NUREG/CR-6864, Vol. 2

 SAND2004-5901 

Identification and Analysis of

Factors Affecting Emergency

Evacuations

Appendices

Sandia National Laboratories

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response 

Washington, DC 20555-0001
 

 NUREG/CR-6864, Vol. 2

 SAND2004-5901

Identification and Analysis of

Factors Affecting Emergency

Evacuations

Appendices

Manuscript Completed: December 2004

Date Published: January 2005

Prepared by

L.J. Dotson, J. Jones 

Sandia National Laboratories

P.O. Box 5800

Albuquerque, NM 87185

D. Schneck, NRC Project Manager

R. Sullivan, NRC Technical Lead

Prepared for

Division of Preparedness and Response

Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555-0001

NRC Job Code J3056
NUREG/CR-6864, Vol. 2 

SAND2004-5901

Identification and Analysis of Factors

Affecting Emergency Evacuations 

Volume II: Appendices

Manuscript Completed: December 2004

Date Published: January 2005

Prepared by

Lori Dotson and Joe Jones

Sandia National Laboratories

Albuquerque, NM 87185

Operated by

Sandia Corporation

for the U.S. Department of Energy

Prepared for

NRC Project Manager: Debra Schneck

NRC Technical Lead: Randolph Sullivan

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Division of Preparedness and Response

Washington, DC 20555-0001

NRC Job Code J3056
ii
iii

ABSTRACT

Volume II contains the data and information that support Volume I. Appendix A contains a

detailed listing of the 230 evacuations that comprise the universe of evacuations. Appendix B

contains the evacuation form used to collect data for each of the 50 cases studied. Appendix C

contains the results of the frequency analysis. The remaining appendices contain the SAS 8.02

output for the regression analyses (Appendices F through K) and the correlation analyses

(Appendix L). 
iv
v

CONTENTS

Page

VOLUME I

ABSTRACT ................................................................. iii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................... ix

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...................................................... xi

ACRONYMS ............................................................... xiii

1.0 INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 1

1.1 Objective ........................................................... 1

1.2 Purpose ............................................................ 1

1.3 Scope.............................................................. 1

2.0 BACKGROUND ........................................................ 3

2.1 Previous Studies ..................................................... 3

2.2 Information Sources .................................................. 5

2.3 Data Collection ...................................................... 6

3.0 METHODS ............................................................ 7

3.1 Development of Evacuation Universe .................................... 7

3.2 Case Study Selection ................................................. 7

3.3 Evacuation Efficiency ................................................ 10

3.4 Regression Analysis ................................................. 11

3.5 Correlation Analysis ................................................. 12

4.0 ANALYSIS ........................................................... 13

4.1 Statistical Summary of Evacuation Universe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

4.2 Case Study Analysis ................................................. 16

4.3 Regression Analysis ................................................. 22

4.4 Correlation Analysis ................................................. 31

4.5 Discussion of Results of Statistical Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

.............................................................

5.0 CONCLUSIONS ....................................................... 37

6.0 REFERENCES ........................................................ 41
vi

VOLUME II

Appendices

ABSTRACT ................................................................. iii

A. Evacuation Universe .................................................. A-1

B. Evacuation Form ...................................................... B-1

C. Statistical Summary Case Studies ......................................... C-1

D. Case Studies ......................................................... D-1

E. Evacuation Frequency Analysis ........................................... E-1

F. Chi-Square Values for Likelihood Ratio Test of Association Between 

Each Variable and Evacuation Efficiency Score . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F-1

G. Cross Tabulations with Evacuation Efficiency Score for Significantly

Associated Variables .................................................. G-1

H. P-values for Tests of Each Variable's Association with Hazard-Type Categorical

Variables Tested Using Fisher's Exact Test and Continuous Variables Tested

Using the Exact Median Test ............................................ H-1

I. Chi-Square Values for Likelihood Ratio Tests of Association Between Each

Variable and Evacuation Efficiency Score After Adjusting for Hazard Type . . . . . . . . I-1

J. P-values for Tests of Association with Evacuation Efficiency Score for

Variables with Significant or Marginally Significant Associations with

Evacuation Efficiency Score ............................................. J-1

K. Cross Tabulations for Variables with Significant Interactions with Hazard 

Type Broken Down by Hazard Type ...................................... K-1

L. Cross Tabulations for Variables in the Correlation Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L-1

Figures

Figure 4-1. Size Distribution of Large-Scale Evacuations in the United States, 

1/1/1990 - 6/30/2003................................................. 14

Figure 4-2. Principal Causes of Large-Scale Evacuations in the United States 

1/1/1990 - 6/30/2003................................................. 14

Figure 4-3. Total Number and Type of Large-Scale Evacuations in the United States,

1/1/1990–6/30/2003 ................................................. 16

Figure 4-4. Distribution of Large-Scale Evacuations in the U.S. Since 1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Tables

Table 3-1. Weights and Ratings Used to Rank the 230 Evacuation Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Table 3-2. Distribution of Evacuation Cases ....................................... 10
vii

Table 4-1. Elapsed Time Between Start of the Hazard 

and the Decision to Evacuate (Hours) .................................... 24

Table 4-2. Frequency of Spontaneous Early Evacuations by Hazard Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Table 4-3. Time to Complete the Evacuation (Hours) by Hazard Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Table 4-4. Evacuation Area (km ) by Hazard Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

31

Table 4-5. Correlations and Associations with Law Enforcement Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Table 4-6. Correlations and Associations with Warning and Subsequent Citizen 

Action Issues ....................................................... 32

Table 4-7. Correlations and Associations with Traffic Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Table 4-8. Correlations and Associations with Emergency Communication Issues . . . . . . . . . . 33

Table 4-9. Correlations and Associations with the Decision-Making Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
viii
A-1

APPENDIX A

EVACUATION UNIVERSE
A-2
A-3

CONTENTS

Table A-1. Comprehensive List of Evacuation Incidents, January 1, 1990, through 

June 30, 2003. ................................................... A-5
A-4
Table A-1. Comprehensive List of Evacuation Incidents, January 1, 1990, through June 30, 2003.

Total

Ranking Date Event Name Identifier Category Specific Type City/County State # Evacuated Rank Value

1 September-99 Hurricane

Floyd

88B Natural

Disaster

Hurricane South to

Broward

FL 373,144 78

2 September-99 Hurricane

Floyd

88A Natural

Disaster

Hurricane Miami-Dade FL 270,403 78

3 November-01 Atlanta Airport 201 Malevolent

Act

Malevolent

Act

Atlanta GA 10,000 76

4 July-01 ATOFINA

Chemicals

Tank Car

Failure

28 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat

Incident

Riverview MI 6,000 76

5 September-01 Kennedy

Space Center

183 Malevolent

Act

Malevolent

Act

Kennedy

Space

Center

FL 12,000 73

6 August-92 Hurricane

Andrew

80 Natural

Disaster

Hurricane Miami-Dade

Co.

FL 650,000 71

7 September-99 Hurricane

Floyd

88C Natural

Disaster

Hurricane Central Florida FL 665,969 67

8 August-99 Hurricane

Dennis

208 Natural

Disaster

Hurricane Rodathe NC 22,000 67

9 September-98 Hurricane

Georges

202 Natural

Disaster

Hurricane Orleans and

Jefferson

Parishes

LA 1,500,000 67

10 September-98 Hurricane

Georges

150 Natural

Disaster

Hurricane Multiple

Counties

FL 63,000 67

11 September-99 Hurricane

Floyd

88D Natural

Disaster

Hurricane Northern

Florida

FL 451,676 67

12 August-98 Hurricane

Bonnie

85 Natural

Disaster

Hurricane Multiple

Counties

NC, SC 200,000-

500,000

67

13 July-98 Ormond

Beach Fire

200 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Ormond

Beach

FL 35,000 67
Table A-1. Comprehensive List of Evacuation Incidents, January 1, 1990, through June 30, 2003.

Total

Ranking Date Event Name Identifier Category Specific Type City/County State # Evacuated Rank Value

14 July-98 Mims Fire 146 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Mims FL 16,000 67

15 July-96 Centennial

Olympic

Park

124 Malevolent

Act

Malevolent

Act

Atlanta GA 60,000 64

16 September-01 General

Motors Corp.

185 Malevolent

Act

Malevolent

Act

Detroit MI 6,000 64

17 September-01 World Trade

Center

126 Malevolent

Act

Malevolent

Act

Lower

Manhattan

NY 300,000 64

18 July-01 CSX Train

Derailment

and Fire

96 Technological

Hazard

Railroad

Accident

Baltimore MD 10,000 64

19 September-02 American

Storage and

Warehouse

Company

74 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat

Incident

Charlotte NC 1,000 64

20 May-03 Brandon

Pipeline

Rupture

235 Technological

Hazard

Pipeline

Rupture

Brandon FL 2,000 62

21 September-98 Tropical Storm

Frances

199 Natural

Disaster

Tropical Storm Corpus Christi TX 6,000 62

22 May-95 New Orleans

Flood

175 Natural

Disaster

Flood New Orleans LA 50,000 62

23 September-96 Hurricane

Fran

84 Natural

Disaster

Hurricane NC 500,000+ 62

24 May-00 New Iberia

Transportation

Accident

61 Technological

Hazard

Transportation

Accident

New Iberia LA 2,000 62

25 March-01 Choctaw Maid

Farm Poultry

Plant

4 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat

Incident

Forest MS 2,000 62
Table A-1. Comprehensive List of Evacuation Incidents, January 1, 1990, through June 30, 2003.

Total

Ranking Date Event Name Identifier Category Specific Type City/County State # Evacuated Rank Value

26 May-00 Union Pacific

Railroad

30 Technological

Hazard

Railroad

Accident

Eunice LA 2,000- 3,500 62

27 February-03 Mathis Farm

Supply Store

75 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat

Incident

Slocomb AL 3,500 62

28 October-95 Gaylord Tank

Car Failure

18 Technological

Hazard

Railroad

Accident

Bogalusa LA 3,000 62

29 August-00 Hurricane

Debbie

151 Natural

Disaster

Hurricane Multiple

Counties

FL >10,000 60

30 1995 Hurricane

Opal

149 Natural

Disaster

Hurricane Multiple

Counties

FL >100,000 60

31 August-95 Hurricane

Felix

82 Natural

Disaster

Hurricane Multiple

Counties

AL, FL 100,000 60

32 July-99 Proctor &

Gamble

Factory

25 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat

Incident

Iowa City IA 5,000 60

33 August-00 Truck

Accident

27 Technological

Hazard

Transportation

Accident

Hugo OK 2,000- 2,500 60

34 June-02 Deadwood

Fire

213 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Deadwood SD 15,000 58

35 May-00 Cerro Grande

Fire

209 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire White Rock NM 7,000 58

36 May-00 Cerro Grande

Fire

107 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Los Alamos NM 12,000 58

37 October-02 Hurricane Lili 230 Natural

Disaster

Hurricane Southern

Louisiana

LA >5,000 58

38 January-98 Cargill

Chemical

Plant

166 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat

Incident

Maysville KY 2,500 58
Table A-1. Comprehensive List of Evacuation Incidents, January 1, 1990, through June 30, 2003.

Total

Ranking Date Event Name Identifier Category Specific Type City/County State # Evacuated Rank Value

39 June-93 Great Flood of

1993

5 Natural

Disaster

Flood Mississippi

River

MN, WI, IA, IL,

MO, SD, ND, 

NE, KS

31,000-

85,000

58

40 June-02 Hayman Blaze 119 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Douglas CO 5,500 56

41 July-97 Flora

Transportation

Accident

198 Technological

Hazard

Transportation

Accident

Flora MS 6,000 56

42 September-02 Tropical Storm

Fay

229 Natural

Disaster

Flood Brazoria

County

TX >5,000 53

43 June-01 Tropical Storm

Allison

162 Natural

Disaster

Flood Gulf Coast TX 30,000 53

44 July-1998 Flagler

Wildfire

99 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Flagler County FL 45,000 53

45 October-99 Hurricane

Irene

238 Natural

Disaster

Hurricane Wilmington NC >5,000 53

46 October-02 Hurricane Lili 156 Natural

Disaster

Hurricane Jefferson and

Orange

Counties

TX 330,000 53

47 October-99 Hurricane

Irene

89 Natural

Disaster

Hurricane Unknown FL >5,000 53

48 February-01 Purdue

University

Campus

240 Technological

Hazard

Pipeline

Rupture

West

Lafayette

IN 3,000 51

49 July-02 LAX Airport 214 Malevolent

Act

Malevolent

Act

Los Angeles CA >1,000 51

50 September-01 Space and

Naval

Warfare

Systems

Center

184 Malevolent

Act

Malevolent

Act

Goose Creek SC 1,700 51
Table A-1. Comprehensive List of Evacuation Incidents, January 1, 1990, through June 30, 2003.

Total

Ranking Date Event Name Identifier Category Specific Type City/County State # Evacuated Rank Value

51 March-98 Alabama

Flood

170 Natural

Disaster

Flood Elba AL 18,000 51

52 February-03 Chemical

Plant

Ammonia

Leak

153 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat

Incident

Gulfport MS ~1,000 51

53 February-93 World Trade

Center

Bombing

122 Malevolent

Act

Malevolent

Act

New York City NY 150,000 51

54 December-00 Railcar Fire 97 Technological

Hazard

Railroad

Accident

Oshkosh WI 2,300 51

55 September-02 Norfolk

Southern

Railway

Derailment

73 Technological

Hazard

Railroad

Accident

Farragut TN 3,000 51

56 May-02 Grand Trunk

Derailment

70 Technological

Hazard

Railroad

Accident

Potterville MI 2,200 51

57

March-00 Railcar Leak 58 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat

Incident

Sterling

Heights

MI 2,400 51

58 October-01 LSU Anthrax

Hoax

1 Malevolent

Act

Malevolent

Act

Alexandria LA 2,000 51

59 March-94 Prichard Train

Derailment

95 Technological

Hazard

Railroad

Accident

Prichard AL 2,000 49

60 January-02 San Francisco

Airport

216 Malevolent

Act

Malevolent

Act

San Francisco CA >1,000 49

61 July-01 West Virginia

Flood

161 Natural

Disaster

Flood Wyoming

County

WV 6,000 49

62 September-02 Tropical Storm

Isidore

157 Natural

Disaster

Flood Multiple

Counties

LA, MS 2,500

49
Table A-1. Comprehensive List of Evacuation Incidents, January 1, 1990, through June 30, 2003.

Total

Ranking Date Event Name Identifier Category Specific Type City/County State # Evacuated Rank Value

63 July-94 Hinds Co.

Railroad

Accident

98 Technological

Hazard

Railroad

Accident

Hinds County MS 5,000 49

64 August-93 Hurricane

Emily

90 Natural

Disaster

Hurricane Dade County FL 250,000 49

65 August-99 Hurricane Bret 87 Natural

Disaster

Hurricane Kennedy

County

TX 100,000 49

66 July-96 Hurricane

Bertha

83 Natural

Disaster

Hurricane Multiple

Counties

NC 250,000+ 49

67 May-0

2

Twin City

Foods Plant

69 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat

Incident

Arlington WA 1,500 49

68 December-95 North

Attleboro

Pipeline

Rupture

19 Technological

Hazard

Pipeline

Rupture

North

Attleboro

MA 40,000 49

69 June-92 Burlington

Northern

Railroad

Derailment

16 Technological

Hazard

Railroad

Accident

Superior WI 40,000 49

70 April-94 Pesticide

Tanker Truck

Explosion

243 Technological

Hazard

Transportation

Accident

Balch Springs TX 5,000 47

71 November-94 Hurricane

Gordon

81 Natural

Disaster

Hurricane Citrus,

Franklin,

Hernando,

Levy and

Taylor

Counties

FL 300,000 47

72 October-01 Fish Plant

Ammonia

Leak

66 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat

Incident

Morro Bay CA 3,500 47
Table A-1. Comprehensive List of Evacuation Incidents, January 1, 1990, through June 30, 2003.

Total

Ranking Date Event Name Identifier Category Specific Type City/County State # Evacuated Rank Value

73 November-00 Burlington

Northern

Santa Fe

Derailment

26 Technological

Hazard

Railroad

Accident

Scottsbluff NE 5,000 47

74

November-98 Louisville

Cargo

Transfer

Accident

24 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat

Incident

Louisville KY 2,400 47

75 June-00 Hanford Fire 103 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Benton City WA 2,500 47

76 October-91 East Bay Hills

Fire

234 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Oakland CA 20,000-

30,000

44

77 August-92 Champion

Technologies

Inc.

245 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat

Incident

Odessa TX 27,000 44

78 September-98 Bossier City

Transportation

Accident

239 Technological

Hazard

Transportation

Accident

Bossier City LA ~2,000 44

79 January-95 California

Flood

177 Natural

Disaster

Flood Rio Linda CA 20,000 44

80 June-02 Roxborough

Village

Fire

140 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Roxborough

Village

CO 5,300 44

81 June-02 Show Low

Fire

131 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Show Low &

PinetopLakeside

AZ 11,000 44

82 May-98 Mason City 

Chemical Fire

79 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat

Incident

Mason City IA 3,600 44

83 December-97 Keystone

Cement

53 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat

Incident

Bath PA >1,600 44
Table A-1. Comprehensive List of Evacuation Incidents, January 1, 1990, through June 30, 2003.

Total

Ranking Date Event Name Identifier Category Specific Type City/County State # Evacuated Rank Value

84

November-97 Railroad

Accident

52 Technological

Hazard

Railroad

Accident

Appleton and

Grand Chute

WI 5,000 44

85 August-97 Paint Plant

Hazardous

Materials

Release

51 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat

Incident

Chicago IL 2,500 44

86 March-97 Port Allen

Transportation

Accident

48 Technological

Hazard

Transportation

Accident

Port Allen LA >1,300 44

87 May-91 Liquified

Chlorine Gas

Leak

36 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat

Incident

Henderson NV ~7,000 44

88 October-94 San Jacinto

River

10 Natural

Disaster

Flood Southeast

Texas

TX 10,000 44

89 June-93 Tropical Storm

Arlene

6 Natural

Disaster

Tropical Storm Hildalgo/Willac

y/ Starr

Counties

TX 2,000 44

90 October-98 Propane

Storage

Facility Fire

3 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat

Incident

Pascagoula MS >1,500 44

91 November-91 Shepherdsville

Railroad

Accident

92 Technological

Hazard

Railroad

Accident

Shepherdsville KY 1,000 42

92 June-02 RodeoChedeski Fire116 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Show Low AZ 20,000 42

93 May-96 Lansing

Pipeline

Rupture

242 Technological

Hazard

Pipeline

Rupture

Lansing MI 1,200 42

94 August-01 Chicago

Transportation

Accident

223 Technological

Hazard

Transportation

Accident

Chicago Il 1,500 42
Table A-1. Comprehensive List of Evacuation Incidents, January 1, 1990, through June 30, 2003.

Total

Ranking Date Event Name Identifier Category Specific Type City/County State # Evacuated Rank Value

95

July-02 Cibecue,

Arizona Fire

215 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Cibecue AZ 30,000 42

96 June-02 Payson Fire 212 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Payson AZ 30,000 42

97 July-99 Charles City

Flood

207 Natural

Disaster

Flood Charles City IA ~8,000 42

98 April-99 Port St. Lucie

Fire

204 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Port St. Lucie FL 1,000 42

99 March-98 Elba Flood 195 Natural

Disaster

Flood Elba AL 2,000 42

100 September-01 Internal

Revenue 

Service

186 Malevolent

Act

Malevolent

Act

Detroit MI 1,600 42

101 May-03 Detroit

Pipeline

Rupture

179 Technological

Hazard

Pipeline

Rupture

Detroit MI >1,000 42

102 June-98 Midwest

Floods

165 Natural

Disaster

Flood Midwest,

Eastern OH

Midwest,

Eastern OH

11,000 42

103 June-02 Missionary

Ridge Blaze

120 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Near Durango CO 7,500 42

104 August-99 Hurricane Bret 206 Natural

Disaster

Hurricane San Antonio TX 1,000 42

105 July-98 Campbell

Chemical Fire

77 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat

Incident

Campbell MO 3,000 42

106 September-00 St. Paul

Hazmat

Incident

64 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat

Incident

St. Paul MN 1,500 42

107 April-98 St. Louis

Transportation

Accident

2 Technological

Hazard

Transportation

Accident

St. Louis MO 2,500 42
Table A-1. Comprehensive List of Evacuation Incidents, January 1, 1990, through June 30, 2003.

Total

Ranking Date Event Name Identifier Category Specific Type City/County State # Evacuated Rank Value

108 May-03 Silver Lake

Dam

251 Technological

Hazard

Flood Marquette MI 1,750 40

109 April-01 Franklin

Pipeline

Rupture

241 Technological

Hazard

Pipeline

Rupture

Franklin IN 1,000 40

110 April-00 Everglades

Fire

219 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Miami-Dade FL 1,450 40

111 October-98 Guadalupe

River Flood

203 Natural

Disaster

Flood Cuero TX >1,000 40

112

July-97 Colorado

State

University

Campus

190 Natural

Disaster

Flood Fort Collins CO 5,000 40

113 June-02 Berkeley

Township Fire

180 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Berkeley

Township

NJ ~1,500 40

114 April-99 Columbine

High School

125 Malevolent

Act

Malevolent

Act

Littleton CO 2,085 40

115 February-03 CTA

Acoustics

76 Technological

Hazard

Unknown Corbin KY ~1,000 40

116 January-02 Danville

Transportation

Accident

68 Technological

Hazard

Transportation

Accident

Danville KY 1,000 40

117 April-00 Danville

Chemical Fire

60 Technological

Hazard

Railroad

Accident

Danville KY 1,000 40

118 April-00 Keyport

Incident

59 Technological

Hazard

Unknown Keyport NJ 1,200 40

119 August-99 Temple

Incident

57 Technological

Hazard

Unknown Temple TX 2,500 40

120

June-03 Lake Manatee

Dam

246 Natural

Disaster

Flood Bradenton FL 1,000 38
Table A-1. Comprehensive List of Evacuation Incidents, January 1, 1990, through June 30, 2003.

Total

Ranking Date Event Name Identifier Category Specific Type City/County State # Evacuated Rank Value

121

April-95 Oklahoma City

Bombing

123 Malevolent

Act

Malevolent

Act

Oklahoma City OK >1,000 38

122 September-02 Phoenix Fixed

Site Hazmat

72 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat

Incident

Phoenix AZ 1,000 38

123 March-96 Railroad

Accident

43 Technological

Hazard

Railroad

Accident

Weyeyauwega WI 1,700 38

124 April-90 C.S.S. &

S.B.RR

32 Technological

Hazard

Railroad

Accident

Michigan City IN 3,000 38

125 February-03 Tamaroa Train

Derailment

29 Technological

Hazard

Railroad

Accident

Tamaroa IL 1,000 38

126 September-93 Odessa Fixed

Site Hazmat

244 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat

Incident

Odessa TX 1,000 36

127 November-02 Veteran’s Day

Storms

218 Natural

Disaster

Tornadoes Multiple

Counties

AL, OH, TN,

MS, GA, PA,

WV

1,900 36

128 1990 Elba Flood 196 Natural

Disaster

Flood Elba AL 4,000 36

129 July-94 Tropical Storm

Alberto

192 Natural

Disaster

Flood Albany GA 20,000 36

130 April-97 Red River

Flood

172 Natural

Disaster

Flood Multiple

Counties

ND, MN 50,000+ 36

131 February-98 California

Floods

171 Natural

Disaster

Flood CA Coast and

Mexico

CA 3,500 36

132 April-01 Midwest

Floods

163 Natural

Disaster

Flood Multiple

Counties

WI, MN, 

IA, IL

4,400 36

133 March-02 Floods 160 Natural

Disaster

Flood Multiple

Counties

KY, TN, VA,

OH, AK, OK

2,000 36
Table A-1. Comprehensive List of Evacuation Incidents, January 1, 1990, through June 30, 2003.

Total

Ranking Date Event Name Identifier Category Specific Type City/County State # Evacuated Rank Value

134

October 02 Texas Floods 155 Natural

Disaster

Flood Laredo,

Brownsville

TX ~1,000 36

135 1994 Northridge

Earthquake

148 Natural

Disaster

Earthquake LA County CA 2,000 36

136 November-93 Jefferson

County

Railroad

Accident

93 Technological

Hazard

Railroad

Accident

Jefferson

County

KY 2,500 36

137 November-96 Lake

Cormorant

Transportation

Accident

46 Technological

Hazard

Transportation

Accident

Lake

Cormoront

MS 2,100 36

138 December-94 Terra

International

39 Technological

Hazard

Unknown Sergeant Bluff IA 2,000 36

139 June-91 USDA 37 Technological

Hazard

Unknown Phoenix AZ 2,000 36

140 October-98 Guadalupe

River Flood

11 Natural

Disaster

Flood 5

Southeastern

counties.

(Bexar, Travis,

etc.)

TX 2,000 36

141 May-00 Tulsa Flood 7 Natural

Disaster

Flood Multiple

Counties

MO, OK 1,200 36

142 July-02 Buscuit Fire 133 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Cave Junction OR 1,000 33

143 June-03 California

Wildfire

249 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Lebec CA 2,500 33

144 November-00 Bellemont

Railroad

Accident

236 Technological

Hazard

Railroad

Accident

Bellemont

(near

Flagstaff)

AZ 1,000 33

145 March-98 Flint River

Flood

191 Natural

Disaster

Flood Albany GA 5,000 33
Table A-1. Comprehensive List of Evacuation Incidents, January 1, 1990, through June 30, 2003.

Total

Ranking Date Event Name Identifier Category Specific Type City/County State # Evacuated Rank Value

146

June-02 Flenwood

Springs Fire

181 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Near Denver CO 4,000 33

147 March-95 California

Floods

176 Natural

Disaster

Flood Monterey, San

Luis, Obispo, 

Santa

Barbara, and

Santa Cruz

counties.

CA 10,000 33

148 February-02 Sterling

Hazmat

Incident

152 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat

Incident

Sterling KS ~1,000 33

149 June-00 Hanford Fire 105 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Horn Rapids WA >2,000 33

150 June-00 Hanford Fire 104 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire West Hanford WA >2,000 33

151 September-98 Hurricane Earl 86 Natural

Disaster

Tropical Storm Plaquemines

Parish

LA >1,000 33

152 April-97 E. St. Louis

Transportation

Accident

49 Technological

Hazard

Transportation

Accident

East Saint

Louis

IL 1,669 33

153

October-98

Kansas City

Floods

9 Natural

Disaster

Flood Kansas City MO 2,000 33

154 July-99 Central Iowa

Flash

Floods

8 Natural

Disaster

Flood Worth County

Floyd County

IA 1,500 33

155 September-02 Williams Fire

“Angel

National

Forest”

227 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Wrightwood CA 2,320 31

156 July-02 Mesa Verde

Park

Wildfire

226 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Mesa Verde

National Park

CO 2,000 31
Table A-1. Comprehensive List of Evacuation Incidents, January 1, 1990, through June 30, 2003.

Total

Ranking Date Event Name Identifier Category Specific Type City/County State # Evacuated Rank Value

157

June-02 Glenwood

Springs Fire

225 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Glenwood

Springs

CO 2,000 31

158 September-93 Midwest

Floods

178 Natural

Disaster

Flood US Midwest OK 2,500 31

159 July-02 Central Texas

Floods

158 Natural

Disaster

Flood Central Texas TX 4,000 31

160 June-98 Gainesville

Fire

139 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Gainesville FL >1,000 31

161 September-02 Glendora Fire,

San

Gabriel

Canyon

136 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire San Gabriel

Canyon

CA 2,000 31

162 July-02 Cache

Mountain Fire

134 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Black Butte

Ranch

OR 5,000 31

163 June-03 HeberOvergaard

Fire

132 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire HeberOvergaardAZ 2,700 31

164 May-02 Black

Mountain Fire

128 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Clear Creek CO 2,444 31

165 August-00 Blodgett

Trailhead Fire

127 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Bitterroot

Valley

MT 2,000 31

166 August-01 Weaverville

Mining Town

Fire

121 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Weaverville CA 3,550 31

167 June-02 Mogollon Rim 118 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Pinedale,

Linden & Clay

Springs

AZ 4,000 31

168 June-02 Million Fire 117 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire South Fork CO 3,000 31
Table A-1. Comprehensive List of Evacuation Incidents, January 1, 1990, through June 30, 2003.

Total

Ranking Date Event Name Identifier Category Specific Type City/County State # Evacuated Rank Value

169

June-99 Selinsgrove

Transportation

Accident

56 Technological

Hazard

Transportation

Accident

Selinsgrove PA 1,000 31

170 February-99 Dallas Fixed

Site Hazmat

55 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat

Incident

Dallas TX 1,000 31

171 December-97 Kansas City

Transportation

Accident

54 Technological

Hazard

Transportation

Accident

Kansas City KS 1,600 31

172 June-98 Carson City

Plant Accident

23 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat

Incident

Carson City CA 1,000 31

173 June-97 Lexington

Flood

232 Natural

Disaster

Flood Lexington MS 1,000 29

174 May-95 South Dakota

Flood

174 Natural

Disaster

Flood Black Hills

Area

SD 75,000 29

175 April-98 Tennessee

Flood

169 Natural

Disaster

Flood Davidson

County

TN 1,200 29

176 October-98 Banning Fire 135 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Banning CA 1,000 29

177 July-97 Rossville Train

Collision

21 Technological

Hazard

Railroad

Accident

Rossville KS 1,500 29

178 June-03 Tropical Storm

Bill

250 Natural

Disaster

Tropical Storm Gulf Coast Gulf Coast >1,000 27

179 January-96 Appelton

Railroad

Accident

231 Technological

Hazard

Railroad

Accident

Appleton WI >1,000 27

180 February-98 Notalia Fixed

Site Hazmat

193 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat

Incident

Natalia TX 1,400 27
Table A-1. Comprehensive List of Evacuation Incidents, January 1, 1990, through June 30, 2003.

Total

Ranking Date Event Name Identifier Category Specific Type City/County State # Evacuated Rank Value

181

May-90 Tipton County

Railroad

Accident

91 Technological

Hazard

Railroad

Accident

Tipton County TN 1,000 27

182 December-96 Lake Zurich

Transportation

Accident

47 Technological

Hazard

Transportation

Accident

Lake Zurich IL 1,500 27

183 August-95 DuPont Plant 40 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat

Incident

Wurtland KY 1,400 27

184 June--90 Alcolac Plant 34 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat

Incident

Sedalia MO 1,500 27

185 April-90 Lomac 33 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat

Incident

Muskegon MI 1,000 27

186 August-00 Flood 237 Natural

Disaster

Flood Sussex

County

NJ >1,000 24

187 February-01 Seattle

Earthquake

211 Natural

Disaster

Earthquake Seattle WA >1,000 24

188 May-95 Flood 173 Natural

Disaster

Flood Multiple

Counties

IL, MO, OK 4,900 24

189 May-02 Flood 159 Natural

Disaster

Flood Multiple

Counties

WV, VA 1,000 24

190 August-00 Wildfire 115 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Boise ID >1,000 24

191 December-96 Crane Hazmat

Incident

78 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat

Incident

Crane MO 1,200 24

192 May-91 Angus 35 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat

Incident

Sterlington LA 1,000 24
Table A-1. Comprehensive List of Evacuation Incidents, January 1, 1990, through June 30, 2003.

Total

Ranking Date Event Name Identifier Category Specific Type City/County State # Evacuated Rank Value

193

June-03 Bosque Fire 248 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Albuquerque NM 1,000 22

194 August-00 Helena Fire 147 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Helena MT >1,000 22

195 July-00 Valley

Complex Fire

142 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire East of Darby MT >1,000 22

196 August-00 Twin Fire and

Sula

Complex Fires

141 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Ravilli County MT >1,000 22

197 July-00 Wildfire 101 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Idaho Falls ID 1,800 22

198 February-94 Ward County

Railroad

Accident

94 Technological

Hazard

Railroad

Accident

Ward County ND 1,500 22

199 March-96 Latta Railroad

Accident

44 Technological

Hazard

Railroad

Accident

Latta OK 1,000 22

200 February-91 Carmichael

Transportation

Accident

15 Technological

Hazard

Transportation

Accident

Carmichael CA ~1,000 22

201 February-93 Flood 13 Natural

Disaster

Flood Unknown AZ 1,600 22

202 June-03 Wildfire 247 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Summerhaven AZ 1,000 20

203 March-02 Kokopelli Fire 228 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Ruidoso NM 1,300 20

204 August-95 Watsonville

Flooding

222 Natural

Disaster

Flood Watsonville CA >2,700 20

205 October-03 Texas Flood 217 Natural

Disaster

Tornadoes

and Flooding

Houston Area TX >1,700 20
Table A-1. Comprehensive List of Evacuation Incidents, January 1, 1990, through June 30, 2003.

Total

Ranking Date Event Name Identifier Category Specific Type City/County State # Evacuated Rank Value

206

July-02 Sequoia

National Park

Fire

189 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Pine Flat CA 1,000 20

207 September-01 Sierra Nevada

Fire

187 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Yankee Hill CA ~1,600 20

208 June-02 Copper Fire 182 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Small

community

west of Los

Angeles

(Green Valley)

CA 1,500 20

209 April-96 Stanwood

Incident

154 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat

Incident

Stanwood WA 1,800 20

210 July-02 Sequoia

National

Forest Fire

145 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Johnsondale CA >1,000 20

211 June-98 Tallahassee

Fire

144 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Tallahassee FL >1,000 20

212 June-02 Cannon City

Fire

138 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Walker River CA 1,000 20

213 May-00 Flood 106 Natural

Disaster

Flood Multiple

Counties

MO, OK 1,200 20

214 June-00 Hanford Fire 102 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire DOE Hanford

Facility

WA 1,700 20

215 November-96 Railroad

Accident

45 Technological

Hazard

Railroad

Accident

Outside of

Phoenix

AZ 1,500 20

216 February-96 Grandview

Incident

42 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat

Incident

Grandview TX 1,100 20

217 February-96 Stratford

Incident

41 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat

Incident

Stratford TX 1,800 20
Table A-1. Comprehensive List of Evacuation Incidents, January 1, 1990, through June 30, 2003.

Total

Ranking Date Event Name Identifier Category Specific Type City/County State # Evacuated Rank Value

218 April-96 Montana Rail

Link

20 Technological

Hazard

Railroad

Accident

Alberton MT 1,000 20

219 August-95 Pajaro Flood 220 Natural

Disaster

Flood Pajaro CA 3,000 18

220 June-98 Flood 167 Natural

Disaster

Flood Multiple

Counties

IA, IN 1,000 18

221 October-99 Belle Vista

Fire

205 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Belle Vista CA >1,000 16

222 September-97 Sierra Nevada

Foothills Fire

194 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Oregon House CA 1,500 13

223 May-98 Flood 168 Natural

Disaster

Flood Prineville OR 1,600 13

224 August-98 Tropical Storm

Charley

164 Natural

Disaster

Flood Del Rio and

Laredo

TX >1,000 13

225 September-99 Kirk Complex 113 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Near Big Sur CA ~1,000 13

226

August-99 Dunn Glen

Complex

112 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Near Battle

Mountain

NV >1,000 13

227 August-99 Big Bear

Complex

111 Natural

Disaster

Wildfire Big Bear Lake CA >1,000 13

228 August-95 Salinas River

Flood

221 Natural

Disaster

Flood Castroville CA >1,000 9

229 March-93 Flood 12 Natural

Disaster

Flood U.S. Midwest NE 1,500 9

230 January-93 Flood 14 Natural

Disaster

Flood U.S.

Southwest

CA, AZ 1,100 7

B-1

APPENDIX B

EVACUATION FORM
B-2
B-3

EVACUATION FORM

TITLE

(Event Name, City, State, Date, Identifier)

INTRODUCTION

Brief introduction to the evacuation incident, including date and time, location, type of hazard,

number of people evacuated, and special or unusual circumstances.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

Community information summarized to include:

General community information

History or experience with hazards or emergencies

Resources available, emergency preparedness activities (e.g., planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness)

Specific questions to be answered:

General

Community: Urban, Rural, Suburban

Population: 

Number of people evacuated: _____

Percent of population evacuated: 

Population density of area during evacuation (High, Low, Medium)

Was ethnicity, nationality, or age important factor in evacuation (Yes, No)

Size (sq. mi.; sq. km) of the community: _____

Size (sq. mi.; sq. km) of evacuated area: 

Land uses in evacuation area (Residential, Commercial/Retail, Industrial, Agricultural, Other,

Don’t Know)

Type of Community (Town, County, City, State, Other)

Form of Government (Mayoral, City Manager, Commission/Board, Other)

Community’s main economic base (Farming, Tourism, Manufacturing/Industry,

Commercial/Retail/Services, Other)

Any special characteristics (e.g., tourism) that attract large number of non-residents (Yes 

(Explain ), No, Don’t Know, N/A)

Proximity to a commercial nuclear power plant (0-10 mi., 11-50 mi., >50 mi.)

Is community located in a state that contains a nuclear power plant (Yes, No, Don’t Know)
B-4

History of Emergencies

Is area more prone to hazards than average (No, Yes-Natural Disasters, Yes-Technological

Hazards, Yes-Both)

Has community had any experience with the hazard that led to this evacuation (Yes, No, Don’t

Know, N/A)

Has community experienced evacuations in previous ten years (Yes, No, Don’t Know, N/A)

Has the community had previous experience with the alerting mechanism used in this evacuation

(Yes, No, Don’t Know, N/A)

Emergency Preparedness

Planning

Did community have a written emergency plan (Yes, No, Don’t Know, N/A)

Did emergency plan contain an evacuation section (Yes, No, Don’t Know, N/A)

Was plan used in this emergency (Yes, No, Don’t Know, N/A)

Did plan conform to NUREG-0654 (Yes, No, Don’t Know, N/A)

Was there an Evacuation Time Estimate (ETE) in the plan (Yes, No, N/A)

How did the actual evacuation time compare to the ETE (Over __%, Under __%, N/A)

Training

Is training provided to emergency response personnel (Yes, No, Don’t Know, N/A)

Is joint training between industry and government regularly conducted (Yes, No, Don’t Know,

N/A)

Drills and Exercises

Do the community’s emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and

exercises (Yes, No, Don’t Know, N/A)

Was the emergency plan used in this evacuation previously tested in a full-scale field exercise

(Yes, No, Don’t Know, N/A)

If so, what type of exercise was performed immediately prior to this evacuation (Full-scale field

exercise, Functional Drill, Tabletop Exercise, Other)

Community Awareness

Level of community awareness of local hazards (High, Medium, Low)

Level of community awareness of evacuation procedures (High, Medium, Low)

Level of community awareness of hazard that caused evacuation (High, Medium, Low)

Level of community awareness of alerting methods used (High, Medium, Low)
B-5

THREAT CONDITIONS

Brief summary of the threat or hazard that caused the evacuation, including weather, road

conditions, and unusual circumstances. 

CONSEQUENCES

Brief summary of the consequences of the event, including, date, time and duration of the event,

time to complete evacuation, statistics on the number of people evacuated, killed or injured, the

distance necessary to adequately evacuate from hazard, and cost information.

Specific questions to be answered:

How many people evacuated: _____

Number of deaths _____ and injuries _____ caused by the hazard

Number of deaths and injuries caused by the evacuation

Estimated total cost of evacuation-related expenses and property damages (not damages due to

hazard) incurred by the public: 

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Summary of the emergency response, including general information on the organization(s)

responding, decision-making, communications, notification and warning (e.g., time to warn),

traffic movement and control, shelters, law enforcement, and re-entry.

Specific questions to be answered:

Hazard that led to evacuation (Technological Hazard, Natural Disaster, or Terrorism)

Time of day (Night, Day, Don’t Know)

Decision Making

Level of cooperation between local, state, and federal agencies (high, low, moderate)

Were political boundaries crossed (i.e., more than one county or state involved) (Yes, No)

Command, control and coordination processes (Ad hoc or Pre-planned)

Who made decision to evacuate (Mayor, Fire Chief, Police Chief, Emergency Manager,

Governor, Other)

Problems with decision making process (Yes (Explain), No, Don’t Know, N/A)

Communications

Emergency Operations Center (EOC) used (Yes, No, Don’t Know, N/A)
B-6

Field (incident) command post used (Yes, No, Don’t Know, N/A)

Communication between field emergency responders and EOC (Radio, Telephone, Cell Phone,

Other (List))

Problems with communications (Yes, No, Don’t Know, N/A)

Notification and Warning

How were senior local officials notified of the incident: _____

How were emergency responders notified of the incident: 

Elapsed time between discovery of the incident and mobilization of response personnel (0-15

min., 15-30 min., 31-60 min., 60+min.)

Elapsed time between start of hazard and decision to evacuate: _____

Time to complete the evacuation: 

Problems with notification of emergency personnel or senior local official (Yes, No, Don’t

Know)

How was the public notified (Sirens, Telephone, Radio/TV Broadcasts, EBS, Police/Fire PA

System, NOAA, Other)

Was evacuation staged or all at once (Staged, All at Once)

Any special problems regarding warning and subsequent citizen action (Yes (Explain), No,

Don’t Know, N/A)

Traffic Movement and Control

Were people given specific instructions about where to go when they evacuated (Yes (Explain),

No, Don’t Know, N/A)

Were people told to use specific routes (Yes, No, Don’t Know, N/A)

How were these routes designated: 

How many special institutions (e.g. hospitals, prisons) were evacuated: _____ (Explain)

Road conditions prior to evacuation (Dry, Wet, Icy, Other)

Were any major roadways unavailable for use due to construction, damage caused by the hazard,

etc. (Yes, No, Don’t Know, N/A)

Were there any special traffic problems encountered (Yes (Explain), No, Don’t Know, N/A)

Did some people spontaneously evacuate before being told to do so (Yes (Explain), No, Don’t

Know, N/A)

Was reverse-laning used (Yes, No, Don’t Know, N/A)

Were there any traffic accidents during the evacuations (Yes, No, Don’t Know, N/A)

Did anyone refuse to evacuate (Yes, No, Don’t Know, N/A)

Shelters

Were public shelters used (Yes, No, Don’t Know, N/A)

Who managed the shelters (Red Cross, Civil Defense, Other)

What type of buildings were used as shelters (Schools, Churches, Public Buildings, Other (List))

What percent of evacuees went to shelters: 

Did people evacuate from areas outside the designated evacuation area (Yes, No, Don’t Know)

Did this cause an impact on traffic (Yes, No, Don’t Know)
B-7

Did this cause an impact on shelter capacity (Yes, No, Don’t Know, N/A)

Law Enforcement

How was the area secured following the evacuation to prevent looting and vandalism (Police,

National Guard, Other)

Were there any instances of looting or vandalism (Yes, No, Don’t Know, N/A)

Any problems with law enforcement (Yes, No, Don’t Know, N/A)

Re-Entry

Who authorized re-entry (Mayor, Fire Chief, Police Chief, Emergency Manager, Governor,

Other)

Describe the Re-entry Process (Controlled Phased Reentry, No Special Controls, Other)

Were evacuees compensated for their expenses (Yes (Explain), No, Don’t Know, N/A)

Any major problems during re-entry (Yes, No, Don’t Know, N/A)

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

Specific questions asked of, or offered by, the Investigator to include, but not be limited to: 

What factors made the evacuation work well?

What factors contributed to the evacuation's faults or problems? 

What were the lessons learned in this evacuation? 

Did the public's prior knowledge of the hazard, or prior evacuations, contribute to the success of

the evacuation? 

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

List of all personal contacts (e.g., fire chief, police chief, emergency manager) and other

references (e.g., news items, reports) used to answer the questionnaire and construct the case

study narrative.
B-8
C-1

APPENDIX C

STATISTICAL SUMMARY CASE STUDIES
C-2
C-3

CONTENTS

Page

Table C-1. General Community Statistics. ....................................... C-5

Table C-2. History of Emergencies Statistics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-8

Table C-3. Emergency Preparedness Statistics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-9

Table C-4. Emergency Response Statistics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-11
C-4
C-5

Table C-1. General Community Statistics.

Question Response # of Cases % of Cases

Community type Urban 9 18

Rural 5 10

Suburban 36 72

Unknown 0 0

Population <2,000 2 4

2,000-5,000 4 8

>5,000 44 88

Unknown 0 0

Number of people

evacuated

<2,000 6 12

2,000-5,000 23 46

>5,000 21 42

Percent of population

evacuated

<10% 15 30

10-20% 8 16

20-50% 12 24

51-99% 3 6

100% 10 20

Unknown 2 4

Population density

during evacuation

High 14 28

Low 8 16

Medium 24 48

Unknown 4 8

Was ethnicity,

nationality, or age an

important factor in

evacuation?

Yes 10 20

No 32 64

Unknown 8 16
C-6

Table C-1. General Community Statistics (continued).

Question Response # of Cases % of Cases

Community size <2.6 km (<1 mi ) 1 2

2 2

2.6-13 km (1-5 mi ) 5 10 2 2

>13 km (>5 mi ) 43 86 2 2

Unknown 1 2

Size of evacuated area <2.6 km (<1 mi ) 3 6

2 2

2.6-13 km (1-5 mi ) 24 48 2 2

>13 km (>5 mi ) 13 26 2 2

Unknown 10 20

Land uses in

evacuation area

Residential 41 82

Commercial/Retail (plus

other uses)

26 52

Industrial Agricultural 18 36

Multiple Land Use 30 60

Unknown 1 2

Type of community Town 9 18

County 8 16

City 31 62

State 0 0

Other 2 4

Form of government Mayoral 32 62

City Manager 2 4

Commission/Board 8 16

Other 8 16

Unknown 0 0
C-7

Table C-1. General Community Statistics (continued).

Question Response # of Cases % of Cases

Community’s main

economic base

Farming 9 18

Tourism 14 28

Manufacturing/Industry 21 42

Government 1 2

Commercial/Retail/

Services

20 40

Other 13 26

Any special

characteristics (e.g.,

tourism) that attract

large number of nonresidents?

Yes 37 74

No 11 22

Unknown 2 4

Proximity to a

commercial nuclear

power plant

0-16 km (0-10 mi) 4 8

17-80 km (11-50 mi) 11 22

>80 km (>50 mi) 35 70

Is the community

located in a state that

contains a nuclear

power plant?

Yes 39 78

No 11 22
C-8

Table C-2. History of Emergencies Statistics.

Question Response # of cases % of cases

Is the area more prone to hazards

than average?

No 13 26

Yes- Natural Disasters 8 16

Yes- Technological Hazards 9 18

Yes- Both 20 40

Has the community had any

experience with the hazard that led

to this evacuation?

Yes 25 50

No 24 48

Unknown 1 2

Has the community experienced

evacuations in previous ten years?

Yes 23 46

No 25 50

Unknown 2 4

Has the community had previous

experience with the alerting

mechanism used in this

evacuation?

Yes 22 44

No 18 36

Unknown 5 10

N/A 5 10
C-9

Table C-3. Emergency Preparedness Statistics.

Question Response # of cases

% of

cases

Planning

Did the community have a written emergency plan? Yes 47 94

No 3 6

Did the emergency plan contain an evacuation

section?

Yes 40 80

No 3 6

Unknown 4 8

N/A 3 6

Was the plan used in this emergency? Yes 43 86

No 1 2

Unknown 2 4

N/A 4 8

Did the plan conform to NUREG-0654? Yes 6 12

No 16 32

Unknown 23 46

N/A 5 10

Was there an Evacuation Time Estimate (ETE) in the

plan?

Yes 1 2

No 13 26

Unknown 2 4

N/A 34 68

Training

Was training provided to response personnel? Yes 50 100

No 0 0

Was there joint training between industry and

government?

Yes 40 80

No 8 16

N/A 2 4

Drills and Exercises

Do the community’s emergency response agencies

regularly conduct emergency drills and exercises?

Yes 42 84

No 7 14

Unknown 1 2

Was the emergency plan used in this evacuation

previously tested in a full-scale field exercise?

Yes 20 40

No 20 40

Unknown 8 16

N/A 2 4

If so, what type of exercise was performed

immediately prior to this?

Full-scale field

exercise 16 32

Functional Drill 3 6

Tabletop Exercise 2 4

N/A 27 54

Unknown 2 4
C-10

Table C-3. Emergency Preparedness Statistics (continued).

Question Response # of cases

% of

cases

Community Awareness

Awareness of local hazards High 12 24

Medium 25 50

Low 13 26

Awareness of evacuation procedures High 10 20

Medium 21 42

Low 19 38

Awareness of hazard that caused evacuation High 15 30

Medium 9 18

Low 26 52

Awareness of alerting methods used High 16 32

Medium 22 44

Low 11 22
C-11

Table C-4. Emergency Response Statistics.

Question Response # of

cases

% of

cases

Hazard that led to evacuation Technological Hazard 33 66

Natural Disaster 14 28

Terrorism 3 6

Time of Day Night 10 20

Day 40 80

Decision Making

Level of cooperation between local, state

and federal agencies

High 45 90

Low 0 0

Moderate 4 8

Unknown 1 2

Were political boundaries crossed? Yes 19 38

No 26 52

Unknown 5 10

Command, control and coordination Ad hoc 12 24

Pre-planned 38 76

Unknown 0 0

Who made the decision to evacuate? Mayor 3 6

Fire Chief 25 50

Police Chief 11 22

Fire/Police Chief Jointly 4 8

Emergency Manager 5 10

Governor 2 4

Multiple Joint Decision 10 20

Other 14 28

Were there problems with the decision

making process?

Yes 6 12

No 44 88

Communications

Was an Emergency Operations Center

(EOC) used?

Yes 34 68

No 15 30

Unknown 1 2

Was an Incident Command Post (ICP)

used?

Yes 45 90

No 4 8

Unknown 0 0

N/A 1 2

Communication between field emergency

responders and EOC or ICP

Radio 46 92

Telephone (plus other methods) 7 14

Cell phone 19 38

Pager (plus other methods) 2 4

Multiple 20 40

Other 0 0
C-12

Table C-4. Emergency Response Statistics (continued).

Question Response # of cases % of cases

Problems with communication Yes 14 28

No 35 70

Unknown 1 2

Notification and Warning

How were senior local officials notified

of the incident?

Telephone/Phone Tree 35 70

Cell Phone 2 4

Pager 2 4

Radio 3 6

911 Dispatch 0 0

Public Notification 3 6

Unknown 4 8

N/A 1 2

How were emergency responders notified

of the incident?

911 41 82

Saw Incident 2 4

Telephone 1 2

Unknown 3 6

N/A 3 6

Elapsed time between discovery of

incident and mobilization of response

personnel

0-15 min. 37 74

16-30 min. 0 0

31-60 min. 1 2

60+ min. 4 8

Unknown 7 14

N/A 1 2

Elapsed time between start of hazard and

decision to evacuate

0-15 min. 11 22

16-30 min. 8 16

31-60 min. 5 10

60+ min. 16 32

Unknown 9 18

N/A 1 2

Time to complete the evacuation <1 hr. 9 18

1-3 hrs. 18 36

4-8 hrs. 9 18

9-24 hrs. 4 8

>24 hrs. 0 0

Unknown 10 20

Were there problems with notification of

emergency personnel or senior local

official?

Yes 2 4

No 46 92

Unknown 2 4
C-13

Table C-4. Emergency Response Statistics (continued).

Question Response # of cases % of cases

How was the public notified? Sirens (plus other methods) 7 14

Telephone 9 18

Radio/TV broadcasts (plus

other methods) 24 48

EBS (plus other methods) 2 4

Police/Fire PA system 27 54

Door-to-Door 31 62

Multiple 34 68

Was the evacuation staged or all at once? Staged 20 40

All at once 30 60

Were there any special problems

regarding warning and subsequent citizen

action?

Yes 12 24

No 38 76

Unknown 0 0

Traffic Movement and Control

Were people given specific

instructions about where to go and

when they evacuated?

Yes 39 78

No 6 12

Unknown 4 8

N/A 1 2

Were people told to use specific

routes?

Yes 31 62

No 15 30

Unknown 3 6

N/A 1 2

How many special institutions (e.g.,

hospitals, prisons) were evacuated?

0 26 52

1 8 16

2-5 9 18

>5 1 2

Unknown 6 12

Road conditions prior to evacuation Dry 46 92

Wet 1 2

Icy 0 0

Other 2 4

Unknown 1 2

Were any major roadways unavailable for

use due to construction, damage caused

by the hazard, etc.?

Yes 15 30

No 32 64

Unknown 2 4

N/A 1 2

Were there any special traffic problems

encountered?

Yes 14 28

No 36 72
C-14

Table C-4. Emergency Response Statistics (continued).

Question Response # of cases # of cases

Did some people spontaneously evacuate before

being told to do so?

Yes 22 44

No 21 42

Unknown 6 12

N/A 1 2

Was reverse-laning used? Yes 6 12

No 40 80

Unknown 3 6

N/A 1 2

Were there any traffic accidents during the

evacuations?

Yes 4 8

No 40 80

Unknown 6 12

Did anyone refuse to evacuate? Yes 26 52

No 21 42

Unknown 3 6

Congregate Care Centers

Were public congregate care centers used? Yes 40 80

Unknown 2 4

No 8 16

Who managed the congregate care centers? Red Cross 30 60

Civil Defense 2 4

Other 7 14

N/A 10 20

Unknown 1 2

What type of buildings were used as congregate

care centers?

Schools 31 62

Churches 10 20

Public Buildings 8 16

Other 4 8

N/A 10 20

What percent of evacuees went to congregate

care centers?

<1% 1 2

1-5% 6 12

6-10% 10 20

11-20% 4 8

>20% 3 6

N/A 9 18

Unknown 17 34

Were there shadow evacuations? Yes 18 36

No 24 48

Unknown 7 14

N/A 1 2

Did this cause an impact on traffic? Yes 5 10

No 13 26

Unknown 1 2

N/A 31 62
C-15

Table C-4. Emergency Response Statistics (continued).

Question Response # of cases % of cases

Did this cause an impact on congregate

care center capacity?

Yes 0 0

No 17 34

Unknown 2 4

N/A 31 62

Law Enforcement

How was the area secured following the

evacuation to prevent looting and

vandalism?

Police only 38 76

National Guard only 4 8

Police and National Guard 5 10

Other 3 6

Were there any instances of looting or

vandalism?

Yes 5 10

No 45 90

Were there any problems with law

enforcement?

Yes 3 6

No 47 94

Re-Entry

Who authorized re-entry? Mayor 6 12

Fire Chief 22 44

Police Chief 6 12

Emergency Manager 4 8

Governor 0 0

Multiple 11 22

Other 23 46

Describe the re-entry process Controlled phased re-entry 9 18

No special controls 40 80

Unknown 1 2

Were evacuees compensated for their

expenses?

Yes 14 28

No 32 64

Unknown 4 8

Were there any major problems during reentry?Yes 4 8

No 44 88

Unknown 2 4
C-16
D-1

APPENDIX D

CASE STUDIES
D-2
D-3

CONTENTS

Table D-1. Evacuation Case Studies ............................................................................................. 5

CAVEAT ....................................................................................................................................... 7

Hurricane Floyd, Miami-Dade County, Florida, September 13, 1999, ID #88A ........................... 8

Hurricane Floyd, S. Florida to Broward County, Florida, September 13, 1999, ID #88B ........... 13

ATOFINA Chemicals Tank Car Failure, Riverview, Michigan, July 14, 2001, ID #28 ............. 18

Hurricane Andrew, Miami-Dade County, Florida, August 24, 1992, ID #80 .............................. 24

Hurricane Floyd, Central Florida, September 13, 1999, ID #88C ............................................... 29

Mims Fire, Mims, Florida, July 1998, ID #146 ........................................................................... 34

American Storage and Warehouse Company, Charlotte, North Carolina, 

September 2002, ID #74 .................................................................................................. 39

CSX Train Derailment and Fire, Baltimore, Maryland, July 18, 2001, ID #96 ........................... 43

World Trade Center, Lower Manhattan, September 11, 2001, ID #126 ...................................... 50

Centennial Olympic Park, Atlanta, Georgia, July 27, 1996, ID #124 .......................................... 56

Gaylord Tank Car Failure, Bogalusa, Louisiana, October 23, 1995, ID #18 ............................... 60

Union Pacific Railroad, Eunice, Louisiana, May 27, 2000, ID #30 ............................................. 65

Brandon Pipeline Rupture, Florida, May 27, 2003, ID #235 ....................................................... 70

Mathis Farm Supply Store, Slocumb, Alabama, February 11, 2003, ID #75 .............................. 74

Choctaw Maid Farm Poultry Plant, Forest, Mississippi, March 20, 2001, ID #4 ........................ 78

Truck Accident, Hugo, Oklahoma, August 18, 2000, ID #27 ..................................................... 83

Proctor & Gamble Factory, Iowa City, Iowa, July 22, 1999, ID #25 ........................................... 87

Cargill Chemical Plant, Maysville, Kentucky, January 4, 1998, ID #166 .................................. 91

Cerro Grande Fire, Los Alamos, New Mexico, May 10, 2000, ID #107 ..................................... 96

Deadwood Fire, Deadwood, South Dakota, June 29, 2002, ID #213 ........................................ 104

Cerro Grande Fire, White Rock, New Mexico, May 11, 2000, ID #209 ................................... 108

Hayman Blaze, Douglas County, Colorado, June 2002, ID #119 .............................................. 115

Railroad Accident, Flora, Mississippi, July 18, 1997, ID #198 ................................................. 119

Flagler County, Florida, Evacuation, July 1998, ID #99 ........................................................... 123

Louisiana State University Anthrax Hoax, Alexandria, Louisiana,

October 29, 2001, ID #1 ................................................................................................. 127

Railcar Leak, Sterling Heights, Michigan, March 2000, ID #58 ............................................... 131

Grand Trunk Derailment, Potterville, Michigan, May 27, 2002, ID #70 ................................... 135

Railcar Fire, Oshkosh, Wisconsin, December 2000, ID #97 ..................................................... 139

Norfolk Southern Railway Derailment, Farragut, Tennessee, September 15, 2002, ID #73 ..... 143

Pipeline Rupture, North Attleboro, Massachusetts, December 9, 1995, ID #19 ....................... 149

Twin City Foods Plant, Arlington, Washington, May 12, 2002, ID #69 .................................. 153

Train Derailment, Prichard, Alabama, March 25, 1994, ID #95 ............................................... 157

Burlington Northern Railroad Derailment, Superior, Wisconsin, June 30, 1992, ID #16 ......... 161

Hanford Fire, Benton City, Washington, June 27, 2000, ID #103 ............................................. 170

Burlington Northern Santa Fe Derailment, Scottsbluff, Nebraska, 

November 4, 2000, ID #26 ............................................................................................. 175

Fish Plant Ammonia Leak, Morro Bay, California, October 3, 2001, ID #66 ........................... 180
D-4

Louisville Cargo Transfer Accident, Louisville, Kentucky, November 19, 1998, ID #24 ........ 184

Pesticide Tanker Truck Explosion, Balch Springs, Texas, April 14, 1994, ID #243 ................ 188

East Bay Hills Fire, Oakland, California, October 20, 1991, ID #234 ...................................... 192

Railroad Accident, Appleton and Grand Chute, Wisconsin, November 3, 1997, ID #52 ......... 197

Keystone Cement, Bath, Pennsylvania, December 9, 1997, ID #53 .......................................... 201

Propane Storage Facility Fire, Pascagoula, Mississippi, October 1998, ID #3 .......................... 205

Transportation Accident, Bossier City, Louisiana, September 18, 1998, ID #239 .................... 209

Paint Plant Hazardous Materials Release, Chicago, Illinois, August 5, 1997, ID #51 .............. 213

Plastics Plant Fire, Mason City, Iowa, May 1998, ID #79 ......................................................... 217

Champion Technologies Inc., Odessa, Texas, August 20, 1992, ID #245 ................................. 220

Liquified Chlorine Gas Leak, Henderson, Nevada, May 6, 1991, ID #36 ................................. 225

Railroad Accident, Shepherdsville, Kentucky, November 19, 1991, ID #92 ............................ 231

Rodeo-Chediski Fire, Show Low, Arizona, June 18, 2002, ID #116 ........................................ 235

Biscuit Fire, Cave Junction, Oregon, July 13, 2002, ID #133 ................................................... 239
D-5

Table D-1. Evacuation Case Studies.

Identifier Date Category Specific Type

City/

County State #Evacuated

Rank

Value

88A September-99 Natural Disaster Hurricane Miami-Dade FL 270,403 78

88B September-99 Natural Disaster Hurricane

South to

Broward FL 373,144 78

28 July-01 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat Incident Riverview MI 6,000 76

80 August-92 Natural Disaster Hurricane Miami-Dade FL 650,000 71

88C September-99 Natural Disaster Hurricane Central Florida FL 665,969 67

146 July-98 Natural Disaster W ildfire Mims FL 16,000 67

74 September-02 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat Incident Charlotte NC 1,000 64

96 July-01 Technological

Hazard

Railroad

Accident Baltimore MD 10,000 64

126 September-01 Malevolent Act Malevolent Act Lower

Manhattan

NY 300,000 64

124 July-96 Malevolent Act Malevolent Act Atlanta GA 60,000 64

18 October-95 Technological

Hazard Railroad Accident Bogalusa LA 3,000 62

30 May-00 Technological

Hazard Railroad Accident Eunice LA 2,000-3,500 62

235 May-03 Technological

Hazard 

Pipeline

Rupture

Brandon FL 2,000 62

75 February-03 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat Incident Slocomb AL 3,500 62

4 March-01 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat Incident Forest MS 2,000 62

27 August-00 Technological

Hazard

Transportation

Accident Hugo OK 2,000-2,500 60

25 July-99 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat Incident Iowa City IA 5,000 60

166 January-98 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat Incident Maysville KY 2,500 58

107 May-00 Natural Disaster W ildfire Los Alamos NM 12,000 58

213 June-02 Natural Disaster W ildfire Deadwood SD 15,000 58

209 May-00 Natural Disaster W ildfire W hite Rock NM 7,000 58

119 June-02 Natural Disaster W ildfire

Douglas

County CO 5,500 56

198 July-97 Technological

Hazard Railroad Accident Flora MS 6,000 56

99 July-1998 Natural Disaster W ildfire Flagler County FL 45,000 53

1 October-01 Malevolent Act Malevolent Act Alexandria LA 2,000 51

58 March-00 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat Incident

Sterling

Heights MI 2,400 51

70 May-02 Technological

Hazard Railroad Accident Potterville MI 2,200 51

97 December-00 Technological

Hazard Railroad Accident Oshkosh W I 2,300 51

73 September-02 Technological

Hazard Railroad Accident Farragut TN 3,000 51

19 December-95 Technological

Hazard Pipeline Rupture

North

Attleboro

MA 40,000 49

69 May-02 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat Incident Arlington W A 1,500 49

95 March-94 Technological

Hazard

Railroad

Accident Prichard AL 2,000 49
D-6

Table D-1. Evacuation Case Studies (continued).

Identifier Date Category Specific Type

City/

County State #Evacuated

Rank

Value

16 June-92 Technological

Hazard Railroad Accident Superior W I 40,000 49

103 June-00 Natural Disaster W ildfire Benton City W A 2,500 47

26 November-00 Technological

Hazard Railroad Accident Scottsbluff NE 5,000 47

66 October-01 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat Incident Morro Bay CA 3,500 47

24 November-98 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat Incident Louisville KY 2,400 47

243 April-94 Technological

Hazard

Transportation

Accident

Balch

Springs

TX 5,000 47

234 October-91 Natural Disaster W ildfire Oakland CA 20,000-

30,000 44

52 November-97 Technological

Hazard Railroad Accident Appleton andGrand Chute W I 5,000 44

53 December-97 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat Incident Bath PA >1,600 44

3 October-98 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat Incident Pascagoula MS >1,500 44

239 September-98 Technological

Hazard

Transportation

Accident Bossier City LA ~2,000 44

51 August-97 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat Incident Chicago IL 2,500 44

79 May-98 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat Incident Mason City IA 3,600 44

245 August-92 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat Incident Odessa TX 27,000 44

36 May-91 Technological

Hazard

Fixed Site

Hazmat Incident Henderson NV ~7,000 44

92 November-91 Technological

Hazard Railroad Accident Sheperdsville KY 1,000 42

116 June-02 Natural Disaster W ildfire Show Low AZ 20,000 42

133 July-02 Natural Disaster W ildfire

Cave

Junction

OR 1,000 33
D-7

CAVEAT

The following case study discussions frequently use relativistic terms such as low, medium, and

high, below and above average, etc. In all such cases, “average” refers to the average U.S. city

or average U.S. community and does not refer to the “average” case among the 50 cases studied.
D-8

Hurricane Floyd, Miami-Dade County, Florida, September 13, 1999, ID #88A

Summary

Rank Value: 78

Number Evacuated: 270,403

Category: Natural Disaster

Specific Type: Hurricane

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

On September 13, 1999, Hurricane Floyd caused the largest peacetime evacuation in U.S.

history. Four states had evacuations in response to Hurricane Floyd (Florida, Georgia, North

Carolina, and South Carolina). Although estimates vary, it was widely reported that two million

people were evacuated in the state of Florida alone. The following case study examines the

evacuation in Miami-Dade County, Florida, where 270,403 people were evacuated. No deaths

or injuries occurred during the evacuation. However, many people experienced near gridlock on

the major evacuation routes. Others expressed frustration over the lack of communication and

poor dissemination of emergency information by officials. 

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

Miami-Dade County consists of suburban communities with a total population of 2,253,362

people. Approximately 270,403 residents (12% of the population) were evacuated. Land use in

the evacuated area is residential, commercial, industrial, and agricultural. The total area of

Miami-Dade is 6,297 km (2,431 mi ) and the evacuated area covered 629 km (243 mi ). The 2 2 2 2

population density of the area during the evacuation was variable (high in some places and low

in others). Nationality and age were important factors in the evacuation. Florida has a large

elderly population and there were some problems associated with evacuating elderly residents

from their own homes as well as from assisted-living facilities. Florida also has a large Hispanic

population, and there were some problems related to the language barrier. 

Miami-Dade County has a commission form of government and its economic base is farming,

tourism, manufacturing, and commercial. Tourism attracts a large number of non-residents. A

portion of the evacuated area is located within the EPZ of the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant,

which is located 48 km (30 mi) south of Miami, Florida. Turkey Point sustained a direct hit

from Hurricane Andrew in 1992. Florida has several commercial nuclear power plants.
D-9

History of Emergencies

The Miami-Dade area is more prone to natural disasters, particularly storms, than the average

U.S. community. Miami-Dade residents had evacuated in response to Hurricane Andrew in

1992 and had previous experience with the alerting mechanisms used for Hurricane Floyd. 

Evacuations are common in Florida because of its vulnerability to hurricanes and dense

population along the coast. The communities involved in the Floyd evacuation were well

prepared for an evacuation event. Since the mid-1980s, the Department of Community Affairs,

Division of Emergency Management has performed regional hurricane evacuation studies in

order to provide critical emergency management data to state and local officials who must make

decisions to evacuate. These studies have determined the extent of an expected hurricane storm

surge, the number of residents living in surge areas, the destinations of evacuees, evacuation

routes, and congregate care center locations. They have also calculated the amount of clearance

time needed to safely evacuate vulnerable residents to places of greater safety. Based on these

results, state and local emergency management officials can determine how much advance time

will be needed to evacuate all vulnerable residents to safety, and plan accordingly.

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.

Planning

The community had a written emergency plan with an evacuation section that was used in this

emergency. The plan did not conform to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, and did not

contain an ETE.

Training

Training is provided to emergency response personnel and joint training between industry and

government is regularly conducted.

Drills and Exercises

The community’s emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and

exercises. The emergency plan used in this evacuation was previously tested in a full-scale field

exercise.

Community Awareness

The level of community awareness of local hazards and of evacuation procedures was medium. 

The level of community awareness about the hazard that caused this evacuation and with alerting

methods used was high.

THREAT CONDITIONS

On September 13, 1999, Hurricane Floyd threatened Florida as a massive Category 4 storm,

equal in power to Hurricane Andrew (1992), but four times larger. The area of hurricane force
D-10

winds extended well over 150 miles from the eye of the storm, requiring hurricane warnings

from south Florida to Massachusetts. Weather conditions during the evacuation were dry and

warm, and there were no unusual circumstances that occurred during this incident other than the

hazard itself.

CONSEQUENCES

Over two million people in Florida evacuated in response to Hurricane Floyd. Approximately

270,403 residents were evacuated from their homes and businesses in the Miami-Dade area

alone. No injuries or deaths were associated with the evacuation or the hurricane in Florida. 

However, there were 56 deaths in other states, mostly due to drowning from freshwater floods. 

Hurricane Floyd caused only minor property damage as it skirted the state of Florida. The

estimated total cost of evacuation-related expenses is unknown.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation between local, state, and federal agencies was high and political

boundaries were crossed. The command, control, and coordination process could best be

described as pre-planned. The decision to evacuate was made by the county commissioner, and

there were no problems with the decision-making process.

Communications

An EOC was used but there was no ICP. Communication among emergency responders was by

radio, and there were no problems with communication.

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials were notified by radio. The elapsed time between the discovery of the

incident and the mobilization of response personnel is unknown. The elapsed time between the

start of the hazard and the decision to evacuate was 108 hours. It took approximately 14 hours to

complete the evacuation. There were no problems with notification of emergency response

personnel or senior local officials. The public was notified by radio and television broadcasts,

police and fire department PA systems, and a reverse-911 phone system. The evacuation was

staged, and there were no problems regarding warning or subsequent citizen action. 

Traffic Movement and Control

Major evacuation routes were gridlocked because too many people tried to leave at the same

time. This study identified the need for reverse-laning along major evacuation routes. 

Mammoth traffic jams had left motorists stuck, in many instances, on bumper-to-bumper

interstate highways for ten hours or more, in order to complete drives to safety they expected

would last two to three hours.
D-11

Evacuees were not given specific instructions about where to go when they evacuated, but a list

of congregate care centers was provided. Special institutions were evacuated, including

hospitals and assisted living facilities. Road conditions prior to the evacuation were dry, and all

major roadways were available to evacuees. There were special traffic problems encountered

involving very heavy traffic. Some people spontaneously evacuated and others refused to

evacuate. There were no traffic accidents during the evacuation and reverse-laning was not used.

Congregate Care Centers

The Red Cross, Salvation Army, and local agencies set up congregate care centers in various

schools and churches. Approximately 6% of the evacuees made use of the congregate care

centers. There were shadow evacuations that did have an impact on traffic but did not impact

congregate care center capacity.

Law Enforcement

Police secured the area following the evacuation. There were no instances of looting or

vandalism and no problems with law enforcement. 

Re-Entry

The county commissioner authorized re-entry and there were no special controls in place. 

Insurance companies compensated evacuees for their expenses and there were no problems

during re-entry. However, it was unclear to some evacuees when it was safe to go home

(re-entry), which is one reason the Task Force recommended disseminating this type of

information over the internet.

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

County and state coordination and the public’s prior knowledge of the hazard and evacuations

are factors that made the evacuation work well. Some lessons learned from the evacuation were:

• People need to be better informed about who does not need to evacuate.

• Congregate Care Centers need to be very visible and made more public. 

• A better system needs to be developed to communicate with people on the road. 

Some solutions that Florida has developed for these problems are:

• The community now has a system that counts and monitors the amount of traffic across the

state.

• Florida’s public radio can now broadcast evacuation updates.

• The community now has a plan that can implement reverse-laning.

• The community now has an Evacuation Liaison Team

• Transportation models were developed to show evacuation transportation information

systems and their impact on surrounding states and regions.
D-12

• The federal highway administration is now involved in Florida’s evacuations.

• The community now has a state web site.

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

State of Florida, All Hazards Planning Manager, Division of Emergency Management (Meeting,

8/26/03)

FEMA Region IV 

Atlanta, GA

(770) 220-5430

(Personal communications, April and May 2003)

References

Dumont, Robert. “The Legacy of Hurricane Floyd-Inland Flooding and a Massive Evacuation.”

<http://www.ofcm.gov/fp-fy01/pdf/sec1.pdf>

Federal Highway Administration (U.S.). “Evacuation Traffic Information System, Southeast

Hurricane Evacuation Study.” 2003.

<http://www.fhwaetis.com/etis/Report_Links/floyd_rpt.htm> (April 2003).

Florida Department of Transportation. “Governor’s Hurricane Evacuation Task Force Report.” 

<http://www11.myflorida.com/publicinformationoffice/EvacuationStudy/

HurricaneTaskForceReport.doc> (June 2003).

North Carolina Shore and Beach (U.S.). “Beach Nourishment for Hurricane Protection: North

Carolina Project Performance In Hurricanes Dennis and Floyd.” 2000. 

<http://www.ncshoreandbeach.org/Dennis-Floyd-Study.htm> (April 2003).

Hosock, H. “Safe But Annoyed: The Hurricane Floyd Evacuation in Florida.” Case 1652. 

Kennedy School of Government Case Programs, Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts.

The Disaster Center. “Hurricane Floyd Reports.” 

<http://www.disastercenter.com/hurricf9.htm> (June 2003).
D-13

Hurricane Floyd, S. Florida to Broward County, Florida, September 13, 1999, ID #88B

Summary

Rank Value: 78

Number Evacuated: 373,144

Category: Natural Disaster

Specific Type: Hurricane

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

On September 13, 1999, Hurricane Floyd was the cause of the largest peacetime evacuation in

U.S. history. Four states had evacuations in response to Hurricane Floyd (Florida, Georgia,

North Carolina, and South Carolina). Although estimates vary, it was widely reported that two

million people were evacuated in the state of Florida alone. The following case study examines

the evacuation of 373,144 people in the southern portion of Florida down to Broward County. 

No deaths or injuries occurred during the evacuation. However, many people experienced near

gridlock on the major evacuation routes. Others expressed frustration over the lack of

communication and poor dissemination of emergency information by officials. 

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

The southern portion of Florida down to Broward County has a total population of 3,109,538

people. Approximately 373,144 residents (or 12% of the population) were evacuated. Land use

in the area is primarily residential, commercial, retail, and industrial. The total area of that part

of the state is 6,039 mi (15,640 km ) and the evacuated area was 483 mi . The population 2 2 2

density of the area during the evacuation was high in some areas and low in others. Ethnicity

and nationality were not important factors in the evacuation; however, age was an important

factor because a large population of elderly residents was evacuated.

The form of government in the region includes a commission and a board. The region’s main

economic base includes farming, tourism, manufacturing, commercial, and retail. Tourism

attracts a large number of non-residents to the area. The EPZ of the St. Lucie Nuclear Power

Plant is located in St. Lucie County, which is in the northern portion of the evacuated area. 

Florida has several commercial nuclear power plants.

History of Emergencies

South Florida to Broward County is more prone than average to both natural and technological

hazards. It is located in a hurricane-prone region and it has a high volume of interstate and

railroad traffic, making it more prone to technological hazards as well. The community had
D-14

previous experience with hurricanes and evacuations in the last ten years and had prior

experience with the alerting mechanisms used in this evacuation.

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities included planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.

Planning

The community had a written emergency plan, which contained an evacuation section, and was

the plan used in this emergency. The plan did not conform to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1,

Rev. 1, and did not contain an ETE.

Training

Training is provided to emergency response personnel, and joint training between industry and

government is regularly conducted.

Drills and Exercises

The community’s emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and

exercises. The emergency plan used in this evacuation was previously tested in a full-scale field

exercise and a tabletop exercise.

Community Awareness

The level of community awareness about local hazards and about evacuation procedures was

medium. The level of community awareness about the hazard that caused this evacuation and

about the alerting methods used was high.

THREAT CONDITIONS

On September 13, 1999, Hurricane Floyd threatened Florida as a massive Category 4 storm,

equal in power to Hurricane Andrew (1992), but four times larger. The area of hurricane force

winds extended well over 150 miles from the eye of the storm, requiring hurricane warnings

from south Florida to Massachusetts. Weather conditions during the evacuation were dry and

clear. However, some unusual traffic conditions (gridlock) occurred during the evacuation.

CONSEQUENCES

Over two million people in Florida evacuated in response to Hurricane Floyd. Approximately

373,144 residents were evacuated from their homes and businesses in the southern portion of

Florida down to Broward County. There were no injuries or deaths associated with the

evacuation or the hurricane in Florida. However, there were 56 deaths in other states, mostly

due to drowning from freshwater floods. Hurricane Floyd caused only minor property damage

as it skirted the state of Florida. The estimated total cost of evacuation related expenses is

unknown.
D-15

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation between local, state, and federal agencies was high and political

boundaries were crossed. The command, control, and coordination processes could best be

described as pre-planned. The decision to evacuate was made by the County Board of

Commissioners, and there were no problems with the decision-making process.

Communications

An EOC was used but there was not an ICP. Communication between field emergency

responders and EOC was by radio. There were no problems with communication.

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials were notified by telephone. The elapsed time between the discovery of the

incident and mobilization of response personnel is unknown. The elapsed time between the start

of the hazard and the decision to evacuate was 108 hours. It took approximately 17 hours to

complete the evacuation. There were no problems with notification of emergency personnel or

senior local officials. Radio and television broadcasts, police and fire department PA systems,

and a reverse-911 phone system notified the public. The evacuation was staged and there were

no special problems regarding warning and subsequent citizen action.

Traffic and Movement

Evacuees were not given any special instructions about where to go when they evacuated, but a

list of available congregate care centers was provided. There were numerous special institutions

evacuated, including hospitals and nursing homes. Road conditions before the evacuation were

dry and all major roadways were available to evacuees. Very heavy traffic congestion problems

were encountered. Some people spontaneously evacuated before being told to do so and some

people refused to evacuate. Reverse-laning was not used and there were no traffic accidents

during the evacuation.

Congregate Care Centers

The Red Cross, Salvation Army, and local agencies set up congregate care centers at schools

and churches. About 7% of the evacuees used the congregate care centers. There were shadow

evacuations and this did impact traffic but did not impact congregate care center capacity.

Law Enforcement

Police secured the area following the evacuation and there were no instances of looting or

vandalism and no problems with law enforcement.
D-16

Re-Entry

The county commissioner authorized re-entry. There were no special controls during the

re-entry process. Insurance agencies compensated evacuees for their expenses. There were no

major problems during re-entry.

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

County and state coordination and the public’s prior knowledge of the hazard and evacuations

are factors that made the evacuation work well. Some lessons learned form the evacuation were:

• People need to be better informed about who does not need to evacuate.

• Congregate Care Centers need to be very visible and made more public. 

• A better system needs to be developed to communicate with people on the road. 

Some solutions that Florida has developed for these problems are:

• The community now has a system that counts and monitors the amount of traffic across the

state.

• Florida’s public radio can now broadcast evacuation updates.

• The community now has a plan that can implement reverse-laning.

• The community now has an Evacuation Liaison Team.

• Transportation models were developed to show evacuation transportation information

systems and their impact on surrounding states and regions.

• The federal highway is now involved in Florida’s evacuations.

• The community now has a state web site.

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

State of Florida, All Hazards Planning Manager, Division of Emergency Management (Meeting,

8/26/03)

References

Dumont, Robert. “The Legacy of Hurricane Floyd-Inland Flooding and a Massive Evacuation.”

<http://www.ofcm.gov/fp-fy01/pdf/sec1.pdf>

Federal Highway Administration (U.S.). “Evacuation Traffic Information System, Southeast

Hurricane Evacuation Study.” 2003. 

<http://www.fhwaetis.com/etis/Report_Links/floyd_rpt.htm> (April 2003).
D-17

Florida Department of Transportation. “Governor’s Hurricane Evacuation Task Force Report.” 

<http://www11.myflorida.com/publicinformationoffice/EvacuationStudy/

HurricaneTaskForceReport.doc> (June 2003).

North Carolina Shore and Beach (U.S.). “Beach Nourishment for Hurricane Protection: North

Carolina Project Performance In Hurricanes Dennis and Floyd.” 2000. 

<http://www.ncshoreandbeach.org/Dennis-Floyd-Study.htm> (April 2003).

Hosock, H. “Safe But Annoyed: The Hurricane Floyd Evacuation in Florida.” Case 1652. 

Kennedy School of Government Case Programs, Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts.

The Disaster Center. “Hurricane Floyd Reports.” 

<http://www.disastercenter.com/hurricf9.htm> (June 2003).
D-18

ATOFINA Chemicals Tank Car Failure, Riverview, Michigan, July 14, 2001, ID #28

Summary

Rank Value: 76

Number Evacuated: 6,000

Category: Technological Hazard

Specific Type: Fixed Site Hazmat Incident

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

On July 14, 2001, a release of methyl mercaptan, a poisonous and flammable gas, occurred at the

ATOFINA Chemicals, Inc. (ATOFINA) plant in Riverview, Michigan, resulting in the

evacuation of about 6,000 people. A pipe attached to a fitting on the unloading line of a railroad

tank car fractured and separated, causing the release of methyl mercaptan, which is the odorant

that is used in natural gas. The Riverview Fire Department arrived within minutes and, shortly

after their arrival, the methyl mercaptan ignited, engulfing the tank car in flames and sending a

fireball approximately 60 m (200 ft) into the air. Fire damage to cargo transfer hoses on an

adjacent tank car resulted in the release of chlorine, another poisonous gas. Three plant

employees were killed in the incident and several others were injured. The evacuation

proceeded smoothly and lasted approximately ten hours. However, there were communications

issues associated with the length of time it took to notify the residents, local communities, and

Canadian authorities on the far side of the Detroit River. 

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

On July 14, 2001, at 5:19 a.m. approximately 600 residences in Riverview, Trenton, Grosse Ile,

and Wyandotte, Michigan, were ordered to evacuate. According to the Riverview Fire Marshal

there was approximately 90% compliance with the order. A total of 6,000 people were

evacuated, including approximately 2,000 residents from homes and industrial facilities within

the area and an additional 4,000 people from the Trenton street fair located approximately 4.8

km (3 mi) south of the incident. 

Riverview is a suburb of Detroit with shopping centers, commercial retail centers, and industrial

facilities. The size of the community is 11.4 km (4.4 mi ) and the size of the evacuated area is 2 2

10.4 km (4 mi ). The population density during the evacuation was low. Riverview is run by a 2 2

city manager and its main economic base is retail trade and service industries. There was a

midsummer festival (street fair) in Trenton on July 14, 2001, that drew approximately 250,000

visitors. The start of this event was delayed, and individuals were evacuated from the area. 

There is one commercial nuclear plant, Fermi II, located in Newport, Michigan, approximately
D-19

24 km (15 mi) south of Riverview. The evacuation did not impact operations and took place

outside the 10-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) of the plant.

History of Emergencies

Riverview is more prone to hazards than the average community of its size. Trenton,

Wyandotte, and Riverview each have a chemical plant, and local fire departments are familiar

with local hazards. The ATOFINA plant has been at this location for over 100 years, and this is

the first major catastrophe resulting in a large-scale evacuation. 

Riverview has experienced evacuations in the previous ten years and has had prior experience

with the alerting mechanism used in this evacuation, which included patrolmen going door-todoor and using loud speakers. Approximately six years ago, there was a train derailment

involving small evacuations, and minor evacuations associated with the chemical plant occur

periodically.

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.

Planning

ATOFINA has implemented an extensive emergency plan for the Riverview facilities, which

included emergency procedures specific to the plant processes. The purpose of the plan is to

minimize hazards to public health or the environment caused by fires, explosions, or releases of

hazardous constituents. A copy of the plan was given to the Riverview Fire Department in

March 2000. Riverview has a local emergency plan and a county plan. The Riverview plan was

used in the emergency. It did not address evacuation organization, communication, or traffic

routing. It only addressed evacuations in terms of exposure limits that require evacuations. This

evacuation covered multiple communities that were not addressed in sufficient detail in the

Riverview or county emergency plans. There was no evacuation time estimate (ETE) in the

plan, and it is difficult to estimate the total time for the evacuation because it covered multiple

communities and was being conducted by separate police departments. The Riverview

emergency plan did not meet the requirements of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1.

Training

ATOFINA provides training to Riverview and Wyandotte Fire Departments and conducts

periodic tours of the facility. 

Drills and Exercises

Riverview emergency response did not conduct emergency drills or exercises for the emergency

plan used in this evacuation. 
D-20

Community Awareness

Although each of the surrounding communities of Riverview, Trenton, and Wyandotte have

chemical plants, the local community had a low level of awareness of the hazards, of evacuation

procedures, and of alerting methods. Previous evacuations were much smaller in scale.

THREAT CONDITIONS

The Riverview chemical release began as a normal chemical transfer operation on July 14, 2001. 

A connecting pipe separated from a faulty valve on a railcar as two workers unloaded methyl

mercaptan. All 113,652 L (25,000 gal) of methyl mercaptan contained in the railcar was

released into the environment. In addition, approximately 11,794 kg (26,000 lb) of chlorine was

released from an adjacent railcar. 

A total of 6,000 people were evacuated from Riverview and the surrounding communities. The

evacuations occurred during the early morning. The weather was hot and the roads were dry. 

The Riverview evacuation involved three unusual circumstances. First, the community of

Grosse Ile is located on an island in the river with only the southern bridge open to traffic. 

Second, the U.S. Coast Guard closed a 16.1 km (10 mi) stretch of the Detroit River. Finally,

there was a street fair in Trenton, approximately 4.8 km (3 mi) south of the incident, that

required the evacuation of approximately 4,000 vendors and members of the public.

CONSEQUENCES

Within 15 minutes of the initial event, the first two units of the Riverview Fire Department were

on scene. Approximately ten minutes later, the methyl mercaptan ignited, resulting in a fireball

that extended an estimated 60 m (200 ft) into the air. When the fireball occurred, the Riverview

fire chief requested mutual aid from the surrounding communities. As the uncontrolled vapor

cloud approached Riverview and the surrounding communities, portions of the communities

were evacuated based on the wind direction. The initial incident resulted in the death of three

workers in the immediate area and injuries to at least nine ATOFINA personnel. No reported

deaths or injuries resulted from the evacuation. Residents voiced numerous complaints that the

evacuation was too slow, resulting in inhalation of the chemical fumes and causing throat

irritation and stinging eyes. However, there were no reports of anyone from the general public

being hospitalized. The overall cost to the public of the evacuation is difficult to estimate

because the release covered multiple communities, each with its own implementation.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation between local, state, and federal agencies was very high. Some of the

local, state and federal agencies involved in this emergency included the Riverview Fire

Department, Wyandotte Fire Department, Grosse Ile Police Department, Downriver Mutual Aid

Hazmat Team, U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The
D-21

evacuation crossed multiple political boundaries, including city, county, and the international

border with Canada. The command, control and coordination processes could best be described

as ad hoc.

The decision to evacuate was made by the Riverview fire chief. There was a delay in the initial

order to evacuate. At about 5:00 a.m., the Grosse Ile Police Department notified the Riverview

fire chief that there were strong odors detected in Grosse Ile and the fire chief advised residents

to shelter in place. However, at about 5:19 a.m., after re-evaluating the situation, he requested

the evacuation of residents in parts of Riverview, Trenton, Grosse Ile, and Wyandotte. 

Approximately 6,000 people were evacuated from their homes, businesses, and the street fair. 

Communications

There was no Emergency Operations Center (EOC); however, the county EOC was on standby. 

An incident command post (ICP) was established near the event, complete with tents set up by

the ATOFINA personnel. Radio was the primary means of communication and, according to the

Riverview fire marshal, the system worked flawlessly.

Notification and Warning

The public safety dispatcher notified the mayor and city manager via telephone. The city

manager was then responsible for notification of other senior local officials. Emergency

responders were notified through the 911 system, which was likely being used as a general

alarm, since the first evidence of a fire was when the escaping gas ignited some 19 minutes later. 

There were no problems with notification of either local officials or responders.

Emergency response personnel mobilized and were onsite within 15 minutes of discovery of the

incident, and the decision to evacuate was made approximately one hour after the start of the

incident. The time to complete the evacuation was not known because multiple communities

were involved. The public was notified by the police using a loudspeaker and going door-todoor to notify residents to evacuate. The evacuation was staged, beginning with a one-mile

radius, and expanding as the fire chief received additional information from ATOFINA on the

hazards. 

There were no special problems with warning the public; however, approximately 10% of the

public did not evacuate when requested. In addition, residents complained that the evacuation

took too long. The Riverview fire marshal stated that it took time to get accurate information

from the plant on the chemicals involved. The deaths and injuries due to this event resulted in

some onsite confusion that delayed the flow of information.

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were told what congregate care centers to go to and what routes to take. The routes

were designated with police barricades. No special institutions were evacuated. Road

conditions prior to the evacuation were clear and dry. The island of Grosse Ile has two bridges;

however, only the southern bridge was open for access. This did not create any traffic problems,
D-22

as there were only about 400 homes evacuated from the island. Reverse-laning was not used. 

No traffic accidents were reported during the evacuations. A 16 km (10 mi) stretch of the

Detroit River was shut down because of the fumes. 

Congregate Care Center

A congregate care center was set up at the Riverview City Hall and was managed by the city

staff. Approximately 20% of evacuees stayed at the congregate care centers. The vast majority

of evacuees stayed with friends and relatives. There were no shadow evacuations.

Law Enforcement 

The area was secured by barricades set up by the local police. There were no reported instances

of looting or vandalism or any other problems identified with law enforcement.

Re-Entry

Re-entry was authorized by the Riverview fire chief at approximately 3 p.m. The media were

used to convey information to the public about when it was safe to return home. No special

controls were in place during the re-entry process. The total evacuation time was approximately

10 hours. There is no report of costs being reimbursed to the public.

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

As a result of the accident, ATOFINA was required to provide financial support to the

surrounding communities to improve the emergency response capabilities. Improvements in the

capabilities and relevant lessons learned include:

1. The fire marshal stated that the evacuation went well with a few exceptions. First, there was

a delay in obtaining accurate information on the chemicals involved because three

ATOFINA employees had been killed. Second, approximately 10% of the public did not

want to evacuate. Third, no large-scale exercises or drills had been conducted with

surrounding communities prior to the event. 

2. Riverview has since been funded to increase the local sirens from one to four. In addition,

they have sent out mass mailings to the public with detailed instructions on what to do when

the sirens go off. 

3. Riverview has now implemented a “first call” automated telephone citizen notification

system. However, experience in recent events has shown that residents hang up when the

recording begins and do not listen to the full message. 

4. Riverview has since been funded for a fully functional EOC, which is now in full operation.
D-23

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Riverview Fire Marshal

(734) 281-4264

(Personal Communication, July 2, 2003)

References

CNN (U.S.), “Chemical plant fire kills 3 in Michigan.” 2001.

<http://www.cnn.com/U.S.7/14/01> (June 2003).

Potts, L. “Two Dead, One Missing in Chemical Fire Downriver.” Associated Press. July 14,

2001.

National Transportation Safety Board (U.S.) (NTSB). HZM-02-01, “Hazardous Materials

Release from Railroad Tank Car With Subsequent Fire at Riverview, Michigan.” NTSB:

Washington, D.C. July 2001.

SEMCOSH (Southeast Michigan Coalition on Occupational Safety and Health). “ATOFINA

Chemical Explosion.” <http://www.semcosh.org/atofina_explosion.htm> (June 2003).
D-24

Hurricane Andrew, Miami-Dade County, Florida, August 24, 1992, ID #80

Summary

Rank Value: 71

Number Evacuated: 650,000

Category: Natural Disaster

Specific Type: Hurricane

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

Hurricane Andrew, which was initially classified as a Category 4 storm and later reclassified as a

Category 5 storm in 2002, was the most destructive and most expensive natural disaster in U.S.

history. It forced the evacuation of approximately 1.9 million people. One-third, or 650,000 of

those evacuated were in Miami-Dade County, Florida, which is the focus of this case study. The

hurricane hit south Florida on August 24, 1992, with violent winds that caused over $25 billion

in property damages. In Miami-Dade County, Hurricane Andrew resulted in 15 deaths and left

up to 250,000 people temporarily homeless. However, there were no deaths or serious injuries

during the evacuation. The estimated total cost of evacuation-related expenses is between $5

and $8 million.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

Miami-Dade County is in the southeastern portion of Florida. As of the 2000 census, the

population was 2,253,362 people. The county has a total area of 6,297 km (2,431 mi ) and is a 2 2

combination of urban, rural, and suburban areas. Approximately 650,000 people, or 30% of the

population, were evacuated in August 1992 due to Hurricane Andrew. The evacuation covered

approximately 2,600 km (1,000 mi ) in the southern portion of the county. Population density 2 2

was relatively low at the time of the evacuation. Land use in the evacuated areas was primarily

residential and agricultural. The community’s main economic base is derived from multiple

sources, including farming, tourism, manufacturing/industry, and commercial/retail. Tourism

and colleges attract a large number of non-residents. Age was an important factor in the

evacuation because the large population of elderly residents was less likely to heed the

evacuation order. 

The Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant is located in Miami-Dade County near Homestead,

approximately 40 to 48 km (25 to 30 mi) south of Miami. The Turkey Point Plant sustained a

direct hit from Hurricane Andrew, causing extensive onsite and offsite damage. The nuclear

reactors were shut down in anticipation of the hurricane, and 235 employees stayed at the plant

and rode out the storm. The plant’s exterior buildings suffered extensive damage, but the
D-25

reactors survived unharmed. A 30-meter (100-foot) tall smokestack at the plant was lost during

the storm.

History of Emergencies

The Miami-Dade area is more prone to both natural disasters, including hurricanes and

tornadoes, and man-made hazards, including accidents at manufacturing plants, nuclear power

plants, and railroads. The community had prior experience with hurricanes and had experienced

evacuations in the previous 10 years, although not on the scale of this evacuation. Residents had

prior experience with the alerting mechanism used in this evacuation [i.e., radio and television

broadcasts, emergency broadcasting system (EBS)].

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.

Planning

Miami-Dade County had an emergency management plan, including an evacuation section,

which was implemented during this emergency. The plan contains an annex for the Turkey

Point Nuclear Power Plant, which contains an Evacuation Time Estimate (ETE) for the 16-km

(10-mile) emergency planning zone (EPZ) of the plant. However, the broader plan, which

covers all of Miami-Dade County, does not contain an ETE for the county.

Training

Training is provided to emergency response personnel and joint training is conducted between

industry and government. The frequency of training has increased since Hurricane Andrew.

Drills and Exercises

The community’s emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and

exercises. However, it is unknown whether the emergency plan used in this evacuation was

previously tested in a full-scale field exercise.

Community Awareness

Community awareness of local hazards and of evacuation procedures is approximately average. 

However, community awareness about the hazard that caused this evacuation (i.e., hurricanes) is

very high. In addition, community awareness about the alerting methods used in this evacuation

was high.

THREAT CONDITIONS

The threat condition that led to this evacuation was Hurricane Andrew, a Category 4 storm with

winds of 235 km per hour (145 miles per hour) as it approached south Florida. The National

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) reclassified Andrew as a Category 5 storm in
D-26

2002. Andrew was (and as of this writing still is) the third strongest hurricane on record to hit

the U.S. It was the most destructive and most expensive natural disaster in U.S. history. 

Conditions during the evacuation, prior to Andrew’s landfall, were clear and calm and road

conditions were good. The evacuation took place during the day and there were no unusual

circumstances during the evacuation. However, there are some conflicting reports regarding the

evacuation. For example, emergency response personnel describe the evacuation as going rather

smoothly while some reports, authored by citizen activist groups, claim that residents were

caught horribly off-guard by Hurricane Andrew. These groups claim that some local residents

did not receive ample warning to evacuate, and their deaths were directly attributed to that lack

of ample warning.

CONSEQUENCES

Hurricane Andrew was the most destructive and most expensive natural disaster in U.S. history,

forcing the evacuation of 650,000 people in Miami-Dade County, Florida on and before August

24, 1992. There were 15 deaths and hundreds of injuries due to the hurricane but no deaths or

significant injuries due to the evacuation. Hurricane Andrew struck southern Miami-Dade

County especially hard with violent winds that destroyed homes, buildings, and power lines. 

Florida Power and Light reported losing 1,900 transmission towers, 8.5 million feet of

distribution lines, 18,700 utility poles, and 16,800 switches. Up to 1.4 million customers lost

power in Florida alone. The Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant near Homestead also sustained

extensive onsite and offsite damage. The estimated total cost of evacuation-related expenses and

property damages incurred by the public was between $5 to $8 million.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies was moderate since there was

some lack of coordination between federal agencies in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew. The

Department of Defense, Federal Emergency Management Agency and National Guard

participated in the evacuation process. Political boundaries were crossed since Broward County

was also evacuated. Command, control and coordination processes could best be described as

pre-planned. The decision to evacuate was made jointly by the Miami-Dade County manager

and the emergency operations manager. There were no major problems with the decisionmaking process.

Communications

An EOC and an ICP were both used in this emergency. Communication between field

emergency responders and the EOC was via radio and telephone. Radio transmission was

limited but was still the primary means of communication. There were problems associated with

communications because most radio towers were down, but telephone communications were still

working.
D-27

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials and emergency responders were well aware of the incident because of the

extensive radio and television coverage, and there were no problems with notification. 

Evacuation of the county took approximately 12 hours to complete. The public was notified

through radio and television broadcasts and by the EBS. The evacuation was ordered all at once. 

There were no special problems regarding warning and subsequent citizen action, although some

citizen activist groups claim that residents did not receive ample warning to evacuate and were

caught in the storm and died as a result.

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were told which congregate care centers were open when they were ordered to

evacuate but were not told to use specific routes. Most of the congregate care centers in the

southern portion of Miami-Dade County had to be shut down because they were in the

evacuation zone. The closest congregate care centers were in the northern part of the county. 

Five out of 30 area hospitals were evacuated. Road conditions were clear and dry during the

evacuation; however, construction work on some of the major roads slowed evacuation traffic. 

In the future, all highway construction will cease, and roadways will operate at maximum

capacity. Reverse-laning was not used. There were no reported traffic accidents during the

evacuation. Some people spontaneously evacuated prior to being told to do so and others

refused to evacuate.

Congregate Care Centers

Congregate care centers managed by the American Red Cross were used. Schools were

primarily used as congregate care centers and approximately 20% of evacuees registered at the

congregate care centers. There were shadow evacuations; however, this did not impact either

traffic movement or congregate care center capacity.

Law Enforcement

Police and National Guardsmen secured the evacuated area; however, there were some instances

of looting and vandalism. There were no other problems with law enforcement. 

Re-Entry

Re-entry was authorized by the mayor and the county commissioner. Re-entry was a controlled

phased process (some areas were re-opened before others). Because this was a declared

evacuation, some evacuees were reimbursed for evacuation-related expenses by their insurance

company. In addition, grant money was provided to cover damage to houses, vehicles, etc. 

Trailers were set up for people in public housing, and some people lived in recreational vehicles

in the driveways of their destroyed homes. Problems during re-entry included lack of water and

power. There was severe damage to many homes and tents and churches were used to

temporarily house people. 
D-28

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

What factors made the evacuation work well?

The public’s awareness and knowledge of hurricanes, especially once Hurricane Andrew was

upgraded to a Category 4 storm, certainly contributed to the effectiveness of the evacuation.

What factors contributed to the evacuation’s faults or problems? 

Problems during the evacuation included:

• Evacuation zones were too broad;

• Traffic pattern predictions and clearance times were “vague and undefined;”

• The media tended to dramatize and exaggerate the situation, leading to public panic and

shadow evacuations.

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Miami-Dade Emergency Management Coordinator

Florida International University Professor

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (305) 229-4404

References

Akers, R. L., R. Dunham, and L. Lanza-Kaduce. “Policing the Wake of Hurricane Andrew:

Comparing Citizens’ and Police Priorities.” Disaster Prevention and Management. Volume 7. 

Number 5. 1998: 413-419.

Issue 178: “Effect of Hurricane Andrew on Turkey Point” (Rev. 2).

<http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr0933/sec3/178r2.html>

Lepore, Frank. “After 10 Years, Hurricane Andrew Gains Strength.” Online posting. 21 Aug.

2002. United States Department of Commerce News. Jan. 29, 2003. 

<http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/NOAA_pr_8-21-02.html>

Nuclear Power Plants Stand in Floyd’s Path, September 14, 1999, CNN.

<http://www.cnn.com/WEATHER/9909/14/hurricane.utilities/>
D-29

Hurricane Floyd, Central Florida, September 13, 1999, ID #88C

Summary

Rank Value: 67

Number Evacuated: 665,969

Category: Natural Disaster

Specific Type: Hurricane

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

On September 13, 1999, Hurricane Floyd caused the largest peacetime evacuation in U.S.

history. Four states had evacuations in response to Hurricane Floyd (Florida, Georgia, North

Carolina, and South Carolina). Although estimates vary, it was widely reported that two million

people were evacuated in the state of Florida alone. The following case study examines the

evacuation in central Florida where 665,969 people were evacuated. No deaths or injuries

occurred during the evacuation. However, many people experienced near gridlock on the major

evacuation routes. Others expressed frustration over the lack of communication and poor

dissemination of emergency information by officials. 

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

Central Florida is a suburban community with a total population of 2,466,553 people. 

Approximately 665,969 residents (27% of the population) were evacuated. The area consists of

residential, commercial, industrial, and agricultural land. The total area of central Florida is

16,735 km (6,461mi ) and the evacuated area was 1,673 km (646 mi ). The population density 2 2 2 2

in the area during the evacuation was high in certain areas and low in others. Age was an

important factor in this evacuation.

Central Florida has a commission and board form of government, and its economic base is

farming, tourism, manufacturing, and commercial. Tourism attracts a large number of

non-residents to the area. This evacuation was not located in an EPZ of a commercial nuclear

power plant. However, the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant is located less than fifty miles away. 

Florida has several commercial nuclear power plants.

History of Emergencies

Central Florida is more prone than average to both natural and technological hazards. It is

located in a hurricane-prone region, and it has a high volume of interstate and railroad traffic,

making it more prone to technological hazards as well. The Kennedy Space Center is also

located in this region. The community has had previous experience with the hazard that led to
D-30

this evacuation and has experienced evacuations in the previous 10 years. The community also

had previous experience with the alerting methods used in this evacuation.

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.

Planning

The community had a written emergency plan that contained an evacuation section, and the plan

was used in this emergency. The plan did not conform to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1,

and did not contain an ETE.

Training

Training is provided to emergency response personnel and joint training between industry and

government is regularly conducted.

Drills and Exercises

Central Florida’s emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and

exercises. The emergency plan used in this evacuation was previously tested in a full-scale field

exercise. The exercise performed immediately before evacuation was a full-scale field exercise

and a tabletop exercise.

Community Awareness

The level of community awareness about local hazards and about evacuation procedures was

medium, but the level of community awareness regarding the hazard that caused this evacuation

and the methods used to alert the community was high.

THREAT CONDITIONS

On September 13, 1999, Hurricane Floyd threatened Florida as a massive Category 4 storm,

equal in power to Hurricane Andrew (1992), but four times larger. The area of hurricane-force

winds extended well over 150 miles from the eye of the storm, requiring hurricane warnings

from south Florida to Massachusetts. Weather conditions during the evacuation were clear, and

road conditions were dry. However, there were numerous traffic-related problems during the

evacuation.

CONSEQUENCES

More than two million people in Florida evacuated in response to Hurricane Floyd. 

Approximately 665,969 residents were evacuated from their homes and businesses in central

Florida. There were no injuries or deaths associated with the evacuation or the hurricane in

Florida. However, there were 56 deaths in other states, mostly caused by drowning from
D-31

freshwater floods. Hurricane Floyd caused only minor property damage as it skirted the state of

Florida. The estimated total cost of evacuation related expenses is unknown.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies was high and political

boundaries were crossed. The command, control, and coordination process could best be

described as pre-planned. The decision to evacuate was made by the County Board of

Commissioners, and there were no problems with the decision-making process.

Communications

An EOC was used but there was no ICP. Communication between field emergency responders

and the EOC was by radio, and there were no problems with communications. 

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials were notified by telephone. The time that elapsed between the discovery of

the incident and the mobilization of response personnel was approximately six days. The time

that elapsed between the start of the hazard and the decision to evacuate was 132 hours. It took

approximately 22 hours to complete the evacuation. There were no problems with notification

of emergency personnel or senior local officials. Radio and television broadcasts, police and fire

department PA systems, and a reverse-911 telephone service notified the public. The evacuation

took place all at once, and there were no problems regarding warning and subsequent citizen

action.

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were not given specific instructions about where to go when they evacuated. Many

hospitals and assisted living facilities were evacuated. Road conditions before the evacuation

were dry, and all major roadways were available to evacuees. Some people spontaneously

evacuated and some people refused to evacuate. Major traffic problems were encountered but

there were no traffic accidents. Reverse-laning was not used. 

Congregate Care Centers

The Red Cross, Salvation Army, and local agencies set up congregate care centers at schools and

churches. About four to nine percent of the evacuees used the congregate care centers. There

were shadow evacuations, which did have an impact on traffic, but did not impact congregate

care center capacity.

Law Enforcement

Local police secured the area following the evacuation. There were no instances of looting or

vandalism and no problems with law enforcement.
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Re-Entry

The county commissioner for local law enforcement authorized re-entry. There were no special

controls during the re-entry process. Insurance companies compensated evacuees for their

expenses. There were no major problems during re-entry.

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

County and state coordination and the public’s prior knowledge of the hazard and evacuations

are factors that made the evacuation work well. Some lessons learned form the evacuation were:

• People need to be better informed about who does not need to evacuate.

• Congregate Care Centers need to be visible and made more public. 

• A better system needs to be developed to communicate with people on the road. 

Some solutions that Florida has developed to address these problems are:

• The community now has a system that counts and monitors the amount of traffic across the

state.

• Florida’s public radio can now broadcast evacuation updates.

• The community now has a plan that can implement reverse-laning.

• The community now has an evacuation liaison team.

• Transportation models were developed to show evacuation transportation information

systems, and their impact on surrounding states and regions.

• The federal highway is now included in Florida’s evacuations.

• The community now has a state web site.

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

State of Florida, All Hazards Planning Manager, Division of Emergency Management, (Meeting,

August 26, 2003)

References

Dumont, Robert. “The Legacy of Hurricane Floyd-Inland Flooding and a Massive Evacuation.”

<http://www.ofcm.gov/fp-fy01/pdf/sec1.pdf>

Federal Highway Administration (U.S.). “Evacuation Traffic Information System, Southeast

Hurricane Evacuation Study.” 2003. 

<http://www.fhwaetis.com/etis/Report_Links/floyd_rpt.htm> (April 2003).
D-33

Florida Department of Transportation. “Governor’s Hurricane Evacuation Task Force Report.” 

<http://www11.myflorida.com/publicinformationoffice/EvacuationStudy/

HurricaneTaskForceReport.doc> (June 2003).

North Carolina Shore and Beach (U.S.). “Beach Nourishment for Hurricane Protection: North

Carolina Project Performance In Hurricanes Dennis and Floyd.” 2000. 

<http://www.ncshoreandbeach.org/Dennis-Floyd-Study.htm> (April 2003).

Hosock, H. “Safe But Annoyed: The Hurricane Floyd Evacuation in Florida.” Case 1652. 

Kennedy School of Government Case Programs, Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts.

The Disaster Center. “Hurricane Floyd Reports.” 

<http://www.disastercenter.com/hurricf9.htm> (June 2003).
D-34

Mims Fire, Mims, Florida, July 1998, ID #146

Summary

Rank Value: 67

Number Evacuated: 16,000

Category: Natural Disaster

Specific Type: Wildfire

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

In July 1998 a wildfire spread throughout Florida, damaging homes and causing numerous

evacuations. Fires burned near the city of Mims in Brevard County, and in Volusia and Flagler

counties to the north. Approximately 16,000 people were evacuated from Mims and Brevard

County, some on more than one occasion.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

Mims, Florida, is a suburban community with a population of approximately 9,147 people and

covers an area of 66.6 km (25.7 mi ). Approximately 16,000 people were evacuated from Mims 2 2

and Brevard County. Ethnicity, nationality, and age were not important factors in the

evacuation. 

The town of Mims is unincorporated. The main economic base is industry from the nearby

Kennedy Space Center. Tourism to the Kennedy Space Center attracts large numbers of

non-residents to the area. The nearest nuclear power plant is located more than 80 km (50 mi)

away.

History of Emergencies

The community is more prone to natural hazards than the average town and has had experience

with wildfires and hurricanes in the past. The community has experienced large-scale

evacuations in the last 10 years, although they were smaller than the evacuations during this

event. The community had not had previous experience with the alerting mechanism used

during this evacuation. 

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.
D-35

Planning

The community had a written emergency plan that was used in this emergency and the plan

included an evacuation section. It is unknown if the plan conformed to NUREG-0654/FEMAREP-1, Rev. 1, or if there was an ETE in the plan. The plan did comply with state requirements.

Training

The community provides training to emergency response personnel regularly. Joint training

between industry and government is regularly conducted; however, this is limited to high-hazard

targets.

Drills and Exercises

The community’s emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and

exercises. The emergency plan used in this evacuation had not been previously tested in

full-scale exercises. 

Community Awareness

The community had a low level of awareness about the local hazards and about evacuation

procedures. It has a low level of awareness about wildfires. The community also had a low

level of awareness about the alerting methods used in this evacuation. 

THREAT CONDITIONS

In July 1998, a wildfire in Brevard County near the town of Mims spread rapidly through the

area. There were three or four fires ongoing and then a big blowup when the fires converged. 

Most of the evacuations occurred over a four-day period. Officials initially issued a mandatory

evacuation order in Mims for about 2,000 homes. The evacuation order was lifted as sea breezes

steered the fire away, but winds switched again at nightfall, sending the fire back toward the

neighborhoods. About 250 homes were evacuated for a second time. In Brevard County, more

than 4,000 people were evacuated, some for the third time. Approximately 16,000 people were

ultimately evacuated from the area. Weather conditions were breezy with sea breezes shifting

direction. The area was very rural and very wooded, causing a difficult time for firefighters.

The roads were dry and clear except for the smoky haze that covered much of the area. There

were no unusual circumstances that occurred other than the wildfires.

CONSEQUENCES

In July 1998, wildfires had scorched large areas in Brevard County around Mims during a severe

drought. A number of cars and barns were destroyed, and there were reports of at least four

houses burned. 

Flames injured at least five firefighters in Brevard County, three with second-degree burns.

Another 12 firefighters were injured using tools for fighting the fires. Numerous firefighters
D-36

were treated for heat exhaustion. One police officer was injured during the evacuation when a

man used his vehicle to run over the officer, who was trying to dissuade people from going back

to their homes. 

There were no fatalities from the wildfires or the evacuations. The estimated total cost of the

evacuation-related expenses is unknown.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation between local, state, and federal agencies was moderate, and political

boundaries were crossed during this event. Response from Patrick Air Force Base and Kennedy

Space Center was good; however, other federal agencies were late to the scene. The command,

control, and coordination processes could best be described as pre-planned; however, the plan

was changed or altered each day. The decision to evacuate was made by the fire chief. There

were problems with the decision-making process. Many teams were exhausted, and there was a

shortage of personnel to support the evacuations. 

Communications

An EOC and an ICP were used in this emergency. Communication between field emergency

responders and the ICP was primarily by cell phone. There were problems with

communications. The radios failed very early when a microwave tower was lost due to the

amount of smoke in the area. There were also too many frequencies in use by the various

agencies when the radios did work.

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials were notified of the event by telephone. Emergency responders were

notified of the fire by a passing airplane about four days before it endangered residents. There

were no problems with notification of emergency personnel or senior local officials. The time

between discovery of the incident and mobilization of response personnel was planned around

the movement of the fire. The time elapsed between the start of the hazard and the decision to

evacuate was four days. Initial evacuations were completed within approximately six hours. 

Subsequent evacuations varied depending on the size of the area. 

The initial evacuation did occur all at once and was expanded as the fire spread. The public was

notified by radio and television broadcasts, police going door-to-door, and police and firefighters

using PA systems. Although there were no problems with warning the public, some citizens

tried to stay and fight the fires. They were unable to do so when the fire burned down power

poles, cutting power to the wells and to the water systems. 
D-37

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were initially just told to get out. However, there were very limited choices in

direction. No special institutions were evacuated. Road conditions during the evacuation were

dry and visibility was limited by the smoke. Interstate 95 was shut down between Mims and

New Smyrna Beach and a 25.6 km (16 mi) stretch of U.S. 1 along the coast was also closed. The

closure of these roads created additional traffic problems in the area. Reverse laning was not

used. Some minor accidents occurred during the evacuation. Some people did evacuate before

being told to do so, and others refused to evacuate.

Congregate Care Centers

The Red Cross established congregate care centers in schools. It is unknown how many

evacuees reported to the congregate care centers; however, only six people showed up at the

Mims Elementary School. There were shadow evacuations, which had a minor impact on traffic. 

Shadow evacuations did not impact the congregate care center capacities.

Law Enforcement

The police and Florida Highway Patrol secured the evacuation area, and there were no instances

of looting or vandalism or any problems with law enforcement. 

Re-Entry

The chairman of the county commission authorized re-entry, and no special controls were used

during re-entry. Evacuees were not compensated for their expenses. There were some major

problems with re-entry when evacuees returned to the area to find no utilities or water. 

Additionally, many evacuees went sightseeing and got into dangerous areas.

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

The evacuation worked well because the size of the fire was manageable. Evacuation problems

could have been reduced with preplanning for the residents on traffic flow and direction. 

Lessons learned included the fact that the evacuation had not been considered until after the fires

were in the vicinity of residences and this could have been discussed and planned earlier. 

Additionally, there could have been better cooperation among the emergency vehicles from the

various agencies.

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Brevard County Assistant Fire Chief

(321) 633-2056

(Personal Communication, 7/30/03)
D-38

Brevard County Fire Department

(321) 633-2056

(Personal Communication, 7/30/03)

References

“Homes spared, evacuation order lifted, but battle against fire not over.” Associated Press. July

1998.

“Wildfire burns homes; evacuations again ordered in Florida.” Associated Press. July 1998.
D-39

American Storage and Warehouse Company, Charlotte, North Carolina, 

September 2002, ID #74

Summary

Rank Value: 64

Number Evacuated: 1,000

Category: Technological Hazard

Specific Type: Fixed Site Hazmat Incident

Community: Urban

Comments: In an EPZ

INTRODUCTION

A chemical that produces noxious fumes spilled from storage drums at the American Storage

and Warehouse Company in west Charlotte, North Carolina, on the evening of September 17,

2002. Approximately 1,000 residents were forced to evacuate their homes and businesses for

more than four hours. Approximately twenty drums of thiourea dioxide, a stripping agent used

in textile dyeing, had reacted and released dangerous vapors into the air. There were no deaths,

but twelve people were treated at the hospital for breathing problems.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

Charlotte is a major city in North Carolina near the border with South Carolina. It has a total

population of 540,828 people. Approximately 1,000 residents (<1% of the population) were

evacuated within a 2.6 km (1 mi) radius of the storage facility in west Charlotte. Land use in the

area is primarily residential and industrial. The total area of Charlotte is 629 km (243 mi ) and 2 2

the evacuated area was 8.13 km (3.14 mi ). The population density of the area during the 2 2

evacuation was medium. Ethnicity, nationality, and age were not important factors in the

evacuation.

Charlotte has a mayoral form of government and its main economic base is financial services. 

Business attracts a large number of non-residents. The evacuated area was located within the

Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) of the McGuire Nuclear Power Plant in North Carolina and the

Catawba Nuclear Power Plant in South Carolina. North Carolina has three commercial nuclear

power plants.

History of Emergencies

Charlotte is no more prone to hazards than the average U.S. city. The community had very little

experience with the hazard that led to this evacuation, only a chemical fire in 1981. However,

the community had experienced hurricane-related evacuations in the previous ten years. The

community did not have previous experience with the alerting mechanism used in this
D-40

evacuation because the reverse-911 automated phone notification system is not used during

hurricane evacuations.

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.

Planning

The community had a written emergency plan with an evacuation section that was used in this

emergency. The plan conformed to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1. However, it did not

contain an ETE.

Training

Training is provided to emergency response personnel and joint training between industry and

government is regularly conducted.

Drills and Exercises

Charlotte’s emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and exercises. The

emergency plan used in this evacuation was previously tested in a full-scale field exercise. The

exercise performed immediately before this evacuation was a tabletop exercise.

Community Awareness

The level of community awareness of local hazards and of evacuation procedures was high, but

the community’s awareness about the hazard that caused this evacuation was low, and

familiarity with the alerting methods used was average.

THREAT CONDITIONS

The threat condition leading to this evacuation was a chemical spill at the American Storage and

Warehouse Company in west Charlotte on September 17, 2002. The incident was reported at

6:30 p.m. by people who saw smoke coming from the building and called 911. About twenty

drums of thiourea dioxide, a stripping agent used in textile dyeing, had reacted and released

dangerous vapors into the air but did not cause a fire. Weather conditions were cool, fair, and

dry, and the roads were dry. No unusual circumstances occurred during this incident.

CONSEQUENCES

One thousand residents were evacuated from their homes and businesses. No deaths were

associated with the incident but twelve people, including five firefighters, five police officers,

one TV news cameraman, and one resident, were treated at the hospital for breathing problems. 

The estimated total cost of evacuation-related expenses is negligible.
D-41

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies was high. Political boundaries

were not crossed. The command, control and coordination processes could best be described as

pre-planned. The Charlotte police chief made the decision to evacuate and there were no

problems with decision-making process.

Communications

An EOC was not used but there was an ICP. Communication among field emergency responders

and the ICP was by radio. There were no problems with communication.

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials were notified of the incident through the Emergency Management’s

telephone calling tree and emergency responders were notified through the 911 phone system. 

There were no problems with notification of emergency personnel or senior local officials. The

time that elapsed between discovery of the incident and mobilization of response personnel was

less than fifteen minutes and the decision to evacuate was made in ten minutes. It took

approximately twenty minutes to complete the evacuation. The public was notified through

several means, including a police/fire PA system, a reverse-911 automated phone system, and

emergency personnel going door to door. The evacuation took place all at once and there were

no problems regarding warning and subsequent citizen action.

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were given instructions about where to go to seek a congregate care center but were

not told to use specific routes. No special institutions were evacuated. Road conditions before

the evacuation were dry and there were no traffic accidents or traffic problems, and all major

roadways were available to evacuees. Reverse-laning was not used. Some people evacuated

before being told to do so and no one refused to evacuate.

Congregate Care Centers

The American Red Cross set up a congregate care center at Harding University High School and

about a dozen people showed up, or approximately 1.5% of evacuees. There were shadow

evacuations but this did not impact traffic or congregate care center capacity.

Law Enforcement

Police secured the area following the evacuation and no instances of looting or vandalism or any

problems with law enforcement occurred.

Re-Entry

At 10:45 p.m. on September 17, more than four hours since the start of the emergency,

responders allowed evacuees to return to their homes. There were no special controls during the
D-42

re-entry process. Evacuees were not compensated for their expenses. No major problems during

re-entry occurred.

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

According to the Charlotte Hazmat Captain, the reverse-911 automated phone notification

system contributed to the success of the evacuation. However, the evacuation was difficult

because the evacuation area was so large. 

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Charlotte Hazmat Captain

(704) 336-2461

(Personal Communication, 7/8/03)

References

Church World Service Emergency Response Program. “Toxic Spills \’Scary\’.” September 18,

2002. <http://www.cwserp.org/technological disasters/nes.php?newsId=12> (April 9, 2003).
D-43

CSX Train Derailment and Fire, Baltimore, Maryland, July 18, 2001, ID #96

Summary

Rank Value: 64

Number Evacuated: 10,000

Category: Technological Hazard

Specific Type: Railroad Accident

Community: Urban

INTRODUCTION

At 3:07 p.m. on Wednesday, July 18, 2001, a CSX Transportation train traveling from Hamlet,

North Carolina, to Oak Island, New Jersey, derailed in the Howard Street Tunnel under the

streets of Baltimore, Maryland. The train was carrying a variety of freight and hazardous

materials with three locomotives and sixty cars. The 2.4 km (1.5 mi) long train derailed

approximately in the middle of the 4.8 km (3 mi) long Howard Street Tunnel. Complicating the

scenario was the subsequent rupture in a 100 cm (40 in) water main that ran directly above the

tunnel. The flooding hampered extinguishing efforts, collapsed several city streets, knocked out

electricity to about 1,200 Baltimore customers, and flooded nearby buildings. The crash also

interrupted a major line associated with the internet and an MCI WorldCom fiber optic telephone

line.

After the derailment, city officials closed down entrances to the city from all major highways. 

The baseball game between the Baltimore Orioles and the Texas Rangers at nearby Camden

Yards was postponed and the stadium was evacuated. In addition, pedestrians were evacuated

from the area and local residents were requested to shelter in place. It is estimated that as many

as 10,000 people were evacuated from the area with no reports of injuries resulting from the

evacuation. It took almost an hour for the Baltimore Fire Department to be notified of the event,

which has been an issue and likely contributed to the difficulty of extinguishing the fire and

controlling the situation.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

Baltimore, Maryland is an urban community with a population of approximately 650,000 people. 

The city covers an area of 238.5 km (92.1 mi ). It has a very diverse economic base including 2 2

industry, government, commercial, retail, and all forms of business services. On July 18, 2001,

as many as 10,000 people were evacuated from the downtown area in the vicinity of the Howard

Street Tunnel. The area was moderately congested at the time of the incident because baseball

games were scheduled at Camden Yards. There was a day/night double header in which two

games are played on the same day, but not back to back. The early game had been completed

and most fans had left the area. The players, concessionaires, and stadium workers were
D-44

evacuated. Between 2,500 and 5,000 fans remained when police officials evacuated the facility. 

The remaining community area was not evacuated, but sheltered in place. Thus, the actual

percentage of the community that was evacuated is small since many of the evacuees were not

residents of the area.

The evacuation area was primarily associated with the stadium and pedestrians in the vicinity

totaling about five square blocks. Ethnicity, nationality, and age were not important factors in

the evacuation. The city is located approximately 121 km (75 mi) from a commercial nuclear

power plant, the Calvert Cliffs Reactors 1 and 2, which are approximately 65 km (40 mi) south

of Annapolis, Maryland. 

History of Emergencies

The area is no more prone to hazards than average for a city of this size. However, as a large

city, evacuations do occur, including those from floods, fires, bomb threats, and chemical

releases. The community did not have any prior experience with the combined fire and

hazardous materials inside a train tunnel. 

The community had experienced minor evacuations in the previous ten years and had experience

with the alerting mechanism used in this evacuation, police notifying people in the area to

evacuate. However, the majority of the evacuation was from the stadium, which does not

adequately represent members of the community, as these were players, fans, and workers in the

area.

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness, as described below.

Planning

Baltimore did have an emergency plan that was used in the incident. The plan contained three

pages on evacuations, but not enough detail to provide a working blueprint for evacuations. The

fire marshal who heads the mostly volunteer committee that produced the plan, said the

committee had been unable to fill several gaps in the plan because of lack of budget. According

to the plan, this was a Level III event requiring public notification to evacuate or shelter in place. 

The stadium and pedestrians in the area were evacuated while the residents of the area were

requested to shelter in place.

The plans probably did not conform to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, and it is unknown

if they contained evacuation time estimates. There have been many complaints about the

adequacy of the plan with regard to the evacuation process. 

Training

Training is provided to emergency response personnel and includes joint training with the

railroad industry. 
D-45

Drills and Exercises

Approximately six weeks before the incident, a full-scale drill was conducted with Baltimore

emergency response teams using a MARC train in an Amtrak Tunnel. The Baltimore emergency

response personnel also conducted drills in a Metro tunnel. These were passenger train drills,

not hazmat train incident drills, but did acquaint personnel with tunnel environments. 

Approximately three years earlier, training was conducted on a train and truck hazardous

materials collision.

Community Awareness

The community’s level of awareness regarding local hazards and evacuation procedures was

likely low. The community’s level of awareness about the hazard that caused the evacuation and

about the alerting methods used was also low.

THREAT CONDITIONS

At 3:07 p.m. on July 18, 2001, a CSX freight train derailed in the Howard Street Tunnel and

caught fire. The 2.4 km (1.5 mi) long train was carrying a variety of freight and hazardous

materials and derailed approximately in the middle of the 4.8 km (3 mi) long Howard Street

Tunnel. Complicating the situation was the break of a 100 cm (40 in) water line that flooded the

area and hampered fire fighting. For the first time since installing them in 1952, the city

activated its civil defense sirens at 5:45 p.m. to warn citizens of the impending danger from the

derailment and fires. The incident occurred on a warm dry day in between games of a Baltimore

Orioles day/night double header at rush hour in downtown Baltimore. 

CONSEQUENCES

The fire and flood that followed caused the evacuation of Camden Yards and the B&O

Warehouse area. Up to 5,000 fans filled the stadium along with approximately 2,000 employees,

including players and additional pedestrians in the area. The evacuation downtown at rush hour

was a complete traffic disaster. Block after block of commuters sat in bumper-to-bumper traffic

keeping abreast of the situation through cellular phones or the radio.

According to the City of Baltimore Emergency Management Plan, a public information

announcement must be made to the public during a Level III emergency. In the early stages of

the incident, the incident was determined to be a Level III emergency and the Emergency

Management Director urged that a public announcement be made over radio and television to

alert citizens and to initiate a shelter in place advisory. In the general area surrounding Mount

Royal Station, citizens were offered the choice to leave or shelter in place. Since there was some

concern over the residual effects of smoke to persons around the tunnel portals, an evacuation

order to pedestrians was broadcast. 

The city of Baltimore issued a liberal leave policy for employees, as did the state of Maryland at

State Center. As utility workers, police, and firefighters labored on Howard Street, two large
D-46

office buildings and several other businesses along the road were shut down. The downtown

business district and Howard Street especially, took a huge economic hit from the train fire. In

total, more than 10,000 people may have been evacuated in the event. At least twenty-two

people, including two firefighters with chest pains, were treated at area hospitals, most for

respiratory or eye irritation. None of these injuries were attributed directly to the evacuation. 

The estimated total cost of the actual evacuation was not determined.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies was high. Only a few political

boundaries were crossed, including city/county involvement with runoff entering the harbor. 

Baltimore has a Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) that includes the BFD to provide

community awareness and interagency cooperation. The success of this incident has been

directly related to the interagency cooperation and coordination of agencies and resources. A

few of the agencies involved included the Baltimore Fire, Police, and Emergency Management

Departments, Maryland Department of Environment, CSX Transportation, Baltimore County

Fire Department, and the U.S. Coast Guard.

The command, control and coordination processes could best be described as preplanned.

The BFD made the decision to evacuate and there were no problems with the decision-making

process.

Communications

The city of Baltimore has a consolidated Communications Center with an 800 MHz fire, police,

and public services frequency system. This system provided outstanding performance to the fire

service during the Howard Street Tunnel incident. The incident commander believed that

communications and radio capabilites of the Baltimore Fire Department were the most important

features of the incident’s success.

Notification and Warning

There were problems with notification of the event reaching the fire department, as it took

almost an hour for the fire department to be notified. However, once they were notified and

responded, the emergency management plan was activated and communication proceeded

smoothly. The mayor was called as he was attending another event and ordered the roads closed.

Emergency response personnel mobilized immediately. The decision to evacuate was made after

the fire department reached the scene more than an hour after the fire started. It is difficult to

estimate the time to complete the evacuation as many of the people were stuck in traffic for

hours. Police notified the public to evacuate by informing stadium management, and the

police/fire PA system was used to notify pedestrians in the area. Police and firefighters going

door-to-door notified some residents to shelter in place. The evacuation took place all at once
D-47

and there were no special problems regarding warning; however, there were significant traffic

problems.

Traffic Movement and Control

State highway officials closed all major roadways into the city in the hours following the

accident at the request of fire and police. Approximately 200 highway workers were stationed at

the city line to turn back motorists, and roadblocks were set up. All traffic coming from the

downtown area was rerouted away from potentially dangerous areas. The changes in traffic

routes cause rush hour gridlocks and even affected the light rail transportation in the city. By

11:30 p.m. all major roads had been reopened.

Evacuees were given specific instructions about where to go when they evacuated and were told

to use specific routes that were designated by police barricades and policemen directing traffic. 

Road conditions were dry and there were no reports of anyone refusing to evacuate.

Congregate Care Centers

Congregate care centers were not available. Shadow evacuations likely occurred; however, this

is difficult to estimate because most people in the area were provided the option to evacuate or

shelter in place.

Law Enforcement

The area was secured by the police, and there were no instances of looting or vandalism. No

problems with law enforcement were identified.

Re-Entry

The downtown streets were reopened by 11:30 p.m. with the exception of Howard Street. As

this is a commercial area, re-entry was not a problem. Businesses in the area opened again the

next day. However, businesses within a few blocks of the event were forced to stay closed

because of the flooding and smoke, and games at Camden Yards were postponed for a few days.

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

The incident, including the evacuation, was considered a success because of the excellent

performance of the city’s communication system and the coordination and cooperation of

authorities. The main problem with the evacuation was traffic control. Had the incident been

reported immediately, evacuation would have occurred closer to 3:30 p.m., and much of rush

hour may have been missed. 

CONTACTS AND REFERENCES

Maryland Emergency Management Agency 

State Emergency Operations Center
D-48

Toll Free 1-877-6362-872

<http://www.mema.state.md.us/main.html> 

References

Baltimore County, Maryland Website. “Emergency Operations Plan.” February, 2000.

<http://resources.co.ba.md.us/Documents/Imported_Documents/e/eop.pdf> (June 2003).

BMD News. “Train fire, toxic cargo shut city.” July 19, 2001.

<http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/Hall/9861/BMDnews.htm> (June 2003).

CNN. “Baltimore Still Feels Train Fire’s Effects.” July 19, 2001. 

<www.cnn.com/2001/US/07/19/train.fire/> (April 28, 2003).

FEMA. “CSX Tunnel Fire.” July 2001. 

<http://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/tr-140.pdf> (June 2003).

SunSpot.net. “Baseball fans and commuters held hostage by road closings.” July 19, 2001.

<http://www.baltimoresun.com/technology/balte.md.scene19jul19,0,4361107.story?coll=bal-tec

hnology-headlines> (June 2003).

SunSpot.net. “Chronology: With a rumble, chaos.” July 21, 2001. 

<http://www.baltimoresun.com/technology/bal-te.md.accident21jul21,0,7229827.story?coll=baltehnology-headlines> (June 2003).

The Bull Sheet. “Howard Street Tunnel Fire.” July 18, 2001. 

<http://www.bullsheet.com/news/tunnelfire.html> (June 2003).

The Daily Ardmoreite. “Freight Train Derails forcing postponement.” July 19, 2001. 

<http://www.ardmoreite.com/stories/071901/spo_orioles.shtml> (June 2003).

The WBAL Channel.com. “Progress made in tunnel fire.” July 19, 2001.

<http://www.thewbalchannel.com/News/879713/detail.html> (June 2003).

The WBAL Channel.com. “Train derails; hazardous chemicals on board.” July 19, 2001.

<http://www.thewbalchannel.com/News/878827/detail.html> (June 2003).

US Fire Administration. “CSX Tunnel Fire.” 

<http://www.usfa.fema.gov/applications/publications/tr140.cfm> (June 2003).

USA Today Sports. “Rangers vs. Orioles.” July 19, 2001.

<http://www.usatoday.com/sports/scores101/101200/101200303.htm> (June 2003).
D-49

Waltham Local Emergency Planning Committee. “Officials to improve city emergency plan.”

July 27, 2001. 

<http://www.walthamlepc.org/news/baltimore/Baltimore2.htm> (June 2003).
D-50

World Trade Center, Lower Manhattan, September 11, 2001, ID #126

Summary

Rank Value: 64

Number Evacuated: 300,000

Category: Malevolent Act

Specific Type: Malevolent Act

Community: Urban

INTRODUCTION

On September 11, 2001, 300,000 people were evacuated from lower Manhattan following an

attack on the World Trade Center (WTC). The attack involved the hijacking of two fully fueled

passenger jets, which were used as flying bombs, crashing into each of the twin towers of the

WTC and ultimately killing 2,823 people. In addition to the loss of life, the twin towers, along

with several neighboring buildings, subsequently collapsed. The evacuation included more than

8,000 children in the vicinity of Ground Zero. Ferries and tugboats were used to evacuate people

to Liberty State Park in New Jersey. Rescue and recovery took months, with the cleanup

continuing through May 2002. The total cost of the evacuation was millions of dollars.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

The WTC brought together businesses and government agencies involved in foreign trade. It

was a complex of several buildings around a central plaza, near the foot of Manhattan in New

York City. Each of the towers had 110 stories. About 50,000 people worked in the WTC, with

offices of 430 businesses from twenty-six different countries. One of the world’s largest gold

depositories was stored underneath the WTC, and was owned by a group of commercial banks.

Manhattan is one of the five boroughs that form New York City. It consists mainly of a small

island between the Hudson River to the west, the East River to the east, and the Harlem River to

the northeast, connected by bridges and tunnels to New Jersey (west), the Bronx (northeast) and

Brooklyn and Queens on Long Island (east and south). Manhattan is 21.5 km (13.4 mi) long and

has an area of 59 km (22.8 mi ). Approximately 300,000 people (or 20% of the population of 2 2

Manhattan) were ordered to evacuate after the adjacent WTC towers collapsed. Age was a factor

in the evacuation, since more than 8,000 children were evacuated from all types of schools,

ranging from day care to high schools and from fully mobile to multiply handicapped children.

The community’s main economic base is business/financial, commercial/retail, and tourism, and

the evacuated area was densely populated with business workers from surrounding areas. 
D-51

The Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant is in Westchester County, New York, just 39 km (24 mi)

north of the New York City boundary and 56 km (35 mi) north of mid-town Manhattan. The

Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant has twenty million people living within an 80 km (50 mi)

radius. 

History of Emergencies

Lower Manhattan is no more prone to natural or technological hazards than the average U.S.

city. However, a malevolent act on February 26, 1993, led to an evacuation; a bomb exploded in

the underground garage of the WTC North Tower, opening a 30 m (98 ft) hole through four

sublevels of concrete. Six people were killed and more than a thousand were injured. Primarily

due to the 1993 incident, residents and workers in lower Manhattan had previous experience

with the alerting mechanisms used in the 2001 evacuation.

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.

Planning

The New York City Fire Department (FDNY) had a written emergency plan with an evacuation

section, and it was used in this emergency. It is unknown whether the FDNY plan conformed to

the requirements of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1. Individual businesses, including the

WTC towers, also had their own evacuation plan; however, it is unknown whether these plans

were used in this emergency.

Training

Training of emergency response personnel, including joint training between industry and

government, is regularly conducted.

Drills and Exercises

Emergency drills and full-scale field exercises are regularly conducted, and the plan used in this

emergency was previously tested in a full-scale exercise. However, the type of exercise

conducted immediately prior to this evacuation is unknown. Evacuation drills have been

regularly conducted at the WTC since the 1993 bombing incident.

Community Awareness

The community likely had an average awareness of local hazards and of the hazard (i.e.,

malevolent act) that led to this evacuation. Evacuation drills had become routine following the

1993 WTC bombing and therefore, the community probably had a high level of awareness about

evacuation procedures and the alerting methods used in this evacuation.
D-52

THREAT CONDITIONS

The WTC attack was an act of malevolence. The weather was dry and clear that day. At 8:46

a.m. American Airlines Flight 11 (a fully fueled Boeing 767) crashed into the North Tower of

the World Trade Center, between floors ninety-four and ninety-eight. At 9:02 a.m. United

Airlines Flight 175 (another fully fueled Boeing 767) crashed into the south side of the South

Tower, between floors seventy-eight and eighty-four. The South Tower began to collapse soon

after it was hit, followed by the North Tower. Shortly after the jets hit, at least twenty people,

primarily in the north tower, trapped by fire and smoke in the upper floors, jumped to their

deaths. No form of airborne evacuation was attempted because the smoke was too dense for a

successful landing on the roof of either tower. People immediately evacuated in whatever

manner possible. At 10:13 a.m. thousands were evacuated from the United Nations complex in

New York. At approximately 10:48 a.m., New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani officially

ordered the evacuation of lower Manhattan. 

CONSEQUENCES

Approximately 300,000 people were evacuated from lower Manhattan. A total of 2,823 people

died and thousands more were injured. However, the deaths and injuries that occurred during

the evacuation could be directly attributed to the attack and not to the evacuation itself. The total

cost of the evacuation was millions of dollars.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Although the community was extremely well prepared for an emergency, it is difficult to prepare

for an emergency of this magnitude. This could very well have been a once in a lifetime event. 

As such, there were several problems identified during the emergency response and the FDNY,

the New York Police Department (NYPD), and other responders are working to rectify those

problems.

Decision Making

The level of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies was extremely high; however,

it was not without problems. Throughout the response, the FDNY and the NYPD rarely

coordinated command and control functions and rarely exchanged information related to

command and control. Because of the magnitude of the incident, FDNY sought aid from

Westchester and Nassau Counties. Command, control and coordination processes could best be

described as pre-planned. The mayor of New York City ordered the evacuation of lower

Manhattan, and there were no problems with the decision-making process.

Communications

An EOC and ICP were used during this emergency. Communication between field emergency

responders and ICP was by radio. Cell phones and regular phone lines were all jammed and not

useable. The FDNY’s response to the attacks of September 11 began at 8:46 a.m. and by 8:50
D-53

a.m., an ICP was established in the lobby of WTC 1 (also called the South Tower). At

approximately 9:00 a.m., the Incident Commander moved the ICP from the lobby of WTC 1 to

the far side of West Street (an eight-lane highway) opposite WTC 1, because of the increasing

risk from falling debris within and around the lobby and other safety concerns.

A number of communication difficulties hindered FDNY chief officers as they coordinated the

response. The portable radios that were used by the FDNY on September 11 do not work

reliably in high-rise buildings without having their signals amplified and rebroadcast by a

repeater system. The World Trade Center had such a system, but chief officers deemed it

inoperable early in the response after they tested it in the lobby of WTC 1.

Radio communications between chief officers in the lobby of WTC 1 and the units they sent into

the building were sporadic. The chiefs were able to get through to some units sometimes, but

not others. Some units acknowledged receiving radio communications some times, but not

others. This left the chiefs not knowing whether their messages failed to get through, whether

their units failed to acknowledge because they were busy with rescue operations, or whether the

units did acknowledge, but the acknowledgement did not get through. Because information

about civilians in distress continued to reach the operations post in the lobby, the chief officers

decided to continue their attempts to evacuate and rescue civilians, despite the communications

difficulties.

In attempts to improve their communications, chief officers tried to deploy the department’s

mobile repeater and give units “standpipe phones” that could be connected to boxes along the

building’s standpipe system. These were all ineffective.

The collapse of WTC 1 at 9:59 a.m. killed many civilians and first responders and destroyed the

ICP on West Street and the Field Communications Unit. The collapse weakened the command

and control structure as fire and EMS chiefs at the ICP, including the Incident Commander,

sought shelter in nearby structures.

Notification and Warning

Emergency responders were notified of the incident through the 911 phone/dispatch system. 

There were no problems with notification of emergency personnel or senior local officials. The

whole world knew about this event, which unfolded in the international media with live

coverage. The time that elapsed between discovery of the incident and mobilization of response

personnel was approximately two minutes. The mayor of New York City ordered the evacuation

of lower Manhattan at 10:48 a.m., approximately two hours after the start of the incident. 
D-54

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were given specific instructions about where to go when they evacuated. Many people

evacuated on foot and walked to ferries that transported them to Liberty State Park in New

Jersey. Mariners began evacuation proceedings immediately following the attacks, moving

unprecedented numbers of people to safety. One company, New York Waterway, carried more

than 160,000 people, while Seastreak America set up a decontamination center at its terminal in

addition to evacuating people off Manhattan. 

For those who did evacuate via roadways, there were no adverse weather conditions to affect

road conditions. However, there was traffic congestion and gridlock in the area. Reverse-laning

was not used since it would hamper the incoming emergency vehicles. People in the immediate

vicinity of the incident began evacuating immediately and no one refused to evacuate.

Numerous special facilities that handle children – from day care to high school seniors, from

fully mobile to multiply handicapped – were safely evacuated from the vicinity of Ground Zero

in lower Manhattan. More than 8,000 children were evacuated.

Congregate Care Centers

Congregate care centers were used and were managed by the American Red Cross. Public

buildings were used as congregate care centers and many evacuated to Liberty State Park in New

Jersey. Others left their workplaces in lower Manhattan and returned to their homes, which were

outside of the evacuated area. It is unknown how many people went to the congregate care

centers. There were no known shadow evacuations.

Law Enforcement

Police and national guardsmen secured the area following the evacuation. However, looting and

vandalism did occur. In addition, some people took advantage of the incident and committed

fraud.

Re-Entry

Re-entry was authorized by the mayor and was a controlled phased re-entry. Most people were

allowed to return to their homes; however, some businesses remained closed for several weeks

and some never reopened. There were no major problems during re-entry, although some

businesses were completely destroyed in the tragedy. Several funds were set up to help the

victims.

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

District Office for New York City Fire Department 

(718) 999-2457
D-55

References

CNN. “September 11: Chronology of terror.” September 12, 2001. 

<www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/chronology.attack/> (June 2003).

Lehmuller, P. and A. Switzer. “September 11: An Elementary School at Ground Zero.”

PRINCIPAL Magazine, March 2002. <http://www.naesp.org/comm/p0302c.htm> (June 2003).

Wikipedia. “September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attack/Timeline September 11.”

<http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/September_11,_2001_Terrorist_Attack/Timeline_September_1

1> (June 2003).

“FDNY Fire Operations Response on September 11,” New York City Fire Department.

<http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/pdf/mck_report/fire_operations_response.pdf>

“McKinsey Report - Increasing FDNY’s Preparedness,” New York City Fire Department.

<http://home.nyc.gov/html/fdny/html/mck_report/toc.shtml> 
D-56

Centennial Olympic Park, Atlanta, Georgia, July 27, 1996, ID #124

Summary

Rank Value: 64

Number Evacuated: ~60,000

Category: Malevolent Act

Specific Type: Malevolent Act

Community: Urban

INTRODUCTION

The Centennial Olympic Park bombing was a malevolent act that took place on July 27, 1996, in

Atlanta, Georgia, during the 1996 Summer Olympics. An early morning blast forced the

evacuation of approximately 60,000 people from the crowded park in downtown Atlanta. One

woman was killed from bomb shrapnel that struck her in the head, and another person, a

cameraman, died from a heart attack while running to cover the blast. The blast injured 111

others. However, there were no injuries or deaths associated with the evacuation and no unusual

circumstances or special problems that occurred during the evacuation.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

Atlanta, Georgia, is an urban city that was the host of the 1996 Summer Olympic Games. It has

a total population of 416,474 residents and has a total area of 343 km (132 mi ). Approximately 2 2

60,000 (14% of the total population) were evacuated from a 1-mi area. Population density 2

during the evacuation was high and ethnicity, nationality, or age were not important factors. 

Land use in the area is mainly commercial, and Atlanta has a mayoral form of government. The

community’s main economic base is tourism and it attracts a large number of non-residents to

the area. Atlanta is more than fifty miles away from the nearest commercial nuclear power

plant, which is in Georgia.

History of Emergencies

Atlanta is more prone to hazards that the average U.S. city because of its numerous railroads and

major highways. It is also in a tornado-prone area. The community did not have experience

with the hazard that led to this evacuation, although it did have experience with evacuations and

with the alerting mechanisms used. 

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.
D-57

Planning

The community had a written emergency plan that contained an evacuation section and was the

plan used in this emergency. It is unknown if the plan conformed to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP1, Rev. 1, or if it contained an ETE.

Training

Training is provided to emergency response personnel and joint training between industry and

government is regularly conducted.

Drills and Exercise

The community’s emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and

exercises. The emergency plan used in this evacuation was previously tested in a full-scale field

exercise, and a full-scale field exercise and a tabletop exercise were performed immediately

before this evacuation. 

Community Awareness

The level of community awareness about local hazards and about the hazard that led to this

evacuation was high. The level of community awareness about evacuation procedures and about

the alerting methods used was medium. 

THREAT CONDITIONS

The threat conditions leading to this evacuation consisted of a malevolent act that took place on

July 27, 1996, in Atlanta, Georgia, during the 1996 Summer Olympics. An early-morning blast

forced the evacuation of approximately 60,000 people from the crowded park in downtown

Atlanta. According to CNN News, the attack happened as follows: At 12:58 a.m., a security

guard found an unattended bag beneath a sound control tower and he alerted the bomb disposal

team. Then at 1:07 a.m., a male called 911 warning that the bag would explode in thirty

minutes. At 1:08 a.m., bomb experts identified wires and a pipe within the bag and began to

evacuate park visitors. At 1:20 a.m., the bomb exploded. Downtown Atlanta was sealed off at

2 a.m.

A few hours after the bombing, Richard Jewell was named as the prime suspect, but it was later

discovered that Eric Robert Rudolph was to blame. Weather conditions were warm and clear

and road conditions were dry. There were no unusual circumstances or special problems that

occurred during the evacuation.

CONSEQUENCES

On July 27, 1996, in Atlanta, Georgia, a bombing occurred in the crowded Centennial Olympic

Park. One woman was killed from bomb shrapnel that struck her in the head and another person,

a cameraman, died from a heart attack while running to cover the blast. The blast injured 111

others. However, no injuries or deaths associated with the evacuation occurred, and no unusual
D-58

circumstances or special problems occurred during the evacuation. The estimated total cost of

evacuation-related expenses is unknown.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation between local, state, and federal agencies was high and political

boundaries were crossed. The command, control, and coordination processes could best be

described as pre-planned. The decision to evacuate was made by venue authorities and the state

EOC. There were no problems with the decision-making process.

Communication

An EOC and an ICP were used in this emergency. Communication between field emergency

responders and the EOC was by radio and cell phone, and there were no problems with

communications.

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials were made aware of the incident by means of a notification tree, and local

police and a 911 phone call notified emergency responders. The time that elapsed between the

discovery of the incident and mobilization of response personnel was less than fifteen minutes. 

The time between the start of the hazard and the decision to evacuate was ten minutes. The

evacuation happened all at once and took 55 minutes to complete. There was no problem with

notification of emergency personnel or senior local officials. The public was notified by

emergency personnel telling evacuees face to face. There were no special problems regarding

warning or subsequent citizen action.

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were not given specific instructions about where to go when they evacuated or specific

routes to use. There were no special institutions evacuated. Road conditions before the

evacuation were dry and no special traffic problems were encountered. Reverse-laning was not

used and there were no traffic accidents during the evacuation. No one evacuated before being

told to do so and no one refused to evacuate.

Congregate Care Centers

Congregate care centers were not used. There were shadow evacuations but they did not impact

traffic.

Law Enforcement

Police secured the area following the evacuation to prevent looting and vandalism. There were

no instances of looting or vandalism and no problems with law enforcement.
D-59

Re-Entry

A joint decision of city, state, and Olympic committees authorized re-entry. There were no

special controls during the re-entry process. Evacuees were not compensated for their expenses

and no major problems occurred during re-entry.

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

The proximity of the blast and getting everyone to cooperate were factors that made the

evacuation work well. 

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Georgia Emergency Management Agency Public Affairs Officer

(404) 635-7022

Personal Contact 9/8/03

References

<http://www,wikipedia.org/wiki/Centennial_Olympic_Park_bombing>

<http://www.emergency.com/olymsec.htm>

<http://www.wikipedia.org/w/wiki.phtml?title=Atlanta%2C_Georgia&printable=yes>

<http://atlanta.fbi.gov/rudolph/bombsite2>

<http://www.securitysolutions.com>
D-60

Gaylord Tank Car Failure, Bogalusa, Louisiana, October 23, 1995, ID #18

Summary

Rank Value: 62

Number Evacuated: 3,000

Category: Technological Hazard

Specific Type: Railroad Accident

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

On October 23, 1995, a railroad tank car at the Gaylord Chemical Corporation Plant in Bogalusa,

Louisiana, exploded, releasing poisonous and corrosive nitrogen tetroxide vapors. 

Approximately 3,000 people were evacuated between October 23 and October 24 because of the

vapor cloud, and 4,710 people were treated for irritated eyes and sore throats at local hospitals;

81 people were admitted. 

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

Bogalusa, Louisiana, is a suburban parish of 13,365 people based on the 2000 Census (14,280

people based on the 1990 census). It covers an area of 24.7 km (9.5 mi ). Approximately 3,000 2 2

people, or slightly more than 20% of the population, were evacuated as a result of the tank car

failure at Gaylord Chemical Corporation on October 23, 1995. The evacuated area was

primarily residential and covered 8.1 km (3.14 mi ). The population density at the time of the 2 2

evacuation was average (medium). Ethnicity, nationality, and age were not important factors in

evacuation.

Bogalusa is a manufacturing and trading center situated on the Pearl River. It has a mayoral

form of government. There are no special characteristics that attract a large number of nonresidents. Bogalusa is approximately 145 km (90 mi) from the River Bend Nuclear Power Plant

and 113 km (70 mi) from the Waterford Nuclear Power Plant, which are both in Louisiana.

History of Emergencies

Because it is a manufacturing center, the city may be slightly more prone to technological

hazards, and it is within a hurricane-prone state, making it more prone to natural disasters than

the average U.S. city. The community did not have any prior experience with the hazard that led

to this evacuation and had not experienced any evacuations in the previous 10 years. Bogalusa

residents did not have previous experience with the alerting mechanism used in this evacuation.
D-61

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.

Planning

Bogalusa does not have a written emergency plan. The Gaylord Chemical Plant’s emergency

response plan was the one in place. The plan likely did not conform to NUREG-0654/FEMAREP-1, Rev. 1, and the Bogalusa Fire Department does participate in this plan. Although

Louisiana passed a state law in 1989 designed to force petrochemical companies and local

emergency planning committees (LEPCs) to work together to plan for worst-case accidents, that

law was never implemented because the Department of Environmental Quality was still working

on the regulation.

Training

Training is provided to emergency response personnel, but joint training between industry and

government is not conducted.

Drills and Exercises

Bogalusa’s emergency response agencies do not regularly conduct emergency drills and

exercises.

Community Awareness

The level of community awareness about local hazards, evacuation procedures, and about the

hazard that caused this evacuation was low. The community probably had an average awareness

about the alerting methods used.

THREAT CONDITIONS

The threat condition leading to the evacuation was a release of poisonous and corrosive vapors

from a failed tank car at the Gaylord Chemical Plant. Around 3:55 p.m. on October 23, 1995,

yellow-brown vapors began leaking from a railroad tank car that contained a mixture of nitrogen

tetroxide and water. Plant personnel notified emergency response agencies, and Bogalusa fire

personnel arrived at the scene around 4:30 p.m. and set up fire hoses to help suppress the vapors. 

At about 4:45 p.m., the tank car exploded, resulting in one end of the tank car jacket being torn

away and thrown about 106.7 m (350 ft). The tank car was then propelled 10.7 m (35 ft) down

the track and derailed at a track bumping block, releasing a large reddish-brown vapor cloud. 

Vapors continued to be released for another 36 hours until the chemical reaction within the tank

was brought under control through neutralization and dilution. 

It was cloudy and windy but the road conditions were dry. However, the emergency response

and ensuing evacuations encountered several special problems. The response was hampered by

the absence of the fire chief, who was being treated at the hospital, and the fact that the
D-62

explosion cut off telephone service in most of Bogalusa. In addition, the streets were jammed

with frightened residents attempting to leave. Emergency medical facilities were taxed to the

limit by injured residents and rescuers, most suffering from burned eyes, irritated skin and

difficulty breathing. In addition, one of the two hospitals available to treat victims was located

inside the evacuation zone. 

CONSEQUENCES

Approximately 3,000 people, or slightly more than 20% of the population, were evacuated. 

There were no deaths or injuries related to the evacuation itself; however, 4,710 people were

treated at local hospitals and 81 people were admitted because of the vapor cloud consisting of

nitrogen tetroxide gas, which is poisonous when inhaled. The estimated total cost of evacuationrelated expenses is unknown.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation between local, state, and federal agencies was high. The incident

involved the state police, two federal agencies, the National Transportation Safety Board

(NTSB) and the Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA), and hazmat teams from

Slidell, Louisiana, and Mobil Oil in Chalmette, Louisiana. Political boundaries were not

crossed. The command, control and coordination processes could best be described as ad hoc. 

The fire chief made the decision to evacuate just before being taken to the hospital to be treated

for inhalation problems. There were no problems in the decision-making process.

Communications

An EOC, including an ICP, was used in this emergency. The Louisiana State Police assumed

command of the incident, as dictated by state law, and the incident commander initiated the

mutual aid system. Because Bogalusa is part of a mutual aid system, the fire department has no

hazmat team and no chemical protective equipment. The Bogalusa Fire Department does

participate in Gaylord’s emergency response plan. Hazmat teams from Slidell and Mobil Oil in

Chalmette were called to the scene. A command center was established, but was moved twice

because of shifting winds. Field emergency responders communicated via radio since the

explosion cut off telephone service in much of Bogalusa. There were problems with

communications because the field responders and EOC were on different radio frequencies.

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials were called and paged and the governor declared a state of emergency. 

Emergency personnel were notified through the 911 system. There were no problems with

notification. Emergency response personnel mobilized to the scene within 15 minutes of

discovery of the incident, and the decision to evacuate was made between 15 and 30 minutes

from the start of the hazard. There were at least two, and possibly three, stages to the

evacuation, although the details are vague. The first stage of the evacuation involved 3,000
D-63

people within a 2.6 km (1 mi) radius and took 1.5 hours to complete. According to published

reports, additional residents were evacuated 24 hours after the initial evacuation (i.e., Stage 2 on

October 24). The public was notified by officers who went door-to-door and by a police/fire PA

system, as well as by radio and television broadcasts. There were no special problems regarding

warning and subsequent citizen action. Citizens were reportedly very cooperative.

Traffic Movement and Control

The Bogalusa fire and police departments set up roadblocks when they arrived on the scene and

immediately made plans for an evacuation. The streets were jammed with frightened residents

attempting to leave. Evacuees were not told to use specific routes and it is unknown if they were

told where to go. No special institutions were evacuated.

No major roadways were unavailable and reverse laning was not used. Some people

spontaneously evacuated before being told to do so when they saw the “mushroom cloud.” There

were no traffic accidents during the evacuations. There were a few instances of people refusing

to evacuate.

Congregate Care Centers

Congregate care centers managed by the Red Cross were used as were churches. The percentage

of evacuees who went to congregate care centers is not known. Evacuation congregate care

centers had to be moved at least once due to changing wind direction. There were some shadow

evacuations but this did not impact traffic and it is unknown if it impacted congregate care center

capacity.

Law Enforcement

The evacuated area was secured by police. There were 600–700 law enforcement officers on the

scene, and there were no instances of looting or vandalism and no problems with law enforcement.

Re-Entry

The state police chief authorized re-entry on the morning of October 25, 1995, two days after the

start of the hazard. There were no special controls on re-entry and no problems associated with

re-entry. Evacuees were not compensated for their expenses.

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

The Bogalusa Fire Department showed a high level of professionalism in its response to the

incident. They secured the scene, called for help, gathered information, and assisted the IC. In

addition, the alerting mechanisms were effective.

The Bogalusa Fire Department felt that notification of the incident could have been move timely. 

In addition, the Fire Department had no hazmat team and no chemical protective equipment. 

The department does participate in Gaylord Chemical Plant’s emergency response plan. 
D-64

Although Louisiana passed a state law in 1989 to force petrochemical companies and LEPCs to

work together to plan for worst-case accidents, that law has never been implemented because the

Department of Environmental Quality is still working on the regulation. 

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Bogalusa, Louisiana Fire Chief

Bogalusa, Louisiana Police Chief

Local American Red Cross

(985) 732-6217 (phone)

(Personal Communication, 6/27/03)

References

Ayers, Shirley. “Rocket Fuel Explosion Releases Toxic Cloud, Thousands Injured.” Dispatch. 

Volume VII, No. 1. Spring 1996. <http://www.efilmgroup.com/Dispatch/dis2.html> (June

2003).

Encyclopedia (U.S.), “Bogalusa.”

<http://www.encyclopedia.com/html/B/Bogalusa.asp> (June 2003).

National Transportation Safety Board (U.S.) (NTSB). HZB-98-01, “Tank Car Failure and

Release of Poisonous and Corrosive Vapors, Gaylord Chemical Corporation, Bogalusa,

Louisiana.” NTSB: Washington, D.C. October 1995.
D-65

Union Pacific Railroad, Eunice, Louisiana, May 27, 2000, ID #30

Summary

Rank Value: 62

Number Evacuated: 2,000–3,500

Category: Technological Hazard

Specific Type: Railroad Accident

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

On May 27, 2000, at least 2,000, and potentially as many as 3,500, residents of Eunice,

Louisiana, were evacuated from their homes after a Union Pacific Railroad train derailed on the

edge of town, sparking several blasts that sent fireballs into the sky. Thirty-two of the train’s

113 cars derailed, including several tank cars loaded with hazardous chemicals that included

acrylic acid and dichloropropane. No injuries were reported. The fire burned for several days,

hampering cleanup and investigation efforts. Residents were allowed to begin returning to their

homes after five days.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

Eunice, Louisiana, located approximately 120.7 km (75 mi) west of Baton Rouge, is classified as

suburban although it is a combination of residential areas, manufacturing plants, and retail

outlets. It has a total population of 11,500 and covers an area of 12.1 km (4.7 mi ). Between

2 2

2,000 and 3,500 residents (or between 17% and 30% of the population) were ordered to evacuate

on May 27, 2000, after a train containing hazardous cargo derailed and caught fire at the edge of

town. The evacuation area was between 7.8 and 31.1 km (3 and 12 mi ). The population 2 2

density at the time of the evacuation was average. Ethnicity, nationality, and age were not

important factors in the evacuation.

Eunice is a small city with a mayoral form of government. The main economic base is

manufacturing and industry (petroleum). There are no special characteristics that would attract a

large number of non-residents (although there is a Cajun Music Hall of Fame). The nearest

commercial nuclear power plant is over 80 km (50 mi) away. The state of Louisiana has two

commercial nuclear power plants.

History of Emergencies

Compared to similar communities, Eunice is more prone to technological hazards because of the

petroleum industry in the area and more prone to natural disasters, such as hurricanes. The

community did not have any experience with the hazard that led to this evacuation and it is
D-66

unknown if there were any evacuations in the previous 10 years or if the community had

previous experience with the alerting mechanism used in this evacuation.

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.

Planning

Eunice has a written emergency plan with an evacuation section, and it was used in this

emergency. However, the plan is not written to the rigor of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev.

1, and it contains no ETE. 

Training

Emergency responders receive training on a routine basis. Firefighters, for example, receive a

minimum of twenty hours of training per month, which includes emergency drills, exercises, and

full-scale field exercises. Joint training is conducted with the state police and the EPA on a

routine basis. 

Drills and Exercises

The community’s emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and

exercises, and the emergency plan used in this evacuation was previously tested in a full-scale

field exercise. The exercise performed immediately before this evacuation was likely a fullscale field exercise.

Community Awareness

The community’s awareness of local hazards and of evacuation procedures was likely no higher

than average. The level of awareness concerning the hazard that caused this evacuation was low,

while the level of community awareness about the alerting methods used was average.

THREAT CONDITIONS

On May 27, 2000, a Union Pacific Railroad train containing hazardous cargo derailed and caught

fire at the edge of Eunice, Louisiana. The evacuation of between 2,000 and 3,500 residents

occurred on a Saturday morning under clear and dry weather conditions. Roads were also clear

and dry, and there were no unusual circumstances that occurred during this incident.

According to the Eunice fire chief, the fire was contained within the area where 32 boxcars

derailed. The fire jumped from boxcar to boxcar. One hour after the derailment, there was a

major explosion, the cause of which was undetermined. The explosion was followed by a

miniature mushroom cloud that hung in the air for a long time. Within the cloud, were green,

blue, lavender, and other rainbow colors (from chemicals). One-and-one-half hours later (i.e.,

2.5 hours from the initial derailment) there was a second (bigger) explosion which was probably

a propane tank, the heat from which was felt 2.4 km (1.5 mi) away. The fires continued for four
D-67

to five days following the derailment. Some fires/explosions were intentionally set to burn off

chemicals (e.g., cyanide, acrylic acids). Wood and grass along the railroad tracks continued to

burn for five days following the derailment. Fires were always contained within that area (i.e.,

no homes burned).

CONSEQUENCES

The derailment of the Union Pacific Railroad train on May 27, 2000, forced the evacuation of

between 2,000 and 3,500 residents. There were no deaths or injuries caused by the accident or

the evacuation. The estimated total cost of evacuation-related expenses was approximately

$200,000.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies was high. Political boundaries

were not crossed. The command, control and coordination processes could best be described as

ad hoc. The decision to evacuate was made by the police chief and there were no problems in

the decision-making process.

Communications

An EOC, including an ICP, was used in this emergency. The Louisiana State Police assumed

command of the incident, as dictated by state law. Field emergency responders communicated

via cell phone and pager. No problems were identified with communications.

Notification and Warning

It is unknown how senior local officials were notified of the incident; however, everyone in

Eunice was aware of the incident and there were no problems with notification of emergency

personnel or senior local officials. Emergency responders were notified through 911 dispatch. 

The elapsed time between discovery of the incident and mobilization of response personnel was

less than 15 minutes and the decision to evacuate was made in two minutes. The police went

door-to-door to notify residents to evacuate. A police/fire PA system was also used. There were

no special problems regarding warning and subsequent citizen action, although some people

refused to evacuate and some people were evacuated more than once. The evacuation occurred

in three stages, as described in the next paragraph.

According to a state policeman, the evacuation occurred in three stages. In the first stage,

approximately 200 people were evacuated within a few blocks of the derailment. The first stage

of the evacuation was completed in approximately 45 minutes. The second stage of the

evacuation occurred within one hour of the derailment and included approximately 1,500 people

within a 2.6 km (1 mi) radius of the accident. It took over two hours to complete this

evacuation. The final stage of the evacuation involved 2,000 people and was initiated within two

hours of the accident. It included residents within a 3.2 km (2 mi) radius from the derailment. 
D-68

The final stage of the evacuation was 95% complete by the following day (i.e., 24 hours later). 

Some people refused to comply with the evacuation order.

Traffic Movement and Control

When ordered to evacuate, evacuees were told to go to three specific hotels designated by Union

Pacific Railroad. Evacuees were told to use specific routes and police directed traffic. No

special institutions were evacuated. Road conditions before the evacuation were dry and no

major roadways were unavailable for use. No special traffic problems were encountered and no

traffic accidents occurred. Since the evacuation was initiated immediately, there was no time for

spontaneous evacuations. Reverse-laning likely was not used. Some people refused to evacuate.

Congregate Care Centers

Congregate care centers were not used. However, the Union Pacific Railroad put up 550

families in hotels, filling up rooms up to 64 km (40 mi) away. The Union Pacific Railroad also

made arrangements to feed pets that were left behind during the evacuations. There were no

shadow evacuations.

Law Enforcement

Police secured the evacuated area and there were no instances of looting or vandalism or any

problems with law enforcement.

Re-Entry

The police chief, in collaboration with state officials, authorized re-entry. The evacuation order

was lifted on Thursday afternoon (i.e., five days following derailment) and people outside of a

2.6 km (1 mi) radius of the derailment were allowed to return to their homes. It was a controlled

phased re-entry. No major problems were identified during re-entry. The Union Pacific

Railroad compensated evacuees for their expenses.

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

The timing of the incident, the fact that it happened on a Saturday morning when everyone was

at home, facilitated evacuation of residents. In addition, the quick response of emergency

responders and the high level of preparedness of the police and other officials made the

evacuation work well.

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Eunice Local Police

(Personal Communication, May 31, 2000)
D-69

Eunice Fire Chief 

(Personal Communication, June 29, 2000)

Acting Eunice Fire Chief 

(Personal Communications, June 20 and 24, 2003)

References

“Cars Explode After Train Derails.” Reuters Ltd. May 28, 2000.

“Fire Ignites After Freight Train Derails in Louisiana.” Associated Press. May 28, 2000.

Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness. “State of Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan

Supplement 1A.” January 2000.

<http://www.loep.state.la.us/Plans/EOPSupplement1a.pdf> (June 2003).

Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness. “State of Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan

Supplement 1B.” January 2000.

<http://www.loep.state.la.us/Plans/EOPSupplement1b.pdf > (June 2003).

“Train Derails.” Associated Press. May 29, 2000.
D-70

Brandon Pipeline Rupture, Florida, May 27, 2003, ID #235

Summary

Rank Value: 62

Number Evacuated: 2,000

Category: Technological Hazard

Specific Type: Pipeline Rupture

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

An anhydrous ammonia leak from a ruptured underground pipeline owned by Tampa Pipeline

Corp. forced the evacuation of more than 2,000 children from an elementary school and middle

school southeast of downtown Tampa. Nearby residents were not evacuated but were advised to

stay inside.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

Brandon, Florida, is a suburban community with a population of approximately 78,000 people; it

covers an area of 75.9 km (29.3 mi ). Approximately 2,000 people, or 2.5%, of the population, 2 2

were evacuated from a 5.1 km (2 mi ) area during this incident. The land use in the area was 2 2

mainly for schools and the population density of the area was low. Ethnicity and nationality

were not important factors in the evacuation; however, age was a factor as most of the evacuees

were schoolchildren.

The community has a county commission form of government, and has a limited economic base,

as the town is a bedroom community. Tourism attracts a large number of non-residents, or

“snowbirds,” to the area. The nearest nuclear power plant is Crystal River, located more than 80

km (50 mi) away. Florida has nuclear power plants.

History of Emergencies

The community is more prone to hazards than average and has had experience with ammonia

leaks in the past on a smaller scale. The community also has experienced industrial facility

incidents and hurricanes and has experienced large-scale evacuations in the last 10 years. The

community has not had previous experience with alerting only schools.

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.
D-71

Planning

The community had a written emergency plan with an evacuation section that was used in this

emergency. It is unknown if the plan conformed to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, or if

there was an ETE in the plan.

Training

The community provides training to emergency response personnel and regularly conducts joint

training between industry and government.

Drills and Exercises

The community’s emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and

exercises. The emergency plan used in this evacuation was previously tested in full-scale field

exercises and in tabletop exercises. 

Community Awareness

The community had a medium level awareness of the local hazards and a high level of awareness

of evacuation procedures. It had a medium level of awareness about hazardous materials in

general and no awareness about the alerting methods used in this evacuation. 

THREAT CONDITIONS

On May 27, 2003, an underground pipeline owned by Tampa Pipeline Corp. ruptured and leaked

anhydrous ammonia. Nearby residents were advised to stay inside, and traffic was detoured

around the leak, which happened on a main thoroughfare near an upscale development of

approximately 1,200 homes. An elementary school and a middle school in the area required

evacuation. It was early in the morning at approximately 7 a.m. on a hot day with a light fog in

the area. The roads were dry and clear and no unusual circumstances occurred during this event.

CONSEQUENCES

Approximately 2,000 people within a 5.1 km (2 mi ) area were evacuated from two schools 2 2

after ammonia leaked from a ruptured pipeline. The evacuees were primarily children from the

two schools. The remaining residents in the area were advised to shelter in place and stay in

their homes. There were no fatalities or injuries from the incident or the evacuation. The

estimated total cost of evacuation-related expenses is unknown.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation between local and state agencies was high, and political boundaries

were not crossed in this event. The command, control, and coordination processes could best be

described as pre-planned. The decision to evacuate was made by the Fire Department Incident

Commander, and there were no problems with the decision-making process. 
D-72

Communications

An EOC was not used in this event; however, an ICP was established. Communication between

field emergency responders and the ICP was primarily by radio and face to face. There were no

problems with communications during the event.

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials were notified of the incident by a telephone tree and e-mail. The

emergency responders were notified through a 911 telephone call from the school. There were

no problems with the notification of emergency personnel or senior local officials. The elapsed

time between discovery of the incident and mobilization of response personnel was less than 15

minutes, and the initial decision to evacuate was made approximately 30 minutes after the

notification of the incident. It took less than one hour to complete the evacuation. 

The two schools were the only facilities evacuated, and they were notified directly by the police. 

The evacuation took place all at once and there were no problems with warning and subsequent

citizen action. No one refused to evacuate. 

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were given instructions on where to go. The schools were the only special institutions

evacuated. Road conditions during the evacuation were dry and no traffic accidents or trafficrelated problems occurred during the event. One road in the area was closed, creating a

moderate traffic problem. Reverse-laning was not used.

Congregate Care Centers

Congregate care centers were established at local schools for this emergency and were managed

by the school administration. All of the evacuees, 100%, went to the congregate care centers. 

There were some shadow evacuations where people left the area because of the odor. Some of

these people went to a local campground. These shadow evacuations had no impact on the

congregate care centers. 

Law Enforcement

Police and the sheriff secured the area following the evacuation and there were no instances of

looting or vandalism or any problems with law enforcement. 

Re-Entry

Re-entry was authorized by the fire chief and there were no special controls. Evacuees were not

compensated for their expenses. There were no problems reported during re-entry.
D-73

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

Preplanning efforts contributed to the success of this evacuation. It was learned that

improvements could be made in notifying the public officials. 

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Hillsborough County Fire Rescue 

Special Operations Chief 

(813) 272-6600

(Personal Communication, 8/6/03)

References

“Tampa ammonia leak disrupts schools, traffic.” Associated Press. May 28, 2003. 
D-74

Mathis Farm Supply Store, Slocumb, Alabama, February 11, 2003, ID #75

Summary

Rank Value: 62

Number Evacuated: 3,500

Category: Technological Hazard

Specific Type: Fixed Site Hazmat Incident

Community: Rural

INTRODUCTION

On February 11, 2003, a fire at a farm supply store housing dangerous chemicals prompted the

evacuation of about 3,500 people within a 3.2 km (2 mi) radius of the site in Slocomb, Alabama. 

One school and two senior citizen centers had to be evacuated. The evacuated area was located

at least 32.2 km (20 mi) from the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Power Plant located near Dothan,

Alabama. 

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

Slocumb, Alabama, is a rural community with a population of around 4,200 people. 

Approximately 3,500 people, or 83% of the population, were evacuated in the middle of the day. 

The evacuated area was primarily residential and included a school and two senior citizen

centers. Population density was high during the evacuation. The city of Slocumb covers

approximately 23.3 km (9 mi ) and the evacuated area was approximately 32.6 km (12.6 mi ). 2 2 2 2

Ethnicity, nationality, and age were not important factors in the evacuation.

Slocumb has a mayoral form of government and its main economic base is farming.

The schools in Slocumb attract other people from around the county. Alabama has two

commercial nuclear power plants; one is in the northern part of state, 16.1 km (10 mi) northwest

of Decatur, and the other is 29 km (18 mi) southeast of Dothan, or at least 32.2 km (20 mi) from

the site of this evacuation.

History of Emergencies

Slocumb is no more prone to hazards than the average U.S. city. The community has not had

any experience with the hazard that led to this evacuation nor experienced any evacuations in the

previous 10 years.
D-75

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.

Planning

The community had a written emergency plan with an evacuation section that was used in this

emergency. The plan did not conform to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, and did not

contain an ETE.

Training

The city of Slocumb provides training to its emergency response personnel. However, joint

training between industry and government is not regularly conducted.

Drills and Exercises

Slocumb’s emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and exercises. 

However, the emergency plan used in this evacuation had not been previously tested in a fullscale field exercise.

Community Awareness

Residents of Slocumb had a low awareness of local hazards and of the hazard that caused this

evacuation. The community’s awareness about evacuation procedures and about the alerting

methods used was average.

THREAT CONDITIONS

A fire at the Mathis Farm Supply in Slocumb, Alabama, at approximately 11:00 a.m. on

Tuesday, February 11, 2003, prompted the evacuation of about 3,500 people. The Mathis Farm

Supply, located a few miles from the Florida line, contained numerous fertilizer products. The

evacuation proceeded with no unusual circumstances. It was sunny but windy that day and the

road conditions were good.

CONSEQUENCES

Approximately 3,500 people were evacuated from Slocumb, Alabama, after the fire broke out at

the Mathis Farm Supply. There were no reported deaths or injuries resulting from the fire or the

subsequent evacuation. Schoolchildren were taken to a high school stadium and an elementary

school gym, and congregate care centers were opened at two churches. The total estimated cost

of evacuation-related expenses and property damages was approximately $10,000 to $15,000.
D-76

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies was very high. No political

boundaries were crossed during this evacuation. The command, control, and coordination

processes could best be described as pre-planned. The decision to evacuate was made by the

mayor, based on the Hazmat team’s assessment of the situation. There were no problems in the

decision-making process.

Communications

There was an ICP but no EOC used in this emergency. Emergency communication was via

radio and communication was a problem because emergency personnel were on different radio

frequencies.

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials were notified of the incident by radio and telephone, and emergency

responders were notified by pager and radio, following report of the incident through the 911

emergency system. There were no problems with notification of emergency personnel or senior

local officials. Response personnel mobilized to the scene in less than 15 minutes, and the

decision to evacuate was made in 20 minutes. It took one hour to complete the evacuation. The

public was notified of the evacuation by sirens and by door-to-door notification. The evacuation

was staged by location. There were no special problems regarding warning and subsequent

citizen action.

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were given specific instructions about where to go when they evacuated and were told

to use specific routes. However, these routes were not specifically marked. Reverse-laning was

not used. One school and two senior citizen centers were evacuated. Road conditions before the

evacuation were dry. Major roadways were available for use, and no special traffic problems or

accidents occurred during the evacuation. No one evacuated before being told to do so and no

one refused to evacuate.

Congregate Care Centers

Congregate care centers were managed by the Red Cross and by volunteers. Congregate care

centers included a high-school stadium and an elementary school gym, and two congregate care

centers located at churches. The percentage of evacuees that went to congregate care centers is

unknown. There were no shadow evacuations.

Law Enforcement

Police secured the evacuated area following the evacuation, and there were no instances of

looting or vandalism or any other problems with law enforcement.
D-77

Re-Entry

Re-entry was authorized by Slocumb’s mayor and there were no special controls during the reentry process. Evacuees were not compensated for their expenses. There were no major

problems during re-entry.

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

According to the Slocumb fire chief, the coordination among agencies contributed to the success

of the evacuation. In addition, one of the lessons learned is that it is difficult to get information

on chemical mixtures (referring here to the hazmat response and not to the evacuation). 

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Slocumb Fire Chief

(334) 684-2257

(Personal Communication, 7/7/03)

References

Chemical Incidents Report Center. “Fire at Farm Supply Store.” February 11, 2003. 

<www.chemsafety.gov/circ/post.cfm> (April 9, 2003).
D-78

Choctaw Maid Farm Poultry Plant, Forest, Mississippi, March 20, 2001, ID #4

Summary

Rank Value: 62

Number Evacuated: 2,000

Category: Technological Hazard

Specific Type: Fixed Site Hazmat Incident

Community: Rural

INTRODUCTION

On March 20, 2001, a fire started in a poultry processing plant in Forest, Mississippi. 

Approximately 2,000 people were evacuated from the town. The evacuation occurred in the

downwind direction from the plant and included schools, businesses, residences, and the Scott

County Jail covering an area of approximately 7.8 km (3 mi ). Three people were hospitalized 2 2

from the event; no injuries were reported from the evacuation. During the course of the event a

rainstorm moved in lowering the temperature and increasing winds. 

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

The city of Forest, Mississippi, is a small urban community with a mayoral form of government. 

It has a population of approximately 5,900 people and covers an area of 33.7 km (13 mi ). Its 2 2

main economic base is manufacturing and industry. On March 20, 2001, approximately 2,000

people were evacuated after a fire started in the Choctaw Maid Farm poultry plant.

The area was not congested at the time of the evacuation. According to the Forest fire chief,

approximately 25% of the community was evacuated. The evacuation area was primarily

industrial, commercial and residential. Ethnicity, nationality, and age were not important factors

in the evacuation. The city is located more than 80 km (50 mi) from the nearest commercial

nuclear power plant, the Grand Gulf Reactor. 

History of Emergencies

The area is prone to similar hazards but this is the largest event in at least 15 years. The

community had prior experience with the hazard that led to this evacuation, including an

ammonia explosion at a poultry plant the previous year. As a result, the fire department was

more prepared for this event. The Forest fire chief stated that this was the largest evacuation in

the 15 years he had been in Forest. There have been a number of smaller evacuations in the

community in the previous years and the same means of alerting people was used for this

evacuation, including using the telephone for the schools and patrolmen going door to door to

notify businesses and residences.
D-79

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.

Planning

Forest had a written emergency plan that contained an evacuation section. However, the plan

was under revision at the time. The plan conformed to federal guidelines and was used in this

emergency. The plan probably did not conform to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, as it

did not contain ETEs and routing information was based on town quadrants rather than the

hazard or wind direction. The Forest fire department does use ETEs for evacuating schools. The

ETE for the schools is 15 minutes and the schools were evacuated within the ETE.

According to the Forest chief of police, prior planning for evacuations was a major contributor to

the success of this evacuation.

Training

Training is provided to emergency response personnel, and joint training between industry and

government is conducted.

Drills and Exercises

The Forest Fire Department regularly conducts emergency drills and exercises with the schools. 

The Fire Department and Police Department conduct planning sessions and tabletop drills for

evacuations.

Community Awareness

The community’s level of awareness about local hazards was high. The community’s level of

awareness about the hazard that caused the evacuation and the alerting methods used was also

high, although the size of the evacuation for this event was significantly larger than that of any

previous evacuations. 

THREAT CONDITIONS

The hazard that led to this evacuation was a fire at the Choctaw Maid Farm poultry plant. The

incident occurred on a lightly overcast morning. However, during the course of the event, a

rainstorm moved in lowering the temperature and increasing the wind speed. The evacuation

was slightly hampered by the direction of the wind. The evacuation plan had segmented the

town into quadrants and evacuation routes were based on the quadrants. However, the wind

direction dictated the direction of evacuation traffic. 
D-80

CONSEQUENCES

On the morning of March 20, 2001, a fire started at the Choctaw Maid Farm poultry plant, and a

911 emergency call was placed from the plant to the local Fire Department. The Fire

Department was on scene within ten minutes. Evacuation of the plant was initiated before the

arrival of the Fire Department. Evacuation of the Tyson plant across the street and of the

downwind population was initiated immediately upon arrival of the Fire Department. There

were three reported injuries and no fatalities associated with the incident. There were no injuries

associated with the evacuation. Approximately 2,000 people were evacuated. The estimated

total cost of the evacuation to the public was minimal.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies was high. No political

boundaries were crossed. The command, control and coordination processes could best be

described as pre-planned. The Forest Fire Chief made the decision to evacuate jointly with the

chief of police as they established command and control at the scene. There were no problems

with the decision-making process.

Communications

An EOC was not used during this emergency but an ICP was used. Field emergency responders

communicated via radio. According to the Forest Fire Chief, the greatest problem encountered

in this event was with the radios and the overload of available frequencies. The emergency

response team has four radio frequencies and all were inundated with communication during the

event. The ICP made a field decision to limit select teams and individuals to designated

frequencies to improve the communications. This resolved the problem, but did create very

slight delays in communication when teams on one frequency needed to communicate with

teams on another frequency. The local radio and cable television stations broadcasted

emergency information, including traffic routes, and kept the public informed of the changing

events.

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials and emergency responders were notified of the incident by phone. There

were no problems with notification of emergency personnel or senior local officials. Emergency

response personnel mobilized immediately. The decision to evacuate was made in less than 10

minutes and took approximately 45 minutes to complete. The public was notified to evacuate by

police who went door to door and informed residents of the evacuation, where to go, and what

direction to proceed. Schools were notified by telephone. The evacuation took place all at once,

and there were no special problems regarding warning and subsequent citizen action. There

were a few businesses that were missed during the evacuation, and a few residents refused to

evacuate; however, these were minor and did not impact the evacuation or result in injury.
D-81

Traffic Movement and Control 

Evacuees were given specific instructions from the patrol officers conducting the evacuation

about where to go when they evacuated and were told to use specific routes that were designated

by policemen directing traffic. The school and the Scott County Jail were evacuated and these

evacuations went very well. Highway 80 is the major roadway through town and passes directly

by the plant. This required that Highway 80 be shut down and traffic be re-routed on local side

roads. There were no problems with re-routing the traffic, as the local roads were very adequate

for the volume and size of the vehicles. There were no reported traffic accidents during the

evacuation. No one evacuated before being told to do so, and very few individuals refused to

evacuate.

Congregate Care Centers

Congregate care centers were not used in this event. There were no shadow evacuations.

Law Enforcement

The evacuated area was secured by the police, and there were no instances of looting or

vandalism. No problems were identified with law enforcement.

Re-Entry

The Forest Fire Chief lifted the evacuation order after approximately five hours and there were

no special controls in place during re-entry. Evacuees were not compensated for their expenses. 

There were no problems associated with re-entry.

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

As a result of this event and lessons learned, the Forest Fire Department has reevaluated its

evacuation procedures and now organizes the evacuation based on wind direction. In addition,

the city has installed sirens and educated the public on what to do if a siren is activated. 

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Fire Chief 

Forest Fire Department

(601) 469-1221

(Personal Communication, July 2003)

Chief of Police 

Forest Police Department

(601) 469-4141

(Personal Communication, July 2003)
D-82

References

“How do you like your chicken?” Associated Press. March 21, 2001.

<http://tspweb02.tsp.utexas.edu/webarchive/03-21-01/> (June 2003).
D-83

Truck Accident, Hugo, Oklahoma, August 18, 2000, ID #27

Summary

Rank Value: 60

Number Evacuated: 2,000–2,500

Category: Technological Hazard

Specific Type: Transportation Accident

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

On August 18, 2000, a military truck carrying rockets flipped over on a highway ramp and

spilled its load in Hugo, Oklahoma. Between 2,000 and 2,500 people within a 2.6 km (1 mi )

2 2

radius of the site were evacuated as a precaution even though the Oklahoma National Guard said

the rockets were in no danger of exploding. Two National Guardsmen were injured in the

incident, but there were no deaths or injuries during the subsequent evacuation.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

Hugo is a suburban community with a population of 5,536 people. Between 2,000 and 2,500, or

36 to 45% of the city’s population, were evacuated on August 18, 2000. The city of Hugo

covers an area of 14.4 km2 (5.6 mi2) and the evacuated area covered an area of 8.1 km2 (3.14

mi2). The population density was medium during the evacuation. Land use in the evacuated

area was residential and commercial. Ethnicity, nationality, and age were not important factors

in the evacuation.

The community is run by a city manager; its main economic base is farming. However, Lake

Hugo attracts a large number of non-residents. The nearest nuclear power plant is more than 

80 km (50 mi) away and the state of Oklahoma does not have any commercial nuclear power

plants.

History of Emergencies

The community is no more prone to hazards than average and had no prior experience with the

hazard that led to this evacuation. Hugo has experienced no evacuations in the past ten years. 

However, the community did have previous experience with the alerting mechanism used in this

evacuation. 

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.
D-84

Planning

The community had a written emergency plan that included an evacuation section that was used

in this emergency. It is unknown whether the plan conformed to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1,

Rev. 1, or whether it contained an ETE.

Training

The community provides training to emergency response-personnel and regularly conducts joint

training between industry and government.

Drills and Exercises

The community’s emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and

exercises but the emergency plan used in this evacuation was not previously tested in a full-scale

evacuation.

Community Awareness

The community had an average level of awareness about local hazards and about evacuation

procedures. The community also had an average level of awareness about the hazard that caused

this evacuation and about the alerting methods used in this evacuation.

THREAT CONDITIONS

The threat condition leading to this evacuation was a truck accident that resulted in a load of

military rockets spilling onto a highway ramp. Between 2,000 and 2,500 people were evacuated. 

The roads were dry and no unusual circumstances occurred during the incident.

CONSEQUENCES

Between 2,000 and 2,500 residents were evacuated. Two National Guardsmen were injured in

the accident and there were no deaths or injuries in the subsequent evacuation. The estimated

total cost of evacuation-related expenses is unknown.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation between local, state, and federal agencies was high. Political

boundaries were not crossed. The command, control and coordination processes could best be

described as ad hoc. The decision to evacuate was made by the Hugo Fire Chief and there were

no problems with the decision-making process.
D-85

Communications

An EOC was not used; however, an ICP was used and communication between field emergency

responders and the ICP was by radio and cell phone. There were no problems with

communication.

Notification and Warning

It is unknown how senior local officials were notified of the incident. Emergency responders

were notified through the 911 phone system. There were no problems with notification of

emergency personnel. The elapsed time between the truck accident and mobilization of response

personnel was less than fifteen minutes and the decision to evacuate was made approximately

thirty minutes after the accident. It took approximately two hours to complete the evacuation. 

The public was notified by radio and television broadcasts and by emergency responders going

door-to-door. The evacuation took place all at once. There were no special problems with

warning and subsequent citizen action. 

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were given specific instructions about where to go when they were notified to evacuate

and they were told to use specific routes, which were designated by police roadblocks. Five

special institutions were evacuated, including one school, two day care centers and two housing

projects. Road conditions before the evacuation were dry and there were no traffic accidents, no

traffic problems, and major roadways were available to evacuees. Reverse - laning was not used. 

No one evacuated before being told to do so and no one refused to evacuate.

Congregate Care Centers

Congregate care centers managed by Civil Defense were used. Congregate care centers

consisted of schools and churches. It is unknown what percentage of evacuees went to the

congregate care centers. There were no shadow evacuations.

Law Enforcement

Hugo Police secured the area following the evacuation and there were no instances of looting or

vandalism or any problems with law enforcement.

Re-Entry

The Hugo fire chief authorized re-entry and there were no special controls during re-entry. 

Evacuees were not compensated for their expenses. There were no problems during re-entry.

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

According to the Hugo first assistant fire chief, the evacuation was successful due to

preparedness and agency coordination. There were no problems encountered during the

evacuation. 
D-86

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contact

Hugo Fire Department

First Assistant Fire Chief

(580) 326-7106

(Personal Communication, 7/14/03)

References

“Military Truck Flips, Spills Rockets onto Road.” Associated Press. August 18, 2000.

“Military Truck Overturns, Spilling Load of Rockets.” Associated Press. August 17, 2000.

Oklahoma Emergency Management. “State of Oklahoma Emergency Operations Plan.” June

2001. <http://www.odcem.state.ok.us/pte/EOP2002.pdf> (June 2003).
D-87

Proctor & Gamble Factory, Iowa City, Iowa, July 22, 1999, ID #25

Summary

Rank Value: 60

Number Evacuated: 5,000

Category: Technological Hazard

Specific Type: Fixed Site Hazmat Incident

Community: Urban

INTRODUCTION

On July 22, 1999, at about 10:00 a.m., a corrosive chemical known as chlorosulfonic acid spilled

while being loaded at a Proctor & Gamble Factory that makes shampoo and toothpaste located in

Iowa City, Iowa. The spilled acid formed a vaporous cloud that began drifting on the wind. As

a result, 5,000 residents were evacuated and two police officers were treated at a hospital and

released. There were no deaths or injuries associated with the evacuation.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

Approximately 5,000 people on the southeast side of Iowa City, population 62,380, were

evacuated (approximately 8% of the city’s total population). Iowa City covers an area of 63.3

km2 (24.4 mi2), and the evacuated area was 2.6 km2 (1 mi2). The population density was medium

during the evacuation. Land use in the evacuated area was residential and commercial. Age was

an important factor in the evacuation since a large percentage of evacuees were children and

special-needs population.

The community has a mayoral form of government and its main economic base is education (i.e.,

the University of Iowa). The University of Iowa attracts a large number of non-residents. The

nearest nuclear power plant is the Duanne Arnold Nuclear Power Plant located 13 km (8 mi)

northwest of Cedar Rapids and approximately 32 km (20 mi) north of Iowa City.

History of Emergencies

The community is more prone to natural disasters than average but not to technological hazards. 

Iowa City has experienced evacuations in the past 10 years resulting from tornadoes, floods, and

storms. However, the community had no previous experience with the hazard that led to this

evacuation. The community did have previous experience with the alerting mechanism used in

this evacuation. 
D-88

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.

Planning

The community had a written emergency plan, which was used in this emergency. However, it

is unknown whether the plan had an evacuation section or if it conformed to NUREG0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1. 

Training

The community provides training to emergency response personnel and regularly conducts joint

training between industry and government.

Drills and Exercises

The community’s emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and

exercises but the emergency plan used in this evacuation was not previously tested in a full-scale

evacuation.

Community Awareness

The community has an average level of awareness about local hazards and evacuation

procedures. However, awareness about the hazard that caused this evacuation (i.e., the

chlorosulfonic acid spill) was low. The community had an average level of awareness about the

alerting methods used in this evacuation.

THREAT CONDITIONS

The threat condition leading to this evacuation was a spill of chlorosulfonic acid at

approximately 10 a.m. on July 22, 1999. The spill formed a vaporous cloud that began drifting

with the wind. As a result, 5,000 residents were evacuated and two police officers were treated

at a hospital and released. The roads were dry and clear and there were no unusual

circumstances that occurred during the incident.

CONSEQUENCES

Approximately 5,000 residents were evacuated and two police officers were treated at a hospital

and released. There were no deaths, but two injuries were associated with the incident; no deaths

or injuries were associated with the evacuation. The estimated total cost of evacuation-related

expenses is unknown.
D-89

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies was high. Political boundaries

were not crossed. The command, control and coordination processes could best be described as

pre-planned. The decision to evacuate was made jointly by the Iowa City fire and police chiefs,

and there were no problems with the decision-making process.

Communications

An EOC was not used; however, an ICP was used and communication between field emergency

responders and the ICP was by radio. There were no problems with this form of communication.

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials were notified of the incident by cell phone, and emergency responders were

notified through the 911 phone system. There were no problems with notification of emergency

personnel or senior local officials. The elapsed time between discovery of the incident and

mobilization of response personnel was less than 15 minutes and the decision to evacuate was

made approximately 45 minutes after discovery of the spill. It took approximately one hour to

complete the evacuation. The public was notified by emergency responders going door to door. 

The evacuation was staged, section by section. The method of disseminating evacuation

information to the residents was not totally effective and could have been better. 

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were given specific instructions about where to go but were not told to use specific

routes; they were told which direction to go. Three special institutions were evacuated,

including two day care centers and a handicapped facility. Road conditions before the

evacuation were dry and there were no traffic accidents or traffic problems; major roadways

were available to evacuees. Reverse-laning was not used. No one evacuated before being told to

do so and no one refused to evacuate.

Congregate Care Centers

Congregate care centers were not used and there were no shadow evacuations.

Law Enforcement

Iowa City police secured the area following the evacuation and there were no instances of

looting or vandalism or any problems with law enforcement.

Re-Entry

The Iowa city fire and police chiefs and an industry representative jointly authorized re-entry. 

There were no special controls during re-entry. Evacuees were not compensated for their

expenses. No problems occurred during re-entry.
D-90

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

According to the Iowa City fire chief, the evacuation was successful because communication

between industry and public safety personnel was effective. However, the lack of a formal

evacuation system contributed to the evacuation’s problems and was a lesson learned during this

evacuation (i.e., that a formal evacuation system is needed).

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contact

Iowa City Fire Chief

(319) 356-5256

(Personal Communication, 7/14/03)

References

“5,000 Evacuated in Iowa due to Spill.” Associated Press. July 22, 1999.
D-91

Cargill Chemical Plant, Maysville, Kentucky, January 4, 1998, ID #166 

Summary

Rank Value: 58

Number Evacuated: 2,500

Category: Technological Hazard

Specific Type: Fixed Site Hazmat Incident

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

On January 4, 1998, approximately 2,500 people were evacuated because of a fire at the Cargill,

Inc. Chemical Plant in Maysville, Kentucky. Communities were evacuated on both sides of the

Ohio River, including Maysville, Kentucky, and Adams and Brown counties in Ohio. The

Cargill Plant contained stockpiles of herbicides, pesticides, and 380 metric tons (420 tons) of

ammonium nitrate, and residents were evacuated because of the potential for a large explosion. 

Authorities decided to let the fire burn out rather than fight it with water and risk washing toxic

chemicals into the Ohio River, which is only 274 m (300 yd) away. No deaths or injuries were

associated with the evacuation, and there was one injury associated with the fire but no deaths.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

Approximately 2,500 people were evacuated from several residential (suburban) communities,

including Maysville, Kentucky, and Adams and Brown counties across the Ohio River in Ohio. 

The evacuated area covered a 2.6 km (1 mile) radius or 8.1 km (3.14 mi ). The population 2 2

density during the evacuation was medium. Ethnicity, nationality, and age were not important

factors in the evacuation.

The region’s main economic base is derived from both tourism and manufacturing. Tourism

attracts a large number of non-residents. There are no commercial nuclear power plants within

80 km (50 mi) of the evacuated area, and there are no commercial power plants in Kentucky. 

However, Ohio has two commercial nuclear power plants.

History of Emergencies

Because of its manufacturing and industry, the area may be slightly more prone to technological

hazards than the average U. S. city. The community had no prior experience with the hazard that

led to this evacuation and no evacuations in the previous ten years, although residents had

previous experience with the alerting mechanism used in this evacuation.
D-92

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.

Planning

Mason County has a written emergency plan with an evacuation section that was used in this

emergency. The plan conformed to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, except it did not

contain an ETE.

Training

Training is provided to emergency response personnel, and joint training is regularly conducted

with industry and government.

Drills and Exercises

Emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and exercises; however, it is

unknown whether or not the emergency plan used in this evacuation was previously tested in a

full-scale field exercise.

Community Awareness

The level of community awareness of local hazards was average (medium). Awareness about

evacuation procedures is low; but the community had a high level of awareness concerning the

hazard that caused this evacuation. The residents were moderately familiar with the alerting

methods used.

THREAT CONDITIONS

The threat condition leading to the evacuation was the burning of hazardous chemicals and the

possibility of a large explosion. Around 2:30 a.m. on January 4, 1998, a Maysville police officer

spotted the fire at the Cargill Chemical Plant. The plant contained stockpiles of herbicides,

pesticides, and 380 metric tons (420 tons) of ammonium nitrate. The initial Maysville Police

Department officers on the scene notified the Mason County Disaster and Emergency Services. 

By 3:05 a.m., 50 firefighters from nine Mason County area fire departments and two ambulance

services arrived on the scene. Shortly thereafter, it was decided to pull back the emergency

response personnel and let the fire burn itself down. The defensive stance was made because of

the volatile nature of the chemicals involved and the risk of contamination given the proximity

of the warehouse to the Ohio River. Road conditions and weather conditions during the

evacuation are unknown. No unusual circumstances occurred during this incident other than the

hazard itself.
D-93

CONSEQUENCES

As the fire at the Cargill Plant grew, approximately 2,500 people, or more than 27% of the

population, were evacuated. There were no deaths or injuries related to the evacuation itself. 

There were no deaths directly related to the fire, but a firefighter did suffer a minor injury. The

estimated cost to the public of the evacuation itself is unknown.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies was high and political

boundaries were crossed. Several communities were evacuated, including those in Adams and

Brown counties, Ohio, which are across the Ohio River from the plant. The command, control

and coordination processes could best be described as pre-planned. The decision to evacuate

was made by the Incident Commander who was the Kentucky State Fire Marshal. There were

no problems with the decision-making process.

Communications

The Ohio EOC was activated, and an ICP was used. Communication between the field

emergency responders and the EOC was by radio, and there were no problems with

communication.

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials were notified of the incident by telephone. Local police saw the fire and

notified emergency responders. There were no problems with notification of local officials or

emergency personnel. The elapsed time between discovery of the incident and mobilization of

response personnel was less than 15 minutes. The decision to evacuate was made in less than 15

minutes. It is unknown how long it took to complete the evacuation. The public was notified by

radio and television broadcasts, police/fire PA system, and by emergency personnel going door

to door to notify residents. The evacuation occurred all at once and there were no special

problems with warning and subsequent citizen action.

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were given specific instructions about where to go when they evacuated but were not

told to use specific routes. One special institution (a senior citizen apartment building) was

evacuated. Road conditions before the evacuation are unknown. No major roadways were

unavailable for use and there were no special traffic problems. Some people spontaneously

evacuated after seeing the fire. Reverse-laning was not used. There were no traffic accidents

during the evacuations. It is unknown whether anyone refused to evacuate.

Congregate Care Centers

Congregate care centers were set up at local high schools in both Maysville, Kentucky, and

Adams and Brown counties in Ohio and were managed by the Red Cross. A total of 437 people
D-94

or 17.5% of the evacuees went to the congregate care centers. There were shadow evacuations

but this did not impact traffic or congregate care center capacity.

Law Enforcement

The evacuated area was secured by the police; there were no instances of looting or vandalism

and no problems with law enforcement.

Re-Entry

The Kentucky State Fire Marshall authorized re-entry at 6:00 p.m. on January 4, 1998,

approximately 15 hours after the start of the incident. No special controls were employed. It is

unknown whether evacuees were compensated for their expenses. No major problems occurred

during re-entry.

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

According to Maysville fire chief, the evacuation worked well because of the high level of

cooperation between agencies and the emergency plan worked well.

The fact that the incident and the evacuation took place in the middle of the night created a slight

problem.

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contact

Maysville Fire Chief

(606) 564-9411

References

CNN (U.S.), “Chemical Fire Forces Evacuations Along Ohio River.” January 1998. 

<http://www.cnn.com/US/9801/04/plant.fire/> (June 2003). 

FEMA News (U.S.), “Kentucky Fertilizer Plant Blaze Forces Evacuations.” January 5, 1998. 

<http://www.fema.gov/nwz98/kyfr0105.shtm> (June 2003).

“Fertilizer Plant Fire.” Associated Press. January 5, 1998.

Kentucky Emergency Management (U.S.), “Kentucky State Emergency Operations Plan.”

September 2002. <http://kyem.dma.state.ky.us/KY%20EOP/tableofcontents.htm> (June 2003). 
D-95

Leonard, James. “Explosions, Fire at Fertilizer Plant Force Early Morning Evacuation.”

Dispatch, Volume VIII, No. 1. Fall 1998. <http://www.efilmgroup.com/dispatch/disviii4.html>

(June 2003).

“Thousands Evacuated in Kentucky Fertilizer Plant Fire.” Associated Press. January 5, 1998.
D-96

Cerro Grande Fire, Los Alamos, New Mexico, May 10, 2000, ID #107

Summary

Rank Value: 58

Number Evacuated: 12,000

Category: Natural Disaster

Specific Type: Wildfire

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

The Cerro Grande Fire, which began on May 4, 2000, was the largest, most destructive wildfire

that New Mexico has ever known. Originally started as a prescribed burn in Bandelier National

Monument, the wildfire ultimately burned 190 km (47,000 acres) and caused the evacuation of 2

thousands of people in Los Alamos County. As a result, a total of 12,000 people were evacuated

from the town of Los Alamos on May 7 and May 10, and another 7,000 people were evacuated

from the unincorporated community of White Rock on May 11 (see also ID #209). Hampering

the evacuation effort was the fact that Los Alamos sits on a hill with only one main road out of

the town. However, the evacuation proceeded smoothly and was accomplished twice as fast as

predicted although this is mostly attributed to the fact that Los Alamos National Laboratories

(LANL) and the public schools were all closed. If these institutions had all been open, the

evacuation may have taken as long as 24 hours to complete (or twice as long as predicted). One

special institution (the Los Alamos Medical Center) was evacuated. The evacuation of Los

Alamos proceeded smoothly; however, several changes were made to the County Emergency

Management Plan as a result of lessons learned.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

On May 7, 2000, approximately 500 residences (~1,000 people) in Los Alamos were ordered to

evacuate as wildfires neared their community. On May 10, 2000, the remaining population of

Los Alamos was ordered to evacuate and there was generally good compliance with the

evacuation order. A total of 12,000 residents (the total population) of Los Alamos were

evacuated. 

Los Alamos is generally a suburban area with small shopping centers and LANL. The size of

the community and of the evacuated area is 28.1 km2 (10.9 mi2). The population density during

the evacuation was low because LANL and the schools were closed. Los Alamos is a town run

by seven county councilors. Its main economic base is LANL. There are no special

characteristics that attract a large number of non-residents. There are no commercial nuclear

power plants located within 80 km (50 mi) of Los Alamos and there are no commercial nuclear

power plants in New Mexico. 
D-97

History of Emergencies

Los Alamos is no more prone to technological hazards than the average community, although it

is slightly more prone to natural disasters, specifically wildfires. Los Alamos County has had

significant experience with the hazard that led to this evacuation, including a large fire in 1954,

La Mesa Fire (1977), Dome Fire (1996), Lummis Fire (1997), Oso Fire (1998), and Guaje Fire

(2000). However, the town of Los Alamos had not experienced any evacuations in the

previous10 years and most likely had no prior experience with the alerting mechanism used in

this evacuation, which was a reverse 911 telephone system.

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.

Planning

The community had a written emergency plan, which contained an evacuation section and it was

used in this emergency. The Los Alamos County Emergency Management Plan generally

conformed to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, except that it did not contain an ETE. 

However, authorities estimated that it would take 12 hours to evacuate Los Alamos and the

evacuation was accomplished in half that time.

Training

Training is provided to emergency response personnel, and joint training is regularly conducted

with LANL.

Drills and Exercises

Los Alamos County’s emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and

exercises and the emergency plan used in this evacuation was previously tested in a full-scale

field exercise. The exercise performed immediately before this evacuation was most likely a

functional drill.

Community Awareness

The local community is highly aware of local hazards, especially of the hazard (i.e., wildfire)

that caused this evacuation. However, the community’s awareness about evacuation procedures

and about the alerting method used in this evacuation was likely no higher than that of the

average community.

THREAT CONDITIONS

The Cerro Grande Fire began as a prescribed burn on May 4, 2000, and quickly spread out of

control. A total of 12,000 people were evacuated from Los Alamos. The evacuations occurred

during the daytime. The weather was hot and dry and the roads were dry. The Los Alamos

evacuation involved two unusual circumstances. First, a special institution (i.e., the Los Alamos
D-98

Medical Center) had to be evacuated. Second, Los Alamos sits on a hill with only one main road

out of the town.

CONSEQUENCES

As the uncontrolled wildfire approached Los Alamos, the entire town was evacuated. First,

approximately 1,000 people were evacuated on May 7 and another 11,000 were evacuated on

May 10 for a total of 12,000 evacuees. There were no reported deaths or injuries due to either

the wildfire or the evacuation although a few firefighters suffered minor injuries. The estimated

cost to the public of the evacuation itself, and not of any damages associated with the wildfire, is

several million dollars. Federal disaster aid was made available to families who had lost homes;

however, there was no reimbursement for evacuation expenses since food and shelter was

provided to those who chose to go to the congregate care centers.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies was very high. Some of the

local, state and federal agencies involved in this emergency include the U. S. Forest Service,

National Park Service, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Los Alamos County, Santa

Clara Pueblo and San Ildefonso Pueblo, state and local police, New Mexico National Guard, and

firefighters and emergency personnel from all over the country. Political boundaries were not

crossed. The command, control and coordination processes could best be described as preplanned. The decision to evacuate was made by the Los Alamos Police Chief although other

authorities influenced his decision. No problems were identified with the decision-making

process even though there was no legal authority to order an evacuation. 

Communications

Two EOCs were used during this evacuation, one maintained by LANL and the other maintained

by Los Alamos County. This was confusing and did not work well. As a result, the County

Emergency Management Plan has been re-written to have a Joint LANL/Los Alamos County

EOC in future emergencies. Field emergency responders communicated with the EOC by cell

phone/pagers and radios. However, the radios did not work well because Los Alamos County’s

various radio systems were designed for routine minimal operational demands. Interoperability

within Los Alamos County and with out-of-town supporting services was a problem. Therefore,

most of the communications took place using cell phones/pagers. Amateur ham radio operators

were very effective in getting and passing on information.

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials were notified of the incident by telephone, the Community Alert Network

System (CANS), which is a reverse 911 system that calls all of the numbers in its database and

alerts the recipients of the hazard, the evacuation, and appropriate emergency procedures they

should follow. Emergency responders were notified of the incident by cell phones and pagers
D-99

and personnel utilized phone trees to make sure all responders were notified. Because of the

nature of this particular incident and the somewhat remote location, response personnel were not

mobilized to the scene until over an hour after the start of the incident. A partial (and smaller)

evacuation occurred three days following the start of the prescribed burn; however, the main

evacuation took place five days from the start of the prescribed burn. The time to complete the

main evacuation was four to six hours. There were no problems identified with the notification

of emergency personnel or senior local officials. The public was notified by the CANS system

described above. 

The evacuation was staged; the first stage on May 7 involved approximately 1,000 people and

the second stage (the main evacuation) involved 11,000 people. The CANS system was slow

and it was later discovered to have an outdated database of telephone numbers. Therefore, it was

not as effective in notifying the public as it could have been. It has since been replaced with the

Emergency Preparedness Notification System, another reverse 911 system, which is operated by

Qwest Communications.

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were given specific instructions about where to go when they evacuated and were told

to use three main routes that were designated with police barricades. The Los Alamos Police

and the New Mexico National Guard manned roadblocks and assisted in the evacuation. The

final route out of town is the one main road that goes down the hill out of Los Alamos. Reverselaning was used. One special institution (the Los Alamos Medical Center) was evacuated early

as a precaution. Road conditions before the evacuation were dry. No major roadways were

unavailable for use due to construction or due to damage caused by the hazard, and there were no

special traffic problems and no traffic accidents. In fact, the main evacuation on May 10

proceeded twice as fast as predicted. There were some instances of residents evacuating early

after they saw the smoke in town. Some residents refused to evacuate and officials did not have

the legal authority to force them to evacuate. The residents who stayed watered the areas

surrounding their homes and their neighbors’ homes to prevent them from burning.

Congregate Care Centers

Congregate care centers were used and were managed by local Red Cross personnel. A preplanned congregate care center was set up at the White Rock Baptist Church; however, when

White Rock was ordered evacuated the following day (May 11), new congregate care centers

were opened at the Pojoaque High School, Santa Fe High School, and the Cities of Gold Casino

in Pojoaque. Other congregate care centers were reportedly available in Glorieta and at the

Pojoaque Gym. Most evacuees came to the congregate care centers for information and meals,

but few clients needed sleeping facilities. Less than 10% of evacuees stayed at the congregate

care centers. The vast majority of evacuees stayed with friends and relatives, in hotels, or in

their own personal recreational vehicles. There were no shadow evacuations.
D-100

Law Enforcement

The Los Alamos Police Department, augmented by the Air National Guard Security Police and

mutual aid departments, maintained intensive security patrols in burned and evacuated areas. 

There were no reported instances of looting or vandalism and no problems identified with law

enforcement.

Re-Entry 

On May 16, 2000, Los Alamos reopened except for the area west and north of Diamond Drive. 

The town had water and electricity but large areas did not have natural gas. Re-entry was

authorized by the Los Alamos Emergency Manager and was accomplished with the assistance of

the Los Alamos Police Department. The re-entry process was a controlled, phased re-entry

because so many homes had been destroyed by the wildfire. Federal disaster aid was made

available to families who had lost homes; however, there was no reimbursement for evacuation

expenses since food and shelter was provided to those who chose to go to the congregate care

centers.

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

The county’s pre-incident planning was adequate but understandably did not anticipate the

magnitude of a Cerro Grande-type incident.

As summarized from “The Cerro Grande Fire of 2000: Summary of Matters to be Considered by

the Los Alamos County Council, December 16, 2002,” relevant lessons learned include:

1. The operation of two EOCs did not work well and the County Emergency Management Plan

has been rewritten to have a Joint LANL/County EOC. The revised plan was approved by

Council in June 2001.

2. The automated telephone citizen notification system used, the Community Alert Network

System (CANS), was not as effective as desired. CANS has been replaced with the

Emergency Preparedness Notification System, operated by Qwest, and appears to be a better

system. 

3. Animal control, specifically care of pets when the town was evacuated, became a major

issue. Tentative mutual aid agreements, prompted by the State Department of Agriculture,

have been discussed by County Animal Control personnel and Santa Fe City and County. 

4. Tracking and registering evacuees proved to be a big problem. Evacuees should be

encouraged to register via internet on the County website or by telephone with a designated

County office. The website should be configured to accept a large number of registrants, and

to receive additional input from telephoned messages. 

5. Donated food, clothing, services, and material exceeded needs and was uncontrolled. 
D-101

6. The American Red Cross national response personnel were very difficult to work with and

declined to coordinate any of their activities with the County. Local Red Cross personnel

initially provided their usual good services, but were completely ignored by the national

level team. 

7. The County’s various radio systems were designed for routine minimal operational demands. 

Interoperability within the County and with out-of-town supporting services was and

continues to be a problem. 

8. The Public Information Telephone Center was one of the most effective steps taken during

the entire operation. Fifty phone lines were placed in operation within a matter of hours, and

handled over 7,000 calls in the first day. 

9. Emergency Management “news bulletins” proved to be a very effective means of getting

timely updates to County officials, the media, and the public. These announcements

addressed fire and law enforcement/security operations, status of utilities and other services,

road closings and openings, volunteer operations, and store openings.

10. The County Joint Service Center was conceived to be the center for recovery operations by

returning residents. All agencies were housed in one building to provide a “one-stop”

service under management by the County. The operation was well received by residents. 

11. The American Red Cross, and to a lesser extent, FEMA, were reluctant to be housed with

any other agencies or with each other. Only strong direction by a county manager kept the

Red Cross functioning as part of the Joint Service Center. 

12. The decision to bring in managers from the city of Oakland (California), which had

experienced a major conflagration in the recent past, was a good one. Their list of actions

taken and advice was invaluable in ensuring all that should be done was done. 

13. A major lesson learned was how to transition from emergency to recovery operations. This

was accomplished by creating the Recovery Planning Group, which operated under the

direction of the Emergency Manager. It was composed of department manager-level

personnel, and met daily, usually for several hours. Its charter was to consider all problems

from the residents’ perspective. Second-level personnel continued staffing the EOC during

the period the two groups overlapped. 

14. County management was instrumental in getting the “Cerro Grande Fire Assistance Act”

through Congress. This was a much needed piece of legislation that provided both short- and

long-range relief to the county and its citizens. 
D-102

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Emergency Management Coordinator

P.O. Box 30

Los Alamos, NM 87544

(505) 663-0883 (office)

(505) 663-0984 (fax)

(505) 670-7824 (cell) 

(Personal Communications, 6/19/03 and 6/24/03)

Emergency Management Aide

Los Alamos County Office of Emergency Management

P.O. Box 30

Los Alamos, NM 87544

(505) 663-0960 (phone)

(505) 663-0984 (fax)

(Personal Communication, 7/1/03)

Los Alamos Police Department

Los Alamos, NM

(505) 662-8228

Chief, Emergency Operations Bureau

Office of Emergency Services & Security

13 Bataan Blvd.

Santa Fe, NM 87504-1628

(505) 476-9622

Los Alamos Medical Center

(505) 661-8900

References

Baker, D. “Northern N. M. Fire Burns Thousands of Acres, Forces Evacuations.” Associated

Press. May 31, 2000.

Los Alamos Community Pages. “Wildfire!” 2001. 

<http://www.losalamos.org/laarc/CerroGrandeFire-K5QIN.html> (June 2003).
D-103

Los Alamos County. “The Cerro Grande Fire of 2000: Summary of Matters to be Considered by

the Los Alamos County Council.” December 16, 2002. 

<http://www.lac-nm.us/vertical/Sites/{845D0DAE-A374-48AD-926FF850E019F2CD}/uploads/{4883FE6F-492D-4973-A789-69175EDD4886}.PDF> (June 2003).

MacDonald, J. “Relief and Grief as Fire Evacuees Get Look at Homes.” Associated Press. May

15, 2000.
D-104

Deadwood Fire, Deadwood, South Dakota, June 29, 2002, ID #213

Summary

Rank Value: 58

Number Evacuated: 15,000

Category: Natural Disaster

Specific Type: Wildfire

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

An 18.2 km (4,500 acre) wildfire near Deadwood, South Dakota, forced the evacuation of 2

15,000 people on June 29, 2002. Deadwood, about 64 km (40 mi) northwest of Rapid City, is

home to about 80 casinos and attracts thousands of tourists to its casinos on summer days. Many

of the evacuees were gamblers rather than local residents. The population of Deadwood is only

1,380 people. Three special institutions were evacuated, including a nursing home, the county

jail and the Deadwood hospital. Only the nursing home evacuation was of any major

consequence, and ambulances and special-lift vans from other towns were used to transport the

elderly. The Deadwood hospital only had three patients. In addition to Deadwood, half of the

town of Lead and the Boulder Canyon Country Club were later evacuated.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

Deadwood, a small suburban community of only 1,380 people, is about 64.4 km (40 mi)

northwest of Rapid City, South Dakota. It attracts thousands of tourists to its eighty casinos, and

the local population swells during the summer months. Population density was high during this

evacuation. On June 29, 2002, 15,000 people were evacuated. This represented the entire

community. Ethnicity, nationality, and age were not important factors in the evacuation. 

Deadwood is a city with a mayoral form of government. Its main economic base is tourism,

which attracts a large number of non-residents. Deadwood is more than 80 km (50 mi) from the

nearest commercial nuclear power plant and there are no nuclear power plants in the state of

South Dakota.

History of Emergencies

Deadwood is more prone to natural disasters than average. Wildfires are frequent in the

surrounding areas and the community has had prior experience with them. However, the last

evacuation of Deadwood was for a wildfire in 1959. The community did not have previous

experience with the alerting mechanism used (door to door).
D-105

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.

Planning

Lawrence County has a written emergency plan with an evacuation section, the “spirit” of which

was followed in this emergency. The wildfire spread so fast that there was not a lot of time to

“open the book.” The Lawrence County Emergency Plan is currently being revised. The plan

conformed to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, in most aspects, except it did not contain an

ETE.

Training

Training is provided to emergency response personnel. The local emergency planning

committee includes members from industry and government, and joint training is conducted with

emergency response personnel.

Drills and Exercises

The emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and exercises. A

minimum of one drill is required each year, and two drills were conducted in 2002. The

emergency plan used in this evacuation was previously tested in a full-scale field exercise. 

Community Awareness

The residents of Deadwood are highly aware of local hazards (i.e., wildfires). They are

moderately familiar with evacuation procedures and they would have been highly aware of the

alerting methods used in this evacuation since it was just door-to-door notification.

THREAT CONDITIONS

The threat leading to the evacuation was a wildfire that started at about 2 p.m. on June 29, 2002,

about a mile south of Lead, which is 4.8 km (3 mi) from Deadwood. The cause of the fire is

unknown, but lightning was reported in the area the previous night. Hot, windy conditions in the

northern Black Hills made the situation worse. The temperatures soared as high as 43.3°C

(110°F).

The fire spread very rapidly and took out all of the power, as well as destroying cell phone

towers. Therefore, telephones, cell phones, and televisions could not be used, and emergency

personnel had to rely on radios. In addition, all notification had to be done door to door. 

Although the media reported that civilian use of cell phones jammed the communication system,

the emergency management manager reported that the communication failure was caused by

destruction of the cell phone towers in the fire.
D-106

CONSEQUENCES

Approximately 15,000 people were evacuated due to the Deadwood Fire. There were no deaths

or injuries resulting from either the fire or the evacuation. The estimated total cost of

evacuation-related expenses is unknown.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies was high. Political boundaries

were not crossed. Command, control and coordination processes could best be described as preplanned. Unofficially, the emergency manager ordered the evacuation. However, officially the

evacuation order came from the governor. There were no problems with the decision-making

process.

Communications

An EOC and an ICP were used in this emergency. Communication between field emergency

responders and the EOC was by radio. All other communication methods were down because of

the fire, but, according to the emergency manager, this was not a major problem for them

because they usually communicate by radio. Although the media reported that civilian use of

cell phones jammed the communication system, the emergency management manager reported

that the communication failure was due to destruction of cell phone towers in the fire.

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials were notified of the incident when emergency personnel knocked on their

door. Emergency responders were notified by radio dispatch. There were no problems with

notification. Response personnel mobilized to the scene within two minutes of discovery of the

incident. The decision to evacuate was made within 30 minutes of discovery of the incident. 

The main evacuation took about 40 minutes to complete. The public was notified by emergency

personnel who went door to door. The evacuation was staged. The nursing home was evacuated

early as a precaution; next the main evacuation took place in Deadwood; later, half of Lead and

the Boulder Canyon Country Club were evacuated. There were no special problems with

warning or subsequent citizen action.

Traffic Movement and Control

People were told to head north toward Spear Fish when they evacuated; however, they were not

told what routes to take. They were told that congregate care centers were set up at Black Hills

State University in Spear Fish and the former armory in Lead. Three special institutions were

evacuated, a nursing home, the county courthouse, including the county jail, and the Deadwood

Hospital. Only the first one, the nursing home, required much in the way of special

arrangements. The Deadwood Hospital, for example, only had three patients. The nursing

home, however, was evacuated early as a precaution. Ambulances and special-lift vans were
D-107

used to evacuate the elderly. In addition, a trolley system from Black Hills was used to evacuate

the elderly.

Road conditions were clear and dry; however, Route 385 was eliminated as an evacuation route

after the fire jumped it. There were traffic jams that the media reported as significant but they

were not significant according to the emergency manager. That manager said that traffic was

still moving even though it was bumper to bumper, and there were no traffic accidents. There

was no time for spontaneous evacuations. Reverse-laning was used. Only a few people refused

to evacuate, including a hotel operator and his employee.

Congregate Care Centers

Congregate care centers included the former armory in Lead and the sports and fitness center at

Black Hills State University in Spear Fish. The American Red Cross managed the congregate

care centers. Only a few hundred people (less than 5%) registered at the congregate care centers. 

There were no shadow evacuations.

Law Enforcement

The State Highway Patrol (police) secured the area following the evacuations. They went house

to house to make sure all of the doors were locked. There were no instances of looting or

vandalism, and no problems with law enforcement.

Re-Entry

The Federal Firefighting Team authorized re-entry. No special controls were used during reentry; however, law enforcement accompanied those who had lost their homes in the fire. 

Evacuees were not compensated for their expenses. No major problems occurred during reentry.

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Lawrence County Emergency Manager

(605) 578-2122

(Personal Communication, June 30, 2003)

References

Kafka, J. “Black Hills towns evacuated as wildfire burns on hillsides above them.” Associated

Press. July 1, 2002.

Kafka, J. “Residents of Black Hills gambling town ordered to evacuate as fire approaches.”

Associated Press. June 30, 2002.
D-108

Cerro Grande Fire, White Rock, New Mexico, May 11, 2000, ID #209

Summary

Rank Value: 58

Number Evacuated: 7,000

Category: Natural Disaster

Specific Type: Wildfire

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

The Cerro Grande Fire, which began on May 4, 2000, was the largest, most destructive wildfire

that New Mexico has ever known. Originally started as a prescribed burn in Bandelier National

Monument, the wildfire ultimately burned 190 km (47,000 acres) and caused the evacuations of 2

thousands of people in Los Alamos County. As a result, 7,000 people were evacuated from the

unincorporated community of White Rock, New Mexico on May 11. Previously, 12,000 people

had been evacuated from the town of Los Alamos on May 7 and May 10 (See also ID #107). 

The White Rock evacuation did not go well. Hampering the evacuation effort was the fact that

White Rock had swollen in size by at least 1,000 people who came from Los Alamos the day

before seeking shelter. Several changes were made to the Los Alamos County Emergency

Management Plan as a result of lessons learned during the evacuations. One major change was

that White Rock was subdivided into three notification zones and three specific evacuation zones

in order to relieve congestion and improve evacuation times.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

On the evening of May 11, 2000, approximately 7,000 people in White Rock, New Mexico were

ordered to evacuate as wildfires neared their community. White Rock is a small, unincorporated

community located near Los Alamos. The size of the community and of the evacuated area is

18.6 km2 (7.2 mi2). The population density during the evacuation was high. White Rock is a

bedroom community to Los Alamos and the main economic base is LANL. There are no special

characteristics that attract a large number of non-residents; however there were a high number of

non-residents in White Rock on the day of the evacuation because evacuees from Los Alamos

came to the congregate care center set up at the White Rock Baptist Church. There are no

commercial nuclear power plants located within 80 km (50 mi) of White Rock and there are no

such plants in New Mexico.

History of Emergencies

White Rock is no more prone to technological hazards than the average community, although it

is slightly more prone to natural disasters, specifically wildfires. Los Alamos County has had

significant experience with the hazard that led to this evacuation. Residents were well aware of
D-109

the significance of the Cerro Grande Fire and had witnessed the evacuation of Los Alamos the

previous day (See also ID #107). In addition, the community has witnessed several large fires

over the last 36 years, including a large fire in 1954, La Mesa Fire (1977), Dome Fire (1996),

Lummis Fire (1997), Oso Fire (1998), and Guaje Fire (2000). However, White Rock had not

experienced any evacuations in the previous 10 years and likely had no prior experience with the

alerting mechanism used in this evacuation, which was a reverse 911 telephone system.

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.

Planning

The community had a written emergency plan, which contained an evacuation section and it was

used in this emergency. The Los Alamos County Emergency Management Plan generally

conformed to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, except that it did not contain an ETE. 

Training

Training is provided to emergency response personnel, and joint training is regularly conducted

with LANL.

Drills and Exercises

Los Alamos County’s emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and

exercises, and the emergency plan used in this evacuation was previously tested in a full-scale

field exercise. The exercise performed immediately prior to this evacuation was most likely a

functional drill.

Community Awareness

The local community is highly aware of local hazards, especially of the hazard (wildfires) that

caused this evacuation. However, the community’s awareness of evacuation procedures and of

the alerting method used in this evacuation was likely no higher than that of the average

community.

THREAT CONDITIONS

The Cerro Grande Fire began as a prescribed burn on May 4, 2000. A total of 7,000 people were

evacuated from White Rock. The evacuations occurred during the night and proceeded slowly. 

The weather was hot and dry and the roads were dry. The White Rock evacuation had one

unusual circumstance; the town had swollen in size due to evacuees from Los Alamos who had

sought shelter in White Rock. This increased the population by at least 1,000 people.
D-110

CONSEQUENCES

On May 11, 2000, as the uncontrolled wildfire approached White Rock, the entire town of 6,000

people plus the 1,000 evacuees from Los Alamos were evacuated for a total of 7,000 evacuees. 

There were no reported deaths or injuries resulting from either the wildfire or the evacuation. 

The estimated cost to the public of the evacuation itself, and not of any damages associated with

the wildfire, is several million dollars. Federal disaster aid was made available to families who

had lost homes; however, there was no reimbursement for evacuation expenses since food and

shelter was provided to those who chose to go to the congregate care centers.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies was very high. Some of the

local, state and federal agencies involved in this emergency include the U.S. Forest Service,

National Park Service, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Los Alamos County, Santa

Clara Pueblo and San Ildefonso Pueblo, state and local police, New Mexico National Guard, and

firefighters and emergency personnel from all over the country. Political boundaries were not

crossed. The command, control and coordination processes could best be described as preplanned. The decision to evacuate was made by the Los Alamos Police Chief, although other

authorities influenced his decision. No problems were identified with the decision-making

process, even though there was no legal authority to order an evacuation. 

Communications

The same two EOCs that were used for the Los Alamos emergency (See also ID #107) were

used for the White Rock evacuation. This included one EOC maintained by LANL and the other

maintained by Los Alamos County. This was confusing and did not work well. As a result, the

County Emergency Management Plan has been re-written to have a Joint LANL/County EOC in

future emergencies. Field emergency responders communicated with the EOC by cell

phone/pagers and radios. However, the radios did not work well because the county’s various

radio systems were designed for routine minimal operational demands. Interoperability within

the county and with out-of-town supporting services was a problem. Therefore, most of the

communications took place using cell phones/pagers. Amateur ham radio operators were very

effective in getting and passing on information.

Notification and Warning

White Rock does not have any senior local officials. It is a small, unincorporated community. 

However, senior county officials and emergency responders were notified of the incident by cell

phones and pagers and personnel utilized phone trees to make sure all responders were notified. 

Response personnel were not mobilized to the scene until over an hour after the start of the

incident. The evacuation took several hours to complete (much longer than the evacuation of

Los Alamos the previous day). There were no problems identified with the notification of

emergency personnel. The evacuation took place all at once on May 11, 2000, and
D-111

approximately 7,000 people were evacuated. The public was notified of the incident by

telephone, using the Community Alert Network System (CANS), which is a reverse 911 system

that calls all of the numbers in its database and alerts the recipients of the hazard, the evacuation,

and appropriate emergency procedures to follow. The CANS system was found to have an

outdated database of telephone numbers and was not as effective in notifying the public as it

could have been. It has since been replaced with the Emergency Preparedness Notification

System, another reverse 911 system, which is operated by Qwest Communications.

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were given specific instructions about where to go when they evacuated and were told

to use three main routes that were designated with police barricades. The Los Alamos police and

the New Mexico National Guard manned roadblocks and assisted in the evacuation. Road

conditions prior to the evacuation were dry. No major roadways were under construction and

therefore unavailable and none were damaged by the hazard. Traffic was heavy because the

population of White Rock had swollen in the previous 24 hours with evacuees from Los Alamos

who had sought shelter there. However, no traffic accidents were reported. If there were any

instances of spontaneous early evacuations, they were negligible. No one refused to evacuate.

Congregate Care Centers

Congregate care centers were used and were managed by local Red Cross personnel. 

Congregate care centers were set up at the Pojoaque High School, Santa Fe High School, and the

Cities of Gold Casino in Pojoaque. Other congregate care centers were reportedly available in

Glorieta and at the Pojoaque Gym. Most evacuees came to the congregate care centers for

information and meals, but few clients needed sleeping facilities. Less than 10% of evacuees

stayed at the congregate care centers. The vast majority of evacuees stayed with friends and

relatives, in hotels, or in their own personal recreational vehicles. There were no shadow

evacuations.

Law Enforcement

The Police Department, augmented by the Air National Guard Security Police and mutual aid

departments, maintained intensive security patrols in burned and evacuated areas. There were no

reported instances of looting or vandalism, and no problems were identified with law

enforcement.

Re-Entry 

On May 14, 2000, White Rock was re-opened to residents. Re-entry was authorized by the Los

Alamos County Emergency Manager and was accomplished with the assistance of the Police

Department. There were no special controls during the re-entry process because, unlike Los

Alamos (See also ID #107), none of the homes in White Rock had been destroyed by the

wildfire. Federal disaster aid was made available to families who had lost homes; however,

there was no reimbursement for evacuation expenses since food and shelter was provided to

those who chose to go to the congregate care centers.
D-112

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

The county’s pre-incident planning was adequate but understandably did not anticipate the

magnitude of a Cerro Grande-type incident. One major change to the plan was that White Rock

was subdivided into three notification zones and three specific evacuation zones in order to

relieve congestion and improve evacuation times.

As summarized from “The Cerro Grande Fire of 2000: Summary of Matters to be Considered by

the Los Alamos County Council, December 16, 2002,” relevant lessons learned include:

1. The operation of two EOCs did not work well and the County Emergency Management Plan

has been rewritten to have a Joint LANL/County EOC. The revised plan was approved by

Council in June 2001

2. The automated telephone citizen notification system used, the Community Alert Network

System (CANS), was not as effective as desired. CANS has been replaced with the

Emergency Preparedness Notification System, operated by Qwest, and appears to be a better

system. 

3. Animal control, specifically care of pets when the town was evacuated, became a major

issue. Tentative Mutual Aid agreements, prompted by the State Department of Agriculture,

have been discussed by County Animal Control personnel and Santa Fe City and County. 

4. Tracking and registering evacuees proved to be a big problem. Evacuees should be

encouraged to register via internet on the county website or by telephone with a designated

county office. The website should be configured to accept a large number of registrants,

and to receive additional input from telephoned messages. 

5. Donated food, clothing, services, and material exceeded needs and was uncontrolled. 

6. The American Red Cross national response personnel were very difficult to work with and

declined to coordinate any of their activities with the county. Local Red Cross personnel

initially provided their usual good services, but were completely ignored by the national

level team. 

7. The county’s various radio systems were designed for routine minimal operational demands. 

Interoperability within the county and with out-of-town supporting services was and

continues to be a problem. 

8. The Public Information Telephone Center was one of most effective steps taken during the

entire operation. Fifty phone lines were placed in operation within a matter of hours, and

handled over 7,000 calls in the first day. 
D-113

9. Emergency Management “news bulletins” proved to be a very effective means of getting

timely updates to county officials, the media, and the public. These announcements

addressed fire and law enforcement/security operations, status of utilities and other services,

road closings and openings, volunteer operations, and store openings.

10. The County Joint Service Center was conceived to be the center for recovery operations by

returning residents. All agencies were housed in one building to provide a “one-stop”

service under management by the county. The operation was well received by residents. 

11. The American Red Cross, and to a lesser extent, FEMA, were reluctant to be housed with

any other agencies or with each other. Only strong direction by a county manager kept the

Red Cross functioning as part of the Joint Service Center. 

12. The decision to bring in managers from the city of Oakland (California), which had

experienced a major conflagration in the recent past, was a good one. Their list of actions

taken and advice was invaluable in ensuring all that should be done was done. 

13. A major lesson learned was how to transition from emergency to recovery operations. This

was accomplished by creating the Recovery Planning Group, which operated under the

direction of the Emergency Manager. It was composed of department manager-level

personnel, and met daily, usually for several hours. Its charter was to consider all problems

from the residents’ perspective. Second-level personnel continued staffing the EOC during

the period the two groups overlapped. 

14. County management was instrumental in getting the “Cerro Grande Fire Assistance Act”

through Congress. This was a much needed piece of legislation that provided both short and

long-range relief to the county and its citizens. 

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Emergency Management Coordinator

P.O. Box 30

Los Alamos, NM 87544

(505) 663-0883 (office)

(505) 663-0984 (fax)

(505) 670-7824 (cell) 

(Personal Communications, 6/19/03 and 6/24/03)
D-114

Emergency Management Aide

Los Alamos County Office of Emergency Management

P.O. Box 30

Los Alamos, NM 87544

(505) 663-0960 (phone)

(505) 663-0984 (fax)

(Personal Communication, 7/1/03)

Los Alamos Police Department

Los Alamos, NM

(505) 662-8228

Chief, Emergency Operations Bureau

Office of Emergency Services & Security

13 Bataan Blvd.

Santa Fe, NM 87504-1628

(505) 476-9622

References

Koidin, M. “Three Days away, White Rock’s 7,000 Residents Return Home.” Associated Press. 

May 15, 2000.

Los Alamos County. “The Cerro Grande Fire of 2000: Summary of Matters to be Considered by

the Los Alamos County Council.” December 16, 2002. 

<http://www.lac-nm.us/vertical/Sites/{845D0DAE-A374-48AD-926FF850E019F2CD}/uploads/{4883FE6F-492D-4973-A789-69175EDD4886}.PDF> (June 2003).
D-115

Hayman Blaze, Douglas County, Colorado, June 2002, ID #119

Summary

Rank Value: 56

Number Evacuated: 5,500

Category: Natural Disaster

Specific Type: Wildfire

Community: Rural

INTRODUCTION

The Hayman Wildfire in Douglas County, Colorado, forced the evacuations of more than 40,000

residents who lived just southwest of Denver. The fire began from an illegal campfire in Pike

National Forest, about 10 km (6 mi) northwest of Lake George. Fire investigators believe the

fire was ignited by underground coal that had been burning since the 1970s. Different sections

of the fire were spreading in Park, Jefferson, and Douglas counties, spurring evacuations in

Deckers, Trumbull, the Wigwam Creek area, as well as areas west of Colorado Highway 67.

Six congregate care centers were set up by the American Red Cross in Woodland Park, Lake

George, Littleton, Highlands Ranch, Colorado Springs, and Castle Rock for at least 3,000

residents previously evacuated. Two other congregate care centers were opened to house 270

travelers stranded when a 111-km (69-mi) long section of I-70 was closed Sunday because of

approaching flames and heavy smoke.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

Douglas County is a suburban county in Colorado located in the southern region of the state. It

has a total population of 175,766 people. Approximately 5,500 people (3% of the population)

from the city of Castle Rock in Douglas County were evacuated. Land use in the evacuation

area was primarily residential. The total area of Douglas County is 2,183 km (843 mi ) and the 2 2

evacuated area was 155 km (60 mi ). The population density of the area during the evacuation 2 2

was medium. Ethnicity, nationality, and age were not important factors in the evacuation. 

Douglas County has a commission and board form of government and its main economic base is

tourism. Tourism and people traveling on Interstate 67 attract a large number of non-residents to

the area. The nearest commercial nuclear power plant is more than 80 km (50 mi) away.

History of Emergencies

Douglas County is no more prone to hazards than the average U.S. county. The community had

previous experience with the hazard that led to this evacuation and had experienced evacuations
D-116

in the previous ten years. The community also had previous experience with the alerting

mechanisms used in this evacuation.

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.

Planning

The community had a written emergency plan, but it did not contain a specific evacuation

section and was the plan used in this emergency. It is unknown if the plan conformed to

NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, or if it contained an ETE.

Training

Training is provided to emergency response personnel but joint training between industry and

government is not regularly conducted.

Drills and Exercises

Douglas County’s emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and

exercises. The emergency plan used in this evacuation was not previously tested in a full- scale

field exercise, but was tested in sections.

Community Awareness

The level of community awareness of local hazards was medium. The level of community

awareness of evacuation procedures was also medium, and the level of awareness about the

hazard that caused the evacuation was low. The level of community awareness about alternate

methods used in this evacuation was medium.

THREAT CONDITIONS

The threat condition leading to this evacuation was a wildfire that began on June 4, 2002, at

approximately 4 p.m. in Pike National Forest and burned more than 100,000 acres before it was

completely contained on July 2, 2002. Weather conditions were clear and dry and the roads

were dry. There were no unusual circumstances that occurred during this incident other than the

hazard itself.

CONSEQUENCES

Approximately 5,500 people were evacuated from their homes and businesses beginning on June

4, 2002, and were allowed to return on July 2, 2002. There were no deaths or injuries caused by

the hazard or by the evacuation. The estimated total costs of evacuation related expenses

incurred by the public are unknown.
D-117

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation between local, state, and federal agencies was high. Five political

boundaries were crossed which included county, national, and forest boundaries. The command,

control, and coordination processes could best be described as pre-planned. The decision to

evacuate was first made by the sheriff and emergency manager of Douglas County and then

became federal jurisdiction. There were problems with the decision making process because

there were two different evacuation commands issued.

Communication

An EOC was used along with an ICP. Communication between field emergency responders and

EOC was by radio, telephone, and cell phone. There were no problems with communication.

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials and emergency responders were notified by telephone. The elapsed time

between the discovery of the incident and the mobilization of response personnel is unknown. 

The elapsed time between the start of the hazard, the decision to evacuate, and the total time it

took to complete the evacuation is unknown because the evacuation was staged over the course

of a month. There were no problems with notification of emergency personnel or senior local

officials. The public was notified by radio and television broadcasts, a reverse 911 system, and

by emergency responders going door to door. There were no special problems regarding

warning and subsequent citizen actions.

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were given specific routes and directions about where to go. These routes were

designated by roadblocks and there were access limitations. There were no special institutions

evacuated. Road conditions prior to the evacuation were dry and Highway 67 was unavailable

due to the fire. Reverse-laning was not used. No special traffic problems were encountered and

no traffic accidents occurred. Some people spontaneously evacuated and others refused to

evacuate.

Congregate Care Centers

The American Red Cross set up six congregate care centers in Woodland Park, Lake George,

Littleton, Colorado Springs, Highlands Ranch, and Castle Rock for 3000 residents. It is

unknown what percentage of evacuees used the congregate care centers. There were shadow

evacuations but this did not impact traffic or congregate care center capacity.

Law Enforcement

The police secured the area following the evacuation and there were no instances of looting or

vandalism and no problems with law enforcement.
D-118

Re-Entry

Incident management teams authorized re-entry through a controlled phase based on the fire’s

location. Evacuees were not compensated for their expenses and there were no major problems

during re-entry.

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

Pre-designated evacuations, trigger points, telephone notification systems, and the public’s prior

knowledge of the hazard contributed to the success of the evacuation. Reoccupation issues about

when and how evacuees could return home made the evacuation difficult. 

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Douglas County Emergency Services Coordinator

(303) 660-7589

8/20/03

References

Long, C. Disaster Relief News Stories. “Hayman Wildfire Breaks Lines.” June 18, 2002.

Long, C. Disaster Relief News Stories. “Hayman Fire 30% Contained.” June 15, 2002.

Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. “Douglas County, Colorado.

<http://www.thechamplainchanel.com/news/1506760/detail.html>

<http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/06/17/colorado.fires/>

Hamilton, J. “Forrest Service Employee Charged with Staring Fire.” Associated Press. 

Portsmith Herald. Castle Rock, Colorado.
D-119

Railroad Accident, Flora, Mississippi, July 18, 1997, ID #198

Summary

Rank Value: 56

Number Evacuated: 6,000

Category: Technological Hazard

Specific Type: Railroad Accident

Community: Rural

INTRODUCTION

On July 18, 1997, 6,000 residents were evacuated from their homes in Flora and an area five

miles north of Flora after 11 tank cars derailed in the middle of the night. Two of the tank cars

carried 159,110 L (35,000 gal) of chloroprene, a chemical used to create the synthetic rubber

neoprene. No deaths or injuries were associated with the derailment or the evacuation.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

The entire town of Flora, Mississippi, population 1,546, and an area five miles to the north were

evacuated (a total of 6,000 people were evacuated). The town of Flora covers an area of 8.8 km2

(3.4 mi2), and the evacuated area covered an area of 38.8 km2 (15 mi2). The population density

was medium during the evacuation. Land use in the evacuated area is residential, commercial,

and agricultural. Ethnicity, nationality, and age were not important factors in the evacuation.

The community has a mayoral form of government and its main economic base is agricultural. 

There is a petrified forest that attracts a large number of tourists. The nearest nuclear power

plant is more than 80 km (50 mi) away. Mississippi has one commercial nuclear power plant,

Grand Gulf 1, located 40 km (25 mi) south of Vicksburg.

History of Emergencies

The community is no more prone to hazards than average, although it has had experience with

derailments and evacuations in the past. In 1995 a car and train accident led to an evacuation. 

However, the community had no previous experience with the alerting mechanism used in this

evacuation. 

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.
D-120

Planning

The community did not have a written emergency plan.

Training

The community provides training to emergency response personnel and regularly conducts joint

training between industry and government.

Drills and Exercises

The community’s emergency response agencies do not regularly conduct emergency drills or

exercises.

Community Awareness

The community has a low level of awareness of local hazards and of the hazard that caused this

evacuation (i.e., the chloroprene spill). However, the community has a high level of awareness

about evacuation procedures and the alerting methods used in this evacuation.

THREAT CONDITIONS

The threat condition leading to this evacuation was the derailment of a train carrying 159,113 L

(35,000 gal) of chloroprene at 3:00 a.m. on July 18, 1997. The roads were dry and clear and

there were no unusual circumstances that occurred during the derailment, other than the fact that

it occurred in the middle of the night.

CONSEQUENCES

Approximately 6,000 people in a 39 km (15 mi ) area were evacuated from their homes after a 2 2

train carrying 159,110 L (35,000 gal) of chloroprene derailed in Flora, Mississippi. No deaths or

injuries were associated with the derailment or the evacuation. The estimated total cost of

evacuation-related expenses is unknown.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies was high, particularly between

the Game and Fish Department and the State Highway Patrol. Political boundaries were crossed. 

The command, control and coordination processes could best be described as pre-planned. The

decision to evacuate was made jointly by the Flora Fire and Police Chiefs and there were no

problems with the decision-making process.
D-121

Communications

There was an EOC and an ICP during this emergency. Communication between field

emergency responders and the EOC was by radio and cell phone. There were no problems with

this form of communication.

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials were notified of the incident by telephone and emergency responders were

notified through the 911 phone system. There were no problems with notification of emergency

personnel or senior local officials. The elapsed time between discovery of the incident and

mobilization of response personnel was less than 15 minutes, and the decision to evacuate was

made approximately 20 minutes after the derailment. It took approximately 1.5 hours to

complete the evacuation. The public was notified by police/fire Public Address (PA) system. 

The evacuation took place all at once and there were no special problems regarding warning and

subsequent citizen action.

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were not given specific instructions about where to go but were told to use specific

routes designated by roadblocks and manned police patrols. No special institutions were

evacuated. Road conditions before the evacuation were dry and there were no traffic accidents

and no traffic problems; major roadways were available to evacuees. Reverse-laning was not

used. No one evacuated before being told to do so and no one refused to evacuate.

Congregate Care Centers

Congregate care centers were not used and there were no shadow evacuations.

Law Enforcement

The State Highway Patrol and the Game and Fish Department secured the area following the

evacuation and there were no instances of looting or vandalism or any problems with law

enforcement.

Re-Entry

The Flora fire and police chiefs jointly authorized re-entry two days after the derailment

occurred. There were no special controls during re-entry and no problems with the re-entry. 

Evacuees were not compensated for their expenses. 

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

According to the Flora police chief, the evacuation was successful because of cooperation of

evacuees.
D-122

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Flora Police Chief

(601) 879-8871

(Personal Communication, 7/8/03)

References

“Evacuation Order Lifted for Area around Derailment.” Associated Press. July 20, 1997.
D-123

Flagler County, Florida, Evacuation, July 1998, ID #99

Summary

Rank Value: 53

Number Evacuated: 45,000

Category: Natural Disaster

Specific Type: Wildfire

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

In July 1998, a wildfire started in Flagler County, Florida and spread rapidly through the area. 

Fires burned in Brevard, Volusia, and Flagler counties and through the neighboring towns of

Bunnel and Palm Coast, damaging and destroying homes. At least 150 homes were damaged or

destroyed, and more than 800 km (500 mi ) were blackened. Approximately 45,000 people 2 2

were evacuated from the area.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

Flagler County, Florida, is a suburban community with a population of approximately 49,832

and it covers an area of 1,478 km (571 mi ). Approximately 45,000 people, almost 100% of the 2 2

population, were evacuated from Flagler County. Ethnicity, nationality, and age were not

important factors in the evacuation. 

The county has a county commission form of government, and the main economic base is

commercial and retail services. Tourism to Daytona Beach attracts large numbers of

non-residents to the area. The nearest nuclear power plant is more than 80 km (50 mi) away.

History of Emergencies

The area is more prone to natural hazards than the average county, and the county has had

experience with wildfires in the past. The community had not experienced large-scale

evacuations in the last 10 years; however, there was a large-scale evacuation in 1985. The

community had had previous experience with the alerting mechanism used during this

evacuation.

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.
D-124

Planning

The community had a written emergency plan that was used in this emergency and the plan

included an evacuation section. The plan did not conform to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev.

1, and there was no ETE in the plan. 

Training

The community provides training to emergency response personnel, and joint training between

industry and government is regularly conducted.

Drills and Exercises

The community’s emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and

exercises; however, the emergency plan had not been previously tested in full-scale exercises.

Community Awareness

The community has implemented a public awareness program and therefore has a high level of

awareness of the local hazards and of evacuation procedures. It has a low level of awareness

about wildfires and a medium level of awareness about the alerting methods used in this

evacuation. 

THREAT CONDITIONS

In July 1998, a wildfire in Flagler County, Florida, spread rapidly through the area. Fires also

burned in Brevard and Volusia counties and through the neighboring towns of Bunnel and Palm

Coast, placing approximately 120,000 people under evacuation orders. The Flagler County fire

was noticed immediately after it started; however, no planes were available to fight the fire

because they were tied up with other fires in the state. In Flagler County, approximately 45,000

people were ultimately evacuated. The evacuations occurred during the day when weather

conditions were dry and hot with gusty winds that hampered firefighters’ efforts to control the

blaze. The roads were dry and clear except for the smoky haze that covered much of the area,

causing motorists to use headlights in midday as visibility was cut to one-quarter mile. Three

fires converging on each other, combined with the large number of evacuees, caused significant

traffic issues. Traffic was bumper to bumper, and people were told to turn around when the fires

shifted directions.

CONSEQUENCES

Beginning around June 1, 1998, some 2,000 wildfires scorched more than 450,000 acres in

Florida during a severe drought. Nearly 200 homes were damaged or destroyed and

approximately 55 people, many of them firefighters, were injured. Flagler County was the worst

hit with fires in July where the fires damaged or destroyed at least 150 homes and blackened

more than 800 km (500 mi ) and caused the evacuation of approximately 45,000 people. 2 2

During the event, three evacuations took place, and the third evacuation, on July 2, 1998, at

approximately 3 p.m., was an order to evacuate the entire county. 
D-125

There were no fatalities from the wildfires, but four people were injured in Flagler County. 

There were no fatalities or injuries as a result of the evacuation. The estimated total cost of the

evacuation-related expenses is unknown.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies was moderate, and political

boundaries were crossed in this event. The command, control, and coordination processes could

best be described as ad hoc. The decision to evacuate was made by the governor, and there were

no problems with the decision-making process. 

Communications

An EOC and an ICP were used in this emergency. Communication between field emergency

responders and the ICP was by radio, telephone, cell phone, and citizen ban (CB) radios. There

were problems with having too many frequencies for communications during the event.

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials were notified of the event by pager and cell phone. Emergency responders

were aware of the fire when it started but could not immediately get to the fire due to the

lighting. The elapsed time between discovery of the incident and mobilization of response

personnel was less than 15 minutes. Emergency responders could see the fire, but there were no

aircraft available to fight the fire as they were tied up on other fires in the state. The initial

decision to evacuate was made approximately seven days after the fire started. The entire

evacuation was completed within approximately 8 hours.

The evacuation occurred all at once and the public was notified by police going door to door,

using PA systems, and by radio and television broadcasts. There were no problems with

warning and subsequent citizen action. Some people evacuated before being told to do so, and

others refused to evacuate. One individual refused to evacuate in Ormond Beach. Flames

ultimately surrounded his house, requiring him to be evacuated by helicopter.

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were given instructions on where to go and were told which routes to use. These

routes were designated by hurricane evacuation route signs. There were special institutions

evacuated, including the Flagler Palm Coast High School, the County Jail, a hospital and a

60-bed nursing home. Road conditions during the evacuation were dry and visibility was limited

by smoke. Approximately 100 miles of Interstate 95 and portions of Interstate 10 were closed,

hampering traffic movement. As winds shifted and three fires converged, people were stopped

and redirected, causing even greater traffic problems and bumper-to-bumper conditions. Some

minor traffic accidents were reported during the event and there were reports of people running

out of gas. Reverse-laning was not used.
D-126

Congregate Care Centers

The Red Cross established 40 congregate care centers, primarily in schools. Approximately

4,800 people or 10% of the evacuees reported to the congregate care centers. Some of these

congregate care centers had to be relocated as the fire encroached on the area. There were

reports of individuals traveling well outside of the evacuation limits to ensure that they were out

of harm’s way. There were shadow evacuations where people from outside Flagler County also

evacuated; however, these did not impact the congregate care center capacities or traffic. Many

evacuees went to the homes of friends or relatives, as well as to hotels, and even to the Daytona

Speedway and Gainesville Fairgrounds to seek shelter.

Law Enforcement

Approximately 1,500 National Guard were brought in to assist police with security following the

evacuation. There were some instances of looting, but no instances of vandalism. There were

reports of individuals violating curfew and then daring the police to arrest them stating that they

would prefer to be taken to jail where it was safe.

Re-Entry

The Chairman of the County Commission authorized re-entry; there were no special controls

during re-entry. Evacuees were not compensated for their expenses.

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

The evacuation worked reasonably well because of the attention the county pays to fires. 

However, problems included the road closures that hampered the evacuation routes and too

many frequencies used for communications. The public’s prior knowledge of evacuations

stemming from hurricanes and the public awareness education program both contributed to the

success of the evacuation.

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Flagler County Fire Department

Emergency Management Division Chief

(386) 437-7831

(Personal Communication, 7/21/03)

References

“Like a war zone.” Associated Press. Mike Schneider. 7/4/98
D-127

Louisiana State University Anthrax Hoax, Alexandria, Louisiana,

October 29, 2001, ID #1

Summary

Rank Value: 51

Number Evacuated: 2,000

Category: Malevolent Act

Specific Type: Malevolent Act

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

On October 29, 2001, 2,000 people at Louisiana State University at Alexandria (LSUA) were

evacuated after a phone call from a caller who claimed that anthrax had been planted in the

school’s ventilation system. All nine buildings on campus were evacuated because the caller did

not specify which buildings had been contaminated. LSUA has no residence halls and it was a

calm and orderly evacuation. The incident was later revealed to be a hoax.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

LSUA is located 11 km (7 mi) south of the city of Alexandria, Louisiana. Alexandria is a

suburban community with a population of approximately 46,342 people and covers an area of

69.9 km (27 mi ). Approximately 2,000 people, or 4.3%, of the population were evacuated 2 2

from a 1.3 km (0.5 mi ) area during this incident. The land use in the area is mainly schools and 2 2

the population density of the area was low. Ethnicity, nationality and age were not important

factors in the evacuation. 

The university is located just outside of Alexandria and is run by a commission in Rapides

Parish. The main economic base of the city is agriculture. The university attracts a large

number of non-residents to the area. The nearest nuclear power plant is River Bend located

more than 80 km (50 mi) away. 

History of Emergencies

The community is more prone to hazards than average and has had experience with highway and

rail accidents in the past along with tornadoes. The community has not had experience with

anthrax in the past and has not experienced large-scale evacuations in the last 10 years. The

community has had previous experience with the alerting methods used at the school, which

included use of the local intercom and alarms.
D-128

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.

Planning

The community had a written emergency plan for the campus with an evacuation section that

was used in this emergency. The plan did not conform to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1,

and there was no ETE in the plan.

Training

The community provides training to emergency response personnel; however, this training does

not include training about emergencies involving anthrax. Joint training is regularly conducted,

on an annual basis, between industry and government.

Drills and Exercises

The community’s emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and

exercises. The emergency plan used in this evacuation was previously tested in full-scale field

exercises and in tabletop exercises. 

Community Awareness

The community has a medium level awareness of the local hazards and a low level of awareness

of evacuation procedures. It has a low level of awareness of anthrax in general, and medium

awareness of the alerting methods used in this evacuation. 

THREAT CONDITIONS

On October 29, 2001, an anonymous call was placed to Louisiana State University at Alexandria

(LSUA) from a caller who claimed that anthrax had been placed in the school’s ventilation

system. The caller did not identify where the anthrax had been placed, requiring the entire

campus to be evacuated. The call occurred at 8:15 a.m. during the early morning classes before

many students had arrived on campus. The roads were dry and clear on a warm morning, and

there were no unusual circumstances that occurred during this event.

CONSEQUENCES

The anthrax threat was later revealed to be a hoax; however, the false report resulted in the

evacuation of approximately 2,000 people, or 4.3%, of the population from a 1.3 km (0.5 mi )

2 2

area. All nine buildings on campus were evacuated because the caller did not specify which

buildings had been contaminated. A special team was called in to take samples, and classes

were suspended until samples demonstrated that the facilities were not contaminated. No

fatalities or injuries from the incident or the evacuation occurred. The estimated total cost of the

evacuation-related expenses is unknown.
D-129

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation between local and state agencies was moderate, and political

boundaries were not crossed in this event. The command, control, and coordination processes

could best be described as ad hoc for the onsite response and pre-planned for the EOC

operations. The decision to evacuate was made by the school Chancellor, and there were no

problems with the decision-making process. 

Communications

An EOC was used in this event, and an ICP was established in the field. Communication

between field emergency responders and the ICP was primarily by radio. There were problems

with communications during the event becasue local and state police used different radio

frequencies.

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials were notified of the incident by telephone. The emergency responders

were notified through a 911 telephone call from the school. There were no problems with the

notification of emergency personnel or senior local officials. The elapsed time between

discovery of the incident and mobilization of response personnel was less than 15 minutes, and

the decision to evacuate the first building was made approximately 15 minutes after the

notification of the incident. Approximately 30 minutes later, it was decided to evacuate the rest

of the campus. It took less than one hour to complete the evacuation. 

Every building that makes up LSU campus was evacuated, and the school made the decision to

evacuate. The evacuation took place quickly, but was considered a staged event. There were no

problems with warning and subsequent citizen action. No one refused to evacuate. 

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were given instructions to get off campus. There was no need to designate

transportation routes. The school is a special institution. Road conditions during the evacuation

were dry, and no traffic accidents or traffic-related problems occurred during the event. 

Reverse-laning was not used.

Congregate Care Centers

Congregate care centers were not established for this emergency, and there were no shadow

evacuations. 

Law Enforcement

Police, the sheriff, state police and campus police secured the area following the evacuation, and

there were no instances of looting or vandalism or any problems with law enforcement. 
D-130

Re-Entry

Re-entry was authorized by the Louisiana State Police Hazmat unit, and there were no special

controls for re-entry. Evacuees were not compensated for their expenses. There were no

problems reported during re-entry.

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

Public awareness of the threat from recent events in the United States helped make this

evacuation work well. The emergency responders’ lack of knowledge of the chemical and

biological contamination was a problem. The public’s prior knowledge of evacuations also

contributed to the success of the evacuation. 

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Director

Rapides Parish Office of Emergency Preparedness 

(318) 445-0186

(Personal Communication, 8/19/03)

References

Hamilton, K. “Local universities affected by threat of anthrax.” Louisiana Wildcat College. 

November 2, 2001. 
D-131

Railcar Leak, Sterling Heights, Michigan, March 2000, ID #58

Summary

Rank Value: 51

Number Evacuated: 2,400

Category: Technological Hazard

Specific Type: Fixed Site Hazmat Incident

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

On March 20, 2000, a railcar carrying hydrochloric acid was found leaking in the CONRAIL

yard in Sterling Heights, Michigan. Approximately 2,400 people within a six-block area were

evacuated from their businesses and homes.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

The city of Sterling Heights, Michigan, is a suburban community with a population of

approximately 124,471 people and covers an area of 95 km (36.8 mi ). Approximately 2,400 2 2

people, or 2% of the population, were evacuated from a 1.3 km (0.5 mi ) area during this

2 2

incident. Ethnicity, nationality, and age were not important factors in the evacuation.

The community has a city council form of government with a city manager. Its main economic

base is manufacturing. There are a large number of manufacturing facilities in the area that

attract large numbers of non-residents. The nearest nuclear power plant is located more than

80 km (50 mi) away.

History of Emergencies

The area is more prone to hazards than the average city, although the city has not had experience

with leaking railcars in the past. The community has experienced large-scale evacuations in the

last ten years and has had previous experience with the alerting mechanism used during this

evacuation.

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.
D-132

Planning

The community had a written emergency plan with an evacuation section; however, the plan was

not used in this emergency. It is unknown if the plan conformed to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP1, Rev. 1, or if there was an ETE in the plan.

Training

The community provides training to emergency response personnel and regularly conducts joint

training between industry and government.

Drills and Exercises

The community’s emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and

exercises, and the emergency plan had been previously tested in tabletop and full-scale exercises. 

In February 2000 General Dynamics Land Systems, a company evacuated during this event,

conducted a tabletop exercise with Sterling Heights emergency response personnel and

government officials.

Community Awareness

The community has a medium level awareness of the local hazards and a low level of awareness

of evacuation procedures. It has a medium level of awareness of hazardous materials in general,

and with the alerting methods used in this evacuation. 

THREAT CONDITIONS

The threat conditions leading to this evacuation consisted of a leak in a railcar and subsequent

plume of hydrochloric acid on March 20, 2000, at approximately 8:30 a.m. Weather conditions

were dry and winds were out of the east at approximately 8 kmph (5 mph). The roads were dry

and clear and no unusual circumstances occurred during the event.

CONSEQUENCES

Approximately 2,400 people within a 1.3 km (0.5 mi ) area were evacuated from their 2 2

businesses and homes after a railcar was discovered leaking hydrochloric acid in Sterling

Heights, Michigan. There were no fatalities or injuries from the incident or the evacuation. The

estimated total cost of the evacuation-related expenses is unknown.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies was high, and political

boundaries were not crossed in this event. The command, control, and coordination processes

could best be described as pre-planned. The decision to evacuate was made by the Sterling

Heights Fire Department IC, and there were no problems with the decision-making process. 

Some of the agencies involved in the evacuation and response included the Sterling Heights
D-133

police, fire and public works departments, EPA, Department of Transportation, Macomb County

Health Department, and PVS Transportation, Inc.

Communications

An EOC was not used, but there was an ICP used in this emergency. Communication between

field emergency responders and the ICP was by radio. There were no problems with

communications during the event.

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials were notified of the incident by telephone, and emergency responders were

notified through the 911 phone system. There were no problems with the notification of

emergency personnel or senior local officials. The elapsed time between discovery of the

incident and mobilization of response personnel was less than 15 minutes and the initial decision

to evacuate was made at 9:40 a.m., approximately one hour after the discovery of the leak when

the fire department and PVS Chemical and Transportation organization completed their

assessment. At 10:40 a.m., the IC assessed the scenario once more and ordered the evacuation of

additional manufacturing facilities, including General Dynamics Land Systems, which employs

approximately 1,400 people. The entire evacuation was completed by 11:20 a.m.

The public was notified by a public address system and police going door to door. The

evacuation was staged and completed within approximately 1.5 hours. It is unlikely that anyone

evacuated before being told to do so, and some people refused to evacuate. 

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were given instructions on where to go and were told which routes to use. These

routes were designated by police barricade. There were no special institutions evacuated. Road

conditions during the evacuation were dry, and no traffic accidents or traffic related problems

occurred during the event. Reverse-laning was not used.

Congregate Care Centers

There were no congregate care centers established in this event and people were told to go home. 

There were no shadow evacuations.

Law Enforcement

Police and private security secured the area following the evacuation and there were no instances

of looting or vandalism or any problems with law enforcement. 

Re-Entry

The EPA monitored the air and, in coordination with the Sterling Heights Fire Department Chief,

authorized reentry at approximately 8:00 p.m. There were no special controls during re-entry

and evacuees were not compensated for their expenses.
D-134

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

According to the Sterling Heights fire chief, the evacuation worked well because of the high

level of cooperation between industry and response personnel. 

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Sterling Heights Fire Department 

Chief of Operations

(586) 446-2991

(Personal Communication, 7/30/03)

References

Sterling Heights Fire Department Incident Report #00-01670.

Jones, Radford. Anticipating the Worst of Times; April 2001.

<http://www.securitymanagement.com/library/001021.html>
D-135

Grand Trunk Derailment, Potterville, Michigan, May 27, 2002, ID #70

Summary

Rank Value: 51

Number Evacuated: 2,200

Category: Technological Hazard

Specific Type: Railroad Accident

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

On May 27, 2002, the Grand Trunk train derailed in Potterville, Michigan, sending 35 of 58 cars

off the tracks. The train had nine cars of propane, two of which were leaking, and two cars of

sulfuric acid. The entire town of Potterville, approximately 2,200 people, was evacuated from a

4.8 km (1.9 mi ) area for five days. 2 2

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

The town of Potterville, Michigan, is a suburban community with a population of approximately

2,200 people. The entire town was evacuated as a result of the train derailment and release of

hazardous materials. The town covers an area of 4.8 km (1.9 mi ) and 100% of the area was 2 2

evacuated. Ethnicity, nationality, and age were not important factors in the evacuation.

The community has a town council and town manager form of government with a mayor. Its

main economic base is retail trade. There are no special characteristics that attract large numbers

of visitors. The nearest nuclear power plant is Palisades, located more than 80 km (50 mi) away.

History of Emergencies

The area is more prone to hazards than average with two railroad tracks running through town

and heavy rail traffic in the area. Although the emergency response teams were aware of the

potential for railroad cargo to be hazardous, the residents, in general, were unaware of the

potential hazards. The community had not experienced large-scale evacuations in the last ten

years. It is unknown whether the community had previous experience with the alerting

mechanism used during this evacuation.

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.
D-136

Planning 

The community had a written emergency plan with an evacuation section that was used in this

emergency. It is unknown if the plan conformed to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, and

there was no ETE in the plan.

Training

Training is provided to emergency response personnel and training is conducted jointly with the

railroad.

Drills and Exercises

The community’s emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and

exercises; however, the emergency plan used in this evacuation had not been previously tested in

a full-scale exercise.

Community Awareness

The community has a medium level of awareness about the local hazards associated with the

railroad. However, it has a low level of awareness about hazardous material leaks, evacuations,

and the alerting methods used.

THREAT CONDITIONS

The threat conditions leading to this evacuation included the derailment of 35 cars from the

Grand Trunk train. Nine of these cars carried propane and two of the cars carried sulfuric acid. 

The accident occurred around noon. The roads were dry and clear, and there were no unusual

circumstances that occurred during the derailment.

CONSEQUENCES

The entire town of Potterville, Michigan, covering an area of 4.8 km (1.9 mi ) was evacuated 2 2

when two of the propane cars leaked in the accident. There were no fatalities or injuries from

the accident or the evacuation. The estimated total cost of the evacuation-related expenses is

unknown.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies was high. Political boundaries

were not crossed in this event. The command, control, and coordination processes could best be

described as pre-planned. The decision to evacuate was made by the fire chief, and there were

no problems with the decision-making process. 
D-137

Communications

An EOC was not used but there was an ICP used in this emergency. Communication between

field emergency responders and the ICP was by radio. There were problems with having too

many frequencies to manage communications during the event.

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials of this small town were immediately aware of the incident, as everyone

responded. Emergency responders were notified through the 911 phone system. There were no

problems with the notification of emergency personnel or senior local officials. The elapsed

time between discovery of the incident and mobilization of response personnel was less than 15

minutes and the decision to evacuate was made approximately 10 minutes after the derailment. 

It took approximately one hour to evacuate the town. The public was notified by a public

address system and police going door to door. The evacuation took place all at once and only

one person refused to evacuate.

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were given instructions on where to go for congregate care centers and were told

which routes to use. These routes were designated using roadblocks. There were no special

institutions evacuated. Road conditions during the evacuation were dry and no traffic accidents

or traffic-related problems occurred during the event. Reverse laning was not used, and no one

evacuated before receiving the evacuation notice.

Congregate Care Centers

A congregate care center was set up at the Sheriff’s Office and approximately 90 individuals, 4%

of the population, went to the congregate care center. However, most of these people left and

went to hotels when they were informed that Canadian National would reimburse residents for

hotel rooms. There were no shadow evacuations.

Law Enforcement

Police secured the area following the evacuation, and there were no instances of looting or

vandalism or any problems with law enforcement.

Re-Entry

Re-entry was allowed after a joint decision by the police chief, fire chief, and mayor. The

re-entry process was controlled and phased and there were no problems with re-entry. Evacuees

were compensated for food and hotel rooms by Canadian National.
D-138

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Potterville Fire Chief

(517) 231-3653

(Personal Communication, 7/23/03)

References

“Potterville, Michigan.” Associated Press 2002.

<http://archive.ap.org/cgi-bin/display.cgi?id=3fld42cb213efMpqaweb1P11018&doc=print>

“Hundreds forced from homes in Michigan after train derailment.” Associated Press. May 28,

2002. 

“Town of 2,200 Emptied for Derailment” Associated Press. May 28, 2002.

“Track Crack Caused Mich. Derailment.” Associated Press. July 1, 2002. 
D-139

Railcar Fire, Oshkosh, Wisconsin, December 2000, ID #97

Summary

Rank Value: 51

Number Evacuated: 2,300

Category: Technological Hazard

Specific Type: Railroad Accident

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

On December 16, 2000, a release of sulfur dioxide from a railcar that caught fire caused an

evacuation of approximately 2,300 people in Oshkosh, Wisconsin. The railcar, leased by

Hydrite Chemical Company, released a vapor cloud that forced the evacuation of about 750

homes, the Oshkosh Truck Corporation Service Center, and the Lake Air Shopping Mall. It also

forced the shutdown of 2.6 km (1 mi) of Highway 45. 

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

The town of Oshkosh, Wisconsin, is a suburban community with a population of approximately

3,234 people and covers an area of 158 km (61 mi ). Approximately 2,300 people, or 71%, of 2 2

the population were evacuated from a 5.2 km (2 mi ) area during this incident. Ethnicity and 2 2

nationality were not important factors in the evacuation; however, age was an important factor

with a number of elderly residents with special needs.

The town has a town council form of government, and the main economic base is manufacturing. 

Tourism attracts a large number of non-residents in the summer months. The nearest nuclear

power plant is Point Beach 2 located near Manitowoc, Wisconsin, approximately 83 km (52 mi)

away. Wisconsin has two commercial nuclear power plants.

History of Emergencies

The community is more prone to hazards than average, and the town has had experience with

chemical leaks from manufacturing plants in the past. The community has experienced

large-scale evacuations in the last 10 years; however, the community has not had previous

experience with the alerting mechanism used during this evacuation.

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.
D-140

Planning

The community had a written emergency plan with an evacuation section that was used in this

emergency. It is unknown if the plan conformed to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, or if

there was an ETE in the plan.

Training

The community provides training to emergency response personnel and regularly conducts joint

training between industry and government.

Drills and Exercises

The community’s emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and

exercises; however, the emergency plan used in this evacuation was not previously tested in

full-scale exercises.

Community Awareness

The community has a high level of awareness about the local hazards and a low level of

awareness about evacuation procedures. It has a medium level of awareness about hazardous

materials in general, and with the alerting methods used in this evacuation.

THREAT CONDITIONS

On December 16, 2000, a release of sulfur dioxide from a railcar that caught fire caused an

evacuation in Oshkosh, Wisconsin. The railcar released a vapor cloud that forced the evacuation

of about 750 homes, the Oshkosh Truck Corporation Service Center, and the Lake Air Shopping

Mall and forced the shutdown of a portion of Highway 45. Weather conditions were cold, snow

was falling, and the winds were shifting during the event. The roads were wet and icy.

CONSEQUENCES

Approximately 2,300 people within a 5.2 km (2 mi ) area were evacuated from their businesses 2 2

and homes after a railcar containing approximately 310,000 kg (141,000 lb) of sulfur dioxide

caught fire. There were no fatalities or injuries from the incident or the evacuation. The

estimated total cost of the evacuation-related expenses is unknown.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies was high, and political

boundaries were not crossed in this event. The command, control, and coordination processes

could best be described as pre-planned. The decision to evacuate was made by the Oshkosh Fire

Chief, and there were no problems with the decision-making process.
D-141

Communications

An EOC and an ICP were used in this emergency. Communication among field emergency

responders and the ICP was by radio and cell phone. There were no problems with

communications during the event.

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials were notified of the incident by telephone in accordance with the EOC plan

and emergency responders were notified through the 911 phone system. There were no

problems with the notification of emergency personnel or senior local officials. The elapsed

time between discovery of the incident and mobilization of response personnel was less than 15

minutes, and the initial decision to evacuate was made less than 30 minutes after the fire

department reached the scene. It took approximately three hours to complete the evacuation,

which started with a local area and expanded to approximately 2,300 people.

The public was notified by radio and television broadcasts, by police going door to door, and

with a reverse 911 system. The evacuation was staged and completed within approximately

three hours. Some people did evacuate before being told to do so, and some people refused to

evacuate.

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were given instructions on where to go and were told which routes to use. These

routes were designated by police barricades. There were no special institutions evacuated. Road

conditions during the evacuation were wet, but no traffic accidents or traffic-related problems

occurred during the event. Reverse-laning was not used.

Congregate Care Centers

Congregate care centers were established at local schools for this emergency and were managed

by the Red Cross. There were shadow evacuations; however, this did not have an impact on

congregate care center capacity or the evacuation.

Law Enforcement

Police and the sheriff secured the area following the evacuation, and there were no instances of

looting or vandalism or any problems with law enforcement.

Re-Entry

Re-entry was authorized as a joint decision among the EPA, Department of Natural Resources,

and the Fire Chief. Re-entry was controlled and took longer than expected because the EPA

wanted to monitor each household before allowing re-entry. Evacuees were compensated for

their expenses.
D-142

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

The cooperation of citizens and multiple means of notification were helpful in making this

evacuation a success. It was learned that the radio and cable interrupt did not work very well. 

The fact that some residents, especially those close to the site, had prior knowledge of hazards

helped in this evacuation.

CONTACT INFORMATION

Contacts

Oshkosh Fire Chief

(920) 236-5240
D-143

Norfolk Southern Railway Derailment, Farragut, Tennessee,

September 15, 2002, ID #73

Summary

Rank Value: 51

Number Evacuated: 3,000

Category: Technological Hazard

Specific Type: Railroad Accident

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

On September 15, 2002, a train derailed in Farragut, Tennessee, just south of Knoxville, and

spilled more than 45,460 L (10,000 gal) of sulfuric acid. Approximately 3,000 people were

evacuated within a 9.6 km (3.7 mi ) evacuation zone, and another 8,000 people were under a 2 2

voluntary evacuation notice. The evacuation occurred in a rural area of Tennessee in the Turkey

Creek and Farragut communities. There were no fatalities from the accident and only minor

injuries, which included skin and lung irritation from exposure to the sulfuric acid. 

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

Farragut is an affluent suburb of Knoxville located in Knox County, Tennessee. The town of

Farragut is a suburban community with a mayoral form of government. It has a population of

approximately 17,720 people and covers an area of 42.1 km2 (16.2 mi2). Its main economic base

is government employment, retail trade, and manufacturing. 

On September 15, 2002, approximately 3,000 people were evacuated in a 2.1 km (1.3 mi)

rectangular grid, totaling approximately 9.6 km (3.7 mi ), after a train derailment in the 2 2

community of Farragut. The area was lightly congested at the time of the evacuation. The

Rural/Metro Fire Department has estimated, based on census data and rough calculations, that

there were approximately 8,700 people in the region that was evacuated, equating to

approximately 35% of the area being evacuated.

The evacuation area was primarily residential (suburban area). Ethnicity, nationality, and age

were not important factors in the evacuation. Knoxville is more than 80 km (50 mi) from the

nearest commercial nuclear power plant, the Watts Bar 1 in Spring City, Tennessee. Oak Ridge

National Laboratory, which has nuclear reactor facilities, is approximately 32 km (20 mi)

northwest of the evacuation but was not involved in the event.
D-144

History of Emergencies

The area is likely no more prone to hazards than average. Although the emergency response

teams were aware of the potential for railroad cargo to be hazardous, the residents, in general,

were unaware of the potential hazards. The emergency response teams have had some

experience with small chemical spills and railcars off track, but this was the first large-scale

event in the community.

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.

Planning

Knoxville County has an active emergency response plan that was developed to meet the

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) Title III requirements. The plan

addresses evacuations in a general sense but does not specify routing or have evacuation time

estimates and does not conform to NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1. As part of the SARA

Title III requirements, the community was required to establish a Local Emergency Planning

Committee (LEPC). The Knox County LEPC is an active organization with representatives from

the area law enforcement, fire protection, and railroad personnel. The working relationship of

this committee contributed to the success of this evacuation.

Training

Training is provided to emergency response personnel. Training is conducted jointly with the

railroad, and a few months before the event, site training was conducted at the Norfolk Southern

switchyard. Most training was directed toward problems at the switchyard and was not directly

related to train derailment. In addition, the incident command structure for emergency response

was practiced at least annually.

Drills and Exercises

The Knox County emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and

exercises and had previously tested their emergency procedures in full-scale field exercises in

the Norfolk Southern switchyard facility. These drills included hazmat practice, but were not

focused on train derailments.

Community Awareness

The community does not have chemical plants or manufacturing facilities in the area. The

community’s level of awareness of local hazards and evacuation procedures was low. The

community’s level of awareness about the hazard that caused the evacuation and about the

alerting methods used was also low.
D-145

THREAT CONDITIONS

On September 15, 2002, a Norfolk Southern train derailed as it was en route from Allentown,

Pennsylvania, to Birmingham, Alabama. The train had 141 cars and three locomotives, of which

24 cars and two locomotives derailed. More than 45,461 L (10,000 gal) of sulfuric acid spilled

from a ruptured tank, forming a heavy cloud of hazardous gas that spread over the area. Some of

the acid leaked into Ft. Loudoun Lake along the Tennessee River and reacted violently. The

incident and the evacuation took place in the middle of the morning. It was overcast outside, and

the roads were clear and dry. 

During the initial response, emergency personnel were placing soda ash on the spill. This

approach was not effective, and officials with Norfolk Southern Railway called in a Pittsburg

clean-up crew that specialized in sulfuric acid. 

CONSEQUENCES

Approximately 20 evacuees and one emergency worker complained of minor skin and lung

irritation and were taken to the hospital as a result of the sulfuric acid leaking from the train

derailment. There were no fatalities associated with the incident. Approximately 3,000 people

were evacuated within a 2.1 km (1.3 mi) rectangular grid downwind of the incident, and another

8,000 people were put on voluntary evacuation notice. Seven public schools in the Knox County

school system were cancelled because of the incident. There were multiple agencies involved in

the evacuation and no cumulative costs were compiled for this event.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies was very good. Some of the

onsite agencies included the EPA, U.S. Coast Guard, FBI, the Farragut Fire Marshal, the

Rural/County Fire Chief, and the Knox County Sheriff. The train derailment occurred near the

border of Farragut and Knox Counties. However, many of these agencies work together

routinely and have interagency training so the response was not impacted by the location. The

command, control and coordination processes could best be described as pre-planned and

followed the written emergency plan. The Rural/Metro fire chief made the decision to evacuate,

and there were no problems with the decision-making process.

Communications

The Knox County Sheriff’s Office EOC was utilized as the central command. An ICP was

established approximately 0.8 km (0.5 mi) from the incident to coordinate activities. Field

emergency responders communicated via radio and cell phone, and there were no problems

identified with communications. There were multiple cell phones available onsite making cell

phones the preferred means to communicate with the EOC.
D-146

Notification and Warning

The train derailment was originally reported through the local 911 emergency system. Senior

local officials were notified by the Farragut Fire Marshal. Emergency responders were notified

of the incident by phone and mobilized immediately. There were no problems with notification

of emergency personnel or senior local officials. 

The decision to evacuate was made within approximately 45 minutes of the event. After notice

to evacuate, it took approximately two hours to complete the evacuation of the area. The public

was notified to evacuate through use of a reverse 911 call-back system and through the use of

patrolmen going door to door in some areas. The evacuation took place all at once with very

infrequent incidents of residents refusing to leave. One area of the evacuation was in an area

with a high concentration of the sulfuric acid. The hazmat team had to go to approximately four

residences in that area and evacuate invalids using an ambulance. There was also a bike tour

sponsored by the Multiple Sclerosis Society that had cyclists traveling near the affected area. 

The bike tour officials were alerted and called off the remaining portion of the tour.

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were informed of the congregate care center locations when the evacuation notice was

given. However, most of the residents in this affluent neighborhood chose to go to friends,

relatives, or hotels rather than to congregate care centers. Specific routes were designated by

police barricades and policemen directing traffic. No special institutions were evacuated. Most

of the roads in the area are two lanes; conditions were dry, traffic moved smoothly, and the

evacuation proceeded well. Some people evacuated before receiving notice, and many people

were in church at the time and just stayed out of the area. 

Congregate Care Centers

The Red Cross immediately established four congregate care centers. These included the

Tokesbury Methodist Church, Blount Christian Church, Beardon High School and the Red Cross

facility. Two of the congregate care centers closed at 9 p.m. the first evening. The remaining

two congregate care centers closed the following morning as people were allowed to go home. 

There were 200 people registered at the congregate care centers, representing less than 7% of the

evacuated population. There was no obvious impact from shadow evacuations.

Law Enforcement

Local law enforcement brought in additional crews to patrol the evacuated area, and there were

no instances of looting or vandalism. No problems were identified with law enforcement.

Re-Entry

Re-entry was allowed after a joint decision by the incident commander and emergency response

officials on September 16, 2002, with re-entry to some areas being allowed on September 17,

2002. The media was used to inform residents that it was safe to return and there were no

special controls in place during re-entry. Norfolk Southern established a hot line to reimburse

evacuees for their expenses. There were no problems associated with re-entry.
D-147

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

According to the Rural/Metro fire chief, the evacuation worked well because of the high level of

cooperation among agencies established through the LEPC, the planning efforts of the

emergency management team, and the training program for the emergency response personnel. 

He did state that it is important to inform residents of how long they would be gone to allow

them to gather medicines, take pets, and turn off appliances. In this evacuation, emergency

personnel did not inform residents of the duration and had to make some special trips into the

evacuation zone to retrieve pets and medicine. 

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Farragut Fire Marshal

(865) 675-2384

(Personal Communication, July 2003)

Rural/Metro Fire Chief

(865) 531-2058

(Personal Communication, July 2003)

References

American Red Cross News. “Thousands evacuated after Tennessee train derailment.”

September 16, 2002. <http://www.nyredcross.org/news/2002/020916_derailment.asp> (June

2003).

Bender, Annett. “Knoxville churches affected by tanker spill.” The Call. September 27, 2002.

<http://www.holstonconference.com/thecall/archives/09-27-02/02_sept27_derailment.html>

(June 2003).

Disaster Relief. “Thousands evacuated after Tennessee train derailment.” September 16, 2002.

<http://www.disasterrelief.org/Disasters/020916TennTrain/> (June 2003).

Jacobs, Don and J. J. Stanbaugh. “Toxic Fumes force Thousands to Flee.” News-Sentinel. 

September 16, 2002. 

<http://www.stevequayle.com/News.alert/America_General/020916.TN.toxic.fumes.html> 

(June 2003).

The Jefferson City News Tribune Online Edition. “Thousands flee after train derails, acid

spilled near Knoxville, Tenn.” September 16, 2002. 

<http://newstribune.com/stories/091602/wor_0916020051.asp> (June 2003).
D-148

WBIR.com. “Neighborhoods evacuated after train derails spilling sulfuric acid.” September 16,

2002. <http://www.wbir.com/News/news.asp?ID=9183> (June 2003).
D-149

Pipeline Rupture, North Attleboro, Massachusetts, December 9, 1995, ID #19

Summary

Rank Value: 49

Number Evacuated: 40,000

Category: Technological Hazard

Specific Type: Pipeline Rupture

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

On December 9, 1995, a 40 cm (16 in) natural gas main was ruptured after being hit at a nearby

construction site by a bulldozer. Approximately 40,000 people were evacuated within a 2.6 km

(1 mi) radius of the incident in North Attleboro, Massachusetts, including 25,000 from Emerald

Square Mall, 15,000 from surrounding strip malls, and several hundred nearby homes. The

evacuation occurred in a highly congested area with a lot of pedestrian traffic. There were minor

injuries to the bulldozer operator and no fatalities associated with the incident. 

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

The town of North Attleboro, Massachusetts, is an affluent suburban community with a mayoral

form of government. It has a population of approximately 27,000 people and covers an area of

49.3 km (19 mi ). Its main economic base is retail, which attracts a large number of non- 2 2

residents to area stores and strip malls. On December 9, 2003, approximately 40,000 people

were evacuated from an 8.1 km (3.14 mi ) area after a natural gas main was ruptured. 2 2

Approximately 25,000 people were evacuated from Emerald Square Mall and 15,000 people

were evacuated from the surrounding strip malls and from the several hundred nearby homes. 

The area was highly congested at the time of the evacuation. It is difficult to determine precisely

what percentage of the community was evacuated, since many of the evacuees from the mall

were not residents of the area. It is estimated that approximately one-quarter of the residents

were evacuated. However, as much as one-half of the people present in the community at the

time, including both visitors and residents, were evacuated. The evacuation area was primarily

commercial/retail. Ethnicity, nationality, and age were not important factors in the evacuation. 

The town is located approximately 40 to 48 km (25 to 30 mi) from a commercial nuclear power

plant, the Pilgrim 1 Boiling Water Reactor at the Energy Nuclear Power Plant in Plymouth,

Massachusetts. 

History of Emergencies

The area is likely no more prone to hazards than average. The community did not have any prior

experience with the hazard that led to this evacuation. The local fire chief stated that he had “not

seen anything like this in twenty years.” The community had not experienced any evacuations in
D-150

the previous 10 years, and it is unknown whether the community had any prior experience with

the alerting mechanism used in this evacuation.

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.

Planning

North Attleboro had a written emergency plan that contained an evacuation section. In addition,

the Emerald Square Mall had an evacuation plan. Both plans were used in this emergency. The

plans probably did not conform to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, and it is unknown if

they contained evacuation time estimates.

Training

Training is provided to emergency response personnel and joint training between industry and

government is conducted annually.

Drills and Exercises

North Attleboro’s emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and

exercises but had not previously tested their emergency procedures in a full-scale field exercise. 

Immediately before this evacuation, they likely performed a “mock disaster drill” (i.e., a

functional drill).

Community Awareness

The community’s level of awareness about local hazards and about evacuation procedures was

likely average. The community’s level of awareness about the hazard that caused the evacuation

and the alerting methods used was probably average.

THREAT CONDITIONS

The hazard that led to this evacuation was the rupture of a 40-cm (16-in) natural gas pipeline

belonging to Algonguin Natural Gas. The gas main was struck by a bulldozer operator who was

working at a construction site near a Wal-Mart Store. The incident occurred on a cold and

snowy Saturday during the height of the Christmas shopping season. Several eyewitnesses

commented that it sounded like a jet taking off. The incident and the evacuation took place in

the middle of the afternoon. It was cold outside and the roads were wet. The evacuation was

slightly hampered by both the snowstorm and the high level of pedestrian traffic. The local

newspaper reported that it resembled a war scene.
D-151

CONSEQUENCES

On December 9, 1995, at approximately 1:20 p.m. a 40-cm (16-inch) natural gas main was

ruptured and within 10 minutes an evacuation was initiated. There was one reported injury (to

the bulldozer operator) and no fatalities associated with the incident. Approximately 40,000

people were evacuated within a one-mile radius. The estimated total cost of the evacuation to

the pubic was minimal.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies was high. However, no

political boundaries were crossed. The command, control and coordination processes could best

be described as ad hoc. The North Attleboro fire chief made the decision to evacuate, and there

were no problems with the decision-making process.

Communications

An EOC, including an ICP, was used in this emergency. Field emergency responders

communicated via radio and no problems were identified with communications.

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials and emergency responders were notified of the incident by phone. There

were no problems with notification of emergency personnel or senior local officials. Emergency

response personnel mobilized immediately. The decision to evacuate was made in less than 10

minutes. It took up to one hour to complete the evacuation. The public was notified to evacuate

by fire engine sirens and a police/fire PA system. The evacuation took place all at once, and

there were no special problems regarding warning and subsequent citizen action.

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were given specific instructions about where to go when they evacuated and were told

to use specific routes that were designated by police barricades and policemen directing traffic. 

No special institutions were evacuated. Road conditions were wet and snowy. Some major

roadways were unavailable because of the hazard. However, traffic moved relatively smoothly

and the evacuation proceeded faster than expected. There was no time for people to evacuate

before being told to do so. Traffic was reverse-laned and there were no reported traffic accidents

during the evacuation. No one refused to evacuate.

Congregate Care Centers

Three congregate care centers were used. It is unknown who managed those congregate care

centers, but it may have been response personnel. High schools were used as congregate care

centers and the length of stay was less than 2.5 hours. It is unknown what percentage of the

evacuees went to congregate care centers. Presumably, all of the out-of-town shoppers would
D-152

have gone home, leaving only the local residents to go to the congregate care centers. Therefore,

it was a very low percentage. There were no shadow evacuations.

Law Enforcement

The area was secured by the police, and there were no instances of looting or vandalism. No

problems were identified with law enforcement.

Re-Entry

The North Attleboro fire chief lifted the evacuation order after 1.5 hours and there were no

special controls in place during re-entry. However the stores remained closed. Evacuees were

not compensated for their expenses. There were no problems associated with re-entry.

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

North Attleboro Fire Chief (former)

North Attleboro Fire Department

50 Elm Street

P.O. Box 904

North Attleboro, MA 02761

(508) 699-0140 (phone)

(508) 643-0296 (fax)

References

“Mall Evacuated.” Associated Press. December 9, 1995.

Skerner, S. “Thousands Flee After Explosion at NA Gas Line.” The Sun Chronicle. December

10, 1995.
D-153

Twin City Foods Plant, Arlington, Washington, May 12, 2002, ID #69 

Summary

Rank Value: 49

Number Evacuated: 1,500

Category: Technological Hazard

Specific Type: Fixed Site Hazmat Incident

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

On May 12, 2002 (Mother’s Day), there was an ammonia spill at the Twin City Foods Plant in

Arlington, Washington. The spill prompted authorities to evacuate approximately 1,500 people

within a 2.6 km (1 mi ) area. Two individuals suffered minor injuries from the accident. The 2 2

leak was thought to be the result of an attempted theft of the ammonia for use in illegally making

methamphetamine. 

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

Arlington, Washington, is a city of approximately 11,713 people, based on the 2000 Census. On

May 12, 2002, approximately 1,500 people, or slightly more than 12% of the population, were

evacuated from a suburban community in Arlington because of the ammonia leak at the Twin

City Foods Plant. Arlington is a small community approximately 90 miles north of Seattle. The

city covers 19.6 km (7.6 mi ). The evacuated area covered 2.6 km (1 mi ). The population 2 2 2 2

density during the evacuation was average (medium). Ethnicity, nationality, and age were not

important factors in the evacuation.

Arlington has a mayoral form of government and its main economic base is manufacturing/

industry and commercial/retail/services. There are no special characteristics that attract large

numbers of non-residents. There are no commercial nuclear power plants within 80 km (50 mi)

of Arlington. The state of Washington does have a commercial nuclear power plant located in

the southeastern portion of the state near Hanford.

History of Emergencies

Arlington is more prone to technological hazards than average because of the local industry,

highway and rail, gas pipeline, etc. It is also more prone to natural disasters, including

earthquakes and flooding. The community had no prior experience with the hazard that led to

this evacuation; no evacuations in the previous ten years; and no previous experience with the

alerting mechanism used in this evacuation.
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Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.

Planning

Arlington has a written emergency plan that is based on the template provided in the Washington

State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP). The Arlington plan was used in

this emergency; however, it does not contain an evacuation section and does not conform to

NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1.

Training

Training is provided to emergency response personnel, and joint training between industry and

government is regularly conducted.

Drills and Exercises

Arlington’s emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and exercises but

the emergency plan used in this evacuation was not previously tested in a full-scale field

exercise.

Community Awareness

The level of community awareness of local hazards, with evacuation procedures, and of the

alerting methods used is average (medium). The level of community awareness about the hazard

that caused the evacuation was low.

THREAT CONDITIONS

The threat condition leading to the evacuation was a spill of ammonia at the Twin City Foods

Plant. Around 12:30 p.m. on May 12, 2002, a passerby noticed an ammonia odor and called

911. Approximately 4,546 L (1,000 gal) of ammonia had been released. Ammonia is a toxic,

reactive, and corrosive gas. In higher concentrations, ammonia can be fatal. 

It was Mother’s Day and the weather at the time of the incident was sunny, calm and warm and

the roads were clear and dry. There were no unusual circumstances that occurred during this

incident, other than the hazard.

CONSEQUENCES

Approximately 1,500 people, or slightly more than 12% of the population, were evacuated. 

There were no deaths or injuries due to the evacuation and no deaths related to the hazardous

ammonia spill. However, two people were treated at the local hospital for eye and throat

irritation. The estimated total cost of the evacuation to the pubic was approximately $20,000.
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies was high. Multiple agencies

were involved, including the Snohomish County Regional Hazmat Team, American Red Cross,

State Police Patrol, and the Arlington Police and Fire Departments. Political boundaries were

not crossed. Command, control and coordination processes could best be described as preplanned. The decision to evacuate was made by the Incident Commander in coordination with

the on-duty police and fire personnel. There were no problems associated with the decisionmaking process.

Communications

An EOC was not used. However, an ICP was used and communication between the field

emergency responders and the ICP was via radio, cell phone, and face-to-face contact. There

were no problems with communications.

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials were notified of the incident by pager and telephone. Emergency

responders were notified through the 911 system. There were no problems with notification of

either local officials or responders. Emergency response personnel mobilized within 15 minutes

of discovery of the incident, and the decision to evacuate was made within 30 minutes of the

start of the incident. It took approximately one hour to complete the evacuation. The public was

notified by a Police/Fire PA System and by emergency personnel going door to door to notify

residents to evacuate. The evacuation took place all at once. There were no special problems

with warning and subsequent citizen action.

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were told what congregate care centers to go to and which routes to take, which were

designated by police barricades. No special institutions were evacuated. Road conditions prior

to the evacuation were clear and dry; however, major roadways (State Routes 9 and 530) were

unavailable for use because of the hazard. Some people evacuated before being told to do so. 

Reverse-laning was not used. There were no traffic accidents during the evacuations. Some

people refused to evacuate.

Congregate Care Centers

Congregate care centers were managed by the Red Cross and included schools. However, there

was a delay in the arrival of the Red Cross. Fewer than 20 people (or 1% of evacuees) registered

at the congregate care centers. There were no shadow evacuations.

Law Enforcement

The evacuated area was secured by the police, and there were no instances of looting or

vandalism and no problems with law enforcement.
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Re-Entry

The Arlington Fire Chief authorized re-entry approximately five hours after the start of the

incident. There were no special controls associated with re-entry and no major problems with

re-entry. Evacuees were not compensated for their expenses. 

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

According to the Arlington fire chief, the evacuation worked well because of the high level of

cooperation among agencies and because the command system worked well.

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Arlington Fire Chief

(360) 403-3600

(Personal Communication, June 27, 2003)

References

Hadley, J. and C. McGann. “1,500 People Evacuated in Arlington during Ammonia Scare.” 

Seattle Post-Intelligencer. May 13, 2002. 

<http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/70190_arlington13.shtml> (June 2003).

Washington State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP), Edition II, May 2002.
D-157

Train Derailment, Prichard, Alabama, March 25, 1994, ID #95

Summary

Rank Value: 49

Number Evacuated: 2,000

Category: Technological Hazard

Specific Type: Train Derailment

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

On March 25, 1994, 13 cars from a train derailed in the early morning hours in Prichard,

Alabama, spilling a tanker loaded with chlorine, a toxic chemical, and resulting in the evacuation

of approximately 2,000 people. There were no deaths or injuries related to the incident.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

Prichard is a city located in Mobile County, Alabama, with a population of 28,633 people. 

Approximately 2,000 residents (7% of the population) were evacuated. Land use in the area was

primarily residential. The total area of Prichard is 66 km (25.5 mi ) and the evacuated area was 2 2

10.36 km (4 mi ). The population density of the area during the evacuation was high. 2 2

Ethnicity, nationality, and age were not important factors in the evacuation.

Prichard has a mayoral form of government, and its main economic base is commercial services. 

There are no special characteristics that attract a large number of non-residents to the area. 

Prichard is approximately 200 miles away from the nearest commercial nuclear power plant,

which is Farley Nuclear Power Plant. 

History of Emergencies

Because Prichard has a major highway (I-65) running through it and because it is located in a

hurricane-prone state, it is more prone to both natural disasters and technological hazards than

the average U. S. city. It is unknown whether the community had prior experience with the type

of hazard that led to this evacuation. The community had experienced evacuations in the

previous 10 years, but they were on a much smaller scale. The community has also had previous

experience with the alerting mechanisms that were used in this evacuation.

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.
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Planning

The community did not have a written emergency plan.

Training

Training is provided to emergency response personnel and joint training between industry and

government is conducted annually. 

Drills and Exercises

The community’s emergency response agencies do not regularly conduct emergency drills and

exercises.

Community Awareness

The level of community awareness of local hazards was low and the level of community

awareness regarding the hazard that caused this evacuation was also low. The level of

community awareness about evacuation procedures was average as was the level of community

awareness about the alerting methods used during the evacuation.

THREAT CONDITIONS

The threat conditions leading to this evacuation consisted of 13 train cars derailing, one of which

spilled chlorine, a hazardous liquid. The derailment was believed to have been caused by

negligence on the part of the rail operator. 

CONSEQUENCES

Two thousand residents were evacuated from their homes and businesses on the evening of

March 25, 1994. No deaths or injuries were associated with the hazard or with the evacuation. 

The estimated total cost of evacuation-related expenses incurred by the public is unknown.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation between local, state, and federal agencies was high. No political

boundaries were crossed. The command, control, and coordination processes could best be

described as ad hoc. The decision to evacuate was made by the Prichard fire chief and there

were no problems with the decision making process.

Communications

An EOC was not used but a field ICP was used. Communication between field emergency

responders and ICP was by radio. There were no problems with communication.
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Notification and Warning

Senior local officials were notified of the incident through dispatch and phone trees. Emergency

responders were notified of the incident through the 911 phone system. There were no problems

with notification between senior local officials and emergency response personnel. The elapsed

time between the discovery of the incident and the mobilization of response personnel was less

than 15 minutes and the decision to evacuate was made in 15 minutes. It took approximately 45

minutes to complete the evacuation. The public was notified to evacuate by emergency response

personnel going door to door. The evacuation took place all at once, and there were no special

problems regarding warning and subsequent citizen action.

Traffic Movement and Control

It is unknown whether people were given specific instructions about where to go when they

evacuated or whether they were told to use specific routes. No special institutions were

evacuated. Road conditions before the evacuation were dry; there were no traffic accidents or

traffic problems, and all major roadways were available to evacuees. Reverse-laning was not

used. No one spontaneously evacuated before being told to do so and no one refused to

evacuate.

Congregate Care Centers

The American Red Cross set up congregate care centers. It is unknown how many evacuees

used the congregate care centers. There were no shadow evacuations.

Law Enforcement

Police secured the area following the evacuation and there were no instances of looting or

vandalism or any problems with law enforcement.

Re-Entry

A joint decision between the mayor and fire chief authorized re-entry at 12 p.m. on March 25,

1994. No special controls were used during the re-entry process and no major problems

occurred during re-entry. Evacuees were not compensated for their expenses.

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

According to the Prichard fire chief, the good response and cooperation of residents and the

public’s prior knowledge of hazards and evacuations contributed to the success of the

evacuation. However, one lesson learned is that the setup and mobility of the ICP needs to be

improved. No unusual circumstances occurred during this incident other than the hazard itself.
D-160

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contact

Prichard Fire Chief

(251) 452-7823

(Telephone Conversation, 8/19/03) 

References

Prichard, Alabama. From Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia. 

<http://www.wikipedia.org/w/wiki.phtml?title=Prichard%2C_Alabama&printable=yes
D-161

Burlington Northern Railroad Derailment, Superior, Wisconsin, June 30, 1992, ID #16

Summary

Rank Value: 49

Number Evacuated: 40,000

Category: Technological Hazard

Specific Type: Railroad Accident

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

On June 30, 1992, a Burlington Northern Railroad freight train derailed as it approached a bridge

over the Nemadji River in Douglas County near the Town of Superior, Wisconsin. The railcar

was on its way from Novacor Chemical Ltd. in Alberta, Canada to Chicago, where its contents

was going to be used to manufacture rubber. Fourteen freight cars derailed, including three tank

cars that contained hazardous materials. About 99,332 L (21,850 gal) of aromatic concentrates

spilled into the river. The more volatile constituents of the aromatic concentrates evaporated

from the surface of the river and formed a vapor cloud about 32 km (20 mi) long and 8 km (5

mi) wide that resulted in the evacuation of more than 40,000 people from the City of Superior,

Wisconsin, from Duluth, Minnesota, and from surrounding areas. A large-scale, staged

evacuation was initiated and generally progressed smoothly. There were some injuries as a

direct result of the evacuation; however, none of these were life threatening and governors from

both states praised the public for their orderly departure.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

On June 30, 1992, at 2:50 a.m. a Burlington Northern freight train derailed in Douglas County,

Wisconsin near the City of Superior. The hazardous plume resulted in the evacuation of

approximately 40,000 people from the following communities: Douglas County, the Town of

Superior, and the City of Superior, Wisconsin; and Duluth, Cloquet, Carlton, Wrenshall, and

Esko, Minnesota. According to written reports there was substantial compliance with the

evacuation. The Town of Superior is a rural community located immediately south of the City

of Superior across Superior Bay from Duluth. Duluth is a more urban and a more heavily

populated area. 

The size of Douglas County is 3,833 km (1,480 mi ); it has a population of approximately 2 2

43,000. The population density during the evacuation, primarily in Duluth, was high. The City

of Superior has a mayoral form of government. Its main economic base is commercial, retail,

and service industries with some industrial facilities. Ethnicity, nationality, and age were not

important factors in the evacuation. The nearest commercial nuclear plant, Monticello, is

located near Minneapolis, Minnesota, more than 80 km (50 mi) from the incident. The
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evacuation did not impact operations and did not enter the emergency planning zone (EPZ) of

the reactor.

History of Emergencies

The Douglas County region is more prone to hazards than the average community. There is a

refinery and tank farm in the City of Superior, along with the railroad activities. Approximately

one year before this event, one of the same railcars that derailed had a leak at the rail yard,

requiring an emergency response but not an evacuation. The Douglas County emergency

management coordinator and the City of Superior chief of police said there had been no previous

evacuations before this event, and the alerting mechanism had not been utilized in the past.

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.

Planning

Douglas County, Wisconsin, and Duluth, Minnesota, both have emergency management plans. 

The Douglas County disaster plan was activated for this event and had been reviewed by the

Wisconsin Department of Military Affairs, Division of Emergency Response and had been

approved as meeting all federal and state emergency planning requirements. The latest

certification of the county disaster plan before the accident occurred March 1, 1992. 

The Duluth disaster planning was included within the St. Louis County, Minnesota, disaster

plan. This plan was reviewed by a Regional Review Committee for the Minnesota Department

of Public Safety, and was approved as meeting all federal and state emergency planning

requirements. The St. Louis County disaster plan was not activated during this emergency

response.

The Douglas County plan did not address evacuation organization, communication, or routing. 

According to the City of Superior chief of police, there was confusion over who made decisions

during the early development of the EOC. However, the decision issues were quickly resolved. 

There was no ETE in the plan, and it is difficult to estimate the total time for the evacuation

because it covered multiple communities and was being conducted by separate police

departments throughout the day. The emergency plans likely did not meet the requirements of

NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1.

There was no hesitation in establishing an ICP at approximately 3:30 a.m. 3.2 km (2 mi) north of

the accident site. Based on the Douglas County disaster plan, the fire chief became the incident

commander (IC) and the patrol commander became the law enforcement on-scene coordinator. 

Later in the morning when the plume was headed for Duluth (about 8:00 a.m.), Duluth and St.

Louis County safety officials established a joint EOC. A Duluth police department lieutenant

became the incident commander for the Minnesota response.
D-163

Training

The Burlington Northern Railroad had an active training program. When the train conductor

radioed the 28th Street yard, a Burlington Northern trainmaster was dispatched immediately to

the site, and the yardmaster called the Douglas County Communication Center (911),

CHEMTREC, Wisconsin Department of Emergency Management, the City of Superior police

and fire departments, and appropriate Burlington Northern officials. CHEMTREC is the

Chemical Transportation Emergency Center operated by the Chemical Manufacturer’s

Association; it was established to provide initial and immediate information on handling

hazardous materials and chemicals.

According to the Douglas County Emergency Coordinator and the City of Superior Chief of

Police, response teams had training in emergency response. This training included frequent, but

not necessarily annual training and exercises in the handling of hazardous materials and railcar

leaks. The training level of the county responders was described as being at the awareness level

while the training for the city responders was described as being at the technician level.

Drills and Exercises

Douglas County and the City of Superior conducted exercises with hazardous materials and

railcar leaks before this event. In January 1991, Wisconsin and Minnesota emergency

organizations conducted a tabletop exercise simulating a train derailment and materials spill into

the Mississippi River on the border between the two states. The emergency notification

coordination was tested in June 1991 during a joint, full-scale exercise involving a simulated

train derailment and hazardous materials spill into the Mississippi River. The county had last

conducted a hazardous materials disaster drill on September 28, 1991.

Community Awareness

The community was very aware of technical hazards and is even more aware today. There is a

refinery and tank farm in the City of Superior along with the railroad activities. However, there

had not been evacuations in the past, so the community was not aware of the alerting methods

that were used in the evacuations. 

THREAT CONDITIONS

On a calm morning, June 30, 1992, at approximately 2:50 a.m. a Burlington Northern Railroad

freight train derailed as it approached a bridge over the Nemadji River in Douglas County

Wisconsin. Three tank cars contained hazardous materials including aromatic concentrates,

liquid petroleum gas (LPG), and crude butadiene. The three tank cars fell about 71 feet, with

one landing in the river and two landing in a flood plain adjacent to the river. About 99,332 L

(21,850 gal) of aromatic concentrates spilled into the river. 

Based on discussions with the manufacturer (Novacor) and information available from

emergency guides, the Town of Superior fire chief, in coordination with the Douglas County

patrol commander, decided that the damaged and leaking crude butadiene represented the worst
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threat. At that time, about 3:40 a.m., a 2.6-km (1-mi) area around the accident site was

evacuated. At around 5:30 a.m., Douglas County personnel reported to the EOC observation of

an oil-like sheen downriver from the accident. The sheen extended several miles downriver and

was traveling toward the City of Superior and Lake Superior. Following this observation and

further telephone consultation with Novacor, the IC decided to expand the evacuation area from

2.6 km (1 mi) around the accident to 2.6 km (1 mi) on each side of the river in a downriver

direction. This evacuation extended into the town of South Superior and into the southeastern

part of the city of Superior.

The Civil Air Patrol was called in and spotted a massive vapor cloud that had formed over the

Nemadji River downriver from the site. At approximately 6:20 a.m., the Douglas County EOC

notified the Duluth police department about the accident and the vapor cloud moving toward

Duluth. The City of Superior police notified Minnesota Point of the accident and

recommendations to evacuate. Local officials in Minnesota Point were aware of the event and

had already initiated evacuation orders.

The morning was calm, and the chemical haze did not dissipate as it drifted across the cold water

of Superior Bay. As the day warmed, the volume of the gas increased, moving up the Duluth

hillside like a Lake Superior fog. In mid-afternoon, a wind off the lake blew the toxic haze away

from Duluth’s East End and Park Point and into Superior, causing substantial evacuations there.

The more volatile constituents of the aromatic concentrates evaporated from the surface of the

river and formed a vapor cloud about 32 km (20 mi) long and 8 km (5 mi) wide. A total of more

than 40,000 people were evacuated from Douglas County; the Town of Superior; the City of

Superior, Wisconsin; from Duluth, Minnesota; and from surrounding areas. Most of the

evacuations occurred during the early morning, with the last notices to evacuate occurring

around 1:30 p.m. The weather was hot and dry and the roads were dry. By mid-afternoon, it

started to rain, helping to dissipate the vapor cloud.

CONSEQUENCES

The derailment prompted one of the largest technical hazard evacuations in history. Winds first

carried a strong smelling bluish haze into eastern Duluth and as far north as Hermantown and

Two Harbors. Then the winds shifted, blowing the plume southwest into the St. Louis River

Valley to communities such as Cloquet, Carlton, Wrenshall, and Esko, where some people were

also evacuated.

More than 100 injuries were reported as a result of the release of the hazardous material and

resulting evacuation. Most people complained of sore throats, headaches, and difficulty

breathing. At least six people were admitted to the hospital; most were treated and released. 

Approximately 35 police and fire fighting personnel who were aiding in the evacuation activities

at nursing homes, health care homes, and patrolling road blocks in the evacuated areas were

treated for dizziness and eyes, nose, and throat irritations at area hospitals. Their injuries were a
D-165

direct result of supporting the evacuation. According to the Chief of Police of the City of

Superior, the patrolmen did not have respirators.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation among local, county, state, and railroad agencies was very high, with

decision-making authority changing hands in mid-morning. Some of the local, state and federal

agencies involved in this emergency included the Douglas County Division of Emergency

Response, Douglas County sheriff, Town and City of Superior police and fire departments,

Wisconsin National Guard, Duluth police and fire departments, St. Louis County emergency

management, Burlington Northern, CHEMTREC, the Civil Air Patrol, the U.S. Coast Guard, and

the EPA. The evacuation crossed multiple political boundaries including city, county, and state

borders. At approximately 10:00 a.m., at the direction of the EPA, the U.S. Coast Guard entered

the Douglas County EOC and took over command as the federal on-scene coordinator until the

EPA arrived. At this point, the Coast Guard restricted communication with the media.

The initial decision to evacuate Douglas County was made jointly by the police captain, the

sheriff, and the Douglas County incident commander. Approximately 2,500 people were

evacuated. As additional information arrived on the size of the spill in the river, the evacuation

area was expanded. After reports from the Civil Air Patrol that a cloud was moving toward

Duluth, police in Duluth began evacuating residents. As late as 1:30 p.m., several small towns in

Carlton County, Minnesota, southwest of Duluth, were also evacuated. Ultimately, more than

40,000 people were evacuated. 

Communications

The command, control and coordination processes could best be described as pre-planned. 

There were EOCs established in accordance with emergency plans. At approximately 3:30 a.m.,

the Douglas County emergency management director for the Division of Emergency Response

established an EOC in the basement of the Douglas County Law Enforcement Center in the City

of Superior, Wisconsin. At approximately 8:00 a.m., Duluth and St. Louis County Minnesota

established a joint EOC in Duluth City Hall. Incident command was established by Douglas

County approximately 3.2 km (2 mi) from the site and was later moved to a point 6.4 km (4 mi)

from the site.

Radio was the primary means of communication between the train conductor and railroad

officials. Notification to Douglas County and other emergency responders was by telephone. 

During the event, the City of Superior phone system locked up and shut down as a result of the

massive volume of incoming calls.

When the Coast Guard took over operations at the direction of the EPA, they stopped all contact

with the media until the arrival of the EPA. This created a communication issue with the

evacuation. As winds changed the evacuation areas changed, while the media continued
D-166

reporting the original information they had received. In some instances, they were reporting that

residents needed to go to an evacuation center that had since been declared an evacuation area. 

Notification and Warning

The train conductor radioed the Burlington Northern 28th Street yard in the City of Superior of

the derailment. The yardmaster immediately dispatched a Burlington Northern trainmaster and

called the Douglas County Communication Center (911) to report the incident. The yardmaster

then called Novacor and CHEMTREC to obtain details on the potential hazards. The police

attempted to notify the mayor of the City of Superior; however he was out of town. The police

then telephoned the president of the City Council. There were no problems with notification of

local officials or responders. 

Once the decision to evacuate was made, the police and fire department started going door to

door to wake individuals. Initially, the residents were told to leave and were given very little

instruction. However, as the evacuations expanded, the police notified the public through radio

and television and provided more information on where and how to leave.

The time to complete the evacuation cannot readily be determined. The continuing spread of the

plume required that additional areas be evacuated throughout much of the day. The early

evacuations in Douglas County used police and firemen going door to door and loudspeakers to

wake residents. Later evacuations also used the media to notify residents to leave the area. 

A minor problem with warning residents was that much of the Douglas County area is very rural,

requiring significant manpower to notify a relatively small number of residents. The NTSB

report states that nearly all affected residents complied with the evacuation requests. However,

most of Duluth’s news organizations are downtown in the area that was evacuated, and many

news staff members ignored the requests and stayed to cover the event.

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuation routes were designated by police barricades. Northbound Interstate Highway 35

outside of Duluth was blocked for several hours to prevent people from entering the city, while

cars streamed out of the city in southbound lanes. There was a traffic jam getting off the

Interstate 35 exit ramp to Hinckley. The Interstate was backed up coming from the north. The

Wisconsin National Guard troops were called in to assist local authorities with traffic control,

transportation of evacuees, and maintaining barricades. The troops assisted local law

enforcement with patrolling the traffic control barricades for the next four days. 

Special institutions were evacuated, including nursing and health care homes. A prison was

planning to evacuate; however, there were not enough buses to transport the prisoners because

the buses were being used to support other evacuation needs. Eventually, the prison officials

determined that they did not require evacuation. Road conditions prior to the evacuation were

clear and dry. It was noted that there were no serious traffic accidents reported during the

evacuations. 
D-167

Congregate Care Centers

Some people moved to evacuation centers set up by the American Red Cross on higher ground,

above areas where the cloud seemed to settle. Others left for cabins or towns on the Iron Range

to the north. In Duluth and Superior, two high schools, a National Guard Armory and student

centers at the University of Wisconsin-Superior and at the University of Minnesota-Duluth were

declared emergency centers operated by the Red Cross. 

Employees of the Carlton County Courthouse loaded people present for jury duty into a bus and

drove them 31 km (19 mi) south to Moose Lake, where authorities set up a makeshift courtroom

in a boardroom of the high school. More than 150 people took refuge in a school auditorium,

and others pitched camp in Moose Lake Park. The total number of people that went to

congregate care centers has not been determined.

Law Enforcement 

The evacuated areas were secured by barricades set up by the local police. The barricades were

patrolled by the police and the Wisconsin National Guard. There were no reported instances of

looting or vandalism or any problems identified with law enforcement.

Re-Entry

By 3:40 p.m. on June 30th, the vapor cloud over the Minnesota areas had dissipated, and the

evacuation orders were lifted for these areas. The mayor of Duluth authorized the re-entry and

notified the public through the media. However, the media message caused some confusion and

residents in the City of Superior and Douglas County thought it was clear to return. However,

these areas remained evacuation areas for a few more hours. By 6:30 p.m., the vapor cloud in

Wisconsin had dissipated, and the evacuation order was lifted for the City of Superior and South

Superior. A 9.7-km (6-mi) by 8-km (5-mi) evacuation zone remained around the accident site

within the Town of Superior. 

Information that it was safe to return home was conveyed to the public via the media. The reentry process was not controlled. At 6:00 p.m. on July 3, 1992, the remaining evacuation order

was lifted and at 6:15 p.m., the ICP was closed. 

Many people received financial settlements from Burlington Northern and were not able to

discuss the settlements. Burlington Northern settled and paid out claims to over 12,000 people. 

The City of Superior settled a claim against the railroad for $89,000 for city expenses involved

in the cleanup. In addition, the U.S. government received $260,000 for costs incurred from the

spill. There was no mention of how much of this amount was for evacuation-related expenses. 

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

In discussions with the Douglas County Emergency Management Coordinator and the City of

Superior Chief of Police, the following observations and lessons learned were noted:
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1. The evacuation was noted as proceeding well because (1) the local population cooperated

with authorities; (2) the use of media for notification was well received; (3) the command

structure was understood, even when the Coast Guard took over operations; and (4) the

emergency responders felt empowered and did not need to wait for local officials to make

decisions.

2. Problems with the evacuation included the shutdown of the phone system that occurred

because of the mass number of residents calling for information on the evacuation. The

news media, although helpful in getting the information out to the public, became a problem

when winds changed and evacuation directions needed to be updated. The media in some

instances were providing old information, sending residents to evacuation centers that were

now located in evacuation areas. 

3. As a result of this event, the City of Superior, the state of Wisconsin, Duluth, and the state of

Minnesota have developed increased capabilities for response to hazardous materials

emergencies.

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Douglas County Emergency Management Coordinator

(Lead Canary Team during event)

(715) 395-1391

City of Superior Chief of Police

1407 Hammond Ave.

City of Superior, Wisconsin

(715) 395-7234

References

Kuchera, Steve. “Toxic Tuesday remains under a cloud of concern.” Duluth News – Tribune. 

June 30, 1997.

<http://www.marshallschool.org/school/cours/course/dvosen/chem/Notes/FireUnit/Toxic%20Tu

esday%20(5yrs%20later).pdf> (June 2003).

Lush, David. “Toxic Tuesday’ the studies, doubts, lawsuits, payments.” The Daily Telegram. 

July 1, 2002.

<http://www.ashlandwi.com/upnorth/placed/story/07-01-2002UNW.html> (June 2003).
D-169

Oaks, L. and P. Doyle. “Thousands flee toxic cloud // Derailment spills chemicals into river

south of Duluth, Superior.” Star Tribune. July 1, 1992.

<http://www.marshallschool.org/school/cours/course/dvosen/chem/Notes/FireUnit/Duluth%20B

enzene%20Spill92.pdf> (June 2003).

Park Point Community Club. “Minnesota Point Environmental Management Plan.”

<http://www.parkpoint.org/envplan/toxic.html> (June 2003).

Rasid, H. and J. Hufferd. “Hazards of living at the edge of the water: the case of Minnesota

point, Duluth, Minnesota.” Human Ecology 17(1), 85-100. 1989.

University of Wisconsin Disaster Management Center. “Aim and Scope of Disaster

Management.”

<http://dmc.engr.wisc.edu/courses/aimscope/AA02-05.html> (June 2003).
D-170

Hanford Fire, Benton City, Washington, June 27, 2000, ID #103

Summary

Rank Value: 47

Number Evacuated: 2,500

Category: Natural Disaster

Specific Type: Wildfire

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

On June 27, 2000, an automobile collided with a tractor trailer, igniting a huge wildfire that

swept through portions of the DOE Hanford Nuclear Site near Richland, Washington. The fire

was reported to have been the fastest-growing fire in the United States during the past ten years. 

It burned 777 km (192,000 acres) of sagebrush/grass-covered land in the region and destroyed 2

eleven homes in nearby Benton City and West Richland. The fire forced approximately 1,700

employees to evacuate the DOE Hanford Site and more than 10,500 residents to evacuate their

homes, including 2,500 from Benton City. There was one fatality due to the automobile accident

and at least three injuries from the fire, but no deaths or injuries related to the evacuation itself. 

The focus of this case study is the evacuation that took place in Benton City, Washington. 

Information for this case study was derived from news wire sources, reports, and interviews with

personnel involved in the evacuations, including the Benton County Emergency Management

Department.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

All 2,500 residents of Benton City were ordered to evacuate on June 28, 2000, as wildfires

neared their community. The entire population (100%) complied with the evacuation order. 

Some people voluntarily evacuated before the official order. Benton City is a residential

(suburban) community surrounded by rural areas. The size of the community and of the

evacuated area is 4.5 km (1.8 mi ). The population density during the evacuation was low. 2 2

Benton City has a mayoral form of government and farming is its main economic base. There

are no special characteristics that attract a large number of non-residents.

Several unique aspects to this community made it extremely well prepared for an evacuation,

according to Lyle Ball of the Benton County Emergency Management Department. The

community is close to the DOE Hanford Site Reservation, which is 24.1 km (15 mi) away, the

Columbia (Energy Northwest) Nuclear Power Plant [10.3 km (6.4 mi) from the EPZ or 26.4 km

(16.4 mi) from the facility itself], and a U.S. Army chemical stockpile detail. Approximately 50

to 60 chemical facilities are located in the area. Because of this, Benton County is subject to

several emergency management plans, each conforming to the guidelines outlined in NUREG-
D-171

0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1. The city evacuated in accordance with the Benton County

Comprehensive Emergency Plan, which contains an evacuation section. However, the plan does

not contain evacuation time estimates for Benton City. Training, drills and exercises, including

full-scale field exercises, are a part of the plan and occur on a routine basis. A minimum of four

exercises are conducted each year and sometimes as many as six to eight exercises are conducted

each year.

History of Emergencies

The Benton County area is probably more prone to both natural and technological hazards than

the average U.S. city. The area was evacuated in the mid-1990s because of wildfires and in 1998

because of flooding on the Yakima River. The proximity to the DOE Hanford Site, the

Columbia (Energy Northwest) Nuclear Power Plant, and the chemical facilities make it

potentially more prone to technological hazards than the average community. Thus, community

awareness of the hazard and of evacuation procedures is relatively high.

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.

Planning

The community was governed by several emergency plans, each of which addressed the hazard

that occurred (the fire). These plans conform to the guidance contained in NUREG0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1. 

Training and Drills

Local law enforcement and fire departments are extremely well prepared for emergency

response and evacuations because they undergo regular training and drills, including full-scale

field exercises. This is related to their proximity to the DOE Hanford Site, the Columbia

(Energy Northwest) Nuclear Power Plant, and several chemical facilities. 

Community Awareness

Community awareness of local hazards is high. Many in the local population work at the abovereferenced facilities and are cognizant of emergency procedures.

THREAT CONDITIONS

The hazard that led to this evacuation was the wildfire that began after an automobile collided

with a tractor-trailer on June 27, 2000. Before the evacuation, residents were aware that this

swiftly moving fire could reach their community and some people voluntarily evacuated before

the official evacuation order. 

Weather conditions at the time of the evacuation were dry with 48.4 km/h (30 mph) wind gusts

and 37.8°C (100°F) temperatures. Thick smoke filled the air and may have had a slight impact
D-172

on the efficiency of the evacuation, according to evacuees interviewed for news reports. As the

fire progressed, the winds increased in strength and moved in the direction of the DOE Hanford

site. The wildfires reportedly came within two to three miles of highly radioactive

contamination at the DOE Hanford Site. Other than that, there were no unusual circumstances

that occurred during this incident, other than the hazard itself. Roads in the vicinity were clear

and dry and did not impact the effectiveness of the evacuation of Benton City. 

CONSEQUENCES

Approximately 2,500 people evacuated from Benton City (100% of that community). Another

8,000 people were evacuated from the communities of West Richland and Horn Rapids and

1,700 employees evacuated the DOE Hanford Site. There were no deaths or injuries associated

with the evacuations. There was, however, one fatality associated with the automobile accident

that created the wildfire that led to the evacuation, and at least three people were hurt in the fire. 

The estimated cost of evacuated-related expenses incurred by the public is $200,000. This is

primarily for hotel stay and meals. Although the government did not reimburse the public for its

evacuation expenses, several funds were established to help the families; it is unknown how

much money each family received.

The accident occurred at approximately 1:30 p.m. on June 27, 2000, and emergency responders

arrived on the scene within minutes. The tractor-trailer involved in the accident was fully

engulfed in flames at that time and the wildfires were rapidly growing. Benton County declared

a state of emergency at 6:00 p.m. on June 27, and by 1:45 a.m. on June 28, the governor had

declared a state of emergency in Benton County. The National Guard was activated to assist

with the evacuations and the Red Cross set up congregate care centers in nearby Richland and

Kennewick, Washington.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

There was a high level of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies. Political

boundaries were not crossed. The command, control and coordination processes could best be

described as ad hoc. The decision to evacuate was made by the County Emergency Manager. 

There were no problems with the decision-making process.

Communications

An EOC, including an ICP, was used in this emergency. Field emergency responders

communicated with the EOC via radio and pager/cell phone. Communication was not identified

as being a problem during this incident or during the evacuation.

Notification and Warning

There were no problems associated with notification and warning. The smoke resulting from the

fire served to alert most in the community, including public officials, of the hazard. The police
D-173

used sirens and police PA system to alert the public of the evacuation. Emergency information

was also broadcast over the radio (KONA Radio on 610 AM and 105.3 FM). The evacuation of

Benton City was staged all at once. Everyone was notified and evacuated at the same time. It

took less than one hour to evacuate Benton City. No special problems were noted regarding

warning and subsequent citizen action.

Traffic Movement and Control

There were no reported problems associated with traffic movement and control. People were

given specific instructions about where to go when they were warned to evacuate. They were

told to use specific routes, and they were directed out along those routes. The roads were

reverse-laned to facilitate movement out of the city. Some people spontaneously evacuated

before being told to do so and no one refused to evacuate. There were no traffic accidents or

specific traffic problems during the evacuation. No special institutions, such as hospitals or

prisons, were involved in the evacuation.

Congregate Care Centers

Congregate care centers managed by the American Red Cross were used. Approximately 20%

of the evacuees went to the emergency congregate care centers, which included Richland High

School and United Central Protestant Church in Richland. People did not evacuate from outside

the designated evacuation area.

Law Enforcement

The area was secured by the National Guard and there was no problem with looting and

vandalism. No problems were identified with law enforcement.

Re-Entry

The evacuation order was lifted by the Benton County Emergency Services on June 29, 2000, at

12:15 p.m. This decision was based on control of the fire. Residents were advised to stay tuned

to local television and radio for further developments. There were no special controls and no

special problems associated with re-entry.

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

Factors that contributed to the success of the evacuation included community awareness and

emergency management preparedness and routine training and drills, including full-scale field

exercises.
D-174

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

DOE Planner

Benton County Emergency Management 

(Part of Benton County Emergency Services)

561 Truman Avenue

Richland, WA 99352

(509) 628-2600

Director, Emergency Preparedness

Fluor Hanford

(509) 372-2823

References

Ashton, L. “Sky on fire.” Associated Press. June 29, 2000. 

CNN. “Energy secretary: Hanford fire contained: No radiation released, tests show; nuclear

watchdogs urge more monitoring.” June 30, 2000. 

<http://www.cnn.com/2000/US/06/30/hanford.fire.03/> (June 2003).

CNN. “Firefighters halt spread of blaze at Washington state nuclear site.” June 29, 2000. 

<http://www.cnn.com/2000/US/06/29/hanford.fire.05/> (June 2003).

Department of Energy: Hanford Site (U.S.), “Hanford Site Fire Information.” 2002.

<http://www.hanford.gov/hanfordfire.html> (April 2003).

“Details On Hanford Fire.” Hanford Joint Information Center, News Release.004, Richland,

Washington, June 28, 2000, 8:15 p.m. 

Disaster Relief. “Fierce Wildfire Burns Through Nuclear Reservation in Washington State.”

June 29, 2000. <http://www.disasterrelief.org/Disasters/000629washfire/> (June 2003).

Mulick, C. and J. Hagey. “Evacuate residents wait for word on fire.” Tri-City Herald. June 29,

2000. <http://www.tri-cityherald.com/news/2000/0629/story2.html> (June 2003).

U.S. DOE. 2000. Type B Accident Investigation: U.S. DOE Report Response to the 24

Command Wildfire on the Hanford Site -- June 27-July 1, 2000, DOE/RL-2000-63. October

2000. http://www.hanford.gov/docs/rl-2000-63/

Wiley, J. K. “Wildfires at nuclear site raises fears.” Associated Press. June 30, 2000.
D-175

Burlington Northern Santa Fe Derailment, Scottsbluff, Nebraska, 

November 4, 2000, ID #26

Summary

Rank Value: 47

Number Evacuated: 5,000

Category: Technological Hazard

Specific Type: Railroad Accident

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

At 10:30 p.m. on Saturday, November 4, 2000, a Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) train

derailed in northwestern Scottsbluff, Nebraska. Twenty-eight out of the 120 tank cars derailed;

10 of the tanker cars contained benzene and dicyclopentadiene and five ruptured, spilling

chemicals. Approximately 5,000 people within a 2.6 km (1mi) radius were evacuated because of

the noxious gas cloud early Sunday morning (November 5th).

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

Scottsbluff, Nebraska, is a city of approximately 14,732 people, based on the 2000 Census. 

Approximately 5,000 people, or slightly more than 30% of the population, were evacuated from

a suburban area of northwestern Scottsbluff because of the train derailment and release of

hazardous material. Population density was medium during the evacuation. The city covers

15.4 km (5.9 mi ) and the evacuated area was approximately 7.8 km (3.14 mi ). Ethnicity, 2 2 2 2

nationality, and age were not important factors in the evacuation.

Scottsbluff is a rural farming community in western Nebraska. It has a mayoral form of

government. Land uses in the evacuation area were residential, industrial and agricultural. The

community’s main economic base is farming. Tourism attracts a large number of non-residents. 

There are no commercial nuclear power plants within 80 km (50 mi) of Scottsbluff. However,

there are two commercial power plants located in Nebraska. 

History of Emergencies

Scottsbluff is likely no more prone to hazards than the average U.S. city. Although more than

thirty trains pass through Scottsbluff daily, the community had no prior experience with

derailments and chemical spills and had not experienced evacuations in the past ten years. 
D-176

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.

Planning

Scottsbluff has a written emergency plan with an evacuation section that was the plan used in

this emergency. The plan did not conform to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, and did not

contain an ETE.

Training

Training is provided to emergency response personnel. However, joint training between industry

and government is not regularly conducted.

Drills and Exercises

Scottsbluff’s emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and exercises but

the emergency plan used in this evacuation was not previously tested in a full-scale field

exercise.

Community Awareness

The level of community awareness about local hazards, derailments/chemical spills, and

evacuation procedures was relatively low. However, the community was highly aware of the

alerting methods used, which included sirens, radio and television broadcasts, police/fire PA

systems, and door-to-door notification.

THREAT CONDITIONS

At 10:30 p.m. on November 4, 2000, approximately 363,688 L (80,000 gal) of a chemical

containing benzene was released following derailment of a Burlington Northern Santa Fe Train. 

Approximately 5,000 people within a one-mile radius were evacuated. The initial evacuation

took place shortly after midnight. Most residents were allowed back into their homes by

morning, but some families were evacuated again that day. The weather was cool, there was

nothing unusual, such as storms, and the roads were dry. The only unusual circumstance was

that the evacuation took place at night.

CONSEQUENCES

Approximately 5,000 people, or slightly more than 33% of the population, were evacuated. 

There were no reported deaths or injuries because of the evacuation, the derailment, or exposure

to the benzene. The estimated cost to the public of the evacuation itself, and not from any of the

damages associated with the train derailment, is unknown; BNSF reimbursed evacuees for their

expenses.
D-177

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

There was a high level of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies. Political

boundaries were not crossed. The command, control and coordination processes could best be

described as pre-planned. The decision to evacuate was made jointly by Scottsbluff’s police and

fire chiefs. There were no problems with the decision-making process.

Communications

An EOC and an ICP were used in this emergency. Communication between field emergency

responders and the EOC was by radio, telephone, cell phone, and fax. There were no problems

with communication.

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials were notified of the incident after receiving a call from the command

center. Emergency responders were notified of the incident by pager and telephone trees

following report of the incident through the 911 emergency system. There were no problems

with notification of emergency personnel or senior local officials. Response personnel

mobilized to the scene in less than 15 minutes, and the decision to evacuate was made soon

afterward. It took two hours to complete the evacuation. The public was notified of the

evacuation by several methods, including sirens, radio and television broadcasts, police/fire PA

systems, and door-to-door notification. The evacuation took place all at once. There were no

special problems regarding warning or subsequent citizen action.

Traffic Movement and Control

People were given specific instructions when they evacuated, including which routes to use and

what congregate care centers to go to. Police officers guided evacuees along the routes. No

special institutions were evacuated. The road conditions were dry; no major roadways were

unavailable, and there were no special traffic problems or traffic accidents. Reverse-laning was

not used. No one evacuated before being told to do so and no one refused to evacuate.

Congregate Care Centers

Congregate care centers managed by the local chapter of the American Red Cross were used. 

Congregate care centers included Scottsbluff High School, Gering High School, and several area

churches. According to the Red Cross, approximately 350 people (or 7% evacuees) sought

congregate care centers immediately following the derailment. Evacuees were allowed to return

to their homes just after 3:00 a.m. on November 5, 2000, or 4.5 hours following the derailment. 

There were some shadow evacuations, but this did not impact traffic or congregate care center

capacity.

Law Enforcement

The evacuated area was secured by the police, and there were no instances of looting or

vandalism or any other law enforcement problems.
D-178

Re-Entry

The Scottsbluff Fire Chief and Police Chief jointly authorized re-entry approximately 4.5 hours

after the derailment occurred. There were no special controls on re-entry and BNSF

compensated evacuees for their expenses. No major problems occurred during re-entry.

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

The alerting system (door-to-door) was very effective and contributed to the success of the

evacuation, especially since it occurred at night.

Lessons learned in this evacuation include:

1. Communication needs to be improved.

2. The public needs to be educated on the use of sheltering in place as an option.

3. Personal protective clothing, including masks and suits are needed for response personnel.

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Special Operations Division

Police Department

(308) 630-6261

Scottsbluff Chapter of the American Red Cross

(308) 635-2114

References

Arizona Summer Wildcat Online. “Neb. town evacuated after derailment.” November 6, 2000.

<http://wildcat.arizona.edu/papers/94/55/01_93_m.html> (June 2003).

“Evacuation Ordered After Train Derailment Releases Fumes.” Associated Press. November 5,

2000.

Nebraska Department of Environmental Quality. “DEQ Update: Scottsbluff Train Derailment.”

<http://www.deq.state.ne.us/Gen.nsf/Pages/Update1> (June 2003).

Nebraska Emergency Management Agency. “State of Nebraska Emergency Operations Plan.”

February 12, 2002.

<http://www.nebema.org/seop.html.pdf> (June 2003).
D-179

The Independent. “Scottsbluff Praised for Handling Derailment.” November 16, 2000.

<http://www.theindependent.com/stories/111600/new_scottsbluffderail16.html> (June 2003).

United Transportation Union. “NEBRASKA: Town evacuated after train derailment.”

<http://www.utu.org/DEPTS/PR-DEPT/NEWS/NDigest/2000/Nov2m/116/1160002.htm> (June

2003).
D-180

Fish Plant Ammonia Leak, Morro Bay, California, October 3, 2001, ID #66

Summary

Rank Value: 47

Number Evacuated: 3,500

Category: Technological Hazard

Specific Type: Fixed Site Hazmat Incident

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

On October 3, 2001, 500 kg (1,100 lb) of anhydrous ammonia leaked at a fish processing plant,

causing the evacuation of approximately 3,500 people within a 910 m (1,000 yd) radius of the

facility in Morro Bay, California. No deaths or injuries were associated with either the incident

or the subsequent evacuation.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

Morro Bay is a suburban community with a population of 10,350 people. Approximately 3,500

people, or 34% of the city’s population, were evacuated on October 3, 2001. The city of Morro

Bay covers an area of 26.3 km2 (10.2 mi2), although 50% of this area is covered in water. The

evacuated area covered an area of 2.6 km2 (1 mi2). The population density was medium during

the evacuation. Land use in the evacuated area was residential, commercial, and industrial. Age

was an important factor in the evacuation since there were elderly patients in a handicapped

facility that was evacuated. In addition, there was a significant Hispanic population that did not

understand either verbal or written evacuation instructions, which were given in English.

The community has a mayoral form of government and its main economic base is tourism,

which attracts a large number of non-residents. A portion of Morro Bay is located within the 16

km (10 mi) EPZ of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, with the remaining part of the city

located just outside of the 16 km (10 m) EPZ and well within the 80 km (50 mi) EPZ.

History of Emergencies

The community is no more prone to hazards than average and had no prior experience with the

hazard that led to this evacuation. Morro Bay has experienced evacuations in the past 10 years,

but not of this magnitude. The community did not have previous experience with the alerting

mechanism used in this evacuation. 
D-181

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.

Planning

The community had a written emergency plan that was used in this emergency. It is unknown

whether the plan contained an evacuation section. According to the Morro Bay Fire Chief, the

plan conformed to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1. However, it did not contain an ETE.

Training

The community provides training to emergency response personnel and regularly conducts joint

training between industry and government.

Drills and Exercises

The community’s emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and

exercises, and the emergency plan used in this evacuation was previously tested in a full-scale

evacuation. Immediately before this evacuation, a tabletop exercise was performed.

Community Awareness

The community has an average level of awareness about local hazards and about evacuation

procedures. However, awareness of the hazard that caused this evacuation (i.e., the anhydrous

ammonia leak) was low. The community had an average level of awareness of the alerting

methods used in this evacuation.

THREAT CONDITIONS

The threat condition leading to this evacuation was a leak of anhydrous ammonia at a fish

processing plant, causing the evacuation of approximately 3,500 people during the day. The

roads were dry; however, it was foggy outside with limited visibility. This did not have a major

impact on the evacuation, and there were no unusual circumstances that occurred during the

incident.

CONSEQUENCES

Approximately 3,500 residents were evacuated. No deaths or injuries were associated with

either the incident or the subsequent evacuation. The estimated total cost of evacuation-related

expenses is unknown.
D-182

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies was high and included the U.S.

Coast Guard. Political boundaries were not crossed. The command, control and coordination

processes could best be described as pre-planned. The decision to evacuate was made by the

County Health Office and there were no problems with the decision-making process.

Communications

An EOC and an ICP were used and were co-located. Communication between field emergency

responders and the EOC/ICP was by radio. There were no problems with this form of

communication.

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials were notified of the incident by telephone and emergency responders were

notified through a citizen’s complaint of an ammonia odor. There were no problems with

notification of emergency personnel or senior local officials. The elapsed time between

discovery of the incident and mobilization of response personnel was less than 15 minutes. The

evacuation was staged. The decision to evacuate Stage 1 was made approximately 30 minutes

after discovery of the leak, and it took approximately 20 minutes to evacuate those people. The

decision to evacuate Stage 2 was made three hours later and it took approximately 30 minutes to

evacuate those people. The decision to evacuate the third and final stage was made six hours

following discovery of the ammonia leak and it took approximately 90 minutes to evacuate those

residents. The public was notified by emergency responders going door to door. There were

problems with warning and subsequent citizen action because many in this community spoke

predominantly Spanish and did not understand the evacuation instructions, which were given in

English. 

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were given specific instructions, both verbal and written (i.e., a flyer), when they were

told to evacuate. However, many in the community spoke predominantly Spanish and did not

understand the instructions, which were in English. Evacuees were not told to use specific

routes. No special institutions were evacuated; however, two schools were closed for the day. 

Road conditions before the evacuation were dry, although it was foggy outside, which hindered

visibility. This did not impact the efficiency of the evacuation. There were no traffic accidents,

no traffic problems, and major roadways were available to evacuees. Reverse-laning was not

used. Some people evacuated before being told to do so and others refused to evacuate. The

third, and largest, stage of the evacuation was timed to coincide with the morning commute to

work and school. Thus, many evacuees simply went to work or went to school and had no need

to go to a congregate care center.
D-183

Congregate Care Centers

Congregate care centers managed by the local American Red Cross were used. Congregate care

centers consisted of schools and approximately 200 people, or 6% of evacuees, went to the

congregate care centers. The third, and largest, stage of the evacuation was timed to coincide

with the morning commute to work and school. Thus, many evacuees simply went to work or

went to school rather than go to a congregate care center. There were no shadow evacuations.

Law Enforcement

Morro Bay police secured the area following the evacuation and there were no instances of

looting or vandalism or any problems with law enforcement.

Re-Entry

The County Health Office authorized re-entry and there were no special controls during re-entry. 

Evacuees were not compensated for their expenses. There were no problems during re-entry.

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

According to the Morro Bay fire chief, the evacuation was successful because there was a good

plan and time to put signs, personnel, etc. into place. In addition to the language issue, the only

problem encountered was pressure from elected officials to authorize re-entry. 

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contact

Morro Bay Fire Chief

(805) 772-6242

(Personal Communication, 7/14/03)

References

National Response Center. “2001 National Response Team Incident Summaries: Fish Plant.”

<http://www.nrc.uscg.mil/insum2001/fishplant1.html> (June 2003).
D-184

Louisville Cargo Transfer Accident, Louisville, Kentucky, November 19, 1998, ID #24

Summary

Rank Value: 47

Number Evacuated: 2,400

Category: Technological Hazard

Specific Type: Fixed Site Hazmat Incident

Community: Urban

INTRODUCTION

Approximately 2,400 people in and around a Ford Motor Company Plant in Louisville,

Kentucky, were evacuated on the morning of November 19, 1998, after a chemical reaction

produced a cloud of toxic gases. At approximately 8:25 a.m., a truck driver delivering chemicals

noticed an orange cloud coming from the bulk storage building. Seven people were injured in

the incident. No deaths or injuries were associated with the evacuation.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

Louisville, Kentucky, is an urban area with a population of 256,231 people as of the 2000

Census; however, as a result of a merger with Jefferson County, it now has approximately

693,604 residents. Approximately 2,400 people, or less than 1% of the population, were

evacuated because of this incident. The city of Louisville covers an area of 172.6 km2 (66.7 mi2)

and the evacuated area covered a small area, probably less than 2.6 km2 (1 mi2). The population

density was high during the evacuation. Land use in the evacuated area was residential,

commercial, and industrial. Ethnicity, nationality, and age were not important factors in the

evacuation.

The city has a mayoral form of government and its main economic base is commercial/retail/

services. The University of Louisville, University of Kentucky in nearby Lexington, and the

Kentucky Derby all attract a large number of non-residents. The nearest nuclear power plant is

over 80 km (50 mi) away and the state of Kentucky does not have any commercial nuclear

power plants.

History of Emergencies

The community is no more prone to hazards than average and had no prior experience with the

hazard that led to this evacuation. Louisville, Kentucky, has not experienced any major

evacuations in the past 10 years. However, the city’s residents did have previous experience

with the alerting mechanism used in this evacuation (broadcasts on public television). 
D-185

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.

Planning

Jefferson County had a written emergency plan that included an evacuation section that was used

in this emergency. It is unknown whether the plan conformed to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1,

Rev. 1, or whether it contained an ETE.

Training

The community provides training to emergency response personnel and regularly conducts joint

training between industry and government.

Drills and Exercises

The community’s emergency response agencies do not regularly conduct emergency drills and

exercises.

Community Awareness

The community has a low level of awareness concerning local hazards and of the hazard that

caused this evacuation. In addition, the community’s level of awareness about evacuation

procedures was low. The community’s awareness about the alerting mechanisms used in the

evacuation was also low, because although the emergency broadcasting system was tested on a

periodic basis, it has rarely been used in an actual emergency.

THREAT CONDITIONS

The threat condition leading to this evacuation was an inadvertent mixing of chemicals, which

produced toxic gases and forced the evacuation of 2,400 people in and around a Ford Motor

Company Plant in Louisville, Kentucky, on the morning of November 19, 1998. After a pipe

fitter at the plant inadvertently attached a hose to the wrong coupler, a nickel nitrate and

phosphoric acid solution being unloaded from a cargo truck was inadvertently mixed with

sodium nitrite solution in a storage tank. A chemical reaction ensued that produced toxic gases

of nitric oxide and nitrogen dioxide, leading to the evacuation. The roads were dry and clear,

and no unusual circumstances occurred during the incident.

CONSEQUENCES

Approximately 2,400 people were evacuated from the Ford Motor Company Plant and

surrounding businesses, and another 600 local residents were told by authorities to remain inside

their homes on the morning of November 19, 1998. The incident resulted in seven people being

treated for minor inhalation injuries, including three police officers, three Ford Motor Company

employees, and the truck driver. No deaths or injuries were associated with the evacuation. The

estimated total cost of evacuation-related expenses is unknown.
D-186

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies was high. Political boundaries

were not crossed. The command, control and coordination processes could best be described as

pre-planned. The decision to evacuate was made jointly by the Louisville Fire Chief and the

Emergency Manager and there were no problems with the decision-making process.

Communications

An EOC was not used; however, an incident command post (ICP) was used and communication

between field emergency responders and the ICP was by radio, telephone, and cell phone. There

were no problems with communication.

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials were notified of the incident by telephone and emergency responders were

notified by plant personnel through the 911 phone system. There were no problems with

notification of emergency personnel or senior local officials. The elapsed time between

discovery of the incident and mobilization of response personnel was less than 15 minutes and

the decision to evacuate the Ford Plant was made within 15 minutes. The decision to evacuate

nearby residents was made within one hour of the incident. It took approximately two hours to

complete the evacuation. The public was notified by radio and television broadcasts, a

police/fire PA system, and by door-to-door notification. The evacuation was staged; first, plant

personnel were evacuated and then nearby residents were evacuated. There were no special

problems regarding warning and subsequent citizen action.

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were given specific instructions about where to go when they evacuated and were told

to use specific routes that were designated by roadblocks and manned police patrols. No special

institutions were evacuated. Road conditions prior to the evacuation were dry and there were no

traffic accidents, no traffic problems, and major roadways were available to evacuees. Reverselaning was not used. No one evacuated before being told to do so and no one refused to

evacuate.

Congregate Care Centers

Congregate care centers managed by Civil Defense were used. Fire stations were used as

congregate care centers; however, none of the evacuees went to the congregate care centers. 

There were no shadow evacuations.
D-187

Law Enforcement

Police secured the area following the evacuation and there were no instances of looting or

vandalism or any problems with law enforcement.

Re-Entry

The Louisville fire chief authorized re-entry and there were no special controls during re-entry. 

Evacuees were not compensated for their expenses. There were no problems during re-entry.

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

According to the assistant fire chief at the Worthington Fire Station in Louisville, the evacuation

was successful due to coordinated effort between agencies.

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contact

Assistant Fire Chief

Worthington Fire Station

Louisville, Kentucky

(502) 241-9366

(Personal Communication, 7/15/03)

References

National Transportation Safety Board (U.S.) (NTSB). HZB-00-02, “Chemical Reactions During

Cargo Transfer Louisville, Kentucky.” NTSB: Washington, D.C. November 1998.
D-188

Pesticide Tanker Truck Explosion, Balch Springs, Texas, April 14, 1994, ID #243

Summary

Rank Value: 47

Number Evacuated: 5,000

Category: Technological Hazard

Specific Type: Transportation Accident

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

On April 14, 1994, a truck carrying 10,500 kg (23,000 lb) of an acutely toxic pesticide, Temik

15-G, which contains aldicarb as its active ingredient, crashed. The truck hit a traffic sign and

burst into flames on Interstate 20 in Balch Springs, Texas, southeast of Dallas, spilling the toxic

pesticide, sending a smoke plume over the community, and causing the evacuation of

approximately 5,000 people.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

Balch Springs is a suburban community with a population of approximately 19,375 people and

covers an area of 20.9 km (8.1 mi ). Approximately 5,000 people, or 26%, of the population 2 2

were evacuated from a 12.8 km (5 mi ) area during this incident. The land use in the area is 2 2

mainly residential, and the population density of the area was high at the time of the evacuation. 

Ethnicity and nationality were not important factors in the evacuation; however, age was a factor

as several schools with young children were evacuated. 

The city has a mayoral form of government, and the main economic base is industry. There are

no special characteristics that attract large numbers of visitors to the area. The nearest nuclear

power plant is Comanche Peak more than 80 km (50 mi) away. 

History of Emergencies

The community is more prone to hazards than average but has not had experience with this type

of emergency in the past. Balch Springs has had emergencies with storms and has a large flow

of traffic, including transport of hazardous materials, through the area. The community has not

experienced large-scale evacuations in the last 10 years and had no previous experience with the

alerting mechanisms used in this emergency.

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.
D-189

Planning

The community had a written emergency plan with an evacuation section that was used in this

emergency. It is unknown if the plan conformed to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, or if

there was an ETE in the plan.

Training

The community provides training to emergency response personnel. However, joint training

between industry and government is not regularly conducted.

Drills and Exercises

The community’s emergency response agencies do not conduct regular emergency drills and

exercises. The emergency plan used in this evacuation was not previously tested in full-scale

field exercises. 

Community Awareness

The community has a medium level of awareness of the local hazards and a medium level of

awareness of evacuations procedures. It had a low level of awareness of the hazards in this

incident, including hazardous materials in general. The community does have a high level of

awareness of the alerting methods used in this evacuation. 

THREAT CONDITIONS

At about 8 a.m. on April 14, 1994, a truck carrying 10,500 kg (23,000 lb) of an acutely toxic

pesticide, Temik 15-G, which contains aldicarb as its active ingredient, crashed. The truck hit

the concrete post of a traffic sign and burst into flames on Interstate 20 in Balch Springs, Texas,

southeast of Dallas. Temik is “the most toxic insecticide registered” with the EPA, according to

the National Pesticide Telecommunications Network at Texas Tech University. Balch Spring

firefighters initially sprayed water on the fire because they believed the driver might still be

alive. But when they contacted the chemical manufacturer, Rhone-Poulenc Co., the company

said the water would make the cloud more poisonous. The company advised firefighters to let

the blaze burn. Authorities let the fire burn for more than 10 hours and the fire was out at about

6:15 p.m.

The evacuation area was initially limited to an area just north of I-20; however, the evacuation

was expanded north during the afternoon as 10 to 20 mph winds pushed the smoke further. The

weather was mild and the roads were dry.

CONSEQUENCES

A cloud of toxic smoke forced the evacuation of more than 5,000 people in a 12.8 km (5 mi )

2 2

area. Four Mesquite schools downwind were evacuated. The North Texas Poison Control

Center at Parkland Memorial Hospital was swamped with calls from worried people, but no one

who called or was treated showed any signs of pesticide poisoning.
D-190

At about 2 a.m. on April 15, police removed scores of roadblocks, allowing people to return to

their homes. Tests by the EPA showed that the area suffered no contamination from the smoke

emanating from the burning wreck. 

The death of the truck driver was the only fatality from the incident. More than 100 individuals

went to hospitals, mostly for eye and lung irritations, but no one was seriously injured. No

injuries were reported during the evacuation. The estimated total cost of the evacuation-related

expenses is unknown. The school district alone estimated costs of overtime pay, fuel, and food

at approximately $30,000 to support the evacuation.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies was high, and political

boundaries were crossed in this event. The command, control, and coordination processes could

best be described as pre-planned. The decision to evacuate was made jointly by the mayor and

the fire chief, and there were no problems with the decision-making process. 

Communications

An EOC was used in this event and an ICP was established. Communication between field

emergency responders and the ICP was primarily by radio and cell phone. There were no

problems with communications during the event. 

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials were notified of the incident by a telephone emergency tree. The

emergency responders were notified through a 911 telephone call. There were no problems with

the notification of emergency personnel or senior local officials. The elapsed time between

discovery of the incident and mobilization of response personnel was less than 15 minutes and

the initial decision to evacuate was made approximately 40 minutes after the notification of the

incident. It took approximately two hours to complete the evacuation. 

Evacuees were notified by radio and directly by the police using a PA system and going door to

door. The evacuation was staged; as wind changed, the area increased. There were no problems

with warning and subsequent citizen action. Some residents refused to evacuate. 

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were given instructions on where to go but were not told to use specific routes, as these

were considered obvious. Police roadblocks were used to direct traffic. A number of special

institutions were evacuated, including four Mesquite schools, a retirement home, and a day care

center. Road conditions during the evacuation were dry, and no traffic accidents or trafficrelated problems occurred during the event. Interstate 20 was closed because of the incident, but

did not create problems. Reverse-laning was not used.
D-191

Congregate Care Centers

Congregate care centers were established at local schools and public buildings for this

emergency and were managed by the Red Cross and city personnel. Approximately 450

evacuees, or 9%, went to the congregate care centers; remaining evacuees went to the homes of

friends or relatives. There were shadow evacuations reported; however, these did not impact the

traffic or capacity of the congregate care centers. 

Law Enforcement

The Dallas police and sheriff secured the area following the evacuation and there were no

instances of looting or vandalism. At least three arrests were made of individuals trying to enter

the evacuation area prior to re-entry authorization.

Re-Entry

Re-entry was authorized by the state police and there were no special controls during the re-entry

process. There were no problems reported during re-entry. Evacuees were compensated for

their expenses. Agents for the trucking company set up evacuation claim centers and reimbursed

people for lodging, food, medication, or other expenses from the evacuation. People with small

claims received checks on the spot. 

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

The fact that many people were at work and were easy to reach contributed to the success of this

evacuation. Improvements could be made in public notification using television and radio. 

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Balch Springs Battalion Chief

(972) 557-6042

(Personal Communication, 8/11/03)

References

Sustainable Agriculture Network. “PANUPS: Aldicarb Spill in Texas.” April 21, 1994.

<http://www.sare.org/htdocs/hypermail/html-home/4-html/0300.html> (June 2003).

United Press International: “Truckload of Pesticides Burn in Texas.” April 14, 1994.
D-192

East Bay Hills Fire, Oakland, California, October 20, 1991, ID #234

Summary

Rank Value: 44

Number Evacuated: 20,000–30,000

Category: Natural Disaster

Specific Type: Wildfire

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

On October 20, 1991, the Oakland, California, fire became this nation’s most costly fire and the

worst fire involving loss of life and property since the Great San Francisco Earthquake and Fire

of 1906. The unusual weather conditions, including high winds and record high temperatures,

coupled with five years of drought, fueled an extremely fast-moving fire. Although estimates

vary, up to 20,000–30,000 people were evacuated from portions of Oakland, Berkeley, and

Piedmont, California, including part of the UC-Berkeley campus. A total of 25 people died in

the fire and 150 were injured. Of the 25 people killed, 19 were in the process of evacuating

when they died. Numerous problems were associated with the evacuation, including

communication problems, traffic problems (including traffic accidents), and looting problems.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

The fire and evacuation took place in the wildland-urban interface area between Oakland and

Berkeley Hills. This is a suburban area that is heavily developed with expensive residential

properties with spectacular views of Oakland and San Francisco. In these hills are a series of

narrow canyons that hampered the fire-fighting efforts.

Oakland has a population of 399,484, and Berkeley has a population of 102,743. The evacuation

involved up to 20,000 to 30,000, or approximately 6% of the total population. Population

density during the evacuation was medium. 

Oakland covers 2,024 km (78.2 mi ) and the evacuated area was approximately 26 km (10 mi ). 2 2 2 2

The evacuated area was largely residential with some commercial/retail outlets, and also

included the University of California at Berkeley campus. Oakland is a city with a mayoral form

of government. Its main economic base is diverse, including business/financial, commercial/

retail, and manufacturing/industry. The University of California at Berkeley attracts a large

number of non-residents. Ethnicity, nationality, and age were not important factors in the

evacuation.
D-193

The state of California contains commercial nuclear power plants. However, the evacuated area

is about two hundred miles from the nearest plant, the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant near

San Luis Obispo, California. 

History of Emergencies

The wildland-urban interface area between Oakland and Berkeley Hills is more prone to fire than

average. There have been 14 major fires since 1923. However, the community had not

experienced a major evacuation in the previous ten years. The community had previous

experience with the alerting mechanism used in this evacuation (police PA system).

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.

Planning

The county had a written emergency plan that included an evacuation section. However, it is

unknown if it was used in this emergency. The plan did not conform to NUREG-0654/FEMAREP-1, Rev. 1, and did not contain an ETE.

Training

Training is provided to emergency response personnel. However, it is unknown whether joint

training between industry and government was regularly conducted.

Drills and Exercises

The Oakland Fire Department regularly conducts emergency drills and exercises. However, it is

unknown whether the emergency plan that was used in this evacuation had been previously

tested in a full-scale field exercise.

Community Awareness

The community in the Oakland and Berkeley Hills area is highly aware of local hazards, mostly

the potential for severe wildfires such as the one that prompted this evacuation. However, the

community’s familiarity with evacuation procedures is only average. The community was also

highly aware of the alerting method used (police PA system).

THREAT CONDITIONS

On October 20, 1991, strong winds rekindled a grass fire that had started the previous day. The

fire began on a steep hillside in a box canyon above State Highway 24 near the entrance to the

Caldecott Tunnel. This is a wooded area with heavy underbrush, narrow streets and steep

terrain. The unusual weather conditions, including high winds and record high temperatures and

drought conditions, fueled a huge blaze. Road conditions before the evacuation were dry. 

However, smoke from the fire made it difficult, if not impossible, to see portions of the road and

to ascertain the direction of the fire. 
D-194

The evacuation included 20,000 to 30,000 people from significant portions of Oakland,

Berkeley, and Piedmont, as well as part of the UC-Berkeley campus. Large areas were

evacuated ahead of the fire. Fire officials identified the areas to be evacuated, while Oakland

and Berkeley police officers conducted the actual evacuation. While some residents hurried to

leave the area, others refused to leave. Police officers had to use their authority to evacuate

some residents and to keep others from returning to endangered areas.

CONSEQUENCES

As many as 20,000 to 30,000 people were evacuated on October 20, 1991, because of the East

Bay Hills Fire in the wildland-urban interface area between Oakland and Berkeley Hills. A total

of 25 people died in the fire and 150 were injured. Of the 25 people killed, 19 were in the

process of evacuating when they died. Eleven were killed when the fire caught up to them and

eight died in the narrow smoke-filled streets during the evacuation. Many of the fatalities

included individuals who were unable to evacuate because of age or disabilities. The body of an

Oakland police officer was found, along with five civilian fatalities, at a narrow point on Charing

Cross Road. It appeared that the cars were jammed at this point by a collision in the narrowest

part of the road, and the occupants were unable to escape the advancing flames. The estimated

total cost of evacuation-related expenses is unknown.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies was extremely high. The

response to this fire was one of the largest ever recorded: 440 engine companies and more than

1,500 firefighters responded to the fire. Initially, the Oakland Fire Department conducted

operation and planning functions at the scene but later in the day, the California Department of

Forestry and Fire Protection provided an overhead management team, and a joint command was

established that consisted of the Oakland, Berkeley, and Piedmont fire departments, and

Department of Forestry. Both Oakland and Berkeley are in Alameda County and participate in

the Alameda County Fire Mutual Aid Plan. Oakland is the coordinating department for mutual

aid within the North Zone of Alameda County, which includes 11 agencies. Engine units from

Orinda, Moraga, and Contra Costa Counties were also dispatched to the fire. Command, control

and coordination processes could best be described as ad hoc. The Incident Commander ordered

the Oakland and Berkeley police to evacuate residents. There were no problems with the

decision-making process.

Communications

The Incident Command System was used and there was both an EOC, which consisted of the

Oakland Fire Department Dispatching Center, and an ICP or mobile command post. 

Communication between field emergency responders and the EOC was by radio, telephone, and

cell phone. There were many communication problems that hampered both the fire-fighting

efforts and the evacuation. The radio channels and Communications Center were overwhelmed
D-195

by the situation. Radio communications were difficult or impossible because there were too

many units on the same channel and too few mutual aid channels available; the steep, hilly

terrain interfered with the radio signals. In the Oakland Fire Communications Center, the

situation was also out of control. The incoming telephone lines rang continuously, with one

caller after another reporting the fire. The news media were calling for information. The radio

was so jammed with traffic that it was difficult to hear and respond to the messages that were

directed to the Communications Center. 

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials were notified of the incident by telephone, and emergency responders were

notified through 911/dispatch. There were no problems with notification of emergency

personnel or senior local officials. Emergency personnel were on the scene immediately because

firefighters were onsite fighting the hotspots from the previous day. The elapsed time between

the start of the fire and the decision to evacuate was a couple of hours. Most of the public was

already aware of the fire but was officially notified to evacuate by police loudspeakers. A police

helicopter PA system was used. Oakland chose not to use the Emergency Broadcast System,

feeling it was inefficient. 

The evacuation was partially staged. Large areas were evacuated ahead of the fire. The fire was

fast moving and the winds were strong and variable in direction. It took several hours to

complete the evacuation and not everyone made it out alive. The narrow streets were packed

with people and the smoke made it impossible to know in which direction to evacuate. There

were problems with warning and subsequent citizen action. Many people evacuated before the

evacuation order and others refused to evacuate. Some of the residents refused to leave and tried

in vain to protect their own homes. Police officers had to use their authority to evacuate some

residents and to keep others from returning to endangered areas. 

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were not given specific instructions about where to go when they evacuated or which

routes to use. The evacuation was conducted primarily by Oakland and Berkeley police officers. 

The scene was very chaotic because the smoke made it impossible to know in which direction to

evacuate. In addition, the high winds produced a rapidly moving fire that actually caught up to

and overwhelmed some of the evacuees. One known special institution (part of the University of

California at Berkeley campus) was evacuated. However, it is unknown if any other special

institutions were evacuated.

Special traffic problems existed during the evacuation. In addition to a heavy smoke that made it

impossible to see, downed power lines and abandoned vehicles impeded the roadways. At least

one traffic accident occurred during the evacuation and those involved in the accident, including

a police officer, died in the fire. It is unknown whether reverse-laning was used. The steep and

narrow roads, as well as the power lines and abandoned vehicles, forced evacuees to take any

route possible to escape the fire. 
D-196

There were some instances of people evacuating before being ordered to do so because the fire

was moving so quickly. In addition, some people actually refused to evacuate and response

personnel had to re-evacuate some people who returned to their homes.

Congregate Care Centers

Congregate care centers were opened in Oakland, Berkeley, and Piedmont. The congregate care

centers were managed by the Red Cross, the Salvation Army, and by the Oakland, Berkeley, and

Piedmont emergency planning and support agencies. It is unknown precisely what types of

public buildings were used as congregate care centers or what percentage of evacuees went to

the congregate care centers. There were no shadow evacuations.

Law Enforcement

The Oakland and Berkeley Police secured the evacuated area to prevent looting and vandalism. 

However, some civilians, posing as volunteers, entered the area and looted homes. There were

problems with law enforcement because officers left the area to protect themselves from the

fast-moving fire.

Re-Entry

It is unknown who authorized re-entry. However, it was a controlled phased re-entry because

many homes had been destroyed in the fire. More than 3,000 structures and 1,500 acres were

destroyed in the fire. Some evacuees received compensation for their evacuation-related

expenses through their insurance companies. It is unknown whether there were major problems

during re-entry. However, it could be assumed that there were problems since many homes were

destroyed in the fire.

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

References

TR-060, The East Bay Hills Fire Oakland-Berkeley, California, October 1991, United States Fire

Administration Technical Report Series, “The East Bay Hills Fire Oakland-Berkeley,

California,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, United States Fire Administration,

National Fire Data Center. <http://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/txt/publications/tr-060.txt>

Parker, Captain Donald R. “The Oakland-Berkeley Hills Fire: An Overview,” Oakland Office of

Fire Services. January 1992. <http://www.sfmuseum.org/oakfire/overview.html>

“The Oakland Berkeley Hills Fire,” National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) in cooperation

with the Oakland and Berkeley, California Fire Departments and the California State Fire

Marshal’s Office. 1992. <http://www.firewise.org/pubs/theOaklandBerkeleyHillsFire/>
D-197

Railroad Accident, Appleton and Grand Chute, Wisconsin, November 3, 1997, ID #52

Summary

Rank Value: 44

Number Evacuated: 5,000

Category: Technological Hazard

Specific Type: Railroad Accident

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

On November 3, 1997, two railroad tankers carrying liquid petroleum gas derailed near the

border of Appleton and Grand Chute, Wisconsin. Approximately 5,000 people within a 2.6 km2

(1 mi ) area were evacuated from their homes in Appleton and Grand Chute as a precaution 2

because of the threat of an explosion.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

Approximately 5,000 people were evacuated from a 2.6 km (1 mi ) area in a suburban 2 2

(residential) community located on the border of the cities of Appleton and Grand Chute,

Wisconsin. Appleton has a population of 70,087 people and covers an area of 55.3 km2 (21.4

mi2). Grand Chute has a population of 18,392 people and covers an area of 64.6 km2 (25.0 mi2). 

Grand Chute is about 121 km (75 mi) northwest of Milwaukee. Ethnicity, nationality, and age

were not important factors in the evacuation.

The community has a mayoral form of government, and its main economic base is industry. 

There is a mall that attracts a large number of non-residents. The closest nuclear power plant is

Point Beach, located near Manitowoc, Wisconsin, approximately 40 km (25 miles) away. 

Wisconsin has two commercial nuclear power plants.

History of Emergencies

The community is no more prone to hazards than the average U.S. city, although the city has had

experience with derailments in the past. In 1996 there reportedly was a massive derailment and

fire that resulted in a nearly three-week evacuation of Weyauwega, which is located 32 km (20

mi) west of Appleton. There were no large-scale evacuations in the previous 10 years. It is

unknown whether the community had previous experience with the alerting mechanism used in

this evacuation. 
D-198

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.

Planning

The community had a written emergency plan with an evacuation section that was used in this

emergency. The plan did not conform to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, and there was no

ETE in the plan.

Training

The community provides training to emergency response personnel but does not regularly

conduct joint training between industry and government.

Drills and Exercises

The community’s emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and

exercises, but it is unknown whether or not the emergency plan used in this evacuation was

previously tested in a full-scale field exercise.

Community Awareness

The community has a low level of awareness of local hazards and of evacuation procedures. 

However, it has an average awareness of train derailment, in general, and a high level of

awareness about the alerting methods used.

THREAT CONDITIONS

The threat condition leading to this evacuation was the derailment of two railroad tankers

carrying liquid petroleum gas in the early evening (approximately 4 p.m.) on November 3, 1997. 

Weather conditions were overcast but there was no precipitation, and it was approximately 10°C

(50°F). The roads were dry and clear, and there were no unusual circumstances that occurred

during the derailment.

CONSEQUENCES

Approximately 5,000 people within a 2.6 km (1 mi ) area were evacuated from their homes after 2 2

two railroad tankers carrying liquid petroleum gas derailed near the border of Appleton and

Grand Chute, Wisconsin. There were no deaths or injuries associated with the derailment or the

evacuation. The estimated total cost of evacuation-related expenses is unknown.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation between local, state, and federal agencies was high. Political

boundaries were crossed, since the evacuation area included Appleton and Grand Chute,
D-199

Wisconsin. The command, control and coordination processes could best be described as preplanned. The decision to evacuate was made by the Appleton fire chief, and there were no

problems with the decision-making process.

Communications

An EOC was not used but there was an ICP used in this emergency. Communication between

field emergency responders and the ICP was by face-to-face contact. There were no problems

with this form of communication.

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials were notified of the incident by telephone and emergency responders were

notified through the 911 phone system. There were no problems with notification of emergency

personnel or senior local officials. The elapsed time between discovery of the incident and

mobilization of response personnel was less than 15 minutes, and the decision to evacuate was

made approximately one and one-half hours after the derailment. It is unknown how long it took

to complete the evacuation. The public was notified by radio and television broadcasts and by

door-to-door notification. The evacuation took place all at once, but some people refused to

evacuate.

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were given instructions about where to go to seek congregate care centers but were not

told to use specific routes. One special institution, a manufacturing facility, was evacuated. 

Road conditions before the evacuation were dry and there were no traffic accidents and no traffic

problems; all major roadways were available to evacuees. Reverse-laning was not used. It is

unknown whether anyone evacuated before being told to do so. Some people refused to

evacuate.

Congregate Care Centers

Two schools were opened as congregate care centers but it is unknown who managed those

congregate care centers or what percentage of evacuees actually went to the congregate care

centers. There were no shadow evacuations.

Law Enforcement

Police secured the area following the evacuation, and there were no instances of looting or

vandalism or any problems with law enforcement.

Re-Entry

The Appleton fire chief authorized re-entry several hours after the derailment. There were no

special controls during re-entry. It is unknown whether evacuees were compensated for their

expenses. There were no problems during re-entry.
D-200

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

According to the Special Operations Chief in the Appleton Fire Department, the evacuation was

successful because of cooperation among agencies, the responders’ and the public’s knowledge

of the hazard, and the emergency plan that was in place.

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contact

Special Operations Chief

Appleton Fire Department

(920) 832-2281

(Personal Communication, 7/9/03)

References

“All Clear Given After Train Tankers Derail in Wisconsin.” Associated Press. November 3,

1997.

“Wisconsin Neighborhood Evacuated Due to Derailment.” Associated Press. November 3,

1997. <http://archive.ap.org> (May 22, 2003).
D-201

Keystone Cement, Bath, Pennsylvania, December 9, 1997, ID #53

Summary

Rank Value: 44

Number Evacuated: >1,600

Category: Technological Hazard

Specific Type: Fixed Site Hazmat

Community: Rural

INTRODUCTION

On December 9, 1997, the temperature doubled in a tank of hazardous solvents at the Keystone

Cement Company in Bath, Pennsylvania, posing the possibility of an explosion. At least 1,600

people were evacuated, including 950 children from two elementary schools and a senior

citizens townhouse complex during a 10-hour emergency that virtually shut down the borough of

Bath.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

Bath is a rural borough located in Northampton County, Pennsylvania. Bath has a population of

2,678 people and a total land area of 2.4 km2 (0.9 mi2). The evacuated area extended beyond the

borders of Bath to include approximately 8 km (3.14 mi ). The estimated population for this

2 2

area is 6,400 people. At least 1,600 people, or 25% of the community, was evacuated. The

population density of the area during the evacuation was medium. Ethnicity, nationality, and age

were not important factors in the evacuation.

Bath has a mayoral form of government. The area of the evacuation was primarily residential. 

The community’s main economic base is manufacturing/industry. There are no special

characteristics that attract a large number of non-residents. The Limerick Nuclear Power Plant,

is located about 34 km (21 mi) northwest of Philadelphia, or about 60 km (37 mi) from this

evacuation. The state of Pennsylvania has five commercial nuclear power plants, including

Three Mile Island, located 16 km (10 mi) southeast of Harrisburg.

History of Emergencies

The Bath area is no more prone to hazards than average, and the community had no previous

experience with the hazard that led to this evacuation or experience with any evacuations in the

previous 10 years. It is unknown whether the community had previous experience with the

alerting mechanism used in this evacuation.
D-202

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.

Planning

The community had a written emergency plan that included an evacuation section used in this

emergency. The plan did not conform to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, and there was no

ETE in the plan.

Training

Training is provided to emergency response personnel, and although joint training is conducted

between industry and government, it is not done on a regular basis.

Drills and Exercises

The community’s emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and

exercises. However, the emergency plan used in this evacuation was not previously tested in a

full-scale field exercise.

Community Awareness

The community had a low level of awareness of local hazards but a high level of awareness

about the hazard that caused this evacuation. The community’s awareness of evacuation

procedures and the alerting mechanisms used was average (medium).

THREAT CONDITIONS

The threat condition leading to this evacuation was a tank of hazardous solvents at the Keystone

Cement Company in Bath, Pennsylvania. The tank doubled in temperature, posing the

possibility of an explosion. The tank capacity was about 133,000 L (35,000 gal), but only

21,000 L (5,500 gal) were being stored. An explosion is more powerful when the tank contains

more vapor than fuel. At least 1,600 people were evacuated. The road conditions were dry and

the outside temperature was low, around 4.4° C (40° F), which helped keep vapors in the

hazardous materials tank down. The evacuation began at 8:30 a.m., and people were allowed to

return to their homes about 6:30 p.m. 

CONSEQUENCES

On December 9, 1997, the hazmat incident at Keystone Cement led to the evacuation of at least

1,600 people, including 950 children from two elementary schools and a senior citizens

townhouse complex. The evacuation lasted 10 hours and shut down Bath. There were no deaths

or injuries associated with either the hazard or the evacuation. The estimated total cost of

evacuation-related expenses incurred by the pubic was minimal.
D-203

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies was high. Approximately 60

firefighters with companies from East Allen, Allen, Hanover (Northampton County), Hanover

(Lehigh County), Bath, Walnutport and Klecknersville were at the plant. Political boundaries

were not crossed. Command, control and coordination processes could best be described as ad

hoc. The decision to evacuate was made by the East Allen fire chief, who opted to evacuate a

2.6 km (1 mi) radius around the plant. There were no problems with the decision-making

process.

Communications

An EOC and an ICP were used. Communication between field emergency responders and EOC

was by radio, cell phone, and messenger. There were no problems with communications.

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials were notified of the incident by telephone, and emergency responders were

notified through the county commission center. There were no problems with notification of

emergency personnel or senior local officials. The elapsed time between discovery of the

incident and mobilization of response personnel was less than 15 minutes. The elapsed time

between start of the hazard and the decision to evacuate was one hour (the evacuation began at

8:30 a.m. and lasted for 10 hours). It is unknown how long it took to complete the evacuation. 

The public was notified by a police/fire PA system. The evacuation took place all at once, and

there were no special problems regarding warning and subsequent citizen action. A few

residents refused to evacuate but this was not a problem since residents were under a voluntary

evacuation notice.

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were given specific instructions about where to go when they evacuated and were told

to use specific routes, which were designated by police roadblocks. Bath was cordoned off to

normal traffic throughout the day. Route 329, where the Keystone plant is located, was blocked

from Airport Road to the borough. Route 512 was closed from Main Street to Hanoverville

Road. Roads were dry and there were no traffic accidents, but there were traffic jams. Traffic

was detoured around the plant, and Routes 512 and 329 were closed for about 10 hours, causing

major delays and tie-ups. Reverse-laning was not used.

Three special institutions were evacuated, including the Howard Jones townhouse apartments, a

senior citizens complex, and two elementary schools. No one spontaneously evacuated before

being told to do so. However, some people refused to evacuate, including an elderly couple who

stayed in their home and a woman who openly strolled through the business district. The

evacuation was mandatory for students and senior citizens but voluntary for the rest of the

populace.
D-204

Congregate Care Centers

Congregate care centers managed by the American Red Cross were used. Children were taken to

Moore Elementary School, located several miles northeast of Bath, and senior citizens were

bused to the Klecknersville Fire Hall, also in Moore. Northampton High School students who

live in Bath were kept at the high school until their parents picked them up. About 118 people,

or 7% of those evacuated, mostly elderly, registered with the Red Cross. However, 1,000 school

children were bused to an elementary school. Therefore, the total number of people going to

congregate care centers was approximately 1,118 people, or 70% of those evacuated. There

were no shadow evacuations.

Law Enforcement

The evacuated area was secured by police, and there were no instances of looting or vandalism

or any problems with law enforcement.

Re-Entry

The evacuation began at 8:30 a.m., and people were allowed to return to their homes about

6:30 p.m., according to the American Red Cross. Re-entry was authorized by the East Allen Fire

Chief and no special controls during re-entry were used. Evacuees were not compensated for

their expenses. There were no major problems during re-entry.

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

None

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

East Allen Fire Marshall

(610) 262-6700

(Personal Communication, 7/15/03)

References

Csencsits, S. and K. Parrish. “Blast Hazard Shuts Down Bath: The Temperature in Tank of

Solvents at Keystone Cement Doubles, Forcing Evacuations.” Lehigh County Emergency

Response News. December 9, 1997. 

<http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/counties/Lehigh/Emergency_Response_NewsClips.htm>

(May 9, 2003).

Devlin, Ron. “Borough Became Town Under Siege Residents Were Hostage to a Tank of

Chemicals Until All-Clear at 6:30 P.M.” Lehigh County Emergency Response News. 

December 9, 1997. 

<http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/counties/Lehigh/Emergency_Response_NewsClips.htm>

(May 9, 2003).
D-205

Propane Storage Facility Fire, Pascagoula, Mississippi, October 1998, ID #3

Summary

Rank Value: 44

Number Evacuated: >1,500

Category: Technological Hazard

Specific Type: Fixed Site Hazmat Incident

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

More than 1,500 residents of Pascagoula, Mississippi, were evacuated in October 1998 after a

fire broke out at a propane storage facility. There were no deaths but three injuries were

associated with the fire; no deaths or injuries were associated with the subsequent evacuation. 

There were no unusual circumstances that occurred during this incident.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

The evacuated area was a suburban community in the city of Pascagoula, Mississippi, which has

a total population of 26,200. Approximately 1,500 people, or 5.7% of the population was

evacuated because of the incident. The evacuated area was approximately 1.3 km (0.5 mi ) and 2 2

the city has a total area of 47.2 km2 (18.2 mi2). The evacuated area consisted of residential and

commercial property. Population density of the evacuation area was average. Ethnicity,

nationality, and age were not important factors in the evacuation.

Pascagoula has a mayoral form of government and its main economic base is manufacturing and

industry. Tourism and shipbuilding attract a large number of non-residents. Ingalls

Shipbuilding constructs many U.S. Navy ships here. Mississippi has one commercial nuclear

power plant, the Grand Gulf 1, which is located over 80 km (50 mi) away from Pascagoula, or

about 40 km (25 mi) south of Vicksburg.

History of Emergencies

Pascagoula is more prone to both natural disasters (e.g., hurricanes and storms) and

technological hazards than the average U.S. city. However, the community had no prior

experience with the hazard that led to this evacuation. There have been hurricane evacuations in

the previous 10 years. However, the residents had no previous experience with the alerting

mechanism used in this evacuation, which was door-to-door notification.

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.
D-206

Planning 

Pascagoula has a written emergency plan with an evacuation section that was used in this

emergency. It is unknown whether or not this plan conforms to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1,

Rev. 1, requirements.

Training

Pascagoula provides training to its emergency response personnel, including joint training

between industry and government.

Drills and Exercises

Pascagoula’s emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and exercises. It

is unknown whether the emergency plan used in this evacuation was previously tested in a fullscale field exercise.

Community Awareness

The community level of awareness of local hazards is average and awareness of the hazard that

caused this evacuation was low. However, community awareness of evacuation procedures and

alerting methods used is high.

THREAT CONDITIONS

The hazard that led to this evacuation was a fire at the propane storage facility in Pascagoula,

Mississippi. The incident occurred at approximately 1 p.m. on a sunny and fair day. The road

conditions were dry, and there were no unusual circumstances that occurred during this incident.

CONSEQUENCES

At least 1,500 residents of Pascagoula, Mississippi, were evacuated after a fire broke out at a

propane storage facility. There were no deaths and three injuries associated with the fire and no

deaths or injuries associated with the subsequent evacuation. The estimated total cost of

evacuation-related expenses is unknown.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies was high. Political boundaries

were not crossed. Command, control and coordination processes could best be described as preplanned. The decision to evacuate was made jointly by the Pascagoula fire and police chiefs. 

There were no problems with the decision-making process.

Communications

An EOC and an ICP were used. Communication between field emergency responders and EOC

was by radio and cell phone. There were no problems with communications.
D-207

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials were notified of the incident by telephone and emergency responders were

notified of the incident through the 911 emergency system. There were no problems with

notification of emergency personnel or senior local officials. Response personnel mobilized to

the scene in less than 15 minutes, and the decision to evacuate was made in about ten minutes. It

took one to two hours to complete the evacuation. The public was notified of the evacuation

door to door. The evacuation took place all at once. There were no special problems regarding

warning and subsequent citizen action.

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were given specific instructions about where to go when they evacuated and were told

to use specific routes around the hazard. Police officers directed evacuees along the routes that

were designated. No special institutions were evacuated; however, two special institutions

sheltered in place. Road conditions before the evacuation were dry. No major roadways were

unavailable for use because of construction or damage caused by the hazard, and no special

traffic problems, including traffic accidents, occurred during the evacuation. It is unknown

whether anyone evacuated before being told to do so or if anyone refused to evacuate.

Congregate Care Centers

A congregate care center was managed by the Red Cross at the fairgrounds. The number of

evacuees that went to the fairgrounds is unknown. There were no shadow evacuations.

Law Enforcement

Police secured the area following the evacuation, and there were no instances of looting or

vandalism or any other problems with law enforcement.

Re-Entry

Re-entry was authorized by the incident commander and the EOC. No special controls were

used during the re-entry process. Evacuees were not compensated for their expenses. There

were no major problems during re-entry.

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

According to the Pascagoula fire chief, the evacuation went smoothly because of the availability

of response personnel and the closeness of the neighborhood. In addition, the public was

familiar with evacuation procedures because of storm-related evacuations. 

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Pascagoula Fire Chief

(228) 762-0751

(Personal Communication, 7/9/03)
D-208

References

Fireworld. “Pascagoula, Mississippi.” October 1998. 

<www.fireworld.com/incidents/Oct1998.html> (May 27, 2003).
D-209

Transportation Accident, Bossier City, Louisiana, September 18, 1998, ID #239

Summary

Rank Value: 44

Number Evacuated: ~2,000

Category: Technological Hazard

Specific Type: Transportation Accident

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

On September 18, 1998, workers loading a bomb from a B-52 accidentally dropped the 500-

pound explosive on a runway in Bossier City, Louisiana. The bomb did not explode; however,

as a precaution, approximately 2,000 people were evacuated before the bomb was picked up and

moved to a safe location.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

The city of Bossier, Louisiana is a suburban community with a population of approximately

56,400 people and covers an area of 107.8 km (41.6 mi ). Approximately 2,000 people, or 2 2

3.5%, of the population were evacuated from a 2.6 km (1 mi ) area during this incident. The 2 2

land use in the area is mainly residential, and the population density of the area was medium. 

Ethnicity, nationality, and age were not important factors in the evacuation. 

The city has a mayoral form of government, and the main economic base is tourism. Tourism

attracts a large number of non-residents to casinos in the area. Additionally, Barksdale Air Force

Base is located in the city and attracts a large number of visitors. The nearest nuclear power

plant is River Bend located more than 80 km (50 mi) away. Louisiana has a commercial nuclear

power plant northwest of Baton Rouge.

History of Emergencies

The community is more prone to hazards than average. However, the city had not had

experience with unexploded ordnance in the past. The community had experienced evacuations

for tornados, train accidents, and transportation accidents, and had experienced large-scale

evacuations in the last 10 years. The community had had previous experience with the alerting

mechanism used during this evacuation. 

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.
D-210

Planning

The community has a written emergency plan with an evacuation section that was used in this

emergency. It is unknown if the plan conformed to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, or if

there was an ETE in the plan.

Training

The community provides training to emergency response personnel and regularly conducts joint

training between industry and government.

Drills and Exercises

The community’s emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and

exercises. The emergency plan used in this evacuation was previously tested in full-scale field

exercises and in tabletop exercises. 

Community Awareness

The community has a medium level of awareness of the local hazards and a low level of

awareness of evacuations procedures. It has a medium level of awareness of these types of

weapons in general, and a low level of awareness of the alerting methods used in this evacuation. 

THREAT CONDITIONS

On September 18, 1999, a bomb was accidentally dropped while being loaded on a B-52 at

Barksdale Air Force Base in Bossier City, Louisiana. The bomb did not explode; however,

possible damage to the bomb and uncertainty about moving the bomb was cause to evacuate the

area. Weather conditions were dry and clear and the roads were clear.

CONSEQUENCES

Approximately 2,000 people within a 2.6 km (1 mi ) area were evacuated from their homes after 2 2

a bomb was dropped during a loading operation at Barksdale Air Force Base. There were no

fatalities or injuries from the incident or the evacuation. The estimated total cost of the

evacuation-related expenses is unknown.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies was high, and political

boundaries were crossed in this event because the accident occurred on federal property near the

city. The command, control, and coordination processes could best be described as pre-planned. 

The decision to evacuate was made by the Bossier City fire chief, and there were no problems

with the decision-making process. 
D-211

Communications

An EOC was not used in this event; however, an ICP was established. Communication between

field emergency responders and the ICP was primarily by radio. There were no problems with

communications during the event.

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials were notified of the incident by telephone. The emergency responders

were notified when the Air Force Base contacted the Fire Department Communication Division. 

There were no problems with the notification of emergency personnel or senior local officials. 

The elapsed time between discovery of the incident and mobilization of response personnel was

less than 15 minutes and the initial decision to evacuate was made approximately three hours

after the notification of the incident. It took approximately one hour to complete the evacuation. 

The public was notified by telephone, radio and television broadcasts, and by police going door

to door. The evacuation took place all at once and there were no problems with warning and

subsequent citizen action. No one refused to evacuate. 

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were given instructions on where to go and were told which routes to use. These

routes were designated by police roadblocks. There were no special institutions evacuated. 

Road conditions during the evacuation were dry, and no traffic accidents or traffic-related

problems occurred during the event. Reverse-laning was not used.

Congregate Care Centers

Congregate care centers were established at local schools and churches for this emergency and

were managed by the facility owners. It is unknown what percent of the evacuees went to the

congregate care centers. There were no shadow evacuations. 

Law Enforcement

Police secured the area following the evacuation and there were no instances of looting or

vandalism or any problems with law enforcement. 

Re-Entry

Re-entry was authorized as a joint decision between the Bossier City fire chief and Barksdale Air

Force Base officials. Re-entry was not controlled, and evacuees were not compensated for their

expenses. There were no problems reported during re-entry.
D-212

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

The coordinated efforts of the Air Force and the city contributed to the success of this

evacuation. It was learned that improvements could be made in notifying the public and that it is

important to work with different agencies in training.

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Bossier City Fire Chief

(318) 741-8700

(Personal Communication, 8/7/03)

Bossier City HazMat Officer

(318) 741-8700

(Personal Communication, 8/7/03)

References

“Air Traffic Suspended, Neighborhoods Evacuated After Bomb Accident.” Associated Press.

September 18, 1998.
D-213

Paint Plant Hazardous Materials Release, Chicago, Illinois, 

August 5, 1997, ID #51

Summary

Rank Value: 44

Number Evacuated: 2,500

Category: Technological Hazard

Specific Type: Fixed Site Hazmat Incident

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

On August 5, 1997, a leaky valve or hose at the Chicago Specialty Corporation released 6,600 kg

(3,000 lbs) of sulfur trioxide into the atmosphere, causing an evacuation of approximately 2,500

people on the south side of Chicago, Illinois.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

The city of Chicago, Illinois, is an urban community with a population of approximately

2,900,000 people and covers an area of 606 km (234 mi ). Approximately 2, 500 people, or less 2 2

than 1%, of the population was evacuated from the south side suburbs of Chicago during this

incident. Ethnicity, nationality and age were not important factors in the evacuation.

The city has a mayoral form of government, and the main economic base is industry and

tourism. Tourism attracts a large number of non-residents. Additionally, there is a large military

contingent and many workers who travel into the city. The nearest nuclear power plant is

Dresden, located approximately 15 km (9 mi) east of Morris, Illinois.

History of Emergencies

Chicago is more prone to hazards than average, and the city has had experience with chemical

leaks from manufacturing plants in the past. The community has experienced large-scale

evacuations in the past 10 years, and the community has had previous experience with the

alerting mechanism used during this evacuation.

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.
D-214

Planning

The community had a written emergency plan with an evacuation section that was used in this

emergency. It is unknown if the plan conformed to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, or if

there was an ETE in the plan.

Training

The community provides training to emergency response personnel and regularly conducts joint

training between industry and government.

Drills and Exercises

The community’s emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and

exercises, and the emergency plan used in this evacuation was previously tested in tabletop and

full-scale exercises.

Community Awareness

The community has a medium level of awareness about the local hazards and a low level of

awareness about evacuation procedures. It has a low level of awareness about hazardous

materials in general, but a high level of awareness about the alerting methods used in this

evacuation.

THREAT CONDITIONS

On August 5, 1997, a leaky valve or hose at the Chicago Specialty Corporation released 6,600 kg

(3,000 lb) of sulfur trioxide. The chemical escaped from a tanker truck in liquid form, then

vaporized and formed a toxic cloud that dispersed and caused an evacuation of approximately

2,500 people on the south side of Chicago, Illinois. Weather conditions were hot and the roads

were dry.

CONSEQUENCES

Approximately 2,500 people were evacuated from their businesses and homes after a release of

sulfur trioxide into the atmosphere. There were no fatalities from the incident; however

hospitals reported treating 40 people for burning eyes and related ailments. There were no

injuries from the evacuation. The estimated total cost of the evacuation-related expenses is

unknown.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation between local, state, and federal agencies was high, and political

boundaries were not crossed in this event. The command, control, and coordination processes

could best be described as pre-planned. The decision to evacuate was made by the Chicago Fire

Chief, and there were no problems with the decision-making process.
D-215

Communications

It is unknown if an EOC was used; however, an ICP was used in this emergency. 

Communication between field emergency responders and the ICP was by radio. There were no

problems with communications during the event.

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials were notified of the incident by a telephone tree, and emergency responders

were notified through the 911 phone system. There were no problems with the notification of

emergency personnel or senior local officials. The elapsed time between discovery of the

incident and mobilization of response personnel was less than 15 minutes. It is not known how

long it took to make the initial decision to evacuate or how long it took to complete the

evacuation.

It is not known how the public was notified, but it was likely door-to-door notification. The

evacuation was completed all at once. It is unknown if people evacuated before being told to do

so or if some people refused to evacuate.

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were given instructions on where to go and were told which routes to use. These

routes were designated by police barricades. There were no special institutions evacuated. Road

conditions during the evacuation were dry and no traffic accidents or traffic-related problems

occurred during the event. Reverse laning was not used.

Congregate Care Centers

It is unknown if congregate care centers were established for this emergency. There were no

shadow evacuations.

Law Enforcement

The police secured the area following the evacuation, and there were no instances of looting or

vandalism or any problems with law enforcement.

Re-Entry

The fire chief authorized re-entry, and there were no special controls in place during re-entry. 

Evacuees were not compensated for their expenses.

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

Interagency cooperation and a clear understanding of the threat were factors that made the

evacuation work well. One problem with the evacuation was the need for clearer

communication and more information.
D-216

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Chicago Fire Department

Chief of Hazmat

(312) 745-1044

(Personal Communication, 7/30/03)

References

“Toxic Spill Forces Evacuations.” Associated Press. August 5, 1997.
D-217

Plastics Plant Fire, Mason City, Iowa, May 1998, ID #79

Summary

Rank Value: 44

Number Evacuated: 3,600

Category: Technological Hazard

Specific Type: Fixed Site Hazmat Incident

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

In May 1998, a fire started in a plastics plant, causing the potential for a chlorine gas leak. 

Approximately 3,600 people were evacuated from their businesses and homes.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

Mason City, Iowa, is a suburban, community with a population of approximately 29,172 people

and covers an area of 68 km (26 mi ). Approximately 3,600 people, or 12%, of the population 2 2

were evacuated from a 2.6 km (1 mi ) area during this incident. Ethnicity, nationality, and age 2 2

were not important factors in the evacuation.

The city has a mayoral form of government and the main economic base is manufacturing. 

Tourism attracts large numbers of non-residents to the area. The nearest nuclear power plant is

more than 80 km (50 mi) away.

History of Emergencies

The area is more prone to hazards than the average city, and the city has had experience with

chlorine leaks in the past. It is unknown if the community has experienced large-scale

evacuations in the last 10 years; however, they have had previous experience with the alerting

mechanism used during this evacuation.

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.

Planning

The community had a written emergency plan that was used in this emergency, and the plan

included an evacuation section. It is unknown if the plan conformed to NUREG-0654/FEMAREP-1, Rev. 1, or if there was an ETE in the plan. The plan did comply with state requirements.
D-218

Training

The community regularly provides training to emergency response personnel; however, joint

training between industry and government is not regularly conducted.

Drills and Exercises

The community’s emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and

exercises. The emergency plan had not been previously tested in full-scale exercises. 

Community Awareness

The community has a medium level of awareness about the local hazards and about evacuation

procedures. It has a low level of awareness about hazardous materials. The community does

have a high level of awareness about the alerting methods used in this evacuation.

THREAT CONDITIONS

On Mother’s Day in May 1998, there was a fire in the mid-afternoon at a plant that makes and

stores plastics, creating a concern about the potential release of chlorine gas. As a result of this

concern, approximately 3,600 people were evacuated. Weather conditions were dry and the

roads were dry and clear. There were no unusual circumstances that occurred during the event.

CONSEQUENCES

Approximately 3,600 people within a 2.6 km (1 mi ) area were evacuated from their businesses 2 2

and homes after a fire started at a plant that makes plastics. There was a significant potential for

release of chlorine gas, hence the need for the evacuation. There were no fatalities or injuries

from the incident or the evacuation. The estimated total cost of the evacuation-related expenses

is unknown.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies was high, and political

boundaries were not crossed in this event. The command, control, and coordination processes

could best be described as pre-planned. The decision to evacuate was made by the Mason City

Fire Chief, and there were no problems with the decision-making process.

Communications

An EOC was not used, but there was an ICP used in this emergency. Communication between

field emergency responders and the ICP was by radio. There were no problems with

communications during the event.
D-219

Notification and Warning

Emergency responders were notified through the 911 phone system, and there were no problems

with the notification of emergency personnel. The elapsed time between discovery of the

incident and mobilization of response personnel was less than 15 minutes and the initial decision

to evacuate was made approximately one hour later. The entire evacuation was completed

within one hour.

Police going door to door notified the public, and the evacuation occurred all at once. There

were no problems with warnings or subsequent citizen action. It is unlikely that anyone

evacuated before being told to do so, and no one refused to evacuate.

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were given instructions on where to go and were told which routes to use. These

routes were designated by police road blocks. There were no special institutions evacuated. 

Road conditions during the evacuation were dry and no traffic accidents or traffic-related

problems occurred during the event. Reverse-laning was not used.

Congregate Care Centers

Congregate care centers were established in churches and schools for this emergency; however,

it is unknown how many people went to the congregate care centers. The Emergency

Management director managed the congregate care centers. There were no shadow evacuations.

Law Enforcement

Police secured the area following the evacuation, and there were no instances of looting or

vandalism or any problems with law enforcement.

Re-Entry

The Mason City fire chief authorized re-entry, and there were no special controls during

re-entry. Evacuees were not compensated for their expenses.

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

The evacuation worked well due to good training, a good command system and the cooperation

of the police and fire departments. A lesson learned was that there needs to be a better way to

notify residents of the need to evacuate.

CONTACT INFORMATION 

Contacts

Mason City Fire Chief

(641) 421-3640

(Personal Communication, 7/22/03)
D-220

Champion Technologies Inc., Odessa, Texas, August 20, 1992, ID #245

Summary

Rank Value: 44

Number Evacuated: 27,000

Category: Technological Hazard

Specific Type: Fixed Site Hazmat Incident

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

On August 20, 1992, a fire at the Champion Technologies Inc. Plant, located just outside the

Odessa City limits, prompted the evacuation of approximately 27,000 area residents. The

facility stores about 702 oilfield chemicals that could pose a health hazard if inhaled. To further

complicate matters, weather conditions, including high humidity, caused the cloud of smoke to

remain low and to blow directly over the city. There were no deaths, but 54 people were injured

because of the hazard. There were no deaths or injuries associated with the evacuation.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

Odessa is a city in Texas with a total population of 90,943 people. Approximately 27,000

residents (29.6% of the population) were evacuated from a suburban area of Odessa. An

estimated 550 businesses, in addition to both Permian and Winwood Malls, were evacuated. 

Land use in the area was primarily residential, commercial, and industrial. The total land area of

Odessa is 95.5 km (36.9 mi ) and the evacuated area was 72.5 km (28 mi ). The population 2 2 2 2

density of the area during the evacuation was medium. Age was an important factor in the

evacuation because a nursing home with numerous senior citizens had to be evacuated. Odessa

is located over 50 miles away from the nearest commercial nuclear power plant. 

History of Emergencies

Odessa is more prone to both technological hazards and natural disasters than the average U.S.

city because it is located in a tornado-prone area and it is intersected by railroads and major

interstates. The community did have previous experience with the hazard that led to this

evacuation, but it is unknown whether the community had experienced evacuations in the

previous 10 years. 

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.
D-221

Planning

The community had a written emergency plan with an evacuation section that was used in this

emergency. However, it is unknown whether the plan conformed to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP1, Rev. 1.

Training

Training is provided to emergency response personnel, and joint training between industry and

government is regularly conducted.

Drills and Exercises

Odessa’s emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and exercises. It is

unknown whether the emergency plan used in this evacuation was previously tested in a

full-scale field exercise.

Community Awareness

The level of community awareness about local hazards and about the hazard that caused this

emergency was medium. The level of community awareness about evacuation procedures and

about the alerting methods used was low.

THREAT CONDITIONS

The threat condition leading to this evacuation was a chemical spill that resulted in a fire at the

Champion Technologies Inc. Plant near Odessa, Texas, at approximately 4:35 a.m. on August

20, 1992. According to Champion Technologies Inc., lightning had struck a chemical storage

facility where approximately 702 oilfield chemicals were being stored. The chemicals involved

in the fire posed a possible health hazard, specifically respiratory distress and irritation if inhaled

for long periods of time. To further complicate matters, weather conditions, including high

humidity, caused the cloud of smoke to remain low and blow directly over the city. The wind

was blowing to the west at 13 to 16 km/hour (8 to 10 mph), humidity was 100%, and the

temperature was 17.2°C (63°F). Changing wind direction forced the ICP to be moved and

hindered the assessment of the evacuation boundary. There was a thunderstorm earlier that day

but roads were clear and dry during the evacuation.

CONSEQUENCES

As a result of the fire at the Champion Technologies Inc. Plant in Odessa, Texas, 27,000 people

were evacuated from their homes and businesses. Approximately 54 people were treated at

Medical Center Hospital for symptoms, including watering and burning eyes, itching skin, and

difficulty in breathing. Among those treated were several law enforcement officers. All 54

individuals were treated and released and there were no deaths. There were no deaths or injuries

associated with the evacuation. The estimated total costs of evacuation-related expenses

incurred by the public are unknown.
D-222

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

There was an integrated emergency response effort of the local, state, and federal agencies

involved in response to the spill, explosion, and fire at Champion Technologies Inc., and the

level of cooperation was moderate. No political boundaries were crossed. The command,

control, and coordination process could best be described as pre-planned. The decision to

evacuate was made by the Odessa fire chief; there were some problems with the decisionmaking process, and it was determined that a unified command structure was needed. Other

agencies that worked with the jurisdiction during this emergency were the Texas Railroad

commission, Texas Water Commission, Texas Air Control Board, Texas Department of Public

Safety, Southwestern Bell Telephone, and Post-Newsweek Cable. A reported 40 officers from

the Odessa Police Department, 25 officers from the Ector County Sheriff Department and

Reserve Unit, 18 Texas Department of Public Safety Officers, three Ector County Independent

School District personnel, four Adult Probation Officers, seven Midland County Sheriff

Department Officers, and 12 Texas Department of Transportation personnel participated in the

evacuation process. 

Communications

An EOC was used as well as an ICP. Communication between field emergency responders and

the ICP was by radio. There were no problems with the communication and equipment worked

okay; however, the agency coordination could have been better. At the onset of the emergency,

the assistant fire chief had been notified of the severity of the situation and in coordination with

the battalion chief, the EOC was activated. 

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials were notified of the incident by telephone, and emergency responders were

notified of the incident through a 911 call from an employee of Champion Technologies. The

elapsed time between the discovery of the incident and the mobilization of response personnel

was less than 15 minutes. The elapsed time between the discovery of the incident and hazard

and the decision to evacuate was one hour and 20 minutes. It took approximately three and a

half hours to complete the evacuation. The public was notified by sirens, radio and television

broadcasts, and by emergency responders going door to door. There were no problems with

notification of emergency personnel or senior local officials. The evacuation took place all at

once and there were no problems regarding warning and subsequent citizen action. Dispatchers

notified fire department personnel, and fire units were dispatched to the scene of what was then

considered a two-alarm fire. The battalion chief responded to the scene of the fire. After

assessing the scene, other fire department personnel were requested to assist firefighters at the

location. The Odessa Fire Department Hazmat Unit was also dispatched. Law enforcement

officers, aided by volunteers from the public and private sector, notified residents of the need to

leave their homes and businesses based upon information provided by the spotters. After

sounding sirens to awaken the residents, door-to-door contact was made to warn and evacuate

citizens. The broadcast news media and local cable company, in conjunction with reports from
D-223

the public information officer, provided regular updates on the fire situation, areas to be

evacuated and the location of congregate care centers. The excellent news coverage of the

emergency was beneficial to the overall operations and was closely followed by key officials in

the EOC, enabling them to grasp the magnitude of the situation even though they were removed

from the scene.

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were given instructions about where to go to seek congregate care centers and were

given specific routes. Several special institutions were evacuated, including two nursing homes,

two malls, one elementary school, and 550 small businesses. Road conditions before the

evacuation were dry and all major roadways were available to evacuees. There were no special

traffic problems encountered and reverse-laning was not used. Some people spontaneously

evacuated; however, no one refused to evacuate.

Congregate Care Centers

By 7 a.m. the American Red Cross had established congregate care centers at the Odessa High

School Field House and the Odessa College Sports Complex. Approximately 1,000 individuals

(3.7% of evacuees) registered at the congregate care centers. EMS units dispatched to the

Avalon Place Nursing Home assessed the need to send patients directly to Medical Center

Hospital for more specialized care. Transportation buses provided by Ector County included

those equipped for persons with disabilities.

Law Enforcement

Law enforcement personnel from the Odessa Police Department, Ector County Sheriff

Department, and Texas Department of Public Safety were called in for assistance and secured

the area following the evacuation. Aid from law enforcement personnel included securing the

area, traffic control and evacuation of citizens in the threatened area. There were no instances of

looting or vandalism and no problems with law enforcement.

Re-Entry

The evacuation order was lifted at 10:42 a.m.; citizens were allowed to return home and

businesses were allowed to open. The Odessa Fire Chief authorized re-entry. There were no

special controls during the re-entry process. Evacuees were not compensated for their expenses

and there were no problems during re-entry.

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

The success of this emergency response operation with such a massive evacuation was a result of

the tremendous cooperation and expertise of all individuals involved, coupled with pre-planning

and training. Areas of improvement identified by city and county personnel included

communications (phone and radio), notification, public education, equipment, and EOC

arrangement.
D-224

1. Communications – add additional phone lines in the EOC, use cellular phones, use RACES

more, and divert incoming calls to a phone bank to keep from tying up the EOC’s lines.

2. Notification – keep a list in the EOC for first call up and assign non-key personnel to make

contacts, as necessary.

3. Public Education – work with media to teach the public to stay off phones during disaster

except for emergencies and not to contact 911 for informational purposes; have more

programs to educate the public about various types of emergencies and how to react.

4. Equipment – arrange for fax machine in the EOC to send group information to media, etc.;

use governmental access channel for training and to display emergency information updated

from EOC/PIO, arrange for additional phones and radios for EOC.

5. EOC Arrangement – work to decrease noise level in the EOC; rearrange room to maximize

use of space by moving phone bank into the hallway; move key officials into another area.

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Odessa Fire Chief

(915) 335-4650

(Personal Communication, 8/5/03)
D-225

Liquified Chlorine Gas Leak, Henderson, Nevada, May 6, 1991, ID #36

Summary

Rank Value: 44

Number Evacuated: ~7,000

Category: Technological Hazard

Specific Type: Fixed Site Hazmat Incident

Community: Suburban

INTRODUCTION

A massive leak of liquefied chlorine gas created a dangerous cloud over the city of Henderson,

Nevada, May 6, 1991. The leak originated at the Pioneer Chlor Alkali facility located in an

industrial area approximately 10 miles southeast of Las Vegas, Nevada. Pioneer is one of

several chemical and materials processing facilities that are located in the Basic Management

Inc. complex. More than 200 persons were examined at local hospitals, including some

policemen who were exposed to chemicals while managing evacuation activities.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

The city of Henderson, Nevada, is a suburban community with a population of approximately

207,640 people and covers an area of approximately 154 km (96 mi ). Approximately 7,000 2 2

people, or 3%, of the population were evacuated from an area of several square kilometers

during this incident. Ethnicity, nationality, and age were not important factors in the evacuation. 

The city has a mayoral form of government, and the main economic base is tourism. Tourism

attracts a large number of non-residents to the area. The nearest nuclear power plant is more

than 80 km (50 mi) away, and there are no commercial nuclear power plants in Nevada.

History of Emergencies

The community is more prone to hazards than average, and the city has had experience with

chemical leaks from manufacturing plants in the past. Several hazardous material incidents have

occurred in the immediate area, including an explosion of ammonium perchlorate at an adjacent

facility in 1988, which resulted in two deaths and 372 injuries. The community has experienced

large-scale evacuations in the last 10 years; however, it is unknown if the community had

previous experience with the alerting mechanism used during this evacuation. 
D-226

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.

Planning

The community did not have a written emergency plan for use in this emergency. 

Training

The community provides training to emergency response personnel and regularly conducts joint

training between industry and government. Joint training exercises had been conducted with the

Clark County Fire Department HazMat Team and other area fire departments.

Drills and Exercises

The community’s emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and

exercises. 

Community Awareness

The community has a medium level of awareness of the local hazards and a low level of

awareness of evacuations procedures. It has a low level of awareness of hazardous materials in

general, and with the alerting methods used in this evacuation. 

THREAT CONDITIONS

Liquid chlorine is stored in pressure tanks at the facility. A leak was first detected by automatic

monitoring equipment located near the storage tanks at approximately 1:10 a.m. on May 6, 1991. 

Employees responding to the alarm found a pinhole size leak in a pipe. Attempts were made by

plant personnel to stop the flow and patch the leak. Management personnel were notified and

members of the company’s emergency team were called to respond to the plant. Plant

employees were considered to be proficient in handling situations of this type. 

At approximately 1:50 a.m. a citizen notified the Henderson Police Department of a strong

offensive odor near the complex. The call was relayed to the Las Vegas City Fire Department

Communications Center, which provides communications for the Clark County Fire Department. 

Since reports of odors in the area are a frequent occurrence, the Clark County battalion chief was

notified and he made the decision to wait for a more positive report before responding. The

communications personnel began to call the industries in the area to ask if any of them had a

problem.

At approximately 2 a.m., a second call was received and the fire department was dispatched. 

Arriving at the gate of the facility, the Clark County battalion chief found several employees

who had been exposed to chlorine gas and were in need of medical attention. Within a few

minutes, the atmosphere around the plant entrance became enveloped by the chlorine cloud and

most of the plant employees donned their emergency escape respirators. All fire department and
D-227

plant personnel evacuated to a location approximately one half mile from the plant where a

command post was established. 

It was very difficult to accurately predict the size or travel of the gas cloud resulting from the

vaporization of the liquid pool on the ground. The flow rate of the leak could not be determined,

and the size of the resulting liquid pool could not be observed. The developing cloud could not

be visually monitored because of the darkness and the location of the problem within the facility.

Weather conditions were clear and dry and the roads were dry.

CONSEQUENCES

The chlorine gas created a dangerous cloud of poison over the city of Henderson, Nevada,

May 6, 1991. The leak originated at the Pioneer Chlor Alkali facility in an industrial area where

several chemical and materials processing facilities are located. All of the adjacent industrial

facilities were shut down and evacuated except one critical facility where employees donned

self-contained breathing apparatus and continued working. 

At approximately 3:30 a.m. conditions began to deteriorate rapidly. The command post and

staging area were suddenly enveloped by the gas and had to be evacuated. The command post

was relocated first to a convenience market parking lot, which also became unacceptable, and

then to a race track parking lot several miles from the facility. Reports of strong odors in the

residential areas and downtown portions of Henderson caused the IC to begin evacuations of

residents. At approximately 3:45 a.m. a state of emergency was declared by the County

Manager and the Clark County Emergency Operations Center was activated. 

Approximately 7,000 people were evacuated from their businesses and residences. More than

200 persons were examined at local hospitals, including some policemen who were exposed to

chemicals while managing evacuation activities. There were no fatalities from the incident or

the evacuation. The estimated total cost of the evacuation-related expenses is unknown.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation between local, state, and federal agencies was high, and political

boundaries of the city and county were crossed in this event. The command, control, and

coordination processes could best be described as ad hoc. The decision to evacuate was made by

the Battalion Chief for Clark County, and there were no problems with the decision-making

process. 

Communications

An EOC and an ICP were used in this emergency. The EOC was activated at 3:45 a.m. when the

County Manager declared a state of emergency. The field ICP was relocated three times during
D-228

the emergency. Communication between field emergency responders and the ICP was by radio

and cell phone. There were problems with communications during the event: the agencies and

jurisdictions involved used a variety of radio systems and frequencies. This problem was

somewhat resolved through the use of cell phones to supplement the radio communications.

Notification and Warning

It is unknown how senior local officials were notified of the incident. Emergency responders

were notified through the 911 phone system. There was a delay in the notification of emergency

personnel while the battalion chief waited for a more positive report. There were no problems

notifying senior local officials. The elapsed time between discovery of the incident and

mobilization of response personnel was approximately 50 minutes and the initial decision to

evacuate was made approximately four hours after the start of the incident. It took

approximately four hours to complete the evacuation, which started with the surrounding

industrial facilities and expanded to approximately 7,000 people. 

The public was notified by use of a PA system and by police going door to door. The evacuation

was completed all at once. It is unknown if some people evacuated prior to being told to do so,

and no one refused to evacuate. 

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were given instructions on where to go and were told which routes to use. These

routes were designated by police road blocks. There was one special institution evacuated and

this was a retirement home in the direct path of the gas cloud. Additionally, the St. Rose

Dominican Hospital in downtown Henderson was located within the affected area. A decision

was made to leave the patients in the building with the air handling system set to recirculate the

interior air. This was determined to be preferable to risking moving the patients outside into the

contaminated atmosphere. Road conditions during the evacuation were dry, and no traffic

accidents or traffic-related problems occurred during the event. Reverse-laning was not used.

Congregate Care Centers

Congregate care centers were established at local schools and hotels in Las Vegas for this

emergency and were managed by the Red Cross. The Clark County School District made school

buses available to the Fire Department and 50 off-duty firefighters were called in to drive them. 

Each bus driver was provided with an SCBA, in case a contaminated area was encountered, and

two teams were made up of full crews of SCBA-equipped firefighters standing by to take buses

into the contaminated areas to rescue residents in immediate danger. Police officers were

assigned to notify residents in the predicted path of the cloud, while firefighters were assigned to

areas where the presence of chlorine could be detected. Approximately 700 people, or 10% of

those evacuated, went to the congregate care centers. There were shadow evacuations; however,

this did not have an impact on congregate care center capacity or the evacuation.
D-229

Law Enforcement

Police secured the area following the evacuation, and there were no instances of looting or

vandalism or any problems with law enforcement. 

Re-Entry

Re-entry was authorized as a joint decision between the Las Vegas, County, and Henderson

Unified Command. The re-entry was controlled and no problems were encountered. Evacuees

were not compensated for their expenses.

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

The unified command working together contributed to the success of this evacuation. One

problem was there were no qualified personnel to drive the evacuation buses.

Additional lessons learned include:

• The problems associated with a high-risk occupancy in one jurisdiction creating a problem in

a different jurisdiction present obvious challenges for emergency planning response

agencies. In this case the responding agencies worked well together, but the deficiencies of

the regulatory and planning processes were a major focus of attention after the incident.

• The Incident Command System proved to be extremely effective in this incident, particularly

in coordinating the efforts of several different agencies at the scene. The ability to assign

major responsibilities to command officers from different fire departments, without any

problems, is evidence that the personnel are trained and prepared to operate effectively.

• The lack of effective radio communications among agencies was a problem in this incident. 

Cell phones were used effectively to supplement public safety radio capabilities and proved

reliable. Had the system become overloaded with calls during the incident, Centel Cellular

would have blocked off communications, allowing only emergency personnel phones to

work.

• Making the decision of whether to evacuate residents or warn them to remain indoors with

windows and outside air inlets closed is critical. The risk of exposure during evacuation may

be greater than the risk of staying indoors.

• The use of buses operated by fire department personnel is a practical means to evacuate. It is

easier to train fire fighters to drive buses than to train bus drivers to use SCBA.

• Police officers who were not provided with or trained to use SCBA were effective in

evacuating areas ahead of the contamination, but could not function in contaminated areas. 

Several police officers who were assigned traffic control or to assist with the evacuation

were exposed to chlorine and transported themselves to medical facilities for evaluation.
D-230

• It proved to be extremely difficult to determine the size, shape, and movement of the chlorine

cloud. Helicopter observation was a valuable asset, particularly with increasing daylight. 

An attempt was made to predict dispersion of the chlorine using CAMEO (a computer code)

but complicated factors of terrain, slope, temperature, wind velocity, humidity and unknown

rate of release made predictions extremely difficult.

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Henderson Fire Chief

(702) 565-2436

(Personal Communication, 7/21/03)

Clark County Deputy Chief

(702) 455-7311

(Personal Communication, 7/21/03)

References

Routley, J. G. “Massive Leak of Liquefied Chlorine Gas, Henderson, Nevada,” May 6, 1991;

Federal Emergency Management Agency Report.
D-231

Railroad Accident, Shepherdsville, Kentucky, November 19, 1991, ID #92

Summary

Rank Value: 42

Number Evacuated: 1,000

Category: Technological Hazard

Specific Type: Railroad Accident

Community: Urban

INTRODUCTION

A freight train derailment sent 14 cars, including one carrying explosive chemicals and one

carrying cluster bombs, plunging off a railroad bridge just after noon on November 19, 1991 on

the main rail line between Louisville and Nashville. Approximately 1,000 people in downtown

Shepherdsville, Kentucky, plus homes and businesses within 1.6 km (1 mi) of the wreck were

evacuated. The evacuation included four schools and the Bullitt County Jail. The derailment

was caused by a garbage truck that struck part of the bridge moments before the train passed. 

The governor declared the site a disaster area, which allowed use of National Guard personnel

and equipment to handle the emergency. 

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

Shepherdsville Kentucky, is an urban community with a population of approximately 8,334

people and covers an area of 27.9 km (10.8 mi ). Approximately 1,000 people, or 12%, of the 2 2

population were evacuated from a 7.68 km (3 mi ) area during this incident. The land use in the 2 2

area is mainly residential, commercial and industrial, and the population density of the area was

high at the time of the evacuation. Ethnicity, nationality, and age were not important factors in

the evacuation. 

The city has a mayoral form of government, and the main economic base is commercial activity. 

There are no special characteristics that attract large numbers of visitors to the area. The nearest

nuclear power plant is more than 80 km (50 mi) away. Kentucky has no nuclear power plants. 

History of Emergencies

The community is more prone to hazards than average but has not had experience with this type

of emergency in the past. The community has not experienced large-scale evacuations in the last

10 years and had no previous experience with the alerting mechanisms used in this emergency.

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.
D-232

Planning

The community has a written emergency plan with an evacuation section that was used in this

emergency. It is unknown if the plan conformed to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, or if

there was an ETE in the plan.

Training

The community provides training to emergency response personnel and regularly conducts joint

training between industry and government.

Drills and Exercises

The community’s emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and

exercises. The emergency plan used in this evacuation was not previously tested in full-scale

field exercises. 

Community Awareness

The community has a low level of awareness of the local hazards and a low level of awareness of

evacuations procedures. It also had a low level of awareness of the hazards in this incident,

including hazardous materials and cluster bombs in general, and a medium awareness of the

alerting methods used in this evacuation. 

THREAT CONDITIONS

On November 19, 1991, a garbage truck struck a trestle leading to a bridge causing the tracks to

move 30 cm (12 in) laterally and 10 cm (4 in) vertically. A freight train crossing the bridge

derailed sending fourteen cars plunging off a railroad bridge just after noon. A total of 28 cars

derailed. One of the cars that derailed, but did not go over the bridge carried 4,100 kg (9,000 lb)

of explosives, including 90 cluster bombs. Of the 14 cars that fell over the bridge, one

containing corn syrup and one containing construction materials caught fire.

The 89-car train was passing over the Salt River about 32 km (20 mi) from Louisville just after

noon at about the same time the truck struck the bridge. The accident occurred on the main rail

line between Louisville and Nashville. The weather was wet and the roads were wet.

CONSEQUENCES

Approximately 1,000 people in downtown Shepherdsville, Kentucky, plus homes and businesses

within 1.6 km (1 mi) of the wreck were evacuated as a result of the accident. Some of the cars

contained chemicals and explosives, prompting officials to evacuate the area. Additionally,

some of the cars, not near the explosives, caught fire. The evacuation included four schools and

the Bullitt County Jail. The governor declared the site a disaster area, which allowed use of

National Guard personnel and equipment to handle the emergency.
D-233

There were no fatalities from the incident, but four firefighters became ill and had to be taken to

the hospital. No injuries were reported during the evacuation. The estimated total cost of the

evacuation-related expenses is unknown.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies was high, and political

boundaries were crossed in this event. The command, control, and coordination processes could

best be described as pre-planned. The decision to evacuate was made by the fire chief, and there

were no problems with the decision-making process. 

Communications

An EOC was used in this event and an ICP was established. Communication between field

emergency responders and the ICP was primarily by radio. There were problems with

communications during the event; different frequencies were being used by different agencies.

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials were notified of the incident by telephone. The emergency responders

were notified through a fire lieutenant who saw the accident. There were no problems with the

notification of emergency personnel or senior local officials. The elapsed time between

discovery of the incident and mobilization of response personnel was less than 15 minutes, and

the initial decision to evacuate was made approximately 10 minutes after notification of the

incident. It took approximately 8 hours to complete the evacuation. 

Evacuees were notified by radio and television broadcast and directly by the police using a PA

system. The evacuation was staged; as information became available on the contents of the

railcars, additional areas were evacuated. There were no problems with warning and subsequent

citizen action. No one refused to evacuate. 

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were given instructions on where to go and were told to use specific routes. Police

roadblocks and traffic control were used to direct traffic. A number of special institutions were

evacuated, including the Bullitt County Jail, four schools, a day care facility, and City Hall. 

Road conditions during the evacuation were wet but no traffic accidents or traffic-related

problems occurred during the event. State Highway 61 was closed because of the incident but

this did not create problems. Reverse-laning was not used.

Congregate Care Centers

Congregate care centers were established at local schools and public buildings for this

emergency and were managed by the Red Cross. Approximately 200 evacuees, or 20%, went to

the congregate care centers while the remaining evacuees went to friends or relatives. There

were no shadow evacuations. 
D-234

Law Enforcement

State and county police secured the area following the evacuation and there were no instances of

looting or vandalism or any problems with law enforcement. 

Re-Entry

Re-entry was authorized by the Kentucky Division of Disaster and there were no special controls

during the re-entry process. Evacuees were not compensated for their expenses. There were no

problems reported during re-entry.

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

Cooperation of the residents in this event was likely enhanced because of the unknown potential

consequences and this cooperation contributed to the success of this evacuation. Improvements

could be made in communications with various agencies, and communication equipment such as

additional and standard frequencies are needed. Lessons learned included the importance of

agency cooperation.

CONTACT INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Shepherdsville Fire Chief

(502) 543-6833

(Personal Communication, 8/6/03)

References

Gibson, A. “Train Plunges off Bridge South of Louisville.” Associated Press. November 20,

1991.

Schreiner, B. “Crews Remove Cluster Bombs from Site of Derailed Train.” Associated Press. 

November 21, 1991.

“Train Carrying Chemicals, Bombs, Plunges off Bridge.” Associated Press. November 20,

1991. 
D-235

Rodeo-Chediski Fire, Show Low, Arizona, June 18, 2002, ID #116

Summary

Rank Value: 42

Number Evacuated: 20,000 

Category: Natural Disaster

Specific Type: Wildfire

Community: Rural

INTRODUCTION

The Rodeo-Chediski Fire in Show Low, Arizona, began as two separate fires. The Rodeo Fire,

which was started on June 18, 2002, combined with the Chediski Fire on June 23, 2002, and was

finally contained on July 7, 2002. The combined fire forced the evacuation of approximately

20,000 people.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

Show Low is a rural town in east central Arizona. For the majority of the year, it has a total

population of 7,695 people and the population increases to around 20,000 people during the

summer season. Approximately 20,000 residents (100% of the population) were evacuated after

a wildfire approached the town. Land use in the area was primarily residential and commercial. 

The total area of Show Low and the evacuated area is 72.3 km (27.9 mi ). The population 2 2

density of the area during the evacuation was low. Ethnicity, nationality, and age were not

important factors in this evacuation.

Show Low has a council/manager form of government and its main economic base is tourism,

which attracts a large number of non-residents, and retail. The community is located more than

50 miles away from the nearest commercial nuclear power plant. 

History of Emergencies

Show Low is more prone to natural disasters and technological hazards than the average U.S.

community. The community has had previous experience with hazardous material spills, floods,

earthquakes and the hazard that led to this evacuation. The community had not experienced

evacuations in the previous ten years or had previous experiences with the alerting mechanism

used in this evacuation.

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.
D-236

Planning

The community had a written emergency plan with an evacuation section that was used in this

emergency. The plan did not conform to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, and it is

unknown if the plan contained an ETE.

Training

Training is provided to emergency response personnel, and joint training between industry and

government is regularly conducted.

Drills and Exercises

Show Low’s emergency response agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and exercises. 

The emergency plan used in this evacuation was not previously tested in a full-scale field

exercise.

Community Awareness

The level of community awareness of local hazards was medium and the level of community

awareness of evacuation processes was high. The level of community awareness about the

hazard that caused the evacuation and the alerting methods used was high. 

THREAT CONDITIONS

The Rodeo-Chediski fire burned in east-central Arizona from June 18, 2002, and was not

controlled until July 7. It was the worst fire in Arizona to date, consuming 467,066 acres of

woodland. Initially there were two separate fires. The first fire, the Rodeo Fire, was reported on

the afternoon of June 18 near the Rodeo Fairground on the Fort Apache Reservation. An

arsonist was arrested on June 29 and was later charged. By early evening, despite the efforts of

fire crews, approximately 1,200 acres were ablaze. Increasing wind speeds fed the fire to more

than 2,000 acres by the following morning and when wind speeds increased to around 25 mph,

the fire grew rapidly, increasing fourfold over the next three hours. By June 21, the Rodeo fire

had consumed approximately150,000 acres. 

The Chediski fire, which was first reported on the morning of June 20 near Chediski Peak, had

been started by a lost hiker who was later arrested and charged. Again fed by strong winds, it

had spread to 2,000 acres by mid-afternoon, and by the following morning it covered more than

14,000 acres.

Show Low was evacuated in the early evening. Weather conditions were very warm and the

skies were smoky. No unusual circumstances occurred other than the hazard itself. 

CONSEQUENCES

On June 18, 2002, 20,000 residents were evacuated from their homes and businesses and were

able to return home on July 7, 2002. No deaths or injuries were associated with the incident or
D-237

the evacuation. The total cost of evacuation-related expenses and property damages incurred by

the public is unknown.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies was high. County and federal

political boundaries were crossed. The command, control, and coordination process could best

be described as ad hoc. The decision to evacuate was made by a unified command, and there

were no problems with the decision making process.

Communication

An EOC was used along with an ICP. Communication between field emergency responders and

EOC was by radio, telephone, and runners. There were no problems with communication.

Notification and Warning

Senior local officials were notified of the incident through paging and visual observations of the

fire. Emergency responders were notified of the incident through government channels. The

elapsed time between the discovery of the incident and the mobilization of response personnel

was approximately 18 hours. The elapsed time between the start of the hazard and the decision

to evacuate was three days. It took four hours to complete the evacuation, and there were no

problems with notification of emergency personnel or senior local officials. The public was

notified by radio and television broadcasts, PA systems, and emergency responders going door

to door. The evacuation took place all at once, and there were no special problems regarding

warning and subsequent citizen action. 

Traffic Movement and Control

Evacuees were given specific instructions about where to go when they evacuated and specific

routes to use. One hospital and two nursing homes had to be evacuated. Road conditions before

the evacuation were dry, and all major roadways were available to evacuees. There were no

traffic accidents during the evacuation and reverse laning was used. Some people spontaneously

evacuated before being told to do so, and others refused to evacuate.

Congregate Care Centers

The American Red Cross set up congregate care centers at various schools; approximately 8,000

people (approximately 40%) of the evacuees showed up. There were shadow evacuations but

they did not impact traffic or congregate care center capacity.

Law Enforcement

The National Guard secured the area following the evacuation and no instances of looting or

vandalism, occurred, nor were there any problems with law enforcement. A small army of law

enforcement officers and National Guard troops patrolled the evacuated area to prevent looting

and vandalism. Roughly 100 Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office posse members and 130 Arizona
D-238

Army National Guardsmen were among the 500 extras called in to help the Navajo County

Sheriff’s Department keep order in and around Show Low.

Re-Entry

On July 7, 2002, nineteen days since the start of the emergency, the unified command authorized

re-entry and allowed evacuees to return to their homes. No special controls were used during the

re-entry process. No major problems occurred during re-entry. Evacuees were compensated for

their expenses.

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

According to the Show Low fire chief, the public’s pre-education about evacuations and fire

hazards contributed to the success of the evacuation. However, the evacuation was difficult

because some people did not have local television stations and were not notified of the

evacuation. What to do with evacuees’ animals and livestock was also a problem.

CONTACT INFORMATION

Contacts

Show Low Fire Chief

(928) 537-5100

(Personal Communication, 8/22/03)

References

<http://www.wikipedia.org/w/wiki.phtml?title=Show_Low%2C_Arizona&printable=yes>
D-239

Biscuit Fire, Cave Junction, Oregon, July 13, 2002, ID #133

Summary

Rank Value: 33

Number Evacuated: 1,000

Category: Natural Disaster

Specific Type: Wildfire

Community: Rural

INTRODUCTION

The Biscuit Fire started July 13, 2002, from a lightning strike approximately 8 km (5 mi) west of

Selma, Oregon, in the Siskiyou National Forest within the Kalmiopsis Wilderness. The fire

continued burning through July and August of 2002, burning over 2,000 km (500,000 acres). 

2

The fire had a 332 km (206 mi) perimeter and encompassed two regions, two national forests,

five ranger districts, and many cooperating agencies. The vegetation, terrain, fire behavior,

environmental factors, public concern and duration of this event made it an extremely complex

operation. The Shelley Creek Fire, Sour Biscuit Fire and Florence Fire all combined in early

August, and the fire was renamed the Biscuit Fire. During the fire, many towns and

communities were placed on evacuation notice and ultimately more than 1,000 people were

evacuated from their homes. The path of the fire provided opportunities for fire officials to

provide early evacuation warning to residents, which contributed to the smooth evacuation

process in the areas affected.

COMMUNITY CONTEXT

General

On July 13, 2002, a lightning strike caused a fire approximately 8 km (5 mi) west of Selma,

Oregon, near the town of Cave Junction. The size of Cave Junction is 4.2 km (1.6 mi ) with a 2 2

population of 1,363 residents in the town and an additional 15,000 rural residents in the area, for

a total population in the area of almost 17,000 people. The area is frequented by vacationers in

the summer, and the population density during the evacuation was medium.

As the fire grew, the entire town of Cave Junction was put on 24-hour evacuation notice. The

Biscuit fire evacuations totaled more than 1,000 people spread over a number of communities. 

The Red Cross registered 950 people evacuating Cave Junction, which represents approximately

70% of the population. Cave Junction is a small town run by a mayor. It is the gateway to the

Oregon Caves National Monument and is the commercial, service, and cultural center for a rural

community of small farms, woodlots, and crafts people. The valley is in the basin of the Illinois

River Valley and its tributaries and includes a number of small communities, all of which were

impacted during the Biscuit Fire. The nearest commercial nuclear plant, the Columbia

Generating Station, is located in Richland, Washington, more than 80 km (50 mi) from the fire. 
D-240

The evacuations did not impact operations and did not enter the emergency planning zone (EPZ)

of the reactor.

History of Emergencies

The Cave Junction area, including Gasquet, California, is more prone to natural disasters than

the average community. The area has been identified as being at risk from previous wildfires,

including the 1987 Silver Fire. Beginning in the spring of 1996 when the Gasquet Shaded Fuel

break was burned, work began to reduce fuels to protect this community. The reduction in fuels

proved to be critical when, in September 1996, the Panther Fire threatened Gasquet. The Panther

Fire almost forced an evacuation of the community. 

Additional hazards included flooding in 1997. After the floods, the Rogue Valley Interfaith

Relief Network was established to support emergency responders in a variety of ways. 

Emergency Preparedness

The community’s emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, drills and

exercises, and community awareness as described below.

Planning

An evacuation plan was available and was used in this event. The recommendation for

evacuations is a joint responsibility of the fire-fighting organization and local officials. The

incident commander manages the fire and gives recommendations to local law enforcement

officials, the Josephine County sheriff. The sheriff then initiates the evacuation. 

These evacuations covered multiple communities. To address the public concern and provide

up-to-date information, many community meetings were held with the local, state, and federal

officials. Residents were urged to listen to the radio and television for current updates on the

evacuation status, and were requested to be ready to leave within 30 minutes upon notification of

an evacuation. This is in effect an evacuation time estimate and there were no reports of

individuals not evacuating within the allotted time. The evacuation plan was specific to the fire

and likely did not meet the requirements of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1.

Training

The sheriff’s office coordinates the evacuations and personnel receive emergency response

training. The Rogue Valley Interfaith Relief Network was established to support emergency

responders. The volunteers are members of regional churches; they go through extensive

training to support the response and evacuation efforts.

Drills and Exercises

If drills or exercises were conducted, they were not reported.
D-241

Community Awareness

The Cave Junction area is a community that was known to be at risk of forest fire, and

community awareness was high. Videos were distributed and public meetings had been held to

persuade owners to thin trees and replace roofs with non-burning materials. Grants were

available to help defer some of the costs. 

THREAT CONDITIONS

What ultimately became known as the Biscuit fire started on July 13, 2002, with a lightning

strike approximately 8 km (5 mi) west of Selma, Oregon, in the Siskiyou National Forest within

the Kalmiopsis Wilderness. The Sour Biscuit fire spread and eventually combined with the

Shelley Creek Fire and Florence Fire and was renamed the Biscuit Fire. The fire was one of the

largest in Oregon history, burning over 2,000 km (500,000 acres). Throughout most of the 2

event, the weather was hot, dry, and windy. Roads were clear and dry, but many local roads,

including Rowdy Creek Road, Low Divide Road and others were either closed or open only to

residents. In addition, Highway 199 was closed because of the fire.

CONSEQUENCES

The Biscuit Fire, which started from a lightning strike on July 13, 2002, was one of the largest in

Oregon history, burning more than 2,000 km (500,000 acres), and having a 332 km (206 mi)

2

perimeter and a 48 km (30 mi) front. The changing winds and hot weather made fighting the fire

difficult and kept the surrounding communities on evacuation alert. Many communities were

partially evacuated, including Cave Junction, Oak Flat, Gasquet, Low Divide, and Rowdy Creek. 

As a result of the fire, more than 1,000 people were evacuated. In addition, three homes were

destroyed in California, two homes were destroyed in Oak Flat, Oregon, and eight buildings at

the McCaleb Boy Scout Ranch were destroyed. At least four firefighters were injured in

accidents. 

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The level of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies was high. Some of the local,

state and federal agencies involved in this emergency included the Jackson County sheriff,

Josephine County sheriff, Oregon State fire marshal, Oregon National Guard, Illinois Valley Fire

District, U.S. Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, and firefighters from Canada,

Australia, and New Zealand. 

The fire crossed multiple political boundaries, including city, county, and state borders and was

managed by the Southwest Oregon National Interagency Area Command Team from a center in

Medford, Oregon. The fire was divided into four administrative zones that were managed by

separate Incident Management Teams. The decisions to evacuate were made by the local sheriff

after receipt of information from the incident commanders that the fires had crossed trigger lines.
D-242

Communications

The command, control and coordination processes could best be described as pre-planned. 

EOCs were established in accordance with emergency plans. The fire was divided into four

administrative zones that were managed by separate Incident Management Teams. The teams

closely coordinated their activities to construct fire lines, conduct burn-out operations and

protect rural communities. Zone 1 had a command center in Lake Selmac, Oregon. Zone 2

managed the southern portion of the fire in northern California from a command center in

Crescent City, California. Zone 3 managed the southwestern flank of the fire with a command

center east of Brookings, Oregon. Zone 4 managed the northwestern portion of the fire from a

command center in Gold Beach, Oregon. Radio was the primary means of communication. 

Notification and Warning

There was considerable time between the start of the fire on July 13 and the initiation of

evacuations, most of which occurred in August. As the fire grew and encroached upon the

communities, the sheriff and fire officials maintained frequent communication with local

officials. During this time, the sheriff and fire officials also notified the public of the current

state of the fire through community meetings. The local television and radio stations were also

used to keep the public posted on the evacuation notices. In some instances firefighters went

door-to-door.

Most communities were provided 24-hour notice, followed by an eight-hour notice and

sometimes as short as a one-hour notice. These evacuation notices notified residents that an

evacuation order could come within the specified period. Residents should be prepared to leave

within 30 minutes if an evacuation order was issued. There was some confusion during a public

meeting in Gasquet at the American Legion Hall on August 5. The sheriff, federal and local fire

officials notified the public that the fire had crossed a trigger point and that the residents should

be on a one-hour evacuation notice alert. However, many residents understood this to mean they

should evacuate. The following evening, the sheriff clarified the statement through the media

that an evacuation order was not in place, only an evacuation notice. This likely resulted in

shadow evacuations; however, the number of residents leaving was not identified. 

The time to complete the evacuation was generally within the time allotted for the specified

evacuation. There were no reports of evacuation notices not providing sufficient time to leave.

The Rogue Valley Interfaith Relief Network supported the communication link by answering

telephones for residents calling and requesting the status of the fire and the current evacuation

plans, including which roadways were open and directions to go in the event of an evacuation. 

There were no problems with notification of either local officials or responders. There were no

special problems with warning the public, although many of the affected residents refused to

leave. Many had built their homes and were not going to leave them unprotected. 
D-243

Traffic Movement and Control

Throughout the incident, roads were clear and dry. Highway 199 was the largest road impacted;

it was closed early on in the incident. Many local roads, including Rowdy Creek Road, Low

Divide Road, and others were either closed or open only to residents. Evacuation routes were

established by road closure barricades and reinforced by sheriff’s deputies providing information

to the residents as they were ordered to evacuate. The McCaleb Boy Scout Ranch was evacuated

and there were no reports of problems with this evacuation. There were also no reports of traffic

accidents occurring during the evacuations. 

Congregate Care Centers

The American Red Cross established a number of evacuation congregate care centers throughout

the event. Congregate care centers were set up at Crescent Elk School in Gasquet, Riley Creek

School in Gold Beach, and Grants Pass South Middle School. In addition, the Seventh Day

Adventist Churches in the Cave Junction area opened their facilities to evacuees who needed

shelter. 

The Red Cross reported 950 people registered as having left Cave Junction. They also reported

53 people staying at the Grants Pass South Middle School on August 2. In addition, the Red

Cross reported that people were staying at motels, with friends, or at campsites until the

evacuation notices were lifted. There were no reports on the number of people staying at the

remaining congregate care centers or at the Seventh Day Adventist facilities. The Red Cross

also made arrangement for pets and livestock, but there were no reports on numbers of animals

sheltered.

Law Enforcement 

The evacuated areas were secured by barricades set up by the Sheriff’s departments. There were

no reported instances of looting or vandalism or any problems identified with law enforcement.

Re-Entry 

The sheriff generally authorized re-entry for each of the evacuated areas. Information was

conveyed to the public through the media that it was safe to return home. Public meetings were

held frequently to update the populace on evacuation conditions. Evacuees were not

compensated for their expenses, and there were no reports on the total cost of the evacuations.

INVESTIGATOR COMMENTS

The considerable time between the start of the fire and the initiation of evacuations was

important for the success of these evacuations. Communication between officials and residents

through town meetings and use of the media kept the public very aware of the threat and

provided the current status of potential evacuations at frequent intervals, which contributed to

the success of this event.
D-244

REFERENCES

References

Biscuit Fire Chronology

<http://www.biscuitfire.com/pdf/chron-july-ext-attack.pdf> (June 2003).

CBS News. “Oregon’s 30 mile wall of flames.” August 4, 2002.

<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/08/01/national/main517254.shtml> (June 2003).

CBS News. “Oregon Valley gets reprieve from fire.” August 2, 2002. 

<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/08/05/national/main517525.shtml> (June 2003).

City of Ashland, Oregon. “Ashland City News: August 21 Biscuit Fire Update.” August 21,

2002. <http://www.ashland.or.us/newsresults.asp?NewsID=859> (June 2003).

CNN. “Fireline last defense from Oregon wildfire.” July 31, 2002. 

<http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/07/31/oregon.fires/> (June 2003).

Disaster News Network. “Fire crews make progress.” August 4, 2002. 

<http://www.disasternews.net/news/news.php?articleid=1510> (June 2003).

Disaster Response. “17000 on edge in Oregon.” August 1, 2002. 

<http://www.ucc.org/disaster/d080102.htm> (June 2003).

Emergency Services Information Site. “Firefighters injured when engine rolls.” August 16,

2002. <http://www.withthecommand.com/2002-Aug/OR-engineroll.html> (June 2003).

National Incident Team. “Florence Fire Information Update.” August 3, 2002. 

<http://www.pnw-team2.com/florence/fireupdates/PNWT2_fireupdate_080302am.pdf> (June

2003).

National Water Resources Association. “NWRA Weekly Report.” July 3, 2002. 

<http://www.nwra.org/article.cfm?nwranewsid=1080> (June 2003).

Rogue Basin Restoration. “Pool Reflections.” Winter, 2003. 

<http://216.239.41.104/search?q=cache:UKvOkuF4TloJ:www.restoretherogue.org/newsletter/po

ol_reflections7.pdf+McCaleb+ranch+evacuation+&hl=en&ie=UTF-8> (June 2003).

Seattle Post-Intelligencer. “Weather works in favor of crews.” August 2, 2002. 

<http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/81086_fire02.shtml> (June 2003).
D-245

The Olympian. “Fire fighters use backfires in effort.” August 17, 2002. 

<http://www.theolympian.com/home/specialsections/Outdoors/20020817/33305.shtml> (June

2003).

USDA Forest Service. “Biscuit Fire Complex News Release.” July 26, 2002. 

<http://www.fs.fed.us/r6/rogue/media020726.htm> (June 2003).

USDA Forest Service. “Incident Information.” July 24, 2002. 

<http://www.fs.fed.us/r5/sixrivers/fire/2002/biscuit/> (June 2003).

USDA Forest Service. “Sour Biscuit News Release.” July 30, 2002. 

<http://www.fs.fed.us/r5/sixrivers/fire/2002/shelly/news/7-30.html> (June 2003).
D-246
E-1

APPENDIX E

EVACUATION FREQUENCY ANALYSIS
E-2
E-3

CONTENTS

Introduction ................................................................ E-7

Table E-1 Overall Efficiency Score .......................................... E-8

Table E-2 Evacuation Efficiency Score ....................................... E-8

Table E-3 Community .................................................... E-8

Table E-4 Population ..................................................... E-9

Table E-5 Number of Evacuees ............................................. E-9

Table E-6 Percent Evacuated .............................................. E-10

Table E-7 Population Density During Evacuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-10

Table E-8 Community Area in km .........................................

2 E-10

Table E-9 Evacuation Area in km ..........................................

2 E-11

Table E-10 Was Ethnicity, Nationality, or Age Important? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-11

Table E-11 Land Uses in Evacuation Area ..................................... E-12

Table E-12 Type of Community ............................................. E-12

Table E-13 Form of Government ............................................ E-13

Table E-14 Community’s Main Economic Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-13

Table E-15 Any Special Characteristics? ...................................... E-14

Table E-16 Proximity to a Commercial Nuclear Power Plant (km) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-14

Table E-17 Is the Community Located in a State that Contains a Nuclear Power Plant? . E-14

Table E-18 Is the Area More Prone to Hazard than Average? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-14

Table E-19 Has the Community had any Experience with the Hazard? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-15

Table E-20 Has the Community Experienced Evacuations in the Previous Ten Years? . . E-15

Table E-21 Has the Community had any Previous Experience with the Alerting 

Mechanism? ................................................... E-15

Table E-22 Did the Community have a Written Emergency Plan? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-16

Table E-23 Did the Emergency Plan Contain an Evacuation Section? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-16

Table E-24 Was the Plan Used in This Emergency? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-16

Table E-25 Did the Plan Conform to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev_ 1? . . . . . . . . . E-17

Table E-26 Was there an Evacuation Time Estimate (ETE) in the Plan? . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-17

Table E-27 How Did the Actual Evacuation Time Compare to the ETE? . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-17

Table E-28 Is Training Provided to Emergency Response Personnel? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-18

Table E-29 Is Joint Training Between Industry and Government Regularly Conducted? . E-18

Table E-30 Do the Community's Emergency Response Agencies Regularly Conduct 

Emergency Drills and Exercises? .................................. E-18

Table E-31 Was the Emergency Plan Used in this Evacuation Previously Tested in a 

Full-scale Field Exercise? ........................................ E-19

Table E-32 If So, What Type of Exercise was Performed Immediately Prior to this

Evacuation? ................................................... E-19

Table E-33 Hazard that Led to Evacuation ..................................... E-20

Table E-34 Time of Day ................................................... E-20

Table E-35 Road Conditions/Weather Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-20
E-4

Table E-36 Other Unusual Circumstances ..................................... E-21

Table E-37 Number of Deaths Caused by the Hazard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-21

Table E-38 Number of Injuries Caused by the Hazard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-21

Table E-39 Number of Deaths Caused by the Evacuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-22

Table E-40 Number of Injuries Caused by the Evacuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-22

Table E-41 Estimated Total Cost of Evacuation Related Expenses and Property 

Damages ...................................................... E-22

Table E-42 Were Political Boundaries Crossed (i.e., more than one county or state 

involved)? .................................................... E-23

Table E-43 Command, Control and Coordination Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-23

Table E-44 Did the Mayor Participate in the Decision to Evacuate? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-23

Table E-45 Did the Fire Chief Participate in the Decision to Evacuate? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-23

Table E-46 Did the Police Chief Participate in the Decision to Evacuate? . . . . . . . . . . . . E-24

Table E-47 Did Emergency Managers Participate in the Decision to Evacuate? . . . . . . . . E-24

Table E-48 Did the Governor Participate in the Decision to Evacuate? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-24

Table E-49 Did Others Participate in the Decision to Evacuate? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-24

Table E-50 Did Multiple People Participate in the Decision to Evacuate? . . . . . . . . . . . . E-25

Table E-51 Were there Issues with the Decision Making Process? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-25

Table E-52 Was an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Used? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-25

Table E-53 Was a Field (Incident) Command Post Used? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-25

Table E-54 Was Communication Between Field Emergency Responders and EOC 

by Radio? ..................................................... E-26

Table E-55 Was Communication Between Field Emergency Responders and EOC 

by Telephone? ................................................. E-26

Table E-56 Was Communication Between Field Emergency Responders and EOC 

by Cell Phone? ................................................. E-26

Table E-57 Was Communication Between Field Emergency Responders and EOC 

by Pager? ..................................................... E-26

Table E-58 Was Communication Between Field Emergency Responders and EOC 

by Multiple Methods? ........................................... E-27

Table E-59 Were there Issues with Communications? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-27

Table E-60 How Were Senior Local Officials Notified of the Incident? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-28

Table E-61 How Were Emergency Responders Notified of the Incident? . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-29

Table E-62 ET Between Discovery of the Incident and Mobilization (Minutes) . . . . . . . . E-29

Table E-63 Elapsed Time Between Start of Hazard and Decision to Evacuate (Hours) . . E-30

Table E-64 Time to Complete the Evacuation (Hours) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-31

Table E-65 Were there Issues with Notification of Emergency Personnel or Senior Local 

Officials? ..................................................... E-32

Table E-66 Was the Public Notified by a Siren? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-32

Table E-67 Was the Public Notified by Telephone? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-32

Table E-68 Was the Public Notified by Radio/TV? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-33

Table E-69 Was the Public Notified by an Emergency Broadcast System? . . . . . . . . . . . . E-33
E-5

Table E-70 Was the Public Notified by a PA System? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-33

Table E-71 Was the Public Notified by NOAA? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-33

Table E-72 Was the Public Notified Door-to-Door? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-34

Table E-73 Was the Public Notified by Multiple Methods? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-34

Table E-74 Was the Evacuation Staged? ...................................... E-34

Table E-75 Were there Any Special Issues Regarding Warning and Subsequent Citizen 

Action? ....................................................... E-34

Table E-76 Were People Given Specific Instructions About Where to go When 

They Evacuated? ............................................... E-35

Table E-77 Were People Told to Use Specific Routes? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-35

Table E-78 How Were These Routes Designated? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-35

Table E-79 How Many Special Institutions (e.g., Hospitals, Prisons) Were Evacuated? . E-36

Table E-80 Road Conditions Prior to Evacuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-36

Table E-81 Were Any Major Roadways Unavailable for Use? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-36

Table E-82 Were there Any Special Traffic Issues Encountered? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-37

Table E-83 Did Some People Spontaneously Evacuate Before Being Told to Do So? . . . E-37

Table E-84 Was Reverse-laning Used? ....................................... E-37

Table E-85 Were there Traffic Accidents During the Evacuations? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-38

Table E-86 Did Anyone Refuse to Evacuate? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-38

Table E-87 Were Congregate Care Centers Used? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-38

Table E-88 Who Managed the Congregate Care Centers? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-39

Table E-89 Were Schools Used as Congregate Care Centers? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-39

Table E-90 Were Churches Used as Congregate Care Centers? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-39

Table E-91 Were Public Buildings Used as Congregate Care Centers? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-40

Table E-92 Were Other Buildings Used as Congregate Care Centers? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-40

Table E-93 Were Multiple Buildings Used as Congregate Care Centers? . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-40

Table E-94 What Percent of Evacuees Went to Congregate Care Centers? . . . . . . . . . . . . E-41

Table E-95 Did People Evacuate From Areas Outside the Designated Evacuation 

Area? ........................................................ E-41

Table E-96 Did This Cause an Impact on Traffic? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-42

Table E-97 Did This Cause an Impact on Congregate Care Center Capacity? . . . . . . . . . E-42

Table E-98 How Was the Area Secured Following the Evacuation to Prevent Looting 

and Vandalism? ................................................ E-42

Table E-99 Were There Any Instances of Looting or Vandalism? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-43

Table E-100 Were there Any Issues with Law Enforcement? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-43

Table E-101 Did the Mayor Participate in the Authorization for Re-entry? . . . . . . . . . . . . E-43

Table E-102 Did the Fire Chief Participate in the Authorization for Re-entry? . . . . . . . . . . E-43

Table E-103 Did the Police Chief Participate in the Authorization for Re-entry? . . . . . . . . E-44

Table E-104 Did the Emergency Manager Participate in the Authorization for Re-entry? . E-44

Table E-105 Did the Governor Participate in the Authorization for Re-entry? . . . . . . . . . . E-44

Table E-106 Did Other People Participate in the Authorization for Re-entry? . . . . . . . . . . E-44

Table E-107 Did Multiple People Participate in the Authorization for Re-entry? . . . . . . . . E-45
E-6

Table E-108 Describe the Re-entry Process ..................................... E-45

Table E-109 Were Evacuees Compensated for Their Expenses? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-45

Table E-110 Were there Major Issues During Re-entry? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-45

Table E-111 Residential Land Use ............................................ E-46

Table E-112 Commercial Land Use ........................................... E-46

Table E-113 Retail Land Use ................................................ E-46

Table E-114 Industrial Land Use ............................................. E-46

Table E-115 Agricultural Land Use ........................................... E-47
E-7

Introduction

Appendix E contains the distribution of questionnaire responses. Note that there were some

missing values (i.e., unknowns) because interviewees either did not have all of the information or

could not remember. Missing values were not included in the regression and correlation analyses

(i.e., the method of pairwise deletion of missing values was used). For verification purposes, the

regression analyses were performed on a select number of imputed datasets, and the results were

similar to those obtained using the pairwise deletion method, confirming the appropriateness of

pairwise deletion for this analysis. 
E-8

Table E-1. Overall Efficiency Score

Overall Efficiency Score

score Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

0 16 32.00 16 32.00

1 21 42.00 37 74.00

2 8 16.00 45 90.00

3 3 6.00 48 96.00

4 1 2.00 49 98.00

5 1 2.00 50 100.00

Table E-2. Evacuation Efficiency Score

Evacuation Efficiency Score

scorec Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

0 issues 16 32.00 16 32.00

1 issue 21 42.00 37 74.00

2 issues 8 16.00 45 90.00

3 or more issues 5 10.00 50 100.00

Table E-3. Community

Community

comm Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Rural (R) 5 10.00 5 10.00

Suburban (S) 36 72.00 41 82.00

Urban (U) 9 18.00 50 100.00
E-9

Table E-4. Population

Population

pnum Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

< 5,000 6 12.00 6 12.00

5,000-9,999 8 16.00 14 28.00

10,000-24,999 10 20.00 24 48.00

25,000-49,999 7 14.00 31 62.00

50,000-99,999 5 10.00 36 72.00

100,000-199,999 2 4.00 38 76.00

200,000-499,999 4 8.00 42 84.00

500,000-999,999 2 4.00 44 88.00

One Million or more 6 12.00 50 100.00

Table E-5. Number of Evacuees

Number of Evacuees

nevac Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

1,000-1,999 6 12.00 7 14.00

2,000-2,999 13 26.00 20 40.00

3,000-3,999 6 12.00 26 52.00

4,000-9,999 9 18.00 35 70.00

10,000-24,999 5 10.00 40 80.00

25,000-49,999 4 8.00 44 88.00

50,000-99,999 1 2.00 45 90.00

100,000-499,999 3 6.00 48 96.00

500,000-999,999 2 4.00 50 100.00
E-10

Table E-6. Percent Evacuated

Percent Evacuated

pevac Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 2 4.00 2 4.00

<10% 15 30.00 17 34.00

10-20% 8 16.00 25 50.00

21-50% 12 24.00 37 74.00

51-99% 3 6.00 40 80.00

100% 8 16.00 48 96.00

>100% 2 4.00 50 100.00

Table E-7. Population Density During Evacuation

Population Density During Evacuation

pop_dens Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 4 8.00 4 8.00

Low 8 16.00 12 24.00

Medium 24 48.00 36 72.00

High 14 28.00 50 100.00

Table E-8. Community Area in km2

Community Area in km2

c_area Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

1-4.9 km2 3 6.00 4 8.00

5-9.9 km2 2 4.00 6 12.00

10-49.9 km2 16 32.00 22 44.00

50-99.9 km2 13 26.00 35 70.00

100-499 km2 6 12.00 41 82.00

500-999 km2 2 4.00 43 86.00

1000 or more km2 7 14.00 50 100.00
E-11

Table E-9. Evacuation Area in km2

Evacuation Area in km2

e_area Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 8 16.00 8 16.00

1-4.9 km2 13 26.00 21 42.00

5-9.9 km2 12 24.00 33 66.00

10-49.9 km2 9 18.00 42 84.00

50-99.9 km2 2 4.00 44 88.00

100-499 km2 1 2.00 45 90.00

500-999 km2 1 2.00 46 92.00

1000 or more km2 4 8.00 50 100.00

Table E-10. Was Ethnicity, Nationality, or Age Important?

Was Ethnicity, Nationality, or Age Important?

ena_fctr Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 8 16.00 8 16.00

No 32 64.00 40 80.00

Yes 10 20.00 50 100.00
E-12

Table E-11. Land Uses in Evacuation Area

Land Uses in Evacuation Area

land_use Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

All 3 6.00 3 6.00

Commercial 1 2.00 4 8.00

Commercial, Industrial 1 2.00 5 10.00

Commercial, Retail 3 6.00 8 16.00

Industrial 1 2.00 9 18.00

Other 2 4.00 11 22.00

Residential 15 30.00 26 52.00

Residential, Agricultural 1 2.00 27 54.00

Residential, Commercial 1 2.00 28 56.00

Residential, Commercial, Industrial 2 4.00 30 60.00

Residential, Commercial, Industrial,

Agricultural

1 2.00 31 62.00

Residential, Commercial, Retail 9 18.00 40 80.00

Residential, Commercial, Retail,

Agricultural

1 2.00 41 82.00

Residential, Commercial, Retail, Industrial 3 6.00 44 88.00

Residential, Commercial, Retail, Industrial,

Agricultural

1 2.00 45 90.00

Residential, Industrial 2 4.00 47 94.00

Residential, Industrial, Agricultural 2 4.00 49 98.00

Unknown 1 2.00 50 100.00

Table E-12. Type of Community

Type of Community

comm_type Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

City 31 62.00 31 62.00

County 8 16.00 39 78.00

Other 2 4.00 41 82.00

Town 9 18.00 50 100.00
E-13

Table E-13. Form of Government

Form of Government

govt_type Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

City Manager 2 4.00 2 4.00

Commission/Board 8 16.00 10 20.00

Mayoral 32 64.00 42 84.00

Other 8 16.00 50 100.00

Table E-14. Community’s Main Economic Base

Community’s Main Economic Base

econ_base Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

All 4 8.00 4 8.00

Commercial 2 4.00 6 12.00

Commercial/Industry/Retail/Services 1 2.00 7 14.00

Commercial/Retail/Services 4 8.00 11 22.00

Farming 5 10.00 16 32.00

Government 1 2.00 17 34.00

Industry 2 4.00 19 38.00

Industry/Retail 1 2.00 20 40.00

Manufacturing 2 4.00 22 44.00

Manufacturing/Commercial 1 2.00 23 46.00

Manufacturing/Industry 5 10.00 28 56.00

Manufacturing/Industry/Commercial/

Retail/Services

2 4.00 30 60.00

Manufacturing/Industry/Commercial/

Retail/Services/Other

1 2.00 31 62.00

Other 8 16.00 39 78.00

Tourism 5 10.00 44 88.00

Tourism/Commercial 1 2.00 45 90.00

Tourism/Commercial/Retail/Services 2 4.00 47 94.00

Tourism/Industry 1 2.00 48 96.00

Tourism/Manufacturing/Industry 1 2.00 49 98.00

Tourism/Retail 1 2.00 50 100.00
E-14

Table E-15. Any Special Characteristics?

Any Special Characteristics?

spec_char Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 2 4.00 2 4.00

No 11 22.00 13 26.00

Yes 37 74.00 50 100.00

Table E-16. Proximity to a Commercial Nuclear Power Plant (km)

Proximity to a Commercial Nuclear Power Plant (km)

prox_npp Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

0-16 4 8.00 4 8.00

17-80 11 22.00 15 30.00

>80 35 70.00 50 100.00

Table E-17. Is the Community Located in a State that Contains a Nuclear Power Plant?

 Is the Community Located in a State that Contains a Nuclear Power Plant?

state_npp Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

No 11 22.00 11 22.00

Yes 39 78.00 50 100.00

Table E-18. Is the Area More Prone to Hazards than Average?

Is the Area More Prone to Hazards than Average?

prone_haz Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

No 13 26.00 13 26.00

Yes 37 74.00 50 100.00
E-15

Table E-19. Has the Community had any Experience with the Hazard?

Has the Community had any Experience with the Hazard?

haz_exp Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

No 24 48.00 25 50.00

Yes 25 50.00 50 100.00

Table E-20. Has the Community Experienced Evacuations in the Previous Ten Years?

Has the Community Experienced Evacuations in the Previous Ten Years?

evac_exp Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 2 4.00 2 4.00

No 25 50.00 27 54.00

Yes 23 46.00 50 100.00

Table E-21. Has the Community had any Previous Experience with the Alerting

Mechanism?

Has the Community had any Previous Experience with the Alerting Mechanism?

alert_exp Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 5 10.00 5 10.00

No 17 34.00 22 44.00

Yes 23 46.00 45 90.00

Not Applicable 5 10.00 50 100.00
E-16

Table E-22. Did the Community have a Written Emergency Plan?

Did the Community have a Written Emergency Plan?

em_plan Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

No 3 6.00 3 6.00

Yes 47 94.00 50 100.00

Table E-23. Did the Emergency Plan Contain an Evacuation Section?

Did the Emergency Plan Contain an Evacuation Section?

evac_plan Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 4 8.00 4 8.00

No 3 6.00 7 14.00

Yes 40 80.00 47 94.00

Not Applicable 3 6.00 50 100.00

Table E-24. Was the Plan Used in This Emergency?

Was the Plan Used in This Emergency?

plan_used Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 2 4.00 2 4.00

No 2 4.00 4 8.00

Yes 43 86.00 47 94.00

Not Applicable 3 6.00 50 100.00
E-17

Table E-25. Did the Plan Conform to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev_ 1?

Did the Plan Conform to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev_ 1?

conform_nureg Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 23 46.00 23 46.00

No 16 32.00 39 78.00

Yes 6 12.00 45 90.00

Not Applicable 5 10.00 50 100.00

Table E-26. Was there an Evacuation Time Estimate (ETE) in the Plan?

Was there an Evacuation Time Estimate (ETE) in the Plan?

ete Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 2 4.00 2 4.00

No 13 26.00 15 30.00

Yes 1 2.00 16 32.00

Not Applicable 34 68.00 50 100.00

Table E-27. How Did the Actual Evacuation Time Compare to the ETE?

How Did the Actual Evacuation Time Compare to the ETE?

ete_est Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 2 4.00 2 4.00

Not Applicable 48 96.00 50 100.00
E-18

Table E-28. Is Training Provided to Emergency Response Personnel?

Is Training Provided to Emergency Response Personnel?

training Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Yes 50 100.00 50 100.00

Table E-29. Is Joint Training Between Industry and Government Regularly Conducted?

Is Joint Training Between Industry and Government Regularly Conducted?

joint_training Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

No 8 16.00 9 18.00

Yes 40 80.00 49 98.00

Not Applicable 1 2.00 50 100.00

Table E-30. Do the Community's Emergency Response Agencies Regularly Conduct

Emergency Drills and Exercises?

Do the Community's Emergency Response Agencies Regularly conduct Emergency

Drills and Exercises?

drills Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

No 7 14.00 8 16.00

Yes 42 84.00 50 100.00
E-19

Table E-31. Was the Emergency Plan Used in this Evacuation Previously Tested in a Fullscale Field Exercise?

 

Was the Emergency Plan Used in this Evacuation Previously Tested in a Full-scale

Field Exercise?

plan_tested Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 8 16.00 8 16.00

No 20 40.00 28 56.00

Yes 20 40.00 48 96.00

Not Applicable 2 4.00 50 100.00

Table E-32. If So, What Type of Exercise was Performed Immediately Prior to this

Evacuation?

If So, What Type of Exercise was Performed Immediately Prior to this Evacuation?

exerc_type Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 2 4.00 2 4.00

Functional Drill (FD) 3 6.00 5 10.00

Full-Scale Field

Exercise (FSFE)

5 10.00 10 20.00

FSFE and Table-Top

Exercise (TT)

11 22.00 21 42.00

N/A 27 54.00 48 96.00

TT 2 4.00 50 100.00
E-20

Table E-33. Hazard that Led to Evacuation

Hazard that Led to Evacuation

haz_type Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Natural

Disaster (ND)

14 28.00 14 28.00

Malevolent Act 

(TE)

3 6.00 17 34.00

Technological

Hazard (TH)

33 66.00 50 100.00

Table E-34. Time of Day

Time of Day

time_day Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Day (D) 40 80.00 40 80.00

Night (N) 10 20.00 50 100.00

Table E-35. Road Conditions/Weather Conditions

Road Conditions/Weather Conditions

cond_good Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 7 14.00 7 14.00

No 2 4.00 9 18.00

Yes 41 82.00 50 100.00
E-21

Table E-36. Other Unusual Circumstances

Other Unusual Circumstances

unus_circ Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 22 44.00 22 44.00

No 20 40.00 42 84.00

Yes 8 16.00 50 100.00

Table E-37. Number of Deaths Caused by the Hazard

Number of Deaths Caused by the Hazard

haz_death Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

0 44 88.00 44 88.00

1 2 4.00 46 92.00

3 1 2.00 47 94.00

15 1 2.00 48 96.00

25 1 2.00 49 98.00

2,823 1 2.00 50 100.00

Table E-38. Number of Injuries Caused by the Hazard

Number of Injuries Caused by the Hazard

haz_inj Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

No Injuries 24 48.00 25 50.00

1-10 12 24.00 37 74.00

11-100 7 14.00 44 88.00

101-200 4 8.00 48 96.00

>1000 1 2.00 49 98.00

4710 1 2.00 50 100.00
E-22

Table E-39. Number of Deaths Caused by the Evacuation

Number of Deaths Caused by the Evacuation

evac_death Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

0 48 96.00 49 98.00

19 1 2.00 50 100.00

Table E-40. Number of Injuries Caused by the Evacuation

Number of Injuries Caused by the Evacuation

evac_inj Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 3 6.00 3 6.00

0 45 90.00 48 96.00

1 1 2.00 49 98.00

35 1 2.00 50 100.00

Table E-41. Estimated Total Cost of Evacuation Related Expenses and Property Damages

Estimated Total Cost of Evacuation Related Expenses and Property Damages

evac_cost Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 43 86.00 43 86.00

0 1 2.00 44 88.00

10,000-15,000 1 2.00 45 90.00

20,000 1 2.00 46 92.00

200,000 2 4.00 48 96.00

2,000,000 1 2.00 49 98.00

8,000,000 1 2.00 50 100.00
E-23

Table E-42. Were Political Boundaries Crossed (i.e., more than one county

or state involved)?

Were Political Boundaries Crossed (i.e., more than one county or state involved)?

bdry_crss Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 5 10.00 5 10.00

No 26 52.00 31 62.00

Yes 19 38.00 50 100.00

Table E-43. Command, Control and Coordination Processes

Command, Control and Coordination Processes

ccc_proc Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Ad Hock 12 24.00 12 24.00

Preplanned 38 76.00 50 100.00

Table E-44. Did the Mayor Participate in the Decision to Evacuate?

Did the Mayor Participate in the Decision to Evacuate?

mayor_ev Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

No 47 94.00 47 94.00

Yes 3 6.00 50 100.00

Table E-45. Did the Fire Chief Participate in the Decision to Evacuate?

Did the Fire Chief Participate in the Decision to Evacuate?

fire_chief_ev Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

No 25 50.00 25 50.00

Yes 25 50.00 50 100.00
E-24

Table E-46. Did the Police Chief Participate in the Decision to Evacuate?

Did the Police Chief Participate in the Decision to Evacuate?

police_chief_ev Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

No 39 78.00 39 78.00

Yes 11 22.00 50 100.00

Table E-47. Did Emergency Managers Participate in the Decision to Evacuate?

Did Emergency Managers Participate in the Decision to Evacuate?

em_mgr_ev Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

No 45 90.00 45 90.00

Yes 5 10.00 50 100.00

Table E-48. Did the Governor Participate in the Decision to Evacuate?

Did the Governor Participate in the Decision to Evacuate?

governor_ev Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

No 48 96.00 48 96.00

Yes 2 4.00 50 100.00

Table E-49. Did Others Participate in the Decision to Evacuate?

Did Others Participate in the Decision to Evacuate?

other_ev Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

No 36 72.00 36 72.00

Yes 14 28.00 50 100.00
E-25

Table E-50. Did Multiple People Participate in the Decision to Evacuate? 

Did Multiple People Participate in the Decision to Evacuate?

multiple_ev Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

No 40 80.00 40 80.00

Yes 10 20.00 50 100.00

Table E-51. Were there Issues with the Decision Making Process?

Were there Issues with the Decision Making Process?

decis_prob Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

No 44 88.00 44 88.00

Yes 6 12.00 50 100.00

Table E-52. Was an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Used?

Was an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Used?

eoc_used Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

No 15 30.00 16 32.00

Yes 34 68.00 50 100.00

Table E-53. Was a Field (Incident) Command Post Used?

Was a Field (Incident) Command Post Used?

icp_used Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

No 5 10.00 5 10.00

Yes 45 90.00 50 100.00
E-26

Table E-54. Was Communication Between Field Emergency Responders and EOC by

Radio?

Was Communication Between Field Emergency Responders and EOC by Radio?

radio Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

No 3 6.00 3 6.00

Yes 47 94.00 50 100.00

Table E-55. Was Communication Between Field Emergency Responders and EOC by

Telephone?

Was Communication Between Field Emergency Responders and EOC by Telephone?

telephone Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

No 43 86.00 43 86.00

Yes 7 14.00 50 100.00

Table E-56. Was Communication Between Field Emergency Responders and EOC by Cell

Phone?

Was Communication Between Field Emergency Responders and EOC by Cell Phone?

cell_phone Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

No 31 62.00 31 62.00

Yes 19 38.00 50 100.00

Table E-57. Was Communication Between Field Emergency Responders and EOC by

Pager?

Was Communication Between Field Emergency Responders and EOC by Pager?

pager Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

No 49 98.00 49 98.00

Yes 1 2.00 50 100.00
E-27

Table E-58. Was Communication Between Field Emergency Responders and EOC by

Multiple Methods?

Was Communication Between Field Emergency Responders and EOC by Multiple

Methods?

multiple Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

No 30 60.00 30 60.00

Yes 20 40.00 50 100.00

Table E-59. Were there Issues with Communications?

Were there Issues with Communications?

comm_prob Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

No 35 70.00 36 72.00

Yes 14 28.00 50 100.00
E-28

Table E-60. How Were Senior Local Officials Notified of the Incident?

How Were Senior Local Officials Notified of the Incident?

off_notif Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 4 8.00 4 8.00

CANS 2 4.00 6 12.00

Cell phone 1 2.00 7 14.00

Dispatcher 1 2.00 8 16.00

Door to Door 1 2.00 9 18.00

N/A 1 2.00 10 20.00

Pager, Cell Phone 1 2.00 11 22.00

Pager, Visual 1 2.00 12 24.00

Radio 1 2.00 13 26.00

Radio and telephone 1 2.00 14 28.00

Radio and television 1 2.00 15 30.00

Telephone 34 68.00 49 98.00

Word of Mouth 1 2.00 50 100.00
E-29

Table E-61. How Were Emergency Responders Notified of the Incident?

How Were Emergency Responders Notified of the Incident?

er_notif Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 3 6.00 3 6.00

911 41 82.00 44 88.00

AF base call 1 2.00 45 90.00

Fire Lt. Saw accident 1 2.00 46 92.00

N/A 3 6.00 49 98.00

Police saw fire 1 2.00 50 100.00

Table E-62. ET Between Discovery of the Incident and Mobilization (Minutes)

ET Between Discovery of the Incident and Mobilization (Minutes)

resp_time Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 7 14.00 7 14.00

0-15 37 74.00 44 88.00

31-60 1 2.00 45 90.00

60+ 4 8.00 49 98.00

N/A 1 2.00 50 100.00
E-30

Table E-63. Elapsed Time Between Start of Hazard and Decision to Evacuate (Hours)

Elapsed Time Between Start of Hazard and Decision to Evacuate (Hours)

start_time Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 6 12.00 6 12.00

0.0 1 2.00 7 14.00

0.1 7 14.00 14 28.00

0.2 4 8.00 18 36.00

0.3 2 4.00 20 40.00

0.5 6 12.00 26 52.00

0.6 1 2.00 27 54.00

0.7 3 6.00 30 60.00

1 3 6.00 33 66.00

1.3 1 2.00 34 68.00

1.5 1 2.00 35 70.00

1.7 1 2.00 36 72.00

3 2 4.00 38 76.00

6 1 2.00 39 78.00

72 1 2.00 40 80.00

96 1 2.00 41 82.00

108 2 4.00 43 86.00

120 1 2.00 44 88.00

132 1 2.00 45 90.00

144 1 2.00 46 92.00

168 1 2.00 47 94.00

<24 1 2.00 48 96.00

>4 Days 1 2.00 49 98.00

N/A 1 2.00 50 100.00
E-31

Table E-64. Time to Complete the Evacuation (Hours)

Time to Complete the Evacuation (Hours)

total_time Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 10 20.00 10 20.00

0.3 1 2.00 11 22.00

0.6 3 6.00 14 28.00

0.7 3 6.00 17 34.00

1 7 14.00 24 48.00

1.5 3 6.00 27 54.00

2 6 12.00 33 66.00

3 1 2.00 34 68.00

3.5 1 2.00 35 70.00

4 4 8.00 39 78.00

6 2 4.00 41 82.00

8 2 4.00 43 86.00

12 1 2.00 44 88.00

14 1 2.00 45 90.00

17 1 2.00 46 92.00

22 1 2.00 47 94.00

<1 Day 2 4.00 49 98.00

>4 Days 1 2.00 50 100.00
E-32

Table E-65. Were there Issues with Notification of Emergency Personnel or Senior Local

Officials?

Were there Issues with Notification of Emergency Personnel or Senior Local Officials?

notif_prob Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 2 4.00 2 4.00

No 46 92.00 48 96.00

Yes 2 4.00 50 100.00

Table E-66. Was the Public Notified by a Siren?

Was the Public Notified by a Siren?

sirens_pn Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

No 42 84.00 43 86.00

Yes 7 14.00 50 100.00

Table E-67. Was the Public Notified by Telephone?

Was the Public Notified by Telephone?

telephone_pn Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

No 37 74.00 38 76.00

Yes 12 24.00 50 100.00
E-33

Table E-68. Was the Public Notified by Radio/TV?

Was the Public Notified by Radio/TV?

radio_tv_pn Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

No 25 50.00 26 52.00

Yes 24 48.00 50 100.00

Table E-69. Was the Public Notified by an Emergency Broadcast System?

Was the Public Notified by an Emergency Broadcast System?

ebs_pn Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

No 48 96.00 49 98.00

Yes 1 2.00 50 100.00

Table E-70. Was the Public Notified by a PA System?

Was the Public Notified by a PA System?

pa_system_pn Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

No 22 44.00 23 46.00

Yes 27 54.00 50 100.00

Table E-71. Was the Public Notified by NOAA?

Was the Public Notified by NOAA?

noaa_pn Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

No 48 96.00 49 98.00

Yes 1 2.00 50 100.00
E-34

Table E-72. Was the Public Notified Door-to-Door?

Was the Public Notified Door-to-Door?

door_door_pn Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

No 15 30.00 16 32.00

Yes 34 68.00 50 100.00

Table E-73. Was the Public Notified by Multiple Methods?

Was the Public Notified by Multiple Methods?

multiple_pn Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

No 14 28.00 15 30.00

Yes 35 70.00 50 100.00

Table E-74. Was the Evacuation Staged?

Was the Evacuation Staged?

staged Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

No 30 60.00 30 60.00

Yes 20 40.00 50 100.00

Table E-75. Were there Any Special Issues Regarding Warning and Subsequent Citizen

Action?

Were there Any Special Issues Regarding Warning and Subsequent Citizen Action?

warn_prob Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

No 38 76.00 38 76.00

Yes 12 24.00 50 100.00
E-35

Table E-76. Were People Given Specific Instructions About Where to go When They

Evacuated?

Were People Given Specific Instructions About Where to go When They Evacuated?

evac_instruct Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 3 6.00 3 6.00

No 7 14.00 10 20.00

Yes 39 78.00 49 98.00

Not Applicable 1 2.00 50 100.00

Table E-77. Were People Told to Use Specific Routes?

Were People Told to Use Specific Routes?

evac_route Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 3 6.00 3 6.00

No 15 30.00 18 36.00

Yes 31 62.00 49 98.00

Not Applicable 1 2.00 50 100.00

Table E-78. How Were These Routes Designated?

How Were These Routes Designated?

route_design Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 4 8.00 4 8.00

N/A 19 38.00 23 46.00

Roadblocks 20 40.00 43 86.00

Signs 1 2.00 44 88.00

Verbal Instructions 6 12.00 50 100.00
E-36

Table E-79. How Many Special Institutions (e.g., Hospitals, Prisons) Were Evacuated?

How Many Special Institutions (e.g., Hospitals, Prisons) Were Evacuated?

inst_evac Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 6 12.00 6 12.00

0 26 52.00 32 64.00

1 8 16.00 40 80.00

2 2 4.00 42 84.00

3 4 8.00 46 92.00

5 3 6.00 49 98.00

>10 1 2.00 50 100.00

Table E-80. Road Conditions Prior to Evacuation

Road Conditions Prior to Evacuation

road_dry Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

No 2 4.00 3 6.00

Yes 46 92.00 49 98.00

Not Applicable 1 2.00 50 100.00

Table E-81. Were Any Major Roadways Unavailable for Use?

Were Any Major Roadways Unavailable for Use?

road_haz Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 2 4.00 2 4.00

No 32 64.00 34 68.00

Yes 15 30.00 49 98.00

Not Applicable 1 2.00 50 100.00
E-37

Table E-82. Were there Any Special Traffic Issues Encountered?

Were there Any Special Traffic Issues Encountered?

traff_prob Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

No 36 72.00 36 72.00

Yes 14 28.00 50 100.00

Table E-83. Did Some People Spontaneously Evacuate Before Being Told to Do So?

Did Some People Spontaneously Evacuate Before Being Told to Do So?

early_evac Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 6 12.00 6 12.00

No 21 42.00 27 54.00

Yes 22 44.00 49 98.00

Not Applicable 1 2.00 50 100.00

Table E-84. Was Reverse-laning Used?

Was Reverse-laning Used?

revlan_used Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 3 6.00 3 6.00

No 40 80.00 43 86.00

Yes 6 12.00 49 98.00

Not Applicable 1 2.00 50 100.00
E-38

Table E-85. Were there Traffic Accidents During the Evacuations?

Were there Traffic Accidents During the Evacuations?

traff_accid Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 6 12.00 6 12.00

No 40 80.00 46 92.00

Yes 4 8.00 50 100.00

Table E-86. Did Anyone Refuse to Evacuate?

Did Anyone Refuse to Evacuate?

refus_evac Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 3 6.00 3 6.00

No 21 42.00 24 48.00

Yes 26 52.00 50 100.00

Table E-87. Were Congregate Care Centers Used?

Were Congregate Care Centers Used?

shltr_used Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 2 4.00 2 4.00

No 8 16.00 10 20.00

Yes 40 80.00 50 100.00
E-39

Table E-88. Who Managed the Congregate Care Centers?

Who Managed the Congregate Care Centers?

mgmt_shelter Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

City 1 2.00 2 4.00

Civil Defense 2 4.00 4 8.00

N/A 10 20.00 14 28.00

Other 6 12.00 20 40.00

Red Cross 24 48.00 44 88.00

Red Cross, Other 6 12.00 50 100.00

Table E-89. Were Schools Used as Congregate Care Centers?

Were Schools Used as Congregate Care Centers?

schools Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

No 8 16.00 9 18.00

Yes 31 62.00 40 80.00

Not Applicable 10 20.00 50 100.00

Table E-90. Were Churches Used as Congregate Care Centers?

Were Churches Used as Congregate Care Centers?

churches Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

 Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

No 29 58.00 30 60.00

Yes 10 20.00 40 80.00

Not Applicable 10 20.00 50 100.00
E-40

Table E-91. Were Public Buildings Used as Congregate Care Centers?

Were Public Buildings Used as Congregate Care Centers?

public_bldg Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

No 31 62.00 32 64.00

Yes 8 16.00 40 80.00

Not Applicable 10 20.00 50 100.00

Table E-92. Were Other Buildings Used as Congregate Care Centers?

Were Other Buildings Used as Congregate Care Centers?

other Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

No 36 72.00 37 74.00

Yes 4 8.00 41 82.00

Not Applicable 9 18.00 50 100.00

Table E-93. Were Multiple Buildings Used as Congregate Care Centers?

Were Multiple Buildings Used as Congregate Care Centers?

multiple_sh Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

No 26 52.00 27 54.00

Yes 13 26.00 40 80.00

Not Applicable 10 20.00 50 100.00
E-41

Table E-94. What Percent of Evacuees Went to Congregate Care Centers?

What Percent of Evacuees Went to Congregate Care Centers?

shltr_perc Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 15 30.00 15 30.00

1.3 1 2.00 16 32.00

1.5 1 2.00 17 34.00

3.7 1 2.00 18 36.00

4 1 2.00 19 38.00

5 2 4.00 21 42.00

6 2 4.00 23 46.00

6.7 1 2.00 24 48.00

7 2 4.00 26 52.00

9 2 4.00 28 56.00

10 3 6.00 31 62.00

10.6 1 2.00 32 64.00

17.5 1 2.00 33 66.00

20 4 8.00 37 74.00

40 1 2.00 38 76.00

70 1 2.00 39 78.00

0 1 2.00 40 80.00

100 1 2.00 41 82.00

N/A 9 18.00 50 100.00

Table E-95. Did People Evacuate From Areas Outside the Designated Evacuation Area?

Did People Evacuate From Areas Outside the Designated Evacuation Area?

shad_evac Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 7 14.00 7 14.00

No 24 48.00 31 62.00

Yes 18 36.00 49 98.00

Not Applicable 1 2.00 50 100.00
E-42

Table E-96. Did This Cause an Impact on Traffic?

Did This Cause an Impact on Traffic?

shad_traff Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

No 13 26.00 14 28.00

Yes 5 10.00 19 38.00

Not Applicable 31 62.00 50 100.00

Table E-97. Did This Cause an Impact on Congregate Care Center Capacity?

Did This Cause an Impact on Congregate Care Center Capacity?

shad_shltr Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 2 4.00 2 4.00

No 16 32.00 18 36.00

Not Applicable 32 64.00 50 100.00

Table E-98. How Was the Area Secured Following the Evacuation to Prevent Looting and

Vandalism?

How Was the Area Secured Following the Evacuation to Prevent Looting and

Vandalism?

law_enfrc Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

National Guard 4 8.00 4 8.00

Police 38 76.00 42 84.00

Police, National Guard 5 10.00 47 94.00

Police, Other 3 6.00 50 100.00
E-43

Table E-99. Were There Any Instances of Looting or Vandalism?

Were There Any Instances of Looting or Vandalism?

loot_vand Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

No 45 90.00 45 90.00

Yes 5 10.00 50 100.00

Table E-100. Were there Any Issues with Law Enforcement?

Were there Any Issues with Law Enforcement?

law_prob Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

No 47 94.00 47 94.00

Yes 3 6.00 50 100.00

Table E-101. Did the Mayor Participate in the Authorization for Re-entry?

Did the Mayor Participate in the Authorization for Re-entry?

mayor_re Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

No 43 86.00 44 88.00

Yes 6 12.00 50 100.00

Table E-102. Did the Fire Chief Participate in the Authorization for Re-entry?

Did the Fire Chief Participate in the Authorization for Re-entry?

fire_chief_re Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

No 27 54.00 28 56.00

Yes 22 44.00 50 100.00
E-44

Table E-103. Did the Police Chief Participate in the Authorization for Re-entry?

Did the Police Chief Participate in the Authorization for Re-entry?

police_chief_re Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

No 43 86.00 44 88.00

Yes 6 12.00 50 100.00

Table E-104. Did the Emergency Manager Participate in the Authorization for Re-entry?

Did the Emergency Manager Participate in the Authorization for Re-entry?

em_mgr_re Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

No 45 90.00 46 92.00

Yes 4 8.00 50 100.00

Table E-105. Did the Governor Participate in the Authorization for Re-entry?

Did the Governor Participate in the Authorization for Re-entry?

governor_re Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

No 49 98.00 50 100.00

Table E-106. Did Other People Participate in the Authorization for Re-entry?

Did Other People Participate in the Authorization for Re-entry?

other_re Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

No 25 50.00 26 52.00

Yes 24 48.00 50 100.00
E-45

Table E-107. Did Multiple People Participate in the Authorization for Re-entry?

Did Multiple People Participate in the Authorization for Re-entry?

multiple_re Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

No 37 74.00 38 76.00

Yes 12 24.00 50 100.00

Table E-108. Describe the Re-entry Process

Describe the Re-entry Process

rentr_proc Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

Controlled Phased 9 18.00 10 20.00

No special controls 40 80.00 50 100.00

Table E-109. Were Evacuees Compensated for Their Expenses?

Were Evacuees Compensated for Their Expenses?

exp_comp Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 4 8.00 4 8.00

No 32 64.00 36 72.00

Yes 14 28.00 50 100.00

Table E-110. Were there Major Issues During Re-entry?

Were there Major Issues During Re-entry?

rentry_prob Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 2 4.00 2 4.00

No 44 88.00 46 92.00

Yes 4 8.00 50 100.00
E-46

Table E-111. Residential Land Use

Residential Land Use

lu_residential Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

No 8 16.00 9 18.00

Yes 41 82.00 50 100.00

Table E-112. Commercial Land Use

Commercial Land Use

lu_Commercial Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

No 23 46.00 24 48.00

Yes 26 52.00 50 100.00

Table E-113. Retail Land Use

Retail Land Use

lu_Retail Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

No 29 58.00 30 60.00

Yes 20 40.00 50 100.00

Table E-114. Industrial Land Use

Industrial Land Use

lu_Industrial Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

No 33 66.00 34 68.00

Yes 16 32.00 50 100.00
E-47

Table E-115. Agricultural Land Use

Agricultural Land Use

lu_Agricultural Frequency Percent Cumulative

Frequency

Cumulative

Percent

Unknown 1 2.00 1 2.00

No 40 80.00 41 82.00

Yes 9 18.00 50 100.00
E-48
F-1

APPENDIX F

CHI-SQUARE VALUES FOR LIKELIHOOD RATIO TESTS OF

ASSOCIATION BETWEEN EACH VARIABLE AND

EVACUATION EFFICIENCY SCORE
F-2
F-3

CONTENTS

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F-5

Table F-1. Chi-Square Values for Likelihood Ratio Tests of Association Between Each 

Variable and Evacuation Efficiency Score . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F-6
F-4
F-5

Introduction

The results of the regression analyses are contained in Appendices F through K. All data

preparation and analyses were carried out using SAS 8.02 for Windows. Each variable in the

questionnaire was compared to the efficiency score using an ordinal logit model, which is a

generalized linear model. In generalized linear regression, the relationship is constrained to be a

straight line and maximum likelihoods are used to determine the best fit. An ordinal logit model

was chosen because the dependent variable (i.e., efficiency score) is neither normally, nor

Gaussian, distributed, and it is an ordinal random variable. Since hazard type is often associated

with other variables, the regression results were adjusted for hazard type.

The resulting chi-squared value (probability or p-value) from the likelihood ratio tests were

performed to test if each variable was significantly associated with the efficiency score. A pvalue is the probability of observing the difference in the data by random chance. Thus, if p <

0.05, there is less than a 5% chance that this association would have occurred if there were no

association, and the hypothesis that there is no association is rejected in favor of the hypothesis

that there is an association. A variable with a p-value of less than 0.05 is considered to have a

statistically significant association to the efficiency score. If the p-value is between 0.05 and

0.10, the variable is considered to have a marginal (or weak) statistical association to the

efficiency score. Often a p < 0.01 is considered to show a highly significant statistical

association.
F-6

Table F-1. Chi-Square Values for Likelihood Ratio Tests of Association 

Between Each Variable and Evacuation Efficiency Score

Variable Variable Label n DF

Deviance

Statistic P2 p-value

1 traff_accid Were there Traffic accidents during the

evacuations?

44 1 0.3703 16.53 <.0001

2 rentr_proc Describe the Re-entry Process 49 1 1.2103 13.22 0.0003

3 h_death Number of deaths from hazard 50 1 10.7082 11.38 0.0007

4 evac_inj Number of injuries caused by the evacuation 47 1 0.0000 11.00 0.0009

5 nat_guard Was the National Guard used for law

enforcement?

50 1 0.4219 8.71 0.0032

6 loot_vand Were there any instances of looting or

vandalism?

50 1 0.5959 8.14 0.0043

7 early_evac Did some people spontaneously evacuate before

being told to do so?

43 1 0.0540 7.95 0.0048

8 fire_chief_re Did the fire chief participate in the authorization

for re-entry?

49 1 3.3908 6.68 0.0097

9 refus_evac Did anyone refuse to evacuate? 47 1 2.0257 6.23 0.0126

10 haz_exp Has the community had any experience with the

hazard?

49 1 0.5241 5.72 0.0168

11 schools Were schools used as congregate care centers? 39 1 7.3277 5.53 0.0187

12 evac_death Number of deaths caused by the evacuation 49 1 0.0000 5.26 0.0218

13 public_bldg Were public buildings used as congregate care

centers?

39 1 0.4690 5.25 0.0220

14 mgmt_shelter Who managed the congregate care centers? 39 4 10.7916 11.12 0.0253

15 mayor_re Did the mayor participate in the authorization

for re-entry?

49 1 1.0333 4.77 0.0289

16 noaa_pn Was the public notified by NOAA? 49 1 0.0000 4.76 0.0291

17 haz_type Hazard that led to evacuation 50 2 4.1425 6.95 0.0310

18 st_time Elapsed time between start of hazard and

decision to evacuate (hours)

41 1 51.0653 4.01 0.0452

19 road_haz Were any major roadways unavailable for use? 47 1 0.7908 3.97 0.0463

20 eoc_used Emergency Operations Center (EOC) used 49 1 1.8256 3.69 0.0549

21 tot_time Time to complete the evacuation (hours) 37 1 39.3267 3.55 0.0596

22 door_door_pn Was the public notified door-to-door? 49 1 3.0670 3.16 0.0756

23 instevac Were one or more special institutions

evacuated?

44 1 1.6318 3.09 0.0787

24 pop_dens Population density during evacuation 46 2 2.2197 5.08 0.0787

25 drills Do the community's emergency response

agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and

exercises?

49 1 8.2453 3.07 0.0796

26 e_area Evacuation Area in km^2 42 1 70.4392 2.89 0.0889
F-7

Table F-1. Chi-Square Values for Likelihood Ratio Tests of Association 

Between Each Variable and Evacuation Efficiency Score (continued)

Variable Variable Label n DF

Deviance

Statistic P2 p-value

27 prone_haz Is the area more prone to hazards than average? 50 1 3.1587 2.85 0.0916

28 aware_alert Level of community awareness with alerting

methods used

49 2 2.6020 4.70 0.0954

29 comm_type Type of Community 50 3 7.9581 6.03 0.1102

30 shad_traff Did this cause an impact on traffic? 42 1 2.9452 2.46 0.1165

31 pevac Percent Evacuated 48 1 80.3729 2.39 0.1224

32 resp_time ET between discovery of the incident and

mobilization (minutes)

42 2 3.8023 4.16 0.1249

33 multiple_sh Were multiple buildings used as congregate care

centers?

39 1 4.9626 2.34 0.1259

34 aware_lhaz Level of community awareness with local

hazards

59 2 1.2782 4.10 0.1287

35 fire_chief_ev Did the fire chief participate in the decision to

evacuate?

50 1 3.6447 2.30 0.1297

36 staged Was the evacuation staged? 50 1 5.4893 1.96 0.1615

37 multiple_ev Did multiple people participate in the decision to

evacuate?

50 1 2.3018 1.64 0.2001

38 h_inj Number of injuries from hazard 48 1 53.2639 1.62 0.2025

39 nevac Number of Evacuations 49 1 79.7763 1.61 0.2044

40 spec_char Were there any special characteristics? 48 1 0.4807 1.56 0.2118

41 coop_level Level of cooperation between local, state, and

federal agencies

49 1 4.2447 1.46 0.2264

42 er_notif How were emergency responders notified of the

incident?

44 3 1.8322 4.23 0.2379

43 pa_system_pn Was the public notified by a PA system? 49 1 2.6479 1.36 0.2439

44 exp_comp Were evacuees compensated for their expenses? 46 1 0.0670 1.35 0.2445

45 multiple_re Did multiple people participate in the

authorization for re-entry?

49 1 5.2741 1.32 0.2501

46 unus_circ Other unusual circumstances 28 1 1.7946 1.31 0.2517

47 churches Were churches used as congregate care centers? 39 1 3.3299 1.27 0.2597

48 conform_nureg Did the plan conform to NUREG-0654/FEMAREP-1, Rev_ 1?22 1 2.2819 1.24 0.2646

49 radio Was communication between field emergency

responders and EOC by radio?

50 1 3.2863 1.20 0.2738

50 lu_Retail Retail Land Use 49 1 0.2387 1.18 0.2774

51 ebs_pn Was the public notified by emergency broadcast

system?

49 1 2.5989 1.14 0.2865

52 off_notif How were senior local officials notified of the

incident?

45 10 20.9546 11.75 0.3019

53 revlan_used Was reverse-laning used? 46 1 1.9220 0.99 0.3190

54 shltr_used Were congregate care centers used? 48 1 1.2542 0.97 0.3240

55 em_mgr_re Did the emergency manager participate in the

authorization for re-entry?

49 1 0.4781 0.96 0.3265
Table F-1. Chi-Square Values for Likelihood Ratio Tests of Association 

Between Each Variable and Evacuation Efficiency Score (continued)

Variable Variable Label n DF

Deviance

Statistic P2 p-value

F-8

56 police Were the police used for law enforcement? 50 1 0.4416 0.88 0.3479

57 bdry_crss Were political boundaries crossed (i.e., more

than one county or state involved)?

45 1 1.1540 0.85 0.3567

58 icp_used Was a field (incident) command post used? 50 1 6.2073 0.85 0.3575

59 multiple_pn Was the public notified by multiple methods? 49 1 1.7831 0.85 0.3577

60 route_design How were these routes designated? 27 2 1.7599 2.05 0.3591

61 time_day Time of Day 50 1 5.5379 0.83 0.3611

62 other Were other buildings used as congregate care

centers?

40 1 1.4270 0.80 0.3709

63 em_plan Did the community have a written emergency

plan?

50 1 3.8346 0.78 0.3780

64 governor_ev Did the governor participate in the decision to

evacuate?

50 1 2.0218 0.70 0.4016

65 road_dry Road conditions prior to evacuation 48 1 0.6485 0.69 0.4059

66 lu_Agricultural Agricultural Land Use 49 1 0.2164 0.63 0.4256

67 cond_good Road conditions/weather conditions 43 1 0.5639 0.57 0.4488

68 evac_exp Had the community experienced evacuations in

the previous ten years?

48 1 0.1241 0.57 0.4519

69 exerc_type If so, what type of exercise was performed

immediately prior to this evacuation?

21 4 9.4252 3.54 0.4711

70 aware_ehaz Level of community awareness with hazard that

caused evacuation

50 2 4.5303 1.46 0.4810

71 joint_training Is joint training between industry and

government regularly conducted?

48 1 1.2887 0.48 0.4892

72 c_area Community Area in km^2 49 1 117.4909 0.44 0.5048

73 sirens_pn Was the public notified by a siren? 49 1 0.7606 0.44 0.5069

74 alert_exp Did the community have previous experience

with the alerting mechanism?

40 1 0.7895 0.41 0.5201

75 plan_tested Was the emergency plan used in this evacuation

previously tested in a full-scale field exercise?

40 1 1.9414 0.34 0.5585

76 ccc_proc Command, control and coordination processes 50 1 3.4652 0.33 0.5664

77 lu_Commercial Commercial Land Use 49 1 1.6215 0.31 0.5758

78 police_chief_re Did the police chief participate in the

authorization for re-entry?

49 1 4.2933 0.28 0.5955

79 govt_type Form of Government 50 3 9.9771 1.79 0.6168

80 ete Was there an Evacuation Time Estimate (ETE)

in the plan?

14 1 1.5570 0.24 0.6234

81 evac_instruct Were people given specific instructions about

where to go when they evacuated?

46 1 3.9407 0.17 0.6783

82 other_re Did other people participate in the authorization

for re-entry?

49 1 2.3693 0.17 0.6822

83 radio_tv_pn Was the public notified by radio/TV? 49 1 0.1289 0.17 0.6834
Table F-1. Chi-Square Values for Likelihood Ratio Tests of Association 

Between Each Variable and Evacuation Efficiency Score (continued)

Variable Variable Label n DF

Deviance

Statistic P2 p-value

F-9

84 pnum Population 50 1 122.3110 0.16 0.6887

85 multiple Was communication between field emergency

responders and EOC by multiple ways?

50 1 2.0225 0.15 0.6984

86 evac_route Were people told to use specific routes? 46 1 0.7840 0.12 0.7286

87 mayor_ev Did the mayor participate in the decision to

evacuate?

50 1 2.0558 0.11 0.7346

88 ena_fctr Was Ethnicity, nationality, or age important? 42 1 8.0793 0.11 0.7433

89 prox_npp Proximity to a commercial nuclear power plant

(km)

50 2 2.3497 0.56 0.7570

90 aware_evac Level of community awareness with evacuation

procedures

50 2 5.1875 0.48 0.7860

91 fsfe Full Scale Field Exercise Immediately prior to

Evacuation

48 1 0.7603 0.05 0.8166

92 evac_plan Did the emergency plan contain an evacuation

section?

43 1 5.5015 0.04 0.8426

93 lu_residential Residential Land Use 49 1 0.1747 0.03 0.8703

94 telephone Was communication between field emergency

responders and EOC by telephone?

50 1 2.9855 0.03 0.8711

95 telephone_pn Was the public notified by telephone? 49 1 1.7498 0.02 0.8747

96 lu_Industrial Industrial Land Use 49 1 1.8313 0.02 0.8930

97 cell_phone Was communication between field emergency

responders and EOC by cell phone?

50 1 2.0194 0.01 0.9042

98 pager Was communication between field emergency

responders and EOC by pager?

50 1 1.7542 0.01 0.9243

99 comm Community 50 2 4.6091 0.15 0.9294

100 state_npp Is the community located in a state that contains

a nuclear power plant?

50 1 1.0813 0.01 0.9316

101 shad_evac Did people evacuate from areas outside the

designated evacuation area?

42 1 1.1778 0.01 0.9350

102 police_chief_ev Did the police chief participate in the decision to

evacuate?

50 1 5.3852 0.01 0.9402

103 other_ev Did other participate in the decision to evacuate? 50 1 0.5610 0.00 0.9456

104 plan_used Was the plan used in this emergency? 45 1 3.4162 0.00 0.9739

105 em_mgr_ev Did emergency managers participate in the

decision to evacuate?

50 1 3.4133 0.00 0.9859

106 shl_per What percent of evacuees went to congregate

care centers?

26 1 43.0944 0.00 0.9893
F-10
G-1

APPENDIX G

CROSS TABULATIONS WITH EVACUATION EFFICIENCY

SCORE FOR SIGNIFICANTLY ASSOCIATED VARIABLES
G-2
G-3

CONTENTS

Table G-1. Traffic Accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-5

Table G-2. Reentry Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-5

Table G-3. Deaths from Hazard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-6

Table G-4. Evacuation Injuries by Score . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-7

Table G-5. National Guard Use by Score . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-7

Table G-6. Instances of Looting or Vandalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-8

Table G-7. Early Evacuations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-8

Table G-8. Fire Chief Participation in Reentry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-9

Table G-9. Refusals to Evacuate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-9

Table G-10. Previous Hazard Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-10

Table G-11. Use of Schools as Congregate Care Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-10

Table G-12. Evacuation Deaths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-11

Table G-13. Use of Public Buildings as Congregate Care Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-11

Table G-14. Management of Congregate Care Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-12

Table G-15. Participation of Mayor in Reentry Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-13

Table G-16. Public Notification of NOAA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-13

Table G-17. Type of Hazard that Led to Evacuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-14

Table G-18. Elapsed Time Between Start of Hazard and Evacuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-15

Table G-19. Unavailability of Roadways for Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-16

Table G-20. Use of Emergency Operations Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-16

Table G-21. Total Time to Complete Evacuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-17

Table G-22. Notification by Door to Door . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-19

Table G-23. Evacuation of One or More Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-19

Table G-24. Population Density . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-20

Table G-25. Regular Conduct of Emergency Drills/Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-21

Table G-26. Extent of Evacuation in km2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-22

Table G-27. Whether Area Is More Prone to Hazards than Average . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-23

Table G-28. Level of Community Awareness of Alerting Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-23
G-4
G-5

Table G-1. Traffic Accidents

Table of traff_accid by scorec

traff_accid (Were there

traffic accidents during the

evacuations?) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

Unknown 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

3

6.00

50.00

14.29

2

4.00

33.33

25.00

1

2.00

16.67

20.00

6

12.00

No 16

32.00

40.00

100.00

18

36.00

45.00

85.71

5

10.00

12.50

62.50

1

2.00

2.50

20.00

40

80.00

Yes 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

25.00

12.50

3

6.00

75.00

60.00

4

8.00

Total 16

32.00

21

42.00

8

16.00

5

10.00

50

100.00

Table G-2. Reentry Process

Table of rentr_proc by scorec

rentr_proc (Describe the 

Re-entry Process) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

Unknown 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

100.00

20.00

1

2.00

Controlled Phased 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

3

6.00

33.33

14.29

3

6.00

33.33

37.50

3

6.00

33.33

60.00

9

18.00

No special controls 16

32.00

40.00

100.00

18

36.00

45.00

85.71

5

10.00

12.50

62.50

1

2.00

2.50

20.00

40

80.00

Total 16

32.00

21

42.00

8

16.00

5

10.00

50

100.00
G-6

Table G-3. Deaths from Hazard

Table of h_death by scorec

h_death (Number of 

deaths from hazard) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

0 14

28.00

31.82

87.50

21

42.00

47.73

100.00

6

12.00

13.64

75.00

3

6.00

6.82

60.00

44

88.00

1 2

4.00

100.00

12.50

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

2

4.00

3 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

100.00

12.50

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

15 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

100.00

12.50

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

25 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

100.00

20.00

1

2.00

2823 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

100.00

20.00

1

2.00

Total 16

32.00

21

42.00

8

16.00

5

10.00

50

100.00
G-7

Table G-4. Evacuation Injuries by Score

Table of evac_inj by scorec

evac_inj (Number of injuries

caused by the evacuation) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

Unknown 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

33.33

4.76

1

2.00

33.33

12.50

1

2.00

33.33

20.00

3

6.00

0 16

32.00

35.56

100.00

20

40.00

44.44

95.24

7

14.00

15.56

87.50

2

4.00

4.44

40.00

45

90.00

1 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

100.00

20.00

1

2.00

35 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

100.00

20.00

1

2.00

Total 16

32.00

21

42.00

8

16.00

5

10.00

50

100.00

Table G-5. National Guard Use by Score

Table of nat_guard by scorec

nat_guard (Was the National

Guard used for law

enforcement?) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

No 15

30.00

36.59

93.75

19

38.00

46.34

90.48

5

10.00

12.20

62.50

2

4.00

4.88

40.00

41

82.00

Yes 1

2.00

11.11

6.25

2

4.00

22.22

9.52

3

6.00

33.33

37.50

3

6.00

33.33

60.00

9

18.00

Total 16

32.00

21

42.00

8

16.00

5

10.00

50

100.00
G-8

Table G-6. Instances of Looting or Vandalism

Table of loot_vand by scorec

loot_vand (Were there any

instances of looting or

vandalism?) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

No 16

32.00

35.56

100.00

20

40.00

44.44

95.24

6

12.00

13.33

75.00

3

6.00

6.67

60.00

45

90.00

Yes 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

20.00

4.76

2

4.00

40.00

25.00

2

4.00

40.00

40.00

5

10.00

Total 16

32.00

21

42.00

8

16.00

5

10.00

50

100.00

Table G-7. Early Evacuations

Table of early_evac by scorec

early_evac (Did some people

spontaneously evacuate

before being told to do so?) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

Unknown 3

6.00

42.86

18.75

1

2.00

14.29

4.76

3

6.00

42.86

37.50

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

7

14.00

No 10

20.00

47.62

62.50

9

18.00

42.86

42.86

1

2.00

4.76

12.50

1

2.00

4.76

20.00

21

42.00

Yes 3

6.00

13.64

18.75

11

22.00

50.00

52.38

4

8.00

18.18

50.00

4

8.00

18.18

80.00

22

44.00

Total 16

32.00

21

42.00

8

16.00

5

10.00

50

100.00
G-9

Table G-8. Fire Chief Participation in Reentry

Table of fire_chief_re by scorec

fire_chief_re (Did the fire

chief participate in the

authorization for re-entry?) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

Unknown 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

100.00

12.50

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

No 5

10.00

18.52

31.25

13

26.00

48.15

61.90

4

8.00

14.81

50.00

5

10.00

18.52

100.00

27

54.00

Yes 11

22.00

50.00

68.75

8

16.00

36.36

38.10

3

6.00

13.64

37.50

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

22

44.00

Total 16

32.00

21

42.00

8

16.00

5

10.00

50

100.00

Table G-9. Refusals to Evacuate

Table of refus_evac by scorec

refus_evac (Did anyone

refuse to evacuate?) scorec

Total

Frequency

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

Unknown 3

6.00

100.00

18.75

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

3

6.00

No 10

20.00

47.62

62.50

7

14.00

33.33

33.33

3

6.00

14.29

37.50

1

2.00

4.76

20.00

21

42.00

Yes 3

6.00

11.54

18.75

14

28.00

53.85

66.67

5

10.00

19.23

62.50

4

8.00

15.38

80.00

26

52.00

Total 16

32.00

21

42.00

8

16.00

5

10.00

50

100.00
G-10

Table G-10. Previous Hazard Experience

Table of haz_exp by scorec

haz_exp (Has the community

had any experience with the

hazard?) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

Unknown 1

2.00

100.00

6.25

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

No 11

22.00

45.83

68.75

9

18.00

37.50

42.86

3

6.00

12.50

37.50

1

2.00

4.17

20.00

24

48.00

Yes 4

8.00

16.00

25.00

12

24.00

48.00

57.14

5

10.00

20.00

62.50

4

8.00

16.00

80.00

25

50.00

Total 16

32.00

21

42.00

8

16.00

5

10.00

50

100.00

Table G-11. Use of Schools as Congregate Care Centers

Table of schools by scorec

schools (Were schools used

as congregate care centers?) scorec

Total

Frequency

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

Unknown 5

10.00

45.45

31.25

5

10.00

45.45

23.81

1

2.00

9.09

12.50

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

11

22.00

No 2

4.00

25.00

12.50

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

3

6.00

37.50

37.50

3

6.00

37.50

60.00

8

16.00

Yes 9

18.00

29.03

56.25

16

32.00

51.61

76.19

4

8.00

12.90

50.00

2

4.00

6.45

40.00

31

62.00

Total 16

32.00

21

42.00

8

16.00

5

10.00

50

100.00
G-11

Table G-12. Evacuation Deaths

Table of evac_death by scorec

evac_death (Number of

deaths caused by the

evacuation) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

Unknown 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

100.00

20.00

1

2.00

0 16

32.00

33.33

100.00

21

42.00

43.75

100.00

8

16.00

16.67

100.00

3

6.00

6.25

60.00

48

96.00

19 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

100.00

20.00

1

2.00

Total 16

32.00

21

42.00

8

16.00

5

10.00

50

100.00

Table G-13. Use of Public Schools as Congregate Care Centers

Table of public_bldg by scorec

public_bldg (Were public

buildings used as congregate

care centers?) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

Unknown 5

10.00

45.45

31.25

5

10.00

45.45

23.81

1

2.00

9.09

12.50

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

11

22.00

No 10

20.00

32.26

62.50

14

28.00

45.16

66.67

5

10.00

16.13

62.50

2

4.00

6.45

40.00

31

62.00

Yes 1

2.00

12.50

6.25

2

4.00

25.00

9.52

2

4.00

25.00

25.00

3

6.00

37.50

60.00

8

16.00

Total 16

32.00

21

42.00

8

16.00

5

10.00

50

100.00
G-12

Table G-14. Management of Congregate Care Center

Table of mgmt_shelter by scorec

mgmt_shelter (Who

managed the congregate care

centers?) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

Unknown 5

10.00

45.45

31.25

5

10.00

45.45

23.81

1

2.00

9.09

12.50

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

11

22.00

City 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

100.00

12.50

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

Civil Defense 2

4.00

100.00

12.50

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

2

4.00

Other 4

8.00

66.67

25.00

1

2.00

16.67

4.76

1

2.00

16.67

12.50

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

6

12.00

Red Cross 5

10.00

20.83

31.25

10

20.00

41.67

47.62

5

10.00

20.83

62.50

4

8.00

16.67

80.00

24

48.00

Red Cross, Other 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

5

10.00

83.33

23.81

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

16.67

20.00

6

12.00

Total 16

32.00

21

42.00

8

16.00

5

10.00

50

100.00
G-13

Table G-15. Participation of Mayor in Reentry Authorization

Table of mayor_re by scorec

mayor_re (Did the mayor

participate in the

authorization for re-entry?) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

Unknown 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

100.00

12.50

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

No 15

30.00

34.88

93.75

20

40.00

46.51

95.24

5

10.00

11.63

62.50

3

6.00

6.98

60.00

43

86.00

Yes 1

2.00

16.67

6.25

1

2.00

16.67

4.76

2

4.00

33.33

25.00

2

4.00

33.33

40.00

6

12.00

Total 16

32.00

21

42.00

8

16.00

5

10.00

50

100.00

Table G-16. Public Notification by NOAA

Table of noaa_pn by scorec

noaa_pn (Was the public

notified by NOAA?) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

Unknown 1

2.00

100.00

6.25

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

No 15

30.00

31.25

93.75

21

42.00

43.75

100.00

8

16.00

16.67

100.00

4

8.00

8.33

80.00

48

96.00

Yes 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

100.00

20.00

1

2.00

Total 16

32.00

21

42.00

8

16.00

5

10.00

50

100.00
G-14

Table G-17. Type of Hazard that Led to Evacuation

Table of haz_type by scorec

haz_type (Hazard that led to

evacuation) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

Natural Disaster 1

2.00

7.14

6.25

7

14.00

50.00

33.33

3

6.00

21.43

37.50

3

6.00

21.43

60.00

14

28.00

Malevolent Act 1

2.00

33.33

6.25

1

2.00

33.33

4.76

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

33.33

20.00

3

6.00

Technological Hazard 14

28.00

42.42

87.50

13

26.00

39.39

61.90

5

10.00

15.15

62.50

1

2.00

3.03

20.00

33

66.00

Total 16

32.00

21

42.00

8

16.00

5

10.00

50

100.00
G-15

Table G-18. Elapsed Time Between Start of Hazard and Evacuation

Table of st_time by scorec

st_time (Elapsed time

between start of hazard and

decision to evacuate (hours)) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

Unknown 2

4.00

22.22

12.50

2

4.00

22.22

9.52

4

8.00

44.44

50.00

1

2.00

11.11

20.00

9

18.00

15 minutes or less 7

14.00

58.33

43.75

4

8.00

33.33

19.05

1

2.00

8.33

12.50

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

12

24.00

16 minutes to 1 hour 3

6.00

25.00

18.75

7

14.00

58.33

33.33

1

2.00

8.33

12.50

1

2.00

8.33

20.00

12

24.00

1-3 hours 3

6.00

37.50

18.75

3

6.00

37.50

14.29

1

2.00

12.50

12.50

1

2.00

12.50

20.00

8

16.00

4-10 hours 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

100.00

4.76

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

One - Two Days 1

2.00

20.00

6.25

2

4.00

40.00

9.52

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

2

4.00

40.00

40.00

5

10.00

Over Two Days 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

2

4.00

66.67

9.52

1

2.00

33.33

12.50

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

3

6.00

Total 16

32.00

21

42.00

8

16.00

5

10.00

50

100.00
G-16

Table G-19. Unavailability of Roadways for Use

Table of road_haz by scorec

road_haz (Were any major

roadways unavailable for

use?) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

Unknown 1

2.00

33.33

6.25

2

4.00

66.67

9.52

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

3

6.00

No 13

26.00

40.63

81.25

12

24.00

37.50

57.14

5

10.00

15.63

62.50

2

4.00

6.25

40.00

32

64.00

Yes 2

4.00

13.33

12.50

7

14.00

46.67

33.33

3

6.00

20.00

37.50

3

6.00

20.00

60.00

15

30.00

Total 16

32.00

21

42.00

8

16.00

5

10.00

50

100.00

Table G-20. Use of Emergency Operations Center

Table of eoc_used by scorec

eoc_used (Was an

Emergency Operations

Center (EOC) used?) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

Unknown 1

2.00

100.00

6.25

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

No 7

14.00

46.67

43.75

6

12.00

40.00

28.57

2

4.00

13.33

25.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

15

30.00

Yes 8

16.00

23.53

50.00

15

30.00

44.12

71.43

6

12.00

17.65

75.00

5

10.00

14.71

100.00

34

68.00

Total 16

32.00

21

42.00

8

16.00

5

10.00

50

100.00
G-17

Table G-21. Total Time to Complete Evacuation

Table of tot_time by scorec

tot_time (Time to complete

the evacuation (hours)) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

Unknown 2

4.00

15.38

12.50

6

12.00

46.15

28.57

3

6.00

23.08

37.50

2

4.00

15.38

40.00

13

26.00

0.33 1

2.00

100.00

6.25

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

0.6 1

2.00

50.00

6.25

1

2.00

50.00

4.76

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

2

4.00

0.66 1

2.00

100.00

6.25

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

0.75 1

2.00

33.33

6.25

2

4.00

66.67

9.52

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

3

6.00

1 3

6.00

42.86

18.75

3

6.00

42.86

14.29

1

2.00

14.29

12.50

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

7

14.00

1.5 1

2.00

33.33

6.25

1

2.00

33.33

4.76

1

2.00

33.33

12.50

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

3

6.00

2 5

10.00

83.33

31.25

1

2.00

16.67

4.76

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

6

12.00

3 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

100.00

4.76

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

3.5 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

100.00

4.76

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00
G-18

Table G-21. Total Time to Complete Evacuation (continued)

Table of tot_time by scorec

tot_time (Time to

complete the evacuation

(hours)) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

4 1

2.00

25.00

6.25

1

2.00

25.00

4.76

1

2.00

25.00

12.50

1

2.00

25.00

20.00

4

8.00

6 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

2

4.00

100.00

40.00

24.00

8 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

50.00

4.76

1

2.00

50.00

12.50

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

24.00

12 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

100.00

12.50

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

12.00

14 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

100.00

4.76

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

12.00

17 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

100.00

4.76

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

22 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

100.00

4.76

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

Total 16

32.00

21

42.00

8

16.00

5

10.00

50

100.00
G-19

Table G-22. Notification by Door to Door

Table of door_door_pn by scorec

door_door_pn (Was the

public notified door-todoor?) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

Unknown 1

2.00

100.00

6.25

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

No 3

6.00

20.00

18.75

6

12.00

40.00

28.57

2

4.00

13.33

25.00

4

8.00

26.67

80.00

15

30.00

Yes 12

24.00

35.29

75.00

15

30.00

44.12

71.43

6

12.00

17.65

75.00

1

2.00

2.94

20.00

34

68.00

Total 16

32.00

21

42.00

8

16.00

5

10.00

50

100.00

Table G-23. Evacuation of One or More Institutions

Table of instevac by scorec

instevac (Was One or more

special institutions

evacuated?) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

Unknown 1

2.00

16.67

6.25

4

8.00

66.67

19.05

1

2.00

16.67

12.50

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

6

12.00

No 12

24.00

46.15

75.00

8

16.00

30.77

38.10

4

8.00

15.38

50.00

2

4.00

7.69

40.00

26

52.00

Yes 3

6.00

16.67

18.75

9

18.00

50.00

42.86

3

6.00

16.67

37.50

3

6.00

16.67

60.00

18

36.00

Total 16

32.00

21

42.00

8

16.00

5

10.00

50

100.00
G-20

Table G-24. Population Density

Table of pop_dens by scorec

pop_dens (Population

density during evacuation) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

Unknown 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

4

8.00

100.00

19.05

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

4

8.00

High 6

12.00

42.86

37.50

5

10.00

35.71

23.81

1

2.00

7.14

12.50

2

4.00

14.29

40.00

14

28.00

Low 1

2.00

12.50

6.25

2

4.00

25.00

9.52

3

6.00

37.50

37.50

2

4.00

25.00

40.00

8

16.00

Medium 9

18.00

37.50

56.25

10

20.00

41.67

47.62

4

8.00

16.67

50.00

1

2.00

4.17

20.00

24

48.00

Total 16

32.00

21

42.00

8

16.00

5

10.00

50

100.00
G-21

Table G-25. Regular Conduct of Emergency Drills/Exercises

Table of drills by scorec

drills (Do the community's

emergency response agencies

regularly conduct emergency

drills and exercises?) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

Unknown 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

100.00

4.76

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

No 5

10.00

71.43

31.25

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

2

4.00

28.57

25.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

7

14.00

Yes 11

22.00

26.19

68.75

20

40.00

47.62

95.24

6

12.00

14.29

75.00

5

10.00

11.90

100.00

42

84.00

Total 16

32.00

21

42.00

8

16.00

5

10.00

50

100.00
G-22

Table G-26. Extent of Evacuation in km2

Table of e_area by scorec

e_area (Evacuation Area in

km^2) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

Unknown 1

2.00

12.50

6.25

3

6.00

37.50

14.29

2

4.00

25.00

25.00

2

4.00

25.00

40.00

8

16.00

1-4.9 km^2 6

12.00

46.15

37.50

5

10.00

38.46

23.81

2

4.00

15.38

25.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

13

26.00

5-9.9 km^2 5

10.00

41.67

31.25

6

12.00

50.00

28.57

1

2.00

8.33

12.50

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

12

24.00

10-49.9 km^2 3

6.00

33.33

18.75

2

4.00

22.22

9.52

1

2.00

11.11

12.50

3

6.00

33.33

60.00

918.00

50-99.9 km^2 1

2.00

50.00

6.25

1

2.00

50.00

4.76

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

2

4.00

100-499 km^2 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

100.00

4.76

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

500-999 km^2 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

100.00

4.76

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

1000 or more km^2 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

2

4.00

50.00

9.52

2

4.00

50.00

25.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

4

8.00

Total 16

32.00

21

42.00

8

16.00

5

10.00

50

100.00
G-23

Table G-27. Whether Area Is More Prone to Hazards than Average

Table of prone_haz by scorec

prone_haz (Is the area more

prone to hazards than

average?) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

No 6

12.00

46.15

37.50

6

12.00

46.15

28.57

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

7.69

20.00

13

26.00

Yes 10

20.00

27.03

62.50

15

30.00

40.54

71.43

8

16.00

21.62

100.00

4

8.00

10.81

80.00

37

74.00

Total 16

32.00

21

42.00

8

16.00

5

10.00

50

100.00

Table G-28. Level of Community Awareness of Alerting Methods

Table of aware_alert by scorec

aware_alert (Level of

community awareness with

alerting methods used) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

Unknown 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

100.00

4.76

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

High 7

14.00

41.18

43.75

7

14.00

41.18

33.33

2

4.00

11.76

25.00

1

2.00

5.88

20.00

17

34.00

Low 2

4.00

20.00

12.50

2

4.00

20.00

9.52

4

8.00

40.00

50.00

2

4.00

20.00

40.00

10

20.00

Medium 7

14.00

31.82

43.75

11

22.00

50.00

52.38

2

4.00

9.09

25.00

2

4.00

9.09

40.00

22

44.00

Total 16

32.00

21

42.00

8

16.00

5

10.00

50

100.00
G-24
H-1

APPENDIX H

P-VALUES FOR TESTS OF EACH VARIABLE’S ASSOCIATION

WITH HAZARD-TYPE CATEGORICAL VARIABLES TESTED 

USING FISHER'S EXACT TEST AND CONTINUOUS VARIABLES 

TESTED USING THE EXACT MEDIAN TEST
H-2
H-3

CONTENTS

Table H-1. P-values for Tests of Each Variable’s Association With Hazard-type Categorical

Variables Tested Using Fisher's Exact Test and Continuous Variables Tested 

Using the Exact Median Test .............................................................................. H-5
H-4
H-5

Table H-1. P-values for Tests of Each Variable’s Association With Hazard-type

Categorical Variables Tested Using Fisher's Exact Test and Continuous Variables

Tested Using the Exact Median Test

Obs Variable Question Test n p-value

1 haz_type Hazard that led to evacuation Fisher's Exact 50 0.00000

2 fire_chief_re Did the fire chief participate in the authorization for reentry?

Fisher's Exact 49 0.00000

3 haz_exp Has the community had any experience with the hazard? Fisher's Exact 49 0.00001

4 fire_chief_ev Did the fire chief participate in the decision to evacuate? Fisher's Exact 50 0.00002

5 aware_ehaz Level of community awareness with hazard that caused

evacuation

Fisher's Exact 50 0.00002

6 comm_type Type of Community Fisher's Exact 50 0.00008

7 nat_guard Was the National Guard used for law enforcement? Fisher's Exact 50 0.00033

8 eoc_used Emergency Operations Center (EOC) used Fisher's Exact 49 0.00093

9 nevac Number of Evacuations Exact Median 49 0.00140

10 govt_type Form of Government Fisher's Exact 50 0.00151

11 lu_residential Residential Land Use Fisher's Exact 49 0.00173

12 icp_used Field (incident) command post used Fisher's Exact 50 0.00197

13 tot_time Time to complete the evacuation (hours) Exact Median 37 0.00203

14 early_evac Did some people spontaneously evacuate before being told

to do so?

Fisher's Exact 43 0.00221

15 e_area Evacuation Area in km^2 Exact Median 42 0.00242

16 refus_evac Did anyone refuse to evacuate? Fisher's Exact 47 0.00432

17 police Were the Police used for law enforcement? Fisher's Exact 50 0.00574

18 revlan_used Was reverse-laning used? Fisher's Exact 46 0.00716

19 shad_traff Did this cause an impact on traffic? Fisher's Exact 42 0.00837

20 evac_instruct Were people given specific instructions about where to go

when they evacuated?

Fisher's Exact 46 0.00916

21 other_re Did other people participate in the authorization for reentry?

Fisher's Exact 49 0.01100

22 other_ev Did other people participate in the decision to evacuate? Fisher's Exact 50 0.01487

23 bdry_crss Were political boundaries crossed (i.e., more than one

county or state involved)?

Fisher's Exact 45 0.01694

24 shltr_used Were congregate care centers used? Fisher's Exact 48 0.01807
H-6

Table H-1. P-values for Tests of Each Variable’s Association With Hazard-type

 Categorical Variables Tested Using Fisher's Exact Test and Continuous Variables

Tested Using the Exact Median Test (continued)

Obs Variable Question Test n p-value

25 c_area Community Area in km^2 Exact Median 49 0.01850

26 aware_evac Level of community awareness with evacuation procedures Fisher's Exact 50 0.02097

27 st_time Elapsed time between start of hazard and decision to

evacuate (hours)

Exact Median 41 0.02259

28 aware_lhaz Level of community awareness with local hazards Fisher's Exact 50 0.02343

29 h_death Number of deaths from hazard Exact Median 50 0.02500

30 telephone Was communication between field emergency responders

and EOC by telephone?

Fisher's Exact 50 0.02942

31 aware_alert Level of community awareness with alerting methods used Fisher's Exact 49 0.03261

32 comm Community Fisher's Exact 50 0.03584

33 off_notif How were senior local officials notified of the incident? Fisher's Exact 45 0.04035

34 resp_time ET between discovery of the incident and mobilization

(minutes)

Fisher's Exact 42 0.04353

35 pevac Percent Evacuated Exact Median 48 0.04602

36 loot_vand Were there any instances of looting or vandalism? Fisher's Exact 50 0.05843

37 coop_level Level of cooperation between local, state, and federal

agencies

Fisher's Exact 49 0.05874

38 pop_dens Population density during evacuation Fisher's Exact 46 0.06067

39 plan_tested Was the emergency plan used in this evacuation previously

tested in a full-scale field exercise?

Fisher's Exact 40 0.08698

40 governor_ev Did the governor participate in the decision to evacuate? Fisher's Exact 50 0.11102

41 prone_haz Is the area more prone to hazards than average? Fisher's Exact 50 0.11580

42 em_mgr_re Did the emergency manager participate in the authorization

for re-entry?

Fisher's Exact 49 0.12096

43 road_haz Were any major roadways unavailable for use? Fisher's Exact 47 0.12761

44 multiple_re Did multiple people participate in the authorization for reentry?

Fisher's Exact 49 0.13259

45 lu_agricultural Agricultural land use Fisher's Exact 49 0.13705

46 traff_accid Were there traffic accidents during the evacuations? Fisher's Exact 44 0.15938

47 mgmt_shelter Who managed the congregate care centers? Fisher's Exact 39 0.17763

48 mayor_ev Did the mayor participate in the decision to evacuate? Fisher's Exact 50 0.19128

49 shad_evac Did people evacuate from areas outside the designated

evacuation area?

Fisher's Exact 42 0.19939

50 public_bldg Were public buildings used as congregate care centers? Fisher's Exact 39 0.21255

51 evac_route Were people told to use specific routes? Fisher's Exact 46 0.22192
Table H-1. P-values for Tests of Each Variable’s Association With Hazard-type

 Categorical Variables Tested Using Fisher's Exact Test and Continuous Variables

Tested Using the Exact Median Test (continued)

Obs Variable Question Test n p-value

H-7

52 rentr_proc Describe the re-entry process Fisher's Exact 49 0.22430

53 police_chief_re Did the police chief participate in the authorization for reentry?

Fisher's Exact 49 0.23043

54 prox_npp Proximity to a commercial nuclear power plant (km) Fisher's Exact 50 0.26288

55 em_mgr_ev Did emergency managers participate in the decision to

evacuate?

Fisher's Exact 50 0.27511

56 schools Were schools used as congregate care centers? Fisher's Exact 39 0.27991

57 route_design How were these routes designated Fisher's Exact 27 0.28917

58 pnum Population Exact Median 50 0.31943

59 evac_death Number of deaths caused by the evacuation Exact Median 49 0.32653

60 state_npp Is the community located in a state that contains a nuclear

power plant?

Fisher's Exact 50 0.34086

61 ebs_pn Was the public notified by an emergency broadcast

system?

Fisher's Exact 49 0.34694

62 noaa_pn Was the public notified by NOAA? Fisher's Exact 49 0.34694

63 h_inj Number of injuries from hazard Exact Median 48 0.35151

64 sirens_pn Was the public notified by a siren? Fisher's Exact 49 0.37232

65 instevac Were one or more special institutions evacuated? Fisher's Exact 44 0.40269

66 ete Was there an Evacuation Time Estimate (ETE) in the plan? Fisher's Exact 14 0.42857

67 alert_exp Did the community have previous experience with the

alerting mechanism?

Fisher's Exact 40 0.43042

68 mayor_re Did the mayor participate in the authorization for re-entry? Fisher's Exact 49 0.43527

69 radio_tv_pn Was the public notified by radio/TV? Fisher's Exact 49 0.44203

70 door_door_pn Was the public notified door-to-door? Fisher's Exact 49 0.45661

71 telephone_pn Was the public notified by telephone? Fisher's Exact 49 0.45819

72 exp_comp Were evacuees compensated for their expenses? Fisher's Exact 46 0.50881

73 em_plan Did the community have a written emergency plan? Fisher's Exact 50 0.62286

74 joint_training Is joint training between industry and government regularly

conducted?

Fisher's Exact 48 0.66791

75 lu_industrial Industrial land use Fisher's Exact 49 0.67834

76 unus_circ Other unusual circumstances Fisher's Exact 28 0.71146

77 time_day Time of Day Fisher's Exact 50 0.72562

78 conform_nureg Did the plan conform to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1,

Rev_ 1?

Fisher's Exact 22 0.73463
Table H-1. P-values for Tests of Each Variable’s Association With Hazard-type

 Categorical Variables Tested Using Fisher's Exact Test and Continuous Variables

Tested Using the Exact Median Test (continued)

Obs Variable Question Test n p-value

H-8

79 ena_fctr Was ethnicity, nationality, or age important? Fisher's Exact 42 0.73790

80 police_chief_ev Did the police chief participate in the decision to evacuate? Fisher's Exact 50 0.73981

81 churches Were churches used as congregate care centers? Fisher's Exact 39 0.78375

82 drills Do the community's emergency response agencies

regularly conduct emergency drills and exercises?

Fisher's Exact 49 0.78449

83 staged Was the evacuation staged? Fisher's Exact 50 0.78609

84 multiple_sh Were multiple buildings used as congregate care centers? Fisher's Exact 39 0.82016

85 exerc_type If so, what type of exercise was performed immediately

prior to this evacuation? 

Fisher's Exact 21 0.89998

86 evac_exp Has the community experienced evacuations in previous

ten years?

Fisher's Exact 48 0.90005

87 lu_retail Retail land use Fisher's Exact 49 1.00000

88 lu_commercial Commercial land use Fisher's Exact 49 1.00000

89 pa_system_pn Was the public notified by a PA system? Fisher's Exact 49 1.00000

90 evac_plan Did the emergency plan contain an evacuation section? Fisher's Exact 43 1.00000

91 multiple_pn Was the public notified by multiple methods? Fisher's Exact 49 1.00000

92 evac_inj Number of injuries caused by the evacuation Exact Median 47 1.00000

93 multiple Was communication between field emergency responders

and EOC by multiple ways?

Fisher's Exact 50 1.00000

94 road_dry Road conditions prior to evacuation Fisher's Exact 48 1.00000

95 spec_char Were there any special characteristics? Fisher's Exact 48 1.00000

96 plan_used Was the plan used in this emergency? Fisher's Exact 45 1.00000

97 ccc_proc Command, control and coordination processes Fisher's Exact 50 1.00000

98 cond_good Road conditions/weather conditions Fisher's Exact 43 1.00000

99 cell_phone Was communication between field emergency responders

and EOC by cell phone?

Fisher's Exact 50 1.00000

100 er_notif How were emergency responders notified of the incident? Fisher's Exact 44 1.00000

101 multiple_ev Did multiple people participate in the decision to

evacuate?

Fisher's Exact 50 1.00000

102 other Were other buildings used as congregate care centers? Fisher's Exact 40 1.00000

103 pager Was communication between field emergency responders

and EOC by pager?

Fisher's Exact 50 1.00000

104 radio Was communication between field emergency responders

and EOC by radio?

Fisher's Exact 50 1.00000
I-1

APPENDIX I

CHI-SQUARE VALUES FOR LIKELIHOOD RATIO 

TESTS OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN EACH 

VARIABLE AND EVACUATION EFFICIENCY SCORE 

AFTER ADJUSTING FOR HAZARD TYPE
I-2
I-3

CONTENTS

Table I-1. Chi-Square Values for Likelihood Ratio Tests of Association Between Each 

Variable and Evacuation Efficiency Score After Adjusting for Hazard Type . . . . I-5
I-4
I-5

Table I-1. Chi-Square Values for Likelihood Ratio Tests of Association Between Each

Variable and Evacuation Efficiency Score After Adjusting for Hazard Type

Variable Variable Label n DF

Deviance

Statistic P2

pvalue

1 rentr_proc Describe the re-entry process 49 1 199.4046 12.40 0.0004

2 traff_accid Were there traffic accidents during the

evacuations?

44 1 169.3717 11.76 0.0006

3 aware_alert Level of community awareness with alerting

methods used

49 2 206.4430 13.33 0.0013

4 evac_inj Number of injuries caused by the evacuation 47 1 195.8641 10.33 0.0013

5 h_death Number of deaths from hazard 50 1 217.6996 9.44 0.0021

6 schools Were schools used as congregate care centers? 39 1 170.3390 5.66 0.0174

7 mayor_re Did the mayor participate in the authorization for

re-entry?

49 1 216.1739 5.58 0.0181

8 loot_vand Were there any instances of looting or

vandalism?

50 1 226.1756 5.21 0.0225

9 early_evac Did some people spontaneously evacuate before

being told to do so?

43 1 184.3282 4.55 0.0330

10 refus_evac Did anyone refuse to evacuate? 47 1 216.6778 4.27 0.0388

11 public_bldg Were public buildings used as congregate care

centers?

39 1 174.1760 3.74 0.0532

12 multiple_sh Were multiple buildings used as congregate care

centers?

39 1 174.1827 3.73 0.0533

13 door_door_pn Was the public notified door-to-door? 49 1 225.6766 3.66 0.0559

14 evac_death Number of deaths caused by the evacuation 49 1 217.9320 3.63 0.0566

15 noaa_pn Was the public notified by NOAA? 49 1 226.2767 3.36 0.0670

16 nat_guard Was the National Guard used for law

enforcement?

50 1 230.2581 3.17 0.0752

17 mgmt_shelter Who managed the congregate care centers? 39 4 165.7099 8.22 0.0839

18 h_inj Number of injuries from hazard 48 1 214.7581 2.67 0.1024

19 spec_char Were there any special characteristics? 48 1 215.4062 2.67 0.1024

20 instevac Were one or more special institutions evacuated? 44 1 207.0517 2.59 0.1078

21 aware_evac Level of community awareness with evacuation

procedures

50 2 228.0223 4.28 0.1175

22 churches Were churches used as congregate care centers? 39 1 177.0526 2.30 0.1295

23 road_haz Were any major roadways unavailable for use? 47 1 221.7815 2.24 0.1347

24 drills Do the community's emergency response

agencies regularly conduct emergency drills and

exercises?

49 1 228.3709 2.19 0.1389

25 multiple_ev Did multiple people participate in the decision

to evacuate?

50 1 232.7491 1.92 0.1659
I-6

Table I-1. Chi-Square Values for Likelihood Ratio Tests of Association Between Each

Variable and Evacuation Efficiency Score After Adjusting for Hazard Type (continued)

Variable Variable Label n DF

Deviance

Statistic P2

pvalue

26 radio Was communication between field emergency

responders and EOC by radio?

50 1 232.8356 1.88 0.1707

27 aware_lhaz Level of community awareness with local

hazards

50 2 230.0096 3.29 0.1930

28 haz_exp Has the community had any experience with the

hazard?

49 1 229.9653 1.51 0.2189

29 alert_exp Did the community have previous experience

with the alerting mechanism?

40 1 186.4828 1.43 0.2323

30 shad_evac Did people evacuate from areas outside the

designated evacuation area?

42 1 189.7794 1.41 0.2343

31 pop_dens Population density during evacuation 46 2 214.7714 2.88 0.2366

32 unus_circ Other unusual circumstances 28 1 131.0810 1.35 0.2454

33 lu_Retail Retail Land Use 49 1 228.4968 1.29 0.2559

34 other_ev Did other people participate in the decision to

evacuate?

50 1 234.0418 1.27 0.2591

35 time_day Time of Day 50 1 234.0529 1.27 0.2601

36 pa_system_pn Was the public notified by a PA system? 49 1 230.5170 1.24 0.2663

37 staged Was the evacuation staged? 50 1 234.1666 1.21 0.2711

38 fire_chief_re Did the fire chief participate in the authorization

for re-entry?

49 1 224.9717 1.18 0.2768

39 prone_haz Is the area more prone to hazards than average? 50 1 234.2903 1.15 0.2837

40 off_notif How were senior local officials notified of the

incident?

45 10 189.9607 11.87 0.2942

41 evac_exp Has the community experienced evacuations in

the previous ten years?

48 1 227.4132 1.09 0.2956

42 resp_time ET between discovery of the incident and

mobilization (minutes)

42 2 192.1269 2.40 0.3014

43 er_notif How were emergency responders notified of the

incident?

44 3 202.2238 3.65 0.3019

44 route_design How were these routes designated? 27 2 103.3675 2.25 0.3249

45 conform_nureg Did the plan conform to NUREG-0654/FEMAREP-1, Rev_ 1?22 1 104.8101 0.95 0.3299

46 sirens_pn Was the public notified by a siren? 49 1 231.2000 0.89 0.3443

47 ete Was there an Evacuation Time Estimate (ETE)

in the plan?

14 1 68.8740 0.87 0.3496

48 other Were other buildings used as congregate care

centers?

40 1 183.2163 0.83 0.3629

49 multiple_pn Was the public notified by multiple methods? 49 1 231.4656 0.76 0.3829

50 c_area Community Area in km^2 49 1 110.0815 0.75 0.3870

51 eoc_used Was an Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

used?

49 1 231.5358 0.73 0.3941
Table I-1. Chi-Square Values for Likelihood Ratio Tests of Association Between Each

Variable and Evacuation Efficiency Score After Adjusting for Hazard Type (continued)

Variable Variable Label n DF

Deviance

Statistic P2

pvalue

I-7

52 st_time Elapsed time between start of hazard and

decision to evacuate (hours)

41 1 183.8800 0.69 0.4050

53 comm_type Type of Community 50 3 230.8689 2.86 0.4137

54 aware_ehaz Level of community awareness with hazard that

caused evacuation

50 2 233.0644 1.76 0.4143

55 telephone Was communication between field emergency

responders and EOC by telephone?

50 1 235.2622 0.66 0.4153

56 prox_npp Proximity to a commercial nuclear power plant

(km)

50 2 233.0792 1.75 0.4158

57 ccc_proc Command, control and coordination processes 50 1 235.2679 0.66 0.4164

58 other_re Did other people participate in the authorization

for re-entry?

49 1 226.0867 0.63 0.4291

59 exp_comp Were evacuees compensated for their expenses? 46 1 212.7030 0.62 0.4326

60 pnum Population 50 1 114.9078 0.61 0.4332

61 em_mgr_ev Did emergency managers participate in the

decision to evacuate?

50 1 235.3817 0.60 0.4372

62 evac_instruct Were people given specific instructions about

where to go when they evacuated?

46 1 215.9498 0.54 0.4610

63 state_npp Is community located in a state that contains a

nuclear power plant?

50 1 235.6393 0.47 0.4907

64 mayor_ev Did the mayor participate in the decision to

evacuate?

50 1 235.7004 0.44 0.5050

65 coop_level Level of cooperation between local, state, and

federal agencies

49 1 231.9532 0.40 0.5279

66 lu_Commercial Commercial Land Use 49 1 230.3341 0.37 0.5418

67 shltr_used Were congregate care centers used? 48 1 228.4826 0.36 0.5478

68 icp_used Was a field (incident) command post used? 50 1 235.8784 0.36 0.5511

69 exerc_type If so, what type of exercise was performed

immediately prior to this evacuation?

21 4 82.8150 3.02 0.5552

70 telephone_pn Was the public notified by telephone? 49 1 232.2996 0.34 0.5573

71 pevac Percent Evacuated 48 1 213.9769 0.34 0.5620

72 multiple_re Did multiple people participate in the

authorization for re-entry?

49 1 226.7607 0.29 0.5913

73 ebs_pn Was the public notified by an emergency

broadcast system?

49 1 232.4802 0.25 0.6142

74 em_plan Did the community have a written emergency

plan?

50 1 236.1064 0.24 0.6232

75 road_dry Road conditions prior to evacuation 48 1 229.2839 0.24 0.6273

76 cond_good Road conditions/weather conditions 43 1 201.0677 0.21 0.6487

77 multiple Was communication between field emergency

responders and EOC by multiple ways?

50 1 236.2370 0.18 0.6748
Table I-1. Chi-Square Values for Likelihood Ratio Tests of Association Between Each

Variable and Evacuation Efficiency Score After Adjusting for Hazard Type (continued)

Variable Variable Label n DF

Deviance

Statistic P2

pvalue

I-8

78 pager Was communication between field emergency

responders and EOC by pager?

50 1 236.2385 0.18 0.6754

79 joint_training Is joint training between industry and

government regularly conducted?

48 1 226.0342 0.14 0.7078

80 shl_per What percent of evacuees went to congregate

care centers?

26 1 114.4758 0.13 0.7160

81 lu_Industrial Industrial Land Use 49 1 230.8281 0.13 0.7235

82 plan_used Was the plan used in this emergency? 45 1 210.3203 0.10 0.7502

83 cell_phone Was communication between field emergency

responders and EOC by cell phone?

50 1 236.3896 0.10 0.7521

84 evac_route Were people told to use specific routes? 46 1 222.3079 0.06 0.8017

85 tot_time Time to complete the evacuation (hours) 37 1 167.2206 0.06 0.8024

86 fire_chief_ev Did the fire chief participate in the decision to

evacuate?

50 1 236.4868 0.05 0.8210

87 evac_plan Did the emergency plan contain an evacuation

section?

43 1 197.6525 0.05 0.8214

88 bdry_crss Were political boundaries crossed (i_e_, more

than one county or state involved)?

45 1 203.8249 0.05 0.8243

89 police_chief_ev Did the police chief participate in the decision to

evacuate?

50 1 236.5155 0.04 0.8478

90 police_chief_re Did the police chief participate in the

authorization for re-entry?

49 1 227.2689 0.03 0.8533

91 em_mgr_re Did the emergency manager participate in the

authorization for re-entry?

49 1 227.2704 0.03 0.8549

92 ena_fctr Was ethnicity, nationality, or age important? 42 1 194.4006 0.03 0.8710

93 radio_tv_pn Was the public notified by radio/TV? 49 1 232.9404 0.02 0.8770

94 police Were the police used for law enforcement? 50 1 236.5552 0.02 0.8963

95 lu_residential Residential Land Use 49 1 231.0523 0.01 0.9089

96 shad_traff Did this cause an impact on traffic? 42 1 192.5901 0.01 0.9244

97 plan_tested Was the emergency plan used in this evacuation

previously tested in a full-scale field exercise?

40 1 190.7405 0.00 0.9588

98 revlan_used Was reverse-laning used? 46 1 208.0585 0.00 0.9621

99 governor_ev Did the governor participate in the decision to

evacuate?

50 1 236.5852 0.00 0.9644

100 lu_Agricultural Agricultural Land Use 49 1 231.0746 0.00 0.9647

101 e_area Evacuation Area in km^2 42 1 184.4551 0.00 0.9773

102 govt_type Form of Government 50 3 236.2856 0.15 0.9850

103 nevac Number of Evacuations 49 1 233.0946 0.00 0.9946

104 comm Community 50 2 250.1955 0.00 1.0000
J-1

APPENDIX J

P-VALUES FOR TESTS OF ASSOCIATION WITH 

EVACUATION EFFICIENCY SCORE FOR VARIABLES 

WITH SIGNIFICANT OR MARGINALLY SIGNIFICANT 

ASSOCIATIONS WITH EVACUATION EFFICIENCY SCORE
J-2
J-3

CONTENTS

Table J-1. P-Values for Tests of Association With Evacuation Efficiency Score for 

Variables with Significant or Marginally Significant Associations with 

Evacuation Efficiency Score . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J-5
J-4
J-5

Table J-1. P-Values for Tests of Association With Evacuation Efficiency Score for

Variables with Significant or Marginally Significant Associations with Evacuation

Efficiency Score

Variable Variable Label n

p-value for

test of

interaction

with hazard

type

p-value for test

of association

after adjusting

for hazard type

p-value for

test of

association 

1 traff_accid Were there traffic accidents during the

evacuations?

44 0.1794 0.0006 <.0001

2 rentr_proc Describe the Re-entry Process 49 0.2020 0.0004 0.0003

3 h_death Number of deaths from hazard 50 . 0.0021 0.0007

4 evac_inj Number of injuries caused by the evacuation 47 . 0.0013 0.0009

5 nat_guard Was the National Guard used for law

enforcement?

50 0.0096 0.0752 0.0032

6 loot_vand Were there any instances of looting or

vandalism?

50 0.1698 0.0225 0.0043

7 early_evac Did some people spontaneously evacuate

before being told to do so?

43 0.8356 0.0330 0.0048

8 fire_chief_re Did the fire chief participate in the

authorization for re-entry?

49 . 0.2768 0.0097

9 refus_evac Did anyone refuse to evacuate? 47 0.2759 0.0388 0.0126

10 haz_exp Has the community had any experience with

the hazard?

49 0.0310 0.2189 0.0168

11 schools Were schools used as congregate care

centers?

39 0.0702 0.0174 0.0187

12 evac_death Number of deaths caused by the evacuation 49 . 0.0566 0.0218

13 public_bldg Were public buildings used as congregate

care centers?

39 0.6073 0.0532 0.0220

14 mgmt_shelter Who managed the congregate care centers? 39 . 0.0839 0.0253

15 mayor_re Did the mayor participate in the

authorization for re-entry?

49 0.1857 0.0181 0.0289

16 noaa_pn Was the public notified by NOAA? 49 . 0.0670 0.0291

17 haz_type Hazard that led to evacuation 50 . . 0.0310

18 st_time Elapsed time between start of hazard and

decision to evacuate (hours)

41 . 0.4050 0.0452

19 road_haz Were any major roadways unavailable for

use?

47 0.0380 0.1347 0.0463

20 eoc_used Was an Emergency Operations Center

(EOC) used?

49 . 0.3941 0.0549

21 tot_time Time to complete the evacuation (hours) 37 . 0.8024 0.0596

. = could not be calculated
J-6

Table J-1. P-Values for Tests of Association With Evacuation Efficiency Score for

Variables with Significant or Marginally Significant Associations with Evacuation

Efficiency Score (continued)

Variable Variable Label n

p-value for

test of

interaction

with hazard

type

p-value for test

of association

after adjusting

for hazard type

p-value for

test of

association 

22 door_door_pn Was the public notified door-to-door? 49 . 0.0559 0.0756

23 instevac Were one or more special institutions

evacuated?

44 . 0.1078 0.0787

24 pop_dens Population density during evacuation 46 0.8533 0.2366 0.0787

25 drills Do the community's emergency response

agencies regularly conduct emergency drills

and exercises?

49 0.0947 0.1389 0.0796

26 e_area Evacuation Area in km^2 42 . 0.9773 0.0889

27 prone_haz Is the area more prone to hazards than

average?

50 0.0237 0.2837 0.0916

28 aware_alert Level of community awareness with alerting

methods used

49 0.6790 0.0013 0.0954

. = could not be calculated
APPENDIX K

CROSS TABULATIONS FOR VARIABLES WITH 

SIGNIFICANT INTERACTIONS WITH HAZARD 

TYPE BROKEN DOWN BY HAZARD TYPE

K-1
K-2
K-3

CONTENTS

Table K-1. National Guard Use/Natural Disaster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . K-5

Table K-2. National Guard Use/Malevolent Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . K-5

Table K-3. National Guard Use/Technological Hazard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . K-6

Table K-4. Community Experience/Natural Disaster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . K-6

Table K-5. Community Experience/Malevolent Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . K-7

Table K-6. Community Experience/Technological Hazard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . K-7

Table K-7. Use of Schools as Congregate Care Centers/Natural Disaster . . . . . . . . . . . . . K-8

Table K-8. Use of Schools as Congregate Care Centers/Malevolent Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . K-8

Table K-9. Use of Schools as Congregate Care Centers/Technological Hazard . . . . . . . . . K-9

Table K-10. Unavailability of Major Roadways/Natural Disaster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . K-9

Table K-11. Unavailability of Major Roadways/Malevolent Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . K-10

Table K-12. Unavailability of Major Roadways/Technological Hazard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . K-10

Table K-13. Regular Conduct of Emergency Drills and Exercises/Natural Disaster . . . . . K-11

Table K-14. Regular Conduct of Emergency Drills and Exercises/Malevolent Act . . . . . . K-11

Table K-15. Regular Conduct of Emergency Drills and Exercises/Technological 

Hazard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . K-12

Table K-16. Whether Area is More Prone to Hazards than Average/Natural Disaster . . . . K-12

Table K-17. Whether Area is More Prone to Hazards than Average/Malevolent 

Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . K-13

Table K-18. Whether Area is More Prone to Hazards than Average/Technological 

Hazard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . K-13
K-4
K-5

Table K-1. National Guard Use/Natural Disaster

Table 1 of nat_guard by scorec

Controlling for haz_type=Natural Disaster

nat_guard (Was the National

Guard used for law

enforcement?) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

No 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

5

35.71

71.43

71.43

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

2

14.29

28.57

66.67

7

50.00

Yes 1

7.14

14.29

100.00

2

14.29

28.57

28.57

3

21.43

42.86

100.00

1

7.14

14.29

33.33

7

50.00

Total 1

7.14

7

50.00

3

21.43

3

21.43

14

100.00

Table K-2. National Guard Use/Malevolent Act

Table 2 of nat_guard by scorec

Controlling for haz_type=Malevolent Act

nat_guard (Was the National

Guard used for law

enforcement?) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

No 1

33.33

50.00

100.00

1

33.33

50.00

100.00

0

0.00

0.00

.

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

2

66.67

Yes 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

.

1

33.33

100.00

100.00

1

33.33

Total 1

33.33

1

33.33

0

0.00

1

33.33

3

100.00

. = could not be calculated
K-6

Table K-3. National Guard Use/Technological Hazard

Table 3 of nat_guard by scorec

Controlling for haz_type=Technological Hazard

nat_guard (Was the National

Guard used for law

enforcement?) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

No 14

42.42

43.75

100.00

13

39.39

40.63

100.00

5

15.15

15.63

100.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

32

96.97

Yes 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

3.03

100.00

100.00

1

3.03

Total 14

42.42

13

39.39

5

15.15

1

3.03

33

100.00

Table K-4. Community Experience/Natural Disaster

Table 1 of haz_exp by scorec

Controlling for haz_type=Natural Disaster

haz_exp (Has the community

had any experience with the

hazard?) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

No 0

0.00

.

0.00

0

0.00

.

0.00

0

0.00

.

0.00

0

0.00

.

0.00

0

0.00

Yes 1

7.14

7.14

100.00

7

50.00

50.00

100.00

3

21.43

21.43

100.00

3

21.43

21.43

100.00

14

100.00

Total 1

7.14

7

50.00

3

21.43

3

21.43

14

100.00

. = could not be calculated
K-7

Table K-5. Community Experience/Malevolent Act

Table 2 of haz_exp by scorec

Controlling for haz_type=Malevolent Act

haz_exp (Has the community

had any experience with the

hazard?) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

No 1

33.33

50.00

100.00

1

33.33

50.00

100.00

0

0.00

0.00

.

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

2

66.67

Yes 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

.

1

33.33

100.00

100.00

1

33.33

Total 1

33.33

1

33.33

0

0.00

1

33.33

3

100.00

. = could not be calculated

Table K-6. Community Experience/Technological Hazard

Table 3 of haz_exp by scorec

Controlling for haz_type=Technological Hazard

haz_exp (Has the community

had any experience with the

hazard?) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

No 10

31.25

45.45

76.92

8

25.00

36.36

61.54

3

9.38

13.64

60.00

1

3.13

4.55

100.00

22

68.75

Yes 3

9.38

30.00

23.08

5

15.63

50.00

38.46

2

6.25

20.00

40.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

10

31.25

Total 13

40.63

13

40.63

5

15.63

1

3.13

32

100.00

Frequency Missing = 1
K-8

Table K-7. Use of Schools as Congregate Care Centers/Natural Disaster

Table 1 of schools by scorec

Controlling for haz_type=Natural Disaster

schools (Were schools used

as congregate care centers?) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

No 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

2

15.38

100.00

66.67

2

15.38

Yes 1

7.69

9.09

100.00

6

46.15

54.55

100.00

3

23.08

27.27

100.00

1

7.69

9.09

33.33

11

84.62

Total 1

7.69

6

46.15

3

23.08

3

23.08

13

100.00

Frequency Missing = 1

Table K-8. Use of Schools as Congregate Care Centers/Malevolent Act

Table 2 of schools by scorec

Controlling for haz_type=Malevolent Act

schools (Were schools used

as congregate care centers?) scorec

Total

Frequency

Percent

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

No 0

0.00

0.00

.

0

0.00

0.00

.

0

0.00

0.00

.

1

100.00

100.00

100.00

1

100.00

Yes 0

0.00

.

.

0

0.00

.

.

0

0.00

.

.

0

0.00

.

0.00

0

0.00

Total 0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

1

100.00

1

100.00

Frequency Missing = 2

. = could not be calculated
K-9

Table K-9. Use of Schools as Congregate Care Centers/Technological Hazard

Table 3 of schools by scorec

Controlling for haz_type=Technological Hazard

schools (Were schools used

as congregate care centers?) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

No 2

8.00

40.00

20.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

3

12.00

60.00

75.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

5

20.00

Yes 8

32.00

40.00

80.00

10

40.00

50.00

100.00

1

4.00

5.00

25.00

1

4.00

5.00

100.00

20

80.00

Total 10

40.00

10

40.00

4

16.00

1

4.00

25

100.00

Frequency Missing = 8

Table K-10. Unavailability of Major Roadways/Natural Disaster

Table 1 of road_haz by scorec

Controlling for haz_type=Natural Disaster

road_haz (Were any major

roadways unavailable for

use?) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

No 1

7.14

14.29

100.00

4

28.57

57.14

57.14

1

7.14

14.29

33.33

1

7.14

14.29

33.33

7

50.00

Yes 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

3

21.43

42.86

42.86

2

14.29

28.57

66.67

2

14.29

28.57

66.67

7

50.00

Total 1

7.14

7

50.00

3

21.43

3

21.43

14

100.00
K-10

Table K-11. Unavailability of Major Roadways/Malevolent Act

Table 2 of road_haz by scorec

Controlling for haz_type=Malevolent Act

road_haz (Were any major

roadways unavailable for use?) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

No 1

50.00

100.00

100.00

0

0.00

0.00

.

0

0.00

0.00

.

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

50.00

Yes 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

.

0

0.00

0.00

.

1

50.00

100.00

100.00

1

50.00

Total 1

50.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

1

50.00

2

100.00

Frequency Missing = 1

. = could not be calculated

Table K-12. Unavailability of Major Roadways/Technological Hazard

Table 3 of road_haz by scorec

Controlling for haz_type=Technological Hazard

road_haz (Were any major

roadways unavailable for use?) scorec

Total

Frequency

Percent

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

No 11

35.48

45.83

84.62

8

25.81

33.33

66.67

4

12.90

16.67

80.00

1

3.23

4.17

100.00

24

77.42

Yes 2

6.45

28.57

15.38

4

12.90

57.14

33.33

1

3.23

14.29

20.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

7

22.58

Total 13

41.94

12

38.71

5

16.13

1

3.23

31

100.00

Frequency Missing = 2
K-11

Table K-13. Regular Conduct of Emergency Drills and Exercises/Natural Disaster

Table 1 of drills by scorec

Controlling for haz_type=Natural Disaster

drills (Do the community's

emergency response agencies

regularly conduct emergency

drills and exercises?) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

No 1

7.69

100.00

100.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

7.69

Yes 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

6

46.15

50.00

100.00

3

23.08

25.00

100.00

3

23.08

25.00

100.00

12

92.31

Total 1

7.69

6

46.15

3

23.08

3

23.08

13

100.00

Frequency Missing = 1

Table K-14. Regular Conduct of Emergency Drills and Exercises/Malevolent Act

Table 2 of drills by scorec

Controlling for haz_type=Malevolent Act

drills (Do the community's

emergency response agencies

regularly conduct emergency

drills and exercises?) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

No 0

0.00

.

0.00

0

0.00

.

0.00

0

0.00

.

.

0

0.00

.

0.00

0

0.00

Yes 1

33.33

33.33

100.00

1

33.33

33.33

100.00

0

0.00

0.00

.

1

33.33

33.33

100.00

3

100.00

Total 1

33.33

1

33.33

0

0.00

1

33.33

3

100.00

. = could not be calculated
K-12

Table K-15. Regular Conduct of Emergency Drills and Exercises/Technological Hazard

Table 3 of drills by scorec

Controlling for haz_type=Technological Hazard

drills (Do the community's

emergency response agencies

regularly conduct emergency

drills and exercises?) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

No 4

12.12

66.67

28.57

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

2

6.06

33.33

40.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

6

18.18

Yes 10

30.30

37.04

71.43

13

39.39

48.15

100.00

3

9.09

11.11

60.00

1

3.03

3.70

100.00

27

81.82

Total 14

42.42

13

39.39

5

15.15

1

3.03

33

100.00

Table K-16. Whether Area Is More Prone to Hazards than Average/Natural Disaster

Table 1 of prone_haz by scorec

Controlling for haz_type=Natural Disaster

prone_haz (Is the area more

prone to hazards than

average?) scorec

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

No 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

7.14

100.00

14.29

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

7.14

Yes 1

7.14

7.69

100.00

6

42.86

46.15

85.71

3

21.43

23.08

100.00

3

21.43

23.08

100.00

13

92.86

Total 1

7.14

7

50.00

3

21.43

3

21.43

14

100.00
K-13

Table K-17. Whether Area Is More Prone to Hazards than Average/Malevolent Act

Table 2 of prone_haz by scorec

Controlling for haz_type=Malevolent Act

prone_haz (Is the area more

prone to hazards than

average?) scorec

Total

Frequency

Percent

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

No 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

.

1

33.33

100.00

100.00

1

33.33

Yes 1

33.33

50.00

100.00

1

33.33

50.00

100.00

0

0.00

0.00

.

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

2

66.67

Total 1

33.33

1

33.33

0

0.00

1

33.33

3

100.00

. = could not be calculated

Table K-18. Whether Area Is More Prone to Hazards than Average/Technological Hazard

Table 3 of prone_haz by scorec

Controlling for haz_type=Technological Hazard

prone_haz (Is the area more

prone to hazards than

average?) scorec

Total

Frequency

Percent

Row Pct

Col Pct 0 issues 1 issue 2 issues

3 or more

issues

No 6

18.18

54.55

42.86

5

15.15

45.45

38.46

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

11

33.33

Yes 8

24.24

36.36

57.14

8

24.24

36.36

61.54

5

15.15

22.73

100.00

1

3.03

4.55

100.00

22

66.67

Total 14

42.42

13

39.39

5

15.15

1

3.03

33

100.00
K-14
L-1

APPENDIX L

CROSS TABULATIONS FOR VARIABLES

IN THE CORRELATION ANALYSIS
L-2
L-3

CONTENTS

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L-5

Table L-1. Traffic Accidents/Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L-6

Table L-2. Road Hazards/Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L-6

Table L-3. Evacuation Instructions/Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L-7

Table L-4. Instructions to Use Specific Routes/Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L-7

Table L-5. Ad Hoc Command, Control, and Coordination Processes/Traffic Issues . . . . . . . L-8

Table L-6. Evacuations from Outside Designated Areas/Special Traffic Issues . . . . . . . . . . L-8

Table L-7. Crossing of Political (County, State) Boundaries/Decision-Making Issues . . . . . L-9

Table L-8. Ad Hoc Command, Control, and Coordination Processes/Decision-Making 

Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L-9

Table L-9. Communication Between Field Emergency Responders and EOC by

Radio/Communications Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L-10

Table L-10. Communication Between Field Emergency Responders and EOC by

Telephone/Communications Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L-10

Table L-11. Communication Between Field Emergency Responders and EOC by

Cell Phone/Communications Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L-11

Table L-12. Communication Between Field Emergency Responders and EOC by

Pager/Communications Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L-11

Table L-13. Communication Between Field Emergency Responders and EOC/

Communications Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L-12

Table L-14. Ad Hoc Command, Control, and Coordination Processes/Communications 

Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L-12

Table L-15. Notification of Public by Siren/Warning and Subsequent Citizen Action 

Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L-13

Table L-16. Notification of Public by Telephone/Special Issues Regarding Warning

and Subsequent Citizen Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L-13

Table L-17. Notification of Public by Radio/Special Issues Regarding Warning and

Subsequent Citizen Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L-14

Table L-18. Notification of Public by Emergency Broadcast System/Special Issues

Regarding Warning and Subsequent Citizen Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L-14

Table L-19. Notification of Public by PA System/Special Issues Regarding Warning and

Subsequent Citizen Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L-15

Table L-20. Notification of Public by NOAA/Special Issues Regarding Warning and

Subsequent Citizen Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L-15

Table L-21. Notification of Public by Door-to-Door Contact/Special Issues Regarding

Warning and Subsequent Citizen Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L-16

Table L-22. Notification of Public by Multiple Methods/Special Issues Regarding Warning

and Subsequent Citizen Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L-16

Table L-23. Ad Hoc Command, Control, and Coordination Processes/Special Issues

Regarding Warning and Subsequent Citizen Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L-17

Table L-24. Instances of Looting or Vandalism/Issues with Law Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . L-17

Table L-25. Use of National Guard for Law Enforcement/Issues with Law Enforcement . . L-18

Table L-26. Use of Police for Law Enforcement/Issues with Law Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . L-18
L-4
L-5

Introduction

The results of the correlation analysis are contained in Appendix L. Correlation coefficients

were calculated for variables suspected of having a correlation to one of the variables used to

define the evacuation efficiency score. Data preparation and analysis were carried out using

SAS 8.02 for Windows.
L-6

Table L-1. Traffic Accidents/Issues

Table of traff_accid by traff_prob

traff_accid (Traffic accidents during

the evacuations?)

traff_prob (Were there any special

traffic problems encountered?)

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct 

Col Pct No Yes

Unknown 4

8.00

66.67

11.11

2

4.00

33.33

14.29

6

12.00

No 31

62.00

77.50

86.11

9

18.00

22.50

64.29

40

80.00

Yes 1

2.00

25.00

2.78

3

6.00

75.00

21.43

4

8.00

Total 36

72.00

14

28.00

50

100.00

Table L-2. Road Hazards/Issues

Table of road_haz by traff_prob

road_haz (Were any major

roadways unavailable for use?)

traff_prob (Were there any special

traffic problems encountered?)

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct 

Col Pct No Yes

Unknown 3

6.00

100.00

8.33

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

3

6.00

No 26

52.00

81.25

72.22

6

12.00

18.75

42.86

32

64.00

Yes 7

14.00

46.67

19.44

8

16.00

53.33

57.14

15

30.00

Total 36

72.00

14

28.00

50

100.00
L-7

Table L-3. Evacuations Instructions/Issues

Table of evac_instruct by traff_prob

evac_instruct (Were people given

specific instructions about where to

go when they evacuated?)

 traff_prob(Were there any

special traffic problems

encountered?)

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct 

Col Pct No Yes

Unknown 2

4.00

50.00

5.56

2

4.00

50.00

14.29

4

8.00

No 2

4.00

28.57

5.56

5

10.00

71.43

35.71

7

14.00

Yes 32

64.00

82.05

88.89

7

14.00

17.95

50.00

39

78.00

Total 36 

72.00

14

28.00

50

100.00

Table L-4. Instructions to Use Specific Routes/Issues

Table of evac_route by traff_prob

evac_route (Were people told to use

specific routes?)

 traff_prob (Were there any special

traffic problems encountered?)

Total

Frequency 

Percent

Row Pct 

Col Pct No Yes

Unknown 3

6.00

75.00

8.33

1

2.00

25.00

7.14

4

8.00

No 8

16.00

53.33

22.22

7

14.00

46.67

50.00

15

30.00

Yes 25

50.00

80.65

69.44

6

12.00

19.35

42.86

31

62.00

Total 36

72.00

14

28.00

50

100.00
L-8

Table L-5. Ad Hoc Command, Control, and Coordination Processes/Traffic Issues

Table of adhoc by traff_prob

adhoc (Ad hoc command, control

and coordination processes)

 traff_prob (Were there any

special traffic problems

encountered?)

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct 

Col Pct No Yes

No 28

56.00

73.68

77.78

10

20.00

26.32

71.43

38

76.00

Yes 8

16.00

66.67

22.22

4

8.00

33.33

28.57

12

24.00

Total 36

72.00

14

28.00

50

100.00

Table L-6. Evacuations from Outside Designated Areas/Special Traffic Issues

Table of shad_evac by traff_prob

shad_evac (Did people evacuate

from areas outside the designated

evacuation area?)

traff_prob (Were there any

special traffic problems

encountered?)

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct 

Col Pct No Yes

Unknown 7

14.00

87.50

19.44

1

2.00

12.50

7.14

8

16.00

No 18

36.00

75.00

50.00

6

12.00

25.00

42.86

24

48.00

Yes 11

22.00

61.11

30.56

7

14.00

38.89

50.00

18

36.00

Total 36

72.00

14

28.00

50

100.00
L-9

Table L-7. Crossing of Political (County, State) Boundaries/Decision-Making Issues

Table of bdry_crss by decis_prob

bdry_crss (Were political

boundaries crossed (i.e., more than

one county or state involved)?)

decis_prob (Were there

problems with decision

making process?)

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct 

Col Pct No Yes

Unknown 4

8.00

80.00

9.09

1

2.00

20.00

16.67

5

10.00

No 23

46.00

88.46

52.27

3

6.00

11.54

50.00

26

52.00

Yes 17

34.00

89.47

38.64

2

4.00

10.53

33.33

19

38.00

Total 44

88.00

6

12.00

50

100.00

Table L-8. Ad Hoc Command, Control, and Coordination Processes/Decision-Making

Issues

Table of adhoc by decis_prob

adhoc (Ad hoc command, control

and coordination processes)

decis_prob (Were there problems

with decision making process?)

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct 

Col Pct No Yes

No 33

66.00

86.84

75.00

5

10.00

13.16

83.33

38

76.00

Yes 11

22.00

91.67

25.00

1

2.00

8.33

16.67

12

24.00

Total 44

88.00

6

12.00

50

100.00
L-10

Table L-9. Communication Between Field Emergency Responders and EOC by

Radio/Communications Issues

Table of radio by comm_prob

radio (Was communication between

field emergency responders and

EOC by radio?)

comm_prob (Were there problems with

communications?)

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct 

Col Pct Unknown No Yes

No 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

2

4.00

66.67

5.71

1

2.00

33.33

7.14

3

6.00

Yes 1

2.00

2.13

100.00

33

66.00

70.21

94.29

13

26.00

27.66

92.86

47

94.00

Total 1

2.00

35

70.00

14

28.00

50

100.00

Table L-10. Communication Between Field Emergency Responders and EOC by

Telephone/Communications Issues

Table of telephone by comm_prob

telephone (Was communication

between field emergency responders

and EOC by telephone?)

comm_prob (Were there problems with

communications?)

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct 

Col Pct Unknown No Yes

No 1

2.00

2.33

100.00

31

62.00

72.09

88.57

11

22.00

25.58

78.57

43

86.00

Yes 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

4

8.00

57.14

11.43

3

6.00

42.86

21.43

7

14.00

Total 1

2.00

35

70.00

14

28.00

50

100.00
L-11

Table L-11. Communication Between Field Emergency Responders and EOC 

by Cell Phone/Communications Issues

Table of cell_phone by comm_prob

cell_phone (Was communication

between field emergency responders

and EOC by cell phone?)

comm_prob (Were there problems with

communications?)

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct 

Col Pct Unknown No Yes

No 1

2.00

3.23

100.00

21

42.00

67.74

60.00

9

18.00

29.03

64.29

31

62.00

Yes 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

14

28.00

73.68

40.00

5

10.00

26.32

35.71

19

38.00

Total 1

2.00

35

70.00

14

28.00

50

100.00

Table L-12. Communication Between Field Emergency Responders and EOC by

Pager/Communications Issues

Table of pager by comm_prob

pager (Was communication between

field emergency responders and

EOC by pager?)

comm_prob (Were there problems with

communications?)

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct 

Col Pct Unknown No Yes

No 1

2.00

2.04

100.00

34

68.00

69.39

97.14

14

28.00

28.57

100.00

49

98.00

Yes 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

100.00

2.86

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

Total 1

2.00

35

70.00

14

28.00

50

100.00
L-12

Table L-13. Communication Between Field Emergency Responders and

EOC/Communications Issues

Table of multiple by comm_prob

multiple (Was communication

between field emergency responders

and EOC by multiple ways?)

comm_prob (Were there problems with

communications?)

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct 

Col Pct Unknown No Yes

No 1

2.00

3.33

100.00

20

40.00

66.67

57.14

9

18.00

30.00

64.29

30

60.00

Yes 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

15

30.00

75.00

42.86

5

10.00

25.00

35.71

20

40.00

Total 1

2.00

35

70.00

14

28.00

50

100.00

Table L-14. Ad Hoc Command, Control, and Coordination Processes/Communications

Issues

Table of adhoc by comm_prob

adhoc (Ad hoc command, control

and coordination processes)

comm_prob (Were there problems with

communications?)

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct 

Col Pct Unknown No Yes

No 1

2.00

2.63

100.00

28

56.00

73.68

80.00

9

18.00

23.68

64.29

38

76.00

Yes 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

7

14.00

58.33

20.00

5

10.00

41.67

35.71

12

24.00

Total 1

2.00

35

70.00

14

28.00

50

100.00
L-13

Table L-15. Notification of Public by Siren/Warning and Subsequent Citizen Action Issues

Table of sirens_pn by warn_prob

sirens_pn (Was the public notified

by a siren?)

warn_prob (Were there any special

problems regarding warning and subsequent

citizen action?)

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct 

Col Pct No Yes

Unknown 1

2.00

100.00

2.63

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

No 31

62.00

73.81

81.58

11

22.00

26.19

91.67

42

84.00

Yes 6

12.00

85.71

15.79

1

2.00

14.29

8.33

7

14.00

Total 38

76.00

12

24.00

50

100.00

Table L-16. Notification of Public by Telephone/Special Issues 

Regarding Warning and Subsequent Citizen Action

Table of telephone_pn by warn_prob

telephone_pn (Was the public

notified by telephone)

warn_prob (Were there any special problems

regarding warning and subsequent citizen action?)

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct 

Col Pct No Yes

Unknown 1

2.00

100.00

2.63

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

No 29

58.00

78.38

76.32

8

16.00

21.62

66.67

37

74.00

Yes 8

16.00

66.67

21.05

4

8.00

33.33

33.33

12

24.00

Total 38

76.00

12

24.00

50

100.00
L-14

Table L-17. Notification of Public by Radio/Special Issues 

Regarding Warning and Subsequent Citizen Action

Table of radio_tv_pn by warn_prob

radio_tv_pn (Was the public

notified by radio/TV?)

warn_prob (Were there any special problems

regarding warning and subsequent citizen action?)

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct 

Col Pct No Yes

Unknown 1

2.00

100.00

2.63

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

No 17

34.00

68.00

44.74

8

16.00

32.00

66.67

25

50.00

Yes 20

40.00

83.33

52.63

4

8.00

16.67

33.33

24

48.00

Total 38

76.00

12

24.00

50

100.00

Table L-18. Notification of Public by Emergency Broadcast/Special Issues 

Regarding Warning and Subsequent Citizen Action

Table of ebs_pn by warn_prob

ebs_pn (Was the public notified

by emergency broadcast system?)

warn_prob (Were there any special problems

regarding warning and subsequent citizen action?)

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct 

Col Pct No Yes

Unknown 1

2.00

100.00

2.63

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

No 36

72.00

75.00

94.74

12

24.00

25.00

100.00

48

96.00

Yes 1

2.00

100.00

2.63

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

Total 38

76.00

12

24.00

50

100.00
L-15

Table L-19. Notification of Public by PA System/Special Issues 

Regarding Warning and Subsequent Citizen Action

Table of pa_system_pn by warn_prob

pa_system_pn (Was the public

notified by a PA system?)

warn_prob (Were there any special problems

regarding warning and subsequent citizen action?)

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct 

Col Pct No Yes

Unknown 1

2.00

100.00

2.63

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

No 15

30.00

68.18

39.47

7

14.00

31.82

58.33

22

44.00

Yes 22

44.00

81.48

57.89

5

10.00

18.52

41.67

27

54.00

Total 38

76.00

12

24.00

50

100.00

Table L-20. Notification of Public by NOAA/Special Issues 

Regarding Warning and Subsequent Citizen Action

Table of noaa_pn by warn_prob

noaa_pn (Was the public

notified by NOAA?)

warn_prob (Were there any special problems

regarding warning and subsequent citizen action?)

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct 

Col Pct No Yes

Unknown 1

2.00

100.00

2.63

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

No 37

74.00

77.08

97.37

11

22.00

22.92

91.67

48

96.00

Yes 0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

100.00

8.33

1

2.00

Total 38

76.00

12

24.00

50

100.00
L-16

Table L-21. Notification of Public by Door-to-Door/Special Issues 

Regarding Warning and Subsequent Citizen Action

Table of door_door_pn by warn_prob

door_door_pn (Was the public

notified door-to-door?)

warn_prob (Were there any special problems

regarding warning and subsequent citizen action?)

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct 

Col Pct No Yes

Unknown 1

2.00

100.00

2.63

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

No 12

24.00

80.00

31.58

3

6.00

20.00

25.00

15

30.00

Yes 25

50.00

73.53

65.79

9

18.00

26.47

75.00

34

68.00

Total 38

76.00

12

24.00

50

100.00

Table L-22. Notification of Public by Multiple Methods/Special Issues 

Regarding Warning and Subsequent Citizen Action

Table of multiple_pn by warn_prob

multiple_pn (Was the public

notified by multiple methods?)

warn_prob (Were there any special problems

regarding warning and subsequent citizen action?)

Total

Frequency

Percent 

Row Pct 

Col Pct No Yes

Unknown 1

2.00

100.00

2.63

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

2.00

No 10

20.00

71.43

26.32

4

8.00

28.57

33.33

14

28.00

Yes 27

54.00

77.14

71.05

8

16.00

22.86

66.67

35

70.00

Total 38

76.00

12

24.00

50

100.00
L-17

Table L-23. Ad Hoc Command, Control, and Coordination Processes/

Special Issues Regarding Warning and Subsequent Citizen Action

Table of adhoc by warn_prob

adhoc (Ad hoc command, control

and coordination processes)

warn_prob (Were there any special problems

regarding warning and subsequent citizen action?)

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct 

Col Pct No Yes

No 29 

58.00 

76.32 

76.32 

9

18.00

23.68

75.00

38

76.00

Yes 9 

18.00 

75.00 

23.68 

3

6.00

25.00

25.00

12

24.00

Total 38 

76.00 

12

24.00

50

100.00

Table L-24. Instances of Looting or Vandalism/Issues with Law Enforcement

Table of loot_vand by law_prob

loot_vand (Were there any instances

of looting or vandalism?)

law_prob (Were there any problems with

law enforcement?)

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct

Col Pct No Yes

No 44

88.00

97.78

93.62

1

2.00

2.22

33.33

45

90.00

Yes 3

6.00

60.00

6.38

2

4.00

40.00

66.67

5

10.00

Total 47

94.00

3

6.00

50

100.00
L-18

Table L-25. Use of National Guard for Law Enforcement/Issue with Law Enforcement

Table of nat_guard by law_prob

nat_guard (Was the National Guard

used for law enforcement?)

law_prob (Were there any

problems with law

enforcement?)

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct 

Col Pct No Yes

No 40

80.00

97.56

85.11

1

2.00

2.44

33.33

41

82.00

Yes 7

14.00

77.78

14.89

2

4.00

22.22

66.67

9

18.00

Total 47

94.00

3

6.00

50

100.00

Table L-26. Use of Police for Law Enforcement/Issues with Law Enforcement

Table of police by law_prob

police (Were the police used for law

enforcement?)

Law_prob (Were there any

problems with law

enforcement?)

Total

Frequency 

Percent 

Row Pct 

Col Pct No Yes

0 48.00

100.00

8.51

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

48.00

1 43

86.00

93.48

91.49

3

6.00

6.52

100.00

46

9

2.00

Total 47

94.00

3

6.00

50

100.00