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[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1383 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1383

    To seek urgent and essential institutional reform at the United 
                                Nations.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             July 12, 2005

Mr. Coleman (for himself and Mr. Lugar) introduced the following bill; 
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To seek urgent and essential institutional reform at the United 
                                Nations.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``United Nations Management, 
Personnel, and Policy Reform Act of 2005''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) An effective United Nations is in the interests of the 
        United States.
            (2) The United States Government must, in the interests of 
        the United States, lead the United Nations toward greater 
        relevance and capability.
            (3) Member States of the United Nations are showing 
        receptivity to needed reforms as a result of the urgency of new 
        challenges facing the organization and investigations into past 
        failures of the United Nations, including the Oil-for-Food 
        Programme scandal and problems with United Nations peacekeeping 
        and security operations.
            (4) The United Nations must transform and reinvigorate 
        itself in order to better prevent and end conflicts and build 
        stable societies, anticipate and respond to gross human rights 
        violations (including genocide), prevent catastrophic terrorism 
        and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and 
        facilitate economic development and poverty reduction.
            (5) In order to address the demand that the mission of the 
        United Nations shift from convener of meetings on these 
        critical challenges to a coordinator of international action, 
        from talk shop to a place of action, the United Nations must 
        undertake institutional reforms that ensure the effectiveness, 
        integrity, transparency, and accountability of the United 
        Nations system.
            (6) It is incumbent upon the United Nations to enact 
        significant reform measures if it is to restore the public 
        trust and confidence necessary for it to achieve the laudable 
        goals set forth in the Charter of the United Nations.
            (7) A successful United States effort to further reform the 
        United Nations will require bipartisanship and the joint 
        involvement of the executive and legislative branches of the 
        United States Government so that there is a unified United 
        States position toward the United Nations.
            (8) A February 2004 General Accounting Office (GAO) report 
        entitled ``United Nations: Reforms Progressing, but 
        Comprehensive Assessments Needed to Measure Impact'' finds that 
        the United Nations has made some progress on a number of reform 
        measures but still needs more accountable leadership and 
        improvements in key management practices.
            (9) The United Nations has issued three separate reports 
        addressing necessary reforms:
                    (A) A report issued in December 2004 by the 
                Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, 
                Challenges and Change (on which Brent Scowcroft of the 
                United States served) entitled ``A More Secure World: 
                Our Shared Responsibility''.
                    (B) An analysis of the work of the High Level Panel 
                in the report issued in March 2005 by United Nations 
                Secretary-General Kofi Annan entitled ``In Larger 
                Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights 
                for All''.
                    (C) A draft outcome document report issued in June 
                2005 by United Nations General Assembly President Jean 
                Ping of Gabon in preparation for the September 2005 
                General Assembly World Summit.
            (10) The June 2005 United States Institute of Peace report 
        prepared by the Task Force on the United Nations chaired by 
        former House Speaker Newt Gingrich and former Senate Majority 
        Leader George Mitchell, entitled ``American Interests and UN 
        Reform'', provides excellent recommendations for management and 
        policy reform and should serve as a model for future bipartisan 
        policy studies.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE NEED FOR UNITED NATIONS REFORM.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United Nations must develop the tools and institute 
        the management techniques and procurement procedures at the 
        United Nations that modern governments and effective chief 
        executive officers utilize to run efficient organizations;
            (2) the United Nations must develop a uniformly 
        professional international civil service through transparent 
        recruitment, strong management oversight, and high professional 
        and ethical standards enforced through performance review 
        procedures and financial disclosure requirements;
            (3) the United Nations must establish budgeting procedures 
        that are transparent and priority driven and performance based, 
        and contributions from the United States and other Member 
        States must be well managed so that the United Nations can meet 
        the critical challenges ahead;
            (4) the United Nations must improve the capacity of United 
        Nations peacekeeping forces to perform dangerous missions by 
        adopting measures that ensure discipline and personal integrity 
        and by ensuring that United Nations troops are provided the 
        training and authority necessary to produce successful 
        outcomes;
            (5) the United Nations must become an effective force for 
        human rights improvement worldwide by reorienting and 
        streamlining its human rights mechanisms so that the United 
        Nations is willing and able to take action to improve the 
        conduct of governments that abuse their people; and
            (6) the United Nations must strengthen the independence of 
        the Office of Internal Oversight Services and its capacity to 
        uncover waste, fraud, and abuse, and the United Nations must 
        also protect whistleblowers and create a mechanism to oversee 
        and strengthen auditing of the organization and to track 
        management and personnel reforms at the United Nations.

SEC. 4. MANAGEMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) No single official is tasked with managing the daily 
        operations of the United Nations.
            (2) The Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
        Governmental Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 
        found that the Government of Iraq manipulated the United 
        Nations Oil-for-Food Programme in numerous ways, and that the 
        United Nations' management of the Programme was plagued with 
        corruption, conflicts of interest, and negligent oversight. The 
        Subcommittee further found that the Programme suffered from 
        extensive smuggling of Iraqi oil and other products, conflicts 
        of interest in procurement and contracting by United Nations 
        agents, billions of dollars in illegal revenue generated by the 
        Hussein regime through kickbacks, and the diversion of 
        humanitarian commodities away from their rightful recipients, 
        the Iraqi people.
            (3) The findings of numerous investigations, including that 
        of the Independent Inquiry into the Iraq Oil-for-Food Programme 
        headed by Paul Volcker, have made it clear that current systems 
        for overseeing procurement and contracting, monitoring 
        management performance, and preventing fraud and corruption at 
        the United Nations are ineffective and must be strengthened.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States should use its voice and vote at the United Nations to pursue 
meaningful management reform that includes actions by the United 
Nations--
            (1) to empower the Secretary-General to replace top 
        officials in the United Nations Secretariat and recruit only 
        the most highly qualified individuals to fill those positions, 
        with priority given to proven professional excellence over 
        geographic diversity;
            (2) to conduct an updated assessment, approved by the 
        General Assembly, of the United Nations procurement system, 
        with the objective of establishing a comprehensive procurement 
        system that incorporates standards commensurate with those used 
        by modern governments and effective private sector companies;
            (3) to adopt procurement policies that embody high 
        standards such as those contained in section 104(a) of the 
        Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (15 U.S.C. 78dd-2(a)), 
        which prohibit persons from making or receiving payments, 
        offering or receiving gifts, or exchanging other promises to 
        secure an improper advantage in winning competitive bids;
            (4) to name within the United Nations Secretariat a single 
        senior official position to be in charge of daily operations 
        and to perform the role of chief operating officer;
            (5) to establish a Management Performance Board to ensure 
        that senior officials are held accountable for their actions 
        and the results their units achieve;
            (6) to provide representatives of each Member State on a 
        timely basis, as requested, all relevant information regarding 
        the expenditure of funds and the management and oversight of 
        United Nations programs;
            (7) to ensure that the Security Council establishes a 
        Sanctions Management Office with the responsibility for 
        assisting and informing Security Council members on all aspects 
        of the management, monitoring, and oversight of sanctions 
        programs;
            (8) to revise the United Nations General Assembly committee 
        structure to eliminate duplication and to reflect the 
        substantive priorities of the United Nations;
            (9) to end the practice of secret voting on the United 
        Nations Economic and Social Council;
            (10) to create an Office of Ethics, which shall be 
        responsible for--
                    (A) revising, overseeing, and enforcing a code of 
                ethics for all United Nations employees;
                    (B) providing education and annual training;
                    (C) monitoring and serving as a repository for 
                financial disclosure documents; and
                    (D) encouraging a culture of avoidance of actual or 
                perceived conflicts of interest.

SEC. 5. UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The personnel system of the United Nations has 
        accumulated a heavy load of staff who lack the skills or the 
        motivation to perform their duties or whose duties are no 
        longer necessary.
            (2) Some United Nations staff remain in the same job for 
        years or decades and often resist being transferred, 
        particularly if a transfer would mean leaving New York City or 
        other desirable locations.
            (3) The Office of Human Resources Management of the United 
        Nations does not utilize basic standard management practices, 
        and the existing performance appraisal system is ineffective.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States should use its voice and vote at the United Nations to pursue 
meaningful personnel reform that includes actions by the United 
Nations--
            (1) to create a modern personnel system for evaluating 
        performance, providing promotional opportunities for deserving 
        employees, separating unneeded and underperforming employees, 
        and recruiting only highly qualified employees;
            (2) to empower a reformed Office of Human Resources 
        Management that employs techniques of modern personnel 
        policies;
            (3) to institute a one-time severance program designed 
        expressly to remove unneeded staff;
            (4) to require annual financial disclosure reports to 
        identify possible or apparent conflicts of interest from any 
        United Nations employee, consultant, or independent expert 
        whose duties and responsibilities include contracting or 
        procurement, managing loans, grants, or programs, or evaluating 
        or auditing any United Nations project, program, or entity; and
            (5) to affirm the authority and responsibility of the 
        Secretary-General--
                    (A) to waive immunity in criminal cases involving 
                United Nations personnel unless the Legal Advisor to 
                the Secretary-General determines that justice is 
                unlikely to be served in the country at issue; and
                    (B) to seek reimbursement of legal fees in such 
                cases only if the accused is cleared by appropriate 
                legal processes.

SEC. 6. UNITED NATIONS BUDGET.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) There is no systematic and consistent procedure to 
        prioritize the goals of the United Nations and to allocate 
        resources to the highest priority programs and offices.
            (2) The United Nations does not systematically monitor and 
        evaluate program performance to determine the relevance of 
        programs for purposes of eliminating obsolete programs and 
        shifting resources to priority programs.
            (3) The United Nations must foster a cost-conscious culture 
        that could better allocate resources to high-priority 
        undertakings.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States should use its voice and vote at the United Nations to pursue 
meaningful budget reform that includes actions by the United Nations--
            (1) to evaluate existing programs and activities with the 
        goal of terminating those that are no longer serving their 
        original purpose or do not meet priority goals;
            (2) to establish sunset provisions for all new programs 
        mandated by the General Assembly;
            (3) to identify operational programs that can be made more 
        effective through voluntary rather than assessed contributions;
            (4) to enforce the ``5.6 rule'', which requires the 
        Secretariat to identify low-priority activities in the budget 
        proposal, and to establish an additional requirement 
        requiring--
                    (A) the identification of the lowest priority 
                activities equivalent in cost to 15 percent of the 
                budget request; or
                    (B) if no such identification is made, the 
                mandatory implementation of an across-the-board 
                reduction of the budget equal to that amount;
            (5) to pursue a mechanism that would provide larger 
        contributors greater influence in votes on budgetary matters 
        without disenfranchising smaller contributors;
            (6) to base the biennial budget of the United Nations on 
        performance-based budgeting and program evaluation;
            (7) to require itemization by program, project, and 
        activity of the annual budget for assessed contributions;
            (8) to establish effective controls to prevent conflicts of 
        interest in the awarding of contracts;
            (9) to establish procedures and policies to ensure 
        effective and comprehensive oversight and monitoring of 
        performance of United Nations contracts;
            (10) to ensure that the United Nations Office of Internal 
        Oversight receives its budget resources through appropriations 
        by the United Nations General Assembly and is not dependent 
        upon any other bureau, division, department, or specialized 
        agency of the United Nations for approving and providing such 
        funding; and
            (11) to promote a culture of cost-consciousness at the 
        United Nations and reduce costs through such measures as--
                    (A) increasing the efficiency of the public 
                information function of the United Nations through use 
                of the Internet and the consolidation of worldwide 
                information centers;
                    (B) expanding outsourcing and automation of 
                translation services; and
                    (C) reducing the frequency of conferences and 
                international meetings.

SEC. 7. INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The United Nations Secretariat does not conduct 
        periodic, comprehensive assessments of the status, impact, and 
        need for United Nations reforms.
            (2) The United Nations has not established sufficiently 
        systematic procedures for the receipt, retention, and treatment 
        of confidential submissions from United Nations employees 
        concerned about unethical practices, fraud, accounting 
        discrepancies, or mismanagement.
            (3) The United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme overtaxed the 
        fragile oversight and accountability mechanisms of the United 
        Nations, revealing significant flaws that urgently need to be 
        addressed if confidence in the United Nations is to be 
        restored.
            (4) The Oil-for-Food scandal has also created an 
        opportunity for reform by conclusively demonstrating to all 
        Member States the need for a significant strengthening of the 
        United Nations oversight system.
            (5) The United Nations would benefit from the establishment 
        of an independent oversight board that has the authority and 
        expertise to uncover weaknesses in the internal auditing and 
        oversight procedures of the United Nations and to recommend 
        ways in which they can be strengthened.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States should use its voice and vote at the United Nations to pursue 
independent oversight of United Nations operations and reform that 
includes actions by the United Nations--
            (1) to strengthen whistleblower policies to the level of 
        the highest emerging standards for national and international 
        law, such as those provided for in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
        2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.), and the Inspector General Act of 
        1978 (5 U.S.C. App.);
            (2) to provide both the resources and the authority to the 
        Office of Internal Oversight Services to carry out appropriate 
        oversight of every activity that is managed by United Nations 
        personnel, whether that activity is funded by the assessments 
        of the United Nations General Assembly or by voluntary 
        contributions;
            (3) to create an Independent Oversight Board that--
                    (A) is responsible for reviewing and providing 
                advice on the audit plans of the Office of Internal 
                Oversight Services and recommending the annual budget 
                of the Office;
                    (B) receives operational and budgetary funding 
                through the General Assembly and is not dependent upon 
                funding from any bureau, division, department, or 
                specialized agency of the United Nations;
                    (C) has the authority to audit all operations of 
                the United Nations, including the operations of the 
                Office of Internal Oversight Services and the Board of 
                External Auditors;
                    (D) is responsible for providing annual reports to 
                the Secretary-General, the Security Council, and the 
                General Assembly on its activities, observations, and 
                recommendations related to audit operations, including 
                information on audits and investigations conducted by 
                the Office of Internal Oversight and the Board of 
                External Auditors; and
                    (E) determines and submits to the General Assembly 
                the budgets for the Office of Internal Oversight and 
                the Board of External Auditors independently of the 
                regular United Nations budget process; and
            (4) to increase the independence of the Office of Internal 
        Oversight Services, including by--
                    (A) designating the Office as an independent entity 
                within the United Nations;
                    (B) ensuring the independence of the Office from 
                any budgetary or organizational authority of any United 
                Nations entity other than the Independent Oversight 
                Board;
                    (C) providing the operational and budgetary funding 
                for the Office through the General Assembly and 
                ensuring that the Office is not dependent upon funding 
                from any bureau, division, department, or specialized 
                agency of the United Nations;
                    (D) providing the Office the authority to initiate 
                and conduct investigations of any bureau, division, 
                department, specialized agency, official (including the 
                Secretary General), employee, contractor, or consultant 
                of the United Nations or any of its specialized 
                agencies; and
                    (E) requiring the Office to provide periodic 
                reports to the Internal Oversight Board on the audits, 
                investigations, and other activities of the Office.

SEC. 8. UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Between 1990 and 2005, the United Nations Security 
        Council, with the support of the United States, initiated more 
        than 40 peacekeeping operations.
            (2) As of late March 2005, there were nearly 70,000 
        international military and police forces serving in 17 United 
        Nations peacekeeping missions, and the approved peacekeeping 
        budget of the United Nations stood at nearly $4,000,000,000.
            (3) In many cases, peacekeeping has evolved into a complex 
        mission to help remake societies emerging from conflicts where 
        progress is uneven and outcomes are uncertain.
            (4) Current United Nations peacekeeping efforts are 
        bedeviled by both limited capacity and operational challenges.
            (5) United Nations peacekeeping operations have contributed 
        greatly toward the promotion of peace and stability for the 
        past 57 years and the majority of peacekeeping personnel who 
        have served under the United Nations flag have done so with 
        honor and courage. Recently, however, the record of United 
        Nations peacekeeping has been severely tarnished by operational 
        failures and unconscionable acts of misconduct.
            (6) If the reputation of and confidence in United Nations 
        peacekeeping operations is to be restored, fundamental and far-
        reaching reforms, particularly in the areas of planning, 
        management, training, conduct, and discipline, must be 
        implemented without delay.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States should use its voice and vote at the United Nations to pursue 
meaningful peacekeeping reform that includes actions by the United 
Nations--
            (1) to strengthen and increase the efficiency of the 
        Department of Peacekeeping Operations;
            (2) to develop doctrine and strategy for multidimensional 
        peace operations that thoroughly integrates the security 
        dimension with associated economic and political development 
        requirements;
            (3) to create a Peacebuilding Commission, a Peacebuilding 
        Support Office, and a voluntary Peacebuilding Support Fund; and
            (4) to reform its peacekeeping operations in the areas of 
        planning, management, conduct, and discipline, including--
                    (A) conducting a global audit and comprehensive 
                review of peacekeeping mandates with a view toward 
                right-sizing or even ending peacekeeping missions;
                    (B) adopting a minimum standard of qualifications 
                for senior leaders and managers of peacekeeping 
                operations;
                    (C) adopting a uniform code of conduct that applies 
                equally to all personnel regardless of rank and an 
                enforcement system that provides for temporary 
                suspension of personnel pending the outcome of 
                investigations and the punishment of those proven 
                guilty;
                    (D) establishing a permanent, professional, and 
                independent investigative body under the Office of 
                Internal Oversight Services dedicated to United Nations 
                peacekeeping;
                    (E) establishing a centralized database to track 
                cases of misconduct; and
                    (F) creating monitoring mechanisms, such as 
                personnel conduct units, to be present within each 
                mission to monitor compliance and report to the head of 
                mission, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and 
                the Office of Internal Oversight Services.

SEC. 9. UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION AND DEMOCRACY PROMOTION.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) In 2005, 6 of the 53 countries sitting on the United 
        Nations Human Rights Commission were listed by Freedom House as 
        the world's ``worst of the worst'' abusers of human rights.
            (2) The Human Rights Commission has been ineffective in 
        monitoring, promoting, and enforcing internationally recognized 
        human rights standards in Member States.
            (3) The international community has not been able to rely 
        on the human rights mechanisms of the United Nations to 
        anticipate, avert, or end genocide and mass killing.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States should use its voice and vote at the United Nations to pursue 
meaningful reform of international human rights institutions that 
includes actions by the United Nations--
            (1) to abolish the United Nations Human Rights Commission;
            (2) to create a Human Rights Council, composed of Member 
        States that commit themselves to upholding the values embodied 
        in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that has a 
        mandate to focus its work on abuse of human rights in Member 
        States;
            (3) to increase substantially the capacity of the Office of 
        the High Commissioner for Human Rights, including by providing 
        increased funding;
            (4) to strengthen the United Nations Democracy Caucus;
            (5) to establish a Democracy Fund at the United Nations, to 
        be administered by the United Nations Democracy Caucus, which 
        shall consider and recommend proposals for funding;
            (6) to provide to the Security Council regular reporting by 
        the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Special Advisor 
        for the Prevention of Genocide;
            (7) to make ineligible for membership in any United Nations 
        human rights body a Member State that fails to uphold the 
        values embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
        and systematically violates the human rights of its own 
        citizens;
            (8) to make ineligible for membership on any United Nations 
        human rights body a Member State that is--
                    (A) subject to sanctions by the Security Council; 
                or
                    (B) under a Security Council-mandated investigation 
                for human rights abuses; and
            (9) to provide the Office of the United Nations High 
        Commissioner for Human Rights increased resources and greater 
        influence in field operations activities involving multiple 
        United Nations activities, such as operations in Darfur, Sudan, 
        and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

SEC. 10. UNITED NATIONS POLICY REFORM AND SPECIFIC COUNTRY ISSUES.

    It is the sense of Congress that the United States should use its 
voice and vote at the United Nations to pursue policy reforms and 
address specific country issues that include actions by the United 
Nations--
            (1) to adopt a definition of terrorism that builds upon the 
        recommendations of the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on 
        Threats, Challenges and Change and negotiate a comprehensive 
        convention on terrorism;
            (2) to recommend to the Western Europe and Others (WEOG) 
        members that Israel be provided permanent membership in the 
        regional grouping throughout the United Nations system;
            (3) to ensure that the United Nations Relief Works Agency 
        establishes mechanisms to refrain from hiring on its staff 
        members of terrorist organizations, including Hamas; and
            (4) to ensure that the Secretary-General undertakes a 
        review of the role of nongovernmental organizations in the 
        United Nations system, and to encourage the General Assembly, 
        based on such review, to establish an updated United Nations 
        policy on the participation, cooperation, and coordination of 
        nongovernmental organizations in United Nations operations.

SEC. 11. REPORTS ON UNITED NATIONS REFORM.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 270 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the President shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the 
extent to which the United Nations has made significant and measurable 
progress toward meeting the reform requirements described in this Act.
    (b) Determination Regarding Implementation of Reforms.--Each report 
submitted under subsection (a) shall include a determination by the 
President whether the United Nations is making sufficient progress to 
implement the reforms described in this Act.
    (c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee 
on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate 
and the Committee on International Relations and the Committee on 
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 12. WITHHOLDING OF UNITED NATIONS CONTRIBUTIONS.

    (a) In General.--The President is authorized to withhold 50 percent 
of United States contributions to the United Nations in a year if the 
President has determined in the most recent report submitted under 
section 11 that the United Nations is not making sufficient progress to 
implement the reforms described in this Act.
    (b) Availability of Funds.--Funds withheld under this section are 
authorized to remain available until expended.
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