United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

February 1997 CHEMICAL WEAPONS

AND MATERIEL

Key Factors Affecting

Disposal Costs and

Schedule

GAO/NSIAD-97-18

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-266135 

February 10, 1997

The Honorable Ted Stevens

Chairman

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd D. Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable John P. Murtha

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on National Security

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

This report describes the Department of Defense’s programs for destroying the U.S. stockpile of

chemical munitions and planning for the disposal of nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel.

The programs’ combined life-cycle cost estimate is $27.6 billion, which includes $12.4 billion for

the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program and $15.2 billion for the Nonstockpile Chemical

Materiel Program. This report provides an overall assessment of the programs’ cost and

schedule, alternatives for improving program effectiveness and efficiency, and actions the Army

has and is taking to improve the programs.

Should the Congress wish to consider changing the programs’ current path, this report

discusses several options for addressing the key factors affecting the programs. We are not

taking a position on the options or current approach, rather the options are presented in

context of the tradeoffs they present.

We prepared this report under our basic legislative responsibilities. We are providing it to you

because of your oversight responsibilities for chemical weapons disposal programs.
B-266135 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and the Army, the Director of

the Office of Management and Budget, and other interested parties. We will make copies

available to others upon request.

This report was prepared under the direction of David R. Warren, Director, Defense

Management Issues, who may be reached at (202) 512-8412 if you or your staff have any

questions. Other major contributors are listed in appendix VI.

Henry L. Hinton, Jr.

Assistant Comptroller General

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
B-266135 

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Executive Summary

Purpose Since 1985, the Army has spent $3.2 billion on its programs for destroying

the U.S. stockpile of chemical munitions and planning for the disposal of

nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel. Today, the programs are still in

the early stages of implementation and the Army estimates that

$24.4 billion more will be needed to complete them.1

 Since 1990, GAO has

issued a number of reports addressing opportunities to improve various

aspects of the disposal programs. Due to continuing congressional and

public interest about the progress and cost of the programs, GAO prepared

this report under its basic legislative responsibilities to provide an overall

assessment of the (1) programs’ cost and schedule, (2) alternatives for

improving program effectiveness and efficiency, and (3) actions the Army

has and is taking to improve the programs.

Background In 1985, the Congress passed Public Law 99-145 directing the Army to

destroy the U.S. stockpile of obsolete chemical agents and munitions. The

stockpile consists of rockets, bombs, projectiles, spray tanks, and bulk

containers, which contain nerve and mustard agents. It is stored at eight

sites in the continental United States and on Johnston Atoll in the Pacific

Ocean. To comply with congressional direction, the Army established the

Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program and developed a plan to incinerate

the agents and munitions on site in specially designed facilities.

Recognizing that the stockpile program did not include all chemical

warfare materiel requiring disposal, the Congress directed the Army in

1992 to plan for the disposal of materiel not included in the stockpile. This

materiel, some of which dates back as far as World War I, consists of

binary chemical weapons, miscellaneous chemical warfare materiel,

recovered chemical weapons, former production facilities, and buried

chemical warfare materiel.2

 In 1992, the Army established the

Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel Program to dispose of the materiel.

In 1993, the United States signed the U.N.-sponsored Chemical Weapons

Convention. In October 1996, the 65th nation ratified the convention

making the treaty effective on April 29, 1997.3

 If the U.S. Senate approves

1

The programs’ combined life-cycle cost estimate is $27.6 billion. This amount includes $12.4 billion for

the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program and $15.2 billion for the Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel

Program.

2

Binary weapons are formed from two nonlethal elements through a chemical reaction after the

munitions are fired or launched. The weapons were manufactured, stored, and transported with only

one of the chemical elements in the weapon. The second element was to be loaded into the weapon at

the battlefield.

3

The convention becomes effective 180 days after the 65th nation ratified the treaty.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Executive Summary

the convention, it could affect implementation of the disposal programs.4

Through ratification, the United States will agree to dispose of its

(1) unitary chemical weapons stockpile, binary chemical weapons,

recovered chemical weapons, and former chemical weapon production

facilities by April 29, 2007, and (2) miscellaneous chemical warfare

materiel by April 29, 2002. If a country is unable to maintain the

convention’s disposal schedule, the convention’s Organization for the

Prohibition of Chemical Weapons may grant a one-time extension of up to

5 years. Under the terms of the convention, chemical warfare materiel

buried before 1977 is exempt from disposal as long as it remains buried.

Should the United States choose to excavate the sites and remove the

chemical materiel, the provisions of the convention would apply. As of

December 1996, the Senate has not approved the convention. However,

the United States is still committed by public law to destroying its

chemical stockpile and related warfare materiel.

In prior reports, GAO expressed concern about the Army’s lack of progress

and the rising cost of the disposal programs. (See Related GAO Products.)

In 1991, GAO reported that continued problems in the program indicated

that increased costs and additional time to destroy the chemical stockpile

should be expected. GAO recommended that the Army determine whether

faster and less costly technologies were available to destroy the stockpile.5

In a 1995 report on the nonstockpile program, GAO concluded that the

Army’s plans for disposing of nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel

were not final and, as a result, its cost estimate was likely to change.6

 On

July 13, 1995, GAO testified that the Army had experienced significant cost

growth and delays in executing its stockpile disposal program and that

further cost growth and schedule slippages could occur.7

Results in Brief While there is general agreement about the need to destroy the chemical

stockpile and related materiel, progress has slowed due to the lack of

consensus among the Department of Defense (DOD) and affected states

and localities about the destruction method that should be used. As a

result, the cost and schedule for the disposal programs are uncertain.

4

Under the U.S. Constitution, treaties must be approved by a two-thirds majority of the Senate.

5

Chemical Weapons: Stockpile Destruction Cost Growth and Schedule Slippages Are Likely to

Continue (GAO/NSIAD-92-18, Nov. 20, 1991).

6

Chemical Weapons Disposal: Plans for Nonstockpile Chemical Warfare Materiel Can Be Improved

(GAO/NSIAD-95-55, Dec. 20, 1994).

7

Chemical Weapons Disposal: Issues Related to DOD’s Management (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-185, July 13,

1995).

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Executive Summary

However, they will cost more than the estimated $24.4 billion above

current expenditures and take longer than currently planned. The key

factors impacting the programs include public concerns over the safety of

incineration, compliance with environmental laws and regulations,

legislative requirements, and the introduction of alternative disposal

technologies.

The Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program cost and schedule are largely

driven by the degree to which states and local communities are in

agreement with the proposed disposal method at the remaining stockpile

sites. Based on program experience, reaching agreement has consistently

taken longer than the Army anticipated. For example, the Army has

consistently underestimated the time required to obtain environmental

permits for the disposal facilities. Furthermore, congressional direction in

the 1997 Authorization and Appropriations Acts to research and develop

alternative technologies to destroy assembled chemical munitions

indicates that there are continued public concerns about the proposed

disposal method. Until DOD and the affected states and localities reach

agreement on a disposal method for the remaining stockpile sites, the

Army will not be able to predict the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program

cost and schedule with any degree of accuracy. Moreover, many of the

problems experienced in the stockpile program are also likely to affect the

Army’s ability to implement the Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel Program.

For example, efforts to dispose of nonstockpile materiel are likely to be

driven by the need to obtain state and local approvals for destruction

methods. In addition, more time is needed for the Army to prove that its

proposed disposal method for the nonstockpile program will be safe and

effective and accepted by the affected states and localities.

Recognizing the difficulty of satisfactorily resolving the public concerns

associated with each individual disposal location, suggestions have been

made by members of the Congress, DOD officials, and others to change the

programs’ basic approach to destruction. However, the suggestions create

trade-offs for decisionmakers and would require changes in existing legal

requirements. These suggestions have included deferring plans for

additional disposal facilities until an acceptable alternative technology to

incineration is developed, consolidating disposal operations at a national

or regional sites, destroying selected nonstockpile chemical warfare

materiel in stockpile disposal facilities, establishing a centralized disposal

facility for nonstockpile materiel, and modifying existing laws and

regulations to standardize environmental requirements.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Executive Summary

Notwithstanding these overarching issues, DOD and the Army have taken

actions in response to congressional direction and GAO recommendations

to improve program management. In December 1994, DOD designated the

Army’s chemical demilitarization program, consisting of both stockpile

and nonstockpile munitions and materiel, as a major defense acquisition

program. The objectives of the designation were to stabilize the disposal

schedules, control costs, and provide more discipline and higher levels of

program oversight. In addition, the Army initiated actions to identify

options for reducing costs. Army officials have identified cost-reduction

initiatives, which are in various stages of assessment, that could

potentially reduce program costs by $673 million. However, the Army

cannot implement some of the more significant initiatives without the

cooperation and approval of state regulatory agencies.

Principal Findings

The Stockpile Program’s

Cost and Schedule Are

Uncertain, but Will Exceed

Current Estimates

The stockpile program will likely exceed its $12.4 billion estimate and take

longer than the legislative completion date of December 2004.8

 This is

because reaching agreement on site specific disposal methods has

consistently taken longer than the Army anticipated. Public concerns

about the safety of incineration have (1) resulted in additional

environmental requirements, (2) slowed the permitting of new

incinerators, and (3) required the Army to research disposal alternatives.

Since 1985, the Army’s cost estimate for the stockpile disposal program

has increased seven-fold, from an initial estimate of $1.7 billion to

$12.4 billion, and the planned completion date has been delayed from 1994

to 2004. Although the Army is committed to destroying the stockpile by the

legislatively imposed deadline of December 31, 2004, it is unlikely to meet

that date. Only two of the nine planned disposal facilities are built and

operating, 4 percent of the stockpile has been destroyed, and

environmental permitting issues at the individual sites continue to delay

construction of the remaining facilities. For example, since the Army

developed the most recent cost and schedule estimate in February 1996,

the plant construction schedule has slipped at Anniston, Alabama; Blue

Grass, Kentucky; Pine Bluff, Arkansas; Pueblo, Colorado; and Umatilla,

Oregon.

8

Approximately $1 billion of the estimated $12.4 billion is associated with the Chemical Stockpile

Emergency Preparedness Program.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Executive Summary

Predicting the disposal schedule for the various sites is difficult. According

to Army officials, this is partly due to the uncertainty of the time required

to satisfy changing environmental requirements. For example, although

based on federal requirements, individual state environmental

requirements differ and are occasionally changed. In addition, according

to the Army, the original scope of the health risk assessment to operate the

disposal facilities was not completely defined, the health assessment

requirements have changed, and the requirements currently vary from

state to state. According to DOD officials, states have modified the

requirements of their health risk assessments well into the process,

delaying the development of the final assessment document. According to

Environmental Protection Agency officials, the agency has issued several

guidance documents concerning health risk assessments and has tried to

keep the Army informed of the changes and updates in the guidance. In

addition, the Environmental Protection Agency has advised the Army to

meet with state officials early in the process to agree on the methodology

and standards to use in the development of the assessments.

Based on program experience, the Army’s 1996 schedule does not provide

sufficient time for the Army to complete the environmental approval

process.9

 For example, the schedule for the Anniston disposal facility

includes a grace period of a month for any slippage in the construction,

systemization, or operation to meet the legislative completion date of

December 31, 2004. Although the Army estimated that the permit would

have been issued by the end of September 1996, Alabama regulatory

officials expect the permit to be issued in June or July 1997—a slippage of

approximately 8 months in the schedule. The Army’s revised schedule

shows Alabama issuing the permit at the end of March 1997. Based on

current expectations, disposal operations at Anniston would extend to

mid-2005.

In the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act, the Congress directed DOD

to conduct an assessment of alternative technologies for the disposal of

assembled chemical munitions.10 The act also directed the Secretary of

Defense to report on the assessment by December 31, 1997. Similarly, the

1997 DOD Appropriations Act provided $40 million to conduct a pilot

9

Department of Defense’s Interim Status Assessment for the Chemical Demilitarization Program, DOD

(Apr. 15, 1996).

10In the 1993 National Defense Authorization Act, the Congress directed the Army to report on

potential technological alternatives to incineration. Consequently, in August 1994, the Army initiated a

program to investigate, develop, and support testing of alternative disposal technologies for the two

bulk-only stockpile sites—Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, and Newport Chemical Activity,

Indiana. This program is still in the development and testing phase.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Executive Summary

program to identify and demonstrate two or more alternatives to the

baseline incineration process for the disposal of assembled chemical

munitions. The act also prohibited DOD from obligating any funds for

constructing disposal facilities at Blue Grass, Kentucky, and Pueblo,

Colorado, until 180 days after the Secretary reports on the alternatives.

Although the prohibition applies only to Blue Grass and Pueblo, public

concerns about incineration may prompt state regulators at other

locations to delay their final decisions to permit incinerators until the

Secretary reports his findings.

According to Army officials, alternative technologies may not reduce costs

or shorten disposal operations but are likely to be acceptable to a larger

segment of the public than incineration. The Army is currently researching

technological alternatives to dispose of chemical agents at the two

bulk-only stockpile sites. It is also planning to develop a program to

respond to recent congressional direction to research alternative

technologies to dispose of assembled chemical munitions. According to

the National Research Council, the Army has successfully involved the

state and the public in its alternative technology project for the two

bulk-only stockpile sites, demonstrating the importance of public

involvement to the progress of a program.11 The development of

alternative disposal technologies for assembled chemical munitions

provides the Army the mechanism for encouraging public involvement and

establishing common objectives for the remaining disposal sites.

The Nonstockpile

Program’s Cost and

Schedule Are Also

Uncertain

The Army has spent $105.9 million and estimates that the nonstockpile

program could cost another $15.1 billion and take nearly 40 years to

complete. However, given the factors driving the program, it is uncertain

how long the program will take or cost. The program is driven by the

uncertainties surrounding buried chemical warfare materiel and unproven

disposal methods. Although Army officials are confident that the proposed

disposal systems will function as planned, the Army needs more time to

prove that the systems will safely and effectively destroy all nonstockpile

materiel and be accepted by the affected states and communities.

Environmental issues similar to those experienced in the stockpile

program are also likely to affect the Army’s ability to obtain the

environmental approvals and permits that virtually all nonstockpile

activities require.

11Public Involvement and the Army Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program, National Research Council

(Oct. 25, 1996).

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Executive Summary

The Army estimates that it can dispose of binary weapons, recovered

chemical weapons, former production facilities, and miscellaneous

chemical warfare materiel within the time frames established by the

Chemical Weapons Convention. Under the terms of the convention,

chemical warfare materiel buried before 1977 is exempt from disposal as

long as it remains buried. Although the Army estimates that buried

chemical materiel accounts for $14.5 billion (95 percent) of the

nonstockpile program cost, the Army is still exploring potential sites and

has little and often imprecise information about the type and amount of

materiel buried. The Army estimated that it will take until 2033 to identify,

recover, and dispose of buried nonstockpile materiel.

Also, additional time is needed for the Army to demonstrate that its mobile

disposal systems are safe and effective and will meet state environmental

requirements. The Army’s disposal concept is based on developing mobile

systems capable of moving from one location to the next where the

munitions are remotely detoxified and the waste is transported to a

commercial hazardous waste facility. Although the systems may operate in

a semi-fixed mode, they are scheduled to be available for mobile use at

recovered and burial sites after 1998. Whether the systems are allowed to

operate at a particular location will depend on the state regulatory agency

with authority over the disposal operations. In addition, public acceptance

or rejection of the mobile systems will affect their transportation plans

and disposal operations.

Alternatives to the

Programs’ Basic Approach

to Destruction

Recognizing the difficulty of resolving the public concerns associated with

each individual disposal location, suggestions have been made to change

the programs’ basic approach to destruction. For example, Members of the

Congress and officials from environmental groups and affected states and

counties have suggested deferring plans for additional disposal facilities

until an acceptable alternative technology to incineration is developed.

Congressional members have also suggested consolidating disposal

operations at a national or regional sites. In addition, officials of various

DOD organizations have suggested destroying selected nonstockpile

chemical warfare materiel in stockpile disposal facilities, establishing a

centralized disposal facility for nonstockpile materiel, and modifying

existing laws and regulations to standardize environmental requirements.

Deferring disposal operations may eliminate much of the public concern

that has influenced the current approach to destroying the chemical

stockpile because alternative technologies are likely to be acceptable to a

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Executive Summary

larger segment of the affected states and local communities than

incineration. However, given the current status of alternative technologies,

the cost and schedule would remain uncertain, and there would be a

corresponding increase in the risk of an accident from continued storage

of the munitions. Although the Army has been researching technological

alternatives to incineration for chemical agents stored in bulk containers,

only recently have research and testing demonstrated potentially effective

alternatives. Currently, there is no proven alternative technology to

incineration capable of safely and effectively destroying assembled

chemical munitions.

Consolidating disposal operations could reduce construction and

procurement costs, but the required transportation of chemical munitions

could be an insurmountable barrier. This option would extend the disposal

schedule and result in increased risk not only from storage but also from

handling and transportation. Although consolidating disposal operations

could reduce estimated facility construction and operation costs by as

much as $2.6 billion, the savings would be reduced by uncertain but

potentially significant transportation and emergency preparedness costs.

To help reduce costs, the Army would have to consolidate three or more

stockpile sites, develop less expensive transportation containers, and

control emergency response costs. In 1988, the Army and many in the

Congress rejected transporting the chemical stockpile weapons to a

national or regional disposal sites because of the increased risk to the

public and the environment from moving the munitions. DOD and Army

officials continue to be concerned about the safety of moving chemical

weapons and public opposition to transportation of the munitions has

grown since 1988.

Similarly, using the chemical stockpile facilities or a national disposal

facility to destroy nonstockpile chemical materiel has the potential for

reducing costs. Although selected nonstockpile items could be destroyed

in stockpile disposal facilities, the 1986 DOD Authorization Act, and

subsequent legislation, specifies that the chemical stockpile disposal

facilities may not be used for any purpose other than the disposal of

stockpile weapons. This legislative provision, in some cases, necessitates

that the Army implement separate disposal operations for nonstockpile

materiel along side of the stockpile facilities. In its 1995 implementation

plan, the Army suggested that the stockpile disposal facilities could be

used to process some nonstockpile weapons, depending on the location,

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Executive Summary

the type of chemical weapon or materiel, and condition.12 Another method

for destroying nonstockpile chemical materiel could be based on the use

of a central disposal facility with equipment designed specifically for

destroying nonstockpile materiel. Although a national disposal facility

could reduce program costs, the legislative restrictions on the

transportation of nonstockpile chemical material and the prevalent public

attitude that such a disposal facility should not be located in their vicinity

would be significant obstacles that would have to be resolved.

Modifying existing laws and regulations to standardize environmental

requirements could enhance both the stockpile and nonstockpile

programs’ stability and control costs. The current process of individual

states establishing their own environmental laws and requirements and the

prevalent public attitude that the Army’s disposal facilities should not be

located in their vicinity have been obstacles to the stockpile disposal

program and are also likely to affect the nonstockpile program. For

example, individual state environmental requirements differ and are

occasionally changed. As a result, there is no standard environmental

protocol and requirements for stockpile and nonstockpile disposal sites.

According to the Army, establishing standardized environmental

requirements for all disposal sites would enhance the programs’ stability.

However, efforts to modify existing laws and regulations to standardize

the environmental requirements for chemical weapons disposal would

likely be resisted by the affected states and localities, and environmental

organizations.

Steps Taken to Improve

the Disposal Programs

DOD and the Army have taken encouraging steps, some in response to GAO’s

recommendations, to improve their management and oversight of the

stockpile and nonstockpile programs. In December 1994, DOD designated

the Army’s chemical demilitarization program, consisting of both stockpile

and nonstockpile munitions and materiel, as a major defense acquisition

program. The objectives of the designation were to stabilize the disposal

schedules, control costs, and provide more discipline and higher levels of

program oversight. In response to recommendations by the National

Research Council and GAO, the Army initiated the Enhanced Stockpile

Surveillance Program in 1995 to improve its monitoring and inspection of

chemical munitions. On the basis of those activities, the Army estimates

that the stockpile will be reasonably stable through 2013.

12Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Program Implementation Plan, U.S. Army Program Manager for

Chemical Demilitarization (Aug. 1995).

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Executive Summary

The Army’s review of the stockpile disposal program has identified several

promising cost-reduction initiatives, but the Army cannot implement some

of the more significant initiatives without the cooperation and approval of

state regulatory agencies. Army officials estimated that the initial

cost-reduction initiatives, which are in various stages of assessment, could

potentially reduce program costs by $673 million. The Army plans to

submit its assessment of the initiatives to the Congress with its fiscal 

year 1998 budget request. It also plans to identify additional cost

reductions as the stockpile program progresses.

Matters for

Congressional

Consideration

As the Congress continues its oversight of the chemical stockpile and

nonstockpile disposal programs and considers modifications or

alternatives to the current approach, it may wish to include consideration

of the suggestions discussed in this report relating to the creation of

alternative technologies, consolidation of stockpile disposal operations,

utilization of stockpile facilities for nonstockpile items, centralization of

nonstockpile destruction, and standardization of environmental laws and

requirements.

Agency Comments DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report and they are

presented in appendix V. DOD stated that the draft accurately and fairly

characterized the current status of the disposal programs and generally

concurred with the suggestions of the draft report that changes in existing

legal requirements would be necessary to change the current path of the

disposal programs. DOD also concurred with GAO’s suggestions that should

the Congress decide to consider modifications or alternatives to the

current approach, it could consider the ones to establish a centralized

disposal facility for nonstockpile materiel and to modify existing laws and

regulations to standardize environmental requirements for chemical

weapons disposal. DOD recommended against consideration of the options

to defer incineration plans, consolidate disposal operations, and to use

stockpile facilities for destroying nonstockpile items.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Contents

Executive Summary 4

Chapter 1 

Introduction

16

The U.S. Chemical Warfare Materiel 16

Evolution of the Disposal Process 18

Management Structure of the Disposal Programs 21

International Efforts to Eliminate Chemical Agents and Weapons 22

Our Prior Concerns With the Army’s Disposal Programs 24

Chapter 2 

The Chemical

Stockpile Disposal

Program Will Require

More Time and Funds

Than Currently

Planned

25

The Army’s Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program 25

Program Delays Past 2004 Are Likely 28

Program Costs Will Likely Exceed 

$12.4 Billion

33

The Stockpile Should Be Stable Through 2013 33

Program Alternatives Generate Trade-offs 34

Chapter 3 

The Nonstockpile

Program Is Likely to

Be Affected by Issues

Similar to Those in

the Stockpile Program

40

The Army Is Far From Accomplishing Its Objectives 40

Recovery and Disposal of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel Will

Be Problematic

42

Environmental Laws and Requirements Govern Most

Nonstockpile Activities

45

The Army’s Mobile Disposal Systems Are Not Fully Developed 47

Opportunities for Cost and Schedule Reductions Are Limited 52

Chapter 4 

Conclusions, Matters

for Congressional

Consideration, and

Agency Comments

55

Conclusions 55

Matters for Congressional Consideration 56

Agency Comments 56

Appendixes Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 58

Appendix II: Appropriated, Obligated, and Disbursement Data for

Fiscal Years 1988 Through 1997

60

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Contents

Appendix III: Summary of Major Federal Environmental Laws

Affecting the Army’s Disposal Programs

62

Appendix IV: Chronology of the U.S. Chemical Demilitarization

Program

63

Appendix V: Comments From the Department of Defense 66

Appendix VI: Major Contributors to This Report 69

Related GAO Products 71

Tables Table 2.1: Slippage in the Army’s Estimated Dates for

Construction Permits at the Remaining Seven Disposal Sites

31

Table 2.2: The Army’s Initial Cost-Reduction Initiatives as of

August 1996

38

Table 3.1: Summary of Nonstockpile Program Activities 41

Table 3.2: Summary of the Nonstockpile Disposal Systems and

Estimated Operational Dates

47

Table II.1: Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program 60

Table II.2: Alternative Technologies and Approaches Project 60

Table II.3: Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Project 60

Table II.4: Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel Program 61

Figures Figure 1.1: Percent of Appropriated Funds by Category for Fiscal

Years 1988 through 1996

17

Figure 1.2: The Baseline Disassembly and High-Temperature

Incineration Process

20

Figure 2.1: The U.S. Stockpile of Chemical Agents and Munitions 26

Figure 2.2: Key Dates for the Chemical Stockpile Disposal

Program After January 2004

27

Figure 3.1: Potential Locations With Buried Chemical Warfare

Materiel

43

Figure 3.2: Conceptual Drawing of the Rapid Response System 49

Figure 3.3: Conceptual Drawing of the Munitions Management

Device-1

51

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Chapter 1 

Introduction

For nearly 80 years, the United States produced and stored chemical

weapons to deter other countries from using them against U.S. military

personnel. In 1985, the Congress directed the Department of Defense

(DOD) to destroy the U.S. stockpile of chemical munitions and establish a

management organization within the Army to be responsible for the

disposal programs. In 1992, the Congress directed the Army to plan for the

disposal of chemical warfare materiel not included in the stockpile. The

Army has spent nearly $3.2 billion on its efforts and estimates that it will

cost $24.4 billion and take nearly 40 years to dispose of the remaining

chemical stockpile weapons and nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel.

Although the Army is committed to destroying the chemical stockpile by

the legislatively imposed deadline of December 31, 2004, only two of the

nine planned disposal facilities are built and operating, 4 percent of the

stockpile and little of the nonstockpile materiel have been destroyed, and

environmental issues continue to delay the remaining facilities. Currently,

the Army has more than 30,000 tons of chemical agent stored at 9 sites and

an unknown amount potentially buried at 64 locations in the United States

and its territories.

The U.S. Chemical

Warfare Materiel

U.S. chemical warfare materiel is classified as either chemical stockpile or

nonstockpile materiel. Since World War I, the United States has

maintained a stockpile of chemical weapons and agents to deter the use of

chemical weapons against its troops. The stockpile consists of rockets,

bombs, projectiles, spray tanks, and bulk containers. Some munitions

contain nerve agents, which can disrupt the nervous system and lead to

loss of muscular control and death. Others contain a series of mustard

agents that blister the skin and can be lethal in large amounts.

Nonstockpile materiel consists of all other chemical warfare items,

including binary chemical weapons, miscellaneous chemical warfare

materiel, recovered chemical weapons, former production facilities, and

buried chemical warfare materiel.

Historically, DOD has placed a higher priority on the destruction of the

chemical stockpile because most nonstockpile items did not pose an

immediate hazard to the environment or public health. Potential threats to

the chemical stockpile include external events such as earthquakes,

airplane crashes, and tornadoes; and internal events such as spontaneous

leakage of chemical agents, accidents during normal handling and

maintenance activities, and self-ignition of propellant. Nonstockpile items,

such as binary weapons’ components, miscellaneous warfare materiel, and

recovered chemical weapons, were placed in storage and old chemical

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Chapter 1 

Introduction

production facilities were closed years ago. Although documentation

surveys, interviews, and site visits have been conducted, much of the

information concerning burial sites remains unknown. The priority for

destroying nonstockpile materiel has increased because of recent

accidental discoveries of buried materiel, congressional interest, and

international efforts to destroy chemical weapons.

The Army has spent nearly $3.2 billion on its efforts to destroy its chemical

stockpile weapons and nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel. (See 

app. II.) As shown in figure 1.1, more than half of the funds has been

appropriated for operations and maintenance activities, such as operating

salaries and utilities, and systems engineering and program management.

The balance has funded procurement of equipment, construction of

facilities, and research and development activities.

Figure 1.1: Percent of Appropriated

Funds by Category for Fiscal Years

1988 through 1996

52% • Operations and maintenance

13%•

Construction

•31%

Procurement

•

4%

Research and development

Source: Based on data from DOD’s Selected Acquisition Report dated December 31, 1995.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Evolution of the

Disposal Process

From 1917 through the 1960s, obsolete or unserviceable chemical warfare

agents and munitions were disposed of by open pit burning, land burial,

and ocean dumping. In 1969, an Army plan to dispose of chemical agents

and munitions at sea raised public concerns about the safety of

transporting chemical weapons from their storage sites to a port of

embarkation and about the potential effects of ocean dumping on the

environment. In June 1969, the National Academy of Sciences

recommended that ocean dumping be avoided and that public health and

environmental protection be emphasized. It suggested two alternatives to

ocean disposal: incineration of mustard agents and chemical neutralization

of nerve agents. In response, the Army stopped ocean dumping operations.1

(See chronology in app. IV.)

Use of Incineration and

Chemical Neutralization

During the 1970s, the Army destroyed obsolete chemical weapons

primarily by high-temperature incineration or by chemical neutralization.

The neutralization process involves altering the chemical, physical, and

toxicological properties of a chemical warfare agent to render it

ineffective for use as intended. In 1984, the National Research Council,

under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences, decided that

incineration was the more desirable disposal method. It concluded that the

neutralization process was more costly and produced larger quantities of

waste than incineration. In 1986, the Army submitted to the Congress a

plan to dispose of the chemical stockpile. Its plan considered the costs and

potential problems associated with three options: (1) transferring the

entire stockpile to one site for disposal, (2) transferring it to two regional

disposal sites, and (3) operating separate disposal facilities at each of the

storage locations. In 1988, the Army formally announced that on-site

incineration was its preferred disposal method. The Army and many in the

Congress rejected transporting the chemical stockpile weapons to a

national or regional disposal sites because of the increased risk to the

public and the environment from moving the munitions.

The Army’s Baseline

Incineration Process

A baseline incineration process uses a reverse-assembly procedure that

drains the chemical agent from the weapons and containers and takes

apart the weapons in the reverse order of assembly. (See fig. 1.2.) Once

disassembled, the chemical agent and weapon parts are incinerated in

separate furnaces and the gaseous and solid waste is treated. Liquid brine

resulting from the treatment of exhaust gases in the pollution abatement

1

The last chemical munitions ocean dump occurred in August 1970.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Chapter 1 

Introduction

system is dried to reduce the volume and transported to a commercial

hazardous waste management facility.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Figure 1.2: The Baseline Disassembly and High-Temperature Incineration Process

Chemical 

weapons such as 

this projectile are 

taken apart by 

machines in the 

reverse order of 

assembly.

The metal parts furnace 

decontaminates the 

metals, which may be 

sold as scrap. 

Other residual materials 

are shipped to a 

hazardous-waste 

landfill.

The liquid incinerator 

destroys the chemical 

agent and 

decontamination 

solutions.

The pollution-abatement 

system cools and 

"scrubs" exhaust gases, 

chemically neutralizes 

components, and 

removes pollutants.

Explosives and 

propellants are 

incinerated in the 

deactivation furnace.

The dunnage incinerator 

burns packing materials 

and wooden pallets.

Chemical Agent

Metal Body

Burster and

Supplementary

Charge

Projectile

Dunnage

Source: Based on data provided by the Army’s Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Potential Alternatives to

Incineration

In November 1991, because of public concern about the safety of

incineration, the Army requested the National Research Council to

evaluate potential technological alternatives to the baseline incineration

process. In the 1993 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 102-484), the

Congress directed the Army to use the National Research Council’s

evaluation and report on potential technological alternatives to

incineration.2

 The Congress also directed the Army to consider safety,

environmental protection, and cost-effectiveness when evaluating

alternative technologies. Consequently, in August 1994, the Army initiated

a more aggressive research and development program, called the

Alternative Technologies and Approaches Project, to investigate, develop,

and support testing of two technologies based on chemical neutralization

of chemical agents at the bulk-only stockpile sites—Aberdeen Proving

Ground, Maryland, and Newport Chemical Activity, Indiana. In addition,

three other technologies—molten metal pyrolysis, high-temperature

hydrogenation, and electrochemical oxidation—have been tested and are

undergoing further development by the commercial firms promoting them.

This research and development effort is conducted in conjunction with

activities to implement the baseline incineration program.

In the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 104-201), the

Congress directed DOD to conduct an assessment of alternative

technologies for the disposal of assembled chemical munitions. The

authorization act also directed the Secretary of Defense to report on this

assessment by December 31, 1997. Similarly, the 1997 DOD Appropriations

Act (P.L. 104-208) provided $40 million to conduct a pilot program to

identify and demonstrate two or more alternatives to the baseline

incineration process for the disposal of assembled chemical munitions.

The appropriations act also prohibited DOD from obligating any funds for

constructing disposal facilities at Blue Grass, Kentucky, and Pueblo,

Colorado, until 180 days after the Secretary reports on the alternatives.

Management

Structure of the

Disposal Programs

The Army was assigned responsibility for the chemical weapons stockpile

in 1981 when DOD designated the Army as its single manager for

ammunition. In March 1991, DOD directed that the Army be accountable for

the disposal of all chemical warfare material. The Assistant Secretary of

the Army (Research, Development and Acquisition), as the executive agent

for the chemical disposal programs, has oversight and policy authority for

the destruction of the chemical stockpile weapons and nonstockpile

2

U.S. Army’s Alternative Demilitarization Technology Report for Congress, Department of the Army

(Apr. 11, 1994).

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Chapter 1 

Introduction

materiel. The Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization is

responsible for implementing the disposal programs and ensuring the

maximum protection to the environment, the public, and personnel.

Because of increasing disposal costs and schedule slippage, changing

legislative and regulatory requirements, and growing public concern about

incineration, DOD designated the Army’s chemical demilitarization

program, consisting of both stockpile and nonstockpile munitions and

materiel, as a major defense acquisition program in December 1994. The

designation was intended to (1) stabilize the disposal schedule, (2) control

costs, and (3) provide more discipline and higher levels of program

oversight. As such, the Army has been required to

• develop a program cost and schedule baseline;

• prepare quarterly defense acquisition executive summaries, which are

intended to provide an early warning that the baseline may be exceeded;

and

• submit an annual selected acquisition report to the Congress, which

includes variances from the program baseline schedule and cost.

Other organizations within and separate from DOD contribute to the

programs. For example, at formerly used defense sites, the U.S. Army

Corps of Engineers has overall responsibility for site investigations,

planning, excavations, and environmental cleanups of burial sites. In

addition, the Department of Health and Human Services oversees public

health issues, the Department of Transportation advises DOD on

transportation issues, and the Environmental Protection Agency oversees

the environmental aspects of the programs.

International Efforts

to Eliminate Chemical

Agents and Weapons

The 1925 Geneva Protocol established the international norm against the

use of chemical weapons in combat, but did not prohibit the production or

deployment of chemical agents and munitions. In 1989 and 1990, the

United States and Russia entered into two bilateral agreements that

required sharing of data on their respective chemical stockpiles, provided

for visits to confirm the accuracy of the shared data, and would eliminate

chemical weapons production and most of their chemical weapons.

In 1993, the United States, Russia, and more than 150 nations signed the

U.N.-sponsored Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,

Production, Stockpiling and the Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their

Destruction, commonly referred to as the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
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Introduction

In October 1996, the 65th nation ratified the Chemical Weapons

Convention, making the convention effective on April 29, 1997.3

 However,

as of December 1996, the United States and Russia have not ratified the

convention. The group of ratifiers includes major industrial states such as

Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom

of Great Britain; and a wide geographical range of nations such as Algeria,

Argentina, Armenia, Belarus, Brazil, Czech Republic, Georgia, India,

Ireland, Latvia, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Oman, Poland, Romania,

Slovak Republic, South Africa, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uruguay.

Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, North Korea, Syria, and other countries, mainly

small island nations, have not yet signed the convention.

If the U.S. Senate approves the convention, it could affect implementation

of the disposal programs.4

 Through ratification, the United States will

agree to dispose of its (1) unitary chemical weapons stockpile, binary

chemical weapons, recovered chemical weapons, and former chemical

weapon production facilities by April 29, 2007, and (2) miscellaneous

chemical warfare materiel by April 29, 2002. If a country is unable to

maintain the convention’s disposal schedule, the convention’s

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons may grant a

one-time extension of up to 5 years. Under the terms of the convention,

chemical warfare materiel buried before 1977 is exempt from disposal as

long as it remains buried. Should the United States choose to excavate the

sites and remove the chemical materiel, the provisions of the convention

would apply. On November 30, 1993, the President submitted the

convention to the U.S. Senate for its approval. The Senate held hearings in

1994 and 1996, but has not approved the convention. However, the United

States is still committed by public law to destroying its chemical stockpile

and related warfare materiel.

Once Russia ratifies the convention, it will be committed to destroying its

chemical warfare stockpile by April 29, 2007, with a 5-year extension if

needed. However, Russia does not have an operational capability to

destroy large quantities of chemical weapons and would need to construct

several chemical weapons disposal facilities to meet the convention’s

requirement.5

3

The convention becomes effective 180 days after the 65th nation ratified the convention.

4

Under the U.S. Constitution, treaties must be approved by a two-thirds majority of the Senate.

5

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Status of Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (GAO/NSIAD-96-222,

Sept. 27, 1996).

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Our Prior Concerns

With the Army’s

Disposal Programs

Since 1990, we have issued a number of reports that focused on

interrelated issues involving cost and schedule estimates, performance,

environmental compliance, stability of chemical weapons, and alternative

disposal technologies. (See Related GAO Products.) For example:

• Chemical Weapons Disposal: Issues Related to DOD’s Management

(GAO/T-NSIAD-95-185, July 13, 1995). We reported that there was a possibility

of further cost growth and schedule slippage for the Chemical Stockpile

Disposal Program.

• Chemical Weapons: Stability of the U.S. Stockpile (GAO/NSIAD-95-67, Dec. 22,

1994). We reported that the Army lacked data to conclusively predict the

stability of stockpiled chemical weapons.

• Chemical Weapons Disposal: Plans for Nonstockpile Chemical Warfare

Materiel Can Be Improved (GAO/NSIAD-95-55, Dec. 20, 1994). We reported that

the Army’s plans for disposing of nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel

were not final and, as a result, its cost estimate was likely to change.

• Chemical Weapons Destruction: Advantages and Disadvantages of

Alternatives to Incineration (GAO/NSIAD-94-123, Mar. 18, 1994). We reported

that alternative disposal technologies identified as most likely to be

feasible for the chemical stockpile program were in the initial stages of

development and over a decade away from operation.

• Chemical Weapons: Stockpile Destruction Cost Growth and Schedule

Slippages Are Likely to Continue (GAO/NSIAD-92-18, Nov. 20, 1991). We

reported that continued problems in the chemical stockpile program

indicated that increased costs and additional time to destroy the chemical

stockpile should be expected. We recommended that the Army determine

whether faster and less costly technologies were available to destroy the

chemical stockpile.

Our objectives, scope, and methodology are described in appendix I.

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
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The Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program

Will Require More Time and Funds Than

Currently Planned

In 1985, the Congress directed the Army to destroy the U.S. stockpile of

chemical agents and munitions. To comply with congressional direction,

the Army established the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program and

developed a plan to incinerate the agents and munitions on site in

specially designed facilities. The Army has spent $2.6 billion and estimates

that the stockpile program could cost another $9.8 billion and take until

December 2004 to complete. However, the program will likely cost more

than estimated and continue past the estimated completion date. This is

because reaching agreement on site specific disposal methods has

consistently taken longer than the Army anticipated. Furthermore, recent

congressional direction in the 1997 Authorization and Appropriations Acts

to research and develop alternative technologies to destroy assembled

chemical munitions indicates that there is continued public concerns

about the incineration disposal method. Recognizing the difficulty of

satisfactorily resolving the public concerns associated with each

individual disposal location, suggestions have been made to change the

program’s basic approach to destruction. These have included developing

an acceptable alternative disposal technology to incineration and

consolidating disposal operations at a national or regional sites. Although

many suggestions offer some benefit, no one change is likely to materially

reduce costs, shorten the disposal schedule, and increase public

acceptance. They also generate other obstacles and issues that need to be

resolved to make them viable.

The Army’s Chemical

Stockpile Disposal

Program

In the DOD Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986 (P.L. 99-145), the

Congress mandated that the Army destroy the U.S. stockpile of obsolete

chemical agents and munitions, which are stored at eight sites in the

continental United States and on Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean. (See

fig. 2.1.) As of December 15, 1995, the stockpile consisted of 3.3 million

items.1

 The objectives of the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program are to

(1) destroy the stockpile of unitary chemical weapons and (2) provide for

the maximum protection of the environment, the public, and personnel

involved in the storage, handling, and disposal of the stockpile.

1

The chemical weapons stockpile information was declassified on January 9, 1996.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
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The Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program

Will Require More Time and Funds Than

Currently Planned

Figure 2.1: The U.S. Stockpile of Chemical Agents and Munitions

Umatilla Depot Activity,

Oregon

Number of items: 220,599

Tons of agent: 3,717

Johnston Atoll,

Pacific Ocean

Number of items: 292,121

 Tons of agent: 1,134 

Tooele Army Depot,

Utah

Number of items: 1,138,488

 Tons of agent: 13,616 

Pueblo Depot Activity,

Colorado

Number of items: 780,078 

 Tons of agent: 2,611 Hawaii

Blue Grass Army Depot,

Kentucky

 Number of items: 101,764

Tons of agent: 523

Pine Bluff Arsenal,

Arkansas

Number of items: 123,093

 Tons of agent: 3,850

Anniston Army Depot,

Alabama

Number of items: 661,529

 Tons of agent: 2,254

Aberdeen Proving Ground,

Maryland

Number of items: 1,818

 Tons of agent: 1,625

Newport Chemical Activity,

Indiana

Number of items: 1,690

 Tons of agent: 1,269

Note: As of December 15, 1995.

Source: DOD.

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Currently Planned

There are several key dates that congressional and defense

decisionmakers will consider as they determine future funding and

program direction for the stockpile program. (See fig. 2.2.) For example,

the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 

(P.L. 102-484) directed the Army to destroy the stockpile by December 31,

2004. If the United States ratifies the Chemical Weapons Convention, the

United States will agree to dispose of its unitary chemical weapons

stockpile by April 29, 2007, and the convention’s signatories may grant a

one-time extension of up to 5 years. In addition, on the basis of its

stockpile assessment and monitoring activities, the Army estimates that

the stockpile will be reasonably stable through 2013. However, according

to Army officials, most of the risk to chemical munitions in storage result

from external events such as earthquakes, airplane crashes, lightning

strikes, and tornadoes.

Figure 2.2: Key Dates for the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program After January 2004

December 31, 2004 April 29, 2007 April 29, 2012 2013 

Legislative

completion date

Chemical Weapons

Convention completion

date with a 5-year extension

Chemical Weapons

Convention 

completion date

Estimated safe

storage date

Source: Based on data provided by the Army’s Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
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The Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program

Will Require More Time and Funds Than

Currently Planned

The Army has taken encouraging steps, some in response to our

recommendations, to improve its management and oversight of the

Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program. In December 1994, DOD designated

the Army’s chemical demilitarization program, consisting of both stockpile

and nonstockpile munitions and materiel, as a major defense acquisition

program. The objectives of the designation were to stabilize the disposal

schedules, control costs, and provide more discipline and higher levels of

program oversight. In addition, in response to the National Research

Council’s and our recommendations, the Army initiated the Enhanced

Stockpile Surveillance Program in 1995 to improve its monitoring and

inspection of chemical munitions.

The Army has also expanded its public outreach activities to promote

dialogue between the Army and the public. For example, the Army has

established storefront information offices near some of the storage sites,

developed public outreach pamphlets and information videos, distributed

information to public libraries and locations, provided toll-free telephone

numbers, and conducted town meetings. However, the National Research

Council recently recommended that the Army increase substantially and

institutionalize public involvement throughout the Chemical Stockpile

Disposal Program.2

 The Council reported that the credibility of the Army

was low and that the treatment of public concerns had been inadequate. It

concluded that the Army’s public relations and outreach efforts to educate

the public about chemical stockpile activities by themselves will not be

enough to facilitate the safe and timely disposal of the stockpile. The

Council recommended that the Army expand its public affairs program to

ensure public involvement in the program, giving the affected

communities a participatory role and a sense of ownership in the

program’s decision-making process. According to the National Research

Council, the Army has successfully involved the state and the public in its

alternative technology project for the two bulk-only stockpile sites,

demonstrating the importance of public involvement to the progress of the

program.

Program Delays Past

2004 Are Likely

Although the Army is committed to destroying the stockpile by the

legislatively imposed deadline of December 31, 2004, its ability to meet

that date is questionable. The program cost and schedule are largely

driven by the degree to which states and local communities are in

agreement with the proposed disposal method. Historically, reaching

2

Public Involvement and the Army Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program, National Research Council

(Oct. 25, 1996).

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
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Will Require More Time and Funds Than

Currently Planned

agreement has consistently taken longer than the Army anticipated. Since

the Army began planning the destruction of the chemical weapon

stockpile in 1985, it has destroyed 4 percent of the stockpile, built and

operated two of nine proposed facilities, and the program has been

extended more than 10 years—from September 1994 to December 2004.

The Army plans to phase in the construction, systemization, and operation

of the remaining seven disposal facilities over the next 8 years. However,

environmental permits for the remaining facilities have already slipped by

3 years or more since April 1992. At the Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal

Facility, obtaining Utah’s approval to operate the facility took 17 months

longer than the Army estimated it would in 1992.

Obtaining Environmental

Permits Will Require More

Time Than the Army Has

Allowed

Before constructing or operating a chemical weapon destruction facility,

the Army must obtain permits to comply with federal, state, and local

environmental laws and regulations. The Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act, as amended, regulates the storage, treatment, and disposal

of most chemical weapons and materiel. (Environmental laws are

summarized in app. III.) The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

controls hazardous waste through a permit process that requires

government approval for individuals who generate, transport, store, or

dispose of hazardous waste. Under the act, the Environmental Protection

Agency may authorize individual states to administer and enforce

hazardous waste programs that are as least as stringent as the federal

program. The act also allows states to establish requirements more

stringent than federal standards. The Clean Air Act, as amended, governs

potential sources of air pollutants and establishes emission standards. The

Army must obtain permits for air pollution control prior to operating a

chemical stockpile disposal facility.

According to the Army’s 1994 risk assessment, there was a high possibility

states would use their authority under these laws to delay or prevent the

construction of incinerators in their states.3

 For example, states can place

restrictions on hazardous waste generators as well as the disposal of the

hazardous waste generated by the chemical agent incinerators, or prohibit

disposal of the waste within their jurisdictions. States may also simply

delay the permit review process for an inordinate amount of time. These

actions could increase the Army’s costs, cause it significant administrative

difficulties, or delay operations. To illustrate, before it will issue a permit

for a chemical stockpile disposal facility, Kentucky requires that

3

Programmatic Risk Assessment Final Report, U.S. Chemical Materiel Destruction Agency (Sept. 30,

1994).

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
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Will Require More Time and Funds Than

Currently Planned

information showing that no alternative disposal method, including, but

not limited to, neutralization and transportation, exists or could be

developed. Maryland and Indiana have also passed laws or adopted

regulations specific to the disposal of chemical agents within their

jurisdictions.

Although the Army’s 1994 risk assessment acknowledges the potential for

delays due to environmental regulations, its program schedule provides

little leeway for dealing with potential problems at the remaining stockpile

sites. For example, the Army’s 1996 schedule only allows for slippage

ranging from 1 to 6 months for delays in the permitting process,

construction, systemization, and operation of the proposed facilities at

Anniston, Pine Bluff, and Umatilla.4

 The schedule for the Anniston

Chemical Agent Disposal Facility shows that to destroy all of the chemical

munitions at Anniston by the end of December 2004, Alabama would have

to issue its permit to start construction no later than October 1996. Army

officials now estimate that the permit will be issued by March 31, 1997,

approximately 6 months later than scheduled. (See table 2.1.) Alabama

regulatory officials expect the permit to be issued in June or July 1997—a

slippage of approximately 8 months. Unless the Army can shorten

construction, systemization, or destruction time frames, disposal

operations at Anniston would extent to mid-2005.

4

Department of Defense’s Interim Status Assessment for the Chemical Demilitarization Program, DOD

(Apr. 15, 1996).

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
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Table 2.1: Slippage in the Army’s

Estimated Dates for Construction

Permits at the Remaining Seven

Disposal Sites

Estimated date of permit to start construction

Site

February 1996

schedulea

August 1996

scheduleb Slippage

Aberdeen Proving

Groundc

Before January 1,

1999

November 12, 1998 None

Anniston Army Depot Before October 1,

1996

March 31, 1997 6 months

Blue Grass Army

Depotd

Before January 1,

1998

September 20, 1998 None

Newport Chemical

Activityc

Before January 1,

2000

August 18, 1999 None

Pine Bluff Arsenal Before October 1,

1996

June 24, 1997 9 months

Pueblo Depot Activityd Before April 1, 1997 February 4, 1998 10 months

Umatilla Depot Activity Before October 1,

1996

January 30, 1997 4 months

aBased on DOD’s interim status assessment for the chemical demilitarization program dated

April 15, 1996.

bBased on data provided by the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization dated

September 27, 1996.

cSchedules are subject to change pending alternative technology decision for the bulk-only

stockpile sites.

dSchedules are on hold as the result of the 1997 DOD Appropriations Act requirement to research

alternative technologies.

The February 1996 schedule for the Pine Bluff Chemical Agent Disposal

Facility shows construction starting by the end of fiscal year 1996 and

provides a 6-month leeway to complete disposal operations by the end of

2004. Based on the Army’s current schedule for the environmental permits,

the start of construction in 1996 is no longer possible because the

schedule shows an issuance date of June 24, 1997—a slippage of 9 months.

This delay eliminated the 6-month leeway and operations now are likely to

continue past December 2004. The disposal schedule for the Umatilla

Chemical Agent Disposal Facility provides a leeway of 4 months. The

Army had expected Oregon to issue the Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act and Clean Air Act permits for the facility by the end of

September 1996. However, Army officials had estimated that the permits

would have been issued by January 30, 1997, approximately 4 months later

than scheduled. This delay eliminated the grace period for starting

disposal operations at Umatilla.

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According to Army officials, implementation of the health risk assessment

requirement has added another layer of uncertainty to the schedule. They

said that the original scope of the health risk assessment to operate the

disposal facilities was not completely defined, the health assessment

requirements have changed, and the requirements currently vary from

state to state. According to DOD officials, states have modified the

requirements of their health risk assessments well into the process,

delaying the development of the final assessment document. According to

Environmental Protection Agency officials, the agency has issued several

guidance documents concerning the health risk assessments over the last

5 years and has tried to keep the Army informed of the changes and

updates in the guidance. In addition, the agency has advised the Army to

meet with state officials early in the process to agree on the methodology

and standards to use in the development of the risk assessment.

Public Support for More

Research on Alternative

Disposal Technologies

Congressional direction in the 1997 Authorization and Appropriations Acts

to research and develop alternative technologies to destroy assembled

chemical munitions indicates that there is continued public concerns

about the proposed disposal method. In the 1997 Authorization Act, the

Congress directed DOD to conduct an assessment of alternative

technologies for the disposal of assembled chemical munitions. The act

also directed the Secretary of Defense to report on the assessment by

December 31, 1997. Similarly, the 1997 Appropriations Act provided

$40 million to conduct a pilot program to identify and demonstrate two or

more alternatives to the baseline incineration process for the disposal of

assembled chemical munitions. The act also prohibits DOD from obligating

any funds for constructing disposal facilities at Blue Grass, Kentucky, and

Pueblo, Colorado, until 180 days after the Secretary reports on the

alternatives.

According to Army officials, the construction and the procurement of

equipment for the disposal facilities at Blue Grass and Pueblo has been

placed on hold because of the 1997 Appropriations Act’s requirement to

research alternative technologies. If the report is not issued before

December 31, 1997, the Army cannot obligate construction funds for Blue

Grass and Pueblo until June 30, 1998. This would delay the planned award

of the construction contract at Blue Grass by 6 months and the planned

award of the construction contract at Pueblo by 15 months. According to

these officials, the Army and the states will continue to work together to

process the environmental permits. However, a recent Army schedule

shows Blue Grass disposal operations ending in June 2005, 6 months past

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
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Currently Planned

the mandated completion date. Although the prohibition applies only to

Blue Grass and Pueblo, public concerns about incineration may prompt

state regulators at other locations to delay their final decisions to permit

incinerators until the Secretary reports his findings.

Program Costs Will

Likely Exceed 

$12.4 Billion

The Army has spent $2.6 billion and estimates that the stockpile program

could cost another $9.8 billion to complete. Since 1985, the Army’s cost

estimate for the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program has increased

seven-fold, from an initial estimate of $1.7 billion to $12.4 billion.5

 Reasons

for the cost increases include (1) program enhancements to respond to

concerns for maximizing the safety of the public and environment,

(2) delays in completing the operational verification tests at the Johnston

Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System, (3) technical problems resulting in

lower than expected disposal rates, (4) additional legislative requirements,

and (5) implementation of the National Research Council’s

recommendations.

The Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program will likely cost more than the

estimated $9.8 billion above current expenditures to complete because of

the schedule slippages since February 1996 and the additional costs to

research alternative disposal technologies. Schedule delays, such as those

previously discussed at Anniston, Blue Grass, Pine Bluff, Pueblo, and

Umatilla, will increase program cost at these locations. These delays

increase direct costs, including personnel, storage, emergency

preparedness, and program management at each disposal site. In addition,

the Congress appropriated the Army $40 million in fiscal year 1997 to

conduct a pilot program to identify and demonstrate two or more

alternatives to the baseline incineration process for the disposal of

assembled chemical munitions. This appropriation was not included in the

Army’s cost estimate.

The Stockpile Should

Be Stable Through

2013

On the basis of its stockpile assessment and monitoring programs, the

Army estimates that the stockpile will be reasonably stable through 2013.

Although continued storage of the M55 rockets is a concern, the Army will

continue to monitor the stockpile until it is destroyed and has developed a

contingency plan to deal with the M55 rockets, which pose a risk.

According to Army officials, most of the risk to chemical munitions in

5

Approximately $1 billion of the estimated $12.4 billion is associated with the Chemical Stockpile

Emergency Preparedness Program.

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storage result from external events such as earthquakes, airplane crashes,

lightning strikes, and tornadoes.

In December 1994, we reported that the Army’s assessment that the

chemical stockpile could be safely stored until the legislatively imposed

deadline of December 31, 2004, was subject to question based on the

nature of the supporting information.6

 The data on which the Army based

its assessment were old and may no longer represent the chemical

weapons in storage. For example, at that time, field samples of the M55

rocket propellant had not been taken since 1989. Also, the assessment did

not include an analysis of leaking munitions. Leaks increase the risk of

auto-ignition during handling, which could lead to fires and potential

explosions in the stockpile storage area. In addition, a contingency plan

for disposal of the rockets was needed because they cannot readily be

reconfigured to remove their propellant. Propellant is inherently unstable

and must be stabilized to help prevent reactions that could lead to a

spontaneous ignition. Manufacturers added stabilizing compounds, but

they deteriorate over time.

Recent Army initiatives to obtain better information to predict the safe

storage life of the stockpile, including the M55 rockets, are encouraging.

For example, the Army initiated an Enhanced Stockpile Assessment

Program to determine the effects of an agent on a propellant, identify the

most appropriate predictive methodology, develop sampling plans, and

perform periodic assessments. In 1995, the Army completed a

reassessment of the stability of the M55 rockets and concluded that the

likelihood of propellent ignition through 2013 was negligible. However,

data were obtained from leaker rockets on Johnston Atoll that were

consistent with the theory that exposure to agent accelerates the

degradation of the propellent stabilizer. Gaining a better understanding of

this chemical process and its impact on the rockets’ stability will be a

major thrust of the Army’s stockpile assessment activities in 1997.

Program Alternatives

Generate Trade-offs

The concern about incineration and the cost and progress of the disposal

programs have led to suggestions for alternative technologies, the

transportation of agents and munitions to a national or regional site, and

other measures to improve efficiency and effectiveness. Two widely

discussed suggestions are (1) changing the planned disposal technology to

something other than incineration or (2) transporting the weapons to a

regional or national site rather than building local disposal sites. Although

6

Chemical Weapons: Stability of the U.S. Stockpile (GAO/NSIAD-95-67, Dec. 22, 1994).

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changing the technology could improve public acceptance and using

national and regional sites could save money, these changes raise other

issues that present trade-offs for decisionmakers. Thus far, these

trade-offs have not been acceptable to one or more of the parties involved

in the program. In addition, the Army is developing other measures to

improve program effectiveness and efficiency.

Alternative Technologies

May Not Reduce Costs or

Shorten Disposal

Operations

Since 1994, the Army has been researching five technological alternatives

for destroying chemical agents stored in bulk containers. The results are

promising but, according to the Army, the alternative technologies are not

likely to significantly affect the program’s overall cost or duration.

Additionally, any alternative, including neutralization, will have its own set

of problems such as hazardous waste disposal and the possibility of leaks

or accidents.

In August 1994, the Army initiated a research and development project to

investigate, develop, and support testing of two technologies based on

chemical neutralization of chemical agents at the bulk-only stockpile

sites—Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, and Newport Chemical

Activity, Indiana. A neutralization process involves altering the chemical,

physical, and toxicological properties of a chemical warfare agent to

render it ineffective for use. In addition, three other technologies—molten

metal pyrolysis, high-temperature hydrogenation, and electrochemical

oxidation—have been tested and are undergoing further development by

the commercial firms promoting them. DOD will decide in 1997 whether to

construct pilot facilities to further demonstrate the alternative

technologies. The Army also will continue laboratory and bench-scale

testing of disposal technologies in support of the program. This research

and development effort is conducted in conjunction with activities to

implement the baseline incineration program.

Transportation Could

Reduce Costs, but There

Are Some Trade-offs

Concerns about the cost and progress of the Chemical Stockpile Disposal

Program have generated interest about moving chemical stockpile

weapons to a national or regional site to improve the program’s

effectiveness and efficiency. However, the Army is prohibited from

transporting stockpile weapons to any of the eight storage sites in the

continental United States by a general provision in DOD’s annual

appropriations act. This provision prohibits the Army from using funds to

prepare studies on the feasibility of transporting chemical weapons.

Transportation options offer some cost benefits, but they also increase the

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risk to the general public and are likely to be opposed by most affected

states and communities.

Although transporting chemical weapons has the potential to reduce

construction and procurement costs by as much as $2.6 billion, the

reduction could be offset by shipping and emergency preparedness costs.

The potential savings come from reducing the number of disposal facilities

that must be built. According to the Army estimates, construction and

procurement of a disposal facility and related equipment cost from

$243 million for a small facility that will handle only bulk agent such as

Newport, to $471 million for a large facility that will process all types of

explosively configured munitions such as Umatilla. The reduction in costs

is offset by increased storage, emergency preparedness, and program

management costs from extending disposal operations at the consolidated

sites. Using existing disposal rates, a national destruction facility at Tooele

could extend the program to 2017 and add as much as 770 months of

storage, emergency preparedness, and management costs to the program.

Similarly, regional disposal sites at Anniston and Tooele could extend the

program to 2010 and add as much as 320 months of storage, emergency

preparedness, and management costs.

In addition, potential savings would be offset by large transportation costs.

In 1987, an Army transportation panel recommended that, prior to

transporting any agent or munitions, the Army develop a shipping

container that (1) provides redundant protection against agent release

during normal transport, (2) prevents agent release in most transportation

accidents, (3) is compatible with standard cargo handling and transport

equipment, and (4) has the capability for automated agent and

temperature monitoring within the transport container. In 1987, the

Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization estimated that 400

containers would cost $96.4 million.7

 An Army official who developed the

on-site transportation containers estimated that the containers would cost

significantly more and could cost as much as $2 million for each container.

In addition, the Army’s transportation concept plan found that using the

rail system would require 70 to 75 rail shipments to a national disposal

site, each consisting of a convoy of 136 railcars. Shipping by truck to a

national disposal site would require 820 convoys, and airlifting would

require several thousand sorties using C-141 aircraft. According to an

Army study, transporting the Blue Grass stockpile would take 1,200 to

1,500 flights. Further, airfields capable of handling large aircraft would

7

Conceptual Design of a Chemical Munitions Transport Packaging System, Program Manager for

Chemical Demilitarization (Aug. 1987).

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have to be constructed. Costs for these transportation alternatives have

not been estimated. However, we reported that moving more than 100,000

U.S. chemical-filled munitions from West Germany to Johnston Atoll in

1990 cost $61.6 million, including $13.6 million for shipping containers.8

The Army shipped the munitions in sealed steel boxes called secondary

steel containers, which were loaded into shipping containers.

Another significant cost element could be emergency preparedness along

the transportation corridor. Proposed rail routes to a national destruction

center total approximately 13,000 miles and pass through 20 states. Rail

routes to regional destruction sites total approximately 7,100 miles and

pass through 16 states. In its response to the Army’s 1987 Final

Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, the Department of Health

and Human Services stated that the difficulties in preparing adequate

contingency plans for a transportation alternative are staggering and that

resources to cope with a worst case scenario in a consistent manner could

never be mobilized. The Department reported that while it might be

possible to provide hospitals near the eight existing storage sites with

enough respirator equipment to support a number of casualties, it would

be difficult to supply all communities along a transportation route. Few

communities along the transportation routes would have the necessary

equipment available to them without federal assistance.

Any movement of chemical weapons or material could be opposed by

federal agencies and the affected states and localities. Before the Army

can transport a chemical weapon, it must (1) coordinate efforts with the

Department of Health and Human Services and must adopt any

precautionary measures that it recommends, (2) meet all regulations

imposed by the Department of Transportation, and (3) obtain permits from

the receiving state and potentially from each state traveled through.

Although the departments of Health and Human Services or

Transportation have not formally opposed transportation, both have

expressed strong reservations about transportation alternatives. In 1988,

13 states provided written comments on the Army’s Final Programmatic

Environmental Impact Statement. Twelve of the states opposed

transporting the chemical weapons, including 7 of the 8 states where

chemical weapons are stored, and endorsed an on-site disposal option.

Only Kentucky wanted the Army to transport its agents and munitions

elsewhere. Utah has gone on record opposing receipt of chemical weapons

from other states.

8

Chemical Warfare: DOD’s Effort to Remove U.S. Chemical Weapons From Germany

(GAO/NSIAD-91-105, Feb. 13, 1991).

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The Army’s Cost-Reduction

Initiatives

Environmental permitting is the most likely area to affect the disposal

schedule for the stockpile program. According to its 1994 risk assessment,

the Army concluded that high-level involvement, possibly from the

Congress or the White House, was needed in the environmental permitting

process to overcome opposition from state regulators. In 1996, DOD

assembled an environmental management team comprised of federal and

state officials to track new and revised environmental requirements to

maintain the current disposal schedule and ensure compliance. In

addition, the Army is reviewing whether the number of trial burns and

time necessary to gain state approval to initiate disposal operations can be

reduced.

The Army is also reviewing the stockpile program’s contracting structure,

disposal operations, and incineration process to identify potential

cost-reduction initiatives. As a result, Army officials have already

identified some cost-reduction initiatives, which are in various stages of

assessment, that could potentially reduce program costs by $673 million.

(See table 2.2.) They also plan to identify additional cost reductions as the

program progresses.

Table 2.2: The Army’s Initial

Cost-Reduction Initiatives as of

August 1996

Dollars in millions

Category Confidencea

Estimated

savings

Reduction in consumables High $50

Engineering improvements in the pollution

abatement filter system

High 55

Removal of the pollution abatement filter

system at Tooele

High 95

Removal of the pollution abatement filter

system at Aberdeen and Newport

Medium to high 85

Elimination of the dunnage furnaces Medium 10

Elimination of the pollution abatement filter

system at Anniston and Umatilla

Low to medium 145

Improved disposal rates for projectiles Medium 160

Elimination of the pollution abatement filter

system at Pine Bluff

Low to medium 73

Total $673

aIndicates the Army’s level of confidence that the initiative will be implemented.

The Army cannot implement some of the more significant cost-reduction

initiatives without the cooperation and approval of state regulatory

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agencies. Regulatory requirements connect the initiatives to the National

Environmental Policy Act process and the Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act and Clean Air Act permitting processes. The Army plans to

submit its assessment of the initiatives to the Congress with its fiscal

year 1998 budget request.

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Recognizing that the stockpile disposal program did not include all

chemical warfare materiel that requires destruction, the Congress directed

the Army to plan for the disposal of nonstockpile chemical warfare

materiel. The Army has spent $105.9 million and estimates that the

nonstockpile program could cost another $15.1 billion and take nearly

40 years to complete. However, given the factors driving the nonstockpile

program, it is uncertain how long the program will take or cost. For

example, the program is driven by uncertainties surrounding buried

chemical warfare materiel, environmental requirements, and disposal

methods. The Army has limited and often imprecise information about the

nature and extent of buried chemical materiel, which accounts for

$14.5 billion (95 percent) of the program cost. Environmental issues

similar to those experienced in the stockpile program are also likely to

affect the Army’s ability to obtain the environmental approvals and

permits that virtually all nonstockpile activities require. In addition, the

Army’s disposal concept is not yet fully developed and the Army has not

proven that its proposed process can safely and effectively destroy all

nonstockpile materiel and will be accepted by the affected states and

localities. The nonstockpile program offers some savings opportunities;

however, these opportunities create obstacles and issues that would have

to be resolved.

The Army Is Far From

Accomplishing Its

Objectives

Although the Army has made some progress in defining the scope of the

program and removing nonstockpile materiel from some locations, more

work is required. The Army’s objectives for the nonstockpile program are

to (1) develop and implement disposal schedules and cost estimates;

(2) determine the magnitude of the nonstockpile chemical problem in

terms of locations, qualities, and types of agents and materiel; and

(3) develop implement transportation and disposal procedures. The Army

plans to continue to refine the cost and schedule estimates as the program

matures, collect information on the magnitude of nonstockpile materiel,

research disposal technologies, and develop disposal plans.

The Army has spent $105.9 million and estimates that it will cost another

$15.1 billion to dispose of its nonstockpile materiel. The Army’s cost

estimate is considered a “rough order of magnitude” estimate, typically

used when a program is not fully developed. According to the Army, it will

issue a revised cost estimate in 1997. To date, nonstockpile materiel has

been disposed of on a limited basis, such as the emergency disposal of

dangerous items. (See table 3.1.)

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Table 3.1: Summary of Nonstockpile

Program Activities Category Activity

Binary chemical

weapons

Some of the key chemical components have been destroyed

and advance planning has been completed.

Miscellaneous

chemical warfare

materiel

The Army’s BZ agent, an incapacitating agent, and bomb

bursters have been destroyed.

Empty ton containers at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Colorado,

have been shipped to Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, for smelting.

Recovered chemical

warfare materiel

Using isotopic neutron spectroscopy and enhanced X-ray

systems, the Army has evaluated and inventoried recovered

chemical materiel.

The Army discovered that some previously classified recovered

chemical materiel did not contain chemical agents and

transferred them to the appropriate agency for use or disposal.

Some recovered chemical weapons considered dangerous

were destroyed.

Former chemical

weapons production

facilities

A contract was awarded in 1994 to assess requirements,

develop technical alternatives, and prepare a statement of work

for the disposal of the former production facility in Indiana.

Rocky Mountain Arsenal facilities are in the process of

remediation. Lessons learned from this effort form the basis for

the disposal method and cost estimate for the remaining three

sites.

Buried chemical

warfare materiel

On the basis of documentation surveys, site visits, and

interviews, the Army has developed a database on potential

burial sites.

In June 1995, the Army contracted for the recovery,

transportation, storage, and disposal of chemical materiel

discovered at small burial sites.

The Army has completed remediation of the Spring Valley site,

Washington, D.C.; Forts Richardson and Wainwright, Alaska;

Jackson, Mississippi; and Defense Distribution Depot, Ogden,

Utah.

Remediation activities at small burial sites at the former Raritan

Arsenal, New Jersey, and former Fort Segarra, U.S. Virgin

Islands, are in process.

The Army has initiated remediation actions at large burial sites

at Aberdeen Proving Ground and Rocky Mountain Arsenal.

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Recovery and

Disposal of Buried

Chemical Warfare

Materiel Will Be

Problematic

Although the Army has good information about most nonstockpile

materiel, it has limited and often imprecise information about the nature

and extent of buried items. The Army estimates that it can dispose of

binary weapons, recovered chemical weapons, former production

facilities, and miscellaneous chemical warfare materiel by the time frames

established by the Chemical Weapons Convention. Under the terms of the

convention, chemical warfare materiel buried before 1977 is exempt from

disposal as long as it remains buried. The Army is still exploring potential

sites and has little and often imprecise information about the type and

amount of materiel buried. This lack of data can critically affect the

successful implementation of the program, because recovering and

disposing of buried materiel accounts for 95 percent of the program cost.

Buried Chemical Warfare

Materiel Accounts for 

95 Percent of Program

Cost

The Army estimates that the disposal of buried chemical materiel will cost

$14.5 billion and be completed in 2033. Burial was a common disposal

method for chemical warfare materiel until the late 1950s and considered

to be the final disposal act. As a result, little record-keeping was done for

burial activities and additional chemical burial sites are likely to be

discovered. Based on its preliminary analyses, the Army has identified

potential buried chemical warfare materiel at 64 locations in 31 states and

the U.S. Virgin Islands that may require further investigation or

remediation actions. (See fig. 3.1.) Of these locations, 40 are active military

installations and 24 are located on formerly used defense sites, which DOD

no longer controls. Some locations have multiple sites and include one or

more burial pits, weapon ranges, or chemical test sites.

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Figure 3.1: Potential Locations With Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel

Virgin Islands -six potential locations.

Locations with potential buried chemical warfare materiel that may require remediation

Source: Based on 1996 data provided by the Army’s Project Manager for Nonstockpile Chemical

Materiel.

Even at well-documented sites, the actual amount, chemical agent,

condition, and type of buried materiel will remain relatively unknown

prior to excavation and visual identification. For example, in 1995 a

chlorine-filled projectile was discovered at Fort Lewis, Washington, and

more than 260 vials of chemical agent were found buried under the

Mississippi State Fairgrounds in Jackson. The Army moved the vials to

Pine Bluff Arsenal, where they remain in storage waiting disposal.

In some locations, chemical materiel was expected to be found but was

not. For example, a 3-day excavation in 1995 at Fort Wainwright, Alaska,

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uncovered no buried chemical materiel, despite evidence of a burial in the

area. The Army’s 1993 Survey and Analysis Report indicated that up to 

30 cylinders of mustard agent may have been buried in the area.1

Subsequent ground-penetrating radar also indicated the potential for

buried materiel. Upon excavation, the Army discovered the objects

detected by the radar were pockets of groundwater sitting on bedrock.

The water created an electrical condition that produced the unexplained

reading.

Other Nonstockpile

Materiel Has Been Easier

to Locate, but Still Difficult

to Destroy

Over the years, the Army has located and inventoried nonstockpile

materiel that has not been buried. Nevertheless, this materiel, which may

include energetics and partially deteriorated weapons, will still be difficult

to destroy.2

Binary Chemical Weapons The locations and quantities of binary chemical weapons are

well-documented. Binary chemical weapons are formed from two

nonlethal elements (called precursors) through a chemical reaction after

the munitions are fired. Binary weapons were manufactured, stored, and

transported with only one of the chemical elements in the weapon. The

second element was to be loaded into the weapon only at the battlefield.

As of October 1996, the precursors for the binary chemical weapons are

stored at Aberdeen, Pine Bluff, Tooele, and Umatilla.

Miscellaneous Chemical

Warfare Materiel

The Army has documented the location, configuration, quantity, and type

of miscellaneous chemical warfare materiel to be destroyed. The materiel

was designed for use in the employment of chemical weapons and

includes unfilled munitions and components, simulant-filled munitions,

dummy rounds, rocket motors, cartridge containers, and other metal and

plastic parts. Some items contain explosive charges that may need to be

extracted before disposal. According to the Army, miscellaneous materiel

is stored at Aberdeen, Anniston, Blue Grass, Pine Bluff, Pueblo, Tooele,

Umatilla, and Dugway Proving Ground.

Recovered Chemical Weapons Chemical weapons have been recovered from range-clearing operations,

chemical burial sites, and research and development test areas. According

to the Army, most recovered items are stored at Aberdeen, Dugway,

Johnston Atoll, Pine Bluff, Tooele, and Rocky Mountain Arsenal. The Army

1

Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Program Survey and Analysis Report, Program Manager for

Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel (Nov. 1993).

2

Energetics are the explosives and propellants in the munitions.

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believes that handling and disposing of recovered chemical weapons will

be difficult because they are more likely to have deteriorated than other

nonstockpile materiel and the identity of the agent is unknown in some of

the items.

According to the Army, the most immediate concern of the nonstockpile

program is the treatment and disposal of Chemical Agent Identification

Sets because of the relative frequency of their recovery and tendency to be

found by the general public. The sets consist of chemicals contained in

glass ampoules, vials, and bottles that are packed in metal shipping

containers and wooden boxes.3

 In the late 1930s, approximately 110,000 of

the sets were produced in various configurations to train soldiers and

sailors how to identify chemical warfare agents. Thousands of the sets are

not accounted for and, in some cases, only the glass vials or bottles filled

with chemicals have been recovered. A small quantity of sets are stored at

Camp Bullis, Texas; Fort Richardson, Alaska; Johnston Atoll, Pacific

Ocean; Redstone Arsenal, Alabama; and Tooele Army Depot, Utah.

Former Chemical Weapon

Production Facilities

Chemical agent and weapons were produced in various government

facilities prior to 1968. These facilities are located at Aberdeen, Pine Bluff,

Rocky Mountain Arsenal, and Newport Army Ammunition Plant, Indiana,

and are in various degrees of deterioration. DOD is reviewing former

production facilities at Swannanoa, North Carolina, and Van Nuys,

California, to determine whether they require remediation actions.

Environmental Laws

and Requirements

Govern Most

Nonstockpile

Activities

The Army has limited experience destroying nonstockpile materiel and is

unfamiliar with what types of environmental problems to expect. Prior to

recovering, storing, moving, or destroying nonstockpile chemical warfare

materiel, the Army must comply with state environmental laws and

regulations. These laws and regulations may impose time frames for

certain efforts that, in turn, drive other nonstockpile activities and related

costs. For example, if an operating permit is delayed for one of the

nonstockpile disposal systems because of an unanticipated requirement,

virtually all disposal activities at the remediation site must stop until the

permit is issued.

The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act controls hazardous waste

through a permit process that requires government approval for

individuals who generate, transport, store, or dispose of hazardous waste.

3

The sets contain sulfur mustard agent, nitrogen mustard agent, lewisite, phosgene, cyanogen chloride,

chloroform, chloropicrin, solid chloroacetophenone, solid triphosgene, solid adamsite, and other

chemicals.

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Under the act, the Environmental Protection Agency may authorize

individual states to administer and enforce hazardous waste programs that

are as least as stringent as the federal program. Although based on the

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act’s requirements, individual state

hazardous waste laws and requirements differ and are occasionally

changed. According to the Army, changes in the states’ laws and

requirements may affect the nonstockpile disposal program because they

are likely to apply to most aspects of the program on military installations.

According to the Army, state regulatory agencies could add unanticipated

requirements to the permitting process, including extra demonstrations or

tests prior to the start of disposal operations. Depending on the time

involved, disposal activities at follow-on sites could be stalled or

suspended, resulting in additional costs. The Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act requires (1) site-specific operating permits for the Rapid

Response System and munitions management devices; (2) specific

disposal standards for the hazardous waste generated by the program; and

(3) precise permitting, record-keeping, and reporting requirements.

Similarly, changes in the Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act requirements may affect the nonstockpile

program. The act provides overall cleanup procedures for some

nonstockpile sites and incorporates the standards of other federal and

state statutes if they are applicable or relevant and appropriate to the

cleanup process. A specific sequence of activities, guaranteeing the

participation of federal and state agencies and the public in key decisions,

must be followed before a nonstockpile site can be cleaned up. The act

requires (1) completion of remedial investigation and feasibility studies for

most formerly used defense sites such as the former Raritan Arsenal, New

Jersey; (2) site-specific closure standards; and (3) emergency response

actions, such as those taken in response to the Spring Valley site in

Washington, D.C.

The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act governs the transportation of

most nonstockpile chemical materiel and limits the movement of materiel

without special permits, licenses, and authorizations. The act delegates

regulatory and enforcement responsibilities to the states but limits some

state regulations. Nevertheless, states may still implement routing

restrictions, transportation curfews, notification deadlines, and public

right-to-know requirements. The act requires specialized packaging for

transporting nonstockpile materiel and the treatment residues, and limits

commercial transportation of selected nonstockpile chemical materiel or

neutralized chemical agent. The Army anticipates that every state

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nonstockpile materiel travels through will have some jurisdiction over part

of the move.

The Army’s Mobile

Disposal Systems Are

Not Fully Developed

The Army’s disposal concept is based on mobile systems capable of

moving from location to location where the munitions are characterized

and the agent is detoxified, the waste is sent to a commercial hazardous

waste facility, and the system and equipment are detoxified before the

next move. The Army is developing mobile systems to characterize and

destroy Chemical Agent Identification Sets, recovered chemical weapons,

and bulk chemical warfare materiel. (See table 3.2.) Although Army

officials are confident that the proposed mobile remediation systems will

function as planned, the Army needs more time to prove that the systems

will safely and effectively destroy all nonstockpile materiel and be

accepted by the state regulatory agencies and the public.

Table 3.2: Summary of the

Nonstockpile Disposal Systems and

Estimated Operational Dates

System Description Status

Portable Isotopic

Neutron Spectroscopy

A portable, gamma ray system used for

noninvasive characterization of elemental

components of chemical agents in

recovered chemical warfare materiel.

Operational

Raman

Spectrophotometer

A portable device used to identify

chemical agents inside glass containers

found in Chemical Agent Identification Sets.

Operational

Chemical Agent

Transfer System

A fixed system at Aberdeen Proving

Ground that transfers chemical agents

from recovered nonexplosive-configured

materiel to storage containers and

performs other chemical operations.

Operational

Rapid Response

System

A portable system designed to process

small amounts of chemical agents and

materiel contained in Chemical Agent

Identification Sets.

Operational in

fiscal year 1998

Munitions Management

Device-1

A portable system designed to detoxify

most nonexplosive-configured chemical

warfare materiel.

Operational in

fiscal year 1998

Munitions Management

Device-2

A portable system designed to detoxify

most explosive-configured chemical

warfare materiel. The system will be

designed to fully contain any potential

explosion resulting from operations.

Operational in

fiscal year 1999

Munitions Management

Device-3

A portable system designed to detoxify

nonexplosive-configured bulk chemical

warfare items larger than a 500-pound

bomb.

Operational in

fiscal year 1998

Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
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Stockpile Program

In its 1993 Survey and Analysis Report, the Army concluded that the

technical risk for the nonstockpile program was high because the disposal

systems were not yet completed. It also reported that if effective processes

or procedures were not discovered, it would have to fund “a major

research and development program.” In its 1994 risk assessment, the Army

reported that the lack of technology for on-site disposal operations could

hamper the completion of the nonstockpile program.

Accelerated Program to

Develop the Rapid

Response System

According to the Army, the most immediate concern of the nonstockpile

program is the treatment of Chemical Agent Identification Sets because of

the relative frequency of their discovery. As a result, the Army accelerated

the program to develop a system, called the Rapid Response System, to

process and destroy the sets. When operational, the two-trailer system will

use commercially available technology. (See fig. 3.2.) The chemical

detoxification of the agent, as well as packaging of the waste, will occur

inside a glovebox housed in the operational trailer. Air circulating through

the glovebox is vented through charcoal filters to entrap agent and other

hazardous chemicals prior to discharge from the trailer. The utility trailer

houses an electrical generator to use mainly at remote sites and a

refrigerator for use in monitoring activities. Once treated with neutralizing

chemicals, the residue will be sent to a commercial hazardous waste

facility. The system will be detoxified before moving to the next location.

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Figure 3.2: Conceptual Drawing of the Rapid Response System

Operations


Trailer

Utility


Trailer

Source: The Army’s Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization.

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The Rapid Response System has been designed and assembled and is

scheduled to be tested at Tooele Army Depot in mid-1997. The Army’s

slow development of background data for Utah’s environmental permitting

process has delayed the start of the system’s concept demonstration by 

9 months. The Rapid Response System is scheduled for its first use at Fort

Richardson, Alaska, in fiscal year 1998. It is expected to process 12 to 15

vials of agent each day.

Prototype of the Munitions

Management Devices Is

Scheduled for Operational

Use in Fiscal Year 1998

The Army is developing mobile munitions management devices to assess,

access, and dispose of most nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel on

site. According to Army officials, the disposal rates are not yet established

and could be as low as one or two items per day. The Munitions

Management Device-1 consists of two tractor trailers, one for processing

nonexplosive configured munitions using chemical neutralization and the

other for controlling operations. (See fig. 3.3.) Weapons and materiel will

be placed in the treatment vessel, drained of liquid chemical agent, and

decontaminated with a neutralizing solution. As a precautionary measure,

the process trailer is designed to contain liquid or vapor accidentally

released and is surrounded by a tent-like enclosure to provide an

additional level of safety. A gas-processing system filters and treats any

chemical vapors in the process trailer and the outside is monitored for

agent. Neutralized waste is packaged and shipped to a commercial

hazardous waste management facility.

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Figure 3.3: Conceptual Drawing of the Munitions Management Device-1

Process


Trailer

Process


Trailer


Enclosure

Control Trailer

Source: The Army’s Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization.

If the Munitions Management Device-1 proves successful, two other

systems will be developed for disposing explosively configured munitions

and bulk munitions and containers. The Army considers the Munitions

Management Device-2, which will process explosively configured

munitions, to be the most technologically challenging of the devices. Its

design, fabrication, and testing are scheduled through mid-1998, with two

follow-on units scheduled for delivery in 2000 and ready for operation in

2001. The Munitions Management Device-3, scheduled for operations in

1998, will process items larger than 500-pound bombs and recovered ton

containers with chemical agent. The Army plans to pack the neutralized

chemical waste and ship it to a commercial hazardous waste facility.

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Stockpile Program

Opportunities for Cost

and Schedule

Reductions Are

Limited

The Army could potentially reduce costs by using (1) chemical stockpile

disposal facilities for destroying selected nonstockpile materiel or (2) a

centralized disposal facility designed specifically for destroying

nonstockpile materiel. However, according to Army officials, these options

create legal and political obstacles and public acceptance issues that

would have to be resolved.

Use of Stockpile Disposal

Facilities

The DOD Authorization Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-145), and subsequent

legislation, specifies that the chemical stockpile disposal facilities may not

be used for any purpose other than the disposal of stockpile weapons. The

Army interpreted this legislation to mean that the stockpile disposal

facilities, with the exception of the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent

Disposal System, may not be used to dispose of other DOD materiel,

including nonstockpile chemical materiel. This interpretation necessitates

that the Army, in order to comply with the act, implement separate

disposal operations for nonstockpile materiel along side of the stockpile

facilities.

In its 1995 implementation plan, the Army suggested that the stockpile

disposal facilities could be used to process some nonstockpile weapons,

depending on the location, the type of chemical weapon or materiel, and

condition.4

 For example:

• The first category of nonstockpile materiel that could be destroyed

includes items that are (1) already located at the disposal site requiring no

off-base transportation, (2) similarly configured stockpile weapons

scheduled to be disposed of in the facility, and (3) the same agent type as

those scheduled to be destroyed in the facility. An example is the

nonstockpile ton containers previously filled with mustard agent stored at

Tooele Army Depot, Utah. The facility is already designed to dispose of

stockpile ton containers filled with mustard agent. The containers are

exactly the same except that the nonstockpile containers were used in

prior sampling and disposal programs and historically recorded as

nonstockpile, while the stockpile containers hold production stock.

• A second category of nonstockpile materiel includes items that (1) are

already located at the disposal site, (2) are similarly configured to items

scheduled for disposal, and (3) contain a different agent type than those

scheduled to be destroyed in the facility. An example is the nonstockpile

ton containers filled with nerve agent stored at Aberdeen Proving Ground,

4

Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Program Implementation Plan, U.S. Army Program Manager for

Chemical Demilitarization (Aug. 1995).

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Stockpile Program

Maryland. With some modifications to a stockpile disposal facility

designed to incinerate mustard-filled ton containers, the facility could

destroy the containers filled with nerve agent.

• A third, and more difficult, category of nonstockpile materiel includes

items that are (1) already located at the disposal site, (2) configured

somewhat differently than the stockpile weapons scheduled for disposal,

and (3) the same or different agent type as those scheduled to be

destroyed. An example is the nonstockpile bottles of mustard agent

located at Pueblo Depot Activity, Colorado. Pueblo’s proposed facility will

be designed to destroy mustard agent and could easily incinerate the

bottles.5

 According to Army officials, some nonstockpile materiel in this

category would probably be easier processed, and for less money, by one

of the proposed nonstockpile disposal systems.

• The last category involves transporting nonstockpile materiel from its

current storage or burial site to an existing stockpile disposal facility.

However, the 1995 National Defense Authorization Act 

(P.L. 103-337) allows the transport of only newly discovered nonstockpile

materiel to the nearest storage site that has the necessary environmental

permits. The nearest permitted location may not have the appropriate

facilities to dispose of the materiel.

The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act also has the potential to

limit using the stockpile disposal facilities to destroy nonstockpile

materiel. State regulators, under the act’s comprehensive body of

requirements, can implement disposal limits and controls for the disposal

facilities. For example, the state of Utah has established disposal limits for

the Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility based on the amounts of

chemical weapons and agent stockpiled at Tooele. To dispose of

nonstockpile materiel, the Army would have to amend the Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act permit to increase the facility’s disposal

limits. The amendment process, controlled by the state, requires time and

money. In addition, DOD and Army officials expect that any efforts to

increase the use of the stockpile facilities would likely result in strong

state and public opposition and potential delays in the state environmental

permitting process.

5

The 1997 DOD Appropriations Act prohibits DOD from obligating any funds for constructing disposal

facilities at Blue Grass, Kentucky, and Pueblo, Colorado, until 180 days after the Secretary reports on

disposal alternatives.

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Stockpile Program

Use of a Centralized

Facility Designed

Specifically for Destroying

Nonstockpile Materiel

Another method for destroying nonstockpile chemical materiel could be

the use of a central disposal facility with equipment designed specifically

for destroying nonstockpile materiel. The facility could operate in

cooperation with existing government and commercial facilities—much

the way it will be done in European countries. According to Army officials,

a similar program in the United States would reduce the costs of the

nonstockpile program. However, the legislative restrictions on the

transportation of nonstockpile materiel would have to be lifted to make a

central disposal facility a viable option. In addition, the current process of

individual states establishing their own environmental requirements and

prevalent public attitude that a chemical weapons disposal facility should

not be located in their vicinity would be significant obstacles that would

have to be resolved to make a centralized disposal facility viable.

Page 54 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Chapter 4 

Conclusions, Matters for Congressional

Consideration, and Agency Comments

Conclusions While there is general agreement about the need to destroy the chemical

stockpile and related nonstockpile materiel, progress has slowed due to

the lack of consensus among DOD and affected states and localities about

the destruction method that should be used. As a result, the cost and

schedule for the disposal programs are uncertain. However, the programs

are likely to cost more than the estimated $24.4 billion above current

expenditures and take longer than currently planned. The key factors

impacting the programs include public concerns about the safety of

incineration, compliance with environmental laws and regulations,

legislative requirements, and the introduction of alternative disposal

technologies.

The Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program cost and schedule are largely

driven by the degree to which states and local communities are in

agreement with the proposed disposal method. Historically reaching

agreement has consistently taken longer than the Army anticipated.

Furthermore, the recent congressional direction in the 1997 Authorization

and Appropriations Acts to research and develop alternative technologies

to destroy assembled chemical munitions indicates that there is continued

public concern about the proposed disposal method. Until DOD and the

affected states and localities reach agreement on a disposal method for

individual sites, the Army will not be able to predict the Chemical

Stockpile Disposal Program cost and schedule with any degree of

accuracy. Moreover, many of the problems experienced in the stockpile

program are also likely to affect the Army’s ability to implement the

Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel Program. For example, efforts to dispose

of nonstockpile materiel are likely to be driven by the need to obtain state

and local approvals for destruction methods. In addition, more time is

needed for the Army to prove that its proposed disposal method for the

nonstockpile program will be safe and effective and accepted by the

affected states and localities.

Recognizing the difficulty of satisfactorily resolving the public concerns

associated with each individual disposal location, suggestions have been

made by Members of the Congress, DOD officials, and others to change the

programs’ basic approach to destruction. However, the suggestions create

tradeoffs for decision makers and would require changes in existing legal

requirements. These suggestions have included deferring plans for

additional disposal facilities until an acceptable alternative technology to

incineration is developed, consolidating disposal operations at a national

or regional sites, destroying selected nonstockpile chemical warfare

materiel in stockpile disposal facilities, establishing a centralized disposal

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Conclusions, Matters for Congressional

Consideration, and Agency Comments

facility for nonstockpile materiel, and modifying existing laws and

regulations to standardize environmental requirements.

Matters for

Congressional

Consideration

As the Congress continues its oversight of the chemical stockpile and

nonstockpile disposal programs and considers modifications or

alternatives to the current approach, it may wish to include consideration

of the suggestions discussed in this report relating to the creation of

alternative technologies, consolidation of stockpile disposal operations,

utilization of stockpile facilities for nonstockpile items, centralization of

nonstockpile destruction, and standardization of environmental laws and

requirements.

Agency Comments DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report and they are

presented in their entirety in appendix V. DOD stated that the draft

accurately and fairly characterized the current status of the disposal

programs and generally concurred with the suggestions of the draft report

that changes in existing legal requirements would be necessary to change

the current path of the disposal programs.

While DOD agreed that the Congress could consider options presented by

us, it recommended consideration of the ones to establish a centralized

disposal facility for nonstockpile materiel and to modify existing laws and

regulations to standardize environmental requirements for chemical

weapons disposal. DOD does not support consideration of deferring plans

for additional stockpile disposal facilities until an acceptable alternative

technology is developed because such delays result in substantial

increases in public risk from continued storage of the stockpile. DOD does

not recommend transportation of the stockpile at this time because

transportation of chemical weapons increases the risk to the general

public. In addition, DOD recommended against using stockpile disposal

facilities to destroy nonstockpile materiel because of the strong public

opposition to both the use of stockpile disposal facilities to treat any other

waste materiel and the transportation of chemical materiel for disposal in

these facilities.

Our draft report recognized that some options could increase the risk to

the general public and would likely be opposed by some of the affected

states and localities and other interested parties. We presented the options

in context of their tradeoffs should the Congress wish to address the key

factors affecting the programs’ disposal costs and schedule. We did not

Page 56 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
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Conclusions, Matters for Congressional

Consideration, and Agency Comments

take a position on the options or current approach given the associated

policy and legislative implications.

Page 57 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Appendix I 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Due to continuing congressional and public interest about the progress

and cost of the programs, we prepared this report under our basic

legislative responsibilities to provide an overall assessment of the

(1) programs’ cost and schedule, (2) alternatives for improving program

effectiveness and efficiency, and (3) actions the Army has and is taking to

improve the programs. During our review, we interviewed and obtained

data from officials of the Department of Defense (DOD), the Army, the

Army Chemical and Biological Defense Agency, the U.S. Army Nuclear and

Chemical Agency, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. We also met with

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency officials to discuss and collect data

on environmental and legal issues related to the disposal programs. We

visited Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; Anniston Army Depot,

Alabama; Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas; Pueblo Depot Activity, Colorado;

Tooele Army Depot, Utah; and Umatilla Depot Activity, Oregon. We also

visited state and county officials in Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado,

Maryland, Oregon, and Utah. We did not include the Chemical Stockpile

Emergency Preparedness Program and overseas U.S. chemical warfare

material in our review. We plan to issue a report later this year on the

status and the management of the Chemical Stockpile Emergency

Preparedness Program in the ten states participating in the program.

To assess the programs’ cost and schedule, we reviewed the Army’s

implementation plans, disposal data, status reports, and data on

environmental and legal issues. We reviewed the Army’s estimation

methodology, potential problems that may affect current cost and

schedule estimates, and the causes of previous schedule slippages and

cost increases. We analyzed (1) the reasons for the public concerns about

incineration of chemical agents, (2) the Army’s efforts to obtain

environmental permits and current issues, (3) obstacles in the

environmental compliance and permitting process, (4) the status of the

environmental permits at each of the disposal sites, and (5) federal and

state environmental laws and regulations that apply to the disposal

programs. We also obtained federal and state officials’ views on the

accuracy of the Army’s estimated schedule to determine how current or

proposed state laws or regulations could affect the disposal programs.

To assess alternatives for improving program effectiveness and efficiency,

we analyzed the Army’s current cost position and initiatives for reducing

costs and shortening the disposal schedules. We also examined data on

the Army’s management approach to contracting, disposal experience at

Johnston Atoll and Tooele, the baseline incineration process, and

approaches for addressing environmental permitting issues. To assess

Page 58 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Appendix I 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

technological alternatives, we analyzed data on disposal technologies, the

advantages and disadvantages of the baseline incineration process, the

advantages and disadvantages of selected alternatives, and public

concerns and issues related to the baseline and alternative technologies.

We also analyzed plans and methodologies for developing alternative

technologies, costs and schedule data related to the alternatives,

acquisition strategies and responsibilities, and test and evaluation results.

To assess transportation options, we analyzed transportation studies and

concepts, packaging methods, and the risk associated with transportation.

We reviewed data on chemical weapon movements, chemical munitions

transport packaging systems, transportation containers for hazardous

material, potential transportation routes, emergency response plans, and

transportation modes. In addition, we collected information concerning

the public opposition to transportation of chemical weapons, obstacles in

the environmental compliance and permitting process for transportation

options, and environmental laws and regulations applicable to

transportation.

To assess the actions the Army has and is taking to improve the programs,

we reviewed DOD’s 1994 designation of the Army’s chemical

demilitarization program as a major defense acquisition program. We

documented and analyzed data on lessons learned from disposal

operations at Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System and Tooele

Chemical Agent Disposal System and their effects on the stockpile and

nonstockpile programs. Lastly, we reviewed the Army’s actions to

strengthen its public outreach efforts and improve its monitoring and

inspection of chemical munitions.

DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report. These comments

are presented in their entirety in appendix V.

We performed our review from August 1995 to November 1996 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 59 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Appendix II 

Appropriated, Obligated, and Disbursement

Data for Fiscal Years 1988 Through 1997

Table II.1: Chemical Stockpile Disposal

Program Dollars in millions

Fiscal year Appropriated Obligated Expended

1988 $195.8 $194.3 $192.9

1989 168.0 165.5 165.4

1990 210.4 208.2 205.9

1991 255.0 252.3 251.5

1992 331.3 330.1 326.8

1993 419.1 417.9 316.0

1994 249.1 246.7 234.9

1995 486.5 472.2 279.2

1996 484.2 346.0 130.5

1997 534.7

Total $3,334.1 $2,633.2 $2,103.1

Table II.2: Alternative Technologies

and Approaches Project Dollars in millions

Fiscal year Appropriated Obligated Expended

1994 $22.4 $22.2 $10.2

1995 9.4 9.4 6.8

1996 22.2 19.6 12.2

1997 56.0

Total $110.0 $51.2 $29.2

Table II.3: Chemical Stockpile

Emergency Preparedness Project Dollars in millions

Fiscal year Appropriated Obligated Expended

1988 $2.5 $2.5 $2.5

1989 11.3 11.3 11.1

1990 43.8 43.7 43.3

1991 37.7 37.6 37.5

1992 40.9 40.5 40.0

1993 88.2 87.5 62.1

1994 71.9 71.6 65.5

1995 56.5 56.4 27.6

1996 80.0 65.2 27.3

1997 82.4

Total $515.2 $416.3 $316.9

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Appendix II 

Appropriated, Obligated, and Disbursement

Data for Fiscal Years 1988 Through 1997

Table II.4: Nonstockpile Chemical

Materiel Program Dollars in millions

Fiscal year Appropriated Obligated Expended

1992 $2.2 $2.2 $2.2

1993 6.3 6.3 6.0

1994 31.5 31.2 26.4

1995 26.0 25.8 18.5

1996 69.7 40.4 14.6

1997 85.3

Total $221.0 $105.9 $67.7

Source: The Army’s Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization.

Page 61 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Appendix III 

Summary of Major Federal Environmental

Laws Affecting the Army’s Disposal

Programs

Date Title Provisions

1969 The National Environmental Policy Act

(42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.)

Requires the Army to develop an environmental impact statement or

assessment about the potential environmental effects of destroying chemical

weapons and materiel.

1970 The Clean Air Act, as amended (42 U.S.C.

7401 et seq.)

Governs potential sources of air pollutants and establishes emission standards.

The Army must obtain permits for air pollution control prior to constructing and

operating any disposal facility.

1972 The Marine Protection, Search, and

Sanctuaries Act (33 U.S.C. 1411 et seq.)

Restricts ocean dumping of chemical weapons.

1974 The Hazardous Materials Transportation

Act (49 U.S.C. 5101 et seq.)

Regulates the packaging, marking, loading, and transporting of hazardous

materials by road or rail.

1976 The Toxic Substances Control Act, as

amended (15 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.)

Regulates the disposal of items containing polychlorinated biphenyls and

asbestos. The fiberglass matrices of the shipping and firing tubes for stockpiled

M55 rockets contain polychlorinated biphenyls, and some former production

facilities contain asbestos.

1976 The Resource Conservation and Recovery

Act, as amended (42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq.)

Regulates the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste. The Army

must obtain state permits prior to constructing and operating any disposal

facility or system where stockpile and nonstockpile items are classified as

hazardous waste.

1977 The Clean Water Act, as amended

(33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.)

Governs potential sources of water pollution and specifically prohibits the

discharge of any chemical agent into U.S. navigable waters.

1980 The Comprehensive Environmental

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act

(42 U.S.C. 9620 et seq.)

Addresses hazardous substance releases into the soil, air, surface water, and

groundwater and regulates the cleanup of these releases. A specific sequence

of activities guaranteeing the participation of federal and state agencies and the

public in key decisions must be followed before cleanup of some nonstockpile

sites.

Page 62 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Appendix IV 

Chronology of the U.S. Chemical

Demilitarization Program

Time frame Activity

1917-1960s Obsolete or unserviceable chemical warfare agents and munitions were disposed of by open pit burning, land

burial, and ocean dumping.

1969 The National Academy of Sciences recommended that ocean dumping be avoided and that public health and

environmental protection be emphasized. It suggested two alternatives to ocean disposal: chemical

neutralization of nerve agents and incineration of mustard agents.

1970 The Armed Forces Authorization Act (P.L. 91-441) required a Department of Health and Human Services review

of any disposal plans and detoxification of weapons prior to disposal. It also limited the movement of chemical

weapons.

1971 The Foreign Military Sales Act prohibited the transportation of U.S. chemical weapons from Okinawa, Japan, to

the continental United States. The weapons were moved to Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean.

1971-1973 The Army tested and developed an incineration process and disposed of several thousand tons of mustard

agent stored in ton containers at Rocky Mountain Arsenal.

1973-1976 The Army disposed of nearly 4,200 tons of nerve agent by chemical neutralization at Tooele Army Depot and

Rocky Mountain Arsenal. The process was problematic and not very reproducible, making automation difficult.

1979 The Army opened the Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System at Tooele to test and evaluate disposal

equipment and processes for chemical agents and munitions on a pilot scale.

1981 The Army decided to build the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System to dispose of its chemical M55

rocket stockpile.

1981-1986 The Army used the Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System to test and evaluate incineration of chemical

agents and energetic materiel, and decontamination of metal parts and ton containers.

1982 An Arthur D. Little Corporation study for the Army concluded that using incineration, rather than neutralization, to

dispose of the stockpile would reduce costs.

1982 The Army declared its stockpile of M55 rockets obsolete.

1983 The Army expanded its chemical disposal program to include the M55 rocket stockpile at Anniston Army Depot,

Umatilla Depot Activity, and Blue Grass Depot Activity.

1984 The Army expanded its chemical disposal program to include the M55 rocket stockpile at Pine Bluff Arsenal and

Tooele Army Depot.

1984 The National Research Council endorsed the Army’s disassembly and high-temperature incineration process for

disposing of chemical agents and munitions. It also recommended that the Army continue to store most of the

chemical stockpile, dispose of the M55 rockets, and analyze alternative methods for disposing of the remaining

chemical stockpile.

1985 The Army began construction of the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System.

1985 The DOD Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986 (P.L. 99-145) mandated the destruction of the U.S. stockpile of

lethal chemical agents and munitions. It also required that the disposal facilities be cleaned, dismantled, and

disposed of according to applicable laws and regulations.

1986 The DOD Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1987 (P.L. 99-500) prohibited shipments of chemical weapons,

components, or agents to the Blue Grass Depot Activity for any purpose.

1987 Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System operations were suspended as a result of a low-level nerve agent

release.

1988 The Army issued the Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for the Chemical Stockpile Disposal

Program. The Army selected on-site disposal of the chemical stockpile because it posed fewer potential risks

than transportation and off-site disposal.

1988 The National Defense Act of Fiscal Year 1989 (P.L. 100-456) required the Army to complete operational

verification testing at Johnston Atoll before beginning to systematize similar disposal facilities in the continental

United States.

(continued)

Page 63 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Appendix IV 

Chronology of the U.S. Chemical

Demilitarization Program

Time frame Activity

1989 The Army started construction of the chemical demilitarization facility at Tooele Army Depot.

1990 The Army completed the successful retrograde of all chemical munitions stored in Germany to storage facilities

at Johnston Atoll.

1990 The Army initiated disposal of M55 rockets at Johnston Atoll.

1990 A very small amount of nerve agent leaked through the common stack during maintenance activities at Johnston

Atoll. The agent release was below allowable stack concentration.

1990-1993 The Army completed four operational verification tests of the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System.

During the tests, the Army destroyed more than 40,000 munitions containing nerve and mustard agents. In

August 1993, the Secretary of Defense certified to the Congress that the Army had successfully completed the

operational verification tests at Johnston Atoll.

1991 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (P.L. 101-510) restricted the use of funds to transport

chemical weapons to Johnston Atoll except for U.S. munitions discovered in the Pacific, prohibited the Army from

studying the movement of chemical munitions, and established the emergency preparedness program.

1991 The Army moved 109 World War II mustard-filled projectiles from the Solomon Islands to Johnston Atoll for

storage and disposal.

1991 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (P.L. 102-190) required the Secretary of

Defense to develop a chemical weapons stockpile safety contingency plan.

1992 The U.S. Army Chemical Materiel Destruction Agency was established to consolidate operational responsibility

for the destruction of chemical warfare capabilities into one office.

1992 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (P.L. 102-484) directed the Army to establish

citizens’ commissions for states with storage sites, if the state’s governor requested one. It also required the

Army to report on (1) disposal alternatives to the baseline incineration method and (2) plans for destroying U.S.

nonstockpile chemical weapons and materiel identified in the Chemical Weapons Convention.

1993 The Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System was shut down during operation and verification tests when

residue explosive material generated during the processing of M60 105mm projectiles caught fire, causing

damage to a conveyor belt and other equipment in the explosive containment room.

1993 The Army completed construction and started systemization of the Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility.

1993 The Army issued its report on the physical and chemical integrity of the chemical stockpile to the Congress.

1993 A mustard leak from a ton container was discovered at Tooele Army Depot.

1993 The Army issued an interim survey and analysis report on the Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel Program to the

Congress.

1994 Approximately 11.6 milligrams of nerve agent were released into the atmosphere at the Johnston Atoll facility

during a maintenance activity on the liquid incinerator.

1994 The National Research Council issued its recommendations for the disposal of chemical agents and munitions to

the Army.

1994 The Army issued its alternative demilitarization technology report to the Congress. The Army recommended the

continuation of the chemical demilitarization program without deliberate delay and the implementation of a

two-technology research and development program.

1994 The Army issued its M55 rocket stability report to the Congress. The report recommended that an enhanced

stockpile assessment program be initiated to better characterize the state of the M55 rocket in the stockpile.

1994 The Army initiated the Alternative Technologies Project to develop an alternative disposal technology to the

baseline incineration process for the bulk-only stockpile locations in Maryland and Indiana. This research and

development effort is conducted in conjunction with activities to implement the baseline program.

(continued)

Page 64 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Appendix IV 

Chronology of the U.S. Chemical

Demilitarization Program

Time frame Activity

1994 The U.S. Army Chemical Materiel Destruction Agency was redesignated the U.S. Army Chemical Demilitarization

and Remediation Activity after a merger with the U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command. In

addition, the Army restructured and centralized its chemical stockpile emergency preparedness program to

streamline procedures, enhance responsiveness of operations, and improve the budgeting process.

1994 The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development and Acquisition became the DOD Executive

Agent for the Chemical Demilitarization Program, replacing the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations,

Logistics, and Environment. The Chemical Demilitarization Program was designated a DOD Acquisition Category

1D Program.

1995 The Army initiated the Enhanced Stockpile Surveillance Program to investigate, develop, and support methods to

improve monitoring and inspection of chemical munitions.

1995 The U.S. Army Chemical Demilitarization and Remediation Activity was renamed the Program Manager for

Chemical Demilitarization.

1995 The Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System surpassed the 1-million pounds target and completed the

disposal of all M55 rockets stored on Johnston Atoll. Disposal rates exceeded established goals.

1995 A perimeter monitor located about 100 yards from the demilitarization building at Johnston Atoll detected a trace

level of nerve agent. The source of the leak was identified as a door gasket in the air filtration system. Temporary

air locks were erected and the gasket replaced. No one was harmed from this event.

1995 The Army awarded the contract for small burial sites and issued its implementation plan for the nonstockpile

program.

1995 The Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility completed equipment systemization testing.

1995 The Army certified to the Congress that all Browder Amendment requirements for the award of the Anniston

construction contract were met.

1996 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (P.L. 104-106) directed DOD to conduct an

assessment of the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program and options that could be taken to reduce program

costs.

1996 The Army completed disposal of all Air Force and Navy bombs stored on Johnston Atoll ahead of schedule.

1996 The Army awarded the systems contract for the construction, operation, and closure of the proposed Anniston

Chemical Agent Disposal Facility. Construction of the facility is scheduled to began after the state of Alabama

issues the environmental permits.

1996 The Army started disposal operations at the Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility. Shortly after the start,

operations were shut down for a week after a small amount of agent was detected in a sealed vestibule attached

to the air filtration system. No agent was released to the environment and no one was harmed.

1996 Several hair line cracks were discovered in the concrete floor of the Tooele disposal facility’s decontamination

area. The cracks caused a small amount of decontamination solution to leak to an electrical room below. No

agent was detected and the cracks were sealed.

1996 The 1997 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 104-201) directed DOD to conduct an assessment of

alternative technologies for the disposal of assembled chemical munitions. The act also directed the Secretary of

Defense to report on this assessment by December 31, 1997.

1996 The 1997 DOD Appropriations Act (P.L. 104-208) provided the Army $40 million to conduct a pilot program to

identify and demonstrate two or more alternatives to the baseline incineration process for the disposal of

assembled chemical munitions. The act also prohibited DOD from obligating any funds for constructing disposal

facilities at Blue Grass and Pueblo until 180 days after the Secretary reports on the alternatives.

1996 The Chemical Weapons Convention was ratified by the 65th country needed to make the convention effective. As

a result, the convention will go into effect April 29, 1997. Through ratification, the United States will agree to

dispose of its (1) unitary chemical weapons stockpile, binary chemical weapons, recovered chemical weapons,

and former chemical weapon production facilities by April 29, 2007, and (2) miscellaneous chemical warfare

materiel by April 29, 2002.

Page 65 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Appendix V 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 66 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Appendix V 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 55 and 56.

Now on pp. 55 and 56.

Now on pp. 55 and 56.

Page 67 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Appendix V 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 55 and 56.

Now on pp. 55 and 56.

Page 68 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Appendix VI 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Thomas J. Howard, Assistant Director

Glenn D. Furbish, Senior Evaluator

Mark A. Little, Senior Evaluator

Bonita J. Page, Evaluator

Page 69 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Appendix VI 

Major Contributors to This Report

Page 70 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Related GAO Products

Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Emergency Preparedness in Alabama Is

Hampered by Management Weaknesses (GAO/NSIAD-96-150, July 23, 1996).

Chemical Weapons Disposal: Issues Related to DOD’s Management

(GAO/T-NSIAD-95-185, July 13, 1995).

Chemical Weapons: Army’s Emergency Preparedness Program Has

Financial Management Weaknesses (GAO/NSIAD-95-94, Mar. 15, 1995).

Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program Review (GAO/NSIAD-95-66R, Jan. 12,

1995).

Chemical Weapons: Stability of the U.S. Stockpile (GAO/NSIAD-95-67, Dec. 22,

1994).

Chemical Weapons Disposal: Plans for Nonstockpile Chemical Warfare

Materiel Can Be Improved (GAO/NSIAD-95-55, Dec. 20, 1994).

Chemical Weapons: Issues Involving Destruction Technologies

(GAO/T-NSIAD-94-159, Apr. 26, 1994).

Chemical Weapons Destruction: Advantages and Disadvantages of

Alternatives to Incineration (GAO/NSIAD-94-123, Mar. 18, 1994).

Arms Control: Status of U.S.-Russian Agreements and the Chemical

Weapons Convention (GAO/NSIAD-94-136, Mar. 15, 1994).

Chemical Weapon Stockpile: Army’s Emergency Preparedness Program

Has Been Slow to Achieve Results (GAO/NSIAD-94-91, Feb. 22, 1994).

Chemical Weapons Storage: Communities Are Not Prepared to Respond to

Emergencies (GAO/T-NSIAD-93-18, July 16, 1993).

Chemical Weapons Destruction: Issues Affecting Program Cost, Schedule,

and Performance (GAO/NSIAD-93-50, Jan. 21, 1993).

Chemical Weapons Destruction: Issues Related to Environmental

Permitting and Testing Experience (GAO/T-NSIAD-92-43, June 16, 1992).

Chemical Weapons Disposal (GAO/NSIAD-92-219R, May 14, 1992).

Page 71 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
Related GAO Products

Chemical Weapons: Stockpile Destruction Cost Growth and Schedule

Slippages Are Likely to Continue (GAO/NSIAD-92-18, Nov. 20, 1991).

Chemical Warfare: DOD’s Effort to Remove U.S. Chemical Weapons From

Germany (GAO/NSIAD-91-105, Feb. 13, 1991).

(709134) Page 72 GAO/NSIAD-97-18 Chemical Weapons and Materiel
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