GAO 

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Chairman, Committee on 

Homeland Security, House of 

Representatives 

INFORMATION 

SHARING 

Federal Agencies Are 

Sharing Border and 

Terrorism Information 

with Local and Tribal 

Law Enforcement 

Agencies, but 

Additional Efforts Are 

Needed 

December 2009 

GAO-10-41 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

December 2009

INFORMATION SHARING

Federal Agencies Are Sharing Border and Terrorism 

Information with Local and Tribal Law Enforcement 

Highlights of GAO-10-41, a report to the Agencies, but Additional Efforts Are Needed 

Chairman, Committee on Homeland 

Security, House of Representatives 

Officials from 15 of the 20 local and tribal law enforcement agencies in the 

border communities GAO contacted said they received information directly 

from at least one federal agency in the vicinity (Border Patrol, ICE, or the FBI)

that was useful in enhancing their situational awareness of border crimes and 

potential terrorist threats. Nine of the 20 agencies reported receiving 

information from all three federal agencies. Overall, where federal officials 

had discussed local and tribal officials’ information needs and had established 

information sharing partnerships and related mechanisms to share 

information with them—consistent with the National Strategy for 

Information Sharing and best practices—the majority of the local and tribal 

officials reported receiving useful information. However, most local and tribal 

officials that reported federal agencies had not discussed information needs 

and had not established partnerships with them also said they had not 

received useful information. By more fully identifying the information needs 

of local and tribal agencies along the borders and establishing information 

sharing partnerships, federal agencies could be better positioned to provide 

local and tribal agencies with information that enhances their situational 

awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist threats. 

Federal officials at two of the five state fusion centers we visited were 

supporting fusion center efforts to develop border intelligence products or 

reports that contained information on border crimes and potential terrorist 

threats, as discussed in the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 

Commission Act of 2007. DHS recognizes that it needs to add personnel to 

other fusion centers in border states to, among other things, support the 

creation of such products, and is developing plans to do so, but cited funding 

issues and competing priorities as barriers. The creation of border 

intelligence products—such as those developed by two of the fusion centers 

we visited—represent potential approaches that DHS and the FBI could use to 

identify promising practices that other fusion centers could adopt. Identifying 

such practices is important because of the central role the federal government 

places on fusion centers to facilitate the sharing of information. Also, DHS 

had not obtained feedback from local and tribal officials on the utility and 

quality of the border intelligence products that its analysts in fusion centers 

have helped to develop. Additional efforts to obtain such feedback would 

support DHS and FBI efforts to improve the utility and quality of future 

products. 

Officials from 13 of the 20 local and tribal agencies in the border communities 

we contacted said that federal agencies had not defined what suspicious 

activities or indicators rise to the level of potential terrorist threats and should 

be reported to federal agencies or fusion centers. Recognizing this problem, 

federal agencies are participating in national efforts to standardize suspicious 

activity reporting. Until such efforts are implemented, defining suspicious 

activity indicators and current reporting processes would help better position 

local and tribal officials along the borders to identify and report incidents 

indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorist threats. 

Information is a crucial tool in 

securing the nation’s borders 

against crimes and potential 

terrorist threats, with the 

Department of Homeland 

Security’s (DHS) Border Patrol and 

Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE), and the FBI, 

having key information sharing 

roles. GAO was asked to assess the 

extent to which (1) local and tribal 

officials in border communities 

received useful information from 

their federal partners, (2) federal 

agencies supported state fusion 

centers’—where states collaborate 

with federal agencies to improve 

information sharing—efforts to 

develop border intelligence 

products, and (3) local and tribal 

agencies were aware of the 

suspicious activities they are to 

report. To conduct this work, GAO 

analyzed relevant laws, directives, 

policies, and procedures; contacted 

a nongeneralizable sample of 20 

agencies in border communities 

and five fusion centers (based on 

geographic location and size); and 

interviewed DHS and FBI officials. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DHS and 

the FBI more fully identify the 

information needs of and establish 

partnerships with local and tribal 

officials along the borders; identify 

promising practices in developing 

border intelligence products within 

fusion centers and obtain feedback 

on the products; and define the 

suspicious activities that local and 

tribal officials in border 

communities are to report and how 

to report them. DHS agreed and the 

FBI did not comment. 

View GAO-10-41 or key components.

For more information, contact Eileen Larence 

at (202) 512-6510 or larencee@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-10-41 

Contents 

Letter 1

Background 5 

Most Local and Tribal Agencies in Border Communities We 

Contacted Found Information from Federal Partners Useful for 

Situational Awareness, but Adopting Further Measures Could 

Close Other Information Sharing Gaps 11 

Federal Agencies Are Supporting Some Fusion Center Efforts to 

Develop Border Intelligence Products, but Additional DHS 

Personnel and Other Measures Could Strengthen Future Efforts 25 

Local and Tribal Agencies in Border Communities We Contacted 

Could Better Support National Counterterrorism Efforts If They 

Were More Aware of the Suspicious Activities They Are to 

Report 35 

Conclusions 39 

Recommendations for Executive Action 40 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 41 

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 44 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security 48 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 53 

Figures 

Figure 1: Number of Local and Tribal Agencies We Contacted That 

Reported Receiving Information from Federal Agencies in 

Their Vicinity 12 

Figure 2: Number of Local and Tribal Agencies We Contacted That 

Reported Discussing Their Information Needs with 

Federal Agencies in the Vicinity 18 

Figure 3: Number of Local and Tribal Agencies We Contacted That 

Reported Having or Were Developing an Information 

Sharing Partnership with Federal Agencies in the Vicinity 21 

Figure 4: DHS Personnel Assigned to Land Border State Fusion 

Centers, August 2009 30 

 Border Information Sharing 
Abbreviations 

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DOJ Department of Justice 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

I&A DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

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Page ii GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
Page 1 GAO-10-41 

 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

December 18, 2009 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson 

Chairman 

Committee on Homeland Security 

House of Representatives 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has identified terrorism as 

one of the primary threats the United States faces on the northern and 

southwest international land borders, along with illegal immigration and 

drug trafficking, among others. In many border communities, the 

individuals who are best positioned to observe suspicious activities that 

may be related to these threats and report the activities to the federal 

government are local and tribal law enforcement officers, particularly in 

communities with a minimal federal presence. Therefore, it is critical that 

federal agencies with key responsibilities for securing the nation’s 

borders—including DHS’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the Department of 

Justice’s (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)—share information 

with local and tribal officials in border communities that enhances their 

situational awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist threats.1

Since information sharing weaknesses were a major contributing factor to 

the nation’s lack of preparedness for the terrorist attacks of September 11, 

2001, the federal government has called for a number of information 

sharing initiatives. One theme common to many of these efforts is for 

federal agencies to share information on terrorism-related matters with 

local and tribal law enforcement agencies—including those in border 

communities—to enhance their situational awareness of potential terrorist 

threats.2

 The initiatives also recognize that an improved information 

sharing environment is to be constructed on a foundation of trusted 

partnerships at all levels of government based on a shared commitment to 

1

This report focuses on the border information sharing efforts of CBP’s Border Patrol, ICE, 

and the FBI and is not intended to assess or compare the overall efforts of DHS and DOJ, 

which include many other component agencies. 

2

Terrorism-related information includes homeland security, terrorism, and weapons of 

mass destruction information. 

 Border Information Sharing 
 

detect, prevent, disrupt, preempt, and mitigate the effects of terrorism. 

Further, most states and some local governments have established fusion 

centers that address gaps in terrorism-related information sharing that the 

federal government cannot address alone and provide a conduit for 

information sharing within the state.3

 Finally, since late 2007, the federal 

government has been working with state and local law enforcement 

agencies to establish a nationwide process for reporting suspicious 

activities that may be related to terrorism. 

Our prior work on the importance of including state, local, and tribal 

entities in information sharing has shown that this sharing continues to be 

a significant challenge for the federal government. In January 2005, we 

designated information sharing for homeland security a high-risk area 

because the government had continued to face formidable challenges in 

analyzing and disseminating this information in a timely, accurate, and 

useful manner. We reported that information is a crucial tool in fighting 

terrorism and that its timely dissemination is critical to maintaining the 

security of our nation. This area remained on the high-risk list for our 

January 2009 update.4

 As a result of this designation, we continuously 

monitor federal information sharing efforts. 

Recognizing that local and tribal law enforcement agencies in border 

communities are important partners in our first line of defense against 

criminals and terrorists entering the United States, you asked us to assess 

information sharing between federal agencies and local and tribal law 

enforcement agencies in border communities. Specifically, our work 

addressed to what extent 

• local and tribal law enforcement agencies in border communities are 

receiving information from their federal partners that enhances the 

agencies’ situational awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist 

threats; 

• federal agencies are assisting fusion centers’ efforts to develop border 

intelligence products that enhance local and tribal agencies’ situational 

awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist threats; and 

 

3

In general, fusion centers are collaborative efforts of two or more agencies that provide 

resources, expertise, and information to the center with the goal of maximizing their ability 

to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity. 

4

GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-09-271 (Washington D.C.: January 2009). 

Page 2 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

• local and tribal law enforcement agencies in border communities are 

aware of the specific types of suspicious activities related to terrorism 

they are to report and to whom, and the process through which they 

should report this information. 

To identify criteria for answering these questions, we analyzed relevant 

laws, directives, policies, and procedures related to information sharing, 

such as the October 2007 National Strategy for Information Sharing and 

the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 

(9/11 Commission Act).5

 The 9/11 Commission Act provides for the 

establishment of a State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative at 

DHS and contains numerous provisions that address the federal 

government’s information sharing responsibilities to state and local fusion 

centers, including those that serve border communities. 

To examine the information sharing that occurs between local and tribal 

law enforcement agencies in border communities and federal agencies 

that have a local presence in these communities (CBP’s Border Patrol, 

ICE, and the FBI), we conducted site visits to five states that are 

geographically dispersed along the northern and southwest borders 

(Arizona, Montana, New York, Texas, and Washington). Within these 

states, we met with county sheriffs, local police chiefs, and tribal police 

chiefs from a total of 23 law enforcement agencies and asked them about 

the information they received from federal agencies in their localities.6

 We 

also asked them about whether federal officials had discussed local and 

tribal officials’ information needs and had established information sharing 

partnerships and related mechanisms to share information with them—

consistent with the National Strategy for Information Sharing and best 

practices described in GAO reports.7

 After our visits, we sent follow-up 

questions to all 23 local and tribal agencies we visited in order to obtain 

consistency in how we requested and obtained information for reporting 

purposes. Three agencies did not respond to our follow-up efforts and 

were excluded from our analysis. Thus, our analysis and reporting is based 

on our visits and subsequent activities with the 20 local and tribal agencies 

that responded to our follow-up questions. We also met with local 

 

5

See generally Pub. L. No. 110-53, tit. V, 121 Stat. 266, 306-35 (2007). 

6

App. I contains additional information on our criteria for selecting the local and tribal 

agencies we visited. 

7

See, for example, GAO, Information Sharing: Practices That Can Benefit Critical 

Infrastructure Protection, GAO-02-24 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001). 

Page 3 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

representatives of Border Patrol, ICE, and the FBI to discuss their 

perspectives on the information sharing that occurred, and compared this 

information to that provided by local and tribal agencies in order to 

identify barriers to sharing. 

To assess the extent to which federal agencies assisted fusion centers in 

developing border intelligence products, as discussed in the 9/11 

Commission Act, we reviewed products developed by fusion centers to 

determine the extent to which they provided border security–relevant 

information.8

 We also met with and conducted subsequent follow-up 

conversations with fusion center directors and other senior fusion center 

officials in the five states we visited to obtain their views on the 

importance of developing such products and about the level of support 

federal agencies were providing in developing these products. We asked 

each of the 20 local and tribal law enforcement agencies we contacted 

whether they received border intelligence products from their state’s 

primary fusion center and, if so, we discussed their views on the 

usefulness of such products. We also interviewed senior officials from 

DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)—the office responsible for 

coordinating the federal government’s support to fusion centers—and 

headquarters components of Border Patrol, ICE, and the FBI to discuss 

their efforts to support fusion centers’ development of border intelligence 

products, identify promising practices for developing such products, and 

obtain feedback from local and tribal officials on the usefulness of the 

products. 

Finally, to determine the extent to which local and tribal agencies in 

border communities were aware of the suspicious activities they are to 

report, we asked officials from the 20 agencies what, if any, information 

federal agencies or fusion centers had provided them on the kinds of 

suspicious activities that could be indicators of or precursors to terrorism 

and what processes they had in place for reporting information on these 

activities.9

 We also reviewed the Findings and Recommendations of the 

Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) Support and Implementation Project

to determine the extent to which the federal government recognizes the 

 

8

In general, border security–relevant information includes information on border crimes—

such as illegal immigration and drug trafficking—and potential terrorist threats. 

9

In general, suspicious activity is defined as observed behavior or incidents that may be 

indicative of intelligence gathering or preoperational planning related to terrorism, crime, 

espionage, or other illicit intentions. 

Page 4 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

role of suspicious activity reporting for detecting and mitigating potential 

terrorist threats.10 We also examined indicators of various suspicious 

activities the FBI and fusion centers developed to determine if they 

contained border-specific content. We interviewed DOJ officials who were 

leading the national initiative to standardize suspicious activity 

reporting—as well as those from headquarters components of DHS and 

the FBI—to discuss the status of the national initiative and whether 

border-specific indicators were needed and are being considered as part of 

this initiative. 

Because we selected a nonprobability sample of agencies in border 

communities to contact, the information we obtained at these locations 

may not be generalized across the wider population of law enforcement 

agencies in border communities. However, because we selected these 

border communities based on the variety of their geographic location, 

proximity to federal agencies, and other factors, the information we 

gathered from these locations provided us with a general understanding of 

information sharing between federal agencies and state, local, and tribal 

law enforcement agencies along the border. Appendix I provides more 

details about our objectives, scope, and methodology. 

We conducted this performance audit from October 2007 through 

December 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background 

Information Sharing Roles 

of Key Federal and State 

Entities 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 and subsequently enacted laws—

including the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 

and the 9/11 Commission Act—assigned DHS responsibility for sharing 

information related to terrorism and homeland security with its state, 

 

10DOJ, Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Major Cities Chiefs Association, and 

DHS, Findings and Recommendations of the Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) Support 

and Implementation Project (October 2008). 

Page 5 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

local, and tribal partners, and authorized additional measures and funding 

in support of carrying out this mandate.11 DHS designated I&A as having 

responsibility for coordinating efforts to share information that pertains to 

the safety and security of the U.S. homeland across all levels of 

government, including federal, state, local, and tribal government 

agencies. In June 2006, DHS tasked I&A with the responsibility for 

managing DHS’s support to fusion centers. I&A established a State and 

Local Fusion Center Joint Program Management Office as the focal point 

for supporting fusion center operations and to maximize state and local 

capabilities to detect, prevent, and respond to terrorist and homeland 

security threats. The office was also established to improve the 

information flow between DHS and the fusion centers, as well as provide 

fusion centers with access to the federal intelligence community. 

Two DHS components—CBP and ICE—have responsibilities for securing 

the nation’s land borders against terrorism and other threats to homeland 

security. Specifically, CBP’s Border Patrol agents are responsible for 

preventing the illegal entry of people and contraband into the United 

States between ports of entry. This includes preventing terrorists, their 

weapons, and other related materials from entering the country. Border 

Patrol’s national strategy calls for it to improve and expand coordination 

and partnerships with state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies to 

gain control of the nation’s borders. ICE is charged with preventing 

terrorist and criminal activity by targeting the people, money, and 

materials that support terrorist and criminal organizations. According to 

the agency’s 2008 annual report, ICE recognizes the need for strong 

partnerships with other law enforcement agencies, including those on the 

local level, in order to combat criminal and terrorist threats. 

The FBI serves as the nation’s principal counterterrorism investigative 

agency, and its mission includes protecting and defending the United 

States against terrorist threats.12 The FBI conducts counterterrorism 

 

11See Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004); Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 

12In addition to the FBI, several other DOJ component agencies are involved in sharing 

information related to the border, including the Drug Enforcement Administration; the 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; and the United States Marshals 

Service. This report focuses on the FBI’s role in sharing terrorism-related information and 

does not include the activities of other DOJ component agencies. 

Page 6 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

investigations through its field offices and Joint Terrorism Task Forces.13

In addition, each FBI field office has established a Field Intelligence 

Group, which consists of intelligence analysts and special agents who 

gather and analyze information related to identified threats and criminal 

activity, including terrorism. Each group is to share information with other 

Field Intelligence Groups across the country, FBI headquarters, and other 

federal, state, and local law enforcement and intelligence agencies to fill 

gaps in intelligence. 

Fusion centers serve as the primary focal points within the state and local 

environment for the receipt and sharing of information related to terrorist 

and homeland security threats. In March 2006, DHS released its Support 

and Implementation Plan for State and Local Fusion Centers. In this plan, 

DHS describes its responsibility to effectively collaborate with its federal, 

state, and local partners to share information regarding these threats. To 

facilitate the effective flow of information among fusion centers, DHS, 

other federal partners, and the national intelligence community, the plan 

calls for DHS to assign trained and experienced operational and 

intelligence personnel to fusion centers and includes the department’s 

methodology for prioritizing the assignments. The plan also notes that 

identifying, reviewing, and sharing fusion center best practices and lessons 

learned is vital to the success of DHS’s overall efforts. Accordingly, it 

recommends that DHS develop rigorous processes to identify, review, and 

share these best practices and lessons learned. In December 2008, DHS 

issued a document entitled Interaction with State and Local Fusion 

Centers Concept of Operations. According to the document, each DHS 

component field office whose mission aligns with the priorities of the 

fusion center is to establish a relationship with that center. This 

relationship should include but not be limited to routine meetings and 

consistent information sharing among DHS and state and local personnel 

assigned to each center. 

The FBI’s role in and support of individual fusion centers varies depending 

on the level of functionality of the fusion center and the interaction 

between the particular center and the local FBI field office. FBI efforts to 

support fusion centers include assigning special agents and intelligence 

analysts to fusion centers, sharing information, providing space or rent for 

 

13Joint Terrorism Task Forces are investigative units consisting of law enforcement and 

other specialists from federal, state, and local law enforcement and intelligence agencies, 

led by DOJ and the FBI. There is a Joint Terrorism Task Force in each of the FBI’s 56 main 

field offices, and additional task forces are located in smaller FBI offices. 

Page 7 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

fusion center facilities in some locations, and ensuring that state and local 

personnel have appropriate security clearances as well as access to FBI 

personnel. 

Statutory Provisions and 

National Strategies 

Governing Information 

Sharing 

Since September 11, 2001, several statutes have been enacted into law 

designed to enhance the sharing of terrorism-related information among 

federal, state, local, and tribal agencies, and the federal government has 

developed related strategies, policies, and guidelines to meet its statutory 

obligations.14 Regarding border threats, the 9/11 Commission Act contains 

several provisions that address the federal government’s efforts to share 

information with state and local fusion centers that serve border 

communities.15 For example, the act provides for the Secretary of DHS to 

assign, to the maximum extent practicable, officers and intelligence 

analysts from DHS components—including CBP and ICE—to state and 

local fusion centers participating in DHS’s State, Local, and Regional 

Fusion Center Initiative, with priority given to fusion centers located along 

borders of the United States.16 The act provides that federal officers and 

analysts assigned to fusion centers in general are to assist law 

enforcement agencies in developing a comprehensive and accurate threat 

picture, and to create intelligence and other information products for 

dissemination to law enforcement agencies.17 In addition, federal officers 

and analysts assigned to fusion centers along the borders are to have, as a 

primary responsibility, the creation of border intelligence products that 

(1) assist state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies in efficiently 

helping to detect terrorists and related contraband at U.S. borders; 

(2) promote consistent and timely sharing of border security-relevant 

information among jurisdictions along the nation’s borders; and 

(3) enhance DHS’s situational awareness of terrorist threats in border 

areas.18 The act further directed the Secretary of DHS to create a 

 

14These initiatives are included in the National Strategy for Homeland Security and the 

National Strategy for Information Sharing; the President’s December 16, 2005, 

Memorandum to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, including Information 

Sharing Guidelines, calling for the establishment of an Information Sharing Environment to 

facilitate the sharing of terrorism and homeland security information; and statutes, such as 

the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, the Intelligence Reform 

and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, and the Homeland Security Act of 2002. 

15Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 511, 121 Stat. at 317 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 124h). 

166 U.S.C. § 124h(c), (e)(1). 

17Id. § 124(d). 

Page 8 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

mechanism for state, local, and tribal law enforcement officers to provide 

voluntary feedback to DHS on the quality and utility of the intelligence 

products developed under these provisions.19

Also, in October 2007, the President issued the National Strategy for 

Information Sharing. According to the strategy, an improved information 

sharing environment is to be constructed on a foundation of trusted 

partnerships at all levels of government, based on a shared commitment to 

detect, prevent, disrupt, preempt, and mitigate the effects of terrorism. 

The strategy identifies the federal government’s information sharing 

responsibilities to include gathering and documenting the information that 

state, local, and tribal agencies need to enhance their situational 

awareness of terrorist threats and calls for authorities at all levels of 

government to work together to obtain a common understanding of the 

information needed to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorist attacks. 

Specifically, the strategy requires that state, local, and tribal law 

enforcement agencies have access to timely, credible, and actionable 

information and intelligence about individuals and organizations intending 

to carry out attacks within the United States; their organizations and their 

financing; potential targets; activities that could have a nexus to terrorism; 

and major events or circumstances that might influence state, local, and 

tribal actions. The strategy also recognizes that fusion centers are vital 

assets that are critical to sharing information related to terrorism, and will 

serve as primary focal points within the state and local environment for 

the receipt and sharing of terrorism-related information. 

Past GAO Work on 

Terrorism-Related 

Information Sharing 

Efforts 

In October 2001, we reported on the importance of sharing information 

about terrorist threats, vulnerabilities, incidents, and lessons learned.20

Specifically, we identified best practices in building successful information 

sharing partnerships that could be applied to entities trying to develop the 

means of appropriately sharing information. Among the best practices we 

identified were (1) establishing trusted relationships with a wide variety of 

federal and nonfederal entities that may be in a position to provide 

potentially useful information and advice; (2) agreeing to mechanisms for 

sharing information, such as outreach meetings and task forces; and (3) 

 

18Id. § 124(e)(2). 

19Id. § 124(g)(1). 

20GAO-02-24. 

Page 9 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

institutionalizing roles to help ensure continuity and diminish reliance on a 

single individual. 

Since we designated terrorism-related information sharing a high-risk area 

in January 2005, we have continued to monitor federal information sharing 

efforts.21 Also, as part of this monitoring, in April 2008, we reported on our 

assessment of the status of fusion centers and how the federal government 

is supporting them. Our fusion center report and subsequent testimony 

highlighted continuing challenges—such as the centers’ ability to access 

information and obtain funding—that DHS and DOJ needed to address to 

support the fusion centers’ role in facilitating information sharing among 

federal, state, and local governments.22 We also recognized the need for the 

federal government to determine and articulate its long-term fusion center 

role and whether it expects to provide resources to help ensure their 

sustainability, and we made a recommendation to that effect to which DHS 

agreed. At the time of this review, DHS was in the process of implementing 

the recommendation. 

 

21GAO, Information Sharing: The Federal Government Needs to Establish Policies and 

Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related and Sensitive but Unclassified Information, 

GAO-06-385 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2006) and GAO, Information Sharing 

Environment: Definition of the Results to Be Achieved in Improving Terrorism-Related 

Information Sharing Is Needed to Guide Implementation and Assess Progress, 

GAO-08-492 (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2008). 

22GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some Challenges 

Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers, GAO-08-35 (Washington, 

D.C.: Oct. 30, 2007) and GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Address 

Some Challenges Faced by State and Local Fusion Centers, GAO-08-636T (Washington, 

D.C.: Apr. 17, 2008). 

Page 10 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

Most Local and Tribal 

Agencies in Border 

Communities We 

Contacted Found 

Information from 

Federal Partners 

Useful for Situational 

Awareness, but 

Adopting Further 

Measures Could Close 

Other Information 

Sharing Gaps 

In general, local and tribal officials in the border communities we 

contacted who reported to us that they received information directly from 

the local office of Border Patrol, ICE, or the FBI said it was useful for 

enhancing their situational awareness of crimes along the border and 

potential terrorist threats. Overall, where information sharing among 

federal, local, and tribal agencies along the borders occurred, local and 

tribal officials generally said they had discussed their information needs 

with federal agencies in the vicinity and had established information 

sharing partnerships with related mechanisms to share information with 

federal officials—consistent with the National Strategy for Information 

Sharing—while the agencies that reported not receiving information from 

federal agencies generally said they had not discussed their needs and had 

not established partnerships. 

Local and Tribal Agencies 

We Contacted That 

Received Information from 

Their Federal Partners 

Found It Useful in 

Enhancing Their 

Situational Awareness of 

Border Crimes and 

Potential Terrorist Threats 

Officials from three-quarters (15 of 20) of the local and tribal law 

enforcement agencies in the border communities we contacted said they 

received information directly from the local office of at least one federal 

agency (Border Patrol, ICE, or the FBI), and 9 of the 20 reported receiving 

information from the local office of all three of these federal agencies. 

However, 5 of the 20 reported that they did not receive information from 

any of these three agencies, in part because information sharing 

partnerships and related mechanisms to share information did not exist. 

We discuss information sharing partnerships and other factors that affect 

information sharing between federal agencies and local and tribal agencies 

in border communities later in this report. Figure 1 shows the number of 

local and tribal agencies that reported receiving information directly from 

the local office of Border Patrol, ICE, and the FBI. 

Page 11 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

Figure 1: Number of Local and Tribal Agencies We Contacted That Reported 

Receiving Information from Federal Agencies in Their Vicinity 

0

20

Border Patrol ICE FBI

Number of local and tribal agencies

Federal agencies

Reported not receiving information 

Reported receiving information

Source: GAO analysis of interviews and other contacts with officials from local and tribal law enforcement agencies.

10

10

6

14

7

13

Overall, the local and tribal law enforcement agencies we contacted that 

received information from federal agencies in the vicinity found it useful in 

enhancing their situational awareness of border crimes and potential 

terrorist threats. 

Local and tribal law enforcement officials in 14 of 20 border communities 

we contacted said they received a range of information directly from local 

Border Patrol officials, including incident reports and alerts regarding 

specific individuals with potential links to criminal activity—such as illegal 

immigration and drug trafficking—as well as border-related threat 

assessments and reports of suspicious activity. According to the local and 

tribal officials, they received this information through direct outreach or 

visits, phone calls, and e-mails, as well as through issued alerts and 

bulletins. Of the 14 local and tribal officials that reported receiving 

information from Border Patrol officials in the vicinity, 12 said it was 

useful and enhanced their situational awareness of criminal activities and 

potential terrorist threats along the border and 2 did not take a position 

Border Patrol 

Page 12 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

when asked about the information’s usefulness. For example, one tribal 

police department official reported that Border Patrol provides an area 

assessment that specifically targets the illicit smuggling of humans and 

contraband in and around the tribal lands, and depicted the threat posed 

by illegal activity occurring in the area. The official said that this 

assessment helped the department identify and emphasize those areas on 

which to focus. Local and tribal officials from the remaining 6 border 

communities we contacted said they did not receive any information 

directly from Border Patrol officials in the vicinity, in part because 

information sharing partnerships and related mechanisms to share 

information did not exist. 

Border Patrol officials in the communities we visited said they shared 

information related to various types of crimes with their local and tribal 

partners, including information related to illegal immigration and drug 

trafficking. The officials said this information is shared primarily through 

established information sharing partnerships and related mechanisms, 

including joint border operations and task forces, such as Integrated 

Border Enforcement Teams.23 The officials noted that they generally did 

not have specific terrorism-related information to share with local and 

tribal agencies, but that the information they share is intended to enhance 

situational awareness of border crimes that terrorists could potentially 

exploit, such as illegal immigration. 

Local and tribal law enforcement officials in 10 of 20 border communities 

we contacted said they received information from ICE officials in the 

vicinity, including specific persons of interest they should be on the 

lookout for, as well as information on drug smuggling and drug cartel 

activities, human smuggling, and other crimes. The officials said such 

information is important because it provides information that is pertinent 

to their immediate area. These agencies reported receiving information by 

e-mail or in person, as well as through participation in task forces, such as 

ICE 

 

23For example, Border Patrol participates in Integrated Border Enforcement Teams at 24 

locations along the northern border, which are comprised of both Canadian and U.S. law 

enforcement agencies and can include state, local, and tribal agencies. These intelligenceled teams were developed to enhance border security by identifying, investigating, and 

interdicting persons and organizations that pose a threat to national security or are 

engaged in other organized criminal activity. 

Page 13 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

Border Enforcement Security Task Forces.24 For example, in one 

southwest border location, law enforcement officials said that the 

department receives information about potential criminal activities in their 

jurisdiction from ICE based on joint investigations it has conducted with 

the agency. 

Of the 10 local and tribal officials that reported receiving information from 

local ICE officials, 8 said it was useful and enhanced their situational 

awareness of criminal activities and potential terrorist threats along the 

border and 2 did not take a position when asked about the information’s 

usefulness. Officials from the remaining 10 local and tribal agencies we 

contacted said they did not receive any information from local ICE 

officials, in part because information sharing partnerships and related 

mechanisms to share information did not exist. 

According to ICE headquarters officials, in addition to sharing information 

at the local level, ICE has significantly expanded its interaction with state, 

local, and tribal law enforcement officials through automated systems that 

allow these officials to access and search certain DHS and ICE law 

enforcement and investigative information.25

Local and tribal law enforcement officials in 13 of 20 border locations we 

contacted said they received a range of information directly from local FBI 

officials, including intelligence assessments and bulletins, threat 

assessments and terrorism-related alerts, and information on criminal 

activity. Of the 13 local and tribal officials that reported receiving 

information from local FBI officials, 12 said it was useful and enhanced 

their situational awareness of potential terrorist threats along the border 

and 1 did not take a position when asked about the information’s 

The FBI 

 

24ICE has partnered with federal, state, local, and foreign law enforcement counterparts to 

create the Border Enforcement Security Task Force initiative, a series of multiagency task 

forces that were developed to identify, disrupt, and dismantle criminal organizations posing 

significant threats to border security. The task forces are designed to increase information 

sharing and collaboration among the agencies combating these threats. 

25ICE is making certain law enforcement information available through the DHS Law 

Enforcement Information Sharing Service. This service establishes bidirectional 

connectivity between DHS and federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement entities. The 

service shares subject records related to valid law enforcement needs. DHS began 

deploying the system in 2008 to DOJ and law enforcement information sharing systems in 

San Diego, Los Angeles, and the Puget Sound region of Washington state. In fiscal year 

2009, DHS anticipates expanding the service to systems in Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, 

and the Washington, D.C., area. 

Page 14 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

usefulness. Local and tribal officials in 7 of the 20 border locations we 

contacted said they did not receive any information directly from local FBI 

officials, in part because information sharing partnerships and related 

mechanisms to share information did not exist. 

FBI officials in the border communities we visited said that they 

understood the desire of local and tribal law enforcement agencies to 

receive terrorism-related information that is specific to the border or to 

their geographic area in particular. However, the officials explained that in 

many cases, such information is classified, so the FBI can only share it 

with officials that have a need to know the information and have the 

requisite security clearances, as well as secure systems, networks, or 

facilities to safeguard the information. FBI officials also said that 

information related to ongoing investigations is generally only shared with 

local officials that participate in an FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force, since 

sharing the information outside the task force could jeopardize the 

investigations. Finally, the officials said that at times, terrorism-related 

information that is specific to the border simply may not exist. Local and 

tribal law enforcement officials we met with recognized that the FBI has 

limits on what it can share—including information that is classified—and 

said they had no intention of interfering with ongoing investigations. 

However, they also thought the FBI could better communicate when these 

limits were in effect and when the agency simply had no information to 

share. We discuss the importance of establishing information sharing 

partnerships to facilitate discussions between the parties and minimize 

expectation gaps later in this report. 

According to FBI officials at the locations we contacted, information that 

is not related to ongoing investigations is shared with local and tribal 

agencies through a variety of mechanisms, including task forces (e.g., Safe 

Trails Task Forces) and working groups; periodic outreach meetings the 

FBI conducts with local and tribal agencies to both share and solicit 

information; and through ongoing information sharing partnerships.26 FBI 

headquarters officials noted that each FBI field office—through its Field 

 

26The Safe Trails Task Force program is designed to unite the FBI with other federal, state, 

and local law enforcement agencies in a collaborative effort to combat the continuing 

growth of violent crime on Indian reservations, including areas along the borders. Task 

force participating agencies include the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the 

Bureau of Indian Affairs, tribal police departments, and state and local law enforcement 

agencies. The FBI supports 15 Safe Trails Task Forces, 10 of which are in states along the 

northern and southwest borders of the United States. 

Page 15 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

Intelligence Group—is to routinely assess the terrorism and criminal 

threats and risks in its geographic area of responsibility and report the 

results to FBI headquarters. 

The officials said that the assessments incorporate border-specific issues 

when appropriate, such as the illegal entry of possible terrorists, 

identification of human smuggling organizations, and the smuggling of 

weapons and other material which could be employed in terrorist attacks. 

However, the officials said that the results of the assessments are 

classified and are generally not shared with local and tribal officials, 

although in some cases selected information is declassified and distributed 

through alerts and bulletins. 

Further, according to FBI headquarters, much of the FBI’s information 

sharing with other law enforcement entities occurs at the officer or 

investigator level, often without the specific knowledge of the state and 

local personnel we interviewed for this report. The FBI also emphasized 

that most Indian Reservations and tribal law enforcement agencies are 

located in remote areas of the United States—100 miles or more away 

from an FBI office—where information sharing between FBI agents and 

tribal law enforcement occurs on an ad hoc basis usually focused on 

investigations of crimes occurring on Indian reservations. We recognize 

that information sharing can occur at the officer or investigator level and 

on an ad hoc basis. However, as discussed later in this report, limiting 

information sharing to the officer and investigator level will not ensure 

that information sharing partnerships are established between agencies. 

Rather, discussions at senior levels—including the county sheriffs, local 

police chiefs, and tribal police chiefs we met with—could help ensure 

continuity in information sharing and diminish reliance on any one 

individual, which is a best practice in building successful information 

sharing partnerships.27

FBI headquarters also noted that in addition to sharing information 

directly with local and tribal officials in border communities, the FBI 

disseminates information to these officials through information systems—

 

27GAO-02-24. 

Page 16 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

such as the FBI’s Law Enforcement Online and eGuardian system28—and 

the FBI’s participation in state and local fusion centers and other 

interagency task forces and intelligence centers throughout the country 

(e.g., High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Investigative Support Centers). 

The FBI noted that it is through these venues that the FBI also 

accomplishes its information sharing responsibilities to other federal, 

state, and local partners. 

More Fully Identifying 

Information Needs Could 

Help Federal Agencies in 

Border Communities 

Ensure That Local and 

Tribal Agencies Receive 

Useful Information 

The National Strategy for Information Sharing identifies the federal 

government’s information sharing responsibilities to include gathering and 

documenting the information that state, local, and tribal agencies need to 

enhance their situational awareness of terrorist threats. Figure 2 shows 

the number of the local and tribal agencies in the border communities we 

contacted that reported discussing their information needs with federal 

officials in the vicinity. 

 

28The FBI’s Law Enforcement Online serves as a real-time, online controlled-access 

communications and information sharing data repository for sensitive but unclassified 

information about antiterrorism, intelligence, law enforcement, and criminal justice efforts, 

among other things. Law Enforcement Online is available to more than 18,000 law 

enforcement agencies nationwide. The FBI’s eGuardian system is an unclassified 

counterterrorism tool that allows state, local, and tribal law enforcement partners to share 

threat information directly with the FBI. 

Page 17 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

Figure 2: Number of Local and Tribal Agencies We Contacted That Reported 

Discussing Their Information Needs with Federal Agencies in the Vicinity 

0

20

Border Patrol ICE FBI

Number of local and tribal agencies

Federal agencies

Did not discuss information needs

Discussed information needs

Did not report on information needs discussed 

Source: GAO analysis of interviews and other contacts with officials from local and tribal law enforcement agencies.

9

9

7

2 2 1

11

11

8

Overall, where local and tribal law enforcement officials in border 

communities had discussed their information needs with federal officials 

in the vicinity, they also reported receiving useful information from the 

federal agencies that enhanced their situational awareness of border 

crimes and potential terrorist threats. Specifically: 

• Officials from 7 of the 11 localities that had discussed their information 

needs with Border Patrol officials in the vicinity also reported receiving 

useful information from them.29

 

29Of the remaining 4 localities that had discussed their information needs with Border 

Patrol officials, 2 reported receiving information from the agency but did not take a 

position on its usefulness and 2 reported that they had not received information from the 

agency. 

Page 18 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

• Officials from each of the 9 localities that had discussed their information 

needs with ICE officials in the vicinity reported receiving useful 

information from them. 

• Officials from each of the 8 localities that had discussed their information 

needs with FBI officials in the vicinity reported receiving useful 

information from them.30

Local and tribal officials in the border communities we contacted said they 

shared their information needs with federal officials through a variety of 

methods, including regularly scheduled meetings, periodic outreach 

performed by federal agencies, ad hoc meetings, and established working 

relationships. For example, one police chief along the southwest border 

said that he discussed his need for real-time information about border 

crimes that could affect his area with local federal agency officials. He 

noted that after he held these discussions, the federal officials took steps 

to provide his department with this type of information. 

Nevertheless, as shown in figure 2 above, officials from about one-half of 

the local and tribal agencies in the border communities we contacted 

reported that federal officials had not discussed information needs with 

them, as called for in the National Strategy for Information Sharing. Our 

discussions with local and tribal officials revealed that where the needs 

were not discussed, local and tribal agencies also were less likely to have 

received information from federal agencies than in the localities where 

needs were discussed. Specifically: 

• Officials from 4 of the 7 localities that had not discussed their information 

needs with Border Patrol officials in the vicinity also reported not 

receiving information from them, while the other 3 had received 

information from Border Patrol. 

• Officials from each of the 9 localities that had not discussed their 

information needs with ICE officials in the vicinity also reported not 

receiving information from them. 

• Officials from 7 of the 11 localities that had not discussed their 

information needs with FBI officials in the vicinity also reported not 

 

30Two localities did not report if they had discussed their information needs with Border 

Patrol, 2 did not report if they had discussed information needs with ICE, and 1 did not 

report if it had discussed information needs with the FBI. 

Page 19 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

receiving information from them, while the other 4 reported receiving 

information from the FBI. 

While the data above show that federal agencies shared information with 

local and tribal officials in several cases where information needs had not 

been discussed, identifying these needs could better support federal 

agency efforts to provide local and tribal agencies with useful information 

that is relevant to their jurisdiction. 

A primary reason why federal agencies had not identified the information 

needs of local and tribal agencies in many of the border communities we 

visited was because the methods federal agencies used to solicit the needs, 

while effective for some localities, were not effective for others. 

Specifically, Border Patrol and ICE officials said that the information 

needs of these agencies were generally identified through outreach 

meetings or through working relationships with local and tribal law 

enforcement officers. Where these interactions did not exist, the federal 

agencies generally had not identified the information needs of local and 

tribal agencies. Also, according to a local police chief, while information 

needs may be discussed between local officers and federal agents on an ad 

hoc basis, his department cannot rely on these interactions to ensure that 

federal agencies have identified the overall information needs of the 

department. 

According to FBI headquarters officials, in developing field office area 

assessments, Field Intelligence Group personnel are required to gather 

information on terrorism and criminal threats and risks from local and 

tribal law enforcement agency officials, wherein the information needs of 

these agencies would be identified. FBI headquarters also noted that 

through outreach meetings and participation in task forces and working 

groups, FBI field offices continually evaluate the information needs of 

their local and tribal partners, as well as their own, and take actions to 

identify and fill any information gaps. Despite these efforts, less than onehalf of the local and tribal agencies we contacted reported discussing their 

information needs with FBI officials in the vicinity. 

By more consistently and more fully identifying the information needs of 

local and tribal agencies in border communities, as called for in the 

National Strategy for Information Sharing, federal agencies could be better 

positioned to provide these local and tribal agencies with useful 

information that enhances their situational awareness of border crimes 

and potential terrorist threats. 

Page 20 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

Most Local and Tribal 

Agencies We Contacted 

That Received Information 

from Federal Agencies in 

Their Localities Had 

Established or Were 

Developing Partnerships 

and Related Mechanisms 

That Facilitated 

Information Sharing 

The National Strategy for Information Sharing recognizes that effective 

information sharing comes through strong partnerships among federal, 

local, and tribal partners. In addition, the current strategic plans of DHS 

and the FBI both acknowledge the need to establish information sharing 

partnerships with state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies to help 

the agencies fulfill their missions, roles, and responsibilities. Figure 3 

shows the number of local and tribal agency officials in the border 

communities we contacted that reported having established or were 

developing an information sharing partnership with Border Patrol, ICE, 

and the FBI officials in the vicinity. 

Figure 3: Number of Local and Tribal Agencies We Contacted That Reported Having 

or Were Developing an Information Sharing Partnership with Federal Agencies in 

the Vicinity 

0

20

Border Patrol ICE FBI

Number of local and tribal agencies

Federal agencies

Reported not having an information sharing partnership

Reported having or developing an information sharing partnership 

Did not comment

Source: GAO analysis of interviews and other contacts with officials from local and tribal law enforcement agencies.

13

7

5

1

14

9

11

Overall, where local and tribal law enforcement officials in border 

communities had established or were developing information sharing 

partnerships with federal officials in the vicinity, they also reported 

receiving information from the federal agencies that enhanced their 

Page 21 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

situational awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist threats. 

Specifically: 

• Officials from 13 of the 14 localities that had or were developing an 

information sharing partnership with Border Patrol officials in the vicinity 

also reported receiving information from them.31

• Officials from 10 of 13 localities that had an information sharing 

partnership with ICE officials in the vicinity also reported receiving 

information from them, while the other 3 were not receiving information 

from ICE.32

• Officials from each of the 11 localities that had an information sharing 

partnership with FBI officials in the vicinity also reported receiving 

information from them. 

The local and tribal agencies that had developed partnerships with federal 

agencies in the vicinity had established a variety of mechanisms to share 

information, including regularly scheduled meetings, periodic outreach 

performed by federal agencies, ad hoc meetings, task forces and working 

groups, established working relationships, phone calls, e-mails, and issued 

alerts and bulletins. In some locations, Border Patrol and local law 

enforcement officials worked together in operational efforts that provided 

opportunities for federal and local officials to develop information sharing 

partnerships. For example, Operation Border Star in Texas—a state-led, 

multiagency effort focused on reducing crime, such as illegal immigration 

and drug trafficking, in targeted regions along the Texas–Mexico border—

draws resources from local law enforcement agencies, the Texas 

Department of Public Safety, and others to support Border Patrol. Also, in 

upstate New York, a county sheriff’s department conducted joint patrols 

with Border Patrol, which extended into Canada. The patrols are designed 

to prevent the illegal entry of individuals into the United States and the 

smuggling of contraband. These operations provide an opportunity for 

officers from all of the agencies to work together and facilitate 

information sharing. 

 

31Officials from 1 of the 14 localities said they were in the process of developing an 

information sharing partnership with Border Patrol officials in the vicinity. One of the 20 

localities did not report if it had established an information sharing partnership with 

Border Patrol officials in the vicinity. 

32Officials from 3 of the 13 localities said they had an information sharing partnership with 

ICE officials in the vicinity but had not received any information. 

Page 22 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

Most of the local and tribal officials that had developed information 

sharing partnerships with ICE officials reported establishing them through 

personal contacts made either while working on various task forces 

alongside ICE personnel or between agents and officers in both agencies. 

For example, one tribal police chief said that his department has a 

memorandum of understanding with ICE, which allows the tribal police to 

perform certain ICE duties in the enforcement of customs laws and 

facilitates information sharing between the agencies. 

Nevertheless, as shown in figure 3 above, officials from several local and 

tribal agencies in the border communities we contacted reported that they 

had not established information sharing partnerships with Border Patrol, 

ICE, or FBI officials in the vicinity. Where partnerships were not 

established, local and tribal agencies also were less likely to have received 

information from federal agencies than in the localities where partnerships 

were established. Specifically: 

• Officials from each of the 5 localities that did not have an information 

sharing partnership with local Border Patrol officials in the vicinity also 

reported they had not received information from them. 

• Officials from each of the 7 localities that did not have an information 

sharing partnership with ICE officials in the vicinity also reported they had 

not received information from them. 

• Officials from 7 of the 9 localities that said they did not have an 

information sharing partnership with FBI officials also reported they had 

not received information from them FBI. 

The local and tribal officials that did not have a partnership with federal 

officials and were not receiving information said that effective 

mechanisms for sharing information—a best practice in building 

successful information sharing partnerships—had not been established. 

One reason why the officials said established mechanisms were not 

effective was because they did not have enough resources or funding to 

participate in the regular meetings or forums that Border Patrol, ICE, and 

FBI officials in the vicinity used to share information, establish face-toface contact, and build trusting relationships. For example, an official 

from one local police department said he was aware of Border Patrol’s 

efforts to share information through such meetings, but the department 

did not have the resources needed to participate, since doing so would 

leave the office short one out of eight patrol officers. Officials at another 

location said they no longer received invitations to Border Patrol 

meetings. 

Page 23 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

Similarly, local and tribal officials in other localities said they did not have 

enough resources to send individuals to participate in outreach meetings 

that FBI officials said were used to share information, because in some 

cases the meetings were held more than 100 miles away. A local county 

sheriff also said that the FBI’s meetings were initially productive but 

interest faded because of the lack of useful information that was shared 

during the meetings. An FBI official from another locality noted that FBI 

officials are sometimes limited in what they can discuss during these 

meetings if the local and tribal representatives in attendance do not have 

the appropriate security clearances or do not have a need to know about 

the information. These examples illustrate the importance of establishing 

partnerships to facilitate discussions between the parties and minimize 

expectation gaps regarding the availability of and limits in sharing 

information. 

Border Patrol, ICE, and FBI officials also said that information is shared 

with local and tribal agencies through multiagency task forces, such as 

ICE Border Enforcement Security Task Forces and FBI Joint Terrorism 

Task Forces. However, local and tribal officials—especially those in small 

departments in rural border communities—said these mechanisms to 

share information were not effective for them, because they did not have 

enough resources to dedicate personnel to the task forces. 

Police chiefs and other senior local and tribal officials recognized that ad 

hoc discussions between officers and investigators are also mechanisms 

federal agencies in the vicinity use to share information with local and 

tribal agencies. The officials noted, however, that limiting information 

sharing to the officer and investigator level is not sufficient to ensure that 

senior-level department officials are aware of the information, which in 

turn could be disseminated to other personnel within the department. For 

example, a police chief in a local community along the southwest border 

said that he does not need the FBI to brief his entire department, but the 

FBI should at least brief the police chief. Best practices in building 

information sharing partnerships call for institutionalizing information 

sharing through discussions at senior levels to ensure continuity in sharing 

and diminishing the reliance on single individuals. 

We recognize that developing and maintaining information sharing 

partnerships with the numerous local and tribal law enforcement agencies 

along the borders is a significant challenge, and that Border Patrol, ICE, 

and the FBI have made progress in this area. However, additional efforts 

by these federal agencies to periodically assess the extent to which 

partnerships and related mechanisms to share information exist, fill gaps, 

Page 24 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

and address barriers to establishing such partnerships and mechanisms, 

could help ensure that information is shared with local and tribal law 

enforcement agencies that enhances their situational awareness of border 

crimes and potential terrorist threats. 

Federal agencies at two of the five fusion centers we visited were 

supporting fusion center efforts to develop border intelligence products 

that enhanced local and tribal agencies’ situational awareness of border 

crimes and potential terrorist threats. DHS recognizes that it needs to add 

personnel to fusion centers in border states to support the creation of 

such products, and is developing related plans, but cited funding issues 

and competing priorities as barriers to deploying such personnel. Further, 

additional DHS and FBI actions to (1) identify and market promising 

practices from fusion centers that develop border intelligence products 

and (2) obtain feedback from local and tribal officials on the utility and 

quality of the products and use the feedback to improve those products 

would strengthen future fusion center efforts to develop such products. 

Federal Agencies Are 

Supporting Some 

Fusion Center Efforts 

to Develop Border 

Intelligence Products, 

but Additional DHS 

Personnel and Other 

Measures Could 

Strengthen Future 

Efforts 

DHS and FBI Personnel at 

Two of the Five Fusion 

Centers We Visited Were 

Supporting Efforts to 

Develop Border 

Intelligence Products to 

Enhance Local and Tribal 

Agencies’ Situational 

Awareness of Border 

Crimes and Potential 

Terrorist Threats 

Federal personnel at two of the five fusion centers we visited—the Arizona 

Counterterrorism Information Center and the New York State Intelligence 

Center—were routinely contributing to border intelligence products that 

were designed to enhance local and tribal law enforcement agencies’ 

situational awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist threats. 

Fusion center officials in these states emphasized that the physical 

presence of federal personnel at the fusion center—including intelligence 

analysts from I&A, Border Patrol, ICE, and the FBI—was critical to 

developing the border products, in part because their presence facilitated 

regular meetings with center personnel and access to federal information 

systems. 

According to local and tribal officials in the border communities we 

contacted in Arizona and New York, the border intelligence products they 

received generally enhanced their situational awareness of border-related 

crimes that could have a nexus to terrorism, such as drug trafficking and 

illegal immigration. However, the border products usually did not contain 

terrorism-related information that was specific to the border because such 

information did not exist or a link between a border crime and terrorism 

had not been established, according to fusion center officials. The two 

fusion centers also routinely generated terrorism information products 

Page 25 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

that were provided to local and tribal agencies throughout the state to 

enhance their situational awareness of terrorist threats. Officials from the 

two fusion centers said that any terrorism-related information that is 

specific to the border would be included in both the border product and 

terrorism product. Below is additional information about the border 

intelligence products developed by the two fusion centers: 

• Arizona Counterterrorism Information Center: The center issues a borderspecific product (the “Situational Awareness Bulletin”) twice a week with 

input from the state’s Department of Public Safety and numerous federal 

agencies, including DHS’s I&A, Border Patrol, and ICE, and the FBI. The 

center initiated the bulletin in 2008 to enhance the situational awareness 

of local law enforcement officials along the Arizona border as drug-related 

violence on the Mexican side of the border increased. The bulletin now 

provides information about all types of crimes occurring in the vicinity of 

the border, as well as incidents from around the country and around the 

world. Topics have included immigration issues, burglaries at public safety 

offices, suspicious activities around critical infrastructure, stolen military 

uniforms, and stolen blank vehicle certificates of title. 

• New York State Intelligence Center: The center’s Border Intelligence Unit 

issues a border-specific report quarterly with input from the New York 

State Police and numerous federal agencies, including DHS’s I&A, Border 

Patrol, and ICE, and the FBI. The report is intended to compile 

information on all types of crimes along the entire border between New 

York and Canada into one product for the convenience of local and tribal 

law enforcement agencies. This report covers crimes—such as illegal 

immigration and drug trafficking—and includes the results of joint federal 

and state operations conducted along the border. The report also contains 

news and updates on policies related to border security. According to 

center officials, the report grew out of recognition that various federal 

component agencies have offices that cover the border territory and could, 

therefore, collectively provide consistent intelligence information that 

would be helpful in enhancing the situational awareness of law 

enforcement agencies in border communities throughout the state. The 

Border Intelligence Unit also issues bulletins with actionable information 

on border-related crimes on an as-needed basis. 

In addition to the benefits that officials from the two fusion centers cited 

from having on-site input and collaboration from representatives of three 

DHS components, the FBI, and other agencies, the majority of local and 

tribal agencies in the border communities we contacted found the border 

intelligence products to be useful. Specifically, six of the seven local and 

tribal law enforcement agencies we contacted in Arizona and New York 

Page 26 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

were receiving border intelligence products from the fusion center in their 

state and all six found that the products were useful or met their 

information needs. For example, one local law enforcement official said 

that his agency receives the quarterly border report developed by the New 

York fusion center and that he finds it useful as it sometimes contains 

issues directly related to his jurisdiction. The remaining locality did not 

comment on why the products were not received. 

According to officials from the other three fusion centers we visited, the 

presence of additional federal personnel would support their efforts to 

develop border intelligence products that help to provide local and tribal 

law enforcement agencies along the borders with situational awareness of 

potential terrorist threats. For example: 

• Washington Fusion Center: The Washington state fusion center is 

colocated with the local Joint Terrorism Task Force, which facilitates 

access to FBI information, and has representatives from DHS’s I&A and 

ICE. According to Border Patrol headquarters officials, as of August 2009, 

the agency was in the process of assigning a full-time representative to the 

fusion center. The fusion center director noted that this official, once 

integrated into the center’s report development process, would contribute 

greatly towards producing a border intelligence product. The fusion center 

director added that the border intelligence product would focus on all 

border crime issues, including any suspected terrorist activity. 

• Montana All Threat Intelligence Center: The Montana All Threat 

Intelligence Center is colocated with the local Joint Terrorism Task Force, 

which facilitates access to FBI information. According to the fusion center 

director, a CBP analyst has supported the center part-time, though most of 

the time that person is working at the CBP office located 90 miles away. In 

August 2009, Border Patrol headquarters officials said that a full-time 

representative had been assigned to the fusion center. The fusion center 

director said that he expected an analyst from I&A to be assigned to the 

fusion center, but was unsure when that would happen. According to the 

director, additional federal personnel and their ability to analyze borderrelated information would enhance the fusion center’s efforts to routinely 

produce a border intelligence product. 

• Texas Intelligence Center: The Texas Intelligence Center is located within 

the Texas Department of Public Safety, and currently has representatives 

from I&A, ICE, and the FBI. Although the center prepares and 

disseminates a number of products, including a daily brief covering, 

among other issues, significant arrests, seizures and homeland security, it 

does not prepare an intelligence product that focuses on border issues. 

Page 27 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

Officials at the center said that the state’s Border Security Operations 

Teams located along the border distribute information on border security 

issues to local and tribal agencies. According to the officials, the center 

will consider developing a border intelligence product once personnel 

from other appropriate agencies, such as Border Patrol, are in place at the 

fusion center. 

DHS Plans to Deploy 

Additional DHS Personnel 

to Support Fusion Center 

Efforts to Develop Border 

Intelligence Products, but 

Cited Funding Issues and 

Competing Priorities as 

Barriers 

The director of I&A’s State and Local Fusion Center Program Management 

Office—the office responsible for managing the relationship between I&A 

and fusion centers—acknowledged the value of having personnel from 

DHS components physically present at fusion centers, not only for state 

and local law enforcement but for federal agencies as well. The director 

noted that deploying DHS analysts to fusion centers is critical to 

developing trusted partnerships, which in turn will facilitate collaboration 

and information sharing among federal, state, local, and tribal officials. 

But to date, the director explained that the office has not received the 

funding needed to deploy the personnel to other centers and has other 

competing priorities. 

DHS has had a plan for deploying personnel from its component agencies 

to fusion centers since June 2006, when the DHS Secretary signed the 

Support Implementation Plan for State and Local Fusion Centers. The plan 

calls for embedding DHS personnel with access to information, 

technology, and training in fusion centers to form the basis of a 

nationwide homeland security information network for collaboration and 

information sharing. According to the director of I&A’s State and Local 

Fusion Center Program Management Office, in part because of limited 

resources, the department is taking a risk-based approach to determining 

where to deploy officers and analysts. As such, the department considers 

several factors in addition to available funding, including population 

density, the number of critical infrastructure facilities, and the results of 

fusion center assessments the office conducts to determine the readiness 

of the center to use the department’s resources. Senior I&A officials noted 

that the department places some priority on deploying DHS personnel to 

state and local fusion centers located in border states, but that other 

factors also have to be considered under the department’s risk-based 

approach. 

According to DHS, as of September 2009, I&A had deployed 41 intelligence 

analysts to state, local, and regional fusion centers. DHS plans to have a 

total of about 70 I&A analysts at fusion centers by the end of fiscal year 

2010 and an equal number of officers and analysts from DHS component 

Page 28 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

agencies (e.g., Border Patrol and ICE). Figure 4 shows DHS personnel that 

were assigned to fusion centers in the 14 land border states as of August 

2009. 

Page 29 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

Figure 4: DHS Personnel Assigned to Land Border State Fusion Centers, August 2009 

Page 30 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

According to CBP headquarters officials, the agency has only a limited 

number of Border Patrol intelligence analysts, and is currently working 

with I&A to identify priority fusion centers. Officials from ICE’s Office of 

Intelligence also said that the agency is working with I&A to develop a 

strategy to enhance ICE participation at state and local fusion centers. 

Further, although the 9/11 Commission Act included an authorization for 

$10 million for each of the fiscal years 2008 through 2012 for DHS to carry 

out the State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative—including the 

assignment of CBP, ICE, and other DHS stakeholder personnel to fusion 

centers—DHS did not specifically request funding for the initiative and no 

funds were appropriated for fiscal years 2008 or 2009 for this specific 

purpose. Rather, for fiscal years 2008 and 2009, DHS reprogrammed funds 

from other activities to support the fusion center initiative. According to 

the director of I&A’s State and Local Fusion Center Program Management 

Office, DHS requested funding for the initiative in its fiscal year 2010 

budget. 

Although the 9/11 Commission Act did not address FBI participation at 

fusion centers, FBI intelligence analysts and special agents were dedicated 

to fusion centers in 8 of the 14 land border states as of September 2009, in 

addition to FBI personnel at Joint Terrorism Task Forces or Field 

Intelligence Groups that were colocated with these fusion centers. The 

FBI noted that it has committed millions of dollars over the years to 

ensure that its classified computer system and other databases and 

equipment were deployed to support FBI personnel assigned on a full- or 

part-time basis to fusion centers. According to the FBI, the bureau has 

worked with DHS to develop uniform construction standards and security 

protocols specifically designed to facilitate the introduction of federal 

classified computer systems in fusion centers. Further, the FBI noted that 

it has deployed the eGuardian system—an unclassified counterterrorism 

tool—to fusion centers and other entities. 

Page 31 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

The creation of border intelligence products—such as those developed by 

the Arizona and New York fusion centers—represent potential approaches 

that other border state fusion centers could use to target products for local 

and tribal law enforcement agencies in border communities. I&A has a 

framework in place to identify and collect promising practices at fusion 

centers nationwide, as called for in the department’s March 2006 Support 

Implementation Plan for State and Local Fusion Centers and the 

December 2008 Interaction with State and Local Fusion Center Concept of 

Operations. Specifically, the implementation plan for fusion centers 

recommended that rigorous processes be used to identify, review, and 

share information regarding promising practices and lessons learned. 

Consistent with that recommendation, the concept of operations identifies 

leveraging promising practices for information sharing and revising 

existing processes when necessary and advisable as one of the guiding 

principles of interaction with fusion centers. 

Identifying and Sharing 

Promising Practices from 

Fusion Centers That 

Develop Border 

Intelligence Products and 

Soliciting Feedback on 

Their Usefulness Would 

Support Other Fusion 

Center Efforts to Develop 

Such Products 

However, as of July 2009, I&A had not yet identified or explored promising 

practices related to fusion center efforts to develop border intelligence 

products. According to the director of I&A’s Border Security Division, 

such analysis has potential value but has not yet occurred because the 

division has been focusing on developing its own products and providing 

other support to fusion centers.33 While it is understandable that I&A 

would focus on its own activities, DHS could benefit from identifying 

promising practices related to fusion center border intelligence products 

because of the importance the federal government places on fusion 

centers to facilitate the sharing of information. By identifying such 

practices, DHS would be better positioned to leverage existing resources 

and help ensure that local and tribal agencies in border communities 

receive information that enhances their situational awareness of potential 

terrorist threats. 

Also, DHS had not obtained feedback on the utility and quality of the 

border intelligence products that its analysts in fusion centers have helped 

to develop. The 9/11 Commission Act requires DHS to (1) create a 

voluntary feedback mechanism for state, local, and tribal law enforcement 

officers and other consumers of the intelligence and information products 

 

33According to the director of I&A’s Border Security Division, the division’s products are 

designed to provide information about border threats and other information that is 

applicable to border communities throughout the country. In contrast, fusion center 

products are generally designed to provide information that is specific to a geographic 

location. 

Page 32 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

developed by DHS personnel assigned to fusion centers under the act and 

(2) provide annual reports to committees of Congress describing the 

consumer feedback obtained and, if applicable, how the department has 

adjusted its own production of intelligence products in response to that 

consumer feedback.34 However, DHS’s December 2008 and August 2009 

reports to Congress did not describe the feedback obtained on the 

intelligence products that its analysts in fusion centers helped to 

produce—including border intelligence products—or adjustments made in 

response to the feedback. 

DHS recognizes that it needs to take additional actions to obtain feedback 

from local and tribal law enforcement officers who are consumers of the 

intelligence products that I&A produces. For example, in mid-2009, I&A 

hired a contractor to initiate feedback pilot projects, including one 

currently underway to evaluate and implement processes for gathering 

and evaluating feedback responses. However, these projects are designed 

to solicit feedback on products developed by I&A and do not specifically 

include products that DHS personnel in fusion centers help to develop, 

including border intelligence products. Therefore, these projects may not 

support I&A efforts to obtain feedback under the 9/11 Commission Act on 

products that DHS personnel in fusion centers help to develop. 

DHS’s August 2009 report to Congress generally illustrates the value in 

obtaining feedback on intelligence products. For example, in one instance, 

the report notes that a state fusion center expressed concerns that the 

perspectives of three southwest border state fusion centers were not 

included in an assessment that I&A headquarters produced on border 

violence. The feedback resulted in teleconferences and other I&A actions 

to ensure that state and local perspectives are included in future 

assessments of border violence. Similarly, obtaining feedback on the 

border intelligence products that DHS analysts in fusion centers help to 

produce would support other fusion center efforts to develop such 

products and the department’s efforts to adjust its own production of 

intelligence products in response to that consumer feedback. 

The two fusion centers we contacted that were creating border 

intelligence products with the support of DHS personnel (Arizona and 

 

34DHS is to submit its annual reports to the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House 

of Representatives. See 6 U.S.C. §124h(g)(2). 

Page 33 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

New York) had established their own mechanisms for obtaining feedback 

from local and tribal consumers of the products. Specifically, the fusion 

centers attached feedback forms to the border products, but have received 

low response rates, according to center officials. As a result, the fusion 

centers took other actions to solicit feedback on the border products, such 

as through direct outreach with local and tribal consumers of the 

information. Officials from both fusion centers said that the feedback has 

generally been positive and that the border products have been modified 

in response to this feedback. According to the officials, since these 

products are developed by the fusion centers, the centers do not routinely 

provide related feedback to DHS on the value of the contributions of its 

staff and intelligence input. However, the fusion centers’ efforts to obtain 

feedback on the border intelligence products—in addition to using 

feedback forms—demonstrate the feasibility of DHS taking additional 

actions to collect feedback on the products and report its findings to 

congressional committees under the 9/11 Commission Act. DHS agrees 

that it could take additional actions to collect this feedback, which could 

be done as part of the department’s ongoing feedback pilot projects. 

By working with fusion centers to obtain feedback on the border 

intelligence products developed, DHS could better support fusion center 

efforts to maintain and improve the utility and quality of information 

provided to local and tribal law enforcement agencies along the borders. 

This information could also be useful to I&A in modifying its own border 

intelligence products to better meet the needs of fusion centers, assist the 

department in making decisions on how to best utilize its limited 

resources at fusion centers, and be responsive to its statutory reporting 

requirements. 

Page 34 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

Detecting the warning signs of potential terrorist activities and sharing the 

information with the proper agencies provides an opportunity to prevent a 

terrorist attack. However, most of the local and tribal officials in the 

border communities we contacted did not clearly know what suspicious 

activities federal agencies and fusion centers wanted them to report, how 

to report them, or to whom. The federal government is working with state 

and local entities to develop a standardized suspicious activity reporting 

process that, when implemented, could help address these issues. In the 

meantime, providing local and tribal officials with suspicious activity 

indicators that are associated with criminal activity along the borders 

could assist the officials in identifying potential terrorist threats. 

Local and Tribal 

Agencies in Border 

Communities We 

Contacted Could 

Better Support 

National 

Counterterrorism 

Efforts If They Were 

More Aware of the 

Suspicious Activities 

They Are to Report 

Most Local and Tribal 

Agencies in Border 

Communities We 

Contacted Did Not Know 

What Suspicious Activities 

Federal Agencies and 

Fusion Centers Wanted 

Them to Report or How to 

Report Them 

According to an October 2008 intergovernmental report on suspicious 

activities, fundamental to local and tribal law enforcement agencies’ 

efforts to detect and mitigate potential terrorist threats is ensuring that 

front-line personnel recognize and have the ability to document behaviors 

and incidents indicative of criminal activity associated with international 

terrorism.35 Unlike behaviors, activities, or situations that are clearly 

criminal in nature—such as car thefts, burglaries, or assaults—suspicious 

activity reporting involves suspicious behaviors that have been associated 

with terrorist activities in the past and may be predictive of future threats 

to public safety. Examples include surveillance, photographing of 

facilities, site breaches or physical intrusion, cyber attacks, and the 

probing of security. 

To varying degrees, federal agencies and fusion centers provided local and 

tribal agencies in the border communities we contacted with alerts, 

warnings, and other information that enhanced the local and tribal 

agencies’ situational awareness of potential terrorist threats. As an 

additional tool, the FBI and fusion centers in two of the five states we 

contacted had developed lists of suspicious activities—in the form of 

reference cards or brochures—to help local and tribal agencies determine 

 

35DOJ, Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Major Cities Chiefs Association, and 

DHS, Findings and Recommendations of the Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) Support 

and Implementation Project. 

Page 35 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

what behaviors, activities, or situations are indicators of potential terrorist 

activities and should be reported for further analysis. However, officials 

from 13 of the 20 local and tribal agencies we contacted said they did not 

recall being provided with a list of the suspicious activities or indicators 

that rise to the level of potential terrorist threats and should be reported, 

while officials from 7 of the 20 agencies said they had received such 

indicators from either the FBI, the state fusion center, or another entity. 

According to the October 2008 intergovernmental report on suspicious 

activities, local law enforcement agencies are critical to efforts to protect 

local communities from another terrorist attack. The report also notes that 

to effectively conduct these duties, it is critical that the federal 

government ensure that local law enforcement personnel can recognize 

and have the ability to document behaviors and incidents indicative of 

criminal activity associated with domestic and international terrorism. 

While federal agencies and fusion centers had taken steps to disseminate 

or discuss terrorism-related indicators with local and tribal officials—such 

as through mass mailings and during outreach meetings and law 

enforcement conferences—these actions did not ensure that local and 

tribal agencies were aware of them, in part because the mechanisms used 

to share information were not always effective, as discussed earlier in this 

report. As a result of not being aware of the suspicious activity indicators, 

local officials in three border communities we contacted said they did not 

clearly know what information federal agencies and fusion centers wanted 

them to collect and report. Increased awareness of these indicators would 

better position local and tribal agencies along the border to identify and 

report behaviors and incidents indicative of criminal activity associated 

with terrorism. 

Also, in about half of the border communities we contacted, local and 

tribal agency officials were not aware of the specific processes they were 

to use to report terrorism-related suspicious activities or to whom this 

information should be reported because federal agencies had not yet 

defined such processes. Absent defined processes, the local and tribal 

officials had independently developed policies and procedures for 

gathering and reporting suspicious activities and they provided varying 

responses regarding how and to whom they would submit suspicious 

activities that may have a nexus to terrorism. Responses included 

reporting suspicious activities to a fusion center, the FBI, or another 

federal agency. Several local and tribal officials we contacted said they 

would report this information to the local federal official—e.g., Border 

Patrol, ICE, or the FBI—with whom they had developed a relationship. By 

defining reporting processes, federal, local, and tribal agencies would be in 

Page 36 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

a better position to conduct more efficient collection and analysis of 

suspicious activities and share the results on a regional or national basis. 

Also, internal control standards call for management to ensure that there 

are adequate processes for communicating with and obtaining information 

from external stakeholders that may have a significant effect on the 

agency achieving its goals and that information should be recorded and 

communicated to the entities who need it in a form and within a time 

frame that enables them to carry out their responsibilities.36

At the national level, the federal government is working with state and 

local law enforcement entities on the National Suspicious Activity 

Reporting Initiative to standardize the reporting of suspicious activities 

that may be related to terrorism.37 The long-term goal of the initiative is to 

develop and implement consistent national policies, processes, and best 

practices by employing a standardized, integrated approach to gathering, 

documenting, processing, analyzing, and sharing information about 

suspicious activity that is potentially related to terrorism. One of the 

immediate goals of the initiative is to help ensure that suspicious activity 

reports with a potential connection to terrorism are expeditiously 

provided by local and tribal law enforcement agencies to the FBI. As of 

September 2009, related pilot projects were ongoing at fusion centers in 12 

major cities. According to the DOJ official who is overseeing the initiative, 

an evaluation of the pilots will be completed by late 2009, but fully 

implementing the initiative across the country could take up to 2 years. 

Until the National Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative is fully 

implemented, additional federal agency efforts to establish defined 

processes for local and tribal officials in border communities to report 

 

36GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). These standards, issued pursuant to the requirements 

of the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act of 1982, provide the overall framework for 

establishing and maintaining internal control in the federal government. Also pursuant to 

the 1982 act, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued circular A-123, revised 

December 21, 2004, to provide the specific requirements for assessing the reporting on 

internal controls. Internal control standards and the definition of internal control in OMB 

Circular A-123 are based on GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government. 

37Entities participating in the National Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative include the 

Program Manager-Information Sharing Environment, DHS, the FBI, the Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence, state and local fusion centers, the Major Cities Chiefs 

Association, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the Major County Sheriffs’ 

Association, and the National Sheriffs’ Association. 

Page 37 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

suspicious activities could help ensure that information is collected and 

shared with the most appropriate entity. 

Suspicious Activity 

Indicators That Are 

Associated with Criminal 

Activity along the Borders 

Could Assist Local and 

Tribal Officials in 

Identifying Potential 

Terrorist Threats 

According to the director of I&A’s Border Security Division, senior 

intelligence officials at fusion centers in two of the five border states we 

contacted, and other subject matter experts—including federal and state 

officials who were involved in developing suspicious activity indicators for 

local and tribal agencies in border communities—the suspicious activity 

indicators could be more useful if they also contained terrorism-related 

behaviors, activities, or situations that were more applicable to the border 

or border crimes and were periodically updated to reflect current threats. 

Officials from three of the local law enforcement agencies we contacted 

also suggested that border-specific indicators would help them link 

potential terrorism-related activities to crimes they are more likely to 

encounter along the border, such as illegal immigration and currency 

smuggling. However, our review of the suspicious activity indicators being 

utilized by the National Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative and those 

that were developed by the FBI and fusion centers generally did not 

include indicators that were specific to the border. 

According to the DOJ official who was overseeing the implementation of 

the national initiative, the primary suspicious activity indicators that were 

validated by the law enforcement and intelligence community for use in 

the major city pilot projects were designed to be general and applicable to 

local and tribal officials located anywhere in the country. The official 

noted that the automated system that is being used by law enforcement 

agencies to record the suspicious activities during the pilot projects was 

designed to accommodate “sub-lists” that contain indicators that are 

applicable to specific sectors, such as the critical infrastructure sector. 

The official said that there was not a sub-list for border-specific indicators, 

but that he saw the potential for developing such a list. The official said 

that I&A would be the entity with the requisite expertise for developing 

such a list. 

In April 2009, I&A deployed an intelligence analyst from its Border 

Security Division to DHS’s Homeland Security Intelligence Support Team 

to develop terrorism indicators that are specific to the southwest border.38

 

38In 2007, DHS created the Homeland Security Intelligence Support Team at the El Paso 

Intelligence Center to improve information sharing among federal agencies and with state, 

local, and tribal partners. 

Page 38 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

According to the director of the Border Security Division, the analyst is 

looking for trends and patterns in terrorism-related incident reports that 

are generated by local and tribal law enforcement officials along the 

southwest border. The director said that I&A has not yet determined a 

final date for developing the suspicious activity indicators since there is a 

lot of information that has to be analyzed. The official noted that I&A is 

considering deploying another intelligence analyst to the northern border 

to perform similar analyses. 

According to the director of I&A’s Border Security Division, in his former 

position as a border analyst in the intelligence community, he worked with 

CBP and ICE to develop border-related indicators that were potential 

precursors to terrorist activities. The official noted the importance of 

periodically updating and consistently disseminating these indicators of 

terrorism-related behaviors, activities, or situations that reflect current 

border threats. According to Border Patrol and ICE headquarters and field 

personnel, neither agency had developed suspicious activity indicators 

that were specific to the borders. 

Additional DHS and FBI actions to develop, periodically update, and 

consistently disseminate indicators of terrorism-related activities that 

focus on border threats could help to maximize the utility of suspicious 

activity indicators as a counterterrorism tool in border communities. 

As discussed in the National Strategy for Information Sharing, state, local, 

and tribal government officials are critical to our nation’s efforts to 

prevent future terrorist attacks. Because these officials are often in the 

best position to identify potential threats that exist within their 

jurisdictions, they must be partners in information sharing that enhances 

situational awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist threats. In 

border communities, this partnership is particularly important because of 

the vulnerability to a range of criminal activity that exists along our 

nation’s borders. Therefore, a more robust effort by federal agencies to 

identify the information needs of local and tribal law enforcement 

agencies along the borders and periodically assess the extent to which 

partnerships exist and related mechanisms to share information are 

working—and fill gaps and address barriers where needed—could better 

enable federal agencies to provide useful information to their local and 

tribal partners that enhances situational awareness. 

Conclusions 

The work of state-run fusion centers is also critical to the nation’s efforts 

to prevent terrorist attacks. Fusion centers in the border states we visited 

Page 39 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

demonstrated a range of practices related to developing border 

intelligence products that could serve as a model for other fusion centers. 

By identifying and sharing these promising practices, DHS and the FBI 

could help strengthen the work of fusion centers nationally in addition to 

enhancing situational awareness of local and tribal law enforcement. Also, 

by working with the centers to obtain feedback on border intelligence 

products, DHS and the FBI could enhance the utility of those products that 

fusion centers share with local and tribal law enforcement agencies. 

Finally, until a national suspicious activity reporting process is in place, 

more consistently providing local and tribal officials in border 

communities with information on the suspicious terrorism-related 

activities they should report—including those related to border threats—

and establishing processes for reporting this information could help 

ensure that critical information is reported and reaches the most 

appropriate agency to take action. 

To help ensure that local and tribal law enforcement agencies in border 

communities receive information from local federal agencies that 

enhances their situational awareness of border crimes and potential 

terrorist threats, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security 

and Director of the FBI, as applicable, require Border Patrol, ICE, and FBI 

offices in border communities to take the following two actions: (1) more 

consistently and fully identify the local and tribal agencies’ information 

needs and (2) periodically assess the extent to which partnerships and 

related mechanisms to share information exist, fill gaps as appropriate, 

and address barriers to establishing such partnerships and mechanisms. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

To promote future efforts to develop border intelligence products within 

fusion centers, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security 

and the Director of the FBI collaborate with fusion centers to take the 

following two actions: (1) identify and market promising practices used to 

prepare these products and (2) take additional actions to solicit feedback 

from local and tribal officials in border communities on the utility and 

quality of the products generated. 

To maximize the utility of suspicious activity indicators as a 

counterterrorism tool, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland 

Security and the Director of the FBI collaborate with fusion centers to 

take the following two actions: (1) take steps to ensure that local and 

tribal law enforcement agencies in border communities are aware of the 

specific types of suspicious activities related to terrorism that they are to 

Page 40 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

report and the process through which they should report this information 

and (2) consider developing, periodically updating, and consistently 

disseminating indicators of terrorism-related activities that focus on 

border threats. 

On November 10, 2009, we provided a draft of this report to DHS and DOJ 

for comment. In its written response, DHS noted that CBP, ICE, and I&A 

are continuing and expanding efforts to share information. DHS agreed 

with all of our recommendations in this report. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Specifically, DHS agreed with our recommendation related to the need for 

Border Patrol and ICE to (1) more fully identify the information needs of 

local and tribal agencies along the borders and (2) periodically assess the 

extent to which partnerships and related mechanisms to share information 

exist. For example, CBP agreed that a systematic and standardized 

process to disseminate information and receive feedback is vital to 

situational awareness for local and tribal law enforcement partners who 

are within the immediate areas adjacent to the border. CBP noted that 

Border Patrol plans to develop a list of individuals who will serve as 

liaisons to local and tribal agencies and also develop a list of local and 

tribal contacts. According to CBP, the Border Patrol liaisons will then 

make initial efforts to assess the information needs of the law enforcement 

partners and take other actions to determine and publish guidance on 

information sharing. To ensure that information shared is useful, Border 

Patrol plans to conduct annual surveys of its partners. Border Patrol 

envisions that this standardized process will be in place by the end of 

fiscal year 2010. When implemented, the Border Patrol’s actions should 

meet the intent of our recommendation. ICE also agreed with the 

recommendation and plans to work with CBP and the FBI to enhance 

local and tribal law enforcement agencies’ situational awareness, but ICE 

did not provide details on the specific actions it will take. I&A provided, or 

otherwise highlighted, additional information on the current status of 

information sharing among federal, state, and local agencies as it pertains 

to border security. 

DHS also agreed with our recommendation related to the need for DHS 

and the FBI to collaborate to (1) identify and market promising practices 

used to prepare border intelligence products within fusion centers and (2) 

take additional actions to solicit feedback from local and tribal officials on 

the utility and quality of the products generated. According to I&A—the 

DHS component that has the lead in addressing this recommendation—the 

department has initiated the creation of a broad Joint Fusion Center 

Page 41 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

Program Management Office, which represents a departmentwide effort 

that seeks to more closely coordinate support to fusion centers with 

department component agencies, including CBP and ICE. I&A also noted 

that its intelligence specialists that are in fusion centers also act as 

conveyers of information about promising practices to develop border 

information products. Finally, I&A noted that the department hosts the 

Lessons Learned and Best Practices Web site that can be utilized to 

promote future efforts to develop border intelligence products within 

fusion centers. While these actions could potentially support DHS efforts 

to identify and market promising practices used to prepare border 

intelligence products within fusion centers, I&A did not provide any 

specific information on the extent to which such practices have been 

identified and marketed. I&A’s comments also did not address what 

actions, if any, are ongoing or planned to solicit feedback from local and 

tribal officials on the utility and quality of the products generated. ICE also 

agreed with the recommendation and noted that it will work with the FBI 

to implement it, but ICE did not provide details on the specific actions it 

will take. 

Finally, DHS agreed with our recommendation related to the need for DHS 

and the FBI to collaborate to (1) ensure that local and tribal law 

enforcement agencies in border communities are aware of the suspicious 

activities related to terrorism they are to report and the process for 

reporting this information and (2) consider developing and disseminating 

indicators of terrorism-related activities that focus on border threats. ICE 

agreed with the recommendation but deferred to I&A on the 

implementation specifics. I&A provided additional information on the 

status of the National Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative and efforts 

to test and evaluate related policies, procedures, and technology. 

According to I&A, the evaluation phase of the initiative at participating 

sites concluded at the end of September 2009 and a final report will be 

issued that will document lessons learned and best practices. I&A noted 

that the initiative will then be transitioned from a preoperational 

environment to a broader nationwide implementation. However, as 

discussed in our report, the DOJ official who is overseeing the initiative 

noted that the nationwide implementation could take up to 2 years. 

Therefore, our recommendation is intended for DHS and the FBI to take 

interim actions until the national initiative is fully implemented, such as 

more consistently providing local and tribal officials in border 

communities with information on the suspicious terrorism-related 

activities they should report—including those related to border threats—

and establishing processes for reporting this information. 

Page 42 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
 

The full text of DHS's written comments is reprinted in appendix II. DHS 

also provided technical comments, which we incorporated in this report 

where appropriate. 

On December 8, 2009, DOJ’s Audit Liaison Office, within the Justice 

Management Division, stated by e-mail that the department will not be 

submitting technical or formal comments on the draft report. 

As agreed with your office, we plan no further distribution of this report 

until 30 days from its date, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, the Attorney General, and other interested parties. In addition, 

this report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff that made major contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix III. 

Sincerely yours, 

Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues 

Eileen R. Larence

Page 43 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

Methodology 

The objectives of our review were to determine the extent to which (1) 

local and tribal law enforcement agencies in border communities are 

receiving information from their federal partners that enhances the 

agencies’ situational awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist 

threats; (2) federal agencies are assisting fusion centers’ efforts to develop 

border intelligence products that enhance local and tribal agencies’ 

situational awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist threats; and 

(3) local and tribal law enforcement agencies in border communities are 

aware of the specific types of suspicious activities related to terrorism 

they are to report and to whom, and the process through which they 

should report this information. 

To identify criteria for answering these questions, we analyzed relevant 

laws, directives, policies, and procedures related to information sharing, 

such as the October 2007 National Strategy for Information Sharing and 

the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 

(9/11 Commission Act).1

 The 9/11 Commission Act provides for the 

establishment of a State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative at 

the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and contains numerous 

provisions that address the federal government’s information sharing 

responsibilities to state and local fusion centers, including those that serve 

border communities. 

To examine the information sharing that occurs between local and tribal 

law enforcement agencies in border communities and federal agencies 

that have a local presence in these communities—U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection’s Border Patrol and U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)—we 

conducted site visits to five states that are geographically dispersed along 

the northern and southwest borders (Arizona, Montana, New York, Texas, 

and Washington). Within these states, we selected a nonprobability sample 

of 23 local and tribal law enforcement agencies to visit based on one or 

more of the following characteristics:2

 

1

See generally Pub. L. No. 110-53, tit. V, 121 Stat. 266, 306-35 (2007). 

2

Nonprobability sampling is a method of sampling where observations are selected in a 

manner that is not completely random, generally using specific characteristics of the 

population as criteria. Results from a nonprobability sample cannot be used to make 

inferences about an entire population because some elements of the population being 

studied had no chance or an unknown chance of being selected as part of the sample. 

Page 44 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

• locations known to be or suspected of being particularly vulnerable to 

illegal entry or criminal activity; 

• land ports of entry with heavy inbound passenger traffic; 

• locations in proximity to areas at the border where there is little or no 

continuous federal border enforcement presence; 

• locations that include Native American tribal communities with lands that 

abut the border; 

• locations where federal, state, and local communities have in the past, or 

are currently working with federal agencies to support border security 

either informally or through pilot programs for sharing information; 

• locations in proximity to federal agencies at the border; and 

• geographically dispersed locations along the northern and southwest land 

borders. 

We met with county sheriffs, local police chiefs, and tribal police chiefs 

from the 23 law enforcement agencies and asked them about the 

information they received from federal agencies in their localities. We also 

asked whether federal officials had discussed local and tribal officials’ 

information needs and had established information sharing partnerships 

and related mechanisms to share information with them—consistent with 

the National Strategy for Information Sharing and best practices described 

in GAO reports.3

After our visits, we sent follow-up questions to all 23 local and tribal 

agencies we visited in order to obtain consistency in how we requested 

and obtained information for reporting purposes. Three agencies did not 

respond to our follow-up efforts and were excluded from our analysis. 

Thus, our analysis and reporting is based on our visits and subsequent 

activities with the 20 local and tribal agencies that responded to our 

follow-up questions. We also met with local representatives of Border 

Patrol, ICE, and the FBI to discuss their perspectives on the information 

sharing that occurred, and compared this information to that provided by 

local and tribal agencies in order to identify barriers to sharing and related 

causes. 

Because we selected a nonprobability sample of agencies in border 

communities to contact, the information we obtained at these locations 

may not be generalized across the wider population of law enforcement 

agencies in border communities. However, because we selected these 

 

3

See, for example, GAO, Information Sharing: Practices That Can Benefit Critical 

Infrastructure Protection, GAO-02-24 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001). 

Page 45 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

border communities based on the variety of their geographic location, 

proximity to federal agencies, and other factors, the information we 

gathered from these locations provided us with a general understanding of 

information sharing between federal agencies and state, local, and tribal 

law enforcement agencies along the border. 

To assess the extent to which federal agencies assisted fusion centers in 

developing border intelligence products, as discussed in the 9/11 

Commission Act, we reviewed products developed by fusion centers to 

determine the extent to which they provided border security–relevant 

information.4

 We also met with and conducted subsequent follow-up 

conversations with fusion center directors and other senior fusion center 

officials in the five states we visited (Arizona, Montana, New York, Texas 

and Washington) and obtained their views on the importance of 

developing such products and about the level of support federal agencies 

were providing in developing these products. We asked each of the 20 

local and tribal law enforcement agencies we contacted whether they 

received border intelligence products from their state’s primary fusion 

center and, if so, we discussed their views on the usefulness of such 

products. 

We also interviewed senior officials from DHS’s Office of Intelligence and 

Analysis—the office responsible for coordinating the federal government’s 

support to fusion centers—and headquarters and field components of 

Border Patrol, ICE, and the FBI to discuss their efforts to support fusion 

centers’ development of border intelligence products, identify promising 

practices for developing such products, and obtain feedback from local 

and tribal officials on the usefulness of the products. We also reviewed 

applicable documents that address fusion centers, including the 9/11 

Commission Act, the National Strategy for Information Sharing, fusion 

center guidelines, and DHS planning documents and reports. 

Finally, to determine the extent to which local and tribal agencies in 

border communities were aware of the suspicious activities they are to 

report, we asked officials from the 20 agencies what, if any, information 

federal agencies or fusion centers had provided them on the kinds of 

suspicious activities that could be indicators or precursors to terrorism 

 

4

In general, border security–relevant information includes information on border crimes—

such as illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and border violence—and potential terrorist 

threats. 

Page 46 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

and what processes they had in place for reporting information on these 

activities. In general, suspicious activity is defined as observed behavior or 

incidents that may be indicative of intelligence gathering or preoperational 

planning related to terrorism, criminal, espionage, or other illicit 

intentions. We also reviewed the Findings and Recommendations of the 

Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) Support and Implementation Project

to determine the extent to which the federal government recognizes the 

role of suspicious activity reporting for detecting and mitigating potential 

terrorist threats.5

 We compared the processes for reporting suspicious 

activities with GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government.6

We also examined indicators of various suspicious activities the FBI and 

fusion centers developed to determine if they contained border-specific 

content. We interviewed Department of Justice officials who were leading 

the national initiative to standardize suspicious activity reporting—as well 

as those from headquarters components of DHS and the FBI—to discuss 

the status of the national initiative and whether border-specific indicators 

were needed and are being considered as part of this initiative. 

We conducted this performance audit from October 2007 through 

December 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

 

5

DOJ, Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Major Cities Chiefs Association, and 

DHS, Findings and Recommendations of the Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) Support 

and Implementation Project (October 2008). 

6

GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). These standards, issued pursuant to the requirements 

of the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act of 1982, provide the overall framework for 

establishing and maintaining internal control in the federal government. Also pursuant to 

the 1982 act, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued circular A-123, revised 

December 21, 2004, to provide the specific requirements for assessing the reporting on 

internal controls. Internal control standards and the definition of internal control in OMB 

Circular A-123 are based on GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government. 

Page 47 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 

of Homeland Security 

Page 48 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security 

Page 49 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security 

Page 50 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security 

Page 51 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security 

Page 52 GAO-10-41 Border Information Sharing
Appendix III: GAO

A

 Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 53 GAO-10-41 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Eileen R. Larence, (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov 

In addition to the person named above, Eric Erdman, Assistant Director; 

Frances Cook; Cindy Gilbert; Kristen Hughes; Christopher Jones; Thomas 

Lombardi; Ronald Salo; Edith Sohna; Adam Vogt; and Maria Wallace made 

key contributions to this report. 

 Border Information Sharing 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(440632) 
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