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44–426 PDF 2008

IRAQ’S BUDGET SURPLUS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, SEPTEMBER 16, 2008

Serial No. 110–40

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Budget

(

Available on the Internet: 

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/house/budget/index.html 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET 

JOHN M. SPRATT, JR., South Carolina, Chairman 

ROSA L. DELAURO, Connecticut, 

CHET EDWARDS, Texas 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine 

ALLYSON Y. SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

XAVIER BECERRA, California 

LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

MARION BERRY, Arkansas 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

JAMES P. MCGOVERN, Massachusetts 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

DENNIS MOORE, Kansas 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin 

PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin, 

Ranking Minority Member 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

JO BONNER, Alabama 

SCOTT GARRETT, New Jersey 

MARIO DIAZ–BALART, Florida 

JEB HENSARLING, Texas 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

JOHN CAMPBELL, California 

PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio 

JON C. PORTER, Nevada 

RODNEY ALEXANDER, Louisiana 

ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

PROFESSIONAL STAFF

THOMAS S. KAHN, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

AUSTIN SMYTHE, Minority Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page 

Hearing held in Washington, DC, September 16, 2008 ........................................ 1

Statement of: 

Hon. John M. Spratt, Jr., Chairman, House Committee on the Budget ..... 1

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 2

Hon. Paul Ryan, ranking minority member, House Committee on the 

Budget ............................................................................................................ 3

Joseph Christoff, Director of International Affairs and Trade, Government Accountability Office ........................................................................... 4

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 6

Frederick W. Kagan, Ph.D., resident scholar, American Enterprise Institute ................................................................................................................. 42

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 44

Lawrence J. Korb, Ph.D., senior fellow, Center for American Progress ...... 48

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 50

Christopher M. Blanchard, analyst in Middle Eastern affairs, Congressional Research Service ................................................................................ 59

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 61

(1)

IRAQ’S BUDGET SURPLUS 

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 2008

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:35 a.m., in Room 210, 

Cannon House Office Building, Hon. John M. Spratt presiding. 

Present: Representatives Spratt, Edwards, Schwartz, Kaptur, 

Becerra, Doggett, Berry, McGovern, Scott, Etheridge, Baird, Moore 

of Kansas, Bishop, Ryan, Conaway, Tiberi, Porter, Alexander, 

Smith, and Jordan. 

Chairman SPRATT. I call the Committee hearing to order, and 

first of all thank everyone for attending today’s hearing on Iraq’s 

Budget Surplus, and especially our witnesses. 

This hearing will be the first opportunity for the Congress to receive testimony on this report, the GAO Report, since the Government Accountability Office released it several weeks ago. GAO reports that Iraq is now running a substantial budget surplus. It may 

reach $79 billion. At the same time the CBO reported last week 

that in contrast to Iraq’s growing surplus, the budget deficit for the 

United States is expected to be $400 billion for the current fiscal 

year. That is the second largest deficit in our history. Even bigger 

deficits are projected next year. 

This hearing will give the Budget Committee the chance to develop some insight into Iraq’s fiscal situation and its ability to help 

pay for its own reconstruction. So far the United States has provided more than $650 billion for our efforts in Iraq, $50 billion of 

which is for reconstruction and security forces training. We are 

spending today at the rate of more than $10 billion a month, which 

is by anybody’s calculus a significant sum of money. 

Given our budget deficits here at home, some find it difficult to 

understand why American taxpayers are still funding Iraqi reconstruction and security training. In funding the Gulf War, the first 

President was able to secure much greater cost sharing from our 

allies which greatly reduced the bill that the taxpayers ultimately 

had to pay. 

Let me say at the outset that this hearing is not a debate on the 

war, not a debate on the surge, or the plans for redeploying any 

troops we may have. In fact, even the strictly budgetary issues of 

the total cost of the war, military and reconstruction, is larger than 

today’s topic. 

We invited the Department of Defense to address the broader 

budgetary issue in a hearing this fall, but they declined to appear. 

Thus today’s hearing is called to examine the issue of the Iraqi 

2

budget surplus. We on the Budget Committee want to assess for 

the purpose of projecting the bottom line whether the burden of 

Iraq’s reconstruction can finally begin to shift from the United 

States to Iraq itself given the surplus they are currently enjoying. 

To help us understand the budget surplus we have two panels. 

On the first is Mr. Joseph Christoff, the Director of International 

Affairs and Trade at the Government Accountability Office. Mr. 

Christoff is joining us to present GAO’s latest information on Iraq’s 

budget surplus. Mr. Christoff, thank you for coming and we look 

forward to your testimony. On the second panel we have Mr. Christopher Blanchard from CRS, Dr. Larry Korb from the Center for 

American Progress, Dr. Fred Kagan from the American Enterprise 

Institute. The second panel will continue the discussion on this 

topic by giving us their expert opinions. On behalf of the Committee I also welcome Mr. Blanchard, Mr. Korb, and Mr. Kagan. 

We will come to you as soon as we finish with this panel. 

But before turning to the testimony of the witnesses let me turn 

to my colleague Mr. Ryan from Wisconsin for any comments he 

may care to make. Mr. Ryan? 

[The prepared statement of John Spratt follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. SPRATT, JR., CHAIRMAN,

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET

I would like to thank everyone for coming to today’s hearing on ‘‘Iraq’s Budget 

Surplus,’’ particularly our witnesses. This hearing will be the first opportunity for 

Congress to receive testimony on this report since the Government Accountability 

Office released it. 

GAO reports that Iraq is now running a substantial budget surplus that may 

reach $79 billion. At the same time, the Congressional Budget Office reported last 

week that in contrast to Iraq’s growing budget surplus, the budget deficit for the 

United States is expected to exceed $400 billion for the current fiscal year—the second largest deficit in U.S. history—with even bigger deficits projected for next year. 

This hearing will give the Budget Committee the chance to develop some insight 

into Iraq’s fiscal situation and its ability to help pay for its own reconstruction. So 

far, the United States has provided more than $650 billion for our efforts in Iraq, 

$50 billion of which is for reconstruction and security forces training. We are spending at a rate of $10 billion a month—a significant sum of money. Given our budget 

deficits here at home, some find it difficult to understand why American taxpayers—rather than Iraqis—are still funding Iraq reconstruction projects and security training. In funding the Gulf War, the first President Bush was able to secure 

much greater cost-sharing from our allies, greatly reducing the bill that the American taxpayers had to fund. 

Let me say at the outset that today’s hearing is not a forum to debate the war 

or the surge or the plans for redeploying our troops. In fact, even the strictly budgetary issue of the total costs of the war—military and reconstruction—is broader 

than today’s topic. We invited the Department of Defense to address that broader 

budgetary issue in a hearing this fall, but they have declined to appear. 

Thus, today’s hearing is called to examine the issue of Iraq’s budget surplus. We 

on the Budget Committee want to assess, for the purpose of projecting the bottomline, whether the burden of Iraq’s reconstruction can finally shift from the U.S. to 

Iraq, given the current budgetary surplus in Iraq. 

To help us understand Iraq’s budget surplus, we have two panels. On the first 

panel we have Mr. Joseph Christoff, the Director of International Affairs and Trade 

at GAO. Mr. Christoff is joining us to present GAO’s latest information on Iraq’s 

budget surplus. Mr. Christoff, I thank you for coming and join my colleagues in welcoming you here. 

On the second panel we have Mr. Christopher Blanchard from CRS, Dr. Lawrence 

Korb from the Center for American Progress, and Dr. Frederick Kagan from the 

American Enterprise Institute. The second panel will continue the discussion on this 

topic by giving us their expert opinions. On behalf of the Committee, I also welcome 

Mr. Blanchard, Dr. Korb and Dr. Kagan. We appreciate their willingness to participate and look forward to their testimony. 

3

I now turn to my colleague, the ranking Member from Wisconsin, Mr. Ryan for 

any statement that he may have.

Mr. RYAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Also, Mr. Chairman thank 

you for holding this hearing on an issue that is of particular importance to this Committee. That is, how do we budget for the War 

on Terrorism, and particularly the war in Iraq? But while talking 

about this is important, with only two weeks left before funding for 

our troops expires it would be wise for this Congress to put forward 

a similar effort into actually completing the Defense Appropriations 

Bill. 

A month or so ago GAO estimated that Iraq will be generating 

significant oil revenues in 2008 and will be running a budget surplus. I am very interested to hear from Dr. Christoff today on 

whether or not he believes that that is still the case today with the 

volatility in oil prices such as it is today. Clearly our success in 

Iraq depends largely on the establishment of a stable security environment that is necessary for a civil society and a growing economy 

in that nation. This report suggests that Iraq is making progress 

on getting its oil industry operating and developing a functioning 

government. 

I view this as progress. I was there a year ago and you had black 

market trucks coming into the biggest refinery at night, stealing 

the oil. And we had to send the 82nd Airborne in just to secure an 

oil refinery. So we are seeing progress going in the right direction. 

And I believe that that progress is due largely to the fact that the 

surge has worked. American troops have made remarkable 

progress in improving ground conditions in Iraq. And by most accounts, it appears that we have clearly turned a corner. 

I was among those who supported the surge, and many of you 

are here as well. Which I will note that Senator Obama recently 

stated that he believes that it, ‘‘has succeeded beyond our wildest 

dreams.’’ And while I have certainly heard the arguments of those 

who insist that now is the right time to simply pull out, I would 

argue the opposite. Now is the time to take those incredibly hard 

fought gains, build upon them, and finish the job so our troops can 

come home with a victory. 

On a final note, if there is one thing I would ask my colleagues 

to keep in mind it is that regardless of which side of the aisle you 

are on none of us wants to be at war. At the same time, every one 

of us wants to ensure the safety and security for our nation. In 

short, I believe we all genuinely want to do what is right for our 

country and for the security of our people. 

This hearing offers the Committee an opportunity to look forward. Forward to how we budget for finishing the job in Iraq, forward to ensuring the security environment in Iraq continues to foster a growing economy, and forward to the day that the Iraq government has the capability to stand on its own two feet. I look forward to hearing from Mr. Christoff and from our other witnesses 

who I would like to thank for coming here today. Thank you, 

Chairman. I yield. 

PROTESTOR. [Inaudible]. 

Chairman SPRATT. I’m sorry you are out of order and you will be 

removed from the room if you persist in doing what you’re doing. 

PROTESTOR. [Inaudible]. 

4

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Christoff, the floor is yours. Your statement will be made a part of the record so that you can summarize 

it, but we welcome you to expand on it as well and explain, number 

one, how this mission came about, and number two how it was conducted as well as the findings of it. I would ask before we get started that there be unanimous consent so that all members can submit an opening statement, or any who care to, which will be entered into the record at this point. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. Christoff, the floor is yours. Thank you again for coming. We 

look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH CHRISTOFF, DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRADE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. I thank you, sir. Thank you Mr. Chairman, Mr. 

Ryan, for inviting me to this important hearing. Iraq has an estimated 115 billion barrels of crude oil reserves. It is the third largest in the world. And oil revenues are critical to Iraq’s economy, 

accounting for over half of the country’s GDP and over 90 percent 

of its revenues. My statement today is based on the report we 

issued last month on Iraq’s revenues, expenditures, and surpluses 

from 2005 to 2008. To complete our work we received revenue data 

from the Central Bank of Iraq and the IMF, and expenditure data 

from Iraq’s Ministry of Finance. 

And let me summarize the findings in our report. First, from 2005 to 2007 Iraq generated $96 billion in revenues. Oil revenues 

accounted for over 90 percent of that total. For 2008 we estimate 

that Iraq could generate between $73 billion and $86 billion in 

total revenues, nearly as much as it generated in the prior three 

years. Second, from 2005 to 2007 Iraq spent $67 billion on operating expenses and investments. Operating expenses, such as salaries and 

goods and services, consumed 90 percent of that total. The remaining 10 percent was spent on investments, such as structures, and 

vehicles. In general, Iraq has spent less on investments than operating expenses. For example, in 2007 the government spent only 28 

percent of its $12 billion investment budget. In contrast, Iraq spent 

80 percent of its $29 billion operating budget. 

We also found that Iraq spent 1 percent of total expenditures on 

maintaining Iraq and U.S. funded investments. These investments 

included bridges, roads, weapons, and water and electricity facilities. Iraq has not spent all of its budgeted funds, resulting in a 

growing surplus, our third key finding. We estimate that Iraq will 

accumulate a budget surplus of between $67 billion and $79 billion 

by the end of this year. This includes $29 billion accumulated 

through the end of 2007 and between $38 billion and $50 billion 

projected for 2008. 

This surplus could be reduced if the government spends the 

$22.3 billion supplemental budget it passed last month. The government of Iraq projects it will spend its entire budget, including 

the supplemental, and end 2008 with a $5 billion deficit. Iraq made 

similar assertions in its 2005 through 2007 budgets, projecting deficits of between $3.5 and $8.1 billion. However, Iraq ended each of 

these years with budget surpluses. Accordingly, it is unlikely the 

5

government will spend its entire budget for 2008. Moreover, as of 

June 2008 the Iraqi government had spent only 38 percent of its 

$50 billion regular budget. 

Several factors affect Iraq’s ability to spend its budget, particularly its investment budget. Iraq has weak budgetary, procurement, and accounting systems. In addition, it has a shortage of 

trained staff with experience in preparing budgets, soliciting 

awards, and overseeing capital projects. And finally, violence has 

decreased the number of workers available and increased the time 

needed to plan and complete capital projects. Violence has also hindered U.S. efforts to help build capacity in Iraq’s central ministries. 

In reviewing our report the Treasury Department agreed with 

our findings. The Department stated that with more revenues the 

Iraqi government is in a stronger position to shoulder the burden 

of developing, rebuilding, and securing the country. To date, the 

United States has largely shouldered that burden. For example, in 

four key sectors, security, oil, water, and electricity, the United 

States has spent 70 percent of the $33 billion it allocated. In comparison, the Iraqi government spent 14 percent of the $30 billion 

it allocated for these same sectors. 

So in conclusion, Iraq’s large surplus and growing oil revenues 

offer it the potential to contribute to the country’s reconstruction 

and provide more services to its people. Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Joseph Christoff follows:]

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Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Christoff, thank you very much, sir. 

Would you explain to us just briefly, did you head up this audit 

team yourself? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Yes. 

Chairman SPRATT. Did you go to Iraq? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Yes, our teams did go to Iraq. We had a team 

that was in Iraq from January to March that we relied on heavily 

to collect some of this information. More importantly, we worked 

with the Treasury Department who gave us the actual oil receipts 

from the Central Bank of Iraq that we used to validate the revenues projections in our report. 

Chairman SPRATT. Are you satisfied that you saw what you needed to see to reach the conclusions you——


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Mr. CHRISTOFF. Yes. 

Chairman SPRATT. And the Iraqi government cooperated with 

you? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Yes. 

Chairman SPRATT. Did you find any instances that might have 

warranted further investigation as to misappropriation or 

misexpenditure of money, or——

Mr. CHRISTOFF. On this particular engagement, sir, we were just 

focusing on trying to answer the questions that Senators Levin and 

Warner asked us to do some projections about the surplus, the revenues, and the expenditures. 

Chairman SPRATT. Does the fact that Iraq has been so slow to 

spend this money for infrastructure in particular and for investment in capital goods, does that arise from some concern that it 

might be misspent, it might be misused? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, the reasons that were cited for Iraq not 

being able to spend its investment budget were the weaknesses in 

its accounting, its procurement, its budgeting systems. The U.S. 

government has had for the past two years a very strong capacity 

building kind of program, spending about $500 million to try to 

teach the Iraqis how to do a better job of budgeting and procurement and contracting. 

Chairman SPRATT. Well, that is the reality of it. If you look at 

June 2008, with a big surplus building up in the current year, the 

General Accounting Office, the Government Accountability Office, 

reported low expenditure rates by Iraq. Whereas we have spent 

about 70 percent, Iraq has spent about 14 percent. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. That is correct. 

Chairman SPRATT. And this is a attributable to the fact that they 

do not have the civil service, the sort of disbursing and procurement bureau to handle the expenditures? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, I mean that certainly is part of the reasons. We certainly have heard the fact that we have been generous 

in the reconstruction dollars. There has been less of an incentive 

on the part of the Iraqi government to spend their own dollars as 

well. 

Chairman SPRATT. So they are able to spend. If the will was 

there they could be spending at a faster rate than they are? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, they can spend it on their operating budget 

with no difficulties. They spent a large percent, almost 80 percent 

of their operating budget. They can pay salaries. They can buy certain operating goods and services. But when it comes to the actual 

investment side, to reconstruct bridges, roads, electricity, and 

water facilities, they fall short. 

Chairman SPRATT. Well, if you spend some of that money on oil 

does it not come back to you in dividends? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, all the oil revenues are required to go into 

the Development Fund for Iraq. So all of those are captured in a 

single fund that the Iraqi government can tap into. 

Chairman SPRATT. And that money is at the New York Fed, I understand? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Yes. The DFI is at the New York Fed, correct. 

Chairman SPRATT. Is there a reason for putting it at the New 

York Fed? 

21

Mr. CHRISTOFF. That was the agreement that was established 

back in 2003 when the DFI was established. And at that time the 

Coalition of Provisional Authority was responsible for spending the 

funds in the first year. 

Chairman SPRATT. So is the Iraq government at will free to draw from the $29 billion surplus at the New York Fed? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Yes. 

Chairman SPRATT. Without our approval or approbation or oversight? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Once the transition occurred in June of 2004 

Iraq was allowed to tap into the DFI. 

Chairman SPRATT. Do you see any movement towards their, how 

long does it take to establish a civil service that can handle the disbursement of money, the procurement of goods and services, and 

things of this nature? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, you know building capacity in any ministries is not a short term effort. It is a long term effort. I think 

when you look at the programs that USAID and State Department 

have established, they have a longer term perspective. 

You know, one of the, we are also looking at Iraqi refugees, for 

example, and in meeting a lot of the Iraqi refugees in Syria and 

Jordan over the past month, I encountered a lot of the civil servants that they need who have had the technical expertise in budgeting and accounting and procurement that have left the country. 

So some of the concerns, and some of their problems, are the result 

of brain drain that among the 2 million Iraqis that have left the 

country, many of them were the Sunni technocrats that had the 

kinds of skills and capabilities. 

Chairman SPRATT. They were Sunnis, too, probably? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Yes, many of them are Sunnis in terms of the 

ones that have left the country. 

Chairman SPRATT. Well, notwithstanding that, the United States 

government has appropriated about $48 billion——

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Correct. 

Chairman SPRATT [continuing]. And spent about $40 billion plus 

or minus. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Correct. 

Chairman SPRATT. A substantial share of what we have provided 

and allocated. Is that sufficient for our share? Do we have ongoing 

projects that we seek to complete that require the appropriation of 

additional money? Or can we now turn to Iraq and say, ‘‘From here 

on, the obligation to undertake these capital projects is your responsibility to fund?’’

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, first in terms of the $48 billion that we 

have appropriated, about 87 percent of that has been fully obligated. So it is covering projects that we have agreed to do. There 

still is money that has not been disbursed that has been set aside 

for projects. Some of these projects are going to continue for several 

years in terms of actually completing them. 

Now, you asked the question about at what point do we turn over 

the responsibility for the reconstruction to Iraq? I think that Congress has been moving in that direction. When you passed the supplemental in June and you provided money for the Economic Support Fund, you established a cost sharing formula, a dollar for dolVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:28 Dec 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 J:\DOCS\HEARINGS\110TH\110-40\44426.TXT HBUD1 PsN: DICK
22

lar match on the part of the Iraq government. So you have begun 

the process of at least requiring the Iraqis to put up a share dollar 

for dollar on those smaller reconstruction projects that are funded 

under the ESF. 

Chairman SPRATT. Two final questions. What level of surplus do 

you expect to be generated this year, 2008? And with this year’s 

surplus, what will the total accumulated surplus be, including the 

$29 billion on deposit at the New York Fed? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. When we did our projections, first of all we projected that just from total revenues would be between $73 billion 

and $86 billion. And that would then result in a potential surplus 

at the end of this year of between $67 billion and $79 billion. 

Chairman SPRATT. To be added to the $29 billion? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. No, that is inclusive of the $29 billion. 

Chairman SPRATT. Including? Okay. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Yes. 

Chairman SPRATT. Thank you very much. Before you get started, 

there is a person with a sign in the middle of the room. You will 

have to remove that sign. We cannot allow you to have the kind 

of display in this hearing room. You can either remove the sign and 

leave the room, or we will have you removed. Okay. Mr. Ryan? 

Mr. RYAN. Let me try and pick up where the Chairman left off. 

While the numbers that we see in the press are kind of treated as 

definitive, in actually reading your report and testimony I see there 

is a bit of a variance and uncertainty in these numbers. You use 

phrases like, ‘‘for 2008 Iraq could generate an estimated $73.5 billion to $86.2 billion in revenues.’’ Based on the fact that the conditions in the world oil markets have changed dramatically since this 

report was published, you know the price of oil has gone down very 

significantly, and based on the fact that Iraq did pass the supplemental, the $22.3 billion supplemental, do you still think they are 

going to have a surplus in 2008 since this report was published? 

And if so, what kind of number do you think we are going to see, 

since these things have taken place since this report was published? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Yes, we still believe that there is going to be a 

surplus. But it will probably be more towards the middle of our 

range. And remember, keep in mind that we have a range that we 

are projecting. I realize that the media has taken the higher end 

of the range. 

Mr. RYAN. Right. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. But it is still a range. We went back and we did 

just some checking, trying to take into consideration the recent 

drops in the oil prices. And if you go to page five of my statement, 

and if you look at what our ranges are for the amount of oil revenues that would be generated, when we——

Mr. RYAN. And these are based on different prices per barrel of 

oil, correct? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Exactly. And when we did some of the checking 

we think that the actual export oil revenues for the end of the year 

would be closer to the range between scenarios two and three, now. 

Mr. RYAN. Yes. 

23

Mr. CHRISTOFF. So the high end of the budget surplus will not be $79 billion. It will probably go down to about $72 billion. But 

there still will be a surplus. 

Mr. RYAN. Now, you use the term cumulative surplus. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Correct. 

Mr. RYAN. As a budget person that is not a concept that we are 

typically familiar with, or that we use here. When we look at a surplus or deficit, we measure them in the year in which they take 

place. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Yes. 

Mr. RYAN. I notice in your report you kind of roll up the years 

2005 through 2007, and add them to the projected numbers for 

2008 which, you know, as we see has some variable. Why do you 

use cumulative surplus numbers like that, which is contrary to the 

way we do budgeting here? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, we do list the surplus at the end of each 

year. It is on the highlights page, the first page. So that you do see 

that in 2005 Iraq had a surplus of $6.5 billion rising to $13.3 billion in that year alone. So when we went and looked at the actual 

financial deposits that Iraq had at the end of 2007 and we calculated where it was, it had a $29 billion surplus, cumulative, up 

to that point in time. 

Mr. RYAN. I know. But why are you using the cumulative number? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Cumulative is a term also that the IMF uses in 

terms of trying to determine exactly what Iraq’s surpluses and projections might be. 

Mr. RYAN. Okay. Now, so the key to this is budget execution, obviously. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Right. 

Mr. RYAN. And they have done a better job. Obviously, they are 

increasing their expenditures. And the whole point of all of this is 

we train their troops along with them, so we can get our troops out 

and they can take over their government and stand on their own 

two feet. So we all understand that. Let me ask you about the, we 

had the SIGIR here, Bowen I think was his name, and Ambassador 

Saloom, who is sort of in charge of budget execution for the State 

Department last year, just chronicling all of these problems that 

Iraq had in executing their budget. To the point where I think we 

had to deposit some money in the New York Fed, make interest on 

it to buy some equipment. Give me a better sense, I know you went 

into this with the Chairman a little bit, about budget execution. 

That is question number one. Question number two, is oil security. 

How is oil security improving? In stemming the black market, in 

controlling what is going on in the refineries, and in pipeline security? How are those two things——

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Yeah, let us talk about the latter point. Because 

you brought up the Baiji incident of last year. 

Mr. RYAN. Right. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Where even the DOD was reporting losses of $2 

billion through the black market, just from the Baiji refinery. That 

and security for the Baiji refinery has improved significantly. I do 

not have actual numbers of what might be the potential losses, but 

I know it has gone down dramatically. Coupled with the fact that 

24

there have been these oil protection forces that have been along the 

oil pipelines. Now there are still interdictions, they are still occurring, particularly the pipelines in the north. But we are doing a 

better job of protecting the actual infrastructure so that you are reducing the diversions that might occur, or the losses. 

Mr. RYAN. Okay, budget execution then? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Budget execution. Budget execution is a very interesting term. It is a term, quite frankly, that was developed by 

the State Department to try to give some idea of what Iraq might 

spend. Not what it actually spends, but what it might spend in 

terms of commitments. And Iraq through its Minister of Planning 

puts out what are called these informal or unofficial reports to try 

to tabulate projects that they are thinking about spending. And 

the, both DOD and State report budget execution rates that are 

higher than the actual expenditure rates, because they are trying 

to capture intentions. 

We sat down with Treasury, went through those reports. And 

both Treasury and GAO reached the conclusion that they are unreliable. The information does not contain reliable——

Mr. RYAN. You mean, you cannot measure intent very accurately, 

right? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Exactly. It is difficult to measure intent. 

Mr. RYAN. Yeah. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Plus, when you just read the reports, things do 

not add up, either. 

Mr. RYAN. So, looking forward to 2009 and watching how the 

Iraqi government is functioning, are they getting that? It was sort 

of, what we found was, you know, the top level was able to put together a good budget. We assist them with that. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Right. 

Mr. RYAN. And then it is down in the mid-levels of government 

where you had that gray area, and you were not allowed to apply 

or execute a budget. I do not mean execute from the term you are 

using it. What is your sense of things at that mid-level in government, where they are able to actually get, you know, projects moving? Actually get funding to employees and actually deliver on executing their budget? Executing their budget in the term that I am 

using. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. You know, one thing that the Iraqi government 

did which was positive was to try to begin decentralizing some of 

the decisions about the threshold for contracts, the dollar value of 

contracts, in terms of who can approve them. A year ago they had 

an incredibly low threshold. $10 million for a contract. If a contract 

exceeded $10 million the decision to actually let that contract had 

to go all the way up to the prime minister’s level. So they have 

begun to increase those thresholds, to $50 million at a minimum, 

and to allow some of the decision making to occur more in the ministries rather at the prime minister’s level. 

Mr. RYAN. Okay. Well, that is good to see progress on that front. 

Thank you. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Edwards? 

Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. Christoff, thank you for being here and for 

your report. Could I ask the staff to put up the chart, Mr. 

Wolfowitz’s statement from 2003?

25

Mr. EDWARDS. One of the administration’s chief architects of the 

Iraq War was Paul Wolfowitz, President Bush’s appointee as Deputy Secretary of Defense under Secretary Rumsfeld. This is a statement he made to members on March 27, 2003 before the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee. ‘‘We are dealing with a country that can really finance its own reconstruction, and relatively 

soon.’’ Given the GAO report I guess I rank that administration 

prediction right up there with some of the predictions that we 

would be greeted as liberators, the war would be short-lived, it 

would cost the American taxpayers less than $100 billion, and we 

are turning the corner. We have turned so many corners in Iraq 

I think we are all dizzy from that. And every time we turn one corner we find another roadblock down the way. I would like to ask 

you just again to get the facts on the table. In fact, let me ask staff 

to put up the chart on how much Iraq has spent and how much 

less it has spent than the U.S.


edw-1.eps
26

Mr. EDWARDS. I just want to verify, Mr. Christoff, that according 

to this chart the United States taxpayers that are now facing historic deficits of over $400 billion this coming year, U.S. taxpayers 

have spent $23.2 billion on Iraq reconstruction. Is that correct, Mr. 

Christoff? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. That is for four sectors that we look at. 

Mr. EDWARDS. Okay. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Security, oil, electricity, and water. 

Mr. EDWARDS. So, reconstruction in those four sectors. And the 

Iraqi government, which now I think has up to a, what, approximately $79 billion surplus has spent only $4.3 billion. Is that 

fact——

Mr. CHRISTOFF. That is correct. 

Mr. EDWARDS [continuing]. Correct? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Yes, sir. 

Mr. EDWARDS. So the U.S. taxpayers, in addition to giving something you cannot put a dollar value on, we have sacrificed over 

4,000 of our young men and women in combat there, we have then 

also spent five times what the Iraqis have spent on reconstruction. 

Despite Secretary Wolfowitz’ prediction that Iraq would very quickly be able to pay for its own reconstruction. 

Let me ask you about this. Am I correct in understanding from 

your report that the same Iraq for which we have sacrificed over 

4,000 American lives has just signed a $3 billion agreement with 

the communist Chinese National Petroleum Corporation to develop 

the Ahdab oil field? Is that correct? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. I do not have any firsthand information on it, 

sir. It is just what I have read in the papers, as perhaps you have 

as well. 

Mr. EDWARDS. Okay. Well I, for the record, I think that is, Mr. 

Chairman, correct. That the Iraqi government, the same one that 

is building up a $79 billion surplus while American taxpayers are 

paying for most of their reconstruction efforts, has just signed a $3 

billion agreement with the communist Chinese National Petroleum 


edw-2.eps
27

Corporation. And Mr. Chairman, it just boggles my mind to think 

that there would be any evidence that the communist Chinese ability to develop oil fields is better than U.S. corporations’ ability to 

do so. So once again, we turn a corner and we are hit in the face 

with something that I consider to be insulting. 

Mr. Christoff, in the minute and a half we have remaining, in 

terms of the 10 to 30 percent of Iraq’s refined fuels that were believed to have been diverted to the black market or smuggled out 

of Iraq in 2006, that is just an astounding number to me. Tell me 

the first, second, and third most important reasons, again, as to 

why that massive amount of fraud occurred? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well those were projections that occurred a couple years ago. And it was based upon what was then an imbalance 

in the price that Iraqis were paying for their fuel. For example, two 

years ago Iraqis were paying four cents per gallon. That has now 

been increased and subsidies have been reduced. So quite frankly, 

the 10 to 30 percent that was projected a couple of years ago probably is less than that. Because a lot of the oil and gasoline was diverted because you could get a better price outside of Iraq because 

of the heavy subsidies within Iraq. 

Mr. EDWARDS. Okay. Mr. Christoff, thank you very much. I appreciate your report and your testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Conaway? 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Christoff, thank 

you for being with us today. In your testimony you were talking 

about the reasons why they have not been able to spend the money. 

When we talk about whether they execute, or whatever, but spending the money, was given in no small part or in large part to weak 

accounting staff, weak accounting systems, internal controls, and 

all those kinds of things. What impact did that have on the numbers that you are working with? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, the standards that we were using was the 

Ministry of Finance expenditure reports that have been vetted in 

terms of, by the Treasury Department and others. So we went 

through a vetting process. We actually excluded an entire year’s 

worth of expenditure data because we found, and Treasury did, 

found the numbers unreliable. But for 2005 through 2007 we found 

that the expenditure data was sufficiently reliable to show the 

trends. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. So you are confident, what is the definition 

of surplus? That is just not the cash in the bank at the Fed. 

What——

Mr. CHRISTOFF. No, not at all. I mean——

Mr. CONAWAY. I mean, how confident are you in the fact that 

commitments and money that has been committed to spend and 

has not been spent has been accurately accounted for in the numbers? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. We are confident in terms of the actual expenditure data that comes from the Minister of Finance. The areas 

where I talked about where we did not feel that the information 

was reliable is when you try to add up and put a dollar value to 

projects that you might commit to. And those are separate reports 

that come from the Minister of Planning that we, when we looked 

28

at them, we could not even add up columns and rows. But you can 

do that with the Minister of Finance data. 

Mr. CONAWAY. So——

Mr. CHRISTOFF. On expenditures. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Sure. But the bills that are due, or payables, or 

commitments that have been made, you are not confident that accurately, that all of those numbers have been folded into what the 

net surplus would be? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, no, they should not be folded in that surplus. 

Mr. CONAWAY. So if you have signed a commitment to build 

something and you have signed a contract to do that, that is, that 

would not reduce that surplus? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. No, let me explain. If you did sign a contract, 

Iraq has what are called letters of credit, in which Iraq will set 

aside a certain amount of money that would be reserved to cover 

that letter of credit. When we calculated the surplus for the end 

of 2007 we excluded those letters of credit so that the surplus that 

we tabulate for the end of 2007 is net letters of credit. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. Okay. You are not suggesting, I hope, that 

Iraq would be better off spending the money willy-nilly without the 

proper controls and ways to do itMr. CHRISTOFF. Oh, absolutely not. 

Mr. CONAWAY [continuing]. Than leaving it in the bank so that 

when they do develop the right infrastructure to be able to let contracts and move forward on these infrastructure projects that that 

money would then be available. So you are not suggesting they 

squander the money, are you? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. No, not at all. And in fact the $22.3 billion supplemental that was just passed, the IMF issued a report yesterday 

in which they expressed even some concerns about Iraq spending 

all of that because of the inflationary effect that it could have. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Oh, okay, the fact that if they were to spend it 

now——

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Right. 

Mr. CONAWAY [continuing]. That it would push prices up unnecessarily. So, okay. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Right. 

Mr. CONAWAY. But given, and one final question about the accuracy stuff, you said your teams were there January through March. 

Is that a recent enough, that is not a stale——

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Oh, no, not at all. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Given how dynamic the circumstances are in Iraq, 

in terms of their building capacity and the things that are going 

on at the provincial level, to allow them to quote, unquote execute 

their budgets better? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. No. In fact, we have actual oil receipt data 

through the end of July that we received from the Treasury Department that gets it from the Central Bank of Iraq. So, and in 

fact, that statement that you have we updated even the expenditure data. Because between when we issued the report and today 

we received the updated expenditure data through the end of June. 

So we have very current data in this statement. 

29

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. So the fact that Iraq is, may not be spending it as quickly as we would like them to, you are confident that 

the controls are in place to protect the money so that when they 

do develop the right, Sunni technocrats get back into place where 

they are supposed to be, and all the folks are in line to spend 

money at least as responsibly as we do here in this federal government, that the money is going to be there to spend? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, there are lots of external auditors that are 

involved in terms of keeping track of Iraq’s expenditures. The Development Fund for Iraq, where the oil revenues go into. There was 

an international advisory and monitoring board that was established in 2004. Ernst and Young audits that on a semiannual basis 

to keep track of it. The one concern that I would have is, though, 

the DFI at the end of this year, the oversight of that is going to 

end because the UN Security Counsel resolution that covered the 

DFI is going to expire. So the future auditing of that is going to 

left to a new counsel of financial experts that the Iraqi government 

has to set up. So I think there might be some concerns about the 

continuing oversight after the end of 2008. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. Well, thank you, Mr. Christoff. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Doggett? 

Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Christoff, has the GAO not found that on 

more than one occasion the American taxpayers’ money was squandered in Iraq and spent willy-nilly? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, I think there have been, when we have 

look at reconstruction efforts in the waters after three years ago we 

found that we made some, quite frankly, some poor decisions about 

turning over reconstruction projects to the Iraqis before they were 

capable of maintaining them. And it has been a concern. 

Mr. DOGGETT. Right. Do I understand from your testimony to 

Mr. Edwards a moment ago that at the time when we were squandering our money and the Iraqis were saving theirs, that Iraqi citizens were paying about four cents per gallon in gasoline? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Two years ago, that is correct. 

Mr. DOGGETT. It has risen some since then? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. It is up to about $1.18 per gallon. 

Mr. DOGGETT. I think there are probably a lot of Americans who 

are paying for this so-called reconstruction in Iraq that would be 

mighty glad if they could get $1.18 a gallon gasoline. 

Did you play a role in the analysis of the benchmarks that the 

Government Accountability Office provided last year? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DOGGETT. What was that role? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. I was the Director in charge of that report. 

Mr. DOGGETT. And have you also played the same role in responding to questions about the benchmark from Chairman Skelton this year with the report that you just did within the last few 

weeks? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Yes. I was the Director on the progress report as 

well. 

Mr. DOGGETT. All of us remember, except maybe President Bush, 

that in January of 2007 he selected the benchmarks, the guidelines, by which to measure success, by which to measure victory in 

30

Iraq. And when we sought an analysis so we would have some objective information instead of just the propaganda from the administration about whether those benchmarks have been met the Congress turned to the Government Accountability Office. And my 

recollection is that when you came out with your report on August 

30th of last year that you determined that eleven of the eighteen 

benchmarks that President Bush had set were not met. Is that correct? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Based upon that prior report, correct. 

Mr. DOGGETT. Yes, sir. And you found that of the eighteen benchmarks that the President set himself to measure success in Iraq 

that only three had been met as of August 30, 2007. Now, in this 

year, a year later, you did some evaluation again. You did not evaluated every single benchmark. But you really found that there had 

been very little progress in the year. We know that fortunately 

fewer Americans are being killed there. But in terms of the objective of the Bush policy in Iraq you had a grand amount of success 

in that they met one more benchmark than they had the year before. Isn’t that correct? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, we did not go through a benchmark by 

benchmark analysis. But we did provide a report that talked about 

progress on the security front, the legislative front, and the economic front in our June report. 

Mr. DOGGETT. Right. And I believe you found one more benchmark met than the year before? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Again, we did not do a benchmark by benchmark 

analysis, sir. 

Mr. DOGGETT. Well, if you look at, it may not have been called 

a benchmark by benchmark analysis. But you looked at some of the 

same factors that you had the year before. And just to begin to go 

through them, on the Constitutional Review Committee you found 

that they had formed the Committee but the Committee had not 

done anything. Right? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. And that is still true. 

Mr. DOGGETT. So they had not met that. On enacting and implementing legislation on debaathification, you found that they had 

enacted the legislation but they had not implemented any of it, 

right? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. That is correct. 

Mr. DOGGETT. So they had not met the second benchmark. On 

the question of enacting the hydrocarbon or oil legislation, you concluded that they had not met that again this year, did you not? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Correct. And no progress this year, either. 

Mr. DOGGETT. On enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form semiautonomous regions, that was the fourth 

benchmark President Bush had. You found that that was only partially met. Again, they passed a law to allow the provinces to act 

but it had not been implemented. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, on that one it will be implemented when 

provinces come together to form regions. So that is an open——

Mr. DOGGETT. Right. But we are not there yet. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, no provinces have voted to form regions 

other than the KRG originally. 

31

Mr. DOGGETT. On enacting and implementing legislation for an 

independent high electoral commission you found only partially 

meeting it. Again, they passed a law but had not implemented it. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. The Commission is established. The provincial 

election law was, the date was established for October 1. But the 

implementing laws have not been enacted. 

Mr. DOGGETT. Right. And they will not have the elections that 

they have been promising us for a year they would have in October? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. October 1, they will not meet that date. 

Mr. DOGGETT. On the enacting and implementing legislation for 

a strong militia disarmament program? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. That is not met. 

Mr. DOGGETT. That is not met. And I see my time is up, but Mr. 

Chairman we can keep going down the objectives that President 

Bush set himself for success for victory in Iraq. And you will find 

that it continues to fail. That this policy has been a failure. American taxpayers are having to fund the failure while the Iraqis pay 

a fraction of the price we pay for a gallon of gasoline. Thank you. 

Chairman SPRATT. The gentleman’s point is well taken. Mr. Porter? Mr. Porter is not here. Mr. McGovern? 

Mr. MCGOVERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. 

Christoff for being here. And like my colleague from Texas, Mr. 

Doggett, I have a great deal of frustration over our policy toward 

Iraq. I believe the War in Iraq was a mistake. I still believe that. 

And I honor the men and women in uniform who have served there 

with great distinction, and they have sacrificed an awful lot. And 

many of them have sacrificed their lives. And listening to your testimony, as powerful as it is, only adds to my frustration over the 

way U.S. policy makers have conducted this war. 

You know, I believe we need to find a way out. And I believe that 

policy makers, Republicans and Democrats, and the administration, need to be talking about how we extricate ourselves from the 

mess in Iraq. And you know, we are spending $10 billion a month 

for Iraq. $10 billion a month. And, you know, you tell us that there 

may be budget surpluses that may reach over $70 billion. And, you 

know, I think that is a difficult thing to explain to the American 

people. Why we are sacrificing so much and yet they have these incredible surpluses. 

Adding to the frustration is the fact that, you know, those in this 

Congress, you know, who have cheered on this war, including this 

administration, have done so and not asked that the money that 

we spend on Iraq is budgeted. The vast majority of dollars that we 

spend on Iraq is put on our credit card. No one has been asked to 

sacrifice. No one has been asked to account for that money. And 

yet we are told that Iraq has these incredible surpluses. Why, you 

know, and the government of Iraq, the Maliki government, I know 

you did not look at the issue of corruption, but it is corrupt. I 

mean, I would not trust them to tell me the correct time. And these 

people are, you know, and here we are hearing people kind of 

rationalizing and explaining away why they do not need to spend 

their surplus. You know, why we need to continue to shoulder the 

burden. Why would the Iraqi government want to change this 

sweet deal that they have with the U.S. government? I mean, we 

32

are a cheap date in this whole matter. I mean, we are giving and 

giving and giving, and sacrificing and sacrificing and sacrificing, 

and yet they have this incredible surplus. 

So what are the incentives? And what should we be doing? What 

should this administration be doing, what should Congress be 

doing, you know, to kind of force this issue? You have obviously 

talked to the people in the administration and people in the departments, what is the plan? What is the plan to kind of transition? 

To kind of force the Iraqi government’s hand, you know, to take 

more responsibility so that we can get out, we can end our occupation. We can end our involvement here, and stop sacrificing so 

much of our resources in this effort? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. I do not know that I have seen a plan that would 

actually talk about transitioning so that the Iraqis begin spending 

more money. But I think you all have begun that debate within the 

Congress. As I mentioned before, when you passed a portion of the 

supplemental in June you had about $3 billion for what is called 

the Economic Support Fund. That was the first time that there was 

legislation that called for Iraq to have a dollar for dollar cost share 

for these small reconstruction projects that this ESF Fund supports. I also know that in part of the NDAA discussion there is discussion about also extending that type of cost sharing to what we 

provide for the continued training and equipping of Iraqi security 

forces. That area alone, we have appropriated, you have appropriated $20 billion. 

Mr. MCGOVERN. Well, you know, I realize that that is a step in 

the right direction. But quite frankly, it is kind of a modest, or less 

than modest, step in the right direction. I mean, we have been 

doing this for years, now. We have been involved in this war for 

many years. Nothing, absolutely nothing about this war has turned 

out as advertised by the proponents of this war. And it just seems 

to me that, you know, given the nature of the Iraqi government, 

given the problem of corruption in that government, and given 

what I believe is an unwillingness for them to kind of take more 

responsibility, and in light of the fact that they do not need to. I 

mean, we are spending $10 billion a month, $10 billion a month, 

in Iraq. And, you know, they have these surpluses. 

I guess my frustration is that there is not more frustration by 

those who are proponents of this war to force the Iraqi government’s hand to take more responsibility. But I appreciate your testimony. I think it is very helpful. And I hope that it will urge, I 

mean, if not this administration, I mean, Mr. Ryan invoked Senator Obama’s name. I mean, you know, Senator McCain has said 

we will be there for a hundred years. I think we will go bankrupt 

if we follow that policy. So I appreciate very much you being here. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Porter? Mr. Porter is not here. Mr. Scott? 

I beg your pardon, Mr. Scott. Mr. Etheridge? 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Christoff, thank 

you for being here and thank you for your report. I am, I guess as 

I look at that and think of the numbers, and where we are, I happen to have, represent a lot of men and women at Fort Bragg and 

Pope who spend an awful lot of time overseas. At the same time, 

their children attend the public schools here in the United States. 

And my question I think sort of fits in a little different area from 

33

what we have heard, so I will, you know, as you mentioned we are 

spending about $10 billion a month of U.S. revenues in Iraq. And 

your report tells us that the Iraqi government is not spending its 

own funds to maintain these reconstruction projects at a level they 

should. Actually, only about 14 percent of the 28 that is allocated 

for security, water, oil, electricity, etcetera. And we have a myriad 

of spending needs here at home. I will not even go through the list. 

I just want to talk about one of them. 

Because we need to be building some school buildings in and 

around my district, where we have got children in trailers, and we 

have got one school that has 50 percent of our military children in 

buildings that ought to, have modern buildings. My question to you 

I guess is what factors are keeping the Iraqis from taking more responsibility for its own reconstruction? And how can we address 

that problem? Or how should we address it? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, the factors that were cited in terms of their 

low expenditure rates for investment, that is for reconstruction, 

were the fact, again, that they have weak procurement, budgeting, 

contracting procedures in place. They have low thresholds in terms 

of the approving authorities. They have to go to the highest levels 

to get actual approving authority for the contracting. They have a 

brain drain in terms of the many technocrats that left the country 

that were responsible for many of these budgeting procurement 

issues. I have spoken with DOD advisors to the Iraqi Ministries of 

Defense and Interior. They have difficulties just teaching basic accounting and spreadsheet technology to some of the Iraqis. And 

also, keep in mind, this is a cash based economy. Things are done 

by cash. They have hand ledgers to keep track. There is not, there 

is not an automated financial management system in place within 

Iraq. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. I think the thing that bothers me, and I think 

a lot of folks who remember, you know, the U.S. taxpayers have financed nearly $50 billion in Iraqi reconstruction in addition to all 

the other funds we have put in place. And now we are spending 

about $10 billion a month. And at the same time we see almost $80 

billion in surplus. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Yes. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. And then I am reminded, and I think most folks 

are, that Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz said in 2003 

that the Iraqis could pay for reconstruction themselves and relatively soon. And I think we have a chart here, Chart 1, that shows 

that. And it is quite obvious that he was wrong. Or overstated it, 

or something, because we paid twice. We have paid a $50 billion 

reconstruction bill and now we are spending $10 billion a month. 

And we are paying billions of dollars at the pump, for gasoline. Is 

this a fair assessment? 

I mean, I just this weekend had people just climb on my shoulders and I do not disagree with them. They are paying a ridiculous 

price for gasoline, and at the same time in Iraq they are subsidizing their citizens. And we are paying more for it, over there, 

to keep our troops in Iraq. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, I think in terms of the Secretary’s original 

statement, Iraq does have now the capabilities to begin financing 

its reconstruction. It did not have it, you know, at the early part 

34

of 2003 or 2004. When you are talking about paying at the pump, 

now I mentioned the $1.18 per gallon, but quite frankly that is the 

typical price in the region. That is what Kuwaitis pay, Saudis pay. 

So the IMF goal was to try to get them to raise their prices to at 

least the regional level. And they have dramatically reduced their 

subsidies for gasoline, kerosene, and diesel, trying to give them a 

little bit of credit for their achievement. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. But my concern is that our troops are not getting that benefit over there, and we are not getting it in terms of 

paying for it by the American citizens buying that fuel to help protect them. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Yeah, I think in fact when we looked at, you 

know, we have the receipts where Iraq actually sold its oil. And 

about a third of the oil did come to the United States. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you. I see my time has expired, Mr. 

Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman SPRATT. Thank you, Mr. Etheridge. Mr. Moore? 

Mr. MOORE OF KANSAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Christoff, 

do you know the projected United States deficit for this year? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, the latest CBO was approaching over $400 

billion. 

Mr. MOORE OF KANSAS. So we are approaching, according to the 

CBO projection, a $400 billion deficit as a nation to add to our $9.6 

trillion national debt now, is that correct? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Based upon what I have read in the CBO projections, that is correct. 

Mr. MOORE OF KANSAS. And Iraq has a projected surplus for this 

year of $79 billion? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Up to $79 billion. 

Mr. MOORE OF KANSAS. Up to $79 billion. What is wrong with 

this picture? That we have a huge projected deficit, they have a 

good projected surplus, and they are asking us, basically, to pay for 

reconstruction in Iraq. I guess I am asking a rhetorical question because I think you have already answered that. What incentive from 

your perspective does the Iraqi government have to step up and assume responsibility for this if they have got us paying for everything right now. And not only money, but 4,000 American lives? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, I think that remains a concern in terms of 

how you incentivize the Iraqi government to begin spending of its 

own money. The incentives are also going to have to come on the 

part of the Iraqi people. They still are only getting about ten hours 

of electricity a day. They are still not getting potable water. Only 

a third of the children in Iraq have clean water, even despite our 

reconstruction efforts. So there has to be some incentivizing on the 

Iraqi people to demand more from their own government. 

Mr. MOORE OF KANSAS. And the Iraqi people have to step up to 

the plate and support their own government, do they not? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Yes. 

Mr. MOORE OF KANSAS. If anything is going to change here? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Yes. 

Mr. MOORE OF KANSAS. But they do have gasoline for $1.18 a 

gallon, and we have gasoline for $3.50 a gallon in this country. Is 

that about right? 

35

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Yes, I have got a diesel car so I pay a little bit 

more. 

Mr. MOORE OF KANSAS. Good. Good. And so basically right now 

what we are doing, and this is the last question I have, we are just 

charging the reconstruction costs to our national charge card and 

passing the bill on to our children and grandchildren, and future 

generations of this country. Is that not correct? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, we have spent, you have appropriated $48 

billion for reconstruction and stabilization. 

Mr. MOORE OF KANSAS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. The big reconstruction projects are tapering off. 

So the additional money that you have been providing through the 

Economic Support Fund is for smaller reconstruction projects. But 

we still have spent a chunk of change in terms of trying to rebuild 

that country. 

Mr. MOORE OF KANSAS. Yes, sir. Thank you very much, Mr. 

Christoff. 

Chairman SPRATT. Thank you, Mr. Moore. Mr. Bishop of New 

York? 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you very 

much, Mr. Christoff, for being here. I have a couple of questions. 

My understanding, the first Iraq War, the total cost was about $61 

billion. The net cost to the United States was about $2.1 billion. 

And the diffence between gross cost and net cost was in some cases 

in kind contributions from some of our coalition partners, and in 

other cases our coalition partners simply reimbursed us for monies 

that we laid out. Does that comport with your understanding? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. I do not know, sir. I know we did reports back 

in 1991 and 1992 in which we saw that there are actually, we 

made a bit of a profit on the last war. 

Mr. BISHOP. I will not comment. What structural and/or legal impediments exist right now, if any, that would prevent Iraq from 

simply reimbursing us from their surplus for some portion of what 

we have already laid out? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. I do not know. I would have to look into that and 

perhaps get back to you for the record. 

Mr. BISHOP. Does that not represent a reasonable course of action for this country, to try to recoup some of the enormous 

amounts that we have laid out while Iraq is sitting on this very 

substantial surplus? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Sir, I would think that is a policy decision that 

I would reserve to the Congress. I do not think it is appropriate 

for GAO to comment. 

Mr. BISHOP. Secondly, if I understand your summary correctly, 

Iraq has spent approximately $4.3 billion over a three-year period 

on its reconstruction and on provision of services. Is that about 

right? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. The $4.3 billion is for the four critical sectors 

that we looked at. 

Mr. BISHOP. And we have spent about $42 billion? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, that is $42 billion in total for all of our reconstruction. 

Mr. BISHOP. For reconstruction and——

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Beyond those four sectors. 

36

Mr. BISHOP. So if I have done my math correctly, $42 billion, 

every dime of which has been borrowed, is, the annual interest on 

that is about $2 billion or thereabouts, if I have done my math correctly. And Iraq is spending less than that on an annual basis for 

the four critical areas. So we are spending more on interest on the 

amount we have borrowed to rebuild their country than they are 

spending in total to rebuild their country on an annual basis? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. I am for an accountability organization. I would 

have to take your numbers and go back and check them——

Mr. BISHOP. Okay. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF [continuing]. Before I could comment on that. 

Mr. BISHOP. I am, these are back of the envelope numbers. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Yes. 

Mr. BISHOP. I would acknowledge. But they appear to be consistent with what you have reported. One last thing. You and 

Ranking Member Ryan were engaged in a bit of a discussion about 

budget execution. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Yes. 

Mr. BISHOP. To what extent do you believe that the decision to 

debaathify, which deprived the Iraqi government of in effect a professional civil servant class, to what extent do you believe that decision has contributed to their inability to execute their budget 

plan? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Debaathify—were you going to interject? 

Mr. RYAN. Yes. I just wanted to tack onto that, because I think 

it is an excellent question. Mr. Bishop, do you mind if I just tack 

onto the end of that question? 

Mr. BISHOP. No, I just would like to hear——

Mr. RYAN. No, it is a good question. And I, and the question is, 

are any of these technocrats coming back now that the 

debaathification reforms have passed, I would like to know if you 

track that as well. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Sure. Debaathification certainly was a factor in 

terms of the brain drain that has resulted in the lack of the kind 

of technocrats that Iraq needs for the administrative capacity, for 

good budgeting, procurement, and contracting. Those types of 

Sunni technocrats are part of the over 2 million refugees in Syria 

and Jordan. The extent to which they are coming back, it is a very 

small amount. Ambassador Foley two days ago said that only about 

16,000 of the 2 million refugees have actually returned to Iraq. I 

know, I met some doctors when I was in Syria who wanted to return, but they have no intentions of returning until they believe 

that the security situation has improved and they have got a 

house. 

Mr. BISHOP. One final question. You presided over the report 

that assessed performance on the benchmarks. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BISHOP. And one of those benchmarks was moving away 

from debaathification and restoring people to their jobs. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Correct. 

Mr. BISHOP. In Mr. Korb’s testimony, I do not know if you have 

had the opportunity to see it, he makes the point that the current 

effort to address debaathification may well result in fewer Baath 

party members working in the government under the new law than 

37

under the old law. To what extent did you address that point in 

your assessment of the benchmarks? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Two parts in answering that question. First of 

all, Iraq did pass the Debaathification Law, which they passed in 

February. 

Mr. BISHOP. The point of my question is, what is the impact or 

efficacy of that law? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. When we issued our progress report in June we 

had classified information that discussed that very issue that I 

could provide later for the record but I could not provide in an open 

session. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much. I appreciate it. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Becerra? Mr. Berry? 

Mr. BERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr. 

Christoff for being here. You have just had the pleasure of experiencing the discomfort and pain that is inflicted on the messenger. 

And I regret that that has had to be the case. I also think anytime 

we have a hearing like this we should first and foremost recognize 

the contribution and sacrifice that our men and women in uniform 

and their families have made, and we should never, ever fail to be 

appreciative of that. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Absolutely. 

Mr. BERRY. And show that appreciation in every possible way. As 

I have listened to this testimony, and we can talk about numbers, 

we can talk about policy, and all of those things. It seems to me 

that we are in a situation where, it reminds me of a bumper sticker 

you see from time to time. ‘‘Don’t follow me, I’m lost.’’ You just said 

a while ago that there is not a plan. I do not know who does not 

have a plan. It seems to me to be pretty obvious that nobody does. 

I cannot imagine a more ridiculous situation than we are in right 

now. 

I would like to think from some of the things you said that we 

actually may have a reasonable expectation that it will get a little 

better. But at the same time, we do not have any reason to think 

that it is going to be cleared up and everything is going to be in 

really good shape over there in the next few years, depending on 

how you define few. I would say anything under five years. But I 

just, I do not see any, I am like Mr. McGovern, I do not see any 

way to end this. We just keep pouring money into that place. We 

continue to make deals that no responsible person would enter 

into, it seems to me. And we thank you for bringing us this information, at least letting us know what really is going on as best as 

you are able to determine it. And I am confident that you have 

done that. And we appreciate all that. Beyond that, I think it is 

time for the Congress, the American people, the administration, 

and anyone else in a position of responsibility to begin to start figuring out how we are going to get out of there, and how we are 

going to bring this to a conclusion. Because the American people 

cannot stand much more of it. And I thank you for the work that 

you have done. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPRATT. Ms. Schwartz? 

Ms. SCHWARTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I also thank you 

for the information. And it is important for us to be having this 

hearing today and I thank the Chairman for doing it, because we, 

38

actually in some ways you are offering a suggestion of how we can 

see our way out of some of this if we actually just look at things 

really quite differently. Which is that, as has been pointed out, you 

pointed out and many of the speakers before me have pointed out, 

that we have, we are looking at working with the Iraqis to make 

sure that they use their almost $80 billion surplus to start spending their money on reconstruction. And you know, I was particularly struck that recently there was, I guess it was back in August, 

you know, some discussion about rebuilding police stations in Iraq. 

And our spending American dollars to do that. I have to say as representing the City of Philadelphia and the suburbs, I go to police 

stations and fire stations all across my district. And they need reconstruction. And so instead of our President saying, ‘‘We are going 

to spend our dollars on reconstructing our police stations and helping our first responders,’’ we are spending American dollars on reconstruction in Iraq when the Iraqis actually are sitting on $79 billion. 

Now you talked about the politics of why it has not happened. 

But my question really is how can we, is there a way for us to, one, 

start to say, and we have tried to in Congress, to say that Iraqis 

should start paying for reconstruction. I believe the last bill we 

passed actually had the condition of their spending 50 percent——

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Right. 

Ms. SCHWARTZ [continuing]. Of going forward on that. Is there 

any way that you would actually, that we could insist upon that 

happening? Is there a way that we could maybe get back some of 

these dollars that we are spending now, that are committed into 

the future? You know, we were led to believe seven years ago that 

we would not have to pay for this war at all, and that has been 

pointed out as well. And yet, we are right now spending billions of 

American taxpayer dollars to reconstruct Iraq when Iraq has the 

money. And so adding insult to injury we are spending a whole lot, 

every American family, on the price of gasoline that we are buying 

from the Iraqis. I mean, something about this picture just is not 

right no matter how you feel about this war, or going into it. 

And I have been asked, just recently, this weekend, was asked 

about how we could, why we are not doing enough to make sure 

that we get the Iraqis to spend their money on reconstruction. And 

I understand the politics of it, and I understand even the difficulty 

and some of the bureaucrats. But even if we lend expertise, even 

if we help them figure out how to do this, why, is there more that 

we could be doing to make sure that going forward the Iraqis are 

spending their money, particularly the surplus, $80 billion surplus, 

rather than American taxpayers on reconstruction of basic infrastructure for the Iraqi people? Which we all agree needs to get 

done. But why not the Iraqis? And why are, why is this administration, that is political. But what more could we be doing, from even 

your perspective, to make sure that going forward this is really a 

changed world, that we are not spending American taxpayers’ dollars on reconstruction, the Iraqis are? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, let us just talk about this concept of trying 

to get repayment for perhaps what we did? I think we began in 

2004 with good intentions. With good intentions to the fact that the 

Iraqis at that time did not have the resources. And so when you 

39

appropriated the $18.4 billion in IRRF 2. It was quote, unquote, to 

jump start the reconstruction process under two premises that generally did not pan out. One, that it would be a benign environment 

where you could do reconstruction without violence. Secondly, the 

Iraqis would step up to the plate. And third, the international community would begin to contribute. Those premises never really 

panned out until, quite frankly, recently where we see the Iraqis 

now have a substantial amount of money. I should not say recently. 

They had surpluses in 2005, 2006, and 2007 as well because they 

did not spend on the investments. 

Ms. SCHWARTZ. But you are making a good point, because things 

are more secure, the issues around violence, allows them to do 

some of this reconstruction without spending so many dollars on 

security. Can we actually get them to both repay us and actually 

begin to pay going forward? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Yeah, I do not know if we want to take back our 

generous contributions to try to jump start, because I thought they 

were good intentions back in 2004. But again, going forward I 

think you should have the healthy debate about cost sharing. And 

you began it with the roughly $3 billion that you put, and the restrictions you put on the Economic Support Fund. That it should 

be a dollar for dollar cost sharing. The State Department in two 

weeks has to send a report to the Congress certifying that the 

Iraqis are engaged in cost sharing on the ESF. So it will be interesting to see exactly how the State Department can confirm that 

that is actually occurring. 

Ms. SCHWARTZ. Okay. Actually, not just interesting but really important to both our own financial security here at home and to respond to the American people that we have actually said they have 

to be cost sharing dollar for dollar. And it will be important for us 

to see that that is actually happening going forward. And of course 

we would like to see at some point the Iraqis pick up much more 

of the reconstruction, if not all of it. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Yeah, and I think the security situation, I mean, 

that has been a noticeable improvement. I mean, violence is down 

80 percent from, if you compare the June data of 2007 to the June 

data of 2008 there has been an 80 percent drop in the number of 

enemy initiated attacks. So that benign environment, it is still not 

a benign environment——

Ms. SCHWARTZ. I was going to say, very generous——

Mr. CHRISTOFF [continuing]. It is still a very difficult environment. But the improvement in the security situation has been noticeable. 

Ms. SCHWARTZ. But having been in Iraq twice I can say certainly 

what all of our generals said, as well as our Ambassador said, and 

unless Iraqis start to see their own government, there is another 

reason for the Iraqis to be spending their own dollars. They need 

to have confidence that their own government is actually supporting the, the services and, you know, the economy there that is 

actually creating some confidence in the Iraqi government for the 

Iraqi people. So their allegiance, their willingness to maintain the 

security is only as great as their confidence and their working together as a government. It certainly starts with their also proVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:28 Dec 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 J:\DOCS\HEARINGS\110TH\110-40\44426.TXT HBUD1 PsN: DICK
40

viding these goods and services and support and infrastructure for 

their people with their own dollars. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. I think General Petraeus would agree with that 

statement as well. 

Ms. SCHWARTZ. And that is what he said, and what we pushed 

him to do. Thank you. 

Chairman SPRATT. Ms. Kaptur? 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sorry, I had a little 

trouble there with the microphone. Welcome, Mr. Christoff, it is 

really good to have you this morning. I have been looking over one 

of the charts that we have been provided that essentially shows the 

increase in spending by the people of the United States on the war 

in Iraq. And I think everyone knows that every year it gets larger. 

I remember Secretary Wolfowitz coming up before our Defense 

Committee and saying that we did not have to worry about this because it would all be paid for. Well, where is he now? I have no 

idea where he is. But he certainly was not correct in those statements which I think influenced a lot of members of this Congress 

to vote in the way that they did. 

But one of the bits of information that I have here, that I want 

you to clarify for me, deals with what appears to me to be two 

structures operating in Iraq. One by the United States, and one by 

the government of Iraq. It says, ‘‘While the United States has spent 

70 percent of the $33 billion that it has allocated for key security, 

oil, water, and electricity sectors,’’ in other words, we are spending 

down the money that the American people have allocated for this. 

Iraq has only spent 14 percent of the $28 billion it allocated to 

those sectors, or less than 3 percent of the $10 billion that it had 

programmed from the year 2005 to 2008. 

So as I read these numbers, and I am looking at the expenditure 

of our dollars, and we look at how much we have spent versus how 

much they have spent, it seems to me then that there may be two 

structures operating in Iraq. The American paid for structure, and 

then the Iraqi structure. Because how can the Iraqis be doing such 

a poor job? Is my perception correct? That in fact there are two separate structures operating there? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well in terms of——

Ms. KAPTUR. For electricity, for water, for oil, and security? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, in terms of how things are spent. Obviously, when the U.S. spent its money the majority of that is being 

spent through the Corps of Engineers. They have been the big 

builder using U.S. appropriated dollars. So they are using Corps of 

Engineers contracting, procurement, budgeting procedures. When 

you look at how the Iraqi government is spending its resources, it 

is going through its own ministries. Oil and electricity, water, to 

try to do the types of contracting and procurement. So yes, there 

are separate procedures because there are separate pots of money. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I appreciate that. Because if in fact oil production 

has gone up it has been because of U.S. expenditures. Because obviously the Iraqi expenditures are not locking in. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Right. Most of the money on oil infrastructure 

investment has been the U.S. funding. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Then why would Iraq sign its first contract with 

China? Do you have any——

41

Mr. CHRISTOFF. I do not know. 

Ms. KAPTUR [continuing]. Clarity on that? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. No. 

Ms. KAPTUR. And Royal Dutch Petroleum, Royal Dutch Shell is 

the next one they signed a deal with. I just find all of this very, 

very strange. Could you also tell me, in terms of the sabotage and 

the smuggling? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Yes. 

Ms. KAPTUR. It is estimated by some that at least a third of what 

is occurring in the oil sector, and again it is unclear to me who is 

really managing the oil sector. Is it the U.S. dollars that have been 

allocated? Or is it the Iraqi dollars that really have a handle on 

what is happening in the oil sector? But regardless, if you have any 

comments on that I would appreciate it. Of the dollars being expended, why is so much being smuggled out of there? Who does not 

have control of what is happening in the oil fields? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, I think actually the smuggling and the diversions have declined over the past couple years. The biggest 

problem that occurred back in 2006 was the massive smuggling of, 

estimates of up to $2 billion out of the Baiji Refinery because there 

was not sufficient protection forces around it. The U.S. and the 

Iraqi government have responded by putting more protection forces 

around the major refinery within Iraq, at Baiji. And also trying to 

set up these oil facility police forces that are trying to manage and 

protect the oil pipelines and the infrastructures, particularly in the 

north. But it still, there are still interdictions that are occurring, 

because you cannot cover everything. And I have not seen——

Ms. KAPTUR. Who, may I ask you, sir, who hires those security 

officers for those oil installations? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Yeah, right now it is the Ministry of Oil. But it 

is supposed to eventually be subsumed within the Ministry of Interior’s police forces. 

Ms. KAPTUR. But if we look at the expenditure of Iraqi dollars 

to do all of this, it looks like the U.S. contracted operations are 

spending their dollars down. Without them, Iraq would not be able 

to function. Am I correct? If you just pulled the U.S. contracting, 

let them fly on their own? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, we have lots of reconstruction projects in 

all of the critical sectors, including the oil sector. So we have been 

investing, over the past several years, in trying to build pipelines, 

trying to improve the refinery capacity, a lot of individual projects 

that have added up to billions of dollars. The Iraqis are trying to 

spend more money in terms of the oil sector. One of the problems 

with the Ministry of Oil is that unlike the Ministry of Electricity 

it has not developed any type of a plan to determine what its needs 

are, its priorities, and exactly where it should be spending its future resources. And the Minister of Electricity has got a pretty 

good plan. The Minister of Oil does not yet have a plan to try to 

set its own priorities. And he himself has estimated that he needs 

$30 billion to try to improve the oil infrastructure in Iraq. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I know my time has expired. If I wanted to read 

one clear report on what is really going on inside the Iraqi oil sector, what would I read? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Inside the Iraqi oil sector? I think in——

42

Ms. KAPTUR. Whose security officers, who is paying for it, how 

much has been smuggled, who did the smuggling, was anybody apprehended, where do I find that? 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Well, I probably have to go back to some of the 

CIA reports that I read that you would not be able to read in the 

public domain. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Christoff, thank you for your good work 

and your excellent testimony. We very much appreciate your being 

here today, and we have learned a great deal from what you had 

to tell us. 

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman SPRATT. Thank you very much indeed. Now let us 

bring forth the second panel, which consists of Christopher Blanchard, who is an analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs for the Congressional Research Service; Frederick Kagan, who is a Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute; and Dr. Lawrence Korb 

who is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress. 

All of you have testimony which we will take and make part of 

the record so that you can summarize it as you see fit. If there is 

no objection, your testimony will be included in its entirety in the 

record. Let us proceed with Dr. Kagan. 

STATEMENTS OF CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD, ANALYST IN 

MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 

SERVICE; FREDERICK W. KAGAN, PH.D., RESIDENT SCHOLAR, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE; AND LAWRENCE J. 

KORB, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR AMERICAN 

PROGRESS 

STATEMENT OF FREDERICK W. KAGAN 

Mr. KAGAN. Mr. Chairman, members of this Committee, it is an 

honor to be appearing before you speaking about this very important issue that concerns us all. It is a particularly interesting day 

to be holding this hearing. This is the day that General David 

Petraeus relinquished command in Baghdad to General Raymond 

Odierno. And General Petraeus will be heading on to take command of CENTCOM in November, I believe. And this marks the 

end of General Petraeus’ nineteen-month tenure as Commander of 

Multinational Forces in Iraq. And I think it is worth noting not 

only the sacrifices that our men and women in uniform have made, 

but also the remarkable successes that have been achieved in that 

period, beginning with the reversal of the sectarian civil war that 

looked as if it was about to engulf the country completely, the defeat of an Al Qaeda in Iraq organization that was in the process 

of declaring victory, and even rather surprisingly the defeat of Shia 

militias and the Iranian backed special groups this year, primarily 

by the Iraqi government itself and the Iraqi security forces. 

All of these accomplishments were the result of joint efforts between Iraqis and Americans. The Iraqis stood up, fought hard, met 

all of the security benchmarks that were put in front of them, and 

surpassed them. Iraqis have been taking casualties at the rate of 

about three times what American forces have been taking and they 

have been fighting very well. 

43

I am a little bit puzzled by some of the testimony that I have 

heard, or some of the conversation that I have heard previously 

which suggest that no one is making a serious effort to get the 

Iraqis to spend their money. And I find that odd. I have made five 

trips to Iraq since last April and one of the things that has consistently been the case is that not only is the American Embassy in 

Iraq working very hard and very diligently to get the Iraqis to 

spend their money and to help the Iraqis to spend their money, but 

American soldiers on the ground, soldiers and Marines every day, 

are working with the Iraqis to overcome some of the very significant problems that they have as they attempt to spend their 

money. So I would like to take issue with any notion that it has 

not been a priority of multinational forces in Iraq and U.S. Embassy in Iraq to get the Iraqis to spend their money. On the contrary, it has been. 

And I think that as we think about the problems that have prevented the Iraqis from spending their money, one thing that has 

not been mentioned is that we are not just dealing with a country 

that was wracked by sectarian civil war at the end of 2006, although that was not mentioned. It is a little bit odd to talk about 

budget execution figures in 2005, 2006, 2007 without recognizing 

that there was an extremely intense war going on which tends to 

play havoc with anybody’s budget execution processes however well 

conceived they might be when it is an internal war. And now we 

have got that under control and the question will be what does it 

look like going forward? In addition to the brain drain which occurred, and some of the problems with debaathification. We have 

to remember that Iraq was also making the transition from a very 

poorly managed, centralized, command economy that had been 

under sanctions for more than a decade, to a market economy that 

had to rebuild a lot of decrepit infrastructure that had not been invested in properly for a very long time. 

We also have to recognize that in the process of transitioning 

that command economy to a market economy we were helping the 

Iraqis to replace an entirely centralized Baghdad driven budget development and execution process with a process that included decentralized budget development, decentralized budget execution. 

We have had to help Iraqi provincial governments stand up and 

learn what it is to make a budget and learn how to execute funds. 

We have had to help local Iraqi organs understand how to do that. 

And we have had to help them all understand how to link up with 

the traditional ministerial structures, which remain focused on directors general that come from the Iraqi ministries. 

This is all rather difficult to do, and it is not something that can 

happen in a few months. And it is particularly not something that 

can happen in the context of the sort of violence that we saw, 

frankly, through the end of last year and into the beginning of this 

year. It is something that I think we can expect to see accelerating. 

But we have to have realistic expectations about this. And measuring from 2003 on is frankly not very informative. 

We were losing the war from 2003 to 2006, unquestionably. I 

have said it many times. I am not here to defend the administration. I do not speak for anyone but myself. In the context of losing 

the war we did a lot of, made a lot of decisions that were wrong 

44

decisions. Now the question is, we have turned the situation 

around in Iraq on the ground. We have seen very significant 

progress in the Iraqi political system and also in budget execution 

measures and so forth. But we have not seen the complete accomplishment of all our objectives, which is not surprising because the 

war is not over. 

The question is, what do we do? I think everyone agrees that it 

is desirable to have the Iraqis spend their money, and it is much 

more desirable for the Iraqis to be spending their money than for 

us to be spending our money. I do not think anyone disputes that. 

I think the argument that we can have, or the discussion that we 

can have that would be helpful is really to focus on what are the 

problems that actually hinder the Iraqis from doing this? I think 

we need to get past the notion that the Iraqis are lazy freeloaders, 

which has been booted about not in this Committee, which has had 

an intelligent, respectful discussion, but in the press, and recognize 

that there are some actual problems. 

And there are incentives for the Iraqis to spend their own money 

because the Iraqis are going into an election period, whenever 

these elections precisely are going to be held. Within the next year, 

not only are all provincial leaders going to have to be reelected but 

the Parliament will have to be reelected as well. And let me tell 

you, Iraqi politicians are very cognizant of the fact, as American 

congressmen are, that spending in their districts translates into 

electoral success at the end of the day in many respects. And they 

understand that American spending in their districts does not help 

them get elected. So the more we have the transition to a political 

process in Iraq the more we see pressure on Iraq’s elected officials 

to spend their budget, which they have been trying to do. And we 

have been helping with. 

And I think one of the last questioners made the excellent point. 

If we simply pulled all of our stuff out and stopped doing anything 

for the Iraqis would the country collapse? I do not know if it would 

collapse. But I know that it would set back any kind of progress 

in Iraq very, very dramatically. Because the role that we are playing at this point is a guarantor, it is a peacekeeping role, in some 

places a peace enforcement role, and an assistance role in helping 

the Iraqis plan and execute budgets. In other words, we are now 

currently engaged in a process of trying to accomplish the very objectives, asking about which I think this hearing was called for. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Frederick Kagan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FREDERICK W. KAGAN, KIMBERLY KAGAN,

AND JACK KEANE

On September 16, General Raymond Odierno will succeed General David Petraeus 

as commander of U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq. The surge strategy Petraeus and 

Odierno developed and executed in 2007 achieved its objectives: reducing violence 

in Iraq enough to allow political processes to restart, economic development to move 

forward, and reconciliation to begin. Violence has remained at historic lows even 

after the withdrawal of all surge forces and the handover of many areas to Iraqi 

control. Accordingly, President Bush has approved the withdrawal of 8,000 additional troops by February 2009. 

With Barack Obama’s recent declaration that the surge in Iraq has succeeded, it 

should now be possible to move beyond that debate and squarely address the current situation in Iraq and the future. Reductions in violence permitting political 

45

change were the goal of the surge, but they are not the sole measure of success in 

Iraq. 

We must see Iraq through the upcoming two elections, pressing the government 

to conduct them fairly and inclusively as well as ensuring that enemy groups do not 

disrupt them with violence. 

The United States seeks a free, stable, independent Iraq, with a legitimately elected representative government that can govern and defend its territory, is at peace 

with its neighbors, and is an ally of the United States in the war on terror. The 

Iraqi leadership has made important strides toward developing a new and inclusive 

political system that addresses the concerns of all Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian 

groups. But it has also taken steps in the wrong direction. An understandable desire 

to seize on the reduction in violence to justify overly hasty force reductions and premature transfer of authority to Iraqis puts the hard-won gains of 2007 and 2008 

at risk. Thus, the president’s announcement of new troop withdrawals has come before we even know when Iraq’s provincial elections will occur. 

Reducing our troop strength solely on the basis of trends in violence also misses 

the critical point that the mission of American forces in Iraq is shifting rapidly from 

counterinsurgency to peace enforcement. The counter-insurgency fight that characterized 2007 continues mainly in areas of northern Iraq. The ability of organized 

enemy groups, either Sunni or Shia, to conduct large-scale military or terrorist operations and to threaten the existence of the Iraqi government is gone for now. No 

area of Iraq today requires the massive, violent, and dangerous military operations 

that American and Iraqi forces had to conduct over the last 18 months in order to 

pacify various places or restore them to government control. Although enemy networks and organizations have survived and are regrouping, they will likely need 

considerable time to rebuild their capabilities to levels that pose more than a local 

challenge—and intelligent political, economic, military, and police efforts can prevent them from rebuilding at all. 

American troops continue to conduct counterterrorism operations against Al 

Qaeda in Iraq, which has not given up, and against Iranian-backed Special Groups, 

which are also reconstituting. U.S. forces support Iraqi forces conducting 

counterinsurgency operations in the handful of areas where any significant insurgent capability remains. But mostly our troops are enforcing the peace. 

In ethnically mixed areas, American troops are seen as impartial arbiters and mediators. In predominantly Shia or Sunni areas, they are seen as guarantors of continued safety, destroying the justification for illegal militias. American brigades also 

play critical roles in economic reconstruction, not by spending American money but 

by helping Iraqis spend their own money. American staffs help local Iraqi leaders 

develop prioritized lists of their needs, budgets to match those priorities, and plans 

for executing those budgets. American troops support the Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams that mentor Iraqi provincial leaders and help local communities communicate their needs to the central government. American soldiers provide essential 

support to Iraqi soldiers and police working hard to develop their ability to function 

on their own. 

Indeed, American combat brigades have become the principal enablers of economic 

and political development in Iraq. When an American brigade is withdrawn from 

an area, there is nothing to take its place—all of these functions go unperformed. 

Clearly, then, the number of brigades needed in Iraq should be tied not to the level 

of violence but to the roles the Americans perform and the importance of those roles 

to the further development of Iraq as a stable and peaceful state. 

But American brigades do more than that. They also give us leverage at every 

level to restrain malign actors within the Iraqi government and to insist that Iraqi 

leaders make concessions and take political risks they would rather avoid. The notion, popular in some American political discussions, that withdrawing our forces increases our leverage is nonsensical. The presence of 140,000 American troops on the 

ground in Iraq requires the Iraqi leadership to pay attention to America’s suggestions in a way that nothing else can. Every brigade that leaves reduces our leverage 

just when we need it most. 

For all the progress made to date, the next president will face significant challenges in Iraq. In recent testimony, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates enumerated 

them: ‘‘the prospect of violence in the lead-up to elections, worrisome reports about 

sectarian efforts to slow the assimilation of the Sons of Iraq into the Iraqi security 

forces, Iranian influence, the very real threat that al Qaeda continues to pose, and 

the possibility that Jaysh al-Mahdi could return.’’

The existence of malign sectarian actors in the Iraqi parliament and in the prime 

minister’s inner circle is not news. Nor is it news that Iraqi politicians, elected 

under a closed-list system that emphasized ethnosectarian identity at the expense 

of political interest, have weak electoral bases and much reason to fear the results 

46

of open and honest elections. It is similarly well known that Iran seeks to drive the 

United States out of Iraq and has been putting tremendous pressure on Iraq’s leaders to obey Tehran and reject Washington. These three factors help explain the development of significant negative trends in Iraq in recent months: the downward 

spiral of negotiations over the Strategic Framework Agreement, delays in the passage of an electoral law, escalating tensions along the Arab-Kurd border, and Iraqi 

government attacks on certain Sons of Iraq groups in and around Baghdad. 

American errors have contributed to these developments. At the outset of negotiations over the Strategic Framework Agreement, for instance, we should have offered 

Iraq a security guarantee. Iraq’s signing a Strategic Framework Agreement would 

have openly and publicly committed themselves to the United States—and against 

Iran, in the zero-sum thinking of Tehran. It was only reasonable that Maliki and 

others in the Iraqi government should have expected an American commitment to 

match their own, and we should have given it to them. But American domestic politics made that impossible. 

Leading congressmen and senators insisted that a security guarantee would raise 

the Strategic Framework Agreement to the level of a treaty requiring Senate ratification—which is true. They also made clear that no such ratification would be forthcoming if the document bound the next administration. The Bush administration 

therefore had to tell Baghdad at the outset that America would not match the commitment we were asking the Iraqis to make with an equal commitment of our own. 

American domestic politics also prevented the administration from placing the security agreement in the larger context of a U.S.-Iraqi strategic partnership, since that 

concept was ridiculed by those who refused to accept the possibility of success in 

Iraq. 

The Iranians sensed an opportunity and responded with a massive public information campaign in Iraq and a virulent private campaign to put pressure on Iraq’s 

leaders. America’s refusal to offer a long-term security guarantee gave weight to the 

constant Iranian refrain that Iran will always be there, while America will ultimately leave Iraq to its fate. Shrewdly refusing to admit the degree of direct Iranian 

pressure, Maliki and his associates used the cloak of ‘‘Iraqi sovereignty’’ to conceal 

their uneasiness at taking responsibility for making a deal with the United States—

uneasiness not before their own people, but before Tehran. As a result, the negotiations have dragged on, Iraqi demands have increased, and it is possible that Maliki 

will now wait until after the American election to see who wins—all because domestic political constraints prevented the Bush administration from making the necessary opening bid. 

Maliki has been using ‘‘Iraqi sovereignty’’ to do more than delay those negotiations, however. He has also used it to insist on the accelerated transfer of Iraq’s 

cities, especially Baghdad, to Iraqi control and the withdrawal of American forces 

from those cities. As a result, the problems that premature transition can cause are 

on display in the city of Baquba, the capital of Diyala Province northeast of Baghdad. 

Diyala has always been one of the most challenging provinces in Iraq because of 

its swirling mix of Kurds with Sunni and Shia Arabs and its proximity to Baghdad. 

It served in the past as a staging area for Shia militias and al Qaeda terrorists 

launching attacks in Baghdad. It was pacified in 2007 with a great deal of hard 

fighting that resulted in the defeat of illegal Shia militias and the capitulation of 

the local Sunni insurgent groups, many of whom joined the Sons of Iraq, volunteer 

security forces organized and initially paid by the United States. More remained to 

be done in Diyala as the surge ended, however. Surge operations had cleared 

Baquba and areas further east, but not the rim of the province from Khanaqin along 

the Iranian border and then through Balad Ruz toward Baghdad. The end of the 

surge meant the withdrawal of significant American forces from Diyala, so U.S. 

troops largely turned responsibility for the city of Baquba over to the Iraqis and 

moved out to clear the peripheral areas of the province. 

Rumors began circulating that the Iraqi government believed it would have to reclear Baquba, even though violence remained low and American leaders did not 

agree. In August 2008, the Iraqi security forces, with limited support from American 

troops, did re-clear the city—but their targets were primarily leaders in the Sons 

of Iraq movement and members of the local government and community that had 

supported them. This action—which could not have taken place if American forces 

had continued to patrol the city—was part of a larger effort by Maliki to weaken 

the urban Sons of Iraq. It appears that the current Iraqi leadership has recognized 

that it must allow the Sunni tribal movements, particularly in Anbar, to organize 

and gain power in their own communities, but it sees the urban Sons of Iraq movements as political threats to its power. 

47

The return of the Sunni Iraq Islamic party (IIP) to the government appears to 

have created an unholy alliance between Maliki and IIP leader (and Iraqi vice president) Tariq al-Hashimi aimed at weakening grassroots Sunni political movements 

in and around Baghdad and ensuring that the unpopular and unrepresentative IIP 

continues to wield power after provincial elections. A similar alliance is operating 

in Ninewa Province, where Kurdish leaders appear to have joined with the IIP to 

ensure that they will continue to have influence in the largely Arab province when 

provincial elections eliminate the current disproportionate Kurdish sway in the provincial government. This Kurdish-IIP alliance helps explain why there are virtually 

no Sons of Iraq in Ninewa. The extremely limited American presence in Ninewa, 

as in Baquba, has enabled these developments, which may call into question the legitimacy of the upcoming provincial elections in some areas. 

Maliki’s actions may reflect the continued powerful influence of malign sectarian 

actors among his advisers, or it may reflect the determination of a temporarily 

strong political leader confronting elections that are likely to weaken his base. The 

specter of Iranian power combines with the enormous question mark hanging over 

the future of American support to make Maliki look to his own resources to stabilize 

his position. Again, contrary to conventional wisdom, the threat of American withdrawal and America’s refusal to guarantee the security of Iraq and its constitutional 

processes presses Iraq’s leaders to make bad decisions, not good ones. 

Whatever Maliki’s motivations, however, the bottom line is clear. Although a dramatic increase in violence or the rebirth of a large-scale Sunni insurgency in the 

next six months is unlikely, it is possible that American policies are combining with 

Iraqi mistakes to undermine the long-term prospects for success. These trends can 

be reversed, with care, over the coming months if the United States can summon 

some strategic patience. 

There is no question that we should be able to start withdrawing significant numbers of American forces from Iraq in 2009 and accelerating our withdrawal in 2010. 

Assuming that Iraqi provincial elections in 2008 or early 2009, and parliamentary 

elections in 2009 or 2010, are accepted as legitimate by the Iraqi people and the 

international community, it is also highly likely that we can continue to withdraw 

from Iraq’s cities, including Baghdad, and move from a patrolling role to an advisory 

and support role in the same period. But the timing of force reductions and withdrawals from urban areas is critical, and the current pace is too fast. 

It appears from media reports that General Petraeus initially proposed no reduction in the number of U.S. brigades below the pre-surge levels, and that was certainly the right recommendation. Current force levels may, in fact, already be too 

low. At all events, we must see Iraq through the upcoming two elections, pressing 

the government to conduct them fairly and inclusively as well as ensuring that 

enemy groups do not disrupt them with violence. Doing so requires a significant 

American presence on the ground in Iraq’s population centers, where, in addition 

to all the other key non-combat roles they play, American soldiers are the canaries 

in the mine shaft. They know before anyone else when Iraqi leaders at any level 

are starting to play games that can undermine mission success. 

We should therefore not withdraw any brigades from Iraq before the provincial 

elections have occurred and the results have been certified and accepted. We should 

not accept timelines for the departure of American troops from Iraq’s cities, particularly Baghdad, before the parliamentary elections of 2009. We should continually 

press the Iraqi government not simply to pay the Sons of Iraq (as it has announced 

it will do beginning in October), but to bring most of them into the political process. 

Some of the Sons of Iraq were leaders of the insurgency and should have no place 

in Iraqi politics, but in its Baquba operation, the Iraqi government was not sufficiently discriminating in whom it sought to exclude (much less detain). We must 

also support the Iraqi government in its efforts to push Kurdish militias out of 

Diyala and Ninewa provinces. 

This is not a matter of Iraqi sovereignty. American troops will not stay anywhere 

in Iraq if ordered by the Iraqi government to leave. We are not going to depose 

Maliki or retake control of Baghdad. We are not going to force the Iraqis to do anything. And, above all, we are not going to maintain a large military presence in Iraq 

indefinitely. But we are engaged in continual negotiations with the Iraqi government about what our forces will do and what Iraqi forces will do, and we have tremendous leverage in those negotiations. 

For too long, we have allowed domestic American political considerations to reduce our leverage and weaken our bargaining position, and we have refused to recognize the critical role the presence of our combat forces plays in keeping us in the 

game at all. When America provides combat forces to maintain internal or external 

security in a foreign state, it acquires the right to bargain hard for what it thinks 

is best for the common interest, even when the host state’s government does not 

48

agree. We have engaged in such hard bargaining in South Korea and in Europe, 

and it is a normal part of alliance relationships. We must bargain harder in Iraq 

and give ourselves the tools and leverage we need to succeed. 

Above all, we must recognize that there is never a glide path in war. As long as 

the outcome remains in doubt, we must never imagine that the situation is under 

control and we can put it on autopilot and ignore it. The relief of getting Iraqi violence under control and American casualties down turns naturally into a desire to 

declare victory and withdraw. That is a danger to be avoided at all costs. This administration must ensure that it hands its successor not only a relatively peaceful 

Iraq, but an Iraq that is headed in the right direction.

STATEMENT OF LAWRENCE J. KORB 

Chairman SPRATT. Thank you, Mr. Kagan. Mr. Korb? 

Mr. KORB. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPRATT. Thank you. 

Mr. KORB. It is a privilege to be here with you today. I think in 

terms of looking at the surplus you have to put it in the context 

of the horrendous costs of this war. As has been pointed out several 

times already, we were told that the Iraqis would pay for their own 

reconstruction, this war would be quick and easy, and would not 

cost the taxpayer very much. And I think had we known then what 

the costs would be we never would have gone to war. It is clear basically from the opinion polls of the American people. 

And there is no doubt about the fact that violence today is lower 

than the horrendous levels that it reached in June 2007. However, 

remember the purpose of our military operations there are to bring 

about political reconciliation. And if you take a close look at it you 

will find that the Iraqis are still not making the tough choices that 

they need to bring about meaningful reconciliation. And I think the 

budget is one of those areas where they are not doing what they 

need to do. They are generating the revenues but they are really 

not executing them. And as I think has been pointed out here, until 

they do that the Maliki government is not going to get the support 

from its own people. So it is not only in our interest that we relieve 

the burden on the U.S. taxpayer but I think it is also in the interests of the Iraqi government. 

Now if you take a look at the trends they are not helpful. The 

revenues are up, there is no doubt about it. But the percentage 

each year that they spend is down. If you take a look at where they 

spend the money, the percentage spent on investment is down. In 

other words, they are spending much more on overhead than actually improving the lives of the Iraqi people. 

Now we talked a lot about the capacity of the government. There 

is no doubt about the fact that the debaathification policy undermined the capacity of the Iraqis to actually perform effectively in 

government. But the fact of the matter is, you have had a 

debaathification law. And while I have not seen the classified report, just from the open reports in the press it is clear there are 

less Baathists back in the government now than there were before 

the debaathification law was passed. Similarly, there is an awful 

lot of corruption. In fact, if you, they rank countries according to 

corruption and Iraq, there is only two countries more corrupt than 

Iraq according to the rankings, Myanmar and Somalia. We also 

know that a lot of the money in the Iraqi government is ending up 

in the hands of insurgents, people who do not wish us well or the 

Iraqi people. 

49

So the question becomes basically what do we do about it? And 

let me make a couple of recommendations. The first, and it has 

been alluded to here but I do not think it has been focused on 

enough, we need to provide a soft landing for the Sunni militias. 

Remember that in the fall of 2006, as General Allen the commander of the Marines in Anbar Province and now General McFarland said, once the Iraqis saw what was happening in this country, 

particularly with the election, the Sunnis in Anbar Province began 

to come over to us. And there we made a big mistake. Why were 

we paying them? Why did the Iraqi government not pay them 

then? We have now come 1 October the Iraqi government is taking 

over that, and I think that is a good thing. 

But if you take a look at some of the things that the Maliki government is doing in terms of integrating them into the security 

forces, giving them government jobs, or actually turning on them. 

Because, remember, we could have had this deal as early as 2005. 

But the National Security Council turned it down because these insurgents would not pledge loyalty to the Iraqi government. And 

there are press reports that the Maliki government is going after 

some of these people who have been working with us. 

Second, we have got to fully implement debaathification. Again, 

as of June 2008 the government of Iraq has not yet appointed 

members to the committee slated to replace the old 

debaathification apparatus. And the current committee has received conflicting instructions from the Iraqi government about 

whether to proceed with the reinstatement petitions. We have got 

to make this happen. 

Number three, we have got to pursue anticorruption within the 

Iraqi government. The Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction, appointed by President Bush, calls corruption the second 

insurgency. And you have got to be able to deal with that. 

There is a joint task force on capacity development that was set 

up to correct these shortfalls. However, the Inspector General 

found that it has, and I quote, ‘‘limited authority to coordinate the 

various activities and to establish an overall capacity development 

agenda. 

And then finally, we have got to set a timetable to get out. Until 

you do, the Iraqi government is not going to seriously do what they 

need to do. We are asking them to do difficult things. And they 

keep kicking the can down the road. They will say one thing, but 

then when you look at the fine print things do not get carried out. 

And I am absolutely convinced that until you do that they are not 

going to do, whether it is spend their budget on investment, or 

meet all of the other benchmarks that the administration has laid 

down, until you give them a timetable to get out. 

Now in conclusion let me say that this budget problem is a symptom of a much larger problem with the way the war was justified 

and conducted. And although we cannot undo the damage to our 

national security, our reputation in the world, and the sacrifices of 

our military men and women and their families, and the cost to the 

American taxpayer, we can take a small step by demanding that 

the Maliki government begin now to pay for its own reconstruction 

and stabilization. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Lawrence Korb follows:]

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STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER BLANCHARD 

Chairman SPRATT. Dr. Korb, thank you very much. Mr. Blanchard? 

Mr. BLANCHARD. Thank you, Chairman Spratt, Ranking Member 

Ryan, and members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me 

to testify before you today on Iraq’s budget surplus. My name is 

Christopher Blanchard. I am an analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs 

with the Congressional Research Service. In the time allotted I 

would like to summarize the main points from my written testimony by discussing four factors that may affect the Iraqi oil sector’s ability to fund Iraq’s reconstruction. Those factors are security, Iraqi politics, market conditions, and revenue management. 


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The U.S. Department of the Treasury and the International Monetary Fund have expressed confidence that Iraq’s oil revenues are 

likely to be sufficient to meet the country’s development needs if 

underlying conditions remain favorable for the expansion of oil production and if Iraqis manage their oil revenues effectively. The prevailing level of security in Iraq has a direct effect on oil production 

and exports. Infrastructure attacks and persistent violence have 

hindered efforts to develop the oil sector since 2003. In turn, corruption in the oil sector has helped fund insurgent violence and 

criminal activity. U.S. and Iraqi investments in infrastructure security have contributed to increased oil exports over the last year. 

In turn, the improvement in the overall level of security in the 

country has reduced some threats to oil output. 

Looking forward, U.S. military leaders have made clear statements about the potential reversibility of recent security gains. The 

establishment of an overall level of security in the country that 

could allow U.S. forces to draw down may still leave the Iraqi government with internal security challenges that could complicate oil 

operations. 

Since 2003 Iraqis have struggled to reach political consensus 

about decision making powers in the energy sector and the terms 

of a national energy policy. This includes debates over revenues 

sharing, and the degree and terms of potential foreign participation 

in oil development. To date, Iraq’s Council of Representatives has 

not taken up draft energy framework legislation because of continuing disagreement between the national government and the 

Kurdistan regional government over their respective decision making powers. Parallel disputes over the status of the City of Kirkuk, 

its large Kurdish population, and nearby oil resources further complicate these matters. Nevertheless, both the National Ministry of 

Oil and the Kurdistan Regional Government have moved forward 

with oil and natural gas development by signing service and production contracts with several foreign companies. The Ministry of 

Oil is now planning to conduct an international bidding round, the 

development of six major oil fields, with contract awards expected 

some time in 2009. 

Fluid global market conditions will ultimately determine the demand for Iraq’s energy exports, the revenue potential of those exports, and the availability of investment capital. An IMF report released yesterday referred to by Mr. Christoff earlier highlighted the 

‘‘fiscal opportunity’’ that higher global oil prices have granted Iraq 

in 2008. The report, however, builds on the IMF’s January 2008 

warning that the Iraqi government has ‘‘little room for fiscal slippage’’ until its oil output increases. Recent declines in global oil 

prices, if sustained with steady exports, will likely lower Iraq’s 

2008 surplus revenue projections. 

According to U.S. and international auditors, as we have heard, 

the Iraqi government has proven unable to spend budgeted funds 

effectively, to maintain current or planned investment programs. 

According to observers, the factors that have prevented effective 

Iraqi spending thus far may continue to hinder reconstruction if 

left unaddressed. Midway through the so called year of transition, 

the U.S. Department of Defense warned in a June 2008 report to 

Congress that the Iraqi government ‘‘lacks the ability to execute 

61

programs on the scale required.’’ Administration officials recently 

created a public financial management assistance group to better 

coordinate interagency budget assistance programs in Iraq. The 

Iraqi government also has amended its contracting procedures to 

facilitate spending at all levels of government. However, officials 

report that much remains to be done. And Iraqi willingness to continue to accept U.S. advice and assistance on revenue management 

and in other areas may prove limited. 

In Congress legislative proposals pending in both houses reflect 

the broad sentiment that seeks to require the Iraqi government to 

pay more of its own reconstruction and security costs. As the confidence of the Iraqi government increases and nationalist sentiment 

among some Iraqis grows more vocal, contract bases assistance 

from U.S. or other international partners may emerge as a politically viable solution to Iraq’s administrative and reconstruction 

challenges. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to present this testimony. 

I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Christopher Blanchard follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD, ANALYST IN

MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

Iraq holds the world’s third-largest proven oil reserves, and revenues from the 

sale of oil resources are the engine of Iraq’s national economy and the lifeblood of 

its national budget. Iraq’s state-owned oil production and marketing system ensures 

that revenue from the export and sale of Iraqi oil accrues to the Iraqi government, 

and the Iraqi people’s elected representatives are now responsible for administering 

that revenue to meet the country’s considerable development needs. Iraq’s energy 

resources and potential export revenues offer the country an undeniable opportunity 

for economic growth, if conditions prevail that allow those resources to be developed 

efficiently and if Iraqi leaders manage export revenues effectively. This statement 

analyzes the recent U.S. policy debate over Iraq’s current budget surplus, reviews 

relevant recent developments in Iraq’s oil and natural gas sector, and discusses factors that may affect the oil sector’s ability to continue to serve as an engine of economic growth and public revenue for Iraqis. 

CURRENT REVENUE ARRANGEMENTS

Iraq’s State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO) is responsible for the sale and 

export of Iraqi crude oil. Under the terms of United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 1483 (and renewed through subsequent Security Council resolutions), 

revenue from Iraq’s oil exports is deposited into an Iraq-controlled account at the 

Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY). Five percent of the funds are reserved 

for a United Nations Compensation Fund for reparations to the victims of the 1990 

Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The remaining 95% is deposited into the 

Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) account at the FRBNY and is then transferred 

to an Iraqi Ministry of Finance account at the Central Bank of Iraq for further distribution to Iraqi government ministries. 

Under the terms of UNSCR1546 (and renewed by subsequent resolutions), the 

DFI is monitored by an International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB), which 

provides periodic reports on Iraq’s oil export revenue, Iraq’s use of its oil revenues, 

and its oil production practices. According to the IAMB, as of December 31, 2007, 

$23.43 billion had been disbursed from the United Nations Compensation Fund; 

Iraq owes $28.95 billion to the Fund. The IAMB estimates that ‘‘at the present rate 

of Iraqi oil sales, it would take approximately 17 years for the compensation award 

to be fully paid.’’ 1 As of June 2008, the balance in the DFI was approximately $17 

billion. 

UNSCR 1790 of December 18, 2007, extended the IAMB monitoring of the DFI 

until December 31, 2008. In October 2006, the Iraqi cabinet approved the creation 

of an oversight body known as the Committee of Financial Experts (COFE) to monitor oil revenue collection and administration. The president of the COFE inaugurated its activities in April 2007, and the committee currently is working alongside 

the IAMB on audit procedures. When the mandate of the IAMB expires in DecemVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:28 Dec 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 J:\DOCS\HEARINGS\110TH\110-40\44426.TXT HBUD1 PsN: DICK
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ber, the COFE will assume its duties. Immunity provisions contained in standing 

UN Security Council resolutions prevent Iraqi funds deposited in the DFI from 

being subject to property attachment motions in lieu of legal judgments rendered 

against the former Iraqi regime. Many observers expect those immunity provisions 

to be renewed in a new UN resolution, and the IAMB has encouraged the Iraqi government to pursue continued immunity protection. 

IRAQ’S BUDGET SURPLUS: SOURCES AND MANAGEMENT

Revenue projections for governments that rely on oil exports are based on variables such as price and export volume, which may be subject to significant or rapid 

changes in domestic or global market conditions. Iraq’s recent surpluses have accumulated based in large part on rapid increases in oil prices over the last year and 

higher levels of oil production and exports attributable to improved security. The 

August 2008 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on Iraq’s budget surplus illustrates these relationships by laying out several revenue projections for 

Iraq’s potential 2008 surplus based on variable price and export levels.2

At present, Iraq’s steady oil export levels and a relative decline in world oil prices 

from recent highs have moved revenue projections closer to the more pessimistic assumptions outlined in the GAO report: The GAO’s lower estimate for Iraq’s 2008 

budget surplus assumed Iraq would export an average of 1.89 million barrels per 

day and that the average price received would be $96.88 per barrel. As of September 

10, 2008, the U.S. State Department reported that Iraq’s Basra Light Crude was 

priced at $100.15 per barrel and that Iraq was exporting 1.93 million barrels of oil 

per day. Coupled with Iraq’s recently adopted Supplemental Budget of $22 billion, 

these market trends suggest that Iraq’s 2008 budget surplus may remain well below 

the upper limit projected in the August 2008 GAO report, pending the result of expenditures through the rest of 2008.

TABLE 1.—IRAQ: KEY OIL INDICATORS 

Oil Production (current weekly avg.) Oil Production 

(pre-2003) 

Oil Exports 

(current) 

Oil Exports 

(pre-2003) 

Oil Revenue 

(2006) 

Oil Revenue 

(2007) 

Oil Revenue 

(2008, to 

date) 

2.48 million barrels per day 

(mbd) ....................................... 2.5 mbd 1.93 mbd 2.2 mbd $31.3 billion $41 billion $50.5 billion 

Note: Figures in the table from the U.S. Department of State ‘‘Iraq Weekly Status Report,’’ September 10, 2008. ’Oil Revenue’ is net of a 5% deduction for reparations to the victims of the 1990 Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait, as provided for in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483. 

The U.S. Department of the Treasury and the International Monetary Fund have 

expressed confidence that, over time, Iraq’s oil revenues are likely to be sufficient 

to meet the country’s development needs, if underlying conditions remain favorable 

for the expansion of oil production and if revenues are managed effectively. However, the IMF warned in a January 2008 report that Iraq’s public finances have 

been ‘‘fragile’’ in recent years and added that, in light of considerable operations and 

reconstruction needs, the Iraqi government has ‘‘little room for fiscal slippage’’ until 

oil output increases. The IMF report explains how higher oil prices have compensated for missed oil production expansion targets that undermined revenue generation and how these factors otherwise would have ‘‘depleted’’ the $9.9 billion balance in the Development Fund for Iraq ‘‘by the end of 2007.’’ 3

While reports about Iraq’s current and projected budget surplus have raised questions in Congress about the relative overall size of Iraqi and U.S. expenditures, 

shortcomings in Iraqi revenue management practices and capabilities also have contributed to the accumulation of surpluses. According to U.S., Iraqi, and international 

observers, these shortcomings have prevented capital investment budgets from 

being spent effectively thus far and may continue to hinder reconstruction progress 

if left unaddressed. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) June 2008 Measuring 

Security and Stability in Iraq report noted ‘‘marginal improvement’’ in the Government of Iraq’s ability to spend its resources, although the report concluded that 

‘‘budget execution rates continue to be relatively low, limiting Iraq’s ability to increase economic development and deliver essential services to its citizens.’’ 4 Among 

the ‘‘considerable challenges’’ facing efforts to improve the performance of Iraq’s 

ministries identified in the report were ‘‘cumbersome budgetary approval and complex funding processes’’, limited experience among available staff, and the ‘‘limited 

availability of resident contractors.’’

The U.S. State Department made similar assessments in July 2008. According to 

the Department’s latest Section 2207 Report on Iraq Relief and Reconstruction, imVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:28 Dec 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 J:\DOCS\HEARINGS\110TH\110-40\44426.TXT HBUD1 PsN: DICK
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pediments to effective budgetary expenditure in Iraq ‘‘persist at all levels.’’ 5 The report concluded that ‘‘continued assistance is needed to address impediments to capital budget execution.’’ 6 The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

(SIGIR) reported in July 2008 that U.S. funded ministerial capacity development 

programs had been hindered by ‘‘weak coordination’’ among multiple agencies that 

‘‘tended to implement their own programs with little prioritization of projects or coordinated planning.’’ The SIGIR concluded that U.S. investments in capacity building are ‘‘at risk’’ unless more integrated programming is implemented.7

In light of these assessments, both the U.S. and Iraqi governments have undertaken initiatives in recent months to improve public financial management and the 

coordination of U.S. assistance programs. Iraq has issued new decrees and reformed 

administrative bodies to grant greater contracting authority to ministries and provinces.8 Iraq’s 2008 Budget Law allows provinces and government agencies to carry 

over their unused budget authority into the current fiscal year. The U.S. Embassy 

in Baghdad and the commanders of Multi-National Forces-Iraq also have reorganized the management of existing U.S and coalition budget assistance programs to 

improve coordination. 

In late June 2008, the interagency Public Finance Management Assistance Group 

(PFMAG) began its work. The PFMAG’s civilian-military Policy and Operations 

Committees now direct the activities of paired teams of Action Officers and Treasury Technical Assistance Advisors who work alongside Iraqis, collecting and analyzing data and helping to re-engineer and expedite payments and other budgetary 

processes.9 These activities build on existing programs such as USAID’s National 

Capacity Development Program (more commonly known by the name Tatweer, the 

Arabic word for development), the U.S. Embassy Iraq Transition Assistance Office 

(ITAO) Ministerial Capacity Development Program, and the work of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) Embedded Advisory and Functional Capability Teams. Coalition partners, such as the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), participate in PFMAG decision-making, and U.S. officials report that expanded PFMAG coordination with international 

bodies such as the IMF and World Bank is planned. 

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ’S OIL SECTOR

The concept of federalism has been incorporated into Iraq’s constitution and law, 

and Iraqi attitudes toward the oil sector often correspond with regional differences 

of opinion about the proper role and power of the national government and regional 

and governorate authorities to make oil policy and revenue decisions. However, the 

constitution’s ambiguity about the roles and powers of federal, regional, and 

governorate authorities has contributed significantly to the ongoing impasse over 

these issues. Articles 111 and 112 of the Iraqi constitution state that Iraq’s natural 

resources are the property of ‘‘all the people of Iraq in all regions and governorates,’’ 

and that ‘‘the federal government, with the producing governorates and regional 

governments, shall undertake the management of oil and gas extracted from present 

fields (italics added).’’ These provisions were included as a means of ensuring consensus among Iraqis and the adoption of the constitution. 

Further complicating matters are Article 115, which provides regional authorities 

the power to override federal law in the event of conflicts with regional legislation, 

and Article 110, which grants powers to Iraq’s federal government to formulate ‘‘foreign sovereign economic and trade policy’’ and regulate ‘‘commercial policy across regional and governorate boundaries’’ similar to those granted to the United States 

Congress by the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, Iraq’s Constitutional Review Commission ‘‘continues to review 

almost 50 amendments addressing the authority of the federal government and 

governorates,’’ including provisions addressing ‘‘the extent of governorate powers 

under Article 115’’ and the ‘‘status and management of oil and gas.’’ 10

To date, draft legislation to establish a new framework for the development of 

Iraq’s hydrocarbon sector has not been placed on the parliament’s legislative calendar because of continuing political differences between the national government 

and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) over their relative powers and other 

constitutional issues, such as the administrative status of the city of Kirkuk. KRG 

Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki met 

in April and June 2008 to negotiate terms for moving forward on the draft hydrocarbon laws, Kirkuk, and other outstanding issues. According to Barzani, a political 

committee has been formed to continue negotiations on the framework legislation.11

The June 2008 Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq report states that the 

Chairman of the Iraqi Council of Representatives Oil and Gas Committee does not 

plan to proceed with a first reading of the draft legislation until the federal governVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:28 Dec 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 J:\DOCS\HEARINGS\110TH\110-40\44426.TXT HBUD1 PsN: DICK
64

ment and the KRG reach a political agreement on the hydrocarbon sector.12 The 

previous report in March 2008 observed that the Iraqi government ‘‘continues to distribute oil revenues equitably to the provinces in the absence of this comprehensive 

legislation.’’ 13

Iraqi, U.S., and other international observers have expressed concern that the potential for renewed violence and the atmosphere of unresolved political tension prevailing in Iraq may not be conducive to careful consideration of hydrocarbon sector 

legislation or to inclusive decision making about long-term oil development contracts. Nevertheless, in the absence of new oil legislation and regulation, the Ministry of Oil and the KRG have moved forward with hydrocarbon sector investment 

and development. New national and KRG contracts have contributed to the persistence of an atmosphere of political controversy surrounding the hydrocarbon sector. 

In turn, several international companies have chosen to pursue investment opportunities is Iraq in an uncertain legal environment. This includes China’s National Petroleum Corporation, which recently modified a Saddam-era production contract into 

a 20-year service contract to improve production in southern Iraq’s Al Ahdab oilfield. Similarly, Shell has launched negotiations to develop systems for capturing 

and marketing associated natural gas in Iraq’s southern oilfields; the gas currently 

is being wasted at a cost estimated by the Iraqi government to be $40 million per 

day.14 The KRG has signed over twenty production sharing agreements with international oil companies, but the limited amount of oil currently being produced in 

KRG territory is not exported. 

Overall, the Ministry of Oil has set a goal of nearly doubling current oil production to 4.5 million barrels per day within 5 years, and expanding production thereafter to 6 million barrels per day within 10 years. To reach these goals, the Ministry 

of Oil is moving forward with plans to conduct an international bidding round for 

the development of six major oil fields, with contract awards expected some time 

in 2009. A pre-qualification round held in early 2008 attracted strong interest from 

U.S. and international bidders: 41 firms were qualified, including six unnamed 

state-owned firms.15 However, the recent collapse and cancellation of an interim 

process to award short-term service contracts for production expansion demonstrates 

the difficulty Iraq’s government and international bidders may have in reaching mutually agreed contract terms and gaining public support in the absence of new legislation and political consensus. 

FACTORS AFFECTING IRAQ’S OIL REVENUE POTENTIAL

As Iraq and the United States look to the future, four key factors may affect the 

Iraqi oil sector’s ability to continue to provide adequate financial resources to the 

Iraqi people. The first and most fundamental of these factors is the security of the 

country. General insecurity and infrastructure attacks have hindered efforts to rehabilitate and develop Iraq’s oil sector since 2003. Oil sector corruption also has contributed to the insecurity of the country, according to U.S. officials. For example, 

according to DoD, until mid-2007, corruption and siphoning at the refinery at Bayji 

resulted in ‘‘as much as 70% of the fuel processed’’ being sold on the black market 

at a value of up to $2 billion a year.16 U.S. military leaders have made clear statements about the potential reversibility of the recent security gains that have enabled oil output to increase since 2007. During that time, U.S. and Iraqi investments in infrastructure security for oil production facilities and pipelines have contributed to increased export levels, and U.S. and Iraqi officials are expanding existing projects to extend these gains. 

Second, Iraqis face the challenge of coming to a greater degree of political consensus about the powers and responsibilities of various levels of government in determining national energy policy and about various issues related to energy development. This includes reaching agreements about the degree and terms of foreign participation and models for revenue sharing. In late 2007, the KRG finalized its own 

regional oil and gas investment law and signed new production sharing agreements 

with several international companies, including U.S.-based Hunt Oil.17 Some analysts believe that the Kurdish moves signal the KRG’s intention to begin large scale 

oil development activities regardless of progress on federal legislation. The KRG has 

stated its opposition to proposals to require federal approval of its existing or future 

contracts, but notes that it is committed to revenue sharing as defined in the constitution and the draft revenue sharing law. As noted above, these issues remain 

the subject of ongoing negotiation. 

In September 2007 a State Department spokesman stated the Administration’s 

view that the KRG deals ‘‘elevate tensions between the Kurdish regional government and the Government of Iraq,’’ and ‘‘aren’t particularly helpful’’ to the extent 

that they hinder consideration of a national oil law.18

65

Iraqi government officials from other parties have reacted negatively to the impasse and the KRG’s recent activities. On September 8, 2007, Iraqi Oil Minister 

Hussein al Shahristani stated that the national government considers contracts 

signed by the KRG to have ‘‘no standing’’.19

Tensions appeared to escalate further after Minister Al Shahristani warned international oil companies that the national government would not allow the export of 

oil produced under KRG contracts.20 The KRG responded by accusing Minister Al 

Shahristani of mismanaging the Oil Ministry budget and restated its opinion that 

its contracts were both constitutional and legal.21 In November 2007, 60 Iraqi oil 

sector leaders wrote to the Council of Representatives to state that the KRG’s unilateral signing of contracts constituted a ‘‘deliberate and dangerous action’’ and had 

no ‘‘legal or political standing whatsoever.’’ 22 At least 120 members of the Council 

of Representatives from a wide range of political parties endorsed a January 2008 

joint statement underscoring their opposition to the KRG contracts.23 The Ministry 

of Oil has since refined its position slightly to emphasize its opposition to contracts 

signed by the KRG after February 2007. Contracts signed before February 2007 

with firms currently producing oil for domestic consumption would be considered 

valid after review and potential amendments. 

Third, fluid global market conditions ultimately determine the demand for Iraq’s 

energy resources, the revenue potential of those resources, and the availability of 

domestic and external investment capital. As noted earlier, recent declines in global 

oil prices have lowered this year’s surplus revenue projections for Iraq. However, the 

abundance of energy resources in Iraq and their relative ease of production will likely sustain the attractiveness of Iraq’s oil sector to international investors over the 

long-term. The U.S. Embassy’s Iraqi Transition Assistance Office estimated in 2007 

that Iraq’s oil sector could require $100 billion in investment to meet the Iraqi government’s production goals. 

In light of Iraq’s transition from conflict and in light of strong economic growth 

in the more stable countries of the Persian Gulf region, Iraq may struggle relative 

to its neighbors in attracting international investment and expertise to assist in its 

non-energy related reconstruction. DoD has reported that projects for critical ministries require ‘‘multi-year, large-scale strategic infrastructure upgrades’’ that may 

require the involvement of international firms; those firms could remain reluctant 

to engage in Iraq.24

Lastly, Iraqi leaders are working to address what the U.S. government and international auditors have described as significant weaknesses in Iraq’s current public 

financial management practices. The United States has financial advisory programs 

in place for many of Iraq’s key ministries, including with civilian leaders of security 

ministries. However, these programs remain limited in scope and funding in spite 

of their recently reorganized coordination. From Iraq’s perspective, the availability 

of significant oil revenues is fortunate in light of the country’s remaining development needs. In addition to planned physical infrastructure investments, investment 

in human capital and management assistance may prove equally important. 

OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

As Iraqi officials and their coalition partners preside over the latter half of the 

so-called ‘‘Year of Transition in Iraq’’, U.S. spending on large-scale reconstruction 

projects is coming to a close: the State Department reports that the funds available 

in the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund have been almost entirely obligated or 

expended as of early September 2008. 

Pending legislative proposals in both houses of Congress reflect broad and growing sentiment that seeks to require the Iraqi government to pay more of the cost 

of reconstituting Iraq’s security forces and providing for reconstruction needs. Proposed defense authorization language in both houses would reduce authorized 

spending from the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF) relative to the Administration’s 

request ($2 billion) and last year’s bridge fund ($1.5 billion).25 The Appropriation 

Committees require ‘‘equal cost-sharing’’ for all reconstruction projects above 

$750,000 in report language as well as prohibiting the use of these funds for salaries 

for Iraqi military personnel.26 Senate authorizers would prohibit using ISFF monies 

for ‘‘large-scale’’ infrastructure above $2 million; House authorizers would prohibit 

the use of ISFF funds for any facilities construction and argue that ‘‘the Iraqi Government is well able to afford to finance its own infrastructure needs at this 

point.’’ 27

As noted above, U.S. and international auditors have not expressed doubt about 

the Iraqi government’s ability to afford taking on more of the costs of its reconstruction and security sector development, if oil production expands and export conditions 

remain favorable. Those auditors and observers have expressed significant doubts 

66

about the Iraqi government’s current ability to expend available funds at a sufficient 

rate or level of efficiency to maintain the complex, long-term, and large-scale programs required. By most public accounts, Iraqis in many areas of the country remain somewhat dissatisfied with the scope and pace of ongoing reconstruction programs, particularly with regard to the delivery of essential services such electricity 

and water. Midway through the ‘‘Year of Transition’’, DoD warned that: 

‘‘Future progress in essential services could be at risk since the U.S. will transition large-scale infrastructure projects to the Iraqis to fund and execute. While the 

Government of Iraq acknowledges it has the revenues to support these projects, 

budget and program execution rates indicate that the Government lacks the ability 

to execute programs on the scale required.’’ 28

As such, Members of Congress concerned about relative scope and effectiveness 

Iraqi contributions to reconstruction and security goals may wish to consider options 

to encourage or enable the Iraqi government to improve its public financial management capabilities. As described above, Administration officials have already taken 

steps to improve the coordination and performance of U.S. financial management assistance programs in Iraq by creating the interagency Public Financial Management 

Assistance Group (PFMAG). Congress can influence the operations of the PFMAG 

and its constituent programs through consideration of pending appropriations and 

authorization legislation or through the exercise of targeted oversight and evaluation. 

Existing U.S. programs to improve the performance and capabilities of the security forces of allied governments in the Middle East also offer potential models for 

the structuring future of the U.S. assistance and advisory relationships with Iraq. 

Significant U.S. foreign assistance programs for Israel and Egypt are funded 

through annual appropriations of Foreign Military Financing, Economic Support 

Fund, and other assistance, and the annual appropriations process offers opportunities for Members of Congress to evaluate progress toward stated bilateral goals and 

respond to changing political and economic conditions. Alternatively, long-standing 

U.S. security assistance programs for Saudi Arabia are financed through Saudi government purchases of U.S. training and services through the Foreign Military Sales 

program. Iraq has begun using the FMS program for its acquisition needs, and may 

soon make large arms purchases worth up to $11 billion according to arms sale proposals recently notified to Congress by the Administration. The U.S. Army Corp of 

Engineers, which is currently carrying out U.S. funded reconstruction work in Iraq, 

carried out construction projects in Saudi Arabia on a contract basis during the 

1970s and 1980s, funded by Saudi government oil revenues. 

Similar direct or contract-based bilateral assistance programs could help Iraq 

complete its transition and reconstruction and would likely make U.S.-Iraqi relations subject to more conventional congressional concerns about human rights, the 

end use of U.S. military equipment, the regional military balance, and the efficiency 

and transparency of contract assistance programs. Increasing confidence within 

Iraq’s political leadership and competition among some Iraqi political groups to harness popular nationalist sentiment may limit the attractiveness or utility of official 

bilateral assistance efforts over time, making contract-based solutions with U.S. or 

other international partners more appealing or effective. 

CONCLUSION

Thank you for the invitation to testify and I look forward to your questions. 

ENDNOTES

1 Ernst & Young, Development Fund for Iraq—Summary of Audit Results for the year ended 

December 31, 2007, May 12-13, 2008. 2Government Accountability Office, GAO-08-1031—Stabilizing And Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi 

Revenues, Expenditures, and Surplus, August 2008. 3 International Monetary Fund, Country Report No. 08/17, ‘‘Iraq: Request for Stand-By Arrangement and Cancellation of Current Arrangement—Staff Report,’’ January 2008, p. 9. 4 U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq—June 2008, 

Report to Congress in accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007 (Section 9010, P.L. 109-289), p. 10. 5 U.S. Department of State, Section 2207 Report on Iraq Relief and Reconstruction, July 2008, 

Report to Congress in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2006 (U.S. Policy in Iraq Act, Section 1227, P.L. 109-163). 6 U.S. Department of State, Section 2207 Report on Iraq Relief and Reconstruction, July 2008. 

7Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) Report 08-020, ‘‘Key Recurring 

Management Issues Identified in Audits of Iraq Reconstruction Efforts,’’ July 2008. 8 A Central Contracts Committee has now replaced Iraq’s former contract approving authority. 

Decrees issued since January 2008 granted Governors and selected Ministers and Heads of 

Agencies authority to enter into contracts worth $50 million. The ministries selected were DeVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:28 Dec 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 J:\DOCS\HEARINGS\110TH\110-40\44426.TXT HBUD1 PsN: DICK
67

fense, Interior, Oil, Trade, Health, Electricity, Industry and Minerals, Water Resources, Municipalities, and Public Works. Agencies not attached to ministries have been granted a $30 million 

contract approval ceiling. Iraq’s governorates can now approve contracts worth up to $10 million. SIGIR Report 08-020, ‘‘Key Recurring Management Issues Identified in Audits of Iraq Reconstruction Efforts,’’ July 2008. 9 Information provided to CRS by U.S. Treasury Attache, Baghdad, Iraq, September 13, 2008. 

10 U.S. Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq—June 2008, p. 3. 11Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Press Release: ‘‘PM Barzani announces political 

committee to discuss Iraqi federal hydrocarbons law,’’ June 28, 2008. 12 U.S. Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq—June 2008, p. 3. 13 U.S. Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq—March 2008, p. 4. 14 Reuters, ‘‘Iraq approves preliminary gas deal with Shell,’’ September 7, 2008. 15 Reuters, ‘‘Firms pre-qualified for Iraq long-term oil deals,’’ June 30, 2008. 16 U.S. Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq—June 2007, p. 13. 17 Bloomberg News, ‘‘Dallas Oil Company Approved to Drill in Kurdistan,’’ September 10, 

2007. 18 U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing, Tom Casey, Deputy Spokesman, Washington, DC, September 28, 2007. 19 Ben Lando, ‘‘Deeper Than an Oil Law in Iraq,’’ UPI, September 10, 2007. 20Platts Commodity News, ‘‘Iraq’s Shahristani Says Hydrocarbon Law not Expected Soon,’’ 

November 15, 2007. 21Kurdistan Regional Government, ‘‘KRG responds to Dr Shahristani’s threats to international oil companies,’’ November 20, 2007. 22 Radio Free Europe Documents and Publications, ‘‘Iraq: Baghdad, Kurds At Odds Over Oil 

Deals,’’ November 30, 2007. 23 Ned Parker, ‘‘Iraqi Political Factions Jointly Pressure Kurds,’’ Los Angeles Times, January 

14, 2008; and, UPI, ‘‘Iraq Factions Join Against Kurd Oil Deals,’’ January 15, 2008. 24 U.S. Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq—June 2008, p. 10. 25The Senate recommends $200 million while both the House authorization bill and the previously-enacted supplemental appropriations act (P.L.110-252) provide $1 billion. 26Section entitled ‘‘Iraq Security Forces’’ in P.L. 110-252 and report language on p. S4337, 

Congressional Record, May 19, 2008. 27Sec. 1616 in S. 3001 as reported and S.Rept. 110-335, p. 428; see also Sec. 1512 in H.R. 

5658 as passed by the House. Section 1613 in S. 3001 as reported by the Senate lists equipment, 

supplies, services, and training as the only types of expenses that can be funded in the ISFF; 

Sec. 1616 applies the prohibition to any ‘‘large-scale infrastructure projects’’ above $2 million. 28DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq—June 2008, p. vi.

Chairman SPRATT. Thank you very much, all three of you presenting today expressing your views on this subject. Let me just 

make clear of why the Chair and the Committee is holding this 

hearing. First of all, some of us were here in the first Gulf War and 

we recall the way the financing of it was arranged through the 

good offices of President Bush, the first President Bush, and Jim 

Baker. Namely we went to the allies in the region and asked them 

for in kind contributions as well as cash contributions, and they 

came through handsomely. We also went to allies from Germany to 

Japan, and they paid substantial sums partly in return for the fact 

that they were not making big troop commitments. As a result the 

cost of that war out of pocket to the United States was $2 billion 

to $4 billion, depending on how you tally up those various contributions and our outlays. 

Begging the question, why have we not been able to achieve the 

same kind of sharing, cost sharing here, especially now that it appears that the country of Iraq is generating cash reserves, cash 

surpluses, that are over and above its immediate requirements. 

And finally, we passed this year a supplemental appropriation 

bill of $185 billion, $160 billion of it goes to Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Everyone in this room knows, given the deficit projections we have 

got as recently as last week from CBO, that that level of commitment simply cannot be sustained on the basis that we have maintained it for the last five or six years, that is without borrowing 

every penny of it so that it goes straight to the bottom line. After 

all, our economy is our first instrument of a national defense. And 

our budget is a key element, a vital element of that economy. And 

we simply cannot keep building debt on top of debt and expect to 

68

be the world’s superpower and also be the world’s largest debtor 

nation. 

So this is all part of our purpose in having the hearing today. 

To ask, is this a source that we can now be relying upon so that 

we can begin using Iraqi funds to do what Wolfowitz said before 

this Committee and said before the Defense Subcommittee, they 

should be able to pay for it themselves, and relatively soon, given 

their vast mineral wealth. And that is what we are trying to explore today. 

So we appreciate your testimony and your observations about it. 

And let me turn to Mr. Conaway now. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and our witnesses. Thank you for coming today and talking. And I do not have 

an extended statement in the interest of time and listening to what 

they have got to tell us rather than us continuing to do our normal 

pontification and talk to each other, comments we already know 

each other are going to say. I would rather hear from the witnesses 

themselves. It may be a bit of a departure from our standard operating procedure, but I appreciate you guys being here and I look 

forward to the questions. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Doggett? 

Mr. DOGGETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to all of 

our witnesses. Dr. Korb, I have three questions for you about violence, about success, and about the future. First on violence, while 

there does appear to be some consensus, some evidence that the addition of troops contributed to a reduction in violence, you know, 

we have heard the administration boast so often that it does not 

negotiate with terrorists. We have heard President Bush and his 

cohorts, even just heap scorn on anyone who wanted to talk with 

people who do not agree with us. And we hear the importance of 

the United States refusing to blink. But is not the decrease in the 

number of deaths in Iraq in large measure the result of the Bush 

administration’s decision to bribe, to pay off, the very organizations 

that were killing and executing our servicemen and women? 

Mr. KORB. There is no doubt about the fact that the so called 

Anbar Awakening, remember Anbar was the most violent province, 

and creating the group called the Sons of Iraq composed of a lot 

of people who had killed Americans as well as Iraqi government officials, has been a big factor in getting the violence down because 

it took place initially in the most violent province. 

Mr. DOGGETT. Well, the decision may have worked in part. But 

I have not heard the administration boasting of the reality that 

when President Bush said, ‘‘Bring it on,’’ he responded by pouring 

on American money to the very people that had the finger on the 

trigger killing our young Americans in Iraq and accounting for 

some of these 4,000 plus deaths. 

Now, the second question concerns success. The objective we 

were told was not that fewer Americans would be killed in Iraq but 

that no Americans were being killed in Iraq, and success was certainly not defined as continuing to pour out $10 billion or $12 billion every single month of American dollars in Iraq. And yet that 

is the situation of success of the surge we have today. If instead 

we measure the success of the surge using President Bush’s own 

benchmarks as he announced them back in January of last year, 

69

is it not correct that he cannot meet his own benchmarks? That is 

why he never talks about them anymore. And that what he deserves in terms of the objective as he defined it with those eighteen 

benchmarks is a big fat F for failure? 

Mr. KORB. Well I think, as I pointed out in my testimony, the 

Iraqis, I was over there as part of the AID project to assess the capacity of the Iraqi government. And one of the things I found in 

talking to a lot of them, they are very clever politicians. And they 

know what is happening back here, at home. And so if you get a 

benchmark like debaathification they will go ahead and pass the 

law. But then when you go and find out whether it is implemented 

it is not. And I think that is, if you take a look at the GAO analysis 

what happens is, yes, they will do a lot of these things. But then 

they really do not carry them out. Or whether it is corruption, or 

whatever it might be. 

I mean, take the example of the provincial elections. Well, the 

provincial elections, we are going to have them in October. Well, 

they still have not set a date, you know, for them. That is a very, 

very, very critical, critical thing. And unless they implement these 

benchmarks you are not going to have political reconciliation, 

which is the whole purpose of all of our military activities. And I 

think it is important to keep in mind that even with the numbers 

of troops reductions that President Bush announced last week, you 

will still have more troops there when these reductions occur than 

you had before the latest build up occurred in January 2007. 

Mr. DOGGETT. As you know, it has become conventional wisdom 

to brag about the success of the surge. But if you evaluate it in 

terms of the objectives that President Bush set out at the beginning he has failed to meet those objectives, has he not? 

Mr. KORB. I would say the majority of them have not been met 

and that is why you really do not have political reconciliation. In 

fact, what I worry about now, again, is the Maliki government not 

incorporating these Sons of Iraq. 

Mr. DOGGETT. And I wanted to talk to you about that because 

that gets to the future. You say that without a timetable we are 

going to continue to have that spigot of dollars just continue to be 

wide open. And of course there is a timetable there because most 

of the so-called group of willing, some would call it billing, the people that we cajoled or bribed into sending troops into Iraq, they 

have got a timetable. They are either all gone or they are going 

from Iraq, are they not? Other than maybe the two or three from 

Estonia, and some of the other major powers that have contributed 

in the dozens instead of in the hundreds of thousands. 

Mr. KORB. The vast majority of the 40,000 troops from other 

countries who went into Iraq with us are gone. 

Mr. DOGGETT. And is it not, your testimony, I believe you used 

the word stalled, that as long as we have a significant American 

troop presence there the Iraqis will never meet the standards that 

President Bush set for them last January that he has failed to 

achieve. And that that spigot will be wide open with American dollars and American blood because we have got the wrong policy 

there and cannot achieve the objectives that he set without getting 

a timetable to get our troops out? 

70

Mr. KORB. I do not believe that they will ever undertake meaningful political reconciliation unless you have that hammer over 

them. 

Mr. DOGGETT. Thank you for your testimony. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Conaway, did you have a question you 

wanted to ask? 

Mr. CONAWAY. I did have some questions, Mr. Chairman. I just 

did not want to make an opening statement. 

Chairman SPRATT. Okay. 

Mr. CONAWAY. So, thank you. Mr. Kagan, in contrast to the 

phased withdrawal that Mr. Korb was talking about, you mentioned that the U.S. would lose leverage if we did that. Do you 

want to flush that out some? 

Mr. KAGAN. Yes, Congressman, I would be happy to. I have to 

say that I completely disagree with the analysis that says that the 

U.S., the threat of a U.S. timetable to withdraw is a hammer in 

some way to hold over the Iraqis. On the contrary, it completely 

misunderstands what we are actually doing in Iraq to say that. We 

are currently engaged in primarily in peace keeping, peace enforcement operations in Iraq. And our troops play an extremely important role. They are seen widely by the Iraqi population as being relatively impartial and as being able to defend sectors of the Iraqi 

society from other malign actors in the government, outside the 

government, and so forth. And they do provide us with tremendous 

leverage toward the Iraqi government. I can guarantee you that 

whatever degree of accommodation we get out of the Iraqi government in the things that we want the Iraqi government to do is 

higher with more American troops in the country than it would be 

with fewer American troops in the country. Now that is not an argument for keeping American troops there forever. I think that we 

should have American troops in Iraq as they are needed. But I do 

think that we, it is important to understand the dynamic there. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you. Dr. Korb, you obviously have a different opinion on that. The eight to ten month time line that you 

would argue for based on all of the evidence you have, based on 

years of experience in the arena, is there a guarantee associated 

with that? 

Mr. KORB. There is no guarantees associated with anything. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. 

Mr. KORB. I think that, let me——

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, I will. I just want to make my point. 

Mr. KORB. I do want to make——

Mr. CONAWAY. Just one second. I will let you speak. Five years 

from now, do you think someone will look on this testimony the 

way we are currently looking back on Paul Wolfowitz’ testimony 

from five years ago and act like as if he had given some kind of 

galactic guarantee that that was going to happen. So I would argue 

that, you know, your position is yours but you are not going to implement it. You are not going to be responsible for that. And you 

do not have any skin in that game and there is no guarantee. So 

what happens during that ten months, if circumstances are different? Do you stick to your guns? Or is there opportunity that the 

vacuum does create some sort of ruckus that has got to be responded to differently? What happens in that regard? 

71

Mr. KORB. Well, as I pointed out in my testimony, General James 

Dubik, the American general in charge of training the Iraqi security forces said that the Iraqi Army and police will be able, and 

these are his words, to assume full responsibility for internal security as early as April of 2009. So that is one indication. 

The others I pointed out in my testimony. And I have testified 

before other committees. I just referenced it very briefly here. That 

in addition to us setting a timetable to withdraw I think you need 

a diplomatic surge, because all of the countries in the region have 

a vested interest in Iraq not becoming a failed state. Even Iran 

does not want to see it become a failed state because they will have 

the refugees coming in. If it becomes a haven for Al Qaeda which 

people, you know, point out, Al Qaeda is not a group that Iran likes 

which is why they were very helpful to us in Afghanistan. But are 

there any guarantees? No. I do not think there are any guarantees 

in terms, but I do not think there is a guarantee if you continue 

to keep expending American blood and treasure that you are going 

to get what the administration says is a, you know, victory, which 

is a stable, democratic Iraq that becomes an ally in the War 

Against Terror and a bulwark against Iran either. 

Mr. CONAWAY. But you are open to the argument that should 

this phased withdrawal be announced and we start walking down 

that path that something unforeseen today happens that that 

might need to be altered at some point. In other words, you are not 

casting this in absolutely concrete the way some of the comments 

get thrown back at us from, that we all make from time to time 

as if we have got some guarantee. But there is an opportunity that 

circumstances would not work out the way you think they are? 

Mr. KORB. Well, again, I go back to testimony I have given before 

the Committee over the last couple of years. We are not leaving the 

region, okay? That is a big difference. In other words, you are leaving Iraq but you are not leaving the region. And so therefore you 

have the capability, for example, if there should be an external invasion. But if General Dubik is right and they can provide for their 

own internal security, and this is a whole other subject here, the 

Iraqis want us to go. This is why we are negotiating with them on 

the status of forces agreement. Okay? They are the ones that have 

asked for the time line. Because the Maliki government, and I 

think feels quite correctly, as long as it looks like we are in charge 

in fact they are not going to be seen as legitimate by their own people. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Right. I think we all agree on the end goal. It is 

just how do we get there? How do we orchestrate this dance? Dr. 

Blanchard, one quick question for you. In terms of the oil markets, 

is there anything sinister about Iraq going to companies who are 

experts in developing large projects like Royal Dutch Shell, like 

Exxon Mobil, like the Chinese government. Is there anything sinister in terms of them looking towards trying to find expertise in 

the arena to actually increase their oil production, and modernize 

an infrastructure that by all arguments has been totally neglected 

for some twenty to thirty years? 

Mr. BLANCHARD. I think the Iraqi government has pursued those 

service, in particular, contract opportunities, based on a recognition 

that it lacks either the expertise or the technical capability to rehaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:28 Dec 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 J:\DOCS\HEARINGS\110TH\110-40\44426.TXT HBUD1 PsN: DICK
72

bilitate its oil production and to meet its immediate short term 

goals. I think over the longer, or medium term run, so if you look 

at these long term oil deals that will come up for bidding next year, 

I think the administration has taken the position, and I imagine 

many in the Congress would agree, that that should be conducted 

through an open bidding process that is free and fair. 

Mr. CONAWAY. But that is something a sovereign government 

would do with——

Mr. BLANCHARD. Indeed, these are sovereign government decisions. And, you know, I think as an observer of Iraq’s oil politics 

the sort of only caveat I would add to that is that these do not represent necessarily broadly discussed, you know, there is a, as I 

said, there is a lack of political consensus about really how to move 

forward with these things. So, you know, a decision by the Maliki 

government to move forward with a certain contract or a decision 

by the KRG to move forward with a certain contract does not necessarily represent the, you know, broadly shared vision of what 

Iraq’s energy future should be. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. 

Conaway. Mr. Doggett has had his opportunity but we will come 

back to you if necessary. Mr. McGovern is not here. Mr. Scott is 

not here. Etheridge, Moore, Bishop, Mr. Berry? 

Mr. BERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Kagan it says in this 

information that I have in front of me that you were one of the architects of the President’s surge policy. Is that correct? 

Mr. KAGAN. Congressman, I am uncomfortable with any particular designation of that. I was an early proponent of the surge. 

I put out a report recommending something very much like the 

surge. But I did not have an official position in government. 

Mr. BERRY. Was part of the idea or the plan that you had to go 

into the neighborhoods and pay people not to cause trouble? 

Mr. KAGAN. I am sorry. I did not understand your last part? 

Mr. BERRY. Go into the neighborhoods and pay people not to 

cause trouble? 

Mr. KAGAN. No, Congressman. We did not recommend in our 

plan the Sons of Iraq initiative, although I think it was a very good 

initiative and I stand by it. But we did not recommend it. 

Mr. BERRY. If I understood you correctly, you recommend continuing with whatever troop levels is necessary to maintain some 

kind of stability in Iraq for as long as it takes, basically, or certainly until there is a better alternative that comes along? 

Mr. KAGAN. Well, Congressman, since my analysis tells me that 

rapidly withdrawing American forces at this point would lead to 

probably a resumption of violence and certainly a failure of current 

Iraqi political efforts and a failure of our mission, right now my 

recommendation is that we maintain forces at levels necessary to 

continue to move forward in Iraq. 

Mr. BERRY. So at what point would you consider that it is time 

to start pulling our forces out? 

Mr. KAGAN. When I believe that that is in the best interest of 

the United States of America, I would recommend that, sir. 

Mr. BERRY. And how are you going to define that? 

Mr. KAGAN. Well, you have to make an evaluation of what the 

likelihood of success is in Iraq, what the consequences of particular 

73

force levels would be, what the new strategy would be, what its 

likelihood of success is, what the various spoilers and enemies 

would do in response to it, and come to a reasoned conclusion about 

this. From my perspective the issues is remaining focused on what 

our objectives are, making sure that we have a strategy that makes 

sense to move us toward those objectives, and maintaining that we 

have adequate force levels and other resources, including non-kinetic measures, to support that strategy. And that is the only way 

to do force planning as far as I am concerned, sir. 

Mr. BERRY. And how would you propose to pay for this? 

Mr. KAGAN. Congressman, I am a strategist, not a budget expert. 

Mr. BERRY. Oh, yes, okay. 

Mr. KAGAN. How would you propose to win the war, Congressman, if we withdraw the troops? 

Mr. BERRY. We are not questioning the members. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman SPRATT.*THANK YOU, MR. BERRY. MR. ALEXANDER OF

LOUISIANA? 

Mr. ALEXANDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Kagan you used 

two terms a while ago. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement. 

Would you describe in your opinion the difference in the two? 

Mr. KAGAN. Congressman, you engage in peacekeeping operations in situations where violence is either low or nonexistent, and 

where the main priority of your military presence is to deter the 

resumption of violence by forces that have put down their weapons 

and helped to make progress toward permanent reconciliation. 

Peace enforcement is a term of art that is used when you have violence that is going on that you are working to reduce. And it is a 

level generally of violence that you would say is below significant 

insurgency. And I think in most areas of Iraq that is where we are. 

Mr. ALEXANDER. Okay. Look at the entire picture and in your 

opinion, on a percentage basis, are our troops engaged in which one 

the most? 

Mr. KAGAN. I would say, Congressman, it is very, I cannot give 

you a definitive answer on that. I would say that it is probably 

about fifty-fifty. Our troops, we put our troops disproportionately in 

areas where there is violence, of course, because our purpose is to 

bring it under control. So in areas such as Diyala and Ninawa 

Province we have been focusing very much on going after violence. 

In Baghdad for the most part, I think, our forces are engaged in 

peacekeeping in a lot of areas. In Anbar they are certainly engaged 

in peacekeeping, in the south in Babel Province and so forth, they 

are engaged in peacekeeping. I think in Basra our forces are largely engaged in peacekeeping. So in large areas of the country we are 

engaged in peacekeeping. But in terms of what the percentage of 

troops that is I cannot say offhand. 

Mr. ALEXANDER. Okay. Thank you. 

Chairman SPRATT. Ms. Kaptur? 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to ask any of 

the panelists to comment, when we look back at the chart on how 

much the American people have spent on this War, nearly threequarters of a trillion dollars, $653 billion and still counting. How 

much of that money possibly could have ended up in the wrong 

hands? There has been a lot of talk about corruption. Congressman 

74

Berry talked about money being handed out in order to buy people’s behavior. From what you know of the diversion of dollars in 

any society, even our own in any federal program, where we have 

major institutions in place to check corruption and even then we 

do not stop it. In a society like Iraq, where lawlessness is more the 

order of the day than a rule of law, what would be your guesstimate on how much of that might have been misspent? Have you 

ever thought about that? Diverted? Stolen? 

Mr. KORB. Well, I think the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

has given you some really good figures on that. And I would, I 

think that his is probably the best analysis. And in fact, you may 

remember that some members of the Congress were so upset about 

his reports that they tried to do away with the office, okay, in 

terms of, you know, the things that he was saying. So I think his 

estimates are probably the, the best of how much money has been 

wasted. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Dr. Korb. Let me ask, of the number 

of U.S. troops that have been killed in Iraq the rate of death has 

been going down. Can we say the same about Iraqi civilians? 

Mr. KORB. It has. I mean, the number of attacks on all Iraqis as 

well as Americans has gone down dramatically. But I think it is 

important to keep in mind that it went up tremendously in 2007. 

So when you compare 2007 to 2008, June of both years, yes, it is 

down. But that was a very, very high number. And I think if you 

say in terms of are the levels of violence where they were then? No, 

they are not. But it is still not a safe place. And I think that is 

the key thing to keep in mind. And that is why I think it is important that the Iraqis take over their security. And if the head of the 

training is correct then they can provide that security. 

Remember now, there are close to 600,000 members of the Iraqi 

security forces. And what we are talking about is basically, we do 

not even have an estimate. But this is not a large scale, conventional military threat they are dealing with. They are dealing with 

violence and basically doing police work. So I think, you know, 

General Dubik is correct that that in fact could occur. 

Ms. KAPTUR. When you saw the death of the Sunni leader in 

Baghdad this week, what did you say to yourself? Who was cooperating with us. 

Mr. KORB. Well, what concerns me about that is the attitude of 

the Maliki government toward the so-called Sunni insurgents, Sons 

of Iraq. They were never happy with this. This was not their idea. 

This was something our on scene commanders did well even before 

the surge. They are the ones who begin working with these groups. 

And General Petraeus has been pressuring the Maliki government 

to take more and more of them in. But the fact of the matter is, 

it has been very, very, very slow. And I do worry about the fact 

that we have created a ticking time bomb there because these people do not support the central government who we are supporting. 

And so while they have been working with us to get rid of Al 

Qaeda in Iraq, because Al Qaeda in Iraq over stepped their boundaries, and they saw the results of the 2006 election, I think that 

in fact if they are not accommodated they can cause an awful lot 

of problems. 

75

Ms. KAPTUR. I viewed it as a sign of the fragility of the situation 

there. I do not know if you——

Mr. KORB. Yes, I do. 

Ms. KAPTUR [continuing]. Share that view to some extent. Let me 

just say, I wanted to make this comment on the record. It has been 

really amazing to me that the insiders who promoted this war as 

a simple task, and I want to say their names, Paul Wolfowitz, 

George Tenet, Douglas Feith, and Donald Rumsfeld, have largely 

disappeared. Where are they? Are they editorializing? Are they 

writing op-eds? Are they on the evening news? Now you would 

think that if these were courageous men they would stand by their 

position. But what has been amazing to me is, it is as though they 

have vaporized. Where are they? Why are they not up here? Why 

are they not giving speeches? It is amazing to me, one of the greatest disappearing acts I have ever seen. 

Now, Colin Powell has sort of been on occasion seen. There has 

been a sighting now and then, and of course I think Vice President 

Cheney is one of the most hidden vice presidents I have ever seen. 

But where is the courage of their conviction? And I just wanted to 

say on the record. It is very upsetting to me. I did not agree with 

them on their position. But where are they? Do the American people not have a right to hear from them now? And I hope if, you 

know, they are listening today or someone says something to them, 

I hope that they hear this member from Ohio,because many of her 

constituents are dead because of them. And I can remember when 

Mr. Rumsfeld and Mr. Powell appeared before our Defense Committee and I asked Mr. Powell the question, ‘‘Sir, do you view what 

is going to happen as a liberation or an occupation? How will you 

know the difference?’’ Mr. Chairman, I view this now as an occupation in the way that it is functioning, not a liberation. And what 

is amazing to me is how these gentlemen have not stood by the 

courage of their convictions. Though I disagree with them completely, where are they? Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPRATT. We have got some votes coming up. We want 

to make sure everyone has an opportunity to ask questions. So Mr. 

Jordan? 

Mr. JORDAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be quick. I want 

to thank you all for coming. I did not get a chance to catch everyone’s testimony. But Dr. Kagan, I just want to go back to this public timetable, time line, deadline, debate. Which to me just does not 

make sense. And this is coming from someone, I mean, on the surface you can recognize it. You know, I always say deadlines influence behavior. The first piece of legislation I ever did back in the 

General Assembly in Ohio was welfare reform legislation. And I did 

the amendment. I remember offering it on the floor, and the big debate. I did the amendment that said after a certain point in time, 

able bodied adults would not longer receive cash payments from 

the state. Made sense, deadlines impact behavior. 

But in this context it just scares me because of the message it 

sends A, to the bad guys, and probably more importantly, and I 

want your comments on this, more importantly to the citizens and 

government of Iraq. Are they going to have the full commitment 

they need to get where they need to get so this country, and our 

troops get home like we all want to see happen. 

76

So elaborate on that if you would, and then I will yield back, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. KAGAN. Thank you, Congressman, I appreciate the opportunity to elaborate on that. The, first of all I want to make the 

point that Iraq has been so far by far the best ally in the war on 

Terror that we have had in terms of the number of troops Iraq has 

put into the field against terrorists and the number of casualties 

that Iraq has suffered. And I think it is very important to remember that. Because it is important to remember that the Iraqi security forces and the Iraqi government really, and the Iraqi people, 

really have chosen our side on the whole against our own worst 

enemy, Al Qaeda in Iraq, and also against Iranian backed militias. 

Mr. JORDAN. In fact, when I was there you saw that, you witnessed that, when we were in Iraq last summer. 

Mr. KAGAN. Absolutely. Absolutely. And it was a very positive 

sign when we were, when I was last down near Amara as the special groups had fled from the Iraqi security forces attack in that 

city. One of them had written graffiti on one of the bridges hear 

the border saying, ‘‘We will be back.’’ And one of the Iraqi soldiers 

who had chased them out wrote underneath it, ‘‘We will be waiting.’’ So there is a real commitment on their part to fighting our 

common foes. And what the Iraqis across the board are looking for 

from us is a commitment to them. And what they are hearing from 

Washington, D.C. is the exact opposite of that. They are hearing 

arguments that we should make no commitment to them. That we 

should hector them, that we should bully them, and we should punish them, but that under no circumstances should we guarantee 

that we will stand with them if they continue to fight against Al 

Qaeda, that we will stand with them if they continue to fight 

against Iranian backed and controlled militias. 

And I think the more time that goes on when we leave open the 

question whether or not we will stand by this ally, the longer they 

are going to have to make some choices that I think we are not 

going to enjoy. Choices about how long do they want to be on the 

firing line alone, and how long do they want to wait before they 

start cutting deals with these various enemies. And I think we 

have already seen the very nefarious effect of this. Because the 

truth is one of the main reasons we have been having a hard time 

with this strategic framework agreement, which was initially supposed to be a SOFA is because at the outset we could not meet, 

the administration could not meet the Iraqis’ asking price. The 

Iraqis’ asking price was a security guarantee. And their point was 

that if they sign any kind of deal with us the Iranians, who see 

the world in a very black and white, zero sum game, would see 

them as siding with us against Tehran. And the Iraqis said, ‘‘We 

are willing to do that. Are you willing to back us?’’ And right up 

front, because of resistance within this Congress, the administration had to say no. And that has already led to very negative effects. 

Now, if we set a timetable and say we are unconditionally pulling 

out by a certain period, whatever the situation on the ground, we 

will be sending the additional signal to the Iraqis that we do not 

plan to be there. We do not plan to back them and they need to 

make their own decisions. And I do not understand why anyone 

77

imagines in that circumstance, given the threats they face, and 

given what the Iranians tell them on a daily basis, why if we abandon them we think that they will choose us and do what we want. 

Mr. JORDAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Scott? 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We were told going into 

this war, just a couple of months before, not to worry about budgeting for the war. The cost would be so insignificant when you considered that oil revenues were not listed in the budget and the cost 

of the war was not listed in the budget. So as the Budget Committee we were told by this administration not to worry about it. 

We have now spent over $600 billion and when you consider the 

future health costs for troops and replacement costs for equipment 

the estimates are in trillions. What happened? 

Mr. KORB. Well, I think what happened is that we got carried 

away. We did not understand what we were dealing with. I think 

also what happened, and again if you go back and you look you 

may remember Larry Lindsey, who I had the privilege of serving 

with in the Reagan administration, who said, ‘‘You know, this could 

be $100 billion to $200 billion.’’ They got rid of him. And then the 

head of OMB, now Governor of Indiana, Mitch Daniels said, ‘‘No, 

no, that is way too high.’’ You know, it could not be even, you 

know, more than a hundred. And then of course Wolfowitz said it. 

I think what happened, and this goes to Congresswoman Kaptur’s point here that I think is very important. We talked about 

people who admitted they made a mistake. One of them is Francis 

Fukuyama, who wrote the book The End of History, is now the 

Dean at SAIS. He basically supported the war. And, but he said 

a couple of years later, I think, if you had told the American people 

that we were going to go to Iraq and have over 4,000 dead, spend 

whatever the number is, some, you know, could be up to $3 trillion, 

hundreds of thousands of Iraqis would die. And these were his 

words, ‘‘So Iraq could have an election,’’ which was basically what 

happened, you would have been laughed out of the ballpark. I 

mean, and that is what happened. People were trying to convince 

the American people that it was necessary to go to war with a 

country that had nothing to do with 9/11. And so therefore, they 

presented a case. 

And, you know, we are talking about Paul Wolfowitz here. He is 

also quoted as saying, ‘‘Well, I never believed there were weapons 

of mass destruction. But that sold. So that is why we emphasized 

that.’’ I mean, that is the type of thing that we had to deal with. 

And I think had the American people known this, had all of you 

known this, in terms of the votes I think the vote would have been 

a lot different in the Congress. 

But we believed our own propaganda. I mean, there was this 

character Chalabi here that convinced the administration we would 

be greeted as liberators. Do you remember that we thought we 

would be down to 30,000 troops by the end of 2003? I remember 

when I went to Iraq the first time in November the troops all 

thought they were coming home by Christmas, okay? I mean, they 

were told that. And then when General Abizaid said, ‘‘No, we have 

got an insurgency.’’ Secretary Rumsfeld said, ‘‘No, you cannot use 

that word.’’ Okay? And then, you know, I mean, so all of these 

78

things happened. You know, there were a number of mistakes 

made. 

But I think the original one was overestimating our ability to go 

into a foreign country and achieve a quick, relatively easy military 

victory. And we are all paying the price for it. I did not support 

the war. But I think it is important to keep in mind that this is 

the first significant conflict we have ever fought in our history 

where we do not have a draft and we have not raised taxes. And 

therefore, the problems that Chairman Spratt was talking about 

earlier in terms of our overall economic position is in terrible, terrible shape. 

And that is also one indicator of our economic power. In terms 

of, what about the costs of not being able to do what you need in 

Afghanistan? Afghanistan is deteriorating rapidly and you do not 

have the wherewithal to deal with that situation. 

Mr. SCOTT. The costs of reconstruction, what portion of that cost 

is due to the damage done by the war and how much of that is new 

and improved infrastructure? 

Mr. KORB. Again, if you go back and you take a look, after they 

said they had no idea how bad the Iraqi infrastructure was before 

we went in. And again, I am thinking, how could you miss that? 

You had, you know, CNN was there, you had newspaper reporters, 

not to know how, so I think the infrastructure was not in very good 

shape before we went in. We did not realize that. Had we realized 

that we would have known that the costs would have been much 

greater to rebuild. I do not think, in fact I think there is a credit 

to our troops, they minimized the damage to the Iraqi infrastructure when they went in. Now, subsequently with the development 

of the insurgency you have had a lot more damage. 

Mr. SCOTT. Iraq has a surplus. Have they ever committed to 

using the surplus to do the construction rather than have us do the 

construction? I mean, I do not remember them inviting us in with 

their representation that they would spend their money. What, on 

what basis are they committed to spend their money and not ours? 

Mr. KAGAN. Congressman, the Iraqis do seem to be committed to 

spending their own money. They are having a variety of problems 

doing that. They do budget annually for infrastructure projects and 

they have said that they want to spend their own money and also 

bring in foreign investment. They have repeated on many occasions, it is their objective to spend their own money to build their 

own country. I do not think there is any question about the intention. 

The issue is the pragmatic difficulties that they face in actually 

doing that spending on infrastructure. And I think we can get a little bit carried away talking about the trivial amount that they 

have spent on reconstruction. The fact is, if you go back and look 

at the GAO report they have spent tens of billions of dollars of 

their revenue. They have spent a lot of their revenue. They have 

spent it primarily on operations and maintenance funds, which is 

to say salaries. 

Now in the context of the sort of insurgency that we were dealing 

with that was fueled for a long time by people who were simply unemployed, that was a direct contribution to our efforts to bring violence under control. Now we are working them toward the process 

79

of developing the systems that they need in order to spend infrastructure money responsibly without having excessive corruption, 

but that takes time. 

Mr. SCOTT. Who decides who gets the contracts? 

Mr. KAGAN. The Iraqi government decides who get Iraqi government contracting, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. And the American contracts? 

Mr. KAGAN. We decide. 

Mr. SCOTT. No further questions. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Baird 

Mr. BAIRD. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I just want to start by stipulating I think this invasion and conduct of it were some of the 

worst foreign policy mistakes in the history of the country. But 

once we are there we have to deal with that reality. In the context, 

I just want to put things in the context. Because I hear things said 

here on Capitol Hill and back home that are just sort of out of context. 

In the context of our total annual deficit, which CBO now estimates at over $400 billion plus another 150 borrowing from social 

security, what is the annual spending on Iraq? 

Mr. KORB. It is about $10 billion to $12 billion, at least $10 billion a month. So that——

Mr. BAIRD. So the point being, the point being if we completely 

withdrew, spent not another penny on Iraq, would we still be in 

deficit or not? 

Mr. KORB. Well I think, yes, you would. 

Mr. BAIRD. We would be substantially, we would not, I do not 

think we should waste a penny of the taxpayers’ money. But people 

have argued back home, ‘‘Gosh, if we were not in Iraq we could rebuild our infrastructure, blah, blah, blah.’’ We would still be in deficit, friends. We need to be clear about that. 

Secondly, in Iraq, U.S. dollars what percentage goes to reconstruction now versus security? 

Mr. KAGAN. Congressman, I do not have the exact number for 

you. But we have made policy decisions sometime hence and we 

were going to stop investing in long term infrastructure projects in 

Iraq. And we were to focus very heavily on security. And so whatever the percentage is now, and I think it is heavily weighted toward security at this point, you will see that it will be even more 

heavily weighted that way in the future based on decisions that 

have already been taken in theater and in the administration. 

Mr. BAIRD. I believe that to be accurate. It is heavily weighted 

toward the security side. The reason I say that is people also say, 

‘‘Why are we spending such vast funds to rebuild the Iraqi infrastructure when our own infrastructure is hurting?’’ I understand 

the concern. I wish we were not spending so much money in Iraq. 

But we need to be clear, at least for the facts, the vast majority 

of U.S. funding is not going to rebuild Iraq’s schools, or roads, 

etcetera. And the Iraqis are doing more of that. 

Mr. Korb, a year ago at this time were you suggesting that there 

was progress in the security situation in Iraq? Or were you skeptical at that time? 

Mr. KORB. Well, a year ago the violence had not yet come down, 

okay? So it does not really start until late in 2007. Okay? When 

80

a combination of factors, Sons of Iraq, more troops, Sadr laying 

down his arms. 

Mr. BAIRD. Did you foresee that and say, ‘‘I see all these things 

happening and therefore I expect casualty numbers of U.S., Iraqi, 

and civilians to go down?’’ Or were you rather skeptical that that 

was going to happen a year ago at this time? 

Mr. KORB. Well, I was mainly focused on the political reconciliation. That is what I was concerned about because the whole purpose of the increase in troops and the other things was the get the 

political reconciliation. 

Mr. BAIRD. Did you make any comments a year ago about the security situation? 

Mr. KORB. Again, a year ago in September? 

Mr. BAIRD. Yeah. 

Mr. KORB. I did not think that the violence was going to come 

down the way that it did, no. 

Mr. BAIRD. I appreciate that. That is correct. If we had pulled 

out, it is correct you said that. It is not correct that you were correct. If we had pulled out one year ago, or if we had begun a withdrawal, a year ago some people were saying, ‘‘Let’s begin to withdraw one to two brigades a month and let us finish it up by 2008.’’ 

So no U.S. combat, very small physical presence, 30,000 or so. Even 

that, some said zero. What do you think would have happened? Mr. 

Kagan, and we will go on down the line. Do you think we would 

be seeing low numbers of casualties? Do you think we would be 

seeing chaos? What do you think, Mr. Kagan? 

Mr. KAGAN. Congressman, I am very confident that if we had 

begun a year ago as General Petraeus was testifying about what 

he thought needed to happen, withdrawing a brigade or two a 

month, sectarian violence would have rapidly begun to increase. 

The Iraqi government probably would have collapsed. The Iraqi security forces definitely would have collapsed. They were not in a 

position to function on their own. As the Jones Report at that time 

made very clear and as our own observations on the ground made 

clear. And I think all of the progress that had been made to that 

point in 2007 would have been undone. And I think the situation 

might well have become irretrievable very rapidly at that point because it would have been seen as the final betrayal by the Americans of the Iraqi people. 

Mr. BAIRD. What would have happened to surrounding countries, 

like Jordan? 

Mr. KAGAN. You would have seen increased refugee flows. I think 

Michael O’Hanlon at Brookings Institute wrote an excellent report 

about the likely spillover effects of this. And you would have seen 

significant destabilization. I think you would have started to see 

much more aggressive intervention on the part of Iraq’s neighbors 

both to stem the tide of refugees and also to try to protect their 

coreligionists and so forth. So I think you saw a real danger. And 

again, I think it was probably Ken Pollack who laid this out. You 

saw a real danger that a situation in Iraq spiraling out of control 

could well have become a regional conflagration. 

Mr. BAIRD. Mr. Korb, do you want to comment on that? 

Mr. KORB. I think if you go back and you take a look in 2006, 

when President Bush met Prime Minister Maliki in Jordan. And 

81

Prime Minister Maliki said the following, ‘‘Let us take control of 

Baghdad, my troops, and you, you move yours to the outskirts.’’ If 

in fact that happened and you also had the so-called Anbar Awakening——

Mr. BAIRD. Let me just, I try not to be discourteous. But my 

question was, if one year ago, not in 2006, in 2007 we had begun 

to withdraw one to two brigades a month, and to this point where 

we were very, very low troop strength. Mr. Kagan is of the belief, 

I actually share that belief, that we would have had substantial infighting, chaos in the ground, possible genocidal violence, a number 

of U.S. troops killed in the withdrawal process, and resurgence of 

Al Qaeda, and the strengthening of Iran. 

Mr. KORB. I disagree. 

Mr. BAIRD. Uh-huh. What do you think would have happened? 

Mr. KORB. As I have said all along, basically, and obviously you 

have looked up some of the things I have said because——

Mr. BAIRD. Well, you said it about me at the time so I remembered it. 

Mr. KORB. Basically, if you set a withdraw date and undertook 

a diplomatic surge with the countries in the region, none of whom 

wanted to see Iraq become a failed state, they would have been involved constructively. And I also demonstrated in the reports, the 

Americans would not have had any casualties if you had done it 

the same way that you put in over 200,000 troops in 2004. So that, 

there would not have been increased American casualties. And it 

would have, in my view, given the Iraqis the incentive to do what 

they need to do. I think, I cannot emphasize, this is a very, you 

know, distinguished group of people. These people are, you know, 

have long traditions. And I think it would have given them the incentives to do what they need to do, which they still have not done. 

And with that——

Mr. BAIRD. Well, the National Intelligence Estimate at the time 

took a somewhat different perspective on that in a line that got 

very little attention. The line basically said that the threat of U.S. 

withdrawal and a U.S. timetable is probably causing people to retrench rather than reach out and work together. Anyway, I am 

thankful, at least, that the casualty numbers have gone down. I 

think it is a credit to our soldiers, it is a credit to the Iraqi people, 

it is a credit to the change in tactics by General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker. Thankfully, we did not have to test the other hypothesis. We did not have to run the risk of genocide, etcetera, 

etcetera. And it is still fragile. But the fragility in my judgment 

does not justify the claims of and the calls that we now withdraw 

one to two brigades a month. Because how, saying an edifice 

propped up by certain things that it is finally getting stronger if 

we just pull out the props, that will suddenly force it to strengthen 

itself, it does not work in architecture and I do not think it would 

work in foreign policy. I thank the Chair and thank the witnesses. 

Chairman SPRATT. Thank you, Mr. Baird. And to our three witnesses for your diligence and cooperation in preparing your testimony and the testimony you have given and the answers you have 

forthrightly stated, we very much appreciate it. We have learned 

from your contribution and we appreciate your participation. 

82

Before we conclude I would ask unanimous consent at this point 

that anyone who did not have the opportunity to ask questions be 

permitted to do so by submitting them for the record within the 

next seven days. 

Thank you once again for coming and for your participation. The 

Committee is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.

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