J-S06024-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DARREN EADES

Appellant No. 3544 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order November 2, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-1107731-1995

BEFORE: MOULTON, J., RANSOM, J., and FITZGERALD J.*

MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.: Filed May 19, 2017

Appellant, Darren Eades, appeals from the order entered November 2, 

2015, denying his petition for habeas corpus ad subjiciendum relief filed 

under 42 Pa.C.S. § 6503(a), following a trial resulting in his conviction for 

first-degree murder, robbery, burglary, and possession of an instrument of 

crime.1 We affirm. 

On September 24, 1996, a jury convicted Appellant of the above 

enumerated crimes in connection with his attack on a ninety-three year old 

woman. On September 25, 1996, he received a sentence of life 

imprisonment for murder. On January 14, 1997, Appellant was sentenced to 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a), 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502, and 18 

Pa.C.S. § 907, respectively. 
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an additional aggregate sentence of twenty to forty years on the remaining 

charges. On May 19, 1998, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence. See Commonwealth v. Eades, 718 A.2d 856 (Pa. Super. 1998) 

(unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 736 A.2d 602 (1999) 

(unpublished memorandum). 

Appellant timely filed his first petition under the Post Conviction Relief 

Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546, in January 2000; the petition was 

ultimately denied. This Court affirmed denial of Appellant’s petition on 

August 20, 2001. See Commonwealth v. Eades, 785 A.2d 1026 (Pa. 

Super. 2001) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 568 Pa. 679 

(2002). Appellant filed two subsequent petitions seeking PCRA relief, both 

of which were dismissed, and the dismissals affirmed on appeal. See

Commonwealth v. Eades, 984 A.2d 1010 (Pa. Super. 2009) (unpublished 

memorandum); see also Commonwealth v. Eades, 31 A.3d 760 (Pa. 

Super. 2011) (unpublished memorandum). 

On March 7, 2012, Appellant submitted a request to the Department of 

Corrections (DOC) for a copy of his sentencing order pursuant to the 

Pennsylvania Right-to-Know Law (RTKL). See 65 P.S. §§ 67.101-67.3104. 

On April 12, 2012, Appellant’s request was denied, as the DOC did not 

possess a copy of the sentencing order. 

In July and October 2013, Appellant filed two petitions for writ of 

habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, asserting that DOC was without legal 

authority to detain him. Following a procedural delay, Appellant sought 
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mandamus relief from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which directed the 

lower court to address his petitions. See Eades v. Philadelphia Common 

Pleas Courts, 123 A.3d 775 (Pa. 2015). Upon review, in November 2015, 

the court denied Appellant habeas corpus relief.2

Appellant timely filed the instant appeal and a contemporaneous rule 

1925(b) statement of matters complained of on appeal. Herein, Appellant 

presents three issues for our review: 

1. Whether the court erred in dismissing Appellant’s Writ of 

Habeas Corpus Ad Subjiciendum without an evidentiary hearing.

2. Whether the court misapplied Joseph v. Glunt and 

misinterpreted § 9764(a)(8). 

3. Whether the court erred by not issuing an order to show 

cause as to why Appellant’s Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad 

Subjiciendum should not be granted. 

Appellant’s Brief at 4. 

We will first address Appellant’s second claim for ease of analysis. 

Appellant contends that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief.3 Our standard 

of review is as follows:

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2

To the extent Appellant asserted his sentence was illegal, the court denied 

PCRA relief. Memorandum Opinion 4/4/16, at 4. Appellant does not pursue 

a claim in this regard on appeal.

3

Post conviction relief implicating the legality of a sentence is typically 

governed by the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542. However, this Court has 

previously determined that where a petitioner challenges the legality of his 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Our standard of review of a trial court’s order denying a petition 

for writ of habeas corpus is limited to abuse of discretion. Thus, 

we may reverse the court’s order where the court has misapplied 

the law or exercised its discretion in a manner lacking reason. As 

in all matters on appeal, the appellant bears the burden of 

persuasion to demonstrate his entitlement to the relief he 

requests.

Rivera v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 837 A.2d 525, 528 (Pa. Super. 2003) 

(citations omitted). 

According to Appellant, the DOC lacks authority to confine him unless 

it possesses a written sentencing order. Appellant’s Brief at 5-6. As DOC 

has acknowledged it does not possess a sentencing order, according to 

Appellant, his confinement is unlawful. Appellant’s Brief at 7, 21. 

Appellant cites in support 42 Pa.C.S. § 9764(a)(8), which provides:

§ 9764. Information required upon commitment and 

subsequent disposition

(a) General rule. -- Upon commitment of an inmate to 

the custody of the Department of Corrections, the sheriff 

or transporting official shall provide to the institution's 

records officer or duty officer, in addition to a copy of the 

court commitment form DC–300B generated from the 

Common Pleas Criminal Court Case Management System 

of the unified judicial system, the following information:

* * *

(8) A copy of the sentencing order and any detainers filed 

against the inmate which the county has notice.

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

confinement, the claim properly sounds in habeas corpus. See Joseph v. 

Glunt, 96 A.3d 365, 368 (Pa. Super. 2014).
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42 Pa.C.S. § 9764(a)(8); see Appellant’s Brief at 8; see also 37 Pa. Code § 

91.3 (providing that DOC will confine persons in accordance with Section 

9764).4

As noted by the trial court, the issue raised by Appellant is controlled 

by this Court’s decision in Joseph v. Glunt, 96 A.3d 365, 268 (Pa. Super. 

2014). Similarly, in that case, a petitioner sought habeas corpus relief 

based upon an alleged violation of Section 9467. Joseph, 96 A.3d at 369-

70. As we observed therein: 

The language and structure of section 9764, viewed in context, 

make clear that the statute pertains not to the DOC's authority 

to detain a duly-sentenced prisoner, but, rather, sets forth the 

procedures and prerogatives associated with the transfer of an 

inmate from county to state detention. None of the provisions of 

section 9764 indicate an affirmative obligation on the part of the 

DOC to maintain and produce the documents enumerated in 

subsection 9764(a) upon the request of the incarcerated person. 

Moreover, section 9764 neither expressly vests, nor 

implies the vestiture, in a prisoner of any remedy for 

deviation from the procedures prescribed within.

Joseph, 96 A.3d at 371 (emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted).

Therefore, Appellant’s reliance upon Section 9764 is misplaced, as it 

does not provide a remedy to incarcerated persons. Id. Accordingly, no 

habeas corpus relief is due. 

____________________________________________

4 To the extent Appellant attempts to argue that 42 Pa.C.S. § 9764 is itself 

unconstitutional or that the habeas court erred in failing to provide a 

statutory construction analysis, we note that Appellant did not raise this 

argument in the lower court. Thus, Appellant has waived this argument on 

appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 302.
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Nevertheless, we further note the following. Here, the lower court 

reviewed the record and confirmed that a copy of the actual sentencing 

order was contained within the quarter session file and certified record. 

Memorandum Opinion, 4/14/16, at 5-6. Appellant’s sentences were also 

outlined in the notes of testimony of the sentencing hearings and accurately 

docketed by the clerk of courts. See Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 9/25/96, at 

93-95; see also N.T., 1/14/97, at 1-9. Thus, the DOC has sufficient 

authority to maintain Appellant’s detention even without possession of a 

written sentencing order. See Joseph, 96 A.3d at 372. 

Finally, Appellant’s remaining arguments, alleging that the court erred 

in failing to hold a hearing and issue a rule to show cause as to why his writ 

should not be granted, are without merit. A rule to show cause and hearing 

are not required where Appellant’s allegations are fully refuted by the record 

of the trial court or where Appellant’s petition does not make out a prima 

facie case for allowing the writ. See Commonwealth ex rel. Rogers v. 

Claudy, 90 A.2d 382 (Pa. Super. 1952); see also Commonwealth ex rel. 

De Poe v. Ashe, 74 A.2d 767 (Pa. Super. 1950). Therefore, Appellant’s 

arguments have no merit based on our conclusion above.

Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion and conclude that the 

trial court correctly denied Appellant’s petition for habeas corpus relief. 

Order affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/19/2017