J-S17029-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: I.M.E.R., A MINOR, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: J.R., NATURAL MOTHER,

Appellant No. 1891 WDA 2014

Appeal from the Decree Entered October 9, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County

Civil Division at No(s): 2014 AD 44

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED APRIL 23, 2015

J.R. (“Mother”) appeals from the decree dated October 7, 2014, and 

entered on October 9, 2014, that granted the petition filed by Blair County 

Children Youth and Families (“BCCYF” or “the Agency”), seeking to 

involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights to I.M.E.R. (“Child”), who 

was born in November of 2013, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), 

(5), and (b), and changed Child’s permanency goal to adoption with respect 

to Mother, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f).1 We affirm.

____________________________________________

*

 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1

 On October 9, 2014, the trial court entered a decree voluntarily 

terminating M.P.’s (Father) parental rights to Child, confirming his voluntary 

relinquishment of his parental rights at the hearing on September 30, 2014. 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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The trial court summarized the relevant factual and procedural history 

of this case as follows:

The subject child, I.M.E.R., was born [in November of 

2013]. His mother is the Appellant, J.R., while his father is M.P. 

This matter involves dependency proceedings filed to Blair 

County Docket No. CP-7-DP-121-2013. Those dependency 

proceedings were incorporated into the record at the time of our 

combined 6th/12th Month Review/TPR hearing held September 

30, 2014.

Blair County Children, Youth & Families (hereinafter 

BCCYF) first became involved with this child and [his] parents [in 

November of 2013,] when the Agency received a call from UPMC 

Altoona stating [Mother] had just delivered a baby, and the staff 

was concerned due to [Mother’s] extremely limited cognitive 

abilities and mental health history. The hospital staff expressed 

additional concerns, including [Mother’s] self-report of being a 

victim of domestic abuse at the hands of the father.

BCCYF acquired emergency custody of the child on 

November 8, 2013. [Child] was initially placed in the emergency 

kinship care of [Child’s] maternal great[-]aunt [“E.M.”;] 

however, she could not be approved for kinship care due to a 

prior criminal conviction in 2004 for possession of non-prescribed 

pills.

The adjudicatory hearing was originally scheduled for 

November 22, 2013[;] however, it was continued and ultimately 

held January 8, 2014. On that date, [Child] was adjudicated 

dependent and remained in foster care placement. No 

appropriate family resources were identified by the parents.

[Mother] was directed to undergo a psychological 

evaluation for the purpose of a global assessment to determine 

her parenting ability. The father was recommended to partake 

in Family Drug Court and to undergo a drug and alcohol 

assessment. Both parents were ordered to cooperate with 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

Father did not file a notice of appeal from the decree terminating his 

parental rights, nor is he a party to the instant appeal.
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reunification services. [Order of Adjudication and Disposition, 

1/8/14].

The 6th Month Permanency Review hearing was scheduled 

for April 30, 2014[;] however, the Agency opted to move the 

matter to court due to its concerns regarding the lack of 

progress made by either parent. The matter was rescheduled 

for June 17, 2014. BCCYF advised the parties it would be 

seeking a goal change to adoption.

Permanency Review Hearings were held on June 17, 2014 

(6th Month Review) and September 30, 2014 (combined 6th

Month/12th Month Review). BCCYF’s Petition to Terminate 

Parental Rights was combined with the CYF Permanency Review 

Hearing held September 30, 2014.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/19/14, at 1-2.

At the six-month permanency review hearing on June 17, 2014, BCCYF 

presented the testimony of Nicole Weyant, a parent-educator with Family in 

Crisis Services (“FICS”) in Blair County, Pennsylvania. N.T., 6/17/14, at 4. 

BCCYF also presented the testimony, via telephone, of Marolyn Morford, 

Ph.D., a licensed psychologist who conducted a psychological evaluation of 

Mother, and who testified as an expert witness. Id. at 13-15.

At the permanency review hearing and termination hearing on 

September 30, 2014, BCCYF presented the testimony of Dr. Morford via

telephone. N.T., 9/30/14, at 8. BCCYF also presented the testimony of 

Shannon Cameron, a reunification worker with Kids First, in Altoona, 

Pennsylvania, who was Mother’s reunification worker. Id. at 40. Next, 

BCCYF presented the testimony of Julie Nardozza, an employee of the Home 

Nursing Agency in Altoona, Pennsylvania, who has provided Children’s 
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Blended Case Management Services for Mother since July of 2012. Id. at 

90. BCCYF then presented the testimony of Jodie Feath, the Support 

Coordinator Supervisor for North Star Services, Inc., in Altoona, 

Pennsylvania, who serves as Mother’s Support Coordinator. Id. at 108-109. 

Finally, BCCYF presented the testimony of Ashley Gehrdes, BCCYF Casework 

Supervisor assigned to Mother’s case since December of 2013. Id. at 119. 

Mother testified on her own behalf, and presented the testimony of her aunt, 

E.M., with whom Mother resides. Id. at 140-141, 173-174.

On October 9, 2014, the trial court entered the decree involuntarily 

terminating Mother’s parental rights. On November 6, 2014, Mother timely 

filed a notice of appeal along with a concise statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925.

Mother raises the following issue for our review:

A. Whether or not the trial court erred in terminating Mother’s 

parental rights to her child?

Mother’s Brief at 6.2

Mother argues that the trial court erred in terminating her parental 

rights because Child had not been in placement for fifteen out of twenty-two 

____________________________________________

2

 In her concise statement of errors complained of on appeal and her 

statement of questions involved in her brief, Mother has not raised the issue 

of the change of Child’s permanency goal to adoption. Therefore, Mother 

waived any challenge to the goal change. See Krebs v. United Refining 

Company of Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating 

that any issue not set forth in or suggested by an appellate brief’s statement 

of questions involved and concise statement is deemed waived).
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months, the Agency failed to provide services at the frequency or duration 

that the Agency’s own expert, Dr. Morford, opined would be necessary to 

accomplish reunification with Mother, and Mother had her aunt, E.M., as an 

appropriate support system. Mother’s Brief at 8. Mother requests this Court 

to reverse the trial court’s determination and remand the matter directing 

reunification between Mother and Child.

We review an appeal from the termination of parental rights in 

accordance with the following standard set forth by our Supreme Court:

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard 

when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for 

termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our 

standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if 

they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court 

made an error of law or abused its discretion. As has been often 

stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because 

the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. 

Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion 

only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.

As we discussed in [In re: R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179 (Pa. 

2010)], there are clear reasons for applying an abuse of 

discretion standard of review in these cases. We observed that, 

unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the 

fact-specific determinations on a cold record, where the trial 

judges are observing the parties during the relevant hearing and 

often presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child 

and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the 

facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in 

dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must 

resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its 

own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must 

defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are 
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supported by the record and the court’s legal conclusions are not 

the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion.

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-827 (Pa. 2012) (some citations 

omitted).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). 

Moreover, we have explained:

[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as 

testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to 

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”

Id. (quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)).

This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the 

termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 

2511(a). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). 

Here, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S. § 

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (b). We will focus upon sections 2511(a)(2) and 

(b), which provide as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * *

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be 
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without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the 

conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

To satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(2), the moving party 

must produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the following 

elements: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; 

(2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or 

mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied. In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 

1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003). In addition, the grounds for termination of 

parental rights under section 2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that 

cannot be remedied, are not limited to affirmative misconduct; to the 

contrary those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to 
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perform parental duties. In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 

2002).

Our Supreme Court set forth our inquiry under section 2511(a)(2) as 

follows:

As stated above, § 2511(a)(2) provides statutory grounds for 

termination of parental rights where it is demonstrated by clear 

and convincing evidence that “[t]he repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused 

the child to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and 

the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.” If and 

only if grounds for termination are established under subsection 

(a), does a court consider “the developmental, physical and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child” under § 2511(b).

This Court has addressed incapacity sufficient for 

termination under § 2511(a)(2):

A decision to terminate parental rights, never to be made 

lightly or without a sense of compassion for the parent, 

can seldom be more difficult than when termination is 

based upon parental incapacity. The legislature, 

however, in enacting the 1970 Adoption Act, concluded 

that a parent who is incapable of performing parental 

duties is just as parentally unfit as one who refuses to 

perform the duties.

In re Adoption of J.J., 511 Pa. 590, 515 A.2d 883, 891 (Pa. 

1986) (quoting In re: William L., 477 Pa. 322, 383 A.2d 1228, 

1239 (Pa. 1978)).

Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 827.

This Court has stated that a parent is required to make diligent efforts 

towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities. 

In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d at 337. A parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long 
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period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of 

services, may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous. Id. at 340.

After a careful review of the certified record, we conclude that the trial 

court aptly discussed the evidence pertaining to the requirements of section 

2511(a)(2). The trial court explained its decision to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights and change Child’s permanency goal to adoption as follows:

We found that there had been minimal compliance with the 

permanency plan, in that:

 The mother has not invested in services and has not 

demonstrated any ability to safely parent this very young, 

11-month old, child. Because of her cognitive limitations, 

and her refusal/inability to implement the safety 

techniques she has been taught, the child would be at 

serious risk if placed in her custody. The mother has no 

other appropriate resources who could constantly be with 

her to help her care for the child, which is what would be 

necessary. The mother has not demonstrated any ability 

to remedy the circumstances which led to placement, nor 

is there any indication that she could remedy such 

circumstances in the foreseeable future even with 

continued services in place.

 BCCYF has attempted reunification services on two 

separate occasions, first with FICS, and then after the 

mother complained about the FICS representatives, with 

New Steps. Both FICS (Nicole Weyant) and New Steps 

(Shannon Cameron) were consistent in their testimony 

that the mother would become very frustrated and angry 

when the representatives tried to teach her basic 

parenting skills such as changing a diaper, feeding the 

baby, dressing the baby, holding the baby, transferring 

the child in and out of a car seat, etc. The mother made 

very little, if any, progress in demonstrating she could 

provide these basic parenting skills. The representatives 

of both agencies testified that there was a lack of eye 

connection and interaction from [Child] toward his 

mother, and that there did not appear to be any apparent 
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bond between the two. The visits always remained 

supervised, and in fact, New Steps decreased the visits 

from 2 hours to 1 hour because of the obvious distress 

the child often demonstrated when with his mother. 

There was a delay in implementation of services by New 

Steps because of the difficulty in making contact with the 

mother. Because of her frustration with the service 

providers, the mother didn’t attend any scheduled visits 

with the child since 8/28/14, nor [sic] any practice 

sessions where parenting skills were being taught since 

9/6/14. Shannon Cameron of New Steps testified that 

they tried to implement the recommendations of Dr. 

Marilyn [sic] Morford, who performed a psychological 

evaluation on the mother (her report being BCCYF Exhibit 

1, 6/17/14). The mother was consistently unable to 

retain basic parenting skills. Ms. Cameron testified that 

she could not assure that the child would be safe in the 

mother’s care for any length of time, even for one 

minute.

 Both Julie Nardozza, the Blended Case Manager from 

Home Nursing Agency, and Jodie Feath, of North Star 

Services, testified as to their respective agency’s 

involvement with the mother. Ms. Nardozza assists the 

mother in areas such as medication management, 

housing, employment and education. The mother suffers 

from a diagnoses of mood disorder, adjustment disorder 

with anxiety, and depression. She is prescribed 

medications. As the service providers from FICS and New 

Steps testified, it was difficult to assist the mother [as] 

she refused to acknowledge the need and/or refused to 

accept such services. Ms. Nardozza consistently 

recommended the mother to seek individual counseling 

for her mental health needs. The mother has scheduled a 

session with an individual therapist on 10/17/14. 

Because of missed appointments, the mother has not 

been able to obtain a primary care physician. Without a 

PCP [Primary Care Provider], the mother was unable to 

get a referral for the neuropsychological evaluation and 

occupational therapy assessment that were 

recommended by Dr. Morford. The mother did complete 

her community service hours, she receives social security 

disability benefits in the approximate amount of $700 per 

month, she currently is residing with her aunt, E.M., who 
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is a source of support for her, and she has separated 

from the child’s father, M.P., which all service providers 

indicate is a “positive” in her life. There remains a worry 

as to whom she may involve herself in a relationship, as 

her judgment in the past has been an area of concern. 

See ¶ 3(a) of Permanency Review Order of 10/7/14.

Dr. Morford testified that the mother suffered from two 

separate areas that hinder her ability to parent. First, her 

cognitive developmental deficit impairs her ability to understand 

proper and safe parenting; and the second is an obvious 

neurological impairment, which impedes her physical ability to 

safely [c]are for the child.

It is important to note that during the June 17, [2]014 

hearing, Dr. Morford testified that even in the “best case” 

scenario, where the mother would cooperate with service 

providers and have a stable support system, that [sic] it would 

still take years before she would have the ability to provide a 

safe, stable and secure environment for this young child on her 

own. More specifically, the child would have to be at least school 

age if this were to ever occur. The fact remains, however, that 

the mother has been uncooperative with services and does not 

have a positive and stable support system.

We also made the following specific findings in our 

Permanency Review Order of October 7, 2014:

• Appropriate services were recommended consistent with 

the goal of reunification with the parents. Unfortunately, due to 

a lack of cooperation and investment in such services by the 

parents, and the mother’s limitations relative to her intellectual 

functioning, reunification is not a viable and safe option. Thus, 

the goal is changed herein to adoption. ¶ 4(a), p. 2.

• The child is doing very well in his foster placement. He is 

beginning to bond with his foster parents, which is a concern for 

the Agency since they are not an adoptive resource. The Agency 

has identified a potential adoptive resource and visits have 

recently commenced. ¶ 23(c), p. 7.

• Since the child’s placement shortly after birth, the 

Agency has offered a multitude of services to the parents, 

including FICS Reunification Services, New Steps Reunification 
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Services, Home Nursing Agency, North Star Services and a 

psychological evaluation by Dr. Morford. Despite these 

multitude of services, neither parent made any progress nor 

demonstrated any ability to safely parent the child. The Agency 

has made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with his parents. 

¶ 23(d), p. 7.

• Neither parent will be able to remedy the circumstances 

that led to placement, nor would either parent be able to remedy 

such circumstances if additional services were put into place. A 

termination of their parental rights would best serve the needs 

and welfare of the child. ¶ 23(d), p. 7.

Based upon the above findings, we found that the mother 

had made “minimal” progress toward alleviating the 

circumstances which necessitated the original placement. ¶ 6(a) 

of Permanency Review Order of 10/7/14.

Based upon the evidence adduced during the Review 

Hearings, we changed the goal to adoption. At the time of our 

Order, the child had been in placement for 11 months, since 

November 8, 2013[;] however, the child has now been in 

placement for a period in excess of 1 year.

In a change of goal proceeding, the best interests of the 

child, and not the interests of the parent, must guide the trial 

court, and the parent’s rights are secondary. In re A.K., 936 

A.2d 528, 532-533 (Pa. Super. 2007).

As a result of the foregoing, we found that BCCYF met its 

burden, by clear and convincing evidence, of establishing 

grounds for termination under §2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5) and 

(b). We believe that a termination of parental rights is in the 

best interest of the subject child. We also submit that the record 

established by clear and convincing evidence, after taking into 

consideration the developmental, physical and emotional needs 

and welfare of the subject child, that the termination of the 

parental rights of J.R. would best serve the needs and welfare of 

the child.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/19/14, at 6-8 (emphasis in original).
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Indeed, there is ample, competent, clear and convincing evidence in 

the record to support the trial court’s determination that Mother has not 

demonstrated any ability to remedy the circumstances which led to Child’s 

placement, nor is there any indication that Mother could remedy such 

circumstances in the foreseeable future, even with continued services in 

place. Unlike section 2511(a)(1) and (5), section 2511(a)(2) does not have 

a time limitation.

In her appellate brief, Mother sets forth portions of the testimony from 

the hearings on June 17, 2014 and September 30, 2014, which she believes 

is beneficial to her case. However, we will not impose our own credibility 

determinations and re-weigh the evidence. Rather, we must defer to the 

trial judge’s determination, as the factual findings are supported by the 

record, and the trial court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of 

law or an abuse of discretion. Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-827. 

Hence, we conclude that the requirements of section 2511(a) have been 

satisfied.

After we determine that the requirements of section 2511(a) are 

satisfied, we next proceed to review whether the requirements of section 

2511(b) are satisfied. In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (en banc). This Court has stated that the focus in terminating 

parental rights under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but under section 

2511(b), the focus is on the child. Id. at 1008.
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In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under section 

2511(b), our Supreme Court recently stated the following:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are 

met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare 

of the child have been properly interpreted to include 

“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” In 

re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., 

[620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that the 

determination of the child’s “needs and welfare” requires 

consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and 

child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to discerning the 

effect on the child of permanently severing the parental bond. 

In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791.

In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).

We have stated that, in conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not 

required to use expert testimony, but may rely on the testimony of social 

workers and caseworkers. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 

2010). This Court has observed that no bond worth preserving is formed 

between a child and a natural parent where the child has been in foster care 

for most of the child’s life, and the resulting bond with the natural parent is 

attenuated. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 764 (Pa. Super. 2008).

There is ample, competent, clear and convincing evidence in the 

certified record to support the trial court’s determination that Child’s foster 

parents currently meet all of his needs and welfare, and that Child, who has 

been in placement since his birth, lacks any bond with Mother. The record 

supports the trial court’s determination that the termination of Mother’s 
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parental rights would serve Child’s best interests, and that there is no bond 

to sever between Child and Mother.

Mother argues that BCCYF did not make reasonable efforts to reunify 

Mother with Child because she did not receive the intensity or duration of 

services recommended by Dr. Morford. Mother’s Brief at 21, 29. She also 

contends that the termination of her parental rights was premature because 

Child had not been in care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months, 

and was less than one year old. Id. Our Supreme Court recently rejected 

the argument that the provision of reasonable efforts by the county 

children’s services agency is a factor in termination of the parental rights of 

a parent to a child. See In the Interest of: D.C.D., a Minor, 105 A.3d 

662, 673-674, 676 (Pa. 2014) (rejecting the suggestion that an agency must 

provide reasonable efforts to enable a parent to reunify with a child prior to 

the termination of parental rights and that section 2511 of the Adoption Act 

should be read in conjunction with section 6351(f)(9)(iii) of the Juvenile 

Act). Thus, based upon our Supreme Court’s holding in Interest of: 

D.C.D., a Minor, we discern no merit to Mother’s argument that Child had 

not been in placement for fifteen of the preceding twenty-two months. 

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decree terminating Mother’s parental 

rights to Child pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (b), and changing 

Child’s permanency goal to adoption pursuant to section 6351 of the 

Juvenile Act.
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Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/23/2015