J-S06012-24 

 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 

IN RE: CIVIL CONTEMPT 

APPEAL OF: A.G. 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 1568 EDA 2023 

Appeal from the Order Entered May 5, 2023 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

 Family Court at No(s): CP-51-JM-0000022-2022 

MEMORANDUM PER CURIAM: FILED SEPTEMBER 24, 2024

A.G. (“Aunt”) appeals from the trial court’s order finding her in civil 

contempt. For the reasons discussed below, we vacate the finding of 

contempt. 

 The instant matter arises from dependency proceedings concerning 

Aunt’s nephew, K.B. (“Child”), born in 2010. See Aunt’s Brief at 5. The trial 

court adjudicated Child dependent in July 2020. See id. Case manager 

Natasha Triplett (“Ms. Triplett”) from Turning Point Children’s Community 

Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) was the caseworker for Child. See N.T., 12/16/22, 

at 5-6. 

 In July 2022, Child ran away from placement to Aunt’s house. See id. 

at 6. Ms. Triplett permitted Child to remain with Aunt pending evaluation of 

Aunt as a kinship resource by the Philadelphia Department of Human Services 

(“DHS”). See id. In October 2022, DHS rejected Aunt’s application because 
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of allegations of domestic violence, inappropriate discipline, and mental health 

issues involving both Aunt and her paramour. See id. Ms. Triplett 

immediately contacted Aunt to inform her Child would be removed. See id. 

at 7. However, when Ms. Triplett went to Aunt’s home, Aunt refused to release 

Child, necessitating police involvement. See id. Aunt then sent threatening 

text messages to Ms. Triplett, her supervisor, and her director.1 See id. at 8. 

 In early November 2022, Child ran away from his new placement and 

returned to the home of his mother, L.B. (“Mother”). See id. Ms. Triplett 

returned Child to placement, but Child again ran away. See id. at 8. DHS 

hired a private investigator (“P.I.”) to try to locate Child. See id. According 

to Ms. Triplett, the P.I. told her Mother refused to cooperate and Aunt claimed 

she knew where Child was but would not disclose the location. See id. 

 On December 6, 2022, a review hearing took place in front of a hearing 

officer. Child appeared at the hearing. See id. at 10. Following the hearing, 

Ms. Triplett went to a waiting area in the courthouse to speak with Child and 

Mother about his return to placement. See id. At that point, Aunt approached 

Ms. Triplett and told her, as Ms. Triplett testified, she was going to “smack the 

mask off my F’ing face.” Id. at 10-11. Ms. Triplett approached a court officer 

to ask for assistance from a sheriff. Aunt “charged” her and threw a punch at 

her. Id. at 11. Ms. Triplett rushed back into the courtroom and “the door had 

____________________________________________ 

1

 The text messages were not entered into evidence. See N.T., 12/16/22, at 

8. 
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to be held shut to keep [Aunt] from getting in.” Id. In the confusion, Child 

again ran away. See id. at 12. 

The trial court held a review hearing on December 16, 2022. Although 

counsel for all parties were present, Mother and Aunt were not. See id. at 2, 

4. After presenting the above-discussed testimony from Ms. Triplett, the 

assistant city solicitor (“ACS”) requested and received a stay-away order on 

Ms. Triplett’s behalf against Mother and Aunt. See id. The trial court then 

sua sponte ordered both Mother and Aunt be subpoenaed for the next hearing, 

and stated: 

[t]here will be a rule to show cause at the next listing with respect 

to [M]other as to why she should not be held in contempt. 

 At the next listing, it is this court’s belief that we will appoint 

[A]unt an attorney or give her an opportunity to have her own 

attorney if she shows up; at which point, we will give a date for a 

rule to show cause as to why she should not be held in contempt. 

Id. at 13 (capitalization standardized); see also Permanency Review Order, 

12/16/22, at 1. The trial court also issued a fill-in-the-blank document entitled 

“Rule to Show Cause-Civil Contempt.” In it, the trial court explained Aunt was 

to appear at the next hearing “to show why she should not be held in contempt 

for not cooperating with DHS.” Rule to Show Cause, 12/16/22 at 1 

(unnumbered) (emphasis added). 

 Mother and Aunt both appeared at the next hearing. See N.T., 1/26/23, 

at 3-4. Ms. Triplett again testified as to the events which occurred on 

December 7, 2022. See id. at 6-7. In addition, for the first time, Ms. Triplett 
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averred, when she left the courthouse on December 7, 2022, Mother barked 

at her like a dog and said, “[W]e’ll see you when you have [to] come out to 

the house.” Id. at 7. Both Mother and Aunt testified they were unaware of 

Child’s whereabouts. See id. at 7-8. The trial court directed that counsel be 

appointed for both Mother2 and Aunt and told both women that they would be 

incarcerated if Child was not returned to placement by the next hearing. See 

id. at 8-9. 

 The record demonstrates the police located Child and returned him to 

placement before the next scheduled hearing. See N.T., 3/2/23, at 16. 

Despite this, the trial court indicated it would proceed with the contempt 

hearings. See id. at 7. However, Edelina Schuman, court-appointed counsel 

for Aunt (“Counsel”) immediately sought a continuance. See id. Counsel 

attempted to explain that she had been unable to obtain both transcripts and 

basic information about the underlying dependency case because Aunt “is not 

a party to the original [dependency] case. . ..” Id. at 8 (emphasis 

added); see also id. at 7-11 (Counsel explains that court administration could 

not figure out how she was supposed to bill for her services and would not 

permit her to order transcripts). Ultimately, the trial court granted the request 

for a continuance but proceeded with a contempt hearing against Mother. See 

id. at 11-21. Following additional testimony by Ms. Triplett, the trial court 

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2

 The record reflects Mother was already represented by counsel. See N.T., 

12/16/22, at 4; N.T., 1/26/23, at 4. 
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found Mother to be in contempt based upon her actions in “barking” at Ms. 

Triplett and threatening, “We’ll see what’ll happen when you come out to the 

house.” Id. at 14, 22. The trial court sentenced Mother to thirty days in jail.3 

See id. at 23. 

At the rescheduled contempt hearing for Aunt, Counsel requested an 

additional continuance, explaining she had not received the final transcript for 

the March 2, 2023, proceeding until that morning. See N.T., 4/17/23, at 4-

5. Despite its initial disinclination, the trial court ultimately continued the 

hearing. In so doing, the trial court agreed with counsel’s assertion that this 

was a civil contempt proceeding. See id. at 6-7. 

 The proceedings resumed four day later. The hearing was chaotic 

making the transcript difficult to read because all participants continually 

interrupted each other. Additionally, parts of the hearing were not transcribed 

due to mechanical difficulties. See N.T., 4/21/23, at 1-36. 

The trial court sought to take judicial notice of Ms. Triplett’s prior 

testimony and admit the notes of testimony of Mother’s contempt hearing. 

See id. at 4. Counsel objected, noting she had not been present for Mother’s 

contempt hearing and had no opportunity to cross-examine Ms. Triplett. See 

id. at 5-6. The trial court agreed it would allow Counsel to cross-examine Ms. 

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3

 Mother does not appear to have appealed the finding of contempt. 
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Triplett but admitted the prior notes of testimony over Counsel’s objection. 

See id. at 6. 

Counsel requested the trial court recuse itself because the court had 

“already shown a predisposition, based on the prior hearings, to fine my client 

and incarcerate her, and that is not due process or justice.” Id. at 7. The 

trial court denied the request. See id. at 7-8. 

Counsel moved to dismiss the contempt proceedings for lack of 

jurisdiction because Aunt was not a proper subject of contempt. See id. at 

8-11. The trial court refused to entertain the application, until after the 

evidentiary hearing. See id. at 11. 

Counsel argued the trial court was conflating civil contempt with criminal 

contempt and that civil contempt was improper because the court had failed 

to set a purge condition and the purpose of the contempt was not to coerce 

Aunt into complying with a court order. See id. at 11-12. The court 

responded that, “[w]hen I initially said contempt, [I] meant to say . . . indirect

criminal contempt . . ..” Id. at 15 (emphasis added). The court continued, 

“[i]f I did in fact say civil contempt . . . then I’m going to rectify that, and we 

will go forward at another time on an indirect criminal procedure[.]” Id.

4

 The 

trial court took a recess to consult with its law clerk and concluded it could go 

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4

 As noted above, the rule to show cause, stated this was a civil contempt 

proceeding. See Rule to Show Cause, 12/16/22, at 1 (unnumbered). 

 
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forward with a civil contempt proceeding and proceed later on criminal 

contempt; it later declared it would restrict itself to a civil contempt 

proceeding. Id. at 14. 

Counsel stated the controlling statute did not allow for incarceration for 

civil contempt.5 See id. at 16. The trial court refused to allow Counsel to 

make further argument and directed her to present her evidence. See id. at 

16-17. After additional argument as to whether the proceedings were properly 

characterized as civil or criminal contempt, and Counsel’s attempt to withdraw 

because she did not practice criminal law, the trial court continued the matter, 

appointed new counsel (“New Counsel”) for Aunt, and issued a rule to show 

cause as to why Counsel should not be held in criminal contempt.6 See id. 

at 17-36. 

 The court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Aunt’s contempt in May 

2023. Ms. Triplett, the sole witness, testified consistently with her earlier 

testimony about Aunt’s threatening behavior on December 7, 2022. See N.T., 

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5

 The statute provided, “Except as otherwise provided by statute, the 

punishment of commitment for contempt provided in section 4132 (relating 

to attachment and summary punishment for contempts) shall extend only to 

contempts committed in open court. All other contempts shall be punished 

by fine only.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4133. Approximately four months later, this 

Court issued its decision in Commonwealth v. Davis, 302 A.3d 166 (Pa. 

Super. 2023), which found Section 4133 unconstitutional. See id. at 171. 

 

6

 The record does not reflect whether Counsel was ever charged with criminal 

contempt. 
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5/5/23, at 6-7. No testimony was offered regarding any orders Aunt 

disobeyed, about her possible role in hiding Child between November 2022 

and January 2023, or about any involvement she may have had with Child’s 

flight from the courthouse on December 7, 2022. See id. At the conclusion 

of the testimony, the trial court found Aunt in contempt explaining, “the 

contempt has to do with not the order, but [Aunt’s] actions with respect 

to that day.” Id. at 12 (emphasis added). The court initially sentenced Aunt 

to fifteen weekend days in prison, but on a later date modified the sentence 

to seventy-two hours in prison. This timely appeal followed.7

 On appeal, Aunt raises four issues for our review: 

1. Whether the trial court erred by finding [Aunt] was in civil 

contempt by violating a court order that was definite, 

clear[,] and specific? 

2. Whether the trial court erred by finding [Aunt] was in civil 

contempt by violating a court order and that there was 

notice of that order? 

3. Whether the trial court erred by finding [Aunt] was in civil 

contempt by violating a court order and that the act 

constituting the alleged violation was volitional? 

4. Whether the trial court erred by finding [Aunt] in civil 

contempt by violating a court order and that [Aunt] acted 

with wrongful intent? 

Aunt’s Brief at 4 (bolding omitted, capitalization standardized).8 

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7

 Aunt and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

8

 DHS, although present, did not participate in the contempt proceedings and 

did not file a brief on appeal. See Letter, 1/26/24, at 1 (unnumbered). 
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As Aunt’s issues are interrelated, we address them together. Prior to 

reaching the merits of Aunt’s claims, we must decide if this case is properly 

before us, as the record indicates Aunt completed her sentence of 

incarceration. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/17/23, at 1. 

As a general rule, an actual case or controversy must exist at all 

stages of the judicial process, or a case will be dismissed as moot. 

An issue can become moot during the pendency of an appeal due 

to an intervening change in the facts of the case or due to an 

intervening change in the applicable law. In that case, an opinion 

of this Court is rendered advisory in nature. An issue before a 

court is moot if in ruling upon the issue the court cannot enter an 

order that has any legal force or effect. 

* * * * * 

[T]his Court will decide questions that otherwise have been 

rendered moot when one or more of the following exceptions to 

the mootness doctrine apply: 1) the case involves a question of 

great public importance, 2) the question presented is capable of 

repetition and apt to elude appellate review, or 3) a party to the 

controversy will suffer some detriment due to the decision of the 

trial court. 

In re D.A., 801 A.2d 614, 616 (Pa. Super. 2002) (en banc) (internal citations 

and quotation marks omitted). “The concept of mootness focuses on a change 

that has occurred during the length of the legal proceedings.” In re Cain, 

590 A.2d 291, 292 (Pa. 1991). “If an event occurs that renders impossible 

the grant of the requested relief, the issue is moot and the appeal is subject 

to dismissal.” Delaware River Preservation Co., Inc. v. Miskin, 923 A.2d 

1177, 1183 n. 3 (Pa. Super. 2007). 

 Here, the issues of the difference between civil contempt and criminal 

contempt and the parameters of a trial court’s contempt powers involve a 
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question of great public importance. Accordingly, we will reach the merits of 

Aunt’s claims. 

We begin, as always, with our standard of review. 

This Court will not reverse or modify a final [order] unless there 

has been an error of law or an abuse of discretion, or if the findings 

are not supported by the record, or there has been a capricious 

disbelief of the credible evidence. As each court is the exclusive 

judge of contempt[ ] against its process, we will reverse an order 

of contempt only upon a showing of a plain abuse of discretion. 

Diamond v. Diamond, 792 A.2d 597, 600 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). 

 In cases such as the instant matter, where there is an attachment and 

summary punishment for contempt, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4132 provides: 

The power of the several courts of this Commonwealth to issue 

attachments and to impose summary punishments for contempts 

of court shall be restricted to the following cases: 

(1) The official misconduct of the officers of such courts 

respectively. 

(1.1) The willful failure of the officers of such courts to 

disclose a person’s complete criminal history record 

information when requested. 

(2) Disobedience or neglect by officers, parties, jurors or 

witnesses of or to the lawful process of the court. 

(3) The misbehavior of any person in the presence of the 

court, thereby obstructing the administration of justice. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4132. 
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This Court has explained the difference between civil and criminal 

contempt, and stated: 

[t]he proper classification of a contempt adjudication is important 

because it governs the procedures that must be followed. If the 

adjudication is criminal, then the contemnor is entitled to all of 

the procedural rights and safeguards afforded to criminal 

defendants, including the right to trial by jury. There is nothing 

inherent in the violation of a court order that renders the violation 

itself civil or criminal. Rather, it is the judicial response to the 

violation that determines whether the contempt is civil or criminal. 

We must look to the nature of the sanction imposed in order to 

ascertain the trial court's “dominant purpose.” In the most basic 

terms, if the dominant purpose is to coerce the contemnor 

to comply with a court order, it is civil; if the dominant 

purpose is to punish the contemnor for a past violation, it 

is criminal. 

The typical sanction for civil contempt is remedial in 

nature. For example, a court may require the contemnor to 

compensate the opposing party for losses incurred as a result of 

the violation or reimburse the party’s attorneys’ fees and costs. 

It is also common in civil contempt for a court to impose a 

conditional prison sentence, giving the contemnor an opportunity 

to purge the contempt and avoid the sentence by compensating 

the opposing party, paying counsel fees, or doing some other 

affirmative act within a certain time period. 

Gunther v. Bolus, 853 A.2d 1014, 1016 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal citations 

and quotation marks omitted, emphases added). Our Supreme Court has 

noted: 

If the dominant purpose is to vindicate the dignity and authority 

of the court and to protect the interest of the general public, it is 

a proceeding for criminal contempt. But where the act of 

contempt complained of is the refusal to do or refrain from doing 

some act ordered or prohibited primarily for the benefit of a 

private party, proceedings to enforce compliance with the decree 

of the court are civil in nature. 
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County of Fulton v. Secretary of Commonwealth, 292 A.3d 974, 1028 

(Pa. 2023) (citation and internal citations omitted). 

Further: 

[i]f the relief provided is a sentence of imprisonment, it is remedial 

if the defendant stands committed unless and until [s]he performs 

the affirmative act required by the court’s order, and is punitive if 

the sentence is limited to imprisonment for a definite period. 

Vito v. Vito, 551 A.2d 573, 574 (Pa. Super. 1988) (citations and quotation 

marks omitted). This Court has stated while incarceration for civil contempt 

is permitted, the violator must be afforded the opportunity to purge the 

contempt. See Wetzel v. Suchanek, 541 A.2d 761, 764 (Pa. Super. 1988) 

(holding the trial court committed reversible error when it sentenced the 

appellant to jail for civil contempt and ordered a purge condition that the 

appellant could not complete before the end of the imposed prison sentence). 

In proceedings for civil contempt, the burden of proof rests with the 

complaining party to demonstrate that the defendant is in noncompliance 

with a court order. See Thomas v. Thomas, 194 A.3d 220, 226 (Pa. Super. 

2018). “To sustain a finding of civil contempt, the complainant must prove, 

by a preponderance of the evidence, that: (1) the contemnor had notice of 

the specific order or decree which he is alleged to have disobeyed; (2) the act 

constituting the contemnor’s violation was volitional; and (3) the contemnor 

acted with wrongful intent.” Id. Nevertheless, “a mere showing of 

noncompliance with a court order, or even misconduct, is never sufficient 

alone to prove civil contempt.” Id. 
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 Aunt contends9 the trial court erred in finding her in civil contempt 

because there was no evidence she violated the permanency review order. 

See Aunt’s Brief at 10-11. With respect to the December 7, 2022, incident, 

Aunt argues the action did not happen in the presence of the trial court and 

there was no evidence Aunt assisted Child in his escape from the courthouse 

that day. See id. 

 Contrary to its bench ruling, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court 

maintains it found Aunt in civil contempt because of her violation of court 

orders. It explained: 

[t]he first issue is whether the court order which [Aunt] 

purportedly violated was definite, clear, and specific and whether 

[Aunt] had notice of the order. . . . [Aunt] was present at the 

permanency review hearing on December 7, 2022, and after the 

hearing she was informed of the court’s order that [Child] had to 

return to placement that day with Ms. Triplett. 

The next issue is whether [Aunt’s] attempt to physically 

assault the CUA worker in the courthouse after the permanency 

review hearing[] and leaving with the minor child in violation of 

the December 7, 2022 permanency review order was willful and 

with wrongful intent. The permanency review order states: “IT IS 

HEREBY ORDERED THAT: Legal Custody of the Child shall remain 

with the Philadelphia Department of Human Services. Placement 

of the Child shall remain in Foster Care.” 

____________________________________________ 

9

 Aunt addresses her four issues under two headings in her brief, contrary to 

our rules of appellate procedure. See Aunt’s Brief, at 9-13; see also

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (“The argument shall be divided into as many parts as there 

are questions to be argued[.]”). Nonetheless, we will address her issues 

because this discrepancy does not hamper our review. See Donahue v. Fed. 

Exp. Corp., 753 A.2d 238, 241 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2000). 
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Based on the preponderance of the evidence, [the trial 

c]ourt found that [Aunt] acted with wrongful intent. . . . After 

learning that [Child] was ordered to return to placement, [Aunt] 

verbally threatened the CUA worker while outside of the 

courtroom in the waiting area. The CUA worker did not confront 

[Aunt], but rather, immediately moved to the other side of the 

waiting area. When Ms. Triplett attempted to request a sheriff, 

[Aunt] charged at her[,] swinging, trying to physically assault Ms. 

Triplett. [Aunt’s] attempt at physically harming Ms. Triplett did 

not stop there. A lot of people in the waiting room, including 

Mother, tried to hold [Aunt] while an ACS swiftly ushered Ms. 

Triplett inside a courtroom where the ACS held the door shut with 

his body weight to keep [Aunt] out while they waited for sheriffs 

to assist. When the sheriffs finally arrived, [Aunt], [Child], and 

Mother were no longer there. [Aunt] acted willfully and with 

wrongful intent, and her actions violated the court’s permanency 

review order. 

Trial Court Opinion, 11/17/23, at 7-8 (unnumbered) (citations, record 

citations, and quotation marks omitted, capitalization regularized). 

 Initially, this Court wishes to make it abundantly clear Aunt’s behavior 

on December 7, 2023, was deplorable. Her conduct of both verbally 

threatening, and attempting to physically assault, a CUA worker was 

inexcusable. Had either DHS or the trial court referred this matter to the 

District Attorney for criminal prosecution, this would be a different matter. 

However, the trial court, sua sponte, and without the support of DHS, elected 

to proceed with contempt proceedings and in so doing plainly abused its 

discretion. As noted above, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4132 limits a trial court’s power 

to attach an individual and issue a summary punishment for contempt. See 
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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4132.10 As discussed in greater detail below, Section 3 requires 

the “misbehavior” both to take place “in the presence of the court” and to 

obstruct “the administration of justice[,]” neither of which occurred in the 

instant matter. Id. Thus, Section 2, which concerns disobedience or neglect 

by “officers, parties, jurors or witnesses of or to the lawful process of the 

court[,]” is the only possible basis for finding Aunt in contempt under Section 

4132. Id. 

 Aunt is not an officer or juror, nor a party to the dependency 

proceedings. Aunt’s sole official involvement in the case began in July 2022, 

when Child, with the permission of CUA, resided with her, and ended in 

October 2022, when CUA removed Child from her home. Further, contrary to 

the trial court’s finding, the record does not demonstrate Aunt was present in 

the courtroom for the actual hearing on December 7, 2022. See 

Recommendation – Permanency Review, 12/7/22, at 1 (listing those people 

in attendance and appearing at the hearing).11 The trial court never 

enunciated any basis for finding Aunt in contempt under Section 4132. 

____________________________________________ 

10 Sections 1 and 1.1 of the statute are inapplicable here because there was 

no alleged official misconduct or willful failure by officers. See id. 

11 Aunt testified she was present in the courthouse because CUA told her “to 

be there to speak to a judge.” N.T., 5/5/23, at 9. This testimony was not 

confirmed by Ms. Triplett, and Aunt never testified at the hearing. See id. at 

5-8. 
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 Additionally, to find an individual in civil contempt, the court must 

accord the individual her due process rights of notice and an opportunity to 

be heard. See Harcar v. Harcar, 982 A.2d 1230, 1235 (Pa. Super. 2009). 

We have defined adequate notice as requiring “that the contemnor had notice 

of the specific order or decree which [s]he is alleged to have disobeyed[.]” 

Stahl v. Redcay, 897 A.2d 478, 489 (Pa. Super. 2006). 

 Here, the rule to show cause failed to accord Aunt due process. It 

vaguely stated Aunt had not cooperated with DHS. But Ms. Triplett is not an 

employee of DHS, and no DHS employee testified at the contempt proceedings 

or stated Aunt failed to cooperate with them. The allegation in the rule to 

show cause was insufficient as a matter of law to give Aunt notice of the order 

she allegedly violated. See Stahl, 897 A.2d at 489. 

Moreover, the record of the hearings delineated above and the trial 

court’s ruling from the bench, make clear that the basis for the contempt 

proceeding was not Aunt’s alleged failure to cooperate with DHS, but the 

December 7, 2023, incident. While the trial court in its 1925(a) opinion 

belatedly suggests Aunt violated what it calls the December 7, 2023 

“permanency review order,” it fails to point to, and we have been unable to 

locate, any place in the record where the trial court placed Aunt on notice that 

she violated that order. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court violated 

Aunt’s due process rights by failing to provide proper notice of the order or 

decree she allegedly violated. See Stahl, 897 A.2d at 489. 
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 In any event, we have thoroughly reviewed the trial court’s explanation 

of its contempt finding and are unable to discern how Aunt’s actions violated 

the “December 7, 2022, permanency review order.” First, there was no 

December 7, 2022, permanency review order. Following the hearing, the 

hearing officer issued a recommendation. See Recommendation – 

Permanency Review, 12/7/22, at 1.12 Second, as noted above, Aunt is not a 

party to this action, the recommendation does not mention her, there is no 

indication she ever received a copy of it, and the trial court does not point to 

any law supporting the position that it has the statutory authority to bind a 

non-party. 

Third, it is unclear how Aunt’s attempted assault and threats to Ms. 

Triplett, however reprehensible, violated the provision of the order giving legal 

custody of Child to DHS. To the extent the trial court is attempting to suggest 

that the attempted assault was a ruse to allow Child to escape, see Trial Court 

Opinion, 11/17/23, at 7 (unnumbered), nothing in the record supports that 

belated hypothesis. Ms. Triplett did not testify Aunt was involved in Child’s 

escape and did not testify at the hearing that Aunt had knowledge of the 

____________________________________________ 

12 The recommendation did not become an order until it was adopted by the 

trial court on March 2, 2023, almost three months after the December 7, 2022, 

incident. See id. at 2. 
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Child’s location when he was missing.13 See N.T., 5/5/23, at 5-8. 

Accordingly, we conclude the trial court plainly abused its discretion in holding 

Aunt in contempt. 

Given the above facts and the trial court’s emphasis at the contempt 

hearing that Aunt’s contempt involved the attempted assault of Ms. Triplett, 

we question the court’s treatment of this matter as civil contempt. As we 

discussed above, contempt of court may be classified as civil or criminal in 

nature. The distinction between the two categories of contempt rests in the 

lower court’s purpose for its finding. As this Court has written: 

[i]f the dominant purpose of the court is to prospectively coerce 

the contemnor into compliance with the court’s directive, the 

adjudication is one of civil contempt. However, if the court’s 

dominant purpose is to punish the contemnor for disobedience of 

the court’s order, the adjudication is one of criminal contempt. 

In re C.W., 960 A.2d 458, 466 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). Here, 

the trial court issued the rule to show cause because Aunt threatened and 

attempted to assault Ms. Triplett. The court never imposed a purge condition 

and sentenced Aunt to a definite term of incarceration, a sanction that is not 

permissible in civil contempt proceedings absent a purge condition. See 

Wetzel, 541 A.2d at 763-64. Thus, there are two things that are clear from 

____________________________________________ 

13 While Ms. Triplett did testify at the December 16, 2022, hearing that an 

unnamed P.I. told her that Aunt knew the child’s whereabouts, see N.T., 

12/16/22, at 8, that statement was inadmissible hearsay and made at a 

hearing where Aunt was neither present nor represented by counsel. Thus, 

the trial court should not have considered it in making its contempt ruling. 
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the record: (1) the dominant purpose of the contempt order was to punish 

Aunt for her misbehavior on December 7, 2022, and (2) Aunt was not in 

violation of any court order. Those are the hallmarks of direct criminal 

contempt, not of civil contempt. See In re C.W., 960 A.2d at 466. 

 Pennsylvania law provides rules and sanctions for both direct criminal 

contempt and indirect criminal contempt. 

 A conviction for direct criminal contempt under Section 

4132(3) requires proof beyond reasonable doubt (1) of 

misconduct, (2) in the presence of the court, (3) committed with 

the intent to obstruct the proceedings, (4) that obstructs the 

administration of justice. 

Commonwealth v. Outlaw, 306 A.3d 406, 409 (Pa. Super. 2023) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted), appeal granted, 2024 WL 3283727 

(Pa. July 3, 2024). Here, we note none of the procedural safeguards attendant 

to criminal contempt proceedings occurred and the trial court applied the 

preponderance of the evidence standard, not the beyond a reasonable doubt 

standard. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/17/23, at 6. Moreover, as noted above, 

this case does not fall within the parameters of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4132(3). 

Assuming, arguendo, Aunt’s conduct constituted misbehavior and the 

intention to obstruct the dependency proceedings, the misconduct 

nevertheless did not take place “in the presence of the court.” Our Supreme 

Court has stated misconduct occurs “in the presence of the court” if the court 

itself witnesses the conduct or if the conduct occurs outside the courtroom but 

so near thereto that it obstructs the administration of justice. See 
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Commonwealth v. Moody, 125 A.3d 1, 12 (Pa. 2015). Accordingly, Aunt 

could not properly have been convicted of direct criminal contempt. 

In contrast to direct criminal contempt, indirect criminal contempt is 

committed 

by obstructive conduct that occurs outside of the court’s 

presence. A conviction for indirect criminal contempt requires, 

inter alia, proof that the alleged contemnor’s conduct violated a 

definite, clear, and specific order or decree. 

Commonwealth v. Perkins, 292 A.3d 1144, 1147 (Pa. Super. 2023) 

(internal citations and quotation marks removed, emphasis added). In 

Perkins, this Court reversed a finding of direct criminal contempt where the 

defendant threatened a witness by the courthouse elevators, outside the 

presence of the court, and the trial court only heard about when the witness 

reported the threat. See id. at 1148. We see little difference between the 

instant matter and the events in Perkins. Thus, even if the trial court had 

treated the matter as criminal contempt, the verdict could not stand. See 

Perkins, 292 A.3d at 1148. Moreover, as discussed above, Aunt’s conduct 

did not violate “a definite, clear, and specific order or decree[,]” thus she did 

not commit indirect criminal contempt. See id. at 1147. 

 While we do not condone Aunt’s actions, we are disturbed by the record 

in this matter. DHS sought neither contempt proceedings nor criminal 

prosecution. The trial court elected, of its own accord, sua sponte, to hail 

Aunt back into court to institute contempt proceedings. Our review of the 

transcripts shows the trial court did so with the expressed intent of punishing 
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Aunt. When Counsel pointed out the same legal difficulties highlighted in this 

memorandum, the trial court threatened Counsel with criminal contempt. 

The trial court’s actions in this matter disregarded Aunt’s due process rights 

and were at odds with well-settled law on contempt. Accordingly, for the 

reasons discussed above, we vacate the finding of contempt. 

 Order vacated. 

Date: 9/24/2024