COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Willis and Overton 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

RAYMOND WESLEY SALMON 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 0193-95-2 BY JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER 

 JULY 30, 1996 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUISA COUNTY 

Lloyd C. Sullenberger, Judge 

 James B. Thorsen (Thorsen, Page & Marchant, 

on brief), for appellant. 

 Richard B. Smith, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General; 

Robert H. Anderson, III, Assistant Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Raymond Wesley Salmon (appellant) appeals from his bench 

trial convictions by the Circuit Court of Louisa County (trial 

court) for possession of cocaine in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-250(A)(a) and possession of methamphetamine in violation 

of Code § 18.2-250(A)(a). The sole issue presented is whether 

the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to suppress 

evidence of the contraband substances obtained by the police. 

Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

 It is well established in Virginia that, on appellate review 

of a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, the appellate 

courts of this Commonwealth view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the trial court's determination. E.g., Fore v. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 1010, 265 S.E.2d 729, 731, cert. 

denied, 449 U.S. 1017 (1980); Brown v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 

1, 7, 421 S.E.2d 877, 881 (1992). In light of the United States 

Supreme Court's pronouncement in Ornelas v. United States, 517 

U.S. ___ (1996), it appears that in certain cases a deferential 

standard of review is no longer appropriate. In Ornelas, Chief 

Justice Rehnquist wrote that henceforth, "as a general matter 

determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should 

be reviewed de novo on appeal." Id. While generally calling for 

de novo review of reasonable suspicion and probable cause 

determinations, the Supreme Court "hasten[ed]" to add that a 

trial court's finding of "historical fact" should be reviewed 

only for "clear error" and noted that a reviewing court should 

"give due weight to inferences drawn from those [historical] 

facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers." 

Id. Additionally, recognizing "that a police officer may draw 

inferences based on his own experience in deciding whether 

probable cause exists," id., the Supreme Court held that "[a]n 

appeals court should give due weight to a trial court's finding 

that [an] officer was credible and [his or her] inference was 

reasonable." Id. 

 Viewed accordingly, the record discloses that on the 

afternoon of December 23, 1993, Trooper Michael Alessi (Alessi) 

stopped his vehicle because of construction on Route 522 in 

Louisa County. While stopped, Alessi noticed a crack in the 
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windshield of the car directly in front of him, which appellant 

was driving. The crack extended from the center down at an angle 

on the passenger side. Alessi followed the car and then stopped 

it, believing that appellant might be violating statutes which 

prohibit the use of "defective, unsafe or unapproved equipment" 

on vehicles. Before he stopped appellant, Alessi could not 

determine whether the crack disturbed appellant's vision. 

 As appellant pulled his car over, he began "lunging toward 

the inner part of the seat." Alessi "could see [appellant make 

a] brisk movement with his hands [toward] the right part of the 

seat." He "wasn't sure if [appellant] was trying to hide 

something or move something in the seat on the right portion of 

him." Alessi approached the vehicle and asked appellant to 

produce his driver's license and registration, which he did. 

Because of his observations of appellant's movements, Alessi then 

asked appellant to step out of the vehicle. After appellant 

stepped out, Alessi saw a beer bottle tucked in the center of the 

seat, but he was unsure if appellant's suspicious conduct was a 

result of an effort to conceal the bottle. Alessi then conducted 

a pat-down search of appellant. 

 During the pat-down, Alessi could feel currency in 

appellant's pockets. After conducting the pat-down, Alessi asked 

appellant what he had in his pockets. Appellant replied that he 

had money. Alessi then asked appellant to let him see the money. 

 Appellant complied with Alessi's request and pulled currency and 
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a cigarette lighter out of his right pocket. Alessi then asked 

appellant to show him what was in his left pocket. As appellant 

pulled out a "wad" of money from his left pocket, he "palm[ed] it 

down," and Alessi saw a "ziplock baggie or bag corner." The bag 

was commingled with the money, with its edges sticking out. 

Alessi observed a whitish-tan powder in the bag, which he first 

thought was cocaine. When Alessi observed it more closely, he 

believed it to be methamphetamine and seized it. Thereafter, 

Alessi arrested appellant and placed him in handcuffs. Alessi 

then conducted a search of appellant incident to his arrest and 

seized a small bag corner containing cocaine from one of 

appellant's front pockets. 

 The Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches 

and seizures. E.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 254 

n.23 (1969); Warren v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 600, 602, 202 S.E.2d 

885, 887 (1974); see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 

(1991). A police officer may stop a vehicle for investigatory 

purposes if the officer possesses a reasonable articulable 

suspicion that the motorist is involved in unlawful activity. 

See Waugh v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 620, 621, 405 S.E.2d 429, 

429 (1991). Code § 46.2-1003, in conjunction with Code 

§ 46.2-1002, prohibits the use of a motor vehicle on a highway if 

that vehicle has defective or unsafe "safety glass." While in 

his cruiser, Alessi could not determine the precise extent of the 

crack in appellant's windshield and its impact on appellant's 
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ability to drive his vehicle. Alessi's observations provided him 

with a proper basis to make an investigatory stop of appellant's 

vehicle. 

 Appellant contends that even if the investigatory stop was 

proper, Alessi was not justified in patting down appellant. 

Looking again to the Fourth Amendment's proscription against 

unreasonable searches and seizures, it is not unreasonable for a 

police officer to conduct a limited pat-down search for weapons 

when the officer can point to "specific and articulable facts" 

"which reasonably lead[] him to conclude, in light of his 

experience, that 'criminal activity may be afoot' and that the 

suspect 'may be armed and presently dangerous.'" Lansdown v. 

Commonwealth, 226 Va. 204, 209, 308 S.E.2d 106, 110 (1983), cert. 

denied, 465 U.S. 1104 (1984) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 

30 (1968)). "Reasonableness is judged from the perspective of a 

reasonable officer on the scene allowing for the need of 

split-second decisions and without regard to the officer's intent 

or motivation." Scott v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 725, 727, 460 

S.E.2d 610, 612 (1995) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 

396-97 (1989)). An officer is entitled to view the circumstances 

confronting him in light of his training and experience, Terry, 

392 U.S. at 27, and he may consider any suspicious conduct of the 

suspected person. Williams v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 53, 67, 

354 S.E.2d 79, 86-87 (1987). 

 Here, as appellant pulled his car over, Alessi observed 
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appellant lunging to his right and making a brisk movement with 

his hands. Alessi was not sure what appellant was attempting to 

do. Under these circumstances, a reasonably prudent officer 

would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of 

others was in danger; therefore, Alessi was justified in 

conducting a pat-down of appellant. See Taylor v. Commonwealth, 

10 Va. App. 260, 391 S.E.2d 592 (1990). 

 After completing the pat-down of appellant, and determining 

that appellant did not possess any weapons, Alessi asked 

appellant to show him what he had in his pockets. Appellant 

consented to the request, and appellant's consent led to the 

discovery of the methamphetamine and cocaine. A consensual 

search is reasonable and thus constitutional, as long as the 

search does not exceed the scope of the consent. Bolda v. 

Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 315, 316-17, 423 S.E.2d 204, 205-06 

(1992); see also Weeks v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 460, 468, 450 

S.E.2d 379, 385 (1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 100 (1995). 

Because Alessi did not exceed the scope of appellant's consent to 

search the contents of his pockets, the search was proper. 

 The facts reveal that appellant was not subjected to an 

unreasonable search and seizure. Accordingly, the judgment of 

the trial court is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.