[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-12396

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

ERIC WATKINS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

SANDY SULLIVAN, 

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 0:19-cv-61972-AHS

____________________

USCA11 Case: 21-12396 Date Filed: 10/19/2022 Page: 1 of 13
2 Opinion of the Court 21-12396

Before WILSON, LUCK, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Eric Watkins, proceeding pro se,1 appeals the district court’s 

orders (1) dismissing in part Watkins’s pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint, (2) denying Watkins leave to amend his complaint, and 

(3) granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant Sandy Sullivan. No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.

I. 

For this appeal, we accept these facts, viewed in the light 

most favorable to Watkins. Between August 2011 and August 

2015, Watkins (a homeless man who lives out of his car) visited 

daily a public park in Florida and used one of the park’s pavilions 

to prepare his meals. As part of his daily routine, Watkins would 

plug a cooking device into the pavilion’s electrical outlet and -- using his own personal pair of pliers -- would turn on the pavilion’s 

water shut-off valve so that he could fill buckets of water for his 

personal use. Each time he visited the park, Watkins would also 

sing routinely the song titled “Boom Bye Bye” by reggae artist Buju 

1 We read liberally briefs filed by pro se litigants. See Timson v. Sampson, 

518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). We also construe liberally pro se pleadings. 

See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).

USCA11 Case: 21-12396 Date Filed: 10/19/2022 Page: 2 of 13
21-12396 Opinion of the Court 3

Banton: an “anti-gay” song with lyrics advocating violence against 

gay people.2 

On the morning of 11 August 2015, Watkins carried out his 

usual routine, including preparing his breakfast and lunch using the 

pavilion’s electricity and water. After Watkins finished using the 

pavilion’s utilities -- and while Watkins was standing by his car --

he was approached by Sullivan, a park employee.3 

Sullivan asked Watkins a question about his car. Watkins 

turned his back to Sullivan and continued moving his belongings 

from the pavilion to his car, all the while singing the anti-gay song. 

According to Watkins, Sullivan became angry when she 

heard the lyrics of Watkins’s song. Sullivan then purportedly told 

Watkins that she disliked the song, that she did not want Watkins 

to return to the park, and that she was calling the police. 

2 This same song has featured in several civil actions filed by Watkins alleging 

violations of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Watkins v. Dubreuil, 820 F. 

App’x 940 (11th Cir. 2020); Watkins v. Pinnock, 802 F. App’x 450 (11th Cir. 

2020); Watkins v. Cent. Broward Reg’l Park, 799 F. App’x 659 (11th Cir. 2020); 

Watkins v. Bigwood, 797 F. App’x 438 (11th Cir. 2019); Watkins v. U.S. Postal 

Emp., 611 F. App’x 549 (11th Cir. 2015). 

That a person is singing a song with lyrics offensive to other people, in 

itself, does not shield the singer from the otherwise valid consequences of the 

singer’s separate acts performed while he was singing.

3 Sullivan says she was employed as a Park Ranger. Watkins contends Sullivan is a supervisor. 

USCA11 Case: 21-12396 Date Filed: 10/19/2022 Page: 3 of 13
4 Opinion of the Court 21-12396

A police officer of the City of Fort Lauderdale Police Department responded to Sullivan’s call. When the officer arrived, Sullivan told the officer that Watkins had violated park rules by using a 

pair of pliers to turn on the pavilion’s water pipe and by plugging 

in an electrical cooking device without a permit. At Sullivan’s request, the officer issued Watkins a trespass warning, explaining that 

Watkins would be arrested for trespassing if he remained on the 

premises.4 Watkins left the park without incident. 

Watkins later filed pro se this section 1983 civil action 

against Sullivan in her individual capacity. Watkins asserted three 

claims: (a) that Sullivan violated his First Amendment rights by issuing a trespass warning against Watkins because she did not like 

the song he was singing (Count 1); (b) that Sullivan deprived Watkins of his right to patronize the park by fabricating a false reason 

for issuing a trespass warning (Count 2); and (c) that Sullivan violated Watkins’s right to challenge the trespass warning by not informing him about the appeal process (Count 3). 

The district court granted in part and denied in part Sullivan’s motion to dismiss. The district court concluded that Watkins 

stated a claim for First Amendment retaliation in Count 1 and 

4 At times, Watkins seems to contend that Sullivan’s statement to him before 

the officer arrived constituted a trespass warning. At other times, Watkins 

asserts that Sullivan issued a trespass warning in the officer’s presence. These 

distinctions are not material to our analysis. For purposes of this appeal, we 

accept that Sullivan caused the issuance of the trespass warning. 

USCA11 Case: 21-12396 Date Filed: 10/19/2022 Page: 4 of 13
21-12396 Opinion of the Court 5

allowed that claim to proceed. The district court, however, dismissed Count 2 as duplicative of Count 1. Count 3 was dismissed 

for failure to state a claim.5 

Following discovery, Sullivan moved for summary judgment on Count 1. The district court granted summary judgment 

in favor of Sullivan, concluding that Sullivan was entitled to qualified immunity. This appeal followed.

II. 

A. Dismissal of Count 2

On appeal, Watkins challenges the district court’s dismissal 

of Count 2 as duplicative of the First Amendment retaliation claim 

asserted in Count 1. Watkins contends that Count 2 asserted a “liberty interest/due process violation,” not a claim under the First 

Amendment. 

In Count 1 of his complaint, Watkins claimed that Sullivan 

violated his First Amendment rights and deprived Watkins of his 

right to patronize the park when Sullivan (because she did not like 

the song Watkins was singing) issued an indefinite trespass warning. In Count 2, Watkins asserted that Sullivan deprived him of his 

right to patronize the park “when she fabricated a false claim 

against [Watkins] . . . to hide the true reasons she was trespassing 

5 Watkins raises no challenge to the district court’s initial dismissal of Count 

3; that ruling is not before us on appeal.

USCA11 Case: 21-12396 Date Filed: 10/19/2022 Page: 5 of 13
6 Opinion of the Court 21-12396

[Watkins] from the park, which was because of the song [Watkins] 

was singing.”

The district court construed reasonably Count 2 as duplicative of the First Amendment retaliation claim asserted in Count 1. 

Although phrased slightly differently, both Counts 1 and 2 assert 

that Sullivan deprived Watkins of his right to patronize the park in 

retaliation for Watkins’s exercising his First Amendment right to 

free speech. The district court committed no error in dismissing 

Count 2 as impermissibly duplicative. Cf. St. Luke’s Cataract & 

Laser Inst., P.A. v. Sanderson, 573 F.3d 1186, 1203 (11th Cir. 2009) 

(recognizing that a plaintiff may recover only once for a single injury). 

B. Leave to Amend Count 3

We review a district court’s denial of a motion for leave to 

amend under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See Bryant v. 

Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001). 

Generally speaking, a pro se plaintiff must be given at least 

one chance to amend the complaint before dismissal. See Bank v. 

Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991), overruled in part by Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th 

Cir. 2002) (en banc) (holding that this rule does not apply to counseled plaintiffs). A district court need not grant leave to amend, 

however, if amendment would be futile. Id. Leave to amend is 

futile if the complaint, as it is proposed to be amended, would still 

USCA11 Case: 21-12396 Date Filed: 10/19/2022 Page: 6 of 13
21-12396 Opinion of the Court 7

be subject to dismissal. See L.S. ex rel. Hernandez v. Peterson, 982 

F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2020).

In its order granting in part Sullivan’s motion to dismiss, the 

district court dismissed Count 3 of Watkins’s initial complaint. The 

district court determined that Watkins failed to identify a constitutionally inadequate process. Instead, Watkins alleged only that Sullivan never informed Watkins about the process for challenging the 

trespass warning: conduct that did not render inadequate the underlying process itself. The district court also concluded that Watkins failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Sullivan -- a “parklevel employee” -- had authority to promulgate and enact procedures or ordinances for challenging the trespass warning. 

Watkins later moved for leave to amend his complaint, and 

he submitted a proposed amended complaint. Watkins’s proposed 

amended complaint was nearly identical to his initial complaint except for two details: (a) Watkins asserted the due-process claim in 

Count 3 against Sullivan in her official capacity, and (b) Watkins 

alleged that Sullivan was the park’s “Supervisor/Manager.” The 

district court denied leave to amend, concluding that the proposed 

amendment added nothing new and reasserted arguments already 

addressed by the district court. 

The district court abused no discretion in denying Watkins 

leave to amend his complaint. Watkins’s proposed amendment 

failed to cure the defects already identified by the district court 

when the district court dismissed Count 3. Watkins neither 

pointed to a constitutionally inadequate process nor alleged facts 

USCA11 Case: 21-12396 Date Filed: 10/19/2022 Page: 7 of 13
8 Opinion of the Court 21-12396

sufficient to demonstrate that Sullivan had the requisite final policymaking authority to trigger municipal liability. See Cooper v. 

Dillon, 403 F.3d 1208, 1221 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Only those officials 

who have final policymaking authority may render the municipality liable under § 1983.”). 

Because Count 3 in Watkins’s proposed amended complaint 

was still subject to dismissal, amendment would have been futile. 

The district court acted within its discretion to deny Watkins leave 

to amend. 

C. Summary Judgment

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing the evidence and all reasonable factual inferences in 

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Skop v. City of 

Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1136 (11th Cir. 2007). Summary judgment 

is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

“Qualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials sued in their individual capacities if their conduct 

‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Vinyard 

v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002). To avoid summary 

judgment based on qualified immunity, the plaintiff carries the burden and must show both that the government official violated a 

USCA11 Case: 21-12396 Date Filed: 10/19/2022 Page: 8 of 13
21-12396 Opinion of the Court 9

federal right and that -- given the circumstances -- the right was already clearly established when the official acted. See id. The doctrine of qualified immunity, when applied properly, “protects ‘all 

but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the 

law.’” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011).

To establish a claim for retaliation under the First Amendment, a plaintiff must show three things: (1) that he engaged in constitutionally-protected speech; (2) that he “suffered adverse conduct that would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in such speech;” and (3) a causal connection between his 

protected speech and the adverse conduct. Brannon v. Finkelstein, 

754 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2014). For purposes of this appeal, 

we accept that Watkins’s singing constituted protected speech and 

accept that the complained-of trespass warning was a sufficiently 

adverse act. This appeal focuses only on whether a sufficient causal 

relationship existed between the trespass warning and Watkins’s 

singing. 

When causation is contested, a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity “[w]here the facts assumed for summary judgment 

purposes . . . show mixed motives (lawful and unlawful motivations) and pre-existing law does not dictate that the merits of the 

case must be decided in plaintiff’s favor.” Foy v. Holston, 94 F.3d 

1528, 1535 (11th Cir. 1996) (emphasis in original).

Watkins has presented evidence that Sullivan had him trespassed-warned because she disliked the lyrics of the song he was 

singing: an unlawful reason. In Watkins’s declaration made under 

USCA11 Case: 21-12396 Date Filed: 10/19/2022 Page: 9 of 13
10 Opinion of the Court 21-12396

penalty of perjury, he stated that Sullivan told him expressly that 

she disliked the song and that she wanted him to leave the park 

because of the song. 

Sullivan, however, has offered evidence of an alternative 

lawful basis for having Watkins trespass-warned. In Sullivan’s 

sworn affidavit, Sullivan stated that she observed Watkins turning 

on the pavilion’s water pipe using his own pair of pliers and observed Watkins plugging a cooking device into the pavilion’s electrical outlet. Sullivan said Watkins had no permit or authorization 

to use the pavilion’s water and electrical resources. The pertinent 

police officer also stated in a sworn affidavit that Sullivan reported 

that Watkins had violated park rules by using the pavilion’s water 

and electricity. The officer attested that he issued a trespass warning based on Watkins’s unauthorized use of the pavilion, not based 

on Watkins’s singing. 

Watkins admits that he used the pavilion’s water and electrical facilities that morning but denies that Sullivan saw him do so. 

We have said that a plaintiff may create a genuine dispute of material fact based on uncorroborated, self-serving statements made in 

an affidavit. See United States v. Stein, 881 F.3d 853, 858-59 (11th 

Cir. 2018) (en banc). Such statements, however, must be based on 

personal knowledge. See id.; Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275, 

1278-79 (11th Cir. 2002) (explaining that, to raise a genuine issue of 

material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment, an affidavit 

must be made on personal knowledge). Here, Watkins had no (in 

reality, can have no) personal knowledge about what Sullivan did 

USCA11 Case: 21-12396 Date Filed: 10/19/2022 Page: 10 of 13
21-12396 Opinion of the Court 11

or did not see on the pertinent day. Nor has Watkins sworn to 

objective facts that seem inconsistent with Sullivan’s sworn statement that she observed Watkins using the pavilion’s utilities. Particularly given Watkins’s admitted use of the pavilion’s water and 

electricity -- activities that happened out in the open – Watkins’s 

own statement that Sullivan never saw him using the pavilion’s water and electricity that morning cannot create a genuine dispute of 

fact or contest Sullivan’s sworn statement that she observed him 

doing so. 

Watkins also contends that he did not need a permit to use 

the pavilion’s water and electrical facilities. Watkins says he was 

told by park management in 2011 that “the pavilion and its facilities 

are open for free use by its patrons except for purposes of an event.” 

Watkins also contends that park management -- including Sullivan 

-- had a “custom and practice” of allowing patrons to use the pavilion’s electric and water utilities without a permit for non-event activities. For purposes of summary judgment, we must accept Watkins’s statements as true. 

Notwithstanding the park management’s custom of generally allowing non-event patrons to use the pavilion’s utilities without a permit, a reasonable park employee in Sullivan’s position 

could have concluded that Watkins’s specific conduct -- especially 

Watkins’s using a pair of personal pliers to turn on the pavilion’s 

water supply -- constituted an unauthorized use of the park’s facilities. Given the pertinent rules and regulations governing the use 

of Florida’s parks, a reasonable park employee in Sullivan’s place 

USCA11 Case: 21-12396 Date Filed: 10/19/2022 Page: 11 of 13
12 Opinion of the Court 21-12396

could have determined that Sullivan acted properly in response to 

Watkins’s specific conduct: properly even if Sullivan herself might 

also have been subjectively motivated in part by unlawful reasons. 

See Foy, 94 F.2d at 1536 (concluding that defendant child custody 

workers acted objectively reasonably for purposes of qualified immunity when, “given the circumstances and state of the law, a reasonable child custody worker could have considered Defendants’ 

conduct arguably proper even if Defendants were motivated in 

substantial part by unlawful motives”); see also FT. LAUDERDALE,

FLA.,CODE OF ORD. § 19-52 (2015) (making it “unlawful for any person to misuse any public property at the public picnic areas or to 

fail to comply with the regulations pertaining to such picnic areas”); Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., Parks & Recreation Rules & Regulations 

11.3 (providing that a person who is found violating the parks’ rules 

“shall be ordered to leave” the park “for a minimum 24-hour period.”). 

The record evidences that Sullivan’s efforts to have Watkins 

removed from the park were motivated at least in part by a lawful 

reason: Watkins’s unauthorized manner of use of the pavilion facilities. That Sullivan subjectively might also have been motivated 

in part by an unlawful reason (her dislike of Watkins’s singing) does 

not deprive her of qualified immunity. The law pre-existing this 

incident in 2015 did not clearly rule out a valid trespass warning for 

Watkins in the circumstances facing Sullivan. Given the circumstances presented in this case, Sullivan is entitled to qualified immunity. See Brannon, 754 F.3d at 1278-79 (concluding that 

USCA11 Case: 21-12396 Date Filed: 10/19/2022 Page: 12 of 13
21-12396 Opinion of the Court 13

defendant was entitled to qualified immunity on a claim for First 

Amendment retaliation because there existed evidence of both lawful and unlawful motivations for defendant’s conduct and because 

pre-existing law did not dictate that the merits of the case be decided in plaintiff’s favor); Foy, 94 F.3d at 1536. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment. 

AFFIRMED.

USCA11 Case: 21-12396 Date Filed: 10/19/2022 Page: 13 of 13