United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 19, 2024 Decided March 12, 2024

No. 23-5036

SAMARK JOSE LOPEZ BELLO,

APPELLANT

v.

ANDREA M. GACKI, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR 

OF THE OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL AND UNITED 

STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY OFFICE OF FOREIGN 

ASSETS CONTROL,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:21-cv-01727)

Erich C. Ferrari argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellant.

Benjamin M. Shultz, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were 

Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney 

General, and Sharon Swingle, Attorney.

Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, HENDERSON, Circuit 

Judge, and RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.
2

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: The Office 

of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), a part of the U.S.

Department of the Treasury (Treasury), named two Venezuelan 

men as Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers (SDNTs or 

Traffickers). OFAC designated Tareck Zaidan El Aissami for 

“playing a significant role in international narcotics 

trafficking,” see 21 U.S.C. § 1904(b)(4), and Samark Jose 

Lopez Bello for materially assisting in that trafficking and 

providing support to El Aissami. See id. § 1904(b)(2)–(3). In 

this action, Lopez Bello alleged that OFAC and its Acting 

Director erred in designating him a Trafficker. The district 

court rejected his challenge and we affirm. 

I.

The Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Kingpin 

Act), 21 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1908, authorizes the President or the 

Treasury Secretary to name persons as Traffickers. The 

Kingpin Act authorizes the imposition of sanctions on 

Traffickers, their organizations and supporting persons whose 

“activities threaten the national security, foreign policy, and 

economy of the United States.” Id. § 1902. The President and 

the Secretary can designate so-called Tier 1 Traffickers—those 

who play “a significant role in international narcotics 

trafficking.” Id. §§ 1903 (President’s authority), 1904(b)(4) 

(Secretary’s authority), 1907(7). The Secretary can also 

designate as so-called Tier 2 Traffickers (1) those who 

materially assist, provide financial or technological support for 

or to, or provide goods or services in support of a Tier 1 

Trafficker’s trafficking activities, and (2) those who support or 

act for or on behalf of Tier 1 Traffickers. Id. § 1904(b)(2)–(3). 

The Secretary has delegated his Kingpin Act authority to the 
3

OFAC Director. 31 C.F.R. § 598.803. A Trafficker 

designation—Tiers 1 and 2—blocks all of the designee’s assets 

in the United States or under the control of persons in the 

United States. 21 U.S.C. § 1904(b). All assets are “effectively 

frozen.” Zevallos v. Obama, 793 F.3d 106, 110 (D.C. Cir. 

2015). No person can transact or deal with the frozen property, 

as doing so risks civil and/or criminal penalties. 21 U.S.C. §§ 

1904(c), 1906(a)–(b). 

Designation under the Kingpin Act is analogous to several 

other Executive Branch designations. See Fares v. Smith, 901 

F.3d 315, 318 (D.C. Cir. 2018). The Congress based the 

Kingpin Act on Executive Order 12978’s successful 

application of the International Emergency Economic Powers 

Act (IEEPA) against Colombian narcotics Traffickers. H.R. 

Rep. No. 106-457, at 42 (1999) (Conf. Rep.); see Exec. Order 

No. 12,978, 60 Fed. Reg. 54579 (Oct. 21, 1995); 50 U.S.C. §§ 

1701–1707. IEEPA is itself analogous to the antiterrorism 

provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 

Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 8 U.S.C. § 1189. Under IEEPA, 

AEDPA and the Kingpin Act, any designated person or entity 

is added to the “Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked 

Persons List” and subject to asset freezing. See Zevallos, 793 

F.3d at 110; 31 C.F.R. § 501.807(a). 

A Kingpin Act designee “may seek administrative 

reconsideration” before OFAC and request “delisting.” 31 

C.F.R. § 501.807. The designee may submit evidence that 

demonstrates “the insufficient basis” for the designation or that 

“circumstances resulting in the designation no longer apply.” 

Id. Said another way, the designee must show that OFAC’s 

basis for designation “was never true or is no longer true.” 

Zevallos, 793 F.3d at 110. OFAC reviews the reconsideration 

request and subsequently provides a written decision. 31 C.F.R. 
4 

§ 501.807(d). A designee can request delisting “as many times 

as he likes.” Zevallos, 793 F.3d at 110. 

Lopez Bello, a citizen of Venezuela and Italy, ran several 

corporations related to the Venezuelan oil and gas industries. 

He also conducted business in the United States, held U.S. 

visas and resided in Florida. OFAC simultaneously designated 

El Aissami and Lopez Bello in 2017. Sanctions Actions 

Pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, 

82 Fed. Reg. 11101, 11101–02 (Feb. 17, 2017). OFAC 

designated El Aissami, then Executive Vice President of

Venezuela, as a Tier 1 Trafficker under 21 U.S.C. § 1904(b)(4) 

and Lopez Bello as a Tier 2 Trafficker under § 1904(b)(2)–(3). 

Id. The designation also blocked thirteen entities and an 

aircraft, all associated with Lopez Bello.1 Id. A Treasury press 

release explained that Lopez Bello served as a “frontman,” 

handled “business arrangements and financial matters” and 

laundered drug proceeds on El Aissami’s behalf.2 

Lopez Bello requested the full administrative record 

supporting his designation and blocking. In response, OFAC 

provided the administrative record supporting designation but 

redacted classified, privileged and law enforcement sensitive 

information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 1903(e). OFAC also 

provided him with a copy of the Designation and Blocking 

Memorandum, the Federal Register notice and the press release 

1

 Based on OFAC’s factual findings, third-party plaintiffs 

holding judgments against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 

Colombia (FARC) have successfully executed on some of the 

blocked assets. Other assets remain subject to post-judgment writs of 

garnishment and execution. J.A. 68–69. 

2

 Treasury Sanctions Prominent Venezuelan Drug Trafficker 

Tareck El Aissami and His Primary Frontman Samark Lopez Bello, 

U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Feb. 13, 2017), 

https://perma.cc/7PHT-TJTN. 
5

related to his designation. OFAC then produced an unclassified 

summary of the redacted information. The summary noted

Lopez Bello’s: money laundering of drug proceeds through 

state-owned oil company Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A.;

organization of trans-continental air and maritime cocaine 

routes; purchase of Venezuelan news outlets on El Aissami’s 

behalf; management of El Aissami’s financial matters; and 

procurement of vehicles in the U.S. that were transported to 

Venezuela and given to El Aissami and other government 

officials. 

Lopez Bello requested administrative reconsideration 

pursuant to 31 C.F.R. § 501.807. OFAC sought additional 

information from Lopez Bello, who received numerous 

extensions to respond. In summer 2021, Lopez Bello 

voluntarily withdrew his petition and OFAC closed the matter.

Lopez Bello then sued OFAC and its Acting Director in district 

court, seeking the vacatur of his and his companies’ 

designation. He pressed various claims, including that OFAC’s 

designation constituted arbitrary and capricious action, went 

beyond OFAC’s statutory authority, deprived Lopez Bello of 

fair notice and resulted in an unconstitutional seizure of 

property. He additionally claimed that OFAC failed to provide 

sufficient post-deprivation notice. OFAC provided the district 

court with classified portions of the administrative record ex 

parte, in camera. 

OFAC moved to dismiss or in the alternative for summary 

judgment. Lopez Bello cross-moved for summary judgment. 

The district court granted OFAC’s motion to dismiss. Lopez 

Bello v. Smith, 651 F. Supp. 3d 20 (D.D.C. 2022). According 

to the court, OFAC reasonably examined the record and 

articulated a satisfactory explanation for its designation of 

Lopez Bello. Id. at 33–34. OFAC’s simultaneous designation 

of El Aissami and Lopez Bello—notwithstanding that Lopez 
6 

Bello’s Tier 2 designation was based on his support of El 

Aissami—did not, in the court’s view, exceed the agency’s 

statutory authority under the Kingpin Act. Id. at 35–36. 

Moreover, the court held, simultaneous designation did not 

deprive Lopez Bello of fair notice of prohibited conduct. Id. at 

41–42. It further held that blockage of Lopez Bello’s assets did 

not violate his Fourth Amendment protection against seizure. 

Id. at 45. Finally, the court concluded that OFAC provided 

Lopez Bello with sufficient post-deprivation notice to satisfy 

due process. Id. at 43–44. Lopez Bello timely appealed the 

district court’s dismissal. 

Parallel to the OFAC litigation, a grand jury in the 

Southern District of New York indicted Lopez Bello and others 

for engaging in transactions prohibited by the Kingpin Act. See

Superseding Indictment, United States v. El Aissami Maddah, 

No. 19-cr-144 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2019). Lopez Bello is now a 

fugitive and refuses to return to the United States to stand trial. 

See United States v. Lopez Bello, No. 19-cr-144, 2023 WL 

3199968, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2023).3 

II.

Our review of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is de novo. Islamic 

Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 732 (D.C. Cir. 

2007). Although we accept the complaint’s factual allegations 

as true, we need not “accept inferences that are unsupported by 

the facts set out in the complaint.” Id. (citing Kowal v. MCI 

Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). Lopez 

Bello raises three claims on appeal: (1) simultaneous 

3

 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement has listed Lopez 

Bello as one of their most wanted individuals and offered a 

$5,000,000 reward for information leading to his arrest. See U.S. 

Immigr. and Customs Enf’t, Most Wanted: Samark Jose LopezBello, https://perma.cc/88CW-2FDC (last visited Feb. 6, 2023). 
7

designation is beyond OFAC’s statutory authority; (2) 

simultaneous designation deprives a designee of fair notice of 

prohibited conduct; and (3) OFAC failed to provide sufficient 

post-deprivation notice. We reject each claim. 

A. Simultaneous Designation under § 1904(b)(2)–(3)

We begin with Lopez Bello’s statutory challenge. He

contends that the Kingpin Act’s plain language and legislative 

history prohibit OFAC from derivatively designating a Tier 2 

Trafficker at the same time it designates the relevant Tier 1 

Trafficker. We disagree. The best reading of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 1904(b)(2)–(3) permits simultaneous designation of a Tier 1 

Trafficker and a derivative Tier 2 Trafficker. 

We start with the text. The Kingpin Act authorizes Tier 2 

designation for persons assisting in the trafficking activities of 

or acting on behalf of a “significant foreign narcotics trafficker 

so identified in the [President’s] report” or “foreign persons 

designated by the Secretary of Treasury [or OFAC] pursuant to 

this subsection.” 21 U.S.C. § 1904(b)(2)–(3) (emphasis added).

The text does not require that the “significant foreign narcotics 

trafficker[s]” or “foreign persons” be “previously” or “already” 

designated. Lopez Bello argues that the statute’s past participle 

“designated” imposes such a temporal requirement. According 

to him, the phrase “designated by the Secretary” necessarily 

means already designated, that is, before Tier 2 designation. 

The Court rejected a similar argument in Rural Cellular 

Association v. FCC, 685 F.3d 1083, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 

Based on precedent interpreting similar adjectival phrases as

temporally ambiguous, the Rural Cellular Court accepted the 

FCC’s interpretation that “established by the Commission” 

covered establishment in the past, present or future. Id. at 

1092–93 (citing Regions Hosp. v. Shalala, 522 U.S. 448, 458 

(1998) and Dep’t of Treasury v. FLRA, 960 F.2d 1068, 1072 
8

(D.C. Cir. 1992)). Because “designated by” is a temporally 

ambiguous adjectival phrase, we adhere to OFAC’s 

interpretation that the statutory provision includes both past 

and simultaneous designations.

4

The Kingpin Act’s purpose reinforces our understanding 

of the text. According to the Act, foreign narcotics Traffickers 

and their organizations “threaten the national security, foreign 

policy, and economy of the United States.” 21 U.S.C. § 1902. 

The Act’s “bottom line objective . . . is to bankrupt and disrupt 

the major narcotics trafficking organizations” and “those 

involved in their illicit activities.” H.R. Rep. No. 106-457, at 

43 (1999) (Conf. Rep.). Achieving this objective requires 

taking “immediate action upon designation to avoid dissipation 

of affected assets.” Id. at 47. Not taking immediate action, such 

as by providing pre-deprivation notice, “would create a 

substantial risk of asset flight.” Zevallos, 793 F.3d at 116; see 

also H.R. Rep. No. 106-457, at 47. Although Lopez Bello

asserts that OFAC must designate a Tier 1 Trafficker first and 

then identify anyone assisting, supporting or acting on behalf 

of the designated Trafficker, his interpretation hamstrings the 

Kingpin Act’s stated purpose of bankrupting and disrupting 

narcotics Traffickers by allowing not-yet-designated Tier 2 

Traffickers to drain assets after a Tier 1 Trafficker designation

occurs. Simultaneous designation upholds the Act’s purpose. 

The history preceding the Kingpin Act’s enactment 

buttresses simultaneous designation. The Congress explicitly 

based the Kingpin Act on Executive Order No. 12978’s use of 

4 At oral argument, the Court questioned whether “designated 

by” encompasses future designation. Oral Arg. Tr. 13:20–22. In 

other words, could OFAC designate a Tier 2 Trafficker before

designating the relevant Tier 1 Trafficker? OFAC noted it has likely 

never made such a designation under the Kingpin Act, Oral Arg. Tr. 

14:15–15:11, and we express no view about whether it could.
9 

IEEPA against Colombian narcotics Traffickers. See 21 U.S.C. 

§ 1901(a). The Executive Order itself designated several drug 

kingpins. The Order also permitted Treasury to designate 

significant Traffickers and those who materially assist or 

support trafficking activities “of persons designated in or 

pursuant to this order.” Exec. Order No. 12,978, 60 Fed. Reg. 

54579 (Oct. 21, 1995) (emphasis added). For example, the 

Treasury simultaneously designated Julio Cesar Nasser David 

as a significant Trafficker and “4 associated individuals.”5

Even under the Kingpin Act’s predecessor Executive Order, 

Treasury used IEEPA to simultaneously designate a Tier 1 

Trafficker and relevant Tier 2 Traffickers.6 

Lopez Bello overstates the Kingpin Act’s legislative 

history. A House Conference Report recites that the Executive 

Order permits designation of persons materially assisting “the 

named drug kingpins or other, already designated SDNTs.” 

H.R. Rep. No. 106-457, at 46 (emphasis added). Given the 

Treasury’s simultaneous designation of Nasser David and his 

associates, however, this sentence inaccurately describes how 

Treasury exercises its Executive Order-IEEPA authority. 

Regardless, the comment addresses only the Executive Order 

program; it does not suggest that the Kingpin Act will function 

accordingly. Nor does OFAC’s implementation of the 

Executive Order via research on foreign targets “that can be 

linked by evidence to individuals or entities already

5

 U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Press Release, Treasury Names 

Fronts for the Colombian Drug Cartels (May 26, 1998), 

https://perma.cc/M4SE-TVPF. 6

 OFAC regularly makes Tier 1-Tier 2 simultaneous 

designations under the Kingpin Act. See, e.g., OFAC, U.S. Dep’t of 

the Treasury, Sanctions Pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin 

Act, 10–29, https://perma.cc/G6UJ-DDF9 (last visited Feb. 7, 2024). 

See id. at 28 for the simultaneous designations of El Aissami and 

Lopez Bello. 
10

designated,” H.R. Rep. No. 106-457, at 47 (emphasis added), 

foreclose simultaneous designation. And it does not state that 

OFAC only researched persons linked to designated 

individuals. Thus, neither of Lopez Bello’s references to the 

legislative history conflicts with our view of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 1904(b)’s text, purpose and history.

We conclude that the best reading of 21 U.S.C. § 1904(b) 

permits simultaneous designation of a Tier 1 Trafficker and a 

derivative Tier 2 Trafficker. Lopez Bello’s contention that he 

conducted no sanctionable conduct before El Aissami’s 

designation is inapposite. When Lopez Bello assisted El 

Aissami—a not-yet-designated Tier 1 Trafficker—he was on 

notice that he, too, could be designated by OFAC. For these 

reasons, we conclude that the Kingpin Act permits OFAC to 

designate a Tier 2 Trafficker and any relevant Tier 1 Trafficker

at the same time.

B. Simultaneous Designation and “Fair Notice”

We turn to Lopez Bello’s argument that simultaneous 

designation deprives potential designees of “fair notice” of 

sanctionable conduct in violation of the Due Process Clause.

According to Lopez Bello, his alleged conduct occurred before 

El Aissami’s designation and thus before Lopez Bello had 

notice that he was assisting or supporting a Tier 1 Trafficker.7

7 We have held that the government can sanction a foundation 

based on evidence tying it to a terrorist organization before the 

organization’s terrorist designation occurs. Holy Land Found. for 

Relief and Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 162 (D.C. Cir. 2003). In 

that IEEPA case, the Court affirmed Treasury’s consideration of the 

ties because “no plausible evidence” “showed that these ties 

[between the foundation and terrorist organization] had been 

severed.” Id. Similarly, OFAC could rely on information regarding 
11

Due Process requires that a law “give fair notice of conduct 

that is forbidden or required.” FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 

Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012). This requirement “‘is 

implicated’ whenever the government imposes ‘civil 

penalties.’” Karem v. Trump, 960 F.3d 656, 664 (D.C. Cir. 

2020) (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 

n.22 (1996)). We consider whether a regulated party received 

adequate notice of the agency’s interpretation “in the most 

obvious way of all: by reading the regulations.” General Elec. 

Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1995). But “[e]ven 

trained lawyers may find it necessary to consult legal 

dictionaries, treatises, and judicial opinions before they may 

say with any certainty what some statutes may compel or 

forbid.” Fed. Express Corp. v. Dep’t of Com., 39 F.4th 756, 

773 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (quoting U.S. v. Bronstein, 849 F.3d 1101, 

1107 (D.C. Cir. 2017)). Thus, we ask “whether the law or 

regulation ‘provides a discern[i]ble standard when legally 

construed.’” Id.

The Kingpin Act provides a discernible standard that is 

reasonably comprehensible to the public. The Tier 2 provisions

cover persons “materially assisting in, or providing financial or 

technological support for or to, or providing goods or services 

in support of” a Tier 1 Trafficker’s trafficking activities or 

“acting for or on behalf of” a Tier 1 Trafficker. 21 U.S.C. 

§ 1904(b)(2)–(3). The provisions do not require a Tier 2 

Trafficker to “knowingly” or “recklessly” assist or support. 

The Congress’ omission of a mens rea requirement carries 

great weight here because other provisions in the Kingpin Act

do have heightened mens rea requirements. The Act’s criminal 

penalties apply only to persons who “willfully” or “knowingly” 

Lopez Bello’s assistance and support before El Aissami’s 

designation. To the extent Lopez Bello has severed ties to El 

Aissami, he can seek delisting. See 31 C.F.R. § 501.807.
12

violate the Act. 21 U.S.C. § 1906(a); see also Fed. Express 

Corp., 39 F.4th at 773 (statute’s express mens rea requirement 

“for criminal penalties, but silence as to civil sanctions, gives 

notice that civil penalties may be assessed on a strict liability 

basis”). The Kingpin Act also defines the term “narcotics 

trafficking” with specificity. See 21 U.S.C. § 1907(3).8 The 

public is on notice that Kingpin Act designation may occur 

even if the designee lacks a specific mens rea. 

Further, the public is on notice that OFAC has previously 

designated Tier 1 and Tier 2 Traffickers simultaneously, at 

least since 2010. See supra note 6. The public is also on notice 

that assisting a not-yet-designated Tier 1 Trafficker subjects an 

aider to potential OFAC sanction as a Tier 2 Trafficker. A

designee can always, and repeatedly, seek delisting by showing 

that the circumstances supporting designation no longer exist. 

See Zevallos, 793 F.3d at 110; 31 C.F.R. § 501.807.

To the extent Lopez Bello argues that the Constitution 

forbids simultaneous designation, several cases rejecting predeprivation notice foreclose his argument. “[D]ue process is 

flexible.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). Postdeprivation process satisfies due process if the government 

must act quickly. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997). 

When seizure is aimed at property that can be easily moved to 

another jurisdiction, destroyed or concealed, the government 

has a “special need for very prompt action.” Calero-Toledo v. 

Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 678–79 (1974). In 

the Kingpin Act context, we have denied pre-deprivation notice 

because it would create a substantial risk of asset flight. 

8 The Kingpin Act defines “narcotics trafficking” as “any illicit 

activity to cultivate, produce, manufacture, distribute, sell, finance, 

or transport narcotic drugs, controlled substances, or listed 

chemicals, or otherwise endeavor or attempt to do so, or to assist, 

abet, conspire, or collude with others to do so.” 21 U.S.C. § 1907(3). 
13

Zevallos, 793 F.3d at 116. Indeed, pre-deprivation process 

“would likely cripple the Kingpin Act.” Id. Barring 

simultaneous designation would have the same effect as 

requiring pre-deprivation notice: providing Traffickers an 

opportunity to drain assets. Because of the government’s strong 

interest in stopping asset dissipation, simultaneous designation 

with an opportunity for post-deprivation process satisfies due 

process. See Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 930. 

C. Due Process and Post-Deprivation Notice 

Finally, we address Lopez Bello’s argument that OFAC 

gave insufficient post-deprivation notice. Although OFAC 

provided the Blocking Memorandum, Federal Register notice, 

press release, redacted administrative record and unclassified 

summary, Lopez Bello alleges that he lacks a basis to 

understand his designation and offer rebuttal arguments. We 

disagree. 

The Court weighs three factors under the familiar 

Matthews v. Eldridge balancing test to assess the constitutional

adequacy of notice: (1) the private interest affected by official 

action; (2) the risk of error and probable value of additional 

safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest. Fares, 901 F.3d 

at 323 (citing Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 355 (1976)).

We apply this balancing in our consideration of the adequacy 

of notice following an OFAC designation. See id. (Kingpin Act 

designation); Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of 

State (NCORI), 251 F.3d 192, 206 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (AEDPA 

designation); Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Dep’t of 

Treasury, 686 F.3d 965, 979 (9th Cir. 2012) (IEEPA 

designation). 

An OFAC designation has a “dire” effect on a designee’s 

private interests. Fares, 901 F.3d at 323. Lopez Bello’s 

designation froze all of his assets in the United States and many 
14

of them are now subject to garnishment and execution. See

supra Section I. OFAC’s reliance on redacted evidence creates 

a risk of erroneous deprivation because the designee has only a 

limited opportunity to probe the evidence. Fares, 901 F.3d at 

323–24. But the government—namely, the Executive 

Branch—has a critical interest in protecting classified, 

privileged and law enforcement information.9 See Holy Land 

Found., 333 F.3d at 164; People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. 

Dep’t of State (People’s Mojahedin), 327 F.3d 1238, 1242 

(D.C. Cir. 2003). Indeed, requiring the government to disclose 

such information could “compel a breach in the security which 

[the Executive B]ranch is charged to protect.” NCORI, 251 

F.3d at 208–09.

Because of classified information’s national security 

implications, we have found due process satisfied when the 

government discloses only the unclassified portion of the 

administrative record in AEDPA cases. See NCORI, 251 F.3d 

at 209; People’s Mojahedin, 327 F.3d at 1242. In the Kingpin 

Act context, OFAC satisfied due process when it provided a 

Trafficker with the unclassified evidence on which the agency 

relied and gave him an opportunity to respond. Zevallos, 793 

F.3d at 116–17. Other circuits have used “means of providing 

information to the potential designee that do not implicate 

national security.” Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 983. According to 

the Third and Ninth Circuits, the government may provide 

designees with a “short unclassified summary of classified 

evidence.” Id.; see Fares, 901 F.3d at 324. Though “not highly 

9 The Kingpin Act separately defines “intelligence” and “law 

enforcement” information. 21 U.S.C. § 1903(e). OFAC described its 

redactions here as protecting privileged law enforcement information 

and classified information. J.A. 111. Lopez Bello does not 

distinguish between withholding “classified” and “law enforcement” 

information so we assume that the withheld information constitutes 

classified information. See Fares, 901 F.3d at 324–25. 
15

fact-specific,” such summaries can provide a designee “with 

the ‘who,’ ‘what,’ ‘when’ and ‘where’ of the allegations 

against him.” Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 542, 548 (3d 

Cir. 2001). 

We conclude that OFAC gave sufficient notice via the 

redacted administrative record, unclassified summary, 

Blocking Memorandum, Federal Register notice and press 

release. As in Zevallos, OFAC provided the redacted

administrative record on which it relied and an opportunity for 

Lopez Bello to be heard thereon. OFAC went further and 

provided an unclassified summary of the administrative 

record’s privileged information. Although brief, the summary 

identifies Lopez Bello’s laundering of drug proceeds, 

organizing of trans-continental cocaine shipments, handling of 

financial affairs, purchasing of Venezuelan news outlets and 

procuring of vehicles on behalf of El Aissami. Lopez Bello is 

not “forced to stumble towards a moving target.” Zevallos, 793 

F.3d at 118. Due process does not require more. See id. at 117.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 

court is affirmed. 

So ordered.