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45–593 PDF 2008

S. HRG. 110–627

U.S. POLICY OPTIONS IN POST-ELECTION

PAKISTAN

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 28, 2008

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania

JIM WEBB, Virginia

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

BOB CORKER, Tennessee

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ... 1

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 5

Negroponte, Hon. John D., Deputy Secretary of State, Department of State,

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 6

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Russell Feingold ................................................................................................................. 43

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Barrasso, John, U.S. Senator from Wyoming, prepared statement .................... 32

Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from California, articles submitted:

Pakistani Military ‘‘Misspent up to 70% of American Aid’’—from The

Guardian, Feb. 28, 2008 ............................................................................... 45

CRS Report for Congress, ‘‘Pakistan’s 2008 Elections: Results and Implications for U.S. Policy’’—April 9, 2008 ........................................................ 48

Executive Summary from ‘‘Terror-Free Tomorrow: The Center for Public

Opinion’’ ......................................................................................................... 69

‘‘Musharraf: Pakistan Isn’t Hunting Usama’’—from FOXNews.com, Jan.

23, 2008 .......................................................................................................... 71

Obama, Hon. Barack, U.S. Senator from Illinois, prepared statement ............... 42

(III)

(1)

U.S. POLICY OPTIONS IN POST-ELECTION

PAKISTAN

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2008

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in room

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

(chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Kerry, Feingold, Boxer, Bill Nelson,

Menendez, Cardin, Lugar, Hagel, Corker, Isakson, and Barrasso.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

The CHAIRMAN. Hearing will come to order.

Welcome, Secretary. Appreciate having you here.

I’m going to make a brief opening statement, then turn it over

to my colleague Chairman Lugar, and then we’ll begin to move.

And I say good morning to my colleagues.

Ten days ago, Pakistan—in Pakistan, three members of this committee witnessed a truly extraordinary thing; and the world observed, I think, an outcome that was better than anyone really had

anticipated, at least in my perspective. People went to the polls and

overwhelmingly cast their votes for democracy, moderation, and the

rule of law. It’s not merely that the party of President Musharraf

was clearly, clearly outvoted by the two major competing parties,

but there was—well, the least noted outcome election was, the religious party suffered serious losses, which I think was a significant,

significant expression of the will of the people of Pakistan.

Senator Kerry, Senator Hagel, and I were privileged to observe

this election. We met with a wide cross-section of Pakistanis, in

and out of government. We met with the leaders of the three largest political parties, two of whom are expected to form the coalition

that leads Pakistan to its first truly civilian government in nearly

a decade.

We met with the wife of the imprisoned leader of the lawyers’

movement, a brave woman carrying the message of those judges

and attorneys who were arrested for the crime of practicing law.

We met with Pakistani journalists, human rights advocates, and

other members of the civil—of civil society, many of whom had

faced detention and physical intimidation in recent months.

And we were the first foreign visitors to meet with President

Musharraf the day after the election, relatively early that morning.

He promised to honor the message delivered by the Pakistani peoVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:59 Dec 03, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 2008PAKISTAN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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ple, and, quite frankly, he was—there was a bit of nobility in the

way he addressed us. He walked into the room, said, ‘‘The people

have spoken,’’ and he would abide by the judgment. And when

asked about issues relating to the Supreme Court and other contentious issues, he said, ‘‘That will be for the Parliament to decide,’’

and he indicated that he was willing to—my phrase, not his—step

back into the roles of the President, as opposed to the Prime Minister. And, under the Constitution, as all my colleagues know, the

vast power under that Constitution is in the hands of the Prime

Minister, not the President. It was encouraging, to say the least.

And I take him at his word, and I hope the administration will

hold him to his word.

The Pakistani people have expressed a very clear vision for

what they want their nation to look like: Moderate, democratic,

grounded in the rule of law, with leaders who provide good governance and the basic necessities for all citizens of Pakistan.

It’s in America’s vital national interest, to say the least, to help

Pakistan make this admirable vision a reality and this transition

smooth. Why? Well, because Pakistan, along with its neighbor,

Afghanistan, could provide the ballast of moderation to stabilize

the Muslim world in that part of the world, or it can become the

generator of violent radicalism that would directly threaten our

own security, as well as the security of the people in the region.

The Afghan-Pakistan border region is where the 9/11 attacks

were plotted, it’s where most attacks in Europe since 9/11 have

originated. It’s where Osama bin Laden lives and his top confederates enjoy safe haven, planning new attacks. And it’s where we

must urgently, in my view, shift our focus to the real central front

on the so-called war on terrorism, using the totality of American

strength, not merely our military, which is incredible. I know all

of you have traveled abroad in the last 3 or 4 years, seeing these

kids, the stuff they’re doing, the authority they’re given—young

captains, a young Navy commander out in a PRT; it’s astounding,

the authority he has and the judgment he’s exercised. I sat down,

Dick, and he laid out for us—I literally—I’m not being facetious—

I could have been in a graduate class at one of the great universities—he explained the tribal allegiances, the history of the tribes,

the way in which they function. I mean, these kids—these guys

and women, they are truly, truly, truly amazing. And I’m not being

solicitous. It really is a great, great asset we have. But, it is not

the totality of the U.S. arsenal, and it’s not—but it’s been relied

upon more than any other part of our arsenal. Our ideas matter,

too.

The border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan, in my view,

remains a freeway for fundamentalism, with the Taliban and

al-Qaeda now finding sanctuary on the Pakistani side, and where

suicide bombers they recruit and train wreak havoc upon Afghanistan and, I predict, increasingly, within Pakistan.

Pakistan’s cooperation in the fight against extremism is critical

to our success in Afghanistan, but that cooperation has been, in my

view, sporadic, at best. The reason is that, until recently, the terrorists we were fighting and the extremists the Pakistanis fear, in

my view, are not one and the same. Islamabad’s main concern is

the indigenous militants in the Federally Administered Tribal

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Areas—Mr. Mehsud, in particular. Success of Pakistani Governments have taken turns fighting them, appeasing them, playing

one militant group against the other, or using them to make trouble in Kashmir, on its eastern border, or in Afghanistan, on its

western border.

This different focus, the Pakistanis, versus our focus on

al-Qaeda, in particular, and Taliban, second, I think, is a reason

for some of the disconnect that has existed, in terms of how we

view, ‘‘the war on terror’’ in that region. This different focus is why,

in my view, President Musharraf decided to divert Pakistani resources from fighting al-Qaeda and the Taliban to keeping his

political opponents at bay. It’s why, in my view, when Musharraf

concluded that we were not serious about finishing the job in

Afghanistan—and that’s not a knock on the military, that’s a judgment that some of us have made, 5 years ago, when we diverted

resources badly needed in Afghanistan to Iraq and left, in my view,

Afghanistan somewhat bereft of the needed resources in order to

conduct this war. And Musharraf, in my view, observed that. And,

as I said to General Musharraf and others—my first visit to

Afghanistan, over 6 years ago, I remember meeting with a British

two-star, and I asked the British two-star, I said, ‘‘How long will

your Parliament allow you to stay?’’ And he said ‘‘We Brits have

an expression, Senator, as long as the big dog is in the pen, the

small dog will stay; when the big dog leaves, the small dogs will,

too.’’ The big dog left Afghanistan. America left Afghanistan, in

terms of what was really needed in Afghanistan, in my view. And

I believe that generated a conclusion on the part of Mr. Musharraf

that we weren’t likely to finish the job in Afghanistan, and he

began to cut his own deals with extremists in Pakistan. It’s why,

in my view, Pakistan could concentrate most of its military might

on the Indian border, not on the Afghan border. It’s why the Pakistani people have not supported, based on their polling data, what

we call—what we call the ‘‘war on terror’’ in that region.

But, now the monster that Pakistan’s intelligence service helped

create is turning on its master. Today’s enemy No. 1 is Baitullah

Mehsud—an indigenous militant—who is taking the fight beyond

the FATA, the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas in the mountains, and is likely behind the assassination of Benazir Bhutto.

Mehsud is independent of the Afghan Taliban and the al-Qaeda in

Pakistan, but he is giving them sanctuary, and they are helping

train his forces. As Islamabad awakens to this new reality, I think

there’s an opportunity to put Pakistan and Afghanistan and the

United States on the same strategic page.

Some argue that, imperfect as Musharraf has been, the civilian

leaders of last week’s elections return to power will be even worse

partners in fighting terrorism and fostering real progress in Pakistan. I disagree, if we change our policy.

For Pakistan, nothing is more important than giving the moderate majority a clear voice and a stake in the system, in my view,

and that’s what the election was about, in my view. Without that,

dissent gets channeled underground and, over time, moderates

make common cause with extremists. We’ve been down that road

before, in my view. It’s not absolutely analogous, but it’s similar.

4

We went down that road in Iran. And it leads to nowhere. Nowhere

good.

With this election, the moderate majority has regained its voice.

The United States should seize the moment to move from a policy

based on a personality—Mr. Musharraf—to one based on an entire

country—Pakistan. I believe we should, first of all, triple nonmilitary assistance—and, to put it in perspective, nonmilitary assistance is roughly $500 million a year now—triple nonmilitary assistance, and make it clear we plan on sustaining that for a decade.

This aid should be focused on schools, roads, and clinics, and expanding development in the tribal areas.

Second, we should give the new government, once it’s formed—

if it is formed consistent with democratic principles and it is a

transition that we expect—a democracy dividend of $1 billion in

annual assistance to jump-start its progress.

Third, we should demand transparency and accountability in the

military aid we continue to provide. It’s one of the things I want

to talk to you about, Mr. Secretary.

At the same time, we have to recognize that, even as Pakistan

develops the will, it still lacks the capacity. One of the things we

came away with—not speaking for my colleagues—but, one of the

things I came away with was, notwithstanding, whether or not the

Pakistani military and the political establishment had the will to

take on extremists in the FATA and in the territories, it does not

have the capacity—it does not have the capacity to do it. And so,

at the same time, as I said, we have to recognize and help develop

the will, we have to help them with their capacity, which is a complicated process, I acknowledge.

Its military is designed to fight a conventional war with India,

not to conduct counterinsurgency operations in the tribal areas. So,

we should make it a priority, as our military is attempting to do,

to help train Pakistan in—to reorganize its military, not in its entirety, but to reorganize its military to be better suited to deal with

those very areas.

Last, in my view, we should engage the Pakistanis on issues important to them, rather than just those important to us. For the

last three decades that I’ve been here, the fact is that our relations

with Pakistan has been basically transactional, and that’s how the

Pakistanis view it and understand it. And I believe they wonder—

that moderate majority wonders whether or not we are looking for

a long-term relationship based on mutual interests. I think we

have to demonstrate to the people of Pakistan that ours is a partnership of mutual conviction, not merely of American convenience,

that we care about their needs and progress, not just our own interests, narrowly defined. That happens to be, in my view, the best

way to support—to secure the support of the Pakistani people and

their democratic-elected leaders, for our priorities, starting with the

fight against al-Qaeda and the fight for Afghanistan.

Our witness today is one of the most eminent members of the administration. He is Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte,

who has taken on challenges as diverse as serving as Ambassador

to Iraq, to the National—to Director of National Intelligence.

Mr. Ambassador, welcome. It’s a delight to have you here.

5

And let me now yield to Chairman Lugar for his opening statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And

I congratulate you and Senator Hagel, Senator Kerry, on, really, an

extraordinary mission of observing the election, but, beyond that,

your advocacy, as represented in your statement this morning.

I join you in welcoming our friend, John Negroponte.

Pakistan has long been one of the most strategically important

nations to the United States. Its efforts against terrorism within its

borders, its stewardship of its own nuclear arsenal, its relations

with other nations in the region, are truly critical to global

security.

The situation in Pakistan is more positive than many of us had

anticipated before the recent election. Although the election campaign and the voting had a number of serious problems, I share the

assessment that the outcome at least broadly represents the will of

the Pakistani people.

The election appears to have restored a rough balance of power

in the country, with the party of the late Benazir Bhutto, the Pakistan People’s Party, the party of former Prime Minister Nawaz

Sharif, the Pakistan Muslim League, each winning a large number

of parliamentary seats. The parties have agreed to join together to

form a government. And the supporters of President Musharraf did

not fare well.

Equally important, the voters in the North West Frontier Province repudiated extremism by voting out the fundamentalist religious parties who came to power in 2002, replacing them with the

secular opposition. This is a return to normalcy in that area, and,

I hope, a sign that Pakistanis will increasingly reject the extremism that poses as much a threat to their interest as it does to

the United States interest in the region.

These changes provide an opportunity for the United States to

recalibrate its policy toward Pakistan. The Bush administration

has been criticized, in Pakistan and by some in this country, for

focusing his policies too narrowly on President Musharraf, who

siezed power in a coup, refused to respect democratic institutions

and the judiciary, and only very recently resigned his post as

leader of the military. The administration should broaden its scope

and engage with the new political actors on stage, and reach out

to the general public of Pakistan.

If Pakistan is to break its debilitating cycle of instability, it will

need to achieve progress on fighting corruption, delivering government services, promoting broad-based economic growth. The international community and the United States should support reforms

and contribute to the strengthening of Pakistani civilian institutions. And I commend the chairman for his specific suggestions as

to how that might be implemented.

Part of our recalibration should involve revisiting the issue of foreign assistance, in particular. We should carefully reconsider both

the amounts we are providing and the goals we are hoping to

achieve in Pakistan. Establishing reconstruction opportunity zones

6

in frontier regions, continued investment in important sectors, such

as education, and efforts to restructure our military assistance in

Pakistan, are all steps in the right direction.

More immediately, the United States could demonstrate its regard for the rule of law by encouraging the new government to reverse or rescind the actions against the media and judiciary that

were taken during the state of emergency last year. The United

States previous reluctance to press President Musharraf on these

matters has fueled doubts within Pakistan about our commitment

to democratic principles. The Bush administration should engage

the two new government parties to continue our cooperation in the

fight against terrorism, al-Qaeda, and the Taliban. However, U.S.

interests are neither one-dimensional nor short term, and bilateral

cooperation must also address economic and social challenges

throughout the country. Otherwise, our security goals are unlikely

to be reached.

While some in the new Pakistan Government may favor new tactics in the battle against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or other extremists, the leaders of both parties appreciate the grave threat that

these elements pose to Pakistan’s internal security, and the United

States should work with the parties to achieve agreement on a

strategy for fighting extremism and advancing Pakistan’s broader

national interests. We should make it clear to the people in Pakistan that our interests lay not in supporting a particular leader or

party, but in democracy, pluralism, stability, the fight against violence and extremism. These are values supported by a large majority of the Pakistani people.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to make this comment and to welcome the witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. NEGROPONTE, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON,

DC

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have submitted a longer statement for the record, but would

like to make some brief summary remarks.

Thank you for inviting me here to discuss recent developments

in Pakistan. Let me, first, underscore that the stakes remain very

high in that country. Successful American engagement with a stable and democratic Pakistan is vital to our national security interest. Pakistan has been indispensable to our worldwide struggle

against radical terrorist groups. As Afghanistan’s neighbor, Pakistan plays a pivotal role in the coalition’s war effort there. Without

peace and stability on the Pakistani side of the border, success in

Afghanistan will prove elusive, its future will be decisive, too, in

the search for stability in South Asia, a region of vastly increased

importance to the United States.

There is a common United States and Pakistani interest in Pakistan’s success, in the robust and multifaceted fight against violent

extremism, focused on democracy and economic development, as

well as on security cooperation. We intend to pursue that common

7

interest vigorously with whatever government emerges from the

election.

Pakistan, as you noted, took another big step toward civilian democracy on February 18, holding successful parliamentary elections

under challenging circumstances. I thank Senators Biden, Kerry,

and Hagel, of this committee, and Representative Sheila Jackson

Lee, for their interest in Pakistan’s democratic progress. You were

in Pakistan on election day, observing polling places and talking to

political leaders, and I believe your presence helped underscore, for

the Pakistani people, the importance we place on their democratic

progress.

The election outcome proves that moderate prodemocracy parties

are the heart of Pakistan’s political system, and that religiousbased politics have no hold on the voters. While not perfect, the

elections reflected the will of the voters, who have embraced the results. Over 70 Pakistanis lost their lives on election day, and we

regret the violence that led to those deaths. I think it is fair to say,

however, that the violence could have been worse. The Pakistani

people refused to be intimidated by a wave of fatal terrorist attacks

prior to election day. In fact, they voted in higher percentages on

February 18 than during the last general elections, in 2002, when

conditions were undeniably safer. We think that democratic participation in the election results will help focus Pakistan’s resolve on

countering the growing threat of violent extremists.

Looking ahead, the United States must help the Pakistani people

size the opportunities that these successful elections now present

for their country. Our assistance and engagement in Pakistan is

designed to help the country develop into a modern, moderate,

democratic, and prosperous country. We should now renew our

efforts. We will continue to support Pakistan’s democratic progress.

We will continue to help Pakistan build a better education system,

improve governance across the country, and offer more economic

opportunities to its citizens in impoverished areas. We will also

help—we will also continue to help Pakistan to increase the capacity of its security forces to fight the violent extremists that

threaten us both.

Our efforts in each of these areas are ongoing. We supported

Pakistan’s elections, and now we will support the Pakistani people

as they choose their leaders. Political parties are negotiating the

formation of a government, and we look forward to working with

the leaders who emerge from that process. We have robust education, governance, and economic growth programs in Pakistan.

Between 2002 and 2007, for example, we invested $256 million in

projects to reform and revitalize Pakistan’s education system. We

also continue to help Pakistan improve its security force capabilities. In many areas, in the northwest, in particular, local forces

cannot defend their homes and towns against militants and

terrorists.

For national security reasons, much of our assistance to Pakistan

will continue to focus on the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

This area, on both sides of the border, is critical to our national

security. Al-Qaeda leaders use this area to plot, plan, and train for

attacks in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and, indeed, throughout the

world, including against the United States and United States interVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:59 Dec 03, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 2008PAKISTAN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
8

ests abroad. Thanks to strong bipartisan support, we are implementing a multiyear program to expand, equip, and train local

security forces in the tribal areas. The goal is to give these forces

what they need to protect their towns and fight violent extremists

who are trying to undermine Pakistan’s modernization.

We are partnering with select units of Pakistan’s special forces,

as well. Enhancing Pakistan’s counterinsurgency skills in the tribal

areas is only part of the story, however. Also, thanks to congressional support, the United States Agency for International Development is implementing programs to support the Pakistani Government’s 9-year, $2 billion sustainable development plan for the

tribal areas. We hope to continue supporting this program, with a

total commitment of $750 million over the next 5 years. Our and

Pakistan’s programs are increasing economic opportunities and improving governance in sections of the tribal areas with little hope

and few jobs. The battle for hearts and minds is nowhere more evident than here, where towns and villages without strong economic

foundations are vulnerable to extremist infiltration.

We urge you to consider and pass legislation to create Reconstruction Opportunity Zones which can play a major role in the development of this part of Pakistan, as well as on the other side of

the border, in Afghanistan. We look forward to legislation authorizing these zones to be introduced in Congress and eventually

passed.

On February 18, the Pakistani people rejected the forces of fear

and terror, and, instead, cast their votes for freedom and democracy. We should help the Pakistani people seize the opportunities

that their successful elections now present. We are fully prepared

to work closely and intensively with all of Pakistan’s leaders to create a strong civilian democracy to continue to aggressively prosecute the war on terror.

I note with interest Chairman Biden’s proposal on our assistance

to Pakistan, which we are looking at closely. We look forward to

talking with you about how we can strengthen our commitment to

Pakistan’s democratic progress, to continue economic prosperity,

and to continue to—continued close cooperation against violent extremism. With the support of Congress, we will remain close allies

with Pakistan in support of our common objectives.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Negroponte follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. NEGROPONTE, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF

STATE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to address recent developments in Pakistan, where the stakes remain very

high for the United States and for the world. Pakistan has been indispensable to

our worldwide struggle against violent extremists, and successful American engagement with a stable and democratic Pakistan is vital to our national security interests. As Afghanistan’s neighbor, Pakistan plays a pivotal role in the coalition’s war

effort there. Without security and stability on the Pakistani side of the border, success in Afghanistan will prove elusive. Pakistan’s future will also be decisive in the

search for stability in South Asia—a region of vastly increased importance to the

United States. The United States and Pakistan have a common interest in the success of a robust and multifaceted fight against violent extremism, focused on democracy and economic development as well as on security cooperation. We intend to

pursue that common interest vigorously with Pakistan’s next government.

9

Pakistan took a big step toward civilian democracy on February 18, holding successful elections under challenging circumstances. We thank Senators Biden, Kerry,

and Hagel of this committee, and Representative Sheila Jackson-Lee, for their interest in Pakistan’s democratic progress. You were in Pakistan on election day, observing polling places and talking to political leaders, and I believe your presence helped

underscore for the Pakistani people the importance we place on their democratic

progress.

The election outcome demonstrates that Pakistanis are strongly committed to democracy, and the outcome in the North West Frontier Province shows that Pakistanis want good governance, including effective action against violent criminals and

suicide terrorists. Although not perfect, the elections reflected the will of the voters,

the vast majority of whom have embraced the results.

More than 70 Pakistanis lost their lives on election day. We condemn the violence

that led to those deaths. I think it is fair to say, however, that the violence could

have been worse. The Pakistani people refused to be intimidated by a wave of murderous terrorist attacks prior to election day. In fact, they voted in higher percentages on February 18 than during the last general elections in 2002, when conditions

were undeniably safer. We think that democratic participation and the election results will help focus Pakistan’s resolve on countering the growing threat of violent

extremists.

Thanks to strong congressional support, the United States was able to help Pakistan prepare for the elections. International observers got the accreditation they

needed to do their jobs, and they were allowed to visit and monitor polling stations.

We helped the Election Commission post voter information online, including a list

of polling station locations, the voter rolls, and a roster and running tally of election

complaints. We also supplied 215,000 translucent ballot boxes for election day.

Our private and public engagement with senior Pakistani leaders helped end the

state of emergency in December 2007, which we believed was a setback to Pakistan’s democratic progress. We supported the international observer effort as well,

deploying some 40 American monitors, and an additional 38 independent observers.

Along with six other countries, we financed and helped train more than 19,000

domestic observers. In general, the observer groups’ reports judged the elections successful, even while pointing out serious flaws in the process. The United States continues to believe that only democracy can build a long-term consensus among Pakistanis on a moderate, prosperous future for their country. Our engagement with

Pakistan’s leaders reflects those beliefs.

Looking ahead, the United States must help the Pakistani people seize the opportunities that these successful elections now present. We supported Pakistan’s elections, and now we will support the Pakistani people as they choose their leaders.

Political parties are negotiating the formation of a government, and we look forward

to working with the leaders who emerge from that process. Our assistance and engagement in Pakistan are designed to help the country develop into a modern, moderate, democratic, and prosperous country. We should now renew our efforts by continuing to support Pakistan’s democratic progress, to improve its education system,

to improve governance across the country, and to offer more economic opportunities

to its citizens in impoverished areas. We will also continue to help Pakistan increase

the capacity of its security forces to fight the violent extremists that threaten Pakistan’s gains and the world’s security. In many areas in the northwest, in particular,

local forces cannot defend their homes and towns against militants and terrorists.

For national security reasons, much of our assistance to Pakistan will continue

to focus on the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Al-Qaeda leaders exploit this

area to plot, plan, and train for attacks in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and, indeed,

throughout the world, including against the United States and against U.S. interests abroad. Thanks to strong bipartisan support, we are implementing a multiyear

program to expand, equip, and train local security forces in the tribal areas. The

goal is to give these forces the capabilities they need to protect their towns and to

fight violent extremists who are trying to undermine Pakistan’s modernization. In

the short term, we continue to encourage Pakistan to aggressively target al-Qaeda,

the Taliban, and other violent extremists who enjoy safe haven in the tribal areas.

Militants and terrorists treat the Afghanistan/Pakistan border region as a unified

battle space. Coordination among Afghan, Pakistani, International Security Assistance Force, and U.S. forces in the border region is therefore crucial to denying violent extremists space to plan and train there. In mid-March, we and our Afghan,

Pakistani, and coalition partners will open the first of six planned Border Coordination Centers at Torkham, Khyber Agency. The centers will make it possible for Pakistani, Afghan, and International Security Assistance Force representatives to coordinate more effectively to stop the enemy from skirting both sides of the rugged

border to avoid engagement.

10

Enhancing Pakistan’s counterinsurgency skills and improving coordination along

the border is only part of the story, however. Also thanks to congressional support,

the U.S. Agency for International Development is implementing programs to support the Pakistani Government’s 9-year, $2 billion Sustainable Development Plan

for the tribal areas. We hope to continue supporting this program with a total commitment of $750 million over the 5 years from FY 2007 through FY 2011. Our and

Pakistan’s programs are increasing economic opportunities, developing capacity and

improving governance in sections of the tribal areas with little hope and few jobs.

Nowhere is the battle for hearts and minds more evident than here, where towns

and villages without strong economic foundations are vulnerable to extremist infiltration. Just as our earthquake assistance to Pakistan in 2005 and 2006 had a profoundly positive impact on the people of Pakistan—generating good will that has

lasted to this very day—so do we envision our support for development of the tribal

areas opening this challenged environment to government and opportunity.

We are accomplishing much in the tribal areas. This month we will help refurbish

several hospitals’ delivery and surgical facilities, and will train maternal health and

other medical professionals. We will continue a 4-year polio eradication drive. We

recently provided water and sanitation facilities to 108 girls’ schools and 54 communities in the tribal areas. We are supporting a range of education programs, from

school construction to curriculum development, that seek to expand opportunities at

all education levels. In another area, we are talking to local officials about how to

restore police authority to a central market. We are even providing blankets, stoves,

utensils, and other relief items to individuals in North Waziristan who have been

displaced due to fighting in South Waziristan. These are just a few examples of the

activities we are pursuing to improve lives and enhance governance in the tribal

areas.

Our security and development programs in the tribal areas are critical to achieving our highest long-term objectives in the war on terror. These programs will boost

sustainable economic development for citizens in impoverished areas at the epicenter of the war on terror and drugs. Just as important, these efforts are essential

to maintaining forward momentum in strengthening our long-term, broad-based relationship with the Pakistani people. In this regard, we urge you to consider and

pass legislation to create Reconstruction Opportunity Zones, which can play a major

role in development of this part of Pakistan and on the other side of the border in

Afghanistan. This legislation is vital to long-term development, to creating jobs, and

to providing an alternative to illicit activities, including terrorism and narcotrafficking, in some of the most troubled regions of Pakistan and in Afghanistan.

On February 18, the Pakistani people cast their votes for freedom and democracy.

We must continue to help the Pakistani people seize the opportunities that these

successful elections now present. We are fully prepared to work closely and intensively with all of Pakistan’s leaders to create a strong civilian democracy and to continue to aggressively prosecute the war on terror. I note with interest Chairman

Biden’s far-reaching proposal on restructuring our assistance to Pakistan, which we

are studying closely. We look forward to talking with the committee about how we

can strengthen our commitment to Pakistan’s democratic progress, to economic prosperity, and to continued close cooperation against violent extremism. With the support of Congress, we will remain close allies with Pakistan in support of our common objectives.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

As you can see, we have a big turnout. The reason why some of

our colleagues have left, we move in order of seniority, and they’re

in other committees, and Banking Committee has the Chairman of

the Fed there, and a few other things, but they’re all planning on

coming back.

So, with the permission of the chairman, I think we should do

7-minute rounds, so everybody has an opportunity, here, getting

questions.

I have many, many questions, as we all do, so I may, with your

permission, submit some in writing for the Department.

One of the things that I observed—I think we all—the three of

us, had a sense of, anyway—we did not get into the Federally Administered Territories—Tribal Areas, but we got very close; we

were right in the border, and we saw their counterparts, in effect,

11

on the Afghan side of the border. And we watched these young

military and aid workers, civilian workers, do remarkable things

with a little bit of money in these forward operating bases and in

these PRTs that we visited. And we went up into the area nestled

up into the mountains, just beyond Tora Bora. As a matter of fact,

we had an interesting landing, because—we blame it all on Senator

Kerry for wanting to go see Tora Bora. I’m only kidding, John,

but——

[Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. But, literally, it was amazing what’s

happened up there.

And here’s the point. The point is that I came away more convinced than I was before, Dick, that economic assistance into these

areas has a gigantic bang for the buck, and that if it worked in the

Afghan side, I was even more convinced it would have even greater

firepower, figuratively speaking, on the Pakistani side.

And so, my first question is a generic one, and just could—if

you’d help me with close to a yes or no—is that—Do you believe

that our ability to bring some economic opportunity into the FATA,

into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, has, along with the

training of the Pakistan special forces, along with our efforts in coordination from the Afghan side, that it is one of the elements of

being able to get a hold on the terrorists coming out of that territory?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Absolutely, Senator. And I would just

make two points.

I think that the Government of Pakistan itself has felt that in

the last couple of years, and they developed this $2 billion,

multiyear plan to develop the Federally Administered Tribal Areas,

and then, of course, we have this $150 million a year plan—5

years, $750 million, total—which I think can, and will, play a very

important role in helping reduce the threat of extremism in that

part of the country.

The CHAIRMAN. I knew you believe that, but I think it’s important, for the record, for a lot of our colleagues not on this committee to understand that the administration, as well, believes

there’s a correlation between the economic assistance and our ability to do this.

I would—there is much to speak about, and I appreciate the invitation to talk with the administration about the proposal I put forward, which, quite frankly, I don’t think is a lot different than

what my friend Senator Lugar is proposing, and maybe he and I

can work out a—an overall position, here. But, I hope we can make

some progress on that. I don’t—I think we’re sort of on the same

page, the administration and us, on what we want to—how we

want to move forward.

One place where I don’t—at least, I haven’t gotten an answer and—is that we have provided $10 billion now in economic assistance—excuse me—military assistance, explicitly for the purpose of

dealing with the fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. And people with whom we spoke, both here and in the region, point out

that there is not much accountability—at least, we’re not aware of

any accountability. I asked Assistant Secretary of State Boucher,

back on December 8—I asked him several questions relating to reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:59 Dec 03, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 2008PAKISTAN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
12

imbursements, the $6 billion, in particular, over the last 6 years.

And what we’re told is that every military—and it’s become, sort

of, the cash cow for speaking with our Embassy personnel, they

view it as a sort of a cash cow for remittance and reimbursement,

and it’s—asked the question, ‘‘Well, how do we know what we reimburse? Do we know whether or not the billion dollars we are paying

to deal with the extremism in the—along the Afghan border—is

that money being spent there, or is it being spent on the Indian

border? Where is it being spent? How do we know?’’ It’s kind of

hard to find a billion dollars worth of expenditures, as I look at it,

along the border with Afghanistan, which I think is the central

point.

And so, I was told the State Department keeps meticulous

records of the reimbursements made under the coalition support

funds to Pakistan. I was told that if State does not—that there is

some paper trail, and that there is a—but, there is a specific

signoff when—and the way it works, as I understand it—and my

time’s about to run out, so maybe you can explain this to me—the

Pakistani military submits—or the Pakistani Government—in this

case, it was, up to now, Musharraf—submits a bill for reimbursement, saying, ‘‘We help—we kept our commitment, we’re out there

fighting the terrorists, this is how much it cost us, reimburse us

for this.’’ I’m told that there is a specific—a specific individual or

group of individuals at State and Defense who look at this and say,

‘‘Yeah, this really was expended for the purpose of fighting terrorism.’’ I have asked whether or not, in a classified forum or a

nonclassified forum, those of us in this committee could see that,

because we’re the ones, along with the Armed Services Committee,

saying, ‘‘OK, let’s spend a billion dollars of the taxpayers’ money.’’

I see very little evidence that a billion dollars has been spent in

what we would characterize antiterrorist, anti-al-Qaeda, antiTaliban expenditures per year.

So, is there a reason why—did they just not get around to it, or

is there a reason why State is unwilling to submit these records

to us, showing what they’ve signed off on that—what constitutes

legitimate reimbursement for the war on terror in Pakistan?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Senator, first of all, if I could, my understanding is that—you talked about $10 billion—I think that’s

probably——

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I—let me amend that.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE [continuing]. The aggregate——

The CHAIRMAN. Six billion, in the aggregate, since——

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Correct.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. 9/11.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Right. I believe it’s $5.6 billion in coalition support funds that have been provided. And you’re correct in

pointing out that these are funds appropriated to the Department

of Defense, and they are essentially a reimbursement to the Government of Pakistan for expenses incurred in their cooperation

with us for logistical, military, and other support provided to our

operations in the war on terror. The Embassy does have a role in

this, although the final disbursement decision is made by the

Department of Defense. I will have to look into the question of the

13

receipts and the information, but we’re certainly more than prepared to provide a briefing to the committee on this.

And let me go back, on the question——

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I——

Ambassador NEGROPONTE [continuing]. Of providing the documentation that you requested.

The CHAIRMAN. I would——

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I don’t know whether this is an

issue—as between the fact that it’s DOD funds, as opposed to our

funds—whether they have the lead responsibility for providing that

kind of information.

The CHAIRMAN. But, as I understand it——

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I would have to inquire——

The CHAIRMAN. I’m 57 seconds over my time—but, as I understand it, State has to sign off first. State actually——

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Right

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Looks at it and checks it out.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. And so, I would formally request that we have

such a briefing, in whatever setting you think it has to occur.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. OK.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Yield to my colleague.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Negroponte, as you can gauge from at least our opening statements, the chairman and I are on the same page with regard to what we hope is your testimony, that there really does need

to be a comprehensive plan involving the economy, specific focus of

foreign assistance, in one form or another, as well as accountability

for military expenditures. So, I’m going to ask two or three things,

so that you can express, maybe, more essay form, rather than spot

answers.

My first question will be, How rapidly can the administration

come forward? I realize that’s not your prime—or your only responsibility. The Department of Defense is involved, National Security

Council, the President’s own decision. But, it seems to me that this

is a crucial turning point—the election, the formation of this government now, our views with regard to that government—and that

the need to at least spell out what type of moneys we’re thinking

about, and how those are to be organized, is really critical, in terms

of our diplomatic role in approaching the new leadership, as well

as the Pakistani people, and, for that matter, our allies elsewhere,

who we are counting upon in Afghanistan. Certainly that forthcoming NATO meeting in Bucharest will clearly have that at the

top of the agenda, quite apart from consideration, at least, directly

with Pakistan.

So, in terms of timeliness, we’re about to take up—in the Senate

in a couple of weeks—a budget that is not definitive for the whole

year, but it does really bring the issue, hopefully, forward pretty

fast. And if this is to be effective, why, appropriations would need

to follow fairly rapidly if we are to seize this moment.

So, my thought is whether we do this in private session, initially

or publicly, that is, the need for a comprehensive plan and a very

rapid one, in which we may have suggestions. The chairman has

14

made some, in terms of actual sums of money involved. But, the

administration’s views are really important, at this point.

Now, I think, on top of that, I would stress, once again, this idea

of accountability. The thought will clearly come to many members,

‘‘Sure, we would like to support some of these objectives, but how

do we know what has happened, what have the results been?’’ Certainly, press accounts have offered a rather murky view of this.

But, here we have a new beginning, we have a new government,

an election, and a new day. At least, we can cast it this way, and

I think the Pakistani people may already have.

Now, as a third function in—this is a more difficult proposition,

I would admit, but this is a good opportunity, it seems to me, once

again, to think about transparency with regards to the nuclear program of Pakistan. And whatever happened to A.Q. Khan—or, more

importantly, his network? What still exists? What elements are

there that are very important for us in nonproliferation in a lot of

other areas that have been affected by Pakistan through this important individual, at one point—A.Q. Khan? For the time being,

President Musharraf has assured us that he’s done about the best

that he can, simply with, a sort of house detention of A.Q. Khan,

but with nothing more said. He would have testified, I think, if he

were here, that A.Q. Khan is a national hero, perhaps of greater

significance than even President Musharraf himself or anybody

else. And, therefore, you don’t touch national heroes. From our national interests, however, we need to have some thoughtful conversation about this. And so, as we have a new beginning with

Pakistan, hopefully we think about this, because we are in heavy

negotiations right now—and they’re rather labored—with the Parliament of India, with regard to the nuclear agreement that we

hope to fashion there. But, many in India, in that Parliament,

quite apart from the Communists, but, say, the military, would

say, ‘‘Why in the world are we becoming more transparent with regard to the IAEA or America or anybody else, with the Pakistanis,

right across the border, being supported, militarily, by the United

States, but without the same questions asked, without the same

possibilities?’’

So, this is a large bit of planning, suddenly; but then, this is the

way the world works, and this is such a critical area for our national security, it would be worthwhile for our highest officials to

take the time, right now, to formulate a plan.

Do you have any overall comment about this?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. A couple of comments, Senator.

First of all, we, of course, are operating under our existing plans,

and we had a 5-year, $3 billion assistance program for Pakistan

under the global war on terror, so that’s fiscal year 2005 through

fiscal year 2009, $600 million a year. We also have the earthquake

reconstruction moneys, which are also being expended at the moment. Plus, now, of course, as I mentioned, this 5-year plan, from

fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2011, to support the Federally

Administered Tribal Areas. So, those, I would submit to you, are

the elements of a plan that are already ongoing. I think the fact

that the 5-year, $3 billion global war on terror plan will be ending

in fiscal year 2009 presents an opportunity to have the kind of dialogue that you’re talking about. So, without getting into specific

15

numbers and figures, I think it’s something that we ought to discuss, going forward.

And the other more general point I would submit, which I think

is the tenor of the commentary that we’ve heard in this room so

far today, is that the situation in Pakistan is of as great an interest

to us—to the United States and to our interests—as the situation

in Afghanistan, and, in some sense, these two countries, they’re the

flip side of the same coin, as far as the problems we’re trying to

address. We’re never going to be able to succeed in one of those

countries unless we succeed in the other. And I think that’s a crucial point, and I would hope that those who are watching or listening would be receptive to that suggestion.

On accountability, one point I would like to make about, ‘‘How

do we know what’s happened?’’—I was reading, in preparation for

the hearing, about some of the results of our economic assistance

programs in Pakistan in recent years, and I really do think that

some of the progress in that country, in terms of infant mortality,

literacy, particularly female literacy, has been, really, quite impressive. Enrollment in schools, which—in 2000, for example, female

enrollment in schools was 47 percent; now it’s 59 percent. I think

there have been some significant improvements in the social and

economic situation in that country. And we would hope to see a reinforcement of those trends in the future years.

Last point, on whatever happened to A.Q. Khan—as you correctly note, he is under house arrest. I gather his health may be

an issue. But, in any event, I don’t think that that network is active, at the moment. I think it has been neutralized, if you will,

and I think we’re satisfied that that kind of activity is not continuing, at the moment. And I think that we’ve also succeeded in

getting quite a bit of information from the Pakistani authorities

about questions that were of concern to us in that regard. But, I

think we probably have to talk, in classified session, about the A.Q.

Khan network, if we’re to go into it any more deeply.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I’d say to my colleague, one of the things that

startled us, the day after the election, is the first comment by

Sharif was that he wanted to see the release of A.Q. Khan. That

was the first official statement he made, to the best of our knowledge. Fortunately, he did not win outright, but it reinforces your

point about the national hero status.

Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being here with us. With reference

to that landing that Senator Biden was talking about, I want you

to know that—that’s the first time I realized I was responsible for

it, but, apart from that, we had decided that if the Taliban or alQaeda attacked, the three Senators were just going to go out and

talk them to death. [Laughter.]

So, we weren’t worried at all.

Mr. Secretary, one of the things that really hit all of us while we

were there, particularly through the competence of the young PRT

personnel that we met with, who are doing extraordinary work, obviously, in nation-building, perhaps even more so than in their

military operations—though they are engaged in those also—but

16

what was really significant was the civic community-building taking place, and the changes occurring as a consequence of that. And,

as Senator Biden said, if you spend some money, and you invest

in it, you can get results. How you do that is pretty critical. What

the relationships are, what your footprint is, what the perceptions

of the people are of that footprint—all of that is part of the mix.

It struck us how critical—and, indeed, you’ve said it in your testimony—the relationship is between what happens on that border

in Pakistan to Afghanistan, and vice versa, what happens in

Afghanistan to Pakistan, because of those tribal linkages, the freedom of movement, obviously, and the history there, culturally and

otherwise.

Here’s the ‘‘but’’ in the big question. We observed that, in Pakistan, their leadership tends to be far more concerned, and expresses greater concern about, the indigenous insurgency.

Baitullah Mehsud and company are a far greater concern to them

than al-Qaeda. And, in fact, disturbingly, I have read, in the papers

in the last couple of days, discussions not dissimilar to what

Musharraf engaged in Waziristan, with the tribal leaders for some

kind of a settlement. It didn’t work then; it allowed freedom of

movement; violence went up. And I think that’s a recipe for disaster. And I’d like to hear your comments on the administration’s

view with respect to your concerns about these distinctions between

different insurgents and the capacity of the Pakistan military and

Government to focus on this mutual concern of transformation that

has to take place in those areas, and the full measure of engagement that’s got to take place, with all of its risks, in order to really

provide real stability.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. First of all, Senator, I would say, I

don’t think that—whatever might be said about talking or not talking with the militants, I don’t think there’s any particular sympathy in the Pakistani body politic for militant extremism. And I

think we saw that in the outcome of the election results.

Senator KERRY. But, Musharraf cut a peace deal, so to speak,

and the peace deal was, ‘‘If you don’t bother us in X, Y, and Z,

we’re not going to bother you here,’’ and that allowed them freedom

to do what they want to do with al-Qaeda.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. If you’re talking about the deal in

south Waziristan—and it didn’t really work, and I think they——

Senator KERRY. That’s what I’m saying.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I think they found that out. And I believe—and the government has got 100-plus-thousand troops up in

that frontier area, they’ve got two divisions in Waziristan—I believe, one in south Waziristan, and one in the north—and they’ve

engaged in significant combat.

Senator KERRY. They have. But, again, in our meetings with the

ISI, and in the discussions with folks, there seemed to be a conclusion that those 100,000 troops and others aren’t really trained for

counterinsurgency, they don’t understand counterinsurgency, and

that there’s a lack of capacity to be able to achieve this. So, just

having 100,000 troops up there engaging in these assaults, in fact,

can push people further away toward the insurgency, rather than

doing what we need to do to win.

17

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Right. And I think that that’s one of

the plan—that’s really one of the plans, going forward, is to help

Pakistan improve it’s counterinsurgency capability, in two different

respects: One, helping the army with some of its special units—and

we have plans with regard to that; and the other is to help train

the frontier corps, although that’ll take a longer period of time.

But, in that $750 million plan, we’ve got some ideas of helping the

frontier corps, as well.

So, I would say that it’s not a question of accommodating these

extremist forces. I believe that the Government of Pakistan wants

to, and I believe the political actors in Pakistan want to, deal with

them. They do not want to give them free rein. They’ve suffered a

lot of casualties. There’s been an enormous increase in violence in

the past year, and it’s spread, as you know, not only from the

FATA, but down into what they call the settled areas. And they

want to resist this trend, and beat it back. But, it’s going to take

some time and some work——

Senator KERRY. My concern is that if there isn’t a more effective

partnership with respect to the counterinsurgency mission, and a

greater understanding on their part of how to implement it, I fear

that they are just going to increase that insurgency.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. And that’s why, I think, we have to

work with them harder on both the counterinsurgency—the military and security aspect of training them, and working with them

on the economic aspects that we’re talking about. And I think we’re

positioning ourselves better to do that than we’ve been, in previous

years.

Senator KERRY. Do you feel that there are some best practices

that come out of the Afghan PRTs that might be applied to what

we’re doing, in terms of that?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I would have to study that, but the

one major difference, of course, is that we’re not going to be able

to use American military forces.

Senator KERRY. Clearly understand—we want the Pakistanis to

do this.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Right.

Senator KERRY. We don’t want American forces—but, the best

practices fit, nevertheless, in the context of the mix of activities,

the presence of a robust kinetic capacity, while, at the same time,

doing the other things——

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Right. And I think that’s a good idea.

And I think we should encourage our AID officials, who have, perhaps, the principal responsibility for carrying out these assistance

programs in the FATA, and they’re doing it mainly through Pakistanis, nongovernmental organizations, subcontractors, and so

forth. But, I think it would be good, if they’re not already doing so,

to compare notes with those running the PRTs across the border.

Senator KERRY. I was impressed that, in a sense, this is sort of

a next-generation effort, and I saw this in Iraq also. A young Navy

commander from Nebraska who was in a PRT was unbelievably

impressive to all of us in his ability to brief us on every single

tribe, the leaders, knowledge of their history, a sense of who the

players were, and what the dynamics were between them. And he

really understood politics. And, while wearing a uniform, his effort

18

was to try to separate the enemy from the people without using the

military. But, that presence does make a difference, notwithstanding. And I think we may have to rethink the AID model,

which doesn’t necessarily work in these unsecure situations, where

you can’t keep people out there. And that was just eye-opening. It

was significant. I’m not saying it’s the whole solution. For one,

you’ve got to substitute those people as rapidly as possible with indigenous forces, obviously.

And the other question that leapt out at me—and I’d just leave

it on the table—there’s a big nut for the American people in that

PRT presence, when it’s on a broader basis. And the question that

has to be asked, Is there a cheaper way? Is there a more effective

way to train indigenous forces and do this without the American

people taking on in some aspects the responsibility of a ‘‘52nd

state? And we need to think about that.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. If I could, just one point, Mr. Chairman, in reply.

One of the issues that you’re addressing, really, is how we’re

going to gear up in the future to deal with these kinds of stabilization situations, and, is there more that could be done? And, of

course, the chairman and Senator Lugar have submitted legislation

on reconstruction and stabilization.

Senator KERRY. Right, the civilian corps.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. They call this the Reconstruction and

Stabilization Civilian Management Act. And I think that could very

well be part of the mix in the future, and I think it’s a very good—

a very, very good initiative, and hope that it receives the support

of the Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

As you can see, Mr. Ambassador, both Senator Kerry and I were

startled that someone from Nebraska knew so much. [Laughter.]

I now recognize the Senator from Nebraska. Senator Hagel.

[Laughter.]

Senator HAGEL. Well, I——

The CHAIRMAN. For the record, that was a joke. OK? I mean——

Senator HAGEL. I’m not often introduced with such a flourish of

flowery——

[Laughter.]

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Positive contribution.

And I would add my note, not only of gratitude, but of acknowledging how impressive all of those young men and women were,

and the work that they’re doing. And they are more than just

soldiers; as Senator Kerry noted, they are ambassadors, they are

mayors, they are mediators, they are warriors. And it’s really a

dramatic recognition of commitment, but also training, as well.

I’d also like to acknowledge our ambassadors in that area. Obviously, we spend a lot of time with Ambassador Patterson, in Pakistan, and her colleagues, who are doing a very, very important job.

And doing it in a way that has, I think, made a considerable difference in watching the Pakistanis respond to Ambassador Patterson and her people was some measure, I think, of the respect that

she has earned, as well as our position there. And I would also add

the same for Ambassador Wood and his colleagues, in Afghanistan.

19

Ambassador Negroponte, you noted, in the opening of your statement, the importance, as you have said here—‘‘Pakistan’s future

will also be decisive in the search for stability in South Asia,’’ and

you connected that to Afghanistan. I agree with that. I’m going to

ask you a question based on that statement. It is my opinion that

the belt that stretches from Iran to India—Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India—represents as important an area—and you’ve noted in

your testimony—but also as a dangerous, combustible, complicated

area of any area in the world. And when you add to that China,

off the border of India, and Turkey, off the border of Iran, we find

three nuclear powers, a nation that obviously is quite interested in

developing nuclear capability in Iran, an indispensable ally in Turkey, and Afghanistan and that strip of land, the border between

Afghanistan and Pakistan, represents, I think, the centerpiece of

our fight—the world’s fight—against extremism.

Now, I know that you agree, at least in some measure, to that

based on your testimony. My question is this. If, in fact, any of that

is accurate, what I have just noted, what is our regional strategy?

You have gotten into some of this regarding Afghanistan and Pakistan, as to how they are connected, how they are linked. One cannot be successful without the other—very clear, very obvious. But,

I think it’s broader than that and deeper than that. I would include

that entire region, the nations that I just mentioned. And so, it

seems to me that some regional strategic context is going to be

required, if it’s not already being applied, and I’d like to get your

response to that ‘‘regional strategy’’ concept.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Of course, the countries you mentioned, in addition to Pakistan and Afghanistan, have other neighbors, as well—I mean, China, and so on, and so forth; and Turkey,

of course, is part of the European region. I think you’re asking a

very complex question, but, I think the way I would try to answer

it, Senator, is, first of all, we think the most important priority is

to deal with the very sensitive border area that you’re talking

about, and deal with the militant extremism; all the while, working

to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan, and help that government

extend its writ throughout the country. I would say that’s point

No. 1.

I think point No. 2 is that, as you know, we have, in recent

years, improved our relationship, our outreach to India, and have

developed more of a partnership with that country, while, at the

same time—and I think we’ve played a constructive role in that regard—encouraging improvement in relationships between India

and Pakistan. And then, of course, Iran, I would say, is a whole

sort of different issue set. It happens to border on Pakistan and

Afghanistan, but it also plays a significant role in the Middle East;

mostly negative. So, I think it would be hard to slot all of this into

one regional strategy of the kind you’re talking about, but there

certainly are elements there.

Senator HAGEL. Well, obviously, we deal with each on the basis

of the dynamics and the realities that are in play, but, at the same

time, it seems to me, the strategic moves that we make in any of

these areas affect all of the other areas. And that’s what my point

is. Do we think about that? Do we strategize? Obviously, Afghanistan is sitting there with two dangerous borders, to the east and

20

the west. The dynamic of Iran seeing American forces on each side

of its border. Do we factor those in to the larger fabric of our strategic thinking, with our allies and our aid, working with governments?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I think we do. If I could say this

about Iran; I think Iran plays a fairly negative role, wherever it

happens to be engaged. We’ve seen—and I’m sure you encountered

this when you were in Afghanistan—a concern about their providing explosive devices to the Taliban. They’ve not been helpful in

Iraq. And, of course, they’ve played a role in fomenting and encouraging militant extremism in the Middle East region, particularly in

Lebanon, and in the Israeli-Palestinian situation. So, I think that

Iran itself calls for a strategy to deal with it, both in the context

of Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also the Middle East, generally.

Senator HAGEL. Do we have enough people to carry out these

programs that you were talking about in your testimony, and Senators Biden and Kerry and Lugar were talking about?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. We’ve got a total, in our mission in

Pakistan, of—permanently assigned—of over 1,400 people; 336 are

Americans, 1,098 are local nationals. And that doesn’t include a

fairly healthy number of temporary duty personnel who are in

Pakistan at any given time. So, I would say it’s a good size mission.

Senator HAGEL. Well, my time is up, but that really wasn’t my

question. It’s a good size mission, I recognize that, but you’re talking about a number of new programs in your testimony. For example, pass legislation to create Reconstruction Opportunity Zones.

We saw a number of those programs; not these specific ROZ programs, but other programs. My question is, Do you have the manpower in order to implement a rather aggressive agenda, which I

think are needed, of programs, or are you going to require more

people?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I think, with respect to Reconstruction Opportunity Zones, if and when we accomplish that, we may

need some more resources, both financial and human, and maybe

that’ll be true of some other programs, but I do think that we have

a solid basis right now, and it may require some adjustments—upward, going forward, but I wouldn’t want to commit to any, or predict any, specific numbers.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this

very timely hearing.

And thank you, Secretary Negroponte, for your testimony.

And, Mr. Chairman, I know you and some of the other Senators

are just back from Pakistan. I appreciate hearing the recent insights that you’re able to give.

The historic, relatively peaceful parliamentary elections in Pakistan have ushered in a new opportunity to build strong institutions

that can bolster and build a strong democracy, address the increasing insecurity throughout the country in a balanced manner, and

ensure that our assistance is consistent with the needs of the people of Pakistan, rather than with a President who now has been

rejected by Pakistan’s voters and who has increasingly repressed

political space and undermined democracy.

21

We must seize this opportunity to reverse decades of failed, ineffective policies with various Pakistani leaders. We can do this by

promoting and supporting the rule of law, and by seeking to eliminate corruption, poor governance, endemic poverty, and historic

marginalization. We should help ensure that restrictions on basic

freedoms and political rights are permanently reversed, all while

working with the Pakistani Government to counter the terrorist

threats that fester and grow in Pakistan and the border region.

And, with regard to some questions, I’m interested to hear from

you about U.S. Government intentions to support the newly formed

coalition government. Mr. Secretary, how does the United States

intend to support the loosely formed coalition government? And can

you speak to how our policy has actually been impacted by these

elections?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Regarding our intentions, Mr. Chairman, as I said in my opening statement, we certainly look forward

to working with whatever government emerges from this process.

We don’t know yet what that government will be. I spoke to

Ambassador Patterson this morning. She predicted that such a government should emerge within the next couple of weeks, perhaps

sooner. So, we’re in a ‘‘wait and see’’ mode, as far as that is concerned. But, certainly, we look forward to working with that government in every way possible, and being supportive.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, obviously, in the long run, the actions

will speak louder than words, and I’m sure it’s not escaped the

attention of the Pakistani people that, as the administration has

paid at least lipservice to democracy in Pakistan, it has continued

to provide hundreds of millions of dollars in military equipment designed to combat a conventional military foe—actually, not terrorists—a military foe to the Musharraf regime. So, right now, are you

encouraging this coalition to work with President Musharraf’s

party? Isn’t there a danger that your unwavering support for the

regime will cost us the support of the Pakistani people?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, as I said, we’re going to work

with whatever government emerges from the process. We’re not in

the business of recommending specific alignments or specific coalitions. I think we would, as a general proposition, urge that the

moderate political forces work together. And, of course, President

Musharraf is still the President of his country, and we look forward

to continuing to work well with him, as well.

Senator FEINGOLD. But, what about the military support to the

regime continuing unabated, without any recognition of the political change, here? I mean, doesn’t it send a troubling message?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Right. I think it’s not a question of

supporting a particular individual, Senator. It’s a question of providing assistance to the institution of the army and of the security

forces in Pakistan, and try to enable them in the ways that we’ve

been discussing, here—improving their counterinsurgency capability and so forth. And also, I don’t think we should underestimate

the high impact that some of our economic and social programs

have had, whether it’s been on literacy or democracy support. Actually, we did a lot, as your colleagues know, to support the election

process that was just carried out, in terms of helping promote election observation, democracy promotion, and so forth.

22

Senator FEINGOLD. I recognize that point. I also recognize that,

in an ideal situation, providing support to the military for a country certainly can be consistent with supporting institutions and

supporting a country moving forward. But, in this case, there’s a

particular problem with the military, with the role of the army in

Pakistan, and with President Musharraf’s relationship with the

military, and how that’s perceived by the public. So, obviously,

you’re aware of that, and it carries more messages than simply

supporting a military institution.

But, let me switch to the issue of judicial reform. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher told a January 29 House subcommittee hearing, ‘‘We have urged the political leaders and other

leaders in Pakistan to focus on the need for an independent judiciary. I think it’s fair to assume they won’t really address it seriously

until after the election.’’ However, immediately after the elections

last week, rather than pressing this point, administration officials

were reportedly pressuring the new Pakistani leadership to stop

their calls for reinstatement of the judges dismissed by Musharraf

when he declared martial law.

So, what is the administration’s policy regarding reinstatement

of the judges? And is it consistent with the Bush administration’s

stated support for democratic institutions?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Just one point on the previous issue,

Senator, which I, of course, should have mentioned, is that Mr.

Musharraf did take off his uniform and did step down as Chief of

Staff of the Army, and I think that was a very significant development.

Senator FEINGOLD. Very, very late in his Presidency, after many

years of requests, and only right before the election.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Correct. But I do recall—prior to her

tragic death, I spoke to Mrs. Bhutto, and I recall her saying that

she thought this was one of the most important things he could do

to advance the prospects for a fair and free election in her country.

Senator FEINGOLD. I agree with that.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. And, of course, we can’t lose sight of

the fact that the Pakistani military now is a vital institution in this

war on terrorism.

As far as the question of the judicial reform, this is something

that we believe the Pakistanis themselves are going to have to sort

out. And I think that it’s something that’ll be taken up in their legislature. And we will watch that discussion with interest. And

we’re certainly not trying to block any changes of any particular

kind, nor do we have some kind of prescription or formula for how

they should go about reforming or improving their own judicial

system.

Senator FEINGOLD. But, does the administration have a policy regarding the reinstatement of those judges? Are they asking—are

we asking for that, or not?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. We have not—we have been silent on

the subject to best of my knowledge.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Corker.

23

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, whoever you are.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. I’m not sure who I am, either. [Laughter.]

Senator CORKER. I want to thank you for your testimony, and I

certainly was glad to hear of the testimony of the three Senators

who were there during the elections. I was there, I guess, within

a day of General Musharraf taking his uniform off, and met with

him, and really was touched, if you will, by many of the comments

that he made. And, I think, actually, some of the Senators have

said the same thing. I also met with former Prime Minister Bhutto

to encourage her to run, and not boycott the elections; and 27 days

later, of course, she was assassinated. But, I think it shows tremendous progress to see what has happened when we had a president that was, in essence, shellacked, if you will, during an election, and yet, is moving ahead with trying to build a coalition. And

I would say that I’m actually somewhat—while this person is not

perfect—impressed with what is happening. It looks like we may,

in fact, have a peaceful transition. Certainly the country is, by no

way, perfect, and there are lots of issues that need to be addressed,

but I hope that you will continue to work with all the leaders in

Pakistan to ensure that this continues. And I want to thank the

Senators for having done what they did.

Let me just ask you this. What do you think has caused the fact

that moderates were elected, when, in fact, we have this tremendous turmoil that is taking place there, which is very different from

what has occurred in other countries, where more extremists have

actually taken the lead—what do you think has caused this response by the electorate, to, in essence, cause moderates to come

to the forefront?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Two points. One would be that I think

there are a lot of secular political leaders in Pakistan, and they

have a fairly long tradition of that. But, the other point I would

make is that, whereas the problem of militant extremism was bottled up in the FATA area in previous years, it has spread into what

the Pakistanis call the ‘‘settled areas’’ now. And I’m sure it was

mentioned to you that the number of suicide bombings and car

bombs and so forth had gone up significantly in the past year or

so, acts of violence by terrorists, in the settled areas. And I think

that what you’re seeing is a reaction to that fact. People don’t like

that, they don’t like the disruption to their lives, they don’t like the

terrorist threat. And I think they want to see it dealt with.

Senator CORKER. I thought that Chairman Biden’s comments

about increasing aid there, the soft aid that actually addresses the

need of Pakistanis, and not necessarily focused so much on our

transactional relationship, if you will, was actually a very good

comment. I don’t know about the actual numbers that need to be

invested, but I did notice the President’s budget actually reduced

funding in that regard by $75 million. And it does seem that this

is a time for us to really try to move ahead the government, move

ahead the understanding of people, move ahead economic development and educational opportunities. And I’m just wondering why,

at the time when this needs to occur, and we’ve invested so much

in this country, we’re actually, through the President’s budget, reducing aid in that way, at least proposed aid, in Pakistan.

24

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Yes; I’d have to look at those precise

numbers, Senator, because my—the picture of the budget that I

carry with me in my mind over the previous—you know, the previous several years, is that it’s been running something between

$600–$700 million a year for these past several years, and that’s

sort of the projection, going forward.

Senator CORKER. OK. Well, I do hope we can follow up with some

of the meetings that I—that Ranking Member Lugar has asked

about. And I hope we can get into some of the accountability issues.

Following up, again, on the chairman’s thoughts regarding

Musharraf’s activities to sort of retrench and look at his own political backside, if you will, based on our lack of investment in

Afghanistan, I will tell you, there’s no question in my mind that

our actions in Iraq have hurt us in Afghanistan, that we have

disinvested there, that we have—we have, sort of, gone sideways

over this last period of time because of that. But, I’d love for you

to respond to that. I don’t think he asked the question. I think he

made the statement. Do you think that, in fact, did affect General

Musharraf’s focus as it relates to terrorism and retrenchment back

to focus on his own political situation there—our lack of focus on

Afghanistan?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, I guess, first of all, I would take

some issue with the thought that we have not been focusing on

Afghanistan, because we have a substantial effort there, both our

own and, of course, the NATO countries, and we have this major

NATO summit coming up, in April, where the subject of Afghanistan will be a focus.

Senator CORKER. But, I think the people on the ground—I mean,

I think General McNeill and everybody there on the ground

acknowledges that we have lacked in our effort there, because of

resource issues, and that it has, in fact, hurt us. I mean, that’s—

these are the folks we depend upon to lead us in that regard——

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Right.

Senator CORKER [continuing]. And certainly have been hamstrung by some of the other efforts. And, again, I don’t want to take

issue with that, it’s just an observation. I think you would agree

with—do you not agree that we’ve been——

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I think I would say that we’re doing

the best we can in both places, and they’re both important,

Senator.

The second thing I’d say is that there’s been a rather sharp increase, in the last couple of years, in the assistance levels to

Afghanistan, whether it’s road-building or other types of aid. And

I think another development in Afghanistan that’s been good in the

last couple or 3 years has been the emphasis on increasing the

competence and capability of the Afghan security forces.

Senator CORKER. On the military side, but not at the police level.

That’s where we really——

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Yes. And that police is an area that

we hope that some of our NATO allies will, maybe, come up with

more offers of assistance. It’s an area where we think they can be

helpful.

Senator CORKER. But, back to the statement that was made,

what do you think that did, in fact, or has, in fact, affected

25

Musharraf in his efforts as it relates to terror, versus just trying

to shore up his own political base?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Senator, I was the Ambassador to the

United Nations in 2001, when President Musharraf came to New

York, had his first meeting with President Bush in November of

that year, and, I think, ever since that time, he’s been committed

in this effort against violent extremism. And he made his famous

speech there, at the end of 2001, and I think he’s been strongly

committed ever since. So, I don’t think I would agree that he has

somehow waned or relented in his effort on this.

Senator CORKER. I know my time is up. I would just say that,

in meeting with our country team there on the ground, and certainly talking with our CIA operatives there, I think there is a tremendous disconnect between the leadership of Pakistan’s view of

where we are, as it relates to fighting terror, and our own CIA view

of that. And I think there’s a huge disconnect there. And hopefully,

as we move into new leadership there, with a new Prime Minister,

those can come into sync more fully.

But, again, I want to say, in general, I think we’ve moved along

in a very good way, as it relates to progress there on the elective

side. I thank the Senators for going over and making sure that the

elections were focused on the proper way. And I think we have an

opportunity for great progress there.

Thank you very much.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, may I respond to something that

the Senator from Tennessee said in regard to his observation about

force structure in Afghanistan?

You recall, as does Senator Kerry, that, when we were there last

week, we were told, by a very senior general, that he would require

an additional two infantry brigades in the south, with a two-star

billet, in addition to the 3,200 marines going in there. And I think

it addresses part of what Senator Corker’s comment was about resources in Afghanistan. This was not a Senator saying this; this

was a rather senior general—not saying he wished we could do it,

he said, straight out, ‘‘We have to do it.’’

The CHAIRMAN. And that he knows he can’t do it, in terms of getting the troops. I apologize for the——

Senator BOXER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Interruption.

Senator Boxer.

Senator BOXER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

I actually want to follow up on your opening—the points you

made about funding. And today, there’s an article—and welcome,

Mr. Secretary—there’s an article in the British press with the

headline, ‘‘Pakistani Military Misspent Up To 70 Percent of American Aid.’’ It goes on to say that, ‘‘American officials processing the

payments at the Embassy in Islamabad have concluded that Pakistan’s expense claims have been vastly inflated. According to an official, ‘My back-of-the-envelope guesstimate is 30 percent of the

money that they requested to be reimbursed was legitimate,’ ’’ so 70

percent was not. The official said he didn’t know what happened

to the remaining $3.8 billion, but suspected that some of the money

might have been spent on F–16 fighter jets or, ‘‘a new house for

an army general.’’ The Pakistani military replied that, ‘‘We’ve

26

never received any formal complaint about this.’’ Every month, the

Pakistani’s expense claims of about $80 million to the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad; no receipts are provided to support the claims,

and the money is paid directly to the Finance Ministry.

Now, here’s the thing. The American people are getting a bit im- patient. We’ve got $9 billion that’s missing in aid to Iraq. And now

we hear this. The American people are being told that President

Bush is cutting everything that they care about, including, let’s see,

funds for after-school programs. We’re supposed to be spending $3

billion on these programs, but we are actually spending less than

$1 billion. Millions of kids can’t get in. The President is not even

willing to spend $1 billion a year on these programs, but we’re losing track of multiple billions of dollars in Iraq.

So, I guess I need to hear from you—what are you doing to address this?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Right. And earlier, Senator—and I

can’t recall whether you were here or not, but I did offer a briefing

to the chairman on this whole issue of coalition support funds, but

I said we’d have to work out as to whether it would be us, in the

State Department, or the Department of Defense, since it’s basically their moneys.

But, let me make a broad point, which is that we—in the case

of these coalition support funds—have provided over the years, it’s

been to compensate Pakistan for the expenses it has incurred in

providing military and logistical support in the war on terror. And,

as I mentioned earlier, they have deployed something like 100,000

troops to their border area, which is not a trivial amount.

Senator BOXER. OK. Mr. Secretary, I don’t—I want us to have a

strong, cooperative relationship.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Right

Senator BOXER. I don’t question that. I’m questioning some fraud

and abuse that could be going on, what American officials are saying might be happening. Here is another quote: ‘‘The road could be

paved with this money.’’ All I’m saying is, I look forward to that

briefing.

I ask unanimous consent to place into the record this article in

the British press that says 70 percent of the money may be being

misspent, and also the chart that shows how much money we’re

talking about, because it’s a lot more than this $6 billion, when you

go to the other accounts.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it’ll be placed in the record.

Senator BOXER. And so, I really do look forward, Mr. Chairman,

to working on this with you as we see this administration slashing

the budget for the American people.

Now, I also feel very disturbed by your seeming ambivalence

about an independent judiciary. Again, we’re spending billions of

dollars in Iraq to set up a judiciary. The Pakistani President—

Pervez Musharraf—dismissed the judiciary. Imagine what would

happen if President Bush went to the microphone and said, ‘‘Today,

I’m firing the Supreme Court, and all the judges can go home.’’

Now, the fact is, when we had a problem with the U.S. attorneys

it caused an uproar. You saw what happened when we had a problem with U.S. attorneys being fired. We still haven’t gotten to the

bottom of that.

27

I would ask unanimous consent to place into the record a CRS

report, which says, ‘‘Reseating the pre-November 3rd Supreme

Court would almost lead to Musharraf’s removal from office, as

that court appeared close to finding his October reelection as President unconstitutional.’’ I want to put that in, as well as another

statement, here, ‘‘By some accounts, the administration remains

wedded to a policy that would keep the embattled Musharraf in

power, despite his weakness and lack of support.’’

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be placed in the record.

Senator BOXER. So, I just hope you’ll rethink this, because we

don’t seem to be sincere when we’re quiet on the importance of an

independent judiciary. It just doesn’t meet American ideals and

what we stand for in our Constitution.

So, I’d like us to rethink this. We cannot base our support for an

independent judiciary on what they might find about President

Musharraf. I just think it’s bigger than that. And if you look at—

and I’d ask unanimous consent to place part of a report from ‘‘Terror-Free Tomorrow: the Center for Public Opinion,’’ in the record—

just their summary page, if I might.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

Senator BOXER. There are some really wonderful things in the

findings. The report basically finds that the Pakistani people really

want to see Osama bin Laden and the terrorists gone. They also

are very concerned that American policy is propping up Musharraf.

This is not good for us. It is not good for us.

So—I will give you an example. And I will finish with this—in

August 2007, Secretary Rice said, ‘‘I think that we and Pakistan

have a very strong interest together in capturing or killing highvalue targets.’’ And she said, ‘‘Musharraf himself is at risk from extremists. We all have this in common, to get the terrorists.’’ Yet,

President Musharraf recently said, on a tour through Europe, regarding the fact that Osama bin Laden and al-Zawahiri are still at

large, that it ‘‘doesn’t mean much.’’ He said, ‘‘it doesn’t mean

much.’’ According to the Associated Press, Musharraf attributed his

feelings about the two’s continued freedom—bin Laden and

Zawahiri—to the fact that the two are less a threat to his regime

than Taliban-linked militants. He even went on to elaborate that

the 100,000 troops that you referenced are not going around trying

to locate Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri. He said that.

So, it’s outrageous, and it runs contrary to what Secretary Rice

said in August 2007. The fact that these al-Qaeda leaders are still

on the loose is distressing to all Americans, especially the families

and loved ones of those who died on 9/11. So, I think your defense

and your support of Musharraf, and talking about the 100,000

troops, when Musharraf himself has said that those 100,000 troops

aren’t being used to catch terrorists, is just very concerning.

So, I have one last question. How do you reconcile Musharraf’s

statements that he’s not worried about these two being loose, with

what Secretary Rice said about our joint commitment to capturing

high-value targets?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Right. Well, I can’t—he’d have to address that, and I’d have to see the context in which he said all of

that. It was a question-answer situation. But, what I would say is,

we’ve had good cooperation with them on this issue of al-Qaeda. I

28

recall, as Director of National Intelligence, being very impressed by

the cooperation that we had with the Government of Pakistan, particularly with counterparts of my then-organization in seeking out

extremist militants. And I think it’s worth recalling that Mr.

Musharraf himself has been the victim of some of these militant

assassination attempts.

Senator BOXER. That’s what Secretary Rice said.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. So, I think that we are essentially on

the same page with the Pakistani authorities on this issue.

Senator BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I’d just like to put in the record,

because you said you didn’t see it—it’s from FOX News. The story

has Musharraf saying that ‘‘The 100,000 troops we’re using are not

going around trying to locate Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri,

frankly,’’ and that, ‘‘it doesn’t—it doesn’t mean much,’’ that they’re

running around loose. This is really outrageous.

And our President is still saying how strongly he supports

Musharraf. I’d put that in the record, a comment made after the

elections.

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The above mentioned comment was not available

at the time of printing.]

Senator BOXER. You know, so it’s just concerning to me, Mr.

Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Isakson.

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Mr. Secretary. I am very supportive of what Chairman

Biden and Ranking Member Lugar said with regard to the coordinated financial assistance to Pakistan. And I’m very supportive of

the $150 million assistance provided to the Federally Administered

Tribal Areas in Pakistan. But, I do have a question with regard to

that.

In Iraq, last month, I traveled with a PRT team into Ghazaliya,

along with a combination of State and military officials and

watched the application for, and the distribution of, microgrants,

which is part of the PRT’s goal to bring economic activity to Iraq,

and was just amazed with the level of accountability and the results those microgrants made in that program.

Here is my question. I know we’re not going to have military personnel of the United States in Pakistan, so we don’t have that program for distribution and accountability of economic assistance.

What type of NGO and what type of accountability are we going

to have on the distribution of those funds in the tribal areas in

Pakistan?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I’d like to submit a longer reply——

Senator ISAKSON. Sure.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE [continuing]. To your question, for the

record, Senator.

[The written response of the State Department follows:]

The State Department or U.S. Agency for International Development monitors assistance in the tribal areas by following standard Federal procurement and financial

management regulations, conducting third party as well as inspector general performance and financial audits of contractors and grantees, and meeting all provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act, including preobligation requirements.

The U.S. Agency for International Development and the Pakistan Government

have been working together to develop joint evaluation plans for programs in the

29

tribal areas as well. That includes collecting baseline data and regular monitoring

and evaluation plans. Several large programs, including the Capacity Building and

Livehoods contracts, have been recently signed. One of the first things the contractors will do is collect baseline data to monitor and evaluate the success of the programs.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. But, in brief, I would say, first of all,

the—our aid programs are administered under the applicable Federal rules of accountability.

The second is that we do have AID personnel stationed up in

Peshawar, adjacent to the FATA area. And, third, Ambassador Patterson has also designated a position, in her Embassy, of a coordinator for our assistance programs to the FATA area, who will also

have that kind of oversight responsibility. So, we will certainly be

mindful of the need for accountability—oversight and accountability.

Senator ISAKSON. Is the—on that—in addition to that, is the type

of assistance contemplated similar to the micro-grants and -loans

that are being made in Iraq for business development—small business?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I don’t know that for a specific fact,

but my understanding is, it’s going to be for the range of civic development, community development type programs.

Senator ISAKSON. It’s my understanding, one of their goals is to

try and bring some employment, economic benefit, and economic

sustainability to the tribal areas.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Absolutely. And, of course, that’s why

these Reconstruction Opportunity Zones would be so helpful, as

well.

Senator ISAKSON. The second thing I want to mention, you may

not want to comment on but you can if you want to, is in regard

to terrorism and extremism in Pakistan. In Atlanta, Georgia, we

had an incident last year, where two Islamic students at Georgia

Tech were arrested, and a cell was broken up—thanks to our intelligence under FISA and the Patriot Act, in communications between Islamabad, Atlanta, and Toronto—successfully before its activation. Those communications were coming out of Pakistan, out

of Islamabad. I want to just make the point that we leave ourselves, I think, at some risk, with the FISA law now being not extended. And one of the reasons that I was so supportive of reauthorizing this measure on the floor of the Senate was because of

that singular experience we had in our city, to bring up a close and

personal experience and how important it is to have that type of

intelligence.

And there is al-Qaeda in Pakistan, and it is operating, and it is

central in the war on terror. And I’m appreciative for the cooperation that we have had, and I think it’s critical that the State

Department engage and maintain our relationship with this new

and emerging Government in Pakistan, because I think it’s probably the key area in the world in the war on terror.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That’s all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Cardin, thank you for your patience.

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it.

Mr. Secretary, I thank you for your long record of service to our

country in so many different roles.

30

There’s a lot we need to understand from this election, and if I

had to point to one area that offers great promise—the rejection of

extremism—particularly in the northwest area. And it seems to me

that we should be looking at modifying U.S. policy and expectations

as to what we expect the new leaders of Pakistan to do in identifying ways to root out the terrorist networks, particularly in the

tribal areas.

I’m frustrated and I think Americans are frustrated, that we

haven’t been able to make more progress in rooting out the areas

that seem to be without control, where al-Qaeda and others can operate without real accountability.

There’s going to be a new Prime Minister in Pakistan. Clearly,

the power of the President has been changed. There’ll be a new

Parliament. What should be our expectations of what these leaders

can do in order to gain greater control of the territories and root

out these training cells and operational support for terrorist organizations?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, I guess the first point I want to

make, Senator, is Pakistan is a sovereign country, and, in the last

analysis, whatever they do to deal with these issues has got to be

based on their government’s perception and their people’s perception of their own best self-interest.

Senator CARDIN. And I agree with that. My point is that U.S.

policy can affect that. And, of course, we have the involvement, not

only in the United States, but the international community, in trying to support efforts within Pakistan. The chairman has mentioned that; I fully agree that it needs to be reevaluated.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Right.

Senator CARDIN. So, using all of our tools, it seems to me we can

have an impact. My question is, What can we expect?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Here would be my answer to that.

First of all, I think that whatever we do should be done on a cooperative basis. I think that it is harmful when people—very often,

unidentified sources—talk about us somehow taking this matter

into our own hands and acting unilaterally. I think all that does

is get people’s backs up on the scene. But, I think what we can expect is that—we would like to work with the Government of Pakistan to help them in our social and economic programs in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and in other parts of Pakistan, to

help deal with the root causes, if you will, of this militant extremism. We would also like to work with them on the security front,

whether it’s intelligence or the military, to help improve their

counterterrorism and their counterinsurgency efforts. And so, the

expectations would be, really, to strengthen our collaborative

efforts together and for them to be open to that kind of cooperation

with the United States.

Senator CARDIN. I would just make the observation. Those who

participated in the elections, their votes were more encouraging

than the current leadership in Pakistan, as to taking on the extremist groups. It’s clearly the right thing, but it’s also, perhaps,

the popular thing within Pakistan. And that may not have been

the reading of the leaders, prior to the election.

I want to comment on Senator Corker’s point, because it’s clear

to me that our efforts in Iraq has an impact on what’s happening

31

in Afghanistan, it’s having an impact on what’s happening in

Pakistan. And many of us think that we’re not focusing on—as we

should—on terrorists, because of the way that Iraq is being

handled.

The Iraq coalition is a small coalition compared to the international support we have in Afghanistan and as it relates to

Pakistan. So, it seems to me, and most Americans, that what’s happening in Iraq is affecting our effectiveness in dealing with

Afghanistan and the cooperation we’re receiving in Pakistan. And

I just welcome your thoughts on that, understanding your position

in the administration. We want to have an effective policy in Pakistan. The purpose of this hearing is, given these new opportunities

brought about by these elections, how we can have programs to

deal with terrorists operating in this region and engage the international community as effectively as we can?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Of course, in addition to my position

in the administration, I’m a former United States Ambassador to

Iraq, so I have a particular personal experience in that regard.

Senator CARDIN. And I met you there. I thank you for your hospitality when I was in Baghdad——

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Right.

Senator CARDIN [continuing]. When you were Ambassador.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. So no matter what anybody thinks

about the merits or demerits of us having gone in there in the first

place, I think we all recognize the importance of now getting it stabilized and getting it on the right footing. And Ambassador Crocker

and General Petraeus will be coming back shortly to brief the Congress and the American people on the situation there, and I think

they’re going to be presenting a fairly hopeful and encouraging

report.

But, as far as Pakistan is concerned, I think the important point

of departure, Senator, is the recognition of its importance in this

global situation, and the importance of Pakistan, not only for itself,

but for, also, the situation in Afghanistan. And it sounds to me,

from the discussion we’ve had this morning, that we’re sort of on

the same page in that regard, so what we’ve got to do is look at

ways, going forward, to be as supportive as we possibly can. I don’t

know what else to say, at this stage.

Senator CARDIN. Well, I thank you. I just think there is a new

opportunity here, because of the elections. I hope we have a way

to energize the international community and working with the sovereign country of Pakistan, to have higher expectations of what can

be achieved in the tribal and the border areas as far as eliminating

the safe havens that currently exist.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. That does remind me of one other

point that I think is worth mentioning—and you’ve suggested it,

yourself—and that is, we also need, in our dialogue—and I’ve been

doing this—trying to do this more and more—in our discussions

with friends and allies around the world, we need to draw their

attention to the importance of Pakistan, in addition to whatever

support they might be providing to some of these other critical

countries. But, in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan—our help to these

countries is vital, each of them, to the United States national

interests.

32

Senator CARDIN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Barrasso, thank you for your patience.

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And

thank you for making me feel so welcome, as the newest member

of this committee.

The CHAIRMAN. I was just, actually, saying very nice things

about you to the Senator—Senator Lugar. I am impressed. And I—

presumptuous of me to say that, but I am, and I——

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. And the floor is yours, sir.

Senator BARRASSO. And thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

I know many of the questions have already been asked. Just two.

First, regarding the elections and the multiple parties trying to get

together with the coalition. I know you want to continue to focus

on working with the new Parliament to ensure Pakistan’s cooperation with us in fighting terrorist groups. You may have addressed

some of it already. Do you believe that there are allies that we

have, within the new government that is forming, who will continue to work with us?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, we certainly look forward to

working with whatever government emerges. I can’t tell you the

precise coloration, if you will, or the specific individuals, because

we don’t know the answer to that question yet. But, I think, given

the rejection of the Islamist parties, I think the general tendency

in the country toward moderation and secular government—I

would hope and expect that we would be able to work as well, if

not better, with the forthcoming government than we have in the

past. Certainly hopeful.

Senator BARRASSO. Yes. And then looking at the history of Pakistan, and the role of the military involvement over the years. We

have a new military leader in November 2007, who was appointed

the general by Musharraf. Do you see the military playing an additional part in Pakistan’s future as we’ve seen in the past? And how

do we go about with that?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Right. And I think the point here is

that the military is a very important institution in Pakistan, particularly with regard to maintaining security in that country. I

think it was a significant development that President Musharraf

stepped down from the military, took off his uniform. And my sense

is that the current leadership of the Pakistani military is very focused on their military tasks and on increasing their professionalization. And we want to be supportive of that. There’s work to be

done together in helping them increase their professionalization,

their training, and their counterinsurgency capabilities.

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Barrasso follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN BARRASSO, U.S. SENATOR FROM WYOMING

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Biden, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, I am honored to be

here today. Through this committee’s distinguished history, members have played

an important role in shaping relations with world leaders and promoting our foreign

policy objectives. We live in an ever-changing world and this committee has a reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:59 Dec 03, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 2008PAKISTAN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
33

sponsibility to be diligent in supporting and directing the United States role as a

world leader.

Building sound relationships with our allies and others in the international community effectively aids the United States as we seek to resolve conflicts and address

humanitarian crises. As issues arise, it is important that this committee provide appropriate oversight and leadership to ensure that American values of liberty and

justice are evident in our policy decisions.

While Americans are generous in aiding those suffering from disease, political unrest, war, and natural disasters, it is important that the committee support policies

that ensure taxpayer dollars are used wisely. As conflicts of all kinds continue to

wreak havoc in the lives of so many people around the world, the United States will

work with our allies to address regional and global conflicts, particularly those that

have a direct impact on our Nation’s interests.

I am pleased to hear the Honorable John Negroponte’s testimony regarding the

current situation in Pakistan. Pakistan has proven to be an ally in the war on terrorism and plays an important role in the stability of South Asia. The elections held

this month in Pakistan produced a new government and Pakistan’s leaders are negotiating the direction their country should take.

It is vital that the U.S. build upon our relationship with Pakistan and support

the Pakistanis’ efforts to have a voice in their own government. Determining our

Nation’s level of involvement in any country is difficult, but also a vital aspect of

our Nation’s interest in maintaining our security and promoting freedom. Due diligence must be given in all aspects of our continuing relationship with Pakistan.

I look forward to discussing this issue further.

Again, I am honored to serve on this committee and I value this opportunity to

serve Wyoming in this capacity.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator, do you have any further questions?

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, if I——

The CHAIRMAN. Sure. Yes, please.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Secretary, as you say, we’ve got to see how

the government will form. There are press reports today of a demand by the leader—the two major leaders of parties, that there

be a meeting of the assembly right away. One news account says

that the election results are not official in all of the constituencies,

thus far, although a vast majority apparently have been decided,

and it would appear that, clearly, the two major—well, three parties have approximately a two-thirds majority, or maybe more. And

the reason that this is being stressed is that they’re saying, under

the Constitution, this would give this assembly the power to

change the judiciary; for that matter, to impeach President

Musharraf. Now, whether that’s the will of the group when they

meet is another question.

But, we’ve been, you know, advising you, and you’ve been advising us, that we are already doing a good number of things, in terms

of taxpayer dollars, with regard to the military, or economic support, and we have encouraged, perhaps, further briefing by you

about accountability of funds, as well as other issues that we’ve

raised, so that we’re all on the same page, in terms of a very timely

response.

But, I’d just ask you, What do you foresee as the timing of events

in Pakistan, or do you have any prediction of this? In other words,

how soon is it likely that this assembly will come together, that

there will be fundamental decisions made about the leadership and

the institutions of the country? And are these likely to be so disruptive that whatever new policies or augmentation of what we’re

now doing could be, sort of, lost in the process of Pakistani politics

for a period of time?

34

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Right. I believe, Senator, the first

step is that the election results need to be certified. And it’s conceivable—I’m not sure whether that has to be done before the legislature, or not. Perhaps it does. So, maybe that’s what that is about.

But, my understanding, from talking to Ambassador Patterson

this morning, was that she expected that—although she wasn’t certain—that a government would likely be formed within the next 2

weeks.

Senator LUGAR. Two weeks.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Perhaps sooner. Obviously, we would

hope that, however this process unfolds, that it happen in a way

that reflects that same moderation that permitted a relatively

peaceful conduct of these elections, and permits Pakistan to go forward in a way that cannot be exploited by the enemies of democracy, including the terrorists.

Senator LUGAR. That leads to my comment, and that is, To what

extent, while this process of 2 weeks, maybe more, is going on—

as Ambassador Patterson has noted, and we are hopeful the same

spirit of moderation might prevail. But, is that spirit more likely

to prevail if there are at least some announcements coming from

the United States about the emphasis of what we wish to do? In

other words, our public recognition of the possibilities of moving to

assist the economy.

Now, you’ve pointed out we have some multiyear responsibilities

and commitments, but these are, I think, not well known to the

American public, quite apart from the Pakistani public. Maybe

even the testimony you have today, it would reiterate that we have

these commitments already, and that you are working with the

Congress to think through what more we can do. It might be reassuring, might help the stability or encourage moderation that

you’re discussing, as opposed to our taking a standoffish view, seeing how it all works out, but then being dismayed that, unfortunately, there were currents in Pakistani politics, that are not involved in the election, that are disturbingly surprised.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, first, I think—I would hope this

hearing could be construed in the way that you suggest, as a——

Senator LUGAR. Yes.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE [continuing]. A relatively—as a positive statement about our interest, and a constructive statement

about our interest in Pakistan.

The other specific point I would mention is that I gather that introduction of this Reconstruction Opportunity Zone legislation may

be fairly imminent, and I think that would certainly be well received in Pakistan, and demonstrate the fact that we’re interested

in being supportive of both Afghanistan and Pakistan’s economic

development.

Senator LUGAR. Well, I think you’re very correct. And, without

being self-serving about this, I would say that the bill that Senator

Biden and I have introduced and has come from this committee has

had a hold on the Senate floor for a while. That’s the reason why

a large majority of Senators who would like to express exactly what

you are saying today have not had that opportunity. So, I’m hopeful that we can work with the House legislation, with the leadership of the Senate. I count upon my chairman to be persuasive

35

with regard to that, because clearly this is timely, I believe, to reinforce all that we’re saying today, in the event we appropriate the

money, the means of spending it, and doing so properly, using both

Defense Department people and State Department people, and others, for that matter, in a team effort, is really important.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. And that—if you’re referring to your

civilian stabilization initiative, I think that’s a groundbreaking

idea. I really do, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

If I could follow up, just very briefly. And this falls in the category of above my paygrade. But—and mildly presumptuous to

suggest to you, Mr. Ambassador, because I know you know how,

sort of, voracious the foreign press is in some of these countries.

One observation, which I’m sure is not instructive, but it—just

a reminder—it astounded me, and, I think, my two colleagues, how

uniform the press in Pakistan was when we held a departing press

conference where there were—hundreds?—I mean, as large a press

conference as I’ve ever attended, other than the Bork hearing—and

there was almost an anger—there was an anger expressed, in the

tone of the questions coming from the press, on the failure of the

three of us to immediately call for the immediate resignation of

Musharraf. And almost every question asked—and, unfortunately—well, not ‘‘unfortunately’’—we literally had to catch a

plane, so we couldn’t stay—was in the context of the promoted

notion by the press that the administration was standing foursquare, notwithstanding the elections, behind Musharraf exercising

a similar kind of power he’s exercised in the past. I know that’s not

true. I know that’s not the administration’s position. But, in a

sense—the point that Senator Lugar made—I strongly urge you to

consider, to the extent that you can affect the White House’s perception, as well, that—I truly believe, if you were—if the administration were to put forward a statement, essentially acknowledging

Musharraf’s comments that he made in the editorial in the—I

guess, the Washington Post, or the New York Times, I can’t remember what editorial he wrote—and the expectation that you believe he will, in fact, recede to the position of President and not

Prime Minister, which is where the power is. If you were to state

that you were working with the Congress to increase economic assistance, if you were to state that you were prepared and anxious

to work with the new coalition government—people don’t know that

in the press in Pakistan. It’s surprising.

Now, I know we have a very fine Ambassador. I am truly impressed with her. All of us are. I think she’s one of the finest we

have. Obviously, she’d know better than either Senator—myself or

any of us here, whether the characterization I have just made

about what I think average Pakistanis reading the Pakistani press

believe about our position, including our position on the court. And

I really think it’s an opportunity to begin to change perceptions on

the ground.

But, that’s my perception. I would urge you—I know you would—

I would urge you to speak with our Ambassador to see whether or

not what I’ve said is accurate. And you would know as well as anyone.

36

Second point I’d like to make, in closing—the reason we were

waiting, I thought Senator Menendez, who’s in another committee,

was going to come back; he’s not able to, but I’m sure he may have

a few questions to submit for the record.

Two closing observations. You referenced that we’re doing more

in Afghanistan. And we are doing more in Afghanistan. One of the

most interesting things I’ve found, I say to my friend Dick Lugar,

is that everyone we spoke to in Afghanistan, on the American side,

from young soldiers we referenced, to our Ambassador, to the military, all started with an interesting opening comment, some

version of what I’m about to say. We acknowledge we haven’t done

much from 2001 to 2006; we dropped the ball. Some version of that.

But, from mid 2006 to now, we have begun to get this together. I

found that refreshing, and I found that—not in an ‘‘I told you so’’

way, but I found it refreshing that there was a recognition that a

lot more had to be done.

But, I just put this one little statistic in your head—which I

think is, at least from my perspective, a way of looking at the

effort. From 2001 to today, we have spent the same amount of

money and resources for reconstruction in Afghanistan that we

spent in 3 weeks—3 weeks—on just military operations in Iraq.

This is not to suggest—which I think we should, but I’m not making the case we should do less in Iraq, but I am just making the

case that if the consensus you, kind of, heard from members here,

on both sides of the aisle, that we think the fault line in the war

on terror is on that border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, we

think a great deal more has to be done in Afghanistan, both militarily and economically. And, again, I’m not suggesting you agree

or disagree, I just want to make that observation.

No matter how much more we’ve done, when you think of it in

terms of 3 weeks is—as much is spent on military operations in

Iraq as we’ve spent in 6 years on reconstruction in Afghanistan, it’s

kind of—it’s a bit of a—it’s a bit of a—it’s not—it exaggerates, in

some ways, but it really illustrates how much has to be done.

But, I apologize, I see my friend Senator Nelson is here. I recognize the Senator. The Senator said he likes us very much, Senator,

but this seniority system of asking questions, he’s not as crazy

about. I felt that exact way ’til I became chairman. [Laughter.]

Senator BILL NELSON. I understand.

Well, I have been—let me just be very complimentary of you. I

came here so that I could hear you and hear the Secretary. And

I came early, and not only did I listen to you, I asked for a copy

of your remarks, which I have read. And——

The CHAIRMAN. I’m about to reconsider this seniority thing.

[Laughter.]

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, I would just be curious if the Secretary would reflect specifically upon your remarks, Mr. Chairman.

And I’m going to reread your remarks from your opening statement. And Senator Biden said, ‘‘I believe we should, first, triple

nonmilitary assistance, and sustain it for a decade, from about

$500 million to about $11⁄2 billion. This aid should be focused on

schools, roads, and clinics, and on expanding the development of

the tribal border areas. Second, give the new government, if it’s

formed consistent with the democratic principles, a democracy diviVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:59 Dec 03, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 2008PAKISTAN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
37

dend of $1 billion above this annual assistance to jump-start

progress. And, third, demand transparency and accountability in

the military aid that we continue to provide.’’

Now, I think we can stipulate that we all agree to No. 3. I’d like

to know your comments, Mr. Secretary, to the chairman’s recommendations on one and two—triple nonmilitary assistance, especially to get it to schools, roads, and clinics; and, second, to give the

new government a democracy dividend of a billion dollars above

this annual assistance to jump-start progress.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Right. Senator, as I said—it may have

been when you weren’t in the room—I said that this was a proposal

we were looking at. At the same time, of course, we have our own

budget proposal, at the moment, before the Congress, so I’m not in

a position to say that, yes, we should modify that. But, what I did

point out was, two things. First of all, that our 5-year, $3 billion

assistance program to Pakistan from fiscal 2005 through fiscal

2009 will be expiring in 2009, so I think we have to start thinking

about what we’re going to be doing in the future years. And this

election may, indeed, be a point of departure. And the chairman’s

suggestion may also be a point of departure for taking a hard look

at that.

And the other was to say that I think that the chairman’s suggestion reminds us—and I think it highlights—the tremendous importance of this country—Pakistan, that is—to this global war on

terror, and to the intrinsic importance of Pakistan itself. But, I

wasn’t in a position to explicitly agree or disagree with the idea of

tripling nonmilitary assistance or paying a democracy dividend.

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, I’ll never forget—and I’ll just stop

with this, Mr. Chairman—early on in this decade, I was visiting

Pakistan, and I so well remember our Ambassador, a career Foreign Service officer, expressing to me, in that visit, her frustration

that our aid was not getting out to build those schools and to get

those curriculum materials into the schools, that it was getting

siphoned off into other things. And so, when you say ‘‘schools,

roads, and clinics,’’ I certainly agree.

And it’s not only Pakistan. You know, it’ll be most of the Third

World that the assistance that we need to do is to get it there. And

this is not the first time that somebody has raised this issue; it’s

a continuing problem.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if I can say to the Senator, before I yield

to—you still have time, but before I yield to Senator Menendez—

I do recall you coming back and making that assertion before the

committee.

What I would say to the Ambassador, Senator Lugar and I, before he left, we’ve agreed, with our staffs, to work on a joint bill

that we would introduce along those lines.

And I’d invite the Senator to join us and give his input on what

that should look like. But, hopefully, we can, in light of the

changed circumstances—the budget was offered prior to the election, and this may be a possibility. We can work out a 2009 budget,

here, and maybe, immediate, in the supplement, some additional

help. But, I very much look to the Senator for his leadership on

that, because I do recall you coming back, making the statement.

I remember you saying to me that the Saudis had built 7,000

38

madrassas in that region, and why weren’t we building schools in

that region? So, I look forward to his participation.

Senator Menendez, thanks for coming back.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you

for holding this hearing. It’s——

The CHAIRMAN. Thanks.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Incredibly important. And I

want to echo some of your remarks that our policy should be to

Pakistan, as an entity, not to a person. And I think it’s been one

of our mistakes.

Mr. Secretary, thank you for being before the committee. And,

unfortunately, I had another hearing at the same time, with Chairman Bernanke; and the economy is important, but so is our policy

toward Pakistan, so I’m glad to be able to make it back.

You know, in December we had a hearing, under the auspices of

the full committee’s—with the chairman’s authority to have us

have a hearing of the subcommittee on our aid issues. And, you

know, when I look at the amount of money that we have spent in

Pakistan to date, and now, looking at the results of the election,

and looking at where we go from here, I am concerned, as the administration presents its latest requests to the Congress, whether

we are headed in the right direction. I sent a letter to Secretary

Rice on the 21st in which, you know, I outlined some of my concerns. Certainly, when I look at anti-Americanism, when I look at

what has happened, in terms of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border

and the FATA region, I really wonder—and so, now I’d like to get

a sense of you, do we know how much money has actually been

spent in the FATA region—of U.S. taxpayer dollars——

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Well, in this——

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Toward our——

Ambassador NEGROPONTE [continuing]. Fiscal year, the plan is

for $150 million.

Senator MENENDEZ. Yes. No, that’s——

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. You’re asking——

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. This fiscal year. I’m asking

what we’ve done——

Ambassador NEGROPONTE [continuing]. What’s actually been disbursed?

Senator MENENDEZ. Yes.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I would have to submit that for the

record.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, if you would.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I certainly know that we’ve begun,

you know, programs there. They’re underway.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I’d like to know what we’ve

actually——

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Sure.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Spent. And how much do you

think will be spent on development programs in that region?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. In Pakistan?

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, particularly in the FATA region.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. You mean, beyond the $150 million?

39

Senator MENENDEZ. Do you have a sense of what we have spent,

to date? It’s the same—you—you’d have to get that for the record,

as well?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. I think so, yes.

[The written response from the State Department to the above

questions follows:]

The Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement has spent $160 million since 2002 in the border areas. This money funds our Border Security Program,

which includes road and other infrastructure construction, provision of an air wing,

training of law enforcement agencies, and commodity support, as well as our Counternarcotics Program, which includes crop control and demand reduction efforts. The United States Agency for International Development has spent $12.4 million

in the tribal areas since 2002 (when USAID returned to Pakistan). We started slowly because the Government of Pakistan was still working on a comprehensive plan

for development of the tribal areas, which it completed in late 2006. The initial

money was spent on vaccinating children in the region for tuberculosis and polio

and prividing health services to children. USAID also rebuilt 38 schools and provided water and sanitation facilities in several girls’ schools. Significantly, USAID

used a private sector construction company from the North West Frontier Province

to work on the schools, to demonstrate that private sector companies from the settled areas of Pakistan can operate inside the tribal areas, with appropriate safeguards, and earn a profit. Finally, we also have supported Kushhali Bank, a microfinance institution, to open branches in all seven tribal area agencies.

Senator MENENDEZ. OK. Let me just ask you, What are our expectations—as we look at the new leadership in Pakistan that has

been elected and, what is our expectation of their engagement?

They’ve been critical of President Musharraf’s policies in supporting the United States in its effort, particularly in the tribal regions—what do we expect from this new leadership in Pakistan as

it relates to this region? I focus on this region—of course, there’s

a lot of different issues in Pakistan that are important, but, you

know, we get our intelligence reports as the—publicly—aspects of

it—and they clearly say that one of the greatest single challenges

to national security in the United States is al-Qaeda’s reconstituted

strength in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, where it is also suspected that Osama bin Laden presently finds safe haven. We look

at the money that we have spent to date. We now look at a new

leadership elected by the people of Pakistan, who seem to have a

different view. So, the question is, What do we expect of this new

Pakistani leadership, as it relates to being engaged with us in dealing with the terrorism that emanates out of this safe haven?

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. First of all, a point I made earlier and

several times during the hearing, we plan to work with whatever

government emerges from this electoral process and from the national assembly. So, that would be my first point.

Second, whatever one might say about Pakistan’s efforts against

militant extremism, I think it is important to point out that they—

they, themselves, have suffered a very high number of casualties,

both military and civilian, in this struggle. And I think what we

would hope to do with this government is work in partnership with

them, and be helpful where we can, in their efforts to curb and

bring under control militancy, which we know that they, themselves, reject. And I think one—that’s one of the clear results of

these elections, is that the Pakistani people, themselves, do not

want this kind of militant extremism in their midst.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I appreciate your answer, but here’s

my concern. Congress has a fiduciary responsibility to the AmerVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:59 Dec 03, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 2008PAKISTAN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
40

ican people, both in terms of the expenditure of its tax dollars, as

well as in the preservation of its security. And the bottom line is,

$10 billion later, since 9/11, we have not prevented al-Qaeda from

operating in a safe zone along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border;

you know, we have rising anti-Americanism; we have not, in my

mind, pursued a policy that deals with the moderate center in

Pakistan; and this FATA region is a huge challenge, notwithstanding—$10 billion later. So, I have—and then we have a terrible

accounting process, where we can’t seem to get a handle about

what, in fact, we have spent, and how it has been spent, and, particularly, where, in fact, it has been spent, as it relates to the

FATA region. So, before one can ask for more, one has to justify

both the past, as well as make the case——

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Right.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. For the future. And that’s the

essence of my question.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. No; I understand, Senator. The answer has several parts, but one part would certainly be, we don’t

know how much worse things would be if we hadn’t gone through

the efforts that we have gone through. For example, would we have

been able to influence the Pakistani Government to send 100,000

troops into the FATA area? They’ve got two divisions there, as was

being mentioned earlier. So, that’s one of the results—or one of the

acts for which we are providing these coalition support funds, the

$5.6 billion that we’ve provided since 2001. They’ve done a lot of

work against militant extremism. And in their own country they’re

revising their curriculum of these madrassas, for example, and of

their school system, they’re trying to secularize it. On the antiAmericanism issue, we’ve got 500 students—I think it’s the largest

Fulbright Program of any of our academic exchange programs here

in the United States, with Pakistani students coming over here. So,

this is work in progress.

But, I would submit to you that the situation is—has improved

in a number of important respects, and I certainly would hate to

speculate as to how much worse it might be, had we not been engaged at all. But, I think it would have definitely been worse.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, Mr. Chairman, I don’t want to belabor

your—the time—and I appreciate it.

But, you know, my—Mr. Secretary, you know, we can look at

anything—any problem in our country, domestically or abroad, and

say, ‘‘Imagine if it would have been worse if we hadn’t done this.’’

The question is, spending billions to accomplish whatever your estimate of what has been accomplished is, compared to what has been

accomplished, is the balance. And I would venture to say that

many of us would say that we’ve far outspent what the accomplishments were. And if we think—whether it be in Iraq, or whether it

be in Pakistan—that spending billions of the taxpayers’ dollars for

a relative small return is the rate in which we make estimations,

then we are in deep trouble. I think that there’s a—there is a lot

larger expectation. And I’m not just going over the past, I’m now

looking prospectively. And it just seems to me, at least speaking for

this one member, that there has to be a far more robust accounting, as well as a convincing, and a—hopefully, a changing of the

dynamics as to how we are spending our money for the purposes

41

that we seek to achieve. We certainly want a stable, democratic

Pakistan. But, at the same time, I find it increasingly difficult to

go back to my home State of New Jersey or to chair the subcommittee on our foreign assistance, and say that, $10 billion later,

we would consider the amount of money that we spend, for what

we achieved, a success. I personally would not consider it a success.

So, I think we need to do a lot better, as you look at this next

budget. And I would really urge a—some better metrics than what

we have today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

You’ve been very patient and responsive, Mr. Ambassador.

Thank you very much.

I was just having—and I’ll conclude by saying—a brief conversation with the chief of staff, here—and I will follow up with Senator

Lugar—but our hope is that we may be able to get together a consensus piece of—with the help of the chairman of the subcommittee—consensus piece of legislation relative to economic

assistance, both in the supplemental, possibly, but also for FY09

budget, based on what I’ve heard here today, through the leadership of the subcommittee chair—I think there’s a consensus here,

and maybe be able to get, in that process, before we produce that

for a markup here, have an opportunity to sit with you, or whomever you designate, Mr. Ambassador, to talk about the outlines of

such a proposal.

Again, I don’t say that, at this point, about—arguing about

whether or not what was proposed is appropriate or not appropriate. Things have changed. Things have changed in the last 2

weeks. And I hope we can agree on taking advantage of that

change.

Again, I thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Do you have any closing

comments you wish to make, or—the floor is yours, if you do.

Ambassador NEGROPONTE. Just two points, Mr. Chairman, part

of it answering the points that Mr. Menendez made, which—I understand his points. The only thing to say in reply is that it is a

vital area, particularly the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. I believe

Pakistan is the third-largest recipient of assistance from the

United States, and, I think, deservedly so.

And then, the other point I’d like to associate myself with is the

point that both the chairman and, I think, by implication, Senator

Nelson made, when he was asking the question—I do think that

whatever we do with Pakistan, and for Pakistan, ought to be over

the longer term. I think that our relationship with Pakistan in past

years, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s suffered from peaks and

valleys and ups and downs. And I think that whatever we can do

to put it on as a sustainable a basis as possible would be to the

good for this vital country in a vital region of the world.

The CHAIRMAN. I’m glad to hear you say that. And I would note,

for the record—I know you—we all know this—but, that transactional relationship occurred with Democratic Presidents, as well

as Republican Presidents, so it’s not like—I just hope we do not

make the mistake we, in hindsight, made with regard to Afghanistan, as it affects Pakistan, that, after the Russians were defeated,

42

we essentially walked away. It would be a real disaster to do that.

I think everybody is aware of that.

And so, this is one of the areas, with your leadership, Mr. Ambassador, we really look forward to working with you. I think we

can do something very positive here, and try to do it quickly.

I thank you. And I thank my colleagues.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BARACK OBAMA, U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing on ‘‘U.S. Policy Options in PostElection Pakistan.’’ I also appreciate Deputy Secretary Negroponte’s willingness to

discuss his assessments related to this important topic.

On February 18, a strong majority of the Pakistani people called for a new direction for their country. The two main opposition parties that made substantial gains

in the parliamentary elections are moderate and have expressed a willingness to

work with the United States. The stark choice that has been presented to us by the

Bush administration—between President Musharraf on the one hand, and violent

Islamists on the other—was shown to be false.

This development presents an important opportunity for the United States to

change its policy toward Pakistan. For years, U.S. policy has valued stability in

Pakistan over the advancement of democracy—as a result, we have gotten neither.

Our unconditional embrace of President Musharraf has stifled democratic reforms,

stoked anti-American sentiment, and contributed to a level of instability that has

hampered Pakistan’s efforts to combat terrorism and extremism. Meanwhile, the

Pakistani Government has failed to root out the al-Qaeda and Taliban sanctuary in

its northwest tribal region.

To advance American interests and American values, we need a policy toward

Pakistan that promotes the interests of the Pakistani people, not just the interests

of Pakistan’s President. All citizens of the world have a fundamental right to live

in freedom, and to express themselves through robust democratic institutions. To

the extent that violence, censorship, and intimidation threaten to destabilize Pakistan and jeopardize its progress toward democracy, American national interests

within Pakistan are more likely to suffer.

Pakistan remains a critically important ally in the fight against al-Qaeda, and for

this reason, I have been proud to support significant investments in its stability and

economic development over the last several years. However, a more effective

relationship with Pakistan can be established if we set sensible conditions on our

foreign aid to Pakistan to ensure that it is advancing democracy and combating

al-Qaeda with an effective approach.

I believe we should continue funding for Pakistan in the areas of counterterrorism, public education, health, microenterprise development, humanitarian assistance, and democracy and rule of law programs. However, I believe we should

temporarily suspend all other funding for Pakistan until we are sure that U.S.

funds are not being used to repress democracy in Pakistan, and we should make

military aid conditional on the Pakistani Government making substantial progress

in closing down terrorist training camps, evicting foreign fighters, and preventing

the Taliban from using Pakistan as a staging area for attacks in Afghanistan.

If the Pakistani Government increases investments in secular education to

counter radical madrasas, we should also increase America’s financial commitment

in this area. If the Pakistani Government does take action to combat al-Qaeda in

its northwest tribal region, we must help Pakistan invest in the provinces along the

Afghan border, so that the extremists’ program of hate is met with one of hope.

A Pakistan that is firmly rooted in seeking democracy and demonstrable progress

in combating terrorism will be better for the people of Pakistan, and for American

national security. And in the long term, a democratic ally will be a stronger ally

in the fight against al-Qaeda and its affiliates.

I will continue to press for a U.S. policy that demonstrates a commitment to the

people of Pakistan, and a more effective approach to foreign assistance to promote

democracy and roll back the forces of extremism.

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RESPONSES OF DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN NEGROPONTE TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY SENATOR RUSSELL FEINGOLD

Question. During last week’s hearing you noted that the final distribution decisions on coalition support funding is made by the Department of Defense, not by

the United States Embassy in Pakistan, even though the Embassy does have a role

to play. Senator Biden noted that the State Department has to sign off first, which

you agreed with. In the interest of clarifying ‘‘chief of mission’’ authorities in circumstances such as our reimbursement to the Pakistani Government of such large

sums of U.S. taxpayer dollars like the Coalition Support Funds, can you clarify what

the specific process is and how decisions are made regarding what is and what is

not reimbursed and who has final clearance of any reimbursement?

Answer. The Government of Pakistan submits Coalition Support Fund claims

through the Office of the Defense Representative at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad

where they are reviewed for completeness and accuracy, and valid claims are then

endorsed. Claims are then reviewed by U.S. Central Command which validates that

Pakistan provided support to war on terror objectives and U.S. operations and that

costs would not have been incurred by Pakistan otherwise. Next, the Office of the

Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) evaluates the claims to ensure costs are reasonable compared with U.S. costs for the same services and operations to show cost savings and are credible based on the documentation provided. The claims are then coordinated with the Department of State, which must concur on the reimbursement

and confirm that it is in line with U.S. foreign policy objectives, is consistent with

U.S. Government National Security Strategy, and does not unfavorably affect the

balance of power in the region. Concurrently, the Office of Management and Budget

must give concurrence. After receiving Department of State concurrence, the Office

of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) prepares a determination for the Deputy

Secretary of Defense to sign a notification to Congress. Once the 15-day congressional notification period expires, the Comptroller releases funds to the Defense

Security Cooperation Agency for payment to Pakistan.

Decisions regarding what is and what is not reimbursed are made throughout the

auditing process, which takes place at the three entities noted above—the Office of

the Defense Representative at the Embassy, U.S. Central Command, and the Office

of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

Final clearance on the reimbursement is provided by the Deputy Secretary of

Defense and is dependent upon concurrence from the Department of State. In addition Pakistan can only receive Coalition Support Funds reimbursement after a 15-

day congressional notification period. Thus, congressional approval is also a necessary part of the process.

We note that the Defense Department has provided detailed information on Coalition Support Funds claims processed for Pakistan since 2001 to Congress.

Our understanding is that the information has been made available to members

of this committee.

Question. Can you expand on how the State Department here in Washington

engages with the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan regarding both major and minor policy

decisions? How regularly are there back and forth conversations, and how much

input does the Embassy have into any policy changes that might occur? How frequently does the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan speak with the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan and what mechanisms exist to ensure they can communicate regularly?

Answer. The Department and U.S. Embassy in Islamabad and its consulates in

Lahore, Peshawar, and Karachi work closely as a single team to develop and implement policies. The impressive array of formal reporting that the Department receives daily from these posts and the numerous e-mails exchanged guides the policymaking process on major and minor issues. The Department’s Bureau for South

Asia and Central Affairs Front Office, Office of Pakistan and Bangladesh Affairs,

and Office of Afghanistan Affairs consult daily with posts via phone and e-mail to

receive the latest updates on political events in Pakistan and discuss policy developments in Washington. A large number of Department offices are also involved when

issues relate to their responsibilities and expertise. The Bureau for South Asia and

Central Affairs and Embassy Islamabad began holding a bi-weekly video conference

to discuss overall strategy and policy priorities, among other specific issues. Department policy moves forward only with Embassy guidance and input—initiatives, both

major and minor, are determined with the guidance and input of the Ambassador

and her staff who communicate closely with the Government of Pakistan and other

elements of Pakistani society.

Embassies Islamabad and Kabul work closely together. In addition to regular consultation between our two Ambassadors in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Embassy perVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:59 Dec 03, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 2008PAKISTAN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
44

sonnel monitor cable traffic from both posts closely and report back and forth as

needed. Numerous e-mails are exchanged daily. Border Coordinator positions in

Islamabad, Kabul, and Washington serve to increase our ability to focus on the

transborder region and advance our goal of drawing the Afghan and Pakistani Governments into cooperative projects to address that region’s problems.

Question. In last week’s hearing you stated that the State Department is in a

‘‘wait and see mode’’ as far as working with whatever government officially emerges

from the recent elections. To that end, could you be more specific with regards to

what kinds of scenarios the State Department is developing to react to any changes

a new government might make to existing institutions, including the Pakistani military. If President Musharraf does step down—or is forced to react—how will State

react?

Answer. The two largest parties in Pakistan’s February 18 parliamentary elections, the Pakistan People’s Party and the Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz, formed

a coalition government in March 2008. We are engaging with the new government

to pursue our critical national interests and to strengthen and build a broad-based,

long-term relationship between our two countries. Most recently, President Bush

met with Prime Minister Gilani in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, on May 18, and several

senior U.S. officials have met government leaders since March.

We encourage all political parties to work together to continue Pakistan’s development as a progressive, moderate, and stable country at a key geopolitical crossroads.

Pakistan faces tough economic, governance, and security challenges that affect the

Pakistani people on a daily basis. We speak regularly with Pakistan’s leaders about

developing solutions to those real and pressing problems.

Moving forward, one of our major objectives is to help Pakistan develop its civilian

institutions, in order to build a more stable relationship between its civilian and

military establishments. The military has made several visible efforts to demonstrate its commitment in this regard. For example, in April, Army chief General

Kayani formally briefed Prime Minister Gilani and the Cabinet on security developments in the FATA, demonstrating the military’s acknowledgment of the civilian

government’s leadership role. Another positive step we have seen in this direction

is that the Pakistani military recently recalled all military personnel working in

civilian government positions to return to military jobs.

Pakistan’s democratic development is an on-going process that we support but do

not seek to drive. It is up to the Pakistani people and their elected leaders to choose

a path toward democracy that achieves peace and stability and advances freedom

and prosperity. We will continue to work closely with Pakistans to pursue our national interests and to strengthen our countries’ long-term partnership.

Question. I have long supported international volunteering—both for the personal

benefits accrued to the individual volunteers and the broader benefits, such as a

more positive and accurate image of Americans and of America. The U.S. Agency

for International Development (USAID) has established an office of Coordinator for

Volunteer Service, strengthening the agency’s management of volunteer programs

sponsored or supported by USAID. One example of these programs is the Farmerto-Farmer program, authorized by Congress and managed by USAID, which enables

U.S. agricultural experts to assist developing country farmers through sharing modern practices and technologies. Can you discuss the nature, extent, and benefits of

these types of programs in Pakistan? What recommendations does USAID have to

increase Americans’ engagement in areas of development need in Pakistan?

Answer. The U.S. Agency for International Development established the Office of

Coordinator for Volunteer Service to better align three agency-managed volunteer

programs: The Farmer-to-Farmer program; the Volunteers for Economic Growth

Alliance; and Volunteers for Prosperity.

Like the Farmer-to-Farmer program, Volunteers for Economic Growth Alliance is

housed within USAID’s Bureau for Economic Growth, Agriculture and Trade. Established by USAID in 2004, Volunteers for Economic Growth Alliance utilizes skilled

volunteers with experience in a variety of sectors through a consortium of 15 U.S.-

based nongovernmental organizations to support the agency’s field activities in economic growth. Through December 2007, Volunteers for Economic Growth Alliance

deployed 149 American volunteers on 194 assignments.

Volunteers for Prosperity is an interagency initiative that was established in September 2003 by President Bush through executive order to promote greater international volunteer service by skilled American professionals. Led by the Volunteers

for Prosperity Office of USAID’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian

Assistance, Volunteers for Prosperity has (as of September 30, 2007) helped to mobilize 74,000 American professionals—doctors, nurses, engineers, teachers, business

45

people, and others—in support of the nation’s global health and prosperity agenda

through a network of over 250 U.S. companies and nonprofit organizations.

Currently, the Farmer-to-Farmer program has no involvement in Pakistan. None

of the agreements awarded in 2003 to eight implementing U.S. nongovernment organizations proposed work in Pakistan. From 2004 to 2008, the Farmer-to-Farmer

program will operate in 40 countries, providing over 3,000 volunteer technical assistance assignments averaging 31⁄2 weeks duration.

USAID believes that any measures for increasing Americans’ engagement in areas

of development need in Pakistan should include consideration of the current situation regarding the security and safety of Americans. The State Department has an

advisory in effect for Americans traveling in Pakistan because they have been targeted for violence in various locations throughout the country.

USAID believes that one option for increasing Americans’ engagement in Pakistan’s development could involve strengthening Volunteers for Prosperity. There is

ample justification for a stronger Volunteers for Prosperity program. Already the

most active of the three in Pakistan—and operating on a considerably smaller

budget than either of its peers—Volunteers for Prosperity may be particularly wellsuited for increasing Americans’ engagement in the development of Pakistan because of its focus and experience managing obstacles facing Americans seeking to

volunteer abroad.

Volunteers for Prosperity is helping to engage more Americans in development

throughout the world by addressing significant obstacles to their volunteer service.

Given its focus and utility in addressing obstacles to volunteer service abroad,

providing Volunteers for Prosperity with greater authority and scope as well as additional resources could prove a worthwhile option for increasing Americans’ engagement in Pakistan’s development as well as the development of other countries.

ARTICLES SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BARBARA BOXER

[From The Guardian, Feb. 28, 2008]

PAKISTANI MILITARY ‘‘MISSPENT UP TO 70% OF AMERICAN AID’’

U.S. EMBASSY STAFF BELIEVE EXPENSES CLAIMS—INFLATED ARMED FORCES DENY

SERIOUS IRREGULARITIES

(By Declan Walsh in Islamabad)

America’s massive military aid package to Pakistan is being scrutinised after

allegations that as much as 70% of $5.4bn in assistance to the country has been

misspent.

Since 2002 the U.S. has paid the operating costs of Pakistan’s military operations

in the tribal belt along the Afghan border, where Taliban and al-Qaida fighters are

known to shelter.

Pakistan provides more than 100,000 troops and directs the battles; the U.S. foots

the bill for food, fuel, ammunition and maintenance. The cash payments—averaging

$80m (÷40m) a month—have been a cornerstone of U.S. support for Pakistan’s

president, Pervez Musharraf.

But over the past 18 months, as militants have seized vast areas of the tribal belt

and repelled a string of Pakistani offensives, the funding has come under the microscope.

American officials processing the payments at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad

have concluded that the Pakistani expense claims have been vastly inflated, two

western military officials have told the Guardian. ‘‘My back of envelope guesstimate

is that 30% of the money they requested to be reimbursed was legitimate costs they

had expended,’’ said one, speaking on condition of anonymity.

The official said that the U.S. did not know what had happened to the remaining

70% of the funds—amounting to approximately $3.8bn—but suspected that some of

the money might have been spent on F–16 fighter jets or ‘‘a new house for an army

general.’’

Other than those possibilities, he said, at least half the money was thought to

have disappeared. ‘‘Who knows, the roads on Constitution Avenue [in Islamabad]

may have been paved with part of this money,’’ he added.

The Pakistani military denied the claims. ‘‘As far as the military is concerned, I

can assure you we have full account of these things,’’ said its spokesman, Major

General Athar Abbas. He admitted that there had been some American complaints

but denied serious irregularities. ‘‘Yes there are minor issues they keep raising, but

at no stage have we received any formal complaint from any official channel.’’

46

The controversy highlights not only strains in the relationship between Washington and Islamabad but also the limits of George Bush’s ‘‘war on terror.’’ Pakistani officials say they have lost more than 1,000 soldiers in the tribal areas since

2002—twice as many as the U.S. has lost in Afghanistan—and caught or killed

more than 1,000 ‘‘terrorists.’’

U.S. officials, who have propped up Musharraf as militants have rampaged across

the tribal belt and beyond, feel they have received bad value for money.

Pakistani civilians are angry with both sides. Anti-American sentiment has hit a

new high, while anger towards Musharraf contributed to the thrashing his party received in last week’s election.

The scale of U.S. military assistance was shrouded in secrecy for years. When it

became public, so did its extraordinarily lax accounting procedures.

Every month the Pakistani military submits expense claims averaging $80m to

the U.S. embassy in Islamabad. No receipts are provided to support the claims, and

the money is paid directly into the finance ministry.

Poorly accounted-for claims for payment caused the U.S. to suspend payouts several months last spring, a second western official said. The Washington Post reported last week that a claim for ‘‘roads and tracks’’ from the Pakistani navy had

been rejected. Abbas claimed that the navy was ‘‘also involved in the war on terror’’

in having to ‘‘guard against infiltration of arms and explosive from abroad.’’

The scale of the problem has led U.S. officials to share their worries with other

allies in Pakistan. American politicians have used the payments to exert pressure

on Musharraf. On the eve of last week’s vote, Democrat Senator, Joe Biden, head

of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, warned that funding could be slashed

if there was widespread rigging. But analysts and officials say the U.S. is unlikely

to turn off the cash tap any time soon given Pakistan’s importance in the hunt for

Osama bin Laden and other foreign fugitives.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY FROM ‘‘TERROR-FREE TOMORROW: THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC

OPINION’’

In a resounding setback for American policy, Pakistanis strongly favor their own

government not fighting against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, but negotiating with

them instead. Public support for al-Qaeda is also gaining ground since earlier this

year.

Important Parliamentary by-elections are scheduled in Pakistan for June 26. In

the first poll before the elections, our survey shows that Nawaz Sharif is now the

most popular political leader in Pakistan. Mr. Sharif’s party, the PML–N, would

emerge as the clear winner in any national contest, far eclipsing the current largest

party in Parliament, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP).

These are among the many findings of a new and extensive nationwide public

opinion survey from May 25 to June 1, 2008, across Pakistan, covering both urban

and rural areas and all provinces. The survey, with face-to-face interviews of 1,306

Pakistanis age 18 or older and a margin of error of 3 percent, was conducted by

Terror Free Tomorrow: The Center for Public Opinion, in collaboration with the

New America Foundation, and field work inside Pakistan by the Pakistan Institute

for Public Opinion, an affiliate of Gallup Pakistan. The survey is the third nationwide poll over the past 9 months conducted by Terror Free Tomorrow and Gallup

Pakistan.

PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR AL-QAEDA, THE TALIBAN AND BIN LADEN INCREASES; PAKISTANIS

DECISIVELY FAVOR NEGOTIATIONS OVER MILITARY ACTION

Half of all Pakistanis want their government to negotiate and not fight al-Qaeda,

with less than a third saying military action by the Pakistani Government against

al-Qaeda is called for. (For Pakistani Taliban, 58 percent favor negotiating to 19

percent for military action.)

Pakistan is considered by most national security experts to be the home base of

Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda and many Taliban fighters. From a safe haven in the

border areas of Pakistan, they are free to train, plan and launch attacks inside

Afghanistan and elsewhere. Indeed, last week, Admiral Michael Mullen, Chair of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that the planning to hit America itself with another

terrorist attack is now taking place—and that it would come from Pakistan.

The new Pakistani civilian government has begun a controversial policy of negotiating with certain Pakistani Taliban fighters—though not with al-Qaeda.

In stark opposition to American policy, the Pakistani people themselves would go

even further than their own government and not only negotiate with Pakistani

Taliban fighters, but with both Arab al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban fighters as well,

decisively opposing any military action.

Even before the latest American military incursion (which occurred after our poll

was complete), a mere 12 percent of Pakistanis supported any unilateral American

military action against al-Qaeda fighters inside Pakistan. Strong opposition to the

U.S. military has also intensified since earlier this year.

Favorable opinion toward al-Qaeda is mounting inside Pakistan. A third of Pakistanis now voice a positive view, nearly double the percentage from earlier this year.

Similarly, for bin Laden, 34 percent currently have a favorable opinion, up from 24

percent in January (but still below the 46 percent who thought so in August 2007).

Trust for American motives has sunk to new lows: Three quarters of Pakistanis say

that the real purpose of the U.S.-led war on terror is to weaken the Muslim world

and dominate Pakistan.

Significantly, when asked who was most responsible for the violence that is occurring in Pakistan today, more than half (52 percent) blame the United States—only

8 percent al-Qaeda fighters.

Despite the spate of suicide bombings that have shaken Pakistan at the apparent

hands of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, Pakistanis see the United States as posing the

greatest threat to their own personal safety. Forty-four percent of Pakistanis think

the United States poses the greatest threat to their personal safety (traditional

enemy India is next at 14 percent). By contrast, a mere 6 percent feel al-Qaeda is

a threat, with 4 percent the Afghan Taliban and 8 percent the Pakistani Taliban.

PAKISTANIS AGREE WITH AL-QAEDA GOALS, BUT NOT TACTICS

Al-Qaeda’s considerable goodwill inside Pakistan is generated by their perceived

goals, which Pakistanis say they largely share. More than any other goal, Pakistanis

think that standing up to America is the goal of bin Laden and al-Qaeda—and 57

percent agree with that al-Qaeda goal. Likewise, the most important reason for

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backing al-Qaeda/bin Laden for almost two-thirds of their supporters was the perception that they stand up to America and lead a defensive jihad against it.

Pakistanis, however, continue to oppose suicide attacks, with 14 percent thinking

these attacks can often or sometimes be justified. Pakistani opposition to suicide

attacks extends to whoever is the intended target, with opposition equally highest

to both Pakistani and American civilians and dropping slightly for Pakistani and

American military personnel.

BEFORE UPCOMING BY-ELECTIONS, NAWAZ SHARIF AND THE PML–N OVERTAKE THE PPP

AS THE MOST POPULAR PARTY IN PAKISTAN

In another dramatic reversal of Pakistani public opinion, Nawaz Sharif has

emerged, by far, as the most popular political leader in Pakistan today. In advance

of the June 26 Parliamentary by-elections in Pakistan, a striking 86 percent of Pakistanis have a favorable opinion of Mr. Sharif, a former Pakistani Prime Minister

with conservative Islamist ties that have made some American policymakers indicate concern.

Mr. Sharif has also seen a steady rise in his popularity, from 57 percent favorable

in our August 2007 poll, to 74 percent in January 2008 and 86 percent today. As

significantly, those with a very favorable opinion have almost doubled since January

2008 to 43 percent now—a level no other political figure in Pakistan comes even

close to. (By comparison, Mr. Zardari, leader of the PPP, just has a 13 percent very

favorable rating.)

If national elections were held today, Mr. Sharif’s party, the PML–N, would

emerge as the clear winner, garnering 42 percent of the vote to the PPP’s 32 percent. The PML–N has witnessed a significant surge in popularity. From only 15 percent saying they would vote for them in our August 2007 poll, to 25 percent in our

preelection January poll (which mirrored the actual election results), the party

today stands at 42 percent, the most popular party in Pakistan.

PAKISTANIS HOLD THEIR GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE HIGH FOOD AND FUEL

PRICES; WANT INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY AND BLAME PPP AND MUSHARRAF FOR

IMPASSE OVER RESTORING JUDGES

The reasons for the rise of Mr. Sharif and the declining fortunes of others inside

Pakistan can be found in widespread Pakistani discontent with the status quo.

The high cost of food and fuel is hitting ordinary Pakistanis hard. An overwhelming 86 percent of Pakistanis have faced increasing difficulty in obtaining flour

for their daily food consumption—primarily because of high prices. And Pakistanis

consider their own government most responsible.

Similarly, 81 percent have been affected by the high price of fuel, with again, in

their view, the Pakistani Government most responsible, only for fuel closely followed

by American and Western oil companies.

Overall, just 20 percent of Pakistanis think their country is heading in the right

direction. With the highest priority Pakistanis have for their government (even

slightly higher than the economy) an independent judiciary, most Pakistanis now

blame the PPP and President Musharraf for failing to restore the judges sacked by

Mr. Musharraf last fall. Almost three-quarters of Pakistanis want Mr. Musharraf

to resign and if he doesn’t, to be removed by Parliament as President.

Dissatisfaction with the current civilian government does not mean, however, that

the public wants the Pakistani military to return to political affairs. In our survey

last August, 45 percent approved of the military playing a role in the political and

economic affairs of the country. That number has now dropped to 28 percent, while

those who disapprove have steadily risen from 46 percent last August to 64 percent

now, with those strongly disapproving doubling to over half.

OPINION OF THE U.S. STILL NEGATIVE, BUT OPEN TO CHANGE

While attitudes towards the United States and particularly the American war on

terror remain strongly negative, Pakistanis say that a change in American policy

toward Pakistan would bring about a stunning change in Pakistani public opinion

toward the United States.

Two-thirds of Pakistanis said that policies ranging from increased American business investment, free trade, educational aid, disaster assistance, medical care/training and increased U.S. visas for Pakistanis would significantly improve their opinion

of the United States.

More than two-thirds of Pakistanis who now have favorable views of al-Qaeda and

bin Laden said they would also significantly change their opinion of the U.S. with

these new American policies.

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Indeed, the number of Pakistanis who are now willing to view the United States

more positively with new American actions is higher than at any other time that

we have measured in our surveys.

[FROM FOXNEWS.COM, JAN. 23, 2008]

MUSHARRAF: PAKISTAN ISN’T HUNTING USAMA

Pervez Musharraf says he still gets the question a lot: When will Usama bin

Laden and his top deputy be caught? The Pakistani president insists it’s more important for his 100,000 troops on the Afghan border to root out the Taliban than

search for Al Qaeda leaders.

That bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are still at large ‘‘doesn’t mean much,’’

the former general said Tuesday on the second day of a swing through Europe. He

suggested they are far less a threat to his regime than Taliban-linked militants entrenched in Pakistan’s west.

Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri are believed to be hiding somewhere in the lawless

tribal areas along Afghanistan’s frontier with Pakistan.

‘‘The 100,000 troops that we are using . . . are not going around trying to locate

Usama bin Laden and Zawahiri, frankly,’’ Musharraf told a conference at the

French Institute for International Relations. ‘‘They are operating against terrorists,

and in the process, if we get them, we will deal with them certainly.’’

A U.S. ally in its war on extremist groups, Musharraf has come under increasing

pressure following the assassination of opposition leader Benazir Bhutto last month

and for his brief declaration of emergency rule in early November.

Musharraf, who as commander of Pakistan’s military seized power in a bloodless

coup in 1999, said the remnants of Afghanistan’s former Taliban regime and its

Pakistani sympathizers are the ‘‘more serious issue’’ for both countries.

But he said there was ‘‘zero percent chance’’ that Al Qaeda, the Taliban and their

Pakistani allies could defeat his 500,000-strong army or that Islamic militants could

win control of the government in Feb. 18 parliamentary elections.

As part of the ‘‘multi-pronged strategy’’ against terrorists, Pakistan has erected

fences ‘‘selectively’’ and set up 1,000 checkpoints along the Afghan border in an effort to stop militants from using the areas to launch attacks inside the neighboring

nation, he said.

Musharraf credited cooperation between Pakistani intelligence services and the

CIA, both of whom believe that Pakistani militant leader Baitullah Mehsud was the

mastermind of the Dec. 27 gun and suicide bomb attack that killed Bhutto.

But in Washington, the State Department’s counterterrorism chief, Dell Dailey,

said the Bush administration was displeased with ‘‘gaps in intelligence’’ received

from Pakistan about the activities of extremist groups in the tribal regions.

‘‘We don’t have enough information about what’s going on there. Not on Al Qaeda.

Not on foreign fighters. Not on the Taliban,’’ he said.

Dailey, a retired Army lieutenant general with extensive background in special

operations, said Pakistan needs to fix the problem. He said the U.S. wasn’t likely

to conduct military strikes inside Pakistan on its own, saying that would anger

many Pakistanis.

Musharraf played down the impact of recent attacks by extremists in the border

region of South Waziristan, calling them ‘‘pinpricks’’ that his government must manage—not a sign of a resurgent Taliban.

Attacks on forts in that district over the last month—including a battle Tuesday—

have fanned concerns that militants with links to Al Qaeda and the Taliban may

be gaining control in the region.

Pakistan’s army said fighting at the fort and another clash killed at least seven

paramilitary border guards and 37 militants Tuesday.

The border region emerged as a front line in the war on extremist groups after

Musharraf allied Pakistan with the U.S. following the Sept. 11 terror attacks. Washington has given Pakistan billions of dollars in aid to help government forces battle

militants.

Rising violence in the border region and a series of suicide attacks across Pakistan that killed hundreds in recent months have added to uncertainty before next

month’s elections, which many people predict will further weaken Musharrafs grip

on power.

Despite turmoil at home, Musharraf defended his visit to four European countries,

saying he wasn’t concerned about the stability of his regime while he was away.

‘‘I can assure you that nothing will happen in Pakistan,’’ he said. ‘‘We are not a

banana republic.’’

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French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who met privately with Musharraf on Tuesday,

expressed support for Pakistan’s fight with extremists and promised to press for increased European Union aid when France takes over the bloc’s rotating presidency

in July, Sarkozy’s office said.

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