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[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1397 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1397

 To amend title 10, United States Code, to provide for an increase in 
the minimum end-strength level for active duty personnel for the United 
                  States Army, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             July 14, 2005

 Mr. Lieberman (for himself, Mrs. Clinton, Mr. Nelson of Florida, Mr. 
 Reed, and Mr. Salazar) introduced the following bill; which was read 
         twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend title 10, United States Code, to provide for an increase in 
the minimum end-strength level for active duty personnel for the United 
                  States Army, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``United States Army Relief Act of 
2005''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The 2004 National Military Strategy of the United 
        States assigns the Army the task of operating with the other 
        Armed Forces to provide for homeland defense, deter aggression 
        forward from and in four different regions around the world, 
        conduct military operations in two overlapping but 
        geographically disparate major campaigns, and win decisively in 
        one of those campaigns before shifting focus to the next one.
            (2) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General 
        Richard Myers, has directed that the Army must be able to ``win 
        decisively'' in one theater, even when it is committed to a 
        number of other contingencies.
            (3) While Congress lauds the current efforts by the 
        Administration to reduce demands upon ground forces by 
        continuing to pursue the transformation of the United States 
        military as a whole, the recent experiences of the Army in Iraq 
        serve to underscore the fact that there is, as of yet, no 
        substitute for having sufficient troops to conduct personnel-
        intensive post-conflict missions.
            (4) The current force requirements posed by the ongoing 
        operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere as part of the 
        Global War on Terror are unsustainable for the long term and 
        undermine the ability of the United States military to 
        successfully execute the National Military Strategy.
            (5) Although the burden may be a heavy one, we as a nation 
        and as a people must not, will not, shy away from our 
        engagement in world affairs to defend our interests and to 
        defend those who are themselves defenseless.
            (6) Our engagement in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the greater 
        Middle East is, as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated, 
        a ``generational'' one.
            (7) Although our commitments in this region--and around the 
        world--are vital, the Army has been ``overused'' according to 
        the Chief of the United States Army Reserve.
            (8) The Army currently has approximately 499,000 active 
        duty troops, and these are backed up by nearly 700,000 members 
        of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve.
            (9) This number is a third less than the force level on 
        hand when the first Persian Gulf War was fought in 1991.
            (10) Approximately 150,000 of these troops are in Iraq. 
        Nearly 10,000 troops are in Afghanistan. 1,700 serve in Kosovo. 
        37,000 serve on the Korean peninsula.
            (11) As of 2005 the relationship between the total number 
        of troops and the number of operationally deployed troops has 
        resulted, as the commanding general of the 18th Corps of the 
        Army at Fort Bragg remarked in 2004, in an active-duty force 
        that is ``stretched extraordinarily thin.''
            (12) A former Army Deputy Chief of Staff has stated that in 
        light of the growing operational demands upon it in the 
        strategic environment after September 11, 2001, that the Army 
        ``is too small to do its current missions''.
            (13) That former Army Deputy Chief of Staff further stated 
        that the current size of the Army, coupled with the current 
        demands upon it, has resulted in a loss of ``the resiliency to 
        provide either strategic balance--what you need if some other 
        thing flares up--or to be able to give a respite as the troops 
        rotate back from overseas areas where they've been in combat.''
            (14) In its attempts to fulfill its missions with too few 
        troops, the Army has risked ``damaging'' the force 
        significantly or ``even breaking it in the next five years'', 
        according to a division commander during Operation Desert 
        Storm.
            (15) In a December 2004 letter to the Chief of Staff, 
        United States Army, the Chief of the United States Army Reserve 
        wrote that ``the current demands'' of operations in the Middle 
        East were ``spreading the Reserve force too thin'' and that his 
        command ``was in grave danger'' of being unable to meet other 
        missions abroad or domestically, and that the Army Reserve was 
        ``rapidly degenerating into a `broken force'''.
            (16) The letter referred to in paragraph (15) was intended, 
        the Chief of the United States Army Reserve wrote, not ``to 
        sound alarmist ... [but] ... to send a clear, distinctive, 
        signal of deepening concern'' to his superiors.
            (17) In addition to hampering the ability of the Army to 
        successfully complete the missions assigned to it, this 
        ``overuse'' has significant consequences for domestic homeland 
        security operations.
            (18) A disproportionate number of Federal, State, and local 
        first responders are also members of the National Guard or 
        Reserve.
            (19) At a time of strain for large municipalities 
        struggling to secure their infrastructure against the threat of 
        terrorism, the drain on available personnel as well as budgets 
        is unacceptable.
            (20) An increase of the end-strength of the Army is in the 
        best interests of the people of the United States and their 
        interests abroad, and is consistent with the duties and 
        obligations of Congress as set forth in the Constitution.
            (21) An increase of 100,000 troops over the permanently 
        authorized level for the Army for fiscal year 2004 of 482,000 
        troops will provide a long-term, lasting solution to the 
        current operational constraints and future mission requirements 
        of the Army.
            (22) Progress was made toward that solution when Congress 
        authorized an increase of 20,000 troops in the end-strength of 
        the Army for fiscal year 2005 in the Ronald W. Reagan National 
        Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-
        375).
            (23) An increase in the permanent authorized end-strength 
        for the Army of 80,000 troops is required to meet the 100,000-
        troop increase level that will provide a lasting, long-term 
        solution to personnel problems currently being experienced by 
        the Army.
            (24) This number will equip the Army with sufficient 
        personnel so that it may not only engage in a stabilization 
        operation like Iraq, but so that it may do so while maintaining 
        optimal troop rotation schedules.
            (25) This conclusion is supported by the November 2003 
        testimony of the Director of the Congressional Budget Office, 
        Douglas Holtz-Eakin, before the Committee on Armed Services of 
        the House of Representatives.

SEC. 3. INCREASE IN END-STRENGTH FOR THE ARMY.

    Section 691 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding 
at the end the following new subsection:
    ``(e) Notwithstanding subsection (b)(1), the authorization for the 
number of members of the Army at the end of each fiscal year as follows 
shall be not less than the number specified for such fiscal year:
            ``(1) Fiscal year 2006, 522,400.
            ``(2) Fiscal year 2007, 542,400.
            ``(3) Fiscal year 2008, 562,400.
            ``(4) Fiscal year 2009, 582,400.
            ``(5) Any fiscal year after fiscal year 2009, 582,400.''.
                                 <all>
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