COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Bray and Bumgardner 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

FELICIA MAE SHEARIN 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1942-97-1 JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III 

 OCTOBER 6, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 

Everett A. Martin, Jr., Judge 

 David H. Moyer (Bashara & Hubbard, on brief), 

for appellant. 

 Linwood T. Wells, Jr., Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Felicia Mae Shearin was convicted of unauthorized use of a 

motor vehicle. On appeal she argues that the evidence was 

insufficient to prove that she intended to deprive temporarily 

the owner of possession of the vehicle. Finding that the 

evidence was sufficient, we affirm. 

 The owner's husband borrowed the vehicle and went out 

drinking beer with a friend on October 8, 1996. Later in the 

evening he lent it to two acquaintances of his friend. When they 

did not return the vehicle as promised, he reported the vehicle 

stolen. Later he told the police the truth that the vehicle had 

been lent and not stolen. Meanwhile, on October 11, 1996, a 

Norfolk police officer recognized the car at a school parking 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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lot. 

 The passenger in the vehicle told the officer that the 

defendant was the driver and gave him her description. Just then 

the officer saw the defendant, who fit the description, walking 

toward the car from the school. On seeing the officer, she 

stopped, turned and started walking at a fast pace back to the 

school. A backup officer, who had arrived, ordered the defendant 

to come back, but she did not respond. He stopped her in the 

school building. The defendant first denied having any 

identification, but the officer retrieved her identification from 

her pocket. 

 After being advised of her rights, the defendant gave a 

confusing and vague story of how she got the car. She said that 

she had just obtained the car fifteen minutes earlier from a man 

whose name she did not know. Later she said his name was Desmond 

and described him. Then she maintained that she had known 

Desmond about two months and that he had rented the car and had 

permission to use it until the next day. The defendant professed 

that she did not know the car was stolen. 

 Where an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the Commonwealth, granting it all reasonable inferences fairly 

deducible from it. See Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 

349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). We may not disturb a 

verdict unless it is "plainly wrong or without evidence to 
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support it." Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 145, 314 

S.E.2d 371, 385, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873 (1984). 

 The Commonwealth has the burden of proving that the 

defendant used the owner's vehicle, that the owner did not 

consent to the use, and that the defendant intended to keep the 

property temporarily from the owner. See Code § 18.2-102; Reese 

v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 172, 174, 335 S.E.2d 266, 267 (1985); 

Blanks v. Gordon, 202 Va. 295, 298, 117 S.E.2d 82, 84-85 (1960). 

 Unauthorized use of a vehicle is a lesser-included offense of 

larceny. See Overstreet v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 234, 236, 

435 S.E.2d 906, 908 (1993). 

 The only issue in this case is whether the Commonwealth 

proved that the defendant intended to keep the property 

temporarily from the owner. The defendant was found in recent, 

exclusive possession of the stolen vehicle. The inference of 

recent possession of stolen goods arises from proof of those two 

facts. This inference permits the trier of fact to find that the 

person found in possession was the thief of those goods. The 

inference is sufficient to convict unless other evidence or a 

credible explanation refutes it. The evidence shows that the 

defendant was not the thief. She was not one of the bailees who 

obtained the vehicle from the owner's husband and then failed to 

return it as promised. See Overstreet, 17 Va. App. at 237-38, 

435 S.E.2d at 908-09. However, recent possession of stolen goods 

gives rise to a related inference. 
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 When the Commonwealth charges someone with receiving stolen 

property, it must prove that the person in possession knew that 

the goods were stolen. The trier of fact may infer that the 

person found in possession of recently stolen goods knew that the 

goods were stolen and that they were received with a dishonest 

intent. See Reaves v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 443, 451, 65 S.E.2d 

559, 564 (1951). 

 The inference of guilty knowledge that arises would prove 

the intent necessary to establish the crime of unauthorized use. 

 The crime of receiving stolen property requires possession with 

knowledge the property is stolen. The crime of unauthorized use 

requires use with the intent to keep the property temporarily 

from the owner. The act of possession necessary for the one 

would embody the act of use necessary in the other. Using a 

vehicle must mean that the person possessed the vehicle during 

use. If the defendant used the vehicle, she possessed the 

vehicle. The defendant used the vehicle, so she had to possess 

it while she used it. 

 The inference permits a finding that the defendant possessed 

the car with knowledge that it was stolen. Possessing stolen 

property while knowing it is stolen must include the concept of 

keeping that item from the owner during the period it is 

possessed. Possessing with guilty knowledge established that the 

defendant was keeping the car from the owner. 

 In this case, the inference that arises from the defendant's 
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possession of the recently stolen car is sufficient evidence of 

the intent element of this crime. The trier of fact may find 

that the element is proven unless the recent possession is 

explained. Other evidence or testimony by the defendant may 

supply the explanation. Here no evidence refutes the inference 

of guilty knowledge. The trial judge found that the defendant's 

explanations given to the police were incredible. She offered 

nothing at trial to explain or clarify her statements at the 

scene. Once the Commonwealth proves recent possession of stolen 

property, it falls to the defendant to explain her possession. 

If she fails to do so, the trier of fact may accept the inference 

as proof of the fact. See Roberts v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 264, 

271-72, 337 S.E.2d 255, 260 (1985). 

 The defendant's actions and statements at the scene 

permitted two additional inferences that support a finding of 

guilt. The defendant turned and tried to elude the police when 

she saw them at the vehicle. She ignored their calls to return, 

and when finally stopped, she stated falsely that she had no 

identification. The trier of fact may reasonably interpret these 

actions as flight, and an inference of guilt may arise from that 

finding. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 370, 374, 157 S.E.2d 

907, 910 (1967). 

 The defendant gave conflicting and inherently incredible 

explanations to the police. At first, she had just obtained the 

vehicle from someone she did not know. Then she gave his first 
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name, and finally she volunteered some detail of her relation to 

him. The trier of fact may reasonably view as false these 

statements along with the false statements about her own identity 

and may draw an inference of guilt from them. See Black v. 

Commonwealth, 222 Va. 838, 842, 284 S.E.2d 608, 610 (1981). 

 The actions and statements of the defendant while she was in 

possession of the recently stolen vehicle are circumstantial 

evidence that she possessed the car with the intent to keep it 

temporarily from the owner. Though circumstantial evidence of 

guilt, it is evidence that is legally sufficient to sustain a 

conviction. The inferences are reasonable, and no hypothesis of 

innocence arises from the facts as found by the trial judge. 

Accordingly, we affirm the conviction. 

 Affirmed.