr. VICKERS. What I was referring to, sir, was the four firing 

units that had been slipped to schedule—6 months, I think, for one 

and two, and 12 months—that I think they have rejuggled, recently, and brought it back. SM–3, I think, is still an issue for us, 

but I’ll have to get back to you on that, sir. 

[The information referred to follows:]

While the February 2008 budget justification for fiscal year 2009 slipped THAAD 

Batteries 3 and 4 fielding 1 year, the Missile Defense Agency made internal realignments which restored the $65 million in fiscal year 2009 to enable award of the 

THAAD Batteries 3&4 interceptor long lead contract as originally planned and 

avoids the delay and production gap for Batteries 3&4. Delivery of Batteries 3&4 

will complete procurement of the 96 interceptors for the first 4 batteries. Further, 

the Agency is working with the Department to address the procurement of 2 more 

THAAD Batteries (5&6) with spares, for a total of 128 additional interceptors, consistent with the recommendations of the Joint Capabilities Mix Study conducted by 

the Joint Staff in association with the combatant commands. 

In President’s budget 2009, the SM–3 Block IB development schedule was slipped 

one year, causing a future missile buy to change from an SM–3 Block IB configuration to Block IA. However, the Agency is working with the Department to procure 

an additional 116 SM–3 Block IB missiles in accordance with the Joint Capabilities 

Mix Study, resulting in a total of 263 missiles procured.

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Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. We put some specific language in 

last year’s authorization bill about this, and it doesn’t seem like the 

Department is paying attention to it. So, we’d like some answers. 

Mr. VICKERS. Yes, sir. The goal of the program is to strike a balance between short- and medium-range threats, and long-range, 

and then near-term and longer-term, and we want to get as much 

capability as we can in the hands of the warfighters, as soon as 

possible. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Let me tell you, those COCOMs want that 

THAAD, they want that SM–3, and they want those Patriots. 

Mr. VICKERS. Yes, sir, and we need THAAD for southeastern Europe defense and NATO defense, as well, sir. Yes, indeed. 

One point, if I could just add, sir, on our earlier discussion. It’s 

very important to align OSD oversight with General Chilton’s responsibilities. He is now moving, if he hasn’t briefed you on this 

already, to broader deterrence plans against a wide range of actors, 

looking at nuclear, cyber, and space, as well, and it’s important, I 

think, that oversight be aligned in any organizational design, whatever we would look at. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino, your agency seems to 

want to finance third-party financing, and you’ve worked it into 

your long-term plan. That’s where a private party would build a 

building or a facility, and then lease it back to the Government. 

Now, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has some pretty 

strict rules about when and the circumstances that the Government can enter into that, as does DOE. The facility must have commercial value, and the arrangement has to be more economic to the 

Government than building the building itself and the facility. The 

NNSA contractor, in many of the proposals that have been discussed, would enter into the lease, not the Government. Why 

doesn’t NNSA enter into the contract? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Actually, I’m not aware of that particular detail. I don’t know if that’s been completely determined, that it’s the 

actual NNSA contractor. We do have an arrangement, right now, 

at Y–12, in that area, and you’re correct, sir, that we are looking 

at this approach, see if it makes sense for two other sites that I’m 

aware of, off the top of my head. I’ll look into that particular point. 

I’d like to take that one for the record, if I could. 

[The information referred to follows:]

The NNSA’s nuclear weapons complex contains many facilities that are very old 

and need to be replaced. Third-party financing is among the options NNSA considers for constructing facilities that, when NNSA no longer needs them, could be 

used by the private sector. Contractors have signed leases for third-party financed 

projects in the past because they are the primary tenants of the leased facilities. 

If the Department of Energy (DOE) selects a new contractor in the future, the lease 

can be assigned to the new contractor. If the contractor no longer needs the facility, 

it can terminate the lease and the developer would seek a new tenant. The National 

Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is considering whether it would be advantageous for NNSA to sign leases as to future third-party financed projects—e.g., for 

facilities in which NNSA, rather than a contractor, would be the primary tenant. 

Provided below is additional information on specific projects:

• To date, NNSA has completed one third-party financed project under the 

provisions of OMB Circular A–11. The Jack Case and New Hope Centers 

at Y–12 are two office buildings: the former is 412,700 ft.2 facility and the 

latter is 137,157 ft.2 and offers expanded meeting space. These Centers, occupied in July 2007, were constructed for $125 million, and leased to the 

127

NNSA’s M&O contractor, which signed a 5-year lease with three 5-year options. 

• At the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), NNSA is considering the 

construction of a 450,000 ft.2 modern science complex consisting of offices, 

light labs, and a self-sustaining infrastructure using third-party financing. 

The contractor is currently working, at their own financial risk, to develop 

a business case and acquisition strategy plan, which includes subcontractor 

selection which will be submitted to NNSA. The DOE acquisition process 

requires the Federal Acquisition Executive (AE) to make a decision, based 

on the Alternatives Analysis and recommended preferred alternative, if an 

alternatively financed project provides the best alternative for the government. This decision would not occur before December 2008. 

• At Y–12 NNSA is seeking to replace its outdated Complex Command 

Center and is considering using third-party financing. The acquisition strategy for this potential construction project has not yet been determined.

Senator BILL NELSON. You can imagine what happens to the 

lease if the NNSA outside contractor is no longer the operator of 

the facility. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Right. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I think that’s right. Yes, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. All right. 

Now, in many of the proposals, the land on which these proposed 

buildings are to be built is government land, behind the security 

fence, that would be sold to, or leased to, a developer. In the lease 

situation, the lease would contain the normal clause that the lease 

could be canceled at any time. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. That’s correct. 

Senator BILL NELSON. If that’s the case, what would happen to 

the building? Would it revert back to the NNSA? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I think, in the lease situation, the idea behind 

the lease is that, should the Government determine that it does not 

have the mission there, or determine—and essentially would 

want—maybe, whether it’s changing mission or further consolidation or downsizing—we would have to determine what is in the 

best interest of the Government, return that building back to the 

NNSA or actually sell it off, in effect. So, there are probably a couple of different approaches, and I think it would probably be situation-dependent. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, the other question that’s begged is, 

does the building behind the DOE security fence have commercial 

value, and it could be leased by a private entity if either the lease 

or the building lease was canceled? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Right. If the determination has to get made before we’d even enter into this type of an agreement, recognizing 

where the building is. If it’s determined that the Government 

doesn’t have a need there before, the fenceline would have to 

change, clearly. It would most likely only happen in the situation 

where we’d be getting out of that mission completely in that area. 

Therefore, moving the fenceline wouldn’t be a problem of having 

two different types of mission activities—one, a commercial one, 

closely located with—inside an enduring, long-term mission. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, before you jump into this, I would 

suggest that you find out about the fiasco in the United States Air 

Force with regard to base housing on five Air Force bases, including Patrick Air Force Base, in Florida. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Okay. 

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Senator BILL NELSON. They are getting themselves into a situation where they turned it over to a contractor, in some cases with 

a lease, and as they come down their checklist, they can be in a 

situation where the builder, the lessee of the land who builds the 

base housing, would be in a situation that they could go out and 

rent that base housing to outside people, and it’s within the security fence. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I’ll look into that, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. This is a real live one, right now with five 

Air Force bases, and the worst, egregious example of how the contractor has botched it up is Patrick Air Force Base. So, there’s lessons learned. You all ought to pay attention to that before you start 

to jump into this. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. In some proposals, the developer would 

not be subject to Federal procurement or contracting requirements, 

or DOE orders. You have to look at that, and would that exemption 

extend to exempting the facility from the jurisdiction of the Defense Nuclear Safety Board? So what’s wrong with the regular 

process of seeking funds for the Government to build a building? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. My goal is to look at all avenues to satisfy the 

mission requirements in the most responsible way possible, which 

involves a combination of financial, programmatic, and the like. I 

have to make sure that these considerations are properly reflected 

in any decision that gets made to move down in that direction. 

What’s clear to me, when I look at our current nuclear weapons 

complex, is that I have something right now that is unwieldy, if 

you will, sir. It has built up over a period of 50 years. Many of 

these facilities are just right-after-World-War-II types of facilities, 

and the status quo of just maintaining what I have is not appropriate. So, I want to dramatically shift the footprint, and essentially reduce the footprint by about 9 million square feet, which 

will take us from 36 to 25 million square feet. 

I’ve been very clear, not only to the contractors, but, more importantly, my direct-reports, that I want to make sure that all options 

are on the table. I just don’t want to keep doing business like we 

used to do business, just continuing to do management and operating-type contracts in the past, and this is an element of that. I 

mean, I’ve been expansive on it from the standpoint of making sure 

we look at all options and to make sure that we meet the criteria, 

not only from OMB, but from Congress, as well, from the Public 

Works Committees, from the authorization committees, and from 

our own DOE regulations. 

From my standpoint, A.J. Eggenberger, who’s the Chairman of 

the Defense Board, and I talk, on I won’t say—certainly not on a 

weekly basis, but talk on a basis where he understands about our 

large projects that we have coming out, and we try to work out and 

make sure that we don’t—we’re not compartmentalizing, if you 

will, Defense Board oversight, because that—in my view, it’s a very 

good input for me, an independent input on whether or not we’re 

doing the right thing, from a safety standpoint. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, you just don’t want to get yourself 

in a situation, in highly sensitive, secure areas, such as the DOE 

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that you suddenly have, because of lessees and lessors the access 

to secured areas by people that are not cleared. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Absolutely. Yes, sir. I’ll take a look at the Patrick Air Force Base example, as well as relook at your question, sir, 

on how the lease payments are made, whether it’s through the Department itself or through the contractor. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. Thank you all for your participation 

today. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

SAFETY AND SECURITY

1. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino, some of the work in relation to a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) is focused on increasing the safety and surety of 

nuclear weapons. Have the requirements been determined for just how inherently 

safe or secure a nuclear weapon should be? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes. There are safety standards and criteria against which nuclear weapon designs and operations are compared before the designs are accepted 

or the operations permitted. Nuclear weapons must incorporate design features that 

minimize the possibility of accidental and/or inadvertent nuclear detonation. The following are design requirements for nuclear weapons: 1) Normal Environment-prior 

to receipt of the enabling input signals and the arming signal, the probability of a 

premature nuclear detonation must not exceed one in a billion per nuclear weapon 

lifetime; 2) Abnormal Environment-prior to receipt of the enabling input signals, the 

probability of a premature nuclear detonation must not exceed one in a million per 

credible nuclear weapon accident or exposure to abnormal environments; and 3) 

One-Point Safety—the probability of achieving a nuclear yield greater than 4 

pounds of TNT equivalent in the event of a one-point initiation of the weapon’s high 

explosive must not exceed one in a million. However, our understanding of the risks 

involved and the threats present in our operational environment have changed over 

time. Therefore in accordance with Presidential guidelines, we continuously examine 

our designs and procedures to maximize their safety and security; however, there 

is not a set definition of an inherently safe or secure weapon. 

A large part of the Department’s effort to examine our designs and procedures is 

done in the Enhanced Surety subprogram of the Engineering Campaign. This subprogram develops and matures modern weapon safety and use-control technologies. 

All of the technologies being developed through this subprogram are targeted for the 

next insertion opportunity, into a weapon in the active stockpile. Included are advanced firing-sets and strong-links, surety sensors, power management, and advanced use-denial technologies. All of these technologies are technically feasible and 

are being matured on a pace intended to allow them to be chosen by the weapon 

system manager, with manageable cost risk, based on Department of Defense (DOD) 

requirements for the weapon system.

2. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino, I ask this because in the past, specifically with respect to the W–88, one of the newest warheads in the inventory, there 

was a conscious decision not to use all available safety features. How do we, Congress, know that even if we fund the safety and surety work that it will be incorporated into any RRW or life extension program? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Even though the W88 is the newest nuclear weapon in the U.S. 

arsenal, it was still designed, developed, and produced during the Cold War. The 

W88 is an excellent illustration of the paradigm shift embodied in the RRW strategy. The Cold War paradigm was to optimize yield in the smallest possible package 

and then include safety to the greatest extent possible. The W88 is an extraordinary 

system, very effective while including some modern safety features. However, meeting the weight, volume, and material limitations imposed by the unique environment of Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles during the Cold War constrained the 

number of surety features we were able to implement in that system. The end of 

the Cold War provided the flexibility to shift from systems optimized for yield and 

weight that include surety to systems optimized for surety yet are still sufficient to 

meet the current military need. The importance of taking advantage of this flexibility was punctuated by the events of September 11. We must continue to evolve 

130

and advance our surety to stay ahead of a threat that is evolving in technical capability and intent. 

The decision on the exact types and amounts of surety features to include will be 

based on the weapon platform, technology maturity, threat assessment, risk, cost, 

and benefit to the stockpile. The RRW strategy will allow for maximizing the inclusion of modern surety technologies, while life extension programs will be more constrained due to low margin, available space, and the need to minimize deviations 

from the existing nuclear test base. In all cases, the final selection will be an optimized set of tradeoffs that the Nuclear Weapons Council will agree to. We will provide you and your staff with updates on the design and development of any RRW 

or Life Extension Programs.

3. Senator BILL NELSON. Major General Webber and Admiral Johnson, would you 

like to comment on this? 

General WEBBER. The security environment has changed dramatically from the 

Cold War when our current weapons were designed. At the time, the primary driver 

was the greatest yield within the allowable weight. Terrorism had not yet come to 

the forefront, and security was maintained with greater numbers of personnel rather than designed into the warhead. While we cannot comment on the trade-off decisions made for the W–88, the Air Force position is to increase the surety features 

of our weapons either in a RRW or Life Extension Program design. Our goal is to 

include as many surety features as possible while meeting our operational requirements. 

Admiral JOHNSON. The maturity of the surety and safety technologies and level 

of risk in the weapons environment are design drivers in the creation of a new nuclear weapons system, with extra emphasis being placed on safety and surety. These 

surety and safety features typically require additional space and weight that can be 

more readily accommodated given the modifications incorporated into the RRW design.

CONTRACTING

4. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) transformation plan discussed the idea of being more DOD-like. In 

other words NNSA would establish requirements for an object and then the contractor would deliver the object from the contractor’s facility using a contractor 

workforce. How far are you taking the DOD-like approach? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The NNSA is currently developing a contract strategy through 

an open, public process that is focused primarily on the three weapons production 

contracts that expire in 2010, but the strategy could also affect the other NNSA 

Management and Operating contracts. NNSA has issued 2 Requests for Information 

(RFI), received written input from industry and other interested parties, and conducted over 30 one-on-one meetings in March 2008 with RFI respondents to discuss 

their ideas in detail. Options being presented include obtaining nuclear production 

services and products from a contractor owned and contractor operated facility; and 

obtaining non-nuclear production products and services from a contractor owned and 

contractor operated facility. Either of these two options would move NNSA to a 

model similar to DOD contracts. There are other contracting options under consideration, and ideas contained in responses to the two RFIs, that could move NNSA 

closer to DOD-like contract structures.

5. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino, would this be limited to having industry 

building some part of or all of a full-up nuclear weapon? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Since the inception of the nuclear weapons program, industry 

has been supplying materials, some weapons parts, and some components that are 

used in nuclear weapons. A substantial portion of the non-nuclear components are 

‘‘outsourced’’ through the Kansas City Plant. In this regard, a significant portion of 

our contracting/subcontracting fits well into the DOD model asked about in the previous question. There is a substantial amount of nonrecurring and some recurring 

design and engineering work that enables series production or purchase of products. 

The ongoing surveillance work can identify issues with aging of materials that is 

difficult to define and purchase as a product. As technologies and environmental requirements change, there has been a substantial amount of work needed to requalify materials, processes, and components used in actual weapons and/or the production of weapons. This workload would also be very difficult to define and purchase as a product. Where we can, I believe we are doing so, even for sensitive materials that used to only be produced within federally-owned facilities. 

131

There are critical aspects which are reserved to federally-owned sites, and these 

principally involve special nuclear materials and surety. What is critical to maintain 

within effective Federal control, is explicit weapon design, nuclear material manufacturing processes, surety (safety, security, and use control), and the assembly and 

system integration, testing, and quality acceptance processes necessary to qualify 

items for war reserve and other weapon program uses (such as in support of experiments and testing performed by the nuclear weapon design laboratories). I do not 

anticipate that we would ever purchase a full-up nuclear weapon commercially, but 

we already purchase a substantial amount of what goes into our weapons commercially and are evaluating ways to increase that amount where cost and security considerations permit.

6. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino, how would you get competition? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. A key element of our contract strategy is to identify actual or 

perceived barriers to competition, and to determine how best to mitigate those barriers to ensure a robust competition. Several of the more than 30 respondents to 

our 2 RFIs identified concerns regarding the potential for winning a NNSA contract 

competition as compared to the resources required to compete. However, on balance, 

we are very encouraged by the level of interest generated by our RFIs, particularly 

among contractors who have not traditionally competed for NNSA Management and 

Operating contracts. Moreover, the information obtained through the RFIs and oneon-one meetings with potential bidders should help us to develop contract solicitation documents and define an open acquisition process that ensures the desired robust competition.

NUCLEAR INCIDENTS AND ACCIDENTS

7. Senator BILL NELSON. Major General Webber, the Air Force nuclear community 

categorizes accidents and incidents involving nuclear weapons depending on the nature and severity of the accident and incident. The lowest level category is a ‘‘dull 

sword,’’ followed by ‘‘bent spear,’’ ‘‘broken arrow,’’ ‘‘empty quiver,’’ and ‘‘nuke flash.’’ 

Has the Minot incident been categorized? 

General WEBBER. [Deleted.]

8. Senator BILL NELSON. Major General Webber, it appears that there have been 

over 200 dull swords since 2001. How many dull swords have occurred since the 

Labor Day incident involving the unknowing movement of nuclear weapons from 

Minot to Barksdale? 

General WEBBER. [Deleted.]

SCIENCE

9. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino, maintaining premier science capabilities 

in the NNSA national laboratories is key to maintaining the stockpile in the future, 

recruiting and retaining the best and the brightest and carry out the many other 

national security-related work that the labs perform in addition to the nuclear 

weapons work. I am concerned that in the NNSA plans for the future complex there 

is too much focus on production and not enough emphasis on maintaining the 

science base. In some instances it seems that there is an assumption that the 

science can or should be maintained by entities other than NNSA. Are you sure that 

we are not diminishing science for the sake of budgets? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. No, we are not sacrificing science for budgets. The science capabilities at the NNSA national laboratories continue to be world-leading. Our computational capabilities, experimental facilities and scientific staff have met the tremendous challenge of maintaining the safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile without recourse to underground nuclear tests. We look forward to even greater 

progress in stockpile science as the major new experimental tools become available 

in the next few years (e.g., National Ignition Facility and Dual Axis Radiographic 

Hydrodynamic Test Facility 2nd Axis). The next 10 years will see these tools exploited to solve many longstanding scientific questions important to our nuclear 

weapons designs. These facilities were major investments in the complex since 1992. 

During that same time, the infrastructure for production continued to age, and this 

coupled with increased demand for security, required that we invest now in some 

modernization in the production facilities, as we have for the past decade invested 

in Stockpile Stewardship Program tools. We continue to be committed to stockpile 

science but in a constrained budget, we will challenge the science program to operate at reduced funding while addressing issues in the stockpile.

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PIT MANUFACTURING

10. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino, the NNSA budget request makes several changes in the way the budget request for pit manufacturing is configured. The 

original pit budget line was established to bring visibility and discipline to process 

of manufacturing and certifying the W–88 pits. Will this reorganization of funding 

allow visibility to all aspects of the pit manufacturing process not only for W–88 

pits, but also for any future pits? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign was an important program that achieved success in reconstituting pit manufacturing within 

the nuclear weapons production complex (addressing a serious shortfall in production capability) and establishing a limited pit manufacturing capability of 10 pits 

per year. With the Campaign’s objectives achieved, we have placed pit manufacturing and pit technology development under Directed Stockpile Work as an established capability supporting the stockpile. In making this placement, however, we 

still recognize its continuing importance by defining specific funding lines under 

Stockpile Services that ensures visibility and management consideration during 

budget preparation and implementation. Pit manufacturing also continues to be a 

separate area for management attention during Quarterly Program Reviews. 

Pit certification, as a part of the Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign, 

also achieved the primary Campaign objective of assuring that the newly-manufactured pits were certified for use in the stockpile. Having achieved this goal, and 

with no clearly identified next-generation pit build, the pit certification funds were 

moved to the Science Campaign to continue work on the development and improvement of certification capabilities and techniques that are required to assure nuclear 

performance in weapon systems. These activities include a unique dynamic plutonium experiment program to improve plutonium material models that support our 

simulation capability, development of engineering testing and analysis to ensure 

that primaries can perform under stockpile to target conditions, and a universal 

baselining capability to generically assess the performance of any new or stockpiled 

weapon system. These efforts are synergistic with the elements of the ongoing 

Science Campaign, and can be managed more effectively within this structure. Once 

a new requirement for manufacture of a specific pit type is established, NNSA management will reconsider the need for any recombination of pit manufacturing and 

certification to ensure success of the mission.

RELIABLE REPLACEMENT WARHEAD

11. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. D’Agostino, what is the scope of the work in support of an RRW concept supported in the NNSA budget? I ask this because last year 

in the fiscal year 2008 budget request there was funding for both a specific RRW 

design in the RRW line and also engineering and science work to support the RRW 

concept generally scattered throughout several budget lines. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Funding that specifically applies to the RRW is located within 

Directed Stockpile Work. $10 million is requested in fiscal year 2009 to enable maturation of the specific RRW design to address the issues raised by the JASON review. The funds are not sufficient to complete the RRW Phase 2A design study. Consistent with the fiscal year 2008 appropriations act, work on certification tools relevant to legacy and future systems continues, and is located within the campaigns.

12. Senator BILL NELSON. Admiral Johnson, the Navy included funding in its fiscal year 2009 budget request for the arming, firing, and fuzing system for the RRW–

1. The full amount of this money is early to need given the actions of the Energy 

and Water appropriators in fiscal year 2008. What amount of this money can be 

usefully used, for what purpose, and how much is excess? 

Admiral JOHNSON. The Navy placed fiscal year 2008 funding on hold when Congress zeroed funding for the NNSA in the Fiscal Year 2008 Energy and Water Authorization Bill. No Navy effort on the RRW is planned unless approved and funded 

by Congress and coordinated with NNSA. If approved and funded, the Navy will use 

$14 million to continue efforts to define requirements and architectures to support 

an integrated/adaptable Arming, Fuzing, and Firing (AF&F) including developing 

Navy/Air Force/U.K. requirements, investigating AF&F concepts, architectures and 

technologies needed to support those requirements and performing an analysis of 

adaptability. This work is critical to the next AF&F and should be applicable to 

Navy, Air Force or U.K. warheads. The fiscal year 2009 effort is contingent on congressional approval of the fiscal year 2008 plan.

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BOMBERS

13. Senator BILL NELSON. General Chilton, the Air Force is looking at beginning 

to field a next generation bomber by 2018 and a more technologically advanced 

bomber by 2025. What are your key requirements for future long range strike platforms? 

General CHILTON. Our bombers remain a valued element of our nuclear forces and 

are expected to remain so into the future. Bombers are uniquely useful in communicating measured concerns in response to other nation’s activities as we seek to 

continue to deter the use of nuclear weapons in the future. In that regard, future 

bombers must be survivable against advanced threats and possess the range, endurance, and payload capability needed to deliver effects against multiple targets deep 

within hostile territory and far from their operating locations.

14. Senator BILL NELSON. General Chilton, after several years of debate and now 

a requirement that the Air Force maintains 76 B–52 bomber aircraft, the funding 

for the B–52 is on the Air Force unfunded priority list. What is your understanding 

as to how the 76 will be funded if Congress does not provide the additional funding? 

General CHILTON. U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) is aware of the funding 

challenges the Air Force faces in sustaining the 76 B–52Hs and understands the Air 

Force is working to resolve the issue.

STRATEGIC DETERRENCE

15. Senator BILL NELSON. General Chilton, in your statement you talked about 

the importance of bilateral dialogue as an element of deterrence. The bilateral and 

multilateral dialogue seems to be more difficult as our enemies are not really states 

per se, while States are competitors. Do you see a need to improve military dialogue 

with and among competitors? 

General CHILTON. Yes, I do see a need to improve military dialogue with and 

among competitors. Although many state actors can now be considered competitors 

rather than adversaries, numerous state adversaries still exist. As your question 

suggests, today’s complex strategic landscape increases our National security challenges. Just as our model for deterrence has evolved to keep up with these challenges, so has our realization of a need to broaden military dialogue-not just with 

our traditional competitors, but with those who are beginning to, or are likely to 

emerge. 

The value of military dialogue with our competitors is based on the ability to build 

understanding of each others’ intentions, and the ability to identify practical steps 

to improve bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Understanding each others’ specific perceptions and respective doctrines goes a long way in ensuring our force postures are perceived in their proper context. The result is enhanced strategic stability.

16. Senator BILL NELSON. General Chilton, how would you go about improving 

and enlarging such military-to-military dialogue? 

General CHILTON. We are improving and enlarging our military-to-military dialogue with competitors by expanding into additional areas beyond traditional nuclear dialogue. For example, in support of geographic combatant commands, I have 

emphasized international engagement on space. If this avenue of engagement begins 

to produce meaningful dialogue, then we’ll move on to our cyberspace mission as the 

next area for expanded military-to-military dialogue with our competitors. 

In line with new concepts of tailored deterrence, military-to-military dialogue 

must also be tailored. These relationships depend, obviously, on the nature of the 

relationship with the competitor or adversary. Our access to certain states and nonstate actors is restricted by limited, and sometimes non-existent, diplomatic relationships. In these situations, our ability to improve and expand upon such militaryto-military dialogue would depend on proxy relationships, both through allies and 

in some cases competitors. 

While I am optimistic about the slow but steady military dialogue with our competitors, it is also important to note that despite a considerable investment in time 

and resources last year, many competitors have shown little interest in completing 

our scheduled dialogues. Therefore, we are reducing this year’s overall number of 

events and refocusing our efforts on the quality and completion rate of the remaining dialogue opportunities.

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MISSILE WARNING GAP

17. Senator BILL NELSON. General Chilton, do the current schedules for the spacebased infrared satellite (SBIRS) geostationary (GEO) and high earth orbit (HEO) 

elements, assuming that there are four GEO satellites and four HEO sensors, avoid 

a missile warning gap? 

General CHILTON. Barring unexpected problems with current on-orbit assets, the 

schedule for the four SBIRS GEO satellites, plus the two HEO sensors and their 

scheduled replacements, will avoid a missile warning gap.

18. Senator BILL NELSON. General Chilton, do you believe there may be a need 

for more SBIRS satellites or HEO sensors? 

General CHILTON. The United States will need the capability to provide missile 

warning for the foreseeable future. At present, the program of record provides adequate coverage, but we will eventually need a follow-on capability.

OPERATIONALLY RESPONSIVE SPACE

19. Senator BILL NELSON. General Chilton, the Strategic Command sets the requirements for operationally responsive space (ORS). What are your key priority requirements and are there any areas where more good could be done? 

General CHILTON. The key priority requirements for ORS are determined based 

upon the urgent needs as expressed by Joint Force Commanders (to include U.S. 

STRATCOM) and, in some circumstances, the needs of services or agencies. In general, the priority areas are battlefield awareness, communications and command 

and control. At this stage of the program it is important to establish common standards and interfaces to enable a timely responsive capability for the future.

NONPROLIFERATION AND COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

20. Senator BILL NELSON. General Chilton, the Strategic Command has the responsibility to coordinate capabilities of the regional commanders to combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD). What do you see as the technology challenges to 

the commanders and what should be the development priorities? 

General CHILTON. Detection of Chemical and Biological Agents, and Nuclear 

Fissile material at standoff ranges is one of the greatest technological challenges to 

combating the proliferation of WMD. It is vitally important to increase detection 

ranges of WMD beyond the current passive detection capability in order to locate 

and challenge the movement of WMD before it reaches our shores.

21. Senator BILL NELSON. General Chilton, how does Strategic Command participate in developing research priorities? 

General CHILTON. One of my responsibilities is development of requirements for 

CWMD on behalf of the Combatant Commanders. These requirements provide a 

foundation for Services and Combatant Support Agencies to focus research efforts 

and development of state-of-the-art technologies. As advocate for CWMD capabilities, we closely monitor the progress and military utility of this research to adjust 

priorities as needed. We focus efforts in documents such as the draft Joint Capabilities Document (JCD), our Integrated Priorities List (IPL) and the 

Counterproliferation Review Committee Report to Congress. We then advocate 

through various technology development forums such as exercises and experiments, 

Science and Technology Symposia and the Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) process, and finally through oversight groups such as the Science Advisory Board and the Strategic Advisory Group.

DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD RECOMMENDATIONS

22. Senator BILL NELSON. Major General Webber, the Defense Science Board 

(DSB) recommendations dealing with the Minot weapons transfer incident took the 

organizational structure of the Air Force to task. The DSB recommended that a single technical organization be created, headed by a major general who reports directly to the Air Force Chief of Staff, ‘‘that has full responsibility and accountability 

with the Air Force for, and only for, nuclear systems and procedures.’’ What is the 

status of this recommendation? 

General WEBBER. The Air Force continues to take its nuclear responsibilities seriously. With creation of the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC) at Kirtland 

AFB in 2006, the Air Force consolidated most nuclear weapons responsibilities in 

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a single technical organization under the command of an Air Force Colonel reporting directly to the Vice Commander, Air Force Materiel Command. The AFNWC assumed further nuclear responsibilities when it incorporated the former Air Force 

Nuclear Weapons and Counterproliferation Agency in 2007. To address concerns of 

the Defense Science Board the Air Force has appointed a Brigadier General to command the AFNWC. 

The AFNWC includes the 377th Air Base Wing, Kirtland AFB, NM and the 498th 

Armament Systems Wing. The 498th Armament Systems Wing includes the 896th 

and 898th Munitions Support Squadrons (MUNSS), the Oklahoma City Air Logistics 

Center (OC-ALC) Cruise Missile Product Group, and the 498th Nuclear Systems 

Support Group, Kirtland AFB, NM. The Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) 

System Program Office (SPO) is scheduled to move into the AFNWC on 1 July 2008. 

When this occurs the AFNWC will encompass, in a single technical organization, all 

functions involved in providing end-to-end stockpile management for all of the Service’s nuclear systems. 

In addition to the AFNWC, a new organization was created on the Air Staff, the 

Directorate for Nuclear Operations, Plans and Requirements. The organization is 

headed by a major general and was created to support the field commander as well 

as work operational policy issues that drive the technical requirements.

23. Senator BILL NELSON. Major General Webber, the DSB recommended that the 

‘‘Commander of Air Combat Command (COMACC) should ensure that 8th Air Force 

has the full resources, authority, and accountability for daily B–52 operations—nuclear and conventional.’’ What is the status of this recommendation? 

General WEBBER. COMACC directed his staff to review and rewrite Air Combat 

Command Pamphlet 38–158, titled ‘‘Manpower and Organization’’. This new version 

will clearly state the responsibilities of the Major Command and 8th Air Force. 

Headquarters U.S. Air Force is the authority for decisions on organizational responsibilities and corresponding resource adjustments. COMACC directed the stand-up 

of a focused Global Deterrence Force for B–52 and B–2 operations, dedicated to U.S. 

STRATCOM, emphasizing the nuclear mission. Standup is expected this July.

24. Senator BILL NELSON. Major General Webber, the DSB recommended that the 

‘‘COMACC should direct that the B–52 initial training course at Barksdale and the 

B–52 Weapons School course include flight training in the nuclear mission.’’ What 

is the status of this recommendation? 

General WEBBER. Numerous administrative, academic, procedural, and technical 

changes were directed and implemented for the B–52 initial training course. Further changes are currently in coordination for formal approval by higher headquarters. 

The following specific changes have been implemented:

1. Revised: B–52 Formal Training Unit (FTU) course syllabus incorporated commission and panel recommendations; revisions were approved 

by higher headquarters. 

2. Added Event: FTU Day 1, Class 1. FTU commander personally briefs 

every B–52 student on the incident to include its causes, effects, and implications to the Nation’s deterrent capability. This brief also includes results 

and recommendations of the panels and commissions. 

3. Added Event: FTU Day 1, Class 1. FTU commander personally teaches 

every B–52 FTU student the nuclear Personnel Reliability Program academic training. 

4. Added Event: FTU Day 2. Aircrew nuclear discipline academic class 

taught personally by the Second Bomb Wing Vice Commander to every B–

52 FTU student. 

5. Added Event: FTU simulator training. Added nuclear simulator mission for every B–52 FTU student. 

6. Added Event: FTU flight training. Added nuclear flight for every B–

52 FTU student emphasizing nuclear command and control procedures, nuclear procedures, and nuclear weapons. 

7. Added Event: FTU mission training. Nuclear weapons academic qualification class (both missile and gravity). 

8. Changed: All B–52 FTU instructors must maintain combat mission 

ready on all nuclear mission qualifications and currencies to include nuclear command and control testing, nuclear weapons qualifications, and nuclear alert qualifications.

The following proposed changes are in review:

1. Added Event: Communication equipment class. 

136

2. Added Event: Additional nuclear simulator. 

3. Added Event: Additional nuclear flight. 

4. Added Event: B–52 instructor upgrade syllabus-academic class on instructing nuclear training, simulator on instructing nuclear items in the 

simulator, flight on instructing nuclear items in the aircraft.

The following specific changes have been made to the U.S. Air Force Weapons 

School (USAFWS) syllabus: 

Nuclear Weapons Physics Lecture (Course PPP208E) Classroom, 2.5 hours 

Presentation of the principles of nuclear weapons physics. The class will include 

the history of US nuclear weapons development and deployment, theory, construction, fuzing and firing, and safety and security features. Permissive action link 

(PAL)/coded switch system (CSS) concepts and operations instructions are also included in this class. 

Nuclear Weapons Theory, Effects and Hazards Lecture (Course PPP210E) Classroom, 

1.5 hours 

Discussion of nuclear weapons effects and effects of bomber aircraft in proximity 

of a nuclear detonation (NUDET). Discussion will also include closed cockpit operations and flash blindness equipment, use and considerations. 

B–52 Nuclear Weapons Inventory Lecture (Course SSS400E) Classroom, 2.0 hours 

Detailed description and breakdown of all bomber deliverable nuclear bombs, missiles, and their warheads. The lesson will include operating procedures, delivery parameters, yields, and options. 

B–52 Suspension and Release Avionics System for Nuclear Weapons Employment 

Lecture (Course AVS265E) Classroom, 1.0hour 

Description, weapons installation, operation, applicability and limitations of B–52 

nuclear weapons-associated suspension and release equipment. 

B–52 Nuclear Weapons Preflight (Course AVS262E) Weapons Storage Area, 2.0 hours 

Instruction from Weapons School instructors and munitions personnel plus students hands-on participation in nuclear weapons preflight. At the completion of this 

class, the student will have completed the requirements for 2nd Bomber Wing 

‘OGRE’ and 5th Bomber Wing ‘NEUTRON’ training. 

B–52 Nuclear Operations (WST—4 of 5 in syllabus) 

Simulator type: Integrated B–52 WST. 

Student/instructor ratio: 2:1 Pilot/Radar Navigator, 1:1 Electronic Warfare Officer. 

Support: None. 

Configuration: Mission 575, 12 × AGM–129, 8 × AGM–86B, 8 × B–61, 8 × B–83, 

900 × chaff, 192 × flare, 140k fuel load. Mission duration: 4.0 hours. 

Mission description: Instructs students on nuclear operations and malfunctions on 

all B–52 deliverable nuclear weapons. 

Strategic Attack: Global Deterrence Strike-Nuclear (sortie 5 of 19 in syllabus) 

Aircraft type: 2 × B–52H. 

Student/instructor ratio: 2:1 Pilot/Radar Navigator, 1:1 Electronic Warfare Officer. 

Support: U–TAC/EC range, 1 × EA platform, 2 × Red Air. 

Configuration: Beyond Line Of Sight data link, Electronic Countermeasures Improvement, USAFWS Electronic Countermeasures tapes, 220k fuel load. Mission duration: 8.0 hours. 

Integration: Red Air requirement may be filled by USAFWS. 

Mission description: Instructs students how to employ AGM–86B, AGM–129, B–

61, and B–83 nuclear weapons in a nuclear global deterrence strike requiring threat 

defense and package integration against both air- and ground-based threat systems. 

This mission emphasizes advanced planning and employment aspects of nuclear 

weapons in a simulated combat environment drawing from academics and student 

experience. 

The B–52 Pilot, Navigator, and Electronic Warfare Officer Initial Qualification 

syllabi were rewritten to include nuclear employment training in addition to the integrated nuclear training simulator mission from previous syllabi. The FTU and 

contracted instructors started Class 08–03 under the new, nuclear added, syllabus 

20 Feb 2008. The B–52 Weapons School Course was approved for implementation 

in December 2007. All syllabi listed below were rewritten, staffed and approved by 

Air Combat Command operations (A3) on the listed dates.

137

TRACK—NBR TITLE APPROVED—

DATE 

B52.03 ............... B–52 Aircraft Commander Upgrade Course ....................................................................... 15 Jan 08 

B52.04 ............... B–52 NAVIGATOR AND RADAR NAVIGATOR BASIC COURSE ............................................... 08 Jan 08

B52.05 ............... B–52 ELECTRONIC WARFARE OFFICER BASIC COURSE ...................................................... 09 Jan 08

B52.12 ............... B–52 Pilot and Aircraft Commander Basic Course ........................................................... 08 Jan 08 

B52.13 ............... B–52 RADAR NAVIGATOR UPGRADE COURSE ..................................................................... 09 Jan 08 

WS.11 ................ USAF WEAPONS INSTRUCTOR COURSE (WIC), B–52 .......................................................... 19 Dec 07 

25. Senator BILL NELSON. Major General Webber, the focus of the DSB report was 

on the general organization of the Air Force and the B–52. Have you or General 

Darnell, your boss, looked at the training, organization, and structure of the B–2 

force to ensure that the same weaknesses do not exist there? 

General WEBBER. Whiteman Air Force Base (AFB) and the B–2 enterprise from 

its inception considered the nuclear mission as the cornerstone of its training program. Beginning in Initial Qualification Training and continuing through all formal 

syllabi including B–2 Weapons School, the nuclear mission is emphasized and competency must be established before completion. The B–2 flight training tasking message also emphasizes the nuclear mission and ensures each crewmember maintains 

the highest level of competency. 

Due to the unique requirements of operating with a small aircraft fleet size, the 

B–2 was forced to optimize for the nuclear mission at its inception. Every squadron 

including the Weapon School and Operational Test are located at Whiteman AFB. 

The two front-line Bomb Squadrons own all the aircraft and are properly manned 

for their nuclear mission requirements. 

The results of the limited nuclear surety inspection in the fall of 2007 and the 

recent nuclear surety inspection (NSI) this June both support the argument that an 

effective organization and training concept of nuclear operations currently exists at 

Whiteman AFB. In fact, the recent June NSI was characterized by the Inspector 

General as ‘‘one of the strongest NSIs on record.’’

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.] 

(139)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2009

TUESDAY, APRIL 1, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:46 p.m. in room 

SR–232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Bill Nelson 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Bill Nelson, Levin, Pryor, 

Inhofe, and Sessions. 

Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; 

Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; and Peter K. Levine, general counsel. 

Minority staff member present: Robert M. Soofer, professional 

staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Jessica L. Kingston. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Christopher Caple and 

Caroline Tess, assistants to Senator Bill Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator 

Pryor; and Todd Stiefler, assistant to Senator Sessions. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON, CHAIRMAN 

Senator BILL NELSON. Good afternoon. 

Mr. YOUNG. Good afternoon. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Each of your written statements will be 

put in the record, and Senator Sessions and I are dispensing with 

our opening statements so we can get right to the questions. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Bill Nelson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

The Subcommittee on Strategic Forces meets today to consider the ballistic missile defense programs of the Department of Defense, and the missile defense budget 

request for fiscal year 2009. 

Today, I want to express my deep concern that the ballistic missile defense program is out of balance. With an annual budget of over $9 billion, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is simply not placing sufficient priority on near-term missile 

defense capabilities needed now by our regional combatant commanders to defend 

our forward-deployed forces, allies, and friends against existing short- and mediumrange missiles. 

140

This should be our very first missile defense priority. North Korea and Iran, to 

name just two nations, have many hundreds of such missiles today, and our combatant commanders do not have the capability to defend their forces, let alone other 

nations in their regions. This is not a hypothetical problem; these are real missiles 

that can reach our troops today. But the MDA has not planned or budgeted sufficient funds to provide the defensive capabilities we need, and MDA ought to know 

it. 

Since 2006, the military has conducted a series of analyses called the Joint Capabilities Mix Study that looked at what our upper tier missile defense capabilities 

and needs were for our regional commands. Specifically, they were looking at the 

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system and its Standard Missile-3 (SM–3) interceptor and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. 

Last year this subcommittee was told that the Joint Capabilities Mix Study concluded that our military would need about twice as many SM–3 and THAAD interceptors as the MDA was planning to buy. It turns out that is the minimum level 

that we need. So, did the Department of Defense increase the number of interceptors it planned to buy? No. 

Instead, it submitted a budget request for fiscal year 2009 that would delay 

THAAD Fire Units 3 and 4 by a year, and cause a production break of 18 months. 

It still plans to buy only 96 THAAD missiles and 147 SM–3 interceptors. That is 

simply not enough to do the job. 

By comparison, the United Arab Emirates (UAE). which is a little smaller than 

the State of Maine, wants to buy 144 THAAD missiles from us, which would be 50 

percent more than the Defense Department is currently planning to buy for our own 

military. The UAE would have twice as many THAAD interceptors per Fire Unit 

as our own military will have. 

The MDA could easily plan for and buy many more of these systems for our own 

military, and could produce them at more economical rates, which would bring down 

the cost per missile and provide the capability sooner. But instead of making this 

investment, the MDA has been spending billions of dollars on far-term research and 

development programs that will not provide any operational capability for another 

decade. 

One example of this misplaced spending is the Airborne Laser (ABL) technology 

demonstration program. The original estimate for the ABL program in 1996 was 

that it would cost $1 billion and take until 2001 to complete the demonstration. Instead, it has had a 500 percent cost increase, to $5 billion, and will not be completed 

until 2009 at the earliest, a delay of 8 years. This system, if it could be made to 

work, would not provide an operational capability for another decade. Given its 

many inherent problems, we don’t know if it can be made to work, or whether it 

will be affordable, or survivable. 

Last year, MDA asked for more than $500 million for ABL. Think of the real, 

near-term SM–3 and THAAD capability we could buy with half a billion dollars. 

Think of the defensive capability we could provide for our forward-based forces, and 

allies and friends who are within range today of hundreds of short- and mediumrange missiles. 

I believe the MDA should commit to fielding sufficient SM–3 and THAAD systems 

to meet the operational needs of our combatant commanders in a timely fashion. 

That means putting more money into these near-term systems, and less money into 

the far-term, high-risk systems that won’t provide capability for another 10 years. 

I hope we can finally start making some progress on this front. We owe our military 

forces no less. 

We have a number of other issues to consider at this hearing, including the fact 

that the Department of Defense failed to comply with a provision of the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. That law requires that, if the Department requests any long lead items for additional SM–3 interceptors or for 

THAAD Fire Units 3 and 4 in fiscal year 2009, it should request procurement funds, 

rather than research and development funds, for those systems. However, the Department did not comply with the law. Instead, it requested research and development funds for buying long lead items for additional SM–3 missiles. That is unacceptable; the Department should comply with the law. 

These are just two of the important issues we will discuss at today’s hearing. I 

appreciate the witnesses appearing before the subcommittee, and I look forward to 

their testimony.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS 

[The prepared statement of Senator Sessions follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

Mr. Chairman, I join with you in welcoming all our distinguished witnesses to 

this hearing on our missile defense programs. I note that while this is Secretary 

Young’s first appearance before the subcommittee, it is most likely to be General 

Obering’s last, as he has announced plans to retire by the end of the year. 

May I just say, at the outset, that we owe a huge debt of gratitude to General 

Obering for having provided this Nation, our forces, and our allies a measure of protection against the ballistic missile threat. Indeed, before 2004, we had no missile 

defense capabilities, except for the Army’s short-range Patriot system. Today, we 

have at the ready some two-dozen ground-based interceptors to protect our Homeland against long-range ballistic missiles, and a similar number of sea-based interceptors loaded on naval vessels capable of defending against short- and mediumrange ballistic missile threats far from our shores. 

General Obering, you and the men and women of the Missile Defense Agency 

(MDA) should be proud of your accomplishments. As you prepare for your retirement, you should take comfort in the knowledge that your performance in this last 

duty assignment brings much credit to an already distinguished military career. 

You will be sorely missed. 

Secretary Young, it is good to have you here. Your views concerning Department 

oversight of the missile defense program are eagerly awaited. As is generally known, 

the MDA has been granted tremendous flexibility and freedom from the normal acquisition process. 

This new acquisition approach was necessary to enable the Department to field 

missile defense capabilities in time to address the threat. Indeed, it has! I would 

be interested to learn from you whether this might not serve as a model for future 

acquisition programs. 

General Campbell, as U.S. Strategic Command’s lead for the integrated missile 

defense mission, the subcommittee will be interested to learn how well our missile 

defense programs are serving the needs of the warfighter. Important questions we 

would like you to address include: Are we fielding missile defense capabilities in 

numbers sufficient to pace the threat? Are we paying enough attention to the improvement of current capabilities to stay ahead of future threats? Where do we 

stand with respect to the transition of missile defense forces from MDA to the Services? 

Dr. McQueary, it is good to have you again before this panel. As the Director of 

Operational Test and Evaluation, we look forward to your assessment of MDA’s Integrated Test Plan, and on the operational effectiveness of our current missile defense systems. It would appear that your testimony is very similar to last year, in 

that while you asses the current missile defense systems to be capable of providing 

protection against the threats for which they are designed, additional operationally 

realistic testing is necessary to raise the level of confidence in that assessment. 

Finally, Mr. Francis, we look forward to hearing the Government Accountability 

Office’s recent recommendations with respect to the MDA. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank the witnesses for their service to the country and look forward to the hearing.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN J. YOUNG, JR., UNDER SECRETARY 

OF DEFENSE, ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS, 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Young follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. JOHN J. YOUNG, JR. 

Good afternoon Senator Nelson, Senator Sessions, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the 

fiscal year 2009 Department of Defense Ballistic Missile Defense Program and budget submission. I am pleased to update you on key issues facing the missile defense 

program and look forward to answering any questions you may have. 

The Defense Department has made great progress on missile defense since the 

President in 2002 made the deployment of an initial defensive capability a national 

priority. Indeed, within 18 months of the President’s direction, the Missile Defense 

Agency (MDA) fielded our Nation’s first long-range hit-to-kill ballistic missile defense capability. 

Moving with such urgency has required the MDA to operate with some flexibility 

in managing the Agency’s portfolio of programs. The MDA has already fielded a limited capability to defeat a limited ballistic missile threat from rogue nations. I beVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:11 Dec 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00147 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\42635.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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lieve it is vital to the security of our Nation that we continue work to close system 

performance gaps and develop new technology to keep pace with the threat. 

To close these gaps, the MDA will need to continue to use spiral-development and 

capability-based acquisition, allowing it to exploit technological opportunities and 

place greater capability in the warfighters’ hands. 

Capability-based acquisition permits early deployment of limited capabilities that 

can be enhanced over time. This approach also allows requirements and standards 

to be added as we understand their impact on cost, schedule, and performance. This 

approach can help the program remain relevant to the threat and technologically 

current while at the same time providing maximum industry design trade space to 

deliver militarily useful, best-value capability. The primary goal is to add capabilities with demonstrated military utility, rather than to meet rigid requirements typically defined several years before any capability can be fielded. 

Capability-based acquisition hinges on knowledge-based, decisionmaking. To reduce risk and ensure program stability, MDA uses knowledge-point decisionmaking 

to drive investment decisions. Knowledge points are tied to the achievement of specific technical or performance requirements and allow MDA to develop new and advanced capabilities without having to make a long-term financial commitment. Failure to meet knowledge points could result in the slowing or even discontinuation 

of a program activity. 

The Department continues to exercise oversight of the MDA’s development and 

deployment efforts. The Director of the MDA reports directly to me on missile defense matters, and we meet periodically to discuss program issues. 

I plan to conduct regularly Program Execution Reviews for all MDA programs. 

These reviews will provide me and other senior Department officials timely and indepth program execution updates. Among other things, these reviews will compare 

actual results against schedule, budget, and performance goals and baselines, and 

describe any earned value cost variances. 

In addition, the Department of Defense has established a Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB) that makes recommendations to me and the MDA Director and 

oversees implementation of the Agency’s strategic policies and plans, program priorities, and investment options. Senior principals from the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense (OSD) staff, the Services, the Department’s independent test community, 

the Joint Staff, and appropriate outside agencies sit on the board, which meets 

every 2 months to provide oversight and guidance. 

One issue currently on the MDEB agenda is the transition and transfer of Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) elements once they reach technical maturity. 

In 2002 the Department of Defense directed MDA to focus on developing, testing, 

and fielding near-term capabilities; the military departments would be responsible 

for long-term procurement and operation and support activities of transferred 

BMDS elements. With the successful fielding of BMDS elements in 2004, the Department looked for ways to facilitate transition and transfer planning. We developed a master BMDS Transition and Transfer Plan to document agreements between the MDA and the military departments. My office updates the Transition and 

Transfer Plan annually in conjunction with MDA and the military departments. We 

have also identified a lead Service for most BMDS elements. 

As the missile defense system has gained technical maturity, it became clear to 

me, the Director of the MDA, and other Department officials that effective transition and transfer planning is the key to successful operation and support of the 

BMDS. The MDEB is currently evaluating proposals to adjust the process in a manner that will ‘‘normalize’’ the transition and transfer process and ensure optimal 

system operations. The MDEB is also considering a revised BMDS program planning process which will provide the opportunity for the military departments and 

OSD to influence BMDS budget formulation and resource allocation using all appropriations in a defense-wide account. To complement this process, we are developing 

guidelines to specify military department and MDA responsibilities in preparation 

for, during, and after transition and transfer of BMDS elements. The Department 

plans to brief this committee in more detail once we have settled on a new path 

forward. 

I continue to be encouraged by the close interaction among MDA, the Director, 

Operational Test and Evaluation, the combatant commanders, and the Operational 

Test Agencies within the Services. Together they have developed an approach to ensure increasingly complex end-to-end tests of the system. The fact that the Director 

of the MDA and the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation jointly approve the 

Integrated Master Test Plan demonstrates to me the high level of cooperation between these organizations. Indeed, today you will find personnel from the Department’s independent test community embedded in the management offices of the missile defense elements. 

143

I believe the close working relationship between MDA and the test community has 

also contributed to recent test successes. Last year alone MDA executed successfully 

a long-range ground-based intercept, six SM–3 intercepts of separating and unitary 

targets, and three Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) intercepts of unitary targets. Each test included elements of operational realism and demonstrated 

to the warfighter the capabilities of the BMDS. 

While attending to environmental and safety concerns, MDA’s future flight tests 

will continue to be increasingly realistic in operational terms. When appropriate to 

the test objectives and consistent with MDA’s overall test campaign, each test will 

build on the knowledge gained from previous tests and add increasingly challenging 

objectives with the goal of devising scenarios that test elements of the system from 

end to end. This test approach increases knowledge and minimizes artificiality. 

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) continues to be actively engaged in 

reviewing the Ballistic Missile Defense Program. GAO conducted eight audits of the 

missile defense program in fiscal year 2007. To further increase transparency, beginning in fiscal year 2008, MDA agreed to provide GAO with quarterly summaries 

that include integrated baseline review schedules (most recent and projected), percent complete, 6 month cost performance index, fiscal year cost variance, and cumulative cost variance. This information will be summarized annually in the BMDS Selected Acquisition Report for Congress. 

Like many members of this committee, I believe we need to field additional ballistic missile defense assets in the near-term. System elements like Aegis Ballistic 

Missile Defense and the THAAD could provide our combatant commanders as well 

as our friends and allies a significant defensive capability in just a few years. I am 

working with General Obering to achieve this goal through the Department’s programming and budgeting process. 

At the same time, we must keep pace with the threat by equipping the 

warfighters with advanced BMDS capabilities. In the near future, we will require 

advanced discrimination, persistent sensor coverage, maneuverable interceptors, 

multiple volume capability, and a robust inventory. I believe that keeping pace with 

the threat while continuing to deliver effective capabilities requires an approach 

that balances near-term fielding and far-term development. 

The President’s budget for fiscal year 2009 reflects the priorities set by the President and was developed by the Secretary of Defense and his most senior military 

and civilian advisors. The budget emphasizes the need to prepare for an uncertain 

and unpredictable future. We must maximize our capabilities gained from our limited defense dollars. 

Toward that goal, the Department is requesting $10.4 billion in fiscal year 2009 

for continued development of a multi-layered system to protect the United States, 

its forces, and its allies from ballistic missile attack. $9.3 billion of that request supports the work of the MDA. The budgeted funds will pay the cost of fielding nearterm missile assets, operating and sustaining these assets, and conducting a missile 

defense test program. A robust research and development program is also needed 

to keep pace with the advancing threat. 

I note that the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 required 

the Department of Defense to transition from research, development, test, and evaluation-only budget requests for ballistic missile defense activities to requests with 

appropriate amounts in each appropriations title. For the fiscal year 2009 President’s budget submission, the Department identified the operations and 

sustainment costs for each BMDS element and requested military construction 

funds for the European Site, the European Midcourse Radar and one forward-based 

radar. The fiscal year 2009 President’s budget did not include procurement funding 

for specified BMDS elements, but the Department will review this issue in preparation of the fiscal year 2010 President’s budget. 

We are grateful for the support of Congress, which has helped make fielding missile defense a reality. As we increase the effectiveness and reliability of the system, 

congressional approval of the President’s request for missile defense funding will be 

essential. Cooperation between the Department and Congress on missile defense 

issues is one of the main reasons this program has been so successful over the last 

several years. I look forward to continuing that cooperation. 

Thank you for this opportunity to testify before the subcommittee. I look forward 

to answering any questions you might have.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. HENRY A. OBERING III, USAF, 

DIRECTOR, MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY 

[The prepared statement of General Obering follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT BY LT. GEN. HENRY A. OBERING III, USAF 

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Senator Sessions, distinguished members of the 

subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to discuss the Department of Defense’s Fiscal Year 2009 Missile Defense Program and budget. As Director of the 

Missile Defense Agency (MDA), I have the privilege of leading an outstanding group 

of men and women who are working hard every day to develop, test, and field an 

integrated, layered Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) to defend the United 

States, our deployed forces, and our allies and friends against ballistic missiles of 

all ranges in all phases of their flight. I want to thank this committee for the support we have received for this critical defense program. We are requesting $9.3 billion in fiscal year 2009 for missile defense. Roughly 75 

percent of this request, or $7 billion, will be allocated to the near-term development 

and fielding of missile defense capabilities. Of this amount, $715 million is for sustaining the capabilities we already have in the field today. I also want to highlight 

that, as has been the pattern for several years now, we will be spending about $2 

billion of the funding in fiscal year 2009 (more than 20 percent of the missile defense budget) on test activities. 

The BMDS is daily becoming more integrated, robust, and global. The BMDS already includes fielded assets operated by Air Force, Army, and Navy units under 

the integrated control of combatant commanders. Our current, limited homeland defense against long-range ballistic missiles will soon be bolstered by additional interceptors in Alaska and the upgrade of an existing radar in Greenland to protect 

against enemy launches from the Middle East. 

The defense of deployed forces, allies, and friends against short- to medium-range 

ballistic missiles in one region/theater will be buttressed by additional Standard 

Missile-3 (SM–3) interceptors, more Aegis BMD engagement-capable warships, 2 

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) fire units, and up to 100 modified 

sea-based terminal interceptors. Tying these assets together will be a global command, control, battle management and communications capability. 

Recent flight tests are confirming technological progress and operational effectiveness for short-, medium-, and long-range defensive capabilities. Since February 

2007, MDA and the military Services have executed a successful long-range groundbased intercept, six sea-based intercepts of separating and unitary targets, and two 

THAAD intercepts of unitary targets. In the near future, MDA’s capability development program is expected to yield enhanced capabilities to discriminate between 

enemy warheads and countermeasures and options for ‘‘multiple kill’’ capabilities to 

meet future challenges. 

To demonstrate the long-range BMDS capability, for example, we conducted an 

integrated flight test last September involving a realistic target launched from Alaska and tracked by the operational upgraded early warning radar in northern California. An Aegis ship and the sea-based X-band (SBX) radar in the North Pacific 

tracked the target as well. The target was successfully destroyed by a Ground-Based 

Interceptor (GBI) launched from an operationally configured silo in central California. The data needed to calculate a fire control solution for the interceptor was 

provided by the operational system and the operational command and control, battle 

management and communications system was employed by the warfighting commanders. Overall, this single test included numerous components separated by thousands of miles and managed by four executing organizations within the MDA. 

As missile defense capabilities expand worldwide, international cooperation with 

allies and friends is dramatically increasing. Assuming we obtain agreements with 

Poland and the Czech Republic and obtain congressional approval to proceed, MDA 

intends to begin site construction for additional long-range interceptors and a fixedsite radar in Europe to defend allies and deployed forces in Europe and expand the 

U.S. Homeland defense against limited Iranian long-range threats. Also, we have 

undertaken substantive cooperative efforts with European, Middle Eastern, and 

Asian nations. With the purchase of Aegis BMD and Patriot Advanced Capability3 assets, and with our fielding of a transportable X-band radar at Shariki, Japan, 

is in the process of fielding a multilayered system interoperable with the U.S. system. Further, with MDA’s support, the Department of Defense participated with 

Israel to develop an Israeli missile defense architecture that can meet threats expected in the next decade. We also held meetings with senior Russian officials and 

technical experts to discuss both threat perceptions and missile defense cooperation, 

including the potential for partnering with Russia in a joint regional architecture. 

Mr. Chairman, one last point before I continue. In February the Department of 

Defense called on our country’s missile defenses to destroy a large tank of toxic fuel 

onboard an out-of-control U.S. satellite about to reenter the Earth’s atmosphere. The 

uncertainty of when and where the satellite would reenter, and the near certainty 

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1Oral Statement by the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Annual Threat Assessment 

Hearing, 5 Feb 2008 http://www.dia.mil/publicaffairs/Testimonies/Statement29.pdf; Current and 

Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Lieutenant General Michael D. 

Maples, U.S. Army Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Statement for the Record, Senate 

Armed Services Committee, 27 February 2007 http://www.dia.mil/publicaffairs/Testimonies/

statement28.html. 2Statement of Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, 5 February 2008. 

3 Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January to 31 December 2005, Central Intelligence Agency, http://dni.gov/

reports/CDA percent2011–14–2006.pdf . 

that the fuel tank would survive reentry and possibly break up on Earth, drove the 

urgency of this mission. Using an extensively modified SM–3 interceptor and a 

modified Aegis Weapon System onboard the U.S.S. Lake Erie, the Navy successfully 

destroyed the tank. The Department undertook this operation, carefully choosing an 

intercept altitude that would not add to the debris currently in orbit, to protect 

against the possible risk to life that a natural reentry of the satellite could have 

posed. After engagement, the toxic hydrazine dissipated in space, and, by now, most 

of the debris from the satellite body has burned up in the Earth’s atmosphere. 

This was a very successful joint mission involving the Navy, U.S. Strategic Command, the MDA, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the National 

Reconnaissance Office, and other national security offices. MDA engineers worked 

closely with the Navy to modify the interceptor and the Aegis weapon system for 

this one-time engagement. This was a case where the missile defense system was 

unexpectedly pushed into service and performed exceptionally well. While this 

stands as an example of what the Nation received for its investment in missile defense, I want to be clear that it does not represent an operational anti-satellite capability. The time and level of technical expertise it took to plan and orchestrate this 

mission, the split-second fragility of the once-per-day shot opportunities, and the relatively low altitude of the satellite’s decaying orbit did not approach the responsive 

and robust capability that would be needed to attack enemy space assets in wartime. 

THREAT UPDATE

To lay the foundation for our budget request, let me review why missile defense 

is so critically needed. There remains intense interest in several foreign countries 

to develop ballistic missile capabilities. In fact, there were over 120 foreign ballistic 

missile launches in 2007, significantly exceeding what we observed in previous 

years. This comes on the heels of a very active 2006, during which time both North 

Korea and Iran demonstrated an ability to orchestrate campaigns involving multiple 

and simultaneous launches using missiles of different ranges. Currently, North 

Korea has hundreds of deployable short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and 

is developing a new intermediate-range ballistic missile and a new short-range, 

solid-propellant ballistic missile, which it test-launched in June 2007. Iran has the 

largest force of ballistic missiles in the Middle East (several hundred short- and medium-range ballistic missiles), and its highly publicized missile exercise training has 

enabled Iranian ballistic missile forces to hone wartime skills and new tactics. 

North Korea’s ballistic missile development and export activities remain especially 

troubling. Pyongyang continues to press forward with the development of a nuclearcapable ICBM. While the firing of the Taepo Dong 2 in July 2006, launched together 

with six shorter-range ballistic missiles, failed shortly after launch, North Korean 

engineers probably learned enough to make modifications, not only to its long-range 

ballistic missiles, but also to its shorter-range systems. North Korea’s advances in 

missile system development, particularly its development of new, solid fuel intermediate-range and short-range ballistic missiles, could allow it to deploy a more accurate, mobile, and responsive force. North Korea’s nuclear weapons program makes 

these advances even more troubling to our allies and the commanders of our forces 

in that region.1

In addition to its uranium enrichment activity, Iran continues to pursue newer 

and longer-range missile systems and advanced warhead designs. Iran is developing 

an extended-range version of the Shahab-3 that could strike our allies and friends 

in the Middle East and Europe as well as our deployed forces. It is developing a 

new Ashura medium-range ballistic missile capable of reaching Israel and U.S. 

bases in Eastern Europe.2 Iranian public statements also indicate that its solid-propellant technology is maturing; with its significantly faster launch sequence, this 

new missile is an improvement over the liquid-fuel Shahab-3.3 Iran has reportedly 

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4Statement of Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, 5 February 2008. 

5 Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Vice Admiral Lowell 

E. Jacoby, U.S. Navy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency Statement For the Record Senate 

Armed Services Committee, 17 March 2005 http://www.dia.mil/publicaffairs/Testimonies/

statement17.html 6 Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January to 31 December 2005, Central Intelligence Agency. 

bought a new intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) under development by 

North Korea; 4 this underscores the urgent need to work with our allies in the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to field and integrate long-range missile defenses in Europe. Moreover, Iran’s development of a space launch vehicle using technologies and designs from its ballistic missiles means Iran could have an ICBM capable of reaching the United States by 2015.5

Syria is working to improve its ballistic missile capabilities and production infrastructure. Today Syria is capable of striking targets in Israel and Turkey, our southern NATO partner, using rockets and ballistic missiles. Syria can produce longerrange Scud variant missiles using considerable foreign assistance from countries 

such as North Korea and Iran.6 So our vigilance must extend well out into the future, when the threats we face today have grown and new threats may have 

emerged. 

NEW MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM STRUCTURE

We have established a new block structure to organize our program of work and 

present our budget. The Agency has made this change to address concerns about 

transparency, accountability, and oversight and to better communicate to Congress 

and other key stakeholders. The new approach has several key tenets:

• Blocks will be based on fielded missile defense capabilities that address 

particular threats and represent a discrete program of work—not on biennial time periods. 

• When MDA believes a firm commitment can be made to Congress, the 

Agency will establish schedule, budget, and performance baselines for a 

block. Block schedule, budget, and performance variances will be reported. 

• Once baselines are defined, work cannot be moved from one block to another.

Based on the above tenets, MDA has currently defined five blocks (see figure 1). 

Blocks 1.0, 3.0, and 4.0 deliver capabilities for long-range defenses, while Blocks 2.0 

and 5.0 deliver capabilities to address the short- and medium/intermediate-range 

threats. 

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Future blocks (Block 6.0, etc.) will be added when significant new capabilities are 

expected to be fielded based on technological maturity, affordability, and need. For 

example, a new Block 6.0 might include enhanced defense of the United States 

against complex countermeasures, drawing on volume kill capabilities from the multiple kill vehicle (MKV) program, improved discrimination capabilities on our integrated sensor, command and fire control network as well as upgraded hardware and 

software on our weapon systems. 

MDA’s budget is organized through the period of the Future Years Defense Program based on the new block structure. Also, program funding that does not fit into 

Blocks 1.0 through 5.0 is assigned to four general categories:

• Capability Development—technologies such as the Airborne Laser (ABL), 

MKV, Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI), Far-Term Sea Based Terminal, 

Project Hercules, and the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS), 

which address future challenges and uncertainties 

• Sustainment—operations and support of weapon systems, sensors, and 

command and fire control components 

• Mission Area Investment—activities that support multiple efforts and 

cannot be reasonably assigned to a specific block or capability development 

program (e.g., intelligence and security; modeling and simulation; systems 

engineering and testing cores; safety, and mission assurance) 

• MDA Operations—activities that support the Agency, such as Management Headquarters and Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 

HIGHLIGHTS OF BUDGET SUBMISSION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009

Our priorities in the fiscal year 2009 budget submission include near-term development, fielding, integration, and sustainment of Blocks 1.0 through 5.0; increasingly robust testing; and a knowledge-based Capability Development program. 

Block 1.0

We are nearing completion of the work in Block 1.0. We are requesting $59 million for fiscal year 2009, mostly to conduct additional system ground and flight tests 

to support a final Block 1.0 capability declaration. 

This past year we saw an unprecedented pace of fielding of an integrated missile 

defense capability, much of it related to Block 1.0. In 2007 we emplaced 10 additional GBIs, for a total of 24 interceptors in missile fields at Fort Greely, AK, and 


401str1.eps
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Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA. In 2008 we plan to increase interceptor inventories 

up to a total of 30 at the 2 sites. By the end of 2008, we will complete work installing the Long-Range Surveillance and Track (LRS&T) capability on 18 Aegis BMD 

ships. These ships will contribute to long-range defense by passing early detection, 

cueing, and tracking data across communications lines into BMDS communication 

and battle manager nodes located at Fort Greely and in Colorado Springs. 

This past year we transitioned the transportable forward-based X-band radar at 

Shariki Air Base, Japan, from the interim site to a permanent location. This radar 

provides precise early detection and tracking to increase the probability we will destroy any lethal target launched by North Korea. The SBX completed crew training 

and testing off the coast of Hawaii and transited to the North Pacific to conduct a 

cold weather shakedown off Adak, AK, where it will be homeported in 2009. The 

SBX participated in system flight tests this past year, including the September 28 

long-range intercept test and the December 17 engagement of a medium-range separating target at sea by our ally, Japan. This summer the radar will again participate in a long-range intercept test. 

In 2007 we completed the fielding of Command, Control, Battle Management, and 

Communications (C2BMC) infrastructure to improve our ability to operate with 

Japan and receive direct feed from the Space-based Infrared System. We moved 

communications equipment and shelters to support the forward based X-band radar 

at Shariki and installed a second server suite at U.S. Pacific Command. We also 

began fielding enhanced C2BMC displays and improvements to our communications 

capabilities. The Parallel Staging Network we installed at U.S. Strategic, Northern, 

and Pacific Commands as part of the Concurrent Test, Training, and Operations 

(CTTO) capability, will be completed this year. Without impeding the operational 

readiness of the system, CTTO allows the warfighter to conduct training and the 

MDA to continue with spiral upgrades, testing, and development. 

By 2009 we plan to install additional planning and situational awareness capabilities to facilitate executive decisionmaking in the European Command. C2BMC capabilities also provide our senior government leadership situational awareness of hostile ballistic missile activities and updates on the performance of the BMDS. 

Block 2.0 

Since 2002 we have expanded and improved terminal and midcourse defenses to 

defeat short- and medium-range threats from land and sea. We are requesting about 

$1.3 billion for fiscal year 2009 for Block 2.0 fielding, development, and integration. 

This block represents the foundation of the capabilities required to protect forces we 

deploy abroad and our allies and friends, initially in a single region or theater of 

combat. 

We began fielding SM–3 interceptors in 2004. Block 2.0 comprises 71 SM–3 Block 

I and IA interceptors (we will have 38 in inventory by the end of 2008). To date, 

we have converted 12 Aegis BMD LRS&T ships to engagement-capable ships. By 

year’s end, we will have 18 Aegis BMD ships—15 destroyers and 3 cruisers—all of 

which will have surveillance and track as well as engagement capabilities. For the 

past 3 years, the Navy and MDA have collaborated on plans for a Sea-Based Terminal defensive layer. We are upgrading the Aegis BMD weapon system, and the 

Navy is upgrading the SM–2 Block IV missile, the goal being to deploy up to 100 

interceptors to provide a near-term terminal engagement capability on 18 Aegis 

BMD ships beginning in 2009. 

We are working closely with the Army to begin developing and fielding by 2009 

two THAAD fire units, with the plan to deliver them by 2010 and 2011. THAAD 

is uniquely designed to intercept targets both inside and outside the Earth’s atmosphere. Consisting of 48 interceptors and the associated radars and C2BMC, THAAD 

will provide transportable terminal protection from short- to medium-range ballistic 

missiles for our troops and our allies. 

Block 3.0 

We are requesting about $1.7 billion for fiscal year 2009 to expand the defense 

of the United States to include limited Iranian long-range threats. Block 3.0 builds 

on the foundation established by Block 1.0. Block 3.0 provides 14 additional GBIs 

above what we plan to deploy by 2008, along with 2 key radars needed for protection of the United States—the upgraded early warning radars at Fylingdales in the 

United Kingdom and at Thule in Greenland. 

This past year we completed operational testing of the Royal Air Force 

Fylingdales radar and made the radar available to the warfighter for emergency situations. In 2007 we began upgrades to the Thule radar and will continue to integrate it into the system by 2009. Together with the early warning radars in California, Alaska, and the United Kingdom, the Thule radar will ensure coverage of 

149

the United States against threats from the Middle East. In the Pacific theater, we 

will continue to enhance additional forward-based X-band radar capabilities in 

Japan and at other operating locations to meet warfighter needs. 

Block 3.0 also provides capabilities to defeat more sophisticated midcourse countermeasures. We are pursuing two parallel and complimentary approaches to 

counter complex countermeasures: first, more sophisticated sensors and algorithms 

to discriminate the threat reentry vehicle in the presence of countermeasures; and 

second, a multiple kill capability to intercept the objects identified by the discrimination systems as potential threat reentry vehicles. Block 3.0 will focus on the first 

of these approaches. It includes upgrades to the GBIs, sensors, and the C2BMC system. The full implementation of this approach will be conducted in phases, with the 

first phase referred to as ‘‘Near-Term Discrimination’’ and the second phase as ‘‘Improved Discrimination and System Track.’’

Block 4.0 

We are requesting about $720 million for fiscal year 2009 for Block 4.0 fielding, 

development, and integration. Block 4.0 fields sensors, interceptors, and the C2BMC 

infrastructure needed to improve protection of the United States and, for the first 

time, extend coverage to all European NATO allies vulnerable to long-range ballistic 

missile attack from Iran. This block focuses on deployment of the midcourse X-band 

radar, currently located at the Kwajalein test site, to the Czech Republic and the 

establishment of an interceptor field in Poland, pending agreements with both governments. By devaluing Iran’s longer-range missile force, European missile defenses 

could help dissuade the Iranian government from further investing in ballistic missiles and deter it from using those weapons in a conflict. We believe that the longrange defense assets we are planning to deploy to Central Europe offer the most 

effective capability for defeating this threat. 

The European Midcourse Radar would complement sensor assets deployed in the 

United Kingdom and Greenland and provide critical midcourse tracking data on 

threats launched out of the Middle East. The radar also would operate synergistically with the planned forward-based transportable X-band radar, jointly providing early threat detection and discrimination of the reentry vehicles. 

An European Interceptor Site will consist of up to 10 interceptors, the two-stage 

configuration of our flight-proven three-stage GBI. A two-stage interceptor has less 

burn time than the three-stage version, which allows it to operate within the shorter 

engagement timelines expected. Nearly all of the components used in the two-stage 

interceptor are identical to those already tested and fielded in the three-stage interceptor, which means modifications required to design, develop, and produce a twostage variant are minimal. Nor are such modifications unprecedented. In fact, the 

first 10 Ground-based Midcourse Defense integrated flight tests, conducted between 

January 1997 and December 2002, successfully utilized a two-stage variant of the 

three-stage Minuteman missile. As we do with all system elements and components, 

we have planned a rigorous qualification, integration, ground and flight testing program for the two-stage interceptor. 

Several countries in southern Europe do not face threats from Iranian long-range 

missiles. Yet these same countries are vulnerable to the shorter-range ballistic missiles currently fielded by Iran and Syria. Mobile system sensors for Aegis BMD, 

THAAD, and Patriot are designed to be augmented by other sensors, like the European Midcourse Radar, and their interceptors are designed to engage slower shortto medium-range ballistic missiles systems. Together with other NATO missile defense assets, these missile defense forces will protect European countries vulnerable 

to short- and medium-range ballistic missiles when integrated into the NATO command and control structure. 

Block 5.0 

We are requesting $835 million for Block 5.0 for fiscal year 2009. This block 

builds on Block 2.0 to expand the defense of allies and deployed U.S. forces from 

short- to intermediate-range ballistic missile threats in two theaters. Block 5.0 will 

increase the number of SM–3 and THAAD interceptors and improve the performance of the Aegis BMD Weapons System and the SM–3 interceptor. 

The SM–3 Block IB interceptor, a critical Block 5.0 development effort, will have 

major modifications to include a much improved seeker and a Throttleable Divert 

and Attitude Control System (TDACS). When combined with processing upgrades to 

the Aegis BMD Weapons System, the more capable Block IB interceptor will more 

readily distinguish between threat reentry vehicles and countermeasures. The Block 

IB expands the battle space and enables more effective and reliable engagements 

of more diverse and longer-range ballistic missiles. This year we look forward to 

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completing design and testing for the two-color seeker and TDACS and commencing 

the element integration of the SM–3 Block IB missile in 2009. 

Block 5.0 includes delivery of 23 SM–3 Block IA interceptors, 53 SM–3 Block IB 

interceptors, 2 additional THAAD fire units with an additional 48 interceptors, 1 Xband transportable radar for forward deployment, and the associated C2BMC support. 

Development/Operational Testing 

Testing under operationally realistic conditions is an important part of maturing 

the BMDS in all five blocks. We have been fielding test assets in operational configurations in order to conduct increasingly complex and end-to-end tests of the system. Our testing to date has given us confidence in the BMDS’s basic design, hitto-kill effectiveness, and operational capability. While the system is developmental, 

it is available today to our leadership to meet real world threats. 

Our flight tests are increasing in operational realism, limited only by environmental and safety concerns. Each system test builds on knowledge gained from previous tests and adds increasingly challenging objectives. The Director, Operational 

Test and Evaluation, the Operational Test Agencies, and the warfighting community 

are very active in all phases of test planning, execution, and post-test analysis. 

Using criteria established by the warfighter and the Agency’s system engineers, all 

ground and flight tests provide data that we and the operational test community 

use to anchor our models and simulations and verify system functionality and operational effectiveness. 

In 2007 we conducted many system ground and flight tests. Our flight test program for Ground-Based Midcourse Defense, Aegis BMD, and THAAD confirmed 

technological progress for short-, medium-, and long-range defensive capabilities. 

Last year we executed successfully a long-range ground-based intercept, six SM–3 

intercepts of separating and unitary targets, and three THAAD intercepts of unitary 

targets. As of today, we have demonstrated hit-to-kill in 34 of 42 attempts since 

2001. Last year alone we successfully intercepted the targets in 10 of 10 attempts. 

After a legacy target failure in May 2007, we successfully completed Groundbased Midcourse Defense Flight Test-03a on September 28, 2007. In this test, an 

operationally configured GBI launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base engaged a 

threat representative intermediate-range target fired from Kodiak Island, AK, using 

sensor information from the operational upgraded early warning radar at Beale Air 

Force Base, CA. Trained crews manning fire control consoles reacted within a specified window under limited-notice launch conditions. This test leveraged fielded hardware and fire control software as well as operational communications, tracking, and 

reporting paths. The Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle successfully collided with the target near the predicted point of impact, destroying it. This was our most operationally realistic, end-to-end test of the long-range defenses to date. Though they were 

not official participants of the test, the SBX and an Aegis BMD ship using its onboard SPY–1 radar also tracked the target and gathered data for post-test analysis. 

We also had enormous success with our integrated ground tests, which involve the 

operational long-range defense elements and employ the actual operational hardware. We test the system end-to-end by simulating engagements. These ground 

tests, conducted in a lab environment and in the field, involve the wider missile defense system community, to include the National Military Command Center, the 

Operational Test Agencies, and U.S. Northern Command. They teach us a great 

deal and give us confidence to move forward with our intercept tests. The most comprehensive to date, these tests demonstrated the ability of the system to execute 

multiple, simultaneous engagements using operational networks and communications and fielded system elements in different combinations. The warfighter also 

was able to evaluate tactics, techniques, and procedures. In 2008 and 2009 we will 

continue our integrated ground test campaigns. 

We completed five sea-based intercept tests in 2007. In all Aegis BMD tests, we 

do not notify the ship’s crew of the target launch time, forcing crew members to 

react to a dynamic situation. This past year we successfully used Aegis BMD cruisers and destroyers to engage threat-representative short-range ballistic missiles and 

medium-range separating targets. We conducted a test with the U.S. Navy involving 

simultaneous engagements of a short-range ballistic missile and a hostile air target, 

demonstrating an ability to engage a ballistic missile threat as the ship conducts 

self-defense operations. In November we simulated a raid attack on an Aegis BMD 

cruiser using two short-range ballistic missiles. The cruiser destroyed both targets. 

The December 2007 test off the coast of Kauai in Hawaii marked the first time 

an allied Navy ship successfully intercepted a ballistic missile target with the Aegis 

BMD midcourse engagement capability. The SM–3 successfully intercepted the medium-range separating target in space, verifying the engagement capability of the 

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upgraded Japanese destroyer. It also marked a major milestone in the growing missile defense cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States. 

THAAD completed three intercept flight tests against threat-representative shortrange unitary targets in the atmosphere and in space. In addition, the THAAD 

radar and fire control participated in two Aegis BMD flight tests to demonstrate 

THAAD-Aegis interoperability. These initial THAAD intercept tests at the Pacific 

Missile Range Facility in Hawaii demonstrated integrated operation of the system, 

including radar, launcher, fire control equipment and procedures, and the ability of 

the interceptor to detect, track, and destroy the target. Soldiers of the 6th Air Defense Artillery Brigade stationed at Fort Bliss, TX, operated all THAAD equipment 

during the tests, which contributed to operational realism. 

In 2007 the MDA conducted 25 major tests and successfully met our primary test 

objectives in 18 of 20 flight tests. In doing so, we used the test ranges available to 

us today to maximum capacity. These totals include three Patriot tests, two Arrow 

tests, and the U.S.-Japan cooperative test. Our test plans for 2008 and 2009 will 

continue to use more complex and realistic scenarios for system-level flight tests and 

demonstrate interceptor capabilities against more stressing targets. 

In 2008 we are planning two system-level long-range intercept tests, and two 

more in 2009, all of which will push the edge of the envelope in testing complexity. 

The tests in 2008 will involve targets launched from Kodiak, AK, and missile defense assets separated by thousands of miles. We are expanding the number of sensors available to cue the system and engage targets. In our next long-range test, 

we will involve the early warning radar at Beale and the forward-based X-band 

radar, temporarily sited at Juneau, AK. This test also will demonstrate integration 

of the SBX into the sensor support system. The intermediate-range target will have 

countermeasures. Later in 2008 Ground-based Midcourse Defense will attempt to 

defeat a longer-range threat-representative target and demonstrate the ability of the 

SBX to send tracking and discrimination data through Ground-based Midcourse Defense Fire Control and Communications to the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle prior to 

engagement. 

We plan three Aegis BMD intercept tests in 2008 and 2009. In 2008 we will demonstrate an intercept of a unitary, short-range ballistic missile target in the terminal phase of flight using a SM–2 Block IV interceptor. Later this year we will 

conduct the second Japanese intercept test against a medium-range target warhead. 

In 2009 we will conduct an intercept flight test against a medium-range target to 

demonstrate an expanded battle space. 

The first test of THAAD this year will involve engagement of a separating target 

low in the atmosphere. In the fall, we plan to demonstrate THAAD’s salvo-launch 

capability against a separating target. In late spring 2009 THAAD will engage a 

complex separating target in space. In 2009 we will increase test complexity by demonstrating THAAD’s ability to destroy two separating targets in the atmosphere. 

In addition to our system flight- and ground-test campaigns, the MDA will continue to participate in Patriot combined developmental/operational tests as well as 

Air Force Glory Trip flight tests. 

Knowledge-Based Capability Development 

The proliferation of ballistic missile technologies and systems means we will face 

unexpected and more challenging threats in the future. We are requesting about 

$2.5 billion in fiscal year 2009 for capability development work to deliver advanced 

capabilities that will help ensure America’s BMDS remains effective and reliable 

and a major element in our national defense strategy well into this century. 

Destroying ballistic missiles in boost phase will deprive the adversary of opportunities to deploy in midcourse multiple reentry vehicles, submunitions, and countermeasures, thereby reducing the number of missiles and reentry vehicles having to 

be countered by our midcourse and terminal defenses. Success in the boost phase 

will increase the probability we will be successful in defeating an attack in the other 

defensive phases. As part of this layered defense strategy, we are developing the 

ABL and KEIs. 

ABL is being developed to destroy ballistic missiles of all ranges. In 2007 the ABL 

program met all of our knowledge point expectations and cleared the way for the 

installation of the high-power laser on the aircraft by the end of 2008. We completed 

in-flight atmospheric compensation demonstrations and conducted low power systems integration testing, successfully demonstrating ABL’s ability to detect, track, 

target, and engage non-cooperative airborne targets. Next we will integrate the high 

power systems and gear up for a series of flight tests leading to a full demonstration 

and lethal shoot-down in 2009 of a threat-representative boosting target. 

The KEI program will provide mobile capabilities to intercept ballistic missiles in 

the boost, ascent, or midcourse phases of flight. This multi-platform, multi-payload, 

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rapidly deployable capability could not only extend the reach of the missile defense 

system, but it also will add another defense layer. In 2007 we completed hypersonic 

wind tunnel testing of the booster and successfully conducted static firings of the 

first- and second-stage motors. This year we are focusing on preparations for the 

2009 flight test of the KEI booster, which, if successful, will demonstrate we are 

ready to proceed to intercept testing and integration into the system. 

We are pursuing parallel and complementary efforts to counter complex countermeasures. Project Hercules is developing a series of algorithms to exploit physical 

phenomenology associated with threat reentry vehicles to counter on-the-horizon advanced threats and counter-countermeasures for employment in system sensors, kill 

vehicles, and C2BMC. The algorithms will improve sensor and weapon element 

tracking and discrimination via data integration and multi-sensor fusion data integration. 

In the years ahead we expect our adversaries to have midcourse countermeasures. 

The MKV program is developing a payload for integration on midcourse interceptors 

to address complex countermeasures by identifying and destroying all lethal objects 

in a cluster using a single interceptor. This past year we delivered the initial models 

and simulation framework for testing sophisticated battle management algorithms 

and developed the liquid fuel divert and attitude control system. 

Our strategy is to manage all future kill vehicle development under a single program office and acquire MKV payloads using a parallel path approach with two payload providers pursuing different technologies and designs. This strategy will allow 

us to better leverage industry experience and talent. The MKV approach leverages 

commonality and modularity of kill vehicle components on various land- and seabased interceptors, to include KEIs, GBIs, and a Block IIB version of the SM–3. The 

goal is to demonstrate a multiple kill capability in 2011 through a series of component development and test events. 

We are undertaking significant upgrades to the BMD Signal Processor in the 

Aegis BMD weapons system. Through our cooperative program with Japan, we are 

upgrading the SM–3 Block I interceptor with the SM–3 Block II to engage longerrange ballistic missiles. This faster interceptor will feature an advanced kinetic warhead with increased seeker sensitivity and divert capability. We also will implement 

upgrades to the Aegis BMD Weapons System. The first flight test is scheduled for 

2012. The Far-Term Sea-Based Terminal program will expand upon the near-term 

capability provided by the SM–2 Block IV blast-fragmentation interceptor by engaging longer-range threats. This year and next we will define weapons system requirements as we work toward initial fielding as early as 2015. 

We are developing the STSS to enable worldwide acquisition and tracking of 

threat missiles. Sensors on STSS satellites will provide fire control data for engagements of threat reentry vehicles and, when combined with radar data, will provide 

improved threat object discrimination. In 2008 we will deliver two demonstration 

satellites scheduled for launch later in the year and a common ground station. We 

plan to use both targets of opportunity and dedicated targets to demonstrate STSS 

capabilities from lift-off through midcourse to reentry. The knowledge gained from 

these demonstrations will guide our decisions on the development of a follow-on 

space sensor constellation. 

I believe the performance of the BMDS could be greatly enhanced someday by an 

integrated, space-based interceptor layer. Space systems could provide on-demand, 

near global access to ballistic missile threats, minimizing limitations imposed by geography, absence of strategic warning, and the politics of international basing 

rights. I would like to begin concept analysis and preparation for small-scale experiments. These experiments would provide real data to answer a number of technical 

questions and help the leadership make a more informed decision about adding this 

capability. 

We have had to restructure some development activities and cancel others as a 

result of reductions in our fiscal year 2008 budget. Reductions in funding for the 

European Site Initiative, STSS, ABL, and MKV programs will result in some schedule delays. Cuts in the system engineering work, including modeling and simulations, undermine our ability to develop and field an integrated system, which requires a collaborative effort by MDA and our industry partners that cuts across 

many disciplines and specialties. The ability to do this cross-cutting engineering 

work will become increasingly important as we move, for example, towards developing common kill vehicles and common interceptors. 

I remain deeply concerned about the future threat environment, and consequently 

believe each one of these efforts is critical to maintaining our defenses in the uncertain years ahead. 

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SETBACKS IN 2007

With our unprecedented success in 2007 came several setbacks. We experienced 

a target failure in our first attempt for FTG–03 as mentioned earlier. While this 

was only the second complete target failure in 42 flight tests, it was a signal that 

we needed to revamp our target program, which is underway. We are at a critical 

juncture in the target program transitioning from the legacy booster motors to the 

more modern Flexible Target Family, and I intend to make this a high priority in 

2008. 

In addition, we are investigating a nozzle failure that occurred in the second static firing of the KEI second stage. While investigation is underway, we plan to execute the first booster flight in 2009. 

We also experienced some cost growth in the THAAD, Aegis, and GMD programs 

which is being addressed within the overall missile defense portfolio. The THAAD 

cost growth was due to test delays, additional insensitive munitions testing, and its 

deployment to the Juniper Cobra 09 exercise in Israel. Aegis cost growth was generated from extended work on the SM–3 Third Stage Rocket Motor and the Divert 

and Attitude Control System. This work also delays the delivery of the Block 1B 

interceptors by 1 year. GMD cost growth was due to the modifications required for 

the two-stage version, the additional missile field in Alaska, and repair of the water 

damage silos. 

RETAINING INTEGRATED DECISION AUTHORITY

I would now like to turn to a topic very near and dear to me. I urge the committee 

to continue its support of the integrated decision authority that the MDA Director 

has been given for the missile defense portfolio. Working with the U.S. Strategic 

Command Commander, I have the ability to propose the evolution of the missile defense system based on all relevant requirements, acquisition, and budget information. This authority was necessary in light of the President’s 2002 directive to begin 

deployment in 2004 of a set of missile defense capabilities that would serve as a 

starting point for improved and expanded missile defense capabilities later. 

I present to you two telling quotes from the 2006 Defense Acquisition Performance 

Assessment (DAPA) report chartered by the Department.

‘‘[T]he budget, acquisition, and requirements processes are not connected 

organizationally at any level below the Deputy Secretary of Defense. This 

induces instability and erodes accountability. Segregation of requirements, 

budget and acquisition processes create barriers to efficient program execution.’’ 

‘‘Acquisition programs need to deliver timely products. Our assessment is 

that the culture of the Department is to strive initially for the 100 percent 

solution in the first article delivered to the field. Further, the ‘‘Conspiracy 

of Hope’’ causes the Department to consistently underestimate what it 

would cost to get the 100 percent solution. Therefore, products take tens of 

years to deliver and cost far more than originally estimated.’’

Well, the DAPA report could have cited the one place in the Defense Department 

below the Deputy Secretary where requirements, acquisition, and budget authority 

comes together—the MDA. This authority has given me the trade space to make a 

balanced recommendation to the Deputy Secretary that has paid dividends for defense of our Homeland, deployed forces, allies, and friends. 

MDA has fielded an initial capability consisting of 24 GBIs; 17 Aegis BMD warships capable of long-range surveillance and tracking, of which 12 are also capable 

of missile intercepts; 23 Standard Missile-3 interceptors for Aegis BMD warships; 

18 SM–2 Block IV interceptors; an upgraded Cobra Dane radar; 2 upgraded early 

warning radars; a transportable X-band radar; a command and control, battle management, and communications capability, and a SBX. None of this capability existed 

as recently as June 2004. This rapid fielding would never have been possible unless 

I had the integrated decision authority over requirements, acquisition, and budget. 

I think it is fair to say that this capability would have taken two to three times 

longer to field under standard Department practices—if not the ‘‘tens of years’’ cited 

by DAPA. 

Should this integrated decision authority be continued now that we have successfully met the President’s injunction to quickly field an initial capability where no 

capability had previously existed? I would make four key points in favor of retaining 

this authority. 

First, the Director of MDA is in the best position to know the program’s progress 

and challenges. This does not mean that I make decisions in a vacuum. We work 

closely with the Intelligence Community, the warfighter, and the Services on the 

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7Knowledge centers for Interceptors, C2BMC, and Sensors were established in January 2008. 

Centers for Space and Directed Energy will be established later in 2008. 

threat, capability needs, and available resources. In addition to the external oversight from your committee and others in Congress and, of course, the Government 

Accountability Office, I also receive significant Department-level oversight from 

Under Secretary AT&L, the Office of the Secretary of Defense Comptroller, and the 

Missile Defense Executive Board. However, it does mean that I have a degree of 

control and trade space that is not available to the managers of other major defense 

acquisition programs. 

Second, because the ballistic missile threat is always evolving, we need to be as 

agile as possible in getting the latest capabilities to the warfighter. The integrated 

requirements, acquisition, and budget authority granted MDA’s Director inevitably 

enables us to deliver a capability more quickly to meet the evolving missile threat. 

Third, while some see MDA’s flexibilities as undeserved special treatment, others 

view MDA’s integrated decision authority as, in effect, a ‘‘test lab’’ for the Under 

Secretary of Defense AT&L to examine alternative, creative approaches to acquiring 

joint capabilities. 

Fourth, ballistic missile defense is and always will be the quintessential joint program. No one Service could easily or naturally take responsibility for developing, 

testing, integrating, and fielding the BMDS. The trade space offered me as portfolio 

manager of the entire BMD program is considerably wider than it would be if MDA 

were wedded to one Service or merely an advocate within the Office of the Secretary 

or joint staff who is trying to negotiate with a myriad of individual program managers protecting their own turf. 

On a personal level, I take my stewardship responsibilities very seriously. I will 

not be in this position forever, and I know how vitally important it is to put my 

successor in the best position to give the warfighter the capabilities needed to negate the threats to our Homeland, deployed forces, allies, and friends. The integrated decision authority granted me as MDA Director does just that, and I urge 

your continued support. 

ORGANIZATIONAL REENGINEERING

MDA’s reengineering goal is to transform the organization into a single, integrated high-performance team capable of sustaining its development and test successes and maximizing its efficiency and effectiveness in acquiring, fielding, and 

supporting an integrated, operational BMDS. To accomplish this goal, I have established policies and defined responsibilities for providing qualified matrix support to 

the program directors/managers (PD/PM) responsible for delivering BMDS capabilities to the combatant commanders (COCOMs). Matrixing is an organizational concept that consolidates skills and resources under a functional manager who, in turn, 

allocates persons and resources among executing organizations needing these skills. 

Matrixed support includes such functions as engineering, contracts, business/financial management, cost estimating, acquisition management, logistics, test, safety 

quality and mission assurance, security, administrative services, information assurance, and international affairs. The matrix management process aims to strengthen 

PD/PM capabilities by assuring their accessibility to all expertise available to MDA; 

increasing accountability for quality of functional staff work; and allocating personnel resources according to the Agency’s needs. 

MDA has established the following objectives to focus the reengineering efforts:

• Implement a full matrix management construct to strengthen functional 

responsibilities at both the BMDS and element level of program execution; 

• Establish key new or restructured organizations and centers to strengthen the implementation of an integrated system; 

• Establish key knowledge centers to focus MDA resources on and within 

critical mission technical areas; 7

• Complete an organizational alignment assessment to improve agency efficiency and effectiveness through elimination of redundancy of functions and 

infrastructure, multiple layers of management and noncritical functions, 

and a verification that resources are aligned with MDA priorities; and 

• Relocate MDA offices from the National Capital Region (NCR) to Huntsville and selected other locations to realize the benefits of a centralized control/decentralized execution strategy, facilitate leveraging all resources 

available in MDA and propagate better cross-flow of expertise and information. 

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BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE

The 2005 Defense BRAC Commission approved recommendations directing the realignment of several MDA directorates from the NCR to government facilities at 

Fort Belvoir, VA, and the Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, AL. Specifically, a Headquarters Command Center for MDA will be located at Fort Belvoir, while most other 

MDA functions will be realigned to Redstone Arsenal. The transfer of government 

and contractor personnel from the NCR is already in progress; by the end of 2008, 

we will have transitioned some 1,100 personnel positions to the Arsenal. Also, construction will start in fiscal year 2008 on additional facilities to be opened in two 

phases in fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011. Construction of the MDA Headquarters Command Center is also scheduled to begin in late fiscal year 2008, with 

occupancy in fiscal year 2010. 

MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY ENGINEERING AND SUPPORT SERVICES

Consistent with the Agency’s reengineering, MDA has undertaken the task of improving how it procures contractor support services (CSS). The objectives of the 

change are to improve oversight, enable matrix management so the Agency can benefit more from cross-flow of information among different offices, enhance efficiency 

and transparency, and more accurately account for our cost of doing business. I have 

determined that the best path forward is to develop a new Agency-wide procurement; the designation for this procurement is Missile Defense Agency Engineering 

and Support Services (MiDAESS). 

We currently receive contractor support through a variety of different avenues, 

such as contracts, other government agencies, and General Services Administration 

orders. Over the next few years, the MiDAESS procurement will allow us to consolidate the CSS into a more efficient procurement, focused on the primary areas of 

technical, administrative, financial, and other support that our agency requires. 

Beginning in March 2007, we began discussions with our industry partners regarding MiDAESS. Throughout 2007, MDA has received industry feedback and continues to refine the details of how competition and contracting within MiDAESS will 

function. We plan to begin initial contract awards under MiDAESS in 2008. 

CLOSING

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, in closing, I again want to 

thank you for your strong support of our program. Since 2002 we have achieved dramatic program efficiencies and effectiveness because we have been able to consolidate missile defense expertise and integrate all missile defense elements into a single, synergistic system. We have made tremendous progress deploying missile defenses to protect our Homeland, our troops deployed and our allies and friends. I 

also believe we have the right program in place to address more advanced threats 

we may face in the future. 

Our investment in missile defense is significant, but our expenditures would pale 

in comparison to the overwhelming price this Nation could pay from a single missile 

impacting America or one of our allies. We need your continued support to carry 

on the tough engineering and integration task of developing and enhancing worldwide ballistic missile defenses. 

This concludes my statement. I look forward to your questions.

STATEMENT OF LTG KEVIN T. CAMPBELL, USA, COMMANDING 

GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND 

[The prepared statement of General Campbell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY LTG KEVIN T. CAMPBELL, USA 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for your ongoing support of our military and for the opportunity to appear again before this panel. As I shared last year, I do believe that this committee 

is a strong supporter of the Army and the missile defense community. This is especially important as we continue to field missile defense capabilities and to continue 

development of future capabilities for the Nation and our allies. Along with those 

testifying today, I am an advocate for a strong global missile defense capability. 

The committee is no doubt familiar with my duties and responsibilities as the 

Army’s senior commander for space and missile defense as well as my position as 

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the Commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile 

Defense, a part of the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). In this role, I 

serve as the joint user representative working closely with the Missile Defense 

Agency (MDA), other Services, and combatant commanders to ensure that our national goals of developing, testing, and deploying an integrated missile defense system are met in an operationally sound configuration. 

Mr. Chairman, please rest assured that America’s Army stands on point to defend 

our Nation against an intercontinental ballistic missile attack. Our soldiers continue 

to be trained and ready to operate the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) Element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) at Fort Greely, AK, 

Vandenburg Air Force Base, CA, and the 100th GMD Brigade’s Missile Defense Element at Schriever Air Force Base, CO. These soldiers, as part of the joint team, continue to serve as our Nation’s first line of defense against any launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile toward our shores. I am proud to represent them along 

with the other members of the Army and joint integrated missile defense community. 

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND JOINT FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND FOR

INTEGRATED MISSILE DEFENSE: PLANNING, INTEGRATING, AND COORDINATING MIS- SILE DEFENSE

The Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense 

(JFCC–IMD), USSTRATCOM’s global missile defense integrating element, has been 

operational for 3 years. The JFCC–IMD continues to be manned by very capable 

Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and civilian personnel. 

USSTRATCOM, through the JFCC–IMD, continues to aggressively execute its 

mission to globally plan, integrate, and coordinate missile defense operations. 

Through a deliberate training and exercise program, the JFCC–IMD has improved 

our collective ability to defend this Nation. While the organization is still maturing, 

JFCC–IMD continues to lead the Department’s transformation toward more robust 

integrated missile defense capabilities. The soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and 

civilians of this joint warfighting organization execute our mission to plan, integrate, and coordinate global missile defense operations and support by 

operationalizing new capabilities from MDA, developing global missile defense plans 

in collaboration with the geographical combatant commanders, and conducting 

cross-geographical combatant commander exercises to eliminate seams and gaps in 

order to maintain a strong defense against advancing threats. In summary, JFCC–

IMD continues to build operational competence and warfighter confidence in the 

execution of our mission. 

Continued Ballistic Missile Defense System Progress 

This past year has been another year of operational achievement for integrated 

missile defense. Since the last time I addressed this committee, the Global BMDS 

has gone from test bed operations to a system configured to support continuous defensive operations. Whether a test bed with a residual operational capability, or an 

operational system that supports research and development activities, it is understood that our efforts and decisions must be entirely focused along two lines—operational capability and spiral development of the BMDS. We balance both fielding 

of near-term and development of long-term capabilities to meet the evolving threat 

to the Homeland. This balance cannot be achieved without comprehensive dialogue 

between MDA, the Services, and the warfighters—dialogue that is ongoing today 

and dialogue that must continue in the future. 

We are continuing to expand the current ballistic missile defense operational configuration. This past year, the early warning radar at Fylingdales Royal Air Force 

Base was upgraded to perform the missile defense mission. This radar is a key element of the BMDS for providing the initial limited defense capabilities to counter 

the emerging ballistic missile threat from Southwest Asia. The radar will also continue to perform its traditional role as an early warning radar. The addition of this 

radar marks the beginning of the integration of BMDS capabilities across five combatant commands to counter simultaneous ballistic missile threats from two ends 

of the globe. We expect the warfighting capability provided by such integration of 

platforms, doctrine, and personnel to continue to grow in the coming years to address emerging threats. 

Continued Warfighter Contributions to BMDS Development 

As warfighters, we continue to participate in key BMDS tests to build confidence 

in the system’s capabilities and provide input to future capabilities. For example, 

the 100th Missile Defense Brigade provided a trained and certified crew in support 

of a successful GMD flight test on September 28, 2007. Their support started with 

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participation in pre-mission training conducted in both Huntsville, AL, and at their 

GMD Fire Control consoles at the Missile Defense Element at Schriever Air Force 

Base, CO. The crew provided critical expertise that enhanced system performance, 

assisting the engineers with validation of pre-mission parameters. These pre-mission events culminated with the conduct of the flight test, where the crew provided 

the Human-In-Control actions necessary for a successful launch and intercept. The 

brigade will also support the upcoming GMD flight test. For this flight test, the AN/

TPY–2 Forward Based X-Band and Sea Based X-band radars will be integrated into 

the GMD system to validate their operational utility and to provide data for anchoring our modeling and simulation efforts. 

Since last year’s testimony to this committee, we successfully intercepted ballistic 

missiles at low and high altitudes; in midcourse and terminal phases; and in endoand exoatmospheric environments with our long-range ground-based interceptor, the 

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and several Aegis Standard Missile-3s. We supported an international BMD partner with a successful 

exoatmospheric intercept from a Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force Destroyer. 

Conducting these system level flight and ground tests required the use of operational assets, the same assets that would be used to defend this Nation and our 

allies against a possible rogue state missile attack. JFCC–IMD worked closely with 

the combatant commanders and MDA to coordinate the availability of these assets 

to ensure sustained operational readiness during the conduct of the system level 

tests. 

The JFCC–IMD was able to balance the requirements of both operations and 

tests. This period of robust achievements underscored the warfighter’s requirement 

to expedite development and deployment of a concurrent testing, training, and operations (CTTO) capability. We have made strides but we still have a ways to go. 

CTTO will permit developers and operators to maintain an operational capability of 

the BMDS while simultaneously developing, testing, or training on the system. Absent a mature CTTO capability, JFCC–IMD aggressively conducts an asset management process to ensure the highest level of operational readiness during the conduct 

of materiel development and tests. 

Continued Advancements in System Capability 

JFCC–IMD, in partnership with MDA and the Services, has integrated additional 

missile defense sensors and shooters to enhance theater and strategic mission capabilities. We have institutionalized the Operational Readiness and Acceptance process to deliberately activate capabilities by baselining the known capabilities and 

limitations. Through this process, activation criteria, which are critical to establishing and maintaining capabilities, are clearly defined to ensure sustainable 

means are provided to the warfighter. 

We continue to refine our processes to ensure the warfighters’ desired operational 

capabilities are considered by the materiel developer. Since I last appeared, the 

Warfighter Involvement Process (WIP) has matured significantly. Warfighter inputs 

and subsequent changes to the overall BMDS of systems started slowly but are 

steadily increasing in effectiveness. After 2 years of operator-generated input, we 

are now seeing changes incorporated in the BMDS. More significantly, capability requests are being reflected in USSTRATCOM’s Prioritized Capability List submissions and in MDA’s corresponding Achievable Capabilities List. 

A success story in the WIP is our partnership with MDA, the Services, and the 

combatant commanders in the expansion of the BMD capability into the European 

theater. In my role as the JFCC–IMD Commander, I have held discussions with the 

European Command to build stronger partnerships with our Allies should our Government conclude agreements for hosting a midcourse radar and interceptor site in 

Europe. If approved, the expansion of the BMDS into Europe will greatly increase 

the security of the United States as well as provide a measure of protection to our 

forward deployed forces and European allies that currently does not exist. 

Looking forward, we are engaged with the Department to balance the missile defense portfolio to ensure we are addressing both the threats of today and tomorrow. 

With more than 20 countries, several of which have an adversarial relationship with 

the United States, now possessing ballistic missile capability and technology, the 

threat to the United States and our allies is growing. The missile defense investment portfolio must address the warfighter needs for the near-term threats from 

these countries while developing new technologies to deter potential adversaries 

from their continued investment in ballistic missile technologies. 

Taking Care of our Warfighters 

If we receive approval to proceed with a European capability, we need to ensure 

we provide quality facilities and services to our soldiers. If built, the European capaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:11 Dec 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00163 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\42635.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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bility will most certainly be an enduring mission. The mission support infrastructure (barracks and morale and welfare facilities) is just as important to mission success as the hardware the soldiers will operate. We believe that the mission support 

facilities ‘‘outside the wire’’ are an integral part of the overall system. The investment in mission support infrastructure contributes immensely to the overall reliability of the system and the cost represents a very low percentage of the overall 

system construction and fielding cost. 

We should continue to work to improve the quality of life at our missile defense 

garrison at Fort Greely, AK. Soldiers in the 49th Missile Defense Battalion of the 

Alaska Army National Guard continue to defend the United States from ballistic 

missile attack from the remoteness of Fort Greely, AK. They continue to do so in 

an outstanding manner, without complaint, in an environment with infrastructure 

that does not meet current standards. While the Army is taking proactive steps to 

improve the quality of life at Fort Greely, the isolation of this remote location cannot be overstated. On the positive front, the Army recently awarded a contract to 

privatize the family housing at Fort Greely—soldiers and their families should start 

to realize significant housing improvements in the near future. Also, the Army is 

currently planning to replace an existing substandard fire station with one that will 

provide adequate coverage for Fort Greely’s population and infrastructure. Challenges still remain as there is very limited support in the local community with respect to medical and dental care, special education needs, higher education opportunities, restaurant establishments, and other services that the vast majority of us 

take for granted. For example, the nearest medical specialist is over 2 hours away. 

This is very problematic, especially when one considers the extreme weather during 

the winter months. Our soldiers and their families deserve more—we need to provide the adequate facilities and the services they need. The Army will continue to 

address these challenges to ensure better living conditions are realized for our soldiers and their families. 

Army Infrastructure Contributions 

The Army also provides key test range assets for BMDS research and development. In addition to providing other vital Department capabilities, these unique facilities continue to serve as key BMDS enhancers for MDA. The United States Army 

Kwajalein Atoll/Reagan Test Site (USAKA/RTS) in the Republic of the Marshall Islands has been instrumental in the development and testing of the GMD system. 

USAKA/RTS will continue to serve as a significant test bed for future BMDS technology development. Also, within the BMDS arena, the High Energy Laser Systems 

Test Facility on White Sands Missile Range, NM, is serving as a key lethality test 

bed for MDA’s Airborne Laser Program. We ask for your continued support to ensure these vital testing ranges are postured to perform necessary BMDS testing. 

AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE—AN OVERVIEW OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2009 ARMY BUDGET

SUBMISSION

In addition to deploying the BMDS, MDA, the Services, and the combatant commanders continue to focus on improving theater air and missile defense capabilities. 

GMD and Theater Air and Missile Defense Systems are vital for the protection of 

our Homeland, deployed forces, friends, and allies. Air and missile defense is a key 

component in support of the Army’s core competency of providing relevant and 

ready land power to combatant commanders. 

As the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army have previously testified, the 

Army is stretched after years of operating at war. To relieve the stress on the force, 

the Army is embarking on a path to restore balance. The Army’s plan centers on 

four imperatives—sustain, prepare, reset, and transform. As we have seen with 

other Army combat capabilities, the requirement for air and missile defense units 

continues to grow, stretching the force. Operation Iraqi Freedom consumes significant quantities of our key missile defense capabilities, leaving other worldwide commitments underresourced. 

Already well underway, the Army has created composite air and missile defense 

battalions to transform the Air Defense Artillery into a more responsive and agile 

organization. These battalions address capability gaps, permitting us to defeat 

cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles while maintaining our ability to defend critical assets from the ballistic missile threat. Composite air and missile defense battalions will capitalize on the synergies of two previously separate disciplines—short-range air and missile defense and high-to-medium altitude air and 

missile defense. Additionally, the Army has pooled air defense artillery battalions 

at the theater-level to provide air and missile defense protection based on the situation and mission requirements. This pooling concept supports the Army’s effort to 

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move to modular designs that allow force tailoring of units better sized to meet the 

combatant commander’s needs. 

With that as a brief background, let me now focus on the Army’s fiscal year 2009 

budget submission for air and missile defense systems. The recently submitted 

President’s budget includes approximately $2.23 billion with which the Army proposes to execute current Army air and missile defense responsibilities and focus on 

future development and enhancements of both terminal phase and short-range air 

and missile defense systems. In short, the Army is continuing major efforts to improve the ability to provide warning, acquire, track, intercept, and destroy theater 

air and missile threats. 

Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) System of Systems (SoS) 

In order to enhance its ability to destroy theater air and missile threats, the Army 

is continuing to transform its air and missile defense force from its traditional system-centric architecture to an integrated, component-based, IAMD SoS. The Army 

IAMD SoS Program provides full, network-centric, plug-and-flight integration of existing and future air and missile defense systems and enables their full technical, 

functional, and procedural integration into the joint IAMD arena. This 

modularization of air and missile defense capabilities will allow Joint Force Commanders to scale and tailor air and missile defense components functioning interdependently to deliver operational capabilities not achievable by the individual elements of the system. Given the diversified air and missile threat set and the limited 

resources to address the threat, development of IAMD SoS is the Army’s top air and 

missile defense priority. 

In addition to the IAMD SoS interdependent capabilities, the Army’s air defense 

community has initiated plans to meet the future challenges and demands, taking 

steps to sustain, prepare, reset, and transform our forces and equipment. These 

plans entail three main component areas of the Army’s air and missile defense construct—terminal phase ballistic missile defense, cruise missile defense, and force 

protection. 

Terminal Phase Ballistic Missile Defenses 

The Patriot/Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) capability is designed to counter theater ballistic missile threats in their terminal phase in addition 

to cruise missiles and other air-breathing threats. Combining these systems with 

the soon to be deployed THAAD system brings an unprecedented level of protection 

against missile attacks to deployed U.S. forces, friends, and allies well into the future. 

Patriot/Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC–3) Overview 

Patriot is the world’s only battle proven theater AMD system and will be a key 

AMD element for the next two decades, providing combatant commanders with modular, scalable, mission-tailored capabilities to greatly enhance operational force protection in support of the joint team. The Patriot is the Nation’s only deployed, landbased, short-to-medium range BMDS capability. 

The Army recognized that the Patriot force was heavily stressed and therefore developed a strategy to Grow-the-Force through a combination of pure-fleeting the existing Patriot force to PAC–3 capability and standing up two additional PAC–3 battalions. This strategy will increase our capacity to handle today’s threat and alleviate logistical and training challenges of maintaining two separate Patriot configurations. Pure-fleeting of the Patriot force with PAC–3 will allow for improved capability and higher lethality against the Theater Ballistic Missile (TBM) and non-TBM 

threat as well as enable commonality across all Doctrine, Organization, Training, 

Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities domains in the Patriot 

force. Also, the additional two battalions of Patriot PAC–3 capability will meet the 

growing demands of the combatant commanders to provide global AMD against the 

entire threat set. Fiscal year 2007 reprogramming actions and fiscal year 2008 funding initiated this strategy—funding in the amount of $492.8 million in the fiscal 

year 2009 budget request will complete these initiatives and continue Patriot modifications. 

Last year, my statement addressed the ongoing Patriot fixes to operational deficiencies that were deemed necessary as a result of friendly fire incidents. The Army 

has taken steps to address lessons learned and correct the deficiencies. Based on 

the current fielding schedule, all Operation Iraqi Freedom fixes will be completed 

during fiscal year 2009. 

Medium Extended Air Defense System Overview 

A top Army priority system for defense against short- and medium-range tactical 

ballistic missiles and air breathing threats, the MEADS will be an integral part of 

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the Army Integrated AMD SOS and capable of operating within a joint and coalition 

operational environment. The system will provide wide-area protection at strategic, 

operational, and tactical levels. 

MEADS, a cooperative development program with Germany and Italy, will provide a lighter, more deployable, maneuverable, lethal, network-centric AMD capability. The program also includes development of the PAC–3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) as the objective tri-national MEADS missile. The PAC–3 MSE is 

currently under development and will be integrated into the MEADS program. The 

MSE missile will provide a more agile and lethal interceptor that expands the engagement envelope of this system. The fiscal year 2009 budget request includes 

funding for MSE initial production facilities—production of the MSE is scheduled 

to begin in 2010. Fielding of MEADS is scheduled to begin in 2015 and be completed 

by 2028. We are confident that this path will provide our forces, allies, friends, and 

our Nation with the most capable air and missile defense system possible. 

Terminal High Attitude Area Defense System Overview 

The Department of Defense is committed to fielding an advanced capability to defend against tactical ballistic missiles as soon as possible. THAAD is designed to 

provide a layered theater ballistic missile defense in support of the short- and medium-range ballistic missile threat. MDA is funding and manufacturing four 

THAAD batteries for the Army in an accelerated fielding that will commence in 

2009. THAAD capabilities will begin to transfer to the Army in 2009. Synchronization between the Army and MDA is crucial in both the development and funding 

areas in order to ensure that the transition delivers a supportable warfighting system. 

To fully optimize the performance of the Patriot, MEADS, and THAAD defense 

systems, effective personnel training and development is essential. The United 

States Army Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill, OK, will provide our Nation 

with the best trained, organized, and equipped Air Defense Artillery leaders and 

units in response to current operational needs and future force warfighting concepts. 

Joint Tactical Ground Station 

Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS) is a transportable information processing 

system that receives and processes in-theater, direct down-linked data from Defense 

Support Program satellites. JTAGS provides our commanders with early warning of 

ballistic missile attack and essential information to defeat TBMs. The system disseminates warning, alerting, and cueing information on TBMs, and other tactical 

events of interest throughout the theater using existing communications networks. 

JTAGS determines the TBM source by identifying missile launch point and time 

and provides an estimation of impact point and time. Since the system is located 

in-theater, it reduces the possibility of single-point-failure in long-haul communication systems and is responsive to the theater commander. JTAGS also fulfills the 

in-theater role of USSTRATCOM’s Theater Event System (TES). It is imperative 

that JTAGS be funded to integrate and evolve to use the next generation of Space 

Based Infrared System sensors. This will significantly enhance warning accuracy 

and timeliness while improving all aspects of theater missile defense. We request 

your continued support of this essential capability. 

Cruise Missile Defense 

Our adversaries understand the value of cruise missiles. They are inherently very 

difficult targets to detect, engage, and destroy, and when armed with a weapon of 

mass destruction warhead, the effects from a cruise missile are catastrophic. The 

Army’s Cruise Missile Defense Program is an integral element of the joint cruise 

missile defense architecture. We are also working closely with the joint community 

to assure development of doctrine that synchronizes our military’s full capabilities 

against the cruise missile threat. Critical Army components of the joint cruise missile defense architecture are provided by the Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System, the Surface-Launched Advanced Medium 

Range Air-to-Air Missile, and the Patriot MSE missile. These systems are on schedule to provide an initial operational capability by 2012. Additionally, these systems 

will be networked within the IAMD SoS architecture, have an integrated fire control 

capability, and operate within a common command and control system. Initial operational capability is planned for 2014. 

Force Protection 

In the conduct of Operation Iraqi Freedom, insurgents continue to pose serious 

dangers by employing indirect-fire tactics of quick-attack, low-trajectory, urban-terrain-masked rocket, artillery, and mortar (RAM) strikes against U.S. forward operating bases in Iraq. To combat this threat, the Army developed a Counter-Rocket, 

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Artillery, Mortar (C–RAM) capability—an integrated set of capabilities to provide 

warning and intercept of RAM threats. The primary mission of the C–RAM project 

is to develop, procure, field, and maintain a capability that can detect RAM 

launches; warn the defended area with sufficient time for personnel to take cover; 

intercept rounds in flight, thus preventing damage to ground forces or facilities; and 

enhance response to and defeat of enemy forces. C–RAM utilizes a SOS approach 

and is comprised of a combination of multi-service fielded and non-developmental 

item sensors, command and control elements, and a modified U.S. Navy intercept 

system. The system utilizes a low cost commercial off-the-shelf warning system and 

a wireless local area network. Advances in the C–RAM capability will continue with 

funding that is requested in the fiscal year 2009 budget submit. 

Efforts are also underway to use the benefits of directed energy to potentially 

counter the RAM threat. Developmental work by joint entities within the Department is producing results that are promising. Within the next few years, through 

the Army’s High Energy Laser Technology Demonstration Program, we are very 

hopeful we will produce a mobile solid state laser weapon system that will serve 

as a complementary resource to the present and future kinetic energy capability in 

countering RAM projectiles. Your continued support in this area will ensure we advance indirect fire protection capabilities. 

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, the Army is a member of the joint team fighting an adaptive 

enemy in a persistent conflict while transforming to meet future threats. We have 

responsibility for GMD, THAAD, Patriot, and MEADS and will continue developing 

and fielding an integrated missile defense for our Nation, deployed forces, friends, 

and allies. USSTRATCOM, through the JFCC–IMD, will continue to develop a joint 

BMDS capability to protect our Nation, deployed forces, friends, and allies. The fiscal year 2009 budget proposal supports the transformation of the Army’s air, space, 

and missile defense force to support the Army’s future force, the Joint Integrated 

AMD System, and our global BMDS. We will continue to work with MDA, the Services, and component commanders to define the characteristics of the emerging air, 

space, and missile defense force and determine how it can best support the 

warfighter and our Nation. 

I appreciate having the opportunity to speak on these important matters and look 

forward to addressing any questions you or the other committee members may have.

STATEMENT OF DR. CHARLES E. MCQUEARY, DIRECTOR, 

OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION, DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE

[The prepared statement of Dr. McQueary follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. CHARLES E. MCQUEARY

Mr. Chairman, Senator Sessions, distinguished members of the subcommittee, 

good afternoon. I am pleased to have this opportunity to speak to you about the testing of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). I will cover five areas. 

First, I will give you my current assessment of the capability of the BMDS. 

Second, I will discuss the factor that limited my ability to provide a thorough assessment as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2006. 

Third, I will discuss the sufficiency and adequacy of the BMDS test and evaluation program during the past year. 

Fourth, I will provide a review of the implementation of the Director, Operational 

Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) recommendations made to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). 

Finally, I will describe how the MDA is a pathfinder for the implementation of 

section 231 language from the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2007. 

FIRST: MY ASSESSMENT

As General Obering has already pointed out, the MDA had a good year of testing 

in 2007. 

Patriot demonstrated that it generally meets its operational requirements with 

some limitations for specific threat missiles. Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense demonstrated the capability to detect, track, and engage short- and medium-range ballistic missile targets in the midcourse phase with Standard Missile-3 missiles. AlVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:11 Dec 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00167 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\42635.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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though Ground-based Midcourse Defense is still developmental in nature, it demonstrated to some degree many of the functions required for system effectiveness. 

As a result, I can state that the BMDS has a limited capability to defend against 

simple, ballistic missile threats launched from North Korea toward the United 

States. 

SECOND: THE LIMITATION

Mr. Chairman, as I told this committee last year, I was particularly concerned 

that verified, validated, and accredited models and simulations would not be available to help me complete my assessment of BMDS capability. My concern was wellfounded. 

Because of the same concern, General Obering diverted MDA resources to meet 

our mutual modeling and simulation requirements. He had his team create an ensemble of models and simulations, called Performance Assessment 07, to replicate 

system-level BMDS performance. Unfortunately, the effort and changes required 

were too great for the time available to accomplish them. Although many MDA element models are well along toward verification and validation, integrating them 

into a system-level BMDS performance model that can be verified, validated, and 

accredited did not happen and will not happen quickly. 

Between the Performance Assessment 07 and the fiscal year 2007 ground test program, the BMDS Operational Test Agency Team attempted to accredit 33 models 

and simulations to support my assessment. The team was able to partially accredit, 

with caveats, only five of theses models. From this attempt, however, the MDA 

learned many valuable lessons about adequate and effective verification and validation that it can apply to this continuing effort. It will be some time before these 

models are ready and sufficient flight test data exists to anchor them so they can 

be properly verified, validated, and accredited for use. 

THIRD: THE TEST PROGRAM

The pace and content of the MDA test program are proper for the developmental 

nature and maturity level of the various elements that constitute the BMDS. Although some would like to test more frequently, General Obering’s deliberate approach to test-analyze-fix-test is warranted for this highly complex system. Analysis 

of large volumes of test data, frequently measured in terabytes, is an important step 

in this process that cannot be short-changed. It is very important to understand the 

results of one complex test before proceeding to the next test. I strongly support his 

approach. 

Unfortunately, the slower test pace results in limited test data for use in 

verifying, validating, and accrediting models and simulations. As I discussed previously, this has impacted my ability to characterization BMDS performance. 

Target availability, reliability, and performance have also been factors frustrating 

the flight test program and impacting test adequacy. During the 18 month period 

concluding December 31, 2007, MDA suffered 4 target failures during 20 flight tests 

conducted by various elements of the BMDS. These failures not only impacted critical data collection, but also forced changes to flight test schedules. 

To be fair, the MDA is not alone in this experience with a target program. Targets 

are a Department-wide problem impacting ground, sea, and air programs, both for 

acquisition and training. The targets we need to adequately test the systems we are 

acquiring are nearly as sophisticated and costly as the threats they are trying to 

replicate and the weapons we are developing to counter them. 

On a positive note, my office and the BMDS Operational Test Agency Team are 

active participants in the MDA’s test planning and execution processes. The MDA 

implements many of our recommendations into the combined developmental and 

operational test program. Every ground and flight test includes both developmental 

and operational test objectives. As a group, we attempt to maximize operational realism in each test without impacting developmental objectives. In lieu of independent operational testing, this has been a valuable and effective approach to give 

warfighters time to operate the system and test their tactics, techniques, and procedures. 

FOURTH: THE RECOMMENDATIONS

Mr. Chairman, in your invitation to address the committee, you asked me to provide an assessment of the MDA’s implementation of DOT&E recommendations 

made to the Agency. I will do that now. 

There were 26 recommendations in the fiscal year 2005 annual report. Four recommendations are still open, and the MDA is acting on each of them. Two involve 

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ongoing data collection, one involves the future test schedule, and one deals with 

the test planning process. 

There were 15 new recommendations in the fiscal year 2006 annual report. Six 

of these recommendations remain open; all are being worked by the MDA. Four involve demonstrations of specific capabilities during actual intercept tests, one involves Information Assurance, and one involves targets. 

There are five new recommendations in the fiscal year 2007 annual report. All 

are still open and being actively worked by the MDA. One involves targets, one involves ongoing data collection, one is scheduled for completion during the next 

Ground-based Midcourse Defense flight test this summer, one involves modeling and 

simulation, and one requires a review of previously completed testing. 

The year-by-year reduction in the number of recommendations made by DOT&E 

is indicative of the progress the MDA is making in the BMDS developmental test 

program. 

I only advise the MDA on its developmental test program. General Obering and 

his staff recognize the value of our suggestions and recommendations. A more capable BMDS is our mutual goal. I am satisfied with the MDA’s response to the recommendations in our annual reports. 

FINALLY: THE PATHFINDER

On December 22, 2007, Under Secretary John Young and I signed a revision to 

Department of Defense Test and Evaluation Policy. The new policy was a response 

to the requirement in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, 

to review and reaffirm or modify test and evaluation policy as appropriate. 

This new policy made developmental testing (DT) and operational testing (OT) integrated and seamless throughout the system life cycle. 

Although we didn’t have the MDA in mind when we developed this policy, the 

MDA is a model for this approach today as it develops, tests, and fields the BMDS. 

Several years ago, General Obering created a combined test force that embeds the 

operational test organization with his developmental test organization while maintaining the operational test organization’s independence. This has worked well. As 

a result, the MDA has been able to transition to combined DT/OT as early as possible during the development and acquisition of the BMDS. As BMDS weapons elements mature, combined DT/OT test objectives are moving from a developmental 

emphasis to an operational emphasis. 

The MDA is a pathfinder for demonstrating integrated and seamless DT and OT 

in the department. The warfighters are, and will continue to be, the clear beneficiaries of this new policy. 

IN CONCLUSION

The MDA experienced another good year with its ground and flight test programs. 

Hit-to-kill is no longer a technological uncertainty; it is a reality, being successfully 

demonstrated many times over the past few years. The challenge now is to demonstrate hit-to-kill in more complex target scenes that include not only target deployment artifacts but countermeasures as well. General Obering has this in his future test plans. 

Individual element successes indicate their growing capabilities. Integrated 

ground testing of the BMDS continues to demonstrate that the warfighters understand and can operate the system confidently and effectively. There is still a long 

way to go, but the MDA’s disciplined and principled approach to flight and ground 

tests is continuing to pay real dividends. 

This concludes my remarks and I welcome your questions.

STATEMENT OF PAUL L. FRANCIS, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION 

AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Francis follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY PAUL FRANCIS

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today 

to discuss the Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) strategy for acquiring a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) and its progress in fielding Block 2006—its second increment of capability. 

MDA has been charged with developing and fielding the BMDS, a system expected to be capable of defending the United States, deployed troops, friends, and 

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allies against ballistic missiles of all ranges in all phases of flight. In fulfilling this 

charge, MDA placed an initial set of missile defense components in the field in December 2005. These components are collectively referred to as Block 2004. Recently, 

MDA delivered its second increment of capability—Block 2006—which includes additional components as well as performance enhancements. 

The National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 2002 and 2006 mandated that we prepare annual assessments of MDA’s ongoing cost, schedule, testing, 

and performance progress. In March 2008, we issued our report covering MDA’s 

progress toward achieving Block 2006 goals during fiscal year 2007 as well as its 

efforts to improve transparency, accountability, and oversight. My statement today 

will focus on the issues covered in that report. We conducted this performance audit 

from May 2007 to March 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

SUMMARY

During Block 2006, MDA fielded additional and new assets, enhanced the capability of some existing assets, and achieved most test objectives. In short, MDA increased BMDS capability. However, MDA did not meet the goals it originally set for 

the block. Ultimately, MDA fielded fewer assets, increased costs by about $1 billion, 

and conducted fewer tests. Even with the cost increase, MDA deferred work to keep 

Block 2006 costs from increasing further, as some contractors overran their fiscal 

year 2007 budgets. We could not determine the full cost of the block as deferred 

work is no longer counted as part of the block. Further, several BMDS contractors 

plan work in such a way that could result in MDA incurring costs that are not yet 

recognized. We could not assess attainment of another MDA goal: the overall performance of fielded assets as an integrated BMDS. This is because: (1) there have 

not been enough flight tests to validate the models and simulations that are used 

to predict system-level performance, (2) the reliability of some interceptors could be 

affected by problematic parts that have not been replaced yet, and (3) tests done 

to date do not provide enough information for the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 

operational test and evaluation director to fully determine if the BMDS is suitable 

and effective for battle. 

MDA has been given unprecedented funding and decisionmaking flexibility that 

has expedited the fielding of assets but also lessened the transparency and accountability provided for oversight. In the past year, MDA has taken significant actions 

to improve oversight. First, MDA has adopted a new block approach that offers several improvements—unit costs for selected assets will now be tracked and work will 

no longer be deferred from one block to another. Second, DOD has established an 

executive board to review and make recommendations on MDA’s acquisition strategy, plans, and funding that could play a more significant role than its predecessor. 

Third, Congress directed that MDA begin using procurement funds to purchase certain assets, which generally means they must be fully paid for in the year they are 

bought. Previously, using research and development funding, MDA could pay for assets over several years, making it difficult to determine their cost. Some oversight 

concerns remain, however. For example, although MDA plans to do so, it has not 

yet estimated the total cost of any block, therefore it cannot have block costs independently verified, as is done for other major programs. While the new executive 

board promises to be more substantive than the previous Missile Defense Support 

Group, it will not have the information—such as on cost estimates and operational 

testing—to provide the oversight the Defense Acquisition Board provides on other 

major programs. The new board, like its predecessor, does not have approval authority. The executive board also faces the unique challenge of evaluating technology development efforts that range from $2 billion to about $5 billion a year—efforts that 

normally do not have a firm cost, schedule, and performance baseline. 

We have previously made recommendations to improve oversight in the areas that 

MDA has recently taken action. In March 2008, we also made recommendations to 

build on the actions already taken to further improve the transparency of block 

costs and oversight of the BMDS program. These included having MDA develop a 

full cost estimate for each block of BMDS capability with verification of that estimate, and examine ways to develop a baseline or some other standard against which 

the progress of technology programs may be assessed. We also recommended that 

MDA and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation agree on criteria and incorporate corresponding scope into developmental tests that will allow a determinaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:11 Dec 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00170 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\42635.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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1The BMDS also includes a 10th element, Patriot Advanced Capability-3 which has been 

transferred to the Army for production, operation, and sustainment. This report does not evaluate Patriot because its initial development is complete and is now being managed by the Army. 

tion of whether a block of BMDS capability is suitable and effective for fielding. 

DOD concurred with having MDA develop block cost estimates and obtaining independent verification of those estimates. DOD partially concurred with the recommendations regarding examining ways to measure the progress of technology programs and adding scope to developmental tests. 

BACKGROUND

Funded at $8 billion to nearly $10 billion annually, MDA’s BMDS is the largest 

research development program in DOD’s budget. Since the 1980s, DOD has spent 

more that $100 billion to develop and field the BMDS and it estimates that continued development and fielding will require an additional $50 billion between fiscal 

years 2008 and 2013. 

Since 2002, MDA has worked to fulfill its mission through its development and 

fielding of a diverse collection of land-, air-, sea-, and space-based assets. These assets are developed and fielded through nine BMDS elements and include the Airborne Laser (ABL); Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD); BMDS Sensors; 

Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC); Groundbased Midcourse Defense (GMD); Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI); Multiple Kill 

Vehicles (MKV); Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS); and Terminal 

High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD).1

To develop a system capable of carrying out its mission, MDA, until December 

2007, executed an acquisition strategy in which the development of missile defense 

capabilities was organized in 2-year increments known as blocks. Each block was 

intended to provide capabilities that enhanced the development and overall performance of the BMDS. The first 2-year block, known as Block 2004, fielded a limited 

initial capability that included early versions of the GMD, Aegis BMD, Patriot Advanced Capability-3, and C2BMC elements. The agency’s second 2-year block—Block 

2006—culminated on December 31, 2007, and fielded additional BMDS assets. This 

block also provided improved GMD interceptors, enhanced Aegis BMD missiles, upgraded Aegis BMD ships, a Forward-Based X-Band-Transportable radar, and enhancements to C2BMC software. In December 2007, MDA’s Director approved a new 

block construct that will be the basis for all future development and fielding, which 

I will discuss in more detail shortly. 

To assess progress during Block 2006, we examined the accomplishments of nine 

BMDS elements that MDA is developing and fielding. Our work included examining 

documents such as Program Execution Reviews, test plans and reports, production 

plans, and Contract Performance Reports. We also interviewed officials within each 

element program office and within MDA functional directorates. In addition, we discussed each element’s test program and its results with DOD’s Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation. Regarding transparency, accountability, and 

oversight, we held discussions with officials in MDA’s Directorate of Business Operations to determine whether its new block structure improved accountability and 

transparency of the BMDS. In addition, we reviewed pertinent sections of the U.S. 

Code to compare MDA’s current level of accountability with Federal acquisition 

laws. We also interviewed officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and DOD’s Joint Staff to discuss the oversight role of the new Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB). Additionally, we reviewed the MDEB charter to identify the oversight responsibility of the board. 

FIELDED CAPABILITY INCREASED, BUT LESS THAN PLANNED AT HIGHER COST

MDA made progress in developing and fielding the BMDS during 2007. Additional 

assets were fielded and/or upgraded, several tests met planned objectives, and other 

development activities were conducted. On the other hand, fewer assets were fielded 

than originally planned, some tests were delayed, and the cost of the block increased 

by approximately $1 billion. To stay within the revised budget despite increasing 

contractor costs, MDA deferred some budgeted work to future blocks. Such deferrals, 

coupled with a planning methodology too often used by some contractors that could 

obscure cost reporting, prevent us from determining the full cost of Block 2006. 

MDA was able to meet most test objectives despite delays in several elements’ test 

schedules. Neither we nor DOD could evaluate the aggregate performance of fielded 

assets because flight testing to date has not generated sufficient data. An evaluation 

of aggregate performance would also have to consider that: (1) some parts in fielded 

interceptors identified as potentially problematic have not been replaced yet, and (2) 

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2 In March 2006, MDA made reductions to its block 2006 goals. It was able in nearly all instances to meet or exceed these revised goals. Two elements—GMD and C2BMC—were able to 

exceed their revised fielding goals. In addition, the Aegis BMD element was able to meet its 

revised block goals for one of its two components. The program upgraded all planned ships, but 

fielded three fewer Aegis BMD Standard Missile-3s (SM–3) than planned because the missiles 

were delayed into 2008 to accommodate an unanticipated requirement to deliver three missiles 

to Japan. 3 Earned Value Management (EVM) is a program management tool that integrates the technical, cost, and schedule parameters of a contract. During the planning phase, an integrated 

baseline is developed by time phasing budget resources for defined work. As work is performed 

and measured against the baseline, the corresponding budget value is ‘‘earned.’’ Using this 

earned value metric; cost and schedule variances can be determined and analyzed. EVM is program management that provides significant benefits to both the Government and the contractor. 

tests done to date do not provide enough information for DOD’s independent test 

organization to fully determine if the BMDS is suitable and effective for battle. 

Fielding of Assets and Cost 

During Block 2006, MDA increased its inventory of BMDS assets while enhancing 

the system’s performance. It fielded 14 additional Ground-Based Interceptors, 12 

Aegis BMD missiles designed to engage more advanced threats, 4 new Aegis BMD 

destroyers, 1 new Aegis BMD cruiser, and 8 Web browsers and 1 software suite for 

C2BMC. In addition, MDA upgraded half of its Aegis BMD ship fleet, successfully 

conducted four Aegis BMD and two GMD intercept tests, and completed a number 

of ground tests to demonstrate the capability of BMDS components. 

MDA was unable to deliver all assets originally planned for Block 2006.2 The Sensors element was the only Block 2006 element to meet all of its original goals set 

in March 2005 while the remaining elements—GMD, Aegis BMD, C2BMC—did not 

meet all of their original quantity goals. Sensors delivered a second Forward-Based 

X-Band Radar, Transportable (FBX–T) in January 2007 while the GMD element 

fielded 14 of the 15 Ground-Based Interceptors originally planned during Block 

2006. Last year, we reported that MDA delayed the partial upgrade of the Thule 

early warning radar—one of GMD’s original goals—until a full upgrade could be accomplished. Additionally, the Aegis BMD element delivered 4 additional destroyers 

and 1 new cruiser as originally planned, but delivered 12 of the 19 SM–3 missiles 

planned for the block. C2BMC did not deliver two of the three software suites originally planned for Block 2006, but did provide the needed capability less expensively 

through Web browsers and other techniques. 

The work MDA completed for Block 2006 cost more than planned. In March 2007, 

we reported that MDA’s cost goal for Block 2006 increased by approximately $1 billion because of greater than expected GMD operations and sustainment costs and 

technical problems. If the contractors continue to perform as they did in fiscal year 

2007, we estimate that at completion, the cumulative overrun in the contracts could 

be between about $1.3 billion and $1.9 billion. To stay within its revised budget, 

MDA deferred some work it expected to accomplish during the block. When work 

is deferred, its costs are no longer accounted for in the original block. In other 

words, if work planned and budgeted for Block 2006 was deferred to Block 2008, 

that work would be counted as a Block 2008 cost. Because MDA did not track the 

cost of the deferred work, the agency could not make an adjustment that would have 

matched the cost with the correct block. Consequently, we were unable to determine 

the full cost of Block 2006. 

Another reason why it is difficult to determine the actual cost of Block 2006 is 

a planning methodology too often employed by some MDA prime contractors that 

can obscure the full cost of work. Contractors typically divide the total work of a 

contract into small efforts in order to define them more clearly and to ensure proper 

oversight. Work may be planned into categories including: (1) level of effort—work 

that contains tasks of a general or supportive nature and does not produce a definite 

end product; and (2) discrete—work that has a definable end product or event. 

When work is discrete, delivery of the end product provides a sound basis for determining actual contractor performance. When discrete work is instead planned as 

level of effort, the contractor’s performance becomes less transparent because work 

is considered complete when the time planned for it has expired, whether or not the 

intended product has been completed. Earned value management does not recognize 

such variances in completing scheduled work and to the extent more work has to 

be done to complete the product, additional costs could be incurred that are not yet 

recognized.3 Many of MDA’s prime contractors plan a large percentage of their work 

as level of effort. MDA officials agree that its contractors have improperly planned 

discrete work as level of effort, and are taking steps to remedy the situation. 

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4GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Acquisition Strategy Generates Results but Delivers Less at a Higher Cost, GAO–07–387 (Washington, DC: March 15, 2007). BMDS performance goals included a numerical goal for the probability of a successful BMDS engagement, a 

defined area from which the BMDS would prevent an enemy from launching a ballistic missile, 

and a defined area that the BMDS would protect from ballistic missile attacks. GMD assets is 

also questionable because they contain parts identified by auditors in MDA’s Office of Quality, 

Safety, and Mission Assurance as less reliable or inappropriate for use in space that have not 

yet been replaced. MDA has begun to replace the questionable parts in the manufacturing process and to purchase the parts for retrofit into fielded interceptors. However, it will not complete 

the retrofit effort until 2012. 

We also observed that while several contractors had difficulty with controlling 

costs, during fiscal year 2007, MDA awarded approximately 95 percent or $606 million of available award fee to its prime contractors. In particular, contractors developing the ABL and Aegis BMD Weapon System were rated as performing very well 

in the cost and/or program management elements and received commensurate fees, 

even though earned value management data showed that their cost and schedule 

performance was declining. Although DOD guidance discourages the use of earned 

value performance metrics in award fee criteria, MDA includes this—one of many 

factors for consideration in rating contractors’ performance—in several of its award 

fee plans. The agency recognizes that there is not always a good link between its 

intentions for award fees and the amount of fee being earned by its contractors. In 

an effort to rectify this problem, the agency has begun to revise its award fee policy 

to align agency practices more closely with DOD’s current policy that better links 

performance with award fees. 

Testing and Performance of Fielded Capability 

Most test objectives were achieved during 2007, although several BMDS programs 

experienced setbacks in their test schedules. The MKV, KEI, and Sensors elements 

were able to execute all scheduled activities as planned. The Aegis BMD, THAAD, 

ABL, STSS, and C2BMC elements experienced test delays, but all were able to 

achieve their primary test objectives. GMD successfully completed an intercept with 

an operationally representative interceptor and a radar characterization test. A second intercept test employing the Sea-Based X-Band (SBX) radar has been delayed 

because a target malfunction delayed the execution of the first intercept test. The 

SBX capability is important as it is a primary sensor to be used to engage ballistic 

missiles in the midcourse phase of flight. As of yet, this capability has not been 

verified through flight testing. 

As we reported in March 2007, MDA altered its original Block 2006 performance 

goals commensurate with the agency’s reductions in the delivery of fielded assets.4

For several reasons, information is not sufficient to assess whether MDA achieved 

its revised performance goals. First, MDA uses a combination of simulations and 

flight tests to determine whether performance goals are met. However, too few flight 

tests have been completed to ensure the accuracy of the models and simulations predictions. Second, confidence in the performance of the BMDS is reduced because of 

unresolved technical and quality issues in the GMD element. For example, the GMD 

element has experienced the same anomaly during each of its flight tests since 2001. 

This anomaly has not yet prevented the program from achieving any of its primary 

test objectives, but to date neither its source nor solution has been clearly identified. 

Program officials plan to continue their assessment of test data to determine the 

anomaly’s root cause. The performance of some fielded GMD assets is also questionable because they contain parts identified by auditors in MDA’s Office of Quality, 

Safety, and Mission Assurance as less reliable or inappropriate for use in space that 

have not yet been replaced. MDA has begun to replace the questionable parts in the 

manufacturing process and to purchase the parts for retrofit into fielded interceptors. However, it will not complete the retrofit effort until 2012. 

Finally, tests of the GMD element have been of a developmental nature, and have 

not included target suite dynamic features and intercept geometries representative 

of the operational environment in which GMD will perform its mission. MDA has 

added operational test objectives to its developmental test program, but many of the 

objectives are aimed at proving that military personnel can operate the equipment. 

Up until 2007, the lack of data limited the operational test and evaluation Director’s 

annual BMDS assessment to commenting on aspects of tests that were operationally 

realistic and recommending other tests to characterize system effectiveness and 

suitability. In 2007, tests allowed a partial assessment of the BMDS’ effectiveness, 

suitability, and survivability. According to the Office of the Director of Operational 

Test and Evaluation: (1) further testing that incorporates realistic operational objectives; and (2) verification, validation, and accreditation of models and simulations 

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5There are five blocks included in the new block construct—1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, and 5.0. MDA 

expects to initially develop budget baselines and report variances to this baseline for Blocks 1.0, 

2.0, and a portion of 3.0. 

will be needed before the performance, suitability, and survivability of the BMDS 

can be fully characterized. 

KEY STEPS TAKEN TO ENHANCE BMDS OVERSIGHT, BUT MORE CAN BE DONE

Since its initiation in 2002, MDA has been given a significant amount of flexibility. While this flexibility allows agile decisionmaking, it lessens the transparency 

of MDA’s acquisition processes, making it difficult to conduct oversight and hold the 

agency accountable for its planned outcomes and costs. As we reported in March 

2007, MDA operates with considerable autonomy to change goals and plans, which 

makes it difficult to reconcile outcomes with original expectations and to determine 

the actual cost of each block and of individual operational assets. In the past year, 

MDA has begun implementing two initiatives—a new block construct and a new executive board—to improve transparency, accountability, and oversight. These initiatives represent improvements over current practices, although we see additional improvements MDA can make. In addition, Congress has directed that MDA begin 

buying certain assets with procurement funds like other programs, which should 

promote accountability for and transparency of the BMDS. 

New Block Structure Offers Improvements, but Does Not Resolve All Issues 

In 2007, MDA redefined its block construct to better communicate its plans and 

goals to Congress. The agency’s new construct is based on fielding capabilities that 

address particular threats as opposed to the previous biennial time periods. MDA’s 

new block construct makes many positive changes. These include establishing unit 

cost for selected block assets, incorporating into a block only those elements or components that will be fielded during the block, and abandoning the practice of deferring work from block to block. 

These changes should improve the transparency of the BMDS program and make 

MDA more accountable for the investment being made in missile defense. For example, the actual cost of each block can be tracked because MDA will no longer defer 

work planned for one block, along with its cost, to a future block. In addition, MDA 

plans to develop unit costs for selected BMDS assets—such as THAAD interceptors—so that the cost of those assets can be monitored. In addition, the agency plans 

to request an independent verification of these unit costs and report significant cost 

growth to Congress. However, MDA has not yet determined all of the assets that 

will report a unit cost or how much a unit cost must increase before it is reported 

to Congress. 

Although improvements are inherent in MDA’s proposed block construct, the new 

construct does not resolve all transparency and accountability issues. For example, 

MDA has not yet estimated the full cost of a block. According to its fiscal year 2009 

budget submission, MDA does not initially plan to develop a full cost estimate for 

any BMDS block. Instead, when a firm commitment can be made to Congress for 

a block of capability, MDA will develop a budget baseline for the block. This budget 

will include anticipated funding for each block activity that is planned for the 6 

years included in DOD’s Future Years Defense Plan.5 Once baselined, if the budget 

for a block changes, MDA plans to report and explain those variations to Congress. 

At some future date, MDA does expect to develop a full cost estimate for each committed block and is in discussions with DOD’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group 

on having the group verify each estimate; but documents do not yet include a 

timeline for estimating block cost or having that estimate verified. Other DOD programs are required to provide the full cost estimate of developing and producing 

their weapon systems before system development and demonstration can begin. 

Until the full cost of each block is known, it will be difficult for decisionmakers to 

compare the value of investing in each block to the value of investing in other DOD 

programs or to determine whether a block is affordable over the long term. 

Another issue yet to be addressed is whether the concurrent development and 

fielding of BMDS assets will continue. Fully developing an asset and demonstrating 

its capability prior to production increases the likelihood that the product will perform as designed and can be produced at the cost estimated. To field an initial capability quickly, MDA accepted the risk of concurrent development and fielding during 

Block 2004. It continued to do so during Block 2006 as it fielded assets before they 

were fully tested. For example, by the end of Block 2004, the agency realized that 

the performance of some Ground-Based Interceptors could be degraded because the 

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6See GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency Fields Initial Capability but Falls 

Short of Original Goals, GAO–06327 (Washington, DC: Mar. 15, 2006). 7The Defense Acquisition Board advises the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics on critical acquisition decisions. 

interceptors included inappropriate or potentially unreliable parts.6 As noted earlier, 

MDA has begun the process of retrofitting these interceptors, but work will not be 

completed until 2012. Meanwhile, there is a risk that some interceptors might not 

perform as designed. MDA has not addressed whether it will accept similar performance risks under its new block construct or whether it will fully develop and demonstrate all elements/components prior to fielding. 

MDA has not addressed whether it will transfer assets produced during a block 

to a military service for production and operation at the block’s completion. Officials 

representing multiple DOD organizations recognize that transfer criteria are neither 

complete nor clear given the BMDS’s complexity. Without clear transfer criteria, 

MDA has transferred the management of only one element—the Patriot Advanced 

Capability-3—to the military for production and operation. For other elements, MDA 

and the military Services have been negotiating the transition of responsibilities for 

the sustainment of fielded elements—a task that has proven to be timeconsuming. 

Although MDA documents show that under its new block construct the agency 

should be ready to deliver BMDS components that are fully mission-capable, MDA 

officials could not tell us whether at the end of a block MDA’s Director will recommend when management of components, including production responsibilities, 

will be transferred to the military. 

New Executive Board Offers Improved, but Not Full, Oversight 

Oversight improvement initiatives are also underway for MDA. In March 2007, 

the Deputy Secretary of Defense established a MDEB to recommend and oversee implementation of strategic policies and plans, program priorities, and investment options for protecting the United States and its allies from missile attacks. The MDEB 

is also to replace existing groups and structures, such as the Missile Defense Support Group. 

The MDEB appears to be vested with more authority than its predecessor, the 

Missile Defense Support Group. When the Support Group was chartered in 2002, 

it was to provide constructive advice to MDA’s Director. However, the Director was 

not required to follow the advice of the group. According to a DOD official, although 

the Support Group met many times initially, it did not meet after June 2005. This 

led to the formation of the MDEB. Its mission is to review and make recommendations on MDA’s comprehensive acquisition strategy to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. It is also to provide the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics) with a recommended strategic program plan and a feasible funding 

strategy based on business case analysis that considers the best approach to fielding 

integrated missile defense capabilities in support of joint MDA and warfighter objectives. The MDEB will be assisted by four standing committees. These committees, 

which are chaired by senior-level officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

and the Joint Staff, could play an important oversight role as they are expected to 

make recommendations to the MDEB, which in turn, will recommend courses of action to the Under Secretary of Defense and the Director, MDA as appropriate. 

Although the MDEB is expected to exercise some oversight of MDA, it will not 

have all the information normally available to DOD oversight bodies. For other 

major defense acquisition programs, the Defense Acquisition Board has access to 

critical information because before a program can enter the System Development 

and Demonstration phase of the acquisition cycle, statute requires that certain information be developed.7 However, in 2002, the Secretary of Defense deferred application of DOD policy to BMDS that, among other things, requires major defense programs to obtain approval before advancing from one phase of the acquisition cycle 

to another. Because MDA does not yet follow this cycle, and has not yet entered 

System Development and Demonstration, it has not triggered certain statutes requiring the development of information that the Defense Acquisition Board uses to 

inform its decisions. For example, most major defense acquisition programs are required by statute to obtain an independent verification of life-cycle cost estimates 

prior to beginning system development and demonstration, and/or production and 

deployment. Independent life-cycle cost estimates provide confidence that a program 

is executable within estimated cost. Although MDA plans to develop unit cost for 

selected block assets and to request that DOD’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group 

verify the unit costs, the agency does not initially plan to develop a block cost estimate and therefore, cannot seek an independent verification of that cost. Although 

MDA will not be required to obtain an independent verification of block costs when 

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8 10 U.S.C. § 2399 requires completion of initial operational test and evaluation of a weapon 

system before a program can proceed beyond low-rate initial production. According to DOD policy, low-rate initial production is intended to result in completion of manufacturing development 

in order to ensure adequate and efficient manufacturing capability and to produce the minimum 

quantity necessary to provide production or production-representative articles for operational 

test and evaluation, establish an initial production base for the system; and permit an orderly 

increase in the production rate for the system, sufficient to lead to full-rate production upon successful completion of operational (and live-fire, where applicable) testing. 9The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–181, § 223. 

they are estimated, MDA officials told us that they have initiated discussions with 

the Cost Analysis Improvement Group on independent verifications of block cost estimates. 

Statute also requires an independent verification of a system’s suitability for and 

effectiveness on the battlefield through operational testing before a program can 

proceed beyond low-rate initial production.8 After testing is completed, the Director 

for Operational Test and Evaluation assesses whether the test was adequate to support an evaluation of the system’s suitability and effectiveness for the battlefield, 

whether the test showed the system to be acceptable, and whether any limitations 

in suitability and effectiveness were noted. However, a comparable assessment of 

the BMDS assets being fielded will not be available to the MDEB. As noted earlier, 

the limited amount of testing completed, which has been primarily developmental 

in nature, and the lack of verified, validated, and accredited models and simulations 

prevent the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation from fully assessing the effectiveness, suitability, and survivability of the BMDS in annual assessments. 

MDA will also make some decisions without needing approval from the MDEB or 

any higher level DOD official. Although the charter of the MDEB includes making 

recommendations to MDA and the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) on investment options, program priorities, and MDA’s strategy for developing and fielding an operational missile defense capability, the MDEB 

will not necessarily have the opportunity to review and recommend changes to 

BMDS blocks. MDA documents show that the agency plans to continue to define 

each block of development without requiring input from the MDEB. According to a 

briefing on the business rules and processes for MDA’s new block structure, the decision to initiate a new block of BMDS capability will be made by MDA’s Director. 

Also cost, schedule, and performance parameters will be established by MDA when 

technologies that the block depends upon are mature, a credible cost estimate can 

be developed, funding is available, and the threat is both imminent and severe. The 

Director will inform the MDEB as well as Congress when a new block is initiated, 

but he will not seek the approval of either. 

Finally, there will be parts of the BMDS program that the MDEB will have difficulty overseeing because of the nature of the work being performed. MDA plans 

to place any program that is developing technology in a category known as Capability Development. These programs, such as ABL, KEI, and MKV, will not have 

a firm cost, schedule, or performance baseline. This is generally true for technology 

development programs in DOD because they are in a period of discovery, which 

makes schedule and cost difficult to estimate. Yet, the scale of the technology development in BMDS is unusually large, ranging from $2 billion to about $5 billion a 

year—eventually comprising nearly half of MDA’s budget by fiscal year 2012. The 

MDEB will have access to the budgets planned for these programs over the next 

5 or 6 years, each program’s focus, and whether the technology is meeting shortterm key events or knowledge points. But without some kind of baseline for matching progress with cost, the MDEB will not know how much more time or money will 

be needed to complete technology maturation. MDA’s experience with the ABL program provides a good example of the difficulty in estimating the cost and schedule 

of technology development. In 1996, the ABL program believed that all ABL technology could be demonstrated by 2001 at a cost of about $1 billion. However, MDA 

now projects that this technology will not be demonstrated until 2009 and its cost 

has grown to over $5 billion. 

MDA Directed to Use Procurement Funding 

In an effort to further improve the transparency of MDA’s acquisition processes, 

Congress has directed that MDA’s budget materials delineate between funds needed 

for research, development, test, and evaluation; procurement; operations and maintenance; and military construction.9 Congress gave MDA the flexibility to field certain assets using research, development, test, and evaluation funding which allowed 

MDA to fund the purchase of assets over multiple years. Congress recently restricted MDA’s authority and required MDA to purchase certain assets with procurement funds. Using procurement funds will mean that MDA will be required to 

171

ensure that assets are fully funded in the year of their purchase, rather than incrementally funded over several years. Additionally, our analysis of MDA data shows 

that incremental funding is usually more expensive than full-funding, in part, because inflation decreases the buying power of the dollar each year. For example, 

after reviewing MDA’s incremental funding plan for THAAD fire units and Aegis 

BMD missiles, we analyzed the effect of fully funding these assets and found that 

the agency could save about $125 million by fully funding their purchase and purchasing them in an economical manner. In the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2008, Congress directed that MDA request procurement funding and 

advanced procurement funding for long lead items in its fiscal year 2009 budget including funding for THAAD fire units and Aegis BMD SM–3 missiles. MDA did not 

request such funding because it slipped the schedule for procuring THAAD fire 

units 3 and 4 by 1 year and because the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 was not signed in time to allow MDA to adjust its budget request 

for SM–3 missiles. However, in MDA’s fiscal year 2010 budget submittal, the agency 

intends to incorporate a detailed plan of action and milestones to transition from 

incremental funding to full funding beginning in fiscal year 2010 and for all fiscal 

years thereafter. 

ACTIONS RECOMMENDED IN OUR RECENT REPORT

In our March 2008 report, we made several recommendations to build on efforts 

to further improve the transparency, accountability, and oversight of the missile defense program. Specifically, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct:

• MDA to develop a full cost for each block and request an independent 

verification of that cost; 

• MDA to clarify the criteria that it will use for reporting unit cost 

variances to Congress; 

• MDA to examine a contractor’s planning efforts when 20 percent or more 

of a contract’s work is proposed as level of effort; 

• MDA to investigate ways of developing a baseline or some other standard 

against which the progress of technology programs may be assessed; and 

• MDA and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation to agree on 

criteria and incorporate corresponding scope into developmental tests that 

will allow a determination of whether a block of BMDS capability is suitable and effective for fielding.

DOD concurred with the first three recommendations. DOD partially concurred 

with the remaining two recommendations to investigate ways of developing a baseline or some other standard against which the progress of technology programs may 

be assessed and to agree on criteria and incorporate corresponding scope into developmental tests. DOD stated that MDA already uses key knowledge points, technology levels, and engineering readiness levels to assess the progress of technology 

programs and that it will continue to investigate other ways of making such assessments. DOD also noted that MDA’s mission is to work with the warfighter, rather 

than Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, to determine that the BMDS is 

ready for fielding. However, DOD stated that MDA will continue to work with operational testers to strengthen the testing of BMDS suitability and effectiveness. We 

believe that DOD and Congress would benefit from understanding the remaining 

cost and time needed to complete a technology program, important information that 

MDA’s methods do not yet provide. Since BMDS testing will continue to serve both 

developmental and operational purposes, its scope should be sufficient to enable the 

Director of Operational Test and Evaluation to evaluate the system’s operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond to any 

questions you or members of the subcommittee may have. 

CONTACT AND STAFF ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

For questions about this statement, please contact me at (202) 512–4841 or 

Francisp@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions to this statement include 

David Best, Assistant Director; LaTonya D. Miller; Steven B. Stern; Meredith Allen 

Kimmett; Kenneth E. Patton; and Alyssa Weir.

Senator BILL NELSON. As a courtesy, I want to call on my colleague, the ranking member, Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Nelson. That 

is nice of you, as always. I guess we would thank each of you for 

your service to our country. 

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I know in some ways it sounds like a lot of money we are spend- ing on missile defense. But at $10 billion out of a $500 billion defense budget, that is not really very much, and it does provide, 

both at the tactical level and strategic level, protections that are 

exceedingly important to us as a Nation. 

So I guess I won’t make much more of a statement than that and 

to say that the budget is tight. I believe that we can accomplish 

our goals with the President’s budget, but it is not a fat budget, 

that is for sure. There are a lot of things we are not going to be 

able to do that we would like to do if we had more money. 

Secretary Young, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has been 

granted integrated decision authority over requirements, acquisition, and budget for the missile defense program. This authority 

was necessary in order to begin deployment of our missile defense 

capabilities by 2004, and it appears to have been successful. It was 

a spiral system, or whatever we want to call it, that gave a certain 

amount of flexibility. 

It is likely that had we not had that flexibility, personally, I am 

inclined to believe that we would not be as far along as we are. 

Have you had a chance to look at that, or form an opinion about 

this different type of development program, and do you think it has 

any benefit as a model in any other acquisition situations? 

Mr. YOUNG. Senator, I certainly do. I have looked at it, to some 

degree, and I believe elements of it are highly relevant to our other 

programs. In particular, across the board, I am already advocating 

that program managers take greater responsibility for engaging the 

requirements community when the requirements bar gets put 

much higher than the money available or the schedule available 

because we can’t promise to deliver to those kinds of schedules. 

So I think MDA, especially in the confines you outlined of an urgent need to get capability out there, had the ability to make those 

trades efficiently and get capability fielded. Across the board, we 

need better ability to make some of those trades to get the best 

value for the taxpayer. 

Senator SESSIONS. General Obering, just briefly, based on your 

tenure now in this position and your previous experience, how do 

you evaluate this acquisition process that we established, I guess, 

8 or 10 years ago for the MDA program? 

General OBERING. Senator, I would say it has been very, very 

successful for us. There has been this approach in which, first of 

all, we are able to trade off requirements and funding and acquisition options to be able to maximize the fielding and to be able to 

react to real-world situations like we have experienced in the past. 

So I am a very strong advocate for this type of approach. 

When you combine that with the single color of money that we 

have enjoyed over the years in research, development, test, and 

evaluation, that gives you a very quick reaction capability to be 

able to meet those emerging situations. I think that has been one 

of the reasons why we have been able to produce, almost at an unmatched fashion within the department, on the scale that we have 

been able to do. 

Senator SESSIONS. It presents some risk, and it has some dangers. But I think with regard to this immature situation we started 

with, it has allowed us to move along rapidly. 

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Secretary Young, today’s Washington Post reports that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has found 95 major Department of Defense (DOD) systems that have exceeded their original 

budgets by a total of $295 billion and are delivered almost 2 years 

late on average. Is this correct? 

Mr. Francis of GAO testifies today that MDA has increased cost over projections by $1 billion, as some overran their fiscal year 

2007 budgets. How would you compare, if you are able, MDA’s performance on major acquisitions with the other areas of the DOD, 

and what is your fundamental response to this disturbing report? 

Mr. YOUNG. I certainly agree with the concerns. I haven’t had a 

chance to review all the details of the report. I think the report documents some of the things that we have been through before I 

came into the office. There were six programs that went through 

the Nunn-McCurdy process and had cost growth, and there were 

programs before that. 

I recently decided a program that is probably a part of that list, 

the C–5, where we actually made a decision instead of spending 

$14 billion and recognizing the cost growth, we scaled back the program, made sure we met the requirements, and saved the taxpayers about $10 billion. 

So we are going through and attacking these programs individually, trying to put more discipline in the process. I need to become 

more familiar with the details of the report, so I can’t yet say the 

numbers are accurate. But there have certainly been a number of 

programs that have exceeded their schedule. 

In regards to MDA, it highlights the issue you asked about, 

where many of these programs have these problems because they 

had very strenuous requirements, and in some cases, probably 

amazingly, we actually changed and increased the requirements as 

we went into the execution of the program. MDA has had the benefit of not making those in general, in my view, bad choices and 

trying to be pragmatic about fielding an incremental capability as 

fast as possible and then working to upgrade that capability as 

money and time and technology support such upgrades. 

Senator SESSIONS. General Obering, do you want to briefly comment on your perception on what this report indicates? 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. I think that, again, echoing what Secretary Young says, the flexibilities that we have allowed and the 

way that we are able to really, really scrub down the requirements 

and also to make the trades has allowed us to stay in fairly reasonable good shape with respect to our cost variances. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, looking at this, maybe you can correct 

me, I guess, but your figure is less than some of the other major 

procurement agencies—at least being over. Would you say that is 

true? 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. Overall in our portfolio, by our calculations, we are about 5 percent to 6 percent variance, and that 

reflects, by the way, a combination of increases in scope. For example, if you recall when the North Koreans went on alert in the summer of 2006, one of the lessons learned from that is there was an 

additional missile field that was requested at Fort Greely, AK, and 

also an additional interceptor to be placed on alert, an operational 

silo at Vandenberg Air Force Base. 

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So we get scope changes as part of those cost calculations. So 

that is not only just cost growth, per se, it is also increased capability. So I feel like we are very much, I think, on the good side 

of that equation. 

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Francis, thank you for your analysis. Do 

you have anything to add in addition or summary without repeating your written testimony or any thoughts you have on that subject? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Yes, Senator Sessions. The report that you had referred to is something that we do every year. We look at about 70 

programs, and we keep that data year in and year out. 

As I was saying to Mr. Young before the hearing, I think one of 

the main findings is that the programs that get in trouble, which 

are a lot of them, are ones that are not abiding by the types of policies that I think Mr. Young is trying to get enforced. 

It is hard to compare the cost figures on missile defense with 

other programs because the other programs are baselined against 

a total, and they generally run 10 to 15 years out. So missile defense, in a number of ways, is a level of effort program, and scope 

can move in and out, as General Obering said. So some scope can 

increase, and some scope can decrease. But just taking that $1 billion, that is 5 percent over 2 years, or 

2.5 percent a year. But Mr. Young will be certifying programs with 

a 25 percent cost breach, but that is because they last 10 years. So 

it is a little hard to get it apples-to-apples, but I think the billion 

dollars is something to be concerned about. 

Senator SESSIONS. Do you feel like some of the goals he has for 

procurement represent progress and could help eliminate some of 

these overruns? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Yes, I think one of the fundamental things we have 

found is that many programs get started before they are ready, and 

a lot of that analysis that we have done has been at the behest of 

this committee, benchmarking best practices. In discussions with 

Mr. Young’s office, I know there are a lot of things he is trying to 

do to get programs on a much sounder footing before they hit that 

first big milestone, which is the Milestone B decision. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, Mr. Young, I would take that as a pretty 

good compliment from GAO because they are a tough watchdog. 

They don’t mind being critical when it is necessary. But it is my 

impression that you are seeking to have a tough, strong approach 

to cost to keep us within our budgets. 

Mr. YOUNG. I do appreciate the kind comments. It is still results 

that I have to put on the table. One of those, I think, and one we 

would highlight that I think MDA has tried to take advantage of 

on their own, is prototyping and to make sure you do initial prototyping and develop your technology readiness before you move forward with a product. 

Now, if you are urgently fielding, you may move that prototype 

more quickly to the field. But across the board in the department, 

one thing we have to do, I think GAO has rightly pointed out, is 

better mature technology through prototyping. Congress has actually helped here because you have given me law. I would rather be 

running my business, but where necessary, if you all tell us things 

that are useful, it probably helps. 

175

You have directed that we not move things through Milestone B 

without them being at technology readiness level 6. I think that is 

a helpful standard for Congress to ask us to hold to. 

Senator SESSIONS. All right. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I will make this brief. I had three questions to ask, and one has 

already been answered, and I was just told I have someone in my 

office. 

General, we talk about where we are, and we constantly update 

this. We are still naked in the boost phase. Now I would like to 

have you tell us, so we can keep that alive, I know there are a lot 

of people that are saying this isn’t going to be necessary. Then, of 

course, the big target is the Airborne Laser (ABL). 

I would like to have you say, first of all, why this boost-phase capability is significant and then, second, why it is necessary to go 

ahead and continue with the funding of the ABL through next 

year? 

Senator INHOFE. Through the shoot-down that will be next year? 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. Well, first of all, the boost phase is—

in a layered defense is extremely important. First of all, if you stop 

and think about it, when you are waiting until the terminal phase, 

you are only able to defend a fairly small footprint from a threat 

missile. In the mid-course phase, that defended area expands. 

But if you can shoot a missile down in the boost phase, you are 

basically defending the entire world from that missile, number one. 

Number two, you are forcing the shoot-down relatively close to the 

origin of the launch of that missile. So, oftentimes, the shoot down 

is over the country’s territory that actually launched the missile. 

Number three, it really helps in dealing with the complex countermeasure or decoy issue that comes up once you get into the midcourse phase and then into the terminal phase. So, for those reasons, it is a very advantageous capability. 

Now to your point with respect to ABL, first of all, we have two 

programs in the boost phase. The ABL continues to be our primary 

boost-phase defense capability, and the Kinetic Energy Interceptor 

(KEI) was a backup to that in case the ABL did not prove to be 

successful. 

Where we are on the ABL is we have completed the low-power 

systems flight testing. We did that last year. It was very successful. 

So between that and the high-energy laser firings that we accomplished over 70 of in a 747 fuselage at Edwards Air Force Base, we 

have now demonstrated all of the key technical capabilities to be 

able to shoot down the missile. 

We have now put the six laser modules onboard the aircraft, the 

high-energy laser modules. We are in the process of completing the 

installations for the three lasers that are on that aircraft—the 

tracking laser, the atmospheric compensation, and then the big 

megawatt-class high-energy laser. At the end of this year, we 

should be firing out of the aircraft on the ground, and we should 

be going through our checks and our fire control loops and that 

type of thing, get back in the air early next year for the shootdown. 

Senator INHOFE. When next year? 

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General OBERING. In the summer is what we are shooting for 

right now for the shoot-down. We think it is important to do that 

because, number one, we have learned a tremendous amount 

throughout this. It is the largest directed-energy weapon in the department, and we have really focused the entire directed-energy 

community in this country on this program. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. That is a very good explanation, and I 

would encourage you to talk about this because that program is 

being attacked by even a lot of people who are very strong supporters because there is just a lack of an understanding of it. 

Now, lastly, let me just mention to you that on December 2, 

2007, I had a chance to meet with the leaders and the negotiators 

in Poland as well as the Czech President, Vaclav Klaus, who is one 

of my favorite presidents anywhere in the world. Then yesterday 

afternoon, I was in Stuttgart with the European Command and 

General Catto had all of his people in there. 

I am very interested in the progress that is being made right 

now. You have two things with two countries. Of course, the radar 

with the Czech Republic and the missiles in Poland. I got the impression yesterday that between December 2 and yesterday, there 

hasn’t really been anything that I can identify as progress. 

Now they aren’t opposed to it. I know the president of the Czech 

Republic isn’t. But there is a lot of misinformation floating around 

that is creating a little bit of a problem. Then I got the impression 

also, as far as Poland is concerned, that they just want to be sure 

that there is a lot of money out there for them. Am I wrong? 

General OBERING. First of all, sir, you are wrong in one aspect. 

That is, there has been tremendous progress since December. In 

fact, we have, for the most part, completed negotiations with the 

Czechs in a positive way. We are down to some of the final wording 

in the agreement. So I expect that to conclude here in the very 

near future in a very successful signing agreement. 

With the Polish negotiations, we were set back somewhat when 

the new government came in, and of course, as any new government has a right to do, they wanted to assess the situation where 

they were. We have now regained some of the momentum that was 

lost as a result of the change in government, and we have been 

back under negotiations with our Polish counterparts. 

Senator INHOFE. Do you think you are in the position now that 

you were before the change took place in Poland? 

General OBERING. I think we are close, sir. I think that we have 

now gotten down to the specifics on what are the steps ahead with 

respect to help with the modernization of their defenses and what 

kind of help that may mean and in a discussion with that, and try 

to separate that somewhat from the missile defense agreement that 

we think is so critically important from a timing perspective as 

well. 

Senator INHOFE. My thinking was this, that yes, I understand 

that a lot of progress has been made in the Czech Republic. But 

until you get both of them, it doesn’t do any good to reach an agreement with one without the other. 

General OBERING. Well, sir. Actually, we fully intend to get 

agreements with both nations. The radar itself is a tremendous capability in terms of the ability of that radar to feed data into any 

177

missile defense system. That could be a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-deployed capability or sea-based capability. 

Senator INHOFE. In the location? 

General OBERING. That would be a tremendous benefit to the 

overall NATO missile defense architecture. So while we certainly 

are on track to get both agreements, even just the radar would be 

tremendous progress. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. Well, that is good to hear because I didn’t 

hear that yesterday in Stuttgart. It was kind of the impression that 

you have to get them both in order to make this thing work. But 

it does make sense if that radar could be used to deploy other systems, then that is better than not having anything. 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. But just to make it crystal clear, we 

need both the interceptors and the radar to provide the long-range 

coverage for the protection of Europe. What I was referring to is 

any future shorter-range coverages that NATO may deploy. 

Senator INHOFE. I understand. Thank you very much. 

Senator BILL NELSON. All right. The big chairman has just come 

in. 

As a courtesy to my colleagues, Senator Levin, I am deferring to 

you all before I get into my questions. So let me call on you. 

Senator LEVIN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just had a few questions, and I don’t know whether our witnesses had opening statements or not. 

Senator BILL NELSON. No, we went straight to questions. 

Senator LEVIN. Straight to questions. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Everything has been entered into the 

record. 

Senator LEVIN. I appreciate your yielding to me, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me just ask a few questions. 

First, Secretary Young, you are supposed to be our acquisition 

czar for the entire DOD. Do you have final acquisition authority 

over the programs of the MDA? If not, is that because of law, or 

is that because of administrative decision? 

Mr. YOUNG. Under the current policy—I have authority, as you 

rightly said, over the programs. Under the current construct, the 

service acquisition executive exercises authority over programs that 

have been delegated to them at certain levels, and in this case, 

most of the milestone and contracting decisions, MDA is currently 

exercising to move forward with the capability, the urgent capability deployment. 

Senator LEVIN. Well, do you have the same acquisition authority 

over the MDA as you do over the other components? 

Mr. YOUNG. I think, theoretically, I do. But right now, we are not 

exercising MDA programs with milestones, whereas with the other 

Services for the largest programs, I personally approve the milestones. But there are also many programs in the Services that are 

not of such a size that I approve the milestones or Service level. 

Senator LEVIN. Do you treat acquisition in the MDA differently 

than other acquisition in the Defense Department? 

Mr. YOUNG. Yes, we definitely treat that program differently. 

Senator LEVIN. Why is that? Is that law, or is that an administrative decision? 

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Mr. YOUNG. I don’t think it is law. I think I would say it is an 

administrative decision made some years, a few years, ago to try 

to urgently deploy capability and let that program be managed, if 

you will, as a portfolio in an effort to expeditiously field capability. 

Some of those authorities were delegated to the MDA organization 

and the director. 

Senator LEVIN. Has there been any discussion about changing 

that so they are treated like other acquisition programs? 

Mr. YOUNG. I think there have been discussions before my time, 

and even now, I wouldn’t say that specific issue is being discussed 

yet. More so we are looking to improve the department as a whole 

on oversight. Because as more capabilities are delivered by MDA, 

the Services have growing roles in operating those capabilities. 

We established a Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB) that 

has met four times in my tenure to begin to discuss MDA programs, their status, their execution, and then the transition of 

those capabilities. We are taking at least a first step in better visibility and collaboration on the MDA programs execution. 

Senator LEVIN. Will you review the relationship of your office to 

MDA for this subcommittee? 

Mr. YOUNG. Yes, sir. 

Senator LEVIN. Get back to us with any recommendations to 

change that so that you deal with them on the acquisition end the 

same way you do with all other acquisition programs. 

Mr. YOUNG. I would be happy to do that. 

[The information referred to follows:]

The Director, Missile Defense Agency (MDA) reports directly to me organizationally. In accordance with a memorandum signed by Secretary Rumsfeld, MDA was 

delegated certain authorities and flexibilities in order to pursue the urgent objective 

of fielding missile defense capability. Within the constraints of this memorandum, 

I have a set of responsibilities to conduct oversight of MDA. Under this memorandum, the authorities that I have to perform oversight of the Ballistic Missile Defense System are not equivalent to the oversight authorities I have for other acquisition programs.

Senator LEVIN. Of course, you would involve the other folks who 

are at the table in that. You are not going to do that unilaterally. 

But would you set that in motion? 

Mr. YOUNG. Yes, sir. 

Senator LEVIN. Just on the question of the new block structure 

that you have, you are going to be reporting variances, as I understand it, from the eventual schedule, cost, and performance baselines in reports that are classified. That is your current plan for 

your new block structure. I am wondering whether or not you cannot make it possible to report those also in an unclassified form? 

I have asked you, General Obering. 

General OBERING. Sir, we would not have any trouble reporting 

any schedule and cost variances unclassified. Performance 

variances, depending on the level of the performance, reporting 

may be classified. 

Senator LEVIN. Can you then include that in your block structure 

planning? 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. 

Senator LEVIN. You will give us all of the cost, schedule, and as 

many performance variables as you can? 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. 

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Senator LEVIN. Now, one other question. You have not yet set the 

schedule, cost, and performance baselines, as I understand it. Is 

that correct? I am not sure. I guess, General, I will look at you for 

that. 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. We had cost, schedule, and performance that we were tracking in our old block structure. What we 

have gone to now with the new block structure is we have set the 

cost and we have allocated the budget. We are in the process of 

doing integrated baseline reviews for each one of these blocks, so 

that will be forthcoming. 

Senator LEVIN. Then when do you expect those baselines would 

be available? 

General OBERING. This year. 

Senator LEVIN. This year? So it could be many months before 

those are available? 

General OBERING. We want to make sure that we do it correctly. 

Senator LEVIN. Would you agree, General—and I will ask also 

Secretary Young this question. I think both of you have testified 

before to this, but I want to make sure that you understand that 

for many of us this is a very significant point. Would you agree 

that our missile defense systems need to be operationally effective, 

suitable, survivable, and affordable? Secretary Young? 

Mr. YOUNG. I certainly would. 

Senator LEVIN. General Obering? 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. I would follow up on Senator Inhofe’s question 

about the situation with regard to Poland and the Czech Republic. 

In the course of our deliberations in any bills that we pass—General Obering, I know you have met with the Czechs and know you 

have met with the Poles on many occasions. Is it important that 

what this Congress passes demonstrates that we are committed to 

this program if and when they approve it? 

In other words, can we afford just to say, well, they haven’t completed all the negotiations with them yet, so we are going to put 

no money up? Would that have an adverse effect on the willingness 

of our allies to make their commitments that we need from them? 

General OBERING. Sir, in my opinion, last year when Congress 

indicated that they were going to withhold the $85 million of the 

$310 million request pending the agreements with these nations, 

that sent the message, I think, to our partners and our allies that 

as an incentive to try to move on with getting these agreements. 

If we do not fund the program this year, I think that sends a different message, which is lack of support. That is very different, and 

I don’t think we want to send that message. I think, as I said, 

there is an urgency about this with respect to the threat, and there 

has also been such great progress, with respect to our allies on 

this, and in the NATO context as well. I think that would send a 

very, very wrong signal to, not only our seriousness in this, but 

also the role of U.S. leadership in the overall missile defense area. 

Senator SESSIONS. This week, the President is meeting with 

NATO leaders. What is the message we are hearing from NATO 

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with regard to their view of sites, the radar and ballistic missile 

site in Europe? 

General OBERING. Sir, I think that there are a couple of facets 

to that. Number one, I believe that there is a recognition that the 

threat is there, and it has to be addressed, and it is growing and 

maturing. Number two, I think that—and there will be, I am sure, 

more details coming this week. But I think that there is a growing 

recognition that NATO needs to do something about this within the 

NATO context, within their active-layer theater missile defense 

plan and move on with that program. 

I think that there is a growing recognition that the U.S. proposal 

could be integrated as we move ahead in the future with NATO. 

So I don’t know the specific wording that will come out, but I think 

it will be along those lines. 

Senator SESSIONS. But overall, the NATO leadership seemed to 

understand and made quite clear, and Mr. Sarkozy of France was 

quite clear, that there is a threat that Europeans know they need 

to deal with. 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. Also the Secretary General of NATO 

has been very vocal and very forceful, I think, in his description of 

the NATO position in missile defense and very positive about that. 

Senator SESSIONS. General Obering, your budget request for fis- cal year 2009 includes $10 million for a space test-bed to begin a 

concept analysis in preparation for certain small-scale experiments. 

As I understand it, the purpose of this is to provide data that could 

help us make more informed decisions about the utility and feasibility of a space-based interceptor capability. Give us some more insight into your reason for that request and how it would be used. 

General OBERING. Sir, I wish that I could tell you in the next 20 

years what the missile threats to the United States will be, and I 

wish the Intelligence Community could see that with a crystal ball, 

but they can’t. So, I think it is very prudent that out of a $9.3 billion request, that we allocate at least $10 million to maintaining 

our options with respect to the future, and that future, in terms of 

flexibility of not knowing which axis the threat may come from, is 

in space, and there are things that we need to understand about 

that. There was a lot of work done in a space-based layer back in 

the 1980s on the Strategic Defense Initiative program. But a lot of 

that was brought to a halt in the early 1990s. We haven’t done 

anything significant since then with respect to this. Then if we look 

out to the future, we need to make sure that we keep our options 

open. 

We believe that there will be a debate about this, obviously, as 

the Nation proceeds. But we would like to be able to inform that 

debate with some type of technical understanding of what is doable 

and what is not. 

We like to use knowledge points, as Secretary Young referred to, 

in a prototyping context, we call them knowledge points. We think 

it is important to establish some of the knowledge points that we 

may need in the future for space-based capabilities. As you say, it 

is a very, very, very modest request, but we think it is important 

to keep our options open. 

If I may, one last example? Many describe this as ‘‘we don’t need 

to be spending money for futuristic capabilities.’’ I would look backVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:11 Dec 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00186 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\42635.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
181

wards and say if we had made the same statements in the mid1990s about the Ground-Based Mid-Course Defense (GMD) System 

that we fielded, beginning in 2004, we would not have had a system to activate when the North Koreans launched their missiles in 

the summer of 2006, and we would not have been able to give the 

President an option other than preemption or retaliation had that 

been a threat. 

I think we have to be very careful about maintaining a balance. 

We already are fielding and developing for fielding in the near 

term about 75 percent of our budget. Only about 25 percent is allocated to future capabilities such as the space test bed. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, you are right. We have emphasized actually deploying systems that we have developed in work because we 

need the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and the 

Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC–3), and this budget that we 

talk about is not all ballistic missile defense. It is not all national 

missile defense. Huge amounts of it are SM–3s on ships, THAADs, 

and Patriots that protect our soldiers in theaters that could be hostile and dangerous from missile attack, just essential parts of the 

Nation’s defense. 

I think a $10 million request is legitimate to explore what options might exist out there and, as you said, help inform us if we 

were ever to want to move forward with something in that area. 

Mr. Chairman, I will turn it back to you. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Senator Sessions. 

Well, speaking of THAAD, General Obering, it is a high priority. 

You want flexibility. Why did you propose a budget request that 

would delay the delivery of THAAD interceptors by a year and result in a production gap of 18 months? 

General OBERING. Sir, part of what I do in my job as the acquisition executive for the missile defense programs is to make sure 

that we are holding contractors accountable and that we are holding our programs accountable. Now in the case of THAAD, we had 

good performance with respect to our test program. They are now 

four for four in terms of their intercept testing, but there was cost 

growth associated with the program that was unacceptable. 

We had worked with the contractors to take a look at the cost 

growth and begin to get those under control because we did not 

want to have a very successful program that became unaffordable 

in terms of the per-missile cost. The initial attempts at that by the 

contractor were not successful. So we zeroed out that portion of 

what we call the award fee incentive for them in cost management 

in the program. We got their attention, and they began reducing 

that cost growth to a very acceptable level. 

In the meantime, though, that generated a bill that had to be 

paid within the portfolio. Now the initial blush at that was they 

were going to have to delay the delivery of fire units 3 and 4. We 

went back and scrubbed that very hard and said, ‘‘wait a minute, 

do we have to do that? Why don’t we go ahead and look at other 

places that are not as much value added to the program?’’ They did 

that. So now we do not have a delay in the delivery of those fire 

units. 

182

To answer your question very directly—I don’t want to reward 

unhelpful behavior, but at the same time, I want to maintain a priority on the program. 

Senator BILL NELSON. All right. Can you boil that down then to 

a simple answer to the question, why did you propose the budget 

request for the delay and a production gap of 18 months? 

General OBERING. At the time, we were trying to see how we 

could reduce the cost, and we had not finished that. Now we have 

done that, and we don’t believe that there will be a delay in those 

fire units. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Wasn’t it that the staff of this committee 

objected to the delay in February that you decided to change your 

plans for the 2009 funds to avoid the delay? 

General OBERING. Sir, we were working that back in November, 

actually. So we were continually trying to address these cost 

growths. 

Senator BILL NELSON. So the fix is now planned for fiscal year 

2009? 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. But that is money that we will have to appropriate in the future, a fix for 2009. 

All right. Secretary Young, are you committed to ensuring that 

our combatant commanders have sufficient inventory of THAAD 

and SM–3 interceptors to meet the requirements of their operational plans? 

Mr. YOUNG. Certainly, sir. Our job is to at least receive the requirements. Unless there is a cost or a technology issue, we try to 

meet them. I know there is a new joint capability mix study, which 

you are probably aware of, that General Obering’s organization is 

digesting and seeking to address because they have, indeed, indicated they may need greater inventory. 

I would tell you that MDA is balancing those demands amongst 

the other demands and also doing a very good thing, and that is 

making sure we pick the right sets of integrated capability. It may 

not just be THAAD, but SM–3 and THAAD that they need to address the theater threat. 

Senator BILL NELSON. So the answer is yes? 

Mr. YOUNG. Yes, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. General Campbell? 

General CAMPBELL. Yes, sir. We are committed to working with 

the combatant commanders (COCOMs) to give them what they 

need, and it is our understanding that MDA is going to adjust their 

budget submission so that they can meet those demands we have 

identified in the study. That study is going to be briefed to your 

staffs this Friday. It is a classified study. 

Senator BILL NELSON. So the answer is yes? 

General CAMPBELL. Yes. 

Senator BILL NELSON. I can tell you that we hear from the 

COCOMs, and they want this system. General Obering, same question. 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. In fact, my initial mission is to do development and initial fielding, and then it is up to the Strategic 

Command (STRATCOM), the COCOMs, working within the department as to what the force structure sizes are that we need to go 

183

to address. The joint capability mix number two study outlined the 

increases in numbers for both THAAD and Aegis SM–3s, and we 

do intend to address that in our Program Objectives Memorandum10 (POM–10) submission to be able to get to the numbers that they 

have recommended. 

That means that we will go in and make adjustments within our 

development program to be able to meet that, but that is our intent. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. Well, speaking of the SM–3 Block 

1A interceptors, the authorization for fiscal year 2008 required that 

any funds in the budget for fiscal year 2009 for long-lead procurement of additional Standard Missile-3 (SM–3) Block 1A interceptors should be procurement funds. But that is not what happened. 

This has been discussed between Congress and your agency, and 

the department has not complied with that requirement of procurement funds. Instead, the budget request seeks research and development funds for the long-lead of the additional SM–3 interceptors. 

So why is your budget at variance with the law? 

General OBERING. Well, sir, first of all, the law was passed after 

the budget had been finalized for 2009. We attempted because we 

understood the direction it was headed—to try to structure the 

budget for procurement, but we were not able to do so within the 

Department because of the timing I just talked about. 

Now if Congress appropriates, obviously, in the procurement appropriations, we will execute those. But we have to work within the 

department’s context. We don’t do this directly with Congress. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Secretary Young, what do you think about 

this? 

Mr. YOUNG. I think we need to comply with the law, where you 

ask us to, and certainly for POM–10, MDA is committed to looking 

to comply with the law. I am not sure about the timelines for building the 2009 budget and whether we could have made those 

changes given the timing of the passage of the authorization act. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, let me ask both of you, do you agree 

that the 2009 funds for the long-lead SM–3 and THAAD interceptors should come from procurement funds? 

General OBERING. Sir, like I said, we will execute whatever is appropriated with respect to those interceptors. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, what the law says is that it should 

come from procurement funds. 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. So you are saying that the appropriations 

may say something different than the authorization law? 

General OBERING. Sir, I am saying that we will abide by the law. 

We will abide by what Congress has asked for us within the direction and the guidance that we get from the Department. 

Senator BILL NELSON. We are supposed to be oversight, and we 

have a law. It is our responsibility to see that the executive branch 

of Government carries out the law. Anything else you want to say 

on this issue? 

General OBERING. No, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. All right. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, it required the MDA to take a 

number of steps in its acquisition activities to improve transVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:11 Dec 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00189 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\42635.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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parency, accountability, and oversight. Those things were cost, 

schedule, performance baselines, and so forth. Have those requirements been fulfilled? 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. We believe that we have made a great 

step forward there. We have totally restructured our programs into 

finite blocks of capability that can be baselined, fielded, and 

tracked to include the life-cycle costing of those, and we are working with the Cost Analysis Improvement Group, and others to be 

able to provide those. So we feel that we have taken great steps 

there. 

In addition, as Secretary Young pointed out earlier, we established the MDEB of which I am the secretary and Secretary Young 

chairs. That is made up of principals across the Department to aid 

in the oversight of the program and to make sure that we are complying, obviously with the wishes of the Department and the wishes of the COCOMs as we move forward. 

So I think we have done quite a bit there in terms of meeting 

the intent of that. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. The question is, with regard to the 

law and things such as cost, schedule, performance baselines, and 

unit cost reporting, will you provide the subcommittee with a specific list of all the specific actions that MDA has taken to comply 

with this section of the law? 

General OBERING. I would be happy to, sir. 

[The information referred to follows:]

Pursuant to section 234 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108–375), the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) 

established schedule, budget, and performance baselines for each block configuration 

being fielded (biennial Blocks 04, 06, and 08 under the previous block structure) and 

reported variances annually in the agency’s Statement of Goals (SOG). 

In 2007, MDA established a new block structure to address concerns about transparency, accountability, and oversight and to better communicate to Congress and 

other key stakeholders our plans and baselines and our continuing improvements 

in Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) capabilities. Blocks will be based on 

fielded capabilities—not biennial time periods—that address particular threats, and 

each block will represent a discrete program of work. When blocks are established, 

schedule, budget, and performance goals will be defined for each block. These goals, 

revised as necessary, will become baselines when MDA can make a firm commitment to Congress because we have a high level of confidence that the baselines can 

be achieved. 

MDA has established schedule, budget, and performance baselines for Blocks 1.0 

(Defense of the U.S. from Limited North Korean Long-Range Threats), 2.0 (Defense 

of Allies and Deployed Forces from Short-to-Medium Range Threats in One Region/

Theater), and Block 3.1/3.2 (Expand Defense of the U.S. to Include Limited Iranian 

Long-Range Threats). We have established goals, not baselines for Block 3.3 (Expand Defense of the U.S. to Include Limited Iranian Long-Range Threats—Improved Discrimination and System Track), Block 4.0 (Defense of Allies and Deployed 

Forces in Europe from Limited Long-Range Threats/Expand Protection of the U.S. 

Homeland), and Block 5.0 (Expand Defense of Allies and Deployed Forces from 

Short- to Intermediate-Range Threats in Two Regions/Theaters). In the SOG that 

accompanied the President’s budget for fiscal year 2009, we presented these baselines and goals. 

In each subsequent year’s SOG, we will explain any significant variances from 

schedule, budget, and performance baselines and the reasons for redefining block 

goals. We will also explain changes in year-to-year funding plans for each block over 

the period of the Future Years Defense Plan. This level of reporting is a significant 

enhancement to transparency. 

MDA has also begun establishing unit cost baseline estimates for BMDS capabilities being acquired and delivered to the warfighter. Our approach is to build these 

estimates from the level of selected components to be fielded (such as the Terminal 

High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Fire Unit) to the element THAAD level and 

185

eventually to the block level. This latter calculation will be a full block cost baseline 

estimate. Before establishing cost baseline estimates, MDA will request an independent review by the Cost Analysis Improvement Group, Department of Defense’s 

(DOD) independent cost estimating unit. 

Once the estimates are established, MDA will report any significant cost variance 

to Congress. This information will supplement the reporting of acquisition cost at 

the BMDS level in the agency’s annual Selected Acquisition Report. We are now in 

the process of determining the thresholds to report such cost variations and will incorporate them in a MDA directive. 

While our capabilities-based, spiral development program may not provide the 

identical kind of information and baselines generated under DOD Instruction 5000 

for traditional acquisition programs, our intention is to fully meet the transparency, 

accountability, and oversight needs of Congress and other stakeholders.

Senator BILL NELSON. Secretary Young, would you help facilitate 

this to see that these requirements are implemented? 

Mr. YOUNG. Absolutely, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. Senator Pryor, what I have been 

doing is deferring to our colleagues and I’ve let them ask the questions first. So I would turn to you. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. Has Senator Sessions already asked? 

Senator BILL NELSON. He has already, and he is going to jump 

in whenever he wants to again. [Laughter.] 

Senator PRYOR. Okay, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and 

thank you, Senator Sessions, as well. I appreciate your leadership 

on this. 

Lieutenant General Campbell, let me start with you, if I may follow up on a question, a line of questions I heard Senator Nelson 

asking when I came into the room—I am sorry for being late—

about the THAAD system and the SM–3 system. Let us see, the 

original inventory objective for the THAAD program was 1,250 missiles. Our current inventory objective is less than 10 percent of 

that. As I understand it, the people who have looked at it said that 

we need quite a bit more than what we have in our current inventory, at least that is the concern. 

Can you explain how force structure and inventory objectives are 

determined for these near-term theater systems and how the process could be improved to ensure that our military has the capabilities they need to defend against existing threats? 

General CAMPBELL. Yes, Senator. Normally, we do studies. We do 

modeling and analysis in wartime settings by theaters, taking a 

look at what the threat has in their order of battle, what blue 

forces have in their order of battle, and we look at all the forces. 

We look at offensive forces, defensive forces in combination and 

make a determination then what is required to defend critical assets within that particular theater. 

In most cases, we are never going to get to the point where we 

will have enough missiles to defend against every ballistic missile 

that an adversary is going to have. So, therefore, we consider in 

these protocols offensive capabilities that could reduce their effectiveness, other actions, passive defense measures that a COCOM 

could take—perhaps moving critical facilities off of locations further away from the shores of an adversary. 

So then we arrive and have to make determinations on risk. Do 

we have a low-risk situation, a moderate risk, or a high-risk situation? Can we live with those risks, given the operations we expect 

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to perform in that particular theater? Then that results in a number that then we will pursue for a particular system. 

Senator PRYOR. Let me make sure I understand. The 1,250 original figure, was that just picked out of thin air? 

General CAMPBELL. I am not familiar with the analysis that supported the 1,250. I know that was back in the 1990s, that particular study, but I am not familiar with what scenarios they 

looked at. I am more familiar with what the JCM has looked at. 

I am familiar with those scenarios, and I understand the numbers 

and how we arrived at those. 

Senator PRYOR. Do you take into consideration what the 

COCOMs are saying in terms of their needs? 

General CAMPBELL. Absolutely. 

Senator PRYOR. Secretary Young, let me ask your thoughts on 

this. Does this process of determining how many, in this case, 

THAAD missiles—but determining how many missiles we have, 

can we improve that process? Does your office play a role in coming 

out with those numbers? Could you tell the subcommittee that, 

please? 

Mr. YOUNG. I think this is a good discussion for this MDEB we 

talked about. I would tell you that the updated joint capability mix 

study is a good starting point. As General Campbell rightly pointed 

out, we may not be able to address every threat. We may not need 

to because we have other offensive strike capabilities that will 

hopefully take out some of the threats before they launch. 

But I believe we will bring this discussion into a MDEB to have 

the discussion. The nice thing or the benefits of having an MDA organization is that we will look across the full set of missile defense 

capabilities and trade THAAD, SM–3, and PAC–3 and do it effectively and get a joint capability instead of single-service capability. 

But we will be looking at this, and we have a good starting point 

for the discussion with the new mix study. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. 

General Obering, thank you again for your leadership on this, 

and it is good to see you again. Let me ask about the Multiple Kill 

Vehicle (MKV) program. As I understand it, we are trying to develop this MKV program. Could you give us just a quick status report on that? 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. As I have stated and testified in the 

past, today we have the ability to deal with simple countermeasures, and we have flown against those in our flight test program in the past. When we get to very complex countermeasures, 

that gives us a problem. So that is a limitation of our system. We 

are addressing that through a number of ways. 

One is to be able to do what we call birth-to-death tracking of 

the target suite. The second thing is to employ more advanced sensors and algorithms, and we have deployed the radars. Now we are 

going to be equipping those with the algorithms that will allow us 

to do the discrimination. The third piece of that is being able to 

equip each interceptor with more than a single kill vehicle so it can 

take out more than one what we call ‘‘credible object.’’ 

So we believe that is very important to meeting the intent that 

we have stated all along. It has actually been part of the criticisms 

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of missile defense that you can’t handle complex countermeasures. 

This is the way we do that. 

We have a plan that we have embarked upon to provide a volume kill or MKV capability to our GMS interceptors, our KEIs as 

well, along with the sea-based interceptors, the SM–3 Block 2A, because it will be large enough to be able to handle the volume kill 

capabilities. 

Senator PRYOR. What impact does that have on Japan? As I understand it, they were the single kill vehicle? 

General OBERING. Well, first of all, we are not walking away 

from the single kill vehicle. We will have that as a complement, 

and that is the baseline right now of the co-development with the 

Japanese. What we wanted to do is have a volume kill capability 

as a Block B of that and have the SM–3 Block 2A as the unitary 

kill vehicle and the Block 2B as the MKV. 

I have discussed this with our Japanese friends. Initially, the 

Japanese were reluctant because they did not want to have anything that would perturb the baseline for the unitary kill vehicle. 

When we had further discussion with them and we assuaged those 

concerns, they actually sent a letter to me documenting that they 

were okay with the MKV program, and we think that we are on 

track with that. 

Senator PRYOR. I assume that we are counting on Japan to play 

a role with our missile defense system? Is that right? 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. They are our leading ally right now. 

With respect to their own investments in missile defense, they are 

approaching about $1.5 billion a year, as I recall. They are not only 

procuring capabilities from us, such as the Patriot 3, they are also 

co-developing their own capabilities like the SM–3 Block 2A I just 

talked about and expanding their sea-based capabilities and sensor 

networks as well. 

We have a very strong and robust partnership with Japan. 

Senator PRYOR. This is my last question, Mr. Chairman. Not to 

belabor the history on this next question, but I know that in 2002, 

Secretary Rumsfeld exempted MDA from some requirements that 

you had. There was a concern that maybe the warfighters were not 

having their say in the process. So there is a program that you initiated called the Warfighter Involvement Program. 

How has that initiative worked? Are you seeing a positive 

change? Has it been successful? 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. I am glad—thank you very much for 

that question. 

There was a misconception when Secretary Rumsfeld exempted 

us from the operational requirements documents that we were 

walking away from warfighter requirements, and we never did 

that. What we were trying to do is actually be able to accelerate 

to meet the warfighter desires and to be able to adapt to changes 

in the threat and to changes in those requirements. 

The requirements process that he exempted us from was a very 

tedious and laborious process that was difficult to change. We went 

to a different model in which we do much more collaboration with 

the warfighter as we go through defining what the capabilities are 

that we will be developing and fielding. In fact, the warfighter involvement process that you refer to is where STRATCOM, under 

188

their unified command plan responsibility as the arbitrator, so to 

speak, and proponent and advocate for missile defense, works very 

closely with us. 

They gather up all of the COCOMs’ requirements via their integrated prioritized list, and when it comes to missile defense, they 

meld that into a listing for us. Then we work with them to tell 

them what we think is affordable, what we think is doable from a 

technical perspective, and when we think we could deliver that. 

But I would encourage you, also, to ask the Commander of 

STRATCOM, General Chilton, about that. I think that they are 

pleased with that process. In fact, the last discussion I had with 

him, he actually wants to accelerate that even more than we have 

done in the past with respect to our POM–10. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Several of you have mentioned the MDEB. 

So, Mr. Francis, let me ask you, as a part of the leadership of the 

GAO, you have been looking at the oversight of this entire defense 

program for a number of years. What are your views on the 

MDEB? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think the executive board is 

more substantive than its predecessor. I think the membership is 

of a higher level. There are four standing committees, each with 

designated responsibilities that I think are intended to create a 

better flow of information across different areas in the Department 

and different vested interests. 

I think the executive board does have a pretty good charter about 

making recommendations and particularly looking at business 

cases for making investment. So I think on that score, the executive board is better than the support group that preceded it. I think 

also that Mr. Young has been pretty active in having fairly regular 

meetings. I think the old support group kind of fell into disuse, and 

it wasn’t meeting anymore. 

I don’t think that the executive board does carry the full weight, 

if you will, of a defense acquisition board (DAB) on other systems, 

which is set up to inform and help Mr. Young make milestone decisions. Right now, the executive board is not an approval board, it 

doesn’t approve missile defense decisions. So it stops short of that. 

I would say there is probably some information, we were talking 

earlier about cost, and I think that might get resolved. But right 

now, they wouldn’t get the full cost information that a DAB would. 

To the extent that Dr. McQueary is not able to do a full evaluation 

of operational effectiveness and suitability, that would be something else that might limit what the executive board could do. 

Senator BILL NELSON. All right. I am going to get to Dr. 

McQueary in a minute. 

General Obering, your testimony makes a number of comments 

about the new block structure. You say, ‘‘Once baselines are defined, work cannot be moved from one block to another.’’ Does that 

mean before the baselines are defined that work can be transferred? 

General OBERING. Yes, sir, we were talking in the context of the 

old 2004, 2006, 2008 block structure, we had the flexibility to move 

back and forth in terms of the work scope. In terms of the new 

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lines. We allocate, as I said, the budget to those, and then we execute to those baselines. 

Now there always may be fact-of-life changes that we will have 

to incur. But again, we would report those as part of our reporting 

process. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Last year’s National Defense Authorization Act required that you obtain independent cost estimates for 

the missile defense systems. Will you also seek independent cost 

estimates on your block cost estimates? 

General OBERING. Yes, sir, and by the way, we have been doing 

independent cost estimates for quite awhile, so there may be some 

misunderstanding. But we have been doing independent cost estimates, working with the Department in the past, and we intend to 

do so with the blocks. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Francis, do you have some comments 

about the issue of baselines and cost estimates? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I think missile defense intends 

to do a total cost estimate for each of the blocks and to baseline 

that. So I think one of the advantages of that is they won’t keep 

moving scope in and out of those blocks and across them. That has 

made it difficult for us in the past to say, ‘‘gee, are you getting 

value for money?’’ 

One of the things, and I think you cleared it up earlier on a question, is the timeline. In other words, when is missile defense going 

to provide those estimates and those baselines? What criteria will 

it use to say when something is ready to be baselined, and then 

how is it going to report variances on, for example, unit costs and 

what assets? 

So I think some of those things are to be determined, and I think 

that is something that MDA should work out in consultation with 

Congress. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Now to you, Dr. McQueary. The law requires you to report on the operational effectiveness, suitability, 

and survivability at the end of each 2-year block. Now with the 

changing of the block structure so that there are no more 2-year 

blocks, would you be able to provide the report on the characterization of the effectiveness, suitability, and survivability on an annual 

basis in your required annual report? 

Dr. MCQUEARY. That would be the proposal that we would make 

to you, sir, if that serves your needs. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. Your organization produced a report last October outlining the concept for a basic test plan for the 

proposed European Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) program, and your plan would permit an initial demonstration of 

whether that proposed system could accomplish its mission. You 

note significant differences between the GMD system and that already deployed. Your report says, ‘‘Simply testing the new twostage booster in a flight test is inadequate to assess the operational 

effectiveness of the European deployment assets.’’ 

So do we correctly surmise from your report’s recommendation 

that it represents minimum testing you believe to be necessary to 

permit the initial level of assessment of the ability of the proposed 

system to accomplish its goal? 

190

Dr. MCQUEARY. If I could come back to a point that I made last 

year of the importance of modeling and simulation? One can get by 

with fewer numbers of actual tests if one has high-fidelity modeling 

and simulation. General Obering has expended a great deal of effort this past year. There is much more to be done in order to reach 

a point to where we have fully accredited models and simulation 

for BMDS. 

Now, with that being said, with high-fidelity accredited models 

in which we have confidence in those models, based upon showing 

that the models themselves are responsive and duplicate information that we get from actual tests, it is our belief that for the twostage rocket, the two-stage motor, that have one test at what I will 

call a taped target, not a live target, and one test that is against 

an actual target, and the MDA has that currently scheduled in 

their plans, I believe. It is our belief that we need one more such 

shot that simulates the actual engagement scenarios that one 

would see in the European theater in order to gain confidence in 

the modeling and simulation so that one could then explore the 

battle space in more detail using the modeling and simulation. 

Senator BILL NELSON. So one more would be how many? 

Dr. MCQUEARY. That would make a total of three. 

Senator BILL NELSON. A total of three. 

Dr. MCQUEARY. A total of three in our judgment, yes. These assume successes on each one of those, by the way. 

Senator BILL NELSON. I thought there were three initial tests? 

Dr. MCQUEARY. I believe that the MDA has two, and we had indicated that we believe we need three, the third one being a test 

that is in an actual engagement scenario that one would see as in 

the European theater. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay, we have a disconnect on that. 

Dr. MCQUEARY. Maybe I have caused it. 

Senator BILL NELSON. All right. MDA, I am told, was planning 

to do two. DOT&E says, no, you need to do three. 

Dr. MCQUEARY. That is correct. 

Senator BILL NELSON. All right. 

Dr. MCQUEARY. But to give full credit to MDA, the test plans 

that they continue to develop evolve with discussions with us over 

time. So we continue to discuss the issue with them. It is not closed 

as far as we are concerned. 

Senator BILL NELSON. All right. Let us go back to the models and 

the testing. In your annual report, you said that the system ‘‘was 

hampered by the lack of flight test data and unverified and 

unvalidated models and simulations.’’ So it seems that that means 

until these models and simulations are anchored with enough flight 

tests, verified and validated, that you are not going to be able to 

have confidence in the operational performance. Is that true? 

Dr. MCQUEARY. Yes, sir. That is true. 

Senator BILL NELSON. All right. Your report also says, ‘‘MDA 

must accomplish more development, integration, and testing before 

it adequately matures its models and simulations and collects sufficient data to allow for verification, validation, and accreditation.’’ 

Continuing, ‘‘This critical step is required before quantitative evaluation of performance can occur.’’ 

191

So it says that, ‘‘these models and simulations are a long way 

from being ready for accreditation.’’ That this situation ‘‘has severely hampered the efforts to characterize’’ the performance of the 

system. So is it likely going to take several more years to get these 

validated and verified models in place? 

Dr. MCQUEARY. Well, I think it will be measured in years. 

Whether it is several or whether it is a few I am not sure because 

we don’t have a schedule for the complete development yet, and I 

think that is the important question to be answered. But I think 

most importantly, the work that MDA did in this past year of looking at the some 33 models that actually represent various elements 

of MDA and determining whether those models could be accredited 

or not was a major step forward because one has to know where 

one is before deciding where they want to go. 

So that was done, and there are, I believe, 5 of the 33 that actually received partial accreditation. But that means there are 26 

that did not, and many of those models simply do not have sufficient data from actual flight tests in order to be able to help accredit them. Now that is one step. There are a series of steps associated. 

There also must be developed what I will call an MDA model 

that one would use for fully exploring the battle space so you can 

do what I will call Monte Carlo simulations—these are looking at 

variabilities and trajectories and so forth—to gain the confidence 

that this system will work in the battle space in which it is scheduled to be worked. That applies whether we are talking with the 

U.S.-based system or the European-based system. 

Senator BILL NELSON. All right. Now, and your report further 

goes on to talk about some of the problems that have been encountered with the target missiles for flight tests, and you observe failure rates of 20 percent and cost increases of 450 percent. Do you 

want to describe some of your concerns? 

Dr. MCQUEARY. In the last 18 months, and General Obering 

touches upon this same subject in his prepared remarks for the 

record, and I believe he mentions 2 complete failures out of the 42 

units. We have looked primarily at the last 18 months because that 

is more near-term, and out of that we have had two complete failures, and there were two partial failures in systems. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Out of how many flights in the last 18 

months? 

Dr. MCQUEARY. Out of, I believe, 20. I believe the number is 20. 

Senator BILL NELSON. So 4 out of 20? 

Dr. MCQUEARY. Four out of 20. So you are talking a 20 percent 

difficulty rate and certainly a 10 percent failure rate and 10 percent more of difficulty with the targets. 

The targets of necessity have become more and more complex because, keep in mind, we are trying to simulate what the threat 

would be. So inherently the targets will become more complex. In 

fact, they will become more complex over time. 

So the flexible target approach that General Obering and his 

folks have undertaken, I think that is an important step. But nevertheless, targets have been, to a degree, a limiting factor in how 

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cause of target failures, for example, and you have to regroup after 

that. 

Senator BILL NELSON. As a matter of fact, you noted that in your 

report that a number of the important tests had been delayed or 

eliminated because of the target problems. Well, what about if targets were available, do you think that the Aegis and the THAAD 

should conduct four tests per year? 

Dr. MCQUEARY. I am an advocate of the test-evaluate-fix approach that General Obering and MDA has used, and that has 

nothing to do with my association with MDA. It has been a view 

that I have had for a long period of time in my career. I spent a 

couple of years on Kwajalein a long time ago before many people 

in the room were born, and——

Senator BILL NELSON. No wonder you look so cool and collected. 

Dr. MCQUEARY. We ran 31 missions in a 2-year period of time, 

and I can tell you, we were having difficulty understanding what 

the problems were with a given mission before we went on to the 

next one. So, I am a very strong advocate on complex systems of 

taking the time to analyze the data that is collected so we can understand because data tells you, gives you information that isn’t always apparent at first look. 

I think it is very, very important in developing highly complex 

systems to have good models and simulations to support them and 

also to take the time to analyze the data that is associated with 

those very expensive tests that are conducted. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Therefore, you are saying then that just 

as they did previously, you ought to do four tests a year on Aegis 

and THAAD? 

Dr. MCQUEARY. I don’t know whether four is the right number 

or not. I would tie it to the ability to be able to analyze the data 

and let that be the driving function. 

Senator BILL NELSON. What say you, General Obering? 

General OBERING. Sir, I think we should test to verify, not test 

to discover. I believe that you should test based on your objectives 

and not on a calendar. As Dr. McQueary stated, if we were going 

to go out and fly five, six, or seven times a year and we are not 

learning anything different in each flight test, it is a waste of the 

taxpayers’ money, in my mind. These are expensive tests. They can 

be $80 million or more for some of these tests. 

So what we want to do is take complete advantage of the opportunity to test and understand what we learned from the previous 

test, and by the way, we work this very closely with the testers. 

We collect just volumes and volumes of data on these tests. We like 

to go through and understand all of it. Sometimes it takes us 

months to go through and reduce that data so that we understand 

where we want to go for the next one. 

What we like to do is base our testing on the event structure, not 

on a particular calendar. Now, for planning purposes, what we 

stated is that we would like to target anywhere from two to four 

tests per year depending on the system and the maturity. But 

again, that depends on what stage we are going into. 

As we complete the testing on the Block 1A for the SM–3, for example, we will probably slow that down in anticipation of more 

Block 1B testing that is, by the way, a major upgrade to that interVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:11 Dec 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00198 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\42635.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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ceptor, and is much more dramatic than going from a three-stage 

to a two-stage on the long-range interceptor. So we like to pace our 

testing based on our development needs, based on the warfighter 

objectives, and based on the test team objectives. 

Senator BILL NELSON. If you had more targets, would you do 

more tests? 

General OBERING. It depends. It all depends. If you are totally 

success-oriented, yes, sir. If we were continuing to fly and we were 

successful in reducing the data, I would say that even if we were 

successful on every test, we would probably not be able to fly more 

than twice a year for the long-range program because of the complexity of those tests, the data reduction timelines, the target complexities, and the distances, et cetera. We probably could do better 

on the shorter range because of the simpler approach to that in 

terms of the rate. 

But again, if you have a target failure, as Dr. McQueary referred 

to, we had one target failure for THAAD. We had a target failure 

for the long-range system as well in terms of our intercept. We only 

had two target failures in the last 18 months for our intercept test, 

but we had to go understand what that failure mode was before we 

could get back in the air with another target. 

So it doesn’t do us any good to have two targets sitting in the 

barn—we go out, try to fly one, and it fails and then pull the other 

one out—because we need to understand why that first one failed 

before we can pull the second one out to go fly it. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Francis, in your testimony, you make 

the point that the original estimate for the ABL was that it would 

cost $1 billion, and it would take until 2001. Now the program has 

had a 500 percent cost increase, over $5 billion, and it won’t complete its demonstration until 2009. 

At the end of that period, we would expect that there would be 

an attempt to shoot down a boosting short-range missile to demonstrate proof of the ABL system. If that system works, do you believe that the initial shoot-down demonstration will constitute proof 

that the ABL system will work as operationally effective? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think that the lethality demonstration in 2009 is essential, and it has been kind of a difficult 

path to get here. But it is, I think, good that we are at this point. 

I would say that the lethality demonstration by itself wouldn’t be 

proof that ABL is the system that we are going to go full with to 

field for the boost-phase system because it is a demonstration, and 

I think what that means is that if it is successful, it says, gee, we 

can do this. 

Then the next thing you want to do is actual testing. This is a 

demonstration. Testing tells you how repeatable this is and how reliable. Can we do this consistently? That would give you another 

data point. 

Then you would have to look at and analyze what I would say 

is the operational practicality, which is if the asset works, can we 

get it where it needs to be and can we keep it on station so it can 

do its job? Then I think, finally, you want to say if we can do all 

of that, can we provide the basing, the maintenance, logistics, the 

people, and so forth to make that happen? 

194

I think it is a crucial first question here for ABL to answer, but 

I think there are other things you want to know before you are absolutely certain that it is the right system. 

Senator BILL NELSON. So you are saying not only operationally 

effective, you are saying affordable, suitable, and survivable? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Yes, sir. 

General OBERING. Sir, may I chime in on that, please? 

Senator BILL NELSON. Please. 

General OBERING. That is a great example of where the flexibilities and what we are approaching in MDA is offering a different 

solution for the department. The ABL program was an Air Force 

program before it was transitioned to the MDA. It was being acquired under the normal rules, the normal approaches. What they 

had done is they had established a major acquisition program. 

They had built up the army of people to support that, and they 

were working on maintainability, supportability, all of the ‘‘-ilities’’ 

that everybody wants to have, and they had not even achieved first 

light out of the laser. 

We said stop. When we took over the program, we said, stop, 

that doesn’t make any sense. You have to go through and show 

that you have the knowledge point achieved to take the first flight 

of the aircraft that has been heavily modified and be able to fire 

that laser for the first time. Since we did that, and we have seen 

steady progress by that program going into the lethal shoot-down 

for next year. 

Now I echo what Mr. Francis says. We are not looking just at 

a technical demonstration. We are looking at the lessons learned 

in this demonstration and what does it mean for affordability and 

for operational suitability? We will collect all of this data from the 

test series that we will initiate here for the lethal shoot-down in 

2009 and then make a determination as to what we need to do to 

the program, not unlike, by the way, what happened on the 

THAAD program from 2000 until about the 2005 timeframe. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Are you satisfied that you haven’t sacrificed the development of the kinetic system on the boost phase? 

General OBERING. Sacrificed that? No, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. By pouring the $5 billion into the ABL? 

General OBERING. No, sir. I do not. In fact, we are the ones that 

initiated the KEI program, and I was a great supporter and have 

been a great supporter of that program over here on the Hill since 

I have been the director for the past 31⁄2 years. 

So, no, sir, we were not sacrificing that. We could not get support 

from the Hill on the KEI program to get it an adequate start. We 

now are getting that support, and so I think we do want to have 

an alternative. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Go ahead, Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Did I hear you say how much money had been 

spent on ABL before it was transferred to your direction? 

General OBERING. Sir, I would have to go get you the numbers 

in terms of what that amount was, but we could do that. Especially 

what the budget estimates were for it back then, et cetera, we can 

do that. 

[The information referred to follows:]

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(1) The initial estimate for the Airborne Laser (ABL) was $1.3 billion (Base Year 

2008) with lethal demonstration scheduled for September 2002 as disclosed in the 

ABL Selected Acquisition Report dated 31 December 1996 (RCS DD–A&T (Q&A) 

823); (2) The amount of money spent on ABL from fiscal year 1996 through fiscal 

year 2001 prior to the program being transferred to MDA in fiscal year 2001 was 

$1.4 billion (Base Year 2008). Current funding for fiscal year 1996–2009 is $5.1 billion (or $5.4 billion Base Year 2008) with lethal demonstration slated for August 

2009.

Mr. FRANCIS. I think, Senator Sessions, the original, as I remember the history of the ABL. I think when it was an Air Force program, it was envisioned to be $1 billion and about 5 years, I think, 

to get to lethal shoot-down. I think right now the estimate is about 

$5 billion and I think about 13 years, if that is right. 

Senator SESSIONS. The $5 billion includes the date for its projected test is when? 

General OBERING. 2009, sir. 

Mr. FRANCIS. At that time, I recall the Air Force had the ABL 

program, and they transitioned it into the acquisition process prematurely because they needed to get more money. So they actually 

got ahead of their own headlights, I would say, there. As General 

Obering said, they were proceeding with the full-blown program before they had a good understanding of the basic technologies. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Francis, you recommended last year 

an independent assessment of the ABL program. Do you still believe that would be useful? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Yes, I think a separate pair of eyes on—I think 

boost phase is something that there has been quite a bit of debate 

on, and it is something I think that we probably know the least 

about if you look at the full layer of BMDS. So I still think that 

is a reasonable thing to do. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. 

Senator SESSIONS. On that, because there are real concerns here, 

I know that Senator Nelson has done a lot of work on it. Did I understand that this may be the top directed-energy laser program in 

the DOD? Are there any other programs that are doing study in 

this area of significance? General Campbell? 

General CAMPBELL. Yes, sir. We are doing a study for solid-state 

lasers not on the same scope of what General Obering is doing. But 

that is moving along, and we are moving towards a demonstrator 

over the next about 18 months of a 100-kilowatt class solid-state 

laser. It may have potential on the counter rockets, artillery, and 

mortar mission. 

Senator SESSIONS. On that subject, it seems to me that we have 

proven that capability to some degree. Is it something we could 

consider deploying in areas around the globe where our bases may 

be subject to rockets or smaller rockets or mortar rounds? 

General CAMPBELL. We think it has potential. The problem with 

some of the past developmental systems, they were chemicallybased lasers, and there is a large logistics footprint, and it is very 

difficult to move it around and very difficult in handling the chemicals. 

Senator SESSIONS. Let us talk about that. We have the green 

zone and places that are pretty stable, going to be there for some 

time. You don’t have to move a system around a lot, would you, 

even if it is a fairly substantial thing to move? 

196

General CAMPBELL. No, you wouldn’t have to move it around a 

lot, but the effectiveness of that system against the range of 

threats they face, in my estimation, is not what we need today, sir. 

Again, it has been very developmental, limited in scope. 

Senator SESSIONS. Do you see a need to accelerate that? 

General CAMPBELL. In my view, there is merit in this, and I 

think we should go after it sooner rather than later. 

Senator SESSIONS. That is just a sort of a separate issue. But go 

ahead. 

Senator BILL NELSON. On the high-energy laser systems test facility out at White Sands, General Campbell, in your prepared testimony you asked for ‘‘continued support to ensure the vital testing 

ranges are postured to perform necessary testing.’’ Now, does the 

Army’s budget request for 2009 contain sufficient funds to keep 

this test facility open? 

General CAMPBELL. The President’s budget for 2009, we can keep 

the facility open. But what we lose is the contracting base that 

runs the existing chemical laser at White Sands. We are very much 

customer dependent on keeping that going. 

General Obering is committed to doing testing this year, but 

when we get into 2009, we will be in the same condition that we 

are in this year. The budget was approximately $2.8 million, which 

keeps the Government crew on station, and we can educate some 

of our Government crews on maintaining the chemical laser in a 

mothball status. But once we go about 6 months or a year after we 

have lost the contracting crew, it could take us 2 to 3 years to recover the capability and quite a bit more cost to bring it back if 

we still needed that facility for testing. 

Senator BILL NELSON. But you don’t have any customers except 

MDA, do you? 

General CAMPBELL. That is correct. MDA is the only customer at 

the moment. 

Senator BILL NELSON. So your funds in your request are just to 

keep it open, not to operate it and able to fully support MDA’s testing plans? 

General CAMPBELL. That is correct. The current level of funding 

would be able to keep it in a mothballed status over the next few 

years. But we would not be able to conduct tests on behalf of MDA. 

Senator BILL NELSON. All right. I want to ask about the Arrow. 

Israel is seeking an upper-tier missile defense system against the 

Iranian Shahab-3 missiles. They are looking at possible nuclear 

warheads incoming. The United States pays a big share of this. 

One of the options is considering the development of a new missile 

defense interceptor, which would also require the development of a 

new long-range radar. 

Now, isn’t this getting duplicative of THAAD and SM–3 systems? 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. We believe so, and that is why we 

have been championing having THAAD and SM–3 as solutions to 

the concern of the Israelis. We have to work through, obviously, the 

nondisclosure policy committees to make sure—even to release the 

data on the SM–3 and the THAAD’s performances to try to assuage 

the Israelis’ concern. We have been successful, partially, in being 

able to do that, and we are continuing to work that process. 

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Senator BILL NELSON. What about a SM–3 launch from a 

ground-based THAAD launcher? 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. One of the options that we also are 

investigating is taking a look at a land-based version, if you would, 

of the SM–3 combined with the THAAD radar. It is a very powerful 

combination, and we think, by the way, not only is it applicable to 

Israel but also applicable to other areas for our own defense as well 

as our other allies. 

Senator BILL NELSON. So you think that might be the solution? 

General OBERING. Well, sir, that is certainly one of the options 

that we are putting into our analysis of alternatives. 

Senator BILL NELSON. How about defending NATO Europe, General Campbell? Could Aegis, BMD, and THAAD have an important 

role in defending Europe against Iranian threats that exist today? 

General CAMPBELL. Yes, sir. They would play a role. In fact, if 

you look at the planned deployment, there is a requirement for 

complementary systems to protect the southeastern part of Europe. 

Senator BILL NELSON. All right, and that would be true against 

Iranian missiles before they would get the long-range missiles? 

General CAMPBELL. Yes, sir, that is true. They are developing a 

missile today that can range parts of southeastern Europe. 

Senator BILL NELSON. General Obering, one of the success stories is the Aegis BMD system with its SM–3 interceptor. You may 

not want to recognize it, but it was a collaborative program with 

the United States Navy. That is a joke. [Laughter.] 

General OBERING. I hope so, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. You have had impressive results. The 

question is, are we buying enough of the interceptors to continue 

to develop the system to its full potential? Can you confirm that 

this system with the SM–3 will have a greater capability when it 

has the improved software and hardware to allow launching and 

engaging on remote sensor tracks? 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. We are planning that. But if I may, 

I feel like a proud father because of all of my children. We have 

had tremendous success with Aegis. We have also had tremendous 

success with our long-range system, and we have had tremendous 

success with THAAD. So I am very pleased with that. 

We have had our challenges on all of the programs. We have had 

our challenges on the long-range. We certainly have had our challenges on the Aegis as well. We had issues with the third-stage 

rocket motor and with the solid divert and attitude control system. 

But working together as a team, we were able to solve those and 

move ahead, and I feel very comfortable there. 

Same thing with THAAD. We have had issues with THAAD that 

we had to work through with respect to qualification of components 

and that type of thing. But our test program that we have had 

going back to 2001, and certainly since 2005, I think is a tribute 

to that collaboration across the board. 

With respect to the sea-based, as I said in the earlier THAAD 

discussion, and by the way, I was asked this question several years 

back by Secretary Rumsfeld about whether we don’t need more 

land-based, silo-based missiles, more than the 54 that we are currently producing? My answer was ‘‘no,’’ sir, we don’t because that 

is enough to provide us the persistent 24/7 coverage that we need 

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for the United States and our allies in the regions, and where we 

want to go to next is to more mobile capabilities and enhance those 

capabilities to be able to address the longer-range threats. 

So that is why we are moving that way as we move into the future because we have been able to secure the homeland and our allies from the initial long-range. Now let us look at what we can do 

for the future. 

Senator BILL NELSON. The joint capability mix study indicates 

that you need to buy about twice as many SM–3 missiles as currently planned. Is that going to be necessary to have additional 

procurement? 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. That is our intent, to be able to do 

that. We would flow that in our POM is what we intend. It would 

not require any significant capitalization to be able to do that with 

respect to a production rate. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Is the Aegis BMD program and the Navy, 

is that program funding going to be restored from when they shot 

down the defense satellite? 

General OBERING. Sir, that was MDA money that did that, and 

we have been working that within the department to be able to recover that cost. 

Senator BILL NELSON. What is the cost? 

General OBERING. Because we took only one shot, it was roughly 

about $70 million total. 

Senator BILL NELSON. You are going to get that money back from 

whom? 

General OBERING. We are trying to work it through the supplemental process is what I understood. By the way, sir, if I may, 

while you are on the subject, that was a great lesson in integration 

that was learned by many, many folks. It is something that we 

have been preaching for a long time. 

Senator BILL NELSON. We certainly compliment you on that. 

General OBERING. The ship could not have done that by itself. It 

had to have off-board information to be able to do that, and it took 

the whole team to be able to do that. Now that has implications 

for, as you stated in your question, how we integrate land-based radars with the ships, how we integrate the ships with land-based 

interceptors. It can tremendously extend your detection and engagement zone, so it is a very, very powerful force multiplier. 

Senator BILL NELSON. In your proposed Europe two-stage interceptor, is there going to be any difference between the two-stage 

booster that you test and the two-stage booster that is proposed to 

be deployed operationally? 

General OBERING. No, sir, not at this time. This is an identical 

configuration with respect to about 95 percent of that interceptor. 

We are just removing the third stage. We are doing some modifications to the adaptors, to the software, as you state. So there are 

minimal changes to that. 

In addition, we have other upgrades that we will do across the 

board to our GMD programs, but they will be factored in as we go. 

We are always in a state of continuous improvement, if you want 

to call it that. But right now, the configuration that we plan to fly 

for the booster verification and the intercept test is the configuraVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:11 Dec 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00204 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\42635.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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tion that we would plan to deploy. There may be minor improvements, but that is the plan. 

Senator BILL NELSON. You have had some quality problems with 

the hardware in the Ground-Based Interceptors. What has been 

done to replace that equipment, retrofit it, and how about the flight 

software? 

General OBERING. First of all, some of the reliability issues that 

we have had, both from a qualification standpoint on the groundbased—the long-range system, as well as the THAAD system in 

terms of the qualifications there, we have worked through. We 

have been able to divert funds to do that. That was more than 2 

years ago now, and we are reaping the benefits of those rewards. 

We continue to preach that in terms of the next generation of improvements on the long-range system and make sure that we are 

paying attention to the new configurations and improvements in 

the kill vehicle, along with the software improvements as well. So 

I feel that we are on track there. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. Do you take the interceptors out of 

their silos, the ones that are there operationally? Do you use them 

as flight test vehicles? 

General OBERING. The plan is that we take them out and that 

we do the refurbishment for those. Some of those will be outfitted 

with a flight termination system so that we can use those in our 

flight testing. But we like to be able to test the configurations coming off the line as well. 

So we do some improvements. For the most part, we can upgrade 

the software right through the umbilicals in the silo. We remove 

them for other things, like we have changed the fuel mixture and 

some other things to improve its performance. Those are the things 

that require the interceptors to be removed. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. You know about Europe and French President 

Sarkozy on March 21 said this in Cherbourg, France. ‘‘In order to 

preserve our freedom of action, missile defense capabilities against 

a limited strike could be a useful complement to nuclear deterrence’’—I guess that is mutually assured destruction—‘‘without 

being a substitute for it.’’ 

He went on to say, ‘‘It is in this spirit that we are taking part 

in the collective work of the Atlantic alliance. We have solid technical know-how in this area that could be taken advantage of when 

the time comes.’’ 

General Obering, that reflects to me a fundamental support for 

the concept of a missile defense system in Europe. Would you agree 

with that? 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. That is somewhat of a change from what we 

have seen in the past in France? 

General OBERING. Yes, sir, and by the way, that is reflective. 

Right now, we have about 18 nations around the world that we 

have some type of activity on missile defense—everything from, as 

I stated earlier, the Japanese involvement to basic research and development across the board. We are seeing a resurgence of this because nations are recognizing the threat. They are recognizing the 

urgency of this. 

200

Senator SESSIONS. There is an interesting article on the 25th anniversary of the missile defense program by Mr. Hackett. It fell on 

Easter Sunday, and he made reference to the fact that this is a lifesaving program. It defends against attack. It doesn’t attack somebody else. It defends human beings from dangerous attacks, and 

hopefully, we can continue to see that improve. 

Dr. McQueary, I appreciate your role, it is very important. I respect your ideas about the third test there. I think it is important 

that we try to accomplish that if we can. But you note in your prepared statement that the hit-to-kill is no longer a technological uncertainty, ‘‘It is a reality being successfully demonstrated many 

times over the past few years,’’ and you note that the GMD, the 

BMDS, ‘‘has a limited capability to defend against simple ballistic 

missile threats launched from North Korea toward the United 

States.’’ 

So I think that represents your analysis a bit detached from the 

system that we are onto something that is important here. 

Secretary Young, is the DOD committed not only to deploying the 

system that we have, but making it even more effective against sophisticated countermeasures and other type capabilities we might 

face in the future. 

Mr. YOUNG. Certainly. The budget request seeks to continue that 

process. 

Senator SESSIONS. I will just say this about the funding that we 

are in. I think Congress has an obligation to review where we 

spend the money and what lower priorities could be sacrificed in 

favor of higher priorities. But I really think we ought to support 

at least the President’s fundamental budget because we already see 

things like THAAD we wish we could do more of. We wish we could 

do more of some of these other systems that I think we need to do. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would note that, at least for this hearing, it may be General Obering’s last time before us. I have to say 

that during your leadership and your predecessor’s, we have seen 

our way through some highly challenging technological problems to 

a day that when the North Koreans rattle their missiles, we feel 

confident that we can knock it down, or that we have a satellite 

that endangers life around the world if not destroyed and we have 

proven we can knock it out of the sky. 

I do believe that enhances our security. I believe it enhances the 

ability of our President to make good decisions and not have to 

worry about being intimidated by even a relatively small nation 

who may have this technology. I think, General Obering, you have 

testified many times, you are a very good advocate for the program 

and proven to be a good manager, and I wanted to express my appreciation. 

We may well see you before you get away from us in November. 

I understand that is your expected date to depart. 

Senator BILL NELSON. We can always call him back. [Laughter.] 

Senator SESSIONS. What if we had a test failure, do you think we 

might call him back? 

General OBERING. I am sure. 

Senator SESSIONS. Even if you have left, we may call you back. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Or a success. 

Senator SESSIONS. Or a success. 

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Senator BILL NELSON. We might have you, when is the next test? 

General OBERING. Sir, we have a series of tests in June with 

Aegis and THAAD, and then we have a July planned test now for 

the long-range system, and then we have another one of the longrange system later in the year, as well as THAAD. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, why don’t we have you back in July, 

after the July test? Of course, what Senator Sessions said speaks 

for the committee as well in thanking you for your public service. 

I am curious in this thought that was brought up early in the 

hearing. How would the Poles and the Czechs treat it if we deployed the radar, but not the launchers? 

General OBERING. Well, sir, first of all, as I said, they are meant 

to go together. That is meant to provide the coverage that we need 

for the longer range. It is certainly—the radar provides value. The 

interceptors have to have the sensors to provide value as well. So 

we are viewing that as a package, and I think that they probably 

view that as a package as well. 

But the radar, in and of itself, is a tremendous advantage to the 

shorter- and medium-range defenses. 

Senator BILL NELSON. So you don’t have a feeling about how 

each of those countries would feel if there were a decision by the 

next President just to deploy the radar? 

General OBERING. No, sir. You would have to ask them. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. Well, we will see you in July then. 

General OBERING. Don’t feel compelled, sir. [Laughter.] 

Senator BILL NELSON. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

CONCURRENT DEVELOPMENT AND FIELDING

1. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Young and Mr. Francis, to meet the President’s direction to rapidly field an initial missile defense capability, the Department of Defense 

(DOD) accepted the increased risk of concurrently developing and fielding systems. 

Among other things, such concurrency poses the risk of fielding prototype systems 

that don’t work properly, need fixing after they are deployed, and cost additional 

money. I know you have both given a great deal of serious thought to the issues 

and risks posed by such a highly concurrent acquisition approach, which is not the 

Department’s normal or desired acquisition approach. Now that we have achieved 

that initial rapid fielding, do you agree that we should consider reducing the degree 

of concurrency in the missile defense acquisition program? 

Mr. YOUNG. The Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) is an effort to develop 

and integrate a number of elements produced in relatively small numbers. To date, 

the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has used knowledge points composed of ground 

and flight testing and modeling and simulation to assess the performance and maturity of each element and the system as a whole. As the Director of Operational Test 

and Evaluation testified, MDA is working to improve the fidelity of the respective 

models and to benchmark these models against test results. The limited fielding of 

the BMDS has been largely threat and event driven, with fielding decisions based 

on available information. You are correct that some of the urgent deployment efforts 

have resulted in a need to modify some of the fielded systems. I plan to conduct 

comprehensive evaluations of BMDS Element progress in preparation for procurement actions, and will consider, among other aspects, concurrency implications for 

future development and fielding. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Yes, the amount of concurrent development and fielding of the 

MDA’s BMDS assets should be reduced. In 2002, the President directed DOD to 

begin fielding an initial missile defense system capable of defending the United 

States, deployed troops, friends, and allies against ballistic missiles of all ranges in 

all phases of flight as soon as technically possible. Prior to this directive, MDA had 

adopted an acquisition strategy that included many of the knowledge-based practices that enable leading commercial developers to field sophisticated products on 

202

time and within budget. However, in order to field an initial capability quickly, 

MDA accepted the risk of concurrent development and fielding during its initial 

block of work—Block 2004—and departed from its knowledge-based strategy. If 

MDA had followed its knowledge-based approach, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) program would have moved through a sequence of eight events that 

included assessing the maturity of critical technologies, designing the element, and 

demonstrating the stability of the element’s design in an end-to-end test using production representative components—all before making a decision to produce and 

field the element. Instead, the GMD program concurrently matured technology, designed the element, tested the design, and produced and fielded the system, even 

though the stability of the element’s design had not been demonstrated in an endto-end test and production processes were not mature. Consequently, the program 

encountered quality control problems and to date, the performance of certain GMD 

interceptors remain questionable because the program was inattentive to quality assurance. 

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) understands that significant risk 

had to be accepted to satisfy the President’s directive to field an initial capability 

by 2004. However, now that an initial capability has been fielded, MDA should return to an acquisition strategy that achieves a better balance between expediency 

and risk. Although Block 2004 ended on December 31, 2005 and fielded an initial 

capability, MDA has continued to concurrently develop and field assets before they 

were fully tested. MDA’s acquisition strategy should provide a means for demonstrating design maturity and operational effectiveness prior to continued manufacturing and fielding of components. If MDA continues to use concurrency as a 

means to expedite fielding, we believe MDA will continue to experience cost growth 

and performance shortfalls.

2. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Young and Mr. Francis, what do you believe would 

be the major benefits of a less concurrent missile defense program? 

Mr. YOUNG. Benefits of a less concurrent program include increased performance 

data prior to fielding, reduced retrofit requirements after fielding, and increased 

configuration stability between production and deployed interceptors which should 

reduce missile production and support costs. However, maintaining concurrency allows incremental improvements to be available for implementation into the deployed 

interceptors. Thus, the challenge for DOD is executing a program with the appropriate balance. I am taking additional steps to ensure that the Department, through 

the Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB), maintains the appropriate balance 

between maturity and production stability, technical risks and cost to decide when 

to field a BMDS capability. 

Mr. FRANCIS. GAO has found that fully developing a component or element and 

demonstrating its capability prior to production increases the likelihood that the 

product will perform as intended and minimizes the risk of unexpected cost increases. Over the last several years, GAO has undertaken a body of work that examines weapon acquisition issues from a perspective that draws upon lessons 

learned from best product development practices. Collectively, these practices comprise a process that is anchored in knowledge. It is a process in which technology 

development and product development are treated differently and managed separately. The process of developing technology culminates in discovery—the gathering 

of knowledge—and must, by its nature, allow room for unexpected results and 

delays. GAO has found that consequences accrue to programs that are still working 

to mature technologies well into system development when they should be focused 

on maturing the system design and preparing for production. For example, while 

undertaking a concurrent approach to developing and fielding BMDS components, 

MDA experienced cost increases that amounted to $1 billion each for its first and 

second increments of work. Additionally, its GMD element realized in 2005 that the 

performance of some of its interceptors could be degraded because the interceptors 

included potentially unreliable parts as the program encountered quality control 

problems that stemmed from an acceleration of its acquisition cycle. While MDA has 

begun the process of retrofitting these interceptors, it is costing the agency more 

money and time to do so. If a knowledge-based approach had been followed to develop and manufacture these assets, MDA may have fielded more reliable assets as 

well as reduced performance risks and costs of those interceptors containing questionable parts.

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MISSILE DEFENSE EXECUTIVE BOARD

3. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Young, the MDEB was established last year to provide more effective oversight of the missile defense program. This was a much needed step in the right direction. How does the MDEB oversight role of the MDA differ 

from the oversight role that the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) provides to other 

major defense acquisition programs? 

Mr. YOUNG. The MDEB was established to recommend and oversee implementation of strategic policies and plans, program priorities, and investment options to 

protect our Nation and allies from missile attack. The MDEB authorities and responsibilities extend to comprehensive oversight of all of the MDA’s activities including those outside the scope of the traditional milestone review process for individual programs (e.g., assessments and potential influence on policy, threat assessments, capability requirements, budget formulation, and fielding options). Within 

the MDEB forum, I will be able to pursue an agenda that examines these topic 

areas and any other that will enhance BMDS development and fielding. When compared to a typical program DAB, the MDEB meets more frequently and, under my 

leadership, will continue to meet six times a year, or more often when necessary, 

to address appropriate MDA oversight topics. I plan to use the MDEB in a decisionmaking manner which will be very comparable to the DAB role.

4. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Young, does the MDEB consider, as its charter suggests, how best to field near-term capabilities to meet warfighter needs against existing short- and medium-range threats in a timely, efficient, cost-effective manner? 

Mr. YOUNG. Yes, the MDEB’s Operational Forces Committee is chaired by the 

Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and is composed of other principal members of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. The MDEB relies on the Operational Forces Committee to review and prioritize BMDS requirements, integrate 

those current Department priorities, and provide recommendations. The Policy Committee has reviewed possible threat expansion, and will continue to influence Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) priorities and MDEB deliberations regarding deployment capabilities. In addition, the use of research, development, technology, and 

evaluation funding allows the flexibility to redirect resources to meet the needs to 

counter emerging or evolving threats.

5. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Young, has the Board made any recommendations for 

the missile defense program? If so, what recommendations were made, and have 

they been approved? 

Mr. YOUNG. The MDEB recommendations include the following: the lead Service 

for the European Midcourse Radar (EMR), expansion of capability analyses for other 

than primary BMDS threats and specific language for a Guidance memorandum 

from the Deputy Secretary of Defense for the BMDS Life Cycle Management Process 

and Business Rules. The lead Service and capability analysis recommendations were 

approved and have generated work in both areas. The Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Guidance memo is currently in coordination with a signature anticipated in the near 

term. These are initial steps for the MDEB. I intend to pursue a more aggressive 

agenda and role as we move forward and mature the MDEB process.

6. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Young, the MDEB charter says that it will ‘‘engage 

other government agencies,’’ among a host of other institutions, to help ‘‘advance our 

mission successfully.’’ Is Congress one of the government entities with which the 

MDEB is intended to engage? If so, do you plan to engage Congress on a regular 

basis? 

Mr. YOUNG. I believe the MDEB is a unique opportunity to focus senior Department officials on a national priority, and to positively influence and closely monitor 

its development and operations. I maintain an inclusive approach to provide all 

stakeholders a voice in the process, and will engage Congress when appropriate to 

provide assessments of insight and oversight progress. Congress is a partner in the 

activities of DOD. I am prepared to work with and engage Congress as requested.

NOT ENOUGH GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE FLIGHT TESTS

7. Senator LEVIN. Dr. McQueary, your most recent annual report on missile defense says that there have not been enough flight tests of the GMD system, nor validated and verified models and simulations, to characterize its performance. You also 

said that it is ‘‘the least mature’’ and ‘‘least understood’’ of the deployed missile defense systems, and that it ‘‘has undergone less testing in all areas of effectiveness 

and suitability.’’ For example, your report says that ‘‘a characterization of suitability 

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is not yet possible,’’ and that ‘‘more flight tests are required to make this characterization.’’ The same is true for characterizing the survivability of the GMD system. 

So, is it correct that, based on the limited flight test data so far, and the lack of 

validated and verified models and simulations, you cannot yet say whether the system is operationally effective, suitable, or survivable? 

Dr. MCQUEARY. That is correct.

8. Senator LEVIN. Dr. McQueary, with respect to GMD test adequacy, your report 

says: ‘‘limited flight test data (two intercepts in 4 years), limited operational realism 

(target scene presentations), and a lack of independent accreditation of models and 

simulations impaired test adequacy.’’ The report notes that, as a result, ‘‘confidence 

in the system performance predictions based on the models and simulations is low.’’ 

So is it correct to understand that, especially if there is only one flight test this fiscal year, it will likely be some years before these problems can be resolved and 

GMD flight testing adequacy will not be impaired? 

Dr. MCQUEARY. Yes. The problems can be resolved as soon as the root causes are 

identified. The details are contained in the classified Part II of our fiscal year 2007 

assessment of the BMDS. Unfortunately, one flight test per year will not be adequate to determine operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability, with confidence, anytime soon. Nor will it be sufficient to assess equipment reliability or 

show repeatability. A comprehensive ground and flight test program, combined with 

verified, validated, and accredited models and simulations, are necessary to confidently assess and predict performance.

GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE SALVO AND MULTI-TARGET TESTS

9. Senator LEVIN. Dr. McQueary, the GMD system is designed to intercept multiple missile targets, and its standard firing doctrine is to shoot two interceptors at 

each missile target. When I asked General Renuart, the Combatant Commander of 

Northern Command (NORTHCOM) who is responsible for operating the system, 

about testing the system in an operationally realistic manner, he agreed that we 

should conduct salvo test launches and multiple target intercept tests. Given the importance of demonstrating the intended capability of the system so we have confidence that it works, do you agree that it would be important to conduct flight tests 

of the GMD system using salvo launches of two interceptors, and using multiple targets for intercepts? 

Dr. MCQUEARY. I also think the MDA should conduct at least one GMD salvo 

launch. Yes, ground testing can demonstrate salvo launches and multiple targets. 

However, there are some things that ground testing cannot demonstrate such as simultaneous communications with two closely spaced interceptors, or the possible 

detrimental impacts on the sensor of the trailing kill vehicle when the divert and 

attitude control system (DACS) is firing on the leading kill vehicle. Aegis BMD successfully conducted a salvo engagement during FTM–13, and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) plans a salvo engagement on FTT–10.

OPERATIONAL TESTING STILL DESIRED

10. Senator LEVIN. Dr. McQueary, although missile defense system testing so far 

has been developmental testing with operational characteristics added, there is no 

dedicated operational testing planned yet. Operational test and evaluation is the 

process for learning how a weapon system will actually work in an operational setting. Do you agree that, in addition to the current testing effort, there is still value 

in operational test and evaluation for missile defense systems, and that such operational testing should take place? 

Dr. MCQUEARY. Yes. We learn things about system performance and system limitations during operational testing that we don’t normally learn during developmental testing or even during combined developmental/operational testing. The Secretary of Defense, in his January 2002 memorandum on missile defense program 

direction, recognized this and stated that when a decision is made to transition a 

block configuration of an element to a Service for procurement and operation, an 

Operational Test Agent will be designated and an operational test and evaluation 

will be conducted to characterize the operational effectiveness and suitability of the 

block configuration of the element. I agree with this policy. However, I believe that 

for the elements of the BMDS, the scope of the operational test and evaluation required to determine operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability, could be 

tailored based on what we previously learned during the combined developmental/

operational testing. Verified, validated, and accredited models and simulations 

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would also play an important role in this evaluation. This approach would provide 

the best value to the Nation given the expense of testing the BMDS.

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM CONSUMES MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES

11. Senator LEVIN. General Campbell, your prepared testimony says: ‘‘Operation 

Iraqi Freedom (OIF) consumes significant quantities of our key missile defense capabilities, leaving other worldwide commitments under-resourced.’’ What key missile 

defense capabilities does OIF consume, and what other worldwide commitments are 

left under-resourced as a result? 

General CAMPBELL. U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense forces continue to provide 

a full range of air and missile defense protection in the U.S. Central Command 

(CENTCOM) theater of operations. Specifically, key missile defense capabilities provided include:

• Patriot missile defense of critical assets; • Counter rocket, artillery, and mortar (C–RAM) protection of critical assets. The C–RAM mission includes both sensor and warning and an active 

intercept capability; 

• Air defense and airspace management for maneuver commanders; • Performance of a detainee operations mission by an air and missile defense battalion.

As with virtually all other mission areas within the Army and the other Services, 

the operations tempo requirements of OIF have dictated some difficult decisions to 

ensure adequate air and missile defense capabilities within the CENTCOM Theater. 

Air and missile defense resources that would normally support other combatant 

commanders are assigned to the CENTCOM Theater. A good example is European 

Command (EUCOM). There, the U.S. committed to providing theater missile defense forces, such as Patriot, to NATO’s Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense Program which is scheduled to be operational in the 2010–2011 timeframe. We 

will have to find the right balance between CENTCOM’s missile defense requirements and our NATO commitment.

12. Senator LEVIN. General Campbell, would it reduce the strain of this situation 

if we had additional missile defense force structure deployed to address the other 

worldwide commitments, like additional PAC–3, SM–3, or Theatre High Altitude 

Area Defense (THAAD) systems? 

General CAMPBELL. Yes, it would. There is a growing demand signal from Geographical Combatant Commanders for additional missile defense force structure to 

meet regional requirements. This has led the Army to fund additional Patriot force 

structure and led the MDA to address the recent recommendations from the latest 

iteration of the Joint Capability Mix Study in the upcoming budget submission. 

MDA plans to seek congressional approval to procure additional SM–3 and THAAD 

assets. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

OVERSIGHT OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS

13. Senator BILL NELSON. Secretary Young, as the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L), you are the senior acquisition official 

in DOD, with the statutory authority to overrule service acquisition executives. You 

are expected to provide active, rigorous, and detailed oversight of major DOD acquisition programs, including BMD programs. You are also the Chairman of the 

MDEB, which has a responsibility for reviewing and making recommendations on 

the programs of the MDA. Please provide a detailed explanation of the specific steps 

you are taking and planning to take to exercise your oversight responsibilities of the 

BMD programs of the MDA. 

Mr. YOUNG. I will continue to conduct reviews of the BMDS and its elements to 

assess program status, and continue the tempo of the MDEB to provide a broader 

DOD exposure. For development, fielding, and support of BMDS blocks and element 

assessments, I plan to implement a rigorous baseline agreement with defined cost, 

schedule, and performance parameters to allow continuous evaluation of program 

execution. I am evaluating the additional steps to be taken to ensure sufficient Department oversight and influence is exercised. We will derive an early and continued visibility into BMDS and its elements by a broad spectrum of the Department, 

enabling us to provide the necessary guidance to maintain missile defense priorities 

within program cost and schedule constraints. In addition, the Director, Operational 

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Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) and the operational testers are continuously involved 

with MDA activities and, together, annually report to Congress on the status of 

BMDS testing.

14. Senator BILL NELSON. Secretary Young, do you believe there are any additional authorities or responsibilities you might need to exercise more effective oversight of the MDA and its programs? 

Mr. YOUNG. The Department currently provides oversight of MDA in accordance 

with the memorandum issued by Secretary Rumsfeld. Within the constraints of this 

memorandum, I have the authorities assigned to USD(AT&L) to exercise oversight 

of the MDA, and the BMDS and its elements.

TRANSITION AND TRANSFER OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS

15. Senator BILL NELSON. Secretary Young, the MDA is notionally the developer 

and initial fielding organization for missile defense systems, with each weapon system expected to be transitioned to one of the military Services at the appropriate 

time. The Services would be concerned about having to pay for expensive missile 

defense systems in addition to all their other priorities competing for funding. How 

and when do you believe missile defense systems should be transitioned to the Services and under what circumstances? 

Mr. YOUNG. The DOD criteria for transition are consistent with standard program 

management guidelines for assessment of element maturity, effectiveness, and 

supportability. The criteria include the maturity of the element design, the testing 

completed, the assessment by DOT&E, delivery schedules, funding profile, and planning for operation and support (O&S). Current Department guidance has the Director, MDA recommend an element for transition to the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, who makes his recommendation to the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense, who approves the transition. 

The MDA and the Services are engaged in near continuous discussions on how 

and when to transition and transfer missile defense capabilities. The Department 

is considering a BMD Life Cycle Management Process intended to address these 

concerns.

16. Senator BILL NELSON. Secretary Young, given the many competing priorities 

for Service funding, how do you believe these programs should be funded when they 

are transitioned to the Services? 

Mr. YOUNG. The Department is considering a BMD Life Cycle Management process to address this issue.

BASELINES AND COST ESTIMATES FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE BLOCKS

17. Senator BILL NELSON. General Obering, your prepared testimony makes a 

number of comments about the new block structure that deserve some clarification. 

For example, you say: ‘‘Once baselines are defined, work cannot be moved from one 

block to another.’’ Does that mean that before baselines are defined, work can be 

transferred from one block to another? If so, isn’t that the problem we were trying 

to fix? 

General OBERING. Congress expects us to be both transparent and accountable. 

In that spirit, we intend to explain our plans clearly—committing only to a program 

that we can confidently deliver. Prior to commitment to a baseline, we will establish 

goals for blocks we would like to baseline in the future. Within the fiscal year 2008 

BMDS Block Baselines and Goals (SOG) document submitted to Congress with the 

fiscal year 2009 President’s budget we called these blocks ‘‘Capability Goals.’’ These 

goals are dependent on the successful completion of technology development or the 

occurrence of some event(s) prior to baseline commitment. It is our expectation that 

the content for these capability goals can be achieved and will be baselined. However, circumstances may arise, such as change of requirements or nature of the 

threat that would require us to shift work from one block to another. Once we commit to a baseline, we intend to field that block with the promised schedule, budget, 

and performance and will not move that work to another block. Before we commit 

to baselines, we remain open to moving work in or out of a block if there is a good 

reason for doing so, however, we will always coordinate these changes with the 

warfighter community and explain the reason to Congress to further the goals of 

transparency and accountability.

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18. Senator BILL NELSON. General Obering, you also say: ‘‘When MDA believes 

a firm commitment can be made to Congress, the Agency will establish schedule, 

budget, and performance baselines for a block.’’ It is not clear what that means, and 

why you can’t make a commitment to Congress now. Please explain what you mean 

by this comment. 

General OBERING. The quoted statement is a general tenet of our new block structure. We will make a firm commitment when we have a high level of confidence that 

the baselines can be achieved. Actually, we have established those baselines for 

Blocks 1.0 (Defense of the U.S. from Limited North Korean Long-Range Threats), 

2.0 (Defense of Allies and Deployed Forces from Short-to-Medium Range Threats in 

One Region/Theater), and 3.1/3.2 (Expand Defense of the U.S. to Include Limited 

Iranian Long-Range Threats) and presented them in our fiscal year 2008 BMDS 

Block Baselines and Goals (SOG) document that accompanied the President’s budget 

for fiscal year 2009. In the spirit of enhancing transparency and accountability, we 

comit to deliver on established baselines. As presented in the SOG, we established 

goals (not baselines) for Blocks 3.3 (Expand Defense of the U.S. to Include Limited 

Iranian Long-Range Threats—Improved Discrimination and System Track), 4.0 (Defense of Allies and Deployed Forces in Europe from Limited Long-Range Threats/

Expand Protection of the U.S. Homeland), and 5.0 (Expand Defense of Allies and 

Deployed Forces from Short-to-Intermediate Range Threats in Two Regions/Theaters) because we did not believe a firm commitment can be made to Congress at 

this time. It would not make much sense, for example, to baseline the schedule for 

Block 4.0 because we are still waiting for host nation agreements to be finalized. 

It would also not be reasonable to baseline the performance of an interceptor that 

we have not yet built or tested, such as the SM–3 Block IB interceptors in Block 

5.0.

19. Senator BILL NELSON. General Obering, given that, as you acknowledge, Block 

1 is nearly complete and Block 2 is well underway, why haven’t you already established those baselines for Block 1 and Block 2? 

General OBERING. Actually, we have established schedule, budget, and performance baselines for Blocks 1.0 (Defense of the U.S. from Limited North Korean LongRange Threats) and 2.0 (Defense of Allies and Deployed Forces from Short-to-Medium Range Threats in One Region/Theater), as well as Block 3.1/3.2 (Expand Defense of the U.S. to Include Limited Iranian Long-Range Threats), and presented 

them to Congress in our fiscal year 2008 BMDS Block Baselines and Goals (SOG) 

document that accompanied the President’s budget for fiscal year 2009.

20. Senator BILL NELSON. General Obering, are you saying you don’t expect to establish baselines until a block is completed? 

General OBERING. Not at all. Our fiscal year 2008 BMDS Block Baselines and 

Goals (SOG) document sent to Congress with the President’s budget for fiscal year 

2009 was the first under our new block structure. In this SOG, we presented our 

baselines for Block 1.0 (Defense of the U.S. from Limited North Korean Long-Range 

Threats), which is still ongoing but expected to be complete in fiscal year 2009, and 

Blocks 2.0 (Defense of Allies and Deployed Forces from Short-to-Medium Range 

Threats in One Region/Theater) and 3.1/3.2 (Expand Defense of the U.S. to Include 

Limited Iranian Long-Range Threats), which are projected for completion in fiscal 

year 2011 and fiscal year 2013 respectively.

INDEPENDENT REVIEW TEAMS

21. Senator BILL NELSON. General Obering, I understand you have recently established a number of Independent Review Teams and at least one Mission Readiness 

Task Force (MRTF), as well as other Readiness Review Teams. Please provide a list 

of each of the review teams you have established, and explain the specific reasons 

you established each team. 

General OBERING. In March 2005, I established an MRTF under the leadership 

of RADM Kathleen Paige to focus our efforts on delivering a BMDS that is ready 

to conduct its mission when called upon. The MRTF was initially focused on the 

GMD element and its flight test program with the charter to develop and refine disciplined procedures for the flight test readiness review process. Admiral Paige’s efforts provided a near-term comprehensive test plan to restore the GM flight test 

program, and the guiding principles provided by the task force have been applied 

across the BMDS to ensure our readiness to conduct each system level flight test. 

Upon Admiral Paige’s retirement from active duty at the end of 2005, I retained 

Don Mitchell, a key member of the MRTF, to apply mission readiness principles 

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across all BMDS elements. Mr. Mitchell heads the Independent Readiness Review 

Teams (IRRT) for GMD, Aegis BMD and THAAD, and is my direct representative 

to the program directors, providing independent advocacy for mission readiness. 

In addition to these element IRRTs, over the past year I convened a review team 

to assess the test plan for our Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) satellite demonstration effort. After a series of technical challenges in the thermal vacuum testing of the first STSS satellite, I asked for a team of nationally recognized 

space experts from the National Reconnaissance Office, Defense Advanced Research 

Project Agency, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Johns 

Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab to review our program plan and identify 

any risk areas.

22. Senator BILL NELSON. General Obering, what tasks have you assigned to each 

of these independent teams, and when do you expect them to report back to you? 

General OBERING. The IRRTs are charged with the following:

(1) Working within the element’s mission readiness review process to identify risks to mission success and offer advice to mitigate those risks; 

(2) Serving as an independent voice to the program directors on any technical issue affecting the conduct of a mission; and 

(3) Providing inputs for consideration as part of the program director’s decision to proceed with a mission or to provide their own assessment to the 

Director regarding the element’s readiness to proceed. The element IRRTs 

provide input for executive management reviews conducted before the execution of each mission.

For the STSS independent review, each participating organization was asked to 

review our satellite demonstration program and then provide technical and programmatic recommendations and space acquisition lessons learned that could be applicable to STSS or future MDA space elements of BMDS. They provided me a final 

report in March 2008.

23. Senator BILL NELSON. General Obering, what programmatic decisions or 

changes could result from their work? 

General OBERING. The IRRT provides a non-advocate perspective to the mission 

readiness assessment process and is a valuable tool for assessing and managing 

risk. This team also provides the Director with deeper insight into the technical 

issues surrounding a particular mission. 

The STSS review team validated the program plan. Their recommendations 

helped us to improve how we manage risk, and we made adjustments to our test 

program accordingly.

OPERATIONAL REALISM IN GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE FLIGHT TESTS

24. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. McQueary, your February 2008 annual report on 

missile defense noted that for the GMD flight tests, ‘‘warfighters operating from 

Fort Greely, the primary fire control facility, did not participate in these tests.’’ If 

warfighters at Fort Greely were to participate in flight tests by launching the interceptors, perhaps while the control facility at Colorado Springs launched the targets, 

would that add operational realism to the flight tests, and would it provide additional confidence that the system could work as intended? 

Dr. MCQUEARY. Yes to both questions. Anytime warfighters operate from their 

wartime positions, operational realism is enhanced. Fort Greely is the primary fire 

control node for GMD; the control facility at Shriever Air Force Base (AFB) is the 

secondary fire control node for GMD. Both locations are designed to fire interceptors 

from either Fort Greely or Vandenberg AFB. Although launching interceptors from 

Fort Greely in peacetime is unacceptable for safety reasons, launching them from 

Vandenberg AFB using the Fort Greely fire control and a formed warfighter crew 

should be demonstrated at least once in the GMD test program and builds confidence.

25. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. McQueary, your report also notes that ‘‘the addition 

of limited operational realism to BMDS testing against strategic threats has uncovered unanticipated deficiencies that will require additional development and testing.’’ You also note that the MDA ‘‘has not identified their root causes.’’ Can you 

say how much additional development and testing you believe will be required to 

resolve these unanticipated deficiencies and will that require identifying their root 

causes? 

209

Dr. MCQUEARY. Until the MDA identifies the root causes and applies permanent 

fixes for the deficiencies, we will never have confidence that the mitigation strategies will work in all circumstances and intercept conditions. Once the MDA identifies the root causes and applies permanent fixes, two flight tests should be sufficient 

to prove the solutions.

COBRA DANE FLIGHT TEST

26. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. McQueary, the primary sensor for the GMD system 

that is deployed in Alaska and California is the Cobra Dane radar on Shemya Island, rather than the Beale radar in California. Cobra Dane is the radar that would 

see a potential North Korean missile launch and provide the data for the GMD 

interceptors to defeat the missile. However, there has never been an intercept flight 

test using the Cobra Dane radar, and the one target fly-by of Cobra Dane did not 

provide a basis for confidence in its performance. If it were possible, and I know 

it is difficult given the geography, to have an intercept flight test using Cobra Dane 

as the primary sensor, would a successful test using Cobra Dane increase your confidence in the ability of the system to work as it is actually intended to work? 

Dr. MCQUEARY. Certainly a successful intercept flight test using Cobra Dane as 

the primary sensor would increase our confidence in Cobra Dane performance. My 

office has been looking at the requirements to conduct this intercept flight test. 

When we complete our study, we will be glad to share it with you.

27. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. McQueary, your annual report says that, because 

there are no validated and accredited models for operational evaluations of Cobra 

Dane, ‘‘this will require the MDA to fly another target through the Cobra Dane field 

of view.’’ Am I correct that unless there is such a test, your organization will not 

be able to assess the performance of Cobra Dane? I presume that is why this is one 

of your recommendations to MDA. 

Dr. MCQUEARY. We saw some performance issues from the first flight test that 

the model did not predict. That is why I support a retest after all the fixes have 

been made. Following the retest, the MDA should be able to verify and validate the 

Cobra Dane model which will allow us to more confidently assess Cobra Dane performance. This approach tracks well with General Obering’s ‘‘test-analyze-fix-test’’ 

approach.

28. Senator BILL NELSON. General Obering, since Cobra Dane is the primary sensor for GMD against a potential North Korean long-range missile, will you schedule 

a target fly-by test as soon as possible to confirm the performance of Cobra Dane 

and if so, when will that test take place? 

General OBERING. Yes. MDA is planning flight test opportunities to include both 

dedicated and non-cooperative targets. A flight test is planned in fiscal year 2012 

to test the cumulative Cobra Dane upgrades planned through software build 2.6.6.1. 

In the interim, we are actively evaluating the incremental software changes made 

to Cobra Dane subsequent to the September 2005 test using our tactical hardware/

software-in-the-loop based ground test program, targets of opportunity from foreign 

launches, and satellites tracks.

MDA PROJECT FTX FLIGHT TESTS FISCAL YEAR 2010–2012

Draft: March 14, 2008

FTX–07

Fiscal Year 2010 

FTX–08

Fiscal Year 2011 

FTX–09

Fiscal Year 2012

Primary ...

Objectives 

Within a BMDS framework, demonstrate SCN–06–0027 end-toend simulated engagement of a 

complex target launched from 

KLC with AN/TPY–2 (FB) and 

AN/SPY–1 (if available) providing initial track and SBX 

serving as the commit sensor 

using a simulated GBI launched 

from Vandenberg Air Force Base 

and perform all functions to 

intercept the lethal object from 

a complex target scene.

Within a BMDS framework, conduct 

a tracking exercise (with potential simulated engagements) of 

a medium range ballistic target 

as risk reduction for follow-on 

theater campaign events.

Within a BMDS framework, Cobra 

Dane characterization of software build 2.6.6.1 (Requested 

by DOT&E). 

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MDA PROJECT FTX FLIGHT TESTS FISCAL YEAR 2010–2012—Continued

Draft: March 14, 2008

FTX–07

Fiscal Year 2010 

FTX–08

Fiscal Year 2011 

FTX–09

Fiscal Year 2012

Sensors ... SBX, TPY–2 (FB), Aegis BMD with 

BSP and sidecar, Beale UEWR.

THAAD, Aegis BMD, Patriot/MEADS, 

Japanese Participation.

Cobra Dane, Aegis BMD, SBX. 

29. Senator BILL NELSON. General Obering, will you also work with the DOT&E 

to determine a means by which to conduct an intercept flight test using Cobra Dane 

as the primary sensor, in which it provides the data to develop the Weapon Task 

Plan? 

General OBERING. Yes, I will continue to work with the DOT&E to explore options 

to conduct an intercept flight test using Cobra Dane as the primary sensor. However, due to the alignment of the Cobra Dane, a representative target with representative track times would need to be launched from within the Russian Flight 

Information Region to support this type of test.

TERMINAL HIGH ALTITUDE AREA DEFENSE DELAYS

30. Senator BILL NELSON. General Obering, during the hearing, you stated that 

you decided to delay the THAAD interceptor delivery due to cost overruns. Please 

detail and explain what the causes were of the overruns for the THAAD program, 

detailing each item with its cost. 

General OBERING. Let me provide a clarification. The delay to THAAD interceptor 

deliveries was driven by both cost overrun and cost growth for the program. The 

detailed items that had to be mitigated and contributed to the fiscal year 2008/2009 

shortfalls with their associated funding across those 2 years were as follows:

• $31.4 million - The Development contract’s final increment of the 5 percent cost overrun 

• $94.0 million - Critical contract changes necessary to prepare for Fire 

Unit Fielding (e.g., Fire Control obsolescence and redesign for the 5-ton 

truck) 

• $92.8 million - Insensitive Munitions/Final Hazard Classification requirements impact 

• $82.5 million - The impact of target availability slips to flight tests 

• $21.5 million - Risk reduction and flight test analysis additions 

• $13.9 million - THAAD’s participation in Juniper Cobra 09

31. Senator BILL NELSON. General Obering, is it correct that there were additional requirements imposed on the THAAD program by the Army, for an insensitive munitions capability, and for using a 5-ton truck instead of a Humvee for the 

THAAD Fire Control Station? If so, why did you not use your extraordinary acquisition flexibility before the budget request was submitted to provide the funds from 

lower priorities outside of THAAD to meet those new requirements, without delaying the THAAD interceptor production by a year? 

General OBERING. Yes, additional requirements for Insensitive Munitions/Final 

Hazard Classification compliance and weight limitations in up-armoring the 

Humvee-based THAAD Fire Control requiring transition to a 5-ton truck both contributed to the need for additional funding for the THAAD program. While 75 percent of our budget is dedicated to near-term fielding capabilities such as THAAD, 

resource decisions between programs must be based on priorities across the Agency. 

In the case of THAAD, we have made additional internal realignments which have 

restored THAAD interceptor production and precluded the 1-year slip.

32. Senator BILL NELSON. General Obering, at the hearing you created some confusion about the fact that your fiscal year 2009 budget request would delay the delivery of THAAD Fire Units 3 and 4 by a year, since you suggested that you had 

been working since November to address this problem. Do you acknowledge the fact 

that your budget justification documents for fiscal year 2009, delivered to Congress 

in February 2008, state that the timeframe for contract award for THAAD Fire 

Units 3 and 4 fielding is planned for the first quarter of fiscal year 2010, and had 

‘‘slipped 1 year due to fiscal year 2008/2009 funding shortfall’’ and also state that 

the timeframe for delivery of Fire Unit 3 is planned for the period from the fourth 

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quarter of fiscal year 2012 to the fourth quarter of 2013, and had ‘‘slipped five quarters due to fiscal year 2008/2009 funding shortfalls’’? 

General OBERING. Yes, the February 2008 budget justification documents for fiscal year 2009 state contract award for THAAD Fire Units 3 and 4 fielding had 

slipped 1 year due to the program’s fiscal year 2008/2009 funding shortfall and delivery of Fire Unit 3 was slipped from the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2012 to the 

fourth quarter of 2013. Subsequent to the House and Senate Authorization Staffer 

Day briefing, the Agency made additional internal realignments which have restored the $65 million in fiscal year 2009 to enable award of the THAAD Fire Units 

3 and 4 long lead contract as originally planned and restored delivery of Fire Unit 

3 back to the fourth quarter fiscal year 2012.

33. Senator BILL NELSON. General Obering, the MDA previously removed three 

flight tests from the THAAD flight test program, thus increasing risk in the program. It appears that four of the remaining flight tests will now be delayed because 

you will not have targets delivered on time for the tests. What were the original 

schedules for THAAD Flight Tests 11–14, and what is their current schedule? 

Please detail the reasons for the schedule delay in Flight Tests 11–14, and whether 

additional funding would have prevented the delays. 

General OBERING.

• Provide the original and current flight test schedule: The original and 

current schedule for Flight Tests 11–14 are shown below. The reason for 

the revised dates for all four tests was target availability.

Flight Test Original Schedule Current Schedule Impact 

FTT–11 ........... 19 Dec. 08 ................................. 22 Jun 09 .................................. Slipped 6 months 

FTT–12 ........... 17 Feb. 09 ................................. 14 Sep 09 .................................. Slipped 7 months 

FTT–13 ........... 23 Jun 09 .................................. Feb 09 ........................................ Slipped 9 months 

FTT–14 ........... 1 Dec 09 .................................... Jun 09 ........................................ Slipped 7 months 

• Would additional funding have prevented the flight test delays? From a 

THAAD organizational perspective, additional funding would not have had 

an impact on the flight test delays as the THAAD program was resourced 

to execute these tests on the original schedule. From a Targets organizational perspective, for FTT–11 and –12b, target availability was not influenced by insufficient funding. The primary schedule driver for FTT–11 and 

–12b was the significant disconnect between what the Government expected 

to see in the offerer’s proposal and what the contractor proposed for the 

MBRV–1 re-entry vehicle work. Issues were associated with resolving technical disconnects. The proposal value was far higher than anticipated and 

technical changes were incorporated during the process. The FTT–13 and 

FTT–14 target availability delays were influenced by a technical review of 

all BMDS target requirements and balancing of available hardware resources across all test events.

JOINT CAPABILITIES MIX STUDY II

34. Senator BILL NELSON. General Campbell, last year you told us that the Joint 

Capabilities Mix Study had indicated that we would need to buy about twice as 

many Standard Missile-3 (SM–3) and THAAD interceptors as we are currently planning. That would mean buying about 200 THAAD interceptors instead of 96, and 

about 300 SM–3 interceptors instead of 147. Does the newest version of the Joint 

Capabilities Mix Study support that same conclusion, or suggest that we might need 

even more? 

General CAMPBELL. The most recent iteration of the Joint Capability Mix (JCM) 

Study supported the previous study findings for the minimum quantities of SM–3 

and THAAD interceptors for combat operations in two near simultaneous conventional campaigns in the 2015 timeframe.

35. Senator BILL NELSON. General Campbell, am I correct in understanding that 

the studies are looking at the minimum quantity of upper tier interceptors required 

for combat operations? In other words, this is not the maximum, but the minimum 

we would need? 

General CAMPBELL. That is correct. Both former as well as the current iteration 

of the JCM Studies make a recommendation for the minimum number of intercepVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:11 Dec 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00217 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\42635.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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tors required for 2015 combat operations in two near simultaneous conventional 

campaigns.

36. Senator BILL NELSON. General Campbell, what role will this study have in 

helping to determine force structure and inventory levels for THAAD and SM–3? 

General CAMPBELL. This study is the starting point in addressing warfighters’ 

BMD interceptor requirements and serves as an input into the Department’s calculus in developing future force structures. The Vice Chairman signed the Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum endorsing the study and further directs 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the MDA, and the Services to develop plans 

for addressing inventory recommendations.

GLOBAL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

37. Senator BILL NELSON. General Campbell, I understand you are working on a 

global concept of operations (CONOPs) for the BMDS that is intended to clarify the 

roles and responsibilities of the regional combatant commanders for missile defense. 

Can you tell me when that effort will be done, and whether the Commander of 

EUCOM will have a command and control responsibility for defending his Area of 

Responsibility (AOR) against missile attacks, including with the proposed GMD system in Europe? 

General CAMPBELL. We are currently coordinating with the Joint Staff and Geographic Combatant Commanders to develop and clarify the missile defense roles of 

Regional Combatant Commanders. We expect to finalize a global CONOPs by midsummer of this year. 

The Commander of EUCOM will always have an inherent responsibility with commensurate authority to defend his AOR per the Unified Command Plan and will utilize the resources in his AOR to include the proposed resident strategic European 

missile defense capabilities. Because the proposed European missile defense system 

would also have the capability to defend against trans-regional capabilities that 

threaten other AORs, the global CONOPs is being written to address both regional 

and trans-regional command and control issues. This will ensure we optimize the 

overall BMDS. The U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) has the overall responsibility to synchronize combatant commander missile defense plans into a global defense design by mitigating operational seams and vulnerabilities.

PRODUCTION RATE

38. Senator BILL NELSON. Secretary Young, General Obering, and Mr. Francis, 

the THAAD program is currently planning to build interceptors at a rate of two per 

month. The THAAD production facility is already capable of producing three per 

month. The contractor estimates that producing three interceptors per month could 

save more than $1 million per missile and result in earlier fielding. Would you agree 

that two per month is a less efficient and less economical production rate than three 

per month, and that a higher production rate would allow for unit cost savings? 

Mr. YOUNG. Yes, there are efficiencies that result in a reduction of total contract 

cost and interceptor unit cost by increasing the production rate from two to three 

interceptors per month. These savings would be realized through the shorter period 

of performance for production deliveries and cost efficiencies realized by the higher 

production rate. 

General OBERING. Yes, there are efficiencies that result in a reduction of total contract cost and interceptor unit cost by increasing production rate from two interceptors a month to three per month. The savings would be realized by a shorter period 

of performance for production deliveries and cost efficiencies realized by the higher 

production rate. 

Mr. FRANCIS. I agree that producing three THAAD missiles per month is more 

efficient and more economical than producing two per month as the Government can 

reduce its costs on subcomponent buys. Moreover, with a potential requirement to 

produce additional missiles for Foreign Military Sales, it may become imperative for 

the program to increase its production rate from two to three per month. However, 

it should be noted that until the program has proven the performance of its missiles 

through testing, increased production rates may lead to costly retrofits if the remaining testing reveals any significant problems. Currently, the production rate of 

two per month is sufficient to support the program’s ground and flight test schedule. 

The THAAD program is planning to deliver 98 interceptors to accompany 4 fire 

units. The program may also award a foreign military sales contract for 3 additional 

fire units including 144 interceptors in the future. The delivery of 98 THAAD interVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:11 Dec 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00218 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\42635.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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ceptors is paced based on need dates for flight and ground testing. The additional 

interceptor quantities would require an increase in interceptor production rate to accommodate FMS production concurrent with Fire Units 3 and 4. For the remainder 

of development testing, production is scheduled at the rate of two to three interceptors per quarter. However, the current production capacity for fire unit interceptor 

deliveries at Troy, AL, is three interceptors per month based on a single shift operation. According to THAAD officials, the interceptor production facility in Alabama 

has recently incorporated lean manufacturing principles and other improvement 

processes that will allow the production facility to increase to three interceptors per 

month. Additionally, the contractor estimates that producing three interceptors per 

month could result in a cost savings of $1 million per missile and accelerate fielding. 

Based on the increased production rate, resulting efficiencies and additional units 

over which to spread fixed costs, it is estimated the interceptor average unit cost 

for Fire Units 3 and 4 would be reduced from $9.8 million to $9.0 million for Fire 

Unit 3 and from $9.5 million to $8.1 million for Fire Unit 4. The savings incurred 

based on increasing the production rate to at least three per month could provide 

a significant savings to the MDA and may provide for fielding assets in an accelerated timeframe. However, until testing of the missile and its components are complete, increasing the production of these interceptors increases the potential for costly rework if it is discovered that the missiles do not perform as intended.

39. Senator BILL NELSON. Secretary Young, does DOD have the policy of trying 

to achieve the most economical and efficient acquisition of weapon systems? 

Mr. YOUNG. The DOD constantly strives to provide the most effective weapons 

systems to the warfighter at the most economical and efficient acquisition means 

possible. To influence BMDS execution, I plan to implement a rigorous baseline 

agreement with defined cost, schedule, and performance parameters, and increase 

Department involvement, to allow continuous evaluation of acquisition and performance metrics. I have issued multiple weekly AT&L notes which call on all members 

of the acquisition enterprise, including MDA, to focus on lowering cost, executing 

within budget, trading requirements which drive cost and schedule, and ensuring 

budgets match plans, and advocating economic order quantity purchases. It is DOD 

policy to seek the most economical and efficient acquisition approach to weapon systems. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JACK REED

IMPROVED OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

40. Senator REED. Secretary Young, in a significant departure from longstanding 

practice, DOD granted MDA exceptional flexibility and authority in its concurrent 

development and rapid fielding of an initial set of limited missile defense capabilities. According to the GAO, this ‘‘unprecedented funding and decisionmaking authority’’ has ‘‘made MDA less accountable and transparent in its decisions than 

other major programs, making oversight more challenging.’’ Now that the initial 

fielding of the limited missile defense capabilities has been accomplished, what 

steps will you take to increase and improve accountability and oversight of MDA 

and its programs 

Mr. YOUNG. I conduct reviews of the BMDS and its elements to assess program 

status, and continue the tempo of the MDEB to provide broader Department exposure. For development, fielding, and support of BMDS blocks and element assessments, I plan to implement a rigorous baseline agreement with defined cost, schedule, and performance parameters to allow continuous evaluation of execution. We 

will derive an early and continued visibility into BMDS and its elements by a broad 

spectrum of the Department, enabling us to provide the necessary guidance to maintain missile defense priorities within cost and schedule constraints. In addition, the 

DOT&E and the operational testers are continuously involved with MDA activities 

and, together, annually report to Congress on the status of BMDS testing.

SLOW PACE OF TESTS

41. Senator REED. Dr. McQueary, your most recent annual report on missile defense concludes that there have not been enough flight tests of the GMD system to 

characterize the capability of the system or validate and verify models and simulations. Although the GMD program has planned to conduct two flight tests per year, 

because of various problems it conducted only one successful flight test last year, 

and will conduct only one flight test during this fiscal year. If the GMD program 

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conducts only one flight test per year, doesn’t that mean it would take even longer 

than expected to produce sufficient flight test data to gain confidence in the system’s 

capability, and to determine if the system is effective, suitable, and survivable? 

Dr. MCQUEARY. Yes. Unfortunately, we cannot explore a lot of the mission 

battlespace with only two flight tests. Nor can we access equipment reliability or 

show repeatability. The key is to employ an evaluation-based test strategy that 

gathers the maximum amount of relevant data during each flight test event to not 

only document performance but also to validate the models for simulations. General 

Obering’s ‘‘test-analyze-fix-test’’ approach is the right way to do developmental testing. Each ground and flight test generates a significant volume of data that must 

be analyzed before the next test can be accomplished. If this important step is not 

accomplished, there is a significant risk that the next test will fail wasting time and 

resources. Two flight tests per year for GMD is about right. Unfortunately, circumstances have reduced GMD testing to only two completed intercept tests in the 

last 2 years.

GROWING DEMANDS FOR ADDITIONAL CAPABILITY

42. Senator REED. General Campbell, your prepared testimony mentions the 

‘‘growing demands of the combatant commanders to provide global air and missile 

defense against the entire threat set.’’ Are the combatant commanders (COCOMs) 

asking for, or interested in, additional PAC–3, SM–3, or THAAD force structure or 

inventory? 

General CAMPBELL. Yes, the COCOMs have asked for greater quantity and earlier 

availability of missile defense forces. We are continuing to refine the force structure 

requirements through additional analysis and inform the MDA of future COCOM 

capability needs through the U.S. STRATCOM led Warfighter Involvement Process, 

the Joint Requirement Oversight Council process, and the MDEB.

PROGRAM ELEMENT REBASELININGS

43. Senator REED. General Obering, how many times have each of the following 

elements been rebaselined or replanned: GMD, THAAD, airborne laser (ABL), Aegis 

BMD, multiple kill vehicle (MKV), kinetic energy interceptor (KEI), STSS, command, control, battle management, and communications (C2BMC), and sensors? 

General OBERING.

GMD - 5, 

THAAD - 4, 

ABL - 5, 

Aegis BMD - 1, 

MKV - 0, 

KEI - 2, 

STSS - 0, 

C2BMC - 2, 

Sensors - 0.

44. Senator REED. General Obering, what were the cumulative cost and schedule 

variances at the time of the rebaselinings or replans? 

General OBERING. 

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AIRBORNE LASER PROGRAM ESTIMATES

45. Senator REED. General Obering, what were the planned date of the lethality 

demonstration and the estimated cost of the ABL program through lethality demonstration when MDA assumed management of the program? 

General OBERING. MDA assumed management of ABL in 2002. In the Selected 

Acquisition Report (SAR) dated 31 December 2001 (RCS: DD—A&T (Q&A) 823), the 

Approved Acquisition Program Baseline had lethal demonstration in September 

2003 with a cost of $3.02 billion (Base Year 2008 dollars). The current ABL program 

estimate achieves lethal demonstration in fourth quarter fiscal year 2009 with a cost 

of $5.4 billion (Base Year 2008 dollars).

46. Senator REED. General Obering, what is the current estimated cost through 

the lethality demonstration? 

General OBERING. The total cost for ABL to complete lethal demonstration, encompasses 13 years, fiscal years 1996–2009. This cost is $5.4 billion (Base Year 2008 

dollars) and $5.1 billion (Then Year dollars).

NEW BLOCK STRUCTURE WORKSHARE

47. Senator REED. General Obering, you stated in your testimony that work for 

a particular block will only benefit that block. Yet in the GMD element, money is 

being requested in Block 3.0 for the purchase of two-stage test interceptors to be 

utilized for Block 4.0. Please reconcile the discrepancy. 

General OBERING. While the two-stage is being developed specifically for the European Interceptor Site (EIS), the two-Stage variant of the GBI provides additional 

capabilities and engagement options whether fielded at Fort Greely, AK; VandenVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:11 Dec 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00222 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\42635.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB

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berg AFB, CA; or in Europe. The GBI two-stage variant development program is 

considered a core capability enhancement to the GMD system, and was therefore 

budgeted in Block 3. The fielding of the two-stage interceptor is planned for Europe; 

European fielding activities are budgeted as part of Block 4.

NEW BLOCK STRUCTURE BASELINES AND ESTIMATES

48. Senator REED. General Obering, MDA plans to estimate total costs for each 

block and then baseline those costs for the purposes of reporting variances to Congress. What is the timetable for estimating total costs and baselining them for each 

block? 

General OBERING. We are currently working on cost estimates for Blocks 2.0 (Defense of Allies and Deployed Forces from Short-to-Medium Range Threats in One 

Region/Theater) through 5.0 (Expand Defense of Allies and Deployed Forces from 

Short-to-Intermediate Range Threats in Two Regions/Theaters) and plan on completing these estimates by this summer. We have also asked the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) to conduct independent cost estimates. Based on these estimates, we intend to submit the cost baselines for Blocks 2.0 and 3.1/3.2 (Expand 

Defense of the U.S. to Include Limited Iranian Long-Range Threats) with the fiscal 

year 2009 BMDS Block Baselines and Goals (SOG) with the President’s budget for 

fiscal year 2010. When we have sufficient confidence that the cost baselines are 

achievable for Blocks 3.3 (Expand Defense of the U.S. to Include Limited Iranian 

Long-Range Threats—Improved Discrimination and System Track), 4.0 (Defense of 

Allies and Deployed Forces in Europe from Limited Long-Range Threats/Expand 

Protection of the U.S. Homeland), and 5.0, we will submit them in subsequent 

SOGs.

49. Senator REED. General Obering, what criteria will MDA use other than the 

qualitative criteria associated with sufficient knowledge levels and urgency of 

threat? For example, will there be a dollar or time threshold for a block that cannot 

be exceeded before it is baselined? 

General OBERING. While we do not have a dollar or time threshold in mind, we 

understand the importance of establishing baselines sooner rather than later for 

purposes of accountability and transparency. Our established process is to initiate 

the block and then to define baselines for it. A new block will be initiated when a 

significant new capability against particular threats is expected to be fielded based 

on a consideration of technological maturity, affordability, and need. Technology maturity and successful achievement of knowledge points will be a critical factor in the 

decision to establish a new block. We will define baselines (schedule, budget, and 

performance) for block when we can make a firm commitment to Congress based 

on a high level of confidence that the baselines can be achieved.

50. Senator REED. General Obering, what units will be identified for unit cost 

tracking, and what criteria will be used to select these units? 

General OBERING. We are still developing our procedures for establishing and reporting unit cost estimates. In general, our approach will be to establish unit costs 

for all equipment being fielded in the following categories: interceptors and weapons; sensors; command and control sites, nodes, and equipment sets; and launch systems. We are still developing these estimates and intend to submit them with our 

fiscal year 2009 BMDS Block Baselines and Goals (SOG) with the President’s budget for fiscal year 2010.

51. Senator REED. General Obering, what criteria will be used to define significant 

variances and report them to Congress? 

General OBERING. We are still refining the specific criteria that will be used to 

define significant variances; and we intend to define and report on them in our fiscal year 2009 BMDS Block Baselines and Goals (SOG) with the President’s budget 

for fiscal year 2010.

52. Senator REED. General Obering, will you work with Congress to determine the 

appropriate thresholds for variances? 

General OBERING. Yes. In order to achieve the goals of accountability and transparency, we are now determining the appropriate thresholds for reporting variances. 

We are committed to working with Congress in this regard.

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PUBLIC REPORTING OF BLOCK VARIANCES

53. Senator REED. General Obering, at the hearing, you agreed to publicly report 

cost and schedule variances, and performance variances within the limitations of 

protecting classified information. What form will this public reporting of variances 

take? 

General OBERING. Our reporting of variances to Congress will be presented in our 

annual BMDS Block Baselines and Goals (SOG) document and annual BMDS SAR. 

The former must accompany the President’s budget submission and the latter must 

follow within 60 days of that submission. Schedule and cost data are typically unclassified while performance data are typically classified. To meet the needs of Congress, we expect to continue the practice of issuing both a classified and unclassified 

version of the SOG, and an unclassified SAR with a classified annex that includes 

the performance information.

COST ESTIMATES FOR BLOCKS

54. Senator REED. General Obering, you have indicated that MDA plans to establish cost estimates for each of the blocks in the new block structure. What costs will 

be included in the total costs for each block? For example, will the total costs include both acquisition costs and O&S costs? If O&S costs are included, will they be 

part of the baseline? 

General OBERING. As described in our President’s budget for fiscal year 2009 and 

budget overview and our fiscal year 2008 BMDS Block Baselines and Goals (SOG), 

each block includes the fielding and development funding associated with the specific capability that the block delivers. Also, O&S costs are not included in block 

baselines, but are tracked separately.

55. Senator REED. General Obering, if O&S costs are included as part of the baseline, would MDA consider decisions that would change the estimates for acquisition 

and O&S costs, but not the total life cycle cost, to be nonreportable variances? For 

example, if the acquisition costs for a block increased but were offset by an O&S 

decrease, holding total life cycle costs constant, would this be considered a reportable variance? 

General OBERING. Since O&S costs are not part of the baseline, changes in those 

costs will not be reported as variances. This particular example, however, would be 

a reportable variance, because a change in the fielding and development costs for 

a baselined block would be a reportable variance. Such variances will be reported 

annually in the BMDS Block Baselines and Goals (SOG) and the BMDS SAR.

56. Senator REED. General Obering, if O&S costs are included as part of the baseline, how will acquisition costs be tracked and reported, in order to ensure accountability and transparency of variances in acquisition costs? 

General OBERING. O&S costs are not included as part of block baselines. Baseline 

costs include fielding and development costs. We will report variances to Congress 

in our annual BMDS Block Baselines and Goals (SOG) document and annual BMDS 

SAR.

57. Senator REED. General Obering, regarding acquisition costs alone, if a change 

in the mix of assets occurs, for example, more THAAD missiles are bought and 

fewer C2BMC planners are bought—again, without changing the total cost of the 

block—would that be a reportable variance? 

General OBERING. We intend to report variances in schedule, budget, and performance from block baselines to Congress. In this example, the addition of THAAD 

missiles or subtraction of C2BMC planners would impact scheduled deliveries and 

performance and would therefore be reported as variances, even if total block costs 

remained the same.

58. Senator REED. General Obering, given that capability development items will 

make up about half of MDA’s budget by the end of the current 6-year program plan, 

how will MDA track actual execution of not only technical progress, but progress 

against the cost and schedules envisioned for these items? 

General OBERING. While our President’s budget submission for fiscal year 2009 

shows that capability development is more than 50 percent of MDA’s budget toward 

the end of the 6-year program planning period, we expect that percentage to decrease over time because, within the next few years, some BMDS element technology programs will progress to the point where they can be incorporated within 

new blocks. Under our new block structure, a new block will be initiated when a 

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significant new capability against particular threats is expected to be fielded based 

on a consideration of technological maturity, affordability, and need. 

As for tracking actual execution of technological progress, we follow a knowledgebased approach. We use standards—called knowledge points—to assess the progress 

of our BMDS element technology programs. These knowledge points address both 

technical maturity and affordability issues. We also pay close attention to technology readiness levels and engineering and manufacturing readiness levels to assess progress. Further, we use earned value management systems to track cost and 

schedule performance against planned work. However, we continually seek better 

engineering and business practices and will continue to investigate other means for 

assessing technology maturity.

COST ACCOUNTING FOR DEFERRED TESTS

59. Senator REED. General Obering, in the normal course of BMD development 

programs, changes have occurred in the test schedules for individual elements. It 

is difficult, however, to determine how budgeted funds are accounted for when tests 

are deferred, combined, or dropped. When a test is planned and funded for one fiscal 

year and then is deferred to a future fiscal year, how are costs accounted for? 

General OBERING. The MDA accounts for funds budgeted for tests using traditional Work Breakdown Structure. Funding for system level tests and element specific tests is delineated within the BMDS Block or Mission Area Investment (MAI) 

level with each Program Element (PE). This Block or MAI level correlates directly 

to the budget projects (e.g., AX08, YX04, EX09) outlined in the MDA fiscal year 

2009 President’s budget (PB09) submission. Test funding is directly related within 

these budget projects, and by correlation each BMDS Block or MAI. An example of 

this would be the R2a accomplishment entitled ‘‘Element Test and Evaluation’’ on 

page 232 of the MDA PB09 submission. 

As the BMDS test program changes (as test activities are deferred, combined, 

and/or dropped) the amount of funding MDA accounts to test activities changes as 

well. MDA accounts for these changes using a defined corporate change process 

which spans the current year of fiscal execution as well as the follow-on budgeting 

and planning fiscal years. This corporate change process allows for the proper and 

necessary accounting of MDA test funding whether the test change affects a single 

fiscal year or spans multiple fiscal years. Frequently, there are fiscal expenditures 

for a test that occurred well in advance of the actual test date. These expenditures 

manifest themselves as ‘‘sunk’’ costs for these tests whether deferred, combined, or 

dropped.

60. Senator REED. General Obering, specifically, are the funds originally budgeted 

for the test used for something else, and then new money requested for the year 

in which the rescheduled test occurs? 

General OBERING. If a test is deferred, and funding originally budgeted for that 

test has not yet been obligated for the purposes of that test, MDA corporately determines whether it is appropriate to realign that funding to support other test priorities or whether to fully utilize the authority of the research, development, test, and 

evaluation (RDT&E) appropriation and retain those funds for later obligation 

against that rescheduled test. Frequently, there are fiscal expenditures for a test 

that occurred well in advance of the actual test date. These expenditures manifest 

themselves as ‘‘sunk’’ costs for these tests whether deferred, combined, or dropped.

61. Senator REED. General Obering, please use the specific example of FTG–04 

and track how the costs for the test were budgeted for and expended. FTG–4 has 

been budgeted for and rescheduled five times between October 2005 and February 

2008. Can MDA show what the costs of this test were as originally estimated and 

budgeted for in October 2005 and compare this with the current estimated costs of 

the test and where they are budgeted? 

General OBERING. The attached Flight Test Replan History chart tracks the evolution of the GMD program’s spiral development approach with regard to FTG–04. 

The June 2005 plan was created following the initial MRTF recommended realignment of the GMD flight test program. Two target-only flight tests were added into 

the schedule during this period, and GMD’s consistent flight test successes since the 

MRTF led to the acceleration of flight test objectives, a prime example of which is 

FTG–04. FTG–04 is a far more complex test now than was envisioned in June 2005. 

A comparison between the original FT–4 and FTG–04 today is shown below: 

Original Cost Estimate FT–4 in October 2005: $96 million - planned as a GMDonly flight test, and the first intercept following the MRTF re-plan of mid-2005. The 

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target was planned with one pre-selected engagement radar to generate the weapons task plan and the target was planned to be a very simple separating target. 

Current Cost Estimate FTG–04: $147 million - planned as a full BMDS test and 

the third GMD intercept since the MRTF re-plan. FTG–04 is now planned as a 

multi-sensor engagement which includes four radars; and the target now includes 

countermeasures.

62. Senator REED. General Obering, have any of the funds budgeted for this test 

been obligated and expended? If so, how much and for what purposes? 

General OBERING. Approximately $147.1 million (or 100 percent) of FTG–04 funds 

have been obligated for all planned test costs.

- $26 million for planning, execution, and analysis 

- $9 million for test lab upkeep (the portion attributable to FTG–04) 

- $35 million for target 

- $9.5 million for target range 

- $50 million for ground-based interceptor (GBI) 

- $4.2 million for GMD Core Range 

- $13.4 million for Variable Core Range

Approximately $101.0 million (or 68.6 percent) of FTG–04 funds have been expended through April 23, 2008.

- $11.4 million (or 43.8 percent) for planning, execution, and analysis 

- $9 million (or 100 percent) for test lab upkeep 

- $22.126 million (or 63.2 percent) for target (target acquired through 

Sandia National Laboratories, expenditures take approximately 120 days to 

process through the Department of Energy) 

- $2.8 million (or 29.5 percent) for Target Range 

- $48.5 million (or 97 percent) for GBI 

- $3.1 million (or 73.8 percent) for GMD Core Range 

- $4.03 million (or 30 percent) for Variable Core

GROUND-BASED INTERCEPTORS RETROFIT PROGRAM

63. Senator REED. General Obering, at the hearing, there was some discussion of 

the program to retrofit the GBIs with more reliable components. What are the components to be retrofit on the GBIs (please list) and what is the cost of each new 

component? 

General OBERING. The following table reflects components that will be replaced 

in four GBIs planned for refurbishment in calendar year 2008. 


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64. Senator REED. General Obering, please provide an update on the retrofit program, including how many interceptors have been retrofit as well as the schedule 

(by month) to complete retrofitting the remaining interceptors. 

General OBERING. Four interceptor refurbishments are scheduled in calendar year 

2008 with planned completion dates of July, August, November, and December. Two 

of these four interceptor refurbishments are currently in process. The basic booster 

upgrades have been completed and the Booster Avionics Module upgrades with new 

Attitude Control System (ACS) decks are in process and near completion. The removed ACS decks and all other available parts that are removed during refurbishment will be used to conduct stockpile reliability analysis. The original refurbishment study had identified future upgrades for an additional 13 vehicles to be completed from calendar year 2009 through calendar year 2012. However, these additional refurbishments are not on contract and therefore no firm schedule yet exists.

65. Senator REED. General Obering, please detail the cost to retrofit and/or refurbish each individual interceptor. 

General OBERING. Each interceptor is unique in the degree of retrofit/refurbishment that will need to be completed in order to provide the warfighter the most 

operationally reliable system. For the four scheduled calendar year 2008 refurbishments, the estimated costs for each are $7.0 million–$9.0 million per interceptor for 

moderate refurbishment. The refurbishment study identified upgrades for an additional 13 vehicles to be completed from calendar year 2009 through calendar year 

2012. In an effort to provide the refurbishment program a flexible and timely contractual response for unscheduled maintenance, a Request for Proposal was sent to 

the prime contractor on April 28, 2008, requesting pricing for three refurbishment 

options (Minimal, Moderate, and Extensive). The ranges of cost for each of these options are expected to be: Minimal - $2 million–$6 million; Moderate - $7 million–

$10 million; Extensive - $14 million–$16 million. The details of what each particular 

interceptor refurbishment will cost have yet to be developed given we are still in 

the early stages of the GBI refurbishment program.

ACQUISITION APPROACH

66. Senator REED. Mr. Francis, MDA suggests that its acquisition approach is 

both novel and an improvement to the more linear approach outlined in DOD acquisition policy (referred to as DOD 5000) and, by association, GAO’s work on best 

practices. What are your views on MDA’s acquisition approach as compared with 

DOD acquisition policy and best practices? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Our work on DOD weapon systems over the past 6 years shows that 

programs have not adopted the knowledge-based approach in DOD’s acquisition policy. Instead, acquisition programs have preferred to manage technology, design, and 

manufacturing risks at the same time which leads to cost growth and schedule 

delays. MDA’s concurrent development and fielding approach to acquisitions has 

more in common with other acquisition programs than with DOD acquisition policy, 

because most programs do not abide by DOD policy. DOD policy is linear only in 

the sense that it calls for following sound systems engineering principles for a given 

scope of work. For example, key technologies should be mature before committing 

to system development; a design should be stable before committing to system demonstration; and the design and production processes should be mature before committing to production. This approach, to me, is inarguable and its linearity, sensible. 

The policy also provides for non-linear spiral development to provide evolutionary 

advances to a basic capability. Thus, I would characterize the issue as not so much 

as policy having failed, but rather as policy not having been tried. Taken in this 

context, MDA’s approach is not so much a novel departure from DOD policy as it 

is taking the de rigueur departure followed by most programs to an even greater 

degree. 

MDA’s acquisition strategy allows its programs to work on maturing technologies 

while they are also maturing the system design and preparing for production. Our 

work has found that programs following this practice have higher cost growth than 

programs that start system development with mature technologies. As reported in 

our March 2008 assessment, for DOD programs that similarly began with immature 

technologies, their total RDT&E costs grew by 44 percent more than programs that 

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1GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO–08–467SP 

(Washington, DC: Mar. 31, 2008) 2GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Acquisition Strategy Generates Results but Delivers Less at a Higher Cost, GAO–07–387 (Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2007). 3GAO–07–387. 

began with mature technologies.1 More often than not, programs were still maturing 

technologies late into system development and even into production. 

Based on our body of work, in order to have good outcomes, the best practices contained in DOD acquisition policy require the use of a knowledge-based approach to 

product development that demonstrates high levels of knowledge before significant 

commitments are made. We have found that programs managed outside the knowledge-based process are more likely to have surprises in the form of cost and schedule increases. MDA has experienced some of these problems, although a full accounting is not possible because of the flexibilities MDA has had in using funds, deferring work, and tracking costs. One must also keep in mind that MDA has benefited from ‘‘linearity’’ in a very basic sense. That is, MDA’s ability to accelerate the 

development and fielding of assets in the past few years owes much to the advanced 

development work that was conducted in the preceding 20 years.

NEW BLOCK STRUCTURE

67. Senator REED. Mr. Francis, MDA has changed its block structure from the 

previous 2-year blocks to a series of capability blocks that are intended to respond 

to particular threats, but without the previous time limits. How does MDA’s new 

block structure address the issues GAO has reported on regarding the previous 2-

year block structure? 

Mr. FRANCIS. MDA’s new block construct, which was redefined in 2007 to better 

communicate the agency’s plans and goals to Congress, makes many positive 

changes. These include establishing a unit cost for selected block assets, including 

in a block only those elements or components that will be fielded during the block, 

and abandoning the practice of deferring work from block to block. 

MDA’s new block construct provides a means for comparing the expected and actual unit cost of assets included in a block. As we noted in our fiscal year 2006 report, MDA’s past block structure did not estimate unit costs for assets considered 

part of a given block or categorize block costs in a manner that allowed calculations 

of expected or actual unit costs.2 Under the new block construct, MDA expects to 

develop unit costs for selected block assets—such as THAAD interceptors—and request an independent verification of that unit cost from DOD’s CAIG. MDA will also 

track the actual unit cost of the assets and report significant cost growth to Congress. However, MDA has not yet determined for which assets a unit cost will be 

developed and how much a unit cost must increase before that increase is reported 

to Congress. 

The new construct also makes it clearer as to which assets should be included in 

a block. Under the agency’s prior block construct, assets included in a given block 

were sometimes not planned for delivery until a later block. For example, as we reported in March 2007, MDA included costs for ABL and STSS as part of its Block 

2006 cost goal although those elements did not field or plan to field assets during 

Block 2006.3 Agency officials told us those elements were included in the block because they believed the elements could offer some emergency capability during the 

block timeframe. 

Finally, the new block construct should improve the transparency of each block’s 

actual cost. Under its prior construct, MDA deferred work from one block to another; but it did not track the cost of the deferred work so that it could be attributed 

to the block that it benefited. For example, MDA deferred some work needed to 

characterize and verify the Block 2004 capability until Block 2006 and counted the 

cost of those activities as a cost of Block 2006. By doing so, it understated the cost 

of Block 2004 and overstated the cost of Block 2006. Because MDA did not track 

the cost of the deferred work, the agency was unable to adjust the cost of either 

block to accurately capture the cost of each. MDA officials told us that under its 

new block construct, MDA will no longer transfer work, along with its cost, to a future block. Rather, a block of work will not be considered complete until all work 

that benefits a block has been completed and its cost has been properly attributed 

to that block.

68. Senator REED. Mr. Francis, what issues still need to be addressed with the 

new block structure? 

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4MDA expects to initially develop budget baselines and report variances to this baseline for 

Blocks 1.0, 2.0, and a portion of 3.0. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Although improvements are inherent in MDA’s new block construct, 

its full benefit to transparency and accountability depends on future actions. MDA 

has not yet estimated the full cost of a block. Also, MDA has not addressed whether 

it will transfer assets produced during a block to a military Service for production 

and operation at the block’s completion, or whether MDA will continue its practice 

of concurrently developing and fielding BMDS elements and components. 

According to its fiscal year 2009 budget submission, MDA does not plan to initially develop a full cost estimate for any BMDS block. Instead, when a firm commitment can be made to Congress for a block of capability, MDA will develop a 

budget baseline for the block. This budget will include anticipated funding for each 

block activity that is planned for the 6 years included in DOD’s Future Years Defense Plan. MDA officials told us that if the budget for a baselined block changes, 

MDA plans to report and explain those variations to Congress.4 At some future 

date, MDA does expect to develop a full cost estimate for each committed block and 

is in discussions with DOD’s CAIG on having the group verify each estimate; but 

documents do not yet include a timeline for estimating block cost or having that estimate verified. It is not clear at this point whether the block cost estimate will contain acquisition costs only or will include O&S costs as well (a life-cycle cost estimate). While it is important to have a life-cycle cost element, it is also important 

to track acquisition costs separately from life-cycle costs for reporting purposes. 

Transparency would suffer if, for example, an increase in a block’s acquisition costs 

offset by a corresponding reduction in O&S costs were treated as having no effect 

on the life-cycle cost total, thus precluding the need to report the acquisition cost 

increase. 

The new block construct also does not address whether the assets included in a 

block will be transferred at the block’s completion to a military Service for production and operation. Officials representing multiple DOD organizations recognize that 

the transfer criteria established in 2002 are neither complete nor clear given the 

BMDS’s complexity. Without clear transfer criteria, MDA has transferred the management of only one element—the Patriot Advanced Capability-3—to the military 

for production and operation. Joint Staff officials told us that for all other elements, 

MDA and the military Services have been negotiating the transition of responsibilities for the sustainment of fielded elements—a task that has proven arduous and 

time-consuming. Although MDA documents show that under its new block construct 

the agency should be ready at the end of each block to deliver BMDS components 

that are fully mission-capable, MDA officials could not tell us when MDA’s Director 

will recommend that management of components, including production responsibilities, be transferred to the military. 

Finally, it is not clear, under MDA’s new block construct, whether the concurrent 

development and fielding of BMDS elements and/or components will continue. Fully 

developing a component or element and demonstrating its capability prior to production increases the likelihood that the product will perform as designed and can be 

produced at the cost estimated. To field an initial capability quickly, MDA accepted 

the risk of concurrent development and fielding during Block 2004. For example, by 

the end of Block 2004, the agency realized that the performance of some groundbased interceptors could be degraded because the interceptors included inappropriate or potentially unreliable parts. MDA has begun the process of retrofitting 

these interceptors, but work will not be completed until 2012. Meanwhile there is 

a risk that some interceptors might not perform as designed. MDA also continued 

to accept this risk during Block 2006 as it fielded assets before they were fully tested. MDA has not addressed whether it will accept similar performance risks under 

its new block construct or whether it will fully develop and demonstrate all elements/components prior to fielding.

69. Senator REED. Mr. Francis, what challenges do you see that MDA will face 

in estimating block costs, baselining them, having them independently verified, and 

reporting variances? 

Mr. FRANCIS. As MDA continues to implement its new block strategy, it will have 

to make important decisions on establishing baselines and reporting variances. Specifically, MDA must decide what it is going to include in a block’s cost, identifying 

the assets for which unit costs will be developed, outlining how much a unit cost 

must increase before that increase is reported to Congress, estimating costs capability development efforts. I believe that MDA should work closely with Congress 

in making these decisions. 

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5GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Acquisition Strategy Generates Results but Delivers Less at a Higher Cost, GAO–07–387 (Washington, DC: March 15, 2007). 

MDA may find that estimating costs for near-term blocks such as Blocks 1.0 and 

2.0 may be easier to develop since the work for these blocks is nearly complete. 

However, estimating costs for work scheduled to occur in Blocks 4.0 and 5.0 may 

be more difficult as work for these blocks is scheduled farther into the future. Additionally, it will be more difficult to estimate costs for elements captured under its 

Capability Development effort, such as the ABL, KEI, and MKV programs. These 

programs are in the midst of developing technology. Such programs generally do not 

have firm cost, schedule, or performance baselines because they are in a period of 

discovery, which makes schedule and cost difficult to estimate. MDA’s experience 

with the ABL program provides a good example of the difficulty in estimating the 

cost and schedule of technology development. In 1996, the ABL program believed 

that all ABL technology could be demonstrated by 2001 at a cost of about $1 billion. 

However, MDA now projects that this technology will not be demonstrated until 

2009 and its cost has grown to over $5 billion. It is imperative that MDA establish 

baselines, because until it does it will be difficult for decisionmakers to evaluate the 

business case for the BMDS.

SIGNIFICANCE OF COST INCREASES

70. Senator REED. Mr. Francis, in your prepared testimony, and in your March report, you make the point that the Block 2006 missile defense system had a $1 

billion cost increase. Some might argue that, in a program with an annual budget 

of more than $9 billion, such cost increases are not worrisome, amounting to only 

a 5-percent increase over the 2-year block. Would you agree with that argument? 

If not, why not? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Although we reported in 2007 that during Block 2006 MDA in- creased costs by about $1 billion, we could not discern the full cost of the block because the agency deferred some budgeted work to future costs in order to stay within its revised budget and offset increasing contractor costs.5 Thus, the actual cost 

increase is likely higher. Although the measurable percentage increase seems relatively small, we should not be insensitive to the fact that at $8 to $10 billion per 

year, the missile defense budget is unusually large. Thus, a small percentage increase translates into a significant amount of money. Moreover, even a 2.5 percent 

cost increase per year for a more typical major defense acquisition program that 

would normally span 10 or so years, would, using the Nunn-McCurdy criteria for 

the current baseline, be enough to trigger a significant cost growth breach by year 

6 and a critical cost growth breach in year 10. That is, at that rate of cost growth, 

a program would accrue a 25 percent cost increase over 10 years. Furthermore, 

every dollar spent inefficiently in developing and procuring weapon systems is less 

money available for many other internal and external budget priorities—such as the 

global war on terror and growing entitlement programs. These inefficiencies also 

often result in the delivery of less capability than initially planned, either in the 

form of fewer quantities or delayed delivery to the warfighter. 

The consequence of cost growth is reduced buying power and lost opportunities. 

Funded at $8 billion to nearly $10 billion annually, MDA’s BMDS is the largest research and development program in DOD’s budget. Every dollar spent on inefficiencies in acquiring one weapon system is less money available for other opportunities. 

As program costs increase, programs must request more funding to cover the overruns, make trade-offs with existing programs, delay the start of new programs, or 

take funds from other accounts. Ultimately, cost overruns and delays affect 

warfighters who have to operate costly legacy systems longer than expected, find alternatives to fill capability gaps, or go without the capability. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK PRYOR

THAAD SYSTEM

71. Senator PRYOR. General Obering and General Campbell, in your statements 

you both allude to the vital importance of THAAD to the terminal defense segment 

of MDA for the protection of our Homeland and overseas bases, our service men and 

women deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and OIF, and our 

friends and allies. Furthermore, you acknowledge that Iran is expanding its delivery 

systems by developing an extended-range version of the Shahab–3 that could strike 

our allies and friends in the Middle East and Europe, and also identify a new 

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Ashura medium-range ballistic missile capable of reaching Israel and U.S. bases in 

Eastern Europe. While the THAAD program is designed to protect the warfighter 

from these threats today, it is underfunded by $65 million, effectively delaying the 

program up to 1 year. What kind of priority does our missile defense strategy give 

the THAAD program? Doesn’t it make sense to fully fund THAAD or maybe even 

buy back the contract and bring Fire Units 3 and 4 on schedule? 

General OBERING. The Agency’s fiscal year 2009 budget reflects an overall strategy that focuses on near-term delivery of BMD capabilities, to include THAAD. It 

is fully funding the program and has realigned funding to enable contract award 

for interceptor long-lead components which restores Fire Unit 3 and 4 schedules. 

General CAMPBELL. The MDA has performed an excellent job in developing a 

BMDS capability. The agency has also collaborated with the DOD, combatant commanders, and Services to deliver capabilities based on a balance of resources and 

technological maturity moderated by the warfighter’s priority of need. In recognition 

of the high priority of need that THAAD enjoys, I understand the MDA has recently 

taken steps to realign internal funding to restore planned procurement and delivery 

of these two fire units and interceptors as originally planned and scheduled. THAAD 

represents a cutting edge BMD capability that we need to field as early as possible.

72. Senator PRYOR. General Obering, what has contributed to the cost growth in 

THAAD and SM–3? 

General OBERING. The Aegis BMD program of record is and continues to be an 

aggressive program from a cost, technical, and schedule perspective. Aegis BMD is 

managing eight developments simultaneously along with a missile manufacturing 

program and an aggressive ship installation schedule. There have been unplanned 

technical challenges with the Third Stage Rocket Motor and Divert Attitude Control 

of the SM–3 Block IA development that required additional ground/element level 

testing to ensure all operational modes of the missile were well understood and 

available prior to its deployment to the fleet. Additional engineering was also required to deal with unplanned SM–3 manufacturing and diminishing manufacturing 

sources issues. 

Aegis BMD’s aggressive testing schedule has driven an increase in modeling and 

simulation and scenario certifications as risk reduction measures to ensure flight 

mission success to achieve Operational Evaluation of the Block 2004 capability. Finally, assessment of mission assurance and other ‘‘core’’ standards within the program, along with added security requirements associated with Kill Assessment have 

driven additional unplanned costs. 

Aegis BMD has taken these development and testing experiences into account 

with the SM–3 Block IB upgrade, as well as, future spirals of the Aegis BMD System. 

For THAAD, there have been several factors contributing to cost overrun and cost 

growth for the program.

• The Development contract has an estimate at completion that is predicted to end the contract with an approximate 5 percent overrun to contract cost. The overrun has been driven principally by variances experienced in the interceptor for design discoveries during assembly/subassembly 

ground qualification testing requiring subsequent rework and launcher 

component hardware and software complexities. 

• There has been cost growth in scope to the program caused primarily by: 

(a) critical contract changes necessary to prepare for Fire Unit Fielding 

(e.g., Fire Control obsolescence and redesign for the 5-ton truck); (b) Insensitive Munitions/Final Hazard Classification requirements; (c) the impact of 

target availability causing delays to the flight test program; (d) risk reduction and flight test analysis efforts; and (e) THAAD participation in Juniper 

Cobra 09. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

COMPLIANCE OF SECTION 223

73. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Young, section 223 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008, as passed by Congress, prohibits the 

use of RDT&E funds for procurement or advance procurement of long lead items, 

including for SM–3 Block IA interceptors in fiscal year 2009. Yet the fiscal year 

2009 President’s budget request for the MDA includes a request for $130.0 million 

in RDT&E funds for the SM–3 Block IA interceptor. Please explain why DOD is not 

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following the law, and what you plan to do to bring MDA into compliance with the 

NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008. 

Mr. YOUNG. Due to time constraints and the advanced state of the DOD budget, 

MDA was unable to incorporate changes to the fiscal year 2009 President’s budget 

submission to be consistent with the requirements of section 223. However, MDA 

was able to implement the direction of Congress to program construction projects 

in the Military Construction (MILCON) appropriations. The Department will carefully consider these requirements as we develop the next budget request. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

COMPLIANCE OF SECTION 223

74. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Young, section 223 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 

2008 requires MDA to revise its budget structure to include procurement, O&S, and 

MILCON accounts in addition to its traditional research and development appropriations. The provision also requires MDA to establish acquisition cost, schedule, 

and performance baselines for MDA programs. The purpose of this provision was 

to provide Congress greater insight into MDA budgets and to provide greater clarity 

as to the true costs of our missile defense programs. It was in no way an attempt 

to slow down the fielding of the current generation of missile defense systems, such 

as GMD, Aegis BMD, and THAAD. What effect does this provision have on the pace 

of development, testing, and fielding of missile defense systems, such as GMD, Aegis 

BMD, and THAAD? 

Mr. YOUNG. Establishment of baselines for MDA programs should have no impact 

on development, testing, or fielding of MDA systems. The transition by the MDA 

from use of research and development funding to research and development, procurement, O&S, and MILCON funding, if planned and executed in an incremental 

fashion, should have little to no effect on the pace of development, testing, and fielding of the BMDS elements, including the Ground-Based Mid-Course Defense, Aegis 

BMD, and THAAD. To the extent fielding requires use of procurement appropriations, normally the full funding policy would apply. In the absence of any top-line 

increase, full-funding may require that some development, testing, or fielding activities be deferred to future years to stay within budget controls. The Department’s 

MDEB has reviewed the potential impacts of procurement funding use with the 

MDA, and is committed to working with the MDA to meet fielding requirements and 

comply with section 223.

75. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Young, should the bureaucratic effect of this provision be to hinder the pace of missile defense fielding, can we be assured that you 

will inform Congress and take steps necessary to rectify the problem? 

Mr. YOUNG. Section 223 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110–181) 

requires the budget justification materials submitted to Congress in support of the 

DOD budget for any fiscal year after 2009 to set forth separately requested amounts 

for the MDA for: (1) RDT&E; (2) procurement; (3) operation and maintenance; and 

(4) MILCON. I will stay informed of any hindrance to missile defense fielding, and 

steps to correct the problems, and in turn, inform Congress.

CERTIFICATION OF SYSTEM

76. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Young, section 228 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 

2008 requires that before more than 40 GBIs may be installed at Fort Greely, the 

Secretary of Defense must certify that the Block 2006 GMD element has demonstrated through end-to-end testing that it has a high probability of working in an 

operationally effective manner. Your predecessor, Ken Krieg, sent a letter to Congress, dated September 19, 2006, stating that the MDA ‘‘completed a successful endto-end flight test of the long-range missile defense capability on September 1.’’ This 

test included a successful intercept of the target. There was another successful endto-end flight intercept test of the GMD system in fall 2007. In light of these successful tests, when will the Secretary of Defense certify that the Block 2006 GMD element has a high probability of working in an operationally effective manner? 

Mr. YOUNG. I will review the progress to date, the testing completed, the assessment by the DOT&E, and planning for O&S, and determine when a recommendation can be provided to the Secretary of Defense. The MDA’s development program 

incorporates ground and flight testing and modeling and simulation to evaluate system and element performance. I will consider the depth and breadth of their preparation, resulting performance, and analysis of their results to formulate the criteria 

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and timing of a certification decision. I will place a significant emphasis on the 

DOT&E assessments. In addition, I will review plans for operating and sustaining 

the Ground-based Missile Defense (GMD) element and the funding allocated for 

Service involvement.

EUROPEAN MISSILE DEFENSE SITE

77. Senator SESSIONS. General Obering, please update the committee on the ongoing work to ensure that the proposed U.S. missile defense site in Europe is fully 

integrated into NATO’s missile defense efforts. 

General OBERING. The technical integration between the U.S. missile defense site 

in Europe and the NATO missile defense capability will occur primarily through the 

command and control (C2) processes and systems of the U.S. and NATO. The U.S. 

and NATO are continuing to work toward integration of our BMD C2 systems. We 

are working collaboratively in the following three areas.

1. Integrate U.S. BMDS elements’ test beds and NATO test bed. We are 

establishing the modeling and simulation and testing environment for identifying areas for analysis and demonstrating progress on the integration. 

We are developing the connectivity and establishing the infrastructure between U.S. Missile Defense Integration and Operations Center (MDIOC) 

BMD test bed and the NATO Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Integration Test Bed. The MDIOC will be the single point-of-presence 

in the U.S. for BMDS elements’ participation with the ITB. The MDIOC is 

located in Colorado Springs, CO, and the ITB is located in The Hague, The 

Netherlands. 

2. Develop technical documentation. We are writing Interface Control Documents for the non-real-time (i.e., planning) and real-time (i.e., situation 

awareness) aspects of C2. Once completed, these documents will be used by 

contractors to build or modify U.S. and NATO C2 systems, as necessary. 

These documents will also contribute to the U.S. and NATO standards process, such as updates to the U.S. Military-Standard 6016 for exchanging 

Link-16 information. 

3. Demonstrate integration. We are incrementally demonstrating and exercising the display and information exchange capabilities via increasing complexity of interoperability demonstrations and exercises. We have scheduled 

four C2 demonstrations/exercises in 2008. The first demonstration was successfully completed in January. We demonstrated the ability to develop a 

critical asset list, analyze coverage, and recommend a specific element of 

BMDS to protect a specific asset. We also demonstrated the ability to exchange situation awareness information (i.e., tracks) and display a consistent operating picture. We have three more C2 events planned with demonstrations scheduled in May and June, culminating in a NATO-led exercise in September.

Activities for 2008 have been discussed and scheduled. Integration efforts between 

the U.S. and NATO for subsequent years have not been finalized. Continued analysis and more complex demonstrations on planning and situation awareness will be 

the focus of the efforts.

78. Senator SESSIONS. General Campbell, please update the committee on 

STRATCOM’s efforts to develop the CONOPs for the European Missile Defense Site, 

and the role you expect EUCOM and NORTHCOM to play in operating the system. 

General CAMPBELL. Extending missile defense to deployed forces, friends, and allies in Europe, known as European Capability (EC), has created an intense collaborative planning effort between the MDA, U.S. STRATCOM, U.S. NORTHCOM, and 

U.S. EUCOM. The development of the Global BMD CONOPs provides the overarching framework for EC development and will guide how the Commanders of 

NORTHCOM and EUCOM will employ EC in the defense of Europe and the Homeland. Because the Global CONOPs continues to be developed and coordinated, detailed command and control relationships between EUCOM and NORTHCOM have 

not yet been determined. We expect the Global CONOPs to be finalized this summer. Concurrent with Global CONOPs development, STRATCOM is also assisting 

EUCOM with a regionally focused European BMD CONOPs.

79. Senator SESSIONS. General Obering, of the $712 million requested for the European Missile Defense System, $241 million is for MILCON. Please explain why 

these funds are necessary, and the schedule implications should these funds not be 

available in fiscal year 2009. 

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General OBERING. This funding provides fiscal year 2009 MILCON funds in the 

amount of $133 million for the EIS and $108 million for EMR to support deployment 

of a European Capability to expand the layered BMDS. This European Capability 

will enhance protection of the U.S Homeland and provide for the defense of deployed 

U.S. troops and European Allies. The fiscal year 2009 MILCON funding is essential 

to allow startup of site preparation, contractor mobilization, long-lead item acquisition, and construction of site and facilities infrastructure. These activities must be 

started in fiscal year 2009 to maintain and execute scheduled development of the 

site to meet a 2013 capability readiness timeline. Failure to provide these funds in 

fiscal year 2009 would result in a 1-year delay in delivery of this vital capability 

and preclude operational readiness. 

In addition, failure to provide these funds would have diplomatic implications that 

could impact the schedule. Full funding is vital to the conclusion and implementation this year of the bilateral missile defense agreements necessary to allow the 

United States to begin to deploy capabilities critical to the defense of the homeland 

and U.S. Allies. Funding cuts could discourage both potential host nations from expending further political capital in efforts to conclude or implement these agreements. Furthermore, as Congress has encouraged us to do, the administration has 

sought and obtained NATO support for U.S. missile defense sites in Europe through 

the unanimous declaration at the Bucharest summit. Less than full funding for the 

missile defense sites in Europe could jeopardize this progress by signaling that the 

United States is backing away from its commitment to this program.

OPERATIONS AND SUSTAINMENT COSTS

80. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Young and General Obering, approximately $715 

million of the MDA request for fiscal year 2009 is for the operations and 

sustainment of fielded missile defense capabilities. Why is the MDA funding operations and sustainment costs? 

Mr. YOUNG. The MDA is funding operations and sustainment costs for BMDS elements to ensure continuous operation of the system, and to prevent creation of competition from within each lead Service for limited funding resources. A potential advantage of funding BMDS O&S through a defense-wide account is the ability to 

manage BMDS funding as a portfolio, with the latitude to balance development, procurement, and support priorities at the Department level, and to rebalance resources in a timely manner as conditions change. The MDEB will take an active 

role in the BMDS Program Objective Memorandum (POM) preparation, resource allocation, and program execution reviews. 

General OBERING. MDA is funding operations and sustainment costs for BMDS 

elements to ensure continuous operation of the system, and we will continue to sustain fielded assets until we transition them to the Services. We are working closely 

with the Services to transition these assets. After transition, the lead Service will 

be responsible for operations and sustainment of the capability.

81. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Young and General Obering, is this not something the Services should be responsible for? 

Mr. YOUNG. At this time, DOD has not decided to make the Services responsible 

for O&S funding in the near term. For the next few years, while we develop O&S 

cost experience, DOD’s approach will be to oversee the management of the BMDS 

portfolio, using the MDEB and involving all stakeholders in annual planning and 

preparation of the BMDS program plan. The intent of the BMDS Life Cycle Management Process and the BMDS Business Rules, which are currently in coordination 

with the Deputy Secretary of Defense, is to manage resource formulation and allocation responsibilities at the Department level. In the year of execution, each Service 

would receive a funding allocation from the defense-wide account as a result of the 

plan endorsed by the MDEB and approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. During the execution year, periodic reviews will be performed to assess performance 

against baseline plans. By doing this, the risk and responsibilities remain at the Department level. 

General OBERING. The Services will be responsible for operations and sustainment 

of BMDS assets upon capability transition. The BMDS Life Cycle Management Process and the BMDS Business Rules are currently in coordination for Deputy 

Secreatary of Defense signature. These documents will assist AT&L in managing 

BMDS sustainment resource formulation and allocation responsibilities at the Department level. The current vision is that in the year of execution, each Service 

would receive a sustainment funding allocation from defense-wide resources per the 

MDEB endorsed and Deputy Secretary of Defense approved plan.

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82. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Young and General Obering, if not the Services, 

then why not create a defense-wide line to fund O&S costs for fielded missile defense capabilities? 

Mr. YOUNG. The MDEB has recently reviewed the draft BMDS Life Cycle Management Process which involves the MDA, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

STRATCOM, combatant commands, Joint Staff, and the Services in an annual program plan and budget preparation process to derive a Deputy Secretary of Defense 

approved BMDS POM and budget submittals. The BMDS Life Cycle Management 

Process will allow development of the missile defense budget as a portfolio (with 

input by all participants), will use a defense-wide account, and will undergo MDEB 

review prior to final approval. The DOD is implementing this initiative during 

POM–10 preparation to learn from the experience and be prepared to fully influence 

POM–12. The portfolio managed defense-wide account will include all types of funding appropriations, and will be the source of funds transferred to the Services for 

administration in the year of execution. O&S funding will be part of this process. 

General OBERING. Business rules have been developed under the MDEB that incorporates the defense-wide approach. The business rules are currently in coordination within the Department. The advantage of funding BMD operations and 

sustainment through a single DOD-wide account is that this approach ensures the 

funding remains dedicated to sustaining missile defense capabilities.

TRANSFER OF THAAD SYSTEM

83. Senator SESSIONS. General Campbell, you note in your prepared statement 

that ‘‘THAAD capabilities will begin to transfer to the Army in 2009.’’ What does 

this mean in a practical sense? 

General CAMPBELL. The THAAD Project Office of the MDA has developed and 

manufactured a mission specific set of equipment that delivers a capability. The 

equipment that comprises this capability will be transferred to the Army. Currently, 

this equipment includes: 3 launchers; 24 missile rounds; 1 THAAD fire control/communications (TFCC) component; 1 radar component; and peculiar support equipment. 

In parallel, the U.S. Army has defined, structured, and resourced an organization 

(battery) of 99 soldiers. These soldiers will complete new equipment training and 

collective training in fiscal year 2009, at which time the THAAD Project Office will 

deliver the manufactured mission equipment set along with Army provided command support equipment to the Army organization.

84. Senator SESSIONS. General Campbell, will the Army now assume the O&S 

costs for the four planned THAAD Fire Units? 

General CAMPBELL. The issue of total THAAD transition and transfer from the 

MDA to the Army continues to be negotiated. It should be noted that some O&S 

costs were assumed by the Army when the initial THAAD unit began personnel fill. 

The Army also funds O&S for unit common support equipment and installation infrastructure. The Army will assume additional O&S resource responsibilities as 

each unit is filled and activated. 

The major issue that remains under discussion and negotiation is at what point 

does the the Army assume responsibility to resource the O&S cost for the THAAD 

mission specific equipment set (interceptors, launchers, etc.). At present, the MDA 

is responsible for providing support to the THAAD mission specific equipment and 

has committed to fully funding Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) through fiscal 

year 2013. In the following 2 fiscal years, MDA will fund CLS as it relates to consequences of design defect issues and the approved THAAD Operational Mode Summary/Mission Profile.

85. Senator SESSIONS. General Campbell, who will then be responsible for purchasing more than the 96 planned THAAD missiles? 

General CAMPBELL. Until the THAAD Project Office is transferred to the Army, 

along with an appropriate increase in Total Obligation Authority, the Army position 

is that responsibility to resource additional THAAD missiles rests with the MDA.

86. Senator SESSIONS. General Campbell, clearly, 96 interceptor missiles will not 

be sufficient. What are Army plans for acquiring additional THAAD missiles and 

Fire Units? 

General CAMPBELL. Presently the Army has no plans to acquire additional 

THAAD missiles or fire units. However, the MDA does intend to address THAAD 

inventory challenges in the next budget submission. 

230

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN THUNE

AIRBORNE LASER

87. Senator THUNE. General Obering, one of the important components of missile 

defense is the ability to attack the missile while it is still in its boost phase. The 

ABL is an excellent example of this capability. What do you need from Congress 

to ensure that you will be able to conduct a lethal shoot-down of a threat representative boosting target in 2009? 

General OBERING. Continue your solid support for ABL and the MDA funding requirement in the PB09 submission.

[Whereupon, at 4:26 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

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