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45–330 PDF 2008

S. HRG. 110–609 

AFGHANISTAN: A PLAN TO TURN THE TIDE? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JANUARY 31, 2008 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: 

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware ..................................... 1 

Boucher, Hon. Richard, Assistant Secretary, South and Central Asian Affairs, 

Department of State, Washington, DC ............................................................... 5 

Prepared statement ...................................................................................... 8 

Holbrooke, Hon. Richard, Former U.S. Permanent Representative to the 

United Nations, New York, NY .......................................................................... 49 

Johnson, Hon. David T., Assistant Secretary, International Narcotics and 

Law Enforcement Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC .................. 12 

Prepared statement ...................................................................................... 14 

Jones, General James L., USMC (Ret.), Former Commander, European Command, and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Mclean, VA ......................... 41 

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana ............................................ 3 

Pickering, Hon. Thomas, Former Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC ................................................................... 43 

Prepared statement ...................................................................................... 45 

APPENDIX

Responses to additional questions submitted for the record by members of 

the committee ....................................................................................................... 67 

(III)

(1) 

AFGHANISTAN: A PLAN TO TURN THE TIDE? 

THURSDAY, JANUARY 31, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Biden, Kerry, Feingold, Bill Nelson, Cardin, 

Webb, Lugar, Hagel, Coleman, Corker, and Sununu. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., 

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order, please. 

Let me, in advance, apologize to my colleagues and the witnesses 

for my cold and my occasional coughing. I am—it’s irritating to me, 

it’s probably going to be more irritating to you, but I thank you 

very much for being here. We have a very—two distinguished panels here today, and we’re anxious to get going. 

As I see it, here’s the situation in Afghanistan. Security is probably at its lowest ebb since 2001, much of the country is only nominally under the control of Kabul. The United States and coalition 

forces win every pitched battle, but the Taliban still grows stronger, day by day. Drug trafficking dominates the national economy, 

and narco-barons operate with impunity. Reconstruction efforts 

have failed to bring substantial improvement to the lives of most 

Afghan citizens, and the slow pace is causing widespread resentment of both the Karzai government and the West. And bin Ladin 

and top al-Qaeda leaders enjoy safe haven somewhere along the Afghan-Pakistani border. 

In fact, this summer, the NIE—the National Intelligence Estimates—on the terror threat, found that al-Qaeda has ‘‘protected or 

regenerated key elements of its homeland attack capability.’’ The 

administration firmly believes that we’re about to turn the corner, 

and that we just need to give our policy a chance to work. I am 

curious as to what that policy is, because, quite frankly, I tell you, 

I’m somewhat—I’m—it’s not clear to me. 

But, that’s exactly, as well, what we’ve been hearing for the past 

5 years, ‘‘the tide is about to turn.’’ I sure hope so, I say to my witnesses—the witness from the administration, but I’m not prepared 

to bet on that, under the present strategy. 

If we’re not going to hold another hearing in Afghanistan next 

year, and have another retelling of the same story, it seems to me 

we need a significant change in policy now. 

2 

Last month, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral 

Michael Mullen, testified to another congressional committee that 

the Taliban support has tripled over the past 2 years. In Iraq, he 

said, ‘‘The United States does what it must, while in Afghanistan 

the United States does what it can.’’ I appreciate the admiral’s honesty. His statement, it seems to me, makes abundantly clear why 

our efforts in Afghanistan seem to be too little too late. 

We’re not succeeding in Afghanistan, quite simply, because we 

haven’t made the kind of priority, I think, that need be made; 

we’ve not made success there our priority. 

What would it take to achieve success in Afghanistan? At a minimum, it seems to me, from reading testimony, talking to other 

people, having briefings from the intelligence community, as well 

as discussions with my colleagues—at a minimum, it’s going to 

take a significantly greater investment, including troops, and the 

type of troops, and including investment in rebuilding that country. 

But, it will still be a small fraction of what we have devoted to 

Iraq, thus far. We’ve spent about as much on development aid in 

Afghanistan over the past 6 years as we’ve spent on the war in 

Iraq—as we spend in the war in Iraq every 3 weeks. 

What could more development aid do? Can it do much without 

a reorganization of the way in which the aid is distributed and 

dealing with corruption? 

As every military expert to testify before our committee has 

noted, the battle against the Taliban is not going to be won with 

bullets and bombs alone. It’s going to be won with roads, clinics, 

and schools. 

General Karl Eikenberry used to say, when he was in command 

of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, ‘‘Where the road ends, the Taliban 

begins.’’ 

We could have done—what could we have done with a fraction 

of the military resources we’ve spent in Iraq? Earlier this month, 

Secretary Gates announced the deployment of 3,200 additional marines to Afghanistan. This is welcome news, at least in my view. 

But, does anyone truly believe that it’s enough to turn the tide? 

What do we need to do to achieve success in Afghanistan? In brief, 

the same thing we should have been doing all along: First, establish security. If we should securing—if we should be surging forces 

anywhere, it’s in Afghanistan, not Iraq. NATO troops and a new 

Marine deployment are necessary, but not sufficient. We have to 

focus not just on sending more forces, but the kinds of forces and 

equipment we need to have sent. We need more helicopters, more 

airlift, more surveillance drones. 

And we’ve got to do a better job of training the Afghan and—police and army. You know, that old, bad expression, ‘‘deja vu all over 

again’’? As I read the reports that have been filed with regard to 

the police agencies, it is frighteningly reminiscent of the early reports about the police agencies in Afghanistan—excuse me, in Iraq. 

They’re corrupt, ineffectual, and, most places, based on what I’m 

told—and the administration may have a different view—they’re 

viewed more as the problem than the solution, by the population. 

We need far more funds. We need to use them far better. The 

Afghans are patient, but they’re not seeing reconstruction worthy 

of a superpower or worthy of the commitment that we made—the 

3 

President made—for a Marshall Plan for Afghanistan. After more 

than 6 years and more than $6 billion, the most we can claim is 

that life of ordinary Afghans isn’t as bad as it was under the 

Taliban. We’ve got to aim much higher, I think, and we have to deliver much more. 

Third thing we have to do is deal with the counternarcotics—excuse me—we have to counter the narcotics explosion. We should 

target multimillion-dollar drug kingpins, not dollar-a-day opium 

farmers. 

Someday, aerial eradication may have its place, but, in my view, 

not until we’ve got an alternative livelihood set up and a judicial 

system capable of taking down the drug barons. Until then, we 

should focus on the top of the food chain, not the bottom. 

We have five witnesses, today, who can explain these issues in 

detail, with authority and expertise. First are Assistant Secretaries 

Richard Boucher and David Johnson, from the State Department; 

then, three outside experts, well known to this committee and 

widely respected, will be here: General James Jones, Admiral 

Thomas Pickering—excuse me—Ambassador Thomas Pickering, 

and Ambassador Richard Holbrooke. 

I believe the war in Afghanistan is winnable, but I don’t believe 

we’re winning. I believe we need a new strategy for success, and 

I hope this hearing can—and this committee—can help the administration produce one. 

Before I recognize Senator Lugar, I’d like to welcome our guest, 

Michael Wilson, the Ambassador of Canada. 

Mr. Ambassador, thank you so much for being here, and thank 

you for the really herculean effort your country is making and the 

sacrifices you’re enduring to deal with the situation in Afghanistan. 

You’re one of our closest friends, and your nation is shouldering a 

heavy load for the common good in Afghanistan, and we thank you 

very much. 

To date, at least 78 Canadian troops have given their lives in 

this struggle. And, of the dozens of nations participating in this 

struggle, only the United States and Britain have lost more troops. 

These represent the first combat deaths Canada has suffered since 

the Korean war, and I’m sure it has political repercussions at 

home. 

It’s not always appreciated. We’re not a—we don’t always tell 

you, but our gratitude for your country is immense, and we thank 

you for being here. 

Senator Lugar. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our very distinguished panels. All of the witnesses are good 

friends of the committee who have appeared before us many times. 

We’re especially grateful that they have come today to share their 

conclusions and insights on a subject of critical importance to 

United States national security. 

The ongoing international effort to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan must succeed. There should be no doubt that Afghanistan is 

a crucial test for NATO. The September 11 attacks were planned 

4 

in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda still operates there, and the fate of the 

country remains both strategic and symbolic. 

Afghanistan has experienced a 22-percent decrease in infant 

mortality since the Taliban were in power. In 2001, only 8 percent 

of Afghans had ready access to health services. Today, almost twothirds of Afghans enjoy this benefit. 

Since the fall of the Taliban, nearly 1,000 miles of main and secondary roads have been rehabilitated. This has contributed to a 

growing economy, which realized a 13-percent increase in GDP in 

2007. School attendance has increased fivefold since 2002, with 5 

million Afghan children attending schools and 60 million textbooks 

delivered. 

Thus far, the United States has invested nearly $5 billion in the 

reconstruction effort. The rest of the international community has 

invested even more. Yet, while these investments have yielded demonstrable gains, the overall situation in Afghanistan remains 

grave. Democratic institutions are fragile, and the government does 

not control significant regions of the country. A massive drug trade 

funds the Taliban, which, despite setbacks, seems to be able to regenerate its ranks. 

Now, these circumstances demand a resolute commitment by 

NATO countries and other coalition partners to help establish security and advance the causes of reconstruction, democracy, and the 

rule of law in Afghanistan. 

For its part, Afghanistan must be committed to building a sufficient army, raising an adequate budget, maintaining control of its 

own territory. NATO can only be a transitional force. 

At the end of the cold war, a debate ensued over the durability 

and purposes of the NATO Alliance. And, after much debate, the 

stability of Europe was greatly enhanced by the addition of new 

NATO members. This discussion flared again in the shadow of the 

Balkan conflicts. Each situation appears to have reinforced the 

value of the NATO Alliance. If the debate over the efficacy of the 

Alliance continues, as the NATO-led ISAF has encountered the limits of coordinated action among its members, there is a troubling 

shortfall of political commitment that is hampering the ongoing operations in Afghanistan. The time when NATO could limit its missions to the defense of continental Europe is far in the past. With 

the end of the cold war, the gravest threats to Europe and North 

America originate from other regions of the world, and this requires Europeans and North Americans to be bolder in remaking 

our alliances, forging new structures, and changing our thinking. 

To be fully relevant to the security and well-being of the people of 

its member nations, NATO must think and act globally. And I am 

pleased to hear that the Bush administration is reviewing its current approach in Afghanistan. I look forward to hearing more about 

that today. 

The decision to send 3,000 additional marines in Afghanistan 

should indicate to partners that the United States is committed 

and willing to dedicate the necessary forces to combat the insurgency. We also stand with the Canadians, the British, and the 

Dutch forces, who are calling for more support from partners. 

I believe strongly that NATO is capable of meeting the challenge 

in Afghanistan. NATO commanders have demonstrated that they 

5 

understand the complexity of the mission. They know that success 

in Afghanistan depends on the attitudes of the people, the progress 

of reconstruction, and the development of the economy, as much as 

it depends on battlefield successes. But, NATO commanders must 

have the resources to provide security, and they must have the 

flexibility to use troops to meet Afghanistan’s most critical security 

needs. 

I thank the chairman for holding this timely hearing, and look 

forward to excellent discussion with our witnesses. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ambassador, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BOUCHER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Thank you, Senators. 

Mr. Chairman, I’m very pleased to be here today. I think it’s very 

timely that we have this discussion of the situation in Afghanistan, 

and strategy on the way forward. And having received your letter 

about what you wanted to hear from us, I will try to be brief, but 

I would like to discuss the situation, talk about the strategy, and 

talk about how we’re implementing it and what the next steps are, 

as far as we see it. 

As Senator Lugar described, progress is being made. I have many 

of the same numbers that he does, but, I think, if you add together 

the achievements in roads, achievements in education, achievements in health care, we see a profoundly changed situation in Afghanistan. The economic growth is one sign of that. The extension 

of the government, having gone through the Bonn process and help 

build up a national government, I think last year we saw a lot of 

progress at the provincial level. And if I could say anything about 

this year, it’s probably that progress needs to be made at the district level, and that’s where a lot of the focus is. 

The Taliban are losing on the battlefield, repeatedly, but they do 

remain a threat. But, over the last year they’ve been driven out of 

their strongholds in places like Panjshir, near Kandahar, Sanguin 

Valley in northern Helmand, and, most recently, Musa Qala, in 

Helmand. Unfortunately, as they’ve lost on the battlefield they’ve 

resorted, more and more, to tactics of pure terror, tactics of bombings, of IEDs, of kidnappings. So, we’ve had many successes, but 

we have not yet enjoyed success, and that’s what we have to focus 

on. 

In the end, we’ve found that, if we provide good governance in 

places, we see development, we see security, we see, as my colleague will say, a decline in the poppy production. Good governance 

and the benefits of governance are what really make the difference 

in Afghanistan. Those are the things that will win the war. It requires military force, it requires good leadership, both in the international and the Afghan side, and it requires continuing flow of 

sufficient resources from the international community to help the 

Afghan Government. 

So, the first conclusion about what we’ve seen in the last year 

and the years before is, we know what works in Afghanistan. We 

6 

just have to make sure we’re doing it, and that we do it more and 

better. 

The first element that we have to do is provide people with security. We’re using the necessary force to fight the enemy. U.S. troops 

are at an all-time high; NATO, as well. Afghan forces are increasing in number, and are increasingly out in front. I think, some of 

the provinces I’ve visited, most of the security is provided by Afghan forces now; and NATO forces, U.S. forces, are there to support them and work with them. 

The extra marines will provide extra capability for us in a very 

key area, and allow us to do some things, particularly with training 

and with putting more people out in the field with the Afghan 

forces and the Afghan police than we have before, since that’s one 

of the keys to winning on the battlefield. 

We have been accelerating police training, quite a rapid pace 

over the last year. The effort right now is focusing on what we call 

focus-development districts. General Cone, at the Combined Command Alpha, has a program that we call the Focus Development 

Districts, where they take the police out, put in some good national 

policemen, more capable, and take the police from a district and go 

retrain them, re-form them, reconstruct them, basically, and then 

put them back with mentors and supporters so that they can do a 

better job of holding territory and providing the basic service that 

people want from their government, which is safety and security. 

The narcotics problem is—my colleague Ambassador Johnson 

will talk about—but, I think it’s fundamentally a matter of watching the map, at this point, that the—we’re going from six—we 

went, last year, from six provinces that were poppy, to three to 

thirteen. We see the narcotics problem, while exploding, but exploding in particular areas. And the insurgency and the narcotics 

trafficking are increasingly feeding off each other. And so, as we 

address the narcotics problem, we have to look at it in that context. 

And, as I said, that’s what we’re doing. 

In terms of providing people with the services that they expect, 

they want safety, they want justice, they want economic opportunity, and they want health care and education from their government. Major push this year is in expanding the governance, the 

ability of government to provide services and safety to people at the 

local level. We’ve got about—if you add up the base request plus 

the supplemental that’s still on request, we’ve got over $500 million 

devoted to governance this year. We’ve got more money going 

through our Provincial Reconstruction Teams, which are spent locally to support the extension of the Afghan Government and give 

people new opportunities. 

The Afghans are doing their part. They’ve provided a new Office 

of Local Governance, working out of President Karzai’s office, that’s 

started to appoint governors and district chiefs who are vetted, who 

are there for their quality, and not just for their connections. And 

these people have already shown, I think, great promise, in terms 

of how they deliver governance at a local level. 

Expanding justice at provincial levels is also a big part of the 

new budget. There’s about $70—about $91 million, either appropriated or on request this year, that will go into expanding justice 

at the provincial level. 

7 

The third big item is the one you referred to by quoting General 

Eikenberry, the—‘‘Where the road ends, the insurgency begins.’’ 

And that’s the opportunity that’s provided by infrastructure, by 

roads and electricity, in particular. We’re now moving from the 

Ring Road, which is, but for one section, almost all completed, 

into—last year, a lot of money went into key provincial connections; 

that’s still being done—and more and more small roads, built by 

Provincial Reconstruction Teams, that go up the valleys and the 

villages. Roads are probably our largest funding item, if you look, 

overall, in Afghanistan, and it’s something that works. I was up in 

Konar Province, which has been one of the most violent provinces 

in Afghanistan. I was there about a week ago, and our Provincial 

Reconstruction Team folks and the governor there are all talking— 

they’re not talking about how many insurgents there are in the 

Konar Valley, but they’re talking about how many gas stations and 

Internet cafes there are along the road that we built down through 

the Konar Valley that connects them to Jalalabad and markets for 

their produce. 

We’re also pushing very hard to expand the availability of electricity in Afghanistan. It’s been a country with a very low supply 

of electricity; I think about 6 percent of the population gets their 

electricity from the grid. We’re trying to expand that very dramatically this year. There are major projects that will bring more electricity to Kabul by the end of the year. The Kajaki Dam, down in 

Helmand, is being—generators there are being refurbished. That’s 

already increased the electricity quite a bit in that area. And we’re 

bringing electricity down from north—from countries in the north, 

working with the neighbors to the north, to get electricity for Afghanistan that they can buy. So, there’s about $200 million in this 

year’s budgets that’s devoted to bringing up electricity. Electricity, 

of course, provides not only lights for kids to do their homework, 

but the ability to do things like cold storage projects, so that farmers can grow something other than poppy and be able to market 

it at better prices, year round. 

Finally, I’d point out, agriculture and education—agriculture and 

irrigation are major components of our work, because much of the 

population is agricultural, and a lot of the aid projects, as well as 

the alternate livelihoods projects, focus on repairing irrigation systems, building irrigation systems, and giving people other forms of 

agriculture and agricultural rural economics to go to when they 

abandon the poppy production. 

One of the things that everybody’s very focused on in Afghanistan—I found that in all my conversations last week—was that— 

the need to concentrate all these efforts on key areas. General 

McNeill points out that 40 percent—40 districts produce 70 percent 

of the violence. And so, there’s a real effort now to concentrate the 

military effects, the police training, local governance programs, 

some of the things the Afghans are doing under their national solidarity program—they do 35,000 small projects in 25,000 villages 

now—as well as our aid efforts and the U.N. efforts, so that we can 

concentrate in particular districts and get the—not just the immediate military effect, but get the rebuilding and get the stability 

that we know that security and governance can provide if they’re 

done well together. 

8 

Musa Qala is the latest example, where, after the troops went in 

and flushed out the Taliban, people are going in now with better 

governance, they’re going in with electric generators, they’re going 

in with projects, in consultations with the local population about 

what they need to stabilize and develop there. So, one area where 

I think you’ll see a lot more of this here is the concentration of 

these effects, concentration of these resources, at the district level. 

The second is, there’ll be a big push this year to expand funding 

and nail down funding for the longer term. Not only has the United 

States done that for the last 2 years, some of our allies have, too, 

and we’ll probably have a major donors conference this year, once 

the Afghan national plan is finished. They look continuously to 

bring in other donors. I say many countries have been responses— 

responsive, and I think the goal this year is to keep that up and 

to bring in some others. 

Effort focused on better coordination of international assistance. 

The Afghans have complained that they have to—you know, 62 different kinds of forms to get projects, and things like that. And 

we’re trying to put ourselves all under a better yoke, in terms of 

working together to support the Afghan Government. 

And, finally, I’d note several of the reports that we’ve seen recently talk about Pakistan and the situation in Pakistan. That is 

very important to us. We understand the militants have been able 

to hole up in the tribal areas and push out from there, push into 

Afghanistan, push into Pakistan. There’s a lot more coordination 

going on. For several years now, we’ve had tripartite military efforts, U.S. commanders, NATO commanders, and the Pakistanis 

and the Afghans getting together, that we feel that’s been a very 

productive process, but we’ve also seen, I think, with President 

Karzai’s recent visit to Islamabad, a very positive set of changes in 

the Pakistan-Afghan relationship, recognition on both their parts 

that they faced a common threat and an opportunity to do more 

and go forward, both on the popular level, with things like the 

jirgas that were held last August, but also the government-to-government and the military level. So, we’ll be pushing forward, in 

terms of cooperation against the insurgents along that border. 

So, that’s a basic overview of what we’re doing, why we’re doing 

it, and what we intend to do this year. So, I’d be glad to take any 

questions you have, after my colleague speaks about narcotics. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Boucher follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD A. BOUCHER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF

STATE FOR SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to address you and the committee 

today regarding progress in carrying out U.S. policy toward Afghanistan. 

Let me begin by sharing a few strategic thoughts about our involvement in 

Afghanistan to help shape our discussion today: Wh y are we there and what strategy are we pursuing to achieve these goals? 

After 9/11 the United States, joined by many international partners, toppled the 

Taliban regime to never let Afghanistan become a sanctuary for terrorists again. 

Our goal is to defeat the insurgency and return Afghanistan to long-term stability 

based on Afghan rational sovereignty, democratic principles, and respect for human 

rights. We have achieved many successes in our fight against the Taliban and alQaida, but we have not won yet. Our goal requires a large commitment from us and 

our allies; and will continue to for a considerable time. 

9 

This commitment is an investment, because Afghanistan is more than just a theater to fight enemies. It is a place of strategic opportunity. Afghanistan offers a rare 

opportunity to win a close, loyal, democratic ally in the heart of a continent with 

unmatched political and economic capital and potential. Afghanistan is located at 

the crossroads of countries that are the focus of our foreign policy efforts and has 

the potential of becoming the linchpin for regional integration in south and central 

Asia. The transformation from an essentially ungoverned territory into a land 

bridge between the hitherto virtually disconnected south and central Asian regions 

provides new opportunities for growth in trade and security. We have the opportunity to help the Afghans in what is also their fight for long-term stability respectful of democratic principles and respect for human rights. 

Concurrent with security efforts to fight insurgent groups and train the Afghan 

National Security Forces are the equally crucial efforts to improve governance and 

prosperity. We’re seeing support for insurgency decline and support for the Afghan 

Government increase in areas where Afghans are provided access to fair government institutions and economic livelihoods. 

It is against this strategic background that I want to discuss the individual areas 

of our Afghanistan engagement. We have made progress on a broad range of fronts. 

Particular achievements include economic growth, strengthened local and national 

institutions, and successes on the battlefield. But our job is not finished, and important challenges remain, most prominently in the fields of terrorism, narcotics, 

human rights, and corruption. 

SECURITY

I am pleased to report that our counterinsurgency effort has shown the way to 

success. We have made considerable progress against the Taliban insurgents. U.S.- 

led NATO forces in the east, have successfully married security with governance 

and reconstruction in a full-spectrum counterinsurgency effort. We are seeing Afghan army and police, governors and citizens resist the Taliban. In the south, Afghan and allied forces have taken the fight to the Taliban, recently recapturing the 

restive district of Musa Qala and helping establish Government of Afghanistan presence. We and our NATO and Afghan partners continue to work together to consolidate and extend those gains by bringing in governance and development. 

Due to th eir inability to win on the battlefield, the Taliban have resorted to malicious tactics such as improvised explosive devices, suicide bombers, and directly targeting foreign civilians. The attack on the Serena Hotel in Kabul on January 14 is 

but the most recent example. We are also battling a Taliban communications strategy that reflects neither the truth nor any respect for the local population. 

The United States and our allies in Afghanistan share the desire to see the Afghan Government assume greater responsibility for its own security. We have had 

success in building Afghanistan’s security forces. At this point, we have already 

trained and equipped more than 49,000 Afghan National Army personnel. The Afghan National Army is a respected institution in Afghanistan and the Afghans show 

an increasing capacity to plan and lead independent military operations. 

The transition from a system of militias loyal to local commanders and warlords, 

to a professionally led force that respects and enforces rule of law and human rights 

will take time. We have a sound program in place for developing the Afghan police 

and to increase policing capacity at the district level. Through better training and 

leadership, improved pay and electronic distribution of salaries, and provision of 

better equipment, we are working to ensure that the police are ready and motivated 

to do their jobs. 

We are increasing American support to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force with more troops and resources because we are committed to NATO’s 

mission. The United States will deploy an additional 3,200 marines to Afghanistan 

this spring; 2,200 marines will be deployed to Regional Command South under command of the International Security Assistance Force. The remaining 1,000 marines 

will train Afghan National Security Forces. 

Success is possible, but not assured. Therefore, the international community 

needs to continue and expand its efforts. The greatest threat to Afghanistan’s future 

is abandonment by the international community. As Secretary Gates has made clear 

in testimony here and in other public comments, meeting the requirements identified by NATO commanders remains a challenge. The mission in Afghanistan needs 

more troops, equipment (such as helicopters), and trainers for the Afghan army and 

police. We expect more from our NATO allies; we have promised the Afghan people 

to assist in stabilizing their country, and we must give NATO personnel the tools 

they need to make good on that promise. Too few of our allies have combat troops 

fighting the insurgents, especially in the south. As we look to the upcoming NATO 

10 

summit in Bucharest in April, we will continue to work with our 25 NATO allies 

and l3 additional partners in Afghanistan to meet the requirement to complete the 

NATO mission. 

GOVERNANCE

Lasting stability will only come when the Afghan Government can step in to fill 

the void that is left when an area is cleared from insurgents. We must, therefore, 

focus on the less tangible, but equally as critical, goal of extending the government’s 

influence nationwide. In order to persuade them to side with the government 

against the insurgents, Afghans must be given more visible evidence that their own 

government has the ability to deliver basic services, provide rule of law, uphold 

human rights, and extend economic opportunities effectively, transparently, and responsibly in all corners of the country. Our foreign assistance programs foster programs big and small to help achieve the objective of visible and viable governance 

at the local level. We are funding local projects developed by community and provincial councils that play an increasing role responding to the people’s needs. We are 

also helping the Ministry of Education create a network of public service academies 

and the Ministry of Justice to promote rule of law at the local level. 

We support honest and competent governors that respond to the needs of the people and respect human rights. In this context, we welcome the establishment of the 

Independent Directorate for Local Governance which has already achieved encouraging results. We hope that this institution will continue to be instrumental in fostering people’s confidence in the state. 

RECONSTRUCTION

Reconstruction and development work remains on track in most of the country 

and the Afghan economy continues to grow at impressive rates, with licit Gross Domestic Product more than doubling since 2002. Thanks in large part to our colleagues in the U.S. Government, the lives of millions of Afghans have improved considerably. In 2001, just 8 percent of Afghans had access to some form of health care; 

now, more than 80 percent of the population has access to medical care. Almost 

11,000 medial professionals have been trained. More than 680 hospitals and clinics 

have been built and outfitted. For the first time in 10 years, the grain harvest was 

sufficient to meet consumption needs inside Afghanistan. In 2001, 900,000 children—mostly boys—were enrolled in school; now, there are more than 5 million and 

more than 1.5 million of these (34%) are girls and young women. Since 2001, there 

has been a 22-percent decline in mortality rates for infants and children under 5 

years of age—we are saving 85,000 more young lives every year. Two years ago only 

35 percent of children were being inoculated against the polio virus. Now more than 

70 percent of the population—including 7 million children—are inoculated. In 2001, 

there was a dysfunctional banking system. Now, Afghanistan has a functioning 

Central Bank with more than 30 regional branches and an internationally traded 

currency. There are now 3 mobile telephone companies serving over 3.5 million subscribers—this is almost 11 percent of the population. In 2001, there were 50 kilometers of paved roadway in the country, now there are more than 4,000 kilometers 

of paved roads. 

We plan to allocate close to $600 million of our fiscal year 2008 base foreign assistance budget to reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, which will support programs ranging from education, health, agriculture, infrastructure, and Provincial 

Reconstruction Teams. In the fiscal year 2008 supplemental, we have also requested 

about $500 million to build roads and power infrastructure and another $50 million 

to expand our successful health and education programs. Working hand in hand 

with the Government of Afghanistan, these initiatives are critical tools to connecting 

the Afghan people to their government and transforming the environment to one in 

which they have the basic services necessary to prosper. 

DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Our support for democratic stability and human rights in Afghanistan is also paying off. The Afghan Parliament is assuming its appropriate role as a deliberative 

body. We attach great importance to the upcoming Presidential and parliamentary 

elections because having free, fair, and transparent elections is an essential part of 

Afghanistan’s transition to a full democracy. Given that voter registration will take 

about a year to complete, it needs to begin soon. The Afghans will have to make 

key decisions on election dates and the electoral system. In the fiscal year 2008 supplemental, the President requested $255 million for critically needed democracy and 

election-support programs. 

11 

There is now a renewed focus on rule of law and the justice sector. We have established a public-private partnership with American law firms and schools to help advance rule of law and establish a strong core of legal professionals. We believe a 

transparent and fair justice system is critical to ensuring that the people of Afghanistan respect the authority of the central government and to ensuring that the rights 

of Afghan citizens are protected. 

The development of an independent, active Afghan media has been remarkable. 

However, there is still room for improvement. We are concerned with the increase 

in detention of journalists and government interference in media coverage over the 

past year. Also troubling were the deaths of two female journalists last summer and 

the recent death sentence of a young Afghan journalist. We are working with the 

Afghan Government and the Afghan Parliament to emphasize the importance of the 

new media law currently in the legislative process meeting international standards 

regarding, in particular, the legal protection of journalists and removing vague content restrictions, establishing a fair, independent licensing system and an independent body to govern Radio Television Afghanistan. 

A peaceful and stable Afghanistan cannot be secured without the active political 

and economic involvement of women. While women’s political participation has 

gained a degree of acceptance, women who are active in public life continue to face 

disproportionate threats and violence. Furthermore, women and girls continue to 

face severe discrimination and both formal and customary justice mechanisms that 

fail to protect their rights. The U.S. is firmly committed to support for Afghan 

women and integrates women’s issues into virtually all of its programs, aiming to 

increase female political participation, education, economic opportunities, and their 

role in civil society. 

COUNTERNARCOTICS

Though the number of poppy-free provinces doubled in 2007, total opium cultivation in Afghanistan grew significantly, The Afghan Government and the international community are alarmed about this development. Afghanistan’s poppy production fuels corruption, narcotics addiction, and is a significant source of financing 

for criminal and insurgent groups. In order to prosper, Afghanistan must rid itself 

of the opium poppy. President Karzai and his top leader recognize this. 

Countering poppy growth requires a multifaceted approach. We are pursuing precisely such an approach with our five pillar strategy involving public information, 

alternative development, law en forcement, interdiction, and eradication. We are reinforcing the message that poppy cultivation is immoral, illegal, and un-Islamic. We 

are helping farmers to gain access to other means to feed and clothe their families— 

access to alternative crops and other means of livelihood, to roads that will allow 

them to move their crops to market, to advice concerning markets for their new 

crops and to legitimate sources of credit. We are also helping the Afghan Government to increasingly provide cre dible law enforcement, interdiction, and eradication. The disincentives for poppy cultivation must be bigger than the potential 

profit. The credibility of our counternarcotics efforts must include making the risks 

of growing poppy unacceptable. 

Local governance structures and counternarcotics are closely interconnected. 

Where government has control and has placed good administrators, poppy production is down. Where the insurgency rages, poppy production is up. 

RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN

The Afghanistan and Pakistan bilateral relationship and improved coordination of 

border surveillance activities along the Durand Line is crucial for stemming the 

cross-border flow of insurgents and eliminating their safe havens in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Afghanistan’s relations with Pakistan moved forward in 2007 with several summits, the productive August bilateral peace jirga in 

Kabul, and President Karzai’s successful visit to Islamabad in late December. Both 

sides ageed at the August peace jirga to hold routine minijirgas. Pakistan has offered 1,000 scholarships to Afghans in a good step to increasing positive connections. 

Current political events in Pakistan may divert the attention of the Pakistan army 

from combating extremism in the FATA, however, close military cooperation with 

Pakistan is still key to the success of U S. strategic goals in the region. 

We continue to encourage the Government of Pakistan to take sustained and aggressive actions against violent extremists. At the same time we recognize that a 

purely military solution is unlikely to succeed. We therefore strongly support the 

Government of Pakistan’s efforts to implement a comprehensive and long-term 

strategy to combating terrorism and eliminating violent extremism in the border regions, which include the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, parts of the NorthVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:58 Nov 20, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\013108.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
12 

west Frontier Province, and Baluchistan. We are committed to supporting this initiative to bring economic and social development and effective governance, thereby 

rendering these remote areas inhospitable to violent extremists, We are also looking 

forward to working with Pakistan’s new civilian government on this important initiative after the February 18 parliamentary elections. 

Along the Afghan side of the border as well, we’re seeing signs that local support 

for terrorism is declining as a direct result of our comprehensive efforts on security 

and reconstruction. Improvements in roads leading to Pakistan reap economic, social, and security benefits. But they also make it easier to identify insurgents crossing the border. While some of the fighters along the Pakistani side of the border 

intend to cross over into Afghanistan to attack U.S. and NATO military forces, their 

main goal now seems to be the expulsion of the Pakistani military from the Tribal 

Areas and the imposition of sharia law in the areas they control. 

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would like to t hank you for this opportunity to 

appear before this committee. We at the State Department appreciate the committee 

members’ interest and support of this most important endeavor. We and our allies 

must recognize that success in Afghanistan is our only option. I am convinced that 

we are a ll moving in the right direction and that with sustained international support Afghanistan can look forward to a stable, democratic, and more prosperous future so that this country will never again fall prey to extremists and terrorists. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID T. JOHNSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, and distinguished 

members of the committee, like Ambassador Boucher, I appreciate 

the opportunity you’re providing us to discuss our efforts to assist 

Afghanistan, and, in my case, to curb the production and trafficking of illegal narcotics. I’m going to focus my remarks on how 

we’ve adjusted our strategy, in light of the current situation, as we 

enter the 2008 poppy growing season. 

I’ve submitted a written statement, for the record, that I’ll summarize. 

Mr. Chairman, the scope of Afghanistan’s drug problem is hard 

to overstate. In 2007, Afghanistan produced 93 percent of the 

world’s opium poppy, a record high in the second year standing. 

Cultivation was particularly pronounced in the south, where the insurgency is strong and government authority weaker. 

Afghanistan’s narcotics industry fuels insecurity, undercuts reconstruction efforts, and hinders the development of the legitimate 

economy. Notwithstanding these challenges, we did observe significant poppy reductions in the north of the country, including in the 

traditional poppy-growing provinces of Balkh and Badakhshan. As 

Ambassador Boucher mentioned, during 2007 the number of poppyfree provinces more than doubled, from 6 to 13. To us, these trends 

demonstrate that counternarcotics success can be achieved where 

there is security, political will, and the ability to provide alternatives. 

Early indications for the 2008 poppy-growing season show a 

deepening of last year’s trends. In the province-by-province map to 

my left, the provinces in the shade of red indicate where we expect 

substantial or moderate cultivation. Those in blue are where we expect to have little cultivation or where we expect to see significant 

decreases in poppy cultivation, such as in Nangarhar. As this demonstrates, the phenomenon of drug cultivation is not uniform across 

Afghanistan. In large sections in the north and east, including 

13 

some areas bordering Pakistan, Afghanistan’s made significant 

progress in reducing poppy cultivation. The problems become much 

more localized and concentrated in the south, in provinces such as 

Helmand and Kandahar, where insecurity persists. 

Our revised counternarcotics strategy, released in August, seeks 

to consolidate and expand upon gains throughout the north, while 

addressing expanding cultivation in a very challenging security environment in the south. 

Our revised strategy aims, dramatically, to enhance incentives 

through the provision of additional development assistance, while 

simultaneously strengthening the disincentives through efforts 

such as interdiction, eradication, and law enforcement. We have, 

for instance, strengthened the good-performers initiative that aims 

to deliver rapid, high-impact development assistance directly to 

those communities that have been successful in reducing or eliminating opium poppy. The enhancements further support the U.S. 

Agency for International Development’s well-established Alternative Development Program. Incentives such as these must be 

balanced with strong disincentives, such as interdiction, eradication, and, most of all, an effective criminal justice system. 

Assisting the Government of Afghanistan in improving interdiction capabilities is among our highest priorities. The Drug Enforcement Administration provides training, mentoring, and investigative assistance to the counternarcotics police of Afghanistan, and it 

supports three specially vetted units that investigate and pursue 

key high-value targets. 

According to the Afghan Government statistics, in 2007 the counternarcotics police of Afghanistan seized 39 metric tons of opium, 

4 metric tons of heroin, arrested 760 individuals for trafficking, and 

destroyed 50 drug labs. Eradication is another critical component 

of our counternarcotics strategy. Based on its experience in other 

countries, the U.N. estimates that 25 percent of Afghanistan’s 

poppy crop must be eradicated in order, effectively, to deter the 

population from growing poppy. To promote eradication that is effective and equitable, the U.S. Government strongly supports nonnegotiated force-protected eradication. 

The U.N. has reported that poppy cultivation is no longer associated with poverty in Afghanistan. The poppy fields in the south are 

largely owned by wealthy drug lords and, in some instance, corrupt 

officials. The benefits of this policy, of reducing financial benefit to 

insurgents and corrupt officials that enable a climate of corruption, 

far outweigh the potential loss of the support of a small percentage 

of the population. 

To develop the ability of the nascent Afghan criminal justice sector, the Departments of State and Justice are training a specially 

vetted task force of Afghan judges, prosecutors, and investigators 

to try mid- and high-value narcotics traffickers before the Counternarcotics Tribunal of Afghanistan. Since that Afghan-led task force 

became operational in May 2005, it’s prosecuted over 1,200 cases, 

arrested over 1,600 defendants, and seized more than 38 metric 

tons of opium. 

Mr. Chairman, again, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you and your colleagues. I welcome your feedback and look forward to the discussion. 

14 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID T. JOHNSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU

FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF

STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, and other distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to come before you to discuss our efforts to 

assist Afghanistan in curbing the production and trafficking of illegal narcotics and 

to enhance the ability of the Afghan National Police (ANP) to provide public security 

throughout Afghanistan. These are two of our most critical missions in Afghanistan 

today. My testimony will provide you with an update on counternarcotics and police 

training activities facilitated by the Department of State’s Bureau for International 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), in close collaboration with the Government 

of Afghanistan, the interagency community, and our international partners, since I 

last appeared before this committee in September 2007. In particular, I would like 

to focus my remarks on how we have adjusted our strategy in light of new realities 

and as we enter the 2008 poppy growing season. 

CURRENT STATUS AND TRENDS

The scope of Afghanistan’s drug problem cannot be overstated. According to the 

U.N., in 2007 Afghanistan produced 93 percent of the world’s opium poppy, which 

was a record high for the second year in a row. Total poppy cultivation increased 

by 28,000 hectares over 2006 levels, which accounts for an increase of 17 percent 

in land under cultivation. Cultivation was particularly pronounced in the south of 

the country where the insurgency is strong and government authority is weak, with 

the southern province of Helmand producing over 50 percent of the country’s opium 

on its own. It is now clear that Afghanistan’s narcotics industry feeds a troubling 

cycle of insecurity wherein drug money fuels insecurity by assisting the insurgency, 

undercuts international reconstruction efforts, and hinders the development of the 

legitimate economy. 

Despite these challenges, U.N. surveys showed significant poppy reductions in the 

north of the country, including in the traditional poppy-growing provinces of Balkh 

and Badakhshan. During 2007, the number of poppy-free provinces more than doubled from 6 in 2006 to 13 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces in 2007. These trends demonstrate that counternarcotics success can be achieved where there is security, political will, and the ability to provide alternative development opportunities. 

Early indications for the 2008 poppy growing season show a deepening of the previous year’s trends: Sustained reductions in poppy cultivation in the north and east 

of the country will likely be offset by increases in the insecure south. We anticipate 

that Nangarhar province, where cultivation of poppy more than doubled from 2006 

to 2007, will demonstrate a dramatic decrease—perhaps as much as 50 percent— 

in poppy cultivation in 2008 due in large part to the successful counternarcotics 

efforts of its Governor. If this expectation proves true, it would demonstrate the 

power of political will even in areas where drug traffickers operate and insecurity 

thrives. 

IMPROVEMENTS TO THE U.S. COUNTERNARCOTICS STRATEGY

In August 2007, the ‘‘U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan’’ was unveiled, and sets forth the USG’s efforts to achieve short-term and long-term success 

in the fight against narcotics. The strategy maintains the basic framework of our 

comprehensive five pillar approach to counternarcotics—which includes public information, alternative development, eradication, interdiction, and law enforcement and 

justice sector reform components—but calls for several key improvements to better 

address changing trends in cultivation, the security context, the political climate, 

and economic development requirements. In particular, we aim to dramatically enhance incentives for participation in licit livelihoods through the provision of additional development assistance, while simultaneously strengthening the disincentives 

in participating in all facets and levels of the narcotics industry through increased 

interdiction, eradication, and law enforcement. The complexity of the drug problem 

in Afghanistan demands a balanced counternarcotics approach that melds deterrence, prevention, and economic development assistance. 

To advance this strategic refinement, the Department of State is actively working 

with the Government of Afghanistan and our allies to provide increased development assistance to Afghans who live in areas with high levels of poppy cultivation 

15 

and who have demonstrated progress in counternarcotics. One vital component of 

this strategy is the implementation of a strengthened Good Performers Initiative 

(GPI) which is a counternarcotics incentive program designed to deliver high-impact 

development assistance directly to those communities leading the fight against 

poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. 

Established in 2006 by the Government of Afghanistan with financial support from the United States ($35 million committed to date) and the United Kingdom 

($6.5 million committed to date), the GPI initially only rewarded poppy-free provinces with funds for development assistance. With sustained encouragement from 

the United States, President Karzai expanded the terms of the initiative in November 2007 to provide GPI assistance to provinces that achieve net poppy reductions 

of over 10 percent as well as those that have taken extraordinary counternarcotics 

measures but did not meet the criteria for an award. To date, 17 provinces are eligible for or have received GPI development assistance totaling more than $16 million. 

GPI projects currently underway include irrigation projects; provision of agricultural 

equipment; and the construction of greenhouses, university buildings, information 

technology training centers, and girls’ schools. 

The enhancements made to the Good Performer’s Initiative further support the 

U.S. Government’s well-established alternative development program in Afghanistan, which is led by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). During FY 2007, nearly $229 million in funding was allocated for USAID-led alternative 

development initiatives, which included efforts to implement a rural finance program to provide credit to farmers and small- and medium-sized enterprises, to create overseas markets for Afghan agricultural exports, to provide technical and material assistance to farmers, to establish economically viable infrastructure to produce 

and move licit goods to market, and to administer cash-for-work programs. USAID 

has been particularly successful in organizing a series of agricultural fairs, which 

encourage public-private partnerships to advance licit agriculture in high-poppy cultivation areas, including Helmand, Nangarhar, and Badakhshan. 

Incentives such as these must be balanced with strong disincentives—namely 

interdiction, eradication, and a viable justice sector—to deter drug traffickers and 

the wider public from participating in the narcotics industry. Although insecurity, 

porous borders, and mountainous terrain make interdiction a particular challenge 

in Afghanistan, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is working with the 

Departments of State and Defense to help the GOA improve its interdiction capability by strengthening the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA). DEA 

provides training, mentoring, and investigative assistance to the CNPA and supports three specially vetted CNPA units that investigate and pursue high-value targets. DEA, with DOD and State Department support, is planning to further expand 

the Afghan Government’s efforts to break major trafficking groups that are operating in outlying and border provinces. 

Eradication, while controversial and difficult, is a critical component of our counternarcotics strategy and is essential to ensuring sustainable progress in democracy, 

economic reform, and rule of law. Based on the experiences of other countries, the 

U.N. estimates that 25 percent of Afghanistan’s poppy crop must be eradicated in 

order to effectively deter poppy farmers, and those who support them, from planting 

poppy in the future. Past efforts by the Afghan central government’s Poppy Eradication Force (PEF) showed that negotiated eradication, in which PEF leaders negotiate with local leaders over which poppy fields to eradicate, allowed for undue political influence and an inconsistent application of Article 26.6 of Afghanistan’s December 2005 Counter Narcotics Law, which subjects all illicit drug cultivation—whether 

you are a wealthy landowner with connections to power or a poor farmer—to the 

risk of destruction without compensation. To this end, the U.S. Government strongly 

supports PEF engagement in nonnegotiated eradication supported by adequate force 

protection. If the Afghan Government chose to pursue this strategy, it would instill 

a heightened degree of risk into the decision to cultivate poppy and have the added 

effect of demonstrating the reach of the central government in areas where it has 

struggled to consolidate its power to date. 

Just as the security context is closely linked to the narcotics industry in Afghanistan, we strongly believe that the State Department’s foreign policy counternarcotics 

mandate, which includes an eradication component, is closely linked to wider U.S. 

Government counterinsurgency objectives. A growing body of evidence indicates the 

presence of a symbiotic relationship between the narcotics trade and the antigovernment insurgency, most commonly associated with the Taliban. Narcotics traffickers 

provide revenue and arms to the insurgency, while the insurgents provide protection 

to growers and traffickers and prevent the government from interfering with their 

activities. In recent years, poppy production has soared in provinces where insurgents are most active—five relatively higher income, agriculturally rich provinces 

16 

1 Richard Holbrook, ‘‘Still Wrong in Afghanistan,’’ the Washington Post, January 23, 2008, 

A19. 

along the Pakistan border account for 70 percent of Afghanistan’s 2007 poppy production with over 50 percent in Helmand Province alone. Our strategy faces this 

challenge head-on, seeking to starve the insurgency of the drug money that fuels 

it. 

Some have suggested that increased eradication would have the effect of pushing 

‘‘farmers with no other source of livelihood into the arms of the Taliban without reducing the total amount of opium being produced.’’ 1 The facts do not support this 

view. The poppy fields in the south—where poppy cultivation and the insurgency 

are most acute—are largely owned by wealthy drug lords and, in some instances, 

corrupt officials. Recent aerial reconnaissance missions have observed organized and 

industrialized poppy farming in broad, open fields. Helmand province is also a significant recipient of international assistance. In fact, if Helmand were a separate 

country, it would be the sixth largest recipient of bilateral USAID assistance in the 

world. Pursuing nonnegotiated, force-protected eradication would primarily impact 

these well-financed narcofarmers and provide a blow to the insurgents that protect 

them in the process. The benefits of this policy—of reducing financial benefit to insurgents and corrupt officials that enable a climate of corruption—far outweigh the 

potential loss of support of a small percentage of the population. 

Advances in interdiction and eradication will stall without simultaneous efforts to 

develop the ability of the nascent Afghan justice sector to investigate, arrest, prosecute, and incarcerate those guilty of narcotics violations. The Departments of State 

and Justice, in collaboration with other international donors, are working to support 

the Afghan Government’s Criminal Justice Task Force (CNTF), responsible for narcotics prosecutions, and the Counternarcotics Tribunal (CNT), which has exclusive 

national jurisdiction over all mid- and high-level narcotics cases. While much work 

remains, progress has been made to help Afghanistan build its justice system from 

the ground up. We are in the process of expanding training efforts for provincial and 

district-level prosecutors to assist them in developing narcotics cases to be transferred to Kabul and tried before the CNT. None of these counternarcotics efforts 

would be possible without the presence of a capable and independent Afghan 

National Police (ANP) force, which I would now like to discuss. 

AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE (ANP)

In 2003, the United States and the international community began a program to 

increase the overall capacity of the Afghan National Police (ANP) and its ability— 

under the direction of the Ministry of Interior (MOI)—to provide law enforcement 

throughout Afghanistan. To this end, the Department of State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the Department of Defense’s 

Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan (CSTC–A) are working together and with our international partners to train, equip, and mentor the Afghan 

police and reform the Afghan Ministry of Interior. 

Together, we have made substantial progress in developing the rosters, the capabilities, and the reach of the ANP. Many of the 74,000 ANP currently deployed— 

including more than 25,000 in 2007—have completed basic, advanced, and/or specialized training at one of seven Regional Training Centers (RTCs) in the provinces 

or the Central Training Center (CTC) in Kabul. To assist in the development of law 

enforcement skills, approximately 500 U.S. civilian police advisors work alongside 

Afghan police units at RTCs at the provincial and district level and within the MOI. 

In addition to the large number of ANP already trained and mentored, the efforts 

of our civilian police advisors have yielded other concrete successes in Afghanistan, 

including: 

• A greater understanding of the operational capabilities and requirements of the 

ANP, which led to the creation of specialized civil-order police units and domestic violence (family response) police units. The civil order police now serve as 

the bedrock of the Focused District Development (FDD) plan to enhance district-level law enforcement, while the family response units provide a unique 

and critical capacity for the ANP to extend their reach to the female population; 

• Recognition of the importance of female police, which has led to greater efforts 

to recruit female ANP and the establishment of the Women’s Police Corps 

(WPC) with facilities designed specifically for training female police; 

• Development of a specialized border security curriculum for the Afghan Border 

Police (ABP); and 

• Significant improvements to the ANP’s investigative techniques for tracking the 

perpetrators of crime. 

17 

Despite these and other successes, considerable challenges remain in establishing 

a professional MOI and a fully independent and functional ANP. Similar to the challenges facing our counternarcotics mission, persistent insurgent activity, especially 

in southern Afghanistan has routinely placed the ANP in high-threat environments 

that demand skills and operations far more complex than those required of community police. ANP are regularly targeted by insurgents and suffer a high casualty 

rate. This environment, and the resulting high mortality rate for ANP, continues 

to have a negative impact on the ANP and on the MOI’s ability to recruit and retain 

qualified personnel. 

To overcome these challenges and further enhance the effectiveness and operational independence of the ANP, the highest priority for our police advisors in the 

coming months is the successful implementation of the Focused District Development (FDD) plan, which is a new and holistic approach to train, equip, and mentor 

the ANP. FDD was designed by the Government of Afghanistan, the United States, 

and international partners to be a Ministry of Interior-led, cross-sectoral approach 

to training, equipping, and mentoring Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) at the district 

level. In each district undergoing FDD, four primary activities occur: 

• A needs and skills assessment of district AUP is conducted; 

• Collective training and equipping of district AUP occurs at RTCs based on the 

assessment findings; 

• Comprehensive mentoring of district AUP follows training; and 

• Concurrent development of the judicial and prosecutorial sectors is assessed and 

implemented in that district. 

Each full cycle of FDD is expected to take 6 to 8 months, per district. 

The first FDD cycle—currently being implemented in seven districts throughout 

Afghanistan—began in December 2007, and is expected to be completed in April 

2008. The MOI is working with the international community to plan for future 

iterations of FDD, which will be rolled out on a regular basis. Assessments for the 

second FDD cycle are currently underway in five districts. 

While comprehensive findings and outcomes of FDD will not be available until 

late spring 2008 at the earliest, preliminary reports on the program are positive. 

Thus far, U.S. civilian police mentors and trainers report that training is proceeding 

on track and anecdotal evidence has indicated that the improved student-mentor 

ratio at the RTCs has led to a more positive learning environment for the ANP. 

Also, the Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP) has been effective in maintaining district security and has been well-received by local populations. Given the vital importance of the police to ensuring security and the rule of law, we will continue to work 

closely with CSTC–A, the Government of Afghanistan, and our international partners to look for creative ways to improve the police program and ensure its continued success. 

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before the 

committee today. Please know that I will continue to strive to keep you fully informed of our progress and our setbacks in these important missions, and I certainly 

welcome your thoughts and advice. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Seven-minute round, is that OK? 

Well, to listen to you two guys, we’re doing really well, things are 

going really well in Afghanistan. And I—that’s encouraging. 

But, let me ask you, 38 metric tons seized, how many produced? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Sir, it’s a fraction of the amount produced. 

The CHAIRMAN. Like what? One percent? 

Mr. JOHNSON. No; I think it’s substantially more than that, but 

not—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, what do you think? Give me an estimate. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I believe, about 400. So, I’d—I would say, in the 

estimate—in the range of maybe 10 percent. 

The CHAIRMAN. And the criminal justice system, is it functional? 

Mr. JOHNSON. It is beginning to function, but it is not functioning in the way that we would expect in a—— 

18 

The CHAIRMAN. It’s not even remotely functional, at this point, 

is it? 

Mr. JOHNSON. ‘‘Remotely,’’ I would not describe—it is—I would 

describe it more than ‘‘remotely functioning,’’ but it is—it is in the 

process of being established. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah. It isn’t functioning. That would be a fair 

statement, isn’t it true? I mean, there are some places where it 

may be functioning, but essentially it’s not a functioning criminal 

justice system. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I did mention that there have been over 

1,200 convictions with—for this special court, so there is a system 

that is producing some results, but it is embryonic. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Boucher, you indicated that we’re 

making progress against the Taliban. How does that square with 

the fact they control a lot more of the country? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. I don’t—I don’t think they actually control a lot more of the country. They operate in a lot of the country. 

But, we’ve seen areas where they’ve tried to settle down and establish control, we’ve seen several of those major areas taken away. 

Panjshir, near Kandahar, Canadian and Afghan operation early 

this—late 2006, early this year—that was one of their heartland 

places, and they’re out of there now, and there are services being 

brought into that area, a lot of people—ordinary people moving 

back. So, I—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Are we better off, relative to the Taliban, today 

than we were 2 years ago? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. We’re better off, in terms of our ability to 

bring in the government and help them provide services throughout the country. We’re not better off—we’re better off, in terms of— 

they’re not controlling places and not having so many concentrations where they can operate from. We’re not better off, in terms 

of bombs, because they’ve been losing on the battlefield, they failed 

to achieve any of their objectives last year, except they’ve turned 

more and more to terror, and they’ve—they’re able to go blow 

themselves up. 

The CHAIRMAN. So, we’re losing more—right?—this year than 

last year. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. We’ve been out there, fighting a lot more, 

and yes, we’ve had more casualties this year. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah. The police, how would you rate their effectiveness? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Very variable. 

The CHAIRMAN. Anyplace—tell me where it’s real good. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. I think some districts—some places in the 

north, some districts in the south, where we’ve started this Focus 

Development, show a lot of promise. Police training has lagged behind all the other sectors. We’ve made a major push last year in 

budget and in effort. Now we’ve got a lot more good policemen coming out, we’ve got a lot more trained policemen, we’ve got a lot 

more focus on what needs to be done with the police, we’ve—— 

The CHAIRMAN. The reports I’ve read—— 

Ambassador BOUCHER [continuing]. Seen some of the reform in 

Ministry of Interior that’s needed, but more is—more of that is yet 

to come. 

19 

The CHAIRMAN. This discussion reminds me so much of the discussion about police in Iraq that Senator Hagel and I have had 

over the years. I don’t—I’ve not found one independent report that 

suggests that they’re anything other than a problem. Can you cite 

one for me? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. I’ll tell you one thing. There was a—it 

was the—a survey done last year that I think was reported by the 

BBC in December, and one of the things that really struck me was, 

people said they’d rather have bad policemen than no policemen at 

all. Now, that’s certainly not our goal, but the fact—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it’s been achieved. 

Ambassador BOUCHER [continuing]. That people who have policemen—— 

The CHAIRMAN. We’ve achieved that, though. It may not be the 

goal. We’ve achieved it. [Laughter.] 

Ambassador BOUCHER. That was the case beforehand, sir. There 

were—— 

The CHAIRMAN. It’s the case right now. Look—look, you know, 

it’s interesting, I—I thought this report by the—by the Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit—it’s called ‘‘Cops or Robbers’’—the report ends with the following—and I’m not citing this as the only 

source; we’re going to hear from two witnesses about this, as well— 

it says that it’s time to clarify today’s blurred vision on the role of 

police in Afghanistan and to achieve a consensus on a common vision, the strategy for developing a police force will operate as cops 

rather than as robbers. This is so much—I mean, such an echo of 

4 years ago, 5 years ago in Afghanistan. The emphasis has been 

on numbers, not quality. The emphasis has been to rapidly ramp 

up the numbers of police, and—— 

Well, I’m going to move on, in the minute or so I have left. 

With regard, Mr. Johnson, to the move against poppy production, 

how many of the drug lords have been arrested and tried and put 

out of business? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I mentioned, in the statement that I made, the 

number of arrests that have been made by—and the number of 

convictions. Now, ‘‘drug lord’’ is a—an indefinite term. 

The CHAIRMAN. No; it’s not. No; it’s not an indefinite term. You 

know there’s at least a dozen identifiable people you know who are 

running these operations. If you don’t know, we really have a problem. We have a gigantic problem if you don’t know. You know. 

Have any of them been arrested? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I think if you—we were going to be using the 

term ‘‘kingpin,’’ which is frequently used in this term, I don’t think 

we have been yet successful in that—and arrested and convicted. 

The exception to that being that there have been some extraditions 

to the United States for trial here. I think all of those individuals 

are people that we would describe as significant players in the Afghan drug trade. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah. One last question on this. And there’s a lot 

more I want to come back to. But, I—in speaking with the intelligence community, the military, almost every segment of our government involved with—having an input on dealing with eradication, nobody seems to think, including our NATO allies, that aerial spraying is a good idea. And you pointed out that you have reVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:58 Nov 20, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\013108.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
20 

duced to—you have six fewer areas in which poppy is now being 

produced. How did you succeed there? Was it aerial spraying? 

Mr. JOHNSON. The way we made progress there was multifold, 

but it was through a forced eradication program in which we provided assistance. It was significantly—— 

The CHAIRMAN. When you say ‘‘forced eradication,’’ what kind of 

‘‘forced eradication’’? What was the—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. On the ground—on-the-ground mechanical. 

The CHAIRMAN. Right. 

Mr. JOHNSON. It was through—it was significantly, and even 

largely, through local governing officials—in particular, governors 

who had the political will and had the security environment in 

which they could destroy poppy, themselves. And that—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I think there’s probably a lesson in that, isn’t 

there? I mean—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I think the lesson is, where you have—that 

security and counternarcotics go hand in hand, that you can’t have 

one without the other, and you can’t do them sequentially, you 

have to do them together. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I—the military tells me that, if, in fact, 

aerial eradication was—is adopted as the favored method of eradication, which is—our Ambassador wants, very much—that that 

would require a heck of a lot more military resources than we have 

now. You’re essentially flying crop dusters. This is something I’ve 

been involved in—with 30 years in the—on this issue, as you have, 

from the Judiciary Committee. And you’re essentially flying crop 

dusters, what most people would think would be that, the eradicating these defoliant—this takes out the—and in order for that to 

occur successfully, you need helicopter gunships, you need protection for those aircraft, because they can be shot down. They can be 

shot down, some of then, just with small-arms fire. So, have you 

calculated what it would—what additional military resources, beyond the actual planes that would spray the defoliant, are needed 

in order to make—even if the decision is made that aerial eradication should be the major thrust of eradication, have you—have 

there been—is there a study or a calculation or a report that 

you’ve—that you’ve put together, what other assets you’d need? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, based on the consideration of this issue earlier, when we were considering whether or not it would be the right 

way to go, we have developed plans for this, including—in addition 

to the spray aircraft, which are lightly armored, as you mentioned. 

We have the helicopter already on the ground that provide security 

for the ground forced-eradication program. So, they’re there, and 

they are capable of providing this service, if it were needed. 

We have these aircraft there, because we need them for the helicopters for the ground program. They’re also used to—for mobility 

for the police training program, for assisting in the development of 

judicial systems. So, those aircraft are on the ground already. 

The CHAIRMAN. Pretty well spoken for, right? 

Mr. JOHNSON. But, not any spray aircraft. We don’t have the capability to do any spraying, and we don’t plan to, because we’ve 

consulted with the Government of Afghanistan, and they—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, OK. 

21 

Mr. JOHNSON [continuing]. Have said that they do not wish for 

us to do so. 

The CHAIRMAN. Good. All right. Thank you very much. 

I yield to the chairman. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to explore a thought, which you mentioned, I think, 

Secretary Boucher, that there will be a donors conference after the 

Afghan national plan is completed, and that sounds like a very 

good idea. But, it just spurs, once again, my thinking, because I’m 

not sure that we have a plan for Afghanistan. I’m not certain we 

really have comprehension on this committee. And I suppose I 

want more reassurance that the administration knows more. 

Specifically, if were to use the model, in business, of a business 

plan of what works—how much capital is required, what kinds of 

activities are going to be required, what marketing strategy and so 

forth—sometimes business plans work and businesses thrive; but, 

in this particular case it appears to me that, of necessity, we’ve reacted to 9/11 and we have been in Afghanistan ever since. We have 

worked with NATO allies in Afghanistan. A great number of good 

things have happened in particular provinces. But, in—at the end 

of the day, despite assurances that the government has some degree of control over the country, most observers, going province by 

province, don’t find that. Central government control is very limited. There is control by tribal leaders or those who had some leadership in the past in various places. Certainly, control is contested 

in many areas—in the south and in the east—and is not simply the 

problem of the drug lords and so forth, it’s Taliban or, on occasion, 

even al-Qaeda supplementing their activities. So, day by day, we 

combat this. We have successes, we can report a number of 

things,—good things that happen. But, I’m hopeful the administration may come forward, working with the international community, 

to try to get some idea what sort of capital resources does this 

country need—a poverty-stricken place—to at least advance to a 

different level of potential economic activity and education. How 

much money to build the roads and the infrastructure so, in fact, 

the central government might have some possibility of actually 

reaching constituent populations? How much is going to be required for the training of an adequate army and police force? In 

other words, a cadre of civil servants who are involved. It’s likely 

to be a very, very large sum. And, in addition to the money, how 

many personnel, whether they are military people of our country 

and others—NGOs, volunteers—are going to be required? 

Otherwise, what I suspect we’re looking at a situation of transition here in which we do not have hearings like this, there’ll be reports that there were some ups and downs last year, and so forth. 

But, at some point, the patience of our NATO allies, maybe even 

of the American people—our constituents—will say, ‘‘We’ve done 

enough. These folks are on their own and will have to do their 

best.’’ Now, some will counsel, ‘‘We’ve been through this before.’’ 

Withdrawal, after the last occasion, led to what some would say, 

a theater in which the Taliban made it possible for al-Qaeda to 

have the camps, and people attacked us. So, they would say, ‘‘Here 

we go again, all the way back around.’’ But, nevertheless, unless 

there is some plan as to why Afghanistan will ever be a different 

22 

country, what, physically, is going to bring integrity to this situation? The model that has often been cast of democracy, with the 

gains for women, for students, for everybody—unless there is some 

goal out there, some overall plan, this situation is going to be a victim, at some point, of the politics of this country or others, and 

then we may lament this, but we will indicate that we gave it our 

best shot, we spent a good bit of money and troops and so forth. 

Now, what kind of overall planning—a comprehensive thing— 

even if, at the end of the day, people say, ‘‘Well, this is impossible, 

we just can’t raise the cash, we can’t get the people there,’’ and, 

therefore, we then have a more limited goal, which will not be as 

satisfying, in terms of the integrity of the state and so forth—but, 

at this point, I don’t see any parameters of this, and that’s disturbing, and this is why I want some reassurance. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Let me reassure you, sir. You’ve raised a 

lot of very important and substantial questions there. And I think 

the framework that you’re coming from is the right one. We have 

to remember, this was one of the poorest countries in the world in 

the fifties, sixties, and seventies; it was on a par with sub-Saharan 

Africa, and then went downhill for 25 years. When I first went 

there, in January 2002, the Afghan Government was 20 people sitting around a table. The Afghan treasury was an empty safe. There 

were 50 kilometers of roads. There were a few telephones, that 

didn’t work. It’s now one of the fastest growing cell phone markets 

in the world. It’s got a road system that unifies the nation. It’s got 

a government that works fairly well—better in some ministries 

than others—but is capable of providing education and wells and 

projects for people around the country. It’s got an army that’s credible and out in the field and fighting. It’s got a police force that is 

reforming. It’s not just quantity, it’s quality, as well. A lot of what’s 

being done with the police training is to reform it as we expand it. 

So, I see all these efforts. Nobody can tell me it’s not going in 

a positive direction. What I see when I go to Kabul, you know, it’s 

a—4 or 5 years ago, people were building housing, and they were 

furnishing houses. The shops that used to be in containers are now 

in buildings. You see school kids out, going to school. You see more 

lights at night than you ever did before. There is progress. It’s 

going in the right direction. 

The question that you asked, though, is: How much does it take 

to finish the job all over the country, to really succeed? Last year, 

at the London conference—last year? Yeah, last year, at the London conference, the London compact and the Afghan strategy were 

laid out with the goals that had to be achieved in a timeframe between then and 2014, I think most of them were. That is being 

turned, increasingly, into an implementation plan, a development 

strategy that will go to the World Bank for vetting, about March 

of this year, and it will be based on that, that we expect to hold 

a donors conference, probably in the summertime—or beginning or 

end of this summer—to try to put money into the specific implementation steps needed to achieve those goals that have been laid 

out. 

On the military side, there have been targets set for military and 

police, requirements set, in terms of what needs—who needs to be 

23 

trained, the kinds of forces they need, the kind of, you know, air 

mobility the army needs, and really set those things. 

Now, those may not be the final numbers. There are plans to get 

to certain levels, and there’s already a look at whether those are 

going to—in the end, going to be the right levels. But, I think there 

is very specific plans about what we’re trying to accomplish with 

training, both in terms of quantity and in quality. 

And these plans dovetail. They dovetail, because they’re brought 

together in Washington by the planners who are making—in 

Kabul, by the people who are making and implementing these 

plans. And the strategy, the overall strategy, is to win on the battlefield, and win the war, really, by providing this governance at 

the local level, and that’s being done more and more every day. I 

think there are places where you can see it definitely working. I 

saw it last week in Konar. I saw it last week in Jalalabad. I’ve seen 

it in Panjshir, in the north. You see it some places at the district 

levels, some place at the provincial level. But, where we have succeeded is—in Afghanistan—is where we’ve been able to provide a 

combination of military force, good governance, and economic opportunity, and we’ve done that successfully in many places; we 

have to do it in all the places if we’re going to succeed fully. 

Senator LUGAR. Just two quick comments. I hope that, as these 

plans are developed, or if they actually are on paper, that you will 

share them with us—— 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Absolutely, sir. 

[The information referred to above follows:] 

Ambassador BOUCHER. A detailed development strategy for Afghanistan, the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, is being finalized by the Government of 

Afghanistan. This multi-year strategy will lay out the strategic priorities and mechanisms for achieving Afghanistan’s development goals with the help of international 

assistance. The Government of Afghanistan will present the Afghan National Development Strategy to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund by the 

end of March 2008. 

The U.S. development program for Afghan National Security Forces will increase 

the capacity and capabilities of the Afghan security forces. Our goal is to have professional, capable, respected, multi-ethnic, and sustainable security forces loyal to 

the Government of Afghanistan. 

With assistance from other countries, the U.S. is training and equipping the Afghan National Army so that it will be able to assume the lead for counterinsurgency 

and internal security operations. Troop strength for the army who recently increased to approximately 80,000 soldiers, including combat forces, support forces, 

Air Corps, sustaining institutions, and ministry and general staffs. 

The U.S., along with other members of the international community is training 

and equipping the Afghan National Police so that they will be able to enhance public security and uphold the rule of law. The police will number approximately 

82,000, including uniformed police, civil order police, border police, auxiliary police, 

and counter-narcotics police. 

However, we continue to review force size and capabilities of the Afghan National 

Security Force based on requirements. 

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. Because this has been the consistent focus of the committee for several years. And let me, finally, 

say—this is not a precise analogy, but—if, for example, in a political campaign, you were to report to your supporters, ‘‘I’m making 

progress.’’ You know, ‘‘I’m—I’ve been to Clinton County, I’ve 

touched base, and we’re doing well over here in Kokomo,’’ but the— 

and if the final result is that you get 25 percent of the vote and 

lose, three to one, this is bad news. And all—— 

24 

The CHAIRMAN. I did that. [Laughter.] 

Senator LUGAR. All I’m saying is that we need to have some overall parameters of, in fact, how this is going to be a nation that 

holds together, as opposed to the fact that, as you point, you’ve 

found some progress, and we acknowledge progress; but, at the end 

of the day, Afghanistan has been a very difficult state, historically, 

as you know better than many in your scholarship, and it will be 

extremely difficult, again, if we really don’t get it right, and we do 

have this opportunity with our NATO allies now, and the focus of 

the world. If this is not the moment we get it right, I pity the Afghans, because their situation is not going to improve after the 

world withdraws. 

But, I thank you very much for your testimony and your answers. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me explain, if I may, the absence of the 

Democrats. There is a Democratic caucus going on right now relating to the combination of what the Democrats are going to do in 

the Senate relative to the stimulus package, as well as what 

they’re going to do relative to our debate relating to continuation 

of the President’s program on eavesdropping. So, that’s underway 

now, that’s the reason why they’re not here. It was called at 10 

o’clock, and I—and I’d rather be here. 

Senator Hagel. 

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And, gentlemen, 

thank you for your time this morning. 

Mr. Boucher, how long have we been in Afghanistan? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Since late 2001. 

Senator HAGEL. So, we’re in our 7th year. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Yeah. 

Senator HAGEL. How much money have we invested in Afghanistan, total—drug eradication efforts, military operations, economic 

assistance? Do you have any general number? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. I want to make sure I get this right. It’s about $25 billion. 

Senator HAGEL. Well, that sounds a little light to me, on the 

numbers that I had, but we’ll come back to that. And I would appreciate it if you could provide this committee, for the record, the 

best numbers that you can provide, over the last 6 years, as we are 

in our 7th year, in total expenditures in Afghanistan. 

[The information referred to above follows:] 

Ambassador BOUCHER. U.S. assistance to Afghanistan from fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2007 is $23 billion in total. On military operations, we have spent $86.3 

billion on Operation Enduring Freedom since 2001. Questions on the total expenditures on the International Security Assistance Force would need to be answered by 

NATO. 

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Boucher, I believe this was your quote, here 

over the last few minutes. You said, ‘‘No one can tell me Afghanistan is not going in the right direction.’’ Now, the panel after you 

will have an opportunity to express themselves rather directly, but 

some of that—of what I think we will hear in the next panel has 

taken some issue with your comment. And since you, I suspect, will 

not be here to respond to this panel, who—you know the individuals who will appear after you and Mr. Johnson, you know they are 

25 

highly regarded, highly experienced, highly respected former public 

officials who know something about Afghanistan and the world. 

And I might draw your attention, especially in light of your comment that no one can tell you we’re not going in the right direction, 

to the Washington Post story this morning. It was based on a press 

conference, yesterday, held by the former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, incidentally—General Jones, who will follow you. 

And this was a release of two studies, according to the Post words 

‘‘strongly worded assessments of the war in Afghanistan.’’ And 

General Jones said this, according to the story, ‘‘’Make no mistake, 

NATO is not winning in Afghanistan,’ said the report by the Atlantic Council of the United States.’’ Further, the quote goes, ‘‘ ’Afghanistan remains a failing state. It can become a failed state,’ warned 

the report.’’ And, of course, the report—both reports produced some 

recommendations, which I would like to get your response to here 

in a moment. 

And you and Mr. Johnson, as the chairman has noted, have expressed yourselves in—I understand, in a way that would be expected from you. But, there’s an astounding number of contradictions about how much progress we’re making. And you have both 

alluded to the fact that the Taliban is losing on the battlefield, 

we’re making good progress on the poppy-production-decline front, 

but yet, the facts just don’t bear that out. And if we’re making so 

much progress, then why are we putting in 3,200 more marines? 

Why are we to a breaking point in NATO over this issue? Consequently, the Canadian Ambassador, sitting in the front row, listening to this. Why is there a great discussion among our allies 

about our strategy, if we have one, what the plan is, as Senator 

Lugar asked you about? So, I’m confused by the facts. 

Now, again, we’re going to have an opportunity to hear from the 

next panel, and they will articulate, in some substance, why they 

have said what they said, according to these two reports, which I 

think, fairly or unfairly, take great issue with what the two of you 

are telling this committee this morning. 

So, my first question is: Have you had a chance to look at those 

reports? Have you had a chance to, in particular, to look at the recommendations included in those reports? And, Mr. Johnson, I’ll be 

particularly interested in your response to—one of the things they 

talk about is, in their words, ‘‘a runaway opium economy,’’ which 

you, I think, alluded to, what—97 or 98 percent of the world’s 

opium is now produced as a result of the poppy production in Afghanistan. Now, I—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Ninety-three, but it—— 

Senator HAGEL. Ninety-three? Well, let the record show 93. It’s 

a—that’s very impressive, that we made that kind of reduction. I 

don’t see how that is progress. And especially in light of the fact, 

Mr. Johnson, as the chairman noted, we obviously don’t have a coordinated policy on an eradication effort. When you look at our continued focus on spraying, when President Karzai, who knows something about his own country and his own government, is opposed 

to that, as do most of our NATO allies that I’m aware of—so, if I 

could focus, with my remaining time, on the administration’s position on these two reports; in particular, the recommendations that 

26 

were made. Do you think there’s validity in the reports? Do you 

think there’s merit in the recommendations? Thank you. 

Mr. Boucher. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Senator Hagel, like you, I have enormous 

respect for the people who have done these reports, and some of 

them have been mentors to me over my career, so I hesitate to contradict them in public, but I will. 

I think—I’ve looked at these reports. They—three big reports 

that came out yesterday on Afghanistan, and they’re all serious efforts. One’s on agriculture, two are on the overall situation. They’re 

all very serious efforts and look at a lot of different angles. I tend 

to disagree with the—sort of, the general observations. Words like 

‘‘failed state’’—I mean, Afghanistan was a failed state in the nineties, it was a failed state when we got in there in late 2001, early 

2002. But, if I plot all the points on the graphs of what’s happened 

since then, I’d say the trajectory is up. And, as I—— 

Senator HAGEL. Just a correction, here. What General Jones 

said, ‘‘remains a failed state.’’ He doesn’t—— 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Remains a failed state. 

Senator HAGEL. He does take issue with what you’ve just said. 

He said it ‘‘remains a failed state.’’ 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Well, it—I guess, you know, one can always say—at what point do you stop being a failed state? But, the 

fact is, they have capabilities, and they have capabilities of governing, of delivering good governance, delivering welfare and assistance to their people, and delivering security to their people. We 

support them in doing that. But, they do that in a way that they 

couldn’t do 7 years ago, and they can do that, increasingly, in more 

and more parts of the country. And I think that’s the right trajectory. So, I tend to disagree with some of the broad observations of 

these reports. 

As I’ve started to go through the recommendations, I see a lot of 

things that we’re either doing, working on, or very interested in, 

and I think a lot of the analysis is very useful. But, just flipping 

through, you know, there’s, like, five pages of key recommendations 

out of the report that Ambassador Pickering did. I see a lot of 

things there about police training, about military training, about 

establishing better coordination, you know, more effective justice 

system, a whole lot of things—better appointments, things like 

that, that we’re working on, and we’ll look at the details of some 

of their ideas, to see if there are pieces of—ways to do this that we 

haven’t, maybe, adopted yet. 

So, I think it’s a very important effort. I know there’s a lot of 

useful material here. And, as I said, I disagree, probably, more 

with the—some of the observations than I do with the actual recommendations. 

Senator HAGEL. Thank you. 

May I ask Mr. Johnson to respond? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir. I’ve, of course, focused on the issues related to counternarcotics in these reports, and there are some 

things I agree with in there, and there are some things that I very 

much disagree with. One is that the—in the discussion about the— 

I think, the thing—the key thing that I do disagree with in the discussion about how to deal with counternarcotics, there is a suggesVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:58 Nov 20, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\013108.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
27 

tion, maybe even you could call it a recommendation, that we could 

sequence this, that we could work on things related to alternative 

development, and we could give time for alternative development 

to take effect, we could put in a judicial system and a police system, and we could mature that over time, and that then it—and 

we could arrest more people, we could engage in more interdictions, 

and, at some point in the indefinite future, we could do eradication. 

Our experience, not just in Afghanistan, but globally, is that that 

doesn’t work. You have to do all of these things at the same time. 

And they move at varying rates. But, the notion that we could just 

avoid eradication until some indefinite point in the future, I think, 

is not going to allow us to succeed. 

Where we have succeeded, as we’ve tried to illustrate on the map 

here, is places where we could combine all of those things. But, the 

key ingredient here, I believe, is security. If you have security in 

an area, and—then you can have the development and the eradication all taking place at the same time. 

One point I would take issue with you and your remarks, about 

our being still focused on aerial spraying. We considered aerial 

spraying. We think it has advantages. But, the essential ingredient 

in a successful aerial spraying program is that the local authorities 

accept it and believe it will work. We consulted with the Afghan 

Government. President Karzai does not believe it’s appropriate. 

We’ve moved on to other things. 

Senator HAGEL. Well, I would tell you that 2 weeks ago I had a 

very senior former member of the Karzai government in to see me, 

and that’s not what he told me. He told me exactly what I just 

said. That’s not the only reason I said what I did, but—and I will— 

since I’ve not asked if I could use his name, I will not use his 

name. But, you know who this individual is. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kerry. 

Senator KERRY. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I apologize for being 

late. I was at the caucus meeting on the stimulus, but glad to be 

here now and welcome our witnesses, this panel and the next. 

I apologize, Mr. Secretary, I wasn’t here to hear your testimony, 

but I’ve gotten a quick update on it, and I want to pick up where 

Senator Hagel left off. 

I think your quote is that, ‘‘Nobody can tell me that it’s not going 

in a positive direction,’’ and you’ve just had a little go-around with 

Senator Hagel about that. And I don’t want to get caught up completely in the definitions or semantics with regard to it, but the 

facts on the ground—and facts are pretty indisputable—seem to indicate, between 2001 and 2005, there were five suicide bombings 

in Afghanistan. There were 77 in the first 6 months of this past 

year alone. Those of us who have traveled to the region, and those 

of us who have had the intelligence briefings, know that we are 

being told about the rise of the Taliban, the increased ability of the 

Taliban to strike, about the reconstitution of al-Qaeda, and so 

forth. There is an increase in heroin trade. President Karzai himself said to me at dinner in Kabul that he would describe his economy as a narco economy. It’s not yet a narco state, but it’s a narco 

economy. 

28 

So, how is it—you know, when you have the Oxfam representatives there now reporting, quote, ‘‘humanitarian conditions rarely 

seen outside sub-Saharan Africa,’’ and there are tensions between 

Kabul and the governors in the regions, the ability of the government, there is suspicion about the government—I mean, all of the 

indicators that wise observers, from, you know, Ambassador 

Holbrooke, General Jones, Ambassador Abshire, others who—all of 

whom made reports public, right here in this room yesterday, contradict what you’re saying. So, how do we get a baseline that’s 

going to be accurate here, in terms of your decisions and your 

choices? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. I think it’s important just to think back 

a little bit before you think forward. Any snapshot is going to show 

a terribly underdeveloped country with a weak government, a raging insurgency, and an enormous poppy crop. But, you can take 

that picture—— 

Senator KERRY. No; it’s bigger—— 

Ambassador BOUCHER [continuing]. Most anytime—— 

Senator KERRY. It’s bigger than it was when we started. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. I know that. 

Senator KERRY. And the conditions are worse than they were 

when we started. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. I don’t think that’s—— 

Senator KERRY. We’re in the opposite direction. 

Ambassador BOUCHER [continuing]. Generally true. 

Senator KERRY. Excuse me? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. I don’t think that’s generally true. Bombings—— 

Senator KERRY. You think 77 suicide bombings—— 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Bombings are horrible. 

Senator KERRY [continuing]. Is not worse than five in 4 years? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. I think it is worse. There’s more bombings. But, that doesn’t mean that the overall condition in the country is worse. If you think back a year ago, what were we talking 

about, what were you hearing in your intelligence briefings? We 

were hearing the Taliban was going to try to take Kandahar, we 

were hearing they were going to launch a major spring offensive, 

we were hearing that they were going to try to push into—they 

were going to try to take provinces and occupy territory. They 

failed. They didn’t take Kandahar, they didn’t launch an offensive, 

they didn’t take new territory. They’ve been pushed out of strongholds—— 

Senator KERRY. The point is, there is—— 

Ambassador BOUCHER [continuing]. And they’ve turned to—— 

Senator KERRY. What the reports—— 

Ambassador BOUCHER [continuing]. Bombing. 

Senator KERRY. What the report said yesterday—and it’s important to listen carefully to what is being said—is not that it has 

failed, but that it is moving in the wrong direction. It also said that 

the military will always win these confrontations. There is no issue 

about the ability to prevent them from taking over a Kandahar. 

That’s not the measurement here. We can fight this to that kind 

of—I mean, unless, you know, we become, ultimately, like the Soviet Union, where our presence doesn’t produce enough economic 

29 

results, that we begin to lose the populace. But, yesterday these 

eminent persons reported we still have the populace, we still have 

support, but they all see and sense and are hearing reports and 

have personally visited and found that it is moving in the wrong 

direction and we are risking losing that support and ultimately 

putting at risk our presence itself if we don’t deliver on the economic side. So, you know, would you not agree that many of the 

reconstruction efforts—the water irrigation, for instance; the water 

irrigation is worse today than it was when we went in, worse 

than—excuse me—worse than pre-Soviets, because the Soviets 

helped destroy that. But, we haven’t made a lot of progress in restoring those projects, and much of the reconstruction is stalled. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Sir, I’ve been to Afghanistan many times; 

I was there last week. I was in the east, where U.S. forces have 

done a terrific job, not only of fighting, but of building. I told the 

story in my opening statement, in Kunar province, which was one 

of the most violent last year, they’re not talking about the number 

of insurgents in the Kunar Valley now, they’re talking about the 

number of Internet cafes and gas stations and markets along the 

road that they built. They’re talking to villagers about the valleys 

that we can reach with other roads. We have seen transformed situations in a number of areas where we’ve been able to apply all 

these tools in a coherent and consistent manner. That doesn’t mean 

we’ve been able to do it everywhere in the country; there’s a lot of 

work still left to do. But, I just think that if you see that kind of 

progress, that’s the test of whether we’re achieving anything. 

You may say that Taliban’s failure to win on the battlefield is not 

the true measure. I would probably say their ability to blow themselves up with suicide bombs is not the true measure, either. I 

think this war is going to be won by delivering good governance— 

meaning safety, justice, opportunity, education, health—delivering 

that at the district and provincial level in Afghanistan. 

Senator KERRY. Well, I don’t think any of us—— 

Ambassador BOUCHER. And that’s the—— 

Senator KERRY [continuing]. Disagree—— 

Ambassador BOUCHER [continuing]. That’s the measure—— 

Senator KERRY [continuing]. That was—that’s exactly the measure that each of the reports laid out yesterday. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Yeah. 

Senator KERRY. And none of us would disagree that that’s ultimately the measure. But, by that measurement, those reports and 

many of us are asserting that we are not moving at the pace and 

in the direction that we ought to be to achieve it. I mean, let me 

just ask you, quickly, because time’s about to run out—on the 

Paddy Ashdown issue, obviously the Karzai government is concerned about the national sovereignty issue and the prospective 

powers of a high commissioner, but without one entity in charge 

and, sort of, helping to coordinate, pull things together, it’s hard to 

see how you really put in place the strategy that we need. Why did 

President Karzai oppose that? And is it still under consideration, 

perhaps with a different nominee? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Senator, I absolutely agree with you that 

we need someone who can help pull this stuff together even tighter 

in the international community and in Kabul. There’s a lot of very 

30 

good coordination going on now, a lot of committees, a lot of groups 

that meet. When I was up in Jalalabad, the military and the 

antinarcotics folks were up there, planning strategy, along with the 

governor and the economic folks. So, there’s a lot of good coordination going on. But, having a single figure who can help bring together the international community remains very important to us. 

Senator KERRY. Is it still under consideration? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. It’s—we’re going to have to look at other 

candidates, unfortunately. Paddy Ashdown, we thought, would 

have been superb man for this job. He—— 

Senator KERRY. Are you over the sovereignty issue? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. I think we are. I think there were particular—a particular hullabaloo raised in Kabul by people that 

might have felt threatened by his person or his position, but I do 

think we’re over the basic issue of whether there needs to be a 

strong international coordinator, and we’re going to do everything 

we can to make sure we get one. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I’d just note, if I—as I yield here, I’d just note 

that it may not be a measure of whether we’re winning or losing, 

but three of us are heading there—Afghanistan, in—shortly. And 

committee staff has come back and filed their fourth report, and little major things—little minor things, like you can’t go outside the 

Embassy now without armed escort—that’s been beefed up; you 

can’t walk places we walked before; you can’t go into certain areas 

without a significant—significant military cover. That may not—in 

fairness, it may go to the point that—you’re right, that it may not 

say much about what the total circumstance of the Afghan people 

are, but it sure says what—how things have become a helluva lot 

more dangerous for our personnel there than they were yesterday 

and the day before and 10 days before and a year before and 2 

years before and 4 years before and 5 years before. 

Senator Sununu. 

Senator SUNUNU. Senator Coleman is a little more senior than 

I am, if you—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I’m sorry. I—sure, no, we—I thank you for 

reminding me of that. I was just looking at the seating arrangement. I apologize. It’s been so long since I’ve been here. [Laughter.] 

Senator COLEMAN. And we’re thrilled to have you back, Mr. 

Chairman. Thank you. 

Gentlemen, I was—I had a chance, yesterday, to be with General 

Jones and Ambassador Pickering and others to review some of the 

reports, and, kind of, got a mixed perspective on this. If you look 

at General Jones, Atlantic Council, ‘‘Make no mistake, NATO is not 

winning. Urgent changes are required now to prevent Afghanistan 

from becoming a failed—failing—failed state. The mission is faltering. And yet,’’ it says, ‘‘support—international support is broad, 

but some of our allies are beginning to believe the mission is false.’’ 

So, clearly we’re in a situation now where the—there is deep concern about the future. And, rather than look back and, you know, 

try to evaluate ‘‘failing,’’ ‘‘failed,’’ whatever, we have some real challenges, and the consequence of failure is great. And I think that’s 

where there’s unanimity. I think nobody disagrees with that. 

31 

One of the—where there seems to be consensus in all these reports is in a couple of fronts, and I’d ask you gentlemen to respond. 

One is—and I’m going to reflect, by the way, back on Iraq, because 

I think we’ve learned some lessons—and, by the way, I am one who 

stood with Senator Kerry to say that we need to decouple Iraq from 

Afghanistan, but that’s not to say—they’re both important. In other 

words, we’ve got to do Iraq right, and we have to do Afghanistan 

right. And I’m not one who believes, because we’re focusing on one, 

that we’re not doing the other. We’re a great nation, and we should 

be able to, you know, walk and chew gum at the same time. We 

have to do both right. 

Among the challenges in Afghanistan are a few—and I’m just 

wondering—the lessons of Iraq. One, clearly we’re bringing in some 

more Marine units now. There is a concern, and the reports reflect 

this, that, you know, we came in—that we’re in, light. That’s been 

one of the issues in Iraq that was raised, early on. Senator McCain 

raised that, and others raised that. No question that we’re light in 

Afghanistan. We’re making a commitment. Is there any discussion 

among our allies to enhance their commitment, just in terms of 

numbers on the military side? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Senator, there is. There is discussion 

among allies, and certainly discussion by us with allies. We were 

talking earlier with Senator Lugar about, sort of, What are the 

plans in this area? NATO has the staffing requirements; it’s just, 

NATO hasn’t met the requirements for what needs to be there. So, 

continuing to look at ways to fill that out. NATO summit coming 

up in Bucharest in April. 

What we found out last year when we added 3,500 U.S. troops 

is, other countries pledged 3,500 to match. And we’re definitely 

going to use the deployment of Marines this year as a lever to 

make sure we get other countries to step up, especially on the follow-on to those Marines and to help solidify some of the efforts in 

the south, particularly with our Canadian friends. 

Senator COLEMAN. I think the real core of the reports then go on 

to note that whatever happens in the military side, unless we 

transform the civil side, unless we do those things to generate a 

system where there is respect for rule of law, where there is a police force that has credibility, ultimately, where there are jobs on 

the economic side, that you can’t win this on the military side. And, 

again, another lesson from Iraq; if you go in now, and you walk 

through the joint security stations, and you’re there with these 

young marines, they’re like mayors, and they’re dealing with security, but they’re also dealing with the economic side. 

Let me focus, then, on that aspect, and starting with the police. 

One of the things that was said, my last trip to Iraq, was that we 

made the mistake, the first couple of years; we tried to train the 

police on their own, and it didn’t work. And now, you walk in, we 

have either joint security stations, we have American troops embedded, the police there, the Iraqi security—the army forces are 

there, and our forces are there. One of the reports makes a recommendation, talks about embedding our folks with police. Give 

me the vision, the sense of what we’re doing on police training, understanding the lessons from Iraq and how we’re applying them to 

Afghanistan. 

32 

Ambassador BOUCHER. There’s a lot of different levels of police 

training. The vision of the police is to have a regular police, and 

then more dedicated and specialized units, to do that. We are— 

we’ve trained a lot, in terms of numbers. Some of the training is 

very, very basic. I mean, basic training has a—you know, they’ve 

got the track for the people who can read and write, and a track 

for the people who can’t read and write, which is, like, 70 percent 

of the recruits. But, there’s also very—there’s focused district development strategy, which will bring police forces out of the districts, 

train them all together, and put them back with mentors and trainers. And I think—what they told me last week was, they’ve got 

mentors, trainers, and support in 102 districts already, even 

though we’re only into the first few months of these focus—— 

Senator COLEMAN. But, does it represent a change? My point is, 

on the one hand, we talk, in Washington, about decoupling Iraq 

and Afghanistan and—— 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Please. 

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. I’d actually like to see a coupling, 

at least in terms of lessons learned. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. I think—— 

Senator COLEMAN. Are we transforming—— 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Yeah. 

Senator COLEMAN. Are we changing the way we’re doing it? Recognizing that it has not—in 7 years, we have not made the 

progress—— 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Yeah. 

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. We need to make, and we have 

learned some lessons to step it forward. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Last year, the big budgets we got was to 

fundamentally transform the way we did police training, and we’ve 

really done that—not only the training, but also the deployment of 

policemen, the support we give them. When I was out last week, 

I saw a lot of the new trucks that we’ve bought. The police are now 

mobile, they can communicate. A lot of things being done to give 

them real capabilities. 

Senator COLEMAN. I would urge you to look at these reports. 

Again, I—without the debate focusing on the broad pronouncements, there are some recommendations in here that I think we all 

should be agreeing on. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. I agree. Yeah. 

Senator COLEMAN. Educating government officials. If there’s no 

structure of local government, of folks who—you’re dealing with a 

society that hasn’t done that. And so, now we’ve got an opportunity. 

Rule of law. If—no matter what success we make militarily, if 

there isn’t—you can’t build an economy without a fundamental, 

kind of, system and respect for rule of law. 

So, my—walk through these recommendations. I think there’s a 

lot of merit, without getting into the debate of finger-pointing, of 

what we didn’t do, or what’s failing, not failed. Afghanistan right 

now is—it’s—where it’s in danger of failing, there’s no question. 

There is frustration about progress, but it’s in danger. And I think 

what you’ve got is, a group of people have come forward with some 

recommendations I think we all could embrace and increase the 

33 

possibility of success, which is in our interest. Failure—we cannot 

afford to fail in Afghanistan. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. I absolutely agree, sir. I think the two 

areas you cited are probably good examples of what I’ve seen in 

this report, so far, is that these are things we are focused on. 

Educating government officials—the United States has major 

program. Last year, the push was to do more education of local and 

provincial officials. The Indian government has taken on a lot of 

the training that’s being done for civil service and others. There are 

academies being built in Kabul. 

So, what I tend to look for in these reports is, go one level deeper 

and see—yes, we agree with the focus and the recommendation, we 

need to go one level deeper, see if they’ve come up with ways of 

doing this, ideas about how to do this, that supplement, complement, or are better than ours. 

Senator COLEMAN. I appreciate that. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. The same with rule of law, a big push 

last year. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Feingold. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for testifying. The war in Afghanistan has been called 

by many experts ‘‘The Forgotten War.’’ The report, released yesterday, which will be discussed on the next panel, notes just how close 

we are to failure in Afghanistan, and yet, despite the clear threats 

emanating from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region in testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mike Mullen, recently said, ‘‘In Afghanistan we do what we can, in Iraq we do what we must.’’ Is this the 

policy of the Bush administration, that Afghanistan is of secondary 

importance to the national security of the United States? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. No; not that I’ve ever had it expressed to 

me. I’m not—perhaps the admiral was talking about, specifically, 

some of the military requirements. We’ve always looked at what we 

have to do in Afghanistan to make—succeed, militarily, as well as 

with assistance. We’ve come to the Congress; Congress has been 

very generous in supporting that. And we’re always looking at 

what we need to do next and how much it’s going to take to do it. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Which of those two—— 

Ambassador BOUCHER. So—— 

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. Situations do you regard as more 

important to our national security? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Iraq or Afghanistan? I think they both 

are. I think—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. No; I asked: Which one do you think is more 

important? Surely they’re not identical. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. I would hope we can do both. I don’t see 

any way of—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. I do, too. I’m asking you, though, which one 

you think is more important, in terms of the threat. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Sir, I spend my—much of my day working on Afghanistan, so I’m very much focused on Afghanistan. I 

find it hard to weigh one against the other, because the problem 

34 

is, if you don’t—if you don’t stabilize both places, the—you’ll never 

stabilize either one. There would be—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. I guess my comment is—— 

Ambassador BOUCHER [continuing]. Support back and forth. 

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. Of course you want to succeed in 

each and every place, but, surely, in any endeavor, including military and war endeavors, priorities matter. And, in order to determine priorities, one has to determine where is the greater concern. 

And so, I’ve tried, several times with different people, to get an answer to this, and I’ve never gotten one; I find it a little surprising, 

in light of the global nature of the threat that we face. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Sir—I mean, which of your—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. Go ahead. 

Ambassador BOUCHER [continuing]. Kids do you like best? 

Senator FEINGOLD. I’m sorry? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Which of your kids do you like best? You 

know, do you want—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I think it’s more—— 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Do you want—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. I think it’s really more—— 

Ambassador BOUCHER [continuing]. Some of your children to be 

educated—— 

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. Going to be—— 

Ambassador BOUCHER [continuing]. Which ones—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. I don’t think it’s as simple—I don’t think it’s 

as simple as that. I think—— 

Ambassador BOUCHER. I—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. I think it really—this is the—— 

Ambassador BOUCHER. I think—— 

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. Core question, of whether we can 

get our priorities right in this country about this war. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Here’s the way I’ve explained it. 

Senator FEINGOLD. These are not identical. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. If you look at the history of 9/11 and how 

that happened, ungoverned spaces are a threat to us around the 

world; wherever they are, that’s where the terrorists are going to 

go, and they’re going to plot, and they’ll plan, and they’re going to 

come out of there and kill us. You can’t neglect any portion of the 

planet. And we—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. That’s absolutely—— 

Ambassador BOUCHER [continuing]. Have, in the last—— 

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. Right. And in that—— 

Ambassador BOUCHER [continuing]. several years, taken away 

those ungoverned spaces—sometimes diplomatically, sometimes 

through our relations with governments, and sometimes with military force. If we don’t continue to do that in all the remaining 

ungoverned spaces, there’s always going to be a threat to us. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Yeah, and if the question here was ‘‘neglect,’’ 

I would understand what you said, but the question here is, in my 

view, is whether or not we’ve neglected Pakistan and Afghanistan 

because of our overemphasis on Iraq. So, the question here is relative emphasis. 

I understand the Secretary of Defense has elected to send an additional 3,200 U.S. Marines to Afghanistan. Is this sufficient to adVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:58 Nov 20, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\013108.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
35 

dress the full nature of the deterioration in that country? What 

steps are we taking to ensure that we address both military needs 

and nonmilitary priorities in Afghanistan? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. The 3,200 marines, about 2,200 will be 

put in a maneuver unit in the south to provide additional security 

for a lot of the operations there, about 1,000 will go into training. 

If you look at the NATO requirements and the other requirements, 

there are still shortfalls, both in fighters, and in trainers especially. 

And we will try to use this deployment of U.S. forces to leverage 

even more contributions from allies, frankly. 

Senator FEINGOLD. A counterinsurgency campaign in the border 

region, I don’t think will be successful if it does not have the support of the Pakistani people. How can we gain the support of the 

people of Pakistan if we continue to be associated with the current 

Pakistani regime, even as it persists in resisting democratic reforms? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Our policy in Pakistan is very much focused now on the elections and with working with the new situation that will emerge after the elections. We’re pushing to try to 

have—try to make it as good an election as we can, try to encourage the Pakistani Government, right up to the end, to take steps 

to make it more transparent, more credible. The new leadership 

will emerge. There’ll be a number of elements to work with there. 

But, I think, overall, we’re trying to encourage the develop—sort of, 

movement toward the center in Pakistan as a base from which they 

can fight their own terrorist problems. 

Senator FEINGOLD. The State Department’s counterterrorism 

chief, Lieutenant General Dell L. Dailey, whom I just saw earlier 

this morning, has expressed, publicly, his concerns that there are 

significant gaps in what the United States knows about the threats 

in the Afghan-Pakistan border tribal areas. He said, ‘‘We don’t 

have enough information about what’s going on there, not on alQaeda, not on foreign fighters, not on the Taliban.’’ I’d like to ask 

both of you how we can be proactive in the region if we’re not adequately informed as to what’s happening on the ground. How do 

you propose that we become better informed? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. I think there are a lot of steps being 

taken so that we and our friends in Pakistan and Afghanistan can 

be better informed about what’s going on up there. It is forbidding 

territory, it has a—administrative arrangements going back to the 

colonial period that mean the government’s not fully there or fully 

in control, and it’s difficult territory for anybody to operate in and 

to understand. There are a lot of things that go on up there that 

are difficult to find out. On the other hand, we do have a pretty 

good idea of what’s going on up there, who’s up there and what 

they’re doing. We do have more and more information about how 

they’re coming across and where they’re coming across. I think, if 

you ask U.S. commanders on the ground, you’ll see that they’ve 

had much more success in interdicting people that are trying to 

come across the border. 

They’re now—the militants in that area are now fighting on two 

sides. The Pakistanis are attacking them from one side, and they 

get attacked when they come into Afghanistan, on the other side. 

So, I think there are a lot of things we can do to improve the capaVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:58 Nov 20, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\013108.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
36 

bilities to monitor the border. We’re working with the Pakistanis 

and Afghans to do that. We’ll have a border coordination center 

that opens in March of this year. There’s better military coordination going on now, and there’s a lot of things we’re doing to support 

the Pakistanis as they start to go after these areas with more force. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. The only thing I would add is that the longest 

standing persistent assistance program we’ve had in Pakistan is in 

the counternarcotics area, and it’s been in this region. And that, in 

and of itself, has given us greater visibility as to what’s going on 

there over a long period of time, when we had no other assets. And 

that is a—I think, a very effective program, and one that’s given 

us some visibility we otherwise wouldn’t have had. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you for your answers. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Who’s next? Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Senator Sununu’s quite polite, and I—Mr. 

Chairman, thank you for having this hearing. 

I was in Afghanistan and Pakistan 2 months ago, and I was able 

to meet with President Karzai, General McNeill, General Livingston, and a number of other people. And I think that—I think the 

testimony today has been helpful. I will say that I think we’ve 

missed a tremendous opportunity over the last period of time, and 

I think there’s absolutely no question that the war in Iraq has definitely taken away from what we’ve been doing in Afghanistan. I 

think that’s beyond dispute. And, while I might not have followed 

exactly Senator Feingold’s line of questioning, I think that’s a indisputable fact, that we have missed opportunities in Afghanistan 

because of what is happening in Iraq. 

One of the things that was recited over and over by people there 

was the lack of training that we were giving the Afghani police, 

and the fact that building up a police force there was most needed. 

There’s no question we’ve had gains, from the standpoint of building the roadways, and there’s no question there’s been economic activity. But, what’s occurring is, we’ll create stability in an area, and 

then the warlords will come back into communities and terrorize 

them. And while I’m concerned about the NATO alliance, I’m concerned about, as Senator Lugar mentioned, that the people here in 

our country and their tolerance for this going on for a long time— 

the people of Afghanistan are a gritty people. We don’t have the 

same issues there that we have in Iraq; we have a people there 

that are willing to really step up and defend their country and 

have a national pride there in a very different way than we have 

in Iraq. And what I’m concerned about is, because of the lack of 

investment that we’ve had there directly because of Iraq, because 

of the lack of manpower that we’ve had there because of Iraq, I’m 

concerned that we’re beginning to lose the Afghani people themselves, and I wonder if you might address that. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, in terms of police, I think the numbers of 

we—police we’ve trained has been, actually, quite high, but we’ve 

had significant problems in retaining them and keeping them retrained. Part of the refocus that Richard was referring to earlier 

that we’ve done with this program is to implement a rank restrucVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:58 Nov 20, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\013108.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
37 

turing and a pay reform so that they’re paid directly, without the 

opportunities to skim off the top, and that we’ve changed the way 

we’ve trained, and put a much greater emphasis both on the Focused District Development Program, where we take a group of policemen out of where they are replace them with a highly trained 

group—retrain, re-form, re-equip, put them back in. 

The other thing we have done is moved away from a singular 

focus on training in a training camp, ‘‘and then you’re on your 

own,’’ to one where the much greater focus is on post-training mentoring. The number we have, about 600—excuse me—a little over 

500 American trainers in Afghanistan now, training police. And by 

a ratio of about five to one, they are mentors in the field with the 

police rather than classroom trainers. So, I think we’re making 

progress there, but it’s—it is a—it is a long road. It’s a—this is a— 

this is going to take time. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. If I can just add to that. The people that 

train the police out there say it’s actually more difficult to train the 

policemen than the—than soldiers, because the policemen have 

been used to a bad system, and there’s a lot of, sort of, reeducation 

and retraining, and re-forming involved in that. But, I think, certainly from last year, with the large appropriation we got from 

Congress, we were able to go about this in a new and a different 

and very much more intense way. And so, we’ve been doing that, 

I think, rather successfully. It’s a question of: Keep doing it, get the 

numbers, get the focus. 

Overall, the reports that we see, the polls that come out in public, they indicate still very high levels of support for government, 

for the new government. They want things from their government. 

If anything, the government’s failure is failure to meet expectations. People want to know where the money goes, they want to 

know where the government is, they want to know why they 

haven’t gotten a new set of policemen to protect them. And—but, 

overwhelmingly, if you—the indications are, people want the government, they want the government to provide them with safety, 

with justice, with economic opportunity, with health care and education. And when the government provides that, the situation stabilizes, the poppy goes down, the Taliban get kicked out. It’s the 

areas where the government can’t provide that yet because they’re 

weak, or provides it badly because of corruption or other things, 

that are the problem areas. And so, we’ve shown that there are 

places that we have brought that kind of stuff to bear successfully, 

and that’s what we’re trying to do much more thoroughly, in a 

more concentrated fashion. 

Senator CORKER. I think it’s more of a manpower issue, by the 

way, of the police and, necessarily, financial resources. And I know 

that both Livingston and McNeill were asking for at least 3,200 

troops, not to do, necessarily, what’s being done today, but to actually train policemen. 

I think the issue of the tsar certainly is something that needs to 

be resolved, as far as coordinating NATO resources, and I realize 

that President Karzai feels, if you will, challenged by somebody 

else coming in and administering those goods and services, and 

maybe the loyalty issue is a problem for him. 

38 

But, let me just ask one last thing. I know my time is getting 

ready to run out. When I came here, I was somewhat stunned by 

the lack of coordination and focus in Iraq. That was a year ago. 

And certainly, things have changed. General Petraeus has provided 

great leadership, and other things have occurred. We are making 

progress in some areas in Afghanistan, but, I have to tell you, I am 

stunned, again, at us not having an overall plan, as has been alluded to in the past, and I’m wondering if you have any sense 

whatsoever of a major resurgence on our part to actually bring resources together in a way, to bring this to an end at an appropriate 

time, and transition over. I just sense we’re just, sort of, moving 

along at a pace, but we really just don’t have a coordinated effort, 

on behalf of our government and others, to really go someplace, to 

call this a victory and move on. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. We went through a major review—strategic review—in late 2006, and that resulted in the big effort that 

was made last year to increase the forces, step up and change the 

nature of police training, push the government out at the provincial 

and local level, build more roads; a lot of things that we have done 

last year, we continue to do this year. We’re always looking at the 

program, we’re always looking at what we’re doing and what we’re 

achieving. Money spent through our PRTs is particularly useful, 

and so, we tend to put money—more money in there. Those kinds 

of things, adjustments along the way. 

But, I think there is a—you know, there are overall plans on the 

economy, there are overall plans on the military side, there are 

overall plans for the police, and they all come together in this very 

fundamental strategy of, you know, beating the Taliban on the battlefield and winning the war by extending governance. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Sununu. 

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary, how much was obligated last year through USAID for 

all of the important programs we’ve been talking about? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. We’re in the range of $2 billion for the civilian side of the effort. 

Senator SUNUNU. On the civilian side—— 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Yeah. 

Senator SUNUNU [continuing]. You think you are close to $2 billion. And—— 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Yeah. 

Senator SUNUNU [continuing]. What are the proposed outlays for 

fiscal year 2008? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. 2008, it’s—same range. I think last year 

was 1.8, and this year is about 2. I now look at my numbers—and 

we didn’t do the totals—but, if I add up the regular spending and 

supplemental, it’s about $2 billion. 

Senator SUNUNU. But, you believe it’ll be close, or slightly above, 

to what we did last year? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Yeah; slightly above, probably. 

Senator SUNUNU. And as I look down a list I have of the different 

areas—agriculture, road, power, water—you know, there are obligations in all of these important areas, but it begs the question, 

Which of these areas is the most resource-constrained? If you had 

39 

an incremental $100 million or $500 million in addition to your 

proposed outlays, where would you put it? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. I’d probably put it into electricity and 

governance. I mean, if you—if you do the totals for this year, I’ve 

got—governance is the biggest one, $493, between the base and 

supplemental—$493 million. That includes $100 million to start 

going on the election, which will be held next year. So, we know 

we need more money as we move to the elections next year. 

Senator SUNUNU. Is the bulk of that money, $500 million, being 

used to prepare for the elections, or is—— 

Ambassador BOUCHER. No. About $100 million is for elections, 

then you have the provincial justice amounts, you have a lot of the 

training that was talked about, especially officials that are going 

to go out at local levels, money to support the outreach efforts of 

the government, the reconciliation efforts, a lot of things like that. 

The overall governance category is—— 

Senator SUNUNU. But, you would place governance and electricity ahead of, say, police training? 

Ambassador BOUCHER. We got—the police training is not included in this amount. There was a big chunk of money, about $8 

billion, I think, for police and military training that came out—— 

Senator SUNUNU. But, that’s not funded through—— 

Ambassador BOUCHER [continuing]. Came out of last year’s budget. There’s more this year, on a continuing basis, but it’s—there’s 

money there to do what we need to do right now. 

Senator SUNUNU. The issue with the police has been covered in 

some detail. It’s clear that there are very significant problems. You 

seem to feel that you’ve changed some of the approaches that are 

being taken. But, I want to try to better understand what went 

wrong, because in the—after, you know, 2002 and the 2003 timeframe, as we were trying to work with the government to deal with 

all of these terrible issues, everything from governance to infrastructure and the economy and security, I think everyone probably 

recognized that local security, police force, would be an important 

issue. You indicated there are 500 U.S. trainers now focused on the 

police. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. No; there’s—— 

Senator SUNUNU. You—— 

Ambassador BOUCHER. It’s more than that now. 

Senator SUNUNU. You said there—well, you just—someone just 

used the number of—— 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Oh. 

Senator SUNUNU [continuing]. Five hundred. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. There’s the military guys, too. There’s— 

I think it’s 500 in your programs. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Plus—yes. 

Ambassador BOUCHER. And then, General Cone’s found, I think, 

another 800 or something—— 

Senator SUNUNU. Understood. So, we have—those are U.S. trainers in place, obviously—— 

Ambassador BOUCHER. Yeah. 

Senator SUNUNU [continuing]. Working on the issue. It sounds as 

if the United States is in a lead position, at this point. Who was 

leading the effort in 2003, in 2004? And what did they do wrong 

40 

that has required us to go back and rethink our approach to training police? 

Mr. JOHNSON. In 2002, when we began this effort, we divided up 

responsibilities among countries who would step up and do some 

things. The Germans had a longstanding program which dated 

back to pre-Soviet days, engagement with security in Afghanistan. 

And this is a program that they began, themselves. As they got underway, it became clear to us that it was focused almost exclusively 

on training a senior officer corps, if you will. And there was a very 

high demand, at that time, by the Afghan Government, by our military, I think by any observer, that we needed to move as rapidly 

as we possibly could to provide some form of police on the streets. 

And, as a result of that, rapid training programs were developed. 

Rapid training programs answered the question of putting people 

on the street, but things—— 

Senator SUNUNU. When was that realization? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I’m sorry? 

Senator SUNUNU. You said ‘‘we realized these’’—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. I think the realization became apparent during 

the course of 2002—— 

Senator SUNUNU. OK. 

Mr. JOHNSON [continuing]. As the program started. 

Senator SUNUNU. It still begs the question, then: What was 

being—if you realized that shortcoming in 2002, what were we 

doing wrong in 2003 and 2004? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I think what we were doing wrong in the long 

term, but right in the short term, was giving short-term training 

to people, to get them out as quickly as we possibly could. That led, 

in and of itself, to retention issues, to not having people as well 

trained as they should have been, but it did answer the demand 

of getting people out as rapidly as we possibly could. We’re—if 

you—and, in a sense, recovering from having tried to push out, possibly too fast. 

Senator SUNUNU. On the issue of drug interdiction, I think it’s 

understandable that there’s a—there’s a potential conflict in aerial 

spraying or any basic eradication, because that’s having an effect 

on the Afghan population on a mass scale, at the grassroots scale, 

with farmers and people who are doing the cultivating. And so, you 

have—run the potential of turning those individuals against the 

government and against our efforts, and it makes the—could make 

the security situation worse. 

But, in the documentation we have, it suggests that targeting 

drug labs is still under review. Now, it would seem to me that the 

lab itself is obviously a bottleneck for the production of drugs. It’s 

a—even a larger source of income for Taliban or other drug lords 

that are benefiting from the cultivation. There are few of them, and 

it would seem to make sense that they should be a target already, 

in some way, shape, or form. Why is this described as still being 

under review? And if it’s not under review, if it’s part of your policy, how many have you targeted over the last 12 months, how 

many have been destroyed? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Let me get you the statistics on the last question 

you asked. 

41 

But, this is something that we’re attempting to do. But, you’ve 

got to bear in mind that these labs can be quite small, so it’s not 

a question of having, you know, a handful that really are the bottleneck that we wish that they were. But, the—as we discussed 

earlier, this is part and parcel of our effort here, but it—we don’t 

believe that it can—we can have a successful program if it is exclusive of any of these elements. And so, there has to be an element 

of risk to someone planting poppy. The U.N. estimates you have to 

have about a 25-percent chance before there’s a real deterrent. So, 

we’re working, as best we can, on all of elements of this program, 

not just on one. 

Senator SUNUNU. How much money was spent on programs to 

provide alternative sources of income, alternative crops, crop substitution, to deal with—or try to reduce the preponderance of 

poppy-growing? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Directly related to poppy and exclusive of other 

development programs, $200 million. 

Senator SUNUNU. So, $200 million, compared to how much spent 

on the interdiction and eradication effort? 

Mr. JOHNSON. On interdiction, which includes funding to support 

the Drug Enforcement Administration, $350 million; on eradication, $166 million. 

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Gentlemen, thank you very much for your testimony. 

Our next panel is a very distinguished panel: General James 

Jones, U.S. Marine Corps (retired), former Commander, European 

Command, and Supreme Allied Commander of Europe; The Honorable Thomas Pickering, former Under Secretary for Political Affairs, the Department of State; The Honorable Richard Holbrooke, 

former U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations. 

[Pause.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, welcome. Thank you for being here. 

I know you have extremely busy schedules, but your continued 

service to this committee and to the country is very much appreciated. 

Why don’t we begin in the order in which you were called: General Jones, Ambassador Pickering, and Ambassador Holbrooke. 

General, it’s all yours. 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, USMC (RET.), 

FORMER COMMANDER, EUROPEAN COMMAND, AND SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE, McLEAN, VA 

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, it’s a great pleasure to be here 

today in front of this committee. I last had the honor of appearing 

here in March of 2007 on the same subject, and so, it’s a great 

pleasure to be able to spend some time with you this morning, and 

with my colleagues at this table. 

I had the privilege of participating in two—the formation of two 

reports that, by coincidence, were released simultaneously yesterday. I won’t go over the details; you have the reports in front of 

you. So, I will just—with your permission, just make a few short 

opening remarks. 

42 

It’s been my experience and my observation that what is happening in Afghanistan is a loss of momentum, in terms of the kind 

of progress that, not only the Afghan people expected to see and 

witness and to feel, but also as a result of an inability of the tremendous international effort to coordinate itself in a way to do 

what I believe is the top two, three, or four things that absolutely 

have to be done. 

This is not a new position on my part. I said it when I left NATO 

in 2006. I said it in testimony in 2007. I continue to believe it to 

be true in 2008. And I think that if there is good news, the good 

news is that we can be successful in Afghanistan, but the loss of 

international momentum, in terms of addressing the issues of narcotics, which permeates the society, corrupts a generation of Afghans, prevents the legitimate growth of economic reform, and, perhaps more insidiously, funds the insurgency by virtue of the tremendous revenues that they’re able to generate. And it certainly 

prevents the influence of the government from expanding. 

Second belief of mine is that judicial reform is—if it’s made any 

progress, it’s barely discernible, and I don’t understand how you 

can not more—have achieved comprehensive judicial reform, given 

the challenge of narcotics and the challenge of a corrupt society 

and criminal activity. 

The third is police reform, which is neither adequate in quality 

or quantity. 

And the three—these three things are completely interrelated, 

because you need all three if you’re going to attack the narcotics 

problem. If you don’t have a police that’s able to secure the countryside and prevent the insurgents from threatening families and 

killing—killings in the middle of the night to intimidate the farmers to grow the crop, if you don’t have a judicial system that can 

prosecute effectively, then you don’t have—you just don’t have the 

incentives for a comprehensive attack on narcotics. 

I would say that a fourth concern of mine has to do with having 

the international community hold the government to some metrics, 

in terms of performance. And I think judicial reform is probably 

one that I would highlight as imminently possible for an elected 

government to begin to try to achieve and to make it a priority. 

When I left, in December 2006, it was still high on my list of one 

of the things that we ought to encourage, and I think it’s still pretty much that way in 2008. 

And last, of course, the deteriorating situation in Pakistan, a 

neighboring state, leads me to conclude that this is now a regional 

problem. You can’t simply just talk about Afghanistan in isolation 

of the regional nature. So, regional problems demand regional solutions and a strategic sense of where we’re going. 

I’m extremely proud of the fact that NATO accepted to be engaged. I think there has been progress on the ground in Afghanistan, but I worry about a loss of momentum, I worry about the fact 

that the safe havens for the insurgents are more numerous now 

than they were 1 or 2 or 3 years ago, and that the resurgence of 

the Taliban is a result of our inability to address three or four 

problems in a way that focuses the tremendous amount of resources, and manpower towards those things that we absolutely 

43 

have to be done—that absolutely have to be done, and done well, 

if we are to succeed in the long term. 

I said yesterday at the rollout of our studies, that I was very disappointed—and I think many others are as well, that the government refused to permit Lord Ashdown to be the international representative. I know Lord Ashdown, personally. I worked with him 

in Bosnia. He did a masterful job. He is the kind of leader that 

could coalesce and focus the international effort and better account 

for the monies that are expended, and hold the government, that 

he—that we all want to see succeed, to some metrics and standards 

that would allow them to make some discernible progress, instead 

of just gradually losing momentum and running the risk of backsliding, which is where I think we are now in terms of those three 

or four things that I mentioned. 

Our two reports agree on several lines of action. One is the need 

for swift completion of the Afghan assessments. We continue to believe the appointment of a high commissioner to work with the 

Karzai government to coordinate and integrate assistance is critically important. We need a comprehensive counternarcotics effort, 

improved training for the Afghan national police force, emphasis on 

effective governance, the creation of a credible Afghan judicial system, and improved development and more focused development assistance. 

Mr. Chairman, I’ll stop with those brief remarks, and we stand 

ready to answer any questions you might have. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Secretary Pickering. 

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS PICKERING, FORMER UNDER 

SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador PICKERING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator 

Lugar. It’s an honor to be here, and thank you for the opportunity 

to be with you. 

There is no mistaking it, I think that we are, perhaps, in a timely period, or maybe even, Senator, to coin a phrase, a post-timely 

period, to be considering Afghanistan at these hearings this morning, in light of the reports. There’s no question, too, that this situation, certainly in my humble view, rivals the situation we faced as 

the Iraq Study Group got its materials together and put those out. 

I hope that reactions, in terms of doing something about this, can 

and will come out of this effort that you’re holding. 

I briefly want to summarize my testimony, which attempts to 

point up both the critical nature of our assessment of the situation 

in Afghanistan, a little bit unlike what we have just heard, and, 

at the same time, I want to highlight a few of the key recommendations from the Afghan Study Group report. 

We say Afghan is—Afghanistan is at a critical crossroads. That 

may be an understatement. Six years of progress is under serious 

threat from resurgent violence, weakening international resolve, 

mounting regional challenges, and a growing lack of confidence on 

the part of the people in the country. The United States and the 

international community have tried to win the struggle with, in our 

view, too few military, insufficient economic aid, and without a 

44 

clear and consistent strategy. We now have to deal with a reconstituted Taliban and al-Qaeda, both in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and 

a runaway opium economy and severe poverty faced by most Afghans. 

General Jones has just pointed out why this is so critically important for us. It’s a national security issue. Collapse in Afghanistan would certainly move what is already a rampant drug culture 

into higher gear. We certainly would have a serious blow to our alliance in NATO, which would be difficult to recover from. As you 

know, this has been the deadliest year for U.S. and coalition troops 

since 2001. We’ve just heard that training is lagging, that counternarcotics efforts, judicial and penal reform are not—if taking place, 

taking place only at a very slow pace. 

There are many detailed questions that I don’t want to go into, 

but I do want to focus just a few statements on the issue of what 

to do and how we are dealing with narcotics. 

2006—that’s a year ago—showed a spread of cultivation by at 

least 30 percent in the acreage involved. And you, yourselves, have 

understood the output tonnage and how little we have been able 

to deal with that. The figure of 93 percent of world-available heroin 

is, I think, a clear statement of the tremendous difficulties. 

We believe that attacking this problem has to be a closely linked 

effort, but you cannot do it by eradication alone. You have to establish a predicate for popular support. And, indeed, I would say, in 

Afghanistan, we have to continue to do everything we can to encourage Afghan leads in dealing with these particularly difficult 

and taxing problems. 

I think that, as General Jones has just pointed—and I think we 

all agree—Afghanistan can no longer be considered as a kind of island state in the middle of nowhere. It is, in fact, deeply linked 

with what goes on around it, and particularly with what is happening in Pakistan. And, as we have seen, that porous and 

ungoverned border region is a source of continued difficulty, that 

there is no question at all that Pakistan itself has serious problems 

in coming to grips with governing that piece of its own territory, 

and it has been a historical legacy that has not been—in my view, 

certainly—dealt with in the way it needs to be done. 

We believe, overall, that the effort to come together on an assessment and a strategy for Afghanistan is way overdue. We have proposed that, if this is not accomplished rapidly by the United States 

and its friends, that perhaps NATO could take the lead in appointing an eminent-persons groups that can bring together Afghans, 

our partners, and ourselves around a strategy. And you, yourselves, 

have felt the need, in your own questioning, for having a clear strategic view ahead. 

Second, we felt, as an overarching proposition, we needed to find 

a way to decouple in the work of the legislative branch, in executive branch consideration, particularly in budgets, and maybe in 

the minds of the American people, Iraq, and Afghanistan. There 

are similar problems, but there are different solutions. 

There are clearly both urgent and emergent priorities that have 

to be dealt with. And we’ve seen some resonance in members’ 

questionings already of this particular issue. I think it is important. It needs careful consideration, but it is significant. 

45 

And then, finally, within our own Government, we have felt, for 

some time, we need a key person to move it ahead. We need an 

American Paddy Ashdown, if I could put it that way, someone who 

can help pull all of these pieces together. If there is anything that 

has impressed me in Afghanistan, it is the number of programs 

that are moving in different channels at different paces in, seemingly, an uncoordinated way. When you asked a question, a minute 

ago, we had to go and compare General X’s police trainers with Department Y’s police trainers to come up with the total figure. Well, 

you know, it doesn’t work that way in the need to have a unified 

effort. 

I spent a lot of my life dealing with last decade’s problems in El 

Salvador and Colombia. Still not dealt with. But, they indicated to 

me that we needed, to the extent that we possibly could get it, a 

unified effort. 

Our report, and its accompanying reports, are all four-square on 

the same ideas. We have 40 or 50 integrated, collected recommendations. They’re part of a synergy. I’m not going into them 

in detail. We commend them to your reading. We think they provide a strong basis for going ahead, and we thank you, again, for 

the opportunity to put this material before you. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Pickering follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS R. PICKERING, FORMER UNDER SECRETARY

FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you 

today to address one of the most pressing and emergent issues we face as a nation— 

one which for too long has been hidden by our focus and concentration on other 

issues in the region and beyond. 

In recognition of the growing crisis in Afghanistan, three major American organizations each carried out independent studies of what was happening and what 

needs to be done to deal with the problems. It is no accident that the issue is so 

exigent, that when the three organizations gathered to discuss their reports, they 

immediately agreed to issue their reports together and to join forces in their presentations. That was done yesterday afternoon. 

Today’s hearing gives me a chance to highlight aspects of the report I had the 

welcome pleasure of cochairing with General James Jones, former NATO SACEUR 

and U.S. Combatant Commander in Europe. He joins me on the panel today and 

will present his own views on the report and its salient features. 

My task is a simple one. In order to highlight the urgency and the importance 

of the issue I want to present to you a summary of the report’s key conclusions on 

what is happening now, as we meet, in Afghanistan. Second, I want to provide you 

with the most important recommendations of a distinguished group of panel members each one of whom has had extensive experience in Afghanistan and the region. 

I don’t claim special knowledge or experience in Afghanistan and have relied heavily 

on the team’s expertise to make and justify our conclusions and recommendations. 

I have drawn heavily on the language of the report to assure that their conclusions 

are concisely and crisply conveyed to you. 

ASSESSMENT

Afghanistan is at a critical crossroads. Six years of progress is under serious 

threat from resurgent violence, weakening international resolve, mounting regional 

challenges and a growing lack of confidence on the part of the Afghan people. 

The United States and the international community have tried to win the struggle 

with too few military, insufficient economic aid, and without a clear and consistent 

strategy. We must now deal with reconstituted Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in 

Afghanistan and Pakistan, a runaway opium economy and the severe poverty faced 

by most Afghans. 

Why is this so important to us? 

46 

In the words of our report, success in Afghanistan is a critical national security 

imperative. Failure means new threats from the Taliban and al-Qaeda from a renewed sanctuary for them in Afghanistan to the detriment of our interests in the 

region and at home. 

Internationally, we are seeing a weakening of resolve among our friends and partners. Polls show public attitudes are divided on bringing troops from their countries 

home immediately or remaining until the country is stabilized. In all but the U.S. 

and the U.K. majorities called for withdrawal as soon as possible. 

It is clear that there is a lack of an overall, overarching strategic vision to reinvigorate the effort to attain unified, reachable goals. 

This year has been the deadliest for U.S. and coalition troops since the invasion 

of 2001. 

The most immediate threat is from the antigovernment insurgency that has 

grown significantly in the last 2 years. Attacks against Afghan military and police 

forces have also surged. Some success has been achieved in targeting Taliban leadership, but significant areas of Afghanistan, particularly in the south have been lost 

to friendly control. 

Some of our allies believe the mission is failing and several NATO members are 

wavering in their troop commitments, offsetting the strong involvement of Britain, 

Denmark, Poland, Canada, Australia, and the Netherlands among others. 

A failure of NATO in Afghanistan would damage the future of the organization 

itself. 

Realizing an Afghanistan that is stable and secure and free of influence from radical, Islamic forces is a core objective. Taliban and al-Qaeda maintain close links. 

There is an acute need for international coordination on both the military and 

civilian side. Separate military commands with some overlapping missions complicate the process as does the lack of a senior civilian leader. The recent inability 

to appoint Lord Paddy Ashdown of the United Kingdom (U.K.) as a result of objections from the Karzai government means we are back to square one in trying to find 

a solution to that critical issue. 

Military and especially police training are lagging as are counternarcotics efforts 

and judicial and penal reform. 

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) fielded by many governments have separate reporting channels back to their capitals and there is no unified field theory 

on how they should operate, be coordinated, or accomplish their missions. 

A recent report in the Washington Post concluded that: ‘‘While the (U.S.) military 

finds success in a virtually unbroken line of tactical achievements, (U.S.) intelligence officials worry about a looming strategic failure.’’ 

Six years after the fall of the Taliban Government in Afghanistan the country is 

still facing a fundamental crisis of governance. Without an honest, sustainable government there can be little effective development and even less political legitimacy. 

The country has ‘‘a stunning dearth of human capital’’ and a number of leaders, 

often in the provinces, are considered to be serial human rights abusers by much 

of the population. This shakes confidence in the rule of law and democracy and overall governance in critical ways. Underpaid civil servants are asked to undertake 

dangerous counternarcotics missions and easily fall prey to bribery and corruption 

in return. 

The public looks to the government not only for housing and health care, roads 

and schools, but just as much, if not more, for security and justice. At present the 

government cannot do this and this leads neighbors, aid donors, and troop contributors to hedge their bets. 

Former U.S. Commander, LTG Karl Eikenberry, has said the greatest long-term 

threat is not the resurgence of the Taliban but ‘‘the potential irretrievable loss of 

the Government of Afghanistan.’’ 

Equally, if not more disturbing are important findings from 2006 showing the 

spread of narcotics cultivation from 165,000 hectares to 193,000; more land than is 

under coca cultivation than in Latin America. And while some key provinces in the 

north and center are being reported as opium free, those provinces continue to profit 

handsomely from drug trafficking. 

Extensive receipts from this activity, ‘‘drug money’’ weakens key institutions and 

fuels and strengthens the Taliban, while at the same time corrupting the country’s 

governmental leadership. 

There are serious disputes about how best to deal with the drug economy. Some 

want large, scale aerial eradication with the potential for serious, disruptive impacts 

on rural Afghans and their livelihood. Others are counseling more gradual but more 

complete approaches seeking to find crop substitutes and other supports for the 90 

percent of Afghans who have said they are willing to abandon poppy cultivation if 

they can count on earning half as much from legal activities. 

47 

Closely linked, but also independently important for Afghanistan’s future, are 

questions of development and reconstruction. It is the second lowest country on the 

U.N.’s human development index for 2007–08. Life expectancy is short, infant mortality high, and access to clean water and health services severely limited. Nevertheless there are some positive economic indicators—8.7 percent growth (against a 

small base), low inflation, a stable currency against the dollar and significant foreign exchange reserves. Refugees are returning, agricultural output is up, and roads 

are being repaired and rebuilt to the rural areas. 

The lack of security has disrupted trade, communications, transport and the energy infrastructure. 

Even after 6 years, foreign assistance amounts are hard to tabulate and coordination is weak. School populations have boomed particularly among girls and efforts 

are being made to fund primary health care. While some experts say it is an exaggeration, claims that only 10 percent of assistance gets to Afghans are worthy of 

attention and a correction of these faults is badly needed. 

Finally, Afghanistan can no longer be considered as an isolated state to be dealt 

with on its own. It is vulnerable as never before to external pressure and what goes 

on, especially in the Pakistan border region, is critical to success or failure. Kabul 

needs better relations with its neighbors, especially coordination with Pakistan and 

a commitment on the part of Pakistan to deal with its own tribal areas FATA, something that is particularly challenging and elusive and has been over the history of 

modern Pakistan. 

With all of these difficulties there is clear reason why we call attention to the 

need to improve and make more strategic and effective our support for Afghanistan. 

It is a state poised for a slide. Our ability to provide the help and support needed 

to make a difference remains a key factor. And for that purpose, I want to provide 

from our report a key list of major recommendations. The report itself should be 

consulted for the full list which is put together with the objective of forming a coherent and collective whole. 

The recommendations are divided, into three overarching recommendations and 

six groups—international coordination, security, governance and the rule of law, 

counternarcotics, economic development and reconstruction, and Afghanistan and its 

neighbors. 

I—OVERARCHING RECOMMENDATIONS

—Create an Eminent Person Group from among our allies and partners to put together a long-term coherent strategy. 

—Decouple legislative and executive branch consideration of Iraq and Afghanistan. 

—Develop a unified management structure led by a Special Envoy to Afghanistan 

to coordinate and lead all aspects of U.S. policy and implementation. 

II—KEY ISSUE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. International coordination 

—Work to consolidate the command structure, missions and rules of engagement to 

simplify and clarify lines of authority and strategic objectives. 

—NATO needs to review its command and control arrangements to simplify and 

streamline them. 

—Appoint a high-level civilian coordinator under U.N. mandate to work closely with 

the Afghan Government and to oversee the full range of activities including contacts with regional governments. 

—Develop an agreed concept of operations, goals, and objectives. 

2. Security 

—Increase the number of NATO troops and match quantity with quality. 

—Focus more efforts on the training of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and provide training, adequate pay, and equipment to the Afghan National Police (ANP) 

so they can maintain security once coalition forces depart. 

—Increase the U.S. role in rebuilding the ANP. 

—Work to reduce civilian casualties with a goal of ‘‘zero civilian casualties.’’ 

—Better integrate Afghan forces in U.S. and NATO planning and operations. 

—Develop with the international community a coordinated strategy in support of 

President Karzai’s political reconciliation efforts. 

—Create a regional plan to target risks coming out of the border with Pakistan involving both the Afghan and Pakistan Governments and work with Pakistan to 

get it more closely to incorporate FATA into Pakistan. 

48 

3. Governance and rule of law 

—A coherent and resourced strategy to increase the reach, capacity, and legitimacy 

of the Afghan Government should be a top priority. 

—Refocus efforts to develop an integrated and effective judicial system. 

—Develop governmental pockets of competence in the country, bringing together the 

judiciary, justice and prosecutorial, and police functions. 

4. Counternarcotics 

—Build and sequence the introduction and use of the core tools of counternarcotics—crop eradication, interdiction (arrests and prosecutions), and economic 

development. 

—Increase investment in development—infrastructure and industry. 

—Enhance interdiction efforts. 

—In lieu of massive eradication adopt an ‘‘Afghan centric’’ approach, including public information campaigns, voluntary restraint, full delivery of announced programs for alternative livelihood, and provision of all the services for alternative 

crops now provided by drug traffickers—(agricultural extension, futures contracts, 

guaranteed marketing, financing and micro finance). 

—Beware of negative effect of large scale eradication without careful support mechanisms and programs on support for the government and its programs. 

5. Economic development and reconstruction 

—The Afghan Government should get more credit for development and it needs help 

to improve its accounting and anti-corruption defenses. 

—Get Afghans to appoint an Afghan development czar. 

—Spread development more evenly around the country. 

—Follow up quickly clearance of Taliban forces from provinces with development 

assistance. 

—Enhance infrastructure development. 

6. Afghanistan and its neighbors 

—Embark on a sustained and long-term effort to reduce antagonisms between 

Afghanistan and Pakistan with the goals of rooting out support for the Taliban 

and its ideology, closing down extremist madrassehs and training camps and encouraging a relaxation of Pakistani restrictions on the transport of goods to 

Afghanistan. The Afghans should continue to be urged to accept the Durand Line 

as its border with Pakistan. 

—Pakistan needs to be encouraged to regain physical control in the FATA. 

—An effort needs to be made to resume conversations with Iran to coax out greater 

cooperation in helping to stabilize Afghanistan. 

—A regional peace process should be developed, beginning with confidence-building 

measures, with the eventual goal for Afghanistan becoming a neutral state protected by commitments against interference in its internal affairs, clandestine 

weapons supply and a comprehensive regime to support the flow of trade. 

CONCLUSION

This is a critically important tissue for this administration in the United States 

and for the next. There are many problems. Among the most important are governance and the building of Afghan capacity in all areas, drug cultivation, security in 

the border areas, and cooperation among our allies. 

The urgency is real. The problems can be dealt with. It will require new and enlarged efforts by this committee and the legislative and executive branches working 

together. 

‘‘REVITALIZING OUR EFFORTS, RETHINKING OUR STRATEGIES’’—AFGHANISTAN STUDY

GROUP REPORT BY THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PRESIDENCY

This bipartisan group, established in spring 2007, and cochaired by General 

James L. Jones (ret.) and Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, consisted of policy experts and former government officials. 

The report asserts that the United States and the international community have 

tried to win the struggle in Afghanistan with too few military forces, insufficient 

economic aid, and without a clear and consistent comprehensive strategy to fill the 

power vacuum outside Kabul and counter the combined challenges of reconstituted 

Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan, a runaway opium economy, and the stark poverty faced by most Afghans. 

49 

Achieving success in Afghanistan will require a sustained, multiyear commitment 

to make the war in Afghanistan—and its reconstruction—a higher U.S. foreign policy priority. Although substantial obstacles remain, the strategic consequences of 

failure in Afghanistan would be severe for long-term U.S. interests in the region and 

for security at home. Therefore, the ‘‘light footprint’’ in Afghanistan needs to be 

replaced with the ‘‘right footprint’’ by the U.S. and its allies. It is time to revitalize 

our efforts and rethink our strategies to stabilize Afghanistan to ensure our commitment level is commensurate with the threat posed by possible failure in 

Afghanistan. 

The Report Calls For: 

• Decoupling Iraq and Afghanistan in the U.S. legislative process and in the management of these conflicts in the executive branch. • Appointing a U.S. government Special Envoy to Afghanistan. • Establishing an Eminent Persons Group that would develop a long-term, coherent, international strategy for Afghanistan in coordination with the Afghan 

Government. 

Some of the Afghanistan Study Group’s other recommendations include: 

• Appoint a high level international coordinator under a U.N. mandate. • Set up a NATO compensation fund for civilian deaths, injuries or property damage resulting from its military operations. • Develop a coordinated strategy in support of President Karzai’s national reconciliation efforts. • Create a regional plan to effectively target the risks coming out of the border 

area with Pakistan. • Sequence the core tools of counternarcotics policy and integrate counternarcotics 

and counterinsurgency operations where appropriate. • Increase and accelerate investment in development—especially infrastructure 

and industry development—in all provinces. Encourage the Afghan Government 

to appoint an Afghan development ‘‘czar.’’ • Initiate a regional process to engage Afghanistan’s neighbors (including Iran) 

and other potential regional partners in the future sustainable development of 

Afghanistan. 

[Highlights from the Jan. 30, 2008, report is available at www.thePresidency.org.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ambassador Holbrooke. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD HOLBROOKE, FORMER U.S. 

PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, 

NEW YORK, NY 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s such a 

great pleasure to appear before you and your colleagues again, and 

especially on this issue. 

In order to be brief, let me just say, for the record, I agree with 

everything that General Jones and Tom Pickering have said, and 

I want to just add a few points, in highlight, and make a couple 

of suggestions. 

The importance of the issue is undeniable, and this committee 

deserves great credit for keeping it in the forefront, but I would 

suggest, even further, Mr. Chairman, we are going to be in Afghanistan long after Iraq is over. This is a long-term commitment. It 

may even turn out—it may even turn out that, in the long-term, 

Afghanistan is more important than Afghanistan. Tom Pickering 

already alluded to the fact that Afghanistan and Pakistan are essentially one strategic unit, and I strongly endorse that view. And, 

for that reason, and because it is the area from which 9/11 was 

planned and from which future attacks against the United States 

are undoubtedly being planned today, it deserves the longest possible examination. And I hope that any legislation you put forward 

in the future will impose on the previous witnesses, and the adminVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:58 Nov 20, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\013108.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
50 

istration that they represent, the kind of metrics that General 

Jones talked about, because that was a very nonresponsive set of 

testimony that we heard today to your very deep questions. 

Now, on the—I would just make one other point on this. If you 

see ‘‘Charlie Wilson’s War’’—and I know many of you know Charlie 

Wilson personally, as we all do—it’s an entertaining film, and I’m 

not going to judge the details of it here, but the core point of the 

film, unstated, is what happened when the film ends, which is that, 

after the Soviets left Afghanistan, the United States turned its 

back on it, in the spring of 1989, leading to the Taliban. 

We can’t walk out. We are going to be in Afghanistan as long as 

those people in this room in front of us, and we, are involved in 

public service. And the American public should recognize that. This 

is not a partisan issue. It is not part of the Presidential campaign, 

as Iran and Iraq are. 

And I was very disappointed in the previous witnesses, because 

they challenged your assertions and did not recognize the merit of 

this extraordinarily important report that General Jones and Ambassador Pickering and others issued yesterday in conjunction with 

this hearing. That report deserves attention, and, for the State Department officials to refute the assertion that things are not going 

well in Afghanistan, which they did, explicitly, today, was, to my 

mind, incomprehensible. 

To be sure, the situation in Afghanistan is better today than it 

was in 2001, when Afghanistan was living through what its people 

called ‘‘The Black Years,’’ but it is not better than it was 2 or 3 

years ago, and the administration’s spin this morning reminded 

me, not only of Iraq, which you, Senator Biden, referred to, but of 

a more distant war in the last century, in southeast Asia, where 

witnesses sat before this committee and tried to present evidence 

that Vietnam was going well, when, quite honestly—and you have 

two veterans of that war before you today—it was not going as well 

as they said. 

Now, I want to stress that we can succeed in Afghanistan, we 

must succeed in Afghanistan, but success will not be defined by 

getting out and leaving it a viable country in the foreseeable future. That’s just not an—that’s not a likely outcome. And the 

American public must be ready to recognize that, as I know all of 

you before us today have. 

We can succeed. The vast majority of Afghans that I have talked 

to do not wish to see a return to what they call ‘‘The Black Years,’’ 

and that’s especially true of the women of Afghanistan, who live in 

mortal terror of the return of the Taliban, for reasons that we all 

understand. 

I first visited the country in 1971, and drove throughout the 

country when it was a different place; and to see what it’s—what 

it looks like today on my recent trip is heartbreaking. 

Now, there are three key problems, to me. I would identify the 

top three problems, out of dozens, Mr. Chairman. 

No. 1, the border. I would submit to you that it is not possible 

for us to achieve success while Waziristan and the northwest frontier tribal areas are safe rest/recuperation/training areas for the 

Taliban and al-Qaeda. And we need to address that problem. It— 

you all know this, but the administration has never put enough atVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:58 Nov 20, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\013108.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
51 

tention to this problem. President Bush did have one well-publicized dinner between Presidents Karzai and Musharraf, but there 

was no followup. 

The second problem is drugs, and the third is police. With your 

permission, I would like to focus on the drug problem briefly. 

With all respect to David Johnson, who I’ve worked with closely 

in previous administrations, and who I think is an excellent career 

diplomat, I must submit to you my own view that we, or you, are 

authorizing, and then the administration is spending, American 

taxpayer dollars to strengthen America’s enemies. I see no other 

way to interpret what’s happened. Each year we spend, in a difficult-to-determine amount of money, which is probably around a 

billion dollars, on our drug program. And, as you pointed out, Mr. 

Chairman, each year the amount of opium that’s produced increases. Furthermore, as you pointed out, the drug lords are 

known. And if you walk around the streets of Kabul—although you 

pointed out, correctly, that walking around now is much more difficult than it used to be—if you walk through the streets of Kabul, 

you will see very large houses, and you ask—new modern houses— 

you say, ‘‘Who’s that?’’ they say, ‘‘That’s the drug lord’s house.’’ Everybody knows who they are. And the testimony you heard, previously, denied the fact that—and it troubled me, because—How 

can we fix a problem if the people in charge of fixing it don’t seem 

to admit it exists? We are strengthening America’s enemies by destroying crops in the insecure areas. 

Now, the previous witnesses referred to Jalalabad and that area 

in the north, where there has been an improvement in security, 

and there has been a reduction of drug production; although, let us 

be precise, they’re also switching from heroin—from opium to marijuana, because the crop blends in with the scenery better. It is 

Helmand, in the south, around Kandahar, which is the issue. And 

in that area, bordering the—bordering Pakistan, heavily insecure, 

that we find an insoluble problem with the present methodology. 

I do not believe that destroying crops in insecure areas can possibly 

work as the priority. 

The report that General Jones and Ambassador Pickering have 

produced talks about sequencing. The previous witnesses attacked 

and questioned that. I think they should explain what they meant, 

because their version of sequencing is precisely the correct approach. We can’t destroy crops when there’s no alternative-livelihood program, when there are no roads, and when we are driving 

farmers into the hands of the Taliban while enriching the drug 

lords. John Lee Anderson’s article in The New Yorker portrayed 

vividly what happened when he went out on a drug eradication— 

on a poppy eradication program, and they only destroyed the crop 

on the left side of the road, because the right side was a landlord 

and a tribe that they wanted to protect. 

So, I would urge you, Mr. Chairman, to continue these hearings 

and keep pushing. And I—with all respect, I hope you will not accept what you heard in the previous testimony, because it is—it is 

a formula for another hearing like this in 6 or 12 months, when 

the situation will be still worse. 

I will stop there, Mr. Chairman, but I appreciate the opportunity 

to join you today. 

52 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank all of you for being here. 

A couple of us went into Afghanistan, the January after the 

Taliban fell, and—with Secretary Rumsfeld trying to keep us out. 

It’s amazing how he didn’t know there are three branches of government, and he got confused. And, anyway, we spent some time 

in there—4 days—and I had a—this is directed to you, General— 

and we met with—I think it was a British two-star, wasn’t it? I 

can’t recall. I think it was a British two-star who was in western 

Kabul and went over, had—I think we had a meeting with him. We 

spent some time with him. And I asked a question of him at that 

time—this is 2002. I said, ‘‘General, how long is your Parliament 

going to let you stay here in Afghanistan?’’ And he said, ‘‘Senator, 

we Brits have an expression.’’ He said, ‘‘As long as the big dog’s in 

the pen, the small dogs will stay. When the big dog leaves, the 

small dogs will leave.’’ 

Well, it seems to me part of the problem is, the big dog left and 

put all its focus on Iraq. I don’t want to get into an argument about 

whether Iraq’s right, wrong, or indifferent, but the bottom line was, 

when we came back, I issued—well, not a report, but a—well, I 

guess it was a report, actually—that then-Secretary of State Powell 

agreed with, and he led the fight within the administration, as you 

may recall, to increase resources and military assets in Afghanistan at that time, and he lost that bureaucratic battle with, I assume, Rumsfeld and Cheney. I don’t know, but I—that’s the obvious assumption. And it seems to me everything’s, kind of, gone 

downhill from there. And I’ve noticed a phrase all three of you 

used, or some version of the phrase, that, you know, international 

resolve is waning. 

Which leads me—there’s a point to this—which leads me to Pakistan. I would argue that, in 2002, we had a real opportunity to— 

with Musharraf—to actually get a little more robust cooperation in 

dealing with Waziristan. And I think he saw the big dog leaving, 

as well, and I think he made his deal, essentially; I don’t want to 

overstate it. But, he made his deal, which was, basically, let—‘‘You 

leave me alone in Islamabad, and I’ll leave you alone in the provinces.’’ 

Which leads me to this point. Most Americans think we’re in Afghanistan, fighting al-Qaeda. They could give a damn about the 

Taliban, if you really got down to it. We all know that you should 

be very concerned about the Taliban. But, they could give a damn 

about the Taliban, because they don’t think the Taliban got in 

planes and came over and attacked the United States, they think 

the Taliban did what they did, they gave refuge and comfort and 

support to al-Qaeda. 

Now, I ask the question, which I can’t respond to today, by—I 

can’t tell you the answer in public, but you will know it—of the intelligence community, about the relative role of the Taliban and alQaeda, and how that mix works. 

Which leads me to my question. If Ambassador Holbrooke is correct that ultimate success—‘‘success,’’ meaning a stable Afghanistan over a long period of time emerging, not unlike our commitment we made to Korea, not unlike commitments we—long-term 

commitments we’ve made in the past that worked—how much of 

the ability to deal with the border relates to the ability to deal with 

53 

Pakistan and the ISI, and how much of that relates to al-Qaeda? 

Make—if you can talk to me about, if there’s a distinction—I think 

there is—but where the focus, you know, should be, in terms of 

that border. 

And I would conclude by saying, I would suggest that if we took 

out the entire—all of al-Qaeda—if the Lord came down and said, 

‘‘There’s not a single member of al-Qaeda left alive and breathing 

on the Earth,’’ we still have a real big problem with the Taliban. 

And, conversely, if the Taliban were gone, you still have a problem 

with al-Qaeda. Talk to me about the nexus between al-Qaeda, 

Taliban, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, if you would. Anyone. 

General JONES. What I can talk about is the fact that, as NATO 

commander, my relationship with Pakistan really occurred in the 

last 6 months of my tour, just as I was leaving NATO. So, I only 

had the opportunity to visit Islamabad twice and host the Pakistani military at NATO one time. This was right at the time when 

we were beginning to witness the failure of the deal that was 

struck with the tribal regions to live and let live, on the false notion that they would honor their side of the deal, which is to say, 

respect the borders and cease and desist, which they didn’t do. 

In my last meeting with a senior Pakistani official, I told him 

that the next few months would probably show that this is not 

going to work, and the problem is going to get worse and not better. And it’s exactly what happened. 

I think that there are a couple of things that were going on in 

2004 and 2005. It was called a Tripartite Commission, where the 

United States, Afghan, and Pakistan militaries regularly met to 

discuss the situation. When NATO came in and took over the responsibility for security and stability in Afghanistan, NATO became a member of the Tripartite Commission, as well. So, there is 

an ongoing relationship. 

I think, whatever the future holds, that part of the region is 

going to be a central point if we’re going to achieve any success, 

and we simply have to make sure that we do it well. 

One last point. My observation during my 4 years there was that 

the Taliban was certainly potentially more numerous; al-Qaeda, for 

a while, was an afterthought in 2002–2003. Both have shown a 

propensity to recover from the defeats that were—that they experienced, and simply because we haven’t addressed the issue of safe 

havens and border transit. 

The CHAIRMAN. Anyone else? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Mr. Chairman, I think that the problem with that border area is one of the toughest on Earth, so 

there’s no easy solution. In General Jones’s and Ambassador 

Pickering’s report, they have a very good suggestion, which relates 

directly to your question, and which, as far as I know, has received 

no attention in the administration. First, an all-out effort to get the 

Afghan Government and the Pakistani Government to agree on the 

international border. As you well know, the Durand Line, in the 

19th-century British legacy, has never been fully accepted. Second—— 

The CHAIRMAN. The recommendation is for the Afghanis to accept the Durand Line. 

54 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Yeah, the—they specifically recommend the Afghans accept the Durand Line, but in the real world 

anything the two countries agree on ought to be fine to the United 

States. The Durand Line is a—is, I feel, a starting point for negotiation. I don’t know every detail of it; no one does, anymore. There 

is—they also suggest an—a major international conference—they 

use the precedent of the Congress of Vienna, in 1815, which fixed 

Swiss neutrality, and it’s held for 200 years—to agree on neutrality 

for Afghanistan. They also point out that Iran must be part of the 

solution of Afghanistan. 

Now, I was in Herat, a year ago. The Iranian influence in Herat 

is crystal clear, and Herat is relatively stable, because the Iranians 

don’t want problems there. They have other problems—drugs are 

crossing the border, and the Iranians want to gain economic hegemony. But, like with Iraq, a point you have made many times, 

you can’t fix the problems of Iran—I mean, excuse me, Iraq and Afghanistan without a buy-in from the neighbors, no matter how they 

are. 

Having said all that, the actual problem of what to do with these 

training camps is an awesome—a daunting one. Some people have 

proposed Americans crossing the border in hot pursuit. The risk of 

that is very—there’s a very high risk here—and I would defer to 

General Jones—that we would get into areas where our military effectiveness would be limited, but the political and strategic negatives would be enormous. So, I think we have to proceed very carefully. 

Finally—two last points—there is now a new element in the 

equation which none of us would have expected 5 years ago: Pakistani Taliban whose focus is eastward toward the populated, nonfundamentalist areas of Pakistan. They pose a real threat, and the 

lack of democracy in Pakistan seems to be feeding that opportunity. 

It would be the biggest strategic catastrophe in memory if Pakistan 

went the way that Iran went in the 1970s. And yet, the narrowing 

base of the government raises that risk in the deepest way. I know 

you have spoken eloquently on this in public, repeatedly over the 

last year, and I can only echo and share the things you have said, 

Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador. 

Ambassador PICKERING. Just three very brief points, Mr. Chairman, to amplify what my colleagues have said, with which I totally 

agree. 

Al-Qaeda is an Arab organization. Taliban is predominantly 

Pushtun. They clearly had tensions, even when we were supporting 

them both to fight the Soviets. In adversity, those tensions go 

away. 

We neglected to understand that, after, in fact, we were quickly 

victorious in Afghanistan, we had a huge mountain of work to do, 

to follow up to make sure that it didn’t roll out under our feet. We 

have a constant capability of doing that, if you look back over the 

years. We—pretty good at wars, and very bad at what to do after 

them. 

The second piece, I think, is equally important, that Iran and the 

United States share a common interest in Afghanistan. We, after 

55 

all, took the two greatest burdens off the Iran plate: The Taliban 

in Afghanistan and the leader of Iraq. 

There is, in my view, a serious opportunity here. And the report 

is not, in my view, at all wrong in suggesting that this happened. 

My belief is that we need a broader conversation with Iran anyway. 

But, if Iraq is a legitimate subject, why isn’t Afghanistan a legitimate subject to talk to Iran about, regardless of all the other difficulties we’ve got? 

Look, we couldn’t have the Karzai government, as Dick reminds 

me, if we hadn’t got together with the Iranians in Bonn and put 

it together. And Jim Dobbins, who led that effort, is almost lavish 

in his praise of Iranian cooperation in those days, as strange as 

that may seem in today’s environment and atmosphere. 

I think the third piece is that Dick is right about the Pakistan 

Taliban, but it’s not totally new on the scene. We’ve had movements in Pakistan in the madrassas, training radical Islamic people, many of whom went to Afghanistan in the pre-Taliban-ruling 

days and became, in fact, the nexus of a lot of the Taliban effort. 

I think that a totally looney idea is to put U.S. forces into the frontier areas of Pakistan. If the Pakistanis themselves cannot do it 

with their knowledge, with their colorable capability to operate in 

those areas, at least now, how are Americans going to get over this 

particular difficult problem? I have no objections to the United 

States helping Pakistan, but this is a Pakistani problem, in almost 

an exclusive sense, and we have to find a way, which we haven’t 

been successful yet in motivating the Pakistanis to do so. 

I think their deal came after, at least according to reports I had, 

they tried putting a division into the frontier tribal areas, and got 

very badly beat up. So, it is not a simple problem, either for 

Musharraf or for the Pakistanis to deal with. But, I see that as the 

only road, and I totally agree with Dick on the looming dangers. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I know you have to go at 12:30, General. 

My time is up. I’ll conclude by saying that, you know, some Americans would wonder why—with us being, essentially, the primary 

guarantor of Karzai’s government, why—when Paddy Ashdown was 

told that he was not acceptable, why we would accept that. I understand it’s an independent government, but many Americans would 

wonder why we would be in a position to not make it clear that 

that was not acceptable, in terms of the help they expect from us. 

But, at any rate—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. May I comment on the Paddy Ashdown 

fiasco? Paddy—I share General Jones’s view of Paddy. I worked 

with him very closely in Bosnia, and I was in close touch with him 

over the last 4 months. He was ready to take great risks to his life 

and give up a very enjoyable retirement to do this. The reason he— 

and he and Karzai had met, and they had agreed on it. And then, 

there was a political backlash, and the press in Kabul began to 

charge him with being a relative of the British lord who had led 

the expedition that ended in such disaster in the 19th century. 

They wrote that he was coming back for a ‘‘blood revenge.’’ They 

warned him that his life would be in danger, and still he was ready 

to go forward, with the support of the U.S. Government. 

But, in the end, he had to withdraw, because he couldn’t have 

possibly fulfilled that mandate he had without the government’s 

56 

support. I did not hear a clear answer to your question to the previous witnesses, which is a very important one, about whether they 

are going to try to get someone else in there, or whether the whole 

issue is now behind us. But, I hope that this—your committee will 

continue to keep this issue foremost, because everyone agrees that 

something along these lines is necessary. 

The CHAIRMAN. Something is necessary. 

Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In my questions for the previous panel, I was asking, as many 

members have, for an overall plan for Afghanistan. And I’ll not go 

back through that, but each of you have illustrated elements that 

have to be in that plan. And there was an assertion that there are 

plans, that they are coordinated, they mesh together in some way 

that we have not perceived very well. So, I was really asking for 

clarification of, really, how Afghanistan might succeed, under the 

best of circumstances, with the proper insertions of capital, personnel, leadership from abroad, all the elements that might be 

helpful, as well as the reforms that the moneys and the training 

hope to bring about. 

What, seems to me this panel—each of you have, individually, 

demonstrated that even if we had a good business plan for Afghanistan, and prospects of gaining all the inputs that are required, we 

would have to think very carefully about Pakistan and Iran, because Afghanistan is unlikely to succeed, isolated, even if the business plan is very good. Now, this is even more daunting, because, 

to begin with, we don’t know the elements of all the investments 

we need. 

And then, on top of that, to say, even we did this, given this border, given Waziristan and safe havens, or, worse still, as you’ve all 

talked about, we don’t know the future of Pakistan, its politics and 

its governance, quite apart from what happens in Waziristan, and 

with Iran—and this is totally outside the scope of this hearing, but 

I was disturbed that Ambassador Khalilzad was being criticized for 

having appeared on the same platform with the World Forum, with 

two Iranians. They’re a long way, to say the least, from dialogue, 

although I agree that the Iranian aspect of this, historically, as 

well as currently, is extremely important. And I think you, Mr. 

Holbrooke, pointed out that we have encouraged, many of us, really, almost a roundtable discussion, if not in Baghdad, somewhere 

else, of all the neighbors of Iraq. That really has not come off, despite a couple of conferences on the side. But, it needs to, at some 

point, if there is to be the integrity of that state, and so that everybody understands what everybody else is doing in the process. 

So, it seems to me, the importance of your testimony is this additional dimension. In addition to sufficient planning for how we 

might have success in Afghanistan, a more comprehensive plan for 

how we work with Afghanistan and the region—and that’s even 

more complex—doesn’t mean it shouldn’t be done; and probably 

we’re not going to have great success in that area without that occurring. 

Now, what I am curious just to ask—I mean, in terms of specifics, because the reports that you’ve cited get into this—we’ve had 

some testimony with regard to the police training, that it was 

57 

rapid, in many cases. I think previous witnesses pointed out one 

deficiency may be the training of 10 days or whatever—it was too 

rapid. People sent out in the field, and were not well equipped to 

handle the job. But, the more common comment is the pervasive 

corruption of those who finally get into the field. In other words, 

there still is not a central government culture of noncorruption. 

There are provincial nodes and cultures that the police seem to fit 

into. And that’s going to be a difficult problem for some time, I suspect, in the same way that we’ve made headway with the rights of 

women or students or all the health care, whatever. The fact is 

that there are cultural differences throughout the country that are 

very substantial, and the police training, even if it was more adequate, has to include, really, integrity and sufficient pay, I suppose, 

as other countries have found, to fight corruption. 

The other point that some of us have heard in other testimony 

is that, in the case of army recruitment, this is difficult; and, furthermore, the number of soldiers going AWOL is substantial. I 

think someone else said retainment is difficult. But, in fact, a very 

large percentage of people seem to have simply disappeared from 

the ranks. Now, that’s disturbing, regardless of what you’re planning for Afghanistan or generally, to have, in both of those elements, that kind of deficiency. 

Finally, let me just throw, before I ask each of you for comment—in the case of the drug situation, maybe eradication on one 

side of the road or the other is not a good idea, or maybe eradicating it at all, given the hostilities and so forth—but, what would 

happen if we adopted a policy, either generally or specifically, that 

our country buys the drugs? We simply reimburse the farmer for 

his problems. We take the drugs out of circulation, put some money 

into circulation in the rural areas, or in those places that are in 

very deep straits. Now, when I’ve made that suggestion before, 

some people have said, ‘‘Well, you would have to arm-wrestle the 

drug lords.’’ In other words, they want to get their hands on it. 

This is a market—this is a system of brokerage and movement in 

which the United States would be competing with the drug lords 

for the product, but perhaps to the benefit of the farmer. 

Now, most people would say, ‘‘Well, this is just too clever, by a 

half, that you—to get our country into an ambivalent moral position of buying poppies or opium, whatever, from these people.’’ But, 

I’m simply wondering, in the sort—in your studies, as a commission, or in your own thinking, whether this idea of purchase as a 

way of moving through this thing more adroitly has ever come up. 

I rest my questions, and I’ve lost my time, but, in any event, if 

any of you have responses, I would appreciate it. 

General JONES. Thank you, sir. 

Just a brief comment about the narcotics situation. I think the 

solution is one that is comprehensive. It may have an element of 

purchase to it, but it also will have an element of eradication, it’ll 

also have an element of crop substitution, an element of subsidies. 

It also has to have a penal element that is enforceable, and a security element. And there’s the overarching question of who’s going 

to do that. I personally think that, ideally, you’d want the Afghans 

to take more responsibility for that kind of interaction with their 

own people, but that hasn’t happened. 

58 

But, if we just simply bought the crop, my feeling is that next 

year you’d be buying twice the crop, because they will—they’ll just 

produce more if that’s going to be the solution. I don’t know where 

that ends. 

But, one of the things that I’ve observed was that, a few years 

ago the G–8 really came up with a pretty good plan of how to address the five pillars that everyone agreed to had to be addressed. 

Two of those pillars have actually gone pretty well. The Japaneseled disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration pillar was actually reasonably well done, and we could put that in a plus box. The 

American-led pillar of revitalizing and training the Afghan army, 

generally, is—has been a good one, as well. We’d like to see more 

progress, but certainly, in the short period of time, we can give that 

a good mark, as well. 

The other three are all linked, and it’s narcotics, judicial reform, 

and police reform. And here, all three of those pillars also have a 

lead nation: Narcotics, United Kingdom; police, Germany; and judicial reform, Italy. And I think what’s happened, at least in my observations, while I—in my monthly trips to Kabul, was that the 

international community basically let those three nations, kind of, 

try to solve the problem on their own, without getting behind them 

to support them, as the international community simply has to do 

for problems of that size. And so, as a result, those three pillars 

have been languishing, and have really not made any substantial 

progress. In the 31⁄2 years that I visited regularly, I always asked 

for updates on the G–8 pillars, and was just saddened to see that 

there was none. I mean, it was simply the same meeting, the same 

group, the same plans dusted off, but without a whole lot of 

progress. So, that’s just a couple of observations. 

But, this is why the Ashdown development is so serious, because 

what is clearly lacking in the capital, where you have the United 

Nations, NATO, the European Union, the World Bank, all kinds of 

NGOs and other global organizations that are all trying to do their 

different things, but that central piece of coordination that would 

direct the international effort to those things that must be done if 

Afghanistan is going to progress, seem to be still lacking, unfortunately. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. May I quickly address your second 

point, Senator Lugar? On crop buyback, there’s a long history of 

this. I first encountered it in the 1960s and 1970s, in the Golden 

Triangle—Thailand, Burma, Laos. The problem is always the same. 

The—General Jones has already alluded to the fact that you just 

create a larger crop to buy back. It just seems to me that the flaw 

in the program is that we are attacking the victim, the people who 

are growing this to survive, without giving them anything in return. On paper, there’s alternate livelihoods, and, in some parts of 

the north, around Musar, and even at Jalalabad, maybe in Herat, 

some of it’s happening. But in insecure areas, that can’t happen. 

So, the administration’s long obsession with aerial eradication, 

which they finally abandoned, because Karzai said he would fight 

it publicly, and the British and the U.N. opposed it, really was a 

great diversion. 

So, what’s to be done? There is no sustained effort against the 

drug lords or the traffickers or precursor drugs. And it was clear 

59 

from the answers to the questions you and the chairman asked to 

the previous witnesses, their evasiveness, their failure to cite any 

high-level drug lord. There’s no effort on precursor drugs—chemicals. 

Now, there—this obviously needs creative thinking, and I don’t— 

I’m not an expert on this, and I don’t know what the answer is. 

I have read a recent proposal that we just do a massive agricultural subsidy to the area. But, I do think that we should not eradicate crops in the insecure areas in Helmand right now. I think it’s 

not just a waste of money. You—we’ve had plenty of wasted programs over the last 60 years. It is actively creating our enemy. 

And, again, I wish to state, Mr. Chairman, this is the only—this 

is the worst program I have ever seen—in the 45 years since I entered the State Department, the most waste of American taxpayer 

money—and it is creating enemies. We’re funding the Taliban’s recruitment drive, we’re funding drug lords. The crop, as you pointed 

out, keeps going up. And yet, we just heard witnesses defend it as 

though it was making progress. It’s—this emperor really has no 

clothes, and we have got to face up to that and do a groundup review of what’s to be done, with experts. And I would urge your 

committee to take the leadership, because we just saw, this morning, Mr. Chairman, that it is not going to come from the administration. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Gentlemen, General Jones has to leave at 12:30, so I would suggest that, if you have any particular question for General Jones, 

maybe we could—you know, it’s obviously your time, Senator Feingold, and I’ll—you’ll have the full time, but maybe, if there are any 

questions for General Jones in the next 15 minutes—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. All right. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. That you might be able to focus 

them. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I understand, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

And I want to welcome this public panel today. It’s an exceptional group of experts. In particular, it’s good to see my friend 

Richard Holbrooke. 

I’m very pleased to know that both the United States and the 

NATO Alliance are currently undertaking reviews of their Afghanistan policy. It’s long overdue. 

I would also note that, while an additional 3,200 U.S. marines 

in Afghanistan is a step forward, I’m not convinced that it’s enough 

to fix the deterioration, as of late. So, I’d like to ask all of you to 

comment—starting with the General—on the critical balance that 

needs to be struck between increased security operations and more 

robust reconstruction programs, including addressing the rampant 

corruption and impunity that have, unfortunately, seized the Afghan government. We need progress on both civilian initiatives and 

military operations, and I’m wondering how we can balance this. 

General. 

General JONES. Senator, I think I can be very brief on this answer. I support the commander’s call for the level of troops that he 

feels he needs. Having been in that situation from the outset of the 

first NATO expansion, I know the difficulties associated with calls 

for more troops and equipment. But, it doesn’t sound to me that 

60 

the number that they’re requesting—and, indeed, the welcome 

number that the Secretary of Defense has proposed—is really excessive; and which goes to reinforce my central point, is that you 

can certainly put a lot more troops in a big country like Afghanistan, but, I think, unless we address the other issues more comprehensively—that is to say, reconstruction and the other points of 

our collective testimony here—then I think you run the risk of losing momentum, which I think may have already happened, but— 

and then, even worse, backsliding. It’s the failed expectations that 

were raised by the—sort of, the people of Afghanistan, when they 

voted so massively—and, in many cases, heroically—to seat a 

President and seat a Parliament, that those expectations have, by 

and large, not been met. And that is, I think, one of the reasons 

why we see a resurgence of Taliban and other insurgent activities—and, obviously, the failure to address the narcotics problem, 

police, judicial reform, and corrupt officials being prosecuted. 

It’s been my experience that, in those areas where we have a 

good governor, a good police chief, and the presence of viable units 

in the Afghan army, that people respond well to that kind of authority. Unfortunately, those areas are few and far between. But, 

when you see them, they stand out like beacons, because it is possible to succeed. 

And the lament that I have is that I would—I wish that we 

could—and the reason I’m so disappointed in the Ashdown denouement is that this is really what is needed—to get the momentum 

and to regain the advantage. I think the troop strength—I defer to 

the commanders. It doesn’t sound to me like what they’re asking 

for is unreasonable, nor a lot. The United States has already offered to kick in some. And I know the Alliance has the capacity to 

do at least as much, if not more, if it wishes to do so. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, General. 

Mr. Holbrooke. 

Ambassador PICKERING. Can I say a few words—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, Mr. Pickering—— 

Ambassador PICKERING [continuing]. Senator, very briefly—— 

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. Is next; yes. 

Ambassador PICKERING [continuing]. In contrast to your question 

on priorities in Afghanistan and Iraq? 

My sense is, from the experts and against the backdrop of mili- tary funding in the neighborhood of $8 billion, and civilian funding, 

a great deal less, I think our conclusion was that if you had to 

make that tough choice on the marginal dollar, it probably ought 

to go to the civilian side. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Very good. 

Ambassador PICKERING. But, you understand the predicates. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Absolutely. 

Mr. Holbrooke. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I agree with what’s just been said. But, 

I want to underscore, Senator Feingold, the enormous importance 

of the police program. A lot of this—these issues are low-grade security, better adjusted for police. The police are underfunded, underpaid, undertrained, under-equipped, and easily corruptible. And 

the people of Afghanistan—I can’t stress this too highly—desperately don’t want the Taliban to come back. So, we need to invest 

61 

an enormous amount more. This is—the truth is, this is going to 

take a lot more taxpayer dollars, which is why I’m so upset that 

our biggest civilian program over there is the one that’s actually 

helping the enemy. And that’s why we need a—that’s why you’ve 

heard the—this excellent report that General Jones and Ambassador Pickering put forward, urged a special envoy—Tom referred 

to it as an American Paddy Ashdown—but, obviously there is no 

focal point in the U.S. Government. The previous witnesses each 

have part of the problem, and neither of them is full-time in Afghanistan. One is Assistant Secretary for a region that includes a 

third of the world’s population, including the subcontinent and the 

central—and the other one has narcotics worldwide. There is no 

one full-time on Afghanistan at the highest levels, as there must 

be. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. I’m going to cede the rest of my 

time, so my colleagues can have a chance to ask General Jones 

questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator BILL NELSON. My irreverent comment to our staff here 

in response to your question was: Where is Charlie Wilson? 

General, before you have to leave, there was a rumor out that 

we were going to trade out the Marines out of Iraq and put the Marines in Afghanistan. Now, of course, the Marines can take care of 

business. Is there any truth to that? There’s this 3,000 augmentation coming up, of Marines going into Afghanistan, and how does 

that tie in a potential spring offensive? 

General JONES. I think the Secretary of Defense has made the 

decision, at least for the time being, on that idea. I think the 3,000 

marines will certainly equip themselves very, very well, as they 

normally do. It is a demonstration of our national resolve, and 

hopefully it’ll be met by some equal offerings by some of our allies 

in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 

I think that it’s important to support the commander’s request. 

It doesn’t seem to me that what they’re asking for is unreasonable. 

But, if we are correct, and there’s a spiraling situation in an unfavorable direction—while I’ve always said, at least in my 31⁄2

years there, that the ultimate solution is not a military problem, 

but it could become one, and I don’t—I really don’t want to see that 

happen. And I think Ambassador Pickering’s recent answer to Senator Feingold was absolutely the perfect answer. 

Senator BILL NELSON. And that has come through, loud and 

clear, in all—— 

General JONES. Yeah. 

Senator BILL NELSON [continuing]. All of your testimony. 

Let me ask Ambassador Holbrooke—when you were talking 

about the lack of success in the poppy eradication, and the huge 

amount of expenditures that we’re making there—so, we’re not getting the bang for the buck, we’re doing it the wrong way—it occurred to me, we’ve gone through a lot of this drill before in Colombia. What have we learned in Colombia that could be applied to the 

situation in Afghanistan? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Senator, to my right is ‘‘Mr. Colombia,’’ 

so may I defer to Tom? 

Senator BILL NELSON. Please. 

62 

Ambassador PICKERING. I’m totally out of date, but I had a lot 

to do with helping to try to put Plan Colombia together. 

The lessons we learned in Colombia, at our peril, were that you 

could not ‘‘not deal’’ with all of the aspects, that the civilian aspects, despite the huge costs of helicopters for the military, which 

were essential, also had to be dealt with. And it was everything 

from judicial reform and effective prosecutions and rule of law, the 

whole thing. 

Now, I’ll tell you, one interesting thing we learned was that we 

could reduce, radically, the amount of hectarage in coca by aerial 

spraying, but the next year, it went up, and it went deeper into the 

jungle, and it went to small plots. And so, in effect, it looked like 

a fairly good device, but what it did was what we’re concerned 

about is going to happen, and Dick has explained so clearly: recruit 

people for the other side, fail to provide the alternative method of 

livelihood, disperse the crop, make it harder to get at, and generally increase, because the value is going up for that 1-year loss, 

the amount of money that comes back into the system. I suspect 

that the farmers don’t get much, but they get a lot. 

The other interesting thing, in terms of the other side of the 

issue: Can you provide an alternative way? Can you provide good 

agricultural crops, security, roads, market, financing? The drug 

lords provide all of that. Can you do that in a comprehensive way? 

You may have to start with the development piece first, before you 

get totally into the eradication piece. That seems, in my view, to 

be a better way to go ahead. Where we have done that in Colombia, 

we’ve been able to hold the line a little better than the other way 

around, and this has been particularly true with the opium crop in 

Colombia at the higher altitudes. 

So, those are a few things, Senator Nelson, that I would put on 

the table, that I think we have tried to take into account in our 

report here, although we all know Afghanistan is not Burma, is not 

Colombia. 

The CHAIRMAN. If the Senator would yield for just a second, I’d 

point out that—because I was chairman of Judiciary during those 

periods, as you’ll remember, and—cops—we vetted their entire police force. We went back and retrained them. And I don’t know how 

Plan Colombia, the portion that worked, could have worked without that. Medellin, you can walk the streets—— 

Ambassador PICKERING. We didn’t train military without vetting 

them. 

The CHAIRMAN. That’s right. And they’re not—that’s not happening now. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. To add to the answer and Senator 

Biden’s comments, Senator Nelson, roads and markets before drug 

eradication, some way of compensation to people when their only 

source of livelihood has been destroyed, or else joining the Taliban’s 

even easier. Hold eradication off in insecure areas for a while, and 

go after the traffickers and the drug lords and the precursor chemicals. 

I think the previous testimony strongly suggested to me, by the 

way the witnesses avoided the questions posed by the chairman 

and his colleagues, that they are not going over the drug lord— 

going after drug lords at a high level. I don’t know, Mr. Chairman, 

63 

if that was your impression, but I listened carefully to the colloquy, 

and I was not encouraged. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me thank all three of our witnesses. 

I want to touch upon the importance of border security in dealing 

with the problems in Afghanistan. There were, I think, some high 

hopes when OSCE agreed to provide some border security with central Asia. There are very challenging issues as it relates to Iran, 

and Iran’s support for extremist groups within Afghanistan. And, 

of course, it was well reported that al-Qaeda has the ability to travel between Pakistan and Afghanistan. So, I just really would like 

to get an assessment from you as two points. First, how important 

is border security in attaining our goals in Afghanistan? And how 

effective have we been on border security issues? 

General JONES. I think border security is extremely important, 

but in a 360-degree sense around Afghanistan. And I think that 

this is why, in our report, we stress the fact that what’s happening 

in the region is now making Afghanistan part of a regional problem. 

If you talk to the individual countries bordering Afghanistan, 

about drugs—China, for example, and Russia—are very concerned 

about the infringement of their borders and the traffic. Iran has 

running gun battles with these drug convoys, losing, I’m told, hundreds of people a year, trying to restrict the flow of drugs through 

their territories. By the way, on their way to European markets at 

the rate of about 90 percent of the drug product, and also to the 

east. 

So, I think one of the aspects of this being a regional problem 

is to get regional actors together and say, ‘‘What are we going to 

do about the border situation? How can more countries do more, 

particularly against drugs, but also against the flow of insurgents?’’ 

Because, obviously, the one that people focus on the most is the 

Pakistan-Afghanistan border dispute. And for several years we listened to the finger-pointing between President Musharraf and 

President Karzai, which didn’t really contribute to any forward 

progress. Now that it is a regional problem, we should all hope that 

the leaders of these countries will get together and do what’s right. 

Senator CARDIN. Let me ask one additional question, General, 

and that is: What should our expectations be? At the end of the 

day, what are we hoping, realistically, to achieve in Afghanistan? 

It’s a country that has a history of tribal leaders. It’s never had a 

strong central government. What can we expect? And what is the 

timeline? And I know that’s very difficult to predict, but I’d be interested in your assessment as to, what can we achieve, as far as 

stability in that country, its extremist groups being eradicated, and 

an economy that’s not based on narcotics? 

General JONES. My feeling, from having traveled all over the 

country, particularly in the aftermath of the elections that were 

held, was that the Afghan people, themselves, really want to stop 

fighting. There are—there is a historical behavioral science, I 

think, that can—you can track problems within a country, or within a region, where people go through a fighting and a killing spell, 

64 

and eventually they get tired of it or something happens, they stop, 

and they go, and they yearn for peace. And hopefully that’s what 

happened in Bosnia. And we’re all hoping that the—in Afghanistan 

we’re seeing the same thing. 

I think that the outpouring of public support for the election, the 

promise of a better life, the promise of economic stability, the promise of a judicial system, the potential of not being pulled in two different directions, terrorized at night, and being able to only go out 

during the days—those promises came through loud and clear to 

the Afghan people, and they voted, overwhelmingly, for that. 

What’s going on, I think, in the aftermath of these elections is 

their frustration over not seeing a progress towards that goal. It 

wasn’t going to happen overnight. We all recognize that. My feeling 

is that, for all of the enthusiasm that happened after the elections, 

the decrease in violence, the fact that the violence had really been 

located to a very small place, the PRTs were launched, NATO came 

in more forcefully, there was a lot of momentum that we had plans 

for judicial reform, police reform, narcotics reform, demobilization, 

reintegration, the—standing down the warlords—a lot of good 

things, a lot of momentum. 

And what I think has happened now is, the momentum has been 

lost. It’s been lost, because a lot of these programs have not been 

fully implemented. It’s been lost, because there is just no sense 

that we can tackle, effectively, the three or four most important 

things that are going on inside the country, complicated now by the 

fact that, I think it’s fair to say, this is a regional problem; whereas, before we were able to focus on Afghanistan, quite apart from 

the nations around it. 

So, I still think that there is a way ahead. I think it’s—I think 

the international community needs to come together, make their 

assessments, and us make our assessments. I do believe that a 

Paddy Ashdown-like figure, or figures, is absolutely critical to focusing the tremendous amount of money and resources in both people and assistance that is going on, and which is to be commended, 

but it’s going on in a almost uncoordinated way. And on certain 

issues, we need a lot more coordination, and a lot more effect. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. And, Senator, the Paddy Ashdown affair is not about Paddy Ashdown, it’s a seminal moment in the relationship between the Karzai government and the international 

community. It had not happened before, anything like this. And, 

for reasons involving internal politics in Afghanistan, the forthcoming elections, Karzai’s need to be more nationalistic and no 

longer so subservient to outside world, he broke an agreement in 

public. It may or may not have helped him, domestically. I have no 

idea. But, if it is allowed to stand, all the things that my colleagues 

have recommended in this terrific report, I don’t think will happen. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, it appears like we have our challenges 

ahead of us, and it’s not going to be a quick path. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Gentlemen, your testimony was greatly appreciated. I mean that 

sincerely. And you can rest assured, unfortunately for you all, we’re 

going to call on you again. 

65 

Three of us on this committee are heading over to Pakistan and 

Afghanistan shortly, and we’ll follow up when we come back. But, 

I don’t know how—to use your phrase, General, I don’t know—and 

also—all three of you—I don’t know we get a handle on this without much greater coordination in the—and involvement—of the 

international community. I just don’t—I don’t think there’s any 

possibility. 

At any rate, thank you very much. 

We are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:36 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(67) 

A P P E N D I X 

Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for 

the Record by Members of the Committee 

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD TO ASSISTANT

SECRETARY RICHARD BOUCHER BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. 

Question. After your appearance at our subcommittee hearing on December 8, I 

submitted several questions for the record to you. Two of them-the most important 

two- remained unanswered until just this week. The responses provided to these 

questions-which go directly to the role played by Pakistani security services in providing sanctuary to the Taliban- were, at very best, far from complete. 

The first question was a request for a detailed list of the reimbursements to the Pakistani military made under Coalition Support Funds: some $6 billion over the 

past six years. You testified on December 8 that every item had to be verified by 

the State Department, and in your response you reaffirm that ‘‘Claims are submitted through the U.S. Embassy where they are reviewed for completeness and accuracy and then endorsed,’’ and that ‘‘The State and Defense Departments work 

closely together on the consideration of reimbursement claims and each claim is examined closely by both departments.’’ Yet your response then states, ‘‘As the Defense Department is responsible for oversight of Coalition Support Funds, reimbursements, it maintains the records necessary to provide the details requested 

here. Consequently, for further details on Coalition Support Funds and a list of 

claims, we would refer you to the Department of Defense.’’ 

a) Does State keep records of the claims ‘‘submitted through the U.S. Embassy where they are reviewed for completeness and accuracy and then endorsed’’? 

b) If State does not keep records of these claims, what are the official guidelines regarding the destruction of this paperwork? 

Answer. The Department of Defense is responsible for oversight of Coalition Support Funds reimbursements. The Office of the Defense Representative—located at 

the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad and staffed by Department of Defense personnel— 

oversees the Coalition Support Funds program. It is the responsibility of the Office 

of the Defense Representative to keep the records of claims submitted through this 

program. For details on the official guidelines regarding the retention or destruction 

of these records, the Department of Defense is best placed to respond. 

I would also like to comment on your description about the role of Pakistani security services. The Pakistani security services do not play a role in providing ‘‘sanctuary’’ to the Taliban. On the contrary, the Pakistani military is engaged in robust 

efforts against terrorism throughout Pakistan. Approximately 100,000 Pakistani soldiers are posted along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. More than a thousand 

Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps troops have lost their lives since 2001 in the 

fight against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Pakistani territory, over 300 security 

force members since last July. A major factor contributing to the continued exploitation of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas is the lack of counterinsurgency 

skills within Pakistan’s security forces, not a lack of will on their part. 

Question. The second question requested ‘‘a list of all weapons systems primarily 

designed for purposes of external security currently scheduled for sale or transfer 

to Pakistan, with dates of scheduled transfer and dollar value of the transaction.’’ 

Less than three weeks later (on December 31), the Pentagon announced that Lockheed Martin had been awarded a $498.2 million contract to supply twelve F-16C 

and six F-16D jets to Pakistan. The decision was announced four days after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, at a time when Pakistani President was publicly deliberating whether or not to postpone national elections 

68 

a) On which date was State made aware of the decision to proceed with the 

award of the F-16 contract to Lockheed Martin? 

b) Given the political sensitivity, was any State Department official consulted 

as to the timing of this announcement? 

c) It seems unlikely that a transaction worth nearly half a billion dollars 

could be finalized and publicly announced without any senior official at State 

or the Department of Defense providing specific authorization. Who was the 

highest-ranking official at State to give approval for this transaction, and on 

what date? 

Answer. On June 28, 2006, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, in coordination with the Department of State, notified Congress for the sale of 12 F-16C and 

6 F-16D aircraft to Pakistan, in addition to various associated munitions and MidLife Update kits for the Government of Pakistan’s existing F-16 fleet. The State Department discussed the sale at length with the Congress, and the Letters of Offer 

and Acceptance were finally signed on September 30, 2006. 

The Department of Defense’s December 31, 2007 announcement was the culmination of a year and a half process since the signing of the Letters of Offer and Acceptance and was standard practice in meeting Foreign Military Sale milestones. Since 

September 2006, the Department of State has been aware that Lockheed Martin 

would be the responsible contractor, but the final ‘‘price’’ that the U.S. government 

would award Lockheed was still being negotiated by the Department of Defense. As 

the sale was already approved by the Congress, and the United States Air Force 

was implementing the case, the State Department was not made aware of this routine milestone announcement. The Department of Defense can provide further details on this matter if needed. 

Question. Your response to the second question stated that of the P-3 Orions slated for delivery, five aircraft (P-3C) have a ‘‘delivery date unknown.’’ 

a) Has the Department of State requested that the Department of Defense 

provide prior notification of any delivery of a weapons system of this type? If 

so, how much prior notice was requested? 

b) If the Department of State receives notice of such a scheduled delivery, will 

you commit to informing this Committee of it in a timely manner? If so, how 

much prior notice should the Committee expect? 

Answer. The delivery dates for the remaining P-3Cs are: 

P-3C 3: April 2009 

P-3C 4: May 2009 

P-3C 5: February 2010 

P-3C 6: March 2010 

P-3C 7: December 2010 

As a matter of practice, the Department of State does not require notice from the 

Department of Defense for the delivery of any aircraft or defense articles. However, 

given the strategic relationship the United States has with Pakistan, the Departments of Defense and State work in close coordination and the Department of State 

is aware of the operations of Foreign Military Sales programs, to include the delivery of equipment. 

From the last Question for the Record requesting a ‘‘list of all weapons systems 

. currently scheduled for sale or transfer to Pakistan, with dates of scheduled transfer and dollar value,’’ Congress has the latest information on the scheduled delivery 

of some of Pakistan’s larger defense procurements. The Department will keep that 

list up-to-date as new defense articles are approved for sale and will be responsive 

to the Committee’s requests. 

Question. In the hearing, you cited a December BBC poll on Afghan public opinion, noting ‘‘one of the things that really struck me was people said they’d rather 

have bad policemen than no policemen at all.’’ Please provide the citation for this 

assertion, as there does not appear to be any such question asked or response received in the report published by ABC and the BBC on the polling. 

Answer. Although polls consistently show widespread perception of corruption, 

they also reflect that Afghans strongly appreciate police presence. Unfortunately, I 

have not been able to find the citation. Perhaps I was mistaken about it. 

Question. In the hearing, you made the following assertion about Afghanistan: 

It’s got a government that works fairly well, better in some ministries 

than others, but it’s capable of providing education and wells and projects 

for people around the country. It’s got an army that’s credible and out in 

69 

the field and fighting. It’s got a police force that is reforming—and it’s not 

just quantity, it’s quality as well. A lot of what’s being done with the police 

training is to reform it as we stand it. So I see all these efforts. Nobody 

can tell me it’s not going in a positive direction. 

a) In the study that you cited above (ABC/BBC survey of December 2007), 

positive ratings for the U.S.-led efforts have dropped from 68% in 2005 to 

57% last year and 42% in 2007. Two-thirds said they could not afford adequate fuel, and over half said they couldn’t afford sufficient food. Fewer respondents said their country was on the right course than in any prior year. 

Satisfaction in living conditions was lower than in each of the three prior 

years polled. Moreover, 42% of respondents view the Taliban as having gotten stronger over the past year, while only 24% saw it as having gotten 

weaker. Would you regard the survey participants—1,377 Afghan citizens— 

as telling you that things were going in a positive direction? 

b) Two members of the private panel which followed your panel (Gen. 

James Jones and Amb. Thomas Pickering) served as co-chairs of a study 

group composed of some of the most respected experts on Afghanistan, the 

region, and the mechanics of nation-building inside or outside of government circles. The report they released on Jan. 30 states that ‘‘the progress 

achieved after six years of international engagement is under threat,’’ citing 

‘‘the growing lack of confidence on the part of the Afghan people about the 

future direction of their country.’’ 

Would you regard the study group participants as telling you that things were 

going in a positive direction? 

Answer. When assessing progress in Afghanistan from a broad perspective, we 

have to consider Afghanistan’s past. Afghanistan was one of the poorest countries 

in the world even before its 25 years of constant conflict and chaos. 

Against this background, it is only natural that daunting challenges remain until 

the present day—especially with respect to security, counternarcotics, and governance. And for millions of Afghans, life remains bitterly difficult. 

But we should not lose sight of the progress that has been made and that we continue to make year by year. Broad swaths of Afghanistan—especially in the North, 

the West and even the East—are hardly recognizable by comparison with where 

they were seven years ago. And we do no one a service if we ignore this progress. 

According to the ABC/BBC survey of December 2007, 70 percent of Afghans rate 

their overall living conditions positively, and two thirds rate their own security positively. The democratically elected President and his Government are rated as good 

or excellent by a majority of Afghans. And most importantly, more than half of Afghans see their country moving in a positive direction. 

Question. In response to a question from Sen. Hagel, you stated that the total 

amount of money spent by the U.S. in Afghanistan, including military operations, 

has been about $25 billion. How much of that, in total, has been spent for reconstruction and development assistance? 

Answer. From fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2007, U.S. Government assistance 

to Afghanistan totaled over $23 billion. This total includes security sector, reconstruction, governance, and humanitarian assistance, as well as operational costs, 

but excludes the cost of U.S. military operations. Of the total, $7.6 billion supported 

reconstruction and development activities. 

Question. Please provide the names of all high-level druglords who have been convicted of crimes in Afghanistan and are serving jail time in that country. 

Answer. There were approximately 760 arrests and 306 convictions of narcotics 

traffickers by Afghan authorities from September, 2006, to September, 2007. However, the U.S. Embassy cannot state with certainty how many are currently serving 

jail time. Once a defendant’s conviction is upheld by the Supreme Court, he/she is 

transferred to his/her province for the duration of his/her term of imprisonment. 

The following high-level narcotics criminals are awaiting trial or have been convicted: 

• Misri Khan—convicted of heroin possession, sales and attempted exportation 

• Bahram Kahn—convicted of heroin possession, sales and attempted exportation 

• Noor Ullah—convicted of heroin possession, sales and attempted exportation 

• Abdul Malik—convicted of kidnapping and murdering of two Afghan National 

Interdiction Unit (NIU) officers in August, 2005 

70 

• Babah Khan—arrested in June, 2007. Opium and heroin trafficker; awaiting 

trial 

• Salam Khan—arrested in June, 2007. Opium and heroin trafficker; awaiting 

trial 

• Haji Salam—arrested on October, 2007, for sale of drugs. Believed to be a Heroin lab operator and money launderer 

The following high-level narcotics criminals have been extradited to the United 

States: 

• Haji Bashir Noorzai—convicted for smuggling heroin into the U.S. 

• Haji Baz Mohammad—pleaded guilty to conspiracy to import heroin into the 

U.S. 

• Mohammad Essa—charged with conspiring to import approximately $25 million 

of heroin into the U.S. 

• Khan Mohammad—charged with narco-terrorism 

Question. According to the State Department’s 2006 Human Rights Report for Afghanistan, women continue to face serious barriers to the improvement of their 

rights and opportunities: ‘‘Societal violence against women persisted, including beatings, rapes, forced marriages, kidnappings, and honor killings.’’ Citing non-governmental organization reports, the State Department indicates that ‘‘hundreds of thousands of women continued to suffer abuse at the hands of their husbands, fathers, 

brothers, armed individuals, parallel legal systems, and institutions of state such as 

the police and justice system. Violence against women was widely tolerated by the 

community and is widely practiced. Abusers were rarely prosecuted and investigations were rarely carried out for complaints of violent attacks, rape, murders, or suicides of women. If the case did come to court, the accused were often exonerated 

or punished lightly.’’ 

What efforts has the U.S. Government undertaken to help the Afghan government 

specifically address the serious problem of violence against women? How, if at all, 

does the widespread prevalence of violence against women hinder women’s participation in and/or support for U.S.-led initiatives to enhance democracy and stability 

in Afghanistan? 

Which regions might you anticipate a need for funding that is not in the current 

budget request? 

Answer. We are committed to addressing the widespread problem of violence 

against women in Afghanistan. In 2005, the State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) supported the Afghan Ministry of Interior in establishing the first Family Response Unit in Kabul to help address domestic violence against women. Today, there are 24 Family Response Units 

attached to police stations in seven Afghan provinces that are staffed primarily by 

women police. The Family Response Units offer women a place of refuge from 

kidnappings, spousal abuse, rape/sexual abuse, forced marriage, and other gender 

crimes and rights violations. They provide women, children, and families a safe 

place to file a police report and also offer mediation and resources to families to prevent future violence. Since the creation of the Family Response Units, the number 

of domestic violence investigations opened by the police has steadily increased due 

to enhanced police capacity and heightened public awareness about domestic violence. Furthermore, the presence of a female staff member serves to showcase the 

opportunities for women in the Afghan National Police and promotes the need for 

their participation in Afghanistan’s security forces. The Afghan Government plans 

to establish additional Family Response Units at all provincial headquarters and in 

larger districts and will continue to staff them primarily with women police. 

Since their establishment, we have provided material and mentoring support to 

the Family Response Units. Each week, American police mentors meet with the 

Family Response Unit’s female officers, identify individual and unit needs, and provide skills training and guidance on case resolution. Police mentors are actively 

working to link Family Response Units increasingly with shelters, social services, 

and prosecutors who can try gender-based violence cases. 

After consultations with an Afghan women’s shelter director, the U.S. has funded 

a transit shelter for women and girls in Kabul in September 2007. This shelter provides domestic violence victims, including those requiring drug treatment services, 

with temporary safe haven, health care, psychological support, and legal aid while 

a long-term care strategy is being crafted. Victims needing longer-term shelter are 

referred to those facilities. 

A key component of preventing and responding to violence against women in Afghanistan is ensuring that women and girls know and understand their rights 

71 

under the law. To this end, since 2004 we have has supported the efforts of a nongovernmental organization that has partnered with Afghan women judges to conduct legal awareness training for more than 1,400 high schools girls and their teachers about their constitutional rights under the new Afghan Constitution. Additionally, in late 2007 we collaborated with and provided funding to the Afghan Ministry 

of Women’s Affairs to run a print and radio information campaign to raise public 

awareness of family violence and the rule of law according to the Afghan Constitution, the Penal Code, and Sharia. USAID programming has also worked to enhance 

Afghan women’s understanding of their rights under the law through roundtables, 

public discussions, and television and radio dramas on topics such as women’s rights 

in Islam, forced marriage, and the right to education. 

The State Department’s Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) 

programming uses radio as a means of communicating with the Afghan people about 

human rights, women’s rights, and democracy issues within the context of Islam. 

The project combines interviews and discussions with Afghan religious scholars 

about human rights within Islam and the role of women in Islam with examples 

from the Koran. DRL programs also include convening women’s and human rights 

non-governmental organizations in order to develop grassroots leadership training 

specifically for women from regions severely impacted by human rights abuses. 

Violence against women is a human rights violation and a serious obstacle to enhancing democracy and stability in Afghanistan. Such violence discourages half the 

population from participating fully in society. Nonetheless, Afghan women have 

proven that they are increasingly ready to assume their rightful role in rebuilding 

their country. For example, record numbers of women registered to vote (accounting 

for 43 percent of all registered voters) in the September 2005 parliamentary elections, and over 600 women ran for parliamentary office. Girls are attending school 

at historical levels and women, particularly in urban areas, are pursuing professions 

denied them under Taliban rule. Education will be critical in transforming society 

in Afghanistan. USAID has made Afghan women and girls a major target of its literacy and other educational projects (e.g., ‘‘Learning for Life’’ and the Women’s 

Teacher Training Institute in Kabul). 

To underscore U.S. government support for women’s rights, for the second year 

in a row, Secretary Rice will present a prestigious ‘‘International Women of Courage’’ Award to an Afghan woman who operates a domestic violence shelter. 

Question. In 2004 the Afghan government established the first unit of female police officers to assist women and children who are victims of crimes. 

Has the U.S. Government provided or offered to provide any training of police or 

prosecutors regarding domestic violence and sexual assault? If so, please describe 

that training. If not, are there plans in place to explore opportunities where our law 

enforcement and prosecutorial expertise on domestic and sexual violence may be 

helpful to Afghan authorities? 

Answer. In 2005, the State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and 

Law Enforcement Affairs opened the first Family Response Unit in Kabul to help 

address domestic violence and gender crimes against both women and men and 

other family issues. Today, there are 24 Family Response Units attached to police 

stations in seven provinces. U.S. civilian police mentors provide training and mentoring to female officers from each Family Response Unit, including specialized assistance in addressing domestic violence cases. Since their establishment, the Family Response Units have handled an increasing number of domestic violence cases. 

For example, in 2007 female officers in the Family Response Units collectively addressed 348 cases of domestic violence nationwide, up from a total of 199 cases in 

2006. 

In September 2007, the State Department provided funding to a women’s issues 

non-governmental organization to establish a transit shelter for female victims of 

gender violence. As part of this grant, the shelter designed a domestic violence 

training curriculum for police officers that introduces types of gender violence, women’s rights under the law, procedures for dealing with victims of domestic violence 

with sensitivity and respect, and available government and non-governmental resources for women in need, including how to use the shelter’s referral system. The 

shelter will hold five of these workshops, the first of which will occur in late February 2008, for male and female police in Kabul during the course of the initial oneyear grant. Based on the outcome of this pilot training program, we will consider 

how best to alter or expand this program to police outside of Kabul. 

In addition to the on-the-job training the police of Afghanistan receive to enhance 

their response to cases of gender violence, we have integrated domestic violence and 

human rights components into our police training program. To date, over 50,000 Afghan National Police officers have gone through the Department funded basic eightVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:58 Nov 20, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\013108.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
72 

week police training curriculum, which covers human rights and domestic violence 

issues. The two-week Transitional Integration Program training course on policing 

in a democratic society, which nearly 25,000 intermediate Afghan National Police 

have completed to date, includes additional coursework on domestic violence and 

human rights in the Afghan context. Domestic violence modules inform police trainees about the causes of domestic violence and the role of law enforcement authorities in responding to it. We are currently exploring additional ways to integrate gender issues and domestic violence responses into training opportunities for police at 

all levels. 

To complement its efforts to train police about domestic violence, the Department 

is actively engaged in the broader effort to reform and build Afghan justice sector 

institutions’ capacity to respond to violations of the law, including gender crimes. 

To date, hawse have spearheaded several efforts specifically geared toward building 

the justice sector’s capacity to respond to cases of gender crimes and domestic violence, including: 

• Enhancing police-prosecutor coordination on domestic violence issues in Balkh 

province in early 2008. The Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs’ police-prosecutor coordination training in Balkh directly led 

to the province’s decision to create the position of provincial family violence 

prosecutor. The new family violence prosecutor, who was a student in the training, has convened several meetings to date with the female police officers that 

staff Balkh’s Family Response Units in order to gain evidence to support the 

prosecution of domestic violence cases. 

• Supported the creation and distribution of 46,000 booklets on treatment of gender crimes under Afghan and Sharia law for use by police and prosecutors in 

late 2007. The booklet for prosecutors cites specific sections from the Constitution, Penal Code, and the Hadith and Sharia while the one for the police uses 

basic language and contains pictures due to low levels of literacy among police. 

• Mentoring female defense attorneys throughout Afghanistan. Approximately 10 

female defense lawyers who represent indigent female defendants throughout 

Afghanistan were provided weekly training sessions during summer 2006. 

• A gender justice training program for 45 justice sector professionals and community members—including 35 women and 10 men—at the Ministry of Women’s Affairs in Wardak province. The training included lectures and small-group 

discussions on domestic violence, forced marriage, and women’s legal rights and 

legal remedies available to women under Islam, Sharia, and Afghan statutory 

law. 

The State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 

Affairs is currently examining the feasibility of developing additional training and 

assistance programs for prosecutors working on domestic violence cases and remains 

committed to further enhancing the capacity of the broader justice sector to respond 

to gender crimes and domestic violence. 

Question. Women’s progress in Afghanistan is particularly dependent on the security situation in the country. In the words of former acting minister of women’s affairs, Masuda Jalal, ‘‘Women’s future depends so much on security. As much as security deteriorates, women’s situation deteriorates. At the first sign of insecurity, 

the head of the family protects his women and children, and the first measure they 

take is to keep them inside the house.’’ In recent months we have seen press reports 

of teachers being targeted and of girls being murdered outside their schools. A recent news article reports that 130 schools have been burned down, 105 students and 

teachers killed and more than 300 schools closed down—many of those schools were 

for girls. 

How are considerations about the security of women and girls incorporated into 

U.S. efforts to ensure the overall security of the population? And specifically, what 

steps, if any, has the U.S. government taken to improve the safety of women and 

girls in Afghanistan, particularly in areas where the Taliban is regaining ground? 

Answer. The United States places great priority on enhancing security for Afghans, including women and girls. Security is an indispensable prerequisite for improving everyday life of women and girls, most notably school attendance and access 

to medical care. U.S. troops, our NATO Allies and partners, and the Afghan Security Forces have achieved sustained successes against the Taliban on the battlefield 

helping expand Afghan Government presence so the population can recover from 

decades of war and conflict. The U.S. and our Allies will continue to train the army 

and police so they can respond effectively and professionally to security and criminal 

threats to the population. Human rights education, including the rights of women 

73 

and girls, are included in army and police training. Properly trained police and 

army soldiers will expand the reach of security services to areas that are currently 

underserved, particularly in southern Afghanistan. In addition, U.S. and other 

NATO-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams have built or rebuilt schools throughout 

Afghanistan, including girls’ schools, and supported other development activities. Although the needs are still great, these efforts represent increased opportunities for 

improvement in the lives of Afghan women and girls. 

Question. There are several obstacles for women in accessing the justice system 

in Afghanistan. Women often face hardship in the enforcement of family law and 

criminal law, and there often is a lack of sensitivity in cases involving women, especially in crimes of sexual nature, like adultery. Furthermore, informal justice sectors 

like local councils often discriminate against women. For example, I am aware of 

a recent reported case in the Province of Badakhshan in which a woman was stoned 

to death for adultery, while the man was only whipped. What steps, if any, is the 

U.S. government taking to help women access the justice sector without discrimination? 

Answer. Enhancing women’s access to the justice sector is a high priority goal for 

the United States. Strengthening the capabilities of the justice sector and increasing 

the number of women legal professionals in it will have a positive impact on women’s access to justice. The Department of State runs a justice sector reform program 

that has provided training in accounting and management to ten female defense attorneys with a local Legal Aid Organization, and is providing ongoing mentoring. 

The Department conducts provincial training seminars on human rights topics, such 

as gender justice and victim’s rights. A gender curriculum is being integrated into 

the Attorney General’s Office continuing legal education course, and specifically includes training on sexual assault prosecution. Ten female prosecutors have gone 

through this continuing legal education course. Another 15 female prosecutors, to 

date, have participated in a Department-sponsored police-prosecutor training in 

Balkh, Herat, and Nangarhar. The Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs is also developing a Victim-Witness Support and Prosecution initiative to more effectively prosecute sexually related crimes. 

In addition, since 2005, Afghan women judges have visited the United States for 

judicial training, including on family law. Back home, these women judges receive 

professional development training and 34 female judicial candidates have also received judge candidate training under USAID programming. 

Working to increase knowledge of their rights is also essential to efforts to help 

women secure their legal rights. In addition to publishing 46,000 booklets on laws 

against gender-based violence for use by police and prosecutors, we are funding 

radio spots and 6,000 street posters on gender crimes that target the general population. We have also supported legal rights courses, including accessing the legal 

system, for over 1,400 high school girls and their teachers in Kabul. In an example 

of provincial outreach, 35 female members of the community (teachers, members of 

the provincial council, women corrections officers, etc.) attended a legal aid training 

session focused on women’s rights in Wardak province. 

USAID is also active in efforts to promote women’s legal rights. It is sponsoring 

a ‘‘women’s-rights-under-Islam’’ program that works with religious leaders and 

human rights activists to develop and disseminate progressive messages about the 

rights of women under Islam. For example, the program supported the formation 

of a 45-member consultative group of local scholars and experts to assist with message development. That group has assisted in the production of 19 radio and television roundtables, and dramas, and three televised public service announcements 

on women’s rights in Islam that were broadcast nationwide. The program is actively 

producing and distributing printed women’s rights materials in the provinces via its 

32 community cultural centers and other means. The program has taken Islamic 

scholars on study tours to more moderate predominately Muslim countries and is 

performing an assessment of access of women to justice and prospects for women 

in the legal profession to help target future programming. This program is undertaken within USAID’s larger program to support the Supreme Court’s efforts to 

strengthen the capacity of the formal court system, engage the informal justice system, educate Afghans on their legal and human rights and help the Ministry of Justice collect, index and disseminate Afghan law. 

74 

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD TO ASSISTANT

SECRETARY RICHARD BOUCHER BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER DODD

Question. Secretary Boucher, according to the Government Accountability Office, 

the Department of Defense mismanaged the procurement and transfer of approximately 200,000 assault rifles and 90,000 handguns to the Iraqi Security Forces. 

These weapons were not tracked and it is unknown in whose hands they have 

wound up. Moreover, section 1228 of Public Law 110–181 mandates an accounting 

for these misplaced arms as well as future such transfers. 

1. Can you provide specific assurances to this committee that all weapons 

being provided to the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police 

are being properly catalogued and tracked? 

2. Is the training and equipping program for these forces being carried out 

under the auspices of the State Department? 

3. What role is the Department of Defense playing in these efforts? 

Answer. Since 2005, the Department of State has engaged in a partnership with 

the Department of Defense and the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, which has responsibility for the Afghan National Security Forces development program. The Department of State coordinates closely with the transition 

command to implement the U.S.-funded program to train the Afghan National Police at the eight Department of State training facilities across Afghanistan. The Department of Defense executes the equipping of the Afghan National Police through 

the transition command. The resource and logistics division of the command and the 

Afghan Ministry of the Interior provide a dual-chain process to monitor police equipment accountability. A combined inventory is recorded on both Afghan and U.S. accountability forms. The U.S. has recently embedded over 800 U.S. military personnel with the police to further improve end-use monitoring. 

The Department of Defense directs and executes the training and equipping of the 

Afghan National Army. Questions concerning the training and equipping of the 

army can be best answered by the Department of Defense. 

Æ