IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE

RONALD BUZZARD, Jr.,

Appellant,

v.

INDETERMINATE SENTENCE 

REVIEW BOARD, et al.,

Respondent.

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No. 38930-8-III

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

STAAB, J. — Ronald Buzzard appeals the superior court’s dismissal of his petition 

for a writ of mandamus to the Department of Corrections (DOC) and the Indeterminate 

Sentencing Review Board (ISRB). Because Buzzard has failed to show a mandatory duty 

to act on the part of either DOC or the ISRB, we affirm the dismissal of his writ.

BACKGROUND 

Ronald Buzzard previously pleaded guilty to first degree rape of a child. He was 

sentenced to 123 months to life and released to community custody after about 12 years 

in prison. After violating his terms of community custody, Buzzard’s release was 

revoked, and he was returned to DOC’s custody to serve a new 24-month minimum term.

While serving his minimum term, the ISRB conducted a releasability hearing. 

During the hearing, the ISRB discussed Buzzard’s “index offense” as well as his 

FILED

FEBRUARY 13, 2024

In the Office of the Clerk of Court

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
No. 38930-8-III

Buzzard v. ISRB

2

subsequent violations. It also discussed Buzzard’s activities while in prison, community 

concerns, and where he would live if released. Buzzard was given an opportunity to 

speak about a statement made by his counselor and discuss what he was currently doing 

and had previously done for his mental health. Additionally, Buzzard admitted to his 

index offense for the first time and addressed what he believed “went wrong” that 

resulted in him violating his terms of community custody.

The ISRB extended Buzzard’s minimum term by 24 months. As part of its 

decision, it recommended Buzzard receive sex offender treatment, noting that he had not 

previously been eligible but likely now was due to his admission of his index offense. 

The End of Sentence Review Committee (ESRC) also recommended Buzzard’s sex 

offender classification be increased from a level 1 to a level 3.

Following the ISRB’s decision, Buzzard filed a writ of mandamus against the 

ISRB requesting that the superior court order his immediate release from custody. He 

argued that the ISRB did not have authority to order him to complete sex offender 

treatment a second time and the ESRC improperly raised his sex offender risk level from 

a level 1 to a level 3.

The ISRB and DOC together filed a motion to dismiss Buzzard’s petition, arguing 

that Buzzard failed to establish a mandatory duty and he had a plain, speedy, and 

adequate remedy at law—a personal restraint petition. The superior court granted the 

motion and dismissed Buzzard’s petition, finding Buzzard failed to establish a mandatory 
No. 38930-8-III

Buzzard v. ISRB

3

duty and the ISRB’s decisions were discretionary. The court did not make a finding 

regarding whether Buzzard had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law.

Buzzard appeals.

ANALYSIS

Buzzard argues that the superior court erred in dismissing his petition for a writ of 

mandamus against the ISRB and DOC. We disagree. Buzzard has failed to show a 

mandatory duty and failed to show that his sex offender notification was raised 

improperly. 

“A writ of mandamus is a rare and extraordinary remedy because it allows courts 

to command another branch of government to take a specific action, something the 

separation of powers typically forbids.” Colvin v. Inslee, 195 Wn.2d 879, 890-91, 467 

P.3d 953 (2020). 

An applicant for a writ of mandamus must establish three elements for a writ to 

issue: “(1) the party subject to the writ is under a clear duty to act; (2) the applicant has 

no ‘plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law’; and (3) the 

applicant is ‘beneficially interested.’” Eugster v. City of Spokane, 118 Wn. App. 383, 

402, 76 P.3d 741 (2003) (citations omitted) (quoting RCW 7.16.170). The burden of 

establishing these elements is on the petitioner. Colvin, 195 Wn.2d at 894.

“A writ of mandamus can only command what the law itself commands.” Id. at 

893. Where there is no legal requirement for a government official to take a specific 
No. 38930-8-III

Buzzard v. ISRB

4

action, a writ cannot require it. Id. As a result, “‘mandamus may not be used to compel 

the performance of acts or duties which involve discretion on the part of a public 

official.’” SEIU Healthcare 775NW v. Gregoire, 168 Wn.2d 593, 599, 229 P.3d 774 

(2010) (quoting Walker v. Munro, 124 Wn.2d 402, 410, 879 P.2d 920 (1994)).

Writs of mandamus are subject to different standards of review depending on the 

issue addressed. Cost Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 178 Wn.2d 635, 648, 310 

P.3d 804 (2013). The question of whether the party to whom the writ is issued is under a 

clear duty to act is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Id. at 649. But the 

question of whether there is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course 

of the law is a discretionary decision this court reviews for abuse of discretion. Id. This 

court reverses discretionary decisions only if they were manifestly unreasonable or 

exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. Id.

The superior court dismissed Buzzard’s writ of mandamus based on a 

determination that Buzzard had failed to establish a clear duty to act on the part of either 

the ISRB or DOC. Buzzard was initially sentenced to an indeterminate sentence pursuant 

to RCW 9.94A.507, which provides for sentencing for certain sex offenders. Under 

RCW 9.95.420 and RCW 9.95.425, the ISRB had authority to determine whether 

Buzzard was releasable and whether to revoke his release when he violated his terms of 

community custody. See also Matter of Forcha-Williams, 200 Wn.2d 581, 593, 520 P.3d 

939 (2022) (“[T]he authority to decide when a sex offender is released is vested with the 
No. 38930-8-III

Buzzard v. ISRB

5

[ISRB].”). RCW 9.94A.507(5)-(6); RCW 9.95.420, .010, .011. There is nothing in these 

statutes and Buzzard points to no authority indicating the ISRB had a mandatory duty to 

release Buzzard. 

Buzzard also argues that the ISRB did not have authority to order him to complete 

sex offender treatment a second time.1 Regardless of whether the ISRB would have 

authority to order such treatment, there is no indication in the record that it did order such 

treatment. Rather, the ISRB recommended Buzzard be rescreened for sex offender 

treatment. Further, were Buzzard to submit to such treatment, there is no indication that 

this would be his second time completing it as the ISRB also explicitly stated that 

Buzzard had not previously been eligible for such treatment.2

 

1 Although the ISRB claims that this argument and the argument regarding the 

ISRB’s authority to raise his sex offender risk notification level from level 1 to level 3 are 

being raised for the first time on appeal, they were both mentioned in Buzzard’s initial 

petition and so we address them.

2

In his petition, Buzzard cites to exhibit 2 to support his contention that he had 

previously completed such treatment. However, exhibit 2 simply contains a letter from 

Buzzard’s counselor stating Buzzard had successfully completed his counseling 

obligation. It does not support Buzzard’s contention that he had previously completed 

sex offender treatment.

Buzzard additionally argues, for the first time on appeal, that WAC 381-90-090(3) 

was violated because he was not afforded his right to write a statement on his change of 

registration level. This argument has not been properly preserved and we decline to 

address it. See RAP 2.5(a).
No. 38930-8-III

Buzzard v. ISRB

6

Additionally, Buzzard claims that the ISRB improperly raised his sex offender 

notification level from a level 1 to a level 3. He claims that the ESRC had a mandatory 

duty, created by RCW 9.95.420(1)(a), (c), to permit him to participate in “actuarial 

testing” prior to determining his sex offender notification risk level and that he was not 

permitted to review the ESRC’s report prior to his releasability hearing. 

The statute requires the ESRC to, in certain situations as part of determining 

whether to release an offender, conduct an examination of the offender “incorporating 

methodologies that are recognized by experts in the prediction of sexual dangerousness, 

and including a prediction of the probability that the offender will engage in sex offenses 

if released.” RCW 9.95.420(1)(a), (c). In this case, the record supports that such an 

examination and inquiry did occur at Buzzard’s releasability hearing as the ISRB 

discussed several matters including a release plan, counseling on the record, and provided 

Buzzard with multiple opportunities to respond and participate. Assuming the ISRB was 

under a clear duty to act, Buzzard fails to demonstrate how it failed to comply with this 

duty.

Further, Washington law permits the ESRC to “[c]lassify the offender into a risk 

level for the purposes of public notification.” RCW 72.09.345(5). Buzzard cites no 

statutory authority supporting his contention that this increase was improper or that the 
No. 38930-8-III

Buzzard v. ISRB

7

ESRC was under a mandatory duty to keep his risk level at level 1. Accordingly, these 

arguments also fail.3, 4

The superior court did not err in dismissing Buzzard’s petition for a writ of 

mandamus.

Affirmed.

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 

2.06.040.

_________________________________

Staab, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________________

Lawrence-Berrey, A.C.J.

_________________________________

Pennell, J.

 

3 Although the ISRB and DOC also argue that this court should affirm the 

dismissal of Buzzard’s writ of mandamus because he had a plain, speedy, and adequate 

remedy at law, the superior court did not make any conclusions on this point. 

4 Buzzard also raises additional arguments including that the ISRB’s actions 

violated his constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, a fair hearing, to 

present a defense, and protection from double jeopardy. He also challenges the evidence 

relied on by the ISRB and makes statements about witness bias and ER 401. However, 

none of these arguments explain how either the ISRB or DOC were under a clear duty to 

act. Accordingly, we decline to address these issues.