UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 98-4434

IRIS JEAN BLANKENSHIP,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke.

Jackson L. Kiser, Senior District Judge.

(CR-97-109)

Submitted: May 28, 1999

Decided: June 22, 1999

Before ERVIN, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Terry N. Grimes, KING, FULGHUM, SNEAD, NIXON & GRIMES,

P.C., Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. Robert P. Crouch, Jr., United

States Attorney, Jennie L. M. Waering, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Iris Jean Blankenship appeals her conviction, following a jury trial,

of sending a threatening communication through the United States

Postal Service in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876 (1994). Blankenship

was sentenced to two years' probation with six months' home confinement. Finding no error, we affirm.

The victim, Margie Brotherton, received a threatening letter in a

white business envelope that was delivered, via the United States

Postal Service, to her home. The letter threatened that if Brotherton

continued to "hang around all the black married men in the post

office" her family would be "interfered with." The letter further

threatened that if Brotherton persisted in her conduct, one of her

daughters would be raped.

On appeal, Blankenship contends that the district court erred in

admitting a letter, envelope, and two nude photographs that were also

delivered to the victim's home and that the district court erred in

denying her motion for a mistrial based on the improper admission of

that evidence. Blankenship contends that the district court relied on

the Government's misrepresentation that her fingerprints were on the

photographs, and admitted the evidence in violation of Fed. R. Evid.

403 and 404(b). Blankenship asserts that but for the Government's

misrepresentation, the district court would not have admitted the evidence, and that such an admission was a denial of due process.

We find that the district court's admission of the evidence and the

denial of Blankenship's motion for a mistrial were not an abuse of

discretion. See United States v. Dorsey, 45 F.3d 809, 817 (4th Cir.

1995) (providing standard); United States v. Whittington, 26 F.3d 456,

465 (4th Cir. 1994) (providing standard). The characteristics of the

letter containing the nude photographs and the threatening letter were

sufficiently similar to cause the non-threatening letter and photographs to be relevant because they tended to establish motive as well

as a pattern of harassment toward Brotherton. Last, Blankenship fails

to show that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by

the prejudicial effect of its admission. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.

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Next, Blankenship contends that she was denied due process and

a fair trial when the prosecutor repeatedly tried to elicit inadmissible

testimony and introduce inadmissible evidence at trial. Blankenship

contends that the Government repeatedly asked questions that were

leading, called for speculation, or were simply irrelevant. Although

we do not condone the Government's numerous attempts to lead witnesses or ask questions requiring the witnesses to speculate on matters

as to which they did not possess knowledge, we find that the Government's questioning did not constitute plain error. See United States v.

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-37 (1993). As Blankenship notes, the district court in many instances sustained defense counsel's objections

and gave limiting or curative instructions. See United States v.

Francisco, 35 F.3d 116, 120 (4th Cir. 1994) (jury presumed to follow

instructions).

Accordingly, we affirm Blankenship's conviction. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid in the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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