J-S08001-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.L.L., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: J.L., FATHER

No. 2967 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree Entered September 11, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000039-2018

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.L.L., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: J.L., FATHER

No. 2969 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree Entered September 11, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-DP-1000206-2016

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 17, 2019

J.L. (Father) appeals from the September 11, 2018 decrees that granted 

the petitions filed by the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (DHS) 

to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights to S.L.L. (Child) (born in 

January of 2013) and to change the goal for Child to adoption.1, 2 After review, 

we affirm. 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 These appeals were consolidated sua sponte by per curiam order of this 

Court, as all of these matters involve related parties and issues. Order, 

1/10/19. 

2 The parental rights of Child’s mother, L.W. (Mother), were terminated by 

separate decree on September 11, 2018. Mother has not filed an appeal. 
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The trial court provided the following factual and procedural background 

of this case, stating: 

The family became known to [DHS] on January 10, 2013 

when DHS received a substantiated General Protective Services 

(“GPS”) report, which alleged that Mother and Child [tested]

positive for cocaine at Child’s birth. On May 24, 2016, DHS 

received a GPS report alleging that Father had custody of [] Child 

after being removed from Mother’s care. The GPS report also 

alleged that Father used drugs and allegedly sexually assaulted a 

female relative. On May 26, 2016, DHS attempted to visit 

[F]ather’s home but could not locate Father and Child. On May 

31, 2016, DHS located Father and determined that he was 

homeless and that [] Child stayed nights with Father’s maternal 

grandmother. On June 10, 2016, an Adjudicatory Hearing was 

held and Child was adjudicated dependent. On August 4, 2016,

Dr. Kai Syversten, PhD[,] conducted a psychological evaluation of 

Father. Father was lethargic and nonresponsive during this 

evaluation. As a result of the evaluation, Dr. Syversten 

recommended that Father (1) receive outpatient psychotherapy 

and psychiatric medication to treat depression; (2) Father submit 

to drug testing; (3) Father obtain housing and (4) that Father 

comply with DHS recommendations. On September 7, 2016, the 

Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) held a Single Case Plan 

(“SCP”) meeting. The goals identified for Father were to (1) 

comply with visits; (2) to complete three random drug screens; 

(3) to make visits with the Child and (4) receive mental health 

treatment. The underlying Petition to Terminate [F]ather’s 

Parental Rights was filed on January 16, 2018 due to Father[’s]

failing to meet his SCP objectives. On September 11, 2018, the 

court ruled to terminate Father’s parental rights to Child pursuant 

to 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(1)(2)(5)(8) and found that termination 

of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of Child

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(b). Father filed the instant Notice 

of Appeal on October 11, 2018.

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 10/31/18, at 2-3 (citations to record omitted). 

In its opinion, the court noted that although Father did not attend the 

September 11, 2018 hearing that resulted in both the termination of his 
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parental rights and the goal change for Child to adoption, he was represented 

by counsel, who stipulated to the facts set forth in the termination/goal change

petitions. The court further identified Emily Cherniack, Esquire, as the Child 

Advocate and Rebecca Mainor, Esquire, as the Guardian Ad Litem (GAL). The 

court also set out a synopsis of the testimony provided by Tyrone King, the 

DHS Representative, stating:

At the termination hearing, Mr. Tyrone King, the assigned 

DHS Representative, testified that Father had failed to achieve his 

SCP objectives[,] which included receiving mental health 

treatment and visits with [] Child. Mr. King testified that Child 

was well bonded to her pre-adoptive foster parent and that Child 

had spent a significant period of time with her foster parent. Mr.

King testified that he had observed interactions between the 

Foster Parent and Child, which indicated a parent/child bond. Mr.

King testified that the termination of Father’s parental rights 

would not cause irreparable harm to Child and that termination of 

[] Father’s parental rights was in [] Child’s best interest. At the 

hearing, Rebecca Mainor, Esquire, the [GAL], proffered that []

Child wanted to remain with her foster parent and that she did not 

believe that there would be any conflict between [] Child’s legal 

interest and adoption. Emily Cherniak, Esquire, as Child 

Advocate, made no indication that [] Child did not want to be 

adopted. The testimony of Mr. King was deemed credible and 

accorded great weight. In addition, the Child Advocate and [the 

GAL] were diligent in their determination that there was no conflict 

between the legal interest and the best interest of [] Child. 

Consequently, documents and testimony presented at the 

Termination of Parental Rights Hearing provided the [c]ourt clear 

and convincing evidence to terminate Father’s parental rights and 

rule that the termination of these rights would be in the best 

interest of Child.... 

Id. at 4-5 (citations to record omitted). Based on this record, the court 

concluded that Father demonstrated an “ongoing inability to provide care for 

or control of Child resulting in his failure to remedy the conditions that brought 
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[] Child into care. Specifically, Father failed to satisfy his SCP objectives.” Id.

at 4. 

On appeal, Father presents the following issues for our review:

1. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in terminating [Father’s] parental 

rights under [23] Pa.C.S.[] [§] 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), and 

(a)(8)?

2. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in finding that termination of 

Father’s parental rights best served [] [C]hild’s developmental, 

physical and emotional needs under [23] Pa.C.S.[] [§] 2511(b)?

3. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in changing [] [C]hild’s goal to 

adoption? 

Father’s brief at vi. 

We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of review relating to 

Father’s first and second issues.

When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating 

parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the 

decision of the trial court is supported by competent evidence. 

Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient 

evidentiary support for the trial court’s decision, the decree must 

stand. Where a trial court has granted a petition to involuntarily 

terminate parental rights, this Court must accord the hearing 

judge’s decision the same deference that we would give to a jury 

verdict. We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the 

record in order to determine whether the trial court’s decision is 

supported by competent evidence.

In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting In re S.H., 879 

A.2d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2005)). Moreover, we have explained that:

The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as 

testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to 

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” 
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Id. (quoting In re J.L.C. & J.R.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)). 

The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented 

and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts 

in the evidence. In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004). If 

competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if 

the record could also support the opposite result. In re Adoption of T.B.B.,

835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

We are guided further by the following: Termination of parental rights 

is governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis. 

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court 

must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental 

rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The 

party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds 

for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, 

other citations omitted). The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear 

and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination 

of parental rights are valid. R.N.J., 985 A.2d at 276. 
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With regard to Section 2511(b), we direct our analysis to the facts 

relating to that section. This Court has explained that:

Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 

A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, “Intangibles 

such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the 

inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In addition, we 

instructed that the trial court must also discern the nature and 

status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect 

on the child of permanently severing that bond. Id. However, in 

cases where there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and 

child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 

946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008). Accordingly, the extent 

of the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the 

circumstances of the particular case. Id. at 763.

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

In this case, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant 

to Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b). We need only agree with the trial 

court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), 

in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en 

banc). Here, we analyze the court’s decision to terminate under Sections 

2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows. 

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

***

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential 

parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or 

mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 
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abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the 

parent.

***

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 

2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1) 

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) 

such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot 

be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those 

grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental 

duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations 

omitted). 
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The main thrust of Father’s argument centers on his allegation that DHS 

failed to provide clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of 

his parental rights, namely, that the “causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal [were] not ... remedied.” Father’s brief at 6. Rather, he claims that 

he completed parenting classes, healthy relationship classes, and a housing 

workshop. He also asserts that he attended mental health treatment, was 

employed, visited with Child and that because he had negative drug screens, 

he did not need any drug or alcohol treatment. 

What Father fails to note is that he, through his attorney, stipulated to 

the facts alleged in the termination/goal change petitions, which together with 

the testimony of Mr. King was the basis for the trial court’s findings. The brief 

filed by DHS cites two cases that support the trial court’s reliance on the 

stipulation of facts. Specifically, DHS’s brief states:

“A stipulation of facts is binding upon the hearing tribunal 

as well as the parties to the stipulation. As a general rule, once a 

stipulation of facts has been effectively entered into, there can be 

no valid contention or conclusion that facts within the scope of the 

stipulation are unsupported by substantial evidence. In sum, facts 

effectively stipulated to are controlling and conclusive.”

Kostecky v. Mattern, 452 A.2d 100, 104 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1982) 

(internal citations omitted). “Evidence admitted by stipulation or 

consent of both parties is fully competent and accorded full 

weight.” Jones v. Spidle, 286 A.2d 366, 367-68 (Pa. 1971)

(internal citations omitted).

DHS’s brief at 19. We have not found any cases that contradict these 

statements of the law. Moreover, based on our review of the record, we
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conclude that the trial court’s decision was supported by competent evidence 

and Father’s arguments to the contrary are without merit. 

Next, we address Father’s second issue, wherein he argues that the 

termination of his parental rights was not in Child’s best interest as delineated 

under Section 2511(b). We have discussed the required analysis under 

Section 2511(b) previously in this memorandum. See In re Adoption of 

J.M., 991 A.2d at 324. However, Father’s sole contention is that because he 

consistently visited with Child, the trial court erred in terminating his parental 

rights. This statement is contrary to the court’s finding, based on Mr. King’s 

testimony that Father “failed to achieve his SCP objectives which included ... 

visits with [] Child.” TCO at 4. Moreover, our review of the record reveals 

that Father’s visits with Child decreased over time from frequent, 

unsupervised periods to supervised, bi-weekly, line-of-sight and line-ofhearing visits. Furthermore, Mr. King testified that Child would not be 

irreparably harmed if Father’s parental rights were terminated and that Child 

had a good bond with the pre-adoptive kinship parent. Again, we conclude 

that based upon the record, Father is not entitled to any relief. 

Lastly, we turn to Father’s issue concerning the goal change to adoption 

for Child. Father’s brief contains a recitation of the law relating to a goal 

change and then he simply argues then he has consistently visited Child and 

was receiving mental health treatment. The transcript of the termination/goal 

change hearing shows that Child, who was five years old at the time of the 
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hearing, had been in care approximately 21⁄2 years. N.T., 9/11/18, at 4. 

Moreover, based upon Mr. King’s testimony, Father was “not fully compliant 

with his [SCP] objectives, including mental health, housing, supervised 

visitation and remaining out of incarceration[.]” Id. at 6. Mr. King also 

concluded that it would be in Child’s best interests to be adopted. Id. at 7. 

Based on the stipulation of facts and this testimony, the court concluded that 

under the circumstances, it was appropriate to order a goal change to 

adoption. Id. 

This Court’s standard of review involving a goal change for a dependent 

child is as follows: 

In cases involving a court’s order changing the placement 

goal ... to adoption, our standard of review is abuse of discretion. 

In re N.C., 909 A.2d 818, 822 (Pa. Super. 2006). To hold that 

the trial court abused its discretion, we must determine its 

judgment was “manifestly unreasonable,” that the court 

disregarded the law, or that its action was “a result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias or ill will.” Id. (quoting In re G.P.-R., 851 A.2d 

967, 973 (Pa. Super. 2004)). While this Court is bound by the 

facts determined in the trial court, we are not tied to the court’s 

inferences, deductions and conclusions; we have a “responsibility 

to ensure that the record represents a comprehensive inquiry and 

that the hearing judge has applied the appropriate legal principles 

to that record.” In re A.K., 906 A.2d 596, 599 (Pa. Super. 2006). 

Therefore, our scope of review is broad. Id.

In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 977 (Pa. Super. 2008). 

Pursuant to the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f), when considering a 

petition for goal change for a dependent child, the juvenile court is to consider, 

inter alia: (1) the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the 

placement; (2) the extent of compliance with the family service plan; (3) the 
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extent of progress made towards alleviating the circumstances which 

necessitated the original placement; (4) the appropriateness and feasibility of 

the current placement goal for the children; and (5) a likely date by which the 

goal for the child might be achieved. In re S.B., 943 A.2d at 977. The best 

interests of the child, and not the interests of the parent, must guide the trial 

court. Id. at 978. 

Our review of the record in this case and the statutory directives 

governing a goal change support the conclusion that reunification of Child with 

Father is not a realistic goal. Father is primarily seeking to have this Court 

reweigh the evidence in a light more favorable to him. However, it is beyond 

our purview to disturb the credibility determinations of the trial court when 

the testimony relied upon is supported in the record. The trial court was free 

to conclude that Father was unlikely to remedy the issues in the near future; 

thus, the permanency needs of Child dictate changing her goal to adoption. 

We are compelled to conclude that the trial court did not err in ordering the 

change of goal to adoption. 

Decrees affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/17/19