C O U R T O F A P P E A LS EI GHTH D I STRI CT OF TEXAS ELPASO, TEXAS M.C., Ap pe lla nt,
v. T E X A S D E P A R T M E N T O F F A M ILY AN D PR OT ECT I VE SER VI CES , Appellee
. § § § § § § No. 08-08-00053- CV

Appea l from the 65th District Court of El Paso County , Texas (TC# 2007CM227)
O P I N I O N M. C. a pp e a ls the tr ia l c ourt ’s fi na l or de r te rm inatin g he r pa re nta l ri g hts to h e r c hil d, L .M .C. I n thre e iss ue s, sh e c on te nd s th a t th e e vid e nc e su pp or tin g t erm in atio n is le g a lly and fa c tua lly insufficient, a

nd that Section 263.405 of the F amily Code violates the d

u e-pr ocess a

nd separ ation-ofpo we rs c la

us e s. We a ff

ir m. BACK GR OUND M.C. is t he biolog ical mother of L .M.C. The T ex as De partment of F amily and Protec tive Service s (“D epar

tment”) filed a petition se ekingto terminate the pa rent-c hild relationship betwee n M.C. and L .M.C. on J anuar y 11, 2007. The De partment subseque ntly filed an a mended pe tition, and the trial cour

t set the case for a

final hea ring . At the conc lusion of the hear ing, the trial court f ound t h at M
. C
. kn o wi n gl y p l ac ed o r kn o wi n gl y al l o we d L
. M
. C
. t o re m ai ni nco n d i t i o n s o r s urr o un d i n gs which enda

ng ere d his phy s i cal or emotional well-being , that M.C. eng ag ed in conduc t or place d L .M.C. with persons who eng ag ed in conduc t which enda ng ere d L .M.C.’s phy sical or e m o t i o n al well-be ing, that M.C. constructively abandone d L
. M
. C
. , t h at M.C. failed to comply with the pr ov isi on s o f t

he c ourt ’s or de r t

hat sp e c if ic a lly e sta bli sh e d the a c tio ns ne c e ssa ry fo r M. C. to o bta inthe re turn of L .M.C., and that termination of the pa rent-c hild relationship was in the best interest of the child. The tria l court ente red its termina t i o n order on J anuar

y 15, 2008. M.C. tim ely

filed a state me nt o f p oints. SUF F ICIENCY OF THE E VIDENCE M.C. first contends that the evidenc e was leg ally and fac tually insufficient to te rminate he r p ar e n t a l r i g h t s w h e nd e s p i t e h e r m e n t a l d i s a

b i l i t i e s , th e r e w a s n o e v i d e n c e o f h ar mt o th e c h i l d
. In revie wing the leg al suffic iency of the e vidence to suppor t a termination finding , we look at a ll of the
e vid e nc e in t

he lig ht m os t f

avo ra ble to th e ter min a tio n f

ind ingto d e te rm ine wh e the r a re a so na ble trier of fac t could have f

ormed a firm belief

or conviction about the truth of the matter on which the Depa rtment bea

rs the burde n of proof

. In reJ .L. , 1 63 S.W. 3d

79 , 8 4- 85 (T e x. 20 05 ); In reJ .F .C. , 96 S.W .3d 256, 265-66 (Te x . 2002). W e assume the fact finder resolved any disputed fac ts in favor of his fi nd ing , if

a re a so na ble fa c t f ind e r c ou ld s o d o, a

nd dis re g ard a ll e vid e nc e that a

re a so na ble fac t finder c ould have disbelieve d or found incr edible. J .F .C. , 9 6 S. W.3 d at 26 6. W e do no t, howeve r, disreg ard undisputed e vidence that does not support the finding
. Id
. I n revie wing the fa ctual suff iciency of the evidenc e, we must g ive “due c onsideration” to a ny evidenc e the f

act f inder c ould rea sonably

have f ound to be clea

r and c onvincing
. Id ., c iti ng In re C .H., 8 9 S. W. 3 d

1 7 , 2 5 ( T e x. 2 0 0 2 )
. We mu s t c o n s id e r th e d is p u te d

e v id e n c e an d

d e te r mine whether a re asonable fac t finder could have resolved that evidenc e in favor of the f inding. J .F .C. , 96 S.W .3d at 266. I f the disputed ev i d en ce is so significa nt that a fa ct finder

could not have
rea sonably

formed a firm belief

or convic tion, then the evidenc e is fac tually insufficient. Id
. Be fore pare ntal rig hts can be involuntarily terminated, the trier of

fac t must find by clea

r and convincingevidenc e that: (1) the pare nt committed one of the e numerated statutory g rounds foundT he t ri al co urt t erm i nat ed M
. C
. ’ s p arent al ri ght s und er Secti o ns 1 6 1
. 0 0 1 (1)(D ), (E ), (N ), and (O ) of t he 1 F a m ily C o d e . T h e re fo re , t h e re le v a n t statu to ry g ro u n d s in th is c a se p ro v id e tha t t h e p a re n t ha s:

(D ) knowingl y placed or kno wi ngl y al l o wed t he chi l d t o remain i n co nd i t i o ns o r s urr o und i ngs w h ic h e n d a n g e r th e p h ysic a l o r e m o tio n a l we ll- b e ing o f t h e c h ild ; ( E ) en gag ed i n c onduct or kn owi ng l y pl ace d t he chi l d wi t h per s ons wh o eng age d i n c onduct wh i ch e n dan g er s t h e ph y s i ca l or e mot i on al w el l

- bei n g of t h e ch i l d;

. . . (N ) const ruct i vel y ab and o ned t he chi l d who has b een i n t he p erm anent or t em p o rary m anagi ng cons er vat ors hi p of

t he D epar t ment of

Fami l y an d P r ot ect i ve Ser vi ces or an aut hor i zed ag enc y fo r n o t l e ss th a n six m o n ths , an d : (i) th e d e p a rtm e n t o r a u tho riz e d a g e n c y ha s m a d e re a so n a b le e ff o rts to re tur n the c h ild to the p a re n t; ( i i ) t h e par en t h as n ot r eg u l ar l y v i s i t ed or ma i n t ai n ed s i g n i f i ca n t c on t ac t w i t h t h e ch i l d; an d (iii) the p a re n t ha s d e m o n stra te d a n ina b ili ty t o p ro v id e the c h ild w ith a sa fe e n v iro n m e n t; (O ) f ai l ed t o co m p l y wi t h t he p rovis i o ns o f a co urt ord er t hat s p eci f i cal l y est ab l i shed t he act i o ns necessar y f

o r t he p arent t o ob t ai n t he ret urn of t he chi l d who has b een i n t he p erm anent or t emp orar y manag i ng cons er vat ors hi p of t he D epar t ment of

Fami l y an d P r ot ect i ve Ser vi ces f or n ot l es s t han ni ne mo nt hs as a r es ul t of t he chi l d’ s r emo val f

r om t he pare nt un der C hapt er 2 6 2 fo r th e a b u se o r n e g le c t o f t h e c h ild ; T EX . F AM . C O D E A NN . § 1 6 1
. 0 0 1 (1). in Sec tion 161.001( 1); and (2) ter mination is i n the best intere st of the child. T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . 1 § 1 61 .0 01 (V e rn on

20 08 ); In re A.B. , 269 S.W .3d 120, 126 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2008, no pet.). The trial court ne ed only find one of the statutory g rounds true, a s well as find that the te rmination was in the child’s best interest to terminate pare ntal rig hts. See I n re A.D. , 2 0 3 S. W. 3 d

4 0 7 , 4 1 2
- 1 3 ( T e x. Ap p. –E l Pa so 20 06 , n o p e t.) ; In re S.F. , 32 S.W .3d 318, 320 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2000, no pet.). Her e, the tria l court terminate d M.C.’s pare ntal rig hts under Sections 161.001(1) (D), ( E), (N ), and (O) of the Fa mily Code. We will beg in our evidentiar y sufficie ncy

discu s sion under Section 161.001(1)(N). Se c tio n 1 61 .0 01 ( 1) ( N)Subparag raph (N) provide s for the te rmination of the par ent-c hild relationship on gr ounds

o f c o n s tr u c ti v e a bandonment. T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 161.001(1)(N). To pr ove construc tive abandonme nt, clear

and convincing evidence must establish that the child has been in the custody of the De partment for

at least six m onths and: (1) the D epar tment made r easona

ble ef forts to retur

n the c hil d to the pa

re nt; (2 ) the pa

re nt ha s not re g ula

rl y vis ite d or ma int a ine d sig nif ic ant c on ta c t w ith the child; and (3) the par ent has de monstrated an ina bility to provide the c hild with a safe environment. SeeT EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 161.001(1)(N). Her e, the De partment wa s appointed as L .M.C.’s temporary

manag ing c onservator on J anuar y 11, 2007, and wa s in St ate c are until the final he ari ngin D e c e mbe r 2 00 7. Thus , L .M .C. wa s in State c are fo r a

pe ri od lon g e r t ha n s ix mon ths
. Mo re ov e r, the Depart men t made r e a so na ble e ff or ts t o r e tur

n L .M .C. to M .C. A f

amil y service plan was pr epar ed, and T ere sa Salazar, the initial ca seworke r, went over the plan with M.C.,
e xpla ini ngthe De pa

rtme nt’ s e xpe c tatio ns . Th e pla n pr ov ide d op po rt

un iti e s f or M. C. t o p art ake in a numbe r o f s e r v ic e s to r e s to r e h e r

p ar e n ta l r igh ts , in c lu d in g c o un s e li n g s e r v ic e s an d p ar e n ti ng classes. The plan also provided for visitations betwe en M.C. a nd L .M.C. The prepa

rat i o n and
a dmi ni st rat io n o f t he s ervi ce pl an s ho ws th at t he D epar tm ent mad e reas on abl e effo rt s t o reu ni te M .C. wi t h her c hild. See I

n re K.M.B. , 9 1 S. W. 3 d 1 8 , 2 5 ( T e x. Ap p . – F o rt Wo rth 2 0 0 2 , n o pet.) (p re pa ratio n and a dmi nis tr a tio n of se rv ic e pla ns by the De pa

rtme nt are re a so na

ble e ff or ts t o r e un ite a par ent and a

child).Ho we ve r, M. C. d id n ot r e g ula rl y vis it a nd ma int a in s ig nif

ic ant c on tac t wi th L .M .C. Ac c or din g to the se rv ic e pla n, M. C. wa s to vis it L .M .C. tw ic e a we e k in t wo -h our i nte rv a ls. Connie Gutie rr e z, L .M .C. ’s fo ste r pa re nt, c la ime d M .C. on ly

vis ite d L .M .C. be tw e e n s ix an d e ig ht t ime s in
a tw e lve -m on th p e ri od , and on ly inf or me d he r on tw o o c c a sio ns that sh e wo uld mis s v isi tatio n. M. C. blamed her

lack of visitation on back pa in, taking ne ighbor s to the doctor or dr ug store, and la ck of transportation. On one occ asion, when M.C. ca lled thirty minutes befor e the visit, stating that she lacke d transportation, the case worke r advised her to call earlier so that the Depa rtment could send someone to g et her . After that, M.C. ca l l ed the De partment a fter the schedule d visits t o say she could not be there. F rom J anuar y 2007 throug h April 2007, M.C. miss ed so many schedule d vis itatio ns that th e De pa

rtme nt a dv ise d th e fo ste r p aren ts n ot t o b ri ngL .M .C. to v isi tatio n unle ss M. C. a pp e are d fir st. Whe n L .M .C. ha d sur g e ry fo r his c le ft lip and wa s hosp ita lize d for fi ve da y s, M.C. never visited him. And when M.C. attende d visitations, s he re mained quiet an d s h o we dno
emo ti o n . B a s e d o n th e s e f a c ts , it is c le ar th a t M
. C. d id n o t r e g u la r ly v is it o r ma inta in significant contac t with L .M.C. See I n re H.R. , 87 S.W .3d 691, 699 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2002, no pet.); In re P.R. , 9 9 4 S
. W
. 2 d

4 1 1 , 4 1 6 (T ex . A p p . – F o r t W o rt h1 9 9 9 , p et
. d i s m ’dw. o . j
. ) ( ca s es n o t i n g a pare nt fails to regularly

visit or maintain sig nificant contac t w ith the child if the pare nt f ails to take advanta g e of the visitation rights or if the visits are intermittent or sporadic)
. Finally , M.C. de monstrated an inability to pr ovide the child with a safe environment. When L .M.C. wa s born, M.C.’s intentions wer e to pla ce him f or adoption since she did not have the means to ta k e c ar e o f

h im – s h e w a s u n e mp lo y e d

an d li v in g w it

ha f r ie n d
. Wh il e L
. M
. C. r emained hospitaliz ed for

a we ek af

ter his birth due to a c left lip a nd pallet, M.C. made no attempts to gather ba sic ne c e ssi tie s f

or him su c h a s a c ri b, fo od , o r c lot he s. Af te r h is b ir th, M. C. s tay e d w ithfr ie nd s, moved without informing the Depa rtment , an d h ad no perma nent housing . She also lacke dtransportation a nd employ

ment. M.C. told her case worke rs that she was diag nosed with b i p o lar disorder a nd depre ssion, and that she had a ng er- manag ement issues. M.C. did not attend all of her thera py sessions and pare nting c lasses as r equeste d by the Depa rtment and fa iled to seek tre atment fr o m MHMR. M.C .’s par enting teac her te stified that althoug h M.C. was smart and indicated a willingness to cha

ng e, she la cked the ability to follow-throug h with actions. Fur t h er, beca use of L .M.C.’s cleft lip and pa llet, L .M.C. requires a s p ec i al bottle and consta nt attention, and nee ds
a d d i t i o n a l s u r g e r

y. H e a l s o h a s b r e a th i n g d i f f i c u l t i e s th a tr e qu i r e h i mt o t ak e m e d i c a t i o nb y a nebuliz er t wi ce a

day , and is allerg ic to most soaps and deter g ents. Given M.C.’s habits and lac k of stability , there is se rious question as to whether she could attend to her son’s hea lth. Theref

ore, afte r re viewingall the evidenc e in the re cord, w e find that M.C. de monstrated an ina bility to provide the child with a saf

e envir onment. See I

n re J.J.O. , 1 31 S.W. 3d

61 8, 63 0 ( Te x. Ap p. –F or t Wor th 20 04 , n o p e t.) (atte nd ingon ly ha lf of he r pare nti ng c la sse s, la c kin g ste a dy ho us ingand e mpl oy me nt,
an d m i s s i n g t h e o p p o rtu n i t y

f o r c o u n s e l i n g an d

a p s y c h o l o g i c a l e v a l u a t i o nd e m o n s tr a t e d i n a b i l i ty to provide child with safe environment); In re M .D.L.E. , No. 09-05-0514- CV, 2007 WL 685562, at *8 (Tex. App.–Be aumont Mar. 8, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (mental- health issues and la ck of stea dy employ ment and housing demonstrated ina bility to provide child with safe environment). I n light of the afor ementioned evidenc e, we hold that the rec ord conta ins sufficient evide nce to support the trial court’ s finding tha t M.C. constructively

abandoned her

child. SeeT EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 16 1. 00 1( 1) (N ); H.R. , 87 S.W .3d at 699 (holding evidenc e suff icient to support finding that mo the r c on str

uct iv ely aband on e d c hil d w he re mot he r f a ile d to fu lf

ill re qu ir e me nts of

c ourt
or de re d s e rv ic e pla

n to re g a in c us tody of c hil d a nd ra re ly vis ite d c hil d) ; P.R. , 994 S.W .2d at 416 (holding evidenc e suff

icient to support finding of constructive a

bandonment whe re mother visited the childre n only

sporadica lly , had an unsta ble employ

ment history , and no perma nent re sidency

),dis ap

pr ov e d on othe r g

ro un ds by J .F .C. , 96 S.W. 3d a t 26 7. B e c a us e we fi nd the re wa s b oth le g a lly and fa ctually

sufficie nt evidence to support t h e t ri al court’s f inding unde r Section 161.001(1) (N),
we ne ed n o t addre ss the other finding s of statutory acts or omission or commission under subpara g raphs (D), (E), or (O ). A.D. , 2 03 S.W. 3d a t 41 2; S.F. , 3 2 S. W.3 d at 32 0. We n owtur n to whether there was suff

icient evidenc e to support termination in the best intere st of the child.

Be st I nte re st o f th e Chi ld A statutory

act of omission or commi ssion must be couple d with a finding that termination
o f th e p ar e n t- c h il d r e lati o n s h ip is in th e b e s t inte r e s t o f th e child. T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 16 1. 00 1( 2) ; A.B. , 269 S.W .3d at 127. In revie wing the suffic iency of the e viden ce to support the
se c on d p ro ng , w e a

pp ly the no n- e xclu siv e fa c tor s f ound inHolley v . Adams , 544 S.W .2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976)
. Those fa ctors include: ( 1) the de sires of the c hild; (2) the emotional and phy sical nee ds of the c hild now and in the future ; (3) the e motional a nd phy sical dang er to the child now and in the futur e ; ( 4) the pa

re nta l a bil iti e s o f the ind ivi du a ls se e kin g c us tod y ; (5) the pla

ns fo r t he c hil d b y

the se ind ivi du a ls; (6 ) t

he sta bil ity of the ho me ; ( 7) the a c ts o r omi ssi on s of the pa re nt whic h ma

y ind ic a te that the exist ing pa

rent-c hild relationship i s n o t a p roper one; and ( 8) any

excuse for the acts or omissions of the pa

rent. Holley , 544 S.W .2d at 371-72. The Holley

fa ct o rs , h o we v er , ar e n o tex h au s t i v e, an d n o s i n gl e c o n s i d er at i o ni s co n tro l l i n g. A.B. , 269 S.W .3d at 126. Nor is a fac t f inder require d to consider a ll of them. Holley, 544 S.W .2d at 372. Undisputed evidenc e of just one fac tor may be sufficie nt to support a finding that termination is in the best interest of a child. C.H. , 89 S.W .3d at 27. But on the other hand, the prese nce of sca nt evidenc e re levant to ea ch Holley fac tor will not support a finding. Id .; A.B. , 269 S.W .3d at 126. The e vidence submitt ed showe d that M.C.’s pare nt-child relat i o n s h i p with her fir st two children w as terminate d based on a perc eived da

ng er to he r childre n. At that time, M.C. wasuncooper at i v e wi t h the Depa rtment and ve ry

resistant. And whe n the Depa rtment discussed the pla c e me nt o f h e r c hil dr e n a nd a sk e d M.C. to sig n a saf

e ty pla n a nd se e k p syc hiatr ic se rv ic e s, M. C. beca me violent, flipping ove r a ta ble and tossing a cha ir in the ca seworke r’s dire ction. Although the Depa rtm en tre co m m en d edt h at M
. C
. at t en d an ger m an age m en tco un s el i n g, and although M.C. beg an her c ounseling sessions, it was not known whether she completed the prog ram. M.C. ref used to seek the se rv ic e s at MH MR. M. C. w a s une mpl oy e d at th e tim e of L .M .C. ’s bir

th a nd la c ke d a sta ble re sid e nc e . B e c a

us e L .M.C. was born with a c left lip and pallet, he rema ined hospitaliz ed for a we ek. Dur ing that time, M. C. m a de no a tte mpt

to g a the r b asi c nec e ssi tie s f or L .M .C. lik e a

c ri b, fo od , o r c lot

he s. Neve rtheless, the D epar

tment prepa

red a family service plan and discusse d the plan with M.C., explaining the De partment’s e x pectations if M.C. hoped to be reunited w ith L .M.C. The servic e plan
re qu ir e d M .C. to p art ic ipate in i nd ivi du a l th e ra py , c on ta c t he r c a se wo rk e r o n a we e kly ba sis , participate in a psy cholog ical eva luation, ref rain from any ty

pe of abuse towa

rds childre n and lea

rn
a pp ro pr iate wa

y s o f p are nti ng , p art ic ipate in p are nti ngc la sse s, ob ta in a nd ma int a in a

pp ro pr iate ho us ingand

e mpl oy me nt, pa rt ic ipate in su

pe rv ise d vis itatio n, and dis c us s in t he ra py the pr ob le ms that require d the Depa

rtment’s interve ntion. M.C. i ndicated he r under standing of the plan. But M.C. o n ly a tt e n d e d thr e e th e r a p y s e s s io n s , an d th e c o un s e lo r “ n e v e r h e ar d f r o m he r ag ain.” And M.C. fa iled to s h ow for two of her e ight sc heduled pa

rentingclasses. M.C. did not
a tte nd me diatio n, no r d id s he stay in con ta c t w ithhe r c a se wo rk e r o n a we e kly ba sis . M .C. a lso
mov e d w ith out in fo rm in g the De pa rtme nt. F ur

the r, M. C. d id n ot r e g ula rl y vis it o r m a int a in signific ant contac t with L .M.C. She had no steady employ ment. And despite be ing inf ormed of her la c k o f c omp lia

nc e wi th t

he fa mil y pla n a nd the wi ll in gness of

the De pa rtme nt t o h e lp h e r w ith visitation and other servic es, M.C.’s habits did not chang e.M.C. was bipolar, depr essed, a nd lac k ed ange r-mana g ement. Althoug h M.C. ex cuses he r conduct based on her mental disability and plac es the blame for he r fa ilure to seek tr eatment f or her mental disability

on the Depa

rtment, nothing stopped M.C. from g oing to MHMR and attending he r thera py s es sions as reque sted by the Depa rtment, espec ially

when the D epar

tment offer ed her

the means to do so. Withre g ard t o L .M .C ., the e vid e nc e sh ow e d th a t he wa s b or n w itha c le ft lip and pa lle t. L .M.C. underw ent s urg ery to corr ect his clef t lip, and although the foster pa rents we re pr esent at the first surg ery , M.C. failed to show. L .M.C. also require s a spec ial bottle and constant attention, needs additional surg ery , has bre athing difficulties that require him to take medic ation by a nebulizer twice a day , and is allerg ic to most soaps and deter g ents. L .M.C.’s foster pa rents, with whom he bonde d with, a re able to me et his medical nee ds. The De partment’s pla n for L .M.C. was for a doption by the foster pa rents. L eig h L ewis, the guardia n ad litem, testified as to her belief that adopti o n by

the foster pa rents would provide L .M.C. with a safe a nd perma nent home and that the proposed a doption
wa s in L .M .C. ’s be st i nte re st. I n revie wing the evidenc e, we conclude that a rea sonable trier of fa ct could have formed a firm belief

or convic tion that termination was in the best intere st of the child. M. C
. did not pa rt ic ipate in t

he se rv ic e s o ff

e re d, sh ow e d v iol e nt b e havio r i n th e pa st , mad e la c klu ste r e ff or ts t o visit L .M.C., showed no emotions when she attended to L .M.C., did not s tay in contact with the Depa rtment, and did not maintain suitable housing or employ ment. L .M.C. bonded with hi s foster pare nts, and unlike M
. C
. , t h ey ar e ca pable of meetinghis medical nee ds. There fore , we f ind the evidenc e is both leg ally

and factually sufficie nt to support a finding t hat t ermination was in L .M.C.’s best interest. See A .B. , 269 S.W. 3d a t 129 (f ind ing e vid e nc e su ff

ic ie nt t o s up po rt

te rm inatio n in

be st interest of c hild when child bonded with foster fa mily and mother r efuse d to participate in service sof

fe re d, did no t stay in c on ta c t w iththe De pa rtme nt, mov e d f

re qu e ntl y , r e fu se d a c c e ss t o h e r h ome by the ca seworke r, cur sed at the caseworke r, and had not seen he r child since the Depa rtment took
c us tod y ); In re M

.R. , 243 S.W .3d 807, 820-22 (Te x . App.–Fo rt W o rt h 2007, no pet.) (f inding evidenc e suff

icient to support termination in best interest of c hildren whe n childre n bonded and fl ouri shed wi th foste r f

amil y , a nd mot he r d id n ot c omp le te a sp e c ts o f h e r s e rv ic e pla n, fa ile d to ob ta in h ou sin g or

e mpl oy me nt, ma de no e ff

or ts t o c ha ng e her beh avi or, ha d h e r p are nta l r ig hts terminated w ith her other c hildren, and c hildren we re e x posed to domestic violence ). Havingdeter

mined that the evidence was leg ally and fa ctually

sufficie nt to terminate M.C.’s pare ntal rig hts, we over

rule I ssue One. CONSTIT UTIONALITY OF SECTION 263.405 M
. C
. n ex t contends that S ections 263.405(b) and (i) of the Fa mily Code violate the due

pr oc e ss c la

us e and se pa ratio n- of -p ow e rs c la

us e . T ho se statut e s p ro vid e a s f oll ow s: (b) Not late r than the 15th da y afte r the date a f

inal order is signe d by the trial judg e, a par ty who intends to reque st a new trial or appe al the orde r must file with the trial c ourt : (1) a

reque st for a ne w trial; or (2) if a n appea l is sought, a statem en t of the point or points on which the pa rt y int e nd s to a

pp e a l.

. . . (i) The appellate court may not c onsider any issue that was not spe cifica lly prese nted to the trial court in a timely filed statement of

the points on which the par ty intends to a pp e a l or in a state me nt c omb ine d w itha mot ion fo r n e w tri a l. T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 2 6 3
. 4 0 5 (b ), (i ) ( Ve rn o n2 0 0 8 ). W e a d dre s s M
. C
. ’s d u e- p ro ce s s ch al l en ge fi rs t. Du e Pr oc essI n contendingthat Sections 263.405(b) and (i) viol ate the due-pr ocess clause, M.C. alleg es

that thos e se c tio ns are un c on sti tut ion a l on the ir fa c e and a s a pp lie d b e c a

us e the e xpe dit e d ti me ta

ble depr i v es h er a

ppellate c ounsel of mea

ningf ul reviewof the trial r ecor d. We turn to M.C.’s facial
un c on sti tut ion a l c ha lle ng e fi rs t. When addre ssing c onstitut ional challeng es, we beg in with the premise that a statute, whe n possible, must be interprete d in a manner that rende rs it constituti onal. FM Props. Ope rating Co.

v . Ci ty of A us tin , 2 2 S. W.3 d 8 68 , 8 73 (T e x. 20 00 ); In reS. N. , 287 S.W .3d 183, 193-94 (Te x . App.– Houston [ 1 4 t h Di s t.] 2009, no pet.). F acia l challeng es ar e the most difficult cha lleng es to mount be c a us e “ the c ha lle ng e r m

us t e sta bli shthat no set of

c ir c ums tanc e s e xists un de r whic h th e statut e will be valid.” Sa nti k

os v . S tate , 836 S.W .2d 631, 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). In other wor ds, a p art y r a i s i n g a

f a c i a l c h a l l e n g e m u s td e m o n s tr a t e th a t th e s t a tu t e a l w ays o p e r a t e s un c o n s t i tu t i o n a l l y. Ne e le yv . W est O ra nge -C

ov e Con so l. I

nd e p. Sc h. Di

st ., 176 S.W .3d 746, 8 1 4 n.94 (Tex. 2005); W ils on v . A nd

re ws , 10 S.W .3d 663, 670 (Tex. 1999). In revie wing a facial challeng e, we consider the statute as wr itten, rather than as it operates in prac tice. FM Pr op s. , 22 S.W .3d at 873. M.C. contends that appellate counsel, who is often diffe rent fr om trial counsel, may not have the tim e wi thi n fi ft e e n da

y s to c los e ly re vie w the tr ia l re c or d to de te rm ine wh e the r t he re are argua

ble points to present for r eview. See I n re E.A.R , 201 S.W .3d 813, 817 (Tex. App.–Waco 2006, no pet.) (Va nce, J., concurr ing) . Howeve r, just beca use a statute “ might operate unc onstitut ionally under
some conce ivable set of circ umstances is insufficie nt to render it wholly invalid . . . .” United States v. Salerno , 481 U. S. 7 39 , 7 45 , 1 07 S.Ct . 2 09 5, 21 00 , 9 5 L .E d. 2d 69 7 ( 19 87 ). Ins te a d, a

pa rt y
s ee king to invalidate a statute must establish that ever y application of the statute violates the constitution. Se e Noo tsi e, Lt d. v . W ill iam so n Co . A

pp ra isa l D ist ., 925 S.W .2d 659, 663 (Tex. 1996). Although a

ppellate c ounsel may

have little to no backgro u n d o n wh at occurre d at trial other tha ninformation obtained f rom trial counse l or the client, we cannot ag ree that these c ircumstance s automatically

result in deprivingpare nts whose par ental rig h t s have be en ter minated of their due

proce ss rig hts. I n this case, a ppellate c ounsel was pr omptly appointed and timely filed a stateme nt of points listing numerous g rounds for appea l. Fur ther, appellate counsel obtaine d and re viewed a transcr ipt of the proce eding s befor e he filed his statement of points. M.C. has not contende d there
area n y iss ue s a pp e llate c ouns e l w a s p re c lud e d f ro m r a isi ngbe c a

us e of the statut or

y tim e re str ic tio ns . Moreove r, consider , for e x ample, whe n appellate counsel is the s ame as trial counsel. In that situation counsel would be able to timely file a statement of points within 15 day s as he would have been a war e of a ll objections at trial that could be raised on appea l. Fur ther, in c ases wher e the r ecor d may be neede d to f

ile a statement of points, the Texas Supreme Court rec ently held that under

Texas R u l es o f C i v i l P r o c edu re 5 , a t ri al co urt m ay gra n ta p arty ’s m o t i o nt o ex t en d t i m e f o r f i l i n g a statement of points for a

ppeal unde r Section 263.405 whe n g ood cause is shown. Se e In reM.N. , 26 2 S. W.3 d 7 99 , 8 04 (T e x. 20 08 ); T EX . R. C IV . P
. 5. There fore , we c onclude that M.C. has not
e sta bli sh e d th a t Se c tio ns 26 3. 40 5( b) and (i ), by the ir te rm s, a lw ay s h a s and

a lw ay s w ill op e rate unconstitutionally
. See I

n re N.C.M. , 271 S.W .3d 327, 329 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2008, no pet.); In reS. N. , N o. 11 -0 8- 00 29 3- CV , — S.W. 3d —, 20 09 WL 22 09 86 3, a t *3 (T e x. Ap p. –E a stl and Jul. 23, 2009, no pet.) (not y et reported) ( case s rejec ting f acia l-unconstitutionality

argument to Section 26 3. 40 5) . Co ns e qu e ntl y , w e rej e c t M. C.’ s argume nt t hat Se c tio ns 26 3. 40 5( b) and (i ) a re fa c ia lly
un c on sti tut ion a l. A c l ai mt h at a s t at u t e i s u n co n s t i tu t i o n al as ap p l i e d i s a c l ai mth at th e s t at u t e, al th o u gh g ener ally constitutional, operates unc o nstitut ionally as to the cla imant beca

use of he r par

ticular circ umstances. Texas Boll W eev il Eradication Found. v . Lewellen , 9 5 2 S. W. 2 d 4 5 4 , 4 6 1 n . 5 ( T e x. 1997). I n an as-applied challeng e, the challeng er is only require d to demonstrate the statute operatesunconstitutionally when applied to her particular circ umstances. In re N.C.M. , 271 S.W .3d at 328-

29. I n this case, M.C. has not identified a ny appellate issues she was pr evente d from pursuing beca use of the restric tions in Section 263.405. Nor has she alleg ed she would have disc overe d more issues i f m o re t i m e h ad bee n allowed. We re cog nize that our sister courts have found Section 263.405 unconstitutional as applied in cases wher e appe llate counse l was not appointed until after the statement of points wa s d u e, and the Supreme Court rec ently held Section 263.405
un co n s t i t u t ional to the extent it preve nts a cha lleng er f rom raisingineffe ctive or e videntiary sufficie ncy

claims on appea l if those contentions wer e not first alleg ed in a state ment of points. See In re J .O.A. , 262 S.W .3d 7, 24 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 2008), rev’d on other grounds , 283 S.W .3d 336 (T e x. 20 09 ); In re S.K.A. , 236 S .W .3d 8 75 , 8 94 (T e x. Ap p. –T e xar ka na 20 07 , p e t. d e nie d) ; In re D.M. , 244 S.W .3d 397, 415 (Tex. App.–Waco 2007, no pet.) ( case s holding Sec tion 263.405
un c on sti tut ion a l a s a

pp lie d whe n ap pe lla

nt wa s n ot a

pp ointe d c ouns e l until a ft e r s tate me nt o f p oints
w a s due ); see also In reJ.O.A. , 283 S.W .3d 336, 339 (Tex. 2009) (conc luding that Sec tion 263.405(i) is unconstitutional to the extent it preve nts c laimants from ra ising inef fec tive assistance of counse l and insufficie ncy of the e vidence when those claims are not f irst r aised in a state ment of points). But those fa ctual sce narios ar e not bef ore us. B eca

use M.C. has not a lleg ed there wer e other complaints she would have raised but f or the re strictions of S ections 263.405(b) and (i), she has not de mon str a te d the statut e op e rate d to dep ri ve he r o f a ny du e -p ro c e ss r ig hts
. In re V.G. , No. 04-08- 00522-CV, 2009 WL2767040, at *15 (Tex. A pp.–San Antonio Aug . 31, 2009, no pet.) (me m. op.); In re T.D.M. , No. 12-07-00458- CV, 2008 WL 2122601, at *2 (Tex. App. –Ty ler May 21, 2008, no pe t.) (m e m. o p. ); In re J

.J. , No. 2-06-333-CV, 2008 WL 623633, at *1 (Te x . App.–For t Worth Mar. 6, 2008) (mem. op.) , pet. denied, 2 6 0 S
. W
. 3 d 4 6 1 (T ex . 2 0 0 8 ) ( ca s es re j ec t i n g as -ap p l i edch al l en geSe ct i o n 26 3
. 4 0 1 pe rt ai ns t o t he d i smi ss al of a sui t af f ect i ng t he p arent
- chi l d rel at i o nshi p f i l ed by t he 2 D e p a rtm e n t. T EX . F AM . C O D E A NN . § 2 6 3 .4 0 1 (V e rn o n 2 0 0 8 ). T h a t statu te re q u ire s the trial c o u rt to d ism iss a su it f i l ed by t h e D epa r t men t i f t h e s u i t h as be en pe n di n g f or on e y ea r a n d t h e cou r t h as n ot r en der ed a f i n al or der or g ra n te d a n e x te n sio n . Id
. at § 2 6 3
. 4 0 1 (a), (b). when a ppellant did not identify

how she wa s harmed by

application of Sec tion 263.405). Ha vin g de te rm ine d th a t M. C. f a ile d to de mon str a te Se c tio ns 26 3. 40 5( b) and (i ) a re fa c ia lly unconstitutional or unconstit utional as applied to her circ umstances, we overr

ule her second issue. Se pa ra tio n o

f P owe rs M.C.’s third i s s u e as k s us to hold S ection 263.405 unconstitutional as a violation of the separat i o n -of-powers c lause, in conjunc tion with our sist er c ourt’s dec ision in I n r e D

. W. , 249 S.W .3d 625 (Tex. App.–For t Worth), pet. denied, 260 S.W .3d 462 (Tex. 2008). In D

. W. , the cour t
was c oncer

ned with the constitutionality of Section 263.405(i) when that statute prohibited the c ourt from addr essing the trial cour t’s denial of a

ppellant’s motion to ex tend the dismissal deadline unde r Section 263.401. Id . at 6 3 2. Deter mining that appe llant properly prese rved he r objec tion under 2 Section 263.401 at trial but that she fa iled to include that issue in her state ment of points, the court found that the leg islature, by enac ting Sec tion 263.405(i), violated t he doctr ine of sepa ration of power s by

encr oachingon the judiciary ’s substantive power to reviewissues prese rved at trial but not included in a stateme nt of points. Id . at 632, 640. We need not re ach the co n s t i t u t ionality of Section 263.405 under the sepa ration-of -powe r
c la us e a s M. C. wh oll y fa ile d to sh ow ho w Se c tio n 26 3. 40 5( i) op e ra te d to d e pr ive he r o f t

he a bil ity to r aise c erta in challeng es on appe al. See V anDev ender v . W

oods , 222 S.W .3d 430, 432 (Tex. 2007) (noting that courts should r est decisions on non-constitutional grounds, if available , and not “wade int o a nc ill ary c on sti tut ion a l qu e sti on s” ); In re B.L.D. , 113 S.W .3d 340, 349 (Tex. 2003) (“A s a rule, we only decide constitutional questions when we c annot re solve issues on nonconstitutionalg ro un ds .” ); see also T EX . R. A PP . P
. 4 4 .1(a) (def ining ha rmful er ror in civil ca ses as e rror that pr ob a bly re su lte d in

an im pr op e r jud g me nt or that “pr ob a bly pr e ve nte d th e a

pp e lla nt f ro m pr op e rl y prese nting the c ase to the c ourt of appe als”). N owher e in M.C.’s brief doe s she identify any issues that w e have no t a lr e a dy

a dd re sse d w hic h w e re pr e se rv e d in the c ourt be low but no t r aise d h e re in be c a us e tho se iss ue s w e re no t in c lud e d in he r s tate me nt o f p oints. Se e, e .g ., W alk e r v . Te x as De pt. of Family and ProtectiveServic es , No. 01-07-00867- CV, — S.W .3d —, 2009 WL1688469, at *7, 12 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] J une 18, 2009, no pet.) (not y et re ported) ( ref using to re ach the
c on sti tut ion a lity

of Se c tio n 2 63 .4 05 un de r t

he du e -p ro c e ss c la

us e and se pa ratio n- of -p ow e rs c la

us e
a bs e nt a sh ow ing that the op e ratio n of the c ha lle ng e d statut e c a us e d a pp e lla nt h arm ); In re M

.M.F. , No . 2 -0 8- 01 4- CV , 2 00 8 WL 52 65 03 3, a t *7 (T e x. Ap p. –F or t Wor th D e c . 18, 20 08 , no p e t.) (m e m. op .) (r e fu sin g to a dd

re ss c on sti tut ion a lity of Se c tio n 2 63 .4 05 un de r t he se pa ratio n- of -p ow e rs c la

us e when ha rm complained- of – that he did not timely file a state ment of points – was moot since the trial court g rante d an extension to file a stat em en t of points and appe llant later filed his stateme nt of po int s) ; In re H.B

. , No. 2-06-102- CV, 2006 WL 3438193, at *2 (Te x . App.–For t Worth Nov. 30, 2006, no pet.) (me m. op. onre h ’g) (r ef u s i n g t o ad dre s s ap p el l an t ’s ar gu m en to ns ep ar at i o n -o f- p o we rs principle when trial court gra nted the re quested re lief and a ppellant fa iled to demonstrate ha rm). As such, an y o p in io n r e n d e r e d b y th is Co urt o n th e c o n s ti tuti o n a li ty o f Se c ti o n 2 6 3
. 4 0 5 un d er the separ ation-of- power s clause w ould addre ss only a hy pothetical injury

and ther efor e be a dvisory
. See Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex as Air Contr ol Bd. , 85 2 S. W.2 d 4 40 , 4 44 (T e x. 19 93 ) ( op ini on iss ue d in
c a se no t r ipe fo r r e vie w i s a dv iso ry be c a us e ra the r t ha n rem edy ingan a c tua l or

imm ine nt h arm , it
a dd re sse s o nly

a hy po the tic a l in

jur y ); Va le ro Re

fin ing -T e x . L.P. v . S

tate , 2 0 3 S. W. 3 d 5 5 6 , 5 6 3 ( T e x. App.–Houston [14th Dis t.] 2006, no pet.) (re jecting constitutional challeng e based on hy pothetical inj ur y and no tin ga pp e lla nt d id n ot b ri ngfo rt

h s uf fi cie nt r e c or d to sh owthe fa c ts s ur ro un din g hisconduct to support a c onstitut ional violation). This we ca n n o t d o. Texas Air Control Bd. , 852 S.W .2d at 444 (appe llate courts have no jur isdiction to render a dvisory opinions). Be cause M.C. has not shown how the statute operated in such a way to cause her ha

rm, we ove rrule he r third issue. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 4 4. 1( a ); In re K.D. , 202 S.W .3d 86 0 , 8 6 6 (T ex . App.–For t Worth 2006, no pet.) (r e fu sin g to a dd

re ss c on sti tut ion a lity

o f S e c t i o n 2 6 3
. 4 0 5 wh e n a

pp e lla nt s uf fe re d n o h arm

un de r R ule 44 .1 (a ) sin c e a

pp e llate c ourt wa s a

ble to re vie w m e ri ts o f a

pp e lla nt’ s p ur po rt e d is su e s) ; Lott v. Be

xar County Sheriff’s Dep’t , N o. 04 -9 7- 00 08 8- CV , 1 99 8 WL 63 52 84 , at *3 (T e x. App .– S an Ant on io Sept. 16, 1998, no pet.) (r efusingto r eac h the constitutionalit y of ce rtain civil servic e commission rule whe n appellant wa s not harmed unde r Texas Rule of Appe llate Proce dure 44.1( a))
. CO NC LU SION Having o v er ru l ed M.C.’s three issues, the trial cour t’s judgme nt terminating her pa renta l rig hts is affirmed.

GUADA LUPE RI VERA, J ustice October 28, 2009 B e f o r e C h e w , C
. J. , M c C l u r e , a n d R i v e r a , JJ.