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45–602 PDF 2008

S. HRG. 110–625

AIR FORCE NUCLEAR SECURITY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 12, 2008

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

(

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia, 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

MICHAEL V. KOSTIW, Republican Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

AIR FORCE NUCLEAR SECURITY

FEBRUARY 12, 2008

Page

Darnell, Lt. Gen. Daniel J., USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff, Air, Space, and 

Information, Operations, Plans and Requirements; Accompanied by Maj. 

Gen. Douglas L. Raaberg, USAF, Director for Air and Space Operations, 

Air Combat Command; and Maj. Gen. Polly A. Peyer, USAF, Director 

of Resource Integration, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, 

Installation and Mission Support ....................................................................... 5

Welch, Gen. Larry D., USAF [Ret.], President and CEO, Institute for Defense 

Analyses ................................................................................................................ 40

(III) 

(1)

AIR FORCE NUCLEAR SECURITY 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room SR–

325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) 

presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Bill Nelson, Warner, Inhofe, Thune, and Wicker. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; John H. 

Quirk V, security clerk. 

Majority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel. 

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican 

staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; 

David G. Collins, research assistant; Gregory T. Kiley, professional 

staff member; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Christopher J. 

Paul, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff 

member; Robert M. Soofer, professional staff member; and Kristine 

L. Svinicki, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Kevin A. Cronin, and 

Jessica L. Kingston. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Jay Maroney, assistant 

to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator 

Lieberman; Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; 

Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator 

Inhofe; Todd Stiefler, assistant to Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator Collins; and Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to Senator Wicker. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. This morning we 

welcome Lieutenant General Daniel Darnell, Major General Polly 

Peyer, and Major General Douglas Raaberg from the Air Force, and 

retired Air Force General Larry Welch, Chairman of the Defense 

Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Weapons. Lieutenant General Darnell, who is the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, and General Raaberg, the Director of Plans and Operations 

at Air Combat Command, conducted the initial investigation into 

what happened at Minot Air Force and Barksdale Air Force Bases 

last Labor Day weekend and why it happened. 

2

Lieutenant General Peyer, Director of Resource Integration for 

the Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, Installations, and Mission Support, followed up with an investigation of the entire Air Force nuclear enterprise to see if the problems at Barksdale and Minot were 

part of a broader systemic Air Force problem. General Welch, at 

the request of Secretary Gates, reviewed the nuclear enterprise of 

the whole Department of Defense (DOD) to see if the problem was 

bigger than the Air Force, and unfortunately it is. 

The issue this morning is very, very serious. Over a 2-day period 

last August, the Air Force lost control and knowledge of six nuclear 

warheads during what had become a routine effort to realign nuclear cruise missiles without warheads between Minot Air Force 

Base in North Dakota and Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. 

Through an extraordinary series of consecutive failures of process, 

procedure, training, and discipline, the nuclear warheads flew on 

the wings of a B–52 bomber from Minot to Barksdale inside of 

cruise missiles. No one knew where they were or even missed them 

for over 36 hours. The warheads were not discovered until the missiles on which the warheads were loaded were being prepared to 

be moved to the weapons storage area after having been unloaded 

from the B–52 at Barksdale after a flight of over 1,400 miles. 

While historically there have been nuclear weapons accidents 

with varying degrees of severity, no breach of nuclear procedures 

of this magnitude had ever occurred previously. Luckily, these 

weapons weren’t stolen or permanently lost, or accidentally 

dropped from the wings of the B–52 bomber on which they flew, 

or jettisoned because of bad weather or mechanical problems, with 

the pilots not even aware that they were jettisoning nuclear weapons containing deadly plutonium. 

Each one of the warheads has the explosive power roughly equivalent to seven times the explosive power of the Nagasaki nuclear 

bomb and ten times the Hiroshima nuclear bomb. If jettisoned and 

they didn’t explode, incredibly dangerous nuclear material could 

have been spread for miles. That’s why the safety precautions are 

so strict, with multiple redundancies. 

The three investigations that have been conducted as a result of 

this incident have found that the underlying root cause is the 

steadily eroding attention to nuclear discipline in the Air Force 

and, indeed, the whole DOD. This inattention started at the end 

of the Cold War and has grown substantially worse over the last 

decade. From the results of General Raaberg’s initial investigation, 

the Commander’s Directed Investigation (CDI), it is clear that an 

erosion of adherence to rigid Air Force nuclear procedures and the 

‘‘intricate system of nuclear checks and balances were either ignored or disregarded.’’ 

The problems existed at both Minot and Barksdale and reflect ‘‘a 

breakdown in training, discipline, supervision, and leadership.’’ 

General Peyer’s blue ribbon review finds that the problems in the 

Air Force spread beyond Minot and Barksdale and begin with senior leadership and a lack of commitment to the nuclear mission and 

extend to shortcomings in training, inspections, and funding. 

General Welch, your report finds that the scope of inattention 

goes even further and is, with a few exceptions, pervasive within 

the DOD. 

3

There are 132 recommendations from these three reports. Some 

have been implemented. Most have not. This entire episode really 

is a wakeup call. As long as the United States has nuclear weapons, they must be handled with the utmost security and attention. 

Many of the details of this incident, the investigation, and corrective measures remain classified. 

Given the situation on the Senate floor this morning, with I believe nine rollcall votes on amendments to the Foreign Intelligence 

Surveillance Act legislation beginning at approximately 10 o’clock, 

we’re going to have, after the statements of our witnesses, one brief 

round of questions and then we will reconvene in S–407 of the Capitol for a closed session, and that is a change in location. We’re 

going to meet in classified session in S–407. 

So, Senator Inhofe, I believe you have an opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE 

Senator INHOFE. I do, Mr. Chairman. Without objection, I’ll read 

Senator Warner’s statement. I’m told he asked if I would do that. 

First of all, thank you for calling this hearing, and I join with 

you in expressing my deep concern over what may have been one 

of the most serious nuclear weapons handling and stewardship incidents in the last 60 years. Since the committee first found out 

about the incident, it has closely monitored in a bipartisan manner 

the ongoing efforts of the Air Force and the DOD to ensure accountability and to ensure this sort of event does not happen again. 

I join our chairman in welcoming our witnesses and thank them 

for their efforts. I would like to especially thank General Welch 

again for answering the call and thank them for their efforts. I 

would like to especially thank General Welch again for answering 

the call of our Nation to serve, proving again that generals never 

really die; they just keep working. 

Also, I want to welcome General Raaberg, who is a regular fixture there at the Vance Air Force Base. When I used to fly in my 

plane in there, he was kind enough to let me land there. So we finally had to write a new chapter in the book to make something 

work. Thank you. 

I was impressed with the rapidity with which the Air Force 

began its investigation and coordinating information to Capitol 

Hill. The CDI was a logical first step. The Air Force-wide blue ribbon review and defense-wide Defense Science Board report on nuclear surety were also well-conceived efforts to get at the root problems and causes. 

While the CDI concludes this to have been an isolated incident 

and the result of the actions of just a few airmen, there are other 

conclusions that speak to long-term degradation of discipline and 

adherence to established procedures. The lack of attention to details spanned two separate military installations. These conclusions 

seem at odds with each other. The witnesses should be expected to 

reconcile the differences. 

One of the major tenets of our military is accountability. Our 

military leaders must be accountable to civilian authority and military subordinates accountable to our military leaders. Without a 

strong reliance on the chain of command, we are weakened as a 

Nation. I bring this up in light of where accountability has been 

4

assigned in this incident. The witnesses will be asked if they are 

satisfied that we have properly placed accountability where it 

should reside. 

One of the principal conclusions of the blue ribbon review is that 

the Air Force is spread thin because it has been at war for over 

17 years. While I share the concern for the stress that our airmen 

have been under the past 2 decades, I would ask how that stress 

was allowed to manifest itself in the procedures used to handle our 

nuclear weapons and what safeguards were sacrificed that allowed 

that to happen. 

How did we allow our adherence to nuclear codes of conduct to 

erode to this point? During the Cold War our forces handled over 

9,000 deployed nuclear warheads. Under our Moscow Treaty obligations, we will reduce to no more than 2,200 warheads by 2012. But 

even if we had just one nuclear weapon, the point, as General 

Welch’s report states, is that the complexity of the nuclear enterprise is not reduced. As long as we have these weapons, their military and political nature demands the most intense attention to 

their proper care. We must sharpen our focus on the extra care required in this nuclear mission. 

Of greatest concern to me is how we ensure the events of August 

2007 don’t happen again. We need to focus more attention on how 

our inspection processes and procedures failed to alert us to the decline in discipline that led to the incident. Additionally, we need to 

reinforce our inspections and readiness reviews to understand and 

heed the signals of decline and reverse the downturn and before 

such incident happens again. 

I look forward to your testimony and appreciate having this hearing, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Chairman Levin, thank you for calling this hearing to receive testimony on the 

very grave and serious incident of the unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons 

from Minot Air Force Base, ND, to Barksdale Air Force Base, LA, in August 2007. 

I join with you in expressing my deep concern over what may have been one of 

the most serious nuclear weapons handling and stewardship incidents in last 60 

years. Since the committee first found out about the incident, it has closely monitored, in a bipartisan manner, the ongoing efforts of the Air Force and the Department of Defense to assure accountability and ensure this sort of event does not happen again. 

I join our chairman in welcoming our witnesses, and thank them for their efforts. 

I would like to especially thank General Welch for once again answering the call 

of our Nation to serve, proving again that generals never really do retire. 

I was impressed with the rapidity with which the Air Force began its investigation, and coordinating information to Capitol Hill. The Command Directed Investigation was a logical first step. The Air Force-wide Blue Ribbon Review and the 

Defense-wide Defense Science Board Report on Nuclear Surety were also well conceived efforts to get to the root problems and causes. 

While the Command Directed Investigation concludes this to have been an isolated incident and the result of the actions of just a few airman, there are other 

conclusions that speak to long-term degradation of discipline and adherence to established procedures. The lack of attention to detail spanned two separate military 

installations. These conclusions seem at odds with each other. The witnesses should 

be expected to reconcile the differences. 

One of the major tenets of our military is accountability. Our military leaders 

must be accountable to civilian authority, and military subordinates accountable to 

our military leaders. Without a strong reliance on the chain-of-command, we are 

weakened as a nation. I bring this up in light of where accountability has been asVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:36 Dec 03, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\45602.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
5

signed in this incident. The witnesses will be asked if they are satisfied that we 

have properly placed accountability where it should reside. 

One of the principle conclusions of the Blue Ribbon Review is that the Air Force 

is spread thin, because it has been at war for over 17 years. While I share the concern for the stress our airmen have been under the past two decades, I would ask 

how that stress was allowed to manifest itself in the procedures used to handle our 

nuclear weapons, and what safeguards were sacrificed that allowed that to happen. 

How did we allow our adherence to nuclear codes of conduct to erode to this point? 

During the Cold War, our forces handled over 9,000 deployed nuclear warheads. 

Under our Moscow Treaty obligations, we will reduce to no more than 2,200 warheads by 2012. But, even if we had just one nuclear weapon, the point—as General 

Welch’s report states—is that the complexity of the nuclear enterprise is not reduced. As long as we have these weapons, their military and political nature demands the most intense attention to their proper care. We must sharpen our focus 

on the exquisite care required for this nuclear mission. 

Of greatest concern to me is how we ensure the events of August 2007 do not happen again. We need to focus more attention on how our inspection processes and 

procedures failed to alert us to the decline in discipline that led to this incident. 

Additionally, we need to reinforce our inspections and readiness reviews to understand and heed the signals of decline, and reverse the downturn, before such incidents happen. 

I look forward to your testimony, and the question and answer period. Our Nation 

deserves to be able to sleep at night knowing our nuclear arsenal is secure, in good 

hands, and will remain so. Our efforts here today and in the future must work towards that aim.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

I understand now that General Darnell is going to make an 

opening statement on behalf of our three Air Force witnesses; is 

that the intent? 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. DANIEL J. DARNELL, USAF, DEPUTY 

CHIEF OF STAFF, AIR, SPACE, AND INFORMATION, OPERATIONS, PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS; ACCOMPANIED BY 

MAJ. GEN. DOUGLAS L. RAABERG, USAF, DIRECTOR FOR AIR 

AND SPACE OPERATIONS, AIR COMBAT COMMAND; AND 

MAJ. GEN. POLLY A. PEYER, USAF, DIRECTOR OF RESOURCE 

INTEGRATION, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF 

FOR LOGISTICS, INSTALLATION AND MISSION SUPPORT 

General DARNELL. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Then, General Welch, the former Chief of Staff 

of the Air Force, will make a statement about the Defense Science 

Board (DSB) study. 

So we’ll start with you, General Darnell. Thank you all for being 

here and for your work on this matter. 

General DARNELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Levin, 

Senator Inhofe, and distinguished members of the committee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to provide you the Air Force way 

ahead for our nuclear enterprise. Let me request that our written 

statement be entered for the record. 

Chairman LEVIN. It will be. 

General DARNELL. Thank you, sir. 

Throughout the history of the United States Air Force, our professionalism and dedication have guaranteed the soundness and 

surety of Air Force crews and weapons. From our Service’s beginning, we have earned the trust of our national leadership and, most 

importantly, the trust of the American public. Unfortunately, in 

late August 2007 the Air Force flew weapons from Minot Air Force 

Base, North Dakota, to Barksdale Air Force Base in an unauthorized manner. 

6

It’s important to note that during the incident there was never 

any unsafe condition and the incident was promptly reported to our 

national leadership, including the Secretary of Defense and the 

President. These weapons were secure and always in the hands of 

America’s airmen. However, as airmen we are accountable and we 

will assure the American people that the Air Force standards they 

expect are being met. 

The commander of Air Combat Command immediately initiated 

a CDI. Without delay, the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief 

of Staff of the Air Force engaged and initiated a series of specific 

actions: One, an immediate, successful 100 percent stockpile 

verification of U.S. nuclear weapons in the Air Force custody; two, 

a standdown of U.S. Air Force nuclear units for extra training and 

to emphasize attention to detail; three, Chief of Staff of the Air 

Force messages to all major commands and each individual airman 

on standards, discipline, and attention to detail, highlighting mission focus and checklist discipline; four, 100 percent limited nuclear 

surety inspections of all nuclear-capable units, with Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency oversight; five, Secretary of the Air Force visits 

to Barksdale Air Force Base, LA, and Minot Air Force Base, ND; 

and lastly, a blue ribbon review of policies and procedures focused 

on the entire Air Force nuclear enterprise. This review took into account operations, maintenance, storage, handling, transportation, 

and security. 

The Air Force is working in partnership with other Federal agencies both inside and outside the DOD to conduct this analysis. 

Additionally, the Secretary of Defense requested General Larry 

Welch to lead a DSB review of DOD-wide nuclear surety. 

The root causes identified for the specific incident were unit level 

leadership and discipline breakdown among a small group of airmen at Barksdale Air Force Base and Minot Air Force Base. As a 

result of this incident, seven leaders within the Air Force have 

been removed from their positions, including one wing commander 

and two group commanders. Additionally, 90 people were temporarily decertified from duties associated with the nuclear mission. 

Many of the actions following the incident are still ongoing. The 

blue ribbon review finds that the Air Force’s policies, processes, 

and procedures are sound and that the Air Force commitment to 

the nuclear enterprise is strong. However, there are opportunities 

for improvement in the Air Force’s nuclear enterprise. 

The Air Force Nuclear General Officer Steering Group has assessed, validated, and assigned responsibility for implementing the 

recommendations from the commander-directed investigation, the 

blue ribbon review, and the DSB. As of the time of this hearing, 

nearly one-quarter of the recommendations are complete. These 

recommendations transcend all levels of the Air Force. Common 

throughout the CDI, the blue ribbon review, and the DSB are recommendations that focus the nuclear enterprise on the level of experience, knowledge, frequency of training, exercises, organizations, 

standardization, evaluation, and inspections. 

The Air Force is committed to continuously improving its ability 

to fulfill the Nation’s nuclear mission, grounded on our core values 

of integrity, service, and excellence, because it is a credible nuclear 

deterrent that convinces potential adversaries of our unwavering 

7

commitment to defend our Nation. The Air Force portion of the Nation’s nuclear deterrent is sound. We will take every measure necessary to continue to provide safe, secure, reliable nuclear surety 

to the American public. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Darnell, General Peyer, 

and General Raaberg follows:]

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT BY LT. GEN. DANIEL J. DARNELL, USAF; MAJ. GEN. POLLY A. PEYER, USAF; AND MAJ. GEN. DOUGLAS L. RAABERG, USAF 

I. INTRODUCTION

Chairman Levin and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the 

opportunity to provide you the Air Force way ahead for our nuclear enterprise. Since 

the weapons-transfer incident of 30 August 2007, we have initiated multiple levels 

of review to ensure we have not only investigated the root causes of the incident, 

but more importantly taken this opportunity to review Air Force policies and procedures in order to improve the Air Force’s nuclear capabilities. The Commander of 

Air Combat Command commissioned the Commander Directed Investigation (CDI), 

a tactical level investigation that focuses on the facts of the incident and determines 

accountability. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) commissioned the Blue 

Ribbon Review (BRR), an operational-level review that focuses on the entire Air 

Force enterprise including both the aircraft and Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 

(ICBM) and reviews policies, procedures. The Secretary of Defense commissioned 

the Defense Science Board (DSB) review, a strategic-level independent review that 

focuses on the Department of Defense (DOD) enterprise and joint organizations. The 

Air Force takes its nuclear obligations seriously, and will continue to take any 

measure necessary to deliver this strategic capability safely. Consequently, we have 

identified the actions required to both enhance our strengths and correct those areas 

needing improvement. 

History of Incident 

The United States Air Force has underwritten the national strategy for over 60 

years by providing a credible deterrent force, and we continue to serve as the ultimate backstop, dissuading opponents and reassuring allies by maintaining an always-ready nuclear arm. Throughout our history, our professionalism and dedication has guaranteed the soundness and surety of Air Force crews and weapons on 

nuclear alert. From its beginning our Service has earned the trust of our national 

leadership and most importantly, the trust of the American public. 

Unfortunately, in late August 2007, the Air Force flew nuclear weapons from 

Minot Air Force Base (AFB), ND, to Barksdale AFB, LA, in an unauthorized manner. Immediately, the Commander of Air Combat Command initiated an investigation into the incident. Soon after that investigation began, the Air Force began to 

analyze its policies, programs, procedures, and processes involving nuclear assets. 

Furthermore, the Air Force is working in partnership with other Federal agencies 

both inside and outside the DOD to conduct this analysis. 

Without delay, the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) and the CSAF engaged 

and initiated a series of eight specific actions:

(1) An immediate, successful 100 percent stockpile verification of U.S nuclear weapons in the Air Force custody. 

(2) A stand-down of U.S. Air Force nuclear units for extra training and 

to emphasize attention to detail. 

(3) A CDI, a tactical-level incident-related investigation, to identify the 

root causes that led to the weapons-transfer incident, which had already 

begun. 

(4) CSAF messages to all Air Force major commands and each individual 

airman on standards, discipline, and attention to detail, highlighting mission focus and checklist discipline. 

(5) 100 percent Limited Nuclear Surety Inspections of all nuclear-capable 

units, with Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) oversight. This was 

in addition to previously scheduled NSIs. 

(6) A SECAF letter to all airmen highlighting discipline and responsibility. 

(7) SECAF visits to Barskdale AFB, LA, and Minot AFB, ND. 

(8) A CSAF-chartered BRR of policies and procedures focused on the entire Air Force nuclear enterprise.

8

At the conclusion of the CDI, the SECAF and the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff 

for Operations, Plans, and Requirements, then-Major General Richard Newton, held 

a press conference to outline the incident and summarize the findings of the initial 

investigation. Also during that press conference, General Newton discussed accountability measures that were taken as a result of the unauthorized weapons transfer. 

Seven leaders within the Air Force have been removed from their position, including 

one wing commander and two group commanders. Additionally, 90 people were temporarily decertified from duties associated with the nuclear mission. 

Many of the actions following the incident are ongoing. The BRR represents a 

comprehensive, operational-level review of policies and procedures of the Air Force’s 

strategic nuclear enterprise including aircraft, missiles, and sustainment missions. 

This BRR is an opportunity for the Air Force to improve its commitment to a sound 

nuclear enterprise. The nuclear surety inspections are complete with the exception 

of the 5th Bomb Wing at Minot AFB, which must be recertified for its nuclear mission. Additionally, the Secretary of Defense requested General (retired) Larry Welch 

to lead a DSB review of DOD-wide nuclear weapons surety. 

II. ROOT CAUSES

We want to assure you that during the incident there was never an unsafe condition, and the incident was promptly reported to our national leadership, including 

the Secretary of Defense and the President. These weapons were secure and always 

in the hands of America’s airmen. However, as Airmen, we are accountable and we 

will assure the American people that the Air Force standards they expect are being 

met. In addition, the wings at Barksdale AFB and Minot AFB are units with a 

proud heritage. It is important that we act to restore the confidence in these units 

and move ahead. Rest assured, we will. 

The root causes identified for the specific incident were unit-level leadership and 

discipline breakdown at Barksdale AFB and Minot AFB. These breakdowns were 

due to leadership failures and a declining focus on the strategic nuclear bomber mission. Over time, the breakdown of leadership and discipline among a small group 

of Airmen at Barksdale AFB and Minot AFB fostered an environment which eroded 

the strict adherence to established procedures. 

Specifically, one of the two pylons for this flight was not properly prepared because an informal scheduling process subverted the formal scheduling process. This 

was the result of a lack of attention to detail and lack of adherence to well-established Air Force guidelines, technical orders, and procedures. 

In addition to discipline breakdowns at the unit level, a declining focus on the 

strategic nuclear bomber mission was cited as a root cause in the CDI. Since the 

end of the Cold War, aircraft units have taken on conventional commitments in the 

midst of an ever-increasing operational tempo and a continuously-shrinking force. 

Thus, the role of the strategic nuclear mission, especially in dual-tasked aircraft 

units, competed for time, attention, and focus. The turning point of this diminished 

focus began when aircraft came off nuclear alert status. At the same time, the Air 

Force began 17 years of continuous combat including conventional airpower commitments across the spectrum of regular and irregular war in numerous theaters of operation. Training in nuclear procedures became less frequent without the daily activity required by nuclear alert conditions coupled with the expanded commitments 

of dual-tasked units. As a result, nuclear-related experience-levels have declined 

within bomber and dual-capable units. 

III. WAY AHEAD

The BRR is a comprehensive, thorough, operational-level review of Air Force policies and procedures of the Air Force’s nuclear enterprise. Senior leadership in the 

Air Force sees the BRR as an opportunity to improve a sound nuclear enterprise. 

As such, the BRR examines the organizational structure, command authorities, personnel, and assignment policies, and the education and training associated with nuclear weapons. This analysis takes into account operations, maintenance, storage, 

handling, transportation, and security. The BRR finds that the Air Force policies, 

processes, and procedures are sound and that the Air Force commitment to the nuclear enterprise is strong. However, there are opportunities for improvement in the 

Air Force’s overall support to the nuclear enterprise. Specifically, the BRR draws 

five general conclusions and offers recommendations to better organize, train, and 

equip the Air Force nuclear enterprise. 

The BRR’s five general conclusions are:

(1) Nuclear surety in the Air Force is sound and the nuclear weapons inventory in the Air Force is safe, secure, and reliable. 

9

(2) Air Force focus on the nuclear mission has diminished since 1991, 

while the conventional commitment has expanded, the operations tempo 

has increased, and the number of airmen has declined. Operations Northern Watch, Southern Watch, Allied Force, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi 

Freedom are but the most notable examples of the operations we have undertaken since 1991. 

(3) The nuclear enterprise in the Air Force works despite being fragmented into a number of commands. For example, nuclear surety in the Air 

Force is sound among both the ICBM force under Air Force Space Command and the nuclear-strike aircraft under Air Combat Command. 

(4) The declining amount of Air Force nuclear experience led to waning 

expertise. During the decline in nuclear experience, conventional experience 

grew exponentially. Today, with almost half the airmen it had during the 

Cold War, the Air Force fulfills a far greater number of conventional commitments, world-wide, than it did just 17 years ago. 

(5) The Air Force nuclear surety inspection programs need standardization.

The BRR’s recommendations range in scope and scale and can be categorized into 

those that can quickly be accomplished, those that are moderately complex and require more time, and those that require substantial resources and time. For example, strengthening the relationship with DTRA can be accomplished with relative 

ease; developing a comprehensive list of all critical nuclear-related personnel positions in other agencies will require some time; and resourcing a long-range replacement and recapitalization program for aging nuclear weapon systems and nuclear 

support equipment will require substantial resources and time. 

The Air Force Nuclear General Officer Steering Group (AFNGOSG), an entity 

with 20 general officers from all disciplines across the Air Force nuclear enterprise 

and originally established in 1997, has assessed, validated, and assigned responsibility for implementing the recommendations from the CDI, the BRR, and the DSB. 

One of those recommendations already completed is for the chair of the AFNGOSG 

to be upgraded to a three-star general, specifically, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Requirements. Given the collective nuclear experience on the 

AFNGOSG, we will depend on this group to track and ensure broadest implementation of the outstanding recommendations. As of the time of this hearing, nearly onequarter of those recommendations are complete. 

These recommendations extend to all levels of the Air Force. For example, one of 

the recommendations is to restructure the Air Staff to increase the visibility and 

focus of the nuclear enterprise, and the AFNGOSG is currently evaluating a number 

of alternatives to achieve this goal. Other recommendations include reviewing how 

the Air Force presents forces to combatant commanders, and the commonality of nuclear forces among the different Numbered Air Forces. Common throughout the 

CDI, the BRR, and the DSB are recommendations that focus on the level of experience, knowledge, frequency of training, exercises, inspections, standardization and 

evaluation, within our nuclear enterprise. 

IV. CLOSING

The Air Force is committed to continuously improving its ability to fulfill the Nation’s nuclear mission, grounded on our core values of integrity, service, and excellence because it is a credible nuclear deterrent that convinces potential adversaries 

of our unwavering commitment to defend our Nation. The Air Force portion of the 

Nation’s nuclear deterrent is sound, and we will take every measure necessary to 

continue to provide safe, secure, reliable, nuclear surety to the American public. 

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Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, General. 

General Welch? 

STATEMENT OF GEN. LARRY D. WELCH, USAF [RET.], 

PRESIDENT AND CEO, INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES 

General WELCH. Thank you, Senator Levin. I can be very brief 

since your opening comments addressed many of the issues in our 

report. 

Our report contains specific findings and recommendations on 

each of the three levels of cause factors. It was released yesterday. 


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It is unclassified. It is 27 pages long, including appendices. Those 

three levels of cause factors are: 

First, the proximate cause that is the failure to sustain and follow credible procedures and processes. Those deficiencies have been 

addressed in detail by the Air Force reports. 

Second is focus and that has to do with the dramatic reduction 

in the number of senior DOD officials with dedicated focus on the 

nuclear enterprise. 

The third level is the environment in which the enterprise operates, and that has to do with the perception at all levels in the nuclear enterprise that the Nation and its leadership do not value the 

nuclear mission and the people who perform that mission. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

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General WELCH. We have specific recommendations for addressing each of those three and I’ll be pleased to address those during 

questions. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, General. 

There are only a few of us here, so we should have some time. 

Let’s try 6 minutes so we make sure we get in at least one round 

before the first vote occurs in the Senate. 


212ful58.eps
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General, I’m a little taken aback by your statement that there 

was never a safety issue and they were always under the control 

of American pilots. Did the pilots know they had nuclear weapons 

on board? 

General DARNELL. Sir, they did not. 

Chairman LEVIN. So, when you say they were under the control 

of the pilots, not knowing that you have nuclear weapons on board 

makes a difference, doesn’t it? 

General DARNELL. Yes, sir, it does. The intent behind that statement is to make it clear that they never migrated off the aircraft 

anywhere else. 

Chairman LEVIN. In terms of safety, when nuclear weapons are 

on a plane and those planes are on a flight line, are there special 

precautions taken? 

General DARNELL. Yes, sir, it’s increased security on the flight 

line with security forces. 

Chairman LEVIN. Was that increased security present here? 

General DARNELL. At Minot it was not, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. It was not. Why do we have increased security 

when we have nuclear weapons on a plane on a flight line? Why 

do we provide that additional security? 

General DARNELL. To ensure security of the weapon itself, because of the gravity of, obviously, anyone taking control of the 

weapon that should not have it. 

Chairman LEVIN. The absence of that security at Minot represents a significant shortfall, does it not? 

General DARNELL. It did in this case, sir, yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, in terms of what happened here and the 

failures that occurred, let’s go through very quickly what happened 

here: and stop me at any point here if what I’m saying is not accurate. The mistake was putting a pylon, which has six cruise missiles on it—and these cruise missiles were not supposed to have 

nuclear weapons loaded in them; they were supposed to have dummies, is that correct? 

General DARNELL. That’s correct, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. So the pylon that was loaded in error had nuclear weapons on it and these were the checks that failed us, these 

were the actions that were supposed to be taken that weren’t 

taken. First, at Minot the payload checks were not performed by 

the handling team. Second, there was a deputy maintenance chief 

at Minot who noted the discrepancy and he never reported back to 

his supervisor that discrepancy between the pylon that was supposed to be on and the number of that pylon and the one that was 

on there. So the second failure was the deputy who noted the discrepancy not reporting it back to his supervisor. 

Then the deputy did not request verification of the payload. The 

tow driver at Minot, who’s supposed to perform payload checks, did 

not do so. The munitions scheduling officer or office at Minot failed 

to verify the status of the pylon as required prior to giving permission to move the pylon. The air crew is supposed to verify the missile status and the payload on all missiles, and they did not do so. 

The aircraft commander did not verify that each of the missiles had 

been checked and did not, as required, make an entry in his preflight log. 

70

Now, so far am I on target? 

General DARNELL. Senator Levin, I think that’s pretty accurate. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. Now, that’s a lot of mistakes, a lot of 

checks and balances here that are supposed to work. None of those 

worked in this case. I think you folks in the Air Force would be 

the first to acknowledge the severity of not knowing that you’re 

dealing with nuclear weapons and not taking the appropriate steps 

to secure them. You live with this every day. You understand the 

implications of the lack of security or lack of awareness that you 

have a nuclear weapon on board in terms of the potential for accident, and so I don’t think you need a lecture from me at least on 

that subject. You’re aware that this is a very significant failure, the 

likes of which we don’t think has ever occurred before and hopefully will never occur again. 

How many folks here would you say failed to carry out some duty 

that they were obligated to perform? How many different people 

along the line here? 

General DARNELL. Senator Levin, I’m going to defer to the officer 

that did the investigation, but we initially decertified 90 personnel. 

Chairman LEVIN. How many? 

General DARNELL. 90. Now, as General Raaberg did his investigation he found that not all 90 were involved and restored their 

status. But initially we had 90 that were decertified. 

I’ll ask General Raaberg if he’d like to add anything to that. 

Chairman LEVIN. How many approximately failed to perform a 

duty that they were obligated to perform? 

General RAABERG. Sir, as you’ve aptly indicated, there were five 

specific procedures broken the day before and the day of the transfer of the tow. It’s approximately 10 individuals involved in all five 

of those, not following the rules and not following the procedures. 

Sir, you also mentioned that there were effectively three scheduling errors that caused them to actually transfer a nuclear-loaded 

pylon set of missiles to the aircraft. Sir, at that point the number 

of individuals involved in that is at least 10 to 15 in that particular 

realm. 

Chairman LEVIN. So a total of 25? 

General RAABERG. Sir, that’s about right, plus the greater architect of the organizations and the units involved. 

Chairman LEVIN. So, and this will be my last question; have disciplinary actions been taken to date? If so, without telling us who 

and what for the time being, just tell us, because these are personnel actions which I think would appropriately leave for a different setting. But against how many of those approximately 25 

people would you say some action has been taken? 

General DARNELL. Senator, it’s my understanding that 13 were 

administered Uniform Code of Military Justice action. A total of 15 

were administratively removed or affected by the incident. 

Chairman LEVIN. They’ve not been returned? 

General DARNELL. No, sir. Some have been returned, but received punishment for what, obviously, had occurred. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator Warner or Senator Inhofe. 

Senator WARNER. Senator Inhofe. 

71

Senator INHOFE. Just a couple of brief questions. First of all, I 

recognized General Raaberg and his fine service at Vance Air Force 

Base. I didn’t say anything about General Peyer at Tinker Air 

Force Base. So this is old home week. I welcome you here. 

General Welch, as I said when I was reading the statement of 

Senator Warner, you’ve come back out and I appreciate very much 

all of the work and the service that you continue to provide. Your 

report includes 16 recommendations to strengthen nuclear security. 

One of the recommendations was that the Secretary of Defense establish a mechanism to ensure that the lessons from the incident 

on August 30 produce institutional and environmental changes of 

lasting attention. My question would be, what mechanisms do you 

think we need to make sure that our successors aren’t here 20 

years from now addressing this same subject? 

General WELCH. Let me answer that as briefly as I can. The reason for that recommendation is that the task force that I chair has 

been in business since 1992, although previously under a different 

name. Over the years there have been any number of deficiencies 

identified by the task force, by other DSB reports, though none of 

them as serious as this. In each case the deficiencies were addressed, corrective actions were implemented, but they didn’t endure. Over time attention faded away, and then we encountered a 

new set of deficiencies. 

That’s the reason for the recommendation. Our recommendations 

regarding the level of focus in the Department, are to ensure there 

are flag officers and senior civilians at the right place, at the right 

level, whose daily focus is on the nuclear mission, and to insist that 

be sustained. I believe that’s what’s required in order to help ensure that this intense attention that we’re seeing right now doesn’t 

once again fade away in the future. 

Senator INHOFE. General Darnell, when this first happened the 

first thing I did was draw a line between Minot and Barksdale, and 

it went right over Tulsa, OK. So I’m a little sensitive to the route 

there. 

I think the most important question to ask, and you’ve all 

touched on it, but it wasn’t really all that specific. Were the weapons ever armed or in danger of being armed? In other words, were 

the American people ever at risk of having a nuclear weapon get 

stolen or exploding? 

General DARNELL. Senator, the weapons were never armed. 

Senator INHOFE. They were never armed. I think there’s an assumption everybody knows that, but certainly that wasn’t covered 

very well back in August. 

General DARNELL. The pylon itself was not powered up and as 

a result the weapons were not armed either. 

Senator INHOFE. They’re never armed during transporting? 

General DARNELL. No, sir. This was what’s called a tactical ferry 

mission. Obviously, we were anticipating a dummy load on the aircraft and there’d be no reason to power the pylon up. 

Senator INHOFE. I think it’s worth repeating. 

I don’t have any more questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

72

Senator Nelson and then Senator Thune. Hopefully, if you get 

your rounds in we will be able to go to S–407 at that point. If not, 

we’ll come back here. Senator Warner’s waiving his questions? 

Senator WARNER. I want to do that, but I want to follow on just 

one point that my distinguished colleague brought out. In no way 

do we forgive, or anyone else, the sloppiness and the breakdown in 

discipline and training and so forth. But the weapons were never 

armed, is that correct? 

General DARNELL. That’s correct, Senator. 

Senator WARNER. As a consequence we could say that the American public was never in danger if there’d been an accidental dropping or otherwise of these weapons; is that correct? 

General DARNELL. Yes, sir, that’s correct. 

Senator WARNER. Good. 

General Welch, it’s nice to see you again. It’s a wonderful, wonderful time we had together over these 30 years Senator Levin and 

I have been on this committee. Glad that you’re still very active on 

behalf of the interests of our country and your beloved Air Force. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Just to clarify something that I said. Now, if 

these weapons had been jettisoned for whatever reason—there was 

mechanical failure or they had been jettisoned over water for whatever reason—could they represent a dangerous release of plutonium? Could that happen? 

General DARNELL. Senator, it’s not my understanding that that 

would be the case, but we’ll have to clarify that for you. 

Chairman LEVIN. You’re saying that if these weapons were jettisoned over land——

General DARNELL. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN.—that there could not be a release upon the destruction of these when they smashed into the ground, that there 

could not be a release of plutonium? Is that what you’re saying, or 

you don’t know? 

General DARNELL. Sir, I don’t know. I’d have to confirm whether 

that would be or not. 

Chairman LEVIN. Does anyone here know? My understanding is 

it could be dangerous. 

General PEYER. I’m a logistician, not a technician. But knowing 

the knowledge of how a system is developed, and that’s part of the 

reliability of the system, is that there is no inadvertent detonation 

of the system——

Chairman LEVIN. No, I’m not talking about detonation. I’m talking about could the plutonium be released inadvertently if this 

weapon were smashed into the ground from 15,000 feet. 

General PEYER. That piece I would not know. 

[The information referred to follows:]

Plutonium dispersal is virtually impossible without a high explosive detonation. 

The W80 warhead is designed to resist detonation and remain intact in an accident 

or jettison scenario. The W80 utilizes insensitive high explosive (IHE) technology. 

IHE is designed to decompose rather than detonate in a fire. The weapons were 

never armed and the release of plutonium would have been highly unlikely in the 

event of a crash or jettisoning scenario.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you know, General Welch? 

73

General WELCH. Yes, sir. The plutonium can’t be released unless 

there’s a high explosive detonation. 

Chairman LEVIN. There’s no possibility of release if jettisoned 

and it smashes into the ground? 

General WELCH. Not unless there is a high explosive detonation, 

and that’s very, very unlikely. 

Chairman LEVIN. Unlikely. Impossible? 

General WELCH. I’m reluctant to say anything is impossible. Let 

me say I can’t imagine how it could happen. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Then why are these so dangerous? 

Why do they need special inspection and security when they’re on 

a flight line? Why is it important that a pilot even know that he 

has a nuclear weapon on board? 

General WELCH. Because with a high explosive detonation you 

will indeed scatter plutonium. So the concern is to ensure that no 

one can have access to these weapons in a way that they can intentionally create a high explosive detonation. There are ways to do 

that. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator Bill Nelson. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Chairman, that’s the appropriate response. There’s no assumption of detonation; however, in the crash 

of two planes in the late 60s or early 70s, plutonium was spread 

all over the place, and plutonium is lethal. Isn’t that correct, General Welch? 

General WELCH. Absolutely. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Chairman, may I have my official 

opening statement put into the record? 

Chairman LEVIN. It will be. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Bill Nelson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. When I learned about the nuclear weapons incident 

that occurred in August 2007, I was stunned. This is the probably the most egregious breach of nuclear weapons procedures that has ever occurred. Six nuclear 

weapons were unaccounted for, for over 36 hours. 

To the Air Force’s credit an investigation was immediately opened. General 

Raaberg, it appears that you had full access to everything you needed to complete 

your investigation and that your report was forthright and uncensored. I hope that 

that is truly the case. 

There have now been three reports. What all three of the reports have revealed 

is that the events of August 2007 were not simply one-time errors, but an indication 

of a long erosion of discipline and attention to nuclear matters in the Air Force. 

As General Welch stated in his report for the Defense Science Board, ‘‘The process 

and systemic problems that allowed such an incident have developed over more than 

a decade and have the potential for much more serious consequences.’’ But, as General Welch also said it can be a ‘‘just-in-time rescue if lasting corrective actions are 

implemented now.’’ 

So, for this hearing today, the question is: Now what?

Senator BILL NELSON. General Darnell, these events show that 

the nuclear procedures were ignored by most everyone, and these 

procedures are designed to force multiple redundant opportunities 

to ensure that the weapons are safe and they’re secure and that 

they’re accounted for. In this case, the sloppiness and the lack of 

discipline and the lack of respect for the process didn’t just happen 

overnight, and fixing the problems are going to take a while. 

74

How long will it take to fix the problems and once fixed what 

steps should the Air Force take to ensure that we’re not going to 

have this problem again? 

General DARNELL. Senator, very good question. We have 124 recommendations that we are taking action on. 41 are complete. I 

would hesitate to give you an exact time line, but obviously we are 

very quickly implementing as many of the recommendations as we 

possibly can. 

Where we started from an organization standpoint is we put 

some very key senior leaders into some key positions. As General 

Welch has mentioned before, I very soon will have a two-star general officer that will be in charge of nuclear matters on the Air 

Staff that reports to me, and that will be their sole duty. 

We have a Nuclear General Officer Steering Group that I just 

chaired 2 weeks ago. We had representatives from every MAJCOM 

there, reviewed all of these 124 recommendations. We were able to 

assign Office of Primary Responsibility, in other words those responsible for implementing, and we’re still working through exactly 

what the time lines will be. 

The Nuclear Weapons Center we stood up nearly 2 years ago at 

Albuquerque. We’ll have a brigadier general in charge of that organization in 2 months. 

So from the top down, we have put some people in some key positions to ensure that we can get these recommendations implemented. I’ll point out also that we put some other officers in some 

pretty key positions as well. Brigadier General Jonathan George is 

going to the Department of Energy. We have Lieutenant General 

Frank Klotz, who is our Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Air 

Force; Major General Dick Weber, who is my deputy, as well as 

Brigadier General Don Alston. I won’t go through their bona fides, 

but they’ve all been squadron, group, and wing commanders, 

whether it be in the missile field or bomber organizations. 

Senator BILL NELSON. General Welch, General Darnell was talking about all how they’re correcting it in the Air Force. But in your 

investigation, this spills over into the DOD as well. So what do you 

think DOD is going to do to make sure this doesn’t happen again? 

General WELCH. As you say, we found this change in the level 

of focus on the nuclear enterprise to be Department-wide, and our 

report has specific recommendations on what has to be done to fix 

that. That is, you need flag officers or senior civilians whose daily 

focus is on the nuclear enterprise. You need it on the Air Staff, the 

Navy Staff, the major air commands, U.S. Strategic Command, the 

Joint Staff, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. 

Our feeling was that if you restore that level of focus, you have 

gone a long way towards having a long-term reliable fix on this discipline issue. 

Senator BILL NELSON. General Darnell, there seems to be a disconnect here between the inspections and the actual performance. 

As a matter of fact, Minot usually received favorable inspection reports. So it seems that the inspections don’t provide an accurate 

picture of the situation. So how does the Air Force address that? 

General DARNELL. Senator, we’ve looked at that and, frankly, 

that’s a valid observation and criticism. I will tell you that in any 

inspection there are going to be areas that you’ve isolated and 

75

you’re focused on and others that you’re not looking at as closely. 

A team has a finite amount of time to do that. 

We’re looking at several different things actually. First of all, 

limiting the notice that we provide a unit prior to being inspected. 

We’re looking closely at that. As you well know, if the unit’s preparing to be inspected and they know when the inspection is and 

they’ve been given a significant amount of time, then they’re going 

to prepare for it in certain ways. We think that there may be some 

value to a limited notice inspection for units, so we’re looking at 

that. 

Elements of our Nuclear Security Inspection and our Operational 

Readiness Inspection. We still think it’s valid that we have them 

separated, but we think there are things about each inspection procedurally that could be tightened up. There has been some discussion about combining both. I think right now, I don’t think we’re 

leaning that way. 

But I know General Sams, who is our Inspector General for the 

Air Force, has a number of proposals that he is working on that 

he will propose to the Chief of Staff in probably another 4 to 6 

weeks. 

Senator BILL NELSON. General Raaberg, you actually found 

where some of the inspection teams were cherry-picked. Is this a 

real problem in the Air Force? 

General RAABERG. When I went back and looked at all the inspections, all the way back to 1996, to be a little more precise, in 

my report I indicated that there were in fact findings, some noncompliance. But those are not uncommon in any of those type inspections. In fact, generally they’re cleared up either during the inspection or shortly after the inspection. 

The key thing was there was no indicator that those deficiencies 

would be identified or any deficiencies identified in the inspections 

that led to this actual incident itself. 

Sir, I’m not aware of the issue you were discussing just now. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Are we talking, is your answer——

Senator WARNER. Has your time, I believe, expired? 

Senator BILL NELSON. It probably has. 

Senator WARNER. I think we’d like to accommodate Senator 

Thune. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Of course. 

Senator WARNER. Then our open session will be concluded. All 

the Senators are invited to put questions into the record. So I 

thank the Senator very much. 

Senator Thune, you could wrap it up for us, and then we’ll reconvene in S–407. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Chairman, I just want one other question for the record. Is the cherry picking limited just to the nuclear 

inspections? He can supply that for the record. 

[The information referred to follows:]

The review of past inspections conducted during the Commander’s Directed Investigation (CDI) of the incident didn’t reveal any evidence of ‘‘cherry picking.’’

The CDI that I led on behalf of the Commander of Air Combat Command did not 

assess the entire nuclear inspection process across the Air Force. The investigation 

was focused on past inspections that may have revealed issues to how the unauthorized transfer of nuclear warhead incident occurred. Therefore, I am not in a position 

76

to comment on the nature of other inspections which were outside the review’s assessment. 

The Air Force Blue Ribbon Review (BRR) led by Major General Peyer documented 

in their report that the current Inspector General (IG) inspection process regarding 

Nuclear Surety Inspections was scheduled as much as 18 months in advance of the 

unit’s visit. As such, local commanders were able to plan accordingly to ensure their 

unit’s readiness was at peak performance for the inspection. This allowed commanders to pick their very best people, equipment, and often negotiate the visit 

schedule that best supported the unit’s mission. This, the BRR found, led to many 

units’ ‘‘cherry-picking’’ their best and brightest and in the opinion of the review, did 

not present the true capability of the unit. The BRR thus recommended the IG address the possibility of transitioning to a no-notice or very limited notice inspection 

process. 

The Air Force is reviewing the nuclear inspection regime to determine if we need 

to make adjustments to the scope and timing of our inspection process.

Senator WARNER. Good. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Thune. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all very much for being here this morning. This is a 

very serious incident and I have a particular interest in it, serving 

both as the ranking member of the Readiness Subcommittee and 

on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee. I think this incident illustrates an important point and that is that everyone is human and 

humans make mistakes. 

That said, obviously we can’t tolerate mistakes on a subject that 

is this important. Our system has to be robust enough to protect 

us from human error. While I have every confidence in the system, 

while this subject is very much at the forefront of our minds, my 

concern would be that as we get farther away in time from this incident that we’ll have the same loss of focus and perhaps erosion 

of procedures. 

So what I’d like to do briefly this morning is I have some questions that I’d be happy to submit for the record, but I would like 

to at least ask a couple of questions, and maybe start with kind 

of the broad view, the 30,000 foot view, if you will. For that question, General Welch, I would simply say that your report discusses 

a long-term perception that nuclear forces and the nuclear deterrent mission are increasingly devalued. 

I guess the question is, in your view how do we regain the focus 

and value of this mission, given current events in Iraq and Afghanistan? 

General WELCH. Certainly the DOD and national security leaders have plenty to occupy their attention. But if you will search the 

Internet or anyplace else you might like to search for statements 

from the senior leadership emphasizing the importance of the strategic nuclear mission, I think you will search in vain. So that the 

people out in the field who maintain these weapons are bright people. They read, they listen. Unless they hear some statements from 

senior people in this government that what they do is important, 

they will only hear those who say that we should get rid of these 

weapons, that they’re not important, that we don’t need them any 

more. They hear that drum beat and it is widely publicized, and 

you don’t hear the counter from leaders that say: Yes, it is important; nuclear deterrence remains a key issue. 

So I don’t think it’s any more complicated than that, sir. 

Senator THUNE. How would you gauge the current health of the 

DOD nuclear weapons surety and safety? 

77

General WELCH. I think we have uncovered no safety issues, although there are some scenarios where two or three things can go 

wrong and you might be concerned. But most of our concerns have 

been about surety. If you look at all the areas and all the ways that 

we have to store and handle these weapons in order to perform the 

mission, it just requires, we believe, more resources and more attention than they’re getting. 

Now, that does not mean that the weapons are not secure. They 

are as secure as they have ever been. It just means that, as the 

standard goes up, which it has, there are technologies that can be 

brought to bear. Some are not brought to bear because of legal concerns. There are also resource needs that are identified, but there 

are other priorities. 

We are not in the business of telling the Department what their 

priorities should be. We are in the business of identifying where we 

think the capability gaps are, and we have done so. 

Senator THUNE. General Peyer, in your blue ribbon review you 

note: ‘‘A consistent observation permeating this review is the friction between the need for surety perfection and operating in an environment of tightly constrained resources.’’ In your view, how do 

we best overcome that friction? 

General PEYER. We’ve already taken many steps. Balancing the 

resources and the requirement is constantly on the plate of our 

senior leaders. So as we looked at the blue ribbon review and offered very specific areas where some investment and some resources could be applied to ensure and enhance our nuclear surety 

program, we’ve already submitted an unfunded requirements list. 

I believe that was submitted on Friday, and that would be for an 

unfunded list. As we go into the fiscal year 2010 program objective 

memorandum (POM), we will pick up on those and include those 

in our POM. So we’ve already begun that realignment of priorities 

within our budget. 

Senator THUNE. I appreciate that answer, that with constrained 

resources it’s a challenge, and we’re all facing the challenge of trying to do a lot of things with a lot of competing demands and a 

very limited amount of resources. But how do you think we got to 

where we didn’t allocate enough to ensure nuclear weapons surety 

and safety, even in an environment where we have constrained resources? 

General PEYER. Senator, our review found that we still have nuclear surety and it’s a strong program. The constrained resources 

does drive some mitigation strategies that we have. A lot of times, 

if you don’t have an asset you’ll apply people instead of an asset 

that you don’t have, for example a piece of equipment. Our aging 

infrastructure, test equipment for example, nuclear weapons test 

equipment, is 25 or 30 years old. So definitely a relook at recapitalizing that. 

So as we’ve gone forward with our resource decisions we are always analyzing exactly where those shortfalls are and we work 

mitigation strategies to be able to reduce the risk. 

Senator THUNE. I see my time is up. I think we have a vote on. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I do have a couple other questions, but I’d be 

happy to enter those for the record. 

78

Chairman LEVIN. You could take another minute or 2 if you 

want. 

Senator THUNE. Let me just, if I could, ask General Darnell. 

You’re in charge of day-to-day operations for the Air Force and I 

understand that the Air Force recently put out a new instruction 

on nuclear weapons maintenance procedures. I guess could you talk 

a little bit about what that instruction changes, as well as some of 

the other steps that we’ve already taken that will ensure that there 

is an appropriate long-term fix? 

General DARNELL. Senator, custody transfer and accountability 

have been several areas that we’ve looked at, as well as tightening 

up standards on logistics movements, security, and safety. We had 

some procedures, scheduling procedures, that were violated there 

at Minot and those have been fixed through a different venue, 

through Air Force Instruction 21–205. 

Most of the focus has been there in the logistical area to ensure 

we tighten up those processes. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Thune. 

Let me just ask a couple more questions on this issue of whether 

plutonium can be spread without a detonation. Just checking with 

a member of my staff, who I think is an expert on the subject, it 

says that what happened in Spain in apparently the late 1960s or 

early 1970s, the reference that Senator Nelson made, was where 

two American planes crashed, there was no nuclear detonation, the 

weapons did not go critical, but plutonium was scattered, and 

they’re still cleaning up that plutonium 30 years later. 

So General Darnell, we’ll need you to clarify that for the record 

if you would, or any of you, if you want to comment on that for the 

record. But it’s a very important point. 

Now, we want to secure these weapons in any event because we 

want to secure them against theft. We’ve spent a lot of time on securing nuclear weapons around the world. We have Nunn-Lugar, 

which spends billions of dollars securing nuclear material because 

we don’t want them to fall into the wrong hands. 

But the question of whether or not planes that either crash or 

have to jettison their weight because, their cargo, because they’re 

going to crash or whatever, surely it makes a difference as to 

whether or not those pilots know they have nuclear weapons, and 

it makes a difference for a number of reasons. But one of them is 

that in the case of a crash or in case of jettisoning, according to 

our information, the weapons can indeed release plutonium, which 

would be highly dangerous without a nuclear or high explosive detonation or without going critical. 

I would welcome any further comment from our panelists on that 

at this point if you want to add anything. But if not, I would ask 

General Darnell for the record if you would clarify this point. 

[The information referred to follows:]

Plutonium dispersal is virtually impossible without a high explosive detonation. 

The W80 warhead is designed to resist detonation and remain intact in an accident 

or jettison scenario. The W80 utilizes insensitive high explosive (IHE) technology. 

IHE is designed to decompose rather than detonate in a fire. The weapons were 

never armed and the release of plutonium would have been highly unlikely in the 

event of a crash or jettisoning scenario.

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Chairman LEVIN. Senator Warner, do you want to add anything 

before we go over to S–407 and vote, not in that order? 

Senator WARNER. Yes. Mr. Chairman, I just wish to point out 

that it appears that you’ve had some clear manifestation here of a 

breakdown in culture and so forth. But the inspection regime did 

not catch it. Does this now require you to go back and examine how 

you’re going to reestablish the inspection regime so that we won’t 

have a repeat of this? In other words, if this thing had persisted, 

this type of breakdown in culture, for maybe a decade or more, 

clearly the periodic checks that go on just didn’t work out. Now you 

have to write a new system of how you’re going to inspect for these 

potential defects again? 

General DARNELL. Senator Warner, that’s an area that we’re 

looking at very closely. Obviously, inspection-wise there are areas 

that could be tightened up. Lieutenant General Ron Sams, who is 

our inspector general, already has several proposals that he wants 

to take to the next meeting that he has with General Moseley and 

review those. 

But as importantly is working with our Defense Threat Reduction Agency partners and others as well, and we’re committed to 

doing that and we’ve already begun. 

Senator WARNER. Anybody else want to comment on that? 

General WELCH. Our report found that the problem with the inspections is the scope is just too limited. For operational readiness 

inspections, over time the scope has been more and more limited, 

to the point where they really don’t demonstrate operational readiness. 

Senator WARNER. That’s a pretty dramatic observation, General. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we’ve had a good hearing. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Warner. 

Now, we’re going to adjourn to S–407 and we’ll be coming in and 

out, a number of us, because we have eight rollcall votes scheduled 

in a row this morning, with 10 minutes each. So it’s going to be 

a little bit chaotic. We very much appreciate all the work you’ve 

put in on this matter, and we will see you all up in S–407 as soon 

as we can get there. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

SPAIN INCIDENT

1. Senator LEVIN. General Darnell, in the 1966 incident in Spain, there was a 

mid-air collision involving a B–2 and a tanker aircraft. When two of the nuclear 

weapons fell to the ground, the conventional high explosive in the nuclear weapon 

detonated. This explosion scattered the plutonium in the weapons over a broad area. 

A second accident occurred in 1968 when a B–52 crashed on landing and the resulting fire caused a detonation of the conventional explosive resulting in plutonium 

being scattered, although over a smaller area than in the accident in Spain. There 

was no nuclear detonation in either accident, correct? 

General DARNELL. Correct, there was no nuclear detonation in either accident.

W80

2. Senator LEVIN. General Darnell, although the case on the W80 is designed not 

to break open, if it did, is there a possibility that the plutonium pit would also 

break, thereby exposing plutonium to the atmosphere? 

General DARNELL. There is a very small, albeit not zero, probability of plutonium 

release by mechanical means (crush, puncture, etc.) in an aircraft accident. However 

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the safety features of the W80 virtually eliminates the possibility of plutonium release in normal environments, abnormal environments, and most combinations of 

abnormal environments.

3. Senator LEVIN. General Darnell, although the conventional explosive on the 

W80 is designed not detonate in the event of a fire, is it possible that there would 

nevertheless still be an adverse effect on the plutonium, depending on the temperature and duration of the fire? 

General DARNELL. The W80 contains insensitive high explosive (IHE), as opposed 

to conventional high explosive (CHE) used in older designs. Some melting of the plutonium may occur, depending on the temperature and duration of the fire.

4. Senator LEVIN. General Darnell, if the case on the W80 cracked and there were 

a fire, what is the possible effect on the plutonium? 

General DARNELL. The use of IHE in the W80 has various advantages over CHEs 

used in older designs such that it is less sensitive to abnormal environments. One 

such advantage is its resistance to detonation from induced heat from a fuel fire. 

Some melting of the plutonium may occur, depending on the temperature and duration of the fire. However, since the IHE would not detonate, no plutonium dispersal 

would occur.

5. Senator LEVIN. General Darnell, if the pylon or an individual missile was 

dropped during a severe storm, are there concerns about the effect on the W80 if 

the case cracked, or if the case remained intact? 

General DARNELL. Any such event would be viewed with concern. However, the 

W80 was designed and tested to withstand conditions that might occur in transport 

and handling, to include being dropped while mounted in a cruise missile.

6. Senator LEVIN. General Darnell, are there any circumstances under which the 

conventional explosive in the W80 would detonate? 

General DARNELL. The W80 contains IHE, as opposed to CHE used in older designs. IHE was developed to reduce vulnerability to fire and impact, and virtually 

eliminates the possibility of accidental high explosive detonation in normal environments, abnormal environments, and most combinations of abnormal environments. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

NUCLEAR OPERATIONAL READINESS INSPECTIONS

7. Senator WARNER. General Peyer, recommendation 12 of the Blue Ribbon Review calls for the consolidation of responsibilities for conducting nuclear surety inspections (NSI) into a single Air Force NSI team and conducting NSIs on a limitedor no-notice basis. What is the difference between a NSI and a nuclear operational 

readiness inspection (NORI)? 

General PEYER. An NSI is a compliance-based inspection that evaluates a unit’s 

ability to manage nuclear resources and comply with all nuclear surety standards. 

A ‘‘Satisfactory’’ rating is given when a unit clearly demonstrates that it can reliably 

handle nuclear weapons in a safe and secure environment. NSIs are conducted at 

intervals not to exceed 18 months and include evaluations of weapons maintenance 

technical operations, storage and maintenance facilities, security, safety, and logistics movement, among others areas. Successful completion of an NSI validates unit 

nuclear surety and is the basis upon which Major Command Commanders certify 

their units to conduct nuclear operations. A NORI evaluates a unit’s capability to 

meet their nuclear wartime operational mission requirements (i.e., operational employment of nuclear weapons). A unit must demonstrate the capability to safely and 

reliably handle nuclear weapons via an NSI before they can perform operations required by a NORI. There are instances where both inspections evaluate common 

tasks and both cover nuclear surety. An NSI provides more frequent checks on unit 

compliance related to nuclear surety rules.

8. Senator WARNER. General Peyer, which inspection reviews the entire process 

from when a weapon is scheduled for transportation to when it is loaded on the aircraft prior to departure? 

General PEYER. Both NSIs and NORIs look at transportation of nuclear weapons. 

This is an example where NSIs and NORIs overlap one another. Transportation to 

wartime (combat) aircraft is inspected during both NSIs and NORIs. However, the 

peacetime transportation of nuclear weapons is only evaluated during NSIs (i.e., 

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movement of a weapon via prime nuclear airlift (C–17)). Peacetime movement of nuclear weapons is not part of a unit wartime operational mission and is therefore not 

evaluated during a NORI.

9. Senator WARNER. General Peyer, recommendation 12 deals only with NSI. If 

the problem is potentially associated with nuclear operational readiness, then why 

is there not a corresponding recommendation to bolster NORIs, to include no-notice 

inspections? 

General PEYER. While nuclear surety and operational readiness do overlap, several areas of our Blue Ribbon Review (BRR) charter were really directed toward elements that influence the likely outcome of NSIs, such as the training associated 

with the operation, maintenance, storage, handling, transport and security of U.S. 

Air Force nuclear weapons systems. However, the Defense Science Board Permanent 

Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety recently completed an independent assessment on the August 30, 2007, unauthorized movement of nuclear warheads. The report included a recommendation to review the scope, scale, and duration of NSIs 

and NORIs. This review is currently ongoing and the Air Force Nuclear General Officers Steering Group (AFNGOSG), comprised of the most senior leadership within 

the Air Force nuclear community, validated the need to conduct this review.

STATE OF THE NUCLEAR MISSION FORCE

10. Senator WARNER. General Peyer, in your report, you state that previous reports and studies over the past two decades identified many of the observations and 

recommendations contained in your report. One such report, the Vice Chief of Staff’s 

Institutional Support Review/Special Management Review from 1998 is particularly 

mentioned having many parallel conclusions. If the state of the nuclear mission 

force was in decline for the past two decades, yet current inspection processes failed 

to demonstrate that decline, is not that an indictment of the current inspection regime? 

General RAABERG. I don’t believe that to be true. NSIs assess a specific unit’s 

compliance with nuclear surety standards, and the unit’s ability to reliably handle 

nuclear weapons in a safe and secure manner. The focus of NSIs is not on the overall nuclear mission force, nor do they assess Air Force cultural change. I would submit though, that despite the end of the Cold War, and the change from a nuclearcentered Air Force to a conventionally-centered Air Force, our inspection system has 

been a primary contributor toward keeping airmen focused on nuclear surety and 

nuclear operations. Our nuclear-capable units are inspected on an 18-month cycle, 

which is more frequent than our conventional operations. Over the years our inspection system has identified deficiencies and analyzed trends related to the decline in 

requisite nuclear experience throughout the nuclear community, and these deficiencies and subsequent corrective actions have been monitored by the Air Force’s 

most senior leadership within the nuclear community . . . the AFNGOSG, as well 

as the Inspectors General responsible for conducting the inspections.

11. Senator WARNER. General Welch, in your report you also mention several reports over the past decade that called for a refocus on the nuclear mission. Despite 

the numerous studies, few, if any, inspections showed any concerns. If the state of 

the nuclear mission force was in decline for the past two decades, yet current inspection processes failed to demonstrate that decline, is not that an indictment of 

the current inspection regime? 

General WELCH. As noted in the report, corrective actions were implemented for 

many of the findings in the reports, but the corrective actions were not lasting as 

attention to the mission waned above the wing level. The inspection teams performed their assigned functions to the apparent satisfaction of the leadership, The 

problem was that there was not a commitment to the stressing level of demand 

needed to discover the deficiencies.

EROSION OF PROCEDURES OVER TIME

12. Senator WARNER. General Welch, you state, ‘‘The process and systemic problems that allowed such an incident have developed over more than a decade and 

have the potential for much more serious consequences.’’ However, both installations 

involved were certified through the current inspection processes as being capable of 

fulfilling their stated mission without reservation. Given the lack of ability of the 

inspection processes to uncover the systemic problems, how can we have confidence 

in the inspection processes? 

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General WELCH. As noted above, the individual inspections must stress the unit 

sufficiently to uncover deficiencies. In the past era, the inspected unit was required 

to generate the foil war plan capability. That stressing demand provided confidence 

in the inspection outcomes. My understanding is that the Combatant Command is 

demanding a return to that standard and that the Air Force will support it.

13. Senator WARNER. General Welch, if this has been a systemic problem, is culpability limited only to the two wing commanders? 

General WELCH. I think it is clear that the neglect of the nuclear enterprise was 

widespread, there has been little push-back on that conclusion, and most of the entities with nuclear enterprise responsibilities are taking action to restore the proper 

level of attention.

NUCLEAR CODES OF CONDUCT

14. Senator WARNER. General Welch, Admiral Rickover, who is considered the Father of the Nuclear Navy, concerned himself very deeply and directly with establishing and maintaining the organizational culture of the naval nuclear propulsion 

program. In 1982, in a speech he gave at Columbia University which he titled, 

‘‘Doing a Job’’, he described the essential elements of this organizational culture—

including the following: ‘‘The man in charge must concern himself with details. If 

he does not consider them important, neither will his subordinates . . . it is hard 

and monotonous to pay attention to seemingly minor matters . . . but when the details are ignored, the project fails. No infusion of policy or lofty ideals can then correct the situation.’’ 

Are you confident that the recommendations laid out in the reviews of this matter, when implemented, will reestablish the organizational culture necessary to 

carry out a mission of such high consequence? 

General WELCH. General LeMay established a similar culture in Strategic Air 

Command and that culture continued through decades of successors leading Strategic Air Command. That culture endures to a large degree in the Air Force ICBM 

forces. That same culture endures to a large degree in the Navy nuclear forces long 

after Admiral Rickover’s departure. But these parts of the nuclear enterprise maintain a single focus on a single mission and that strongly supports a continuing culture. However, even in these forces, the culture is impacted by a decline in the level 

of senior attention to the mission and the widespread perception that what they do 

is of declining value in the public perception. In the case of the bomber forces, the 

decline in the culture was greatly accelerated by the demands on the bomber force 

for support of conventional operations, This demand is the product of an extraordinarily valuable capability to support ongoing combat operations. This demand 

multiplied and accelerated the impact of the decline in senior level and national attention. 

The only assurance of a culture suitable to a mission of such high consequence 

is restored and lasting senior level attention and national support. Actions are underway to provide the first. I have no projection on the second.

DISTINGUISHING THE NUCLEAR MISSION FROM OTHER MISSIONS

15. Senator WARNER. General Raaberg, General Chilton, Commander, United 

States Strategic Command (STRATCOM), spoke to an audience in Washington, DC, 

last month and was asked to give his thoughts regarding how the nuclear mission 

compares to the other missions of STRATCOM. He gave the following answer: ‘‘We 

have a lot of balls we juggle every day in this command. All but one of them are 

rubber. One is crystal. Most of them that we drop, they’re going to bounce. We can 

pick them back up, throw them back into the stream and juggle them. But the nuclear mission is a crystal ball. We cannot afford to drop that. This is a mission area 

where we as human beings are challenged to be perfect. We are not perfect. That 

is our challenge.’’ Do you believe the Air Force has a similarly clear view of what 

distinguishes the nuclear mission from its other mission? 

General RAABERG. Yes, I do. The Air Force nuclear mission is a ‘‘no fail’’ business. 

We have rigid procedures in place to help our airmen in their quest to be perfect. 

However, my investigation revealed an erosion of our nuclear focus in some areas. 

The calculus has changed over the years as we moved away from a nuclear deterrent bomber force on constant alert. We used to be near a 1-to-1 nuclear to conventional ratio. Today’s ratio is closer to 1-to-20. Our challenge is to take the right 

measures to balance the equation and refocus our nuclear enterprise. We’re moving 

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in the right direction to do just that as we prosecute the collective recommendations 

from the recent investigations. 

As a side note, I didn’t observe the same erosion in the Intercontinental Ballistic 

Missile Wing at Minot Air Force Base. Their calculus has remained constant over 

the years.

MISSION FOCUS AND TRAINING

16. Senator WARNER. General Peyer, appendix F of your review lists the many 

questions you posited to the wings. If you can, please summarize the answers you 

received to two of them: On mission focus, ‘‘Are inspection results indicative of unit 

capability?’’ and on training, ‘‘Do you believe Air Force training requirements adequately prepare the members of your unit to accomplish their nuclear responsibilities?’’

General PEYER. These questions were presented to leaders at the squadron, group 

and wing levels. In response to the question, ‘‘Are inspection results indicative of 

unit capability?’’, there was almost an even split between those who stated ‘affirmative’ versus ‘negative.’ Those responding ‘affirmative’ indicated the inspections are 

a fair assessment. The negative responses were diverse, however, there was a recurring suggestion to conduct unannounced inspections, and this is a suggestion the Air 

Force Inspector General is exploring. While our current policies do not preclude nonotice inspections, the Inspector General is exploring the feasibility of requiring nonotice inspections. In response to the question ‘‘Do you believe Air Force training 

requirements adequately prepare the members of your unit to accomplish their nuclear responsibilities?’’, most respondents stated ‘affirmative’. However, there were 

concerns that declining experience could potentially be linked to a reduction in 

training frequency and quality. Several recommendations in our BRR addressed 

training needs. One in particular recommended providing more robust training to 

U.S. Air Force personnel to reinforce the primacy of the nuclear mission (BRR Recommendation #3.2.2.3) and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Requirements (AF A3/5) has taken this recommendation for action and is evaluating 

training needs.

ENHANCING NUCLEAR SCIENCE AS A CAREER FIELD

17. Senator WARNER. General Welch, your report, as well as the Blue Ribbon 

Panel report, both found that the nuclear mission has been devalued and that, as 

a result, it is challenging to recruit and retain the best and brightest young airmen 

into nuclear-related positions. The civilian nuclear power industry experienced similar challenges after the Three Mile Island incident, and the subsequent cancellation 

of most new power plant orders in the United States. This Nation is still dependent, 

however, on existing nuclear power plants for 20 percent of our electricity generation. How do we, as an Air Force, or as a Nation, address the challenge of attracting 

young people to fields, such as nuclear science, upon which our national security 

and our prosperity depend? 

General WELCH. This question is well beyond the scope of the Permanent Task 

Force report so my answer is a personal view informed by more than two decades 

of interface with the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Energy 

nuclear enterprise. Those who claim we no longer need a viable nuclear deterrent 

and those who oppose nuclear power plants receive widespread attention to include 

editorials in major newspapers and invitations to speak in public forums. In contrast, those who believe that nuclear capabilities remain critically important to national security and that nuclear power provides a safe and clean contribution to energy independence are largely silent. Further, when they emerge from the state of 

silence, they are unheard. Those who spend their daily lives in the nuclear enterprise are bright and well read and they are very aware of all of the above. 

The supporters of a reliable, safe, and secure nuclear deterrent and supporters of 

nuclear power for electricity have a more compelling story and can claim to be more 

aligned with the interests of the American public. For example, the poster child for 

opponents of nuclear power is Three Mile Island. The poster child for those who support nuclear power should be 104 nuclear power plants in the United States that 

have been operating safely and efficiently for years, that meet one-fifth of the Nation’s electrical power needs, and that could be expanded to meet a much larger 

share of that growing need. Yet, few Americans are aware of this large, safe, and 

efficient nuclear power industry in the United Stales. Until informed supporters of 

nuclear deterrence and nuclear power speak up, it will be difficult to attract and 

retain the needed talent

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18. Senator WARNER. General Welch, how do we revive these fields as the prestige 

areas they once were? 

General WELCH. The answer to 17 applies. In addition, within DOD, there must 

be clearly articulated and visible senior level support for the importance of the nuclear enterprise, regardless of the shrinking size of the enterprise needed to meet 

national security needs in the current and expected global environment.

[Whereupon, at 10:25 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

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