~KEATII-ORN~Y GENERAL 

OF v?JcuAs 

AUWTIN 11. TExAe 

February 1.6, 1949 

Hon. William N. Hensley 

Criminal District Attorney 

San Antonio, Texas 

Dear Mr. Bensleyr Opinion No. V-776 

Rer Several quest Ions 

relating to rendition and assessment of property 

for ad valorem 

taxation. 

You request the opinion of this office upon 

the questions set out below as follows: 

“(1) What Is the percentage of the 

fair cash market value of property upon 

which a taxpayer may make a sworn rendltion* In other words, can the taxpayer 

legally render his property at, say, 

Flg*percent of the fair cash mai%et 

“(2) Should the Tax Assesso? advise persons making renditions th.:ct the 

rendition must be on the true and full 

value 

marke i 

that Is to say, the fair cash 

value of the property? Is It the 

duty of the Tax Assessor to tier to the 

Board of Equalization such r endltions as 

are not made at the fair cash market 

value? 

“(3) At what percentage of fair cash 

market value may the Tax Assessor assess 

unrendered properties when he makes his 

assessment on such unrendered properties? 

“(4) At what values can the Board of 

Equalization set the assessed values of 

property before them for consideration? 

May the Board of Equalization set a value 

of less than the fair cash market value? 
Hon. William N. Hensley, Page 2, v-776 

What Is the effect of the ‘uniformity! provision of the statutes? In other words, 

may the Board set a value on a particular 

piece of property at the fair cash market 

value while the standard for property assessments generally Is at forty percent of 

the fair cash market value?” 

We shall not attempt to answer your questions 

categorically, for as we perceive your primary concern 

is: What significance is to be attached to the several 

constitutional and statutory provisions pertaining to 

the value at which property is to be assessed for ad 

valorem taxes? 

Preliminary to our discussion of this question, it may be observed that the duties of the taxthe Tax Assessor-Collector and the Board of 

gt%&ation have been definitely’deflned by statute. 

An excellent summary from which may be gathered the 

narrw function of an “assessment ‘I Is contained in the 

case of Cracker v. Santo Consolidated Independent 

School District, 116 S.. W. (2d) 750 (C.C.A. . . . 1938) 

expressed in the following language: 

“Some confusion Is manifest. . . regard& 

ing the nature and functions of renditions of 

property and assessments of property, particularly manner of listing or otherwise evidencing rendition and assessments. 

“It should be borne in mind that a taxpayer never assesses his property for taxas. 

Not even a commissionerst court has authority t0 a0 that. The assessment of property 

Is peculiarly the duty and responsibility of 

a tax assessor. The jurisdiction of the commissioners’ court with r eference to assessments Is confined to raising or lowering 

assessments as incident to Its duties as a 

board of equalization. It has no power to 

add property to the tax rolls not previously 

assessed, nor to take property from them . . . 

‘#The taxpayer lists or Inventories property by describing it and placing a value 

upon same. He may make the list himself, or 

merely furnish the information to the assessor. 

If the assessor agrees to the rendered valuations he the assessor, makes the rendered 

valua 4 ion the assessed valuation, or, If he 
Hon. William N. Hensley, Page 3, v-776 

does not agree, he Is required to note the 

assessed value on the same list, subject 

in either case. to final action bv the 

board of equalization as to &sing or lowering it. B. S. 1925, Art. 7211. Thus 

the r enditlon lists become also assessment 

lists. When after legal levy such assessment lists are corrected and approved by 

the board of equalization the liability of 

a taxpayer is thereby fixed.” 

v. c. s., 

In addition to the provisions .of Article 7211, 

other statutory provisions direct the Assessor-Collector to transmit to the Commissioners’ Court, 

sitting as a Board of Equalization, assessments of rendered and unrendered property which have been made to 

him. After the .Board of: Equalization has equalized the 

values, the Assessor-Collector then proceeds to assess 

;llcuniSendered property as required by Article 7218, 

. * to prepare rolls or books of all rendered or 

&rende&. real and personal property as required by 

Article 7218 and 7219, V. C. S.; on or before August 1 

to transmit to the Board of Equalization his rolls or 

assessment books with his affidavit attached thereto 

in the form directed by Article 7222, V. C. S.; and 

the Board of Equalization after it has examined and 

approved the rolls or assessment books trsnsmlt copies 

to the Comptroller, County Clerk and the AssessorCollector as prescribed in Article 7224. The AssessorCollector’s tax rolls, as finally equalized and approved by the Board of Equalization and delivered, 

constitute the assessment upon which the Tax Collector 

proceeds to collect the taxes assessed by the Assessor 

and as equalized by the Board of Equalization., 

We now pass to the question in which we think 

you are primarily interested. That Is, the standard of 

fixing the value upon which taxes are ultimately assessed and collected. There are three constitutional 

provisions which should be noted. Article VIII, Section 1, of the. Constitution provides: 

“Taxation shall be equal and unlf orm. 

All pr~operty. . . shall be taxed in proportion to Its value, which shall be,,ascertained m~mav be Drovided bv law. 

Section 11 of the same Article provided: 

“And all lands and other property, . . 
Hon. William N. Bensley, Page 4, v-776 

shall be assessed at Its fair value.” 

Section 20 of the same Article provides: 

“No property of any kind in this State 

shall ever be assessed for ad valorem taxes 

at a rester value than wair cash 

&JJ~ nor shall any board of equalization of 

any county or political subdivision or taxing district within this state fix the value 

of any property at more than its 

market-” 

The following statutory provisions also deal 

with the quest ion of value. 

Article 7149 provides in partz 

“The term ,ltrue and full value f wher--. 

ever used shall be held to mean the fair 

market value, in cash, at the place where 

the roperty to which the-m is applied 

shal P be at the time of assessment being 

the price which could be obtained {herefor 

at private sale, and not at forced or auct ion sale .‘I 

Article 7174 provides: 

“Personal property of every description shall be valued at its true and full 

value In money.” 

We think that the apparent confusion as to 

value which would seem to arise by these numerous 

statutory provisions for the guidance of tax administrative officials is dispelled by the case of West 

Texas Hotel Company v. City of El Paso, 83 S- W. (2d) 

772 (C. C. A.) holding that there is no substantial 

difference In 4 he terms (1) market value, (2) fair 

market value, (3) cash market value, (4) fair cash 

market value, (5) reasonable cash market value, and 

(6) true and fu3.1 value in money, which terms appear 

In various constitutional and statutory provisions 

pertaining to value for the assessment of taxes. 

Since our courts have held that the various terms 

used in the Constitution and Statutes as a basis of 

value for assessing taxes are synonymous 

4 

we shall 

use for the purpose or this opinion the erm “fair 
, 

Hon. William N. Hensley, Page 5, v-776 

cash market value" used in Section 20 of Article VIII 

of the Constitution, supra, and the term used in 

Article 7149, V. C. S., "fair market value in cash", 

which clearly are equivalent terms. Ko provision 

similar to Section 20 of ?rticle VIII was in the 

Constitution prior to its adoption ,$ugust 23, 1937, 

and it did not become effective under its express 

terms until January 1, 1939. 

Clearly, from the Constitutional and statutory provisions above mentioned, it is lawful for the 

Tax Assessor-Collector to assess and the Commissioners1 

Court to equalize property assessments at the full 

cash market value. If there were not court interpretations to the contrary, one would conclude from the 

above provisions that ,this was the only legal standard which could be used. However there have been 

numerous court decisions which hoid that the ,taxing 

authorities may use'8 lesser value if the standard is 

uniformly applied to all taxable property. Therefore, 

in the light of the court decisions, the taxing authorities are free to elect whether they will assess and 

equalize at the full cash market value or a lesser 

percentage thereof, so long as the percentage is uniformly applied to all taxable property. It is worthy 

to note that Section 20 of Article VIII of the Constitution, which became effective January 1, 1939, 

does not specifically forbid an assessment at less 

than the fair cash market value, but expressly forbids 

an assessment upon a valuation greater than such value. 

Uniformity of assessment is the end to be achieved 

the absence of which is forbidden by the Constitution. 

Our Supreme Court so held in the case of Lively v. 

?.fissouri ,Kansas Texas Railway Company of Texas, 120 S. 

W. 852, speakin:. through Justice r.::a;rn, in the following language: 

"But, as stated before in this opinion the wrong which was inflicted upon the 

appellee was not in requiring it to pay 

taxes upon the full value of its property, 

but In denying to it the equality of taxa- 

;hec Constitution, % 

i n n cessa ilv deD n 9 

yoon yniformitv of assessment." 

4 

n this case the Railroad Company objected 

to the 10 o valuation upon its intangible assets for 

the purpose of assessing taxes against it in Dallas 

: 

. 
. 1 

Ron. William N. Hensley, Page 6, V-776 

County, which county adopted a 66 2/3$ value applicable to property generally in the County, and in 

settling this difficulty, the Supreme Court said: 

nIn administering the remedy the 

court must take the course which 1s most 

practical to secure uniformity of valuation of the property to be taxed. This 

may be done either by Increasing the assessment of each property owner in the 

county to its full value and to collect 

from each the taxes upon this full value, 

or to reduce the assessment of the intant 

ible assets of the railroad company to 

6 2/j per cent on the $100 of its assessed value. The court will adopt that plan 

which is most feasible and calculated to 

secure justice to the parties. . . The 

Court is placed in a dilemma, from which 

it can only escape by taking that path 

which while it involves a nominal departure irom the letter of the law, does 

injury to no ane, and secures that uniformity of tax burden which was the sole 

end of the Constitv~tion. To hold otherwise is to make the restrictions of the 

Constitution instruments for defeating 

the very purpose they were intended to 

subserve. It is to stick in the bark, 

and to be blind to the substance of 

things. It Is to sacrifice justice to 

it 9 incident : 

“It would be utterly impracticable to 

increase the assessment of all other property owners in Dallas County to its full 

value, therefore a court of equity will 

adopt the other method--reducing the assessment made by the state board tom the 

same proportion of value as was placed upon the masS of property in the county. . .” 

The principle laid down by Judge Brown in 

this case bas not been departed from but uniformly 

adhered to as will appear from quota 1, ions from the 

following cases: 

In city of El Paso et al. v. Howze, 248 

5. W. 99 (writ of error denied), which dealt with a 

City Charter provision requiring rendition and assessment at a “fair market value”, the Court said: 
Hon. William N. Hensley, Page, 7, v-776 

“Then assessor a@ ,collector oft the 

city of El Paso is ~the office* tiji6ri whom 

is impo.sed the duty of making’the ini- 

;p;t;:;uatlon of property r~endered for 

The .law, has established the ,~ 

basis o?‘the’ valuation td be “its true 

and full value in money” .(article ‘753’0, 

R. S.:) or as it is termed in article 

7569. 6. S.,: “its reasonable cash market value. n 

“in the valuation of property the 

function of the city council is limited 

to that of a board of equalization.. 

When exerci,siag such function, it has 

the authority not only to equalize values but to see that all property has 

been assegsed at its falr market :value. 

But before such board can increase the 

value of property theretofore~ assessed 

it must give notice to the owner and 

afford him a hearing. 

.“In this case Howse. rendered his 

property to the asses’sor asd that officer approved and accepted the valuations placed thereon. This valuation 

by the assessor was a quasi judicial 

act and wasp not subject to increase 

except by the board of equaliaation 

after notice and hearing. No notice 

was given, 90 shearing was afforded, and 

without the consent of the taxpayer the 

valuation was changed and increased by 

the assessor, acting under the order of 

the city council made in i.ts legidatlve capacity, on August 14th. We are 

of the opinion that such incregs,e was 

invalid. . . 

~“The~. edidence- shows that for a 

I’& t.ime ,it. has been .the custom of the 

..oltp.:t~o a&ss property. upon the basis 

oC.64 per cent, Of it.% ~ptual, or market ~. 

va$ue and the value which the assessor ‘, 

placed upon the plalnt$ffls property in 

the qriginal assessment was 6stimat.ed 

upon that basis.,, ‘But an assessment 

made by the assessor upon ,that basis 
. . . 

Hon. William N. Hensley, Page 8, V-776 

when uniformly to all okE+h;nt;x.+L 

;b$e FoRpert.: is not Invalid. 

244 u. s. 499, 37 sup:ct: 

673' 6i L: Ed:'1280 Ann. Gas. 1917s aaTaylor v. L. % N. R: R. Co., 88 Fed.'305: 

31 C. C. A. 537; Cam Phosphate Co. v. 

Allen, 77 Fla. 341, gl South. 503. 

"On the contrary it Is valid and 

must stand as made u&l1 corrected by the 

proper reviewing authority and in the manner prescribed by law." 

See also the statement by the Waco Court of 

Civil Appeals in Duvall v. Clark, 158 S. W. (26) 565, 

from which we quote as follows: 

"And It Is well settled that an assessment at less than actual or market 

value when uniformly applied is valid." 

To the same effect, the Supreme Court of the 

UniteilSEatg in the case of Greene v. Louisville R.R. 

co., 

ing la&go** 

u. S. 242, 1280, stated In the follow-, 

"It Is equally plain that it makes 

no difference what basis of valuationthat Is what percentage of full value-i 

ma 

to L 

be adopted,, provided it be applied 

11 alike. The adoption of full value 

has no different effect in dlstrlbuti 

the burden than would be gained by ad 7 p$- 

lng 75 per cent< or 50 per cent, or even 

10 per cent as he basis--so long as 

either was applied uniformly." 

It is therefore 

of fixing valua<ions at a 

apparent that the custom 

iercentage of the full lOO$ 

valne for the purpose of taxation is 1egaI If equally auu uniformly applied to all taxpayer8 and property 

of the County. We do not mean to Imply that we ap 

prove the percentage method.aa th&ons thaO.should be 

generally accepted by the -tie&or and 

Board of Equalization, if an assessment at less than 

the full "fair cash market value" seems adequate to 

meet the fiscal needs of the taxing authority, but 

merely hold that the same Is not Illegal If equally 

and uniformly offered to all persons and property 
. 

Ron. William N. Hensley, Page 9, v-776 

. 

within the jurisdiction of the taxing authority. You 

ask what remedial action can be taken by the Bexar 

County Commissioners' Court if it does not agree with 

the percentage assessments of the Tax AssessorCollector and desired that they be raised to full 

cash market value. The Court, sitting as a Board of 

Equalization after due notice to each taxpayer affected has ihe authority under Article 7206 to raise 

the values not to exceed lOO$. By the same method, 

the Court has the authority to lower assessments so 

long as all are given equal and uniform treatment. 

The Constitution and Statutes of this 

State rc::ulre uniformity of assessment of 

real and personal property at full cash 

market value, but the courts have held that 

assessments at a lower percentage of market 

value are valid if equally and uniformly 

applied to'all taxable property. Therefore, 

the taxing authority may require all property to be assessed at 106 market value or 

any fraction thereof equally and uniformly 

applied. Lively v. Missouri Kansas Teras 

Railway Company of Texas 120 S. W. 852. 

Duvall v. Clark, 158 S. 4. (2d) 565; ci$y of 

El Paso w. v. Howze, 248 S. W. 

v. Louisville R 

w; Texas Con ik 

tions 1, 11 and 20;...- 

Articles 7149, 7174, 7211, 7218, '7219, 7222 

and 7224.Y.c.5 

Yours very truly, 

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

LPL: 3mc