2014 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-10-2014

David Stetser v. Sherry Jinks

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 13-4053

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Recommended Citation

"David Stetser v. Sherry Jinks" (2014). 2014 Decisions. Paper 697.

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 13-4053

___________

DAVID STETSER,

 Appellant

v.

SHERRY JINKS, Individ. & in her official capacity as a Police Officer in the Gloucester 

Township Police Department; GLOUCESTER TOWNSHIP; GLOUCESTER 

TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT; W. HARRY EARL, Chief of Police of 

Gloucester Township Police Department, Individually and in His official capacity as 

Chief of Police of Gloucester Township Police Department; JOHN DOES 1-10

_______________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil No. 1-10-cv-03094)

District Judge: Honorable Renee M. Bumb

______________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

June 5, 2014

Before: HARDIMAN, SCIRICA, and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: July 10, 2014)

_________________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_________________

SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.
2

Appellant David Stetser filed a complaint against Officer Sherry Jinks for 

malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The District Court granted summary 

judgment to Officer Jinks, finding as a matter of law she had probable cause to initiate 

the prosecution, and denied Stetser’s motion for reconsideration. Stetser appeals both 

orders. We will affirm.1

I.

On October 3, 2007, Stetser and his wife, Jacqueline Stetser, divorced. Afterward, 

Jacqueline Stetser was granted a temporary restraining order against Stetser, which 

matured into a final restraining order on April 28, 2008. The restraining order prohibited 

Stetser from having any contact with his ex-wife and from visiting his two children. 

On August 21, 2008, Jacqueline Stetser entered the police department in 

Gloucester Township, New Jersey, and complained to Officer Jinks that her ex-husband 

violated the restraining order by sending her a text message containing a picture of a 

woman performing fellatio on a man. Jacqueline Stetser showed Officer Jinks the 

message on her cell phone and signed a statement that she had received the lewd picture 

from her ex-husband and that it was sent to her cell phone number from his cell phone 

number. Stetser does not dispute that the number from which the picture was sent 

previously belonged to him. Relying on Jacqueline Stetser’s statement, Officer Jinks 

filed a criminal complaint against Stetser on August 21, 2008. At that time, Officer Jinks 

was well aware of Jacqueline and David Stetser from their previous contacts with the 

police and complaints they had filed against each other.

 1 The District Court had federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Our 

jurisdiction is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
3

The criminal complaint charged Stetser with violating the restraining order and 

harassment. Stetser claimed he had changed his cell phone number after the final 

restraining order went into effect, and that the number from which his ex-wife received 

the lewd picture no longer belonged to him. At trial, Stetser presented evidence based on 

cell phone records that he did not send the lewd picture, and the charges were dismissed.

Stetser then filed this § 1983 malicious prosecution claim against Officer Jinks in 

federal court. As noted, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Officer 

Jinks, finding she had probable cause to initiate the criminal prosecution. This timely 

appeal followed.2

II.

To prevail on a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must show that the 

“proceeding was initiated without probable cause.” Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 

186 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citation omitted). Probable cause exists when “the facts 

and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient in themselves to 

warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.” 

United States v. Cruz, 910 F.2d 1072, 1076 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Dunaway v. New York, 

442 U.S. 200, 208 n.9 (1979)). A court determining whether an officer had probable 

cause considers an objective officer’s beliefs rather than the arresting officer’s state of 

mind. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004). Although the probable cause 

 2 We exercise plenary review of an order granting summary judgment. Kossler v. 

Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). Drawing all inferences in the light 

most favorable to the nonmovant, Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 203 (3d Cir. 2007), we 

may affirm the entry of summary judgment if “there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a).
4

inquiry is usually a question for the jury, “where no genuine issue as to any material fact 

exists and where credibility conflicts are absent, summary judgment may be appropriate.” 

Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 818 (3d Cir. 1997) (citation omitted), abrogated on 

other grounds by Curley, 499 F.3d at 209-11.

In this case, the District Court found Officer Jinks had probable cause to initiate 

the prosecution. We agree. Officer Jinks initiated a criminal proceeding against Stetser 

on the basis of Jacqueline Stetser’s statement that she had received a lewd picture from 

her ex-husband. As noted, Jacqueline Stetser showed the picture to Officer Jinks and 

signed a statement that the cell phone number from which she received the picture was 

her ex-husband’s number. Based on this evidence, a reasonable officer would be 

warranted in believing Stetser had violated the restraining order. See Wilson v. Russo, 

212 F.3d 781, 790 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting “a positive identification by a victim witness, 

without more, would usually be sufficient to establish probable cause”).

Stetser contends his ex-wife was an unreliable witness and Officer Jinks should 

have conducted further investigation before filing the criminal complaint. Yet an officer 

is “not required to undertake an exhaustive investigation in order to validate the probable 

cause that, in [her] mind, already exist[s].” Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 

782, 790 n.8 (3d Cir. 2000). Because the facts known to her established probable cause, 

Officer Jinks was not required to investigate further. Moreover, it would have been 

implausible to speculate the message could have been sent by someone other than Stetser. 

As the District Court reasoned, “it would mean that someone, with the same number that 

[Stetser] undisputedly had, randomly sent a lewd photograph to [Stetser’s] former wife.” 
5

Stetser v. Jinks, Civil No. 10-3094, 2013 WL 3791613, at *3 (D.N.J. July 19, 2013)

(emphasis in original). Accordingly, there was sufficient probable cause to file the 

complaint.

Nor does the fact that Officer Jinks observed David and Jacqueline Stetsers’ 

previous disputes at the police department render Jacqueline Stetser an unreliable 

witness. Although we have stated that “[i]ndependent exculpatory evidence or 

substantial evidence of the witness’s own unreliability . . . could outweigh [a victim’s] 

identification” and thus defeat probable cause, each case must be examined on its facts. 

Wilson, 212 F.3d at 790. In this case, Officer Jinks’s awareness that Jacqueline Stetser 

was willing to file criminal complaints does not erode the finding of probable cause. 

In sum, we find Officer Jinks had probable cause to initiate the criminal 

prosecution against Stetser. Officer Jinks is entitled to summary judgment. Although 

Stetser also appeals the denial of his motion for reconsideration, he advances no 

arguments independent of his challenge to the order granting summary judgment. 

Accordingly, on the grounds stated, we find the motion for reconsideration was correctly 

denied.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s orders granting 

summary judgment and denying the motion for reconsideration.