F OR P UB LIC AT ION


### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

R EX C H A PP ELL ,

Plaintif f-Appellee ,

v.
R. M A N D EV I LLE ; T. R O SA R IO , De fe nd an ts- Ap pe lla nts , and
J. C A SE ; C. D A V IS ; C. RAS MU S S EN ; R ODRI GUEZ ,

De fe nd an ts

. No. 09-16251

D.C. No. 2:03-cv-00653- G E B

- K JM

OPI NI ON

Appea l from the United States District Court fo r t he Ea ste rn

Di str ic t of

Ca lif or nia Gar land E. B urre ll, J r., District Judge, Pre siding

Argued and Submitted Au g us t 29 , 2 01 1— San F ra nc isc o, Ca lif

or nia Filed January

31, 2013C H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE

2

T he H on or abl e Ja mes L. G r ah am, Se n i or D i s t r i ct J u dg e f or t h e U

. S. * D i st ri ct C o urt f

o r t he So ut hern D i st ri ct of O hi o , s i t t i ng by desi gnat i o n.

T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es no part o f the o pi ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s ** b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. B e fo re : Ma

rs ha S. B e rzo n a

nd Jay S. B y be e , Ci rc uit J udg es, and James L . Gra ham, Senior District Judge. * Opinion by

J udg e B y bee; Con c ur re nc e by Judg e Gr aham; Partial Dissent by

J udg e B erzon

SUMMAR

Y **

P risoner Civil Rights The pa nel re verse d the district court’s denial of a moti on for summary judgme nt broug ht by two California state pr ison officia ls in thi s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in which plaintiff
a l l e g e d E i g h th A m e n dm e n t an d d u e p r o c e s s v i o l a t ion s in
connec tion with his six -day place ment on contra

band watch. The pa nel conc luded that, as of April-May 2002, the law was not cle arly

established as to whe ther the c onditions t hat plaintiff experienced in conne ction with the contra band
watc h, inc lud ingtw e nty -four ho ur lig hti ngand

mattr e ss de pr ivatio n, vio late d th e Ei g hth Am e ndme nt. Th e pa

ne l a lso
c on c lud e d th a t pl a int if

f c ou ld n ot c la im a libe rt y int e re st un de r t he Du e Pr oc e ss C la

us e of the F ourt e e nth

Am e ndme nt, and it was not cle arly

established that he ha dsustained aC H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE 3

vio latio n o f a

state-c re a te d li be rt

y int e re st. Th e re fo re , b oth p r i s o no f f i c i a l s w e r e e n t i t l e d

t o qu a l i f i e d i m mun i ty.
Con c ur ri ng , Di stric t Judg e Gr aham w ro te se pa rate ly beca use he disagree d with the majority ’s interpre tation of the Supreme Court’s de cision in Sandin v . Conner , 515 U.S. 472 (1995), in the c ont ex t of their ana ly sis of plaintiff’s due pr oc e ss c la im b a se d o n a

state -c re a te d li be rt

y int e re st.
Dissenti n g in part, Judge B erzon ag ree d that prison officia ls were enti tled to qualified immunity on the due proce ss issues. J udg e B erzon dissented bec ause in he r view,
a re asonable office r would have known that, in combination, the tw e nty -f

our- ho ur br ig ht l ig ht, the a

bs e nc e of a mattr e ss, and the e x tensive bodily

restra ints risked deprivingplaintiff of sle e p, in v iol a tio n o f t

he Ei g hth Am e ndme nt.

CO UN SEL Meg an R. O’Car

roll, Deputy Attorney Gene ral, Sac rame nto, California, for

Def endants-A

ppellants.
Ca leb E . M a so n, Southw e ste rn L aw Sc ho ol, L os An g e le s, California, for

Plaintiff-Appellee

.

OP IN ION
BY BEE , Circuit J udg e:
Pla int if f R e x Ch appel l br ou g ht a § 1 98 3 c a se a g a ins t various off

icial s from C alifornia State Prison, Sacr amento, alleg ing c onstitut ional violations relati ng to his six -dayC H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE

4 pla c e ment on c on tr a

ba nd watc h. Th e de fe nd ants br ou g ht a motion for summary

judgme nt, a

nd the district court g rante d the motion on some of the claims, but de nied s u m mary judgme nt w ith r espec t to Chappell’s Eig hth A mendment and due proc ess claims ag ainst d ef endants R. Mande ville and T. Rosario. Mande ville and R o s ario a ppeale d. We hold that both M an d e v il le an d

Ro s ar io ar e e n ti tl e d

to q u a li f ie d immunit y beca use the lawat the time Chappell w as on con t ra band watch did not clear ly establish that their ac tions
wer e unconstitutional. We theref ore r ever se.
I. F ACTS AND P ROCEDURAL HISTORY
Rex Chappell was a p ri soner in California State Prison, Sa c ra me nto wh e n his f

ianc e é , Ph ili ssa

Ric ha rd , c ame to v isi t him on April 28, 2002. Whe n Richard e ntere d the prison fac ilit i es s h e wa s wea

ringa pony

tail hairpiec e; the next day t h e h ai rpi ece was discove red in a trash ca n near the visiting
ro om. Pr is o n o f

f ic ia ls th e n s e ar c h e d th e e n ti r e v is it ing area and fo un d s pa

nd e x und e rg arm e nts in the wo me n’ s b a thr oo m. Both the hairpiece and the underg arme nts tested positive for
c oc a ine re sid

ue . Ric ha rd a dmi tte d that the ha ir

pie c e wa s h e rs , but an investig ation di d not conclude whether the underg arme nts al so belong ed to Richard. Abackground ch eck reve aled that Richa rd had a long history

of fe lony offe nses, including numerous drugoffe nses.
Prison staff c onducted a

sear ch of Chappe ll and his prison cel l, d ur in g w h ic hth e y

n o ti f ie d Ch a p p e ll th a t t

h e y b e li eved that someone ha d introduced drug s throug h a hairpiec e. The officia ls discovere d three unlabelled bottl es of what appea red to be eye drops in Chappe l l ’s cell. The liquid in t he bottles tested positive for methamphetamine.C H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE 5

On April 30, 2002, Chappell wa s place d on contra band watch. Under p ri s o n regulations, an offic ial who is the rank of ca ptain or above can ma

ke the decision to place a prisoner
on c ontr a ba nd watc h if the offic ia l ha s r e a so na

ble c a us e to believe that an inmate has i n gested or se cre ted contra band. F. Schr oder w as the a cting fac ility capta in at the time, but he did not remember

any specific details as to how Chappell was place d on contra

band watch or who ma de the de cision. R. Ma ndeville, capta in of the Investig ative Servic es Unit, was in char g e of the investigatio n but denies that he w as the officia l who order ed contr aband w atch. T. Rosar io was the actingwar den and also would have had a uthority to order the watch.
Contraband watch, also known as a “body cavity sear ch,” is a te mpo ra ry c on fi ne me nt d

ur ingwh ic h a

pr iso ne r is c los e ly monitored and his bowel moveme nt s sear ched to de termine wh e the r h e ha s in g e ste d o r s e c re te d c on tr a ba nd in h is dig e sti ve tr a c t. Und e r p ri so n p ro c e dure s, the pr iso ne r i s f ir st sear ched a

nd then dresse d so as to preve nt him from excreting any contra band and r emoving it from his clothing. The prisoner is pla ce d in two pairs of unde rwe ar, one worn normally and the other backw ards, with the underw ear taped at the wa ist and thighs. The p ri s o n er is also placed in two jum ps uit s, on e wo rn no rm a lly and the oth e r b a c kw ard s, wi th the su it s tap e d at th e thi g hs , a nk le s, wa ist , a

nd up pe r a rm s. The tape on both the underw ear and the jump suits is not meant to touc h the skin; it is use d to c lose off any o p en i n gs in t he c lot hi ng . T he pr iso ne r i s th e n p la c e d in wa ist c ha in restra ints, which are handcuf fs t hat are separate d and cha ined to the sid e of

the pr iso ne r’ s w a ist

. This preve nts the prisoner fr o mb e i n g a

b l e t o r e a c hh i s r e c tu m
. T h e w a i s tc h a in
r e s tr a i n t s ar e a d

j u s t a b l e an d c anb e l e n g th e n e d

i f n e c e s s ar y. The prisone r is the n place d in a surveillanc e ce ll where prisonC H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE

6

sta ff watc h th e pr iso ne r at a ll tim e s. Th e lig hts are ke pt o n in the ce ll to allow staff to see the p ri s oner. To pr event the inmate from c oncea ling co n t raba nd, the ce ll does not have
any f ur n it ur e o th e r th an a b e d w it h o u t a matt

r e s s . The prisoner is g iven a blanket , and re ceive s three me als a da y and be ve ra g e s. Whe n the pr iso ne r n e e ds to d e fe c a te he mus t no tif y the pr iso n s ta ff wh o will br inghim a pla sti c , mo ve a

ble toilet ch ai r. Once he uses the c hair, the staf f will sear ch the waste to de termine if it contains c ontraba nd. Chappell g ener ally

confirme d that t hese policie s were a p p l i e d t o h i mw h i l e h e w a s u n d e r c o n tr a b an d w a t c h

. In a dd iti on to t he se pr oc e dure s, Cha

pp e ll c la ims that he wa s a lso place d i n ankle shackles, and c hained to the be d. He complains that the wa ist restraints were not loosened f or meals, for cinghim to “eat [his] food like a dog ; the te mp e r a tu r e in th e c e ll w a s v e r y h igh ; th e c e ll was unventilated; and the lig hts were “ver y brig ht.” Cha

pp e ll
a l l e g e d th a tth e c o n d i t i o n s “ d i d

i nf a c tt o rtur e [ h i m ] m e n t a l l y” and he f

elt like he “de teriorat[ ed] mentally ” during contra band watch.
After havingthree bowel movements that did not reve al contra band, Chappe ll was release d from contr aband w atch on May 6, 2002. Chappell broug ht an ac tion under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 naming various prison officials as def endants, including Ma n d e v il le a n d Ro s a r io , a n d alleg ing nume rous constitutional claims. The d ef endants brought a

motion for
summa ry jud g me nt, and th e d i strict court, a dopting the finding s and re comm endations of the ma g istrate judg e, g rante d t h e m otion on some of the claims, but denied
summa ry jud g me nt w ithre sp e c t to tw o of Cha pp e ll’ s c la imsC H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE 7

ag ainst M an d eville and Rosar io: (1) that the contr aband watch c onstitut ed cr

uel and unusua l punishment in vi olation of the Eig hth A mendment, and (2) that Chapp el l ’s due proce ss rig hts w ere violated since he was not g iven notice of the c ha rg e s a g a ins t hi m or

an o pp or tun ity to b e he ard

pr ior to be ingpla c e d o n c on tr a

ba nd watc h. Mand e vil le and

Ros ari o appea led.
II. LEGAL BACKG ROUND Qualified immunity

protec ts gove rnm en t officials fr om c ivi l da ma g e s “ insofar a s th e ir

c on du c t do e s n ot v iol a te clea rly established st atutory or constit utional rig hts of which
a re asonable person would h av e known.” Harlow v. Fi tzge ra ld , 4 57 U. S. 8 00 , 8 18 (1 982); see also Schwe nk v. Ha rtf or d , 204 F.3d 1187, 1195–96 (9th Cir. 2000) (a pplying qualified immunity

to prison officials). Whether qualified immunit y ap p l i es t hus “turns on the objec tive leg al
rea sonablene ss of the ac tion, assessed in light o f t h e leg al rules that wer e clea

rly established at the time it was t aken.” Messe rschmidt v. Millende r , 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1 2 4 5 (2012) (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma

rk s o mitte d) . O ff

ic ia ls mus t ha

ve “ fa ir
war ning” that their ac tions are unc onstitu t ional. Hope v

. Pelzer , 536 U. S. 7 30 , 7 41 (2 00 2) ; Porter v. Bowen , 496 F.3d 10 09 , 10 26 –2 7 (9 th Cir

. 20 07 ). I f an of fi c ial “re a so na

bly beli eves that his or her c onduct complies with the law,” qualified immunity

applies. P e a r

s o n v

. Ca ll

a h an , 555 U .S. 22 3, 24 4 ( 20 09 ); see also Motley v. Parks , 432 F. 3 d1 0 72, 1077 (9th Cir. 2005) (e n banc) (noting that qualified immunit y will “shield[] an off

icer from trial whe n the offic er rea sonably

mi s ap p r e h ends the law g overning the circ u m stance s she conf

ronted, e ven if the of

fice r’s c onduct
was constitutionally defic ient” (interna l quotation m arksC H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE

8

W e h av e j u r i s di ct i on t o con s i der an i n t er l ocu t or y a ppea l of a de n i al of 1 q u a lif ie d im m u n ity. B ehr ens v. P el l et i er , 5 1 6 U .S . 2 9 9 , 3 0 7 (1 9 9 6 ). W e re v i ew a di s t r i ct c ou r t ’ s de n i al of s u mmar y j u dg men t on g r ou n ds of omitted)), overruled o n o ther grounds by United States v. King , 687 F.3d 1189 ( 9th Cir. 2012) (en ba nc).
To deter mine whether

the law wa s clea

rly established, we first look to our own bi n d i n g prec edent. See O solinski v. Kane , 92 F .3 d 93 4, 93 6 (9 th Cir

. 19 96 ). I f no ne is on po in t, we may consider other decisional law

. Id. ; Drum mo nd e xre l. Drum mo nd

v . Ci ty of A na he im , 343 F .3 d 1 05 2, 10 60 –6 1 ( 9th Cir. 2003). W e nee d not find that the “ve ry action in question has previously been held unlawful,” Anderson v. Creighton , 48 3 U .S. 63 5, 64 0 ( 19 87 ) ( int e rn a l c itatio n o mit ted ), but, rathe r, we consider whether “a r easona

ble offic er w ould have had fa ir notice that [the action] was unlawf ul, and that any mistake to t h e contrary

would have be en unre asonable .” Drummond , 34 3 F .3 d a t 10 60 ; see also Hope , 536 U.S. at 741 (“[O]fficials ca

n still be on noti ce that their conduc t violates established law e ven in novel fa ctual cir cumstance s.”).

In deter mining whe ther a

g overnme nt official should be g rante d qualified immunity , we view th e fa ct s in the light most favora

ble to the injured pa

rty

. Sa uc ie r v . Ka tz , 5 33 U. S. 194, 201 (2001), rece ded from on other grounds by Pe arson , 35 5 U .S. a t 81 7– 21 ; see also Bryan v . MacPhe rson , 630 F.3d 805, 817 (9th Cir. 2010)

.

III . D ISC USS ION On appe al, Mande ville and Ros ario a rgue that they

are e nti tle d to qu a lif

ie d immun ity

on Cha pp e ll’ s E ig hth Am e ndme nt a

nd du e pr oc e ss c la ims

. We ag ree . Under 1C H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE 9

q u a lif ie d im m u n ity d e no v o
. See Br yan , 6 3 0 F .3 d a t 8 2 3 ; So r r el s v. M cKee , 29 0 F.3d 96 5 , 96 9 (9t h C i r. 20 0 2 ). Chappell’s ver sion o f t h e facts, and a ssuming that he ha s state d a c la im und e r t

he Ei g hth and F ourt e e nth

Am e ndme nts , the law wa s not clear ly

establi s h ed o n either of

Chappell’s claims at the time the contra band watch took pla ce suc h that Mand e vil le and

Ros ari o wo uld have ha d fa ir no tic e that th e ir
a c tio ns we re un c on sti tut ion a l. T hu s, Mand e vil le and Ros ari o ar e e n t i t l e d

t o qu a l i f i e d i m mun i ty.
A. Chap pe ll’ s Ei ght h Amend ment Cl aim
Cha pp e ll a rgue s th a t th e c omb inatio n o f c on dit ion s to which he was subj ecte d, including twe nty -four -hour lig hting and mattre ss d eprivation, viol ated his Eig hth Amendment ri g hts . We ho ld t

hat a s of A

pr il- May 20 02 , w he n Ch a

pp e ll
wa s p la c e d o n c on tr a

band w a tc h, the law w a s n ot c le arl y e st ablish e d a s to wh e the r t he c on dit ion s Ch a

pp e ll experience d—either in isolat i o no r c o mb i n at i o n

— violated the Eig hth Amendment, made a pplicable to the states throug h the Four teenth Amendme nt.
1. Continu ous li ghting
Wit h reg ards to continuous lig hting, a s of April-Ma y 2002, we ha d explained ge nera lly that s ufficie nt or “[a]dequate lig ht i n g i s one of the f undamental attributes of ‘ade quate sh el ter’ r equire d by the Eig hth Amendment,” Hoptowit v. Spellman , 753 F. 2 d 7 7 9 , 783 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that inadequate lightingviolated the Const i t u tion), but w e ha d o nly

a dd re sse d c on sta

nt i ll uminatio n o nc e in Ke e na n v. Ha ll , 83 F.3d 1083, 1088, 1090–91 ( 9th Cir. 1996). In Keenan we he ld that there w as a t ri able issue of fac t on aC H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE

10

As J ud ge B er zon a ck n owl edg es i n h er di s s en t , Cha ppel l “ di d n ot 2 exp res sl y al l ege” t hat t he co nt raba nd wat ch caused hi m s l eep i ng p rob l em s. D i ss ent O p
. at 35

. T he o nl y s t at em ent rel at i ng t o s l eep i n t he A m end ed C o m p l ai nt i s t hat C ha p p el l was “ d et eri o rat i ng m ent al l y ” and h a d to “a ttem p t t o sle e p tha t wa y.” c on tin uo us lig hti ng c la im whe re a pr iso ne r w a s su bje c te d to two larg e fluoresc ent lights that wer e kept on 24 hours a day fo r s ix m o n th s , an d

th e p r is o n e r

c la im e d th a t t h e li g h ting
cause d him “‘g rave sleepingprobl em s ’ and othe r and psy cholog ical proble ms.” Id. at 1088, 1091. We noted that the prison officia ls in that case ha d “no leg itimate penolog ical justification for re quiring inmates to suffer phy si ca l and psy cholog ical har

m by living in constant il lumination,” id. at 1090 (int er n al quotation marks and a lterations omitted), relying on a district c ourt dec ision, Le Ma irev . M

aa ss , 7 45 F. Supp. 623, 636 (D. Or. 1990) , va ca t ed , 12 F.3d 1444, 1459 (9 th C ir

. 19 93 ) (v a c a tin g , in pa rt , b e c a us e the state a g re e d to chang e the lig hting)

. Keenan did not clear l y establish that Mandeville’s a nd Ro s ar i o ’s ac tions were unc onstitut ional beca use the fa cts of Keenan are distinguishable. In Keenan , the prisoner claimed sleep de privation over a

period of six months; C happell’s
c la im i s b a se d o n s e ve n d ay s o f co ntr a ba nd watc h, and

he did not claim that he wa s sleep depr ived. 2

Moreove r, Keenan did not clea rly establish that constant illumi nation violates the Eig hth Amendment when done for a leg itimate penolog ical purp o se. Keenan noted that no leg itimate p enolog ical justification had be en off ere d in that
case
. Keenan , 83 F.3d at 1090. F urthermor e, the district court
case on which Keenan relied, Le Ma ire , ac kn ow le dg e d th a t a need to se e into cells as a secur i t y m easure could be aC H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE 11

Ju d g e B e rz o n p o ints o u t t h a t Kee nan say s t hat “ ‘ t here i s no le g iti m a te 3 p eno lo gi cal jus t i f

i cat i o n f o r r eq ui ri ng i nm at es t o s uf f er phys i cal and psy chol ogi cal har m by l i vi ng i n c ons t ant i l l umi nat i on. ’ ” Kee nan , 83 F. 3d at 10 9 0 (quo t i ng L eM a i re , 7 4 5 F . S u p p . at 6 3 6 ); s ee D i ss ent O p
. a t 36. A l t ho ug h Ju d ge B erz o n re ad s Kee nan as broadl y s t at i ng t hat penol ogi cal
rea so ns ca nn o t justi f

y co nstant i l l um i na t i o n un d er a ny circum st an ce s, Kee nan i t s e l f

w a s qu ot i n g f

r om L eM a i re , i n whi ch t hat co urt l ef t op en t he p o ss i b i l i t y t hat a legi t i m at e p eno l o gi cal purp o se coul d jus t i f y co nst ant i l l u mi n at i on
. 745 F. Su pp. a t 636. leg itimate penolo g ical justification, but conclude d that the penolog ical justification offe red in that c ase w as insufficie nt beca use there was no e vidence that the staff “ need[ed] to see into the qui et ce l l s for 24 hour s per da y , or that they

[were] even ne ar the quiet cells for 24 hours per

day .” Le Ma ire , 745 F. Supp. at 636. I n contra st, the rec ord her e re flec ts a clea r 3 pe no log ic a l pur

po se . Pris on of

fi c ia ls sus pe c te d th a t Ch a

pp e ll ha d s e c re te d c on tr a

ba nd in h is bod

y and ke pt the lig hts on

so that they could monitor Chappe ll 24 hours a day t o p re v ent him fr om d ispo si ngof

the c on tr a

ba nd . T he of

fi c e rs wo uld have be e n un a

ble to pe rf

or m c on tr a ba nd watc h if the y

c ou ld
no t se e int o h is c e ll. Thus , o ur c a se law d id n ot c le arl y est a b li s hth a t i nAp r il

- M a y 2 0 0 2 th a t t

h e c o n s tant ill umi natio n o f C ha

pp e ll’ s c e ll w a s unc on sti tut ion a l.

In addition, even if Chappe ll and Mandeville had looked to other dec isional law for guidance they still would not have ha d f a ir no tic e that th e ir

a c tio ns were un c on sti tut ion a l. I n d eed, one district court c ase sur veying the state of the la

w explained that the re have been “mix ed results” on c ontinuous lightingclaims bec ause “ such ca ses ar e fa ct-drive n.” Sh e ph e rd v . A ult , 9 8 2 F

. S u

p p
. 6 4 3 , 6 4 5 ( N

. D

. Io w a

1 9 9 7 )

. In that case the cour

t held th at p ri soners ra ised a g enuine issue of mater ial fac t on their Eig hth Amendment claims whe re two prisoners spe nt 283 day s and 550 d ay s , respe ctively , underC H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE

12 brig ht lighting , and one of those two prisoners c laimed that he had difficult y

s l eeping

. Id. at 647–49. Under differ ent circ umstances, howe ver, othe r cour ts had conclude d that the
e ff e c ts of c on tin

uo us lig hti ng we re no t se ve re e nough to constitute a violation of the Eig hth Amendment. See, e .g. , Zatko v. Rowland , 835 F. Supp. 1174, 1181 (N.D . Cal 1993) (noting that contin u o us light depr iving a prisoner of

sleep
wo uld be un c on sti tut ion a l but di smi ssi ngthe c la im b e c a us e the offic ers did not use the l i gh t to try to keep the pr isoner
awa ke ); W ill iam s v . W

ar d , 567 F. Supp. 10, 13, 15 (E.D.N .Y 1982) (holdingthat keepinghallway lights on all night did not viol ate a constitutional right eve n wher e plaintiff c laimed ina bil ity to s le e p) ; Cassidy v. Superintendent , 392 F. Supp. 33 0, 33 4 ( W.D . V a . 1 97 5) (h old ing that “ fl oo d[in g ] a c e ll with a brig ht lig ht twe nty -four hours a day ” was constitutional whe re the lights allowed g uards to che ck t he cells, the lig hts w ere not brig ht enoug h to interfer e with the prisoners’ sleep, the p ri s o ner c hose to stay in that particular cell, and the light was not use d in a “vind i ct i v e manner”) , aff’d in part, rev ’d in part and remande d , 5 29 F .2 d 5 14 (4 th C i r
. 1 9 7 5 ) ( g r o un d s f

o r r e v e r s a l n o tp r o v i d e d) ; Bauer v. Sie laf f , 3 7 2 F

. Su

p p
. 1 1 0 4 , 1 1 1 0 ( E

. D

. Pa

. 1 9 7 4 ) (“ [T] he discomfort of lig hts at night do[es] n o t constitute a constitutional deprivation.”).
Moreove r, in a diff

ere nt context—t hat of pr e- trial detainee s bring ing c laims under the Due Process Clause of the Four teenth Amendment, which pr otects an e ven broa der class of inter ests than the Eig hth Amendment, see Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego , 942 F.2d 1435, 1440 n.7 (9th Cir. 1991) (explaining that “ while the eig hth amendment prosc ribes
crue l and unusual punishment for convicted inmates, the due proce ss c lause of the fourtee nth a mendment proscr ibes any punis hme nt of

pr e tr ia l de ta ine e s” ); se e als o B e ll v . W olf ish ,C H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE 13

441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 1 6 (1979),—other courts ha d held that constant lig hting can se rve a leg itimate penolog ical purpose

. See, e .g. , Fe rgus on v . Ca

peGi ra rd

e au Cou nty , 88 F.3d 647, 650 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding wher e brig ht lights wer e on continuously

and the plaintiff was observed slee ping that the “totality of the c ircumstance s—which include the relative short duration of the c onfinement, the ne cessity t o keep the detainee under obse rvation for both his medical condition as well as g ener al safe ty

conce rns, and t he amount of time that he sp e nt o ut o f t

he c e ll— su

pp or ts the a sse rt ion

of le g iti mate g overnme ntal interest,” a nd t hus no constitutional viol ation
occur red) ; O’Donne ll v . Thomas , 826 F.2d 788, 790 (8th Cir. 1987) (“ [C ]ont inuous lighting in [ a] holding ce ll was not
unre a so na

ble g ive n the ne e d for ja il s e c ur ity and the ne e d to
mon ito r [the pr iso ne r]. ” ); Fillmore v. Ordone z , 829 F. Supp. 1544, 1568 (D. Ka

n. 1993) (holding t h at a continuous lowintensity light was “re asonably related to the maintenanc e of internal sec urity

of the Osa g e County

jail”), aff’d , 1 7 F. 3d 1436 (10th Cir. 1994), abrogated in part on other grounds as recognized by

W illiams v. W

eber , 905 F. Sup p
. 1 502, 1512 n.13 (D. Ka

n. 1995).
Over all, as of Apr il- May 2002, other jurisdictions had made de cisions on continuous l i gh ting ba sed on var ious fac tors, including whether the lights cause d sleep de privation, Sh e phe rd , 9 82 F . Su

pp . at 64 7–49 ; Zatko , 835 F. Supp. at 11 81 ; Cassidy , 392 F. Supp. at 334; the brig htnes s and intensity of the lig hts, id. ; the duration of e x posure, Sh e ph e rd , 98 2 F. Sup p. a t 64 8–49 ; Ferguson , 88 F.3d at 650; whether a leg itimate penolog ical justification ex i sted, Cassidy , 3 92 F. Sup p. a t 33 4; F

e r g uson , 88 F .3 d at 65 0; Fi llm or e , 8 29 F. Sup p. a t 15 68 ; and

wh e the r pri son o ff

ic ia ls w e re tr

yingto k ee p the prisoner

awake, Zatko , 8 3 5 F

. Su p p
. a t 1 1 8 1. The results of these case s w ere mix ed. A lar g e majority of theC H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE

14

c ourt s, ho we ve r, c on c lud e d th a t th e the re wa s n o E ig hth Amendment violation. Since, at the time Chappe ll’s con t raba nd watch took place , no court ha d ruled on whe th er c ontraba nd watch constitutes a leg itimate pen o lo g ic a l p urpose that would justify
c on tin uous lig hti ng , a

nd Cha pp e ll w a s su

bje c te d to continuous lightingfor only seven da y s and did not claim that he wa s deprived of s l eep or intentionally

kept awa

ke, Mand e vil le and Ros ari o did no t have fa ir no tic e th at t he ir actions we re unc onstitut ional. Given our de cision in Keenan and the de cisional law in other c ircuits, we have some doubt that t h e c o n d it io n s th a t C h a p p e ll e xp e r ie n c e d

under contra band wa t ch even a

mounted to Eighth Ame ndment vio latio n, but w e do no t r each thi s q ue sti on sin c e , at a minimum , the law wa s not cl ea rl y established that the contra band watch was unc onstitut ional and thus Chappell’s Eig hth Amendm ent claim ca n be re solved on qualified immunit y g rounds.
2. M at tr e ss d e pr iva ti on
The lawwas not c lear ly established as of April-Ma y 2002 with reg ards to mattre ss deprivation either . We had held that
mattr e ss de pr ivatio n “ fo r on ly on e night [w a s] in su ff ic ie nt t o state an eig hth amendment violation,” Hernande z v. De nton , 861 F.2d 1421, 1424 ( 9th Cir. 1988), vacate d on other grounds , 493 U.S. 801, (1989), but had not made c lear wh e the r mattr e ss de pr ivatio n for lon g e r c ou ld s tate an E ig hth Amendment cla im. Although we had indicated in an unpublished decision that a pr isoner who was “for ced to sleep on the floor, without a mattre ss, next to b ro ken toilets and overf lowing show ers” for a n unspecifie d period of time a nd “had to we ar the same c lothe s for 45 da y s” mig ht have a

nC H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE 15

Eig hth Amendment claim, Seagra ve v. He nnessey , No. 92- 17121, 1994 U.S. A

pp. L EXI S 4321, at *4–6 (9t h C i r. Mar. 2, 1994), we had also explained that the Suprem e C o u rt’s observation that “ a condition of confine ment which does not violate the Eig hth Amendment when it exists for just a fe w day s may constitute a violation when it exist s for ‘w eeks or months,’ . . . [ did] not p ro vide clea r guidance to prison
o ff i ci al s as t o h o w m u ch t i m e m u s tp as s b ef o re re qu i ri n g a pr iso ne r t o slee p o n th e fl oo r o f a c e ll w ith out a

mattr e ss [ m ay ] co n s t i tu t e a nE i gh thAm en dm en tv i o l at i o n
. ” S c h roeder v. Kaplan , 6 0 F .3 d 83 4, 19 95 WL39 88 78 , at *2 (9 th C ir . July 7, 1995) (unpublished) ( quoting Hu t t o v. Finley , 4 37 U. S. 678, 686–87 (1978))

. We also held in Sc hr oe de r that, wher e a prisoner

was for ced to slee p on a cold c oncre te floor f or most of a month, the l aw wa s not clear ly established on whether mattress depr ivation was an Eig hth Amendment violation. Id. at *2–3. We conclud ed that ther e wa s no binding prece dent in our circ uit, that decisional law in other jurisdictions was incon s is te nt, and that those cour ts that found
a c on sti tut ion a l vi olatio n h a d a dd iti ona l e g re g iou s f a c ts s upporting an Eig hth Amendment claim. Id. a t * 2 ( c iting
case s that included additional factors such as “ex treme c old, la c k o f s anit ary c on dit ion s, so lit ary c on fi ne me nt, ina de qu a te clothing, or

improper diet” ).

I f Mandeville and Rosario had looked to Schroede r they would not ha

ve had notice on whether mattress de p ri vation
c on sti tut e d a

n E ig hth Am e ndme nt v iol a tio n. Th is i s particula rly true be cause the fac ts surrounding Chappell’s confine ment are much less seve re tha n those in Schroe de r. Not only was Chappe ll forc ed to sleep without a mattre ss for only seven da

y s, which is s i gnificantly less time than the prisoner in Schroede r wh o we nt a month w ith out a

mattr e ss, but Chappell had a be d and a blanket. Mande ville andC H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE

16
Ros ari o a lso su

bmi tte d e vid e nc e tha

t th e re wa s a

le g iti mate purpose f or n o t al lowing Cha

ppell to have a

mattress—no mattress or f

urniture wa s allowed into the ce ll to prevent the inmate from c oncea ling c ontraba nd.
We did not hear a

ny case s on m at tress depr ivation betwee n J uly 1995, when Sc hr oe de r wa s d e c ide d, and Ap ri lMay 2002, when Chappell was placed on c ontraba nd watch. Th e law o f oth e r j ur isd ic tio ns be tw e e n July 19 95 and Ap ri lMay 20 02 wo uld

no t ha ve provide d Ch a

pp e ll a nd Ros ari o with a ny further clar ity either. Compare Jone

s v. Toombs , 77 F.3d 482, 1996 WL67750 (6th Cir. Fe b. 15, 1996) (u np ub lis he d) (h old ing that two we e ks wi tho ut a mattr e ss d id not violate the Eig hth A m en d ment), O’ Le ar yv . I owa Sta te Me n's R e for ma tor y , 79 F.3d 82, 84 (8th Cir. 1 9 9 6 ) (holding th atth re e d ay s wi th o uta b l an k eta n d a m at tre s s d

uri n g a dis c ipl ina ry c on fi ne me nt d id n ot v iol a te the Ei g hth Amendment), Castro v. Chesney , No. CI V. A. 97-4983, 1998 WL767467, at *8 (E.D. Pa. N ov. 3, 1998) (holdingthat two day s without a mattress and a blanket wo u l d not rise to a constitutional viol ation), and Johnson v. Zanon , 543 N.W. 2d 868, 1995 WL 576891, at *1–2 (Wis. C t. App. Oct. 3, 1995) (u np ub lis he d) (h old ingthat thr e e da y s w ith out a

mattr e ss d id not support an Eig hth Amendment claim), with DeSpain v. Up ho ff , 2 2 9 F. 3 d

1 1 6 2 , 2 0 0 0 W L1 2 2 8 0 0 3 ( 1 0 thC i r. Au g. 30 , 2 00 0) (u

np ub lis he d) (h old ing th at thre e da y s w ith out a mattress, bedding , o r clothes in an unhe ated c ell was
su ff i cient to wit hstand summary judgme nt on prisoner’s Eig hth A mendment claim), Rhoden v . Godinez , No. 95 C 5085, 1996 WL55 9 9 5 4, at *4 (N.D . I ll. Sept. 30, 1996) (unpublished) (holding that sever al m onths without bed linen and a mattress could sustain a n Eig hth Amendment claim, but noti n g th a t th e d e p r iv a ti o n c o u ld h av e b e e n “ ju s ti f ied by leg itimate security

concer n s”), and Gordon v. She ahan , No.C H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE 17

96 C 1784, 1997 W L 136699, at *7 (N.D. I ll. Ma r. 24, 1997) (noting that “[ r] equiring eve n a convic ted prisoner to sleep
w i th o u ta m a t tr e s s f

o r m o r e t h ana

f e wd ay s c o u l d ” v i o la te the Eig hth Amendment). Thus, our c onclusion in Schroede r that th e law w a s n ot c le arl y e sta bli sh e d wa s st ill tr

ue in A pr ilM ay 2002. Ma

nd e vil le and

Ros ari o w ou ld n ot h ave ha d f a ir notice that mattre ss de privation alone w ould have c onstitut ed a constitutional violation.
3. Co m bina ti on o f co ndit ion s
Vi e wi ngthe fa c ts i n th e lig ht m os t fa vo ra ble to C ha

pp e ll, in a dd iti on to th e c on tin uo us lig hti ngand

the mattr e ss deprivation, Chappell alleg ed that he was taped into two pairs of under wea r and jumpsuits, p l ac ed in a hot ce ll with no ventilation, chained to a

n iron bed, shackle d at the ankles a nd
wa ist so that he c ou ld n ot m ov e his arm s, and was forc e d to eat like a dog . The district cour

t adopted the mag istrate’s finding that these c onditions had the “mut ually enfor cing
e ff e c t of sle e p d e pr ivatio n th a t any re a so na ble of fi c e r w ou ld know comp ri s edu n co n s t i tu t i o n al co n ditions of confinement.” We disag ree
. I t is true that “[ s ] ome condit ions of confine ment may es t abli sh an Eig hth Amendment violation ‘in combination’ when e ach w ould not do so alone.” W ilson v. Seiter , 501 U. S. 294, 304 (1991). B ut this onl y ap plies when the c onditions “have a mutually

enfor cingeff

ect that pr oduces the deprivation of a sing le, identifiable human need such as food,
war mth, or exercise—for

example, a low cell temperature at night c ombined with a fa ilure to issue blankets.” Id. Cha pp e ll ha s n ot a lle g e d th e de pr ivatio n o f a ny su c h ne e d he re . H e did not specifica lly

claim that he wa s sl ee p d eprive d duringtheC H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE

18

contr a b an d w a tc h , b u t o n ly

th a t h e w a s “ d e te r io r a ting mentally ” and ha d to “attempt to sleep that wa y .”
Moreove r, th e foc us of the inquiry under qua lified immun ity is whe the r the de fe nd ants ha d fa ir no tic e that th e ir actions were unconstitut ional. I n April-May 2002, there wer e no case s in this jurisdiction that involved a contr aband w atch sim ila r t o th e on e that oc curre d h e re . T he on ly fa c tua lly sim ila r c a se wa s M

e n d o z a v

. B l od

ge tt , which involved a

“ fe c e s w a tch ” whe re the pr iso ne r w a s p la c e d in a “ dr y c e ll”
we ari ng on ly a pa ir of sh or ts and no t g ive n a bl ank et. Me nd oz a v . B lod

ge tt , 1990 WL263527, at *4–5 (E.D. Wash. Dec . 21, 1990), aff’d on other grounds , 960 F.2d 1425, 1427
n. 3 ( 9th Cir . 1 99 2) (n oti ngthat Me nd oza did not r e ne w h is Eig hth Amendment Claim). I n that case, the district court he ld t hat th e se c ir c ums tanc e s d id not amo unt to an E ig hth Am e ndme nt v iol a tio n, no tin g that th e purp os e of the se c on dit ion s w a s “ to i ns ur e tha t [th e pr iso ne r was ] un a

ble to conce al or de stroy

any contra band passedthroug h a bowe l movement.” Id. at *5.
Ca s e l aw in other

jurisdictions would not have provided any further clar ity . The Seventh Circuit held simi larly that place ment of a prisoner into a dry cell for three day s, during which he w as unable to wash his hands and de nied per sonal hyg ie ne ite ms, did

no t vi olate the Ei ghth Ame ndme nt, particula rly since the pr isoner had be en “c onfined to the dry cell to serve a leg itimate peno l o gi cal inter est.” Jihad v. W right , 1 2 4 F. 3 d 2 0 4 , 1 9 9 7 W L4 7 1 3 4 5 , at* 2 (7 thC i r. Au g. 14 , 1 99 7) (u

np ub lis he d) ; see also Stewart v. W right , 101 F.3d 704, 1996 WL 665978, at *1 (7 t h Cir. Nov. 14, 1996) (unpublished) (holdingthat a thre e-da y confine ment to dry cell without toilet paper, toothbrush, toothpas t e, in a “f ilthy
roac h-infeste d cell” did not violate t he Eighth Amendment).C H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE 19

B e c a u se M a n d e v ill e a n d R o sa rio a re e n tit le d to q u a lif ie d im m u n ity, 4

w e d o no t co n sid e r w h e the r th e se c o n d iti o n s a m o u n te d to a n a c tua l E igh th A mendm ent vi ol at i on. O ur hol di ng i s l i mi t ed t o a f i ndi ng t hat t he l aw w as not c l ear l y es t abl i s hed a s t o whet her t he condi t i ons t hat Chapp el l was su b je c te d to , b o th in i s o la tio n a n d c o m b ina tio n , vio la te d the E igh th A m e n d m e n t. See Rei chl e v. H owar ds , 132 S. Ct

. 2088, 2093 ( 2012) ( expl ai ni ng t hat a cour t “ may gr ant qual i f i ed i mm un i t y on t he gr ound t hat a p urpo rt ed ri ght was not ‘ cl earl y est ab l i shed’ by p ri o r case l aw, wi t ho ut
res o l vi ng t he o f

t en m o re d i f

f i cul t q uest i o n whether t he p urpo rt e d right
e x ists a t all” to a v o id d e c id ing c o n stitutio n a l q u e stio n s u n n e c e ssa rily); s ee als o Pear s on , 5 5 5 U .S . at 2 3 6

– 3 7 , 2 4 1

. Al tho ug h th e c on dit ion s h e re we re mor e se ve re tha n th os e in t he fe c e s w a tc h c a se s, a s p re vio us ly e xpla ine d, Ma

nd e vil le and Rosario pre sented e vidence that the contra b an dwatch conditions were eng ineer ed with a n ey e to ac complishing the
s am e p en o l o gi ca l p u rp o s e a s t h e f ec es wa tch
case s—discoveringsecr e te d c o ntr a b a n d

. G iv e n this important penolog ical purpo s e and the state of the lawat the time, the contra band watch was not “such a far cry from what any rea sonable prison officia l could have be lieved wa s leg al that th e defenda

nts knew or should have known they wer e brea king the law.” So rre ls , 29 0 F .3d at 971; se e als o Me sserschmidt , 1 3 2 S

. C t

. a t1 2 4 4 ( “ Q u a l i f i e d i m mun ity gives g overnme nt officials bre athing room to make
r e a s o n a b le b u t m is ta

k e nju d g me n ts , an d

p r o te c ts a ll b u t the plainly incompetent or those who knowing ly violate the law.” (interna l quotation marks omitted)).

B e c a us e no c ourt ha d h e ld t

hat c on dit ion s si mil ar t o th os e Chappell experience d wer e unconstit utional in the face of the important penolog ical purpose of di scover ing contraba nd, we hold that Mandeville and Rosar io are en t itled to qualified immun ity on Cha pp e ll’ s E ig hth

Am e ndme nt c la im. 4C H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE

20
B. C h a p p e l l ’ s D u eP r o c es s C l a i m Chappell also claims that his rig ht to due p rocess was vio late d b e c a

us e he wa s not p ro vid e d w ithan o pp or tun ity to be hea rd by the offic ial who orde red the contra band wa t ch. For Chappell to be entitled to due proc ess we f irst must find that he ha s a lib e rt

y int e re st tri g g e ri ngpr oc e dura l pr ote c tio ns
. A liberty interest can ar ise from one of two sourc es—either the Due Proc ess C lause of the Four teenth Amendme nt or state law. Me nd

oz a , 960 F.2d a t 1428. Since Chappell does
no t make c le ar wh e the r he ba se s his c la im on the Du e Pr oc e ss Cla us e of the F ourt e e nth Am e ndme nt or wh e the r h e c la ims a state-c reated liberty

interest, we analy

ze both theories.
1. Libe r ty

i n t e r e s t u nde r th e F our te e nt h Am e ndm e nt
We conclude tha t the Due Proc ess Clause of the F ourt e e nth

Am e ndme nt d oe s n ot a ff or d C hap pe ll a

lib e rt y i n t e r e s t

. “ [ L ] aw f

u l l y i n c ar c e r a t e d

p e r s o n s r e t a i no n l y a narr ow ra ng e of pr otected liber

ty interests.” Hewitt v. Helms , 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983). Thus, “[a]s long as the conditions or degree of conf

inement to which t h e prisoner is subjected is w ith in t he se nte nc e imp os e d u

po n h im a nd is n ot o the rw ise violative of the Constit ution, the Due Proc ess Clause does not in i tse lf su

bje c t an inmate ’s tr e a tme nt by pr iso n a uth or iti e s to judicial oversig ht.” Montanye v. Hay mes , 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976). Tr ansfe r t o l ess amena ble quar ters for non-punitive
r e a s o n s h a s b e e nh e l d

t o b e “ o r d i n ar i l y c o n t e mp l a t e d b y a prison sentenc e.” He witt , 459 U. S. at 4 68 ; se e als o W ilkinson
v . A us tin , 5 45 U.S. 209, 221 (2005) (e x plaining that “[t] he Con sti tu ti on

its e lf do e s n ot g ive ri se to a

lib e rt y int e re st i n avo id in g tr a n s f

e r to mo r e a d v e r s e conditions of confine ment”). Indeed, the Due Proc ess Clause does not protec t ag ainst all chang es in c onditions of confine ment evenC H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE 21

wher e they

“hav[e] a substant i al adve rse impac t on the prisoner involved.” Meac hum v. Fano , 4 2 7 U.S . 215, 224 (1976). An investig ative contr aband w atch is the ty pe of c ond ition of conf inement that is ordinarily contemplat ed by

the sentenc e imposed. Only

the most ex treme c hang es in the conditions of confine ment have been found to directly invoke the protec tions of the Due Proc ess Cl au se, such a s involuntary

commitment to a ment al institut ion, see Vitek v. Jones , 445 U.S. 4 80, 493–94 (1980), or the forc ed administration of

psy chotropic dr

ug s, W ashington v. Harper , 494 U.S. 210, 221–22 (1990). Since a tempora ry contra band
wat c hd o e s n o tr i s e t o t h i s l e v e l , C h a p p e l l c an n o td i r e c tly claim a l i b erty

interest under

the Due Proc ess Clause of the Four teenth Amendme nt.
2. St at e -c r e at e d libe r tyint e r e st
I n addition, the claim that Mande ville and Rosario ar e liable to Chappell for da mag es base d on a state- cre ated lib e rt y int e re st a lso fa ils . Si nc e the l aw w a s n ot c le arl y established on whether a state- cre ated liber ty interest existed with reg ard t o t h e contraband w atch whe n it took place, Man d ev i lle and Rosario a re a lso entitled to qualified immunit y on Chappell’s due pr ocess c laim, a nd so cannot be liable for da

mag es.

a. Sand in and th e substantive predicates t est
A s tate may

c re a te a lib e rt y int e re st t

hr ou g h sta tu tes, prison regulations, and policies. W ilkinson , 545 U.S. at 222; Ne a l v. Shimoda , 131 F.3d 818, 827 ( 9th Cir. 1997). For
many y e ars we ana ly

zed wh e the r a state ha d c re a te d a lib e rt yC H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE

22 interest in its pris o n regulations under the “substantive predic ates a

pproac h,” based on the Supreme Court’s de cision in Hewitt v. Helms , 459 U.S. 460. This approac h asked whether the state ha s place d “substantive limitati ons on officia l discretion,” thr o u g h “adoptingregulations which establish ‘substantive predic ates’ to g overn officia l deci sionmaking,” by

using “ expli citly

mandatory” rather than discre tionary

languag e. Me nd

oz a , 960 F.2d at 1428–29;
se e als o He witt , 459 U.S. at 471–72.
Our a pproac h to s t ate- cre ated liber ty interests cha

ng ed, howeve r, in response to the Cou rt ’s decision in Sandin v. Conner , 515 U.S. 472 (1995)

. In Sa nd in , the Court criticized its pr e vio us “sub sta

nti ve pr e dic a te s” a

pp ro a c h a s a

pp lie d to chang es i n prison conditions, assertingthat “the se arc h for a neg ative implication from manda t o ry languag e in prisoner regulations has stray ed fr om the rea l conce rns un d erg irding the liberty protec ted by the Due Pro ce s s Clause.” Id. at 480–83. Sandin then re focuse d the inqui ry o n whether the action “imposes [an] aty

pical and signific ant hardship on the inmate i n relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at4 8 3

– 8 4

. Inap p l yi n g Sa nd in , we ha ve con cl u d ed that the discretionar

y /mandatory

substa nti ve pre dicates a

pproac h was “aba ndoned” o r “overrule d” in Sa nd in , and our de cisions have focuse d only on the “aty pical and sig nificant ha

rdship” test, even in the fac e of r eleva nt prison regulations. See, e .g. , Myron v . Terhune , 476 F.3d 716, 719 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting tha t Sa ndin abandone d the mandatory /discretionary me tho do logy

f o r c o nv i c t e d p r i s on e rs ); McQ uillion v. Duncan , 30 6 F .3 d 8 95 , 9 03 (9 th C ir . 2 00 2) (n oti ngthat Sa nd in

“ a ba nd on [ed ] the ‘m and a tor

y langua g e ’ f

ra me wo rk ” ); Du

ffy v. Rive land , 98 F.3d 447, 457 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining that the mandator

y languag e “te s t for the e x istence ofstatecr e a te d li b e rty inte r e s ts

. . . h a s b e e n a b an d o n e d b y

theC H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE 23

I n co nt ras t t o t he shi f t regar d ing p riso n co nd i t i o ns and dis ci p l i ne 5
c a se s, the “m a n d a to ry la n g u a g e ” a n a lysis o f G r ee nhol t z v. In m a t es of Neb. P en a l & Co r r

. Co m pl ex , 442 U

. S. 1 ( 1979) , a n d B d. of P ardons v

. A l l en , 48 2 U

. S. 36 9 (19 8 7 ), ret ai ns co nt i nui ng vit al i t y in cases co ncerni ng p riso n e rs ’ state -cr e a te d li b e rty inte re st in p a ro le

. See Sw art ho ut v. Co oke , 1 3 1 S. C t

. 85 9 , 86 1

– 6 3 (20 1 1 ) (pe r cur i am ) ( charact eri zi ng our ho l d i ng tha t C a li fo rn ia law c re a te s a li b e rty inte re st in p a ro le a s “a re a so n a b le
a p p lica tio n ” o f Al l en an d G re e n h o ltz , but ho l d i ng t hat pri soners have no
c o n stitutio n a lly p ro te c te d li b e rty inte re st in fa c tu a l s u p p o rt fo r p a ro le d e c isio n s) ; s ee al

s o, e

. g. , M i l l e r v

. Or

. Bd

. o f Pa r o l e & Po s t Pr i s on Super vi s i on , 6 4 2 F .3 d 7 1 1 , 7 1 4

– 1 6 (9 th C ir. 2 0 1 1 ); R ob er ts v. H art l ey , 6 4 0 F.3d 10 4 2 , 10 4 5 (9t h C i r. 20 1 1 ). Supreme Court” in Sa nd

in ); Mi tc he ll v . D up nik

, 75 F.3d 517, 52 2 ( 9th Cir. 19 96 ) ( no tin g tha t Sandin criticized the “substantive pre dicates a pproac h” and r efoc used the test); Mujahid v. Me

yer , 59 F.3d 931, 932 ( 9th Cir. 1995) (not i ng that Sandin “over

ruled” Ninth Circuit cases that have take n a su bs tanti ve pr e dic a te /man dator y langua g e a

pp ro a c h) ; c

f. Neal , 131 F.3d at 828–29 (noting, be fore W ilkinson , that the substantive predic ates test had “ likely . . . been disa pproved” of in Sa nd

in but holding that a state prog ram likely cre ated a liberty interest in any

event)

. 5
Sand in and its prog eny ma d e th is mu c h c le ar : to f in d a vio latio n o f a

state -c re a te d li be rt

y int e re st th e ha

rd sh ip imposed on the prisoner

must be “aty

pical and sig nificant . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sa nd in , 515 U.S. at 483–84.
b. Atypical and si gnif

icant hardshi p test
We conclude that the law did not clea rly establish that the conditions that Cha

ppell experience d constituted an “aty pical and sig nificant ha

rdship.” At the time of Cha ppell’sC H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE

24

contra band watch, we ha d explained that the “aty pical and signific ant har dship” is context-dependent and require s “fa ct b y f a c t c o n s id e r a tion,” Keenan , 8 3 F

. 3 d a t 1 0 8 9

. We conf ir me d th is o n ly a y e ar a f

te r th e c o n tr a

b an d w a tc htook place , noting that “ [t ]here is no s i n gl e standa rd for deter mining whe ther a

prison hardship is aty pical and signific ant” a

nd th at analy sis under this standard r equire s “ca se by case , fac t by fac t consideration.” Ra mi re z v . G ala za , 334 F.3d 850, 8 6 1 (9th Cir. 2003) (interna l quotation marks omitted). I ndeed, we had noted pr ior to April-May 2002 that
a t le a st thr e e fa c tor s f

ro m Sandin sh ou ld b e c on si dere d in
eac h case : ( 1) whether the conditions o f c o nfinement

“ mir ro re d th os e c on dit ion s im po se d u po n inmate s in
an a l o g o us discretionary c on fi ne me nt s e tti ng s, name ly administrative seg reg ation and prote ctive custody ,” (2) the duration and intensity of the conditions of confine ment; and (3 ) whe the r t

he c ha ng e in c on fi nem ent wo uld “ ine vit a bly
a f f e c t t h e d ur a ti o no f

[th e p r is o n e r ’ s ] s e n te nce.” Pifer v. Ma rsh all , 139 F.3d 907, 1998 WL81335, at *1 n.3 (9th Cir. Fe b

. 24, 1998) (unpublished) ( internal quotation marks omitted).
We are not awar e of a

ny court that, as of April-Ma y 2002, had applied th e Sandin t e s t , o r s i m i l ar t e mp o r ar

y, investigatory

confine ment, to hol d that a contr aband w atch
was a n “aty pical and sig nificant ha

rdship” apar t from the ordinary conditions of prison manag ement. The only simil ar case in which we ha d considere d a due pr ocess c laim was Me nd oz a , wher e the pr isoner had be en placed on “f ece s watch.” Me nd

oz a , 960 F.2d at 1427–29. That case, howe ver, was pre - Sa nd

in and thus did not apply the “aty p i cal a nd signific ant har dship” test. Id. Moreove r, no other jur isdiction had applied the “aty

pical and signific ant hardship” test to any fac tually simil ar c ases be fore April-May 2002 either.C H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE 25

Be c a u s e th e r e w a s n o c a s e la

wh o ld in g th a t c o n tr a

b and watch, or any simil ar r eg ime, is an “aty pical and si gn i fi cant ha rd sh ip, ” and

the “ a ty pic a l and signif

ic ant ha rd sh ip” te st i s so f a c t

- s p e c i f i c , M an d e v i l l e an d R o s ar i o d i d n o t h av e fa ir notice on whe ther the c onditions t hat Chappell experienc ed violated a state -cr eate d liberty interest that would trig g er due pr oc e ss pr ote c tio ns
. Thus , Mand e vil le and Ros ari o are also
e nti tled to q

ua lif ie d immun ity

on Cha pp e ll’ s d ue pr oc e ss claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
We conclude that, as of April-May 2002, the law wa s not c le arl y e sta bli sh e d a s to wh e the r the c on dit ion s that Ch a pp e ll experie n c e d

in c onnection with the contr aband w atch violated the Eig hth Amen d m ent. M oreove r, we conclude that Chappell ca

nnot claim a liberty

interest under

the Due Process Clause of

the Four teenth Amendment, and it wa s not clea rly established that Chappe ll had sustained a violation of
a state -c re a te d li be rt

y int e re st. Th e re fo re, bo th M and e vil le
and Ros ari o a re e nti tle d to qu a lif

ie d immun ity

. In lig ht of

thi s c on c lus ion , w e do no t de c ide wh e the r Ch app e ll’ s c la ims , if pr ov e n, wo uld vio late the Ei g hth or F ourt e e nth

Am e ndme nts

. REVERSED.

GR AH AM , S en i o r D i s tri ctJ u d ge, co n cu rr i n g:
Ijoin the panel’s o p i n ion with the exception of Section I I I

. B

. 2

. I w r i t e s e p ar a t e l y b e c a u s e I d i s a g r e e w i th my
c oll e a g ue s’ int e rp re tatio n o f t he Sup re me Court ’s de c isi on in Sandin v. Conner , 5 15 U. S. 4 72 (1 99 5) , in the c on te xt of

the irC H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE

26 analy sis o f

Ch a p p e ll ’ s d u e p r o c e s s c la im

b a s e d o na s tate

c re a te d li be rt

y int e re st.
Ibe lie ve that su

bje c tin g Cha

pp e ll to c on tr a

ba nd watc h d id not violate his rights unde r the Due Proc ess Clause. The due proce ss ana l y s i s should end there beca use Chappell has id e n ti f ie d n o s tate s tatute o r r e g u lati o n w h ic h li mits t he discretion o f prison officials to subject him to thi s kind of temporar y investigatory

confine ment. In the abse nce of such a state statute or

regulation, t h er e can be no state-c reated lib e rt y int e re st. My c oll e a g ue s a

pp are ntl y be lie ve that Sandin change d thi s r e quir eme nt a

nd that po st- Sandin any

c ha ng e in conditions of confine ment wh i ch imposes an “ aty pical and signific ant har dship” may g i v e ri se to a violation of a statecre ated liber

ty interest. I

fail t o understand how

it could be said that a s t at e has “c reated” a liberty interest by

imposing harshe r conditions of conf inement. I n eff

ect, my colleagues have inter

prete d Sa nd

in to c on fl a te the state -create d li be rt y int e re st a na ly sis so a s to g ive a

state pr iso ne r d ir e c t a c c e ss t o the protections of the Due Proc ess Clause if he can show that the conditions of his confineme nt impose a n “a t y pical and signif ic ant h ard sh ip. ” Th is is a ra dic a l c ha ng e in d ue pr oc e ss jurisprudenc e and a signific ant depa rture f rom previous limit ations. See Meac hum v. Fano , 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976) (re jectingthe proposition that “[a]ny chang e in t he conditions of conf inement havinga substantial adve rse impa ct on the prisoner involved is suff

icient t o invoke t he protections of the Due Proc ess Clause”) . Cases in which the S u p re m e Court has found that c onditio ns of conf inement amounted to a violation of the Due Process Clause have be en limited to such extremes as involuntary

co mmitm ent to a mental institution and the forc ed administration of psy chotropic drug s. SeeC H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE 27

Vitek v . Jones , 445 U.S. 480 (1980) and W ashington v

. Harper , 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
A s tate ma

y c r e a te a li b e rty inte r e s t thr o u g h s tatute s and pr is on regulatio ns and

may the re by tr ig g e r d

ue pr oc e ss protec tions. W

ilk ins on v . A us tin , 545 U.S. 209, 222 (2005); Neal v. Shimoda , 131 F.3d 818, 827 ( 9th Cir. 1997). The de te rm inatio n o f whe the r a state -c re a te d libe rt

y int e re st e xists is a two-par

t inquiry . First, t h ere must be a re g ulation that place s “subs t antive limitations on official discre tion.” Me nd oz a v . B lod

ge tt , 960 F.2d. 1 4 25, 1428 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Kentucky

Dep’ t of Corr ections v. Thompson , 4 90 U. S. 454, 462 (1989)) . In Me nd oz a , th e c ourt

e xpla ine d:
The most common way a state cr eate s such an int ere st is by

adopting regulations which establish “sub stantive predic ates” to gove rn officia l decisionmakingand by mandatingthe outcome to be rea ched upon a finding that the rele vant cr iteria have bee n met. There must be particula rized standards or

criter ia to g uide the state ’s de c is io nma

ke rs , a nd the c ri te ri a must serve to limit di scre tion. I f a decisionmake r ca

n make his dec isio n for a ny constitutionally

permissible rea son or for no
re a so n at al l, the state ha s not cr e a te d a li be rt y int e re st.
960 F.2d at 1428-1429 (citations omitted).
The sec ond part of the inquiry asks whethe r the re g ulation in question conce rns a restra int that imposes an “aty pical and signific ant hardship on the inmate in re lation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sa nd in , 5 15 U. S. at 48 4. Pr ior toC H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE

28
Sa nd in , p ri so ne rs had ass e rt e d f e de ra l du e pr oc e ss c la ims ba se d o n a ll so rt s o f p ri so n r e g ulatio ns , s uc h a s th os e pe rt a ini ngto v isi tatio n, lun c h tr ay s, bo oks, e le c tr ic a l outle ts in cells, prison jobs, etc. Id. at 482–83. I n Sa nd in , the Court
c lari fi e d it s e arl ie r d e c isi on s on sta te -c re a te d li be rt

y int e re sts by making it clear

that those interests ar e prote cted by the Du e Pr oc e ss C la

us e on ly wh e n s tate re g ulatio ns , r e latin g to fre edom from r estraints, im p ose “aty pical and sig nificant har ds hip s o n th e inm a te in r e latio n to the or din ary inc ide nts of prison life.” Id. at 484.
This two-par

t inquiry is based on my

understandingof the state of the la

w in the af

termath of Sandin and is the appr oach adopted by the S econd Circuit. In Tellier v. Fields , 280 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 2001), the Sec ond Circuit described the prope r ana ly sis :
As we ha ve re cog nized previously , afte r the S u preme Court’s decision in Sa nd in , o ur deter minatio n of “whether

the plaintiff had a protec ted liberty

interest in not being
c on fi ne d” a lso requ ir e s a tw o- pa rt ana ly sis

. [ Sealey v. Giltner , 1 1 6 F

. 3 d

4 7 , 5 1 ( 2 d

Ci r. 1 9 9 7 )] (c i t i n g Fraz ie r v . Co ug hli n , 8 1 F.3d 31 3, 31 7 (2d Cir . 199 6) (p e r c ur iam) ). “ As a result of Sa nd

in , a pr isone r h a s a

lib e rt y interest o nly

if the depr ivation . . . is aty pical and sig nificant a

nd the state has cr eated the liberty interest by

statute or re g ulation.” Id. at 52. First, we examine whether the alleg ed deprivation was aty

pical and signific ant. . . . Se c on d, we mus t e xami ne w he the r t he stateC H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE 29

has cr eate d a liberty

interest by

statute or regulation.
280 F.3d at 80.
After conductingthe He witt /Sa nd in ana ly sis

. . . we c on c lud e tha

t Se c tio n 5 41 .2 2 c re a te s a liberty interest. Unde r [ Hewitt v . Helms , 459 U.S. 460 (1983)], courts consideringthe
e xiste nc e of

an a lle g e d li be rt

y int e re st mus t asce rtain whe ther “ st at utes or re g ulations
re qu ir e , in

‘l angua g e of

an unmi sta

ka bly mandatory

char acte r,’ that a

prisoner not suffe r a pa rticular de privation abse nt spe cified predic ates.” W

e lc h v . B ar tle tt , 196 F.3d 389, 3 9 2 (2 d C i r. 1 9 9 9 ) ( qu o t i n g He witt , 4 59 U. S. at 471–72).
280 F.3d at 81. Read tog ether , Sa nd

in , W olf f , and Meac hum , all support the pr o p osition t hat a statute or regulat i on which involves “state -cr eate d rig ht[ s],” [ W

olf f v . M c Do nn e ll , 418 U.S. 539, 55 7 (1 97 4) ], c re a te s a pr ote c ta ble li ber ty int e re st whe n anof

fi c ia l’ s f a ilure to a dh e re to the statute re sults in an “aty pical, sig nif

icant deprivation,” Sa nd

in , 515 U.S. a

t 486, of “re al substan ce , ” W

olf f , 418 U.S. at 557, and not sim ply “ e ph e me ra l a nd ins ub st ant ial” violations. Meac hum , 427 U.S. at 228.
280 F.3d at 83.C H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE

30

M yr on v

. Te r hune , 476 F. 3d 716, 719 ( 9t h C i r
. 2007) ( f i n di n g pr i s on 1
re g u la tio n s g o v e rn ing a n inm a te ’s cla ssifica tio n d id no t cr e a te a li b e rty i nt erest be c a u se th ey d i d not am o unt t o an at y p i cal and s i gni f i cant h a rd sh ip a n d no ting tha t S a n d in rej e c te d the mand at o ry / d i scr et i o nary m et ho d o l o gy ); M cQui l l i on v

. D uncan , 306 F. 3d 895, 903 ( 9t h Ci r
. 2002) (h o ld ing tha t S a n d in w as no t a p p l i cab l e t o t he p arole s y st em at i ss ue, but
o p in ing tha t S a n d in “ ab and o ned ” t he m and at o ry l anguage f ram ewo rk) ; Simi larly , in Sm ith v . Cr us e , t h e Northern District of Ca lif or nia hel d that Sandin’s “aty pical and sig nificant hardship” due proce ss analy sis must be trig g ere d by the exis tence of a s t ate regulation which sig nificantly limit s the discretion of pr ison of

ficials. No. C 10- 3684 SBA (PR), 2012 WL11 55 96 4, a t *7 (N .D . Ca l. M ar. 30 , 2 01 2) ; se e als o Lopez
v . Ca te , No. C 11-2644, 2012 WL4677221 YGA ( PR), at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2012) (“D eprivations that are a uthorized b y s tate la

w
. . . ma

y a ls o amo un t to d e p r iv a tions of a pr oc e dura lly

pr ote c te d li be rt

y int e re st, pr ov ide d th a t: ( 1) state statutes or re g ulations narrow ly restric t the powe r of prison officia ls to im pose the de privation, i.e., g ive the inmate a kind of rig ht to av o i d i t , and (2) the liberty in question is one of ‘r e a l su bs tanc e .’ ” ); Ree d v. Knipp , N o
. C I V

- S

- 1 1

- 2 7 5 3 K JN KJN P., 2012 WL 6570906, at *2 (E.D. Ca l. Dec. 17, 2012) (“ B e c a us e thi s la

ngua g e g ive s th e dec isi on make r a c e rt a in amount o f d iscretion to deny cre dit restoration, the statutes and re g ulations do not create a libert y interest in the restoration of forfe ited cre dits.”).
The c ourt cites the opinions of five panels of this cour t for the proposition that “we ha ve con cl u ded that the discretionar

y /mandatory

substa nti ve pre dicates a

pproac h was ‘aba ndoned’ or

‘over ruled’ in Sa nd

in , and our de cisions have fo c us e d o nly

on the ‘aty pic a l and sig nif ic ant h ard sh ip’ te st, e ve n in the fa c e of re le va

nt pr iso n re g ulatio ns .” I t is tr ue tha t, in these five c ases and

a ha nd fu l of oth e rs , pa

ne ls o f t his 1 2C H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE 31

M itch e ll v . D u

p n ik , 75 F. 3d 51 7, 52 2 ( 9t h Ci r
. 199 6) ( hol di ng a j ai l pol i cy d id no t cr e a te a n “a typ ic a l a n d sign ifi c a n t ha rd sh ip ” a n d so no li b e rty i nt erest was creat ed , b ut no t i ng t he Sup rem e C o urt i n Sandi n cri t i ci zed t he “su b sta n tive p re d ic a te a p p ro a c h ” ); Duf f y v

. Ri v e l and , 9 8 F. 3d 447, 457 (9th C i r. 19 9 6 ) ( rem and i ng t he case f o r co n sid e ra t i o n of whether t he d ep ri vat i o n co nst i t ut ed an at y p i cal a nd s i gni f i cant hardshi p , but
comme n t i n g t h at t h e s u bs t an t i v e pr edi ca t e t es t h ad bee n “ aba n don ed” by S a n d in ); M uj ah i d v. M eye r , 5 9 F.3d 9 3 1 , 9 3 2 (9th C i r. 1 9 9 5 ) (h o ld i ng d isc ip lina ry se g re g a tio n d id no t co n st itu te “a typ ic a l an d sign ifi c a n t” hardshi p unde r Sandi n and t hus, no l i b ert y i nt erest was cr eat ed , but no t i ng t h at c as e l aw e mpl oy i n g t h e “ s u bs t an t i v e pr edi ca t e” a n d “ man d at o ry la n g u a g e ” tes t ha d b e e n o v e rr u le d b y S a n d in ).

See , e

. g. , Ne a l v

. S h i moda , 131 F. 3d 818, 829–30 ( 9t h Ci r
. 1997) 2 ( op i ni ng t hat t he s ubs t ant i ve predi cat e t es t ha d “l i ke l y . .
. been d isa p p ro v e d ” b y S a n d in , but co ncl ud i ng t hat , i n any e v ent , t he
c la ssific a ti o n o f p riso n e rs a s se x o ff e n d e rs sa tisf

ie s tha t t e st); K eenan v. H a ll , 8 3 F .3 d 1 0 8 3 , 1 0 8 8 -8 9 (sta ting tha t S a n d in “ r ej ec t ed i t s pri or [ s ubs t ant i ve predi cat e] t es t ” and r emandi ng becau s e t he di s t r i ct cour t ha d
no t co nsi d ered whet her t he d ep ri vat i o n was at y p i cal and s i gni f i cant ). c ourt have op ine d th a t Sa nd

in e nd e d th e su

bs tanti ve pr e dic a te approa ch. But none of these c ases dire ctly addre ss the issue, and their state ments ab o u t the continuing va lidity of the
su bs tanti ve pr e dic a te a

pp ro a c h ar e dic ta , n ot b ind ingon thi s pa ne l or on dis tr ic t c ourt s w ith in t

he cir cuit . Ins te a d, the se ca s es simply

aff irm the uncontrove rsial proposition that Sa nd in cre ated the require ment of an “aty pical and sig nificant ha rd sh ip” in or de r to es ta

bli sh a state -c re a te d li be rt

y int e re st. Turningnow to the fa cts of this case , the par ti es did not identify any prison regulation that puts a limit on an official’ s discretion in orde r to place a prisoner on contra

band watch. Th e pa rt ie s se e m to have a g re e d, and c e rt a inl y did no t di sp ute for pur poses of summary

judgme nt, that the contraband watch
re g ulati on s in

e ff e c t at th e re le va

nt t ime we re se t f

or th i nC H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE

32

T hi s ex hi bi t was not i ncl uded i n t he r ecor d of t hi s cour t an d was 3
o b t ai ned f

rom t he d i st ri ct co urt do cket

. A cc o rd ing to t he d i st ri ct co urt deci s i on, pl ai nt i f

f of f er ed t hi s exc er pt of t he C D C O pera t i ons M anu al as proof of t he condi t i ons an d procedur es i n e f f ect at t he t i me whe n h e wa s o n c o n tra b a n d w a tc h , a n d the d e fen d a n ts h a v e n o t o b je c te d to it s a c c u ra c y. p l a i n t i f f ’ s e xh i b i tJ. These regulations de al mainly with the 3
c on dit ion s o f co ntraba

nd watch, a

nd do not describe any l i m i ta tio ns on an off

icial’s discre tion. The only provisions relating to the de cisio n t o place an inmate on c ontraba nd watch are found in the first para g raph of pag e 1 and the second pa ragraph on pa g e 5 of r egulation 52050.25:
The responsible Fa cility Captain during business hours, and the AOD duringnonbu s i n e s s h o u r s , ( e v e n i n g s / S a t u r da y s/ Sun da y s/h oli da y s) , a re de le g a te d th e a

uth or ity to place inmate s suspe ct ed of conce aling contra band items within their body cavities on Body Cavity Surveillan c e Status. Notification wi ll b e ma de to t

he re sp e c tiv e As so c iate Warden duringbusiness hours.

. . . Th e Wat c h Command e r w ill on ly te rm inate Body Cavity Surveillance with Concurre nce of the F acility Captain wher e the inmate w as previously

housed or the A OD duringnonbusiness hours. I f extenuating circ umstances exis t, the Body

Cavity Surveillance may

be
c on tin ue d; h ow e ve r, re vie w of e a c h ca se wi ll be c on du c te d d a ily

by the a ff e c te d F a c ili ty Prog ram L ieutenant to deter mine whetherC H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE 33

termination or continuation of the Bo dy Cavity Surveillance is nece ssary
. An inmate may

be plac ed on contr aband w atch ba sed on
mere suspicion of conc ealing contraband w ithin his body cavities. Such suspicion doe s not e ven have to be rea sonable. Mo re ov e r, it a

pp e ars fr om t

he re g ulatio n th a t it is e nti re ly within the discretion of t he af fec ted Fa cility

Prog ram L ieutenant to de termine whether termination or continuation of the B ody

Cavit y Se arc h is ne c e ssa

ry . T his re g ulatio n is not a substantive limitation on official discretion and there fore the re g ulations do not qualify as a state -cr eate d lib e rt y int e re st.
Be cause subjectingChappell to contraba nd watch did not violate the Due Proc ess Clause, and be cause he fa iled to show that he had a

state-c reated libert y i n tere st in avoiding contra band watch, his due proc ess claim fa ils as a m at t er of law.

B ERZ ON , Ci rc uit

Judg e , d iss e nti ngin p art :
Ijoin Part I I I .B of

the majority o p i nion, as Iag ree that Def endants Mande ville and Rosario ar e entitled to qualified immunit y on the due pr ocess issues. In my view, howe ver, the def endants are not entitled to qualified immunity on Chappell’s Eig hth Amendment claim. As I would aff irm the district court’s denial of summar y judgme nt on qualified immunit y with respec t t o the Eig hth Amendment issue, I respe ctfully

dissent from Part I I I .A of the ma jority opinion.C H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE

34
I Our jurisdiction over t h i s coll ater al orde r appe al of the district court’s de nial of summary judgme nt on qual ified immunit y g rounds is limi ted to questions of law. See O rtiz v. Jordan , 131 S. Ct. 884, 891 (2011); Behrens v . Pelletier , 516 U. S

. 29 9, 31 2– 13 (1 99 6) ; Johnson v. J ones , 515 U.S. 304, 31 9– 20 (1 99 5) ; Alston v. Read , 663 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 2011). We do not conce rn ours el v es wit h whether the “pr etrial rec ord sets for

th a g enuine issue of

fac t for tria l,” but ins te a d e xami ne the “ pure ly le g a l is su e wh e the r t

he fa c ts alleg ed . . . support a c laim of clea rly establ i s hed law.” A l s t on , 663 F.3d at 1098 (alteration in original) ( internal quotation marks omitted).
On t h i s rec ord, there are disputed issues of fac t conce rning : (a) the impact of the lig htin g, in combination wi th o the r co nd iti on s (e .g ., la c k o f a mattr e ss, wa ist

re str a int s, e tc

. ) , o nCh a

p p e ll ’ s s le e p ; a

n d ( b ) th e le g it im a te n e ed for a twenty -four

hour brig ht light in Chappell’s ce ll (as opposed to a dimmed light) f

or surve illance, g iven all t he other restric tions on his movement. W e resolve all fac tual disputes and dra w all re asonable infere nces in fa vor of Chappe ll, the non-moving party , and “look at t he pure ly leg al question of whether the def

endant[s’] a l l eged c onduct violated [C hap pell’s] clearly

established constitutional rig hts.” Cunningham v. C ity of W

enatche e , 3 45 F .3 d 8 02 , 8 07 –0 8 ( 9th Cir . 2 00 3) ; ac c or

d Mattos v. Agarano , 661 F.3d 433, 439–40 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. de nied , 1 3 2 S. Ct . 2681, 2682, 2684 (2 01 2) ; Jeffers v . Gomez , 267 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 2001).

F or purp os e s o f t

his a pp e a l, t he e sta bli sh e d f a c ts perta ining to Chappe ll’s Eighth Ame nd m en t claim ar e as fo llo ws :C H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE 35

Fr om April 30, 2002, u n t i l May 6, 2002, Chappell was
c on fi n e d t o a s ur v e i l l an c e c e l l c o n t a i n i n g o n l y a b e d f r a me wi tho ut a mattr e ss. After

being s t ri p p ed and subje cted to a “b o dy c av it

y s e ar c h , ” Ch a

p p e ll w a s dr e s s e d in tw o p a ir s of underw ear

and two jum psuits, one of ea ch wor n fac ing forwa rd and the other wor

n backw ards. The clothing w as taped c losed at t he thi g hs, ankles, upper ar ms, and waist. He
wa s th e n p la c e d in wa ist c ha in r e str a int s and ank le sh a c kle s, and was chaine d to the bedfr ame. Chappe ll’s handcuf fs wer e attache d to the waist cha in, forcinghim to kee p his hands at his sid e s at a ll tim e s, e ve n wh ile e a tin g
. Th e lig hts in t he c e ll
wer e “ve ry

brig ht” and we re ke p t o n constantly throug hout his nearly seven- day

confine ment on contra

band watch.
Whil e Chappe ll did not ex pressly alleg e that the conditions of contra

band watch ca

used him “g rave sleeping problems,” a s did the prisoner in Keena n v . H all , 83 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 1996), the state m ents in Chappell’s amende d complaint permit an infe renc e that his sleep wa s dis tur be d. Spe c if

ic a lly , he de sc ri be s ho w he ha d to “ a tte mpt ” to sleep on a ba

re me tal cot with bod i l y re s t raints, under
c on sta nt “ ve ry br ig ht l ig ht, ” a lle g ingthat the c on dit ion s “ did in fac t torture [hi m] mentally ” and that he was “ deter iorating mentally .”
II
Whe the r c on st ant i llumin a tio n v iol a te s th e Ei g hth Amendment in a pa

rticular c ase is a fac t-specif ic i nquiry . But c on tr ary to t he ma jor ity ’s su g g e sti on , Maj . Op. a t 10 , o ff ic ia ls do no t e njo y

qu a lif ie d immuni ty sim

ply be c a us e the pr e c ise fac ts at issue in their particula r ca se have not been a ddresse d previously

. Offic ials can “ still be on notice that their conduc t violates established laweven in novel factual circ umstances.”C H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE

36 Hope v . Pelzer , 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002). I f newfac ts alone tr ig g e re d q

ual if ie d immun ity , th e n o ff

ic ia ls w ou ld r are ly

if
ever be held a ccounta

b l e in case s involving “f act- driven” claims, such as the Eigh t h Am endment claim at issue her e. Cf. Mattos , 6 61 F .3 d at 44 2 (appl yingthe “ c le arl y established” r

ule to a fa ct-spec ific F ourth Amendment c ase)

. We t he re fo re mus t be g in w ithwh a t was the c le arl y established Ei g hth Amendment law r eg ardingprison conditions at the time of Chappell’s c ontraba nd wa t ch , and then proc eed to de termine w h ether a re asonable prison official co uld have c onsidered the conditions of Chappell’s
c on tr a ba nd watc h c on sti tut ion a l in

lig ht o f t ho se pr e c e de nts

. In Apr il–May

20 02 , it was c le arl y

e sta bli sh e d th a t it

is
un c on sti tut ion a l to c a

us e a pr iso ne r h arm

by su bje c ting him to constant lig

hting. Keenan pr on ounc e d in 19 96 that “ [t] he re is no leg itimate penolog ical just i fication for re quiring [i nmates] to suffer phy sical and psycholog ical har m by living in c on sta nt i llumin a tio n. ” 83 F .3 d at 1 09 0 (a lte ratio n in orig inal) (e mphasis added) . Thus, contra ry t o the majority ’s repr esentation, Keenan did not sim ply h o l d that the prison of fi c ia ls in that part icular case la c ke d a le g iti mate penolog ical jus tification for imposing constant illumination,
see Maj. Op. at 9

– 1 1 & n.3; it held that if c onstant i l l umination causes a

prisoner phy sical or psycholog ical harm, then no pe nologic al purpose c an justify it; “[ the] prac tice is unconstitutional.” Keenan , 83 F.3d at 1090

. Moreove r, it was clearly

established law that conditions havingthe m utually reinfor cing eff ect of depriving a prisoner of a sin g le ba sic ne e d, su c h a s sl eep, m ay vio late the Ei g hth Amendment. S

e e W il s o n v

. S e ite r , 501 U.S. 294, 304–05 (1 99 1) ; see also Kee nan , 83 F.3d at 1090 (“Ade quate lig hting is one of the f

undamental at t ributes of a dequate shelterC H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE 37

required by

the Eig hth Amendment.”) (interna l quotation
mark s o mitte d) ; Ha rp er v . S ho we rs , 1 74 F .3 d 7 16 , 7 20 (5 th Cir . 1 99 9) (“ [S]le e p und ou bte dly c ounts a s o ne of lif

e ’s ba sic needs.” ); Sh e

ph e rd v . A ult , 982 F. Supp. 643, 648 (N. D. I owa 1997) (“ Constant ill umin at ion can undoubtedly cause sleep deprivation .

. . and sl eep is c erta inly an ‘ide ntifiable human need.’ ”).
The c ases the ma

jority cites in support of its qualified immunit y analy sis are not to the c ontrary

. See M aj

. Op

. at 12–13. Instead, those cases held only that constant ill umi nation

fr om d im l ig hts or

lig hts dis tanc e d f

ro m a pr iso ne r’ s c e ll ( su c h a s h a llw ay lig hts ) d id no t amou

nt t o crue l a nd unusual punishment, see Fillmore v . Ordonez , 829 F. Supp. 1544, 1552, 1568 (D. K an. 1993) ( “l o w- i ntensity ,”

“ so ft ” lig hti ng ); W

ill iam s v. W

ar d , 567 F. Supp. 10, 13 (E .D .N .Y

. 19 82 ) (l ig ht in hal lw ay ); Cassidy v. Superintendent , 392 F. Supp. 330, 334 (W.D. Va. 1975) (“ [T]he lig ht i s n ot s o b ri g ht a s to int e rf e re wi th t he inm a te s’ rest.”) , and that “disc omfort of lig hts at nig ht [ does] not constitute a constitutional deprivation” when the prisoner w as pr ov ide d w ith be dd ing , n ot s ub je c t to any

oth e r b od ily restra ints in hi s cell, and not d en i ed sl eep, Ba ue r v . S ie laf f , 372 F. Supp. 1104, 1110 (E.D. Pa. 1974) . Those ca ses ar e inapposite here , wher e the lig ht was “ve ry brig ht” and inside Chappell’s ce ll, a

nd wher e the fa ir infer ence from the f acts on summa ry jud g me nt, vie we d mo st f

avo ra bly to the pla int if

f, is that the lighting , in c ombination with the other c onditions on contra band watch, interfe red w ith Chappell’s sleep.
Simi larly , the majority ’s re liance on Zatko v . Rowland , 835 F. Supp. 1174 (N. D. Cal. 1993), is misplaced. See Ma j. Op. at 12, 13. While the co u rt ’s observation in Zatko that constant illumination of a jail cell with brig ht light, depr ivingC H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE

38
the inm a te of no rm a l sle e p, “ wo uld vio late his ba sic ri g ht t o shelter,” is releva

nt, id. at 1181, its ulti mate rulingon Z atko’s Eig hth Amendment claim has little bea ring o n t h e law
a pp lic a ble he re . Z a tko a dmi tte d th a t t he offic e rs “ tr [ie d] to
acc ommodate the inmates [and did not] unnece ssarily use the light to kee p [hi m] awa k e.” Id. In contra st, Chappell never
conce ded that the br ight light (in combination with other conditions) was not intended to interf ere wi th his sleep, or that th e de fe nd ants did

no t exhib it d e lib e rate ind if fe re nc e to its im pact on his sleep.
Moreove r, that some cour ts—unli ke ours—have re co g nized that there c an be a leg itimate penolog ical jus tif ic a tio n f or c on sta nt l ig hti ngdo e s n ot mea n that any asser ted p enological pur

pose will justify

such illumination. The Eig hth Circuit cases c ited by the majority , Ferg u s on v. Cap e Gi ra rd

e au Cou nty , 88 F.3d 647 (8 t h Cir. 1996) and O’Donne ll v. Thomas , 826 F.2d 788 ( 8th Cir. 1987), see Ma j. Op. at 13, held that ther e wa s a leg iti m ate g overnme ntal in tere st i n c on sta

nt i llumin a tio n o f p re tr ia l inmate s’ c e lls in view of t h e p a r t i cu l ar circumstance s of tho se cas es—circ umstances distinct enoug h from those at issue here that a re asonable office r would n o t h ave thoug ht that either Fergus on or O’

Do nn e ll condones the actions take n here

. In Ferguson , the pr iso ne r’ s med ic a l con dit ion and sa fe ty conce rns, in c ombination with the amount of tim e h e s pent outsi de of the c e ll, jus tif

ie d c on sta

nt i llumin a tio n to e na

ble
c on tin uo us surv e ill anc e of

the pr iso ne r whil e he wa s in his cell. See F

erguson , 88 F.3d at 650. Moreove r, F erguson was o b s e r v e d s l e e p i n g “ n i n e ty- th r e e h o ur s o f th e f o urt e e nd ays spent in the vesti b ule [cell].” Id. Her e, the totality of the circ umstan ce s , i n cl u d i n g th e c o n d i t i o n s re s tri ct i n g Chappell’sC H A PP ELL V

. M A N D EV I LLE 39

movement and f

orec losing his ability

to conceal any

thing while on contra

band watch, detra ct from, r ather than enha nce, the ne e d f

or the c on stan t, twe nty -f

our- ho ur br ig ht l ig ht: Cha pp e ll w a s n ot a llo we d o ut o f t he c e ll; ha d n o mattress, water , or t oilet; was dresse d in highly restric tive clothing; a

nd
wa s p la c e d in

wa ist re str a int s and

sh a c kle s.
Nor would O’

Do nn e ll lead a

rea sonable office r to believe that the conditions of Chappell’s conf inement on contra

band watch wer e constitutional. The constant illumi nation of O’Donne ll’s cell was he ld “not unrea sonable” in view of the inmate’s pre vious suicide attempt, esca pe conc erns, a

nd fea r th a t h e w o u ld

b e a d an g e r to h im s e lf

o r o th e rs. O’Don ne ll , 826 F.2d a t 79 0. Com

pa rable con c e rn s w e re no t pr e se nt i n Ch a p p e l l ’ s c a s e
. M o r e o v e r , th e r e w a s n o i n d i c a t i o n th a t, i n a dd iti on to t he lig hti ng , O’ Donn e ll w a s si mul tane ou sly
su bje c t to phy sic a l res tr a int s in his ho ldi ngc e ll, lik e tho se imposed on Chappell, decr easing the nee d for illumination as a saf ety prec aution.
A r e a so na

ble of fi c e r wo ul d have kn ow n th a t, i n combination, the twenty -four -hour br ight lig ht, the absenc e of a mattress, and the e x tensive bodily restra ints risked de pr ivi ngChap pel l of s le e p, in v iol a tio n o f t he Ei g hth Amendment. The district court cor rec t l y denied summary jud g me nt o n th is c la im o n q ua lif ie d immun ity

g ro un ds , a ff or din g Cha

pp e ll a n o pp or tun it y to pr ov e that Ma

nd e vil le
and Ros ari o d e mon str a te d d e lib e rate ind if fe re nc e to t

he ri sk of phy sical or psy cholog ical har m cre ated by

the conditions of conf inement on contra

band watch. For

these re asons, I respe ctfully

dissent from Part II I

. A of the ma jority opinion.