E PLURIBUS UNUM

NATIONAL TRA SPORTATIO

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SAFE T Y

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National Transportation Safety Board 

Washington, D.C. 20594 

Railroad Accident Brief

Accident No.: DCA-06-FR-004 

Location: Lincoln, Alabama 

Date: January 18, 2006 

Time: 4:17 p.m. central standard time 

Railroad: Norfolk Southern Railway 

Property Damage: $5.2 million 

Injuries: 3 

Fatalities: None 

Type of Accident: Rear-end collision and derailment 

Accident Synopsis 

About 4:17 p.m., central standard time,1 on January 18, 2006, eastbound Norfolk 

Southern Railway (NS) freight train No. 226A117 (226), while traveling about 50 mph 

near Lincoln, Alabama, diverted from the main track onto a siding track where it struck 

the rear of eastbound NS train No. 22RA116 (22R), which was stopped in the siding. The 

collision derailed the three locomotives and the first seven cars of train 226 and the rear 

three cars of train 22R. The three crewmembers of train 226 were injured. Property 

damage was estimated to be about $5.2 million. 

Accident Sequence 

Train 22R originated in New Orleans, Louisiana. Train 226 originated in 

Los Angeles, California. Both trains were destined for Atlanta, Georgia, and both trains 

were re-crewed at the NS Birmingham, Alabama, terminal at Norris Yard, milepost 

(MP) 791, before continuing to Atlanta. The crew of train 2262

 (engineer, conductor, and 

 1

 All times referenced in this brief are central standard time. 

2

 The train 226 locomotive engineer was hired on May 5, 1978, as a brakeman. On April 21, 1997, he 

was promoted to locomotive engineer and started working in the district. The conductor was hired on 

April 18, 2005, as a conductor trainee. On September 19, 2005, he was promoted to conductor. The 

conductor trainee was hired on October 20, 2005. At the time of the accident, he was working in that 

capacity. 

1 NTSB/RAB-07/03 
conductor trainee) went on duty at Norris Yard at 1:15 p.m. on January 18, 2006. The 

train 22R crew3

 (engineer, conductor, and engineer trainee) went on duty at 1:35 p.m. 

Train 22R departed Norris Yard at 2:30 p.m.4 The train had 2 locomotives pulling 

81 cars and was trailing 6,046 tons. It was 8,276 feet long. Train 226 departed the yard at 

2:50 p.m. with 3 locomotives pulling 23 cars (all of which were platform cars loaded with 

intermodal containers5

) and trailing 3,582 tons. The train was 4,580 feet long. Train 226 

left the yard behind train 198, which was following train 22R. About 9 miles from 

Norris Yard, train 198 diverged from the east-west main line and started southward 

toward Columbus, Georgia. At that point, train 226 was following train 22R on signal 

indication.6

About 3:49 p.m., the NS dispatcher radioed the crew of train 22R to inform them 

that they would be taking their train into the siding at Coosa (MP 758) to allow train 226 

to pass on the main line.7

 The crew of train 226 said that they overheard this conversation 

and were therefore expecting to run around train 22R at Coosa. The train 226 engineer 

(who had also worked as an engineer on train 22R) said it was common for train 226 to 

be following train 22R. And because train 22R often had to work a local automobile plant 

en route while train 226 was a “hot shot,” or priority train,8

 the dispatcher would 

routinely direct train 22R into a siding to allow the through train to pass. 

As it followed train 22R, train 226 passed several clear signals9 before 

encountering consecutive approach signals10 at Holt (MP 767.8),11 Eden (MP 765.4), 

and Pell City (MP 762.8). These signals were consistent with the presence of train 22R 

ahead. The approach signal at Pell City meant that the crew had to be prepared to stop 

 3

 The train 22R engineer was hired in January 1997; he had worked as an engineer for this territory for 

the last 5 years. About 1 year before the accident, NS had hired the locomotive engineer trainee as a 

conductor. 

4

 As train 22R was leaving Norris Yard in Birmingham, a trackman noticed that a door was open on 

the 66th car and radioed the train. When the train stopped, a road foreman of engines (RFE) boarded and 

gave his pickup truck to the conductor to use in checking the open door. The foreman rode the train and 

instructed the conductor to rejoin the train at Coosa. The RFE had 12 years of experience with NS. He had 

worked 2 years as a brakeman, 9 years as a locomotive engineer, and about 1 year as a supervisor of 

locomotive engineers. 

5

 All the cars on the train were articulated cars with platforms specially designed to accommodate 

stacked intermodal containers (containers designed to be transported by more than one form of carrier, such 

as truck, rail, or ship). The lengths of the individual cars varied depending on the number of platforms. 

6

 In this centralized traffic control system, wayside signals along the main track sense the presence of 

trains within a defined block of track and automatically display the appropriate signals to other trains that 

may be approaching the occupied block. (Some of the signals can also be controlled by the dispatcher.) 

7

 The dispatcher operated the siding switch remotely. 

8

 A priority train is one that is operated so as to minimize delays en route. 

9

 A clear signal indication allows a train to operate at the maximum speed authorized for the track 

segment. 

10 An approach signal indication requires that a train slow and be prepared to stop before passing the 

next signal. 

11 Milepost numbers decrease going east. 

2 NTSB/RAB-07/03 
before passing the next signal, at Riverside (MP 760.4), which was the last signal before 

the siding at Coosa. (A map of these signals is shown in figure 1.) 

Figure 1. Map displaying selected signals that train 226 encountered before reaching 

Coosa. 

3 NTSB/RAB-07/03 
About 4:03 p.m., as train 226 was passing the approach signal at Pell City, train 

22R was diverting from the main track and entering the siding at Coosa. The train 226 

conductor said he had heard the train 22R crew announce (on the radio) a diverging 

approach indication12 at Coosa and was therefore aware that the train was entering the 

siding and would thus be clear of the main line before the arrival of train 226. 

While train 22R was moving from the main track into the siding, the signal just 

west of the siding was displaying a stop indication to following trains. This indication 

triggered the signal at Riverside, about 2 miles west of Coosa, to display a restricting

indication13 for train 226. 

The dispatcher stacked consecutive train movement requests into the centralized 

traffic control equipment and lined train 22R into the siding. In this situation, the switch 

would line for the main track after the rear car cleared the siding switch track circuit. The 

signal system would then light the corresponding signal aspect after the switch was lined 

for the main track. In this case, however, when train 22R stopped in the siding, about 84 

feet of the rear of the train⎯though physically well clear of the main line⎯remained 

within the switch circuit. As a result, the switch remained lined for the siding, and the 

signals continued to display stop and restricting indications. 

A student engineer was at the operating controls of train 22R when it entered the 

siding. The student engineer did not activate the footage counter when the head of the 

train passed over the insulated joint at the west end of the siding.14 Train 22R was 

stopped at a familiar landmark near the east end of the siding. The crew of 22R were not 

aware that the rear car was occupying the circuit of the west switch. 

Meanwhile, according to interviews and event recorder data, the engineer of train 

226 had reduced the speed of his train to between 2 and 5 mph as the train came around 

the 2° curve at the approach to the signal at Riverside.15 According to signal and 

dispatcher data, the Riverside signal, because of the switch alignment at Coosa, was 

displaying a restricting indication; that is, a single red aspect on both the high and low 

signal heads.16 (See figure 2.) According to the train 226 engineer, however, he saw the 

signal as “green over red.” He said he observed that signal for “probably a minute.” 

 12 A diverging approach indication requires that the engineer slow the train to the prescribed speed for 

diverging through an upcoming switch onto another track. 

13 The restricting indication requires that the train proceed at a speed, not exceeding 15 mph, that 

permits stopping short of railroad equipment, a stop signal, a derail or switch not properly lined, or broken 

rail. 

14 The NS does not require train crews to use a distance counter in signalized territory, and the Federal 

Railroad Administration does not require the use of a distance counter at any time. 

15 The engineer was operating his train in accordance with the approach indication he had received at 

Pell City, which required that he be prepared to stop the train before passing the signal at Riverside. 

16 The high signal head of the signal at Riverside had three aspects (green, yellow, and red, top to 

bottom); the low signal head had two aspects (green, at the top, and red). 

4 NTSB/RAB-07/03 
Figure 2. Eastbound signal at Riverside as seen from a locomotive cab during 

postaccident sight distance testing. The high signal head has three aspects: green over 

yellow over red. The lower, offset, signal head has two aspects: green over red. This 

configuration should be considered an improperly or imperfectly displayed signal.

The train 226 engineer stated: 

I looked at it [the signal at Riverside] for the last time, and we still had a 

clear signal. I called it again in the cab, still clear, and at that time I called 

it over the radio. 

The train 22R crew told investigators that they heard train 226 call “clear” at 

Riverside.17 The dispatcher told investigators that she did not hear this clear call because 

she was tending to other duties. The conductor and conductor trainee, who were in the 

226 locomotive cab at the time, also remembered calling the signal as clear. 

Event recorder data indicated that train 226 passed the Riverside signal at about 

18 mph. The train then proceeded toward Coosa while increasing its speed, in accordance 

 17 The crew of train 22R was not aware that the rear of their train was within the switch circuit. They 

therefore would have thought that the siding switch had returned to normal and would have expected the 

signal at Riverside to be displaying a clear indication. 

5 NTSB/RAB-07/03 
with the clear indication the crew believed they had seen at Riverside. As the train exited 

a 3° curve (restricted to 55 mph) west of Coosa at 53 mph, the crew were able to observe 

the stop indication at Coosa and could see the switch alignment. The engineer said he was 

preparing to announce the signal indication for Coosa on the radio when he saw the stop

signal and realized that the switch was lined for the siding. Instead of announcing the 

indication, he simply transmitted, “Oh Lord!” 

The engineer placed the train’s braking system into emergency, but the train only 

slowed to about 45 mph before striking the rear of train 22R.18 The three crewmembers 

braced for the impact and were able to exit the cab after the collision. Emergency 

responders examined the crewmembers and transported them to a local hospital where the 

conductor trainee was treated and released. The engineer and conductor were treated and 

held for observation. The crew of train 22R were not injured.19

The collision derailed the three locomotives of train 226 and its first seven cars. 

(These were platform cars carrying a total of 34 intermodal containers and one semitrailer.) The three rear cars of train 22R, loaded automobile carriers, also derailed. The 

collision and derailment occurred during bright daylight under sunny, clear skies. The 

temperature was 53° F, and winds were from the west-southwest at 6 to 8 mph. 

Sight Distance Tests 

On January 25 and 26, 2006, investigators, using a locomotive and locomotive 

configuration (short hood forward) similar to those of train 226 on the day of the 

accident, conducted sight distance tests of the NS main line signals at Pell City, 

Riverside, and Coosa. The testing was conducted under sunny, clear skies and at a time 

when the sun approximated its position at the time train 226 had passed the signals on the 

day of the accident. For the tests, the siding switch at Coosa was lined and locked for the 

siding, and the Coosa signal was energized to display stop. This caused the signal at 

Riverside to display restricting, as it had when train 226 passed the signal on the day of 

the accident. 

 18 About 4 minutes after the collision, the dispatcher saw track lights on the dispatch board that raised 

her concern about whether train 22R was clear of the switch, and she called the crew of train 22R. The 

engineer thought that the train was clear but said that he would move the train forward to “clear it up.” 

Neither the dispatcher nor the engineer was aware that the collision had occurred. 

19 The crewmembers of both trains and the dispatcher underwent postaccident toxicological testing in 

accordance with 49 Code of Federal Regulations 219, Subpart C. All eight employees tested negative for 

illicit drugs and alcohol. Three employees (the engineer trainee of train 22R, the engineer of train 226, and 

the dispatcher) tested positive for prescription medications. The use of these medications was not a factor in 

this accident. 

6 NTSB/RAB-07/03 
About 1,230 feet before the Riverside signal, investigators observed two red 

aspects (one on the upper signal head and one on the lower signal head), which is the 

correct aspect for a restricting indication. 

The train then slowly moved forward by 40 feet, until it was within 1,189 feet of 

the signal. At that point, the green aspect at the top of the upper signal head appeared to 

be illuminated, even though the green aspect was not energized. As the locomotive pulled 

slowly forward, the green aspect became even more prominent. The red aspect in the 

same signal head remained energized and continued to be visible to those in the 

locomotive cab. The upper signal head’s top aspect continued to appear to display green 

as the locomotive approached and then passed the signal. During a subsequent test run at 

accident train speed, the Riverside upper signal head again appeared to display two 

aspects—green over red—even though the green was not energized. 

The next day, investigators again performed sight distance tests at Riverside. The 

results were the same as on the previous day, and investigators determined that the period 

of time the green aspect appeared to be illuminated was about 1 hour. Although the green 

light was not energized, it appeared to be illuminated because of sunlight reflecting from 

its lens. After the sight distance tests, the railroad installed devices at Riverside to better 

shield the lights from sun reflection. 

NS Signal Recognition 

Signal A in figure 3 illustrates the signal as energized at the time of the accident, 

displaying a restricting indication. Note that the restricting indication is displayed as a 

single red light illuminated in each of the upper and lower signal heads. Signal B in 

figure 3 illustrates the signal as it appeared in postaccident sight distance tests. Signal B 

is somewhat similar to signal A, but it has one critical difference: in addition to the single 

red light on each of the signal heads, a green light appears to be illuminated in the upper 

head. Because no legitimate NS signal indication uses this combination of illuminated 

aspects, this configuration should be considered an improperly or imperfectly displayed 

signal. 

NS operating rule No. 27 had instructions for employees who encountered an 

imperfectly displayed signal. The rule stated, in part: 

A signal imperfectly displayed, a signal functioning erratically, the 

absence of a light at a place where a signal is usually shown, must be 

regarded as the most restrictive indication that can be given by that signal 

and must be promptly reported to the Dispatcher, Control Station, or 

Yardmaster. 

7 NTSB/RAB-07/03 
 A B 

Figure 3. Signal at Riverside at time of accident as it was energized (A) and as it was 

observed during postaccident tests (B). 

Neither NS operating rule No. 27 nor any of the rule book’s signal illustrations or 

accompanying text informed employees that extra lighted aspects20 in a signal head 

indicate an anomaly in the observed signal, that such a signal should be considered an 

imperfectly displayed signal, and that it should be treated as if it were displaying its most 

restrictive indication. 

The NS provides its employees with classroom and practical training at the 

company’s training facility in McDonough, Georgia. Operating employees are taught to 

recognize and respond appropriately to signal indications. To prepare trainees to 

recognize improperly displayed signals, training staff set signals with signal lights out or 

flickering. 

During classroom work, because of the variety of signal types employees might 

encounter on the company’s widespread territories, trainees use a computer system that 

displays signals as depicted in the NS rule book. Employees are expected to learn the 

various signal configurations used on their specific territories while they are undergoing 

on-the-job training with regular crews. 

 20 Some signal configurations (for example, directional signals) display more than one lighted aspect 

in the same signal head; extra lighted aspects are aspects in addition to those displaying a legitimate signal 

indication. 

8 NTSB/RAB-07/03 
Probable Cause 

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of 

the January 18, 2006, collision of Norfolk Southern Railway train 226 with the rear of 

Norfolk Southern Railway train 22R at Lincoln, Alabama, was the failure by the crew of 

train 226 to recognize an extra lighted aspect (caused by reflected sunlight) as an 

imperfectly displayed signal and to treat it as a most restrictive indication. Contributing to 

the accident was Norfolk Southern Railway’s inadequate illustrations and text in the 

rulebook and inadequate training to prepare crews to recognize a signal displaying an 

extra lighted aspect as an imperfectly displayed signal. Also contributing to the accident 

was the lack of a positive train control system that would have intervened when the crew 

did not respond appropriately to the signal. 

Recommendations 

As a result of its investigation of the January 18, 2006, collision of Norfolk 

Southern train 226 with the rear of Norfolk Southern train 22R at Lincoln, Alabama, the 

National Transportation Safety Board made the safety recommendations listed below. 

(For more information about these recommendations, see the safety recommendation 

letters issued to the recipients.21) 

To the Norfolk Southern Railway Company: 

Modify your initial and recurrent training and operating rules to emphasize 

to your employees and the crews of other railroads operating on your 

territory that any signal that appears to display extra lighted aspects in a 

signal head should be treated as an imperfectly displayed signal. (R-07-29) 

To the Class I Railroads: 

After reviewing the circumstances of the January 18, 2006, railroad 

collision near Lincoln, Alabama, modify, as necessary, your initial and 

recurrent training and operating rules to emphasize to your employees and 

the crews of other railroads operating on your territory that any signal that 

appears to display extra lighted aspects in a signal head should be treated 

as an improperly or imperfectly displayed signal. (R-07-30) 

 21 The recommendation letters are available on the Safety Board’s Web site at <www.ntsb.gov>. 

9 NTSB/RAB-07/03 
10 NTSB/RAB-07/03 

To the Association of American Railroads and the American Short Line and 

Regional Railroad Association: 

Using the circumstances of the January 18, 2006, railroad collision near 

Lincoln, Alabama, inform your members through your publications, web 

site, and conferences of the need to enhance their signal training to 

emphasize that extra lighted aspects in a signal head should be treated as 

an improperly displayed signal. (R-07-31) 

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD 

Mark V. Rosenker 

Chairman 

Deborah A. P. Hersman

Member 

Steven R. Chealander 

Member 

Robert L. Sumwalt 

Vice Chairman 

Kathryn O’Leary Higgins 

Member 

Adopted: October 26, 2007 

Chairman Rosenker and Member Chealander disapproved adoption of this brief.