96-613

 No. 96-613

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

1997

STATE OF MONTANA,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

 v.

CURTIS A. FITZGERALD,

 Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Missoula,

 The Honorable John S. Henson, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 Mark E. Jones, Attorney at Law, Missoula, Montana

 For Respondent:

 Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General;

 Jennifer Anders, Assistant Attorney General;

 Helena, Montana

 Robert L. "Dusty" Deschamps III, Missoula County

 Attorney; Betty Wing, Deputy County Attorney;

 Missoula, Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: May 30, 1997

 Decided: June 17, 1997

Filed:

 __________________________________________

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 Clerk

Justice Jim Regnier delivered the Opinion of the Court.

 Curtis A. Fitzgerald was cited with driving under the influence of alcohol 

pursuant

to 61-8-401, MCA, on August 22, 1995. The Missoula County Justice Court denied

both Fitzgerald's motion to suppress evidence of his breathalyzer test result, and 

his

motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial. Fitzgerald pled guilty, reserving his 

right to

appeal both rulings in District Court. Prior to trial in the District Court, 

Fitzgerald again

moved to dismiss for lack of speedy trial, or in the alternative, to suppress the

breathalyzer test result. The Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, 

denied

both motions. Fitzgerald entered a plea of guilty. Fitzgerald appeals from the 

sentence

and judgment of the District Court, and from the order denying his motion to dismiss 

for

lack of speedy trial, or in the alternative, to suppress the breathalyzer test 

result. We

affirm.

 The issues on appeal are:

 1. Did the District Court err when it failed to dismiss for lack of speedy 

trial

pursuant to 46-13-401(2), MCA?

 2. Did the District Court err when it failed to suppress Fitzgerald's blood

alcohol content test results?

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 Curtis A. Fitzgerald was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol in

Missoula County Justice Court on August 23, 1995. He appeared in court and pled not

guilty to the charged offense on August 29, 1995.

 An omnibus hearing was originally set for October 5, 1995. On October 2,

defendant's counsel filed a motion to continue the hearing. Apparently, that motion 

was

not received by the Justice Court prior to the omnibus hearing because, on October 

23,

the court issued a formal notice that defendant and his attorney failed to appear at 

the

scheduled hearing and that this was "not acceptable practice." Nevertheless, the 

court

rescheduled the omnibus hearing for November 2, 1995. At the defendant's request,

however, the court postponed the hearing until December 7, 1995.

 At the omnibus hearing on December 7, 1995, the defendant informed the court

that he would be filing two pretrial motions: (1) to suppress the evidence of the 

blood

alcohol test results; and (2) to challenge probable cause for his arrest. The court 

ordered

that the motions be briefed and filed by December 20, with the State's response due

January 5, 1996. The court set a trial date of March 26, 1996.

 On December 19, 1995, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the blood alcohol

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test results. The State responded and the defendant failed to file a reply brief. 

The

motion was denied by the Justice Court on February 5, 1996. 

 On March 7, 1996, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the

ground that he was not brought to trial within six months. The motion was denied on

March 21, 1996. Thereafter, Fitzgerald pled guilty, while reserving his right to 

appeal

the suppression and speedy trial issues.

 On appeal to the District Court, Fitzgerald presented the same motions to 

suppress

and dismiss for lack of speedy trial. The District Court denied both motions on the 

briefs

without a hearing. Fitzgerald entered a guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal 

the legal

issues raised. The District Court sentenced Fitzgerald to sixty days in the Missoula

county jail, with all but seven days suspended upon conditions. 

ISSUE 1

 Did the District Court err when it failed to dismiss for lack of speedy trial 

pursuant

to 46-13-401(2), MCA?

 Because the basis of the motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial is based 

upon

a legal interpretation made by the district court, we will review the court's legal

conclusions as to whether the court was correct in its interpretation of the law. 

State v.

Mantz (1994), 269 Mont. 135, 137, 887 P.2d 251, 253 (citing Doting v. Trunk (1993),

259 Mont. 343, 856 P.2d 536).

 Fitzgerald argues that 46-13-401(2), MCA, mandates dismissal of this matter. 

Section 46-13-401(2), MCA, reads:

 After the entry of a plea upon a misdemeanor charge, the court,

 unless good cause to the contrary is shown, shall order the prosecution to

 be dismissed, with prejudice, if defendant whose trial has not been

 postponed upon the defendant's motion is not brought to trial within 6

 months.

Fitzgerald argues that his right to a speedy trial was violated because the Justice 

Court

scheduled his trial more than six months after the entry of plea. Furthermore, he

contends that the State cannot show that good cause exists not to dismiss the 

motion. On

the other hand, the State argues that good cause to the contrary is shown, as two

postponements are directly attributable to Fitzgerald. 

 This Court explained that 46-13-201(2) (since renumbered 46-13-401(2)),

MCA, mandates the dismissal of a misdemeanor charge not brought to trial within six

months only if two conditions are met: (1) the defendant has not asked for a

postponement; and (2) the State has not shown good cause for the delay. State v. 

Crane

(1989), 240 Mont. 235, 238, 784 P.2d 901, 903.

 In this case, Fitzgerald entered his plea of not guilty on August 29, 1995. The

six-month period would have expired on February 29, 1996. After two continuances

requested by defense counsel, the Justice Court held an omnibus hearing on December

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7, 1995. At that time, the Justice Court set a trial date of March 26, 1996, which 

was

beyond the six-month time limit. On March 7, 1996, Fitzgerald moved to dismiss the

charge pursuant to 46-13-401(2), MCA, which was denied by the Justice Court.

 Fitzgerald renewed his motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial on appeal 

to the

District Court. The District Court denied Fitzgerald's motion, concluding that the

scheduled trial date fit within the "good cause to the contrary" exception in the 

statute. 

The District Court concluded that the record clearly showed that the two 

postponements

resulted from Fitzgerald's actions and requests. The District Court explained that, 

first,

Fitzgerald and his counsel failed to notify the Justice Court prior to the omnibus 

hearing

set on October 5, 1995, that they wished a continuance in this matter. That hearing 

was

rescheduled due to their failure to appear. Second, at the rescheduled hearing on

November 2, 1995, the defendant sought and was granted a continuance until December

7, 1995. 

 In support of its decision, the District Court cited State v. Crane (1989), 240

Mont. 235, 784 P.2d 901. In Crane, we held that dismissal of a misdemeanor charge was

not mandated under the former version of 46-13-401(2), MCA, where the defendant's

motion for continuance caused the trial to be delayed beyond the six-month 

limitation.

Crane, 240 Mont. at 238, 784 P.2d at 903.

 Fitzgerald asserts that Crane is not applicable to the facts in his case. 

Fitzgerald

distinguishes the facts in Crane by stating that he never requested a postponement 

of the

trial date, as Crane did, but only sought continuance with respect to the omnibus 

hearing. 

Fitzgerald suggests that this Court's decision in Crane should be limited to only 

those

cases where a defendant specifically requests that a trial date be extended beyond 

the sixmonth period set forth in 46-13-401(2), MCA.

 The State counters that the District Court was correct in taking into account

Fitzgerald's actions in postponing the scheduling of the omnibus hearing in denying 

his

motion to dismiss. The State points out that pretrial motions for continuance often

necessitate delays in the trial itself. Also, the State argues that nothing in 46-

13-401(2),

MCA, or in this Court's holding in Crane, limits a district court's consideration of 

delay

strictly to motions to continue the trial. The State contends that it is only 

proper that a

district court take into account any delay occasioned by a defendant when considering

whether to dismiss a misdemeanor charge. Otherwise, defendants could manipulate a

court's calendar to delay the start of a trial.

 We conclude the District Court correctly determined that dismissal of the charge

against Fitzgerald was not mandated by 46-13-401(2), MCA. We hold that any 

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pretrial

motion for continuance filed by a defendant which has the incidental effect of 

delaying

the trial beyond the six month time limit could be said to "postpone trial" for 

purposes

of 46-13-401(2), MCA. In this instance, Fitzgerald sought or caused several

postponements that necessitated the delay of the trial. The Justice Court 

accommodated

Fitzgerald by moving back the date of the omnibus hearing twice, from October 5 to

December 7. After these delays caused by Fitzgerald, the Justice Court cannot be

expected to alter its schedule to ensure that the misdemeanor charge is tried within 

six

months. A Justice Court must retain a measure of flexibility over scheduling to hear

cases on its docket. As such, we determine that the trial date of March 26, 1996, 

fell

within the "good cause to the contrary" exception of 46-13-401(2), MCA.

ISSUE 2

 Did the District Court err when it failed to suppress Fitzgerald's blood alcohol

content test results?

 The standard of review for a district court's denial of a motion to suppress is

whether the court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether those 

findings were

correctly applied as a matter of law. State v. Flack (1993), 260 Mont. 181, 185-88, 

860

P.2d 89, 92-94.

 Fitzgerald contends that the blood alcohol content ("BAC") test result should be

suppressed, as the Intoxilyzer machine used to test his breath was not tested within 

the

time frame mandated by Rule 23.4.213, ARM. That rule states:

 (1) Breath analysis instruments shall be field certified for accuracy

 at least once every seven (7) days by a breath test specialist/senior operator,

 or in the event of a senior operator's absence, his/her authorized designee,

 using a solution of ethyl alcohol approved by the division of forensic

 science and using the field certification report form for the breath analysis

 instrument being certified.

Rule 23.4.213, ARM. 

 The field certification report form for the machine used to test Fitzgerald's 

BAC

shows that the machine was tested on August 16, 1995, and again on August 23, 1995. 

Fitzgerald's BAC test was taken on August 22, 1995.

 Fitzgerald argues that, since the August 16 test was performed at 8:47 a.m., and

the August 23 test at 8:59 a.m., more than seven days had passed between the tests, 

due

to the twelve minute discrepancy. Thus, he asserts that the Intoxilyzer machine was 

not

certified "every seven days" as required by Rule 23.4.213, ARM. The State counters 

that

this argument is wholly frivolous because the field certification reports show that 

the tests

were routinely performed every seven calendar days.

 Section 1-1-305, MCA, provides that "[f]ractions of a day are disregarded in

computations which include more than 1 day and involve no questions of priority." 

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For

most purposes, the law regards the day as an indivisible unit. Kelly v. Independent

Publishing Co. (1912), 45 Mont. 127, 133, 122 P. 735, 736. Departure from this rule

is allowed when it becomes necessary to inquire into the order or sequence of two or

more events occurring on the same day to determine a question of priority or right, 

or

when the computation includes only one day or less. Kelly, 45 Mont. at 133, 122 P. 

at

736. 

 Fitzgerald asserts that 1-1-305, MCA, does not apply when construing

Rule 23.4.213, ARM. However, Fitzgerald is attempting to reduce a day into fractions

for purposes of field certification. We conclude that neither the administrative 

rule nor

the law supports Fitzgerald's argument, nor does this case fall within either of the

exceptions provided for in the Kelly case.

 This Court concludes that the District Court was correct in denying Fitzgerald's

motion to suppress the results of his BAC test. We determine that the field 

certifications

on August 16, 1995, and August 23, 1995, complied with the procedural safeguards of

the administrative rule.

 We affirm. 

 /S/ JIM REGNIER 

We Concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

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