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38–836 2008

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–67]

GLOBAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD

JULY 11, 2007

(II)

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii

MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas

ADAM SMITH, Washington

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island

RICK LARSEN, Washington

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam

MARK UDALL, Colorado

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana

NANCY BOYDA, Kansas

PATRICK MURPHY, Pennsylvania

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa

KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida

KATHY CASTOR, Florida

DUNCAN HUNTER, California

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina

KEN CALVERT, California

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia

JEFF MILLER, Florida

JOE WILSON, South Carolina

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey

TOM COLE, Oklahoma

ROB BISHOP, Utah

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona

THELMA DRAKE, Virginia

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington

MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director

MARK LEWIS, Professional Staff Member

AAILEEN ALEXANDER, Professional Staff Member

MARGEE MECKSTROTH, Staff Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2007

Page

HEARING:

Wednesday, July 11, 2007, Global Security Assessment ...................................... 1

APPENDIX:

Wednesday, July 11, 2007 ....................................................................................... 41

WEDNESDAY, JULY 11, 2007

GLOBAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Ranking Member,

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1

WITNESSES

Fingar, Dr. Thomas, Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis,

Office of the Director of National Intelligence ................................................... 3

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Fingar, Dr. Thomas .......................................................................................... 45

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Mr. Loebsack ..................................................................................................... 73

Mr. Smith .......................................................................................................... 71

(1)

GLOBAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, July 11, 2007.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in room

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman

of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED

SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the House

Armed Services Committee hearing on global security environment.

Before us today are: Dr. Thomas Fingar, Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis from the Office of Director of National Intelligence; Mr. Robert Cardillo, Deputy Director for Analysis from the DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency; and Mr. John

Kringen, Director for Intelligence from the Central Intelligence

Agency.

I certainly want to thank you, and I understand that you will

have staff behind you in case we have additional questions.

I expect that today’s hearing will be a very important one, as it

is the first one in a series of what there is out there that we need

to know to perform our constitutional duties.

The oversight plan for the 110th Congress reads that ‘‘the committee will conduct all its oversight activities within the context of

a comprehensive approach to understanding the strategic risks facing the United States. In so doing, the committee will seek to determine what level of strategic risk is acceptable, what factors increase that risk and what factors reduce it.’’

We must keep that test in mind. A large measure of considering

and evaluating the strategic risk is understanding what potential

security challenges face our country. With that in mind, I call for

this hearing to orient our members to the range of potential security challenges our country faces in the immediate and mid-term

future.

In a sense, the hearing is the first of a series. As I mentioned,

very shortly, our committee will resume its oversight activities involving the Middle East as a region and then the conflicts in Iraq

and Afghanistan. Today’s hearing will provide us with the broad

strategic context which we can use to help us to understand how

those wars, especially Iraq, fit into the overall security environment facing our country. We could very easily call this hearing

Strategic Risk 101.

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We must consider the ongoing wars, both in terms of their importance to our national security interests and the amount of risk incurred through the continued expenditure of resources for their

prosecution, is the risk-reward equation in balance, and it is my

hope that members will use today to inform their judgment to consider that question.

It is important to remember that the international security situation is fluid. We must hedge against strategic surprise and at the

same time work to identify trends that could have implications to

our national security down the road.

Members of this committee have heard me say that since I have

been in Congress—I have been blessed to be here 30-plus years—

during that time, we have had 12 conflicts in which our country

has been involved militarily, 4 of which were major, and most of

them were not thought out ahead of time and came as a surprise.

So why is it important? It is our constitutional duty to raise and

support the armies, provide and maintain the Navy, and we have

responsibility to do just that for the foreseen and unforeseen.

So, ladies and gentlemen, let me welcome you, thank you for

coming over. It is extremely important that you give us your best

judgment on these very important issues today.

My friend, my colleague, Ranking Member Duncan Hunter.

STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON

ARMED SERFVICES

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for holding

this very important hearing, and I want to join with you in welcoming our guests.

During the 2006 Committee Defense Review, an effort intended

to complement the Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Review, this

committee defined a threat as intent plus capability, and during

our review, we realized that the international security environment

that the U.S. forces operate in today includes a broad and diverse

spectrum of threats, changing the strategic security equation that

we use to understand strategic risk and determine necessary capabilities.

Today’s strategic security equation continues to include those potential threats generated by hostile nation states, and I would just

go over a couple of them.

China: The Pentagon’s 2006 QDR noted that China is at a strategic crossroads with ‘‘the greatest potential to compete militarily

with the United States. China’s rapid economic growth, doubledigit defense spending, investments in military modernization with

a focus on power projection and its strategic forces contribute to increasing security competition in Asia.’’

Iran: ‘‘Iran continues to take steps that counter U.S. influences

in the region by supporting international terrorism and expanding

its nuclear program and ballistic arsenal.’’

And we have seen the recent steps that they have undertaken in

the last several weeks, Mr. Chairman, with respect to the excavations that are taking place near their centrifuge sites in Iran. It

is these actions that disrupt regional stability and require the

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United States to ensure it is postured to deter and defeat any aggression against American interests.

Venezuela: As a regional neighbor of the United States, Venezuela is increasingly threatening stability in the Western Hemisphere. The country’s leadership is determined to move the country

away from democracy and toward socialism, maintains close relations with Cuba and Iran, and continues to decrease its cooperation

in antidrug and antiterrorism efforts.

And, again, on the front pages of the newspapers these last several weeks have been stories about the new arms deal that would

bring a new array of fairly sophisticated military systems to Venezuela.

Today’s security equation is not a simplistic one that is limited

solely to meeting the threats posed by hostile nation states, but

also includes elements from non-state actors, such as violent extremist groups like al Qaeda. The threat from al Qaeda and related

groups is one of the most daunting challenges to U.S. security we

face as they exploit conditions created by regional instabilities in

such places as Iraq, Africa, the Pacific, and the Horn of Africa to

provide safe haven and espouse a corruptive view of Islam to encourage violence against the United States and other nations.

This problem of having to face both state and non-state actors

becomes even more complex as we are seeking more and more linkages between these threats. A recent cyberattack on Estonia raises

the specter of states enlisting non-state actors to act as a proxy.

The attacks against Estonia were not military in nature, but attacked communications, economic systems, and other infrastructure

which raises new concerns about the scope of potential hostile actions we might face.

So these security challenges are very complex. They are diverse.

They are evolving. They require this committee’s understanding of

a multifaceted strategic security equation and a continued effort to

ensure that our forces have the necessary resources and capabilities to perform their missions honorably and reduce the risks to the

security of the American people.

So, Mr. Chairman, once again, thanks for holding this very timely hearing. I look forward to the discussion.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I thank the gentleman from California.

As I understand it, Dr. Fingar, you have a prepared statement

and will deliver your comments now. As I understand it, Mr.

Kringen and Mr. Cardillo will be here to answer questions. Am I

correct on that?

Dr. FINGAR. Yes, you are, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, Doctor, please proceed and then we will go

to the questions. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF DR. THOMAS FINGAR, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FOR ANALYSIS, OFFICE OF THE

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Dr. FINGAR. Thank you.

Chairman Skelton, Ranking Member Hunter, members of the

committee, thank you for this opportunity to present our assessment of threats to our nation.

4

Mr. Chairman, thank you for introducing my colleagues, Dr.

Kringen and Mr. Cardillo, who will be here to help with questions.

Indeed, in order to maximize time for you to ask the questions of

greatest interest to you, I will give a very abbreviated opening

statement.

Mr. Chairman, America confronts a greater diversity of threats

and challenges than ever before. Globalization is the defining characteristic of our age and has more positive than negative consequences, but globalization facilitates terrorist activity, increases

the danger of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation

and contributes to regional instability and reconfiguration of power

and influence, especially through competition for energy.

Many nations are unable to provide good governance and sustain

the rule of law within their borders. This enables hostile states and

non-state actors to threaten fundamental building blocks of international order, creating failed states, proxy states, terrorist safe

havens, and ungoverned regions that endanger the international

community and its citizens.

It also threatens our national security. Terrorist threats to the

homeland and to our friends and allies post the most serious danger to our nation and the biggest challenge for the intelligence community.

Al Qaeda is the terrorist organization posing the greatest threat

to U.S. interests, including the homeland. We have captured or

killed numerous senior al Qaeda operatives, but the organization is

resilient and continues to plot attacks against high-profile targets

with the objective of inflicting mass casualties. al Qaeda maintains

active connections between its leaders hiding in the AfghanistanPakistan border region and affiliates throughout the Middle East,

North and East Africa, and Europe.

The ongoing efforts of nation states and terrorists to develop and/

or acquire dangerous weapons and delivery systems constitute the

second major threat to the safety of our nation, our deployed troops

and our friends. Iran and North Korea pose the most serious proliferation challenges.

Iran continues to pursue uranium enrichment and has shown

more interest in protracting negotiations and working to delay and

diminish the impact of United Nations Security Council sanctions

than in reaching an acceptable diplomatic solution. We assess that

Tehran is determined to develop nuclear weapons, despite its international obligations and international pressure.

Iran’s influence is rising in ways that go beyond the potential

threat posed by its nuclear program. The fall of the Taliban and

Saddam increased oil revenues. Hamas control of Gaza and

Hezbollah’s perceived success last summer in fighting against

Israel embolden Iran and unsettle our Arab allies.

North Korea has flight-tested missiles and a nuclear device. We

are concerned by the prospect of further proliferation because

Pyongyang has a long history of selling ballistic missiles, including

to several Middle Eastern countries. The agreement reached

through the six-party talks last February obligates the Democratic

People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to declare all its nuclear programs and disable its nuclear facilities. We will look closely for

signs of compliance.

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In Iraq, coalition and Iraqi forces seek to reduce violence, combat

terrorism, and create an environment conducive to national reconciliation. The government of Prime Minister Maliki is making

halting efforts to bridge divisions and restore commitment to a unified country. Iraqi security forces, especially the Iraqi army, have

become more numerous and more capable. Despite these and other

positive developments, however, communal violence and deep suspicion among Shias, Sunnis, and Kurds continue to polarize politics.

The intelligence community stated in the January 2007 National

Intelligence Estimate on Iraq that security and political trends

were moving in a negative direction and that, even if efforts to reduce violence were successful, political progress would take time. It

is too early to assess whether the strategy currently being implemented will allow lasting improvements in this situation.

Afghanistan’s leaders continue to face a resurgent Taliban threat

and formidable challenges to effective governance. The country has

a chronic shortage of resources and qualified and motivated government officials, and pervasive drug cultivation contributes to endemic corruption at all levels of government. Diminishing the safe

haven that the Taliban and other extremists have found in Pakistan is a necessary but insufficient condition for ending the insurgency in Afghanistan.

Mr. Chairman, cognizant of your desire to allow as much time as

possible for questions and discussions, I will further compress the

points made in my statement for the record with the goal of illustrating the scope, complexity, and implications of other threats and

challenges facing our country. Each of the points I will convey in

telegraphic form are discussed at greater length in the written

statement.

Very briefly, the rise of China and economic prosperity more generally, except for North Korea, are challenging Northeast Asia in

unprecedented ways, but Asia still lacks mature integrating security mechanisms, except for bilateral security treaties with the

United States.

Beijing continues to emphasize economic development and friendly relations with its neighbors, but it also continues its rapid military modernization program involving several weapons systems designed to challenge the United States’ capability.

As Russia moves toward a Presidential election, succession maneuvering has intensified. The Kremlin has increased efforts to stifle political opposition and widen the state control over strategic

sectors of the economy. High energy prices continue to fuel economic recovery and fan aspirations to become an energy superpower.

The situation in the Palestinian territories is precarious, with

forces loyal to Hamas and Fatah poised to renew fighting, and

prospects for negotiations with Israel are dimmed by the existence

of competing Palestinian governments. Large-scale killing and organized massacres in Darfur are less frequent than they were a

few years ago, but violence continues and the numbers of refugees

and displaced persons continue to grow.

Democracy is at risk in Venezuela where President Chavez has

become one of the most stridently anti-American leaders in the

6

world. The strong showing of Presidential candidates with leftist or

populist views in several other Latin American countries speak to

the growing impatience of national electorates with corruption, real

and perceived, and the failure of incumbent governments to improve the living standards of large elements of the population.

Somalia remains in turmoil. Lebanon remains at risk. The list

goes on.

Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I will conclude my oral

statement with a request that my written statement be made a

part of the record of today’s proceedings and a pledge to answer

questions from the committee as fully and frankly as possible in an

open session.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Fingar can be found in the Appendix on page 45.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Without objection.

Let me ask one question before I call on Mr. Hunter. Looking

back to an era of relative worldwide calm—and I doubt if there is

such an era—Doctor, correct me if I am wrong—somewhere between 1953, the end of the Korean War, and the early 1960’s,

which showed the breakup of the various African colonies, if that

is fairly true, how much more dangerous is this world in which we

live now than it was during that era?

Dr. FINGAR. Three points, I think, will frame the answer.

The first is that the period, of course, was a part of the Cold War

era where the existential threat to our nation from Soviet nuclear

weapons and the intensity of the two-camp struggle, the ideological

struggle, the incredible arms race, militarization, competition for

allies around the world had a very, very serious threat to our existence, our way of life and, indeed, the safety of every American.

A difference—second point—is that because it was a largely bipolar world in which the United States and the Soviet Union exercised a degree of influence or control over most other nations, even

the newly emerging nations that you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, as

a result of decolonization, that lent an element of stability to the

high-risk situation.

Today, the frail, failing governments in many parts of the world,

the absence of an overarching threat to galvanize attitudes and

populations in increasingly democratic societies around the world

lend a degree of unpredictability that we did not have in the earlier

period.

The third difference is the emergence of asymmetric challenges.

At one end of the spectrum, the prospect of nuclear proliferation,

use of biological toxins by nation states, by weak nations or by nonstate actors. The other end of the spectrum, there is the poor man’s

nuclear deterrent of terrorism that, as nations and non-state actors

recognize that their ability to challenge the United States militarily

has diminished in many cases to zero, the temptations to utilize

the asymmetric tactics of terrorism increase, and in the

ungoverned, poorly governed areas that result in part from the

playing forward of history of decolonization and the breakup of the

two blocs, there are an increasing number of areas in the globe

7

that are conducive to being safe havens for terrorists looking for a

foothold to prepare for actions against us.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, one aspect of the conflict with the Soviet Union was

the development and the maintenance of Coordinating Committee

for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), the technology transfer

regime that was a multilateral regime that worked. While it had

a few holes in it and there were obviously many attempts by members of the Soviet bloc to get around it, it kept a lot of important

military technology from flowing to the Soviet Union and Warsaw

Pact nations.

COCOM dissolved with the Soviet Union, and today it is basically every man for himself, with nations self-imposing some disciplines in some cases, in other cases having goals and standards

that are very general and somewhat vague with respect to transfers of technology to places like China. We are trying to maintain

the European arms embargo with respect to China, but lots of stuff

is getting through.

My question is do you think that we need a new COCOM, if you

will, a new discipline that we would negotiate with our allies to

prevent the transfer of technology to nation states that have been

helping or might be helping terrorists, understanding we have certain lists and disciplines that are basically limited to American entities that to some degree keep critical military technology from

getting into the wrong hands?

But my question is do you think that we need a new regime with

respect to transfer of technology to China and/or other nation

states?

Dr. FINGAR. My starting point, Mr. Chairman, is we have some

reasonably well-functioning international regimes, the Nuclear

Suppliers Group, the Australia Group and so forth, that are effective and need to be strengthened.

Reviving COCOM or a COCOM for the 21st century, I think,

though it may be desirable in certain respects, globalization makes

it less than practical, in my view. I say that as somebody who was

on the advisory panel for the Office of Technology Assessment

when Congress rewrote the Export Administration Act in 1978–

1979, that the old model that made COCOM effective, that had a

relatively small number of producers, generators of technologies,

many of which were closely linked to the military and could be controlled because the military was the primary customer has been replaced by global manufacturing just in time, many, many centers

of technological and engineering excellence, most technology being

commoditized dual use, the larger markets being outside of military procurement in our own country and elsewhere.

I think any type of a control regime—and I do believe control regimes are appropriate—need to be very tightly focused on specific

technologies with very direct military applications that would endanger our weapons systems, for example. Broader technology constraints, I think, would be very difficult to enforce, but I invite my

colleagues to comment.

Mr. KRINGEN. We would agree.

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Mr. HUNTER. With respect to having a tight array of controlled

technologies, would you agree that we need to have another

COCOM system? You know, I am thinking of when the nine-axis

milling machines were delivered to the KGB by Toshiba. It was a

COCOM discipline that basically punished Toshiba for that activity

and, I think, to a large degree deterred further activities along that

line.

Right now, except for the weapons of mass destruction area, we

have very, very limited international, multinational systems or regimes in place to control technology transfer? COCOM was it basically.

Dr. FINGAR. COCOM was it. COCOM, as you know, Congressman, was replaced by the Wassenaar agreement, but a major difference—and I will invite Mr. Van Diepen to expand on this—is

that with the breakup of the two camps, the bipolar world, the ability to exercise discipline is very different than it was. We have

more jawboning and less forceful methods to enforce discipline

within it.

It is not that I do not think it is a good idea. I just think it is

a very difficult challenge.

Van, do you want to add to——

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. I think that is essentially correct. COCOM, in

effect, was an economic warfare mechanism against the Soviet bloc

that was perceived by all the member states as posing an existential threat and, as Dr. Fingar noted, in the wake of the end of the

Cold War, that common perception of a single existential threat, a

unified list of targets that countries were willing to forego economically lucrative exports to wage economic warfare against, has basically gone away, and now you have much more dual-use technology, much more interest in promoting mutually beneficial economic activity.

Mr. HUNTER. Well, let me just finish with this question then. Is

there anything you would do to change the status quo on technology transfer control? Anything?

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. I think, you know, working in niche areas

where you can come up with consensus in sort of building that

brick by brick. For example, in the U.N. Security Council, we have

been able to get sanctions on specific entities, on specific countries,

on specific commodities, but trying to sort of re-establish that common perception of threat where one can, and then also trying to

strengthen these informal arrangements like the Wassenaar arrangement, like the Nuclear Suppliers Group, but I think it is

going to have to be kind of a bottom-up approach rather than a topdown comprehensive approach like a COCOM.

Dr. FINGAR. Let me add, Congressman, coming at this as the intelligence community rather than as the policymakers who would

have to devise such a control regime, I think what we can do, must

do and are doing is to do all that we can to identify objectives, specific countries, technologies that they regard as keystone, as critical

to their ability to move ahead in threatening ways, to do everything that we can to persuade those who might supply that technology, perhaps to work with police and customs officers around

the world to interdict or perhaps take other measures to inhibit the

access to that technology.

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So we can do what we can to prepare long laundry lists of all of

the elements of Hamas or something. It is not going to be very

helpful, I would not think, to those we support.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Spratt.

I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you.

Thank you very much for your testimony, and forgive my hoarse

voice this morning.

General Petraeus and others have sat where you sit, and general

officers and senior civil servants alike have said that the real solution in Iraq has to be a political solution, some grand compromise

among the Kurds, the Sunnis and the Shia, and you say, I think,

the same thing in your report here.

But you also give a rather bleak assessment of the national reconciliation effort that is now underway. You indicate, for example,

that it is moving in a negative direction as opposed to proceeding

in a positive direction and that ‘‘given the current winner-take-all

attitude and sectarian animosity infecting the Sunni political

scene, Iraqi’s leaders will be hard pressed to achieve sustained political reconciliation.’’

That does not leave much room for hope or foresight as to how

this thing comes to some sort of acceptable conclusion. What do you

do with the situation? If we need a political solution, how do we

overcome the bleak assessment you have made of the government

in power right now?

Dr. FINGAR. Congressman, I wish I had the answer to this one,

but the analysis that the community made in January at the time

of the estimate appears to be borne out by events since then.

That assessment focused on the imperative for reducing levels of

violence in the country as a prerequisite for beginning to restore

some confidence among the competing fractured body politic in the

groups, in the political system, in the ethnosectarian communities,

that the surge that began a few months ago is having an effect.

It has not yet had a sufficient effect on the violence, in my judgment, to move the country to a place that the serious obstacles to

reconciliation can be overcome, that the most optimistic projection

is that it would be difficult and time consuming to bridge the political gulf when violence levels are reduced, and they have not yet

been reduced significantly.

Mr. SPRATT. Let me ask you about the other side of the equation,

and that is Iraqi Security Forces. One of our objectives was to, obviously, build up their forces to the point that they were a freestanding force operationally effective so that we could turn over to

them the responsibility for the security of their own country.

What needs to be done for us to reach that point where we can

turn over to the Iraqi armed forces the better part of the responsibility for the security of their own country?

Dr. FINGAR. Congressman, let me invite General Landry, National Intelligence Officer (NIO)——

Mr. SPRATT. Absolutely.

Dr. FINGAR [continued]. For Military Issues, to respond to that

question.

10

Mr. LANDRY. When you take a look at both the size and the capabilities of Iraqi security forces, there is no doubt that there have

been improvements, and I am talking now about the army, much

less so in the police. The fact of the matter is that they do not have

the logistics capabilities, nor do they have many of the elements of

combat support, for example fire support, that they need to be able

to perform those kind of functions.

The second thing is that there are many of those units today

that, in fact, are so riven with a certain degree of sectarian infiltration that they are less than the reliable forces that you would like

to see.

What does it take? It takes——

Mr. SPRATT. Do you think 135 battalions are sufficient to the

task?

Mr. LANDRY. Would you say that one more time, please?

Mr. SPRATT. Do you think 135 battalions—infantry, combat battalions—is an adequate force to cope, to bring the solution to some

sort of a successful closure?

Mr. LANDRY. To be very honest with you, I think you need to go

to the military to get a feel for just how many forces—we do not

make those kinds of calculations.

I will tell you this, that with the capability of those forces today,

their ability to take over by themselves to accomplish the security

functions that we are talking about is not likely. I cannot talk to

you about specific numbers, but I can tell you their capabilities

today are not likely to be able to work alone.

Now that does not mean that there are certain units that do

have those capabilities and already are performing them, but not

as a whole.

Mr. SPRATT. We have known that they would need combat service support and combat support and logistics backup. Why haven’t

we been able to multitask and do these things on a parallel basis

while we were developing and training their infantry?

Mr. LANDRY. We have been. The question is what is the level of

sufficiency, and I must tell you it takes a much longer time than

perhaps we have recognized to be able to accomplish those functions.

Just one other issue, leadership, leaders take years to develop,

not months, and when I say years, I am talking about, in the case

of senior leaders, about a decade to develop, and they have not had

that kind of a capability.

In addition to that, you are talking about a culture that, in fact,

has resisted some part of the messages we have been trying to

bring forth, which is the non-sectarian, professional performance of

the force, and we have not reached all the leaders in that force that

are necessary to be able to instill those kinds of values.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

And to the panel, thank you for being here today.

And, Doctor, I thank you for being the lead at this point.

I have and have had for a number of years—I have been here

12, 13 years now—a deep concern about stability issues involving

Central and South America. I know you have touched on this in

11

your abbreviated comments. Are you seeing more evidence of al

Qaeda’s presence in Central and South America in maybe not large

numbers, but their presence meaning that they are trying to have

a foothold in some of these countries?

Mr. KRINGEN. In general, sir, no, we are not seeing that kind of

movement in Central and South America. We are much more typically worried, frankly, about Europe in that regard in terms of that

being a safe haven, in part because that allows them access to the

United States in ways that make it difficult for us to keep them

out.

In the South American region, our particular concern is with regard to Hezbollah, a Shia organization, you know, where they are

embedded in certain parts of South America, but we have looked

very closely in the wake of 9/11 at the whole issue of Sunni extremist use of that area of the world, for staging terrorist operations

and have not found as much as we worried might have been the

case.

That does not mean, however, that they would not use it as transit points, particularly as venues to try to get in the United States.

There are well-developed illicit smuggling activities to bring individuals in, and that always presents some risk, but I would say it

is lower than a number of other areas of the world—South Asia,

Europe and the Middle East, for example.

Mr. JONES. Let me ask you about Honduras. I only ask this question because I have a friend I have met in the last few years who

is from Honduras. He is a Honduran, and he now lives in America.

He is an American citizen now.

He has been very concerned about the Arab population that is

growing in Honduras, not saying that these are terrorists, not saying they are going to be terrorists, but it is his concern. I share his

concern if this is true. He recommended, but I have not done it yet,

that I buy a book called ‘‘Dove, Dollar, and Eagle’’ and I have not

read the book, but, apparently, this is about the Arab influence in

Honduras and the fact that the influence is beginning to be political, meaning that they are beginning to become more and more involved in local elections.

Are you seeing this in Honduras?

Mr. KRINGEN. I myself am not in a position to comment on that

specifically, sir.

Mr. CARDILLO. Neither am I, but I will say that at Defense Intelligence, we concur with CIA’s view of the current state of affairs

in Latin America with respect to al Qaeda. But we do agree, sir,

that there are conditions that do exist that cause us to maintain

a watchful eye so that those conditions do not change into reality.

So it is something we continue to look at it.

Mr. KRINGEN. We will get you a better answer than we have

been able to provide today, sir.

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Dr. FINGAR. From, Congressman, a general observation, I do not

have the specifics on Honduras either, but as a part of sort of the

global movement toward more responsive governments, toward

more democratic governments, more electoral participation, that

immigrant communities kind of around the world have more opporVerDate 22-MAR-2001 14:30 Dec 03, 2008 Jkt 038836 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-67\192000.000 HNS1 PsN: HNS1
12

tunities to become engaged in the political process because there is

now a political process into which they can join and participate.

So some of this undoubtedly is a positive development of a portion of a community that previously was unconnected from longstanding political parties. Whether there is a malevolent dimension

to this in Honduras or elsewhere, we will have to look for an answer for you.

Mr. JONES. Okay.

Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Dr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.

Dr. Fingar, the activities that you all are involved in are so crucial to this country and our national security, but it is in the context of the strategy of the United States with regard to our national security. Would you summarize for this committee, please,

what you see as being the strategy, the national security strategy,

of this country toward Iran, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq?

Dr. FINGAR. Congressman, you have put me in the unenviable

position of being an intelligence analyst asked to comment on our

own policy, which—

Dr. SNYDER. I do not want you to critique it. I think it is a fair

question, is it not, because you are in the context of what our strategy is?

As you see it, how would you summarize today the national security strategy in the United States toward Iran, Syria, Lebanon and

Iraq?

Dr. FINGAR. I think the key elements in the strategy are stability

in a very volatile portion of the world where we have many interests, energy being one of them.

In the case of Iraq—one by one—Iraq is reducing violence, facilitating reconciliation, restoring the ability of the people of Iraq to

live in safety and security in their homes.

In the case of Iran, at the top of the list is preventing Iran from

acquiring a nuclear weapon and countering Iranian support for terrorist activities. The policy is not aimed at taking a position in the

Sunni-Shia divide, at limiting legitimate aspirations of Iran or anyone else.

For Syria, primary elements of this are checking Syrian behavior

that undermines stability in Iraq. Some of it is harboring former

regime elements. Some of it is allowing foreign fighters to cross its

territory. On the other side of Syria, it is ending its meddling, destabilizing activities in Lebanon, that democratically elected government being undermined to some extent by Syria.

In Lebanon, restoration, preservation of stability after decades of

civil war with a political system that probably is no longer approached. Based on allocation of positions, based on percentage of

the population awarded to different groups that no longer conform

to the demographic reality, reducing the threat that Hezbollah

poses to Israel on the southern border, and limiting the danger

that through Hezbollah Lebanon and Syria could become not proxies, but extensions or agents of Iran in the region.

Do you want to add to that, either of you?

13

Mr. CARDILLO. No.

Dr. SNYDER. Yesterday, Henry Kissinger had a piece in The

Washington Post in which he focused less on our military presence

in Iraq and what is going on with regard to that, which is of great

concern to the American people and the Congress, but on the

broader issue of diplomacy and the relationships of our country

with the other nations in the region and the world with regard to

leading to an ultimate solution for Iraq, how right do you think are

our relationships with nations Syria, Iran, and Lebanon with regard to participating in some kind of grand scheme for promoting

stability in Iraq?

Dr. FINGAR. My own view is that in the case of Iran that the

price of participation, meaningful in that kind of a grand scheme,

would be very high. They would set a high price.

Given the sense that we judge Iranians have of things going

their way, windfall oil profits, their agents, Hezbollah, having, in

their view, challenged Israel more effectively than have the military forces of any Arab state, stability in Iraq is not the highest

value for them. I think it is okay for the Iranians that Iraqi oil production is down. It helps keep prices up.

Though the Shia majority would have the appearance of extending the Shia influence in the region, but the Shia in Iraq are not

generally beholden to Iran, that it was Shia troops who died in the

largest numbers in the eight-year war between Iraq and Iran, that

Syria, I think, has a desire for stability, but, again, at what price?

Return of the Golan from Israel would immediately come up.

It does not suggest that we should not attempt to negotiate with

them and to work toward such a solution, but it would not be easy.

And, John, do you want to add something?

Mr. KRINGEN. I think the only point I would add is that we believe that both Iran and Syria do want a unified Iraqi Government.

They just want to in the meantime use it as a venue to inflict pain

on the coalition and forces that they are uncomfortable with.

So we are not beginning here from a premise that their objective

is the dissolution of the Iraqi state. We actually believe that they

would like in the long run to have an Iraq there that has some stability in the case of Iran that is governed by the Shia and, therefore, politically friendly, that is open to Iranian economic and other

influence. But that is the only point I would add, sir.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Jeff Miller.

Mr. MILLER OF FLORIDA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Doctor, what role, if any, does global connectivity and/or economic globalization play in your threat assessment?

Dr. FINGAR. Globalization is a facilitator of a lot of activity, good

and bad, that the rapid communications, the Internet that makes

it possible for groups separated by long distances to be in direct

contact or learn from one another, the wannabes, the affiliates of

al Qaeda or other terrorist groups that can be located at some distance using Web sites and so forth to communicate. These same

kind of capabilities enable police forces around the world to exchange information and airline security people to be on top of developments, the amount of commerce that characterizes the global

system.

14

The amount of goods, technologies moving around the world

greatly complicates efforts to thwart proliferation. It gets at the

problem that Mr. Hunter was raising about controlling access to

technologies. The world is becoming increasingly interdependent,

that the importance of energy to the world economic system, because of the concentration of hydrocarbon resources, that accord

both wealth and the degree of influence to states—Venezuela, Iran,

for example, that are not particularly friendly to the United

States—the danger of the cyberthreat, the extent to which the

economy or security systems are dependent on global communications puts in the system a vulnerability here to actors, to state actors, that bringing down one bank anywhere in the world could

have very rapid ramifications through the international financial

system that would be unlike anything we have encountered in

years past. That is getting to your question.

Mr. MILLER OF FLORIDA. How about foreign investment into the

United States? That is why I am talking about global economic concerns, and the reason I ask is because I was under the understanding that we had a vote coming up in just a few minutes that dealt

with Committee of Foreign Investment in the United States

(CFIUS), and I have some concerns. It appears now it has been

pulled off the agenda for a vote in the first round of votes today,

but coming back from the Senate, it appears that it is watered

down the director of national intelligence’s ability to forward or assist or investigate potential conflicts, problems, and I would like to

know what your feelings are on that issue.

Dr. FINGAR. Let me invite General Landry who directs the intelligence community input into the CFIUS process for us.

Mr. LANDRY. Can you say your question just one more time for

me, please?

Mr. MILLER OF FLORIDA. It was in regards to the Senate bill that

has come back over to the House, and it appears not only has the

Secretary of Defense’s (SECDEF) role been diminished in the ability to ask for an investigation, but also the director of national intelligence as well, and my concern is: Is that an appropriate move?

Mr. LANDRY. Well, as you know, the director of national intelligence is not a sitting member nor under the proposed legislation

would he be. He would still retain an advisory function and, frankly, from that perspective, the DNI has never taken a position on

whether a particular case should be brought before CFIUS or

whether a particular action should be taken.

What we do is to provide as impartially as we can an intelligence

assessment on which—

Mr. MILLER OF FLORIDA. And I understand that, but in the

House-passed provision, it did give the director the ability to intervene and the Senate stripped that version out. So my question is:

Would it have been good to have left the House provision in?

Mr. LANDRY. We have consistently said that we thought the DNI

should not be a sitting member on the CFIUS itself. Should—

Mr. MILLER OF FLORIDA. That was not the question. The question

was being able to intervene and require an investigation to take

place.

Mr. LANDRY. We do not believe that should have been a part of

the legislation.

15

Mr. MILLER OF FLORIDA. Okay.

Mr. LANDRY. The one thing we do have problems with right now

is the injunction to get the intelligence assessments done within 20

days, which we thought is somewhat onerous.

Mr. MILLER OF FLORIDA. And that is something that the Senate

passed on the 20 days.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Adam Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Two areas of questions.

One, in your testimony this morning, obviously, there are a lot

of problem spots in the world, a lot of information out there. What

I am most interested in is how we process that information. I

mean, I guess I see sort of a transition point. I mean, there was

a time when intelligence was about how do you get information difficult to come by. Now it is overwhelming with the Internet in

terms of the amount of information that we can generate without

even wiretapping anything, I mean, just going out there, open

source information, and finding it.

I am not convinced at this point that our intelligence community

has figured out how to smartly process that information so as they

find what they need to find as quickly as possible and figure out

how to use it. So I am curious what your thoughts are.

I met with a group of folks from the company IPS. They have a

new modeling system for how to process information, open source

information, that got me thinking on this road. So I am really interested in your thoughts on how we process it.

And, second, focusing on al Qaeda, there has been a lot of analysis about how they have sort of franchised out this vision of sort

of self-starting groups out there that are sympathetic to bin Laden,

but not necessarily connected to him. But every time we pull back

the layers of a plot, like, you know, the bombing in the U.K. a couple years ago, the plot that was thwarted last year—now we have

not quite unraveled the one that happened just a few days ago—

it all seems to point back toward Pakistan and Northwest Pakistan

and where bin Laden and al Qaeda are centrally located.

So I guess my question here is: Is the center more important in

al Qaeda’s terrorist act than we have perhaps been led to believe,

that basically they are exercising greater control to at least some

extent of the people who ultimately commit these terrorist acts?

If you could take a stab at those two, I would appreciate it.

Mr. KRINGEN. I will talk on the al Qaeda issue and defer to others on the information processing or I can dig into that one a little

bit later.

I would say I do not think we see it in the context of an eitheror. We actually see the al Qaeda central being resurgent in their

role in planning operations. They seem to be fairly well settled into

the safe haven and the ungoverned spaces of Pakistan there. We

see more training. We see more money. We see more communications. So we see that activity rising.

At the same time, they are having success in the franchising that

you talked about or the branding, and the example I would use

there is what used to be Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat

(GSPC), which is now al Qaeda and the Maghreb, where clearly we

16

see that as they have taken on that brand name, they have also

gotten more active.

My understanding is there is another bomb today in Algeria. I

do not know if it is associated with them or not. But if it is, it continues in a pattern of activity. So we see both developments going

on simultaneously.

Mr. SMITH. What is your view for the best plan to try to disrupt

that center that has seemed to settle in northwest Pakistan?

Mr. KRINGEN. Well, sooner or later, you have to quit permitting

them to have a safe haven there. I mean, at the end of the day,

when we have had success, it is when you have been able to get

them worried about who was informing on them, get them worried

about who was coming after them. The degree to which they feel

comfortable in that space and the security environment they have

is the degree to which we get more and more concerned.

I would second one of the comments that you made earlier, sir,

with regard to the notion that many times when we uncover a plot

overseas, it is only after you peel back the layers, you suddenly

find the connections. But, in some cases, those connections may not

be as centrally directed as before, but, nonetheless, may have a financial aspect to it or a planning guidance or training.

So, you know, your comment there is absolutely right on, and we

always look at those carefully, trying to investigate those foreign

connections.

Mr. SMITH. Lots of things to be done there. Just quickly, smashing that safe haven, I think is enormously important.

I see we are almost out of time. If you could take a quick stab

at the processing of intel, that would be great.

Mr. CARDILLO. Let me pick up on that one, sir. You are exactly

right. This is a major issue for us. When I came into the community 23 years ago, we were in hunting mode, and you would spend

a good part of your day out searching for, looking for, trying to get

access to the right pieces and sources and data so that you could

put together context and then make your analysis.

And my analysts today are facing just the opposite problem. It

is: How do I deal with what is an overwhelming sometimes set of

data, points and views, and put them together, first get some context for myself and then be able to tell the customer so what out

of all that?

Now we are pursuing many avenues of approach, both from how

we do the methodology of analysis, but also tools, applications to

help us filter, help us prioritize so that when it hits the desktop

or the in-box, you have a way of at least having a better chance

of getting to those significant pieces of data sooner.

Mr. SMITH. I would be interested in getting some more details on

that, and I will follow up with all of you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Conaway.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We have a problem with our buttons down here. I will just have

to hold it down.

Gentlemen, thank you.

17

Can you talk briefly about demographic issues within China as

to what that looks at, you know, looking 10, 15, 20 years down the

road? You know, I am not so much concerned about their economic

development. I understand as a sovereign nation, they get to build

their military against threats they perceive for themselves, but can

you talk to us about what role overall demographic issues have

within China in our assessment of how that looks as a threat to

us?

Dr. FINGAR. I will start and invite others. John and I both started out as China analysts a long time ago.

China’s population will continue to grow for about another generation. Then it will begin to decline unless there is a change in

projection.

China will have one of the most rapidly aging populations in the

world. I think it is now 15 years out projection that there will be

more people over 65 in China than there are citizens of the United

States. An aging population, a couple of generations of one-child

families, no social security safety net, a shrinking pool to support

an ever-larger group without the normal family ties, you know, a

one-child family means there are not aunts and uncles and cousins

and others that would be a part of the support system. So it injects

at least a potential for fragility to the social system.

It does have economic problems associated with it, with agriculture that is more gardening than farming and so forth. The idea

of the running out of hands in China seems strange, but the model

and the trajectory that they have been on, that has brought very

great success, simply will not be sustainable over the long run.

Mr. KRINGEN. I would agree. It also may have some political repercussions in the sense that the expectation is that the state will

be able to pick up those sorts of responsibilities that at one time

were handled by family and other social networks and will not be

in a good position to do that.

Dr. FINGAR. If I could interject one additional sort of dimension,

we often focus—and correctly—on the double-digit growth in the

military budget. The military growth actually lags behind the rates

of growth in some of these social services, starting from a much,

much lower base, but the demand is enormous.

Mr. CONAWAY. As we look at this—and I am also aware of some

information that those one-child families, those individuals are less

likely to have children themselves because they are so spoiled and

self-centered—can we convert all of that information into how

should we assess the way we look at military threats from China

to us over the next couple of generations? How should we perceive

and how should we move forward in that regard?

Mr. CARDILLO. It is difficult to say, but you are right, sir. It is

a factor. I mean, what we look at in Defense Intelligence is the

professionalization of that military, and not just the piece parts of

one more sub or one more missile system, but how it is that it is

operated and can they develop a professional non-commissioned officer corps, can they develop the types of general staff leadership

courses and the like, and I think the factors that you bring up—

those human factors, if you will—do contribute to it.

It is a growing area of our business as we look at leadership profiles and the like, and all’s I can say is you are touching on a point

18

that we need to include more in our analysis of how that overall

capability comes together.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Andrews.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank the witnesses for their testimony.

I want to preface my question by saying I have profound and utmost respect for you gentlemen and the people you represent, the

sacrifice and patriotism that you and the people you represent are

making for the country. I am profoundly grateful for what you do.

Dr. FINGAR. Thank you, Congressman.

Mr. ANDREWS. Second is I want to preface my question by saying

that I want you to answer my question within the bounds of good

sense, given the fact we are in a public forum.

I want to ask you a question that I think is very pregnant on

the minds of the American people with respect to what you have

identified as the greatest threat to our security, which is al Qaeda,

and particularly with respect to its leader, Osama bin Laden.

By my calculations, it has now been 2,098 days since September

the 11th. We have had broadcasts from Osama bin Laden, some of

which are probably authentic, some of which are not. We have had

some indication he is in contact with other al Qaeda cells and

operatives around the world. And we do not, I assume, definitely

know what his state of health is, but we assume he is alive.

Now I do not equate capturing or killing Osama bin Laden with

victory in the war against al Qaeda by any stretch of the imagination, but I also understand that the psychological value to the

American people and around the world and the strategic blow that

it would strike to al Qaeda around the world is obviously of great

significance.

I do not mean this as a rhetorical or hostile question, but after

spending a huge amount of money for a period of time in excess

of 2,000 days, with what I hope is a focus on apprehending a person who is responsible for the murder of more than 3,000 Americans, why haven’t we succeeded?

Mr. KRINGEN. Let me frame this first with a couple of comments.

We, like you, continue to assess that Osama bin Laden is alive. We

continue to assess that he is probably in the tribal areas of Pakistan.

In terms of your frustration and I think the frustration of anybody who has been working on this problem since 11 September,

the challenge we face is those are ungoverned spaces in which the

Pakistani government does not control much of that, very tribally

based, and so it is very, very difficult——

Mr. ANDREWS. If I may——

Mr. KRINGEN [continued]. To operate in that environment.

If I could just say one more thing and then——

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes.

Mr. KRINGEN. The other thing is Osama bin Laden in particular

goes into extended periods in which he does not communicate, does

not interact with anyone directly.

Mr. ANDREWS. All right, but isn’t there a distinction between an

ungoverned area and a tribally governed area? I take it at face

value that the Pakistani regime does not have control over some

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of these areas, but someone does. Some tribe has some control over

what goes on in this area.

Why haven’t we made more progress in understanding the incentives, the disincentives, the economic realities of the tribal leaders

that have some, if not control, knowledge over what is going on in

these areas?

Mr. KRINGEN. In some cases, those tribal leaders are the very

people who are protecting him, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, but they must then interact——

Mr. KRINGEN. And they are not necessarily motivated. We have

had rewards out for bin Laden for a long period of time, and economic motivation is not a principle driver of——

Mr. ANDREWS. But those tribal leaders must in turn interact

with other outside forces outside the circle, whether it is for material support, economic support. I mean, you know, the more people

you get involved in something, the more people they become reliant

upon, and somebody in that circle must not be a sympathizer. Why

aren’t we making more progress on that?

Mr. KRINGEN. All I can tell you in this particular context is it is

an extremely challenging environment in which to operate and to

turn individuals who would be the people who have the access into

people who are willing to work with the U.S. Government.

Dr. FINGAR. Let me just add it is certainly not for want of trying.

Mr. ANDREWS. I do not doubt that.

Dr. FINGAR. We share your frustration.

Mr. ANDREWS. I do not doubt it.

Dr. FINGAR. Being number three in al Qaeda is a bad job. We

regularly get to the number three person. The security measures

and the lessons learned about do not turn on your cell phone, all

that kind of stuff—I guess even in the mountain redoubts know

what has led to the killing and capture of people elsewhere—the

security practices are very good, as John indicated.

They are in an environment that is more hostile to us than it is

to al Qaeda and the appeal of call it the ideology rather than the

religion exceeds the appeal of money or any other blandishment

that we have been able to offer.

Mr. ANDREWS. I understand. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The gentlelady from Virginia, Ms. Drake.

Mrs. DRAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you for being here. It is very interesting conversation.

But what I wanted to ask, as we are discussing the impact and

the future impact of our military commitment in Iraq and what

that impact has on future operations, have you also assessed what

the impact would be of a withdrawal?

The Iraqi foreign minister was here, spoke with a group of us,

and has recently been quoted in the press saying the same thing

of what those consequences would be, we have also met with the

ministers of surrounding countries who have been clear with us on

what the consequences would be in their countries if we were to

pull out abruptly, and in the Kissinger article just recently, he

makes the quote that withdrawal would not end the war, but would

shift it to other areas.

20

So my question is can you assess what the impact would be if

we took that action, what the impact would be on our credibility,

what the impact would be on our ability to mount operations in the

future, particularly where it would require the trust and cooperation of other populations and particularly special operations missions?

Dr. FINGAR. Let me begin the answer and invite colleagues to

jump in.

Again, framing it, the impact on the broader geopolitical picture

that you sketched out, I think, will be very much dependent on the

nature of the withdrawal, how rapidly, to what places, within what

kind of internationally discussed framework. So I do not think that

is automatically one thing or another thing. How one does it matters.

A second is a function, I guess, of the gray hair. Those of us who

lived through Vietnam and thought about, heard about the dominoes, the impact, American credibility around the world, as traumatic as all of that was, much of the worst casing did not happen,

I think in part because the Soviet Union continued to exist. We

still did have an organizing rubric.

The third point I would make would be to return to the judgment

in the January National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq in which we

looked at a rapid drawdown. That was the only scenario we looked

at because it was predicated on ‘‘if you take the targets away, does

the violence go down’’ approach.

And I think we are still where we were at the time of that estimate, and I will simply read it: that ‘‘coalition capabilities, including force levels, resources and operations, remain an essential stabilizing element in Iraq. If coalition forces were withdrawn rapidly

during the terms of this estimate’’—it was 18 months—‘‘we judge

that this almost certainly would lead to a significant increase in

the scale and scope of sectarian conflict in Iraq, intensify Sunni resistance to the Iraqi government and have adverse consequences

for national reconciliation.’’

Do either of you want to add to that?

Mrs. DRAKE. And also on the future, what our credibility would

be, have you assessed that?

Dr. FINGAR. We have not specifically looked at, you know, a hypothetical what would our credibility be around the world.

Mrs. DRAKE. Or our ability in the future to work another area.

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you to all of you for being here.

Perhaps this is a different way of stating the previous question,

but I am just wondering, you know, what conditions do you think

could be met for our adversaries to view our withdrawal as anything but a victory for them? Are there conditions that you would

look to?

The second question really would just go with the way that our

adversaries view both our strengths and our weaknesses. How

21

would you assess that—our reliance on foreign oil, our reliance on

technology, our forces, the fact that they are stretched today? Could

you please comment on that?

Mr. CARDILLO. I will just start with, obviously, when you discuss

adversaries, there is quite a range from non-state all the way up

to state actors. Certainly, across that range, there are going to be

some adversaries that will take whatever we do—and, oh, by the

way, that includes staying, okay—as a failure, and so, in my mind,

you have to just kind of park that this is a broad campaign of information competition that will continue.

So I think your question is how do we best posture ourselves so

that we can be competitive in that environment. To me, ma’am, it

is about transparency of purpose to the extent that we can—and

this is the difficult part—come with definitive objectives that can

be identifiable and to some degree measured, but therein lies the

real problem, the one that we are having now with respect to our

translation or our definition of success—even the people that we

are trying to help—and so I would just offer that within that environment, the more that we can communicate clearly what it is we

are doing and why we are doing it, that we will have a chance to

go. At least it is the bulk if the population that is on the fence, you

know, not on one extreme or the other.

Dr. FINGAR. Let me make it even more complicated. May I associate myself with the comments that both of you had made, that it

is not only what has been said and the how it has played out, but

for some of the audiences, adversaries hostile or at least very critical of what we are doing—and I would distinguish between those

that are hostile and those that are not happy with our involvement

in Iraq—a mixture of glee that we have had our comeuppance and

relief if they judge that that will enable us to get back to doing

some things in ways that they might prefer.

Will al Qaeda and others view this as having defeated and depicted, as having defeated the sole remaining superpower in the

same way that the Muhjahadeen claimed credit for defeating and

contributing to the downfall of the Soviet Union? It is information.

It is a message. I actually have a pretty high level of confidence

in our ability, U.S. Government, society writ large, to work the modalities of any decision in ways that minimize the downsides and

avoid some of the more cataclysmic predictions of dire consequences of staying or going or doing any other particular course

of action.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Could you comment on the second

question on the strengths and weaknesses? Perhaps you do not

have enough time. I am sorry, but——

Mr. KRINGEN. Just a couple of thoughts: If you look at two nations that we care a lot from a national security point of view,

namely Iran and China, what they clearly see is our ability to integrate technology into our military operations in a very closely knit

fashion where you have intelligence and surveillance assets guiding

military operations, doing that real time, doing it at night.

So where you see them embarking on their efforts is what Tom

alluded to earlier, which is various forms of asymmetric warfare in

which they try to degrade those capabilities, whether it is, you

know, an anti-satellite program to at least threaten our satellite caVerDate 22-MAR-2001 14:30 Dec 03, 2008 Jkt 038836 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-67\192000.000 HNS1 PsN: HNS1
22

pabilities or swarms of small vessels in the Persian Gulf, so very

much focused on asymmetric approaches and not, frankly, trying to

match us one for one in terms of the technology and the forces that

we have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Akin.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let’s assume that we do some kind of a scenario in terms of moving out of Iraq, and let’s say that we manage that to a certain degree so there is not a big civil war or something there. The people

that we are fighting there, though, are then going to be picking

new targets to a certain degree, and is it true that they would then

probably go after Turkey and Jordan and try to destabilize those

countries and make sure that Iraq returns to the column just like

Iran? Wouldn’t they move to those other more moderate Middle

Eastern type countries?

Mr. KRINGEN. One assessment that we have made is that al

Qaeda and Iraq have as one of its principle plans conducting external operations within the region. We believe they have been unable

to be very successful in those activities. There was, indeed, an attack on some hotels in Amman that you may remember, but because they have been so preoccupied with their internal operations,

that mission has gotten shorter shrift.

But we certainly believe that Jordan would be part of that, possibly Turkey, certainly, you know, Israel would be part of their

plans, but a regional plan, in effect a hub, should they be able to

sustain an environment that allows them to do that. So, certainly,

we would see——

Mr. AKIN. Would they probably emerge as the leaders? If we

move out, would they emerge as the leaders in one shape or another in Iraq? Is that hard to predict?

Dr. FINGAR. It is hard to predict, but I will make a prediction,

one in which I have a fair degree of confidence, is that it will be

difficult for Iran to hold Iraq in its sway, that the Arabs are not

Persians, that at some point that becomes more important than the

Shia affinity.

As one of the most influential Shia clerics has put it, ‘‘Yes, he

spent a great deal of time in Iran, but being under house arrest

did not make him feel warm and fuzzy toward the Iranians,’’ that

the very different views of the role of the clerics in governance, the

Velayat-e Faqih approach of the Iranians is not accepted by the

most influential of the Iranian clerics. They believe sort of governance is a bad and dirty thing, and the religious should not be deeply involved in that. It is the separation of church and state kind

of thing, that——

Mr. AKIN. So the Iraqis are more into that separation than the

Iranians are?

Dr. FINGAR. Yes, yes.

Mr. AKIN. Okay.

Dr. FINGAR. Yes. They reject it as an element of theology.

Amir, have I got that right?

Mr. AKIN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cooper.

23

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentleman.

I, too, admire your patriotism, but I only have three questions

and five minutes. So let us both be short-winded.

Yesterday in another committee that takes sworn testimony, the

former surgeon general of the United States admitted under oath

that he had been coached in his testimony before Congress, prevented from saying certain things involving stem cell research,

global warming, and required, for example, to mention President

Bush three times on each page of his testimony.

Were any of you gentlemen coached by political appointees in

your statements before this committee today?

Dr. FINGAR. Absolutely not.

Mr. KRINGEN. No, Congressman.

Mr. CARDILLO. No, sir.

Mr. COOPER. And your answer would not change if you were

sworn?

Dr. FINGAR. Absolutely not.

Mr. KRINGEN. Absolutely not.

Mr. CARDILLO. No.

Mr. COOPER. Second question: When you stress in your testimony

that al Qaeda poses the number one threat to U.S. interests, are

you unintentionally helping build the al Qaeda brand that in turn

may help them franchise their operation?

Mr. KRINGEN. I would say that that is a risk. On the other hand,

I am not sure what the alternative approach is given that it is our

judgment that in terms of a capability to attack the U.S. homeland,

al Qaeda is the number one threat.

Mr. COOPER. Well, this involves some deeper questions, but when

they are also trying to hijack one of the world’s great religions for

their violent extremist ends, they may be using us as a means of

doing that, and we may be playing into their hands by highlighting

the threat, you know, that they pose vis-a-vis other organizations.

That brings me to my third point, which is when you stress that

al Qaeda is our number one enemy and then you say, ‘‘Well, they

are probably operating in an ungoverned space possibly in Pakistan, maybe Waziristan,’’ who knows, but isn’t it interesting that

it is an ungoverned space, uncontrolled by the Pakistani government, but yet controlled sufficiently by the Pakistani government

that we cannot intervene militarily? So it is not controlled, but it

is controlled. This is the Pakistani paradox. Which is it?

Dr. FINGAR. Well, there is a difference between the Pakistani

government’s ability or inability or limited ability to control what

happens in that space, and our respect for the territorial sovereignty of a key ally in the war on terror. It is not that we lack

the ability to go into that space, but we have chosen not do so without the permission of the Pakistani government.

Mr. COOPER. Are they a key ally if they fail to help us find America’s number one enemy?

Dr. FINGAR. Again, it is a mixed picture. The Pakistanis have

been extremely helpful and have captured or enabled us to capture

a very large number of al Qaeda figures. They have not enabled us

to capture everybody.

John, do you want to add to that?

24

Mr. KRINGEN. No, I think that is right. Their track record in

what we describe as the settled areas of Pakistan in terms of helping to capture those individuals has actually been very strong.

Mr. COOPER. Aren’t you just justifying the very disturbing status

quo in which our number one enemy is actually growing in size and

has grown since 9/11 and the initiation of the war in Iraq?

Mr. KRINGEN. I would not say we are justifying. We are describing it. I mean, this is the dilemma, sir.

Mr. COOPER. But we are not taking actions to diminish the size

of our number one enemy, at least not effective action that would

decrease their ranks or decrease their capability?

Mr. KRINGEN. In another forum, we can talk about what actions

are being taken or not taken at this point in time.

Mr. COOPER. It is interesting that we are in a situation in which

even Secretary Rumsfeld at DOD tried to change the name of the

war from GWOT, the global war on terror, to GSAVE, the Global

Struggle Against Violent Extremism, but was unable to do that, as

we understand it, due to White House urging.

When someone like that tries to nuance the debate or shift the

focus, is unable to, and we are back in the same situation we have

been for lo’ these several years, the number one enemy in an

ungoverned space that is sufficiently governed, we cannot catch

him, and also admitting in a public forum that the ranks of our enemies are growing, not diminishing. That does not sound like a formula for success to me.

Dr. FINGAR. Not to be too overly simplistic, I hope, but part of

the dilemma that you correctly identified here is the risk of taking

actions in the less well-governed areas of Pakistan, the federally

administrated tribal areas, the northwest areas that could lead to

developments in all of Pakistan, that would increase the problem.

There are an awful lot of potential recruits being engaged in the

struggle in Kashmir that are held in check by the security forces

in the rest of Pakistan, so it is not too great an exaggeration to say

there is some risk of turning a problem in Northwest Pakistan into

the problem of all of Pakistan.

Mr. COOPER. I see that my time has expired.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Four votes have been called for 1:15, then three five-minutes.

Mr. Franks.

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I first want to thank the witnesses for their testimony and

their participation. Kind of behind the scenes, you are the hidden

front line of freedom, and we appreciate what you do very much.

I also want to thank you for reminding this committee what our

responsibility really is, which is to ensure that the U.S. is able to

defeat adversaries who threaten U.S. interests.

Having said that, I wanted to address one point quickly. You

know, to suggest that we are not doing anything to diminish al

Qaeda is to ignore some of the warfare that is taking place against

them. Many of their leaders, many of their ranks have been decimated and, certainly, in an ideological war like this, it is important

to remember that the image that is portrayed has a great deal to

25

do with whether or not the ranks of recruitment are increased or

not.

And I just think it is very, very important that we realize Mr.

Fingar’s comments about this being an ideological base that ties

things together. We need to understand that this ideology is the

most dangerous aspect that we face and that, if they see a weakness on our part or a willingness to back off, I do not think that

that is going to diminish them at all.

But I had to say that. Having said that, this committee is going

to be considering in the near future extending more rights to

enemy combatants such as in Guantanamo, and former Attorney

General William Barr testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee in July of 2005, and he said this. He said, ‘‘What we are seeing today is an effort to take the judicial rules and standards, make

them applicable in domestic law enforcement context, and extend

them to fighting wars. Nothing could be more farcical or more dangerous.’’

And I know there is a pretty intense debate about extending the

constitutional types of protections that we give to those that live

in this country to those that are combatants against this country

outside the nation, but, Mr. Cardillo, I would like to perhaps start

with you. What do you think would be the impact of that, and what

do you think is the proper approach? Do you think that we should

extend these kinds of judicial rules that we apply to domestic law

enforcement to enemy combatants?

Mr. CARDILLO. I do appreciate the question. I really must tell you

I do not believe I am qualified to answer.

Mr. FRANKS. Would there be anybody else on the panel that

would want to take a shot at it?

Dr. FINGAR. I think it would be inappropriate—

Mr. FRANKS. All right. Well, let me shift gears then. Let me get

back to Iraq.

We had talked about earlier that some of the prognostications

about Vietnam did not materialize, but isn’t it true that somewhere

around between one and two million people died after the U.S.

withdrew, mostly Cambodians, and that that was a human tragedy

all by itself and that if, indeed, we withdrew from Iraq abruptly,

what do you think—Mr. Cardillo, I will start with you again here

and we will run down the line—would be the human impact and

how do you think that that would affect both the image of the

United States on the world stage and al Qaeda’s ability to recruit

additional people, and if the Iraq government did not stand, what

do you think would be the outcome?

Mr. CARDILLO. Sir, if I could equate your statement, abrupt withdrawal, with what we called a rapid withdrawal when we did our

assessment, we would agree that conditions would deteriorate and

that the amount and intensity of sectarian violence would increase.

I cannot give you a number, okay, to say what that would equate

to.

Mr. FRANKS. To go beyond sectarian violence, how do you think

it would impact terrorist recruitment that might come against the

United States?

Mr. CARDILLO. I know it would be used, okay, as a marketing

tool and an attraction for their cause. Again, I think if it was abVerDate 22-MAR-2001 14:30 Dec 03, 2008 Jkt 038836 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-67\192000.000 HNS1 PsN: HNS1
26

rupt, okay, and caused those conditions to occur that we think

would happen, it would also be in a sense a force multiplier for

that recruitment.

Mr. FRANKS. Compare with me for a moment the difference between us staying there until the Iraqi government can stand by

itself or withdrawing too soon to where the Iraqi government falls.

Fall or stand? What is the difference in the outcome, do you think,

as far as the security of the United States goes?

Mr. CARDILLO. The security of the United States would begetter

served with an Iraqi government that could stand on its own.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have run out of

time. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy, let’s try to get you in before we

break for the four votes.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.

I have always said, Mr. Chairman, that the American people do

not need to be reminded that we need to win the war on terror.

What we need is leaders who put forth the real plan to do it. I have

been outspoken in my views that the current Administration has

failed to offer a real plan to win the war on terror.

Gentlemen, I appreciate your service to our country, but I believe

one glaring example of this Administration’s failure has been our

relationship with Pakistan, and I echo the sentiment of Representative Adam Smith, Rob Andrews, Mr. Cooper in their earlier lines

of questioning.

I do not have time to recite all the troubling accusations recently

made toward our ally, but I want to name a few.

One, a peace deal that allows Islamic militants allied with the

Taliban and al Qaeda to operate freely in increasing strength, a situation Pakistan’s own interior ministry called ‘‘a general policy of

appeasement toward the Taliban.’’

Two, at least one account by our American soldiers that Pakistani security forces fired mortar shells and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) in direct support of Taliban ground attacks on the

Afghan army post.

And, three, recent accounts that Secretary of Defense Donald

Rumsfeld aborted a raid on al Qaeda chiefs in Pakistan in 2005.

The U.S. has provided $5.6 billion in coalition support funds to

Pakistan over the past 5 years with zero accountability. As one

senior military officer described the situation, ‘‘They send us a bill,

and we just pay it.’’

So my questioning is twofold then. It goes hand in hand.

One, why is Pakistan still being paid these large sums of money

even after publicly declaring that it is significantly cutting back patrols in the most important border area?

And, second, I would like to echo a sentiment first expressed by

Senator Jack Reed. Why are we not paying for specific objections

that are planned and executed by the Pakistani military, rather

than just simply paying what the country bills us?

Gentlemen, I would like all your responses to that two-part question.

Thank you.

Dr. FINGAR. Congressman, I am not sure how to answer it because they are questions for those who make and implement policy.

27

Your question of why the Administration is doing things one way

rather than another is not a subject that we——

The CHAIRMAN. Do your best to answer the question, please.

Dr. FINGAR. I have to assume that the calculus of costs and benefits and risks associated with the strategy has led to the conclusion

that what is being done is appropriate. What the elements of that

calculation are, I do not feel qualified to speculate.

Do either of you want to add to that?

Mr. KRINGEN. The only thing I would add is to one of your first

observations there, we would agree that the peace deal with

Waziristan has not been helpful in terms of the antiterrorist effort.

Musharraf’s rationale for that was that in the long run it would

create the political space to create a more stable environment.

From our assessment, we have not seen the developments go in

that direction, but actually in a negative direction. So we would

second one of the premises of your question, sir.

Mr. CARDILLO. Without speaking to the dollar amounts and the

measurements along with that, we would agree that there are conditions that have come on the backside of that agreement that have

made it more difficult for us to achieve objectives. So, from an intelligence assessment perspective, we have seen more downside

than up.

Mr. MURPHY. Can you elaborate on that last point? More downside than up in regards to?

Mr. CARDILLO. Well, because, look, there was an agreement to

provide an additional amount of confidence and security on the adversary’s side. The trade was to be an eventual increase in governance in the area. So, when I say we have seen the first part of that

go through, but not the second, at the end of the day, we see a

worse condition than was before the agreement.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, gentlemen, I know with your professions in

the intelligence industry and being someone that worked with our

intelligence units in Baghdad when I was there a few years ago,

when you give them specific objectives and the carrot that is used

is financial carrot, would not it make more sense to hold specific

objectives to and give them to the Pakistani government and hold

them accountable for these financial carrots, these $5.6 billion that

we are giving them? Yes or no?

Dr. FINGAR. I think the answer has to be, yes, that provision of

assistance should be properly tied to expected outcomes, and the

outcomes which people have committed, they should be held accountable for.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We have three minutes within which to make

the vote, and, gentlemen, we shall return. We appreciate your waiting for us for our four votes. Thank you.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Georgia, Dr. Gingrey.

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much.

Gentlemen, I apologize for coming in to the hearing a little late

this morning. I missed most of it, and I am sure that there is a

possibility that my question has already been asked and answered,

but if you will bear with me, first of all, I really appreciate, as I

28

read your bios, the important work—life’s work really—that you

guys have done for the country, and it could not be more important. So this is very timely, and we are very appreciative of it.

I am, if you do not know, in my prior life, a physician. I practiced

medicine for 31 years before being elected from the 11th District

of Georgia.

This situation that occurred recently in London and Glasgow was

bad enough, but when we realized that the perpetrators were, in

fact, mostly physicians or health-care workers, I was absolutely appalled by that, and then I realized, of course, that they were working for the British health-care system, national health-care system,

and so it concerns me.

We have some great, great doctors in this country who are foreign medical graduates. Don’t let me suggest that they are not

doing a great job for us, and they do.

But I have been real concerned about things like the visa waiver

program and maybe now we ought to take a look, step back and

look at the J visa program which would pertain to foreign medical

graduates.

The question that I am leading up to is this: We enjoy and promote and talk about how important the global economy is and global connectivity and how that is the wave of the future, fair, free

trade and all of this. How does this play into what you worry about

at night, what keeps you awake at night?

Do you concern yourself with things like the visa waiver program? When you have 27 countries from Western Europe mostly—

you know, back in 1978 or whenever this program started, it was

probably to promote tourism and globalization, global economy,

whatever.

And now there is also a move afoot to even expand that to two

additional countries, and yet, you know, in our law, in the Patriot

Act, a border security secure entry bill—back in 2001, we said that

at date certain we have to have the U.S. visit, we have to make

sure those countries have passports based on biometrics so that,

you know, we are not just stamping something that could be anybody.

I would like for you to talk about that a little bit and respond.

It is not in the way of a question, but maybe each one of you can

touch on that a bit.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. FINGAR. I will take the first whack at it, and this is more reverting to my previous position in the State Department.

I actually do not spend a lot of time worrying about the visa

waiver program. As you know, I am sure, Congressman, that one

of the reasons that it exists is to be able to concentrate the resources, consular officials and so forth, in areas judged to be higher

threats, or risk management, X number of consular officers in Y

number of interviews able to be conducted, put them in the higher

threat areas.

Other aspects of managing the crossings of our border, knowing

where people are when they come here, knowing whether or not

they have actually departed in accordance with the visa is something that troubles me a little more than this.

29

But I think the movement of people, the movement of ideas, the

familiarity with our country, the number of people who come, the

vast majority of whom who are not a threat to us that pick up understanding, even if not greater affection for us, that then I judge

that it nets out to a benefit to us when they go home and have had

a positive experience and can talk about what America is and

counter some of the caricatures of what life is like in America,

whether it is standing up in a community hall or religious institution.

Dr. GINGREY. I know I am running out of time, Mr. Chairman.

I talk too slow.

But in regard to that, I think we are talking about today, though,

a soft underbelly, if you will, and I would agree with what you just

said, in 1978, whenever, visa waiver was started and the purpose

of which. That all makes sense, but I am concerned today.

I wish I had more time because I would love to hear Mr. Cardillo

and Mr. Kringen also respond, Mr. Chairman, but I see I am limited.

The CHAIRMAN. We will have a second round shortly.

Mr. Sestak.

Mr. SESTAK. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Sir, Dr. Fingar, when you spoke about the rapid drawdown and

your conclusion of what would occur, did it include in the outcome

that you said the efforts, if it were to happen, that would be also

happening at the same time potentially if Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, were serious about trying to accommodate stability in Iraq?

Was that part of your assessment of its spiraling downward?

Dr. FINGAR. No, that was not part of it.

Mr. SESTAK. The second question then is you spoke that negotiating with Iran would be hard, but you said, ‘‘I am not suggesting

we not do it.’’ You also said—I think you, sir—that Iran is inflicting

pain on us because we are there, and then you said, ‘‘But it does

not want a fractionalized government.’’

What does your intelligence say that if Iran were to work in

what your testimony said had great influence on select extremist

groups, knowing that a lot of this violence is being perpetrated by

an extreme violence group, what would your outcome then be, if we

are there and/or if we are not there?

Dr. FINGAR. The framing of the answer is that there are Iranian

links to extremist groups like Hezbollah. There is an indirect relation, Hezbollah assisting in training of groups that attack us in

Iraq——

Mr. SESTAK. Understand that, but what would be the outcome?

Dr. FINGAR. I am also not sure how to answer that question.

Mr. SESTAK. Wouldn’t it be important to answer this? As I go

through your testimony——

Dr. FINGAR. Yes.

Mr. SESTAK [continued]. It is a great snapshot, but it is a good

snapshot primarily upon the military situation, and yet intelligence

has so much to do with the political intelligence, diplomatic intelligence, economic intelligence, and this is such an important part,

people have said, ‘‘Can Iran be part of the solution?’’

Dr. FINGAR. Iran ultimately has to be part of the solution, in my

view, that when violence is reduced, governance is improved beVerDate 22-MAR-2001 14:30 Dec 03, 2008 Jkt 038836 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-67\192000.000 HNS1 PsN: HNS1
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cause it is a major nation in the region and there are long historic

conflicts with Iraq——

Mr. SESTAK. Sir, not to interrupt, but only because of time, if

that is so and the United States were to have its influence be such

that it could negotiate hard, it does not want a field coalition as

government, what would the outcome in your intelligence estimate

be for Iraq, whether we are not there in a year to 18 months or

if we were there? The first please.

Dr. FINGAR. I——

Mr. SESTAK. This is an important issue because——

Dr. FINGAR. Oh, it is a very——

Mr. SESTAK. What if Iran were pulled into this where she does

not want a failed government?

Dr. FINGAR. The difficulty I have squaring—and I will hand it off

in a moment—is that——

Mr. SESTAK. Understand.

Dr. FINGAR [continued]. For Iran, the nature of what is left and

what is our role, they do not want an Iraq in which we in some

form or another could be conceived by them as a threat to their existence. It might have to do with basing. It might have to do with

for us we would be a training presence for them that would be a

hostile——

Mr. SESTAK. Could I assume from what you are saying, it is an

important ingredient to think about?

Dr. FINGAR. Absolutely.

Mr. SESTAK. It is an important ingredient that potentially if we

have no bases it might be more attractive to them?

Dr. FINGAR. Well, I think all of the kinds of issues you

address——

Mr. SESTAK. So your intelligence supports that dealing with Iran

may well be one of the keys to an unfailed state, including our not

being there.

Dr. FINGAR. I would put it slightly differently. The

intelligence——

Mr. SESTAK. Slightly.

Dr. FINGAR. The intelligence makes clear that Iran is a very important player——

Mr. SESTAK. I am out of time, but then is there a possible strategic approach to redeploying and not leaving a failed state?

Dr. FINGAR. I hope so.

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Shea-Porter, please.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you.

My question has to do first of all with the question about why

have we lost so many friends in that region and could you tell me

where we were, in your opinion, six years ago versus now for the

Middle East, and if you see the loss of respect and loss of support

and loss of available intelligence information, what you attribute it

to, please.

I welcome anybody to answer that or all three.

Mr. KRINGEN. If you could take another run at the question because I am not sure I quite understood——

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Looking at what has happened in the Middle

East in the period of maybe six years now and looking at how

31

much more difficult our relationships are with other nations, the

lack of support, problems with intelligence, et cetera, what do you

attribute that to?

Do you think it is actually policy? I realize you do not make policy, but I am asking you to speak about if you think that our involvement in Iraq has been detrimental to your ability to get the

intelligence and to make friends. Basically, why we have lost so

many friends in the region and there is so much hostility?

And, also, address the growth of the terrorist groups in that region.

Mr. KRINGEN. In terms of the growth of terrorist groups, there

is little doubt, I think, that our engagement in Iraq has served as

a focal point for Sunni extremists to flow into their conflict and has

served as a rallying point more broadly internationally.

In terms of our relationships, I guess I do not see them as having

changed as much as you would seem to imply by your question in

terms of our relationship with Jordan, Israel, Egypt, other countries in the region. They may in some cases be critical of U.S. policy actions, but I do not see that having resulted in a major shift

in their orientation toward the U.S. overall in the Middle East,

which they still see as very important, something that needs to be

maintained.

So maybe if you can give me a little better sense——

Dr. FINGAR. Let me take a run at it, building on what John has

said, that I would distinguish between discontent in the region

with things we are doing, attacking an Islamic country, occupying

an Islamic country in their characterization of it, propping up governments so that we have access to oil, again in the way they

would conceive of it, as opposed to hostility toward American values, American way of life.

One of the great ironies is the length of visa lines in these countries where people want to come and study and take part in the

world that we are in.

The second is the growing political awareness through, again, the

Internet, satellite television, everything else, of populations that

are basically dissatisfied with the quality of governments and quality of life and the non-responsiveness of their own governments and

see us as playing a role in supporting their governments, warts and

all, for our interests that they do not see as consistent with their

own political interests.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. I am going to change the direction maybe. Is

it harder for you to get intelligence now from that region than it

was six years ago? Is it harder for you to have a handle and find

out what is actually happening on the ground and more difficult to

track terrorist activity than it was six years ago? Are there fewer

people willing to speak up?

Dr. FINGAR. No.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. No.

Dr. FINGAR. No.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. Let’s jump to Europe then. Would you

say that our relationship with Europe are strained over policies

and is it harder to work with Europeans for that reason?

Dr. FINGAR. I do not want to talk broadly about Europe because

with all places, it is country dependent, but, indeed, clearly in

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places like Italy and Germany, as you can see by various legal actions they have taken, that they are concerned about some of the

things that we have done with regard to counterterrorist activity,

yes.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Does it worry you about our ability to get

them to see us in a warmer light, in a friendlier light?

Dr. FINGAR. I am less worried about seeing us in a warmer,

friendly light than getting the kinds of cooperation that we need

to go after the terrorists of interest, and, once again, that varies

according to countries, and so some are very supportive, and others

are less supportive, I would say.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. I know that surveys show that Europeans try not to buy American products. I think that is reflective

of something going on there that worries me about our ability to

get the information if we are not seen in the same regard.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Castor.

Then we can go back at Dr. Gingrey for a second round.

Ms. Castor.

Ms. CASTOR. And thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony and

report here today. Your global security assessment paints a very

serious and stark picture in the Middle East and Iraq.

You state that ‘‘Iraq is at a precarious juncture and communal

violence and scant common ground between Shias, Sunnis and

Kurds continues to polarize politics, it seems that, given the current winner-take-all attitude and sectarian animosities infecting

the political scene, Iraqi leaders will be hard pressed to achieve

sustained political reconciliation.’’

Despite the fact that the American people have now spent over

$450 billion and suffered great loss of life by very courageous men

and women in service, you state that the current security and political trends in Iraq are moving in a negative direction.

I would also like to focus on the regional concerns in particularly

the nations that have been our friends and have had some strategic

interests in common over the years.

You state here in your report in the assessment, ‘‘Friends of the

United States in the region are concerned about the consequences

of growing instability in Iraq. Many are increasingly apprehensive

about Iraqi ethnosectarian strife agitating their population, and all

of our allies in the region are nervous about the growing role of

radical Islamists, the spreading of Iranian influence and refugee

flow.’’

Would each of you go around the region maybe country by country? As we begin to consider more of a redeployment strategy,

where can we look and where can we bring pressure to bear country by country? What are their strengths when it comes to their

military capability, their ability to step into some of the training

roles, intelligence gathering, resources that they can bring?

If you could give us a snapshot of folks in the region that have

those same security interests, that would be very helpful and enlightening.

Would you start on the military?

Dr. FINGAR. Start on the military?

Mr. CARDILLO. Sure. I will start on the military roles.

33

Well, first of all, you are exactly right, I mean, in that our assessment is that if we get too focused on a particular governance

issue and problem, we will miss the opportunity that the region

does offer. I think that we have already found to date good contributions from allies to enable support, whether it is the training

roles that we have had assistance in, and it is our assessment that

what we need to do is we need to leverage that mutual concern for

stability so that it is not those allies looking at us to make the decisions and implement all the actions.

But as much in life, it is finding that balance between turning

their good intentions into actions versus, in some cases, them actually benefiting from our lack of success, if you will. So what we

have to do is we have to turn that equation around and find ways

to leverage their interest in the stability. As Dr. Fingar mentioned,

none of the governments in the region are interested in a fractured

state, so how can we invest those strengths that they have on the

military side to be part of the solution.

Dr. FINGAR. I would agree with what Robert has said, that highly

desirable to look for ways to cooperate with the region in areas of

mutual interest. Among the hurdles that one has to get over to do

that are Arab states, the Sunni Arab states. Look at Iraq. They

look at the Iraqi government. They look at the Shia demographics.

The Shia dominate the government because they won an election

and they are the largest chunk of the population.

I think many look and they see the Shia in Iraq as a cat’s paw

or an extension of Iran, so there is a sort of a do you help your

principle adversary while Iran is feeling full of itself and sort of

getting over that.

But the concern is about Sunni-Shia tensions that are high, perhaps higher than they have been in a very long time, and willingness to run some domestic risks by engaging what for our perspective would be an international geopolitical stabilization effort that

has an element of taking sides in a religious conflict.

Are there capabilities in the region, in Egypt, in Jordan, in Saudi

Arabia? Yes. How easily can they be tapped? That is a much more

difficult and, well, problematic question.

John.

Mr. KRINGEN. I would agree. They are, in many cases, fairly direct in laying out their concerns about the Shia-led government in

Iraq and clearly have difficulties fully supporting a government of

that nature, and so you would say at this point they have not done

as much as we would have liked, I think, them to do, and as Tom

laid out, that is a big hurdle for what we can expect them to do

in any kind of future scenario.

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlewoman.

Mr. Taylor, the gentleman from Mississippi.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and for

sticking around so long.

My last memory of Kuwait around Easter time is flying out just

after dark, and I am seeing a convoy of approximately 300 vehicles

forming up, headed toward Iraq, and it really is one of those moments where you scratch your head and say, ‘‘How is it that they

are safe here, but the moment they cross the berm’’—so my quesVerDate 22-MAR-2001 14:30 Dec 03, 2008 Jkt 038836 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-67\192000.000 HNS1 PsN: HNS1
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tion to you, the experts on that, is what have the Kuwaitis done

in order to, you know, stymie violence in their country and do you

see that as sustainable. Or am I wrong? Is there violence going on

that I am not aware of?

Dr. FINGAR. Kuwait does not have a high level of internal violence, that the government has tease words like ‘‘liberalized’’ and

‘‘democratized’’ and so forth probably overstate the situation, have

been increasingly responsive to the national needs.

This is a population that knows they suffered horrendously during the period of the Iraqi occupation, and there is a recovery,

there is a ‘‘we can put aside a lot of differences because we do not

want to go through that again’’ operating, I believe, in that country, and they do seem to be pretty well able to resist efforts at outside meddling.

John or Bob.

Mr. CARDILLO. I would agree.

Dr. FINGAR. Do you want to add something?

Mr. KRINGEN. The only other thing I would add to what has already been said regarding Kuwait is that Kuwait has a long history of managing Shia unrest, and the majority of the population

in Kuwait is Shia, and as a result, the Sunni problem is sort of a

relatively new one, and the Kuwaitis have had a long history of

sort of looking, being able to identify in a very, very small country

where trouble spots may be and using that experience in the past

of managing the Shia problem, sort of apply it to what is now a

lesser problem of Sunni extremism.

Mr. TAYLOR. If you had to guess what percentage of the, jumping

to Pakistan, what percentage of the OSI rank and file would you

say are sympathetic to the Taliban or al Qaeda?

Mr. KRINGEN. This has been an issue that we have spent a lot

of time and energy on. It is clearly a very mixed picture. I do not

think our intelligence base would allow us to label percentages, but

we are concerned that some of the folks who should be the folks

damping down those issues are, indeed, sympathetic, but in terms

of a number or percentage or anything like that, we do not have

the data to support that.

Mr. TAYLOR. Does that start with President Musharraf, or does

it start one level below him, two levels below him?

Mr. KRINGEN. We are not in a position to kind of lay that out.

I would say in terms of President Musharraf himself, we do not

think that is an issue at all, sir.

Mr. TAYLOR. I will jump into Afghanistan. How long has President Karzai’s brother openly been in the drug business?

Mr. KRINGEN. I know there are reports of him being in the drug

business. Those reports have been longstanding. I am not in a position here to kind of verify or deny those reports.

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, let’s just pass it on as how long has the average Afghan on the street been aware of this?

Mr. KRINGEN. Oh, many——

Mr. TAYLOR. It is something you are aware of.

Mr. KRINGEN. These allegations have been longstanding for multiple years, sir. It is, you know, two or three years, easily, I would

say, sir.

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

35

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Dr. Gingrey.

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity for

a second round of questions, and I do want to go back to my original question.

Dr. Fingar, you have answered it. Basically, I think I heard you

say that it does not keep you awake at night, the visa waiver program, and the fact that we do not have any really good way of

tracking people that come to this country as tourists or for businesses up to 90 days, and I am concerned about that. I would like

to hear, Mr. Cardillo and Dr. Kringen, also respond to that.

Mr. KRINGEN. Let me start off. I would say because I am not responsible for the visa waiver program, I also do not spend a lot of

time on it. What I am concerned about is——

Dr. GINGREY. But you, Doctor, are the director for intelligence of

the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. KRINGEN. No, no. But I am saying I am not involved in the

implementation or policy decision about the visa waiver program

policy.

What I will tell you is we are very concerned about the capability

of terrorist groups to use Europe as a venue and a lunching point

for bringing terrorists into the United States.

We are very concerned about the connection that clearly exists

between British citizens, in some cases British immigrants, in

other cases coming out of Pakistan, and so that connection between

Pakistan, the U.K. and then the potential for those individuals to

get into the United States is a matter of exceedingly high concern

to our agency, which is why we work very closely with various elements of the British government in this particular case to be able

to run to ground all reporting that bears on any individual, British

citizen or otherwise, who may have a terrorist connection.

So we do think there is an issue there that we need to monitor

very closely, and from an intelligence point of view, the way we

tackle that is by working closely with our European partners.

Dr. GINGREY. And I am relieved to hear that response.

Mr. Cardillo.

Mr. CARDILLO. I would share the concern. First to your broader

point about the globalization issue and access to markets and to

talent, if you will, skill sets across the world, I do hold my analysts

accountable to be, A, aware of that context within which we are

working now and, as Dr. Fingar has mentioned in his testimony,

there are pluses and minuses to that fact, that condition in the

background.

To your specific question, I share Mr. Kringen’s concern which is

to the extent that there are leaks in the system, okay, that cause

us to lose track, okay, of persons of interest or threads of threat,

both here and to deployed forces abroad, because our defense forces

are around the world and you can strike at the United States and

not do it here in the homeland, as has been done in the past. So,

for both of those reasons, sir, if it in any way inhibits our ability

to maintain that track, we have a great concern.

Dr. FINGAR. Let me, sir, if I may——

Dr. GINGREY. Yes, Doctor, sure.

36

Dr. FINGAR. I clearly failed to convey what I wanted to. With the

visa waiver program, I worry a lot about being able to track. You

can interview the people at one end where you can do a very good

job of accounting for them when they get here and absolutely

screening. We ought to know where they go and follow.

Whether you pick it up on the front end or you screen against

the same databases when they arrive at the port of entry, we absolutely should be doing that, utilizing the lists of who was on an airplane and notification ahead of time that there are alternative

mechanisms that I believe give us the capability to identify who

was coming in, identify them at port of entry, and that the weak

link, in my view, is sort of after they arrive.

Dr. GINGREY. Well, Dr. Fingar, I am glad you clarified, and I appreciate that, and just in my concluding seconds, that is my concern. A chain is only as strong as its weakest link, and that is a

tried expression, but, clearly, we have some concerns here and we

have to be able to identify these people.

And maybe it sounds draconian to say that, you know, we ought

to temporarily suspend the program until these countries abide by

the provisions of the Patriot Act, that they have biometric passports so that we can put that through a data processing and know

exactly who is coming to this country, and then, of course, if they

are clear, everything is fine, but yet stay beyond the 90 days,

whether it is for business or tourism, we need to be able to find

them.

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Shea-Porter, second round.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you very much.

I wanted to return to my question, if you gentlemen would

please. My concern here has to do with our Nation’s security and

our troop safety, and so I wanted to return to the question that I

asked you before.

Our policies are not hampering our ability to get intelligence

from individuals in that region? Is that so? Our policies are not

hampering our ability to get intelligence from individuals living in

the region around Iraq and Iran and Syria? We have the same

level of intelligence that we can get from individuals as we did six

or seven years ago?

Mr. CARDILLO. I would just say difficult to give a blanket answer

because, obviously, it is mixed, but I would agree with Mr.

Kringen’s earlier statement that on the whole, our relationships,

which are mutually beneficial, are, in fact, enhanced if you use six

years ago as the baseline.

Dr. FINGAR. We are looking for very different kinds of information than we were six years ago—I associate myself with both John

and Robert—and we are getting cooperation, we are getting information, that six years ago we were not looking for that kind of

tracking targeting kind of data on specific terrorist-related individuals, movements of terrorist monies moving around and so forth,

that we are asking different questions.

The granularity of what we need is much greater, and we are

getting, you know, not everything we want, of course. Might more

people come forward if they had a more positive view of us, that

the critical element here is that segment that knows something

37

about the bad guys and might be willing to tell us about it, and

sort of at the margins, presumably it is a smaller pool willing to

tell the crown jewel kind of information.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. But there is no extra challenges getting information from individuals who live in the area who because of policies or they do not agree with the United States? You do not think

that is hampering our ability to find out, for example, if there is

a terrorist attack planned, if they are going to be attacking troops

in two days or if there is some action along the border? That is not

impacting is what you are basically saying.

Mr. KRINGEN. I think you have to distinguish between in the region and within Iraq, and I would say within Iraq the disposition

of individuals to provide intelligence to us varies according to

whether they think that our presence there is going to be a helpful

act, and I would cite current developments in Anbar as a case

where previously a lot of the tribal elements were resistant to

working with us against al Qaeda. Now they are in part because

they see that as something that is helpful to them.

So, within that particular complex, you have Sunnis, you have

Shia, you have Kurds. They all have very different views of the

U.S. presence, and those very different views within Iraq clearly

drive their willingness to collaborate with us.

The Sunnis have the most concern about our role in Iraq. The

Kurds have the least concern. The Shia are very much in the middle and, therefore, present a more mixed picture. So, within Iraq,

it clearly does shape who we can work with.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. I understand that. Thank you. What I am concerned about is that we are not getting the intelligence we need.

And then I also wanted to ask you once more about the European

nations and our strained diplomatic relationships with some of the

nations because of the policy. This is not in any way interfering

with our ability to share information on individuals of possible terrorist activities? You are saying that you feel that other nations

that may disagree with us for our Middle East policy are just as

forceful about sharing and including us in intelligence. So we are

not impacted at all?

Mr. KRINGEN. No. What I would say—and tried to say before but

clearly did not articulate it well—was that working with us varies

according to a lot of variables, the capabilities of the particular government in terms of their ability to go after terrorists, the legal regimes within which they operate as well as kind of their attitudes

toward the United States.

All of those shape how we are able to get information or not get

information from those countries, and so it is certainly not uniform

across all those countries by any stretch of the imagination.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. So it is not a yes or a no answer?

Mr. KRINGEN. Because it is highly variable based on a number

of different criteria of which, you know, government attitudes——

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. So that attitude toward us could impact the

amount of intelligence that we receive?

Mr. KRINGEN. Absolutely.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. That is what I needed to hear. Thank

you.

Mr. KRINGEN. Okay. Thank you.

38

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sestak, do you have questions?

Mr. SESTAK. Yes, sir. Two questions.

But, Dr. Fingar, I was struck by I think what you said, that the

army of Iraq is rift with sectarian militias. I think it speaks to the

issue of whether some talk about their training is adequate. I have

kind of always disagreed with it. I always thought it was their motivation and allegiance. To some degree, reports are that half of

them never show up for work.

When I was in Iraq with Senator Hagel from Nebraska, I was

struck by the report of a message recently that Ambassador Crocker sent forward that alleged that he was not struck by the A-team

quality he would expect where our troops are engaged in a war.

When I was there—I think your head there was actually an acting head—I was struck by the youth that was there, but youth can

do a lot. But I was also struck that I was not able to get an answer

to who is loyal to whom in these units and who will be where. And

I bring that up because that is background. People talk about postsurge training.

Does your intelligence give us any confidence that if we are to

leave troops behind—50,000, 20,000—that you would feel comfortable that you can embed them for training in an Iraqi unit

whose loyalty is not suspect and whose motivation to fight well to

protect our trainers is there?

Dr. FINGAR. That is basically a question that should be directed

to the military on the intelligence side of this.

John, do you want to answer that?

Mr. LANDRY. When you take a look at the performance of embedded troops at this point and the casualties they have taken, frankly, I think what we from an intelligence perspective see is a manageable risk.

Mr. SESTAK. I am talking post-surge, that the——

Mr. LANDRY. Now it is hard to say. That is going to depend upon,

for example, is there a plus-up in embedded soldiers, number one.

Number two, there have been plans in the past to put in position

that security detachments precisely provide the kind of security

you are talking about.

Mr. SESTAK. I am talking training of the Iraqi troops, though, sir,

not the security detachments.

Mr. LANDRY. The security detachments we are talking about are

those that would, in fact, protect the embedded soldiers.

Mr. SESTAK. So we would need our U.S. security combat forces

to protect our embedded trainers.

Mr. LANDRY. Yes, but, you know, for lots of reasons, both to protect them against insurgent terrorist activities——

Mr. SESTAK. Understand. So, in a sense, we should not look at

this training mission post-surge and talk about just embedding

some trainers and taking out our combat forces. Your intelligence

indicates we need U.S. combat forces to remain to protect the embedded trainers.

Mr. LANDRY. I am saying there will always be a requirement for

what we call force protection, and that force protection mission will

either be performed by the trainers themselves in areas and in

units where that is, you know, feasible, but where it is not, you are

39

probably going to have to provide some additional form and we

now——

Mr. SESTAK. Can you define which units are more loyal than others at this time?

Mr. LANDRY. We have reports that would give us some indications of units that have performed better in that regard than others.

Mr. SESTAK. All right.

Mr. LANDRY. As I said earlier, the fact of the matter is that this

is not a phenomenon that goes across all units.

Mr. SESTAK. So it is still to some degree an art, not a skill?

Mr. LANDRY. Absolutely.

Mr. SESTAK. The second question: You said, which I thought was

an important statement, that the number one threat to America’s

homeland is al Qaeda. Where do you believe the center of strategic

risk or center of strategic gravity for U.S. security interests lie?

This is a global assessment.

Mr. LANDRY. I think my answer to that would be the Middle

East, the Middle East writ large, that for the energy dimension, for

the proliferation dimension, the danger or the potentially seriously

destabilizing impact of an Iranian nuclear weapon in that portion

of the——

Mr. SESTAK. I am out of time. Could I just ask have 30 seconds,

sir?

I am sure you are right, but can you also, as you answer, comment upon other types, not just military, but the financial, the economic security, the policy security of Middle East versus Western

Pacific, China? You did a very good job, I thought, earlier describing some sides of China that people do not normally think about,

but those two areas, do you still rate the Middle East as the center

of strategic for the decades to come?

Dr. FINGAR. I do, although the danger of tension in Northeast

Asia, we have nuclear powers up against one another, where you

have a little bit of a wildcard regime at Pyongyang, we have the

unresolved issues of the Cold War across the Taiwan Straits and

the Demilitarized Zone, where the amount of armament, the

lethality of the weapons that are involved, the deep historic suspicions and animosities increase the danger of miscalculation.

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, thank you.

Let me finish by a comment. Your testimony today, other than

an earlier reference, Dr. Fingar, seemed to omit Latin America entirely, I suppose, as a result thereof it does not rise to the level of

the other parts of the world. Is that correct?

Dr. FINGAR. Well, the written statement for the record includes

Latin America. I mentioned Venezuela, and I mentioned——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, you did. You did that, but you did not mention the other areas.

Dr. FINGAR. That is correct. I did not do so in terms of trying to

hit the greatest threats to the United States. Happily, most of

South America is not in the category of grave threat to the United

States.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you expand on one other topic? You did

mention the Persian-Arab differences, Iraq really being Persia, and

40

the Arab countries are the rest of what we call the Middle East.

How deep is that division? I know it should be historic, but how

deep is that division, and how can we best take advantage of it?

Dr. FINGAR. The short answer is a very longstanding and

deep——

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me. I think I said Iraq. I meant Iran.

Dr. FINGAR. Yes, you meant Iran.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Dr. FINGAR. I realized that, Mr. Chairman.

That the division is very longstanding and very deep, that rather

than thinking about how we can take advantage of it, I think we

need to think harder about how to deal with it as a fact of life in

the region, that attempting to sort of exploit it seems to me to be

fraught with an enormous number of problems.

Conversely, failure to grapple with it is a part of the solution,

and it was suggested by many members’ questions about bringing

those states in the region into any type of a solution for Iraq, a

longstanding security or stability framework. We simply have to

recognize that there is a division there that, much as we sort of

Americans say, ‘‘Can’t you get over those differences?’’ the people

in the region are not there yet.

You might want to add something?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, gentlemen, thank you for your excellent

testimony, and I know we have kept you a bit longer than you had

anticipated, but we did have the vote in between. It is certainly

good of you to do this.

And with that, we will adjourn the hearing. Thank you.

Dr. FINGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 1:13 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

JULY 11, 2007

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JULY 11, 2007

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE

RECORD

JULY 11, 2007

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH

Mr. SMITH. During the July 11th hearing, I expressed concern about barriers to

the effective and timely processing of intelligence data, both classified and open

source. I have heard from intelligence community experts that the most critical

shortcoming in our intelligence system is the failure to process and synthesize massive amounts of available data. Some argue that the gaps can be bridged through

more effectively leveraging existing data processing technologies.

1) Do you agree that this information processing gap is a major barrier

to effective intelligence analysis? If so, how would you describe the nature and causes of the problem? For example, is the problem one of a

lack of sufficiently advanced data-processing technologies, insufficient

budget allocation toward information-processing activities, or perhaps

institutional reluctance to prioritize information-processing activities

versus other intelligence activities?

2) What specifically has your agency or office done to identify and rectify

these shortcomings?

3) Can you identify any ways in which Congress or the Administration can

help address these shortcomings?

Mr. KRINGEN. Processing and synthesizing massive amount of data is indeed a

significant challenge in the Intelligence Community. The volume of available information—both classified and unclassified—continues to grow dramatically. Over the

past seven years, for example, the number of worldwide Internet users has more

than doubled, and the number of Internet host computers has grown by nearly a

factor of ten. The main database that informs our analytic judgments at the CIA

has increased almost 100 percent over the past decade.

To cope with these increasing volumes of information, we need improvements not

only in our information technology (IT) systems, but also increases in the numbers

and expertise of our analytic cadre. Thanks to the support of the Congress over the

past three years, the CIA has made significant improvements in both areas, upgrading our IT systems in support of analysis and increasing the number of analysts by

almost 30 percent since the end of 2004.

In recent years CIA has deployed many IT improvements that allow analysts to

better cope with the growth of information, including:

• Trident—a web-based analytic tool environment that offers significant

efficiencies in searching, filing, and sharing insights with colleagues on

the expanding pool of relevant information.

• Neptune—a common data repository that allows a broader array of analytic tools to be used to analyze and interpret the available data.

• Quantum Leap—a system for discovering relationships and knowledge

in massive, disparate data using innovative data aggregation and tools.

• Visual Information Initiative (VII)—a data system that provides users

the ability to access near real-time classified imagery as well as a large

historical archive of non-textual data.

• Castanet—a federated search solution that enables analysts to conduct

single Boolean searches of multiple systems and data sets from across

the Intelligence Community.

• Entity extraction and link analysis—capabilities that are key to using

analytic tools on unstructured, textual reporting and identifying key relationships among people, places, and things described in the text.

• eViTAP—a suite of tools that captures foreign video in near-real time,

simultaneously creates a transcript in the source language, and instantly renders the transcript into English through machine translation.

• Analysts’ access to the Internet at their desktop, along with the ability

to easily send Internet data to CIA’s network where it can be analyzed

using sophisticated tools.

72

• Data visualization technologies, like InSPIRE, that allow analysts to discover trends and anomalies in large document collections.

Collectively, these IT improvements provide us significantly more capability to

keep pace with the increased volumes of information than we had just a few years

ago. They have been developed in close cooperation with experts from private industry, the Intelligence Community, national laboratories, and CIA’s venture capital

arm, In-Q-Tel.

Of course, information growth continues, and we must continue to make investments in new capabilities to keep pace. Guided by engagement with our analysts

to identify their most pressing needs, we have asked for additional funds in FY09

and beyond to deploy a range of emerging technologies and tools that will help keep

us in front of the ever-growing flow of information. Our current search tools are optimized for finding what we already know, not for finding what we don’t know. The

new technologies we have requested focus on helping analysts find relationships

that they cannot uncover with existing search tools:

• Tools optimized for research and discovery against structured data that

is increasingly becoming available.

• Concept searching of text, allowing analysts to find documents that a

traditional text search would miss.

• Guided navigation through text documents, giving analysts a more effective alternative to traditional Boolean text search.

• Entity relationship discovery via latent semantic indexing, allowing analysts to uncover subtle relationships among people, organizations, or locations.

• Entity visualization, letting analysts browse large document collections

by finding related documents and discovering new links and relationships.

• Link and entity editing, giving analysts the power to enrich automatically extracted data with their own analytic insights and judgments.

• Visual browsing of large document collections to help analysts home in

on the most important documents.

• Geographic query, to find documents and data by their location.

• Using both implicit and explicit analyst feedback on intelligence reports

including tagging and commenting, usage statistics, and subjective ratings of value—to guide analysts to the documents most valued by their

peers.

Support by both the Administration and the Congress for the funding of these

technologies is essential for us to keep pace and reduce the risk that critical information will be lost or inadvertently ignored.

Mr. SMITH. During the July 11th hearing, I expressed concern about barriers to

the effective and timely processing of intelligence data, both classified and open

source. I have heard from intelligence community experts that the most critical

shortcoming in our intelligence system is the failure to process and synthesize massive amounts of available data. Some argue that the gaps can be bridged through

more effectively leveraging existing data-processing technologies. a) Do you agree

that this information processing gap is a major barrier to effective intelligence analysis? If so, how would you describe the nature and causes of the problem? For example, is the problem one of a lack of sufficiently advanced data-processing technologies, insufficient budget allocation toward information-processing activities, or

perhaps institutional reluctance to prioritize information-processing activities versus

other intelligence activities? b) What specifically has your agency or office done to

identify and rectify these shortcomings? c) Can you identify any ways in which Congress or the Administration can help address these shortcomings?

Mr. CARDILLO. a) The amount of data now available to analysts is a direct result

of Intelligence Community (IC) efforts to make data stores available across the IC,

Through these successful efforts, the IC has progressed to the point that it is unable

to process it all, and DIA agrees with the arguments that the IC can bridge the gaps

by leveraging existing technologies. It must be noted, however, that failure to process and synthesize massive amounts of data is but one of many issues negatively

impacting the IC’s ability to effectively process and disseminate intelligence.

b) Ongoing funded activities at DIA are striving to bring together multiple data

sources under a single architecture. As the amount of data already is massive and

continues to grow, analysts must be able to discover what is relevant to them at

any given time. This service-oriented architecture is streamlining the way in which

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analysts will be able to discover and access the intelligence they need. It enables

services and data feeds to other agency applications, thereby improving data integration and DIA’s collaboration efforts. DIA Also has made significant progress in

applying commercial technologies to managing finished intelligence products from

across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise, providing improved access and search capabilities.

c) DIA is coordinating all these issues with the Director of National Intelligence

(DNI) staff as DIA takes on the role of Executive Agent for the DNI’s Analytic Space

or A-Space initiative. DIA believes relevant policies will be reviewed and updated

to remove identified shortcomings.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK

Mr. LOEBSACK. In your testimony, you state that, despite initial steps being taken

in the North Korean denuclearization process, North Korea’s ‘‘threat to international

security remains grave.’’

A) In your opinion, is the successful completion of at least the initial steps in

the denuclearization process cause for optimism that North Korea may be stepping

back from the brink and may one day become a responsible regional actor?

B) Do you believe that the success of the Sin Party Talks in bringing North

Korea to the table and beginning to curb their nuclear program might lay the

groundwork for success in curbing North Korea’s ballistic missile program and continued proliferation of these missiles abroad?

Mr. KRINGER. North Korea’s shutting down of the Yongbyon reactor and its allowing IAEA inspectors access to the Yongbyon facilities are positive moves, but completion of these initial steps under the February agreement does not provide sufficient evidence on whether North Korea is ‘‘stopping back from the brink’’ or will become a responsible regional actor. Additional actions under the February agreement

would reveal more about Kim Jong II’s ultimate intentions.

North Korea has historically dealt with missile proliferation separately from negotiations over its nuclear program, but it is possible that success in the nuclear area

could build trust for progress on missiles. Much depends on getting Pyongyang to

accept that being a part of the international community requires adherence to international norms across the board.

Æ