J-S21032-16

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: STEVEN WHITERS, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

APPEAL OF: STEVEN WHITERS,

No. 1754 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order May 1, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-MD-0012916-2011

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED FEBRUARY 17, 2016

Appellant Steven Whiters appeals from the order entered in the Court 

of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which validated a settlement 

agreement in response to Appellant’s motion for the return of property. We 

affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: Appellant, his 

wife (Cassandra Wise), and their three adult sons (Lennard, Ramon, and 

Michael Whiters) lived in a large home at 5864 Woodbine Avenue in 

Philadelphia. On January 5, 2010, police officers went to the house with an 

arrest warrant for Lennard, and in searching the house for him, the police 

discovered nine live marijuana plants, as well as high intensity heat lamps 

and video recording equipment, in the basement. 

The police secured a search warrant for the premises, and upon 

execution of the search warrant, the police seized eight firearms from the 
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locked closet in Appellant’s and his wife’s bedroom. The police found no 

other contraband in the couple’s bedroom. 

The police arrested and filed various charges against Appellant, his 

wife, and their three sons. On December 12, 2011, Appellant filed a 

counseled petition seeking the return of his property, i.e., the firearms, and 

the petition was held pending trial. 

On July 16, 2013, Appellant, his wife, and their three sons proceeded 

to a bench trial, and they were acquitted of all charges. On May 1, 2014, 

the trial court approved a settlement agreement between Appellant, who 

was represented by counsel, and the Commonwealth, which provided in 

relevant part the following:

[I]t is hereby ORDERED AND DECREED that the firearms 

listed on [the relevant] property receipts . . . be liquidated.1

The above firearms, along with any ammunition, are to be 

turned over to Locks’ Gun Exchange for liquidation, which is 

located at 6700 Rowland Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 

The guns are to be released only to John Locks, agent of 

Locks’ Gun Exchange. Said firearm and ammunition may not 

be sold, assigned, optioned, given, bequeathed or transferred in 

any manner to [Appellant], Cassandra Wise, Robert Snead or 

anyone acting on her behalf. The net proceeds of the sale of the 

above firearm[s] are to be turned over to [Appellant]. Locks’ 

may contact the District Attorney’s Office to receive 

authorization to sell firearms to a particular individual. The 

individual may or may not receive approval to purchase the 

firearms. Verification of said transaction will be done by the 

District Attorney’s Office. 

If it is found that any of the individuals listed above or a 

party acting on their behalf purchase or attempt to purchase the 

firearms covered by this Order, this agreement is null and void. 

All firearms will then be relinquished to the Commonwealth for 

destruction. Any cost incurred by the Commonwealth and/or 

Locks Gun Exchange will be the responsibility of [Appellant]. 
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1 [Appellant] opposes liquidation, however in light of the fact 

that the Court ordered the same he is agreeable to the above 

arrangement so that he may recoup the monetary value of the 

firearms. 

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Trial Court Order, filed 5/1/14, at 1-2 (emphasis and footnote in original). 

Appellant filed a timely, counseled notice of appeal, and all Pa.R.A.P. 

1925 requirements have been met.

Appellant contends the trial court erred in ordering that Appellant’s 

firearms be liquidated. More specifically, he alleges the following:

Instantly, [A]ppellant first contends that the firearms in 

controversy are not contraband per se, such that there [sic] 

mere possession is unlawful. Second[ ], he personally[ ] is not 

prohibited from possessing firearms[.] Third, [A]ppellant

contends that in spite of the fact that he resides with his wife. . . 

who is prohibited from possessing firearms he should not be 

precluded as a member of the prohibited person’s 

household from meeting the burden of proof necessary for 

return of his firearms that were seized from their residence. 

Appellant[,] who belongs to a gun club and possessed the 

subject firearms as family heirlooms[,] is a marksman that 

secured the firearms in gun cases under lock in the closet of 

their marital bedroom. Appellant should be allowed to recover 

the firearms and store them some place other than where the 

prohibited person resides. 

Appellant’s Brief at 11 (citation to transcript omitted) (bold in original). 

Initially, we note that Appellant’s argument (that for various reasons 

the trial court should have ruled he be allowed to recover the firearms and 

store them some place other than where his wife resides) overlooks the fact 

that he entered into a court-approved settlement agreement with the 

Commonwealth whereby he agreed to relinquish the firearms for liquidation 
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purposes and, in exchange, the Commonwealth agreed to turn over to 

Appellant the net proceeds of the sale. 

We have held that return of property actions are civil in nature, but 

are also quasi-criminal in character. See Commonwealth v. Landy, 362 

A.2d 999 (Pa.Super. 1976). Principles of contract law ordinarily govern the 

enforceability of settlement agreements. Mazzella v. Koken, 559 Pa. 216, 

739 A.2d 531 (1999). Contract interpretation is a question of law and, thus, 

our standard of review is de novo. Ruby v. Abington Memorial Hosp., 50 

A.3d 128, 132 (Pa.Super. 2012).

“Where a settlement agreement contains all of the requisites of a valid 

contract, a court must enforce the terms of the agreement.” Mastrioni–

Mucker v. Allstate Ins. Co., 976 A.2d 510, 518 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citation 

omitted). “Under ordinary contract law, contracts are enforceable when 

parties reach [a] mutual agreement, exchange consideration[,] and have set 

forth terms of their bargain with sufficient clarity.” Biddle v. 

Johnsonbaugh, 664 A.2d 159, 163 (Pa.Super. 1995) (citation omitted). A 

binding agreement exists where all parties come to a “meeting of the minds” 

on all essential terms of the agreement. Mastrioni–Mucker, 976 A.2d at 

518. Judicial policy favors the settlement of law suits and in the absence of 

fraud and mistake the courts will enforce an agreement to settle a legal 

dispute. See id.
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Here, as indicated supra, Appellant entered into a settlement 

agreement. In examining its plain terms, contrary to Appellant’s current 

appellate argument, there is no indication the parties intended for Appellant 

to retain and store the firearms some place other than where his wife 

resides. Thus, we find no merit to Appellant’s first argument. 

This does not end our inquiry, however, as Appellant alternatively 

argues that the footnote in the alleged settlement agreement reveals there 

was no “meeting of the minds” on an essential element, i.e., liquidation of 

the firearms, and therefore, the alleged settlement agreement is not a valid 

contract. 

As indicated supra, the settlement agreement contains the following 

footnote: “[Appellant] opposes liquidation, however in light of the fact that 

the Court ordered the same he is agreeable to the above arrangement so 

that he may recoup the monetary value of the firearms.” Trial Court Order, 

filed 5/1/14, at 1 n.1. 

In examining the settlement agreement, including the subject 

footnote, the trial court concluded there was a “meeting of the minds” so as 

to form a legally binding contract requiring enforcement of its terms, 

including liquidation of the firearms. As the trial court noted:

Nothing in the [footnote] states that trickery or chicanery was 

involved in resolving the issues between the parties. Nothing is 

raised regarding the voluntariness of the agreement and it is 

also presumed that everyone entered into the agreement 

knowingly. While [Appellant] may have opposed liquidation or 
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forfeiture, he agreed to this disposition and as such was bound 

by the terms entered into by his attorney. 

Trial Court Opinion, filed 2/27/15, at 3. 

While Appellant may have been unhappy with the sale of his firearms, 

the totality of the settlement agreement reveals he understood that 

liquidation was going to occur and he was “agreeable.” Thus, we conclude 

there was a “meeting of the minds,” whereby both parties mutually assented 

to the same thing, i.e., liquidation of the firearms, and Appellant is bound by 

the terms of the settlement agreement. See Prieto Corp. v. 

Gambone Const. Co., 100 A.3d 602 (Pa.Super. 2014) (explaining the 

“meeting of the minds” necessary for a valid contract). 

For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

Affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/17/2016

 
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