ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Eric K. Koselke Steve Carter 

Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana 

Matthew D. Fisher 

Deputy Attorney General 

 Indianapolis, Indiana 

In the 

Indiana Supreme Court _________________________________ 

No. 49S00-0501-CR-2 

RONALD COVINGTON, JR., 

 Appellant (Defendant below), 

v. 

STATE OF INDIANA, 

 Appellee (Plaintiff below). 

_________________________________ 

Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, No. 49G02-0206-MR-157363 

The Honorable Robert R. Altice, Judge 

_________________________________ 

February 14, 2006 

Shepard, Chief Justice.

 Appellant Ronald Covington, Jr., challenges his sentence of life without parole for the 

2002 murder of three people. He argues that his sentence was inappropriate and that Indiana’s 

life without parole statute violates the Sixth Amendment. We conclude that imposition of the 

life sentence was appropriate. Our cases are stare decisis against him on the constitutional 

claim. We therefore affirm. 

1
Facts and Procedural History 

 On June 1, 2002, Covington forced his way into the apartment of Maranda Wilson (the 

mother of his two children) by kicking in the front door. He began shooting the occupants of the 

apartment. Covington shot and killed Frederic Harris and Kevin Simmons who were visiting 

Wilson at the time. Covington then shot Jasmine West five times -- three times in the chest, once 

in the arm and once in the hand. The bullet that struck West’s hand passed through the hand and 

hit her in the face, ultimately lodging in her neck. Covington then took Wilson into a back 

bedroom where he shot and killed her. 

West remained conscious throughout the ordeal and survived by pretending to be dead. 

After Covington left, she managed to call the police. When officers arrived, they discovered 

three bodies -- Harris and Simmons in the living room and Wilson in a bedroom. These three 

individuals were pronounced dead at the scene. West was transported to a local hospital. During 

an interview with police several days later, West stated that Covington had shot her and the 

others. Based on that identification, and calls from Covington’s parents suggesting his 

involvement in the crimes, the State charged Covington with three counts of murder, one count 

of attempted murder, and one count of class A burglary. On June 6, 2002, Covington 

surrendered to the police. 

In September 2002, the State filed a death penalty request for the murders of Wilson, 

Harris, and Simmons. It alleged as aggravators that the murder of Wilson occurred during the 

commission of a burglary and that Covington committed multiple murders. See IND. CODE ANN. 

§ 35-50-2-9(b)(1)(B), (b)(8) (West 2004). 

On August 25, 2004, Covington entered into a plea agreement with the State under which 

the State withdrew its request for the death penalty in exchange for his pleading guilty to all 

counts. The agreement left the State free to seek life without parole based on the same 

aggravators charged in requesting the death penalty. During the guilty plea hearing, Covington 

admitted the material allegations of the charging information and established a factual basis for 

2
the plea. The trial court rendered judgment on all counts, but entered the burglary conviction as 

a class B felony. 

At the sentencing hearing, Covington introduced evidence of numerous mitigating 

circumstances, most notably: the contentious nature of his relationship with Maranda Wilson, the 

dysfunctional nature of his family life during childhood, his generally good behavior prior to the 

murders, a risk assessment produced by a corrections expert who concluded that Covington 

“would be completely harmless” after twenty-five to thirty years in prison, and the existence of 

several psychological disorders Covington claimed contributed to his actions. (Tr. at 37, 39, 60, 

90, 110-11, 113, 142; Appellant’s Br. at 13-14.) 

Judge Altice entered a substantial and helpful sentencing order. He recognized certain 

mitigating factors, but declined to find others, particularly those that suggested Covington was 

not a risk to commit future acts of violence if his mental health issues were properly treated. The 

court concluded that it was too difficult to predict Covington’s compliance with treatment 

outside of a structured environment. In the end, the court found that the statutory aggravators 

outweighed the mitigating circumstances and sentenced Covington to life without parole on the 

three counts of murder. 

For the attempted murder, the court found as aggravation the repeated shooting of 

Jasmine West and Covington’s actions in leaving her to die. It declared that the aggravators 

outweighed the mitigators and thus sentenced Covington to fifty years for attempted murder, and 

ten years for burglary, both to be served concurrently with the life sentence. 

Covington appealed his sentence, arguing that the imposition of life without parole was 

inappropriate in light of the “nature of the offense and character of Mr. Covington” as well as the 

mitigating circumstances presented to the court, and that Indiana’s life without parole statute 

violates the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. (Appellant’s Br. at 7-8.) 

Pursuant to Indiana Rule of Appellate Procedure 4A(1)(a) this Court has mandatory and 

exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal. 

3
I. Covington’s Sentence Was Appropriate 

Covington’s principal challenge to his sentence is that it is inappropriate in light of his 

character and the mitigating factors presented at sentencing. He makes two separate arguments 

on this issue: that the court failed to assign appropriate weight to certain mitigators, and that it 

failed to find others. 

A. Mitigating Circumstances Not Improperly Weighed. Generally, the weight 

assigned to a mitigator is at the trial judge’s discretion, and the judge is under no obligation to 

assign the same weight to a mitigating circumstance as the defendant. Stevens v. State, 691 

N.E.2d 412 (Ind. 1997). We set aside a judge’s weighing of aggravators and mitigators only if 

there is a manifest abuse of discretion. Dunlop v. State, 724 N.E.2d 592 (Ind. 2000). 

Covington first argues that the court failed to give adequate weight to the effect a 

dysfunctional childhood home life had on his actions, to his remorse, and to the effect of his 

mental health on his actions. (Appellant’s Br. at 13.) 

The court did find that the defendant’s dysfunctional home life as a child constituted a 

mitigating circumstance, but assigned little weight to it. (Appellant’s App. at 416.) The court 

explained this conclusion by stating that although the defendant had witnessed episodes of 

domestic violence during his childhood, there was other “evidence that the Defendant’s home 

environment was, for the most part, very stable.” (Id.) Given this conflict, we conclude that the 

trial court could properly assign this mitigator little weight. 

Covington also argues that the trial court failed to give significant weight to his 

expression of remorse for the murders. (Appellant’s Br. at 13.) It was certainly proper for the 

defendant to show remorse, and the court did find this as a mitigator. (Appellant’s App. at 414.) 

Such an expression does not necessarily compel a conclusion that Covington’s regret outweighs 

the brutal nature of the killings. Covington killed three individuals and attempted to kill a fourth. 

4
One of those victims was the mother of his children and a woman with whom he had shared a 

long-term relationship. We cannot say the trial court erred in finding that the aggravators 

outweighed this mitigator. 

Covington also argues that the court failed to assign sufficient weight to the mitigating 

circumstance of his mental health. (Appellant’s Br. at 13.) At the sentencing hearing, Covington 

introduced evidence that he suffered from Delusional Disorder, Depressive Disorder NOS, 

Anxiety Disorder NOS, and Schizotypal Personality Disorder. (Appellant’s App. at 378-87 (386 

specifically listing diagnosis).) The trial court found that these disorders constituted a mitigating 

circumstance and that they had some impact on Covington’s actions. 

The American Psychiatric Association’s definitions of mental illness, contained in the 

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (presently “DSM-IV-TR”) have 

continued to expand to the point that a recent study declared that about half of Americans 

become mentally ill and half do not.1 This suggests the need for a high level of discernment 

when assessing a claim that mental illness warrants mitigating weight. In Weeks v. State, we 

laid out several factors to consider in weighing the mitigating force of a mental health issue. 697 

N.E.2d 28 (Ind. 1998). Those factors include the extent of the inability to control behavior, the 

overall limit on function, the duration of the illness, and the nexus between the illness and the 

crime. Id. at 30. 

In this case, the judge acknowledged that there was some nexus between the crime and 

the illness. He also cited evidence, however, that suggested that Covington was otherwise able 

to control his behavior and that the illness imposed little limit on his functioning. For example, 

the examining psychologist noted that Covington was able to discern right from wrong behavior, 

that he had developed an awareness of his own temper and would “get away from a situation” 

when he noticed his temper becoming uncontrollable, and that “unless subject to intense or 

prolonged stress or provocation” Covington would be “unlikely to behave in . . . a disorganized 

 

1

 The National Comorbidity Survey Replication, conducted every ten years, found that 46 percent of Americans 

suffer or will suffer from mental illness during their lifetime. According to the survey, a third to a fifth of 

Americans will suffer from anxiety disorders, impulse control disorders, or mood disorders. Sadly, the survey also 

revealed that many Americans go undiagnosed and untreated for these disorders. Alex Barnum, Mental Illness Will 

Hit Half in U.S., Study Says, SAN FRAN. CHRONICLE, June 7, 2005. 

5
and emotional fashion.” (Appellant’s App. at 384-85.) In light of this evidence, we are not 

persuaded that the court erred in assigning some, but not determinate, weight to Covington’s 

mental condition. 

B. Mitigators Not Improperly Disregarded. Covington also claims that the court failed 

to consider evidence regarding several mitigators, particularly the lack of his risk for recidivism. 

The evidence he presented on this point consisted of: his lack of prior criminal history; his 

generally good behavior prior to the crime and during his stay in the Marion County Jail while 

awaiting trial; the report of corrections expert James Aiken, who concluded he would be little 

risk in twenty-five to thirty years; and that with treatment his mental health issues would allow 

him to re-enter society safely. (Tr. at 65, 68, 72-73, 90, 142; Appellant’s Br. at 13.) 

The court addressed most of these mitigators in its sentencing order. For example, the 

court specifically found that Covington’s insignificant criminal history was a mitigating 

circumstance. (Appellant’s App. at 414.) However, here too the court concluded that it was of 

insufficient weight to outweigh the aggravators. (Id. at 417.) 2

The other evidence was apparently introduced to demonstrate that the murders were a 

spontaneously one-time act, and that Covington’s future behavior could be controlled through 

treatment of his mental health issues. The trial court sympathized with this argument, but did so 

conditionally. It noted that while Covington’s mental health issues may be treatable, this 

required “the Defendant [to] be compliant with his treatment.” (Appellant’s App. at 416.) The 

court concluded that the evidence presented of Covington’s apparent previous non-compliance 

with medical treatment for physical illness made it “too difficult to make an accurate prediction 

as to [his] future behavior.” (Id.)

3

 

2

 The court did not make mention of Covington’s witnesses who testified about his generally good behavior before 

the murder. Given the court’s careful consideration of other mitigators, and the weight of the aggravators, we are 

not persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion in not listing this as a mitigating circumstance, or that finding 

the mitigator would have had any measurable impact on the court’s decision. 

3

 The evidence of this is contained in the report of the psychiatrist who interviewed and diagnosed Covington. The 

report indicates that Covington sought treatment for a sexual dysfunction, but during the interview Covington 

indicated that he disregarded the treatment prescribed. (Appellant’s App. at 380-81.) Covington made this denial 

even though the psychiatrist indicates that review of the medical records strongly suggests his compliance with the 

6
Similarly, the court carefully considered the testimony of James Aiken, Indiana’s former 

Commissioner of Correction, who testified that lifelong incarceration would likely not be 

necessary for Covington, and that Covington could likely be successfully reintegrated into 

society after twenty-five or thirty years. The court took note of this testimony, but again 

concluded that Covington’s mental health issues and unpredictable compliance with mental 

treatment outside of the structured corrections environment made it “too difficult to make an 

accurate prediction” regarding him. (Appellant’s App. at 416.) 

Judge Altice’s sentencing order clearly indicate that the trial court carefully considered 

the evidence about Covington’s seemingly low risk of recidivism, but determined that this 

evidence was insufficient to demonstrate the defendant’s contention. We cannot conclude that 

the trial court was wrong in refusing to find these mitigators. 

Finally, Covington says the court should have found the contentious nature of his 

relationship with Maranda Wilson as a mitigating circumstance. (Appellant’s Br. at 13.) 

Certainly there are occasions when a victim’s own actions may be appropriately considered as a 

mitigating circumstance; however, as the court noted, this is not one of those times. The court 

stated, “while the relationship was certainly ‘rocky’ at times, the stress and dysfunction should 

not have resulted in the death of Miranda [sic] Wilson . . . [nor those of] Frederick [sic] Harris 

and Kevin Simmons as well as the attempted murder of Jasmine West. Each of these victims had 

nothing to do with that relationship.” (Appellant’s App. at 415.) We agree. Evidence heard at 

the sentencing hearing suggests Covington’s relationship with Wilson had been “rocky” for years 

and that he had handled repeated moments of stress in the relationship without becoming violent. 

The court was not in error by refusing to find this mitigator. 

All things considered, the trial court seems warranted in finding that three unprovoked 

killings outweighed the mitigating circumstances. 

 

treatment plan. (Id. at 381.) The report also indicates that Covington was at one time prescribed Wellbutrin – 

apparently for the same physical condition – but insisted that he never took the drug, and indicated that in the past 

“he has vigorously opposed taking any pills that can alter your thinking.” (Id. at 380.) 

7
II. LWOP Does not Violate the Sixth Amendment 

 Covington argues that Indiana’s statute on life without parole violates the Sixth 

Amendment because it does not require that the determination that the aggravating facts 

outweigh the mitigating circumstances be made beyond a reasonable doubt before the imposition 

of a sentence of life without parole. 

 As Covington rightly notes, we have already decided this issue adverse to his position. In 

Ritchie v. State, we addressed a similar challenge to our death penalty sentencing scheme based 

on Apprendi v. New Jersey,

4

 and Ring v. Arizona.

5

 809 N.E.2d 258, 264-68 (Ind. 2004) cert. 

denied, 126 S.Ct. 42 (2005). 

We addressed this issue again in Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90 (Ind. 2005), where we 

examined Indiana’s death penalty in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Blakely v. 

Washington.

6

 Blakely reiterated the holding of Ring and Apprendi that “[o]ther than the fact of 

a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 

maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Blakely, 542 

U.S. at 301. Blakely went further, however, by defining the term statutory maximum as “the 

maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury 

verdict or admitted by the defendant.” Id. at 303. 

Pruitt held that Blakely did not affect Indiana’s death penalty statute since the “jury’s 

determination of whether the eligibility factors outweigh any mitigating factors is not a finding 

of fact and it does not increase the penalty of the crime.” Pruitt, 834 N.E.2d at 112. 

Although both Richie and Pruitt dealt with challenges to Indiana’s death penalty, 

Indiana’s death penalty provisions and life without parole option operate under the same 

framework. See Ajabu v. State, 693 N.E.2d 921, 938 (Ind. 1998). We have previously upheld 

 

4

 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 

5

 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 

6

 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 

8
our life without parole statute in the face of challenges under Ring and Apprendi when, as here, 

the defendant pleads guilty. Leone v. State, 797 N.E.2d 743, 749-50 (Ind. 2003). Covington’s 

arguments are substantially the same as those we considered in the foregoing cases, and they are 

stare decisis against him. 

Conclusion 

We affirm the judgment of trial court. 

Dickson, Sullivan, and Boehm, JJ., concur. 

Rucker, J., concurs in Part I and concurs in result in Part II. 

9