[Cite as State v. Harris, 2017-Ohio-8419.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 GREENE COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

TRAVONTE E. HARRIS 

Defendant-Appellant

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C.A. CASE NO. 2017-CA-19 

T.C. NO. 17-CR-107 

(Criminal Appeal from 

 Common Pleas Court) 

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O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the 3rd day of November, 2017. 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

NATHANIEL R. LUKEN, Atty. Reg. No. 0087864, Assistant Prosecutor, 61 Greene Street, 

Xenia, Ohio 45385 

 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

 

JAMES S. ARMSTRONG, Atty. Reg. No. 0020638, P.O. Box 20368, Kettering, Ohio 

45420 

 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 

DONOVAN, J. 
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{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Travonte E. Harris appeals his conviction and sentence 

for one count of felonious assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), a felony of the 

second degree, and one count of having a weapon while under disability, in violation of 

R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), a felony of the third degree. Harris filed a timely notice of appeal 

with this Court on March 24, 2017. 

{¶ 2} On November 23, 2016, Harris was indicted in Case No. 2016 CR 0615 for 

one count of aggravated robbery, one count of felonious assault, one count of having a 

weapon while under disability, and one count of kidnapping. At the time he was indicted, 

Harris was on post-release control (PRC) from a conviction in a separate case dating 

back to 2009. The trial court eventually scheduled Harris’ trial to be held on March 6, 

2017. The trial was then continued to March 13, 2017. 

{¶ 3} Pursuant to a plea agreement reached after the final pre-trial conference, the 

State dismissed the original case and prepared a bill of information charging Harris under 

a new case number. Pursuant to negotiations between the parties, on March 10, 2017, 

the State filed a bill of information in Case No. 2017 CR 0107 charging Harris with one 

count of felonious assault and one count of having a weapon while under disability. On 

the same day, Harris pled no contest to both counts in the bill of information. Harris’ Plea 

Agreement Report stated as follows: 

The Defendant will make a plea of no contest to Count one [R.C.] 

2903.11(A)(2) Felonious Assault, a felony of the second degree and Count 

two [R.C.] 2923.13(A)(2) Having Weapons While Under Disability, a felony 

of the third degree. The parties stipulate to 5 years. Defendant 
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understands that the sentence on Count 1 will be a mandatory sentence 

based upon his prior conviction in Greene County Common Pleas Court 

Case No. 2009 CR 580. The State would oppose judicial release and 

transitional control. No other charges of intimidation to be filed as a result 

of this agreement and no imposition of PRC [Post-Release Control] time as 

a sentence will be imposed in this case. 

{¶ 4} The trial court accepted Harris’ no contest plea and found him guilty. The 

trial court imposed the stipulated five-year prison sentence, imposing two years for the 

felonious assault1 and three years for having a weapon while under disability, ordering 

the sentences to be served consecutively. The trial court did not impose a prison 

sentence for Harris’ violation of PRC. 

{¶ 5} It is from this judgment that Harris now appeals. 

{¶ 6} Harris’ sole assignment of error is as follows: 

{¶ 7} “APPELLANT’S PLEA OF NO CONTEST WAS NOT ENTERED 

KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY AND VOLUNTARILY AND SHOULD BE VACATED 

AND THE CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.” 

{¶ 8} In his sole assignment, Harris contends that his no contest pleas were not 

entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because the trial court failed to inform him, 

at the plea hearing, that any prison sentence it imposed for his violating post-release 

control was required to be consecutive to his sentences for felonious assault and having 

a weapon while under disability. Harris also argues that the trial court failed to inform 

 

1 The sentence for felonious assault was required to be mandatory since Harris had a 

prior conviction for aggravated robbery. 
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him of the effect that future felonies would have on his post-release control once he was 

released from prison for the instant offenses. 

{¶ 9} “Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) provides that, before accepting a guilty plea, a court 

must ‘[d]etermin[e] that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding 

of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved * * *.’ ” State v. Jones, 

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24772, 2013-Ohio-119, ¶ 6. “The ‘maximum penalty’ includes 

any mandatory post-release control sanction[.]” Id. at ¶ 7. “Thus if the defendant will 

be subject to a period of post-release control, to comply with Crim.R. 11 the court must 

inform the defendant of post-release control.” Id.

{¶ 10} “The Supreme Court of Ohio has urged trial courts to literally comply with 

Crim.R. 11.” State v. Jennings, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2013 CA 60, 2014-Ohio-2307, ¶ 6, citing 

State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 29. “However, 

because Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b) involve non-constitutional rights, the trial court need 

only substantially comply with those requirements.” Id., citing State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 

106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990). “Substantial compliance means that under the totality 

of the circumstances the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea 

and the rights he is waiving.” (Citations omitted.) Nero at 108, 564 N.E.2d 474. 

{¶ 11} “Furthermore, when non-constitutional rights are at issue, a defendant who 

challenges his guilty plea on the basis that it was not knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily made generally must show a prejudicial effect.” Jennings at ¶ 7, citing State v. 

Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 17. “Prejudice in this 

context means that the plea would otherwise not have been entered.” Id.

{¶ 12} As previously stated, Harris argues that his no contest pleas were not 
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entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because the trial court failed to inform him, 

at the plea hearing, that any prison sentence it imposed for his violating post-release 

control was required to be consecutive to his sentences for felonious assault and having 

a weapon while under disability. In that regard, R.C. 2929.141(A)(1) provides that a 

prison term imposed for a post-release control violation “shall be served consecutively to 

any prison term imposed for the new felony.” In support of his argument Harris cites two 

cases that were previously decided by this Court, to wit: State v. Branham, 2d Dist. Clark 

No. 2013 CA 49, 2014-Ohio-5067, and State v. Landgraf, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2014 CA 12, 

2014-Ohio-5448. 

{¶ 13} In Branham, the defendant had been on post-release control when he 

engaged in gross sexual imposition (GSI). Branham pled guilty to the GSI charge. The 

plea form advised Branham that post-release control could be revoked and that any 

sentence for having violated post-release control “could be imposed consecutively” to the 

GSI sentence. Branham at ¶ 11. The trial court subsequently imposed consecutive 

sentences for the gross sexual imposition conviction and for the post-release control 

violation. The plea agreement in Branham also included the State’s promise not to take 

any action on the post-release control violation. 

{¶ 14} At the plea hearing, Branham acknowledged that he was on post-release 

control. The court inquired whether Branham had signed the plea form, had read and 

discussed it with his attorney before signing it, and had understood it; Branham stated 

that he had. The court explained to Branham that the State did not speak for the parole 

board when it agreed to take no action on the post-release control violation, and the court 

told Branham that it could still sentence him for the post-release control violation. 
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Branham stated that he understood. 

{¶ 15} On appeal, Branham argued that the trial court erred in imposing 

consecutive sentences for the new felony and the post-release control violation. We 

agreed on the ground that the trial court had failed to inform Branham during the plea 

colloquy that, pursuant to the explicit language in R.C. 2929.141(A)(1), if it revoked his 

post-release control, the imposition of consecutive sentences for the violation was 

mandatory upon imposition of a prison term for the new felony. Branham at ¶ 12. 

{¶ 16} In rejecting the State’s assertion that the plea form adequately informed 

Branham that the court would impose consecutive sentences upon the termination of his 

post-release control, we stated as follows: 

Significantly, although the plea form signed by Branham included a 

provision which informed him of the effect that his PRC violation could have 

on sentencing, it did not contain any language putting him on notice that 

consecutive sentences were mandatory upon a prison sentence on the GSI. 

Rather, the general provision in the plea form merely states that the trial 

court “could” impose consecutive sentences in the event of a violation of 

felony probation, parole, community control sanction, or post-release 

control from prison. The use of the word “could” in this context is misleading. 

Branham at ¶ 13. We thus concluded that the trial court “not only should have told 

Branham that it was not bound by the State’s recommendation, but also if a new prison 

term was imposed [on the gross sexual imposition] and the court elected to revoke his 

PRC, the time must be served consecutively. The trial court did not have the discretion 

to use the word ‘could’ as the language in the plea form suggests.” Id. at ¶ 14. 
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{¶ 17} In Landgraf, we applied and followed Branham. The defendant in Landgraf

pled guilty to felony theft of a motor vehicle. At that time, he was on post-release control 

for an earlier conviction. The plea form advised him that post-release control could be 

revoked and that any new sentence for having violated post-release control “could be 

imposed consecutively.” Post-release control was not mentioned at the plea hearing. 

The trial court confirmed, however, that the defendant had reviewed the plea form and 

that he understood it. The trial court later imposed consecutive sentences for the felony 

theft conviction and for the post-release control violation. 

{¶ 18} On appeal, we reversed the decision of the trial court, holding that before 

pleading guilty the accused must be notified that, pursuant to R.C. 2929.141, the trial 

court is authorized to impose an additional consecutive prison sentence for the postrelease control violation, as well as inform the accused of the maximum possible sentence 

for such a violation. Landgraf at ¶ 23; contrast State v. Welch, 2017-Ohio-314, 81 N.E.3d 

997, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.) (finding substantial compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), despite the 

trial court’s failure to inform the defendant of the mandatory consecutive nature of any 

prison sentence it might impose for violating post-release control during the plea hearing, 

when the plea form explicitly informed Welch that his plea “may result in revocation 

proceedings” and that “any new sentence will be imposed consecutively.”) We note that 

the trial court in the instant case did not impose an additional consecutive PRC prison 

sentence as the trial court did in both Branham and Landgraf. 

{¶ 19} In State v. Jones, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24772, 2013-Ohio-119, we 

discussed whether the trial court had complied with Crim.R. 11 when it advised the 
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defendant of the correct term of post-release control and notified the defendant that the 

prison term for violation of post-release control could be “up to one half of the Court’s 

stated prison term,” but failed to notify the defendant about the nine-month-per-violation 

limitation for a violation of post-release control in R.C. 2943.032. We held that the trial 

court’s notice substantially complied with Crim.R. 11. Id. at ¶ 8. We further concluded 

that the trial court’s failure to mention the nine-month limitation did not render the 

defendant’s plea other than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. We reached this 

conclusion based on the following reasoning: 

Jones does not assert, let alone demonstrate, that he was prejudiced—that 

he would not have pleaded guilty had the trial court told him that the 

maximum possible prison term for a single violation of a post-release control 

condition is 9 months. We fail to see how this defendant, facing a potential 

of many years of re-incarceration for post release control violations, would 

have failed to enter his pleas if he knew those many years could only be 

imposed in nine month increments. 

Id. at ¶ 11. 

{¶ 20} More recently, we held in State v. Redavide, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 

26070, 2015-Ohio-3056, that a plea is not rendered invalid based on the trial court’s 

failure to fully explain the sanctions that could be imposed for a post-release control 

violation. Id.at ¶ 19. We noted that “when the trial court substantially complies with the 

notice requirement of informing a defendant about post-release control sanctions, no error 

occurs without demonstrating that a fuller disclosure would have changed his decision to 

plead.” Id.; see Jones at ¶ 11; Jennings, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2013 CA 60, 2014-Ohio-2307, 
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¶ 12. 

{¶ 21} During the plea hearing, the following exchange occurred: 

Defendant: Okay. My next question was, you’re familiar with the 

1,100 days that I supposedly had on parole time? 

The Court: What about that? 

Defendant: 1,100 days of PRC time that I had – 

Defense Counsel: He’s referring to the request made by the parole 

board to reimpose [sic] the 1,100 days that was remaining on PRC. 

The Court: If the State wishes to ignore that, that’s their prerogative. 

Defendant: Well, was it a – 

Defense Counsel: And they are ignoring it. 

The Court: I mean, it’s not mandatory. I don’t have to – if the State 

don’t [sic] want to pursue it, I don’t have to do it. 

* * * 

The Court: Okay. And has Counsel made any promises or 

representations to your client other than what I read on the record here? 

Defense Counsel: No, Your Honor. But there was one thing, I don’t 

think we need to put on the plea form, but is that [sic] there will be no other 

charges out of this incident, particularly no intimidation of a witness charge. 

The Court: What’s the State’s position on that? 

The State: No objection, Your Honor. And while we’re at it, we might 

as well put that we are not pursuing time remaining on the PRC from his 

original case in 2009 either then.
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The Court: All right. I have written the following, tell me if this is 

okay. I’ve said, no other charges of intimidation will be filed as a result of 

this agreement, and no imposition of Post Release Control time as a 

sentence will be imposed in this case. Does that cover what you were 

talking about? 

The State: Yes, Your Honor. 

Defense Counsel: Yes, Your Honor. 

The Court: Did you understand what I said? 

Defendant: Yes, sir. 

{¶ 22} At the end of the colloquy, the trial court accepted Harris’ no contest plea 

and found him guilty. The trial court imposed the stipulated five-year prison sentence, 

imposing two years for the felonious assault and three years for having a weapon while 

under disability, ordering the sentences to be served consecutively. It is undisputed that 

the trial court did not inform Harris that if it imposed additional prison time for his PRC 

violation, the time would have to be served consecutive to his sentence for the felonious 

assault and having a weapon while under disability. However, pursuant to information 

contained in the Plea Agreement Report, the trial court did not impose any additional 

prison time for Harris’ violation of his PRC from his 2009 conviction. We also note that 

the trial court orally informed Harris at the plea hearing that he would be subject to three 

years of mandatory PRC for the felonious assault conviction and up to three years of 

discretionary PRC for having a weapon while under disability. 

{¶ 23} The Ohio Supreme Court has explicitly held that the requirement that the 

court inform a defendant of the maximum penalty for the offenses involved is a statutory 
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requirement, and has no constitutional basis. State v. Johnson, 40 Ohio St.3d 130, 133, 

532 N.E.2d 1295 (1988). While strict compliance is the standard for constitutional 

Crim.R. 11 notifications, courts must only substantially comply in informing defendants of 

the non-constitutional notifications under Crim.R. 11. State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 

2008–Ohio–5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, at ¶ 18. Substantial compliance means that under 

the totality of the circumstances, the defendant subjectively understands the implications 

of his plea and the rights he is waiving. Veney at ¶ 15. Further, when non-constitutional 

aspects of the Crim.R. 11 colloquy are at issue, a defendant must show prejudice before 

a plea will be vacated. Id. Prejudice in this context requires that the defendant show that 

but for the error, there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would not have 

entered a plea of guilty. Jennings at ¶ 7, citing State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-

Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 17. 

{¶ 24} Where the trial court completely fails to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) or 

(b), “an analysis of prejudice” is not implicated. State v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86, 

2008–Ohio–509, 881 N.E.2d 1224, ¶ 22. Here, we find Sarkozy distinguishable, 

because unlike where a trial court completely failed to mention post-release control during 

the plea colloquy, here the trial court only failed to inform Harris about its ability to 

terminate PRC and impose a mandatory consecutive sentence. In all other respects, the 

record establishes that the trial court went to great lengths during its Crim.R. 11 colloquy 

to insure that Harris was aware of the constitutional rights that he was waiving by pleading 

no contest to the charged offenses and to comply with the non-constitutional rights of 

Crim.R. 11.

{¶ 25} Although the record reflects that the trial court did not advise Harris of its 
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ability under R.C. 2929.141 to terminate PRC and impose a consecutive prison sentence, 

Harris has failed to present evidence that shows a reasonable likelihood that but for the 

trial court's non-advisement, he would not have entered no contest pleas and would have 

chosen to go to trial. Harris never mentions in his brief, or otherwise, that he would not 

have entered no contest pleas if he had known of the trial court's ability to terminate PRC 

and impose a mandatory consecutive sentence. 

{¶ 26} Unlike the defendants in Branham and Landgraf, Harris was not ordered to 

serve an additional consecutive sentence for violating his PRC. Moreover, Harris was 

orally informed during the plea hearing and in his Plea Agreement Report that the State 

would not be requesting that the trial court impose an additional consecutive sentence for 

violating his PRC. The record establishes that before Harris pled no contest to felonious 

assault and having a weapon while under disability, the trial court expressed its intention 

to follow the parties’ agreement and sentence him to the stipulated prison term of five 

years with no additional prison time for violating his PRC. 

{¶ 27} We agree that notifying a defendant of the additional consecutive prison 

time he could face if the trial court exercises its authority under R.C. 2929.141 is certainly 

the preferred practice. However, under the circumstances presented in the instant case, 

Harris was not prejudiced in any way by the trial court’s failure to advise him of its ability 

under R.C. 2929.141 to terminate PRC and impose a consecutive prison sentence. See

Redavide at ¶ 19. Despite the trial court’s failure to inform Harris of its ability under R.C. 

2929.141 to terminate PRC and impose a consecutive prison sentence, we find that the 

trial court substantially complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) when it accepted his no contest 

pleas, found him guilty, and sentenced him to the agreed upon prison term of five years. 
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{¶ 28} Furthermore, the record establishes that the trial court properly informed 

Harris that he would be subject to a period of mandatory PRC for the felonious assault 

and a discretionary period of PRC for having a weapon while under disability. In addition 

to informing Harris of PRC for the instant offenses, the trial court informed him of the 

consequences of violating his PRC once he was released. Therefore, we find that the 

trial court complied with Crim.R. 11 by informing Harris of PRC once he is released from 

prison for the instant offenses. 

{¶ 29} Harris’ sole assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 30} Harris’ sole assignment of error having been overruled, the judgment of the 

trial court is affirmed. 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

HALL, P.J. and TUCKER, J., concur. 

Copies mailed to: 

Nathaniel R. Luken 

James S. Armstrong 

Hon. Stephen A. Wolaver