United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-1234

___________________________

American Farm Bureau Federation; National Pork Producers Council,

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; Gina McCarthy, Administrator of the U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency,

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees,

Food & Water Watch; Environmental Integrity Project; Iowa Citizens for

Community Improvement,

lllllllllllllllllllllIntervenor Defendants - Appellees,

------------------------------

National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center,

lllllllllllllllllllllAmicus on Behalf of Appellant(s).

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis

____________

 Submitted: October 22, 2015

 Filed: September 9, 2016

____________
Before LOKEN, MURPHY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

____________

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

The American Farm Bureau Federation and the National Pork Producers

Council appeal the district court’s ruling that they lack Article III standing to bring

a “reverse” Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) suit, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 552,

706(2)(A), challenging the Environmental Protection Agency’s disclosure of certain

information about concentrated animal feeding operations. The associations contend

that this disclosure is an unlawful release of their members’ personal information. 

Assuming, for purposes of standing analysis, that their claim would be successful on

the merits, the associations have established a concrete and particularized injury in

fact traceable to the EPA’s action and redressable by judicial relief. We therefore

conclude the district court erred in dismissing this case for lack of standing. We

further determine that the EPA abused its discretion in deciding that the information

at issue was not exempt from mandatory disclosure under Exemption 6 of FOIA. Id.

§ 552(b)(6). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the district court to consider the

associations’ request for injunctive relief.

I.

The Clean Water Act prohibits the discharge of pollutants into waters of the

United States, except as authorized under the Act. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342,

1362(7), (12), (16). The Act regulates numeroussources of potential water pollution,

including concentrated animal feeding operations (“CAFOs”). Id. § 1362(14). A

CAFO is any area where a certain number of animals are “stabled or confined and fed

or maintained for a total of 45 days or more in any 12-month period” and where

“[c]rops, vegetation, forage growth, or post-harvest residues are not sustained in the

normal growing season.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(1), (2), (4), (6). A CAFO may not

-2-
discharge pollutants into the waters of the United States unless it obtains a National

Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit from the EPA or an authorized state

agency. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), (e), 1342, 1362(14); 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(d), (f).

A person seeking a system permit for a CAFO from either the EPA or an

authorized state agency goes through the same application process. 40 C.F.R.

§§ 122.21(i), 123.25(a)(4). An applicant submits an array of information, including

the name of the owner or operator of the facility, the facility location and mailing

address, a topographic map of the geographic area where the feeding operation is

located, and the estimated amounts of manure, litter, and process wastewater

generated per year. Id. § 122.21(i); see id. § 122.23(d). The Act requires that permit

applications and issued permits must be available to the public. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1342(b)(3), (j).

In 2008, the Government Accountability Office issued a report stating that the

EPA’s information about CAFOs that received system permits from authorized state

agencies was inconsistent and inaccurate. This report recommended that the agency

compile a national inventory of CAFOs with system permits. U.S. Gov’t

Accountability Office, GAO-08-944, Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations:

EPA Needs More Information and a Clearly Defined Strategy to Protect Air and

Water Quality from Pollutants of Concern, at 48 (2008). At that time, a CAFO was

required to obtain a systempermit only if the operation actuallydischarged pollutants. 

The EPA expanded its system-permit requirement to include any CAFO that was

designed, constructed, operated, and maintained in a manner that the CAFO would

discharge, but the Fifth Circuit vacated the revised regulations as exceeding the

agency’s statutory authority. Nat’l Pork Producers Council v. EPA, 635 F.3d 738,

746, 756 (5th Cir. 2011).

In addition to issuing these revised regulations, the EPA agreed—as part of a

settlement agreement with environmental organizations—to propose a separate rule

-3-
requiring all CAFOs to submit information to the EPA, whether or not the operations

had a system permit. The proposed rule required certain information from all

CAFOs: the contact information of the CAFO owner, the location of the operation’s

production area, and whether the operation had applied for a system permit. National

Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Concentrated Animal Feeding

Operation (CAFO) Reporting Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 65,431, 65,437 (proposed Oct. 21,

2011). Commentsfromindustry observers and States, however, suggested that much

of the information to be collected under the proposed rule was already available from

sources other than the owners. The EPA consequently withdrew its proposed

reporting rule and decided to collect the relevant information from federal, state, and

local government sources. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System

(NPDES) Concentrated Animal Feeding Operation (CAFO) Reporting Rule, 77 Fed.

Reg. 42,679, 42,681 (July 20, 2012).

Although the GAO had criticized the EPA’s internal data systems as

incomplete, the agency did retrieve what information was available about system

permits for CAFOs before issuing the proposed reporting rule. Much of the

information from the agency’s internal data systems is available to the public in a

different format on a public website. Enforcement and Compliance History Online,

Env’tl Protection Agency, https://echo.epa.gov/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2016). The

website’s publicly available information includes “facility names, locations, permit

information, inspections, violations, enforcement actions (completed actions only),

and penalties.”

After withdrawing the proposed reporting rule, the EPA obtained information

about CAFOs for its national inventory from several sources. The agency has

collected information from thirty-five States: twenty-seven States provided publicly

accessible information at the EPA’s request, two States referred the agency to the

federal data systems for their CAFO information, and the agency retrieved CAFO

information from eight States’ websites (including two States that provided

-4-
information at the EPA’s request). The EPA also gathered information about six

States from its regional offices. While most of the information received from the

States related to CAFOs, some States also gave the EPA information about other

facilities.

While the agency was in the process of collecting this information, three

organizations—Earthjustice, the Pew Charitable Trusts, and the Natural Resources

Defense Council—submitted FOIA requests for the EPA’s records with information

about CAFOs. Some of the requested information included the legal name of the

owner of the CAFO and the owner’s mailing address, e-mail address, and primary

telephone number. In response, the EPA released to the requesters information

gathered from twenty-eight States and from the EPA’s data systems. The EPA did

not release information obtained fromthe remaining seven States, because the agency

gathered those data after the FOIA requests. After the agency notified agricultural

stakeholders, including the Farm Bureau and the Producers Council, of the release,

the stakeholders raised concerns. The EPA agreed to investigate whether it had

disclosed information that was not readily available to the public and that could

trigger privacy concerns under FOIA.

In a letter dated April 4, 2013, the EPA informed the agricultural stakeholders

of the agency’s view that information concerning CAFOs from nineteen States did

not implicate privacy interests that made the records eligible for withholding under

Exemption 6 of FOIA. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). Exemption 6 excludes from mandatory

disclosure “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which

would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” Id. The EPA

determined that Exemption 6 did not apply because the information fromthe nineteen

States was accessible on a public website or available to the public on request, and

that the release of that information thus did not implicate a substantial privacy

interest. Even assuming a privacy interest, the agency determined that the weight of

the public interest rendered any invasion of privacy not “clearly unwarranted.”

-5-
On the same day as the April 4 letter, the EPA provided an amended response

to the FOIA requesters after completing its review. The agency disclosed all

information regarding CAFOs in nineteen States. The agency did not disclose some

of the information obtained from several other States, however, because that

information pertained to facilities without system permits or facilities not subject to

federal or state mandatory permitting disclosure requirements. The EPA reasoned

that the latter subset of information—which contained individual names, phone

numbers, mailing addresses, and e-mail addresses—implicated a substantial privacy

interest that outweighed the public interest in disclosure. At the close ofthe response,

the EPA asked the FOIA requesters to return the agency’s initial response, and all of

the requesters acceded to the request.

The EPA currently has information regardingCAFOs in seven additional States

that was obtained after the initial FOIA requests at issue here. The agency has not yet

released that information to the FOIA requesters. Since its amended response to the

original FOIA requests, the agency has received seven more information requests

seeking the same or similar information as the original requests; some requests also

seek the information fromthe seven Statesthat had not been released previously. The

agency deferred those requests pending resolution of this litigation.

The Farm Bureau and the Producers Council brought this “reverse” FOIA

action under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). They

sought an order preventing the EPA from making additional disclosures of personal

information that it collects from the States and requiring the agency to recall the

personal information that it released. The Farm Bureau and the Producers Council

argued that 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), known as Exemption 6 of FOIA, protected the

information from mandatory disclosure, and that the agency abused its discretion and

acted arbitrarily and capriciously or contrary to law by not withholding the

information. Several environmental organizations—Food & Water Watch,

-6-
Environmental Integrity Project, and Iowa Citizens for Community

Improvement—intervened in support of disclosure of the information. 

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court

granted summary judgment for the EPA and the Intervenors, concluding that the Farm

Bureau and the Producers Council lacked standing under Article III of the

Constitution. The Farm Bureau and the Producers Council appeal.

II.

Article III ofthe Constitution limits the jurisdiction offederal courtsto “Cases”

and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. “[S]tanding is an essential and

unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.” Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). A plaintiff establishes standing by

showing that he has suffered an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the challenged

conduct of the defendant and that will likely be redressed by a favorable decision. Id.

at 560-61. “The standing inquiry is not, however, an assessment of the merits of a

plaintiff’s claim.” Red River Freethinkers v. City of Fargo, 679 F.3d 1015, 1023 (8th

Cir. 2012); see Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 591 (8th Cir. 2009). 

In assessing a plaintiff’s Article III standing, we must “assume that on the merits the

plaintiffs would be successful in their claims.” Muir v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 529

F.3d 1100, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

Associations like the Farm Bureau and the Producers Council have standing

to bring suit on behalf oftheir members, provided that the “members would otherwise

have standing to sue in their own right, the interests at stake are germane to the

organization’s purpose, and neither the claimasserted northe relief requested requires

the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.

Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000). The EPA admits that

-7-
the latter two elements are satisfied; the only dispute is whether any members of the

organizations would have standing to sue in their own right.

The district court accepted the EPA’s argument that the Farm Bureau and the

Producers Council lack standing because the personal information of their members

is already publicly available. The Farm Bureau and the Producers Council argue that

the court’s analysis conflates the requirements of standing with the merits of their

claims under the APA.

Injury in fact means an actual or imminent invasion of a concrete and

particularized, legally protected interest. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. A party’s injury in

fact is distinct from its potential causes of action. Carlsen v. GameStop, Inc., No.

15-2453, 2016 WL 4363162, at *3 (8th Cir. Aug. 16, 2016); Braden, 588 F.3d at 591,

593. Accordingly, a plaintiff need not prove an unlawful action to have standing,

because “whether a statute has been violated ‘is a question that goes to the merits . . .

and not to constitutional standing.’” Muir, 529 F.3d at 1105-06 (quoting La. Energy

& Power Auth. v. FERC, 141 F.3d 364, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1998)); see Red River

Freethinkers, 679 F.3d at 1023.

The EPA reasons that because the disputed information was publicly available

on the Internet or available for public review, further distribution of the information

could not establish any injury. That conclusion, however, assesses the merits of the

asserted privacy interest under FOIA rather than whether the associations’ members

had a legally cognizable interest in preventing the agency’s release of their personal

information. It was undisputed on the motionsfor summary judgment that the agency

has released or will release personal information of association members without their

consent as part of its response to the FOIA requests. That is sufficient to establish a

concrete and particularized injury in fact: the nonconsensual dissemination of

personal information. Whether the release of this information “would constitute a

-8-
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), is a separate

inquiry into the merits of the claim.

The EPA also contends that the plaintiffs cannot show causation or

redressability. The agency asserts that the disputed information is already publicly

available through the States, and the court cannot prevent further distribution and use

of that information by third parties. This argument, however, rests on the agency’s

flawed understanding of the plaintiffs’ alleged injury in fact. The asserted injury is

the nonconsensual disclosure of personal information by the EPA. That injury was

caused by EPA’s disclosures and threatened disclosures, and it can be redressed by

an order requiring EPA to refrain from future disclosures and to recall information

previously disclosed.

The Intervenors argue that the claims of the Farm Bureau and the Producers

Council are moot because the EPA has already produced the information requested,

and the information will remain in the public domain. The case is still live, however,

because EPA has proposed to disclose more information fromseven States, including

Minnesota, and because EPA has the capacity to request the return ofinformation that

it already disclosed.

The Intervenors further contend that a dispute over the unreleased information

from seven States is not ripe for review because the EPA has not made a final

decision about whether to disclose it. See 5 U.S.C. § 704. The agency’s decision

letter of April 4, however, is a “final agency action” under § 704, because the letter

marks “the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process . . . from which

legal consequences will flow.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997)

(internal quotations omitted). Based on its analysis in the April letter, the agency

committed to release data that it had gathered about CAFOs. The agency agreed to

delay releasing information gathered from certain States only until the conclusion of

this litigation. The agency’s decision letter is therefore is a final, reviewable action

-9-
under the APA. For essentially the same reasons, the decision is ripe for review. See

Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 782 F.3d 994, 1002 n.2 (8th Cir. 2015).

In sum, members of the Farm Bureau and Producers Council allege that the

EPA’s disclosure of their personal information was based on a misapplication of a

FOIA exemption designed to protect personal privacy. That allegation and the

undisputed evidence of nonconsensual disclosures or impending disclosures by the

EPA suffice to establish an injury in fact that was caused by the agency and is

redressable by the court. The associations therefore have standing to challenge the

agency’s action.

III.

Although the district court ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue, the

court’s decision in substance addressed the merits of whether the EPA’s disclosure

constituted a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy subject to Exemption

6 of FOIA. As the district court’s decision on that question is foreordained, there is

no point in remanding for the court to address the merits of the agency’s action on

Exemption 6. The parties have fully briefed the issue, and neither party identifies a

question of fact that must be resolved by the district court. We thus proceed to

consider whether the EPA’s decision concerning Exemption 6 was an abuse of

discretion, arbitrary and capricious, or contrary to law. 

As a general matter, FOIA requires that the government provide information

requested under FOIA to a requester. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a); see In re Dep’t of Justice,

999 F.2d 1302, 1305 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc). The Act, however, includes nine

categories of information that are exempt from mandatory disclosure. 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(b). If requested information is exempt from mandatory disclosure, the agency

normally may still elect to disclose the information, “unless something independent

-10-
of FOIA prohibits disclosure.” Campaign for Family Farms v. Glickman, 200 F.3d

1180, 1185 (8th Cir. 2000).

Exemption 6 of FOIA states that an agency is not required to disclose

“personnel and medical files and similar files” if such disclosure “would constitute

a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). An

agency’s review under Exemption 6 involves three steps. First, the agency must

determine whether the request seeks personnel, medical, or similar files. The parties

do not dispute that the information here involves “similar files.” 

The agency must then determine whether disclosure would compromise a

“substantial” privacy interest. See Multi Ag Media LLC v. Dep’t of Agric., 515 F.3d

1224, 1228-29 (D.C. Cir. 2008); accord Cook v. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin.,

758 F.3d 168, 175-76 (2d Cir. 2014). If the agency determines that there is a

substantial privacy interest in the information, the agency must then “balance the

privacy interest of the individual against the public interest in disclosure” to

determine whether the exemption applies. Campaign for Family Farms, 200 F.3d at

1185; see Multi Ag Media, 515 F.3d at 1229-31.

As a disclosure statute, FOIA provides only a cause of action to compel

disclosure; it does not provide a means of preventing disclosure. See 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(a)(4)(B); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 290-94 (1979). A party

aggrieved by an actual or impending disclosure, however, may bring a “reverse”

FOIA action under the APA and obtain relief if the agency’s decision to disclose the

information is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a); see Campaign for Family Farms, 200

F.3d at 1184. A reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for a permissible

judgment of the disclosing agency, but the agency must examine the relevant factors

and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n

of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).

-11-
The associations dispute the agency’s conclusion that disclosure of the

information would not compromise a “substantial” privacy interest. See Cook, 758

F.3d at 175-76; accord Multi Ag Media, 515 F.3d at 1229. In this analysis, “[a]

substantial privacy interest is anything greater than a de minimis privacy interest.” 

Multi Ag Media, 515 F.3d at 1229-30. While Exemption 6 speaks only of “personal

privacy,” we have never employed an “overly technical distinction between

individuals acting in a purely private capacity and those acting in an entrepreneurial

capacity.” Campaign for Family Farms, 200 F.3d at 1189; see Multi Ag Media, 515

F.3d at 1228. Rather, we construe Exemption 6 broadly “as a general exemption that

excludes ‘those kinds of files the disclosure of which might harm the individual.’” 

Campaign for Family Farms, 200 F.3d at 1188-89 (quoting U.S. Dept. of State v.

Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 599 (1982)). A CAFO owner thus may have a

substantial individual privacy interest in the disclosure of the operations’ records if

the disclosure of those files would harm the owner personally. Id.

The information requested here includes personal information about CAFO

owners, including names, home addresses, telephone numbers, GPS coordinates of

homes, and information from which financial information could be gleaned. 

Declarant David Rydberg, for example, avers that his home address is the same as

the address of his facility, that his family lives at that address, and that the global

positioning coordinates that he provided to the State of Iowa match the location of his

home. The EPA, however, has released that information over Rydberg’s objection. 

The Farm Bureau and the Producers Council provide similar affidavits from several

Minnesota farmers opposed to the impending release oftheir personal information by

the agency.

The disclosure of names, addresses, telephone numbers, GPS coordinates, and

financial statuses can implicate substantial privacy interests. See U.S. Dep’t of Def.

v. FLRA, 510 U.S. 487, 500 (1994); Campaign for Family Farms, 200 F.3d at 1188-

89; Multi Ag Media, 515 F.3d at 1230. In this context, the disclosure of such

-12-
information would constitute a substantial invasion of privacy, because it would

facilitate unwanted contact with CAFO owners by FOIA requesters and their

associates, and even potential harassment of CAFO owners and their families. See

U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 176 n.12 (1991); Forest Serv. Emps. for

Envtl. Ethics v. U.S. Forest Serv., 524 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The

avoidance of harassment is a cognizable privacy interest under Exemption 6.”). One

member of Food & Water Watch, for example, admits to having “participated in

aerial and ground investigations of poultry facilities” and avers that “to protect our

waterway under the Act, it is important to know the name and proper contact

information for these facilities and their owners and operators.” Declarant Rick

Grommersch of Minnesota provided details of an incident during which members of

an environmental organization entered his property and told him that they were going

to post pictures of his property online. The agency itself acknowledged in its

proposed reporting rule “that providing latitude and longitude information mightraise

security or privacy concerns.” National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System

(NPDES) Concentrated Animal Feeding Operation (CAFO) Reporting Rule, 76 Fed.

Reg. at 65,438.

The EPA’s decision letter nonetheless concluded that Exemption 6 did not

apply because the requested information was “well known or widely available within

the public domain.” The agency emphasizes that much of the disputed information

is accessible on federal or state websites or otherwise available in the public record.

The agency’s conclusion on this point was contrary to law. “An individual’s

interest in controlling the dissemination of information regarding personal matters

does not dissolve simply because that information may be available to the public in

some form.” FLRA, 510 U.S. at 500. The EPA here is more than simply a second

source for identical, publicly available information. The agency has aggregated vast

collections of data from the majority of States—much of it obtained through statespecific information requests—and provided it to requesters in a single response.

-13-
In United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom

of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 757 (1989), news organizations sought the release of

criminal “rap sheets” compiled by the United States Department ofJustice. These rap

sheets compiled publicly-available information from local, state, and federal law

enforcement agencies into a single report of subjects’ personal information and

criminal history. Id. at 752. The Supreme Court upheld the Justice Department’s

refusal to release the rap sheets, and rejected the requesters’ argument that there was

no exemption from FOIA disclosure because the information was publicly available. 

The Court noted the “vast difference” between public records that might be found

after a diligent search through various administrative files and “a computerized

summary located in a single clearinghouse of information.” Id. at 764. Reporters

Committee considered a privacy interest under Exemption 7 of FOIA rather than

Exemption 6, but the decision provides important guidance in assessing a privacy

interest under Exemption 6. See FLRA, 510 U.S. at 496 n.6.

Like the requesters in Reporters Committee, the requesters here seek access to

“a single clearinghouse ofinformation” compiled by a government agency. While the

advent of the Internet has made some of the information at issue here more easily

accessible than the information in Reporters Committee, CAFO owners still have a

privacy interest in preventing the mass aggregation and release of their personal

information by the government. The agency’s own extensive collection efforts and

advocacy groups’ multi-year effort to obtain the data show that the EPA has

consolidated information that would otherwise exist in considerably greater obscurity. 

See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 780.

That information about a particular owner might be obtained through publiclyavailable sources likewise does not preclude a substantial privacy interest. There is

an important distinction “between the mere ability to access information and the

likelihood of actual public focus on that information.” Am. Civil Liberties Union v.

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 750 F.3d 927, 933 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Although a requester

-14-
might be able to find the information he seeks on a website or in a State’s publicly

available files, the agency’s comprehensive listing of CAFOs substantially increases

the public visibility and accessibility of that information. The agency’s release of the

complete set of data on a silver platter, so to speak, eliminates the need for requesters

and others to scour different websites and to pursue public records requests to create

a comprehensive database of their own. If the information were so easily accessible,

then it is passing strange that the parties would engage in protracted and expensive

litigation to secure it through the Freedomof Information Act. See ReportersComm.,

489 U.S. at 764. We conclude that the organizations’ members have a substantial

privacy interest in the personal information at issue.

As to some of the disclosures, the agency concluded alternatively that even if

there were a substantial privacy interest in the number, size, and location of animal

livestock operations, that privacy interest was outweighed by the public’s interest in

disclosure. In assessing that conclusion, “the only relevant public interest” is “the

extent to which disclosure of the information sought would shed light on an agency’s

performance of its statutory duties or otherwise let citizens know what their

government is up to.” Bibles v. Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n, 519 U.S. 355, 355-56 (1997)

(per curiam) (quotations and brackets omitted). FOIA’s purpose “is not fostered by

disclosure of information about private citizens that is accumulated in various

governmental files but that reveals little or nothing about an agency’s own conduct.” 

Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 773; see FLRA, 510 U.S. at 495-96.

The EPA assertsthat there is a public interest in disclosing the collected CAFO

information because it providesthe public with information about the agency’s efforts

to implement the Clean Water Act. But the disclosure of names, addresses, phone

numbers, e-mail addresses, and GPS coordinates does not directly shed light on the

agency’s performance of its statutory duties. See 489 U.S. at 773. The EPA argues

instead that the disclosures will indirectly promote this public interest by showing

that the agency followed through on its commitment to gather CAFO information

-15-
from existing sources and demonstrating that the agency is succeeding in its efforts

to create a comprehensive inventory of information about CAFOs.

The EPA’s contention is unconvincing, because other records responsive to the

FOIA requests address those two public interests without invading personal privacy. 

The EPA’s 2012 memorandumof understanding with the Association ofClean Water

Administrators details the agency’s collaborative effort with the Association to focus

on “identifying CAFOs and obtaining pertinent information about CAFOs on a state

by state basis for use” by the EPA. The memorandum explains the agency’s “plan to

take the following steps to achieve” the listed objectives, including that the EPA

would “[u]se best effortsto facilitate the collection and transfer ofCAFO information

currently maintained by states” to the agency. Another internal document sets forth

an “Implementation Workplan” that outlines “specific tasks” to meet the agency’s

“action items” and establishes a time frame for collecting the CAFO data. 

The records also show that the agency followed through on its plan. An e-mail

from an EPA employee in November 2012 explained to a Florida state official that

the agency had completed forty-two telephone calls with state officials to collect

CAFO information. The e-mail attached a standard agenda used for those calls,

which included discussions about the “[a]mount and format of state permitting

records for CAFO data elements,” along with the “[e]xchange of information”

between the respective State and the EPA. There is a presumption of regularity

accorded to the EPA’s collection efforts, and the agency records described above

largely address the public interest in knowing how the agency proceeded to collect

CAFO information in the wake of the GAO report. See Ray, 502 U.S. at 179.

The disputed spreadsheets themselves could be disclosed in redacted form and

still inform the public about the agency’s collection efforts. See id. at 174, 177-79. 

If information implicating a substantial privacy interest were redacted, the

spreadsheets with columns reflecting only system permit status, city, county, and zip

-16-
code would reflect the scope and comprehensiveness of the EPA’s collection efforts

without intruding on the personal privacy of CAFO owners. The marginal public

interest in disclosing personal information such as names, street addresses, phone

numbers, e-mail addresses, and GPS coordinates is de minimis. To recognize a public

interest in disclosure of private information merely to verify that it has been collected

would swallow the rule that Exemption 6 protects against clearly unwarranted

invasions of personal privacy.

The EPA suggests that Congress, having required public disclosure of permits

and permit applications, placed a premium on citizen involvement in the regulatory

process under the Clean Water Act. Therefore, the agency argues, there must be a

public interest in releasing personal information about CAFO owners to the

requesters. The Clean Water Act, however, did not amend the public interests that

are relevant under FOIA—i.e., shedding light on an agency’s performance of its

statutory duties. That the requesters may seek to vindicate policies underlying the

Clean Water Act does not affect the FOIA analysis under Exemption 6. See FLRA,

510 U.S. at 499.

All told, we conclude that the EPA’s disclosure of spreadsheets containing

personal information about owners of CAFOs would invade a substantial privacy

interest of the owners while furthering little in the way of public interest that is

cognizable under FOIA. Under those circumstances, disclosure “would constitute a

clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6); see FLRA,

510 U.S. at 500-02, and it was an abuse of discretion for the agency to conclude

otherwise. Accordingly, the agency records at issue were exempt from mandatory

disclosure. Campaign for Family Farms, 200 F.3d at 1189.

The Farm Bureau and the Producers Council urge this court to go further and

direct the entry of injunctive relief that would prevent the EPA in its discretion from

disclosing the records. We explained in Campaign for Family Farms that normally,

-17-
“an agency has discretion to disclose information within a FOIA exemption, unless

something independent of FOIA prohibits disclosure.” Id. at 1185. The associations

contend that the Privacy Act is a source of law independent of FOIA that forbids

disclosure. They rely on a provision of the Privacy Act that prevents an agency from

disclosing any record which is contained in a system of records without the prior

written consent of the individual to whomthe record pertains, unless disclosure of the

record would be required under FOIA. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2). The associations also

contend that it would be arbitrary and capricious under the APA for the EPA to

release information contrary to an internal agency policy that allegedly requires

categorical withholding of information subject to Exemption 6. The EPA responds

that the cited provision of the Privacy Act does not apply to the records at issue in this

case, and that the agency has no internal policy in place that would have prohibited

disclosure if the agency had applied Exemption 6. The record was not developed,

however, concerning any internal agency policy, and the district court—having

dismissed the case for lack ofstanding—did not address whether injunctive relief was

appropriate on either ground asserted by the associations. We therefore remand the

case for further proceedings on this question.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment ofthe district court isreversed, and the

case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

______________________________

-18-