The HONORABLE GEORGE F. GUNN, JR., United States District Judge 1 for the Eastern District of Missouri. United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 96-3243

_____________ United States of America, * * Plaintiff - Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Eastern District of Missouri. Norman Ray Woodall, * * Defendant - Appellant. *

_____________ Submitted: April 17, 1997 Filed: July 25, 1997

_____________ Before LOKEN, MAGILL, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

_____________ LOKEN, Circuit Judge. In this 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding, Norman Ray Woodall se eks relief from the fifteen-year

sentence imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) following his conviction for vio lating § 922(g)(1), which prohibits felons from possessing firearms. The prio r procedural history is set forth in W oodall v. United States , 72 F.3d 77 (8th Cir. 1995). Foll owing our remand, the district court concluded that Woodall has at least thre e 1 qualifying predicate offenses and again imposed the fifteen-year sentence mandated by § 924(e). Woodall appeals, arguing that six Texas burglary convictions are not-2-

predicate offenses because they qualify for the “civil rights restored” exclusion i n § 921 (a)(20), or alternatively, that § 924(e) as here applied violates his Fifth Amendme nt

right to equal protection because it arbitrarily classifies violators base d upon differing state laws. We affirm.
Section 924(e)(1)’s man datory sentence applies to § 922(g) violators who have three p rior convictions for “a violent felony or a serious drug offense.” Woodal l concedes that the burglaries in que stion were violent felonies under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), as construed in Taylor v. United States , 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990). However, Woodall argues that his Texas burglary convictions are excluded as predicate violent felon y offenses under the following portion of § 921(a)(20): Any convic tion . . . for which a person has . . . had [his] civil right s restored shall not be considered a conv iction for purposes of this chapter, unless such . . . restoration of civil rights expressly provides that th e person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.
Woo dall argues that his right to possess a firearm has been restored under Texas law and ther efore his burglary convictions are not § 924(e) predicate offenses. This is a question of state law that w e review de novo

. See United States v. Dockter , 58 F.3d 1284, 1289-90 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied , 116 S. Ct. 932 (1996).

The fat al flaw in Woodall’s argument is its exclusive focus on his right t o possess a firearm under Texas law, whereas § 921(a)(20) explicitly instr ucts us to focus first on wh ether he has had “civil rights restored.” As we explained in Presley v

. United States , 851 F.2d 1052, 1053 (8th Cir. 1988), the statute’ s focus on “civil rights” requires examination of a broad range of leg al disabilities imposed on convicted felons to see whether a particular State substantially restores those rights when a felon i s discharged from prison. Only if the State has generally restored civil rights -- either by statute or by the terms of a prison discharge -- do we look at whether the Stat e nonetheless prohibits the possession of firearms, in which case the § 921(a)(20)The Senate Judiciary Committee Report explained that the firearms 2 exception was added to the § 921(a)(20) exclusion to give States flexibility in cases where the restoration of civil rights was “based upon considerations not relating to fitness to own a firearm.” S. R EP
. N O . 97-476, at 12 (1982), quoted in United States v. Cassidy , 899 F.2d 543, 548 (6th Cir. 1990). See United States v. Wind , 986 F.2d 1248, 1250-51 (8th Cir. 1993) 3 (Minnesota law); Bell v. United States , 970 F.2d 428, 429-30 (8th Cir. 1992) (Iowa); United States v. Ellis , 949 F.2d 952, 954 (8th Cir. 1991) (Minnesota); United States v. Davis , 936 F.2d 352, 356 (8th Cir. 1991) (Minnesota), cert. denied , 503 U.S. 908 (1992); United States v. Traxel , 914 F.2d 119, 123 (8th Cir. 1990) (Minnesota). See also Dockter , 58 F.3d at 1289-91, where we assumed that other civil rights had been restored under North Dakota law but upheld the § 924(e) enhancement because the right to possess firearms had not, and Davis v. United States , 972 F.2d 227, 231 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied , 507 U.S. 950 (1993), construing Nebraska law. -3- exclusion does not apply and the prior violent felony conviction remains a § 924(e ) pred icate offense. In other words, as the Fifth Circuit explained in United States v

. 2 Thomas , 991 F.2d 206, 214-15 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 510 U.S. 1014 (1993), “[t]he isolated right to possess firearms, in t he absence of restoration of such core civil rights
as we ll, does not immunize convicted felons from [the § 924(e) sentenc e enhancement].”

Woodall relies on language in prior Eighth Circuit cases that focused primarily on the defendant’s right

to possess firearms under the applicable state law. However, thos e cases involved prior convictions in Minnesota and Iowa, States which hav e enacted statutes broadly restoring civil rights upon discharge from prison. Thus, th e fight ing issue in those cases was whether the State had also restored the discharge d felon’s right to possess firearms. Here, we must construe Texas law, which like the 3 Missouri law at issue in Presley has no statute generally restoring civil rights, as th e Supreme Court noted in Beecham v. United States , 511 U.S. 368, 373 (1994).-4-

That leaves us with the question Woodall has not addressed -- whether Texas has substantially restored his “civil rights.” Texas has no stat ute that broadly restores civil rights upon discharge from prison. A State may also restore civil ri ghts piecemeal. See Presley , 851 F.2d at 1053. Our sister circuits agree that the three key civil rights for this purpose are the right to vote, the right to hold public office, and the right to sit on
a jury. See Uni ted States v. Caron , 77 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1996) (en banc); Unite d Stat es v. McKinley , 23 F.3d 181, 183-84 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Essig , 1 0 F.3d 968, 975-76 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Gomez , 911 F.2d 219, 221 (9th Cir. 1990) ; Cassidy , 899 F.2d at 549. Applying this standard, the Fifth Circuit surveyed the laws of Te xas piecemeal in Thomas -- a task at which that court has far mor e experi ence than do we -- and concluded “that Texas does not restore to any felon , whether violent or non-violent, the three civil rights considered key.” 991 F.2d at 214. The Tenth Circuit subsequently surveyed Texas law in applying § 921(a)(20) in United States v. Maines , 20 F.3d 1102 (10th Cir. 1994) . It noted that convicted felons may vote two years afte r receiving a certificate of discharge, see T EX
. E LEC
. C ODE A NN . § 11.002(4 ) (A) (West 1986), but agreed with Thomas that key civil rights are no t otherwise restored. Id. at 1104 . We have examined the Texas statutes cited in Thomas and Main es and agree with those courts that Texas has not by statute substantiall y restored the civil rights of a discharged felon such as Woodall . As Woodall has no t presented a prison discharge ce rtificate purporting to restore those key civil rights, the district court pro perly counted his prior burglary convictions in imposing the § 924(e) sentence enhancement.

Wo odall also argues that his fifteen-year sentence under § 924(e) violates hi s Fifth Amen dment

right to equal protection of the law because the statute “creates a sentencing scheme whereby the length of sentence is determined by whether or not a defendant is fortunate enough to have committed his . . . prior offenses in a state which restores civil rights to convicted felons.” This same attack on § 924(e) was rejected in United States v. Phelps , 17 F.3d 1334, 1342-45 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 513 U.S. 844 (1994), and in United States v. Bregnard , 951 F.2d 457, 461 (1st Cir. 1991), cert.-5-

denied , 504 U.S. 973 (1992). The same challenge to a predecessor statute was rejected in United States v. Houston , 547 F.2d 104, 107 (9th Cir. 1976), and in United States v. Burton , 475 F.2d 469 , 471 (8th Cir.), cert. denied , 414 U.S. 835 (1973) . We agree with those decisions.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.