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37–325 2008

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–53]

HEARING

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED

PROGRAMS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE U.S.

CENTRAL COMMAND

HEARING HELD

APRIL 18, 2007

(II)

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii

MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas

ADAM SMITH, Washington

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California

RICK LARSEN, Washington

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam

MARK UDALL, Colorado

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana

NANCY BOYDA, Kansas

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa

KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida

KATHY CASTOR, Florida

DUNCAN HUNTER, California

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina

KEN CALVERT, California

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia

JEFF MILLER, Florida

JOE WILSON, South Carolina

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey

TOM COLE, Oklahoma

ROB BISHOP, Utah

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona

THELMA DRAKE, Virginia

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director

MIKE CASEY, Professional Staff Member

STEPHANIE SANOK, Professional Staff Member

MARGEE MECKSTROTH, Staff Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2007

Page

HEARING:

Wednesday, April 18, 2007, Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization

Act—Budget Request from the U.S. Central Command ................................... 1

APPENDIX:

Wednesday, April 18, 2007 ..................................................................................... 65

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 18, 2007

FISCAL YEAR 2008 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—

BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Duncan, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Ranking Member,

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 3

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1

WITNESSES

Fallon, Adm. William J., Commander, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Navy ....... 4

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Fallon, Adm. William J. ................................................................................... 69

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 96

Ms. Giffords ....................................................................................................... 97

Mr. Loebsack ..................................................................................................... 97

Mr. Meehan ....................................................................................................... 95

Mr. Skelton ....................................................................................................... 95

Mr. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 97

(1)

FISCAL YEAR 2008 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 18, 2007.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:01 a.m., in room 2118,

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the

committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED

SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Fallon, we welcome you and again congratulate you on your new position. You have done an outstanding

job in the Pacific, and now we give you another part of the world.

We appreciate your appearing before us.

We want to thank you for taking on your new challenge and also

take a moment to thank those troops of ours who are under your

command for their sacrifice and their hard work. We certainly owe

them a great debt.

And I am positive that most of the members present today will

ask you about Afghanistan and Iraq, and I certainly have questions. But hopefully we will not lose sight of the operations in other

parts of your area of responsibility (AOR).

We would like to know what is going on in the Horn of Africa,

Somalia, other ongoing regional engagements of the Central Command.

Spend some time, if you don’t mind, talking about Iran, its role

in Iraq, the nuclear program, how we can best deal with that country in going forward.

Please take a moment to talk about the Kurdistan Worker’s

Party (PKK), the attacks on our ally, Turkey, and the risk of serious conflict there.

And members have had a long interest in the situation in Darfur

and would appreciate an update on that horrible, horrible situation.

As we go through the hearing, we would appreciate any thoughts

you might have on the growth of extremism in the Middle East.

I refer to Afghanistan as our forgotten war. We have a real

chance of success there and we have a vital interest at stake. But

we must not underestimate the challenges that are there, ranging

from a possible spring offensive to record narcotics production.

How can we best address the problems to maximize our chances

of success? And I have as a major worry of mine, Admiral, North

2

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) living up to its commitments

both in numbers and in what they are limited—in at least some of

the countries, limited in doing.

I am so concerned that if NATO is seen as a failure there, what

that would do to the NATO organization back in Europe.

Turning to Iraq, recently Muqtada al Sadr’s allies in the Iraqi

cabinet resigned. Some may say that is a welcome development.

But we would be interested in having your thoughts about that.

American soldiers have spent four years heroically fighting in

Iraq, who we are not able—in Iraq’s civil war, and we should not

be fighting it for them. The Iraqis must take steps to end their sectarian violence while we begin to reorient our efforts to training

the Iraqi troops, fighting terrorism and protecting Americans.

Iraq’s government must make a serious effort to keep its commitments to meet the benchmarks their president mentioned and what

our President mentioned in January.

If they do not begin to do so seriously and address the deBaathification process, pass an oil law, reform their constitution,

hold local and provincial elections, take other steps they promised

to take, the sectarian violence will obviously continue.

And we cannot simply keep the same number of troops we have

in Iraq for much longer without breaking the Army, if it is not already broken. I am terribly concerned about that.

That brings me to my last comment, Admiral. I mentioned several of the challenges and conflicts in your area of operations that

we can discuss. And we could spend hours talking about the potential flash points in your old AOR in the Pacific Command.

Many threats and possible sources of military conflict in the

world, including the ones we can’t see. I have been blessed to be

in Congress 30 years. And during that 30 years, according to the

Library of Congress, our country has used force 12 times—those actions were predicted years in advance. We cannot continue to take

strategic risks without paying for it.

We must not allow our Army to be broken because of a policy,

a misguided policy, fighting someone else’s civil war. We have important interests in the Middle East and elsewhere, and we must

protect them to continue to help our allies.

Admiral, my first year in law school, my roommate, who later became a judge, a longtime judge, in Brookfield, Missouri, was called

to the Pusan Perimeter after he had graduated from college and before he went to law school. And that was a very unhappy Task

Force Smith situation.

I don’t want ever to see that again. And that is what worries me

about the readiness of our military, not just today but for the future, and that is what is key to the whole problem of the days

ahead.

So we thank you for being with us.

And I welcome the statement of our colleague, my friend, Mr.

Hunter, ranking member.

3

STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON

ARMED SERVICES

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing today.

And, Admiral Fallon, to you and your team, thanks for being

here and sharing some time with us.

And, Mr. Chairman, I have reviewed those tough days when

that—really, a third-rate military pushed us down the Korean Peninsula, and we had the difficult times in the Osan Pass and the

Pusan Perimeter.

Mr. Chairman, I am reminded of one other thing, though, and

that is that over the last six years we have more than doubled the

precision firepower in this country that we have ready to utilize at

any place in the world.

And so for those who think that we are not capable of reacting

to a crisis somewhere else in the world, I would say don’t bet your

life on it, because you are going to lose.

Admiral, thank you for being here, and as you know, we have—

I know you have had a thorough discussion with lots of other folks

here in Washington, D.C.

I want to go directly to what I think is a key for a successful

turnover of the security apparatus in Iraq, and that is a capable

military force that is combat-tested and accountable to its civilian

leadership.

And toward these ends, you may be aware that I forwarded to

President Bush a recommendation to ensure that all 129 Iraqi battalions that are presently trained and equipped experience what I

would call combat tours in hotspot areas like Baghdad to grow and

validate their capabilities.

And this plan would involve implementing a rotation schedule

that requires every Iraqi combat battalion to participate in a threemonth combat rotation, to develop unit cohesion, leadership, confidence, capabilities in the chain of command.

Of course, we understand there are a number of battalions that

have been in contentious zones in Baghdad, and in Anbar province,

and the Sunni Triangle and other places and have a fairly extensive combat record at this point, but there are a number of them

that do not have them.

And as we have discussed earlier, I think it is key to our success

to rotate those guys in, get them their combat rotation, validate the

leadership from top to bottom, and at that point they are capable

of displacing American forces on the battlefield.

Along with that, I think we need to identify enabling capabilities

that they have to develop, and I am sure that we are working on

that right now.

And perhaps neighboring countries and coalition members could

provide some support with respect to these enablers, especially in

the medical area.

So I am interested in your thoughts on this plan. It is not complex. It simply involves doing what any military must do to become

proficient, and that is to operate, undertake military operations.

4

And I know you are concerned about that, too, as is General

Petraeus. So please comment on that, if you could, when you get

to your comments.

I would also like to know about your insights, especially in your

former role, with respect to current and planned naval presence in

this region and how that might act as a deterrent to Iranian aggression. So if you could speak to that, that would also be, I think,

very valuable.

And last, with respect to Afghanistan, I would appreciate your

advice on how to create a sustainable alternative to opium as a

cash crop.

And I know that one of our plans is to substitute out opium and

to substitute in orchard crops, and orchards that could sustain an

economic income for the farmers who heretofore have been developing opium crops.

And I would like to know how that plan is going, how that program is going. I know we have got a number of large nurseries that

we have developed over in Afghanistan. We worked with the tribal

leaders and with the populace to displace the opium crops with orchard operations.

I would like to know how that is going, because in my estimation

that would appear to be one of the valuable, sustainable ways of

permanently displacing opium.

Farmers are probably not going to cut down an orchard of 5- and

10- and 15-year-old trees to grow a one-time opium cash crop. So

talk to us a little bit about that, if you could.

So finally, Admiral, we members of Congress appreciate all that

you and your fellow service members and your families sacrifice to

protect American national security interests around the world.

Please know that you have our enormous gratitude.

And finally, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this very important hearing on the crucial issue of the next several years. But

thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to the remarks of our

guest.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Ladies and gentlemen, we have had a national tragedy at Virginia Tech just recently, and I would like to ask our committee just

for a moment to pause for a moment and pay tribute to those victims. Thank you.

Admiral Fallon, there have been a number of recent press reports—and in your comments today, I hope you would include

something about the so-called war czar in your statement.

The floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF ADM. WILLIAM J. FALLON, COMMANDER, U.S.

CENTRAL COMMAND, U.S. NAVY

Admiral FALLON. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Skelton, distinguished members, it is an honor to be back

here again. It seems like just yesterday—it has actually been about

a month.

But in my new responsibility here at CENTCOM, the real honor

is to be able to represent the many, many thousands of men and

women in uniform and those civilians that support them that are

5

serving so admirably throughout this region, which is challenging

from one end to the other, for a number of reasons.

There is lots to do. I have tried my best to, in my written testimony, give you what I believe is my most accurate assessment of

how things really are, based on a couple of weeks of observation

and questioning and visits.

I took over about a month ago. I spent about three weeks out in

the region visiting Iraq, Afghanistan and particularly the Gulf

countries, and then Pakistan and Egypt and Jordan, to try to form

my first impressions.

There are many things—you have brought up a number of issues

already this morning, with the chairman and Mr. Hunter.

And so I think rather than give another dissertation, what I

would like to do is just tell you that what I have done to date is,

first off, to gather my staff and to gather a group of people from

throughout the region who have various backgrounds and interests

and locked ourselves up for about one and a half days.

And we pondered what it is we have on our plates and what it

is we think we ought to be doing and why, took a look at the mission that Central Command had been operating under, and we set

about trying to make sure we were focused on those things that

were most important.

And from that, I have distilled five areas in which I want our

people to work and have given them the guidance that if what they

are doing doesn’t fit into these areas, or if they think that we may

have missed something, let me know, but if they are not in these

areas then they probably ought not be doing it, and get yourselves

redirected.

The areas are somewhat pretty obvious—Iraq, Afghanistan. I

want to work on degrading the violent extremist networks, which

are running throughout this region and to other parts of the world,

because I think that a couple of these countries, particularly Iraq

and Afghanistan, are really focal points for the terrorist networks.

The other area I would like to work on is with the neighborhood.

I don’t believe that there is really a solution to Iraq that is just internal to that country, that it is going to involve the neighboring

nations.

And I am working hard to try to understand their perspectives

and then get them to contribute to the stability not only in that

country but in the region, which I think is very important for this

country and the world in the long term.

And the last area would be to look at our posture, the way we

have our forces arrayed right now, with an eye toward the future,

and to see if, in fact, we are appropriately positioned.

And an enduring issue is the readiness and training of our forces

and how we are doing in that.

So as we address these things, I will tell you that my initial impression of Iraq is we have got a lot of work to do. Whatever went

on in the past is what it is. I am working from now forward.

I believe that the things that I see on a daily basis give me some

cause for optimism, but I will tell you that there is hardly a week

goes by—certainly, almost a day that doesn’t go by—without some

major event that also causes us to lose ground.

6

And so we are in the process of making a lot of change on the

ground in Iraq. The surge of forces is one thing, but what they are

doing is more important to me.

We have about half of the additional troops that are headed to

the region actually in place right now. The rest are in some degree

of movement toward the theater.

We have a lot of other changes that have taken place. We have

got new leaders on the ground, both our ambassador and our leader in the military forces, General Petraeus.

We have a number of new initiatives by the interagency that are

beginning to come into play.

And so as we pull these things together, I am acutely interested

in figuring out how these things are going to work together and

how we are going to be able to accurately measure and assess the

progress that will be made or won’t be made as we move forward.

So my summary is that I am guardedly optimistic, and I am

very, very interested in the detail of how we go forward.

Afghanistan—different story altogether. Probably the biggest

thing, the most encouraging thing, that I find across the board in

that country is that the vast majority of the people there openly

welcome us.

They are happy to have us there. They are interested in a better

life, and there is an awful lot to do, as you know, beginning with

just the basic literacy in the country, which is about one-third of

the population.

And so there is an awful lot to do, but when you have the kind

of open welcome that our folks have received, that is a pretty good

place to start. So we can talk about that in a number of areas.

The rest of the neighborhood is not exactly benign. There are

challenges in virtually every country in this region—no surprise to

you.

You have mentioned some already—the Sudan. It just goes from

one end to the other. But we are going to take those in turn.

I think that what I will do is go back and touch on a couple of

the things that the chairman and Mr. Hunter have already brought

up and at least kind of get those in play, and then I will turn it

over to you for your questions.

First, regarding, Afghanistan and the NATO participation, my

assessment here is that this is a very good idea. The theory is terrific. It remains to be seen just how much we are going to get out

of this.

The idea is that NATO and the vast capabilities of this alliance

be asked to play a role in helping this country get back into a position of stability and security.

If they didn’t do it, then we would either—we would be faced, I

think, with two choices, either it wouldn’t get done, or we would

end up trying to do it with more of our people.

So there are thousands of NATO troops and other personnel on

the ground working the issue. There are challenges.

General McNeill, our commander of the International Security

Assistance Force (ISAF) there, is a U.S. general, as you know. He

is working for the NATO command. He is on record as asking the

alliance in Brussels for additional assets.

7

He needs them not only in terms of military forces and capabilities, such as rotary wing lift to move these forces in the field, but

he also needs some help in the civilian world.

There are a lot of slots that have been rogered up for, in military

parlance. The nations have said they will provide. But as yet, there

are lots of folks who have yet to appear on the ground. And this

is really important if it is going to move forward.

The question was asked about Muqtada al Sadr and the influence he may or may not have inside of Iraq. This is a guy that is

pretty difficult to understand for us. He holds clearly a large

amount of influence within segments of the Iraqi population.

But of late, he has been absent; by all accounts, appears to be

in Iran. And his followers, some of whom are particularly nasty—

the militia—the acronym is the JAM, the Jaish al Mahdi—are certainly not people that are playing a constructive role in this country of Iraq.

Sadr has issued a number of proclamations, none of which have

been helpful to the coalition or, I believe, to the greater government

of Iraq, a very self-centered and—but what I find interesting is

that the impact of these statements appears to be maybe less than

some might have feared or given him credit for.

We have not, in the Baghdad security plan and its implementation in and around the capital city—we have not seen an overwhelming resistance, at least to date, from the JAM.

They are certainly attacking our forces sporadically, but we have

not seen what there appeared to be at one time a potential for, and

that is a mass uprising against our forces.

There are probably lots of reasons for this, and one of them is

that a lot of people in this country have clearly gotten very tired

of the sectarian violence, the murder, mayhem and chaos that are

reigning every day.

And so we have people in leadership positions, such as the mayor

of Baghdad or of Sadr City within Baghdad, who have stood up and

said it is time to figure out a better way than just fighting everybody. Of course, for his trouble, he was hit with an assassination

attempt.

But the kind of statements that the leaders must make in standing up to the terrorists, I think, is essential if we are going to make

progress.

A little bit about readiness, Mr. Chairman. I am really interested

in readiness of our forces. I think you know that from a long history of working with me.

I watch this every day. I will tell you honestly that the one area

in which I am focused particularly is on the mid-level leadership,

particularly of our ground forces, the Army and Marine Corps, the

senior and mid-grade non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and our

junior and mid-grade officers, because these are the people that

keep going back for repetitive tours.

We have lots of young folks—and aren’t we blessed to have

them?—volunteering to come into the services still in large numbers, but it is these key leaders that are ones that I am concerned

about, because of the importance of their task and the things they

do.

8

We would not be able to do anything in this world without their

particular expertise and dedication. And so I am acutely sensitive

to this and will promise you I am going to watch it very carefully.

The business of the Iraqi security forces and their coming along

to accept responsibilities—as we would like to have them take over

the lead not only in small areas but throughout this country, so

that we can then withdraw the footprint that we have now and revert to a different role in this country—clearly, one of our key objectives. It is a mixed bag to date.

Chairman Hunter, I take your point. And one of the thing that

in my discussions with General Petraeus recently—were to try to

get a better look at the leadership of the Iraqi security forces, to

see just how we are doing with those that are charged with leading

these battalions and other units in the field.

We are seeing some good examples of people doing the right

thing and leading their troops, particularly in a couple of recent

skirmishes, where the Iraqi security forces have given a good accounting of themselves. And this, of course, is what we would like

to see replicated.

I think we are doing a lot better with the army, and that is really the area that we want to focus in, than the police. That is a different story. I could probably answer a question or two on that.

But we are focused on it, and the command, MNSTCI, the acronym, the multinational training organization, is one that I plan to

visit when I leave here this afternoon and head over there. I am

going to spend the full day with them.

And I want to actually go around—I have asked to actually sit

and meet and watch what goes on with the Iraqi forces so I can

get my own sense of how we are doing.

The last thing, it is the opium business in Afghanistan. This is

opium harvest season, I am told, and that is probably one of the

reasons why the Taliban have been relatively quiet in the last couple of weeks, because they tell me they are busy in the fields harvesting their crops.

It is painful to watch this, because the impact of this criminal

activity runs throughout the country, and I suspect it is one of the

reasons life is challenging in Afghanistan, because it appears that

at every level, from the growers, the farmers, on up through higher

levels, there is some degree of gain from this illicit trade.

However well and desirous it would be to me, and I am sure to

you, to get rid of this as the main line of the economy in this country, I think we have got to come up with a realistic alternative.

Mr. Hunter, I have heard of the orchard proposal, and I have actually seen a couple of examples of this in the valleys there. What

I don’t know is how viable this is as a realistic major muscle mover

in the economy.

I suspect that one of the challenges—in fact, I have been told

that one of the biggest challenges—is actually getting this stuff to

market.

But to that end, one of the highest priorities in development in

the country is the business of extending the highway network, and

particularly this ring road, which everybody that I have talked to

from President Karzai on down tells me is absolutely essential to

the economic future of this country.

9

So I don’t have an answer, to tell you quite frankly, on what is

really the best solution, if there is one. But I am very interested

in it, as well as you.

I think I will end it there. And, Mr. Chairman, back to you, sir,

for questions from the committee. Thanks again for the opportunity

to be here.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Fallon can be found in the

Appendix on page 69.]

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, one question with two parts. We, of

course, would like to know, as well as the American people would

like to know, number one, what is the end state or victory, in your

opinion, in Iraq? Second, what is the end state or victory in Afghanistan?

And that will be my only question. I will reserve the remainder

for later.

Admiral.

Admiral FALLON. Mr. Chairman, I would say that to use the

term end state would be a challenge, because we are in a world—

reality in this world of constant change. And so conditions that we

might point to for tomorrow will probably—not probably; without

a doubt will be influenced by events that we have yet to see.

But there is little doubt in my mind that what we are trying to

do in the biggest picture with both countries is to end up with

states that are functioning for the benefit of their people, that actually give people a say in the government, that provides services

that we would like to see for them.

We would like to see, because they are in different stages of development and the security situation is decidedly different in both,

in Iraq we need an essential degree of security and stability so that

the fledgling institutions in this country can actually be able to

benefit the citizens.

I would like to see a substantially reduced level of bloodshed and

violence in this country. I will tell you that my observation for the

month that I have been in this job is, as I look at and ask for

data—and I have got reams of it; trying to sift through and make

sense out of it is a challenge.

But I am seeing some significant signs of goodness in the data

in terms of a reduction in bloodletting, reduction in murders, reduction of incidents of many kinds.

However, I will tell you quite honestly that it bothers me, and

I hold my breath regularly in anticipation, regrettably, of the suicide bombers, these people that are just seemingly totally bent on

creating as much chaos and bloodshed as possible, particularly

against the civilian communities. And I think we are challenged to

work against this problem.

If I could digress for one minute, of all the things that we have

on the plate in Iraq, the one that I think is first and foremost as

a target for us to try to get a grip on and to neutralize is the group

that is very clearly al Qaeda motivated, that is linked to Sunni extremists in this country that are perpetrating these big suicide

bombings.

They have two objectives. One is to try to continually damage the

coalition, to weaken our will and to kill and maim our coalition

forces.

10

And the second objective is to kill and maim as many people in

the population, with the idea that they would get retribution from

the Shi’a. It is clearly sectarian-aimed, and it is very tragic.

If we can get a handle on this—and I think that ultimately, in

addition to the kinetic things that our forces are doing, the best,

most likely way that this is going to be reduced is by getting the

Sunni population in this country to believe that they have a future

as a part of Iraq and to tell us at every opportunity or tell the Iraqi

security forces what is going on, so that we can really work against

this threat, because of all the challenges, all the things that happen that are not good in this country, this is the one that I think

is most destabilizing today. So we will work on that.

But back to the—what would we like to see in Iraq, I would like

to see a place in which people have confidence that their future is

going to be better than what they have seen in the past and what

they have today.

And how we are going to measure that is one of the key things

that I am working on right now, to get a baseline so that—everybody in town here is talking about benchmarks.

They are interesting, but what I want to know is what beneath

the surface of these topics is appropriate for us to see whether we

are actually making progress, and I will work on that.

In Afghanistan, there are institutions—there are people of significant competence that are in positions of leadership in this country. They have challenges.

The literacy rate is pretty abysmal. It is very difficult to get

around. They are challenged with tribal affinities that go back for

centuries that have caused instability.

There are lots of signs of hope. There are many people in the

world that are working this, in addition to the ISAF and other security forces.

There are thousands of people volunteering, government-supported non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and so forth that

are working many of the issues in Afghanistan.

And the goal here is to, again, have a country that is stable, that

gets along with its neighbors and is doing things to try and help

their population.

Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, thank you very much.

Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just very briefly, Admiral, give us your take on the leadership

at the very top in the Iraqi forces, in the Iraqi army particularly.

Admiral FALLON. I will start at the top with the minister of defense. He impressed me on a couple of counts. One, that he was

into the detail of what was going on within the ministry of defense.

And I have met a number of leaders in this country and others

that kind of give me a hand wave, but I get no sense of actually

having a clue what the detail is.

This guy seemed to know a lot about that, maybe too much, but

I am happy that he understands a lot about what is going on.

The other thing is my initial reaction is that he is a pretty

shrewd judge of assessing the leadership capabilities of his people,

and he proceeded to, in our first encounter as we got into talking

11

about certain personalities—gave me a picture of them that actually pretty well matched up with the picture I had from meeting

some of these same people, and that is encouraging.

General Abboud, who is the leader of the Iraqi side of the Baghdad security plan, first meeting, impressed me as a guy that had

a grip on things. He was unlikely from our first expectations. We

didn’t really know him, I think.

I say ‘we’ probably a little too easily, but the reports I got from

Baghdad were that our people were not very familiar with this gentleman, and because they weren’t, were a little uneasy.

What he seems to be demonstrating is the kind of leadership example that we would like to see in all people in those positions. He

gets out and about. He is not hesitant to give guidance and direction to his subordinates, and I think that is a good thing.

But one of the challenges that is pretty obvious with these people

is that very few of them have ever had the opportunity to have responsibilities of the scope which they are trying to deal with right

now.

They have been in the military, maybe, been in the security

forces for some time, but they have never been asked to do things

at this level. So this is a challenge.

And the rest of the—from those that I have met in leadership positions with these divisions—it is a mixed bag. A good sign is that

as we go down the road, those that appear to be weaker or less capable are being pulled aside and new people putting in.

So I think this is a process that is moving in the right direction,

probably a long way to go, because we are trying to expand this

force pretty dramatically. It is a work in progress, but it is one

which General Petraeus and his team are really focused on as well.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman from California.

Mr. Ortiz, please.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, good to see you again, sir. Congratulations on your new

position.

Admiral FALLON. Thank you, sir.

Mr. ORTIZ. I was just wondering if you could comment on the recent Iranian—this issue of the 15 British sailors and marines.

What were the motivations behind the Iranians apprehending

them?

And will it require coalition forces to change how they operate

off the coast of Iraq?

Some commentators have been talking about a possible agreement between the British and the Iranians, and that this was one

of the reasons why they were turned loose.

Are you aware of any such agreement between the Iranians and

the British, and if you are aware if the United States participated

in such an agreement?

Admiral FALLON. Thanks. Good to see you again, sir, and pleasure to be here.

Regarding that issue in the Gulf, from the U.S. standpoint, one

of the first things I did was to call Admiral Cosgriff, our component

commander and Fifth Fleet naval commander in the region, and

ask him what procedures we had in place and what he thought of

those.

12

So we had a conversation, and he forwarded me some information, and we both agreed that we liked some aspects of it and we

wanted some things changed, and if you want I would be happy to

tell you a little bit about the detail maybe in a closed session, because it is operational in nature.

But suffice it to say that we had a good look at it, and I feel very

confident that Admiral Cosgriff has got a grip on that.

There was no deal made between us and the British and the Iranians regarding this.

What motivated this thing? Interesting—and speculative on my

part. The folks that carried this out, to the best of our knowledge,

were the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). That is kind

of a force within a force.

Our commanders over there for a number of years now have recognized that when they deal with Iranian military folks in this region there are a couple of different flavors, and that, for example,

the Iranian navy, the mainline navy, is different and acts differently than these characters, who are more along the less disciplined and more likely to carry out actions that are less predictable than mainline forces.

So we are very wary of them, and the guidance that we have

given to our commanders is quite specific. I don’t want to get into

the detail of that in an open session. But I think we have got the

appropriate things in place to deal with it.

It is a place in which this area in which the Iranians claim that

these folks were ‘‘over the line.’’ As you know, in most cases in the

naval world, there are no—in fact, in no cases are there lines on

the ocean.

But the area in which these people were operating, the British,

is an area near the oil terminals in the northern Gulf that are the

primary export means for the Iraqi economy.

And we are up there helping the Iraqis to protect those terminals, and our coalition forces have been doing a very credible job.

As you know, a couple of years ago, there was an attempt to blow

those things up.

The waters are confined. They are shallow. And by my observation, the Iranians have been acting periodically in a manner that

is not particularly helpful, that is occasionally threatening to the

coalition forces, and that is not what I would consider responsible.

There is certainly dispute about exactly where the territorial

lines go out into these waters. But one would think that responsible nations would direct that their forces act in a manner that is

fitting to the situation.

We have not seen that kind of behavior, I will tell you, from the

IRGC in this area. And so it is something that we ought to address

in the bigger picture.

But there has been no deal cut regarding ourselves, the Iranians,

or the British regarding this.

Mr. ORTIZ. My time is up, but if there is a second round—thank

you so much. Good to see you again, Admiral.

Admiral FALLON. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Saxton from New Jersey.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, good to have you here again.

13

Admiral, in your opening statement, you mentioned that every—

or I don’t know whether you said every or almost every—country

in the AOR has issues that you are concerned about.

I suspect that you can say that those issues are related, as you

travel around the AOR. Can you just explain to us how they are

related and if they have an impact on the situation in Iraq?

Admiral FALLON. Congressman, many of the countries have religious and ethnic challenges, sectarian challenges.

Iran is a predominantly Shi’a nation, although it is composed of

several different ethnic groups.

Iraq has a majority Shi’a population, and it is very clear that

Iran is trying to play a major role inside Iraq shaping the future

of that emerging government.

The rest of the nations in the Gulf area are predominantly

Sunni, and this has been a friction point for some time.

And so there is concern not only about Iranian power or the perception of growth of power and influence against those nations, but

also the perception in the Gulf countries that there is a potential

alliance between Iraq and Iran that would be somehow more

threatening to them.

There are lots of development issues. There are any number of

challenges both internal and external. The issues on the Levant

with Israel and the Palestinians overshadow, and I hear about it

from every leader in every country as a primary cause of instability

amongst the masses of people within countries.

There are certainly many challenges in the Horn of Africa. These

are Islamic countries. The predominant folks in each of them are

of the Islamic religion. And there are longstanding issues of development and challenge and governance within virtually every one of

these states.

There are some moderate states which have established institutions—Egypt, a great example—which I think could be helpful in

this area. Jordan plays a very constructive role, as an example. But

it is very difficult to get people to work together.

I found in my initial meetings with most of the leaders in this

region that they are keen to work bilaterally with us and with

other individuals, but the idea that they would cooperate together

for any common purpose is one that is a really tough sell.

Mr. SAXTON. Yesterday, in talking with an individual who has

just returned from the region, I learned that there are—that most

of the bad actors, suicide bombers and others, in Iraq are now from

outside of the country and that they are inspired by some of the

people that you are mentioning.

Would you just elaborate on that a little bit, if that is true?

Admiral FALLON. We have had the idea for some time that a significant number of these suicide bombers are from outside the

country. I think it is really a mixed bag, and I am interested and

keen to try to find out everything we can. It is pretty difficult to

sift through the remains and to figure out who is who.

I think it is really a mixture of people. I believe that one of the

most destabilizing influences are these outsiders that have been

coming into Iraq to inspire people to commit these kinds of acts.

How many of them are actually the bombers themselves I think

remains to be seen.

14

Mr. SAXTON. Just to use the last few moments of my time, is it

also true, as I was told yesterday, that the general Sunni population in Iraq has had it up to here with the violence and that they

are now beginning to take steps to deal with al Qaeda on their

own?

Admiral FALLON. I think this is one of the most significant positive steps that is occurring within Iraq. I looked at some data yesterday that showed that for the eighth straight week the level of

violence in Anbar province has been coming down.

And this is a really good sign, and the reason for this is that, in

fact, people are fed up. And the leaders, the tribal leaders, there

have made alliances among themselves and have come to the coalition and the government and said that they would prefer to work

with us rather than al Qaeda. And we are trying to help them

every way we can.

This is a really good trend, particularly within Anbar, and that

is where most of the Sunni population is located.

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Reyes.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, again, welcome. And I wish you well in your new job.

So much depends on it.

I was wondering, Secretary Gates announced the extension from

12 months to 15 months tour of duty for the Army. Were you consulted in that process? And if you were, can you explain to the committee what that process was?

Admiral FALLON. Sure. We have had a lot of discussions since

the first day I got here, because it was apparent—General Petraeus

told me straightaway that his look at the situation in Iraq was

such that a troop surge was under way to move us up to 20 combat

brigades on the ground.

But as he looked at the rotation cycle that was already in place,

the amount of time in which these 20 brigades would actually be

together on the ground was, in fact, only a couple of weeks, and

so he asked me to consider supporting his request for extending a

couple of these brigades, and he identified them.

And when I was over there several weeks ago, we sat down, and

I actually talked to one of the brigade commanders personally to

kind of get a sense of what was going on.

The particular people that he was most interested in extending

for a period of time, for a couple of months, were really key, and

I understood that.

As we got into this, though, as you start to peel the onion, you

begin to find out that there is just a continuing series there. There

was going to be a continuing series of issues regarding who ought

to get extended, for what period of time and why.

And no sooner had we looked and I had said, ‘Okay, I think it

makes sense to extend these two brigades for a couple of months

to give you the staying power, so that we can actually see what effect we are getting from the surge’—and then it turned out there

was a division headquarters that was actually very well-known to

me, because it was the 25th Infantry Division from Hawaii—and

so I was very sensitive to what they were doing and why they were

important.

15

And so, okay, then as you look down the road, it also became apparent that there were other—there were going to be other decisions that would be coming up one after the other, so this month

we could make this decision, and if it were supported, okay, and

next month there are going to be more units that we would have

to look at.

And so I could see that we would spend the next several months

doing one series of debates after another.

Meanwhile, back in Washington, the Army had taken a look at

this and said, ‘‘Yes, we can support this, if that is what you need

to do.’’

But there is another issue, and that is the business of the Army

at large, and how many units are being told what, and what kind

of—you know, the differences between this unit—why are these

people maybe going to do 12, these 14, these 13, these 15, and so

forth.

So they looked at this and tried to come up with a comprehensive

way that this could be addressed in a smart manner, that would

give us—reduce the flail on planning and try to give the best predictable future for the most number of people, particularly families,

for their planning.

And so the decision was made to at least put in place and to announce to people that their tours could be up to 15 months long.

This is not a commitment to do this for the Army at large and for

all these brigades.

But it puts us in position so that if you do the planning, you can

lay these out and actually have forces available on paper and in reality. They can start making their plans to be able to do this.

And then some time later on this year we can then have a decision as to whether we are actually going to do this for significant

numbers of the forces or it is not going to be done.

So really, you could have done it either way. We could have

piecemealed it and had each individual request come up, with a

constant churn on that, or try and take it and address the thing

in large measure for the entire Army, at least put us in position,

so that if we decide to back off, much better to have people say hey,

you don’t have to spend this whole amount of time, than to keep

surprising people with very short notice.

The biggest issue I got from the people on the ground, the leaders out there, was, ‘‘Please don’t drag this out. Make a decision. We

think that we can make a difference if we stay here, and we recognize the value that we are providing to the forces, so just tell us

now.’’

Mr. REYES. So right now the tour is 12 months with a potential

to go to——

Admiral FALLON. No. Every one of these brigades has been told

that they can expect to have a 15-month tour. Whether they actually do that remains to be seen.

Mr. REYES. Any chance that an extension would come along and

then make it 18 months?

Admiral FALLON. I don’t think so, because there is so many factors here. The flip side of this that is advantageous to the individuals and their families is this puts in place a way to actually get

16

them to stay back in their home bases for a year rather than some

which are actually getting under a year now.

Mr. REYES. All right.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

John McHugh.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, welcome back. I, too, wish you all the best in, shall we

say, an interesting region—very big and interesting region of the

world.

I had the opportunity to go to Iraq and Afghanistan and Pakistan a few months ago. We spent a lot of time with Presidents

Karzai and Musharraf.

It was clear to our people that there was seriously an agreement

it is just not working, and we talked to President Musharraf about

that. He seemed to express a willingness to rework it but not to

do something different.

Have you been able to get a read on what the status of that is?

It seems to me that is so critical if we are really going to interdict

and get at the root cause of what is happening in Afghanistan.

Admiral FALLON. This is a very complex issue, as I am finding

just about everything in this region.

I spoke with President Karzai and with President Musharraf

separately and had, I thought, real good conversations for me—first

time to actually meet each individual, but to get an understanding

of where their heads were in this issue.

They have differing opinions, to put it mildly. But my sense in

Pakistan in particular, because I know there has been a lot of talk,

particularly here in Washington, that there is not enough being

done, more needs to be done—President Musharraf was pretty eloquent in taking me through a long list of things that people had

suggested, requested, or demanded, in some cases, that the Paks

do, and met with different reactions from him.

But he was pretty kind in walking me through a number of

things. There have been significant changes in recent days, within

the last month or so. I have looked at it from two sides—one, at

the big picture, to see what the level of commitment seems to be

from him and from his government, and I see a couple of significant things.

He has moved or had his army move two brigades of forces from

the Indian frontier to the west of the country.

Given the mindset that I think I understand within that country,

this is pretty significant. Because of all the things that they are

concerned about, they still have this fixation on the Indian frontier

and the challenges between these countries—interesting to me, because having just come from the Pacific I had an insight into the

Indian side as well.

As an aside, there is some good news here. For the better part

of two years now, there has been a steady de-tensioning on that

border between India and Pakistan, and I think that can be only

good news for them and for the rest of the world.

But back to Pakistan. He has made these moves. He has put

these forces in positions just outside these tribal areas. He told me

that there is a long history in these areas.

17

These are not parts of his country in which he has traditionally

put his military, other than the border forces, the tribals, that actually come from these areas and work in there to provide security.

He is working it. He has given his commanders authority to work

with our commanders down to battalion level. I think this is very

significant.

So at the other end of the spectrum, I went to our forces in Afghanistan and I asked what has been going on, what is the level

of cooperation, have you seen a difference. Hopefully it is improved.

The answer is yes and yes.

And I think this is really good. And the more that our people on

the border and the Afghan security forces can work directly with

counterparts, I think the more ground we are going to gain in this

challenge with the terrorists and their supporters that are going

back and forth.

One thing that I—the President asked me to keep in mind. This

is the Pashtun tribal area. It encompasses large swaths of land on

both sides of the borders. These people don’t recognize a border.

This is their tribal territory, and they feel they have got a right to

go back and forth and do what they do.

In the last several weeks, in South Waziristan, you may have noticed that there has been significant conflict.

This conflict was instigated by the tribal leaders out there in

Pakistan who have had enough, not unlike the tribal leaders in

Anbar in Iraq, with outsiders, troublemakers, al Qaeda-inspired

and other ‘‘we are here to help’’ ne’er-do-wells that have been destabilizing not only the border region in Afghanistan but inside of

Pakistan.

It appears that the tribal leaders have been successful in ejecting

a significant number of these insurgents from outside. I see all of

these things as very positive steps.

And President Musharraf assured me that he would continue to

work it to the best of his ability, and if I had a specific issue that

I wanted to take up in here, he would be happy to entertain it.

So I think these are good signs.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Admiral.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Dr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, I wanted to ask you about the Iraq supplemental. One

of my frustrations with the last few weeks is we have had this

great debate going on in this country, and the President has been

involved, and the vice president, and the speaker.

And it seems to me that the debate that has been going on has

not really been about the language that is in the supplemental but

on interpretations or overstatements of language, of what people

are saying the language is.

I wanted to ask, were you consulted by the White House—have

you had input into what the language of the House version and the

Senate version might mean for your troops in Iraq?

Admiral FALLON. Sir, I will be quite honest, I have not focused

on this. I have been using every available minute and hour to try

18

to have an understanding of what is really going on inside the

country so that I can try to——

Dr. SNYDER. No, I understand that, but it also means to me that

nobody from the White House called you up and said, ‘‘Admiral, we

really need you to look on pages whatever and see what the language is going to mean for——’’

Admiral FALLON. No, sir.

Dr. SNYDER. Well, that is the impression I have gotten from the

debate.

Let me ask you some specific questions, because I think, you

know, you read these press summaries—I have read them again

today. They talk about, you know, the language that calls for a

troop withdrawal by some time in 2008.

And there is no language—that not the result of the language of

the House bill. I am going to speak specifically about the House

bill.

And let me tell you what I mean, because there is very specific

language in here that has a number of exceptions. And the result

is we end up with a bill that is really calling for a change in focus.

And so the specifics—my understanding is that currently in Iraq

we have about 5,000 U.S. troops involved in training. Is that about

the right number, to your knowledge?

Admiral FALLON. I have seen a number like that that may be

dedicated to the command that does training.

Dr. SNYDER. Is it fair to say that——

Admiral FALLON. But we have people all over—we have people

embedded in every single one of these units that are doing mentoring and training——

Dr. SNYDER. Which I think is actually—my understanding is the

goal is to get more than what is currently there, too, is that accurate?

Admiral FALLON. I am sorry, sir, what was that?

Dr. SNYDER. It is my understanding that the goal is to have more

trainers as they get up trained and we get the numbers and

what—that that number will go up as time goes by. Is that accurate?

Admiral FALLON. General Petraeus has expressed to me a desire

to significantly boost the number of people within the Afghan units

themselves—I am sorry, Iraq.

Dr. SNYDER. Yes, that is right.

Admiral FALLON. By the way, it also applies to Afghanistan, but

Iraq. Now, here is the challenge.

Dr. SNYDER. Well, I have got very limited time. I need to stick

with this language.

Admiral FALLON. The answer is yes.

Dr. SNYDER. You are helping me with your analysis here. Well,

according to the language of the House bill, there is no limit in the

numbers and no limit on duration of the number of U.S. troops

that can be involved in training.

So when everyone says there is going to be a complete withdrawal of troops by some time in 2008, that is an inaccurate statement of the House bill.

My second point—the language also says that troops can be in

Iraq for as long as the secretary of defense wants and in whatever

19

number to protect American troops. Well, specifically, these trainers would be the ones we would be most concerned about.

So if we have between 5,000 and 10,000 trainers, as you said,

embedded all over the country in all these different units—I mean,

I have talked to military people that would say it would take tens

of thousands of U.S. troops in Iraq to protect those American troops

with the kind of robust over-the-hill forces to get them out if we

need to, to support them, close air support.

Would you agree with that? I mean, it is hard for me to say—

pin you down on a number, but tens of thousands would not be unreasonable at all to protect 5,000 to 10,000 trainers sprinkled all

over the country in Iraqi units, would it?

Admiral FALLON. Mr. Snyder, I have not looked at what kind of

a laydown we might have in a different scenario in Iraq, but it is

very clear to me that what we would like to have in the big picture

is Iraqi security forces——

Dr. SNYDER. I understand.

Admiral FALLON [continuing]. Would take most responsibility,

and we have a different supporting role for them—how many

troops that is going to be.

Dr. SNYDER. Rapidly running out of time. There also is language

in the bill that says that U.S. forces can be there in whatever number for as long as they need to be, without any regard to this 2008

date, to protect American civilians, American citizens.

Is it fair to say that we have tens of thousands of U.S. citizens

in a civilian capacity in Iraq, both private, NGO, and in other government agencies other than military?

Admiral FALLON. I couldn’t give you an accurate figure on that,

sir. I know that we have a lot of people, and I have seen a lot of

Americans. I have no idea how many are actually there.

Dr. SNYDER. And I would make the same statement by this language. There are also going to be tens of—there could be unlimited

troops, U.S. troops, without regard to time or number, to protect

U.S. civilians.

And then finally, and very clearly, you can have as many troops

for as long and in what number as the secretary of defense deems

necessary to go after al Qaeda and other international troops—

other international forces.

Well, my time is up, but the bottom line is the language that is

being used by the Administration—perhaps reflective of the fact

they did not ask you for what that language actually would mean—

is not what is in this bill.

And in fact, the President can well decide that there would need

to be 100,000, or 150,000 or 170,000 troops to do the kind of things

that you are talking about other than having U.S.-led combat missions.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Would the admiral take for the record a question? If you can get back to us in several days—the number of contractors that are in Iraq and a basic description of their various

missions.

I know you couldn’t give us that today, but we would certainly

appreciate that.

Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir.

20

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 95.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hayes.

Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Admiral Fallon, thank you for being with us today and

thank you for the incredible service that the men and women serving under you are providing and the successes.

In my district in North Carolina, Fort Bragg, and 82nd Airborne,

and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), United States Special Operations Command (USSOC) are very prominent in this

fight, and we are extremely proud of them, fully deployed.

The 1st Brigade Combat Team is scheduled to deploy this summer, which will really make us fully deployed.

From information that I am getting from the field, the reinforcement of the troops is having a very positive effect on the war

against terrorists, particularly in Iraq.

It is hard to find this information. You can dig through the press,

and folks in the field are telling me about various incidents that

are happening.

I would like for you—I want to complete my question—to sort of

help me tie that together from your perspective.

And then another little component is—there was a bombing in

the Green Zone of the Iraqi parliament which shocked everybody,

but having been there numerous times, as most folks here have

been, it is possible to see how that could happen.

It would seem to me that, bad as that is, that has strengthened

the resolve of the Iraqi parliament, so if you could include that in

your answer.

And just last, in the way of a comment, I would think—and you

don’t have to respond to this, but the only thing worse than Congress telling you how many troops and when and how to get them

there and back would be to tell you how many trainers and how

many civilians and all that stuff.

So I hope we don’t go down that road. But if you would talk to

me about the progress that is being made, that is obviously happening.

Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir. Our special forces personnel have been

doing a phenomenal job. I was very, very impressed by the briefings and by my observation of their activities both in Iraq and Afghanistan. Americans nationwide would be exceedingly proud.

We are not going to talk publicly about a lot of what they do. I

would be happy to give you more detail maybe in a closed session.

But they are working very hard and they are making a difference. They are dedicated.

I was impressed with not only the work of the forces themselves

but the team that they have gathered to do their support work, the

analytic work, the incredibly quick turn on information from the

littlest snippet of intelligence.

To expand and build on this, to be able to take the appropriate

actions, I think, are remarkable.

They are doing things on a daily basis that are exceedingly wellexecuted, well-thought-out, and we are getting great advantage

from their work. And I will end it at that.

21

A comment about your second point on the bombing incident in

the COR, the council of representatives. I was there a couple of

weeks ago, visited that building, went actually to meet with Speaker Mashhadani.

And I will be honest with you. My impression as I walked into

that building and I went right through that room where the bombing took place was a little bit of concern, because it was filled with

people, of different folks coming and going, did not appear to be

particularly orderly, and my instant reaction was I don’t know who

is in charge of security here, but it looks pretty tenuous.

In response to my queries, I was told that one of the biggest challenges was that every person in the COR saw him or herself as a

very important person (VIP), and as such they merited certain particular privileges, among them being a coterie of bodyguards that

were unique to that individual.

And the second was unfettered access in and out of that building

without any searches, because they were above this. And so you

can see the recipe for a problem, and it certainly was exploited the

other day.

In the aftermath of that, there have been some pretty smart decisions made to get a grip on security. I will tell you that General

Petraeus and our team over there have had their fingers all over

this to try to steer it in the right direction, to try to make it better.

I take note of your comment that in the aftermath of that, this

particular institution, which has been sometimes less than enthusiastic in their approach to diligently carrying out their duties as

this body may be, actually decided to have an extraordinary session

and get together to demonstrate some solidarity.

That is a good sign.

Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I might note for the record that some of the special forces soldiers we were talking with at Bragg on Friday were talking about

how the ICTF, the Iraqi counterterrorism force, their special forces,

are taking to and responding to the training.

Our soldiers were very proud of the improvements that those

folks were making. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Ellsworth.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Admiral. Before I get to a question, I would be remiss if I didn’t tell you that three members in the room here today

just got back on Thursday from the region.

And with everything we learned, probably one of the most important things was just how impressed I was, and I think we were,

of all our troops, from all the different agencies and branches with

their dedication, and obvious intelligence and internal fortitude.

I couldn’t be more impressed with our troops over there.

Getting to my questions, General Pace was here a couple months

ago and, in regard to the surge, talked about that they were developing a matrix to determine if the surge was going to be effective,

and some benchmarks there.

And I just want to know—I really don’t need to know the benchmarks, just if that matrix has been developed and if at some point

in the future we might see that.

22

And then I would like you to comment, if you could—one of the—

I guess the jaw droppers for me was in both countries. We are talking about the lack of real law, the lack of anyone in the country

understanding the rule of law as we would know it.

And one of the generals referred to it as kind of like a milking

stool. We are training the police—and I know you said earlier you

may not be able to comment as much on the police—but we were

training the police—but the total lack of the other legs of the stool,

in the judiciary, the attorneys, both prosecutorial and defense, and

then the penal system.

And I guess my question is what is our plan and a time frame

for adding those two of the legs of the stool, so that it will sit on

the ground, if that is going to be the answer that they take over

and they do the job, when we can pull the military back, and put

the police in?

You know, I think you know what I am saying.

Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir. Regarding General Pace’s testimony on

the matrix, I am not particularly familiar with that. I can tell you,

for my part, I am working to try to put some meat on the bones

of these things by which we can actually measure success.

The first order of business for me is to get a sense of the foundation, where we are right now, in areas that I think are key—security, levels of violence, governance, and moving forward and so

forth, and not just in Baghdad, in provinces and so forth.

So one of the things I have my staff doing, in fact, this week

while I am up here, is brainstorming how we would measure any

number of topics here. And there are dozens of them, but to try to

figure out which are most important and how we can actually track

them and get good data.

As far as rule of law, clearly a big deal. There is no doubt in my

mind that we can be as successful as the day is long in trying to

establish security zones, if you would, to try to carve out areas in

which the violence has been reduced, but the long-term stability of

this country is only going to occur when and if the other instruments of governance are going to fall into place.

There is no tradition here, near as I can tell—very little tradition

in this country of the kind of rule of law that we would certainly

enjoy or like to see. So we have got to help them rebuild this, or

build it from scratch in some cases.

General Petraeus has put out and made one of his key requests

to try to get help in this area. He has started what I think is a

pretty interesting innovation.

And they have actually set up a court system inside the Green

Zone to provide a little bit of protection, because one of the key factors we have discovered is any time a person stands up and agrees

to be a judge, or somebody in the rule of law system, they become

immediate targets for al Qaeda, because they just—this is anathema to them. But they are starting.

For my part, I will tell you that I think this is a great idea, and

I would welcome support from wherever we can get it in this regard. I will tell you that as I was leaving Hawaii, just as an anecdote, a gentleman came up to me and volunteered himself to actually go out and serve.

23

He is a lawyer, actually had experience in the Army as an Army

Judge Advocate General (JAG), thought that his experience of 20

years in the service and then quite a number in the private sector

would be helpful. And I said, ‘‘You are on.’’ And I think we may

be successful in actually getting him in place.

It is very, very important and necessary for a couple of reasons.

One, to give people a sense of a future, that they have some recourse to just the rule of gun, or the thug on the corner, or the

neighborhood bully, or the militia as the way to settle disputes,

which inevitably, as you know, will arise.

In the old days, they had a tribal system that took care of these

things in a manner that may not be very democratic or representative.

But we clearly recognize the need for this and are trying to help

them to install a system that can be helpful to the country.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Drake.

Mrs. DRAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, Admiral, it is good to see you again and congratulations on your new command. We look forward to working with you.

My first question is can you comment to us on the recent Iranian

claims that they have started industrial-level development of nuclear fuel? And tell us if you think those claims are credible.

Admiral FALLON. It appears, based on the level of effort and the

analysis by the intelligence community, that they are hard into

working to develop a nuclear capability in this country.

I don’t view this as particularly beneficial to anything good in the

region or the world. This has, I think, been widely recognized by

most folks in the world as a negative development.

The U.N. has certainly taken note of it, and the Security Council,

as you know, has acted accordingly.

This is destabilizing, and it is recognized by the neighbors. Their

biggest apprehension is what Iranian intentions might be in this

area.

They claim to be working for their own internal development,

and they claim to have no negative desires or aspirations toward

the neighborhood, but their actions belie their words.

Not only are they pursuing this program and the degree to which

they are boasting about it—I am not sure how much of that is, in

fact, accurate—but they are tripping over themselves, it seems to

me, to make breast-beating proclamations that are unhelpful.

And there is no doubt that they are taking actions particularly

destabilizing in both Iraq and Afghanistan. So the behavior is certainly not very good.

This recent caper with the British, the kind of cowboy-type activity that is certainly not representative of what they claim to be trying to do—and that has become a major player in the region.

The only thing major they are doing is acting in a manner that

is not particularly exemplary by any of our standards.

Mrs. DRAKE. Can you also comment for us—I mean, we all understand the threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). We

have seen the loss of life and the serious injury.

But there has been some criticism recently toward the Joint Improvised Explosive Devices Defeat Organization and concern that

24

in spite of all the money that has been spent that we don’t have

the results that we need, and they haven’t produced anything.

So do you feel you are getting the support you need from them?

Is there anything that we can do? And certainly, anything we could

do that would allow us to overcome these IEDs should be a first

course of action.

Admiral FALLON. Ma’am, there is little doubt that this organization—and General Meigs, who has been the head of it, has briefed

me several times on their work—that they are dedicated and they

are trying to help us in this problem.

The challenge is that a lot of their work tells us in detail what

is going on, gives us better insight into what is happening, but

frankly this is a very challenging situation in which we are chasing

a rabbit that runs pretty quickly.

The enemy is very astute at watching what we do and adapting

his tactics and procedures to take advantage of any weakness they

see.

What has been very disturbing of late is that they are—some of

these terrorist networks inside Iraq are clearly getting help from

Iran. And the particular type of technology that the Iranians have

introduced is deadly toward our people.

And so we are working hard to try to understand and defeat

these weapons, but frankly it is the number one challenge that our

troops face on a tactical level. It is very difficult to get ahead of

this thing.

As we see an evolution of their tactics, we can typically come up

with a counter to that. But trying to anticipate what they are going

to do next and how these things might be used against us is a real

challenge.

As you know, there are countless actions that have been taken

to try to increase the security for our own forces and to give them

a way to deal with these things.

Mrs. DRAKE. And also during these two weeks at home I heard

a lot of concern from our ship repair yards and contractors in the

region about what will happen if we don’t pass the supplemental.

So I don’t know if you are going to really have time to answer,

but what your thoughts were if—either in a delay or not being able

to get the supplemental passed—how that will impact the military.

Admiral FALLON. What I have been told from our people here in

the Pentagon is for the commands in Central Command, in Iraq,

Afghanistan, and those supporting, they are cash-flowing resources

from the services, so there is money coming out of service entities,

Army and Navy and other services, that would be intended for

other things that are now being diverted to take care of our daily

needs.

Mrs. DRAKE. Thank you, Admiral.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

Mr. Johnson from Georgia.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just had the opportunity, Admiral Fallon, to visit that region

last week, Afghanistan and Iraq. And I was very impressed with

what we have going on in Afghanistan.

The situation there is a little different than it is in Iraq, and I

think you would agree to that. Security and governance are in

25

place in Afghanistan. The vast majority of the people over there

favor representative government and prosperity, not Taliban brutality, according to your statement.

And they are standing up and fighting for their country’s future.

And you could also see that they were very eager, well-led, and

courageous fighters. We visited with a number of them on the trip,

and I concur in your assessment.

We also met with some Iraqi security forces. They seemed to be

less eager, less well-led, less brave, and certainly not equipped with

weapons, vehicles to get them around. In some cases, they were

without uniforms, kind of a ragtag bunch.

And I don’t know how many of them there are, how many have

been through training, how many are currently in training. But it

just appeared that the Iraqi security forces are not in a position to

stand up and take on the security of their country.

We also visited with the Iraqi navy down in the Gulf where the

incident occurred with the British forces, and my assessment—I

won’t give you my assessment, but bottom line, I didn’t have a lot

of confidence in the forces down there, the Iraqi navy in particular.

And have you had the opportunity to review the polling data

from Iraq in terms of what the Iraqi people think of our presence

in their country down there?

It appears that 60 percent of them think that it is—or they approve of using violence against American forces.

And so, differently from Afghanistan, where the people support

the United States and NATO presence there, the people in Iraq

don’t support our presence there.

And there is no sectarian violence going on in Afghanistan like

it is in Iraq, which puts our troops in the middle of a civil war,

something that we cannot win militarily for either side.

And so my impressions were that we are doing a great job in Afghanistan, but it is time for us to depart from street combat responsibilities in Iraq.

And I would like to get your take on what I have said.

Admiral FALLON. Well, I would agree with some things and not

agree with others. First of all, there is a very clear difference, as

I indicated in my oral and written testimony, in the situations in

both countries.

The size and the quality of the Afghan security forces—much

smaller than the numbers in Iraq, with a tradition of experience

in the field. These are tough—physically—people. A lot of them

have had experience in security business before.

And they are well-led. Their defense minister—their general,

Bismullah Khan, I think, is a sharp guy who really understands

how to get things done, and so little doubt in my mind that they

are moving out smartly in providing a foundation for security in

that country.

Iraq has got a lot of challenges. We are trying to take an institution that was dismantled, partly by us, and build it from scratch

into something of some several hundred thousand folks which we

would like to see charged with taking care of security in this big

country that is in constant turmoil day by day.

This would be challenging for anybody in any circumstances.

There is no doubt in my mind that there are units within the Iraqi

26

security forces that have a long way to go. And it is our intention

to try to do our best to train these people.

In fact, one of my priorities on this trip, leaving this afternoon,

is to spend time with those forces so I can get my own personal

assessment of how well we are doing.

I have seen some terrific performance by some of these forces.

There is little doubt we have a lot of work to do with others. We

are going to work on it.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Admiral, for your service. I believe what you are

doing is crucial to protecting American families, by making sure

that terrorist camps are not recreated in the region to attack the

United States again.

I was really grateful—I had a son serve for a year in Iraq. It was

a very meaningful experience for him.

I appreciate in your statement—you indicate the surge of additional military forces into Baghdad has disrupted extremist elements, at least temporarily reduced ethnic violence, and has been

welcomed by a majority of the city’s people.

This is a very hopeful assessment. A concern I have—have the

pledged Iraqi forces been placed in the city? What is the status of

Iraqi forces?

Admiral FALLON. There are substantial numbers of Iraqi forces

that are actually in the city and functioning.

And the reports I received, which I am eager to understand,

show me that in recent days we have had a couple of exemplary

demonstrations of their performance, in which they have actually

done very well under combat conditions, and in one case stayed in

the fight all day, in the lead.

The overwhelming number of forces that were engaged were

Iraqi forces with our people backing them up, and they actually

performed very well. So we would like to see this continue.

One of the questions that General Petraeus and I both have is

what the Iraqi plan is to continue to rotate forces in.

As they have had units there now for a couple of months, they

have indicated they would like to change these out. And we are all

ears to find out just how they plan to do this and whether we are

going to be able to maintain the force levels that we would like to

see in there.

So I would like to get back to you on that after I see it myself.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 97.]

Mr. WILSON. Additionally, I am very grateful. This weekend, I

will be joining the sendoff ceremony of the 218th Mechanized Infantry Brigade of the South Carolina Army National Guard.

I served with this brigade for 25 years. And I am so proud of

them. They are committed. They are trained professionals. They

and the state of South Carolina are very proud that they will be

proceeding to Kabul to train the Afghan police.

And I want you to know that under your command that you have

just got top-quality people. And the people of our region are just

27

so supportive and understand how important this is for America’s

security.

I was interested—in your statement, you indicated that the

spring offensive may be overstated. I am glad to hear that.

I really would like your assessment again on how it may be overstated, or what you can tell us has been done by way of being prepared fully to address the incursion.

Admiral FALLON. Well, there has been an awful lot of hype about

the so-called spring offensive.

Frankly, what I am hearing from intelligence reports right now

is that most of the Taliban that we think we can identify are actually out there whacking down poppies to fatten their coffers.

But there have been very aggressive actions taken in anticipation of any potential offensive by ISAF, both NATO and U.S. forces

as a part of that, to go out and rout out the Taliban, particularly

in the south, in and around Helmand province, where there has

been report resurgence of Taliban activity.

We have had forces down there working for several weeks now

that are pushing Taliban and their supporters out of key areas and

have taken quite a bit of—reclaimed quite a bit of territory.

This has not been done—it was cleared out once several years

ago. But frankly, my assessment is that we allowed this thing. We

congratulated ourselves a little too early and allowed them to come

back into these areas.

We have now cleaned them out again. The aim is to try and keep

them out of there and get the Afghan security forces to take over

responsibility for policing that up and keeping it squared away.

Mr. WILSON. And I, too, as Congressman Johnson, have visited

Afghanistan. The level of support, although I have been to Iraq six

times and been impressed by the dedication of their military, too—

is there sufficient equipment for modernization for the Afghan

army and police?

Admiral FALLON. The commander charged with that responsibility, U.S. commander, that is working it has been extremely diligent, I think, in trying to get the right things to the right people

at the right time.

And I had a meeting with the defense minister and the chief of

defense, General Khan, when I was there a couple of weeks ago,

and they indicated that—of course, they have a long list of things

they would like to have, but that they were receiving generally the

equipment they wanted. And I think this is working pretty well.

Mr. WILSON. Again, thank you for your service.

Admiral FALLON. Thank you.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Loebsack, please.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Admiral, for appearing before us today. I, too, was

in Iraq recently. It was in February. And I have to say that when

I—and I am a new member of Congress, just some 100 days, or

whatever it has been.

When the bombing occurred at the parliament, I was shocked, to

say the least, because I thought to myself what if there had been

a bombing at the U.S. Capital—the functional equivalent, basically.

28

Now, having been there, I realize that obviously the security situation isn’t the same as it is here.

Although having been there and having been to the Green Zone

and the U.S. embassy and what have you, I actually thought that—

and having been trailed by contractors the whole time, even when

I had to head to the restroom. I was very happy that they were

with me.

But I thought to myself there actually seems to be somewhat

more security there than there is here. That is not to say anything

about our Capital or the security here. It is wonderful.

But the first thing that came to my mind was not only the contractors we have there, but the subcontractors—the Peruvians, for

example. Can you tell us how many Peruvians are employed by us

there?

Admiral FALLON. No, I can’t, sir, but I will tell you that I have

got it. I had a hearing yesterday with the House Appropriations

Committee-Defense (HACD), had a lot of the same questions. I am

only 30 days into my job, so——

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 97.]

Mr. LOEBSACK. Okay. Why do we have Peruvians in the first

place?

Admiral FALLON. Well, it isn’t so much why do we have them.

It is many of these security personnel—and by the way, my impression was there were so many to be more dysfunctional than functional in the Green Zone, is my—probably the gang there don’t

want to hear this.

How effective all these folks are remains to be seen. What I believe is going on—and I know for a fact that many of the organizations within the Iraqi government have contracted for people

through various ministries.

What I have discovered is that in addition to the Iraqi security

forces that we generally talk about, the army and the police, every

single ministry within that country has its own security force. And

it keeps on flowing.

One of the challenges, I think—and there is a culture here. I

think that one or the reasons or the methods by which Saddam

kept the place under control was he had half the people in the

country employed in some security capacity, and there is a tradition of that.

I want to look at——

Mr. LOEBSACK. Could I ask you about who is under our control?

I mean, technically, we have occupied the country, so technically,

you know, this is all supposedly under our control at the moment

until we remove our troops.

But at the same time, my understanding was that the contract—

Blackwater, or whoever it is—that we employ, that the U.S. Government pays, has also subcontracted with Peruvians and maybe

others, for all I know. Is that correct?

Admiral FALLON. I don’t know all the details, but what I am told

is that there are contractors and subcontractors and subcontractors.

Mr. LOEBSACK. And I guess I just want to—I mean, I have a real

concern about this——

29

Admiral FALLON. Me, too.

Mr. LOEBSACK [continuing]. Why we don’t have American citizens protecting facilities that are under our command. This strikes

me as a little bit strange, to say the least.

And I do want to make a comment, I guess, about sort of the privatization, if you will, and this has nothing to do with you as such,

but, you know, the sort of privatization craze that I think we have

seen in the last six years as far as our government is concerned.

And then it becomes manifest as far as the number of contractors. We have the whole issue of contractors in Iraq and to whom

they are responsible, and then when they go out and subcontract.

Ultimately our government is responsible, is it not, for those operations?

Admiral FALLON. I think that this is, at the highest level, pretty

well-intended in that if you can save having to put American uniformed personnel out here to do non-combat missions that this is

general goodness, that there are many support functions which

could easily be done by civilians that could free up service personnel to actually do things that would be more useful for the big picture.

The degree to which this has been rippled down is something I

am just going to have to get a grip on. I see a lot of goodness in

places, for example—many of the contracted personnel are, in fact,

Iraqi civilians.

And this is an opportunity to actually give them some meaningful work, give them a future and actually, as they get to see what

our people are trying to do for them, maybe carry this message

back to the community. I see a tremendous amount of the potential

for good there.

I also know that many people are contracted from other countries, and people are standing in line in these other countries to get

these kinds of jobs for exactly the same reason, because they don’t

have work at home.

And you know, how much of this plays into effective security is

the question, and I got it. I will work on it.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Admiral. And I do thank you for your

service. You don’t have an easy job.

Admiral FALLON. Thank you, sir.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Dr. Gingrey.

Dr. GINGREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Fallon, welcome to the committee and thank you for

your tremendous service and what you did in leading the Pacific

Command, and of course, now in this new area of responsibility,

Central Command, the first naval officer to have that responsibility.

It is just amazing as I read about all of the areas that are under

your command, certainly now the most volatile region in the world,

without question, probably five of the top six most volatile areas.

So I know you have got your work cut out for you.

I came in a little late, and I hope this question hasn’t already

been addressed.

30

But in regard to how your command works with NATO and General McNeill in Afghanistan, I know we have—I think it is about,

what, 10,000 of our troops still in Operation Enduring Freedom

and another 15,000 that are part of the NATO force structure,

ISAF.

And it is a little hard to understand exactly how General McNeill

works with you and what specifically we can do.

I know we recently put another 3,200 from the 10th Mountain

Division preparing for the so-called spring offensive. I know you addressed that when Mr. Wilson was asking his questions.

But could you give us a feel of how—what is the working relationship between your command and NATO?

Admiral FALLON. I wouldn’t feel alone in sensing this is complex,

because it is complex for me, too. First, the easiest one to answer

is that General McNeill works for the NATO chain of command,

and he reports back through the NATO chain in Brunssum and

then back into Belgium.

But in Afghanistan, there are several different missions, and

only one of these missions, the counterinsurgency mission, has

been officially signed up for by NATO. And that is what ISAF is

attempting to do.

The challenge is there are a couple of other missions, as I see

them, in this country. One is the counterterror mission which we

have undertaken as part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), to

work not only within Afghanistan but in the region. This is one

that is being done by U.S. forces and not by NATO.

The other mission that is rather surprising to me——

Dr. GINGREY. Admiral, if I could interrupt you just for a second,

explain that again, because I may have missed that point.

Admiral FALLON. NATO has undertaken the mission of

counterinsurgency within Afghanistan. The U.S. retains the mission of counterterrorism.

Now, on a given day, I would propose that you could flip a coin

sometimes to decide which particular task might be in which category.

There is another significant issue within this country, and that

is the reconstruction of this nation of Afghanistan, the nationbuilding responsibility.

NATO has not accepted that particular mission. But what I find

fascinating is that there are people, many from NATO countries,

that are working in exactly this area of trying to rebuild and to get

institutions functioning and to reconstruct this country—not just

NATO but other nations beyond that alliance, too.

So it is confusing, and it isn’t clean and neat. And from my perspective, as I am the geographic commander for this region, I have

responsibility for all U.S. service personnel in here, although for

some missions, operationally, they don’t directly work for me.

So this is something that I have highlighted to the secretary, to

the chairman, and we are going to work on this as I get more into

it, to make sure that I have a firm understanding of exactly what

the lines are and how—at the end of the day, what we are really

trying to do is figure out the way to be most effective and to actually get the job done, so we will work on that. But it is often confusing.

31

Dr. GINGREY. Admiral, thank you. It is confusing to us, and it is

a little comforting to know that it is still maybe just a touch confusing to yourself.

But again, in my closing seconds, let me just say how much we

appreciate and how much we realize that your job has got to be,

at this point, the toughest one in the military.

And I just say godspeed. I know you are going to do a great job

and give victory a chance. And I thank you for that.

Admiral FALLON. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. Admiral Fallon, you have a tough job, but I assure

you you have our support in carrying it out.

With respect to Afghanistan, I noted from your testimony we

have roughly 25,000 troops there.

Admiral FALLON. That is right, sir.

Mr. SPRATT. How many non-U.S. NATO troops augment our

25,000 troops?

Admiral FALLON. I don’t think I would say it is augment. I think

the number is about 14,000. But I will take that and maybe my

staff can——

Mr. SPRATT. Is this all NATO can muster for——

Admiral FALLON. I am sorry?

Mr. SPRATT. Is this all that NATO can muster, of the non-U.S.

member states?

Admiral FALLON. I think that is a really good question to ask the

NATO alliance. I would be very happy, and I know General

McNeill would be happy, with additional support both in troops

and in other areas that these countries have actually signed up for

but have not so far enabled people to actually show up on the

ground.

Mr. SPRATT. Several years ago, I was at Shaw Air Force Base,

where Central Command Air Force is headquartered.

Now, I had the opportunity to talk to the chief of intelligence and

some of his junior officers who just returned from Afghanistan.

They described it—while there was a tenuous balance of power, it

was really a confederation of warlords.

Would you describe the situation in the country today as essentially the same as that of a rather tenuous balance of power

amongst the confederation of warlords?

Admiral FALLON. No, I don’t think I would characterize it that

way. It is clear that the history of this area is one of tribal alliances and chieftains.

But President Karzai is attempting to build a set of governing institutions to actually help to move away from that traditional construct, and one that is more representative of the people as a

whole, and actually get people to work together and to feel confidence in a bigger government.

It is a challenge, because the culture goes a different way. But

there is certainly cooperation among the various factions and sects

and tribes within that country, and he works at it every day.

I am eager, as I go back there on subsequent visits, to get out

and see each of these different areas, to get my own assessment of

just how well this is working.

32

Mr. SPRATT. Are you concerned that some of the replacement

troops and augmentation troops being dispatched both to Iraq and

to Afghanistan are coming from units that, in some cases, are

below C–3, C–3 or below, in their readiness classification?

Admiral FALLON. The status of units that are in line to come to

these countries is certainly of concern to me, but I have high confidence that the services, the Army and Marine Corps in particular,

before they have these forces in the queue to actually come to me,

will be in the appropriate readiness condition.

And I know they are working very hard to make this so. Clearly,

I come from a culture in the Navy, for example, where we have not

traditionally tried to maintain every deploying unit at a high readiness level.

We will recognize that events will occur that have these readiness levels dip for various reasons. But as they work up and prepare and do the training and get the personnel, particularly the

new personnel, into these units, that the readiness levels will rise.

And that is not unusual to have that occur.

Mr. SPRATT. When we visited the White House and the President

laid out his surge proposal, Secretary Gates and the other there,

including General Pace, as I recall, said that we will know within

three months or four months whether or not the surge was working, within a fairly short period of time.

What is the metric? What are the indicators that tell us whether

or not the surge is working or not working and indicates whether

or not this tactic is something we should pursue?

Admiral FALLON. Two things. First, let me go back and correct

myself. I have been told that closer to 20,000 is the actual number

of non-U.S. NATO forces in Afghanistan.

Mr. SPRATT. Is what?

Admiral FALLON. Twenty, two-zero. Twenty.

Regarding benchmarks and assessments and so forth, one of my

priority tasks is to look at the areas in which we would like to

agree, certainly amongst my chain of command down through General Petraeus, on things that we would recognize as goodness and

be able to make an assessment that things are really working as

we would like them to work in this country.

I will tell you that I have spent a fair amount of time already

trying to determine which of these things we ought to measure and

how we are going to do that.

I don’t have that fixed yet. That is something I am building. And

I will continue to work this with General Petraeus.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I find it interesting. In making reference to conflicts of the past as to whether there were any such animals as

benchmarks, we either knew we were winning or not.

With that, Mr. Calvert.

Mr. CALVERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I also apologize. I wasn’t here in the beginning, but—so if this

question has been asked, I apologize. And again, thank you for

your service, Admiral.

But regarding Syria, I was in Iraq recently, and as was mentioned in prior testimony, we were looking at some of the activities

that Iran is involved in and the IED business, a particular type of

33

IED, as you are aware of, that is causing hardship on our troops,

and certainly killed in action (KIA) that we are still experiencing

to this day.

I wanted to know about what is happening along the Syrian border. I know we put the posts, border posts, in. I understand they

are operating. They are manned.

Has that significantly stopped the smuggling of foreign fighters,

which I understand are the primary folks that are being utilized

as suicide bombers both in Baghdad and the Al Anbar province,

and weapons that are being used to attack our troops?

Admiral FALLON. By every appearance to me, the bulk of the al

Qaeda support, which is Sunni-linked, was coming down the Syrian

rat lines, if you would.

By the anecdotal recent evidence in Anbar province, which has

been now consistently moving in the right direction—I mentioned

earlier in the hearing that I got data yesterday that showed eight

straight weeks of reduced level of violence in this heretofore pretty

volatile province.

That indicates to me that something good is happening out there.

As I am told, and I will look forward to getting to each of these

places down the Euphrates River Valley, which has been one of the

traditional main sources of the flow of things that we don’t want

in the country, things have been significantly improved in most of

these population centers.

And so it seems to me that things are working. When I was up

there a couple of months ago in the north, the northern part, to the

west of Mosul, I was told that we had a much improved situation

along the border, where the Iraqi security forces actually have the

lead, but we had a pretty robust U.S. and coalition force backing

them up.

And it looks to me that appearance are that we are making

progress in this area.

Now, things need to happen inside of Syria, to my way of thinking. And this country, I believe, could be more helpful in doing

things that would try to help cut off whatever support may be existing.

There is a challenge here. There are many, many thousands of

Iraqis that have migrated to other places for various reasons, some

I am sure very innocently and just trying to do good for their families and get away from the violence, others maybe for different reasons.

And so there is a significant population of these folks that are

in Syria. How many of them are helping and aiding and abetting

the troublemakers, I don’t know.

But we would welcome additional Syrian support to get this

under control and cut down on, from their side, the transit of, particularly, foreign fighters into Iraq.

Mr. CALVERT. To be more specific, do you see any activity as far

as the Syrian government, particularly President Assad, to do anything to stem the flow of foreign fighters and weapons into Iraq?

Admiral FALLON. We have some intelligence reports that would

indicate that some progress might be being made.

I think more significant is likely to be the inclusion of Syria in

fora such as this neighbors conference that is upcoming, scheduled

34

to be held in Sharm El Sheik in Egypt, in which we can, along with

others, encourage Syria and the other neighbors to be playing a

constructive role in the development of Iraq and the security situation there.

I think that to date, there has been very little in the way of assistance given by countries and, in fact, in the case of Syria, certainly negative assistance to help the situation.

But I would like to see a collective effort made by regional leaders to agree to cooperate to help the situation, because it is, I believe, in their best interest.

And in the long term, an unstable, insecure, chaotic Iraq is just

going to be a real problem for every one of them. So I would think

that, if nothing else, their own self-interest would take note of the

fact that they ought to be doing more.

Mr. CALVERT. Again, thank you for your service.

Admiral FALLON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Sestak.

Mr. SESTAK. Good morning, Admiral.

Admiral, if I could take off on your comment about Anbar province, you told us in the last three months that the tribal leaders

out there have decided to band together, and that is the reason

why we are successful, because they are finally helping the U.S.

military.

My take, having been just there, is that what I heard was that

may provide one of the three things I have heard you say in different ways. We need military security, but we also need political

security and economic security.

And so the Anbar province may now be gaining military security.

What evidence that was missing was the national entity that the

Sunnis could now tie into—Baghdad, we heard very senior government leaders say words like, ‘‘The de-Baathification law is an appeasement. The de-Baathification law isn’t that meaningful.’’

But yet when you talk to the military commanders, they say it

is absolutely critical. So we see an improvement, some say, in the

military security in Baghdad, but what is the reason why? Have

they gone elsewhere? Are they laying low?

At the same time, we are told Iraqis were going to lead this, but

U.S. military deaths are now in their third—which will be a record

breaking—over 80 deaths per month, on our way to 100, although

the Iraqis were to lead this effort. And we were told by someone

very senior that the truth is they are not.

So my question is even if you are gaining military security,

where is the political security? And what movement do you actually

see, since you and others have said it really is a political issue here

also?

Where is that coming, and what are your prospects for it?

Admiral FALLON. Thanks, Congressman.

First of all, I don’t think we have a ghost of a chance of getting

the kind of movement in this country that we—I think the vast

majority of us would like to see, without a significant aura, if you

would, of stability and security. So this is the critical function that

the military can provide.

35

There has been significant progress on the ground in several

areas in this country. The focus is clearly in Baghdad and Anbar

because these have been the historic hotbeds of challenge.

The reason that many of the indicators are positive is because of

the very significant engagement of U.S. forces along with Iraqi

forces.

But there is no doubt that it is our influx of personnel and the

significant redistribution and refocus of forces that are getting

them out into many areas they hadn’t been into in large numbers

before that are both providing the security but, regrettably, on the

downside, putting our people in a position where they are certainly

subject—and as you have seen, the casualty rates have been high

in the last couple of months.

And so this is certainly a price that we are paying for this increased security. But to the larger issue, if we can provide a sense

of security, it hopefully will afford these people some space, some

opportunity, to make these tough decisions.

And I think they are really difficult. As I look at the leadership

in this country, this fledgling representative entity called the government of Iraq, almost without exception the leaders come from

positions of very narrow political base, from a party position or

some other ethnic or tribal affiliation that has never previously

paid attention to anything except the goodness and desires of a

very narrow entity.

What we are trying to do is introduce a concept by which these

people will have to take responsibility for an entity called Iraq,

much larger than themselves. It is a challenge. We have to encourage them.

And the thing that we can do in the military is provide security

and to encourage them every——

Mr. SESTAK. Admiral, if I might, I understand encouragement.

But what is the leverage you have in the political process, particularly since we heard out there, from the very top, that the debate

here about not open-ended commitments has actually helped move

the process forward? In fact, Secretary Gates was quoted today in

the paper saying it.

What kind of leverage do we have? And what time frame?

Admiral FALLON. Time is short, and we have tried to give them

space to make these decisions. But at every opportunity, I carry the

same message, ‘‘You have got to start taking these tough decisions

faster if we are going to be successful and you are going to be successful.’’

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, would you expand just a little bit on

your last question that Mr. Sestak put about time?

Admiral FALLON. About time.

The CHAIRMAN. Please.

Admiral FALLON. We have been at this for four years. We have

seen various ebbs and flows of security but generally have not seen

the consistent progress that we think we need to see to make this

entity called Iraq the kind of functional representative government

that we would desire.

It is very clear to me that we have in play right now a significantly different approach to this, but that given the many factors

36

that are at play that this is really the Iraqi leadership’s major and

potential last opportunity to really take this ball forward.

We have made an extraordinary commitment, from our country

and from our coalition allies, to provide them the space to be able

to make the decisions to try to move this country forward.

I can’t imagine being given another opportunity of the degree

and magnitude that they have been given now. And it is imperative, from my view, that they act on it.

I recognize there are countless problems and challenges both

from their historic and various backgrounds in making these tough

decisions. But I believe that they have to do it, and we have to

keep at them, make sure they understand it, that the heads all

nod.

Every meeting I have had with every one of them, they say they

understand it, but these many inhibitors tend to slow down the decision making. But no doubt, it has got to move quickly.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, should we ask you that question three

months or four months from now, will you give us your best assessment at that moment?

Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Admiral, for hosting our Congressional Delegation

(CODEL) just after New Year’s. I think we were the first CODEL

of the new year to come through Hawaii. You were very gracious

as our host. Thank you very much.

Most of the focus in this country and around the world is on Iraq.

But we are also in Afghanistan. And obviously, the quantitative

challenge is very much greater in Iraq than it is in Afghanistan.

But qualitatively, which of those has the better chance of success

and why?

Admiral FALLON. Well, I would like to think that both have a

good chance of success. There are many, many reasons why we

could and should be successful in both places.

Iraq, if you would, has resources in great quantity. It has many,

many thousands of acres of arable land that could feed many people. After all, this is the Fertile Crescent.

It has a significant part of the population that is well-educated

and ought to be very helpful in moving this place forward. It has

certainly got a lot of challenges. We have talked about those.

But the foundations are certainly there, and I think the key issue

now is whether the leadership in this country can pull together the

significant factors to give the population the sense that they can

be successful, that their future can be different and better than it

was in the past.

Afghanistan—I mentioned earlier that the most encouraging factor in this country is that the vast majority of the people clearly

don’t like the Taliban, don’t want to go back to that kind of rule.

They appreciate and support our presence there, and they want

a better life. And they have a significant infrastructure of leadership, particularly in their security forces, that I think is in pretty

good shape and should be able to help them.

37

So there are many reasons why this ought to be successful in

both places.

Mr. BARTLETT. Admiral, I had the privilege before we went into

Afghanistan to visit the king of Afghanistan in his villa just outside

Rome.

It happened that at that same time there were, I think, ten of

the tribal chiefs in the Northern Alliance that were visiting the

king of Afghanistan, and so we had a chance to meet with them

also.

Very clearly then, and I think probably now, Afghanistan does

not represent a unified central kind of a government focus. Is the

command of the central government now any better—the control of

the central government now any better than it was then? Because

at that time, the central government—the Taliban controlled very

little of Afghanistan, and the Northern Alliance—these tribal chiefs

represented a huge counter force which ultimately, with our help,

was successful.

Will Afghanistan ever be a cohesive government, or will it forever, for the near future, at least, be—separation of tribal chiefs?

Admiral FALLON. I would propose that Afghanistan will probably

not look anything like the U.S. Government and the relationship

between the Federal Government here and the states and communities any time soon.

But I recognize, I think, in President Karzai a leader that has

a very good understanding of what he has in this country. He has

his own arrangements, connections, alliances, if you would, and

processes for dealing with these various leaders around this country.

He is quick to get out and about and go visit them. When I was

there last time, he left, certainly, shortly after meeting with me to

go visit one of the provinces and have an interesting meeting, I am

told, with one of the governors.

He knows the people. He has a hand in the selection of these

people. And my sense is he has got probably, certainly, a much better understanding of how this works than I do. I am anxious to

learn from him and to see.

I don’t think it is going to be anything like what we have here

any time soon. But given the motivation of the people and what I

saw of the competence of the leadership, they are working on it.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Ms. Castor.

Ms. CASTOR. Welcome, Admiral.

This is quite a complex and complicated area of responsibility.

And explain to me, as folks rotate into Central Command and out,

what kind of training is—do folks undergo to understand the cultural diversity of this area?

It is a diverse and dynamic area in and of itself. I know in your

testimony you highlighted some of the challenges with the present

inventory of language and intelligence specialists, and counterintelligence, language expertise, which is crucial to counterinsurgency,

counterterrorism, counterintelligence operations.

What is under way now? What tools do you have as folks rotate

in and out? And then as we look to the defense reauthorization, do

38

you have any recommendations for how we can improve the training and all of the specialists that you need?

Admiral FALLON. It would be wonderful if we had—if each of us

were fluent in languages in the regions in which we work. I will

start with me. I don’t speak Arabic, which is the most common language.

It puts me at a disadvantage, one which I recognize, and I have

been searching for that magic person that is not only fluent but

very well-versed in the history and cultures of these regions.

But I recognize that even in the Central Command there is a significant difference between the Sudan and the Horn of Africa and

Central Asia, where the cultures are dramatically different. It is a

challenge. It is one in which we recognize there is work to be done.

At the highest level, at my staff, we have people that are assigned to be as expert as we can make them for their parts of the

region. And we try to get them well-connected with the history and

background and, if at all possible, to have some fluency with the

language.

It would be wonderful if all of our people that went forward were

similarly equipped. I will be honest. They are not.

We are working the priorities, clearly, in Afghanistan and, more

importantly, in Iraq, to have people there that can be immediately

useful in the field and in the intelligence work in analyzing what

we have got when we apprehend people, or detain people, or run

into situations that need assistance.

And so there are a number of programs under way that are longterm. I know that for many years now, at least since 9/11, there

has been an emphasis put on trying to get people to be trained in

specifically these languages.

And I know there has been some fruit there, but the demand far

exceeds the supply of those people now, so it is something that we

work. I recognize it. And we try to—every individual soldier and

Marine that deploys out there is given some amount. And I would

have to get back to you on exactly who gets what.

Some, of course, have been out there before. Some are actually

pretty proficient. They have managed to pick up the language, and

they certainly know—but we make it a point to try not to have

anybody show up in this theater that doesn’t have some cultural

sensitivity training.

And that even applies to the Navy and the Air Force people that

may not be on the ground, but certainly they have an opportunity

to interact while they are there.

Ms. CASTOR. And at MacDill Air Force Base, where the Central

Command headquarters is located, I know there is a lot of construction. The facilities there are absolutely vital to the national security.

Do you have any impressions coming on as the commander there

on how the progress on those facilities are going and long-term

needs?

Admiral FALLON. Well, I can see the digging and hear the banging, so I know it is going on. To be honest with you, I have spent

about three-quarters of the time since I have been on the job out

in the region, so I haven’t had the opportunity.

39

But I know it is in work, and the intelligence section is the priority construction. And I know it is under way. And I would look forward to the opportunity to get into them when they are completed.

Ms. CASTOR. And I hope you know that the Tampa Bay community is very supportive of the presence of Central Command headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base. And if we can assist you in any

way, you know our community is there to do that.

Admiral FALLON. Thanks. We have been made welcome. I look

forward to seeing you out at the facilities when you can. Thanks.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Admiral, thank you for sticking around for a fairly long

time this morning.

Admiral, our efforts in Afghanistan go back to the events of 9/

11. The people who perpetrated that crime were Saudi Arabians.

They practiced their flight training in America. But we are told the

mastermind who approved it and probably financed the effort was

a guy named Osama bin Laden, who at the time was living in Afghanistan. We are now told that he could probably be on the border

area with Pakistan.

And on the recent trip that several of my colleagues just mentioned, I became aware for the first time of an area that has apparently been given autonomy by the Pakistan government called

Waziristan, which brings to my mind, at least, what happened a

few years back in Colombia, where the Colombians had actually

given an area to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia

(FARC) and they pretty well could rule themselves in that area.

If Osama bin Laden was identified to be in a specific building,

on a specific street, in a specific village in Waziristan—you had satellite imagery, human intel, several sources saying, ‘‘He is there,’’

and since he at the end of the day is the reason for our involvement in Afghanistan, do you have operational approval to strike at

him in Waziristan?

What would have to happen? What are the agreements or lack

of agreements that we have with the Pakistani government to try

to do something about that, if that situation came to you this morning?

Admiral FALLON. Mr. Taylor, I can tell you that if I could get information on the exact whereabouts of Osama bin Laden, we would

do everything we possibly could to try to get him.

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. But I have given you a fairly plausible scenario.

Admiral FALLON. There are a couple of factors here that, as I met

with both President Karzai and President Musharraf a couple

weeks ago, I think are pertinent.

First of all, this area in North Waziristan or the larger area of

the FATA, so-called federally administered tribal areas—they

haven’t been given to anybody.

The fact is they have never really been owned, if you would,

other than the border line that goes to the west of them by the Pak

government. These are areas in which there really isn’t government authority—one of the more complex issues in this region.

40

But to your point, I have, in fact, talked with President

Musharraf about situations in which we might ask for specific help

and have been assured that he would be—receive those should I

bring those to his attention.

So without getting into the details of how we might do this, I will

tell you that from the highest level I have gotten his assurance of

assistance if we have an issue that we think we need to work.

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, Admiral, to the point, if that actual scenario

occurred, if you had human intel, if you have satellite intel, if you

had guys saying, ‘‘He is right there,’’ do you have standing permission from the Pakistan government to try to do something about

that, either to actually capture him or kill him?

Admiral FALLON. I do not have permission to go across that border on my own and to conduct activities within that country without some arrangement or agreement with the government of Pakistan.

Mr. TAYLOR. The second question is—I am pleased to see the

Sunnis coming our way in Anbar province, but I am kind of curious

as to their motives.

One line of thought is if the Iraqi—if you were to take a snapshot

of the Iraqi government at this moment, the course that it is headed on, and project that out four years, my gut tells me it would look

a lot like Iran.

It would look a lot like Iran. The government—the way they

treat their people would be an Islamic state that looks a lot like

Iran, and that one scenario for the Sunni cooperation is they see

us as leverage against that.

Is that anywhere accurate in your mind?

Admiral FALLON. Well, if I could get back to your first question,

I think that there is an awful lot of self-interest that is the real

motivator here. I don’t think we have had any great awakening

that they now really love us, and that they are happy that we got

rid of Saddam, and that they are out of power now.

I think this is a recognition that there is a greater evil here, and

that evil is the constant terror and disruption of their lives that is

perpetrated on them by al Qaeda and their allies, and they have

had enough of it.

And so they are going to cooperate because they see an alternative that might be a little bit better than what they have had

to endure recently. And I think that is the prime motivation.

Mr. TAYLOR. For the record, I would like your views of where you

think Iraq is going to be four years from now, for the record.

Admiral FALLON. Well, I can tell you what we would like to see

in Iraq, and that is one that has made progress so that these various factions within Iraq—the majority of the people feel that there

is actually a government that has an interest in them and not just

the narrow base from which the actual leaders are drawn.

And that is the critical step that needs to take place. If we are

going to be successful, these populations—Sunnis, Kurds, Shi’a—all

have to feel that this greater entity of Iraq represents a future that

for them is better than what they have had in the past.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Admiral.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

41

Admiral, that is the confidence of which you spoke a few moments ago, am I correct?

Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Davis.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Good to see you, Admiral, and I think we all do recognize what

a difficult task you have. And we are behind you in that. Thank

you.

You mentioned that you were going to be visiting the Iraqi security forces soon. And as a member of the Oversight and Investigations Committee, I know we have struggled to get the kind of numbers that we think are ones that we really can take a look at.

And so I hope that as you visit—and if you can help us to understand those numbers, that would be helpful. I think there is a difference between those Iraqis who have been trained and those who

are actually serving.

We are also interested in the logistics issue and the capacity,

really, of the military to develop the wherewithal to be able to do

the job that is ahead of them and having some kind of a time frame

in terms of all those pieces that have to be in play.

I also just wanted to mention, because it is interesting to me—

and I guess I have heard this several times. You know, we talk

about the ability of the government to benefit their people, to provide services, and we seem to have dropped—and I am not sure if

it is a casual drop or whether it is more an understanding of the

situation—to drop the words of democracy, because, in fact, we

know people can provide services but that doesn’t necessarily mean

that the people are all being well-served.

And it may just be a matter of omission, but it is interesting that

you are not the only one. That word seems to have been dropped.

And if you would like to comment, please feel free to do that.

But I wanted to just turn to a different border now and ask if

you could comment on what was reported in the International Herald Tribune, that the chief of the general staff of the Turkish army

announced that from a military perspective it made sense for Turkey to invade northern Iraq.

According to some reports, Turkey is already massing forces on

the Iraqi border to prevent Kurdish rebels from launching attacks

from Iraq into Turkey.

And I wondered if—what you, General Craddock at EUCOM, are

perhaps doing or working with our border there—Iraq’s border

there to understand that situation. And what is our plan, in fact,

if Turkey would choose to invade northern Iraq?

Admiral FALLON. Well, it certainly wouldn’t be a great day if the

Turks carried out that threat. The issue is that for quite a long

time now there has been an insurgent movement of Kurds, now

known as the Kongre-Gel, PKK in a prior day, which is instigating

trouble and violence inside of Turkey, and they are tired of it.

And they know that these groups get some support, in their opinion, from Kurdish populations within Iraq. They have been working

against this problem for some time. They are looking for help. We

are trying to assist them in this area.

When I was in Iraq a couple of weeks ago, I spent the better part

of a day in the north and actually with President Barzani. We

42

talked about a lot of things, the contribution they could make to

a new Iraq, by example and by playing a role to help mediate between the Shi’a and Sunni further south.

And that part of Iraq, by the way, is decidedly different than

Baghdad in its environs. It is booming.

But I was particularly interested in a role that I would like to

see them playing, they being the leadership of Kurds in Iraq, to try

to minimize the impact of this Kongre-Gel in Turkey, because at

the end of the day it is going to be certainly to their decided disadvantage and hurtful to not only that region but the whole country if the Turks carry out this threat.

The Turks are concerned. I think they are making these statements to emphasize how concerned they are about it.

And I know that we are working to try to play a role to get this

kind of activity stopped and to do whatever we can to get those

who could——

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Are you able to characterize it in

terms of a level of concern right now in the region?

Admiral FALLON. I guess it is one of the concerns. I don’t think

it is—and I certainly hope they don’t carry out this threat. We are

trying to convince them that this is not a good idea.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

The gentlelady from Guam, Ms. Bordallo.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Fallon, thank you for appearing before the committee

today. And the challenges you face are diverse and significant, and

I wish you and all those service members serving in the Central

Command godspeed in successfully achieving your mission.

I have two questions for you today, Admiral. First, four companies of soldiers from the Guam National Guard have rotated in and

out of the Horn of Africa, and you have mentioned this region in

your opening statement.

The Horn of Africa assignment for the Guam National Guard soldiers is becoming a regular one. Can Guam National Guard soldiers and their families expect the Guam Guard to be rotated in

and out of the Horn of Africa for the foreseeable future?

Or can the Guam Guard anticipate a different mission?

Admiral FALLON. I will have to get back to you, ma’am, with the

specifics, but I know that we have discussed within the headquarters the idea that instead of taking folks on subsequent rotations and bouncing them all over the theater that it would probably

be in our better long-term interest to have folks get very familiar

with and do subsequent tours in the same area if it weren’t too onerous for other reasons.

So my first reaction to this one is that they will probably be reassigned to this area. But I will take it for the record and get back

to you if it is different from that.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 96.]

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you, Admiral. I do know at

our last CODEL out to Guam, which was a couple of weeks ago,

we visited the guard facilities, and I know they are very satisfied

with that mission.

43

My next question addresses one of my major concerns with respect to Iraq. You have recently begun your assignment as commander of Central Command and approached the challenges in

your area of responsibility with fresh eyes.

So given this fresh perspective, I would appreciate learning your

thoughts on this issue. Iraq has 18 provinces. Analysts have identified five of Iraq’s provinces as the predominant areas of violence in

that country: Ninewa, Salahaddin, Diyala, Baghdad, and Anbar.

Analysts have identified four of these five provinces as significant sources of violence, and that is Salahaddin, Diyala, Baghdad,

and Anbar.

Now, despite this, the President’s surge plan addresses only some

of the challenges in only two of those at-risk provinces. That is

Baghdad and Anbar.

That is, of the four provinces that are the sources of significant

violence in Iraq, the President’s plan addresses only two of them.

But more broadly, it also can be argued that the President’s new

plan for Iraq, which is focused on improving the situation in only

two of Iraq’s 18 provinces, literally is 16 provinces short of being

a comprehensive plan.

So assuming that the surge plan is executed flawlessly, and that

results in successful outcomes on the ground in Baghdad and

Anbar, will these successes constitute the completion of Operation

Iraqi Freedom?

Or, upon the completion of the surge plan, can the American people and Congress expect to learn of newer new plans for Iraq? Can

you address this for the committee?

Admiral FALLON. Ma’am, that is a lot of territory you covered,

but I will tell you, I think it is really a good point, and I would

like to talk about it.

There is much more going on in Iraq than a focus in just Baghdad and Anbar. And I mentioned Anbar earlier—that we have seen

significant progress in just about every respect out there, and that

is really good, because this was really a tough territory.

The facts are that of all of these provinces in the country, the

ones that you have highlighted are, in fact, where most of the trouble is. And the reason is because these are the provinces in which

you have the mixed sects interacting.

In the majority of the south, it is all Shi’a, overwhelmingly majority Shi’a, and there is very little of the kind of sectarian violence

that we see up in the center. In the north, in the Kurdish dominant

lands—virtually nothing going on up there of an untoward nature.

And so it is the center of the country where the three come into

conflict.

The reality is that we have significant forces that are working in

other provinces, in Diyala, for example, which has become, in fact,

significantly more challenging, probably because a lot of the characters that have been evicted out of Baghdad or decided on their

own to leave moved up into this area.

And because it has been an area of fault lines, there is a lot of

conflict, and we have a major focus. So a lot of these troops in the

redeployment have, in fact, moved—we have a much increased

presence up in this area.

44

In Ninewa, I guarantee you that this is not going to escape the

attention of General Petraeus. He spent a couple of years up in this

part of the country. He knows it very well.

And in fact, we are very attentive to what goes on in and around

Mosul, and we are going to watch it.

I was in Salahaddin just a couple of weeks ago, met with our

PRT and our military people up there. It is getting attention as

well.

And so I can guarantee you that we are going to not let these

things out of sight. In fact, we are working them today, and it is

part of the comprehensive plan.

Mr. TAYLOR [presiding]. The chair recognizes Mr. Smith——

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Admiral.

Mr. TAYLOR [continuing]. Mr. Smith of Washington.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wanted to ask a question about Iraq, following up a little bit

on some of the issues that Mr. Snyder raised earlier.

The big question and concern that I have—we have got, you

know, a big debate going on, certainly, and difference of opinion

about the direction going forward.

The question I have for you is at some point we are going to

leave, and what is troubling to me, as we get further into this—

it is increasingly difficult to decipher what the President and our

command structure—or how, I should say, the President and the

command structure envisions that departure.

And I guess the problem I have is—you know, we have got a

huge problem over there, and I get that we need to secure the situation, but bottom line, in terms of the big picture of battling al

Qaeda, it is kind of a bad thing to have 160,000 U.S. troops occupying a Muslim country.

It undermines us in a whole bunch of different ways, and that

is not to say that we shouldn’t do it if it is necessary, but it is to

say that it should be in the forefront of our minds to try to figure

out how to extricate ourselves from that situation in as responsible

a manner as possible, not just because of the bad international

stuff, but as you mentioned, I think, in answer to Mrs. Drake’s

question, you know, supplies to fund Iraq and Afghanistan are

coming from the rest of the military and causing enormous problems.

And that is true, supplemental or no supplemental. We have got

the readiness problem that we have got out there. So the bottom

line is it makes sense to figure out some way to get out of there.

And as I look at it and what the President is doing, it just seems

like this massive sectarian violence, and violence of other kinds as

well, and we are just trying to be there as it shifts and ebbs and

flows to monitor it and try to prevent it.

And there is really no end in sight. So if you could sort of help

me out, what does it look like? You know, forget for the moment

what Democrats or people who are against the war are saying.

Just as a commander looking at that situation, thinking that we

need to get out of there at some point, what does it look like when

we do?

45

What is the plan for an exit strategy? And what does the country

look like? And is this something that the command structure has

started to at least contemplate?

Admiral FALLON. I would like to talk about the term you used:

leave Iraq. I would propose that at some time in the future that

we—and we are clearly moving toward and have as an objective

transforming the security laydown and focus that we have in this

country now to something significantly different.

But the idea that we leave, as in ‘‘we are out of here’’ and all

gone, strikes me as something that may not be particularly useful

for this——

Mr. SMITH. Let me pick my term a little better: Significantly

draw down. I mean, we have troops in dozens of different countries,

and I know that we are going to have them there for a while.

Admiral FALLON. Absolutely.

Mr. SMITH. Significantly draw down. Let’s call it that.

Admiral FALLON. So at some time we want to redefine the security arrangement with this country, and so I think this is something that would be helpful, as we discuss and you debate this

issue back here, to—maybe it would be helpful for our own people

to have that we, in fact, do have very, very useful and productive

security arrangements with countries all over the world, the vast

majority of countries in which we have some presence and engagement.

And it is absolutely crucial and seen by people around the world

as crucial. And certainly in this region, we would like to do that.

Mr. SMITH. And I agree completely. You know, I chair the subcommittee that has jurisdiction over the special forces. We have

them in a large number of countries. Those are not occupations,

however. So I am talking about a different set here.

Admiral FALLON. And that is something that I am anxious to get

into. We have some challenges today we have got to overcome. We

have got to help get the security.

But you mentioned massive sectarian violence. I would tell you

that the data that I am seeing now indicates that that particular

segment of concern is dramatically improved.

If you were to look at the number, if you—again, one of my challenges is, of all the data that I am being inundated with in the last

four weeks here, trying to decide what is the most important, to be

able to be predictive of how we are really doing and assessing

where we have come. I am working with it.

But one thing that is really standing out—if you look at the number of deaths that we have been able to identify over the last several months, you will see a dramatic improvement in those numbers.

There are still hundreds of people, bodies, that are showing up

in the morgues in this past month. But compared to where it was

back in December and January, there is a significant improvement.

There is no doubt in my mind that this is a direct result of the

increased security presence in these areas of conflict that I just

mentioned, in the friction areas of Baghdad and its immediate surroundings.

46

And this is the presence of our forces and particularly the Iraqi

security forces making a difference. So it isn’t just ebbing and flowing. There is a significant improvement in many of these factors.

Now, as I mentioned earlier when I first got into the hearing, the

biggest concern I have are the periodic big bangs which are really

troublesome because of the potential to instigate retaliation and

retribution by the Shi’a.

Mr. SMITH. Well, like this morning, for instance. I am sure you

have seen the news. There was over 130 killed in Baghdad—or I

guess it was maybe yesterday, but—so there is some ebb and flowing going on there.

Admiral FALLON. There are certainly events. I watch it. I flip my

computer on every morning. I am anxious to see what has happened. And we are in a phase where we have a lot of change going

on.

And I would just ask that we collectively allow these changes to

get in place and to see what the effect is over a period of several

months—and I don’t think we have a whole lot longer than that—

to get a realistic view of how we are doing and what the chances

are for continued success in the future.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Admiral.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TAYLOR. The chair recognizes Ms. Gillibrand.

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a few areas of inquiry. The first—you know, I spend my

weekends going to public forums and to Congress on Your Corner,

where I talk to regular folks about issues that matter. And one

young woman came up to me and said, ‘‘What is Congress doing

about Darfur?’’

And I wanted to get a sense from you what militarily is possible,

if there will be any involvement, and what your thoughts are about

stabilizing that region.

Admiral FALLON. This has been a troubled area for some time,

as you no doubt are aware. There has been a mission in the Darfur

area undertaken by troops from the African Union to attempt to

provide some stability and security in the area.

I think by most accounts it has been not particularly effective.

And so there has been a lot of pressure on the government in the

Sudan to allow—one proposal is a U.N. force to actually get in

there and see if it can do more.

I am told that there have been some public pronouncements in

the last one and a half days that indicate that the government has

now at least ostensibly agreed to allow for a U.N. presence.

And I think if that turns out to be true—again, I am the new

man in town here, but I understand we have kind of heard some

of these stories before that haven’t turned out to be quite as they

have been told.

So this would be a good turn if, in fact, this turns out to be true,

at least to give a chance to get some other folks on the ground and

maybe a better chance to do it good.

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Thank you.

My second area of inquiry, of course, is Iraq. And I have particular concerns about Muqtada al Sadr’s role and his prevalence in the

region.

47

I would like to get an update from you about the current disposition of his army, how many members, how are they armed and who

is paying for them, how are they funded, and then really what your

assessment is about what al Sadr’s impact of having his six followers leave Prime Minister al Maliki’s government.

Admiral FALLON. One, I would say that to characterize his band

of militias as an army is probably giving him more credit than they

are really due.

There is not much good to be said about the JAM, as they are

called, Jaish al Mahdi, which is the militia that appears aligned to

him. There was an interesting discussion today and in recent times

about Muqtada al Sadr.

He clearly has a populist following among a certain segment of

the Shi’a population in the country. He has been publicly very

unhelpful in comments that have been attributed to him.

Now, we don’t know what he is really saying, because we don’t

know really exactly where he is. By all reports, he is in Iran somewhere.

And that is indicative of probably the fact that were he to come

back into Iraq, folks would probably like to get a hold of him and

have a conversation of sorts.

He has not been playing a particularly helpful role. But I wonder

what is going on, and I think the jury is out on this one right now,

exactly how much influence he has over how many people.

There are things that he has perpetrated, the most recent being

the—two things that stand out in my mind. One is the admonition,

allegedly, to his folks to go ahead and not cooperate—that is a euphemism, I think, for go after the coalition—and what that might

mean for our people.

The second is his alleged direction to have the cabinet members

of the Maliki government that are aligned with his party to bail

out. So it remains to be seen what is going to happen.

There is a little bit of history here, in my mind. One is that last

year, at the end of the year, he allegedly directed the members of

the COR that were aligned with his faction to depart that legislative body.

But after a couple of months, they somehow decided that it was

maybe in their better interest to come back in again. The net effect

of this appears to me to be about a zero.

And I suspect that in the longer term, at least my appraisal of

this is that his effectiveness as a leader may not be nearly as great

as it may have been.

So we are watching this one closely. There are clearly factions

developing within his militia, if you would, the JAM. These are not

nice guys.

If some of these factions might be split into somebody that is

more amenable to actually working with this government, it would

be particularly helpful. I think that remains to be seen.

So he is kind of an enigmatic figure of dubious help, I think, to

the government, but clearly with some following, and we are just

going to have to watch to see what comes here.

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Thank you. And thank you again for your leadership and your tremendous service.

Admiral FALLON. Thank you.

48

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Mr. Courtney, please.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, looking at your scope of command and the range of

places we have talked about today, I was sitting here thinking you

must feel like you are in that Johnny Cash song, ‘‘I Have Been Everywhere.’’

And just to keep moving along, a couple of months ago we had

a hearing where it was brought out that two aircraft carrier battle

groups were being located in the Gulf.

And obviously with your background, maybe this would be a good

opportunity to ask you some questions about that, because obviously—and I don’t think there is any great surprise to you—there

was a lot of concern about what the policy goal—what the national

security goal was being achieved by doing that.

And I just wondered if you could comment on the current status

of naval operations in the Gulf and what the planning is for those

aircraft groups.

Admiral FALLON. We routinely deploy forces around the world, as

you know. It seems to me that it is to our interest as a nation that

we periodically demonstrate our capabilities, which are substantial,

to be able to influence events when required in various areas of the

world.

We certainly have our land forces, the Army and Marine Corps,

very busy today in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some folks might have

the idea that because we are busy in these areas that we don’t

have the capacity or will or capability to actually be interested in

other things that might occur.

To the contrary, our maritime and air forces are very capable

and can operate in many places.

It is also to the advantage of the operational forces to periodically

put capabilities together to make sure that we, in fact, are understanding of the challenges of operating forces in sizes that are

above what we would characterize as the more routine deployments.

And so in practical terms, for the Navy, if there were to be an

event of some significance anywhere in the world, you would probably ask for forces that were over and above the typical deployment

of maybe a single aircraft carrier strike group or a single Marine

expeditionary unit.

And as we demonstrated last year in the Pacific, where the commanders out there, the naval commanders, actually pulled three—

and actually, for a while, four—aircraft carrier strike groups to operate in the same general area at the same time, it gave our commanders a rare opportunity to exercise the scope of responsibilities

that they would have to be capable of doing in the event of some

crisis in the world.

It also tests our ability to support and sustain these kinds of operations.

It was apparent, because these balls are in motion well before I

appeared on the scene, that we had not recently demonstrated any

of these capabilities in the Central Command region.

And so there were two carriers that were made available and

have operated and done significant work. And so I think this is in

our interest to demonstrate to ourselves our capabilities and to

49

prove to our people and to get the experience of operating in various regions. It is in our interest to do that.

And it is also, because I have had this comment just in past

weeks as I traveled around the Gulf, certainly noted by our friends,

allies and supporters, and I am sure by others, that we are capable

of doing this, and it is reassuring, certainly, to many people that

we are not only interested but capable of doing these things.

So I think I am not going to provide advance notification of future operations, but I would say that I think it is in our interest

to periodically take our forces and to operate them in the sizes and

shapes of capabilities that we ought to periodically demonstrate.

Mr. COURTNEY. And obviously, there was an incident that just

happened there involving the Iranian navy and the British. And I

mean, there was some question about an agreement that was instrumental in getting the release of those sailors.

I don’t know whether you have any comment about our own possible involvement in such an agreement, whether the rules of operation were changed, or what effect that is going to have——

Admiral FALLON. Yes, there was another question earlier about

some agreement. There is certainly no agreement between the U.S.

The agreement that was reached between the British and the Iranians to get the freedom of those people is a detail that was only

between those two countries. But the U.S. had no part of that

agreement.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Ms. Giffords, please.

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And congratulations, Admiral Fallon, on your new position.

There are currently about 20,000 security contractors serving in

Iraq. And I am curious, since you took command of Central Command, what explanation have you received of the legal status of security contractors working in both Iraq and Afghanistan?

What legal system do they currently operate under? And what is

the process by which they can be disciplined for misconduct?

Admiral FALLON. The answer is I don’t know yet, but I will find

out. This issue came up yesterday when I was in the HAC. It was

news to me.

I was certainly aware that we had many contractors of various

sizes and shapes and descriptions working in both countries, and

for many well-intentioned reasons.

The numbers of them that are providing security I don’t know exactly, but I can get back to you and find out.

Whoever they are, and if they are working for U.S. command

that is under my responsibility, they are certainly going to be

under our control and operate under certainly the same general

rules of engagement that our people would operate, as a minimum.

We will make sure that there is—I can’t imagine that they have

any more latitude than our own people do.

Before I misspeak here or get into it, I will go find out the detail

of it. All I can tell you is that many entities within both countries

have hired, my understanding is, security contractors to do work

for them.

Many of these folks are not working for U.S. entities. They are

working for other governments, either Iraq or ministries within

50

Iraq, for example, which I know are pretty plentiful, or in Afghanistan working for other entities.

But we will find out and get back to you.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 97.]

Ms. GIFFORDS. Well, Admiral, let me tell you about an experience

that I had when I was in Iraq just a couple of months ago.

You see our United States military, and it is very clear what

they look like and what they represent, by their uniform, by how

they act and who they are accountable to.

To see, you know, the Blackwater, the Triple Canopy security

forces—these guys, frankly, look like thugs. They have got tattoos.

They have got earrings. They don’t wear a uniform.

And for those Iraqis or the people of Afghanistan, it is not clear

who is United States military and who is a contractor. And frankly,

it blemishes our reputation.

Also, if you had a chance to see the article yesterday in The

Washington Post about what was happening with Triple Canopy—

and I urge you to read this.

The former director of the security for the Green Zone, when

asked about the incidents of Triple Canopy in terms of the shooting

rampage that went on and this cover-up, he was quoted saying,

‘‘This is out of my venue,’’ and he referred the company to the Joint

Contracting Command.

And then when Major Small, who is a spokesperson for Central

Command, was asked about this, he replied, ‘‘This is not a

CENTCOM issue. It is for whoever is running the contract.’’

We cannot allow this to perpetuate and to continue on, Admiral,

and I would just like your opinion about that, and how we are

going to immediately take control of the situation.

Admiral FALLON. Well, let me say that I think it is a really good

point you make about the issue of identification and image. We are

in both of these countries with an avowed mission of trying to help

them to establish security and stability.

And any image of lawlessness, or gunplay or other reckless kind

of cowboy behavior that is described here, of which I am not familiar, but—strikes me as being exactly the opposite of what we want

to do.

As far as CENTCOM having no ownership of this, I will tell you

what. If it has to do with security in either one of these countries,

we have got a dog in this fight and we will find out.

I guarantee you General Petraeus, as our commander on the

ground there, is very interested in anybody who would be doing

anything that would either tarnish the image of what we are trying

to do or actually contribute to instability or lawlessness in any

way.

So I got it, and we will get on it.

Ms. GIFFORDS. And one other point, Admiral. When talking with

some young soldiers over there, they are very aware that these contractors are making $500 a day, $600 a day, $700 a day.

And frankly, it undermines morale of our United States military

when they are making $24,000 a year, and meanwhile someone—

a kid that comes in that has—you know, didn’t graduate from high

51

school, that—you know, there is just a whole range in terms of the

background of some of these contractors.

And so it doesn’t just affect our reputation, but I think it undermines as well our United States military.

Admiral FALLON. Well, I have no idea what these folks are being

paid, but I will tell you that at least the proposed reason for why

they are there is precisely so that we don’t have to have more U.S.

uniformed people on the ground to do these security functions.

So if what was well-intended is now working against us, it is certainly not what we want to perpetuate, and we will take it on and

do something about it.

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you, Admiral.

Admiral FALLON. Thanks.

The CHAIRMAN. The admiral will recall my earlier request regarding contractors to be answered on the record——

Admiral FALLON. Sir.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Which I would appreciate.

Ms. Shea-Porter, please.

Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you.

Admiral Fallon, thank you so much for your service. I wanted to

say that I was in Baghdad last month, and I would ask that you

speak to me privately for about 60 seconds, following up on what

we just heard from the congresswoman.

Admiral FALLON. Sure.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. I think it is very critical.

Thank you for being here. What I wanted to talk to you about

today was what our chairman had talked about, the growth of extremism and what instruments of our national power we would use

besides military over time.

And I wanted to talk about an article that was in USA Today

that talked about Iraqi children. And they had photo of children

looking out a school window as U.S. soldiers were climbing onto the

roof.

Now, I know those U.S. soldiers were trying to protect those children. I am not sure the world knows that when they sent that

photo around.

And then the article went on to say that 70 percent of the Iraqi

children are showing extreme post-traumatic stress syndrome disorder.

And I am very worried about the fact that the psychiatrists and

psychologists have fled the country now, so they are not there

treating them, and that these children, who have been so traumatized by all that they have seen—walking to school, they see people

blown up.

How are we going to convince these children that we are, indeed,

good people, which, of course, we are, but how are we going to convince them not to join the terrorists and the extremist movement

after seeing what they have seen and going untreated—

undiagnosed, untreated, and their communities are falling apart?

What is our role there, as you see it?

Admiral FALLON. A couple of comments. This challenge of media

reporting is one in which I have a high interest, and we owe it to

52

ourselves as well as the Iraqis to try to get the appropriate reporting and imaging done.

As I see reports, both the official things that I see through the

chain of command and then read the media reports, I am struck

by sometimes a divergence in the description of the event.

And visual images, of course, are ones that are even more challenging. But it seems to me that we both in the military and all

of our forces working this need to be sensitive to the fact that at

the end of the day the most important target, if you would, of our

attention is really the Iraqi people’s perception of how life really is,

and whether it is really better to live in the day-to-day uncertainty

of terror and who is going to be alive or wounded tomorrow, or a

better future.

And so trying to help the government of Iraq to do the things,

to make the decisions that would move this thing forward—and at

the same time being very sensitive to things we do.

You know, we are trying to provide security. I am certain that

in the process of doing that, there are images of our actions there

that appear to be convincing people that maybe this isn’t a good

deal.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Well, let me say——

Admiral FALLON. We have just got to work on it. I don’t know

how to do—I mean, we know what we are trying to do.

General Petraeus is trying his best to make sure that his commanders are highly sensitive to the image that they portray as

they go about their duties.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. I may have been misunderstood. It is not the

image that I am talking about. It is the reality.

Let’s get over the picture and say that what I was talking about

was the fact that the children of Iraq are seeing a country that is

being laid to waste in areas and that they are suffering greatly the

psychological damage.

And what are we going to do to remedy some of that, to stabilize

that country, so that these children will not grow up to be the new

wave of terrorists?

Admiral FALLON. I guess in my mind, first things first. We have

to convince their parents that they ought to be helping the government and the security forces of Iraq rather than the insurgents in

the daily decisions they make.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. I don’t even think it is that, Admiral. I think

that a lot of the people actually initially supported this. I think

what is—is when they talk outside and their children are shot or

see something terrible, that that is what is turning it, that what

is happened has been this terrible violence.

So I don’t even think it is a question of whether the parents supported something. You could talk the parents into, you know, supporting the government. I think it is just a fact of what they are

seeing.

How are we going to treat the children? And how are we going

to create some kind of a societal fabric again?

Admiral FALLON. We have to get the people to believe that there

is a future, and the way that future is going to come about is by

helping this government that is in place to make life better for

them.

53

And the children we will deal with or try to help the government

deal with those children as you get—but the children aren’t making

the decisions to aid and abet the terrorists.

It is the parents and others, the adults in the society. So we have

got to—I think we have got to start there. I would love to help the

children——

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. I respectfully suggest that most of those parents are not doing that with their children. But I understand what

we are saying, that we don’t have the answer, and I thank you for

at least addressing the question, Admiral. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

The gentleman from Hawaii, Mr. Abercrombie.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Admiral Fallon, aloha.

Admiral FALLON. Aloha.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Admiral, you already mentioned there is—at

least what we know from media reports; I don’t know what the actual numbers are—127 dead in hospitals today in Baghdad itself,

hundreds wounded.

I cite that not to get in a discussion about whether that represents dramatically improved progress, or significant progress or

anything like that.

Those kinds of things, I think, are relatively useless, and I wish

we could get away from that kind of discussion. For me, that has

political import.

My sole purpose in talking with you today has to do with the

military side of it. There is entirely too much politics coming across

from both sides in a lot of these hearings, it seems to me, these

days.

I am sure you understand my meaning when I say I am not interested in your political views or your assessment of the efficacy

of the political circumstances that you find you have to contend

with when the military factor, the military element, of it is what

you have responsibility for.

And that is the thrust of my questions to you. I am very, very

concerned about the answer that you gave to Ms. Davis in the military context here.

That is to say, what is the role of the United States military, if

any, in the upcoming situation that we are going to confront—that

the United States military will have to confront in terms of Kurdish nationalism and the referendum to be held this December?

I know that General Ralston is appointed—I don’t know if he is

subordinate to you in this particular endeavor—as a kind of envoy

in this situation in anticipation of it.

I believe this referendum is going to go ahead. I believe the

Kurds will absolutely demand it. I believe that there is very, very

difficult circumstances regarding the Turkmen and the ethnic

cleansing that——

Admiral FALLON. This is the Kirkuk referendum that you are

speaking of?

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. The Kirkuk referendum, yes. Without going

into too much detail of the back and forth between the Turks and

the Iranians, for that matter, who—at least the information that

I have is that the Iranians and the Turks are talking about it, because they all have an interest in the Kurd situation.

54

My question has to do with where we fall in this situation. We

seem to be, in all the answers you give today, finding ourselves as

referees, or commentators, or interpreters of one kind or another.

Do we have a military responsibility, and do we have a plan, if

you will, with regard to what happens with regard to the referendum in Kirkuk in December?

Do we anticipate participating in a military way in the—and I

see you shaking your head ‘‘no’’. I don’t see how that can be avoided if there is a—if we are occupying the country and there is a

clash that takes place as a result of the Kurds not reconciling, as

Secretary Gates would like them to do.

Admiral FALLON. Sir, my earlier comments to Ms. Davis were in

connection with the cross-border activity with the Kurdish terrorists and insurgents operating inside of Turkey.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. They don’t see themselves as terrorists and

insurgents. We are in trouble already.

Admiral FALLON. Maybe, but the Turks sure see them that way.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I know they do. That is my point.

Admiral FALLON. The fact is that the Kirkuk thing—this is the

political process. This is an attempt to define a future for this region as a political entity——

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I quite agree.

Admiral FALLON [continuing]. The military.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is why my question is do you see a role

for the United States military in that context?

Admiral FALLON. I do not.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Could we take that that we do not have

plans, then, to intervene should there be a clash between the—

whatever the clash may be up there?

It doesn’t necessarily have to be between the Turks and the

Kurds, let alone Turkish Kurds, but this can be internally in the

Iraqi so-called reconciliation process that we are attempting to support politically.

I am concerned that the United States military will find itself

being called upon to try and solve a political problem in the Kurdish north that—I don’t think such activity would be conducive to

any kind of resolution.

Admiral FALLON. The provinces in the north that are predominantly Kurdish are teed up as next in line after Maysan in the

south to revert to what they call PIC, or provincial Iraqi control.

And this is another step in a process that we would hope is much

more political than the military. We would hope not to get involved

up there any more than we have to.

We are in a position to provide oversight and overwatch, and we

will certainly respond if there is some significant untoward incident, but we are pushing the Iraqis hard to try to figure this out

themselves.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. My time is up. I am sorry. But I want to conclude, Admiral and Mr. Chairman, by saying I certainly hope that

we don’t end up in hopes. I don’t think we can live in hope in this.

Mr. Chairman, I think we have to have a very clear understanding of what the United States military responsibility is in the wake

of any kind of internal Iraqi conflict, let alone border conflict, with

regard to the Kirkuk referendum.

55

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Admiral, there have been recent news reports that suggested

that America was close to announcing a large arms sale to certain

Gulf nations as part of a so-called Gulf security dialogue, but also

that this is the—the news reports are that this has been delayed

by Israeli concerns. Are you aware of this?

Admiral FALLON. I know that the Gulf security dialogue is an

initiative to try to get multilateral cooperation among the Gulf

states, to try to find common ground in things that would be useful

for better security and stability in the region.

I have in my briefings, as I have gone into this, gotten an assessment of where we are with certain countries, and I think it is a

good idea. It kind of runs against the traditional tide here, because

most of these folks like to do bilateral things as opposed to multilateral.

Regarding the details of a massive arms sale somewhere, I am

not up to speed on that one. I know that as I visited some of the

countries in the last couple of weeks, there are specific requests for

certain items that are out there, and I know those are being

worked, but I am not aware of any particularly massive sale.

The CHAIRMAN. Along that same line, the reports that the U.S.

and others allowed North Korea to ship some arms to Ethiopia—

what steps are being taken to convince the Ethiopians to sever relationships, if any, with the North Koreans?

Admiral FALLON. What I believe I understand to date about Ethiopia is that of all the countries in the Horn of Africa, the Ethiopians at least appear to be playing the best shot at a constructive

role in helping to deal with the instabilities in their region, particularly with Somalia.

And the extent to which they have received help from others is

one that I will be interested in. I suspect that there are probably

deals with the devil here that I need to check on and see exactly

what is going on.

I don’t have that information. I will look at it. What I do know

is that Ethiopia has been attempting to help to stabilize this region, which we certainly support, and I will have to get back to you

and see just what is going on.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, we were talking about benchmarks a

little while ago, and the Administration has seen not to hold the

Iraqi government’s feet to the fire regarding benchmarks.

But let me ask you, how hopeful are you that the Iraqi government will actually pass and implement a meaningful oil reform,

constitutional reform, as they have promised, and de-Baathification

reform, which has also been promised?

Admiral FALLON. Mr. Chairman, I wouldn’t want to predict——

The CHAIRMAN. I know predicting legislation is not always an

easy thing to do, but nevertheless, this is terribly important, because they have promised to do these specific pieces of legislation,

so how—do you have any thought?

Admiral FALLON. Sure. I would assess these as very essential elements to indications that this government is taking the steps that

are necessary to make this a viable entity in Iraq.

And it seems to me that they need to take these actions, they

need to make them effective, and that people need to see them as

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something that would give them the kind of hope that would engender greater support and greater stability in the country.

Without them, it is difficult for me to see significant progress,

unless they are actually enacted.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any judgment as to a time table regarding these three reforms that I mentioned?

Admiral FALLON. No, I do not. I know that they are constantly

in play, in discussion, and for my part, when I visited and spoke

with the prime minister and the other leaders a couple of weeks

ago, I made known my strong opinion that I thought these were essential steps that needed to be undertaken at the earliest opportunity.

The CHAIRMAN. I have had the opportunity to be at the National

Training Center some time ago, and of course we have the National

Training Center as well as the Joint Readiness Training Center for

pre-deployment rotations or which are returning to Iraq after a

good number of months here in the home station.

I understand that there is a deployment of a good number of

forces to Iraq, both active duty and National Guard, that have not

been able to go to either the National Training Center or the Joint

Readiness Training Center.

That concerns me a great deal, and I worry about the readiness

challenge that the lack of attendance at these training centers will

bring. Are you concerned about that?

Admiral FALLON. I would like to have every one of our units that

deploys to Iraq to have the opportunity to get the maximum benefit

of all the training that could be made available to them.

I suspect that given where we are that it is going to be very challenging for the Army to get each of these units to participate, certainly, to the full extent of the soldiers that would deploy to these

entities.

I am going to be relying on my subordinate commanders to accurately assess the training status of these forces, and if they are not

adequately prepared to go to Iraq that they would tell me that, and

that we would take appropriate steps to make sure that if they are

perceived to be deficient that they would be corrected.

So this is one that we are going to have to make sure my commanders understand and that we are getting the accurate assessments that are so necessary for the reasons you stated.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I just ran over to the floor a minute ago for the commendation that Mrs. Drake is leading to commemorate the anniversary

of the special operations forces. And there is lots of speakers over

there to commemorate these great men and women.

I came back here to get these last questions in, so thank you, Mr.

Chairman, for letting me come back here and ask a few follow-ups.

The gentlelady spoke a few minutes ago—and I wish she were

still here—who spoke in a disparaging way about contractors, and

I am just reminded that the Blackwater Group which is over there,

to the information I received, is mostly American veterans, honorably discharged, many of them from Special Forces Command.

Many veterans who have served a lifetime in the SEALs, special

forces, Army Rangers, are presently contractors, and I am further

57

reminded that it was—I believe it was Blackwater employees, contractors, who were hung from the bridge in Fallujah, when they

were undertaking their mission over there that precipitated the initial battle of Fallujah.

And so there are many, many honorable people doing a great job

as contractors in Iraq and some in Afghanistan. And in fact, many

of them come from American Special Forces Command.

To my information, nobody who ever received a dishonorable discharge—and they were spoken of as thugs with tattoos and other

things.

I don’t believe anybody with dishonorable discharges from the

military are allowed to participate as contractors, at least in the

group that is known as Blackwater. Do you have any information

to the contrary, Admiral?

Admiral FALLON. No, sir, and I would agree that it is not particularly useful to generalize for what may be—and I am not familiar

with the details of the incident that the congresswoman referenced.

But I would agree with you that we have seen some terrific service by people in contracting status, be they in the field doing this

kind of work or other things that are highly supportive.

I have had a chance to meet several contractors, if you would,

that are working for General Petraeus that are doing phenomenal

work for him in trying to think through and come up with the best

way ahead in these challenging circumstances.

Mr. HUNTER. The last observation I would make on that is that

most of those folks that have tattoos—and a lot of them have tattoos—my son has done two tours in Iraq. He has got a USMC tattoo. Most of those received their tattoos while they were in the

United States military. And to disparage people because they have

got tattoos I thought was not, as you said, particularly helpful.

Let me ask you a question that goes right to the point of the supplemental, Admiral. I have got a copy of the supplemental there.

Your staff has got it right behind you.

And I direct you—it is right behind you there—to page 72, which

has been a provision of enormous concern to me and to other members of the committee, and it says this.

It says, ‘‘None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available in this or any other act may be used to deploy any unit of the

armed forces to Iraq unless the chief of the military department

concerned has certified in writing to the Committees on Appropriations and the Committees on Armed Services at least 15 days in

advance of the deployment that the unit is fully mission capable.’’

Now, I have asked our lawyers what that means, and that says

you have got to wait 15 days. Even if they are fully mission capable, you have got to tell this committee and other committees two

weeks before you make that deployment that you are going to

make it.

And, Admiral, I am reminded that many of these missions are

after targets which are fleeting targets. Some of them involve

teams—in fact, some of those celebrated special forces teams that

we are commemorating on the House floor right now—who come

from out of country who have to enter Iraq.

58

And what our lawyers tell us, at least, is that that means they

can’t enter Iraq unless there is a 15-day notice, a notice and wait,

given to the Armed Services Committee.

And similarly, if you make air strikes with aircraft that are out

of Iraq, you have to give that same 15-day advance notice.

My question to you is is that something that will allow you to

fight this war effectively? You have got the provision right in front

of you there, and it is pretty straightforward.

Admiral FALLON. I would say that in my experience, a decision

to deploy a unit or a sub-unit of some organization is made certainly with an understanding of our best assessment of the readiness of that unit.

There are times in which we may deploy units that are not in

the highest mission readiness category with an understanding of

the risk that may be involved in that mission and the assumption

of that risk by the commander that receives that unit.

So from my experience——

Mr. HUNTER. What I am talking about, though, is the 15-day

waiting period, even if you are fully mission-capable and you can

certify that immediately.

This language says you have to report to the Committee on

Armed Services and make that certification two weeks before you

make the deployment of any unit.

That means if you have a hostage situation and you have to send

a Special Operations Command (SOCOM) team in to rescue them

from out of country, you have to wait two weeks under this should

this become law.

My question is assuming all our SOCOM guys are fully missioncapable when they go into country, and presumably most of our air

capability that would come out of a place like Incirlik is also fully

mission-capable, but can you live with a two-week wait in a war

against terror, where your targets are fleeting and sometimes the

American forces are in extremis?

Do you see what my question is? My question is can you wait for

two weeks before units go into Iraq?

Admiral FALLON. As a commander, I would ask for a consideration that we not limit the flexibility of our commanders in allowing them to use forces that might be necessary to meet a situation

or a mission which they may be asked to undertake.

So I would opt to allow our commanders to have the flexibility

of making that decision rather than have some dictated requirement in advance.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I would tell the admiral that there are three

waivers in the proposed legislation, Presidential waivers, and one

of those three waivers is on the language to which the gentleman

from California, Mr. Hunter, made reference.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, would you yield on that?

The CHAIRMAN. You bet.

Mr. HUNTER. Yes, there is a waiver, but the waiver does not go

to units which are fully mission-capable, which presumably any

special operation forces are going to be.

That waiver exists in subsection D, and it only refers to consideration of units that are not assessed as fully mission-capable.

59

So having asked our attorneys to look at this, there is no waiver

for a special forces team that would be fully mission-capable, that

would be capable of asserting that on the very first day. Under the

law, they would still have a 15-day waiting period.

Subsection D applies to, and I am quoting, ‘‘a unit that is not assessed as fully mission-capable.’’

Admiral FALLON. I would just ask the committee in their deliberations to please keep in mind that our commanders would like

to have the ability to have the flexibility to make decisions that

would be appropriate to the task which they are asked to carry out.

The CHAIRMAN. It is my understanding, Admiral, that the waiver

does apply, and of course it really boils down to interpretation by

various lawyers, but I appreciate the gentleman bringing the—

mentioning the issue.

Dr. Snyder.

Well, Admiral, we are very, very appreciative—oh, Mr. Sestak?

You have a question, sir?

Mr. SESTAK. Admiral, thank you.

Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, a lot of people talk about is there a Plan B if what is

happening with the surge or escalation, however you want to characterize it, does not achieve the goals the President is trying to attain—military security environment that is such that politically

people would, in his opinion, be more willing to compromise and

come forward.

You had said that this is a last great chance opportunity for

them. Did you mean that as far as militarily with this emphasis

on what the military could do to help the process—but did you also

mean that diplomatically?

And I say this with great respect for having watched what you

did in the Western Pacific diplomatically with a nation such as

China.

And so my question comes down to two areas—one, politically,

internally, which we talked about, what leverage do we actually

have to move them along?

But number two, if you could address it first, is Iran and Syria,

and particularly Iran, who came to us in 2003 and appeared to

want to work with us, to where General Eikenberry, when he sat

at the table here, actually, in answer to a question, said, ‘‘Iran appears to be working toward our interest in Afghanistan,’’ because

our interests happened to coincide. It doesn’t want al Qaeda there.

And yet there has been recent reports, just recent, that now

there is arms from Iran there. Have we missed opportunities here?

Is there an opportunity here?

Where you had talked about working with regional nations—you

mentioned Syria—is there really a different approach we should be

taking, not tougher, but not dissimilar to what happened in the

Western Pacific, so that there really is a Plan B?

Admiral FALLON. Well, a couple things. First, to the latter comment on Iran, it seems to me that we ought to be very interested

in those things which would be helpful in general security and stability of the region.

Whatever has gone on in the past, it seems that in this challenge

with Iraq that we could use all the help we can get.

60

There is a conference upcoming that was agreed by President

Mubarak to host in Egypt—actually, there are two, but the one of

interest straightaway is the so-called neighbors conference.

This is an attempt by those in the region to get people together

to talk about how they might be helpful to one another, particularly as regards Iraq.

And it seems to me that this is a really good place in which we

might have constructive dialogue on an item that is of very high

interest to us.

And you are aware, of course, that there was an inaugural discussion here in recent weeks, and I would look forward to the discussion that might ensue in this meeting, particularly in the context of what role Iran may play in a helpful venue toward Iraq.

And so I think this is probably a good place to start, and we look

forward to that.

Regarding Iraq itself, and the business of how much time there

is left and the necessity for tough decisions, I believe that notwithstanding the phenomenal effort that is being put forth by our military personnel and many other entities in the interagency and

thousands of people that are hard at work today, that this is, at

the end and the beginning, about the willingness of the Iraqi leaders to make those decisions that will engender the kind of confidence in the people in that country to want to move forward in

a manner in which we would be happy to see them and really encourage them to do it.

So we are trying to make sure, without any doubt, that the leaders in this country understand that that is really our objective, and

that we recognize that this is their decision. They are going to have

to make the choices.

But if they fail to make choices that will engender that kind of

confidence, then I don’t know how much we could do absent those

kinds of calls. So they got the message, and now it is going to be

up to them.

But we recognize there is an awful lot of help that they need,

confidence-wise and others, to help make that——

Mr. SESTAK. Could I just make a closing comment, if I might?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you, sir. It is not that I believe many are

anti-war, so to speak, with Iraq.

And the issue on time, even just after this recent trip with Senator Hagel, comes back as I look at the Army brethren and watch

that not one unit in America is ready to deploy to another contingency.

It is really pro-security and how we place ourselves—is why we

keep coming back to how long. And so therefore, the comment is

if it is having the political leaders willing to do something, what

it ultimately comes to—what is the leverage?

And thus far, what I did hear out there from military leaders

and political was dates, and not being open-ended has helped.

Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Giffords has another question.

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I know that in my absence maybe there was a misunderstanding

about the question that I asked you, Admiral.

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I think it is absolutely critical that now, as the head of Central

Command—that we know of these 20,000, plus or minus, contractors that we have of the security forces what sort of legal status

they have in terms of security status in Iraq and Afghanistan,

what legal status they currently operate under, and by what process can they be disciplined for misconduct.

My experience over there was that it was very unclear who these

people worked for, what they did, and who was in charge of them.

Now, I know there was a comment made in reference to tattoos.

And I think that is great. If people want to have tattoos, that is

fine.

But our United States military—there are some very strict guidelines in terms of what your physical appearance can look like and

should look like, because you represent not just your branch of the

military but the entire United States of America.

So my experience was that it was very unclear—no name tags,

no badges, no indication who these people worked for—and I just

certainly believe that you need to take real control of who these

20,000 people are, where they—who they currently report to.

And I just don’t want that to be undermined in terms of a comment that was made recently.

Mr. HUNTER. Would the gentlelady yield?

Ms. GIFFORDS. Yes, sir, I will yield.

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentlelady for yielding.

My comment, and I was the person who commented—in fact, I

wish you had stayed—was not to the point of the control factor of

the contractors—and incidentally, the fact that you didn’t see control doesn’t indicate there wasn’t any—but your comments with respect to thugs, tattoos, et cetera.

And my point was, which I didn’t think you understood, was that

the vast majority of those contractors at places like Blackwater are,

in fact, honorably discharged veterans of the United States military

who are outstanding Americans, SEALs, special forces, people who

have done an enormously good job for our country and are in a second career.

And they are in a second career as contractors. They have security skills. They are disciplined people. And they are good people.

And they aren’t thugs. And I heard the word ‘‘thug’’ used.

And my further point was that if you use the idea that a person

has a tattoo—is somehow an indication that he is a disorderly or

a bad person—most of the people who are contractors who have

tattoos are people who acquired them in the United States Navy,

Army, Marine Corps, Air Force.

We have had a lot of our contractors who have been killed over

there. They have given their lives for what they thought was a

good cause.

The contractors who were killed and whose bodies were hung on

the bridge in Fallujah were American contractors, in fact, who

came from the place that you spoke of somewhat disparagingly.

That is Blackwater. They were Blackwater contractors.

So that was the point that I made, and I don’t think the admiral

has said that his contractors are out of control.

Ms. GIFFORDS. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HUNTER. And I thank the gentlelady for yielding.

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Ms. GIFFORDS. I would like to reclaim my time.

Ranking Member Hunter, I am sorry if my comments were taken

out of context. But what I said is that some of these security contractors look very unprofessional. And we have to take ourselves

out of the position and think about what the Iraqi people think

about seeing Americans over there.

Some of them, I am sure, were discharged honorably from the

United States military, but they are currently not under the umbrella of the United States military, so they have served our country with honor and they may continue to serve our country with

great honor and distinction.

But it is important not to take my words out of context. Some

of these men look unprofessional. And it is important that we understand—again, getting away from—the premise of my question—

of what sort of legal system do they currently operate under.

And in terms of discipline for their misconduct, how do we do

that here? And does Central Command play an active role?

The comments that were made in the newspaper just a couple of

weeks ago by Major Small, a spokesperson for Central Command,

was, ‘‘This is not a CENTCOM issue. It is for whoever is running

the contract.’’

So, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Hunter, I urge the United

States military to really take control of these contractors. I think

it is really important.

Mr. HUNTER. I have some information on that, if the gentlelady

would yield just briefly.

Ms. GIFFORDS. Actually, you know what?

Mr. HUNTER. My understanding is that—and I believe we asked

these questions initially during the initial occupation—was that because there was a determination—is it under what body of law

American personnel in Iraq would be governed by.

And there was initially an agreement with the Iraqi government—and you will have to—the staff will have to help us on this,

because this was some time ago—that the American contractors

would be under the jurisdiction of American law, if your question

is what jurisdiction applies.

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you.

And, Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield the balance of my time

to Congressman Sestak.

Mr. SESTAK. And if I could, Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to comment to your comment.

I spoke with the colonel who had to go get the remaining body

parts of the three Blackwater individuals, and he said to me—and

it gets to Admiral Fallon’s point about command and control—‘‘If

only they had called me, I would have told them that that road was

not safe, and they would be alive today.’’

Not only for their safety, but for accountability of not having a

separate military force, Admiral Fallon’s point well-taken by my

fellow representative, it is very important to have the command

and control of this separate entity there.

And that is what I learned, is we don’t have that, according to

the Marine colonel.

Thank you for yielding your time.

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The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Fallon, in an earlier comment, made it

clear that they are under the Central Command control.

Am I correct, Admiral?

Admiral FALLON. I have now got this article that is attributed to

a person at Central Command whom I don’t know. And I will go

find out.

But if there is someone who is contracted to us or representing

us in any way, shape or form, then I will take responsibility and

find out what is going on.

The CHAIRMAN. That clarifies that.

Second, Admiral, I think the questions put by the gentlelady and

others would fall within the request I made earlier regarding contractors, and——

Admiral FALLON. Got it.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. We look forward to an early answer

to that request of you, knowing full well you don’t have it at your

fingertips today.

Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, we can’t thank you enough for your

past service, your present service, your future service. You are a

great American.

We appreciate your taking this very challenging position on, and

we wish you the very best. Thank you again.

Admiral FALLON. Thank you, Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 12:33 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

APRIL 18, 2007

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE

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APRIL 18, 2007

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SKELTON

The CHAIRMAN. Can you get us the number of contractors that are in Iraq and

a basic description of their various missions?

Admiral FALLON. As of April 2007, there were approximately 129,000 total personnel working for DoD-funded contractors within Iraq. There are approximately 6,000

Private Security Contractors (PSCs) in Iraq. In addition to those working for DoD,

there are a number of contractors in Iraq who work for a variety of other USG agencies including State, Justice, USAID, and Interior, to name a few.

Contractors within the CENTCOM AOR perform a variety of functions and services. These include communications support, construction, facility maintenance and

repair. In some locations, contractors perform base operations that include food and

sanitation services, base security, and other logistical support functions.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MEEHAN

Mr. MEEHAN. Please comment on the relationship between CENTCOM, General

Petraeus and the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. How is our strategy in Iraq coordinated

between them? Who is responsible for the development of the campaign plan that

addresses the political, diplomatic, information, military and economic (DIME) plans

there?

Admiral FALLON. The relationship between CENTCOM, MNF–I and the US Embassy in Baghdad are founded upon the principles and congressional intent expressed in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, in the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, and the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense

Reorganization Act of 1986. Our strategy in Iraq is a mutually coordinated effort.

As CENTCOM Commander, I establish the military regional strategy for our

CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR), and as a major subordinate headquarters,

MNF–I (GEN Petraeus), establishes and recommends the strategy for Iraq. The Iraq

Joint Campaign Plan, development, and revisions are collaborated efforts between

the US Embassy and Multi-National Force-Iraq. The Joint Campaign Plan addresses the political, diplomatic, information, military and economic (DIME) aspects of a

collaborated campaign. Prior to the Joint Campaign Plan being approved and signed

by the Ambassador and Commanding General, the plan is briefed to me.

Mr. MEEHAN. Could you please detail CENTCOM’s role, as distinguished from the

Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF–I), commanded by General Petraeus, the MultiNational Corps-Iraq (MNC–I), commanded by LTG Odierno, and the Multi-National

Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC–I), commanded by LTG Dempsey, in

‘‘direct[ing] all U.S. Government efforts and coordinat[ing] all international efforts

in support of organizing, equipping, and training all Iraqi security forces,’’ as provided in the May 11, 2004 National Presidential Security Directive (NSPD–36). For

example, a. What role does CENTCOM play in the plan to develop an organic logistics capability for the ISF? b. What role does CENTCOM play in vetting requests

for forces for transition teams and the selection of personnel to serve on the transition teams? Does CENTCOM receive feedback on the performance or training of

transition teams? On the progress of the Iraqi Security Forces? On the Transition

Readiness Assessment (TRAs) reports? If so, what does CENTCOM do with the feedback? c. What are typical requests for support from CENTCOM headquarters from

MNF–I or MNSTC–I relative to the Iraqi Security Forces and transition teams? d.

How is CENTCOM participating in the revision of the MNF–I/U.S. Embassy Baghdad ‘‘Joint Campaign Plan?’’ How is CENTCOM tracking progress in meeting the

conditions set forth in the Joint Campaign Plan? Can the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee get a copy of the plan and a briefing on the ISF’s progress relative to the plan?

Admiral FALLON. US Central Command (CENTCOM) provides strategic-level

guidance to both MNF–I and MNSTC–I including forming the Iraqi Security Force’s

(ISF) logistics development plan.

The CDR, MNF–I validates all requirements for transition team personnel and

sends those requirements to CENTCOM who in turn vets and validates the requirements and submits them to the Joint Staff. Selection and training of transition team

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personnel is accomplished by the individual services. MNF–I and MNSTC–I submit

feedback directly to the services and their training centers. USCENTCOM receives

periodic reports and TRA data from MNF–I that tracks the progress of the ISF. The

CENTCOM staff monitors and analyzes this information so as to keep the

CENTCOM commander informed of ISF development. Typical MNF–I and MNSTC–

I requests for support include requests for forces, strategic guidance, and assistance

in planning efforts.

Campaign assessment, development, and revisions are collaborated efforts between the US Embassy and Multi-National-Iraq. Prior to the Joint Campaign Plan

being approved and signed by the Ambassador and Commanding General, the plan

is briefed to the Commander, US Central Command.

Mr. MEEHAN. You may be aware, the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, which I chair and on which Mr. Akin serves as the ranking member, has undertaken an in-depth examination of the planning for and progress in the development of the Iraqi Security Forces. I was able to lead a congressional delegation intheater in February and obtained valuable insights into both the progress that is

being made and the challenges the Coalition faces in standing up the ISF. Additional follow-up work is needed to assist the subcommittee’s investigation. The subcommittee staff is having difficulty in arranging a follow-on staff delegation trip this

month or early next month. Preliminary arrangements for travel that was to occur

this week have been pushed off, we’re told, until mid-June, at the earliest, because

of the surge. We are sensitive to the fact that it can be a challenge to accommodate

such work during wartime, but we have done our best not to request personnel from

theater in such a way that would take them out of the fight. That is part of the

reason that travel to Iraq is necessary. I would ask for your support and assistance

in seeing that the staff delegation is re-scheduled as soon as possible. Can I have

your commitment to see that that occurs?

Admiral FALLON. US Central Command (CENTCOM) recognizes the need for Congressional travel to the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) and makes every

attempt to accommodate all requests. It should be noted that in light of the current

operations tempo in Iraq and the increased demand on airlift assets, CENTCOM

has been operating under restricted travel for several months. Due to the number

of request for Congressional delegation travel, staff delegations are approved on a

case by case basis by exception and are authorized military air support into and out

of Iraq on a space available basis.

Mr. MEEHAN. Current programs call for the Iraqi Air Force to acquire tactical

transport and limited ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance)-capable

assets. What longer-range plans are there for the Iraqis to purchase and train on

aircraft and systems providing the full range of capabilities currently provided by

Coalition support?

Admiral FALLON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the

committee files.]

Mr. MEEHAN. Are any issues arising with respect to training the Iraqi Navy given

the Iranian capture of the British?

Admiral FALLON. No, the Iranian capture of British naval personnel earlier this

year has not had any effect on the training of the Iraqi Navy.

The Iraqi Navy faces significant challenges in meeting the individual and collective training needs for its ambitious acquisition program, including development of

leadership and technical skills. Training efforts include mentorship conducted by the

Naval Transition Team and active skills training conducted by Coalition Navy, Marine, and Coast Guard Forces. Infrastructure development will remain the primary

effort throughout 2007. Naval planning is maturing and coherent across acquisition,

training and infrastructure lines of development extending to 2010.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO

Ms. BORDALLO. The Horn of Africa assignment for the Guam National Guard soldiers is becoming a regular one. Can Guam National Guard soldiers and their families expect the Guam Guard to be rotated in and out of the Horn of Africa for the

foreseeable future?

Or can the Guam Guard anticipate a different mission?

Admiral FALLON. Although the Horn of Africa will continue to be a requirement

within the Central Command AOR, we do not make recommendations as to which

units fill those requests.

USCENTCOM does not know the future force requests that the Guam Guard will

be required to fill.

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON

Mr. WILSON. Have the pledged Iraqi forces been placed in the city? What is the

status of Iraqi forces?

Admiral FALLON. Since the end of 2006, the Iraqi Army has provided reinforcement units to support operations in Baghdad. The original requirement has been

adjusted several times resulting in the current fixed requirement of 3 Brigades and

9 Battalion.

Each unit deployment in Baghdad is scheduled for a period of 3 months (90 days),

not including a period of three weeks of unit preparation at the unit’s home location

and additional collective training at the Besmaya Range Complex east of Baghdad.

Two units have volunteered to extend their tours in Baghdad.

The MOD is already planning the next series of rotations which will occur in July,

August and September. To reduce the turbulence caused by these constant unit rotations, the Ministry of Defense plans to create six dedicated battalions for use in

Baghdad (in addition to those units and formations already based in Baghdad) before the end of the year. Once complete, this initiative will reduce deployment, training, and sustainment problems currently felt by the rotating units and donor formations. Furthermore, these units are likely to have improved manning numbers as

they are based in Baghdad, their home territory.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK

Mr. LOEBSACK. Can you tell us how many Peruvians are employed by us there?

Admiral FALLON. The mix of contractor personnel in Iraq is approximately: 16%

US; 33% multi-national; and, 51% Iraqi. We do not maintain statistical data on the

country of origin of multi-national contractors and sub-contractors.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. GIFFORDS

Ms. GIFFORDS. There are currently about 20,000 security contractors serving in

Iraq. And I am curious, since you took command of Central Command, what explanation have you received of the legal status of security contractors working in both

Iraq and Afghanistan?

What legal system do they currently operate under? And what is the process by

which they can be disciplined for misconduct?

Admiral FALLON. Contractors are required to comply with USCENTCOM Rules

for the Use of Force (RUF) and are not authorized to participate in offensive combat

operations. However, private security contractors are authorized to use deadly force,

when necessary, in self defense; in the defense of facilities or personnel as specified

in their contract; to prevent life-threatening acts directed against civilians; and, in

defense of Coalition-designated property as specified in their contract.

Private security contractor (PSC) personnel must be properly licensed to carry

arms in accordance with host nation law and must receive USCENTCOM/Coalition

Forces approval of their operations. PSC personnel must comply with US and host

nation laws; treaties and international agreements; US regulations, directives, instructions, and policies; and, orders, standard operating procedures, and command

policies.

Additionally, PSC activities are governed by an MNF–I FRAGO (05–231) which

establishes procedures for private security contractors to report all escalation of

force (EOF) incidents or other weapons firing incidents. If a firing incident occurs,

an initial report must be sent to the Reconstruction Operations Center (ROC) as

soon as practical.

Issues of questionable conduct are governed by a variety of authorities depending

on the nature of alleged offense. These sources of authority include: Title 18, U.S.

Code; the Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ); host nation law; command/

activity directives; and employer directives and policies.

Companies within the CENTCOM AOR which are under contract with DoD are

currently held accountable through the following organizations: US Army Corps of

Engineers for military construction (MILCON); Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan (JCCI/A) for theater support contracts such as transportation, vehicle

maintenance, water, and waste disposal; Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) for multiple classes of supply; Air Force Center of Environmental Excellence (AFCEE) for

reconstruction; Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) for Logistics Civil

Augmentation Program (LOGCAP); and, Defense Energy Supply Center (DESC) for

fuel.

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Private security contractor personnel whose conduct would constitute a felony

under U.S. law are subject to prosecution by the Department of Justice under the

Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) of 2000 (18 U.S.C. 3621). A recent

legislative change also allows for the use of the UCMJ in prosecuting civilians who

serve with, or ‘‘accompany’’, the U.S. Armed Forces.

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