20-436

Singh v. Garland

BIA

Hom, IJ

A208 616 450

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION 

TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED 

AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS 

COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX 

OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A 

PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY 

NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 23rd 4 day of February, two thousand twenty5 two.

6

7 PRESENT:

8 DENNIS JACOBS,

9 GUIDO CALABRESI,

10 RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,

11 Circuit Judges.

12 _____________________________________

13

14 HARPREET SINGH,

15 Petitioner,

16

17 v. 20-436

18 NAC

19 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED

20 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,

21 Respondent.

22 _____________________________________

23

24 FOR PETITIONER: Genet Getachew, Esq., Brooklyn, 

25 NY.

26

27 FOR RESPONDENT: Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Acting 

28 Assistant Attorney General;
2

1 Sabatino F. Leo, Senior Litigation 

2 Counsel; Ilana J. Snyder, Trial 

3 Attorney, Office of Immigration 

4 Litigation, United States 

5 Department of Justice, Washington, 

6 DC.

7 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

8 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

9 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

10 is DENIED.

11 Petitioner Harpreet Singh, a native and citizen of India,

12 seeks review of a January 7, 2020 decision of the BIA 

13 affirming a May 4, 2018 decision of an Immigration Judge 

14 (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of removal, and relief 

15 under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Harpreet 

16 Singh, No. A208 616 450 (B.I.A. Jan. 7, 2020), aff’g No. A208 

17 616 450 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City May 4, 2018). We assume the 

18 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural 

19 history.

20 We have reviewed both the BIA’s and IJ’s decisions. See

21 Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d 

22 Cir. 2006). (“When the BIA briefly affirms the decision of 

23 an IJ and adopt[s] the IJ’s reasoning in doing so, we review 

24 the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions together.” (internal 
3

1 quotation marks omitted)). We review questions of law de 

2 novo and review the agency’s factual findings, including 

3 adverse credibility determinations, for substantial evidence. 

4 See Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009); 

5 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 

6 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018).

7 An applicant bears the burden to establish eligibility 

8 for asylum by showing either past harm rising to the level of 

9 persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. 

10 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b). He must

11 “present credible testimony that he subjectively fears 

12 persecution and establish that his fear is objectively 

13 reasonable.” Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 

14 (2d Cir. 2004). An applicant can meet that burden if his 

15 “testimony is credible . . . [and] persuasive,” but “[i]n 

16 determining whether the applicant has met the applicant’s 

17 burden, the trier of fact may weigh the credible testimony 

18 along with other evidence of record.” 8 U.S.C. 

19 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). 

20 The record supports the agency’s determination that Singh 

21 was not credible as to his allegations of past harm by members 
4

1 of rival political parties. “Considering the totality of the 

2 circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may 

3 base a credibility determination on the . . . consistency 

4 between the applicant’s . . . written and oral 

5 statements . . . , the internal consistency of each such 

6 statement, [and] the consistency of such statements with 

7 other evidence of record.” Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We

8 defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination 

9 unless . . . it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could 

10 make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. 

11 Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei 

12 Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. 

13 Substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility 

14 determination as the agency reasonably relied on 

15 discrepancies between Singh’s testimony and interview. See 

16 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585 F.3d 

17 715, 725 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Where the record of a credible fear 

18 interview displays the hallmarks of reliability, it 

19 appropriately can be considered in assessing an alien’s 

20 credibility.”). Singh told an asylum officer that he 

21 received a beating that resulted in bruises but later 
5

1 testified that his attackers carried a knife and sword and 

2 cut his arm. Although “omissions are less probative of 

3 credibility than inconsistencies,” the agency did not err in 

4 relying on Singh’s omission of these facts during his 

5 interview because he was asked how he was beaten and, in 

6 contrast to his description of another earlier beating in 

7 which he was asked the identical question and stated that he 

8 had been beaten with hockey sticks, he did not mention that 

9 his attackers had weapons. Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 78–79 

10 (“[I]n assessing the probative value of the omission of 

11 certain facts, an IJ should consider whether those facts are 

12 ones that a credible petitioner would reasonably have been 

13 expected to disclose.”). It was not unreasonable for the 

14 agency to expect Singh to disclose the most severe harm 

15 supporting his claim. See id. at 78–79; see also Singh v. 

16 Garland, 6 F.4th 418, 428 (2d Cir. 2021) (explaining that,

17 “in a hypothetical case, a petitioner who later claims to 

18 have been brutally beaten but omitted any reference to a 

19 beating from his earlier description of his persecution 

20 (there mentioning only less brutal conduct such as a slap in 

21 the face), can be properly found to have made inconsistent 
6

1 statements and to have fabricated the later assertion because 

2 the fact of the beating would have been so important to his 

3 earlier claim that he would have been expected to have 

4 included it”). The agency was not required to accept Singh’s 

5 explanation that he was scared to be sent back to India,

6 because the more serious harm would have bolstered his claim. 

7 See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A 

8 petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation 

9 for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must 

10 demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled

11 to credit his testimony.” (quotation marks omitted)).

12 The agency reasonably concluded that Singh failed to meet 

13 his burden of proof because he did not provide reliable, 

14 objective evidence to resolve the inconsistency or 

15 corroborate his past harm. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii); 

16 Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An 

17 applicant’s failure to corroborate his . . . testimony may 

18 bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in 

19 general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony 

20 that has already been called into question.”). The agency 

21 was not required to credit Singh’s supporting letters because 
7

1 the authors were not available for cross examination, Singh’s 

2 parents were interested witnesses, and the party leader did 

3 not discuss Singh’s harm. See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 

4 332, 334 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that “[w]e generally defer 

5 to the agency’s evaluation of the weight to be afforded an 

6 applicant’s documentary evidence” and upholding BIA’s 

7 decision to afford little weight to letter from applicant’s 

8 spouse); Matter of H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 215 

9 (B.I.A. 2010) (finding letters from relatives and friends did 

10 not provide substantial support for claim where authors were 

11 “interested witnesses . . . not subject to cross12 examination”), overruled on other grounds by Hui Lin Huang v. 

13 Holder, 677 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2012). Singh does not challenge 

14 the agency’s determination that his country conditions 

15 documents contained little current evidence of persecution of 

16 members of his party (the Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar Party) 

17 by members of rival parties. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 

18 426 F.3d 540, 541 n.1, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding claim 

19 abandoned where not addressed in brief).

20 The agency did not err in concluding that Singh failed 

21 to meet his burden of proof given the inconsistency in his 
8

1 descriptions of his past harm and the lack of reliable, 

2 objective corroboration. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii), 

3 (iii). This determination is dispositive of asylum, 

4 withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three forms 

5 of relief were based on the same factual predicate. See Paul 

6 v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006). As this 

7 finding is dispositive, we do not reach the alternative 

8 grounds for the agency’s decisions. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 

9 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies 

10 are not required to make findings on issues the decision of 

11 which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).

12 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

13 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and 

14 stays VACATED.

15 FOR THE COURT: 

16 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,

17 Clerk of Court