If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

BACK IN MOTION CHIROPRACTIC, DC, 

PLLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

June 20, 2019

v No. 341886

Wayne Circuit Court

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 

INSURANCE COMPANY,

LC No. 17-002778-NF

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: CAMERON, P.J., and MARKEY and BORRELLO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff, Back in Motion Chiropractic, DC, PLLC, appeals an order granting summary 

disposition in favor of defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. We 

reverse and remand for further proceedings. 

In this action for recovery of medical expenses under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et 

seq., plaintiff filed suit in February 2017 seeking payment for services it rendered to Sabrina 

Gater following a car accident. Defendant filed a motion for summary disposition, pursuant to 

MCR 2.116(C)(8), after the Michigan Supreme Court’s ruling in Covenant Med Ctr, Inc v State 

Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 500 Mich 191, 196; 895 NW2d 490 (2017), which held that healthcare 

providers do not have an independent statutory cause of action against no-fault insurers for the 

recovery of personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under the no-fault act. Plaintiff 

amended its complaint to assert a cause of action based on Gater’s June 3, 2017 assignment of

her rights to payment of benefits. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary 

disposition, finding that the antiassignment clause in Gater’s insurance policy precluded

assignment without defendant’s approval. 

Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it granted defendant’s motion for summary 

disposition because antiassignment clauses have been held to be void because they are against 

public policy. We agree. 
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This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to grant or deny summary disposition de novo. 

Rory v Continental Ins Co, 473 Mich 457, 464; 703 NW2d 23 (2005). Defendant moved for 

summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8). “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests 

the legal sufficiency of the complaint,” and the court may only consider the pleadings. Maiden v 

Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119-120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). “When deciding a motion under 

(C)(8), this Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and construes them in the 

light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Dalley v Dykema Gossett PLLC, 287 Mich App 

296, 304-305; 788 NW2d 679 (2010). “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) may be granted only 

where the claims alleged are so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual 

development could possibly justify recovery.” Maiden, 461 Mich at 119 (quotation marks and 

citation omitted). 

However, the trial court “clearly considered material outside the pleadings, contrary to 

the proper procedure for considering a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8).” Jawad A Shah, MD, 

PC v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 324 Mich App 182, 206; 920 NW2d 148 (2018). Although 

plaintiff attached Gater’s assignment document to the corrected and amended complaint, the 

insurance policy that contained the antiassignment clause was not attached to the pleadings1;

instead, the insurance policy was provided as an exhibit to defendant’s response to plaintiff’s 

motion for leave to amend its complaint. The insurance policy that contained the antiassignment 

clause was crucial to the trial court’s decision to grant defendant’s motion for summary 

disposition. “Therefore, we treat the motion as having been brought and decided under MCR 

2.116(C)(10) because it necessarily involved considering material outside the pleadings.” Id. at 

207. 

A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the 

complaint. In evaluating a motion for summary disposition brought under this 

subsection, a trial court considers affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, 

and other evidence submitted by the parties, MCR 2.116(G)(5), in the light most 

favorable to the party opposing the motion. Where the proffered evidence fails to 

establish a genuine issue regarding any material fact, the moving party is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law. [Maiden, 461 Mich at 120.] 

In Covenant, the Michigan Supreme Court held that healthcare providers do not possess 

an independent statutory cause of action against no-fault insurers. Covenant, 500 Mich at 217. 

However, the Covenant Court clarified that a healthcare provider is not without recourse for 

services rendered to an injured person because the Court’s holding did not “alter an insured’s 

ability to assign his or her right to past or presently due benefits to a healthcare provider.” Id. at 

217 n 40. 

On June 3, 2017, Gater assigned her right to pursue a claim for payment of benefits to 

plaintiff. The contract stated that Gater assigned her “claim/right to pursue payment from any 

Insurance entity for services [she] received at this clinic, to the clinic, including, but not limited 

 1 A pleading is a complaint, cross-claim, counterclaim, third-party complaint, an answer to any 

of the aforementioned documents, and a reply to an answer. MCR 2.110(A). 
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to[,] filing suit to pursue benefits.” Therefore, plaintiff had a legally sufficient cause of action 

unless the assignment is found to be void. 

Defendant argues that the trial court properly granted summary disposition because the 

antiassignment clause in the insurance policy unambiguously prevented Gater from transferring 

her claim for benefits under the policy unless there was a written demand made and defendant 

agreed to the assignment. The antiassignment clause in the insurance policy states: “No 

assignment of benefits or other transfer of rights is binding upon us unless approved by us.” 

“Insurance policies are contracts and, in the absence of an applicable statute, are subject 

to the same contract construction principles that apply to any other species of contract.” Titan 

Ins Co v Hyten, 491 Mich 547, 554; 817 NW2d 562 (2012) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). “[O]ur Supreme Court has . . . recognized that ‘courts are to enforce the agreement as 

written absent some highly unusual circumstance such as a contract in violation of law or public 

policy.’ ” Shah, 324 Mich App at 197, quoting Rory, 473 Mich at 469. “Because the contract at 

issue involves mandatory PIP benefits required by the no-fault act, the contract and statutes must 

be read and construed together as though the statutes were part of the contract . . . .” Henry Ford 

Health Sys v Everest Nat’l Ins Co, 326 Mich App 398; ___ NW2d ___ (2018) (quotation marks 

and citation omitted). 

The factual scenario in Shah is nearly identical to the facts of this case. In Shah, the 

insured was injured in a car accident; he then assigned his right to payment of no-fault benefits 

for rendered medical services to the plaintiff, his healthcare provider. Shah, 324 Mich App at 

186-188. The plaintiff then sued the defendant, the injured person’s insurance company. Id. 

After Covenant was issued, the plaintiff obtained an assignment of rights to pursue payment of 

no-fault benefits from the defendant. Id. at 187-188. The Shah Court determined that “Roger 

Williams [Ins Co v Carrington, 43 Mich 252; 5 NW2d 303 (1880)] essentially held that an 

accrued cause of action may be freely assigned after the loss and that an antiassignment clause is 

not enforceable to restrict such an assignment because such a clause violates public policy in that 

situation.” Shah, 324 Mich App at 200. Accordingly, the Shah Court determined that “the 

antiassignment clause in the instant case is unenforceable to prohibit the assignment that 

occurred here—an assignment after the loss occurred of an accrued claim to payment—because 

such a prohibition of assignment violates Michigan public policy that is part of our common law 

as set forth by our Supreme Court.” Id. Based on Shah, the trial court erred in this case when it 

granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition because, once a claim for payment is made 

after a cause of action has accrued, the antiassignment clause in defendant’s insurance policy 

contravenes public policy and so is void and unenforceable. 

Although defendant argues that the Shah Court’s reliance on Roger Williams was 

misplaced, and this Court should therefore convene a conflict panel, Shah recognized: 

[A]s our Supreme Court has instructed, we are bound to follow its decisions 

except where those decisions have clearly been overruled or superseded. There is 

no indication that Roger Williams or its holding relating to antiassignment clauses 

has been clearly overruled or superseded. Therefore, if the continued validity of 

Roger Williams is to be called into question, it will have to be by our Supreme 

Court. [Shah, 324 Mich App at 201 (quotation marks and citation omitted).] 
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Because this Court recognized that unambiguous contract terms must generally be enforced as 

written, yet still applied Roger Williams, this Court must continue to follow Shah. MCR 

7.215(J)(1); Holland Home v City of Grand Rapids, 219 Mich App 384, 394; 557 NW2d 118 

(1996) (“A decision by any panel of this Court is controlling precedent until a contrary result is 

reached by this Court or the Supreme Court takes other action.”). Moreover, a conflict panel is 

unnecessary based on MCR 7.215(K)(3) because Shah’s holding is currently on appeal to the 

Michigan Supreme Court. Jawad A Shah, MD, PC v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 503 Mich 882 

(2018).

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not 

retain jurisdiction. 

/s/ Thomas C. Cameron 

/s/ Jane E. Markey 

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello