# Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali C 118/2013

| | ISSN 1977-0987
  doi:10.3000/19770987.C_2013.118.mlt |
| --- | --- |
| Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali
  tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 118 |
| | |
| Edizzjoni bil-Malti | Informazzjoni u Avviżi | Volum 5625 ta' April 2013 |

ISSN 1977-0987

doi:10.3000/19770987.C_2013.118.mlt

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali

tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 118

Edizzjoni bil-Malti

Informazzjoni u Avviżi

Volum 5625 ta' April 2013

---

| Avviż Nru | Werrej | Paġna |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Komunikazzjonijiet |
| | KOMUNIKAZZJONIJIET MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA |
| | Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea |
| 2013/C 118/01 | Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata (Każ COMP/M.6879 – Mitsui Group/Gestamp Automoción/Target Companies) (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2013/C 118/02 | Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata (Każ COMP/M.6782 – HIG Capital/Petrochem Carless Holdings) (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2013/C 118/03 | Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata (Każ COMP/M.6753 – Orkla/Rieber & Son) (
  1
  ) | 2 |

Avviż Nru

Werrej

Paġna

II   Komunikazzjonijiet

KOMUNIKAZZJONIJIET MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

2013/C 118/01

Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata (Każ COMP/M.6879 – Mitsui Group/Gestamp Automoción/Target Companies) (
  1
  )

1

1

2013/C 118/02

Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata (Każ COMP/M.6782 – HIG Capital/Petrochem Carless Holdings) (
  1
  )

1

1

2013/C 118/03

Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata (Każ COMP/M.6753 – Orkla/Rieber & Son) (
  1
  )

1

2

| | IV   Informazzjoni |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMAZZJONI MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA |
| | Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea |
| 2013/C 118/04 | Rata tal-kambju tal-euro | 3 |
| | INFORMAZZJONI DWAR IŻ-ŻONA EKONOMIKA EWROPEA |
| | Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza EFTA |
| 2013/C 118/05 | Stedina biex jitressqu l-kummenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-Twaqqif ta’ Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza u ta’ Qorti tal-Ġustizzja dwar kwistjonijiet ta' għajnuna mill-Istat rigward għajnuna potenzjali lil ħames fornituri tat-trasport bil-karozzi tal-linja fil-kontea ta’ Aust Agder | 4 |
| 2013/C 118/06 | Informazzjoni kkomunikata mill-Istati tal-EFTA dwar għajnuna mill-Istat mogħtija skont l-Att imsemmi fil-punt 1 j tal-Anness XV tal-Ftehim dwar iż-ŻEE (ir-Regolament tal-Kummissjoni (KE) Nru 800/2008 li jiddikjara ċerti kategoriji ta’ għajnuna bħala kompatibbli mas-suq komuni (Regolament għal Eżenzjoni Ġenerali Sħiħa) skont l-Artikoli 87 u 88 tat-Trattat) | 26 |

IV   Informazzjoni

INFORMAZZJONI MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

2013/C 118/04

Rata tal-kambju tal-euro

3

INFORMAZZJONI DWAR IŻ-ŻONA EKONOMIKA EWROPEA

Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza EFTA

2013/C 118/05

Stedina biex jitressqu l-kummenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-Twaqqif ta’ Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza u ta’ Qorti tal-Ġustizzja dwar kwistjonijiet ta' għajnuna mill-Istat rigward għajnuna potenzjali lil ħames fornituri tat-trasport bil-karozzi tal-linja fil-kontea ta’ Aust Agder

4

2013/C 118/06

Informazzjoni kkomunikata mill-Istati tal-EFTA dwar għajnuna mill-Istat mogħtija skont l-Att imsemmi fil-punt 1 j tal-Anness XV tal-Ftehim dwar iż-ŻEE (ir-Regolament tal-Kummissjoni (KE) Nru 800/2008 li jiddikjara ċerti kategoriji ta’ għajnuna bħala kompatibbli mas-suq komuni (Regolament għal Eżenzjoni Ġenerali Sħiħa) skont l-Artikoli 87 u 88 tat-Trattat)

26

| | V   Avviżi |
| --- | --- |
| | PROĊEDURI AMMINISTRATTIVI |
| | Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea |
| 2013/C 118/07 | Sejħa għall-proposti – EACEA/04/13 – Skont il-Programm tat-Tagħlim tul il-Ħajja – Implimentazzjoni tal-objettivi strateġiċi Ewropej fl-Edukazzjoni u t-taħriġ (ET 2020) (kooperazzjoni tal-partijiet interessati, esperimentazzjoni u innovazzjoni) | 27 |
| | L-Uffiċċju Ewropew għas-Selezzjoni tal-Persunal (EPSO) |
| 2013/C 118/08 | Avviż ta' kompetizzjonijiet ġenerali | 32 |
| | PROĊEDURI TAL-QORTI |
| | Qorti tal-EFTA |
| 2013/C 118/09 | Sentenza tal-Qorti tal-11 ta’ Diċembru 2012 fil-Każ E-2/12 – HOB-vín ehf. v The State Alcohol and Tobacco Company of Iceland (ÁTVR) (Il-Moviment liberu tal-merkanzija – Id-Direttiva 2000/13/KE – Il-Kopertura tal-prodott – It-tikkettar tal-oġġetti tal-ikel – It-tikkettar li jiżgwida – Nuqqas ta’ notifika ta’ miżura nazzjonali lill-ESA – Ġustifikazzjoni – Responsabbiltà tal-Istat) | 33 |
| 2013/C 118/10 | Sentenza tal-Qorti tal-21 ta’ Diċembru 2012 fil-Kawża E-14/11 – Schenker North AB, Schenker Privpak AB u Schenker Privpak AS v l-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA (Azzjoni għall-annullament ta’ deċiżjoni tal-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA – Aċċess għal Dokumenti – Ammissibilità – Miżuri ta’ Organizzazzjoni ta' Proċedura – Ftuħ mill-ġdid ta' proċedura orali) | 35 |
| 2013/C 118/11 | Talba għal Opinjoni Konsultattiva mill-Qorti tal-EFTA magħmula minn Hæstiréttur Íslands datata s-6 ta’ Diċembru 2012 fil-kawża ta’ Jan Anfinn Wahl vs l-Istat tal-Islanda (Il-Kawża E-15/12) | 36 |
| | PROĊEDURI DWAR L-IMPLIMENTAZZJONI TAL-POLITIKA TAL-KOMPETIZZJONI |
| | Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea |
| 2013/C 118/12 | Notifika minn qabel ta' konċentrazzjoni (Każ COMP/M.6919 – KKR/Bregal Fund/Avenia/Cognita) – Każ li jista' jiġi kkunsidrat għal proċedura simplifikata (
  1
  ) | 37 |

V   Avviżi

PROĊEDURI AMMINISTRATTIVI

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

2013/C 118/07

Sejħa għall-proposti – EACEA/04/13 – Skont il-Programm tat-Tagħlim tul il-Ħajja – Implimentazzjoni tal-objettivi strateġiċi Ewropej fl-Edukazzjoni u t-taħriġ (ET 2020) (kooperazzjoni tal-partijiet interessati, esperimentazzjoni u innovazzjoni)

27

L-Uffiċċju Ewropew għas-Selezzjoni tal-Persunal (EPSO)

2013/C 118/08

Avviż ta' kompetizzjonijiet ġenerali

32

PROĊEDURI TAL-QORTI

Qorti tal-EFTA

2013/C 118/09

Sentenza tal-Qorti tal-11 ta’ Diċembru 2012 fil-Każ E-2/12 – HOB-vín ehf. v The State Alcohol and Tobacco Company of Iceland (ÁTVR) (Il-Moviment liberu tal-merkanzija – Id-Direttiva 2000/13/KE – Il-Kopertura tal-prodott – It-tikkettar tal-oġġetti tal-ikel – It-tikkettar li jiżgwida – Nuqqas ta’ notifika ta’ miżura nazzjonali lill-ESA – Ġustifikazzjoni – Responsabbiltà tal-Istat)

(Il-Moviment liberu tal-merkanzija – Id-Direttiva 2000/13/KE – Il-Kopertura tal-prodott – It-tikkettar tal-oġġetti tal-ikel – It-tikkettar li jiżgwida – Nuqqas ta’ notifika ta’ miżura nazzjonali lill-ESA – Ġustifikazzjoni – Responsabbiltà tal-Istat)

33

2013/C 118/10

Sentenza tal-Qorti tal-21 ta’ Diċembru 2012 fil-Kawża E-14/11 – Schenker North AB, Schenker Privpak AB u Schenker Privpak AS v l-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA (Azzjoni għall-annullament ta’ deċiżjoni tal-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA – Aċċess għal Dokumenti – Ammissibilità – Miżuri ta’ Organizzazzjoni ta' Proċedura – Ftuħ mill-ġdid ta' proċedura orali)

(Azzjoni għall-annullament ta’ deċiżjoni tal-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA – Aċċess għal Dokumenti – Ammissibilità – Miżuri ta’ Organizzazzjoni ta' Proċedura – Ftuħ mill-ġdid ta' proċedura orali)

35

2013/C 118/11

Talba għal Opinjoni Konsultattiva mill-Qorti tal-EFTA magħmula minn Hæstiréttur Íslands datata s-6 ta’ Diċembru 2012 fil-kawża ta’ Jan Anfinn Wahl vs l-Istat tal-Islanda (Il-Kawża E-15/12)

36

PROĊEDURI DWAR L-IMPLIMENTAZZJONI TAL-POLITIKA TAL-KOMPETIZZJONI

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

2013/C 118/12

Notifika minn qabel ta' konċentrazzjoni (Każ COMP/M.6919 – KKR/Bregal Fund/Avenia/Cognita) – Każ li jista' jiġi kkunsidrat għal proċedura simplifikata (
  1
  )

1

37

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Test b’relevanza għaż-ŻEE |

---

(1)   Test b’relevanza għaż-ŻEE

1

| MT | |
| --- | --- |

MT

---

II Komunikazzjonijiet

KOMUNIKAZZJONIJIET MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

| 25.4.2013 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 118/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.4.2013

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 118/1

---

Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata

(Każ COMP/M.6879 – Mitsui Group/Gestamp Automoción/Target Companies)

(Test b’relevanza għaż-ŻEE)

2013/C 118/01

Fis-17 ta’ April 2013, il-Kummissjoni ddeċidiet li ma topponix il-konċentrazzjoni notifikata msemmija hawn fuq u li tiddikjaraha kompatibbli mas-suq komuni. Din id-deċiżjoni hi bbażata fuq l-Artikolu 6(1)b tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004. It-test sħiħ tad-deċiżjoni hu disponibbli biss fl-Ingliż u ser isir pubbliku wara li jitneħħa kwalunkwe sigriet tan-negozju li jista’ jkun fih. Dan it-test jinstab:

| — | Fit-taqsima tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta' amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali, |
| --- | --- |

—

Fit-taqsima tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta' amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali,

| — | f’forma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) fid-dokument li jġib in-numru 32013M6879. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-internet għal-liġi Ewropea. |
| --- | --- |

—

f’forma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) fid-dokument li jġib in-numru 32013M6879. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-internet għal-liġi Ewropea.

---

| 25.4.2013 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 118/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.4.2013

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 118/1

---

Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata

(Każ COMP/M.6782 – HIG Capital/Petrochem Carless Holdings)

(Test b’relevanza għaż-ŻEE)

2013/C 118/02

Fis-26 ta’ Marzu 2013, il-Kummissjoni ddeċidiet li ma topponix il-konċentrazzjoni notifikata msemmija hawn fuq u li tiddikjaraha kompatibbli mas-suq komuni. Din id-deċiżjoni hi bbażata fuq l-Artikolu 6(1)b tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004. It-test sħiħ tad-deċiżjoni hu disponibbli biss fl-Ingliż u ser isir pubbliku wara li jitneħħa kwalunkwe sigriet tan-negozju li jista’ jkun fih. Dan it-test jinstab:

| — | Fit-taqsima tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta' amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali, |
| --- | --- |

—

Fit-taqsima tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta' amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali,

| — | f’forma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) fid-dokument li jġib in-numru 32013M6782. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-internet għal-liġi Ewropea. |
| --- | --- |

—

f’forma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) fid-dokument li jġib in-numru 32013M6782. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-internet għal-liġi Ewropea.

---

| 25.4.2013 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 118/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.4.2013

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 118/2

---

Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata

(Każ COMP/M.6753 – Orkla/Rieber & Son)

(Test b’relevanza għaż-ŻEE)

2013/C 118/03

Fl-4 ta’ Marzu 2013, il-Kummissjoni ddeċidiet li ma topponix il-konċentrazzjoni notifikata msemmija hawn fuq u li tiddikjaraha kompatibbli mas-suq komuni. Din id-deċiżjoni hi bbażata fuq l-Artikolu 6(1)b tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004. It-test sħiħ tad-deċiżjoni hu disponibbli biss fl-Ingliż u ser isir pubbliku wara li jitneħħa kwalunkwe sigriet tan-negozju li jista’ jkun fih. Dan it-test jinstab:

| — | Fit-taqsima tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta' amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali, |
| --- | --- |

—

Fit-taqsima tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta' amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali,

| — | f’forma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) fid-dokument li jġib in-numru 32013M6753. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-internet għal-liġi Ewropea. |
| --- | --- |

—

f’forma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) fid-dokument li jġib in-numru 32013M6753. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-internet għal-liġi Ewropea.

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IV Informazzjoni

INFORMAZZJONI MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

| 25.4.2013 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 118/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.4.2013

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 118/3

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Rata tal-kambju tal-euro (1)

L-24 ta’ April 2013

2013/C 118/04

1 euro =

| | Munita | Rata tal-kambju |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | Dollaru Amerikan | 1,3006 |
| JPY | Yen Ġappuniż | 129,46 |
| DKK | Krona Daniża | 7,4553 |
| GBP | Lira Sterlina | 0,85250 |
| SEK | Krona Żvediża | 8,5885 |
| CHF | Frank Żvizzeru | 1,2302 |
| ISK | Krona Iżlandiża | |
| NOK | Krona Norveġiża | 7,6780 |
| BGN | Lev Bulgaru | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Krona Ċeka | 25,909 |
| HUF | Forint Ungeriż | 299,55 |
| LTL | Litas Litwan | 3,4528 |
| LVL | Lats Latvjan | 0,7001 |
| PLN | Zloty Pollakk | 4,1367 |
| RON | Leu Rumen | 4,3495 |
| TRY | Lira Turka | 2,3476 |
| AUD | Dollaru Awstraljan | 1,2659 |
| CAD | Dollaru Kanadiż | 1,3345 |
| HKD | Dollaru ta' Hong Kong | 10,0980 |
| NZD | Dollaru tan-New Zealand | 1,5366 |
| SGD | Dollaru tas-Singapor | 1,6147 |
| KRW | Won tal-Korea t'Isfel | 1 453,80 |
| ZAR | Rand ta' l-Afrika t'Isfel | 11,9395 |
| CNY | Yuan ren-min-bi Ċiniż | 8,0352 |
| HRK | Kuna Kroata | 7,6065 |
| IDR | Rupiah Indoneżjan | 12 637,76 |
| MYR | Ringgit Malażjan | 3,9644 |
| PHP | Peso Filippin | 53,657 |
| RUB | Rouble Russu | 40,9583 |
| THB | Baht Tajlandiż | 37,626 |
| BRL | Real Brażiljan | 2,6318 |
| MXN | Peso Messikan | 15,9395 |
| INR | Rupi Indjan | 70,5190 |

Munita

Rata tal-kambju

USD

Dollaru Amerikan

1,3006

JPY

Yen Ġappuniż

129,46

DKK

Krona Daniża

7,4553

GBP

Lira Sterlina

0,85250

SEK

Krona Żvediża

8,5885

CHF

Frank Żvizzeru

1,2302

ISK

Krona Iżlandiża

NOK

Krona Norveġiża

7,6780

BGN

Lev Bulgaru

1,9558

CZK

Krona Ċeka

25,909

HUF

Forint Ungeriż

299,55

LTL

Litas Litwan

3,4528

LVL

Lats Latvjan

0,7001

PLN

Zloty Pollakk

4,1367

RON

Leu Rumen

4,3495

TRY

Lira Turka

2,3476

AUD

Dollaru Awstraljan

1,2659

CAD

Dollaru Kanadiż

1,3345

HKD

Dollaru ta' Hong Kong

10,0980

NZD

Dollaru tan-New Zealand

1,5366

SGD

Dollaru tas-Singapor

1,6147

KRW

Won tal-Korea t'Isfel

1 453,80

ZAR

Rand ta' l-Afrika t'Isfel

11,9395

CNY

Yuan ren-min-bi Ċiniż

8,0352

HRK

Kuna Kroata

7,6065

IDR

Rupiah Indoneżjan

12 637,76

MYR

Ringgit Malażjan

3,9644

PHP

Peso Filippin

53,657

RUB

Rouble Russu

40,9583

THB

Baht Tajlandiż

37,626

BRL

Real Brażiljan

2,6318

MXN

Peso Messikan

15,9395

INR

Rupi Indjan

70,5190

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(1)  Sors: rata tal-kambju ta' referenza ppubblikata mill-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew.

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INFORMAZZJONI DWAR IŻ-ŻONA EKONOMIKA EWROPEA

Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza EFTA

| 25.4.2013 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 118/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.4.2013

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 118/4

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Stedina biex jitressqu l-kummenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-Twaqqif ta’ Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza u ta’ Qorti tal-Ġustizzja dwar kwistjonijiet ta' għajnuna mill-Istat rigward għajnuna potenzjali lil ħames fornituri tat-trasport bil-karozzi tal-linja fil-kontea ta’ Aust Agder

2013/C 118/05

Permezz tad-Deċiżjoni Nru 60/13/COL tas-6 ta’ Frar 2013, riprodotta fil-lingwa awtentika fil-paġni li jsegwu dan is-sommarju, l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA bdiet proċedimenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-Twaqqif ta' Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza u ta' Qorti tal-Ġustizzja. L-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi ġew infurmati permezz ta’ kopja tad-deċiżjoni.

Permezz ta’ din in-notifika l-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA tavża lill-Istati tal-EFTA, lill-Istati Membri tal-UE u lill-partijiet interessati biex iressqu l-kummenti tagħhom dwar il-miżura inkwistjoni fi żmien xahar mid-data tal-pubblikazzjoni lil:

| L-Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza tal-EFTA |
| --- |
| Ir-reġistru |
| Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussell |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

L-Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza tal-EFTA

Ir-reġistru

Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussell

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Il-kummenti se jkunu kkomunikati lill-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi. L-identità tal-parti interessata li tissottometti l-kummenti tista’ tinżamm mistura wara talba bil-miktub li tiddikjara r-raġunijiet għat-talba.

SOMMARJU

Sfond

Fin-Norveġja, is-settur tat-trasport bil-karozzi tal-linja lokali huwa rregolat mill-Att tat-Trasport Kummerċjali tal-2002 (is-“CTA”) u r-Regolament dwar it-Trasport Kummerċjali tal-2003 (is-“CTR”). Kemm is-CTA kif ukoll is-CTR ħassru leġiżlazzjoni preċedenti li kienet sostanzjalment simili. Dan il-qafas leġiżlattiv jipprovdi fost l-oħrajn għal sistema ta’ konċessjonijiet li huma neċessarji għal impriżi biex isiru eliġibbli biex jiġu fdati bit-twettiq ta’ servizzi tal-karozzi tal-linja pubbliċi, u tikkonferixxi fuq il-kontej, bħal Aust Agder, ir-responsabbiltà li tagħti kumpens lill-impriżi li joperaw rotot li ma jrendux. Tali kumpens jista' jingħata biex tiġi koperta d-differenza bejn id-dħul iġġenerat mill-bejgħ tal-biljetti u l-ispejjeż tal-operar tas-servizz.

F’Aust Agder, sa minn qabel id-dħul fis-seħħ tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE, il-kuntratti għall-forniment ta' trasport lokali bi skeda tal-karozzi tal-linja kienu ingħataw direttament lil ħames operaturi (seba' qabel l-2009), li fuq il-bażi tagħhom kien ingħata kumpens annwali lill-konċessjonarji ta' rotti li ma jrendux f'konformità mal-proċedura tal-baġit tal-belt. Il-kumpens kien jitħallas permezz ta' somma f’daqqa annwali, li kienet ibbażata fuq l-ispejjeż imġarrba fis-snin preċedenti, billi jittieħed kont ta’ firxa ta' fatturi ta' korrezzjoni. Sa mill-2004 ġie applikat metodu ġdid għall-kalkolu tal-kumpens tas-servizz pubbliku.

Aust-Agder ikkonkludiet kuntratti għas-servizzi ta' trasport lokali bi skeda tal-karozzi tal-linja mal-kumpaniji li ġejjin: Birkeland Busser AS; Frolandsruta Frode Oland; Høyvågruta AS, sakemm saret il-fużjoni tagħha ma’ Nettbuss Sør AS fl-2009; Nettbuss Sør AS; Risør and Tvedestrand Bilruter AS (“RTB”), sakemm saret il-fużjoni tagħha ma’ Nettbuss Sør AS sa mill-2009; Setesdal Bilruter L/L; u Telemark Bilruter.

L-operaturi kollha jwettqu attivitajiet kummerċjali ’il barra mir-responsabbiltà tas-servizz pubbliku. Dawn l-attivitajiet jikkonsistu fi trasport tal-merkanzija, karozzi tal-linja għaż-żjarat, servizzi tat-taxi u rotot tal-karozzi tal-linja ekspress. Madankollu, l-operaturi ma żammewx b’mod konsistenti matul il-perjodu kollu kontijiet separati għall-attivitajiet kummerċjali u ta’ servizz pubbliku.

Barra minn hekk, skont l-informazzjoni pprovduta mill-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi, bosta muniċipalitajiet flimkien mal-kontej ta' Vest-Agder u Aust-Agder stabilixxew proġett ta’ kooperazzjoni, imsejjaħ bħala l-proġett ATP, li jimmira lejn iż-żamma ta’ servizzi ta’ trasport imtejba. Sa mill-2004, kienet biss Nettbuss Sør AS li rċeviet għotjiet diretti ta’ madwar NOK 1 miljun (NOK 2 miljuni mill-2010) fuq il-bażi ta’ dak il-proġett.

Valutazzjoni tal-miżuri tal-kumpens annwali

Il-preżenza ta' għajnuna mill-Istat

L-Awtorità għandha dubji jekk il-kumpens annwali tas-servizz pubbliku lill-konċessjonarji jġorrx miegħu għajnuna mill-Istat. Il-kumpens annwali ma ġiex iddeterminat permezz ta’ proċedura ta’ akkwist pubbliku. Il-kwistjoni hi jekk hux simili għall-kost li tkun ġarrbet impriża immexxija tajjeb u mgħammra kif imiss. Ma jidhirx li l-każistika Altmark intlaħqet u għalhekk il-kumpens x’aktarx jikkostitwixxi għajnuna mill-istat skont it-tifsira tal-Artikolu 61(1) tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE.

In-natura tal-għajnuna

L-Awtorità kkonkludiet li l-għajnuna hi mogħtija b'mod ġenerali taħt skema eżistenti ta’ għajnuna li tkun ibbażata fuq is-CTA, is-CTR u l-Att dwar l-Edukazzjoni, kif applikar f'Aust Agder sa minn qabel id-dħul fis-seħħ tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE. L-Awtorità bħalissa mhix f’pożizzjoni li tiddetermina jekk l-għajnuna kollha li ngħatat kinitx ibażata fuq dik l-iskema. Barra minn hekk l-Awtorità mhix f'pożizzjoni li tivvaluta jekk in-natura eżistenti tal-għajnuna tal-iskema kinitx mibdula bl-introduzzjoni tal-metodu ALFA fl-2004 u jekk l-iskema minn hemm ’il quddiem kinitx tikkostitwixxi skema ġdida ta’ għajnuna.

Il-kompatibbiltà tal-għajnuna

F’dan l-istadju jidher li l-ħlasijiet li saru taħt il-konċessjonijiet li ngħataw direttament jistgħu jkunu kompatibli bħala kumpens għas-servizz pubbliku skont l-Artikolu 49 ŻEE. Il-valutazzjoni tal-kompatibbiltà fid-deċiżjoni finali għalhekk tiffoka partikolarment fuq jekk kienx hemm kumpens żejjed.

Valutazzjoni tal-miżura tal-għotjiet annwali lil Nettbuss Sør AS

Il-preżenza ta' għajnuna mill-Istat

Barra minn hekk Nettbuss Sør AS rċeviet għotjiet diretti ta’ madwar NOK 1 miljun (NOK 2 miljuni mill-2010) fuq il-bażi tal-proġett tal-ATP. Din il-miżura selettiva, hekk imsejħa, tidher li tipprovdi vantaġġ ekonomiku li x'aktarx Nettbuss Sør AS ma tkunx kisbitu taħt ċirkostanzi normali tas-suq. Madankollu, l-Awtorità ma rċevietx informazzjoni adegwata li tpoġġiha f'pożizzjoni li tagħmel valutazzjoni xierqa ta' jekk il-pagamenti annwali jikkostitwixxux għajnuna mill-Istat.

Il-kompatibbiltà tal-għajnuna

Rigward il-proġett ATP, fin-nuqqas ta’ informazzjoni suffiċjenti, fil-preżent l-Awtorità ma tistax tivvaluta l-kompatibilità ta’ dik il-miżura mal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE fuq il-bażi tal-Artikolu 49 tagħha jew kwalunkwe dispożizzjoni oħra tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE.

Konklużjoni

Fid-dawl tal-kunsiderazzjonijiet ta' hawn fuq, l-Awtorità ddeċidiet li tiftaħ proċedura ta' investigazzjoni formali skont l-Artikolu 1(2) tal-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-Twaqqif ta' Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza u ta’ Qorti tal-Ġustizzja. Il-partijiet interessati huma mistiedna jressqu l-kummenti tagħhom fi żmien xahar mill-pubblikazzjoni ta' dan l-avviż f'Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 60/13/COL

of 6 February 2013

opening the formal investigation procedure concerning potential aid to public bus transport providers in Aust-Agder County

(Norway)

THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY (‘THE AUTHORITY’),

HAVING REGARD to:

The Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Articles 49, 61 to 63 and Protocol 26,

The Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘SCA’), in particular to Article 24,

Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1 of Part I and Articles 4(4), 6 and 13 of Part II,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

| (1) | By letter dated 23 March 2011 (Event No 591767) the Authority received a complaint (‘the complaint’) from the Norwegian bus company Konkurrenten.no (‘the complainant’) alleging that unlawful State aid is involved in the contracts awarded by Aust-Agder County, Norway (‘Aust-Agder’) to several bus operators for the supply of local bus transport services in Aust-Agder. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

By letter dated 23 March 2011 (Event No 591767) the Authority received a complaint (‘the complaint’) from the Norwegian bus company Konkurrenten.no (‘the complainant’) alleging that unlawful State aid is involved in the contracts awarded by Aust-Agder County, Norway (‘Aust-Agder’) to several bus operators for the supply of local bus transport services in Aust-Agder.

| (2) | Furthermore, the complaint alleges breaches of the EEA procurement rules. That aspect of the complaint is dealt with by the Authority’s Internal Market Affairs Directorate as Cases No 69656 and 69548. On 12 October 2011, the Authority issued a letter of formal notice to Norway for failure to comply with the principles of non-discrimination and transparency laid down in Articles 4 and 48 of the EEA Agreement by allowing Aust-Agder to award, and prolong bus transport concessions without any form of publication (Event No 607316). On the same grounds, on 22 June 2012, the Authority delivered a reasoned opinion to Norway (Event No 620449). |
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(2)

Furthermore, the complaint alleges breaches of the EEA procurement rules. That aspect of the complaint is dealt with by the Authority’s Internal Market Affairs Directorate as Cases No 69656 and 69548. On 12 October 2011, the Authority issued a letter of formal notice to Norway for failure to comply with the principles of non-discrimination and transparency laid down in Articles 4 and 48 of the EEA Agreement by allowing Aust-Agder to award, and prolong bus transport concessions without any form of publication (Event No 607316). On the same grounds, on 22 June 2012, the Authority delivered a reasoned opinion to Norway (Event No 620449).

| (3) | The present decision only covers the State aid part of the complaint which has been investigated by the Authority’s Competition and State aid Directorate. |
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(3)

The present decision only covers the State aid part of the complaint which has been investigated by the Authority’s Competition and State aid Directorate.

| (4) | By letter dated 10 November 2011 (Events Nos 612071 and 614791), the Authority informed the Norwegian authorities that the complainant also alleges that unlawful State aid is involved in the award of the contracts for local bus transport services, and sent a request for information. By letter dated 9 December 2011 (Event No 618202), the Norwegian authorities replied to the Authority’s request. Additional requests for information were sent to the Norwegian authorities on 13 March 2012 (Event No 624061) and on 17 October 2012 (Event No 648686), to which the Norwegian authorities replied by letters dated 10, 11 May 2012 (Events Nos 634034 and 634269) and 15 November 2012 (Event No 653639), respectively. By email dated 15 January 2013 (Event No 659645), the Authority asked for additional information, to which it received replies by emails dated 17, 22, 23, 24 January and 30 January 2013 (Events Nos 660036, 660348, 660467, 660486, 660960, 661258 and 661576). |
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(4)

By letter dated 10 November 2011 (Events Nos 612071 and 614791), the Authority informed the Norwegian authorities that the complainant also alleges that unlawful State aid is involved in the award of the contracts for local bus transport services, and sent a request for information. By letter dated 9 December 2011 (Event No 618202), the Norwegian authorities replied to the Authority’s request. Additional requests for information were sent to the Norwegian authorities on 13 March 2012 (Event No 624061) and on 17 October 2012 (Event No 648686), to which the Norwegian authorities replied by letters dated 10, 11 May 2012 (Events Nos 634034 and 634269) and 15 November 2012 (Event No 653639), respectively. By email dated 15 January 2013 (Event No 659645), the Authority asked for additional information, to which it received replies by emails dated 17, 22, 23, 24 January and 30 January 2013 (Events Nos 660036, 660348, 660467, 660486, 660960, 661258 and 661576).

| (5) | On 19 December 2012 the Authority adopted its Decision closing the formal investigation into potential aid to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene. This case concerned an existing aid scheme in local public transport that was governed by the same legislative framework as the present case. In the view of the Authority, it was necessary to conclude on that case before adopting an opening decision for the contracts awarded by Aust-Agder. |
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(5)

On 19 December 2012 the Authority adopted its Decision closing the formal investigation into potential aid to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene. This case concerned an existing aid scheme in local public transport that was governed by the same legislative framework as the present case. In the view of the Authority, it was necessary to conclude on that case before adopting an opening decision for the contracts awarded by Aust-Agder.

2.   The complaint

| (6) | The complainant ‘Konkurrenten.no’ is a privately owned Norwegian bus transport operator. It claims that the award of contracts by Aust-Agder without any form of competition has favoured Nettbus Sør AS and several other the complainant’s competitors during the period 2004-2016, as well as before that period. The complainant takes the view that the compensation paid according to these contracts involves unlawful State aid. It refers in particular to the Authority’s Decision No 254/10/COL of 21 June 2010 (AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene) submitting that the contracts in this present case also constitute unlawful State aid. |
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(6)

The complainant ‘Konkurrenten.no’ is a privately owned Norwegian bus transport operator. It claims that the award of contracts by Aust-Agder without any form of competition has favoured Nettbus Sør AS and several other the complainant’s competitors during the period 2004-2016, as well as before that period. The complainant takes the view that the compensation paid according to these contracts involves unlawful State aid. It refers in particular to the Authority’s Decision No 254/10/COL of 21 June 2010 (AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene) submitting that the contracts in this present case also constitute unlawful State aid.

| (7) | The complainant furthermore submits that Aust-Agder has for many years granted substantial State aid under the contracts. In particular, Nettbuss Sør AS is claimed to have received significant advantages. The complainant argues that in 2009, Aust-Agder increased the compensation to Nettbuss Sør AS by as much as 37 % without any corresponding increase in the production level. According to the complainant, this shows that the compensation that Aust-Agder has been paying out is above the market price. |
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(7)

The complainant furthermore submits that Aust-Agder has for many years granted substantial State aid under the contracts. In particular, Nettbuss Sør AS is claimed to have received significant advantages. The complainant argues that in 2009, Aust-Agder increased the compensation to Nettbuss Sør AS by as much as 37 % without any corresponding increase in the production level. According to the complainant, this shows that the compensation that Aust-Agder has been paying out is above the market price.

| (8) | The complainant alleges that in 2010 Nettbuss Sør AS received more than 70 % of the annual compensation that Aust-Agder paid to the bus transport operators and that this has led to a serious distortion in the local bus transport market, as well as in the express bus market. |
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(8)

The complainant alleges that in 2010 Nettbuss Sør AS received more than 70 % of the annual compensation that Aust-Agder paid to the bus transport operators and that this has led to a serious distortion in the local bus transport market, as well as in the express bus market.

| (9) | The complainant argues that the compensation paid by Aust-Agder represents as much as 68,5 % to 88,4 % of the expected costs of the bus operators for performing local transport services. |
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(9)

The complainant argues that the compensation paid by Aust-Agder represents as much as 68,5 % to 88,4 % of the expected costs of the bus operators for performing local transport services.

| (10) | Furthermore, the complainant refers to the compensation mechanisms in the contracts between Aust-Agder and the bus operators. These mechanisms set out: (1) that the parties can adjust productions and compensation annually and that the bus operators have a right to propose ‘production changes’; (2) that the compensation automatically increases in response to higher labour costs, higher fuel costs and any increase in the general consumer price index; (3) that the bus operator can also renegotiate the compensation in response to ‘changes in public levies or laws and regulations’. Such negotiations can lead to ‘extraordinary adjustments of the compensation, changes in production or other measures’; and finally, (4) that Aust-Agder must allocate NOK 1 million per year for ‘research and environmental measures’ to the bus operators. |
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(10)

Furthermore, the complainant refers to the compensation mechanisms in the contracts between Aust-Agder and the bus operators. These mechanisms set out: (1) that the parties can adjust productions and compensation annually and that the bus operators have a right to propose ‘production changes’; (2) that the compensation automatically increases in response to higher labour costs, higher fuel costs and any increase in the general consumer price index; (3) that the bus operator can also renegotiate the compensation in response to ‘changes in public levies or laws and regulations’. Such negotiations can lead to ‘extraordinary adjustments of the compensation, changes in production or other measures’; and finally, (4) that Aust-Agder must allocate NOK 1 million per year for ‘research and environmental measures’ to the bus operators.

| (11) | The complainant alleges that the compensation has been increased due to these mechanisms and that Aust-Agder has displayed a lack of interest in holding the operators to the terms of the contracts. |
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(11)

The complainant alleges that the compensation has been increased due to these mechanisms and that Aust-Agder has displayed a lack of interest in holding the operators to the terms of the contracts.

3.   Background — the legislation on local scheduled and school bus transport

3.1.   
  Local scheduled bus transport

   (1)

3.1.1.   Centralised State responsibility

| (12) | At the time of the entry into force of the Transport Act of 1976 (2), the Norwegian State (the Ministry of Transport) was responsible for local scheduled transport services. State transport agencies managed the local scheduled transport in each county. |
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(12)

At the time of the entry into force of the Transport Act of 1976 (2), the Norwegian State (the Ministry of Transport) was responsible for local scheduled transport services. State transport agencies managed the local scheduled transport in each county.

3.1.2.   De-centralisation process

3.1.2.1.   Introduction

| (13) | Shortly after the entry into force of the Transport Act of 1976, a de-centralisation process was initiated. From 1 January 1979, the powers of the Ministry of Transport could be delegated to county level. At the same time, the State transport agencies were turned into county administrative bodies. |
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(13)

Shortly after the entry into force of the Transport Act of 1976, a de-centralisation process was initiated. From 1 January 1979, the powers of the Ministry of Transport could be delegated to county level. At the same time, the State transport agencies were turned into county administrative bodies.

| (14) | In 1981, with the introduction of Article 24a to the Transport Act of 1976, by providing funding to the counties, the State could confer the responsibility for financing local scheduled transport to the counties (3). |
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(14)

In 1981, with the introduction of Article 24a to the Transport Act of 1976, by providing funding to the counties, the State could confer the responsibility for financing local scheduled transport to the counties (3).

3.1.2.2.   The 1980 Regulation

| (15) | Another important element of the de-centralisation process was the Regulation of 19 December 1980 on compensation for providing local scheduled transport (‘the 1980 Regulation’). Its Article 1 stated that the county has the responsibility to finance local scheduled transport. Pursuant to Article 3, the amount of the compensation should be decided on an annual basis, based on the difference between estimated income according to the decided tariffs and discounts, and reasonable costs. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

Another important element of the de-centralisation process was the Regulation of 19 December 1980 on compensation for providing local scheduled transport (‘the 1980 Regulation’). Its Article 1 stated that the county has the responsibility to finance local scheduled transport. Pursuant to Article 3, the amount of the compensation should be decided on an annual basis, based on the difference between estimated income according to the decided tariffs and discounts, and reasonable costs.

| (16) | The 1980 Regulation also contained rules on control and access to information and clarified the roles of, on the one hand, the Ministry of Transport and, on the other, the counties. Its Article 7 provided the legal basis for the Ministry to issue further rules and guidelines for the compensation of local scheduled transport. |
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(16)

The 1980 Regulation also contained rules on control and access to information and clarified the roles of, on the one hand, the Ministry of Transport and, on the other, the counties. Its Article 7 provided the legal basis for the Ministry to issue further rules and guidelines for the compensation of local scheduled transport.

3.1.2.3.   The 1982 Regulation and the KS and NABC Standard Main Agreement

| (17) | On 1 January 1983, the 1980 Regulation was replaced by the Regulation of 2 December 1982 on compensation for providing local scheduled transport (‘the 1982 Regulation’). Its Article 4 of the 1982 Regulation imposed an obligation on the counties to enter into agreements with the concessionaires on the compensation for the provision of the scheduled public transport. On this basis, the Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities (‘KS’) and the Norwegian Association of Bus Companies (‘NABC’) (4), concluded a standard main agreement (‘the KS and NABC Standard Main Agreement’) and a standard yearly compensation agreement to be used by each county when concluding agreements for the provision of local scheduled bus transport. As regards the calculation of the compensation, the standard agreement was based on the same principles as Article 3 of the 1980 Regulation. The standard main agreement also provided for a separation of costs between the local bus transport services and other commercial services. |
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(17)

On 1 January 1983, the 1980 Regulation was replaced by the Regulation of 2 December 1982 on compensation for providing local scheduled transport (‘the 1982 Regulation’). Its Article 4 of the 1982 Regulation imposed an obligation on the counties to enter into agreements with the concessionaires on the compensation for the provision of the scheduled public transport. On this basis, the Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities (‘KS’) and the Norwegian Association of Bus Companies (‘NABC’) (4), concluded a standard main agreement (‘the KS and NABC Standard Main Agreement’) and a standard yearly compensation agreement to be used by each county when concluding agreements for the provision of local scheduled bus transport. As regards the calculation of the compensation, the standard agreement was based on the same principles as Article 3 of the 1980 Regulation. The standard main agreement also provided for a separation of costs between the local bus transport services and other commercial services.

3.1.2.4.   The 1985 Regulation

| (18) | With the adoption of a new income system for the counties, a new Regulation on Compensation for Local Transport was adopted in 1985 (‘the 1985 Regulation’). The new income system for the counties (and municipalities) entailed that the central contribution for local transport was given as a lump sum. The main focus of the 1985 Regulation was the relationship between the Ministry of Transport and the counties. The 1985 Regulation was repealed on 1 January 1987 by a new regulation (5) which remained in force until 30 April 2003 when it, in turn, was replaced by the Commercial Transport Regulation (see below). |
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(18)

With the adoption of a new income system for the counties, a new Regulation on Compensation for Local Transport was adopted in 1985 (‘the 1985 Regulation’). The new income system for the counties (and municipalities) entailed that the central contribution for local transport was given as a lump sum. The main focus of the 1985 Regulation was the relationship between the Ministry of Transport and the counties. The 1985 Regulation was repealed on 1 January 1987 by a new regulation (5) which remained in force until 30 April 2003 when it, in turn, was replaced by the Commercial Transport Regulation (see below).

3.1.3.   Commercial Transport Act 2002 and Commercial Transport Regulation 2003

| (19) | At present, the local scheduled bus transport sector is regulated by the Commercial Transport Act of 2002 (‘CTA’) (6) and the Commercial Transport Regulation of 2003 (‘CTR’) (7). The CTA repealed and replaced the Transport Act of 1976 (8). The CTR repealed and replaced two regulations (9). |
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(19)

At present, the local scheduled bus transport sector is regulated by the Commercial Transport Act of 2002 (‘CTA’) (6) and the Commercial Transport Regulation of 2003 (‘CTR’) (7). The CTA repealed and replaced the Transport Act of 1976 (8). The CTR repealed and replaced two regulations (9).

| (20) | Further, the Norwegian authorities submit that the relevant provisions have not been significantly altered since the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in 1994. |
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(20)

Further, the Norwegian authorities submit that the relevant provisions have not been significantly altered since the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in 1994.

3.1.4.   Administrative responsibility of the counties

| (21) | In Norway, the responsibility for providing local public transport services is conferred on the counties. However, the counties are not under any obligation to offer such services. |
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(21)

In Norway, the responsibility for providing local public transport services is conferred on the counties. However, the counties are not under any obligation to offer such services.

| (22) | The counties can either administer local bus transport services through their own organisation or through an administrative company (10) set up by the county. The CTA provides that when the county sets up an administrative company, the funds intended for the financing of the local bus transport services will be allocated to that company (11). The administrative companies can either obtain the bus transport services from a third party, or provide the services themselves. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

The counties can either administer local bus transport services through their own organisation or through an administrative company (10) set up by the county. The CTA provides that when the county sets up an administrative company, the funds intended for the financing of the local bus transport services will be allocated to that company (11). The administrative companies can either obtain the bus transport services from a third party, or provide the services themselves.

3.1.5.   Co-financing of local transport services by the State and counties

| (23) | The counties partly finance the local transport services with tax revenue. In addition, under the CTA the counties receive State funding by way of annual block grants (12). The amount of the grants is determined on the basis of the extent to which the counties need contributions from the State. Therefore, the counties have to provide the Ministry of Transport with budgets, accounts and other relevant information necessary to assess the need for contributions (13). The Norwegian authorities have stated that if a county reduces the amount of the block grant used for the financing of local scheduled transport costs, this would have consequences for future grants. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

The counties partly finance the local transport services with tax revenue. In addition, under the CTA the counties receive State funding by way of annual block grants (12). The amount of the grants is determined on the basis of the extent to which the counties need contributions from the State. Therefore, the counties have to provide the Ministry of Transport with budgets, accounts and other relevant information necessary to assess the need for contributions (13). The Norwegian authorities have stated that if a county reduces the amount of the block grant used for the financing of local scheduled transport costs, this would have consequences for future grants.

3.1.6.   Concessions

3.1.6.1.   Introduction

| (24) | Under the CTA, concessions are required to carry out scheduled passenger transport services by bus for remuneration (i.e. for payment by the users (the passengers) of the transport services) (14). |
| --- | --- |

(24)

Under the CTA, concessions are required to carry out scheduled passenger transport services by bus for remuneration (i.e. for payment by the users (the passengers) of the transport services) (14).

| (25) | Both a general and a special concession are required for operators of scheduled passenger transport services by bus for remuneration. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

Both a general and a special concession are required for operators of scheduled passenger transport services by bus for remuneration.

3.1.6.2.   General concession for passenger transport

| (26) | Undertakings providing passenger transport services for remuneration must have a general concession (15). In order to obtain a general concession, the applicant must (i) provide a certificate of good conduct, (ii) have satisfactory financial means and abilities, and (iii) have satisfactory professional qualifications (16). General concessions are not time limited (17). |
| --- | --- |

(26)

Undertakings providing passenger transport services for remuneration must have a general concession (15). In order to obtain a general concession, the applicant must (i) provide a certificate of good conduct, (ii) have satisfactory financial means and abilities, and (iii) have satisfactory professional qualifications (16). General concessions are not time limited (17).

3.1.6.3.   Special concessions for scheduled passenger transport

| (27) | In addition to the general concession, any undertaking wishing to carry out scheduled passenger transport for remuneration must have a special concession (18). There are two types of special concessions: (i) area concessions, and (ii) route specific concessions. The area concession is of a residual nature, in that it permits its holder to operate scheduled bus transport services in the entire area covered, in so far as other route specific concessions have not been granted in the area. The holder of a route specific concession is the sole entity entitled to operate scheduled bus transport on that route. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

In addition to the general concession, any undertaking wishing to carry out scheduled passenger transport for remuneration must have a special concession (18). There are two types of special concessions: (i) area concessions, and (ii) route specific concessions. The area concession is of a residual nature, in that it permits its holder to operate scheduled bus transport services in the entire area covered, in so far as other route specific concessions have not been granted in the area. The holder of a route specific concession is the sole entity entitled to operate scheduled bus transport on that route.

| (28) | The special concession confers upon the concessionaire both a right and a duty to carry out the transport service as set out in the concession (19). When applying for a special concession, a proposal for a transportation schedule and tariffs must be submitted (20). Schedules and tariffs are subject to the control of the counties (21). The counties can order changes in the schedules and tariffs (22). |
| --- | --- |

(28)

The special concession confers upon the concessionaire both a right and a duty to carry out the transport service as set out in the concession (19). When applying for a special concession, a proposal for a transportation schedule and tariffs must be submitted (20). Schedules and tariffs are subject to the control of the counties (21). The counties can order changes in the schedules and tariffs (22).

| (29) | Special concession can either be awarded for periods of up to 10 years (i) through tender procedures and granted for the period determined in the tender procedure (23), which in any event will not be for a longer period than 10 years (24), or (ii) directly, i.e. outside any tender procedure for a 10 year period (25). |
| --- | --- |

(29)

Special concession can either be awarded for periods of up to 10 years (i) through tender procedures and granted for the period determined in the tender procedure (23), which in any event will not be for a longer period than 10 years (24), or (ii) directly, i.e. outside any tender procedure for a 10 year period (25).

3.1.6.4.   Ticketing systems

| (30) | The concessionaires must deploy ticketing systems approved by the counties (26). |
| --- | --- |

(30)

The concessionaires must deploy ticketing systems approved by the counties (26).

3.1.6.5.   Contracts

| (31) | To complement the concessions, the counties may enter into contracts with the concessionaires about the provision of public services. The counties are free to determine the form of these contracts (27). |
| --- | --- |

(31)

To complement the concessions, the counties may enter into contracts with the concessionaires about the provision of public services. The counties are free to determine the form of these contracts (27).

3.1.6.6.   Compensation

| (32) | The counties are responsible for compensating the concessionaires (28). Compensation is only granted to undertakings that operate unprofitable routes (i.e. where the revenue generated from the sale of tickets does not cover the cost of operating the service). |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The counties are responsible for compensating the concessionaires (28). Compensation is only granted to undertakings that operate unprofitable routes (i.e. where the revenue generated from the sale of tickets does not cover the cost of operating the service).

| (33) | Under Article 22 CTA, counties have to compensate operators for the provision of the transport service on unprofitable routes that the counties seek to establish, or to maintain within their territories (29). The counties are free to determine the manner in which the concessionaires are to be compensated; the CTA and the CTR do not forsee any particular rules on how compensation is to be provided. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

Under Article 22 CTA, counties have to compensate operators for the provision of the transport service on unprofitable routes that the counties seek to establish, or to maintain within their territories (29). The counties are free to determine the manner in which the concessionaires are to be compensated; the CTA and the CTR do not forsee any particular rules on how compensation is to be provided.

| (34) | The Authority understands that Article 22 CTA allows for compensation to cover the cost of the public service minus the ticket revenues but including a reasonable profit, and that any compensation beyond that could not be based on the CTA. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

The Authority understands that Article 22 CTA allows for compensation to cover the cost of the public service minus the ticket revenues but including a reasonable profit, and that any compensation beyond that could not be based on the CTA.

3.2.   
  School Transport

| (35) | Since before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in Norway on 1 January 1994, the Norwegian counties have been responsible for providing primary and high school transportation of children residing in a certain distance from the school (normally four kilometres). At present, this responsibility is laid down in the Act on Education of 1998 (30). This Act was preceded by the Act on Primary Schools of 1969 (31) and the Act on Secondary Schools of 1974 (32). In the mid-1980s, on the basis of an act amending the Act on Primary Schools and the Act on Secondary Schools (33), the counties became responsible for providing school transportation. For the sake of clarity, in this Decision the term ‘Education Act’ will be used throughout the text to refer also to the relevant legal provisions in force in the period prior to 1999. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

Since before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in Norway on 1 January 1994, the Norwegian counties have been responsible for providing primary and high school transportation of children residing in a certain distance from the school (normally four kilometres). At present, this responsibility is laid down in the Act on Education of 1998 (30). This Act was preceded by the Act on Primary Schools of 1969 (31) and the Act on Secondary Schools of 1974 (32). In the mid-1980s, on the basis of an act amending the Act on Primary Schools and the Act on Secondary Schools (33), the counties became responsible for providing school transportation. For the sake of clarity, in this Decision the term ‘Education Act’ will be used throughout the text to refer also to the relevant legal provisions in force in the period prior to 1999.

| (36) | According to the Education Act, for primary school transportation, the municipalities are obliged to pay a tariff to the county. The county, thereafter, pays the bus operator for providing the service. For high school transportation, the counties pay for monthly tickets for the students, pursuant to contracts concluded with the bus operators. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

According to the Education Act, for primary school transportation, the municipalities are obliged to pay a tariff to the county. The county, thereafter, pays the bus operator for providing the service. For high school transportation, the counties pay for monthly tickets for the students, pursuant to contracts concluded with the bus operators.

4.   The award of contracts and compensation in Aust-Agder

| (37) | Point 1 of the contracts entered into between Aust-Agder and the bus operators provides that ‘the contract commits the parties to ensure that the residents of Aust-Agder receive the best possible local scheduled and school transport services (...)’. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

Point 1 of the contracts entered into between Aust-Agder and the bus operators provides that ‘the contract commits the parties to ensure that the residents of Aust-Agder receive the best possible local scheduled and school transport services (...)’.

4.1.   
  Potential aid recipients

| (38) | Aust-Agder has concluded contracts for local scheduled and school bus transport services with the following companies:






  — | Birkeland Busser AS, owned by Setesdal Bilruter L/L. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(38)

Aust-Agder has concluded contracts for local scheduled and school bus transport services with the following companies:

—

Birkeland Busser AS, owned by Setesdal Bilruter L/L.

| — | Frolandsruta Frode Oland, owned by Frode Stoltenberg Oland. |
| --- | --- |

—

Frolandsruta Frode Oland, owned by Frode Stoltenberg Oland.

| — | Høyvågruta AS, until its merger with Nettbuss Sør AS in 2009. |
| --- | --- |

—

Høyvågruta AS, until its merger with Nettbuss Sør AS in 2009.

| — | Nettbuss Sør AS, which is part of the Nettbuss-group and owned by the bus transport company Nettbuss AS, which is owned by Norges Statsbaner AS (34). |
| --- | --- |

—

Nettbuss Sør AS, which is part of the Nettbuss-group and owned by the bus transport company Nettbuss AS, which is owned by Norges Statsbaner AS (34).

| — | Risør and Tvedestrand Bilruter AS (‘RTB’), until its merger with Nettbuss Sør AS since 2009. |
| --- | --- |

—

Risør and Tvedestrand Bilruter AS (‘RTB’), until its merger with Nettbuss Sør AS since 2009.

| — | Setesdal Bilruter L/L whose three main shareholders are Sigmund Aune, Brøvig Holding AS and Bykle Municipality. Additionally, several other municipalities within Aust-Agder and some in Vest-Agder are shareholders; and |
| --- | --- |

—

Setesdal Bilruter L/L whose three main shareholders are Sigmund Aune, Brøvig Holding AS and Bykle Municipality. Additionally, several other municipalities within Aust-Agder and some in Vest-Agder are shareholders; and

| — | Telemark Bilruter whose main shareholders are Vinje Municipality, Seljord Municipality and Seljord Sparebank; in addition, several municipalities in the Telemark County own shares in the company. |
| --- | --- |

—

Telemark Bilruter whose main shareholders are Vinje Municipality, Seljord Municipality and Seljord Sparebank; in addition, several municipalities in the Telemark County own shares in the company.

| (39) | These companies have been operating scheduled and school bus transport in Aust-Agder since before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in Norway on 1 January 1994. As from 2009, and following the merger of Nettbuss Sør AS with Høyvågruta AS and RTB, five operators have remained to carry out the transport services under the Aust-Agder contracts (35). |
| --- | --- |

(39)

These companies have been operating scheduled and school bus transport in Aust-Agder since before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in Norway on 1 January 1994. As from 2009, and following the merger of Nettbuss Sør AS with Høyvågruta AS and RTB, five operators have remained to carry out the transport services under the Aust-Agder contracts (35).

| (40) | The right and the obligation to provide local scheduled and school bus transport has been awarded through concessions, as well as, at a later stage, in combination with the award of separate contracts to the bus transport operators. The two most recent awards of concessions covered periods of 10 years (1993-2003 and 2003-2013). The awards of concessions and contracts have routinely been extended to the same bus transport operators during the two concession periods. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

The right and the obligation to provide local scheduled and school bus transport has been awarded through concessions, as well as, at a later stage, in combination with the award of separate contracts to the bus transport operators. The two most recent awards of concessions covered periods of 10 years (1993-2003 and 2003-2013). The awards of concessions and contracts have routinely been extended to the same bus transport operators during the two concession periods.

| (41) | All the operators carry out commercial activities outside the public service remit. These activities consist of freight transport, tour buses, taxi services and express bus routes. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

All the operators carry out commercial activities outside the public service remit. These activities consist of freight transport, tour buses, taxi services and express bus routes.

| (42) | The Norwegian authorities have stated that Telemark Bilruter AS has kept separate accounts for the public service and the commercial activities since 2000. Since 1 January 2012, the Norwegian authorities have confirmed that Telemark Bilruter has kept separate accounts for the contracts between the County of Telemark on the one hand and the County of Aust-Agder on the other. Frolandsruta Frode Oland has not kept separate accounts. Nettbuss Sør AS, L/L Setesdal Bilruter and Birkeland Busser AS introduced account separation in 2009. As for Høyvågruta AS and RTB, the Norwegian authorities have not been able to provide information whether the companies have kept separate accounts. As from their merger with Nettbuss Sør AS in 2009, their accounts have been incorporated to those of Nettbuss Sør AS. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

The Norwegian authorities have stated that Telemark Bilruter AS has kept separate accounts for the public service and the commercial activities since 2000. Since 1 January 2012, the Norwegian authorities have confirmed that Telemark Bilruter has kept separate accounts for the contracts between the County of Telemark on the one hand and the County of Aust-Agder on the other. Frolandsruta Frode Oland has not kept separate accounts. Nettbuss Sør AS, L/L Setesdal Bilruter and Birkeland Busser AS introduced account separation in 2009. As for Høyvågruta AS and RTB, the Norwegian authorities have not been able to provide information whether the companies have kept separate accounts. As from their merger with Nettbuss Sør AS in 2009, their accounts have been incorporated to those of Nettbuss Sør AS.

4.2.   
  The award of contracts have been linked to the award of concession

| (43) | With the exception of Birkeland Busser AS, all bus companies referred to above have been operating scheduled and school bus transport in the area for decades. In fact, most of them were awarded concessions shortly after the concession system was introduced in 1947. Birkeland Busser AS was established in the late 1980s and has since been operating local bus routes. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

With the exception of Birkeland Busser AS, all bus companies referred to above have been operating scheduled and school bus transport in the area for decades. In fact, most of them were awarded concessions shortly after the concession system was introduced in 1947. Birkeland Busser AS was established in the late 1980s and has since been operating local bus routes.

4.3.   
  The award of contracts between 1988 and 2003

| (44) | From 1988, Aust-Agder concluded agreements with each bus operator holding a concession. The duration of these agreements was for one year with the possibility of automatic renewal for a year at a time. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

From 1988, Aust-Agder concluded agreements with each bus operator holding a concession. The duration of these agreements was for one year with the possibility of automatic renewal for a year at a time.

| (45) | These agreements did not provide a formula on how to calculate the public service compensation. The compensation was based on negotiations. However, the contracts provided an obligation upon each bus company holding a concession to prepare a production plan and a budget proposal indicating their expected income and costs. This proposal should, as far as possible, be based on the accounts, statistics and also on prognosis of predictable costs and income plus the traffic evolution. Further, the proposed production costs should correspond to the costs for a normal and well run operator. This constituted the basis for the negotiations. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

These agreements did not provide a formula on how to calculate the public service compensation. The compensation was based on negotiations. However, the contracts provided an obligation upon each bus company holding a concession to prepare a production plan and a budget proposal indicating their expected income and costs. This proposal should, as far as possible, be based on the accounts, statistics and also on prognosis of predictable costs and income plus the traffic evolution. Further, the proposed production costs should correspond to the costs for a normal and well run operator. This constituted the basis for the negotiations.

4.4.   
  The award of contracts between 2004 and 2008

| (46) | Following a decision by its County Council of December 2002, Aust-Agder concluded a new form of individual contracts. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

Following a decision by its County Council of December 2002, Aust-Agder concluded a new form of individual contracts.

| (47) | According to the Norwegian authorities, the introduction of these contracts did not entail any fundamental change compared to the prior system. All contracts continued to be awarded directly to the existing operators. However, the negotiation-based compensation system was replaced by the so-called ALFA method. As of 2004, this ALFA method, which is explained in more detail below under 4.6 and 4.7, was used as a basis to calculate the compensation for the public service obligations. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

According to the Norwegian authorities, the introduction of these contracts did not entail any fundamental change compared to the prior system. All contracts continued to be awarded directly to the existing operators. However, the negotiation-based compensation system was replaced by the so-called ALFA method. As of 2004, this ALFA method, which is explained in more detail below under 4.6 and 4.7, was used as a basis to calculate the compensation for the public service obligations.

| (48) | The new individual contracts were initially in force from 1 January 2004 until 31 December 2006 and were prolonged by two years until 31 December 2008. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

The new individual contracts were initially in force from 1 January 2004 until 31 December 2006 and were prolonged by two years until 31 December 2008.

4.5.   
  The award of contracts since 2009

| (49) | On 12 June 2007, the Aust-Agder County Council decided to award new contracts directly to the existing bus companies for the next period 2009 to 2012. Following negotiations with the bus transport companies, it approved the new contracts on 9 December 2008. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

On 12 June 2007, the Aust-Agder County Council decided to award new contracts directly to the existing bus companies for the next period 2009 to 2012. Following negotiations with the bus transport companies, it approved the new contracts on 9 December 2008.

| (50) | The previous contracts remained largely unchanged. However, the ALFA method was supplemented by a new indexation system. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

The previous contracts remained largely unchanged. However, the ALFA method was supplemented by a new indexation system.

| (51) | The new contracts initially ran from 1 January 2009 until 31 December 2012 and were prolonged until the end of 2016, except for the contract with Nettbuss Sør AS which was extended by two years, until 31 December 2014. |
| --- | --- |

(51)

The new contracts initially ran from 1 January 2009 until 31 December 2012 and were prolonged until the end of 2016, except for the contract with Nettbuss Sør AS which was extended by two years, until 31 December 2014.

4.6.   
  The ALFA-method to calculate the compensation for local scheduled and school bus transport (2004-2008)

| (52) | As from 2004, the level of compensation continued to be concluded on negotiations between the county and the bus companies, but the basis for the negotiations changed with the introduction of a new system on how to calculate the compensation, the so-called ‘ALFA method’ (36). |
| --- | --- |

(52)

As from 2004, the level of compensation continued to be concluded on negotiations between the county and the bus companies, but the basis for the negotiations changed with the introduction of a new system on how to calculate the compensation, the so-called ‘ALFA method’ (36).

| (53) | According to the Norwegian authorities, the ALFA method was developed as an objective and transparent calculation model for costs connected to bus transport. A fundamental principle has been that the transport companies shall not have their remuneration calculated based on their own, actual costs, but according to representative assumptions for their type of enterprises. That said, the ALFA method provides for a basis for the assumption that costs shall correspond to a lower threshold. For example, normalised consumption of fuel for a certain number of operations shall correspond to a level which will mean that 33 % of measured values will lie below the norm and 67 % higher than the norm. This means that the system is not based on average cost, but on the cost of the 33 % best run companies. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

According to the Norwegian authorities, the ALFA method was developed as an objective and transparent calculation model for costs connected to bus transport. A fundamental principle has been that the transport companies shall not have their remuneration calculated based on their own, actual costs, but according to representative assumptions for their type of enterprises. That said, the ALFA method provides for a basis for the assumption that costs shall correspond to a lower threshold. For example, normalised consumption of fuel for a certain number of operations shall correspond to a level which will mean that 33 % of measured values will lie below the norm and 67 % higher than the norm. This means that the system is not based on average cost, but on the cost of the 33 % best run companies.

| (54) | According to the Norwegian authorities, this method simulates the costs of a well-run bus company. The normalised cost calculation of bus operations under the ALFA model includes the following core elements:






  (a) | Calculation of production: number of kilometres per production period per vehicle; each scheduled route is registered by distance driven, time consumed, number of days per period and type of bus used. The calculation of the number of kilometres per vehicle and hours in traffic is included, as well as the average speed per period; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(54)

According to the Norwegian authorities, this method simulates the costs of a well-run bus company. The normalised cost calculation of bus operations under the ALFA model includes the following core elements:

(a)

Calculation of production: number of kilometres per production period per vehicle; each scheduled route is registered by distance driven, time consumed, number of days per period and type of bus used. The calculation of the number of kilometres per vehicle and hours in traffic is included, as well as the average speed per period;

| (b) | Calculation of costs: unit costs x numbers of kilometres per vehicle; the ALFA-method takes into account costs such as fuel, tires, spare parts, service, maintenance, carwash, costs of vehicle, cost of personnel (drivers), budgets costs (traffic costs such as ferries, toll etc.), administration costs and other shared cost. The cost of each items is partially calculated on the basis of prices for input factors multiplied by their consumption per km, which give the normalised figure per km; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Calculation of costs: unit costs x numbers of kilometres per vehicle; the ALFA-method takes into account costs such as fuel, tires, spare parts, service, maintenance, carwash, costs of vehicle, cost of personnel (drivers), budgets costs (traffic costs such as ferries, toll etc.), administration costs and other shared cost. The cost of each items is partially calculated on the basis of prices for input factors multiplied by their consumption per km, which give the normalised figure per km;

| (c) | Revenue from traffic operations in the production period; and |
| --- | --- |

(c)

Revenue from traffic operations in the production period; and

| (d) | Calculation of the need for subsidies. The calculation of subsidies is built on the normalised calculation plus budget costs minus traffic revenue. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

Calculation of the need for subsidies. The calculation of subsidies is built on the normalised calculation plus budget costs minus traffic revenue.

| (55) | The calculation has been based on the production of transport services (i.e. the number of kilometres driven by vehicles carried out in the various vehicle groups and scheduled service groups) by each of the companies; then on the ALFA-method’s average costs for the various cost items; and finally on some adjustments based on costs that are specific to the individual company due to: geographical and topographical consitions, traffic conditions and legislation, as well as tariff cited conditions. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

The calculation has been based on the production of transport services (i.e. the number of kilometres driven by vehicles carried out in the various vehicle groups and scheduled service groups) by each of the companies; then on the ALFA-method’s average costs for the various cost items; and finally on some adjustments based on costs that are specific to the individual company due to: geographical and topographical consitions, traffic conditions and legislation, as well as tariff cited conditions.

4.7.   
  The indexation of the ALFA-method (2009-2014/2016)

| (56) | As from 2009, the ALFA method was complemented by a system of indexation linked to certain cost relevant input factors. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

As from 2009, the ALFA method was complemented by a system of indexation linked to certain cost relevant input factors.

| (57) | From then on, the costs were indexed annually according to the following formula:










  L | = | change in wage cost (Statistics Norway, statistics of wages within transport) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| K | = | change in the Consumer price index (Statistics Norway) |
| D | = | change in fuel cost (Platts Oilgram index in NOR). |

(57)

From then on, the costs were indexed annually according to the following formula:

Formula

L

=

change in wage cost (Statistics Norway, statistics of wages within transport)

K

=

change in the Consumer price index (Statistics Norway)

D

=

change in fuel cost (Platts Oilgram index in NOR).

| (58) | The final amount of compensation continued, however to be set based on negotiations. These negotiations were concluded taking into account the calculations made the previous years by using the ALFA-method, increased costs of the bus operators and finally, the general increase of costs by the new system of indexation. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

The final amount of compensation continued, however to be set based on negotiations. These negotiations were concluded taking into account the calculations made the previous years by using the ALFA-method, increased costs of the bus operators and finally, the general increase of costs by the new system of indexation.

5.   Financing project for ATP Kristiansand area

| (59) | The complainant alleges that Aust-Agder has allocated NOK 1 million annually for ‘research and environmental measures’ to the bus operators. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

The complainant alleges that Aust-Agder has allocated NOK 1 million annually for ‘research and environmental measures’ to the bus operators.

| (60) | According to the information provided by the Norwegian authorities, the municipalities of Kristiansand, Sognadalen, Søgne, Vennesla, Lillesand, Birkenes and Iveland and the counties of Vest-Agder and Aust-Agder have established a cooperation project referred to as the ATP project. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

According to the information provided by the Norwegian authorities, the municipalities of Kristiansand, Sognadalen, Søgne, Vennesla, Lillesand, Birkenes and Iveland and the counties of Vest-Agder and Aust-Agder have established a cooperation project referred to as the ATP project.

| (61) | On the basis of the ATP project, as from 2004, only Nettbuss Sør AS was granted directly by the project an annual amount of NOK 1 million. As from 2010, that amount was increased to NOK 2 million and was granted to Nettbuss Sør AS directly from Aust-Agder as part of their contract on local scheduled and school bus transport. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

On the basis of the ATP project, as from 2004, only Nettbuss Sør AS was granted directly by the project an annual amount of NOK 1 million. As from 2010, that amount was increased to NOK 2 million and was granted to Nettbuss Sør AS directly from Aust-Agder as part of their contract on local scheduled and school bus transport.

6.   Comments by the Norwegian authorities

| (62) | The Norwegian authorities submit that the complaint, without further elaboration, mainly refers to an Authority Decision that concerned an entirely different case, i.e. bus transport in Oslo (37). The complainant, according to the Norwegian authorities, has not substantiated how Aust-Agder has violated the State aid rules, nor has it explained how the bus companies concerned have been overcompensated. Further, the Norwegian authorities reject as incorrect the complainant’s allegation that Aust-Agder has displayed a lack of interest in holding the companies to the terms of the contracts. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

The Norwegian authorities submit that the complaint, without further elaboration, mainly refers to an Authority Decision that concerned an entirely different case, i.e. bus transport in Oslo (37). The complainant, according to the Norwegian authorities, has not substantiated how Aust-Agder has violated the State aid rules, nor has it explained how the bus companies concerned have been overcompensated. Further, the Norwegian authorities reject as incorrect the complainant’s allegation that Aust-Agder has displayed a lack of interest in holding the companies to the terms of the contracts.

| (63) | The Norwegian authorities further take the view that the present compensation scheme in Aust-Agder does not entail State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement because it fulfils the criteria laid down in the Altmark judgment (38). |
| --- | --- |

(63)

The Norwegian authorities further take the view that the present compensation scheme in Aust-Agder does not entail State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement because it fulfils the criteria laid down in the Altmark judgment (38).

| (64) | As regard the first Altmark criterion, the Norwegian authorities consider the public bus transport service obligations to be clearly defined as a service of general economic interest. In that context, the Norwegian authorities point to Article 1(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 (39), arguing that the obligations at issue have been defined and entrusted by way of both law, concessions/licences and in the contracts concluded with the companies. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

As regard the first Altmark criterion, the Norwegian authorities consider the public bus transport service obligations to be clearly defined as a service of general economic interest. In that context, the Norwegian authorities point to Article 1(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 (39), arguing that the obligations at issue have been defined and entrusted by way of both law, concessions/licences and in the contracts concluded with the companies.

| (65) | According to the second Altmark condition, the parameters that serve as a basis for calculating compensation must be established in advance in an objective and transparent manner in order to ensure that they do not confer an economic advantage that could favour the recipient undertakings. The Norwegian authorities submit that the introduction of the ALFA-method as from 2004, complies with the second condition. The costs, revenues and the compensation from Aust-Agder are determined in advance in an objective and transparent manner indicating all the different elements of the formula that relevant for the calculation. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

According to the second Altmark condition, the parameters that serve as a basis for calculating compensation must be established in advance in an objective and transparent manner in order to ensure that they do not confer an economic advantage that could favour the recipient undertakings. The Norwegian authorities submit that the introduction of the ALFA-method as from 2004, complies with the second condition. The costs, revenues and the compensation from Aust-Agder are determined in advance in an objective and transparent manner indicating all the different elements of the formula that relevant for the calculation.

| (66) | With regard to the third Altmark condition, the Norwegian authorities argue that the calculation of the compensation according to the ALFA-method and its indexation does not exceed what is necessary to cover the costs of the discharge of the public service obligations, taking into account relevant income and a reasonable profit. They point out that the compensation in this case is calculated to cover the difference between estimated income and estimated costs of the company, being applied in an objective and transparent manner. The operating profit is also relatively low and limited for most of the companies. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

With regard to the third Altmark condition, the Norwegian authorities argue that the calculation of the compensation according to the ALFA-method and its indexation does not exceed what is necessary to cover the costs of the discharge of the public service obligations, taking into account relevant income and a reasonable profit. They point out that the compensation in this case is calculated to cover the difference between estimated income and estimated costs of the company, being applied in an objective and transparent manner. The operating profit is also relatively low and limited for most of the companies.

| (67) | Based on figures made available to the Authority, the Norwegian authorities further submit that the accounts of the companies operating the public service do not reveal any overcompensation. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

Based on figures made available to the Authority, the Norwegian authorities further submit that the accounts of the companies operating the public service do not reveal any overcompensation.

| (68) | With regard to the fourth Altmark condition, the Norwegian authorities submit that the ALFA method and the later system of indexation (see above paragraphs 52-58) are both based on a benchmarking exercise as provided in the Altmark judgment. Thus, the compensation is calculated on the basis of the costs and incomes of a well run undertaking and not only the average in the sector concerned. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

With regard to the fourth Altmark condition, the Norwegian authorities submit that the ALFA method and the later system of indexation (see above paragraphs 52-58) are both based on a benchmarking exercise as provided in the Altmark judgment. Thus, the compensation is calculated on the basis of the costs and incomes of a well run undertaking and not only the average in the sector concerned.

| (69) | The Norwegian authorities also submit that the scheme of compensation for public service bus transport would in any event comply with the requirements of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

The Norwegian authorities also submit that the scheme of compensation for public service bus transport would in any event comply with the requirements of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007.

| (70) | In particular, the Norwegian authorities argue that two of the five contracts meet the requirements of Article 5(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007, which provides for thresholds below which public service contracts can be awarded directly (40). It is also submitted that due to the limited number of kilometres driven, the low contract value and the relatively short duration of the contracts, these have no direct or potential interest to an undertaking located in other EEA States than Norway. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

In particular, the Norwegian authorities argue that two of the five contracts meet the requirements of Article 5(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007, which provides for thresholds below which public service contracts can be awarded directly (40). It is also submitted that due to the limited number of kilometres driven, the low contract value and the relatively short duration of the contracts, these have no direct or potential interest to an undertaking located in other EEA States than Norway.

| (71) | If the Authority were to conclude that State aid was present in this case, the Norwegian authorities argue that such aid would in any event have to be classified as existing aid. In their view, the financing has been carried out on the basis of a scheme that has existed before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in Norway in 1994. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

If the Authority were to conclude that State aid was present in this case, the Norwegian authorities argue that such aid would in any event have to be classified as existing aid. In their view, the financing has been carried out on the basis of a scheme that has existed before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in Norway in 1994.

| (72) | It is further submitted that no significant changes have been made; neither to the basic features of the basis for the aid, nor to the source of financing, nor to the aims pursued by the aid. The aim of the scheme has always been to provide public passenger transport. Consequently, any aid granted in accordance with the present scheme must, the Norwegian authorities contend, be considered as existing aid. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

It is further submitted that no significant changes have been made; neither to the basic features of the basis for the aid, nor to the source of financing, nor to the aims pursued by the aid. The aim of the scheme has always been to provide public passenger transport. Consequently, any aid granted in accordance with the present scheme must, the Norwegian authorities contend, be considered as existing aid.

| (73) | As regards the ATP project, the Norwegian authorities have stated that the amount paid annually to Nettbuss Sør AS aims at maintaining improved bus transport services. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

As regards the ATP project, the Norwegian authorities have stated that the amount paid annually to Nettbuss Sør AS aims at maintaining improved bus transport services.

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of State aid

1.1.   
  State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement

| (74) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ |
| --- | --- |

(74)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

1.2.   
  The presence of State resources

| (75) | The Authority notes that the compensation for both local scheduled and school bus transport is paid from the public budget of Aust-Agder. In the context of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, both local and regional authorities are considered to be equivalent to the State (41). Hence, Aust-Agder is equivalent to the State for the purposes of the EEA State aid rules. On this basis, the Authority concludes that the compensation measure implies the use of State resources. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

The Authority notes that the compensation for both local scheduled and school bus transport is paid from the public budget of Aust-Agder. In the context of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, both local and regional authorities are considered to be equivalent to the State (41). Hence, Aust-Agder is equivalent to the State for the purposes of the EEA State aid rules. On this basis, the Authority concludes that the compensation measure implies the use of State resources.

| (76) | Equally, the Authority notes that the ATP project is paid from the budget of municipalities and Aust-Agder. Therefore, the Authority finds that State resources are involved. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

Equally, the Authority notes that the ATP project is paid from the budget of municipalities and Aust-Agder. Therefore, the Authority finds that State resources are involved.

1.3.   
  Undertaking

| (77) | As provided by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, it must also be established whether the public service compensation to the five operators (seven operators before 2009), as well as the financing from the ATP project, grant a selective economic advantage in favour of certain undertakings or the production of certain goods. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

As provided by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, it must also be established whether the public service compensation to the five operators (seven operators before 2009), as well as the financing from the ATP project, grant a selective economic advantage in favour of certain undertakings or the production of certain goods.

| (78) | The beneficiaries in the present case are bus operators that engage in economic activities, inter alia scheduled and school bus transport against remuneration (see para. (41) above). Thus, they all constitute undertakings within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

The beneficiaries in the present case are bus operators that engage in economic activities, inter alia scheduled and school bus transport against remuneration (see para. (41) above). Thus, they all constitute undertakings within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

1.4.   
  Selectivity

| (79) | In order to determine whether a measure is selective, the question is whether the undertaking(s) in question are in a legal and factual situation that is comparable to other undertakings in light of the objective of the measure (42). |
| --- | --- |

(79)

In order to determine whether a measure is selective, the question is whether the undertaking(s) in question are in a legal and factual situation that is comparable to other undertakings in light of the objective of the measure (42).

| (80) | In the present case, the public service compensation has been limited to five (seven before 2009) companies. Other undertakings engaging in transport activities in Norway or elsewhere in the EEA, that have been in a similar legal and factual situation, have not received public service compensation. Therefore, the Authority concludes that the award of public service compensation is selective. |
| --- | --- |

(80)

In the present case, the public service compensation has been limited to five (seven before 2009) companies. Other undertakings engaging in transport activities in Norway or elsewhere in the EEA, that have been in a similar legal and factual situation, have not received public service compensation. Therefore, the Authority concludes that the award of public service compensation is selective.

| (81) | Furthermore, the financing of NOK 1 million (NOK 2 million as from 2010) from the ATP project has only been granted to Nettbuss Sør AS. It is, thus, a selective measure. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

Furthermore, the financing of NOK 1 million (NOK 2 million as from 2010) from the ATP project has only been granted to Nettbuss Sør AS. It is, thus, a selective measure.

1.5.   
  Advantage — Compensation for a public service obligation for local scheduled and school bus transport

1.5.1.   Altmark criteria

| (82) | In order to constitute State aid, the measure must also confer an advantage that relieves an undertaking of charges that are normally borne from its budgets. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

In order to constitute State aid, the measure must also confer an advantage that relieves an undertaking of charges that are normally borne from its budgets.

| (83) | As regard the grant of a selective economic advantage, it follows from the Altmark judgment that where a State measure must be regarded as compensation for services provided by the recipient undertakings in order to discharge public service obligations, such a measure is not caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. In the Altmark judgment, the Court of Justice held that compensation for public service obligations does not constitute State aid when four cumulative criteria are met:






  — | First, the recipient undertaking must actually have public service obligations to discharge and such obligations must be clearly defined. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(83)

As regard the grant of a selective economic advantage, it follows from the Altmark judgment that where a State measure must be regarded as compensation for services provided by the recipient undertakings in order to discharge public service obligations, such a measure is not caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. In the Altmark judgment, the Court of Justice held that compensation for public service obligations does not constitute State aid when four cumulative criteria are met:

—

First, the recipient undertaking must actually have public service obligations to discharge and such obligations must be clearly defined.

| — | Second, the parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated must be established in advance in an objective and transparent manner. |
| --- | --- |

—

Second, the parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated must be established in advance in an objective and transparent manner.

| — | Third, the compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of the public service obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit. |
| --- | --- |

—

Third, the compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of the public service obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit.

| — | Fourth, and finally, where the undertaking which is to discharge public service obligations is not chosen pursuant to a public procurement procedure which would allow for the selection of the tender capable of providing those services at the least cost, the level of compensation needed must be determined on the basis of analysis of the costs which a typical undertaking, well run and adequately equipped, would have incurred (43). |
| --- | --- |

—

Fourth, and finally, where the undertaking which is to discharge public service obligations is not chosen pursuant to a public procurement procedure which would allow for the selection of the tender capable of providing those services at the least cost, the level of compensation needed must be determined on the basis of analysis of the costs which a typical undertaking, well run and adequately equipped, would have incurred (43).

1.5.2.   1994-2003

| (84) | According to the information provided by the Norwegian authorities, from 1994 to 2003, no objective and transparent parameters for the calculation of the compensation existed (2nd Altmark criterion). The compensation was in principle based on negotiations between the individual operators and Aust-Agder, which cannot exclude overcompensation, even though, according to the agreements, each operator should, prior to these negotiations, have presented a plan of the relevant route production and also provided a budget proposal of its costs and income (3rd Altmark criterion). In addition no method determining the level of compensation in relation to the costs of an efficient operator (4th Altmark criterion) was in place. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

According to the information provided by the Norwegian authorities, from 1994 to 2003, no objective and transparent parameters for the calculation of the compensation existed (2nd Altmark criterion). The compensation was in principle based on negotiations between the individual operators and Aust-Agder, which cannot exclude overcompensation, even though, according to the agreements, each operator should, prior to these negotiations, have presented a plan of the relevant route production and also provided a budget proposal of its costs and income (3rd Altmark criterion). In addition no method determining the level of compensation in relation to the costs of an efficient operator (4th Altmark criterion) was in place.

| (85) | As a result, the Authority concludes that before 2004, the Altmark criteria were not cumulatively met. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

As a result, the Authority concludes that before 2004, the Altmark criteria were not cumulatively met.

1.5.3.   Since 2004

1.5.3.1.   The first Altmark condition

| (86) | The relevant bus operators have been under public service obligations to provide local scheduled and school bus transport services in Aust-Agder. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

The relevant bus operators have been under public service obligations to provide local scheduled and school bus transport services in Aust-Agder.

| (87) | The public service obligations have been based on (1) the CTA and the CTR, and on provisions in the Education Act, all stating that the grant of concession involves an obligation to carry out the transport services stipulated in the concession; (2) the concessions granted to the relevant operators, which cover the provision of local scheduled and school bus transport services in Aust-Agder; and (3) the individual contracts between Aust-Agder and the operators. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

The public service obligations have been based on (1) the CTA and the CTR, and on provisions in the Education Act, all stating that the grant of concession involves an obligation to carry out the transport services stipulated in the concession; (2) the concessions granted to the relevant operators, which cover the provision of local scheduled and school bus transport services in Aust-Agder; and (3) the individual contracts between Aust-Agder and the operators.

| (88) | Further, it is possible to identify in the relevant contracts the service providers, the duration of the service period, the nature of the public service obligations of operating collective transport services in the local network. Hence, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the first condition of the Altmark judgement has been fulfilled since 2004. |
| --- | --- |

(88)

Further, it is possible to identify in the relevant contracts the service providers, the duration of the service period, the nature of the public service obligations of operating collective transport services in the local network. Hence, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the first condition of the Altmark judgement has been fulfilled since 2004.

1.5.3.2.   The second Altmark condition

| (89) | As regards the second condition, the Authority observes that the parameters for calculating the compensation changed with the introduction of the ALFA model as from 2004. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

As regards the second condition, the Authority observes that the parameters for calculating the compensation changed with the introduction of the ALFA model as from 2004.

| (90) | As it is presented by the Norwegian authorities, the ALFA method appears to contain parameters on how to calculate the compensation that are established beforehand in an objective and transparent manner, e.g. calculation of production on the basis of the number of kilometres per production period per vehicle or calculation of costs on the basis of unit costs multiplied by the number of kilometres per vehicle. That being said, negotiations about the exact amount of the compensation to be granted take place after the ALFA method has been applied. This begs the question whether the systematic use of such negotiations, ex post, entails that the calculation of compensation in practice leaves room for discretionary adjustment (44). As a result, the Authority, based on the information before it, has doubts as to whether the second condition of Altmark has been met since 2004. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

As it is presented by the Norwegian authorities, the ALFA method appears to contain parameters on how to calculate the compensation that are established beforehand in an objective and transparent manner, e.g. calculation of production on the basis of the number of kilometres per production period per vehicle or calculation of costs on the basis of unit costs multiplied by the number of kilometres per vehicle. That being said, negotiations about the exact amount of the compensation to be granted take place after the ALFA method has been applied. This begs the question whether the systematic use of such negotiations, ex post, entails that the calculation of compensation in practice leaves room for discretionary adjustment (44). As a result, the Authority, based on the information before it, has doubts as to whether the second condition of Altmark has been met since 2004.

1.5.3.3.   The third Altmark condition

| (91) | The third condition is that the compensation shall not exceed what is necessary to cover all — or part of — the costs incurred in discharging the public service obligations, taking into account relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations. |
| --- | --- |

(91)

The third condition is that the compensation shall not exceed what is necessary to cover all — or part of — the costs incurred in discharging the public service obligations, taking into account relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations.

| (92) | In that regard, the EFTA Court already held in Joined Cases E-10/11 and E-11/11:
  ‘If it is shown that the compensation paid to the undertakings operating the public service does not reflect the costs actually incurred by that undertaking for the purposes of that service, such a system does not satisfy the requirement that compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of public service obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations’ (45). |
| --- | --- |

(92)

In that regard, the EFTA Court already held in Joined Cases E-10/11 and E-11/11:

‘If it is shown that the compensation paid to the undertakings operating the public service does not reflect the costs actually incurred by that undertaking for the purposes of that service, such a system does not satisfy the requirement that compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of public service obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations’ (45).

| (93) | It is evident from the information submitted that all operators involved carry out activities outside the public remit. However, concerning Telemark Bilruter AS, the company has not kept separate accounts for the public service contracts in Aust-Agder and its public service contracts with the county of Telemark until the end of 2011, although it has kept separate accounts for the public service and the commercial activities since 2000; concerning Nettbuss Sør AS (including the two companies that were merged with Nettbuss Sør AS in 2009: RTB and Høvågruta AS) no complete figures showing the full accounts from 2004 onwards have been submitted and Nettbuss Sør AS has not kept separate accounts before 2009; as for RTB and Høvågruta AS there has been no information submitted for the period until they ceased to exist with the merger of 2009; L/L Setesdal Bilruter and Birkeland Busser AS have not kept separate accounts before 2009; finally, as to Frolandsruta, the Norwegian authorities have not been able to provide information whether the company has kept separate accounts. |
| --- | --- |

(93)

It is evident from the information submitted that all operators involved carry out activities outside the public remit. However, concerning Telemark Bilruter AS, the company has not kept separate accounts for the public service contracts in Aust-Agder and its public service contracts with the county of Telemark until the end of 2011, although it has kept separate accounts for the public service and the commercial activities since 2000; concerning Nettbuss Sør AS (including the two companies that were merged with Nettbuss Sør AS in 2009: RTB and Høvågruta AS) no complete figures showing the full accounts from 2004 onwards have been submitted and Nettbuss Sør AS has not kept separate accounts before 2009; as for RTB and Høvågruta AS there has been no information submitted for the period until they ceased to exist with the merger of 2009; L/L Setesdal Bilruter and Birkeland Busser AS have not kept separate accounts before 2009; finally, as to Frolandsruta, the Norwegian authorities have not been able to provide information whether the company has kept separate accounts.

| (94) | Consequently, at this stage, the Authority considers that there has been no complete, transparent and objective information available as to the costs and revenues of the public service operations as opposed to those of other commercial activities. Even though for some companies the accounts have been kept separate, it is not clear whether there are common costs between the public service provided in Aust-Agder and the activities outside the public service remit in Aust-Agder. Furthermore, it is not clear how these potential common costs have been allocated to avoid cross-subsidization. |
| --- | --- |

(94)

Consequently, at this stage, the Authority considers that there has been no complete, transparent and objective information available as to the costs and revenues of the public service operations as opposed to those of other commercial activities. Even though for some companies the accounts have been kept separate, it is not clear whether there are common costs between the public service provided in Aust-Agder and the activities outside the public service remit in Aust-Agder. Furthermore, it is not clear how these potential common costs have been allocated to avoid cross-subsidization.

| (95) | Further, the Authority recalls that the calculattion of the final compensation was not only based on the application of the ALFA method, but also on subsequent negotiations. In principle, the use of negotiations cannot guarantee that the amount of compensation finally granted does not exceed what is necessary for the discharge of public service obligations. |
| --- | --- |

(95)

Further, the Authority recalls that the calculattion of the final compensation was not only based on the application of the ALFA method, but also on subsequent negotiations. In principle, the use of negotiations cannot guarantee that the amount of compensation finally granted does not exceed what is necessary for the discharge of public service obligations.

| (96) | In view of the above, the Authority cannot exclude that any of the companies have been overcompensated for the provision of the public services since 2004. Given that separate accounts have not been consistently kept by the companies since 2004, and that no proper allocation of common costs has been reported, it is not clear at this stage whether the final compensation agreed on the basis of negotiations covers solely the cost of the public service (46). As a result, the Authority doubts whether the third Altmark condition has been fulfilled since 2004. |
| --- | --- |

(96)

In view of the above, the Authority cannot exclude that any of the companies have been overcompensated for the provision of the public services since 2004. Given that separate accounts have not been consistently kept by the companies since 2004, and that no proper allocation of common costs has been reported, it is not clear at this stage whether the final compensation agreed on the basis of negotiations covers solely the cost of the public service (46). As a result, the Authority doubts whether the third Altmark condition has been fulfilled since 2004.

1.5.3.4.   The fourth Altmark condition

| (97) | In this case, the bus operators’ compensation has not been determined on the basis of a public procurement procedure. Rather, the Norwegian authorities submit that the compensation scheme in Aust-Agder was based on a benchmarking exercise that ensures that the compensation granted covers but the cost of a well run operator (as compensation calculated under the ALFA model is based on the costs of the 33 % best run bus companies). |
| --- | --- |

(97)

In this case, the bus operators’ compensation has not been determined on the basis of a public procurement procedure. Rather, the Norwegian authorities submit that the compensation scheme in Aust-Agder was based on a benchmarking exercise that ensures that the compensation granted covers but the cost of a well run operator (as compensation calculated under the ALFA model is based on the costs of the 33 % best run bus companies).

| (98) | The Authority acknowledges the measures taken by the Norwegian authorities to increase the efficiency of the operators concerned. However, at this stage, the Authority cannot conclude on the applicability of the fourth Altmark criterion, due to the fact that the ALFA method does not specify in detail the sample of undertakings that were taken into account for benchmarking purposes. In addition, no analytical ratios representative of productivity (such as turnover to capital employed, total cost to turnover, turnover per employee, value added per employee or staff costs to value added) or quality of supply have been submitted (47). The Authority also entertains doubts as to whether all relevant costs for the discharge of the public service correspond to the lower threshold as envisaged by the ALFA method, or only a sample (e.g. fuel consumption), and only for a certain number of operations. |
| --- | --- |

(98)

The Authority acknowledges the measures taken by the Norwegian authorities to increase the efficiency of the operators concerned. However, at this stage, the Authority cannot conclude on the applicability of the fourth Altmark criterion, due to the fact that the ALFA method does not specify in detail the sample of undertakings that were taken into account for benchmarking purposes. In addition, no analytical ratios representative of productivity (such as turnover to capital employed, total cost to turnover, turnover per employee, value added per employee or staff costs to value added) or quality of supply have been submitted (47). The Authority also entertains doubts as to whether all relevant costs for the discharge of the public service correspond to the lower threshold as envisaged by the ALFA method, or only a sample (e.g. fuel consumption), and only for a certain number of operations.

| (99) | Therefore, it is not clear at this stage whether the ALFA method applies a cost analysis that corresponds to the totality of the costs of an efficient undertaking — and in such a case the fourth criterion would be met — or a cost analysis that provides incentives to companies to become more efficient than before on the basis of selective cost factors — and in such a case the fourth criterion could not be met. In addition, the fact that the final compensation is set on the basis of negotiations may be held to allow for discretionary cost adjustments that cannot reflect the costs of an efficient operator. |
| --- | --- |

(99)

Therefore, it is not clear at this stage whether the ALFA method applies a cost analysis that corresponds to the totality of the costs of an efficient undertaking — and in such a case the fourth criterion would be met — or a cost analysis that provides incentives to companies to become more efficient than before on the basis of selective cost factors — and in such a case the fourth criterion could not be met. In addition, the fact that the final compensation is set on the basis of negotiations may be held to allow for discretionary cost adjustments that cannot reflect the costs of an efficient operator.

| (100) | As a result, the Authority doubts whether the fourth Altmark condition has been fulfilled since 2004. |
| --- | --- |

(100)

As a result, the Authority doubts whether the fourth Altmark condition has been fulfilled since 2004.

1.5.3.5.   Conclusion on the Altmark test

| (101) | Based on the information submitted, the Authority cannot, at this stage, conclude that the compensation awarded since 2004 for the local scheduled and school bus transport service obligations in Aust-Agder complies with all the four criteria in the Altmark judgement. The presence of an advantage granted to an undertaking for performing public service obligations in the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA agreement cannot thus be excluded. |
| --- | --- |

(101)

Based on the information submitted, the Authority cannot, at this stage, conclude that the compensation awarded since 2004 for the local scheduled and school bus transport service obligations in Aust-Agder complies with all the four criteria in the Altmark judgement. The presence of an advantage granted to an undertaking for performing public service obligations in the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA agreement cannot thus be excluded.

1.6.   
  Advantage — ATP Project

| (102) | If a recipient undertaking receives an economic advantage from the State, which it would not have obtained under normal market condition, such an advantage would normally involve State aid. |
| --- | --- |

(102)

If a recipient undertaking receives an economic advantage from the State, which it would not have obtained under normal market condition, such an advantage would normally involve State aid.

| (103) | Since 2004, Nettbuss Sør AS has received NOK 1 million from the ATP project on an annual basis. In 2010 the amount was increased to NOK 2 million. This would appear to constitute an economic advantage that Nettbuss Sør AS is unlikely to have obtained under normal market conditions. However, the Authority has not received adequate information that would enable it to make a proper assessment of whether the annual payments constitute State aid. |
| --- | --- |

(103)

Since 2004, Nettbuss Sør AS has received NOK 1 million from the ATP project on an annual basis. In 2010 the amount was increased to NOK 2 million. This would appear to constitute an economic advantage that Nettbuss Sør AS is unlikely to have obtained under normal market conditions. However, the Authority has not received adequate information that would enable it to make a proper assessment of whether the annual payments constitute State aid.

| (104) | Due to the absence of such information, the Authority cannot presently assess whether these amounts are connected to the award of compensation by Aust-Agder, or whether they constitute, or form part of, a separate scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(104)

Due to the absence of such information, the Authority cannot presently assess whether these amounts are connected to the award of compensation by Aust-Agder, or whether they constitute, or form part of, a separate scheme.

| (105) | Therefore, based on the information before it, the Authority cannot exclude that the ATP project provides an advantage to Nettbuss Sør AS that may entail State aid in the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(105)

Therefore, based on the information before it, the Authority cannot exclude that the ATP project provides an advantage to Nettbuss Sør AS that may entail State aid in the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

1.7.   
  Distortion of competition and effect on trade between Contracting Parties

| (106) | Next, the Authority must examine whether the measures are liable to affect trade and to distort competition (48). |
| --- | --- |

(106)

Next, the Authority must examine whether the measures are liable to affect trade and to distort competition (48).

| (107) | Since before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in Norway, several undertakings have been providing scheduled bus services in Aust-Agder. The Authority thus concludes that the annual compensation has been liable to distort competition since then (49). |
| --- | --- |

(107)

Since before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in Norway, several undertakings have been providing scheduled bus services in Aust-Agder. The Authority thus concludes that the annual compensation has been liable to distort competition since then (49).

| (108) | With respect to the effect on trade and the fact that the present case concerns a local market for bus transport in Aust-Agder, the Authority recalls that in the Altmark judgment, which also concerned regional bus transport services, the Court of Justice held that:
  ‘a public subsidy granted to an undertaking which provides only local or regional transport services and does not provide any transport services outside its State of origin may none the less have an effect on trade between Member States ... The second condition for the application of Article 92(1) of the Treaty, namely that the aid must be capable of affecting trade between Member States, does not therefore depend on the local or regional character of the transport services supplied or on the scale of the field of activity concerned’ (50). |
| --- | --- |

(108)

With respect to the effect on trade and the fact that the present case concerns a local market for bus transport in Aust-Agder, the Authority recalls that in the Altmark judgment, which also concerned regional bus transport services, the Court of Justice held that:

‘a public subsidy granted to an undertaking which provides only local or regional transport services and does not provide any transport services outside its State of origin may none the less have an effect on trade between Member States ... The second condition for the application of Article 92(1) of the Treaty, namely that the aid must be capable of affecting trade between Member States, does not therefore depend on the local or regional character of the transport services supplied or on the scale of the field of activity concerned’ (50).

| (109) | This means that even if — as in the present case — only a local or regional bus transport market (Aust-Agder) may be concerned, public funding made available to one operator in that market is still liable to affect trade between Contracting Parties (51). Consequently, the Authority considers that the annual compensation is liable to affect trade between Contracting Parties. |
| --- | --- |

(109)

This means that even if — as in the present case — only a local or regional bus transport market (Aust-Agder) may be concerned, public funding made available to one operator in that market is still liable to affect trade between Contracting Parties (51). Consequently, the Authority considers that the annual compensation is liable to affect trade between Contracting Parties.

| (110) | Moreover, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the same considerations apply, mutatis mutandis, both to the school transport activities (52) and to the ATP project. |
| --- | --- |

(110)

Moreover, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the same considerations apply, mutatis mutandis, both to the school transport activities (52) and to the ATP project.

1.8.   
  Conclusion

| (111) | The Authority considers that the compensation awarded by Aust-Agder to the seven bus operators for local scheduled and school bus transport prior to 2004 constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(111)

The Authority considers that the compensation awarded by Aust-Agder to the seven bus operators for local scheduled and school bus transport prior to 2004 constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

| (112) | Furthermore, the Authority has doubts as to whether the compensation awarded by Aust-Agder to the seven bus operators for local scheduled and school bus transport from 2004 until today constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(112)

Furthermore, the Authority has doubts as to whether the compensation awarded by Aust-Agder to the seven bus operators for local scheduled and school bus transport from 2004 until today constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA agreement.

| (113) | Finally, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the financing of Nettbuss Sør AS on the basis of the ATP project may entail State aid in the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(113)

Finally, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the financing of Nettbuss Sør AS on the basis of the ATP project may entail State aid in the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA agreement.

2.   The classification of new and existing aid

2.1.   
  The legal provisions — the EFTA Court’s Judgement in Case E-14/10

| (114) | According to Article 1(c) of part II of Protocol 3 SCA; ‘new aid’ shall mean:
  ‘all aid, that is to say, aid schemes and individual aid, which is not existing aid, including alterations to existing aid.’ |
| --- | --- |

(114)

According to Article 1(c) of part II of Protocol 3 SCA; ‘new aid’ shall mean:

‘all aid, that is to say, aid schemes and individual aid, which is not existing aid, including alterations to existing aid.’

| (115) | The relevant provisions, Article 1(b)(i) and (v) of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA provide that ‘existing aid’ shall mean:
  ‘all aid which existed prior to the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in the respective EFTA States, that is to say, aid schemes and individual aid which were put into effect before, and are still applicable after, the entry into force of the EEA Agreement; (...)’
  and
  ‘aid which is deemed to be an existing aid because it can be established that at the time it was put into effect it did not constitute an aid, and subsequently became an aid due to the evolution of the European Economic Area and without having been altered by the EFTA State (...)’ |
| --- | --- |

(115)

The relevant provisions, Article 1(b)(i) and (v) of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA provide that ‘existing aid’ shall mean:

‘all aid which existed prior to the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in the respective EFTA States, that is to say, aid schemes and individual aid which were put into effect before, and are still applicable after, the entry into force of the EEA Agreement; (...)’

and

‘aid which is deemed to be an existing aid because it can be established that at the time it was put into effect it did not constitute an aid, and subsequently became an aid due to the evolution of the European Economic Area and without having been altered by the EFTA State (...)’

| (116) | In its judgment in Case E-14/10, the EFTA Court held:
  ‘Whether the aid granted (...) constitutes “existing aid” (...) depends upon the interpretation of the provisions of Protocol 3 SCA (...)’
  ‘(...) to qualify as an “existing aid measure” under the EEA State aid rules, it must be part of an aid scheme that was put into effect before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement’ (53). |
| --- | --- |

(116)

In its judgment in Case E-14/10, the EFTA Court held:

‘Whether the aid granted (...) constitutes “existing aid” (...) depends upon the interpretation of the provisions of Protocol 3 SCA (...)’

‘(...) to qualify as an “existing aid measure” under the EEA State aid rules, it must be part of an aid scheme that was put into effect before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement’ (53).

2.2.   
  Definition of an aid scheme

| (117) | Article 1(d) of Part II of Protocol 3 provides that an ‘aid scheme’:
  ‘shall mean any act on the basis of which, without further implementing measures being required, individual aid awards may be made to undertakings defined within the act in a general and abstract manner and any act on the basis of which aid which is not linked to a specific project may be awarded to one or several undertakings for an indefinite period of time and/or for an indefinite amount;’ |
| --- | --- |

(117)

Article 1(d) of Part II of Protocol 3 provides that an ‘aid scheme’:

‘shall mean any act on the basis of which, without further implementing measures being required, individual aid awards may be made to undertakings defined within the act in a general and abstract manner and any act on the basis of which aid which is not linked to a specific project may be awarded to one or several undertakings for an indefinite period of time and/or for an indefinite amount;’

| (118) | Article 1(e) of Part II of Protocol 3 provides that ‘individual aid’:
  ‘shall mean aid that is not awarded on the basis of an aid scheme and notifiable awards of aid on the basis of an aid scheme;’ |
| --- | --- |

(118)

Article 1(e) of Part II of Protocol 3 provides that ‘individual aid’:

‘shall mean aid that is not awarded on the basis of an aid scheme and notifiable awards of aid on the basis of an aid scheme;’

| (119) | This distinction is of particular importance in the context of existing aid, as Protocol 3 provides the Authority with the competence to keep under constant review existing systems of aid (54). Likewise, Section V of Part II of Protocol 3 applies only to existing aid schemes (55). |
| --- | --- |

(119)

This distinction is of particular importance in the context of existing aid, as Protocol 3 provides the Authority with the competence to keep under constant review existing systems of aid (54). Likewise, Section V of Part II of Protocol 3 applies only to existing aid schemes (55).

| (120) | The Authority notes that this definition entered the EEA Agreement in 2001 when the Procedural Regulation was incorporated as Part II of its Protocol 3 (56). Prior to 2001, there was no similarly precise EEA law definition of an aid scheme. Moreover, the rationale for the concept of existing aid must be borne in mind, i.e. to provide both beneficiaries of State aid and the EFTA States with legal certainty regarding arrangements that predate the entry into force of State aid control in their legal systems, whilst empowering the Authority to bring such systems in line with EEA law. |
| --- | --- |

(120)

The Authority notes that this definition entered the EEA Agreement in 2001 when the Procedural Regulation was incorporated as Part II of its Protocol 3 (56). Prior to 2001, there was no similarly precise EEA law definition of an aid scheme. Moreover, the rationale for the concept of existing aid must be borne in mind, i.e. to provide both beneficiaries of State aid and the EFTA States with legal certainty regarding arrangements that predate the entry into force of State aid control in their legal systems, whilst empowering the Authority to bring such systems in line with EEA law.

| (121) | Furthermore the Authority notes that the case-law of the European Courts does not provide for detailed guidance as regards the interpretation of this definition. While not bound by either, the Authority has found it useful to review its own case practice and that of the European Commission and found that existing ‘aid schemes’ have been held to encompass non-statutory customary law (57) and administrative practice related to the application of statutory (58) and non-statutory law (59). In one case, the European Commission found that an aid scheme relating to Anstaltslast and Gewährträgerhaftung was based on the combination of an unwritten old legal principle combined with widespread practice across Germany (60). |
| --- | --- |

(121)

Furthermore the Authority notes that the case-law of the European Courts does not provide for detailed guidance as regards the interpretation of this definition. While not bound by either, the Authority has found it useful to review its own case practice and that of the European Commission and found that existing ‘aid schemes’ have been held to encompass non-statutory customary law (57) and administrative practice related to the application of statutory (58) and non-statutory law (59). In one case, the European Commission found that an aid scheme relating to Anstaltslast and Gewährträgerhaftung was based on the combination of an unwritten old legal principle combined with widespread practice across Germany (60).

| (122) | The Authority observes that the compensation for carrying out bus transport in Aust-Agder has from before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in Norway on 1 January 1994, been provided on the basis of the CTA and the CTR (and the relevant legislation preceding them). Furthermore, since before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement, compensation for the provision of school transport services has been awarded on the basis of the Act on Education (and the relevant legislation preceding it). |
| --- | --- |

(122)

The Authority observes that the compensation for carrying out bus transport in Aust-Agder has from before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in Norway on 1 January 1994, been provided on the basis of the CTA and the CTR (and the relevant legislation preceding them). Furthermore, since before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement, compensation for the provision of school transport services has been awarded on the basis of the Act on Education (and the relevant legislation preceding it).

| (123) | Further, in order to conclude on the existence of an aid scheme, it is necessary to examine whether the legal framework for the financing of scheduled and school bus transport in Aust-Agder meets the three criteria of Article 1(d) of Part II of Protocol 3: (i) an act on the basis of which aid can be awarded, (ii) an act that shall not require any further implementing measures, and (iii) an act that shall define the potential aid beneficiaries in a general and abstract manner. |
| --- | --- |

(123)

Further, in order to conclude on the existence of an aid scheme, it is necessary to examine whether the legal framework for the financing of scheduled and school bus transport in Aust-Agder meets the three criteria of Article 1(d) of Part II of Protocol 3: (i) an act on the basis of which aid can be awarded, (ii) an act that shall not require any further implementing measures, and (iii) an act that shall define the potential aid beneficiaries in a general and abstract manner.

| (124) | As for the first criterion, the Authority notes that the CTA, the CTR and the Education Act are acts on the basis of which Aust-Agder awarded the compensation. |
| --- | --- |

(124)

As for the first criterion, the Authority notes that the CTA, the CTR and the Education Act are acts on the basis of which Aust-Agder awarded the compensation.

| (125) | As for the second criterion, it is noted that the administration of any aid scheme requires a certain decision-making process that allows for individual awards of aid without the adoption of further implementing measures. |
| --- | --- |

(125)

As for the second criterion, it is noted that the administration of any aid scheme requires a certain decision-making process that allows for individual awards of aid without the adoption of further implementing measures.

| (126) | In turn, a mere ‘technical application’, as indicated above, of the provisions providing for the scheme would thus not be an implementing measure (61). Moreover, the mere fact that a decision awarding aid under an aid scheme has implications for the budget of the authority administering that scheme, cannot, in the Authority’s view, mean that such decisions are to be regarded as implementing measures (62). |
| --- | --- |

(126)

In turn, a mere ‘technical application’, as indicated above, of the provisions providing for the scheme would thus not be an implementing measure (61). Moreover, the mere fact that a decision awarding aid under an aid scheme has implications for the budget of the authority administering that scheme, cannot, in the Authority’s view, mean that such decisions are to be regarded as implementing measures (62).

| (127) | In a similar vein, considering acts of entrustment, such as the award of a concession, this, as any entrustment, specifies one particular undertaking, and cannot by definition thus relate to a group of undertakings ‘defined in a general and abstract manner’ (compare the third criterion). |
| --- | --- |

(127)

In a similar vein, considering acts of entrustment, such as the award of a concession, this, as any entrustment, specifies one particular undertaking, and cannot by definition thus relate to a group of undertakings ‘defined in a general and abstract manner’ (compare the third criterion).

| (128) | In contrast, the Authority is of the view that ‘implementing measures’ should be understood to entail a certain degree of discretion, that would influence to a significant degree the amount, characteristics or conditions under which the aid is granted. In particular, it would seem that every scheme determines the purpose which aid can be awarded for. Thus, where a public body, for example, is empowered to use different instruments to promote the local economy and grants several capital injections, this implies the use of considerable discretion as to the amount, characteristics or conditions and purpose for which the aid is granted, and is hence not to be regarded as an aid scheme (63). |
| --- | --- |

(128)

In contrast, the Authority is of the view that ‘implementing measures’ should be understood to entail a certain degree of discretion, that would influence to a significant degree the amount, characteristics or conditions under which the aid is granted. In particular, it would seem that every scheme determines the purpose which aid can be awarded for. Thus, where a public body, for example, is empowered to use different instruments to promote the local economy and grants several capital injections, this implies the use of considerable discretion as to the amount, characteristics or conditions and purpose for which the aid is granted, and is hence not to be regarded as an aid scheme (63).

| (129) | In the case at hand, Aust-Agder was responsible for the management and funding of the local scheduled and school bus transport within its territory (64). It is clear that no further legislative measures needed to be adopted for the compensation payments to the undertakings involved. The Authority, thus, is of the opinion that the CTA, the CTR and the Education Act limit the discretion of Aust-Agder, in the sense that the county is bound by that legal framework when taking decisions on the amount of compensation, the characteristics, conditions and purpose for which the aid is granted. |
| --- | --- |

(129)

In the case at hand, Aust-Agder was responsible for the management and funding of the local scheduled and school bus transport within its territory (64). It is clear that no further legislative measures needed to be adopted for the compensation payments to the undertakings involved. The Authority, thus, is of the opinion that the CTA, the CTR and the Education Act limit the discretion of Aust-Agder, in the sense that the county is bound by that legal framework when taking decisions on the amount of compensation, the characteristics, conditions and purpose for which the aid is granted.

| (130) | The compensation can only be granted for the purpose of financing local scheduled and school bus transport in the areas concerned. Aust-Agder is not entitled to award aid for different purposes on the basis of the provisions described above. |
| --- | --- |

(130)

The compensation can only be granted for the purpose of financing local scheduled and school bus transport in the areas concerned. Aust-Agder is not entitled to award aid for different purposes on the basis of the provisions described above.

| (131) | Also, the State is responsible for the coordination and development of public transport in Norway and exercises this prerogative in a way that restricts the counties’ powers. |
| --- | --- |

(131)

Also, the State is responsible for the coordination and development of public transport in Norway and exercises this prerogative in a way that restricts the counties’ powers.

| (132) | As for the third criterion, the same compensation systems in Aust-Agder have applied and still apply to all concessionaires that are entrusted with the provision of bus services on unprofitable routes. |
| --- | --- |

(132)

As for the third criterion, the same compensation systems in Aust-Agder have applied and still apply to all concessionaires that are entrusted with the provision of bus services on unprofitable routes.

| (133) | Accordingly, the Authority considers that an aid scheme has been and still is in place in Aust-Agder. The provisions providing for that aid scheme are the CTA, the CTR, the Education Act and the relevant administrative practice in Aust-Agder. |
| --- | --- |

(133)

Accordingly, the Authority considers that an aid scheme has been and still is in place in Aust-Agder. The provisions providing for that aid scheme are the CTA, the CTR, the Education Act and the relevant administrative practice in Aust-Agder.

2.3.   
  Definition of existing aid

| (134) | Article 1(b)(i) of Part II of Protocol 3 provides that existing aid encompasses all aid which existed prior to the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in the respective EFTA States, that is to say, aid schemes and individual aid which were put into effect before, and are still applicable after the entry into force of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(134)

Article 1(b)(i) of Part II of Protocol 3 provides that existing aid encompasses all aid which existed prior to the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in the respective EFTA States, that is to say, aid schemes and individual aid which were put into effect before, and are still applicable after the entry into force of the EEA Agreement.

| (135) | Here, the provisions providing for the scheme have been in place since before the EEA Agreement entered into force in Norway on 1 January 1994. As the market for local bus transport was already exposed to some competition on that date, the Authority is of the view that the financing of local scheduled and school bus transport on the basis of the CTA, the CTR and the Education Act constitutes an existing aid scheme that existed before January 1994 and remained applicable thereafter. |
| --- | --- |

(135)

Here, the provisions providing for the scheme have been in place since before the EEA Agreement entered into force in Norway on 1 January 1994. As the market for local bus transport was already exposed to some competition on that date, the Authority is of the view that the financing of local scheduled and school bus transport on the basis of the CTA, the CTR and the Education Act constitutes an existing aid scheme that existed before January 1994 and remained applicable thereafter.

| (136) | Further, Article 1(c) of Part II of Protocol 3 provides that ‘new aid’ is:
  ‘all aid, that is to say, aid schemes and individual aid, which is not existing aid, including alterations to existing aid;’ |
| --- | --- |

(136)

Further, Article 1(c) of Part II of Protocol 3 provides that ‘new aid’ is:

‘all aid, that is to say, aid schemes and individual aid, which is not existing aid, including alterations to existing aid;’

| (137) | In its judgment Namur, the Court of Justice stated the following:
  ‘(...) the emergence of new aid or the alteration of existing aid cannot be assessed according to the scale of the aid or, in particular, its amounts in financial terms at any moment in the life of the undertaking if the aid is provided under earlier statutory provisions which remain unaltered. Whether aid may be classified as new aid or as alteration of existing aid must be determined by reference to the provisions providing for it’ (65). |
| --- | --- |

(137)

In its judgment Namur, the Court of Justice stated the following:

‘(...) the emergence of new aid or the alteration of existing aid cannot be assessed according to the scale of the aid or, in particular, its amounts in financial terms at any moment in the life of the undertaking if the aid is provided under earlier statutory provisions which remain unaltered. Whether aid may be classified as new aid or as alteration of existing aid must be determined by reference to the provisions providing for it’ (65).

| (138) | Moreover, as Advocate-General Trabucchi pointed out in his Opinion in Van der Hulst, modifications are substantial if the main elements of the system have been changed, such as the nature of the advantage, the purpose pursued with the measure, the legal basis, the beneficiaries or the source of the financing (66). |
| --- | --- |

(138)

Moreover, as Advocate-General Trabucchi pointed out in his Opinion in Van der Hulst, modifications are substantial if the main elements of the system have been changed, such as the nature of the advantage, the purpose pursued with the measure, the legal basis, the beneficiaries or the source of the financing (66).

| (139) | Purely formal or administrative changes to an aid scheme do not lead to the reclassification of existing aid as new (67). |
| --- | --- |

(139)

Purely formal or administrative changes to an aid scheme do not lead to the reclassification of existing aid as new (67).

| (140) | As shown above, the financing of bus transport services in Aust-Agder has been provided on the basis of an aid scheme consisting of the CTA, the CTR, the Education Act and the administrative practice in Aust-Agder. In 2004 the administrative practice was amended with the introduction of the ALFA method, on the basis of which new contracts were concluded for the period 2004-2008. This ALFA method was supplemented by the introduction of a new indexation system, on the basis of which new contracts with the same operators were signed to cover the period 2009-2012 with the possibility of prolongation for up to additional four years. The question is whether the introduction in 2004 of a new financing system though the ALFA method and its later indexation can be considered as features that change the existing aid scheme to new aid. |
| --- | --- |

(140)

As shown above, the financing of bus transport services in Aust-Agder has been provided on the basis of an aid scheme consisting of the CTA, the CTR, the Education Act and the administrative practice in Aust-Agder. In 2004 the administrative practice was amended with the introduction of the ALFA method, on the basis of which new contracts were concluded for the period 2004-2008. This ALFA method was supplemented by the introduction of a new indexation system, on the basis of which new contracts with the same operators were signed to cover the period 2009-2012 with the possibility of prolongation for up to additional four years. The question is whether the introduction in 2004 of a new financing system though the ALFA method and its later indexation can be considered as features that change the existing aid scheme to new aid.

| (141) | The ALFA method, as explained above in Part I, Sections I, 4.6 and 4.7, is a system used to calculate the costs connected to bus transportation. Its later indexation introduced several cost relevant parameters, such as fuel costs or wage costs, on the basis of which the compensation is to be calculated. The introduction of this system does not appear to have changed the legal basis and the aim for awarding the compensation or the beneficiaries involved. Nevertheless, the Authority doubts whether the substance of the scheme remained unaffected. Before 2004, the compensation was determined on the basis of negotiations and the compensation so agreed might simply have covered the difference that could not be covered by revenues, including a reasonable profit. As a result, the Authority doubts whether the basic features on how to calculate the compensation have been significantly altered by the introduction of the ALFA method. |
| --- | --- |

(141)

The ALFA method, as explained above in Part I, Sections I, 4.6 and 4.7, is a system used to calculate the costs connected to bus transportation. Its later indexation introduced several cost relevant parameters, such as fuel costs or wage costs, on the basis of which the compensation is to be calculated. The introduction of this system does not appear to have changed the legal basis and the aim for awarding the compensation or the beneficiaries involved. Nevertheless, the Authority doubts whether the substance of the scheme remained unaffected. Before 2004, the compensation was determined on the basis of negotiations and the compensation so agreed might simply have covered the difference that could not be covered by revenues, including a reasonable profit. As a result, the Authority doubts whether the basic features on how to calculate the compensation have been significantly altered by the introduction of the ALFA method.

| (142) | The Authority recalls that if an alteration affects the substance of an existing aid scheme and it is not clearly severable from it, then the whole scheme is transformed into new aid (68). |
| --- | --- |

(142)

The Authority recalls that if an alteration affects the substance of an existing aid scheme and it is not clearly severable from it, then the whole scheme is transformed into new aid (68).

| (143) | Therefore, the Authority doubts whether the change introduced with the ALFA method and its indexation has substantially altered the existing aid scheme. In case the Authority would come to the conclusion that this change is substantial, and not severable from it, the scheme, in its entirety, would have turned into new aid as of 1 January 2004. |
| --- | --- |

(143)

Therefore, the Authority doubts whether the change introduced with the ALFA method and its indexation has substantially altered the existing aid scheme. In case the Authority would come to the conclusion that this change is substantial, and not severable from it, the scheme, in its entirety, would have turned into new aid as of 1 January 2004.

2.4.   
  Conclusion

| (144) | The Authority concludes that there is an aid scheme in place in Aust-Agder based on the CTA, the CTR, the Act on Education and the administrative practice. The Authority is of the view that scheme was existing in nature at least until the end of 2003, but has doubts as to whether the scheme may have turned into new aid with the introduction of the ALFA method on 1 January 2004. |
| --- | --- |

(144)

The Authority concludes that there is an aid scheme in place in Aust-Agder based on the CTA, the CTR, the Act on Education and the administrative practice. The Authority is of the view that scheme was existing in nature at least until the end of 2003, but has doubts as to whether the scheme may have turned into new aid with the introduction of the ALFA method on 1 January 2004.

3.   Whether the aid was granted on the basis of an existing aid scheme

| (145) | In its judgment in Case E-14/10, the EFTA Court stated the following on the question of the existing or new nature of the aid:
  ‘(...) in so far as the compensation payments were indeed used to finance the operation of non-profitable scheduled bus services, the (Authority) may correctly have classified those payments as existing aid.
  However, (...) any aid granted to Oslo Sporveier in excess of the losses actually incurred in connection with the services in question cannot be regarded to constitute, on the basis of that aid scheme, existing aid (...)’ (69) |
| --- | --- |

(145)

In its judgment in Case E-14/10, the EFTA Court stated the following on the question of the existing or new nature of the aid:

‘(...) in so far as the compensation payments were indeed used to finance the operation of non-profitable scheduled bus services, the (Authority) may correctly have classified those payments as existing aid.

However, (...) any aid granted to Oslo Sporveier in excess of the losses actually incurred in connection with the services in question cannot be regarded to constitute, on the basis of that aid scheme, existing aid (...)’ (69)

| (146) | It follows from the judgment of the EFTA Court that only payments made on the basis of the existing aid scheme can be considered as existing aid disbursed under that scheme. Conversely, payments not made on the basis of the provisions providing for the scheme cannot be protected by the existing aid nature of that scheme (70). |
| --- | --- |

(146)

It follows from the judgment of the EFTA Court that only payments made on the basis of the existing aid scheme can be considered as existing aid disbursed under that scheme. Conversely, payments not made on the basis of the provisions providing for the scheme cannot be protected by the existing aid nature of that scheme (70).

| (147) | The Authority doubts at this stage whether the aid, in its entirety, has been granted on the basis of an existing aid scheme, which entitled concessionaires that provided public scheduled bus services in Aust-Agder to a compensation which would cover the difference between ticket revenue and cost for discharging the public service, including a reasonable profit. It is recalled that, the bus operators have not consistently kept separate accounts for public service activities and the activities outside the public service remit (71). Nor can the Authority determine whether common costs have been properly (or at all) allocated between these two kinds of activities. |
| --- | --- |

(147)

The Authority doubts at this stage whether the aid, in its entirety, has been granted on the basis of an existing aid scheme, which entitled concessionaires that provided public scheduled bus services in Aust-Agder to a compensation which would cover the difference between ticket revenue and cost for discharging the public service, including a reasonable profit. It is recalled that, the bus operators have not consistently kept separate accounts for public service activities and the activities outside the public service remit (71). Nor can the Authority determine whether common costs have been properly (or at all) allocated between these two kinds of activities.

| (148) | In line with the above cited judgment of the EFTA Court, the Authority is of the view that any aid not granted on the basis of the existing aid scheme would have to be qualified as new aid. |
| --- | --- |

(148)

In line with the above cited judgment of the EFTA Court, the Authority is of the view that any aid not granted on the basis of the existing aid scheme would have to be qualified as new aid.

| (149) | In addition, the Authority at present has not received enough information that would enable it to consider whether the financing of Nettbuss Sør AS on the basis of the ATP project is part of the overall existing aid scheme at place in Aust-Agder. To the extent, thus, that the ATP project is not part of that existing aid scheme, it constitutes new aid. |
| --- | --- |

(149)

In addition, the Authority at present has not received enough information that would enable it to consider whether the financing of Nettbuss Sør AS on the basis of the ATP project is part of the overall existing aid scheme at place in Aust-Agder. To the extent, thus, that the ATP project is not part of that existing aid scheme, it constitutes new aid.

4.   Notification of new aid

| (150) | According to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, new aid must be notified to the Authority, and cannot be put into effect before the Authority has taken a decision authorising it (the standstill obligation). |
| --- | --- |

(150)

According to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, new aid must be notified to the Authority, and cannot be put into effect before the Authority has taken a decision authorising it (the standstill obligation).

| (151) | Should the Authority conclude that new aid has been granted, there would be a breach of the standstill obligation, given that this aid has been put into effect, whilst not having been notified to, nor approved by, the Authority. |
| --- | --- |

(151)

Should the Authority conclude that new aid has been granted, there would be a breach of the standstill obligation, given that this aid has been put into effect, whilst not having been notified to, nor approved by, the Authority.

5.   Compatibility

5.1.   
  The legal framework

| (152) | The compatibility of public service compensation for transport by road (72) is assessed on the basis of Article 49 of the EEA Agreement. This provision cannot be applied directly, but only by virtue of Council Regulations, i.e. Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 (73) or Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 (74). An essential element under both regulations is to verify that aid in the form of public service compensation only covers the cost of the public service (including a reasonable profit) and does not lead to overcompensation. |
| --- | --- |

(152)

The compatibility of public service compensation for transport by road (72) is assessed on the basis of Article 49 of the EEA Agreement. This provision cannot be applied directly, but only by virtue of Council Regulations, i.e. Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 (73) or Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 (74). An essential element under both regulations is to verify that aid in the form of public service compensation only covers the cost of the public service (including a reasonable profit) and does not lead to overcompensation.

5.2.   
  Potential aid granted outside an existing aid scheme

| (153) | In case the compensation for local scheduled and school bus transport services was granted in excess of what was allowed for under the existing aid scheme (until 2004, or alternatively, until today, if the nature of the aid was not altered by the introduction of the ALFA method), this would constitute new aid. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that such new aid, which in practice would represent a form of overcompensation, would likely to be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, in particular its Article 49 and Regulations (EEC) No 1191/69 or (EC) No 1370/2007, as overcompensation by definition exceeds what is necessary for the operation of the public service. |
| --- | --- |

(153)

In case the compensation for local scheduled and school bus transport services was granted in excess of what was allowed for under the existing aid scheme (until 2004, or alternatively, until today, if the nature of the aid was not altered by the introduction of the ALFA method), this would constitute new aid. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that such new aid, which in practice would represent a form of overcompensation, would likely to be incompatible with the EEA Agreement, in particular its Article 49 and Regulations (EEC) No 1191/69 or (EC) No 1370/2007, as overcompensation by definition exceeds what is necessary for the operation of the public service.

5.3.   
  Potential new aid granted after 2004

| (154) | In case the Authority should come to the conclusion that the introduction of the ALFA method entailed that the compensation disbursed from then on constituted new aid, the compatibility of that aid would have to be assessed. |
| --- | --- |

(154)

In case the Authority should come to the conclusion that the introduction of the ALFA method entailed that the compensation disbursed from then on constituted new aid, the compatibility of that aid would have to be assessed.

| (155) | The Authority notes that the Norwegian authorities have submitted some arguments relating to the compatibility of the compensation granted by Aust-Agder, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 and Article 49 of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(155)

The Authority notes that the Norwegian authorities have submitted some arguments relating to the compatibility of the compensation granted by Aust-Agder, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 and Article 49 of the EEA Agreement.

| (156) | The Authority concurs that the bus operators have been the subject of genuine and clearly defined public service obligations, pursuant to Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007. These obligations have been based on: (1) the CTA and the CTR, and the Education Act; (2) concessions granted to the relevant operators, which cover the provision of local scheduled and school bus transport services in Aust-Agder; and (3) individual contracts between Aust-Agder and the operators. |
| --- | --- |

(156)

The Authority concurs that the bus operators have been the subject of genuine and clearly defined public service obligations, pursuant to Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007. These obligations have been based on: (1) the CTA and the CTR, and the Education Act; (2) concessions granted to the relevant operators, which cover the provision of local scheduled and school bus transport services in Aust-Agder; and (3) individual contracts between Aust-Agder and the operators.

| (157) | Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 requires furthermore that the public service concession establishes in advance, in an objective and transparent manner, the parameters on the basis of which the compensation payment is to be calculated in a way that prevents overcompensation. Moreover, the arrangements for allocating costs to the provision of the services should be clear so that only the costs associated with public service obligation is taken into consideration. |
| --- | --- |

(157)

Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 requires furthermore that the public service concession establishes in advance, in an objective and transparent manner, the parameters on the basis of which the compensation payment is to be calculated in a way that prevents overcompensation. Moreover, the arrangements for allocating costs to the provision of the services should be clear so that only the costs associated with public service obligation is taken into consideration.

| (158) | With regard to this provision, the Authority has already expressed doubts as to whether the parameters to calculate the compensation have been established in advance; and whether there is overcompensation (75). Therefore, it cannot be established that the aid in the form of public service compensation only covers the cost of the public service (including a reasonable profit) and does not lead to overcompensation. Thus, as the Authority cannot take a final view on this matter. Therefore, the Authority cannot at this stage conclude that the compensation system at hand complies with the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 49 and Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 (or Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69). |
| --- | --- |

(158)

With regard to this provision, the Authority has already expressed doubts as to whether the parameters to calculate the compensation have been established in advance; and whether there is overcompensation (75). Therefore, it cannot be established that the aid in the form of public service compensation only covers the cost of the public service (including a reasonable profit) and does not lead to overcompensation. Thus, as the Authority cannot take a final view on this matter. Therefore, the Authority cannot at this stage conclude that the compensation system at hand complies with the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 49 and Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 (or Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69).

| (159) | Concerning the ATP project, in the absence of sufficient information, the Authority cannot presently appraise the compatibility of that measure with the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 49 and Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 (or Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69) or any other provision of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(159)

Concerning the ATP project, in the absence of sufficient information, the Authority cannot presently appraise the compatibility of that measure with the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 49 and Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 (or Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69) or any other provision of the EEA Agreement.

6.   Conclusion

| (160) | Based on the information submitted by the complainant and by the Norwegian authorities, and having carried out a preliminary assessment, the Authority considers that the compensation to local scheduled and school bus transport operators in Aust-Agder prior to 2004 constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(160)

Based on the information submitted by the complainant and by the Norwegian authorities, and having carried out a preliminary assessment, the Authority considers that the compensation to local scheduled and school bus transport operators in Aust-Agder prior to 2004 constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

| (161) | Moreover, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that compensation to local scheduled and school bus transport operators in Aust-Agder since 2004 may entail State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(161)

Moreover, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that compensation to local scheduled and school bus transport operators in Aust-Agder since 2004 may entail State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

| (162) | The Authority is of the view that there is an existing aid scheme at place in Aust-Agder until the end of 2003 based on the CTA, the CTR, the Act on Education and the administrative practice. The Authority, however, has doubts as to whether that scheme has been materially altered as from 2004. |
| --- | --- |

(162)

The Authority is of the view that there is an existing aid scheme at place in Aust-Agder until the end of 2003 based on the CTA, the CTR, the Act on Education and the administrative practice. The Authority, however, has doubts as to whether that scheme has been materially altered as from 2004.

| (163) | In case new aid has been granted as from 2004, the Authority doubts, on the basis of the information provided, whether such aid would be compatible with Article 49 of the EEA Agreement and Regulations (EEC) No 1191/69 or (EC) No 1370/2007. |
| --- | --- |

(163)

In case new aid has been granted as from 2004, the Authority doubts, on the basis of the information provided, whether such aid would be compatible with Article 49 of the EEA Agreement and Regulations (EEC) No 1191/69 or (EC) No 1370/2007.

| (164) | The Authority has further doubts as to whether there is overcompensation that is not based on the existing aid scheme, and is thus considered as new aid, and whether such potential new aid is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(164)

The Authority has further doubts as to whether there is overcompensation that is not based on the existing aid scheme, and is thus considered as new aid, and whether such potential new aid is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (165) | It is the Authority’s preliminary view that the financing of Nettbuss Sør AS on the basis of the ATP project may entail State aid in the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. To the extent that the ATP project is not part of the existing aid scheme in Aust-Agder, it constitutes new aid. |
| --- | --- |

(165)

It is the Authority’s preliminary view that the financing of Nettbuss Sør AS on the basis of the ATP project may entail State aid in the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. To the extent that the ATP project is not part of the existing aid scheme in Aust-Agder, it constitutes new aid.

| (166) | However, the Authority does not presently have sufficient information that would enable it to consider whether the ATP project would be compatible with Article 49 of the EEA Agreement and Regulations (EEC) No 1191/69 or (EC) No 1370/2007, or any other provisions of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(166)

However, the Authority does not presently have sufficient information that would enable it to consider whether the ATP project would be compatible with Article 49 of the EEA Agreement and Regulations (EEC) No 1191/69 or (EC) No 1370/2007, or any other provisions of the EEA Agreement.

| (167) | Therefore, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA, the Authority is obliged to open the procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 SCA. This decision to open a formal procedure is without prejudice to the final assessment of the case by the Authority. |
| --- | --- |

(167)

Therefore, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA, the Authority is obliged to open the procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 SCA. This decision to open a formal procedure is without prejudice to the final assessment of the case by the Authority.

| (168) | In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 SCA, invites the Norwegian authorities, within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision, to submit their comments, as well as all documents, information and data needed to address the doubts of the Authority outlined above, as well as all relevant information that will enable the Authority in consolidating its preliminary views expressed in this decision. |
| --- | --- |

(168)

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 SCA, invites the Norwegian authorities, within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision, to submit their comments, as well as all documents, information and data needed to address the doubts of the Authority outlined above, as well as all relevant information that will enable the Authority in consolidating its preliminary views expressed in this decision.

| (169) | Further, the Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to forward a copy of this Decision to the potential recipients of the aid immediately. |
| --- | --- |

(169)

Further, the Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to forward a copy of this Decision to the potential recipients of the aid immediately.

| (170) | The Authority would like to remind the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully put at the disposal of the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law. Moreover, according to Article 15 Part II of Protocol 3, the powers of the Authority to order the recovery of aid are subject to a limitation period of 10 years. This period begins on the day on which the unlawful aid is awarded. Any action taken by the Authority with regard to this unlawful aid shall interrupt the limitation period, |
| --- | --- |

(170)

The Authority would like to remind the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully put at the disposal of the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law. Moreover, according to Article 15 Part II of Protocol 3, the powers of the Authority to order the recovery of aid are subject to a limitation period of 10 years. This period begins on the day on which the unlawful aid is awarded. Any action taken by the Authority with regard to this unlawful aid shall interrupt the limitation period,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure, provided for in Article 1(2) of part I of Protocol 3 is opened regarding the potential aid to the five (seven before 2009) local scheduled and school bus operators in Aust-Agder, Norway, in the form of (i) potential new aid not granted on the basis of the scheme for local scheduled and school bus transport services since 1994 until today, and (ii) potential new aid granted on the basis of the scheme for local scheduled and school bus transport services since 2004.

Article 2

The formal investigation procedure, provided for in Article 1(2) of part I of Protocol 3 is opened regarding direct grants made available to Nettbuss Sør AS on the basis of the ATP project since 2004.

Article 3

The Norwegian authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure within one month of the notification of this Decision.

Article 4

The Norwegian authorities are requested to provide within one month from notification of this Decision, all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the nature and compatibility of the aid measure.

Article 5

This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of Norway.

Article 6

Only the English version of this Decision is authentic.

Done at Brussels, 6 February 2013.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Oda Helen SLETNES

President

Sabine MONAUNI-TÖMÖRDY

College Member

---

(1)  This section is an extract from the recent decision of the Authority 519/12/COL of 19.12.2012 (not yet published), closing the formal investigation into potential aid to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene.

1

(2)  Act of 4.6.1976 No 63 (e.i.f. 1.7.1977). Repealed and replaced by the CTA on 1.1.2003.

2

(3)  See the preparatory works to the amendment of the Transport Act of 1976 — Ot.prp. nr. 16 (1980-81) at page 2.

3

(4)  In Norwegian: Norsk Rutebileierforbund.

4

(5)  Regulation of 12.8.1986 No 2170 (e.i.f. 1.1.1987).

5

(6)  Act of 21.6.2002 No 45 (e.i.f. 1.1.2003).

6

(7)  Regulation of 26.3.2003 No 401 (e.i.f. 1.4.2003).

7

(8)  See footnote 2.

8

(9)  Regulation of 12.8.1986 No 2170 (e.i.f. 1.1.1987) and Regulation of 4.12.1992 No 1013 (e.i.f. 1.1.1994). Both repealed and replaced by the CTR on 1.4.2003.

9

(10)  In Norwegian: Administrasjonsselskap.

10

Administrasjonsselskap

(11)  Article 23 CTA.

11

(12)  Article 22(3) CTA.

12

(13)  Article 22(4) CTA.

13

(14)  Articles 4 and 6 CTA.

14

(15)  Article 4(1) CTA.

15

(16)  Article 4(2) CTA and Chapter I of the CTR.

16

(17)  Article 27(1) CTA.

17

(18)  Article 6(1) CTA.

18

(19)  Article 25 CTR.

19

(20)  Articles 28 and 29 CTR. These are the requirements the Authority considers to be the most relevant for the purposes of describing the national scheme, however, a number of other detailed requirements for a special concession are set out in the CTR.

20

(21)  The Ministry of Transport has delegated its competence for setting the tariffs to the counties. However, some rebates are determined on the national level. In practice, the Ministry has instructed all the counties to ensure that local scheduled bus transport operators carrying out a public service offer a 50 % price reduction to children, senior and disabled citizens.

21

(22)  Articles 28 and 29(2) CTR. On the basis of Article 28(3) CTR, the Ministry of Transport has the competence to give guidelines on the content and publication of the transportation schedules. The Ministry of Transport’s Circular Letter N-1/2006 contains supplementary guidelines on the publication of route schedules. Before 2006, Article 28 CTR regulated certain aspects of the publication of route schedules. These aspects were taken out in 2006. In practice, the Circular Letter N-1/2006 refers to the old provision (Article 28 CTR) as it was before the amendment, and states that the requirements of the old provision, until further notice, shall be considered as a guideline for the content of the route schedule.

22

(23)  Article 27(2) CTR.

23

(24)  As stated in the preparatory works, chapter 10.1 of Prop. 113 L (2009-2010).

24

(25)  Article 8 CTA. The possibility to tender the concessions was introduced by an amendment of the Transport Act of 1976 by Act of 11.6.1993 No 85 (e.i.f. 1.1.1994).

25

(26)  Article 30(1) CTR. The Ministry of Transport has powers to give general guidelines for the use of electronic ticketing systems (Article 30(2) CTR). The Ministry has given such guidelines in the form of its Circular Letter N-1/2006. In that Circular Letter the Ministry has decided that the following document should serve as a standard for electronic ticketing systems — Part 3 of Handbook 206 by the Norwegian Public Roads Administration (in Norwegian: Statens Vegvesen).

26

Statens Vegvesen

(27)  Article 22(5) CTA.

27

(28)  Article 22(1) CTA.

28

(29)  The Norwegian authorities, in their comments to the opening decision in case 71524 concerning alleged aid to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene, have confirmed this and explained, with reference to legal literature (Norsk Lovkommentar), that the preceding provision — Article 24a of the Transport Act of 1976 — was interpreted in the same way. In that regard, Norsk Lovkommentar to the Transport Act of 1976 (available on http://www.rettsdata.no/ (access requires a paid subscription)) on the issue of compensation states the following in note 43 (in Norwegian): ‘I rutetransporten vil det dog ofte være aktuelt å pålegge utøver en større rutetjeneste som sammenholdt med de takster som godkjennes, ikke gir et forsvarlig økonomisk grunnlag. I slike tilfeller kan plikten bare opprettholdes dersom det ytes tilskudd, jf. § 24 a’. Translation by the Authority: ‘For scheduled transport it will, however, frequently be appropriate to require the transport operator to provide a more comprehensive service that, in light of the set maximum prices, would not be of sound financial interest. Under such circumstances, the public service obligation can only be maintained against compensation, cf. Article 24a.’

29

Norsk Lovkommentar

Norsk Lovkommentar

(30)  Act of 17.7.1998 No 61 (e.i.f. 1.8.1999).

30

(31)  Act of 13.7.1969 No 24.

31

(32)  Act of 21.6.1974 No 55.

32

(33)  Act of 31.5.1985 No 41.

33

(34)  Norges Statsbaner AS (NSB) is train operator for passengers in Norway. It is owned by the Ministry of Transport and Communications. In addition to provide transport services by train or by bus, the company is also engaged in cargo trains, foreign train transport and real estate activity.

34

(35)  The merger was notified to the Norwegian company registry on 10 and 11 June 2009 and the companies Høyvågruta AS and RTB were removed from the registry on 3 and 5 September 2009.

35

(36)  There has been two parallel systems for calculation compensation for bus transport services in Norway, which share many of the same features. One system is called ALFA, as applied by Aust-Agder, while the alternative is called BUSSKOST. Both systems are based on the same core elements but the BUSSKOST is developed and exclusively managed (for a fee) by the consultancy company Asplan-VIAK.

36

(37)  Decision No 254/10/COL dated 21.6.2010 (AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene).

37

AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene

(38)  Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellshaft (2003) ECR I-7747 (‘the Altmark judgment’).

38

Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg

Nahverkehrsgesellshaft

(39)  Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and the Council of 23.10.2007 on the public passenger transport services by rail and by road and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 1191/69 and 1107/70 (OJ L 315, 3.12.2007, p. 1), incorporated in the EEA Agreement by means of section 4(a) of Annex XIII to the EEA Agreement.

39

(40)  Frolandsruta Frode Oland provides a total annual amount of 120 000 kilometer with a value of service concession at NOK 2 779 000 in 2010. Also, Telemark Birluter AS provides an annual amount of 220 000 kilometer with a value of service concession at NOK 7 144 000 in 2010.

40

(41)  Article 2 of Commission Directive 2006/111/EC on the transparency of financial relations between Member States and public undertakings (OJ L 318, 17.11.2006, p. 17), incorporated at point 1a of Annex XV to the EEA Agreement.

41

(42)  C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke ECR (2001) I-8365, paragraph 41.

42

Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke

(43)  The Altmark judgment, paragraphs 87-93.

43

Altmark

(44)  Commission Decision of 23.2.2011 on State aid C 58/06 (ex NN 98/05) implemented by Germany for Bahnen der Stadt Monheim (BSM) and Rheinische Bahngesellschaft (RBG) in the Verkehrsverbund Rhein-Ruhr (OJ L 210, 17.8.2011, p. 1).

44

(45)  Paragraph 170. See for comparison, Joined Cases C-34/01 to C-38/01 Enirisorse (2003) ECR I-14243, paragraphs 37-40.

45

Enirisorse

(46)  See in this respect the Judgment of the EFTA Court of 8.10.2012 in Joined Cases E-10/11 and E-11/11, paragraph 175.

46

(47)  See the Authority’s Guidelines on the application of the State aid rules to compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic interest (not yet published), paragraphs 72 and 73.

47

(48)  See Joined Cases E-5/04, E-6/04 and E-7/04, Fesil and Finnfjord and Others v EFTA Surveillance Authority (2005) EFTA Court Report 117 at paragraph 93.

48

Fesil and Finnfjord and Others

EFTA Surveillance Authority

(49)  Moreover, the Court of Justice observed in its Altmark judgment that since 1995, several EU Member States had voluntarily opened up certain urban, suburban or regional transport markets to competition from undertakings established in other EU Member States. The risk to inter-Member State trade was thus not hypothetical but real, as the market was open to competition (paragraphs 69 and 79).

49

Altmark

(50)  Paragraphs 77 and 82 of the Altmark judgment.

50

Altmark

(51)  See also Case 102/87 France v Commission (1988) ECR 4067, paragraph 19; Case C-305/89 Italy v Commission (1991) ECR I-1603, paragraph 26.

51

France

Commission

Italy

Commission

(52)  See Commission Decision to open the investigation in case C-54/07 (Germany) State aid to Emsländische Eisenbahn GmbH (OJ C 174, 9.7.2008, p. 13), paragraph 119.

52

State aid to Emsländische Eisenbahn GmbH

(53)  Paragraphs 50 and 53.

53

(54)  Cf. Article 1.1 of Part I of Protocol 3.

54

(55)  The Authority considers that the terms ‘aid schemes’ and ‘systems of aid’ are synonyms

55

(56)  Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty (OJ L 83, 27.3.1999, p. 1).

56

(57)  See the Authority’s Decision No 405/08/COL, HFF (OJ L 79, 25.3.2010, p. 40, EEA Supplement No 14, 25.3.2010, p. 20), Chapter II.2.3.1, p. 23: ‘The State guarantee on all State institutions for all their obligations follows from general unwritten rules of Icelandic public law predating the entry into force of the EEA Agreement. The guarantee is applicable to all State institutions, regardless of when they are established, or of their activities, or changes in those activities. This possible aid measure must be regarded as a scheme falling within the definition in Article 1(d) in part II of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement.’

57

(58)  See Commission Decision in Case E-45/00 (Netherlands) Fiscal exemption in favour of Schiphol Group (OJ C 37, 11.2.2004, p. 13).

58

Fiscal exemption in favour of Schiphol Group

(59)  From the Authority’s Decision No 491/09/COL Norsk Film group (OJ C 174, 1.7.2010, p. 3, EEA Supplement No 34, 1.7.2010, p. 1), Chapter II.2 p. 8: ‘the yearly payments made by the Norwegian State since the 1970s to Norsk FilmStudio AS/Filmparken AS for the production of feature films and to maintain an infrastructure necessary for the production of films were based on an existing system of aid. The Authority considers that in this case, where regular payments were consistently made over a very long period of time, the practice shows that state support was an essential element in the financing of the company. The Authority considers on that basis that the annual grants were made under an existing system of State aid within the meaning of Article 62 EEA.’ In that case, the Authority opened the formal investigation into a payment of NOK 36 million that had been made in addition to the regular payments and an alleged preferential tax measure. With Decision No 204/11/COL (OJ L 287, 18.10.2012, p. 14, EEA Supplement No 58, 18.10.2012, p. 1.) the Authority closed the procedure on the basis that the NOK 36 million payment was made on the basis of the existing aid scheme and that the tax measure did not constitute State aid.

59

(60)  See Commission Decision in Case E-10/00 (Germany) State guarantees for public banks in Germany (OJ C 150, 22.6.2002, p. 6).

60

State guarantees for public banks in Germany

(61)  See Commission Decision in Case E-4/07 (France) Charges aéroportuaires (OJ C 83, 7.4.2009, p. 16), paragraph 56.

61

Charges aéroportuaires

(62)  See to that effect, the judgment of the EFTA Court in Case E-14/10 Konkurrenten, at paragraphs 74-75, where the EFTA Court states as follows:

62

Konkurrenten

‘In the case at hand, the City of Oslo was entitled, under the provisions of the 1976 Transport Act and the implementing regulations, to provide financial support in order to enable the operation of non-profitable scheduled bus services. The fact that the level of the compensation was “negotiated” does not, as such, entail that the payments did not cover actual losses incurred in the operation of those services and were per se not covered by the scheme. The Court considers that in so far as the compensation payments were indeed used to finance the operation of non-profitable scheduled bus services, the defendant may correctly have classified those payments as existing aid.

The argument that the aid must be considered as new aid because it was granted on an annual and discretionary basis under the city budget must (...) be rejected.’

(63)  Cf. Case SA.21654 (ex NN-69/07 and C-6/08) Public Commercial Property Åland Industrihus (OJ L 125, 12.5.2012, p. 33), paragraphs 107-109 in particular.

63

Public Commercial Property Åland Industrihus

(64)  With the exception of primary school transportation, for which the municipalities are obliged to pay a tariff.

64

(65)  Case C-44/93 Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit (1994) ECR I-3829, paragraph 28.

65

Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit

(66)  Opinion of Advocate General Trabucchi in Case 51/74 Van der Hulst (1975) ECR 79.

66

Van der Hulst

(67)  See Article 4(1) of the consolidated version of the Authority’s Decision No 195/04/COL of 14.7.2004 on the implementing provisions referred to under Article 27 of Part II of Protocol 3 (available at: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/decisions/195-04-COL.pdf). See also the opinion of Advocate General Lenz in Namur.

67

Namur

(68)  Case T-195/01 Gibraltar v Commission ECR (2002) II-2309, paragraphs 109 ff.

68

Gibraltar

Commission

(69)  See paragraphs 74 and 76.

69

(70)  The same logic applies for schemes that have been approved by the Authority or the European Commission. See for example Case C-47/91 Italy v Commission (1994) ECR-4635, paragraphs 25-26.

70

Italy

Commission

(71)  See paragraph (42) of this Decision.

71

(72)  Cf. Article 47 of the EEA Agreement.

72

(73)  Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 on public service in transport by rail, road and inland waterway (OJ L 156, 8.6.1969, p. 8), incorporated into the EEA Agreement by means of Annex XIII to the EEA Agreement.

73

(74)  Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23.10.2007 on public passenger transport services by rail and by road and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 1191/69 and (EC) No 1107/70 (OJ L 315, 3.12.2007, p. 1), incorporated in the EEA Agreement by means of Annex XIII to the EEA Agreement. Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 entered into force in Norway on 1 January 2011, see Regulation of 17.12.2010 No 1673.

74

(75)  See paragraphs 89-96 above.

75

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| 25.4.2013 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 118/26 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.4.2013

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 118/26

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Informazzjoni kkomunikata mill-Istati tal-EFTA dwar għajnuna mill-Istat mogħtija skont l-Att imsemmi fil-punt 1 j tal-Anness XV tal-Ftehim dwar iż-ŻEE (ir-Regolament tal-Kummissjoni (KE) Nru 800/2008 li jiddikjara ċerti kategoriji ta’ għajnuna bħala kompatibbli mas-suq komuni (Regolament għal Eżenzjoni Ġenerali Sħiħa) skont l-Artikoli 87 u 88 tat-Trattat)

2013/C 118/06

PARTI I

| Għajnuna Nru | GBER 2/13/EMP |
| --- | --- |
| L-Istat tal-EFTA | In-Norvegja |
| L-awtorità awtorizzanti | Isem | Arbeids- og velferdsetaten (L-Amministrazzjoni Norveġiża għax-Xogħol u l-Protezzjoni Soċjali) |
| L-indirizz u | Postbox 8019 Dep |
| 0030 Oslo |
| NORWAY |

Għajnuna Nru

GBER 2/13/EMP

L-Istat tal-EFTA

In-Norvegja

L-awtorità awtorizzanti

Isem

Arbeids- og velferdsetaten (L-Amministrazzjoni Norveġiża għax-Xogħol u l-Protezzjoni Soċjali)

L-indirizz u

Postbox 8019 Dep

0030 Oslo

NORWAY

l-paġna tal-internet

http://www.nav.no

It-titolu tal-miżura ta’ għajnuna

Forsøk med arbeidsavklaringspenger som lønnstilskudd (Proġett pilota – l-użu tal-benefiċċju għall-valutazzjoni tax-xogħol bħala sussidji tal-pagi)

Il-bażi legali nazzjonali (Referenza għall-pubblikazzjoni nazzjonali uffiċjali rilevanti)

Forskrift av 21. desember 2012 nr. 1418 om forsøk med arbeidsavklaringspenger som lønnstilskudd — Lovdata Hl-2012-1184

Regolament Norveġiż tal-21 ta’ Diċembru 2012 Nru 1418 dwar l-użu tal-benefiċċju għall-valutazzjoni tax-xogħol bħala sussidji tal-pagi

Il-link tal-internet għat-test sħiħ tal-miżura ta' għajnuna

http://lovdata.no/for/sf/ad/xd-20121221-1418.html

It-tip ta’ miżura

Skema

X

It-tul ta’ żmien

Skema

Mill-1.1.2013 sal-31.12.2017

Is-settur(i) ekonomiku/ekonomiċi kkonċernat(i)

Is-setturi ekonomiċi kollha eliġibbli biex jirċievu l-għajnuna

X

It-tip ta' benefiċjarju

SME

X

Impriżi kbar

X

Baġit

L-ammont totali annwali tal-baġit ippjanat skont l-iskema

NOK 25,2 miljun

L-istrument tal-għajnuna (Art. 5)

Għotja

X

PARTI II

| L-Għanijiet Ġenerali (lista) | L-Għanijiet (lista) | L-intensità massima ta’ għajnuna f'% jew l-Ammont massimu ta' għajnuna f'NOK | SME – bonusijiet f'% |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | Għajnuna għall-impjieg ta’ ħaddiema b’diżabilità fil-forma ta’ sussidji tal-pagi
  (Art. 41) | 40 % | |

L-Għanijiet Ġenerali (lista)

L-Għanijiet (lista)

L-intensità massima ta’ għajnuna f'% jew l-Ammont massimu ta' għajnuna f'NOK

SME – bonusijiet f'%

Għajnuna għall-impjieg ta’ ħaddiema b’diżabilità fil-forma ta’ sussidji tal-pagi

(Art. 41)

40 %

---

V Avviżi

PROĊEDURI AMMINISTRATTIVI

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

| 25.4.2013 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 118/27 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.4.2013

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 118/27

---

SEJĦA GĦALL-PROPOSTI – EACEA/04/13

Skont il-Programm tat-Tagħlim tul il-Ħajja

Implimentazzjoni tal-objettivi strateġiċi Ewropej fl-Edukazzjoni u t-taħriġ (ET 2020) (kooperazzjoni tal-partijiet interessati, esperimentazzjoni u innovazzjoni)

2013/C 118/07

| Parti A – | Appoġġ għall-implimentazzjoni u s-sensibilizzazzjoni nazzjonali dwar l-objettivi tal-kooperazzjoni Ewropea fl-edukazzjoni u t-taħriġ (ET 2020 (1)) |
| --- | --- |

Parti A –

Appoġġ għall-implimentazzjoni u s-sensibilizzazzjoni nazzjonali dwar l-objettivi tal-kooperazzjoni Ewropea fl-edukazzjoni u t-taħriġ (ET 2020 (1))

| Parti B – | Appoġġ għall-implimentazzjoni ta’ soluzzjonijiet politiċi innovattivi fil-livell istituzzjonali biex jonqos it-tluq bikri mill-iskola, b'konformità mal-prijoritajiet stabbiliti f'Ewropa 2020 u ET 2020. |
| --- | --- |

Parti B –

Appoġġ għall-implimentazzjoni ta’ soluzzjonijiet politiċi innovattivi fil-livell istituzzjonali biex jonqos it-tluq bikri mill-iskola, b'konformità mal-prijoritajiet stabbiliti f'Ewropa 2020 u ET 2020.

1.   Objettivi u Deskrizzjoni

L-għan ġenerali tas-sejħa għall-proposti huwa:

Sabiex tħeġġeġ kooperazzjoni politika Ewropea sabiex – permezz tal-ET 2020 – jiġu appoġġati l-isforzi tal-pajjiżi biex jilħqu l-objettivi ta’ Ewropa 2020, kif rifless fl-Istħarriġ Annwali dwar it-Tkabbir tal-2013 u l-Komunikazzjoni “Reviżjoni tal-Edukazzjoni”, b'mod partikolari: l-iżvilupp ta' ħiliet għat-tkabbir u l-kompetittività, it-tisħiħ tal-impjegabbiltà taż-żgħażagħ u t-tnaqqis tal-livelli ta' tluq bikri mill-iskola, f'kuntest li jagħti prijorità lill-investiment effiċjenti fl-edukazzjoni u t-taħriġ, billi:

| — | jiġu appoġġjati s-sensibilizzazzjoni u l-impenn istituzzjonali, il-koordinazzjoni u s-sħubija mal-partijiet interessati kollha sabiex b'mod partikolari jiġu promossi l-ħiliet għat-tkabbir u l-kompetittività u l-impjegabbiltà taż-żgħażagħ (parti A); |
| --- | --- |

—

jiġu appoġġjati s-sensibilizzazzjoni u l-impenn istituzzjonali, il-koordinazzjoni u s-sħubija mal-partijiet interessati kollha sabiex b'mod partikolari jiġu promossi l-ħiliet għat-tkabbir u l-kompetittività u l-impjegabbiltà taż-żgħażagħ (parti A);

| — | jiġu appoġġjati l-iżvilupp, l-ittestjar u l-evalwazzjoni, permezz ta' provi fuq il-post, soluzzjonijiet politiċi innovattivi għat-tnaqqis tat-tluq bikri mill-iskola (parti B). |
| --- | --- |

—

jiġu appoġġjati l-iżvilupp, l-ittestjar u l-evalwazzjoni, permezz ta' provi fuq il-post, soluzzjonijiet politiċi innovattivi għat-tnaqqis tat-tluq bikri mill-iskola (parti B).

Is-sejħa tipprovdi wkoll opportunitatjiet għall-ministeri u l-partijiet interessati sabiex jittestjaw – f'sitwazzjonijiet tal-ħajja reali – l-implimentazzjoni ta' politiki innovattivi (esperimentazzjonijiet politiċi) li jindirizzaw għanijiet Ewropej.

2.   Organizzazzjonijiet eliġibbli

L-applikazzjonijiet jistgħu jiġu ppreżentati minn organizzazzjonijiet (inklużi l-organizzazzjonijiet imsieħba kollha) imwaqqfa f'pajjiżi li jieħdu sehem fil-Programm ta' Tagħlim Tul il-Ħajja:

| — | is-27 Stat Membru tal-Unjoni Ewropea, |
| --- | --- |

—

is-27 Stat Membru tal-Unjoni Ewropea,

| — | il-pajjiżi taż-ŻEE/EFTA: l-Islanda, il-Liechtenstein, in-Norveġja, |
| --- | --- |

—

il-pajjiżi taż-ŻEE/EFTA: l-Islanda, il-Liechtenstein, in-Norveġja,

| — | il-pajjiżi kandidati: il-Kroazja, it-Turkija, |
| --- | --- |

—

il-pajjiżi kandidati: il-Kroazja, it-Turkija,

| — | l-Isvizzera, |
| --- | --- |

—

l-Isvizzera,

| — | is-Serbja, l-Ex-Repubblika Jugoslava tal-Maċedonja, il-Bosnja-Ħerzegovina, l-Albanija u l-Montenegro (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

is-Serbja, l-Ex-Repubblika Jugoslava tal-Maċedonja, il-Bosnja-Ħerzegovina, l-Albanija u l-Montenegro (2),

Għal din l-azzjoni mhijiex permessa parteċipazzjoni minn pajjiżi terzi.

Tal-inqas pajjiż wieħed tas-sħubija jrid ikun Stat Membru tal-UE (japplika biss għall-Parti B ta' din is-sejħa).

L-applikazzjonijiet iridu jiġu ppreżentati minn persuna ġuridika b'kapaċità ġuridika. Il-persuni fiżiċi ma jistgħux japplikaw għal għotja.

Il-benefiċjarji jistgħu jkunu ministeri nazzjonali jew reġjonali inkarigati mill-edukazzjoni u t-taħriġ u l-politiki tat-tagħlim tul il-ħajja, u awtoritajiet/korpi u organizzazzjonijiet ta' partijiet interessati oħrajn attivi fl-iżvilupp u l-implimentazzjoni ta' politiki ta' tagħlim tul il-ħajja. L-organizzazzjonijiet tal-partijiet interessati jinkludu assoċjazzjonijiet jew organizzazzjonijiet Ewropej, nazzjonali u reġjonali li l-attivitajiet ewlenin jew ir-responsabilitajiet prinċipali tagħhom huma marbutin direttament ma' xi settur tal-edukazzjoni u t-taħriġ, b'mod partikolari organizzazzjonijiet ta' msieħba soċjali u assoċjazzjonijiet nazzjonali jew reġjonali oħrajn li jirrappreżentaw l-interessi ta' grupp soċjetarju fit-twaqqif u l-implimentazzjoni ta' politiki ta' tagħlim tul il-ħajja.

Parti A –   Appoġġ għall-implimentazzjoni u s-sensibilizzazzjoni nazzjonali dwar l-objettivi tal-kooperazzjoni Ewropea fl-edukazzjoni u t-taħriġ (ET 2020 (3))

L-applikazzjonijiet għal finanzjament jistgħu jsiru biss minn imsieħba nazzjonali msawra minn tal-inqas tliet organizzazzjonijiet li tal-inqas jinvolvu awtorità nazzjonali jew reġjonali waħda responsabbli għall-edukazzjoni u t-taħriġ u l-politiki ta' tagħlim tul il-ħajja (qabel il-primarja, l-iskejjel, l-ETV, l-edukazzjoni superjuri u t-tagħlim għall-adulti), u korpi u organizzazzjonijiet ta' partijiet interessati oħrajn involuti direttament fl-iżvilupp u l-implimentazzjoni ta' politiki bħal dawn.

Parti B –   Appoġġ għall-implimentazzjoni ta’ soluzzjonijiet politiċi innovattivi fil-livell istituzzjonali biex jonqos it-tluq bikri mill-iskola, b'konformità mal-prijoritajiet stabbiliti f'Ewropa 2020 u ET 2020.

L-applikazzjonijiet għal finanzjament jistgħu jsiru biss minn sħubijiet transnazzjonali ta' ministeri nazzjonali jew reġjonali inkarigati mill-iżvilupp u l-implimentazzjoni tal-edukazzjoni u t-taħriġ u l-politiki ta' tagħlim tul il-ħajja, jew organizzazzjonijiet oħrajn magħżula minn dawn il-ministeri sabiex iwieġbu għas-sejħa.

Is-sħubijiet iridu jkunu msawra minn tal-inqas 5 organizzazzjonijiet li jinvolvu 3 pajjiżi eliġibbli jew iktar. Tal-inqas wieħed mill-imsieħba ta' kull pajjiż irid ikun ministeru nazzjonali jew reġjonali inkarigat bl-iżvilupp u l-implimenazzjoni tal-edukazzjoni u t-taħriġ u l-politiki ta' tagħlim tul il-ħajja jew organizzazzjoni oħra magħżula minn dan il-ministeru sabiex twieġeb għas-sejħa, u tal-inqas sieħeb wieħed irid ikun korp ta' evalwazzjoni. Is-sħubijiet għandhom jinkludu partijiet interessati relevanti oħrajn ukoll, skont kif ikun xiearq.

Trid tintbagħat ittra (jew ittri) ta' ħatra mill-ministeru/i tad-delegazzjoni mal-verżjoni fuq karta tal-proposta.

Għall-finijiet ta' din is-sejħa, l-istituzzjonijiet tal-edukazzjoni superjuri kollha akkreditati mill-Istati Membri (il-pajjiżi li jieħdu sehem), u l-istituzzjonijiet jew l-organizzazzjonijiet kollha li jipprovdu opportunitajiet ta' tagħlim li rċivew iktar minn 50 % tad-dħul annwali tagħhom minn sorsi pubbliċi tul l-aħħar sentejn (għotjiet oħrajn tal-Unjoni Ewropea għal azzjoni eskluża), jew li huma kkontrollati minn korpi pubbliċi jew ir-rappreżentanti tagħhom, huma meqjusa bħala korpi pubbliċi. Organizzazzjonijiet bħal dawn huma meħtieġa jagħmlu dikjarazzjoni fuq l-unur iffirmata (inkluża fil-pakkett ta' applikazzjoni) li l-organizzazzjoni tagħhom tikkonforma mad-definizzjoni msemmija hawn fuq ta' korp pubbliku. L-Aġenzija tirriżerva d-dritt li titlob dokumentazzjoni li tipprova l-veraċità ta' din id-dikjarazzjoni.

3.   Attivitajiet Eliġibbli

Parti A –   Appoġġ għall-implimentazzjoni u s-sensibilizzazzjoni nazzjonali dwar l-objettivi tal-kooperazzjoni Ewropea fl-edukazzjoni u t-taħriġ (ET 2020 (4))

L-attivitajiet li għandhom jiġu ffinanzjati minn din il-parti tas-sejħa jinkludu:

| — | Attivitajiet ta' sensibilizzazzjoni li jistimolaw id-dibattiti u d-djalogi nazzjonali marbutin mal-implimentazzjoni tal-erba' għanijiet strateġiċi tal-ET 2020 biex tiġi appoġġjata l-istrateġija Ewropa 2020 |
| --- | --- |

—

Attivitajiet ta' sensibilizzazzjoni li jistimolaw id-dibattiti u d-djalogi nazzjonali marbutin mal-implimentazzjoni tal-erba' għanijiet strateġiċi tal-ET 2020 biex tiġi appoġġjata l-istrateġija Ewropa 2020

| — | It-twaqqif ta' fora tal-partijiet interessati fuq l-istrateġiji nazzjonali ta' tagħlim tul il-ħajja bħala ġlieda kontra l-qgħad fost iż-żgħażagħ u biex jiġi promoss it-tkabbir |
| --- | --- |

—

It-twaqqif ta' fora tal-partijiet interessati fuq l-istrateġiji nazzjonali ta' tagħlim tul il-ħajja bħala ġlieda kontra l-qgħad fost iż-żgħażagħ u biex jiġi promoss it-tkabbir

| — | Attivitajiet ta' tixrid u sensibilizzazzjoni skont ET 2020 biex jissaħħu l-opportunitajiet ta' tagħlim permezz ta' mogħdijiet alternattivi |
| --- | --- |

—

Attivitajiet ta' tixrid u sensibilizzazzjoni skont ET 2020 biex jissaħħu l-opportunitajiet ta' tagħlim permezz ta' mogħdijiet alternattivi

| — | Azzjonijiet ta' segwitu fil-livell nazzjonali billi jintrabtu r-riżultati tal-Metodu Miftuħ ta' Koordinazzjoni mal-programmi nazzjonali eżistenti |
| --- | --- |

—

Azzjonijiet ta' segwitu fil-livell nazzjonali billi jintrabtu r-riżultati tal-Metodu Miftuħ ta' Koordinazzjoni mal-programmi nazzjonali eżistenti

Parti B –   Appoġġ għall-implimentazzjoni ta’ soluzzjonijiet politiċi innovattivi fil-livell istituzzjonali biex jonqos it-tluq bikri mill-iskola, b'konformità mal-prijoritajiet stabbiliti f'Ewropa 2020 u ET 2020.

L-attivitajiet li għandhom jiġu ffinanzjati skont din il-parti tas-sejħa jinkludu:

| — | L-iżvilupp, l-ittestjar u l-evalwazzjoni ta' soluzzjonijiet politiċi innovattivi għat-tnaqqis tat-tluq bikri mill-iskola, permezz ta' provi fuq il-post imwettqa permezz ta' sħubijiet transnazzjonali. |
| --- | --- |

—

L-iżvilupp, l-ittestjar u l-evalwazzjoni ta' soluzzjonijiet politiċi innovattivi għat-tnaqqis tat-tluq bikri mill-iskola, permezz ta' provi fuq il-post imwettqa permezz ta' sħubijiet transnazzjonali.

| — | Tfassil u ttestjar konġunti ta' azzjonijiet politiċi innovattivi li jinvolvu numru għoli biżżejjed ta' stabbilimenti edukattivi. |
| --- | --- |

—

Tfassil u ttestjar konġunti ta' azzjonijiet politiċi innovattivi li jinvolvu numru għoli biżżejjed ta' stabbilimenti edukattivi.

| — | Analiżi, minn perspettiva politika, tal-effikaċja, l-effiċjenza u l-kundizzjonijiet għall-iskalabilità tar-riżultati tal-isperimentazzjoni tal-politiki u għat-trasferiment transnazzjonali ta' prattiki tajbin. |
| --- | --- |

—

Analiżi, minn perspettiva politika, tal-effikaċja, l-effiċjenza u l-kundizzjonijiet għall-iskalabilità tar-riżultati tal-isperimentazzjoni tal-politiki u għat-trasferiment transnazzjonali ta' prattiki tajbin.

| — | Tixrid sistematiku fil-livell nazzjonali u Ewropew; it-tħaffif tat-trasferibilità bejn sistemi u politiki tal-edukazzjoni u t-taħriġ differenti. |
| --- | --- |

—

Tixrid sistematiku fil-livell nazzjonali u Ewropew; it-tħaffif tat-trasferibilità bejn sistemi u politiki tal-edukazzjoni u t-taħriġ differenti.

Għall-Partijiet A u B:

L-attivitajiet iridu jibdew bejn l-1 ta’ Marzu 2014 u l-31 ta’ Mejju 2014.

Id-durata obbligatorja tal-proġetti hija ta' 12-il xahar għall-Parti A u ta’ 36 xahar għall-Parti B. Ma hi ser tiġi aċċettata l-ebda applikazzjoni għal proġetti skedati li joperaw għal perjodu differenti minn dak speċifikat f'din is-sejħa għal proposti.

4.   Kriterji tal-Għoti

L-applikazzjonijiet eliġibbli ser jiġu vvalutati fuq il-bażi tal-kriterji li ġejjin:

Parti A –   Appoġġ għall-implimentazzjoni u s-sensibilizzazzjoni nazzjonali dwar l-objettivi tal-kooperazzjoni Ewropea fl-edukazzjoni u t-taħriġ (ET 2020)

| 1. | Ir-relevanza (30 %). |
| --- | --- |

1.

Ir-relevanza (30 %).

| 2. | Il-kwalità tal-pjan ta' azzjonijiet (10 %). |
| --- | --- |

2.

Il-kwalità tal-pjan ta' azzjonijiet (10 %).

| 3. | Il-kwalità tal-metodoloġija (10 %). |
| --- | --- |

3.

Il-kwalità tal-metodoloġija (10 %).

| 4. | Il-kwalità tal-Konsorzju (10 %). |
| --- | --- |

4.

Il-kwalità tal-Konsorzju (10 %).

| 5. | Il-Proporzjon Kostijiet-Benefiċċji (10 %). |
| --- | --- |

5.

Il-Proporzjon Kostijiet-Benefiċċji (10 %).

| 6. | L-impatt (20 %). |
| --- | --- |

6.

L-impatt (20 %).

| 7. | Il-kwalità tal-pjan ta' valorizzazzjoni (tixrid u sfruttament tar-riżultati) (10 %). |
| --- | --- |

7.

Il-kwalità tal-pjan ta' valorizzazzjoni (tixrid u sfruttament tar-riżultati) (10 %).

Parti B –   Appoġġ għall-implimentazzjoni ta’ soluzzjonijiet politiċi innovattivi fil-livell istituzzjonali biex jonqos it-tluq bikri mill-iskola, b'konformità mal-prijoritajiet stabbiliti f'Ewropa 2020 u ET 2020.

| 1. | Ir-relevanza (30 %). |
| --- | --- |

1.

Ir-relevanza (30 %).

| 2. | Il-kwalità tal-pjan ta' azzjonijiet (10 %). |
| --- | --- |

2.

Il-kwalità tal-pjan ta' azzjonijiet (10 %).

| 3. | Il-kwalità tal-metodoloġija (10 %). |
| --- | --- |

3.

Il-kwalità tal-metodoloġija (10 %).

| 4. | Il-kwalità tal-Konsorzju (10 %). |
| --- | --- |

4.

Il-kwalità tal-Konsorzju (10 %).

| 5. | Il-Proporzjon Kostijiet-Benefiċċji (10 %). |
| --- | --- |

5.

Il-Proporzjon Kostijiet-Benefiċċji (10 %).

| 6. | L-impatt u l-Valur Miżjud Ewropew (20 %). |
| --- | --- |

6.

L-impatt u l-Valur Miżjud Ewropew (20 %).

| 7. | Il-kwalità tal-Pjan ta' Valorizzazzjoni (Tixrid u Sfruttament tar-Riżultati) (10 %). |
| --- | --- |

7.

Il-kwalità tal-Pjan ta' Valorizzazzjoni (Tixrid u Sfruttament tar-Riżultati) (10 %).

5.   Baġit

Il-baġit totali allokat għall-kofinanzjament ta' proġetti jammonta għal madwar EUR 4 miljun.

Il-kontribuzzjoni finanzjarja mill-Unjoni Ewropea ma tistax taqbeż il-75 % tal-ispejjeż eliġibbli totali.

L-għotja massima għal kull proġett ser tkun ta' EUR 120 000 għall-Parti A u EUR 800 000 għall-Parti B.

L-Aġenzija beħsiebha talloka l-ammont disponibbli skont il-proporzjon indikattiv li ġej: EUR 1 200 000 għall-Parti A u EUR 2 800 000 għall-Parti B. Madankollu, l-allokazzjoni finali tiddependi fuq in-numru u l-kwalità tal-proposti riċevuti għall-partijiet A u B.

L-Aġenzija tirreżerva d-dritt li ma tqassamx il-fondi kollha disponibbli.

6.   Data ta’ skadenza għas-sottomissjoni

Sejrin jiġu aċċettati biss l-applikazzjonijiet sottomessi fuq il-formola l-korretta, mimlija kif suppost, datata, li turi baġit ibbilanċjat (dħul/infiq), sottomessa online (oriġinali) u ffirmata mill-persuna awtorizzata sabiex tidħol f’impenji legalment vinkolanti f’isem l-organizzazzjoni applikanti.

Data ta’ skadenza: It-Tnejn 16 ta’ Settembru 2013 12:00 nofsinhar (Ħin tal-Ewropa Ċentrali)

L-applikazzjonijiet li ma jinkludux id-dokumenti kollha stipulati u li ma jiġux sottomessi qabel id-data ta’ skadenza mhumiex sejrin jiġu kkunsidrati.

Applikazzjoni sħiħa tikkonsisti f’dan li ġej:

| — | Pakkett ta’ Applikazzjoni oriġinali wieħed (Formola Elettronika u l-erba’ annessi tagħha). Irid jiġi sottomess online kif jingħad fil-Gwida tal-Utenti tal-Formola Elettronika. Din il-verżjoni, inklużi l-annessi tagħha huma meqjusin bħala l-verżjoni prinċipali. |
| --- | --- |

—

Pakkett ta’ Applikazzjoni oriġinali wieħed (Formola Elettronika u l-erba’ annessi tagħha). Irid jiġi sottomess online kif jingħad fil-Gwida tal-Utenti tal-Formola Elettronika. Din il-verżjoni, inklużi l-annessi tagħha huma meqjusin bħala l-verżjoni prinċipali.

| — | Verżjoni stampata waħda li trid tintbagħat bil-posta normali jew irreġistrata eżatt wara s-sottomissjoni online fuq l-indirizz li ġej:





  Education, Audiovisual & Culture Executive Agency |
| --- | --- |
| Unit P9 — Lifelong Learning: Eurydice and Policy Support |
| Key Activity 1 — ECET (ET 2020) |
| Call for Proposals EACEA/04/13 — Part A/Part B (jekk jogħġbok speċifika) |
| BOU2 01/055 |
| Avenue du Bourget/Bourgetlaan 1 |
| 1140 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

—

Verżjoni stampata waħda li trid tintbagħat bil-posta normali jew irreġistrata eżatt wara s-sottomissjoni online fuq l-indirizz li ġej:

Education, Audiovisual & Culture Executive Agency

Unit P9 — Lifelong Learning: Eurydice and Policy Support

Key Activity 1 — ECET (ET 2020)

Call for Proposals EACEA/04/13 — Part A/Part B (jekk jogħġbok speċifika)

BOU2 01/055

Avenue du Bourget/Bourgetlaan 1

1140 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

L-applikazzjonijiet sottomessi wara d-data ta’ skadenza mhumiex sejrin jiġu kkunsidrati.

Dawk l-applikazzjonijiet mibgħuta b’faks jew bil-posta elettronika biss mhumiex sejrin jiġu aċċettati.

Għal iktar dettalji, jekk jogħġbok irreferi għal-Linji Gwida Ġenerali tas-Sejħa.

7.   Aktar tagħrif

Linji Gwida Dettaljati dwar is-Sejħa għall-Proposti u l-Pakkett ta’ Applikazzjoni sħiħ huma disponibbli fuq il-websajt li ġejja:

http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/llp/funding/2013/call_ecet_2013_en.php

L-applikazzjonijiet iridu jiġu sottomessi billi jintużaw il-formoli pprovduti u jrid ikun fihom l-hemżiet, l-annessi u l-informazzjoni kollha kif mitlub fil-linji gwida dettaljati.

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(1)  http://ec.europa.eu/education/lifelong-learning-policy/policy-framework_en.htm

(2)  Il-parteċipazzjoni tal-Albanija, il-Bosnja-Ħerzegovina u l-Montenegro f'din is-sejħa għal proposti hija soġġetta għall-firma ta' Memorandum ta' Qbil bejn il-Kummissjoni u l-awtoritajiet kompetenti ta' kull wieħed minn dawn il-pajjiżi rispettivament. Jekk sal-ewwel tax-xahar tad-deċiżjoni ta' għoti tal-għajnuna finanzjarja jkun għadu ma ġiex iffirmat il-Memorandum ta' Qbil, il-parteċipanti minn dan il-pajjiż mhux ser jiġu ffinanzjati u mhux ser jittieħdu f'kunsiderazzjoni fir-rigward tad-daqs minimu tal-konsorzji/sħubijiet.

(3)  Ara n-nota f’qiegħ il-paġna Nru 1.

(4)  Ara n-nota f’qiegħ il-paġna Nru 1.

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L-Uffiċċju Ewropew għas-Selezzjoni tal-Persunal (EPSO)

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AVVIŻ TA' KOMPETIZZJONIJIET ĠENERALI

2013/C 118/08

L-Uffiċċju Ewropew għas-Selezzjoni tal-Personal (EPSO) qed jorganizza dawn il-kompetizzjonijiet ġenerali:

| — | EPSO/AD/252/13 (AD 9) u EPSO/AD/253/13 (AD 12) – Kapijiet tal-Unità ta' ċittadinanza (HR) |
| --- | --- |

—

EPSO/AD/252/13 (AD 9) u EPSO/AD/253/13 (AD 12) – Kapijiet tal-Unità ta' ċittadinanza (HR)

fl-oqsma li ġejjin:

| (1) | Liġi |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Liġi

| (2) | Ekonomija |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Ekonomija

| (3) | Amministrazzjoni Pubblika Ewropea |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Amministrazzjoni Pubblika Ewropea

L-avviż tal-kompetizzjoni hu ppubblikat fit-23 lingwa fil-Ġurnal Uffiċjali C 118 A tal-25 ta' April 2013.

Għal aktar tagħrif ikkonsulta l-websajt tal-EPSO http://blogs.ec.europa.eu/eu-careers.info/

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PROĊEDURI TAL-QORTI

Qorti tal-EFTA

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Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 118/33

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SENTENZA TAL-QORTI

tal-11 ta’ Diċembru 2012

fil-Każ E-2/12

HOB-vín ehf. v The State Alcohol and Tobacco Company of Iceland (ÁTVR)

(Il-Moviment liberu tal-merkanzija – Id-Direttiva 2000/13/KE – Il-Kopertura tal-prodott – It-tikkettar tal-oġġetti tal-ikel – It-tikkettar li jiżgwida – Nuqqas ta’ notifika ta’ miżura nazzjonali lill-ESA – Ġustifikazzjoni – Responsabbiltà tal-Istat)

2013/C 118/09

Fil-Każ E-2/12 HOB-vín ehf. v il-Kumpanija Statali tal-Alkoħol u t-Tabakk tal-Islanda (ÁTVR) – TALBA lill-Qorti taħt l-Artikolu 34 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-twaqqif ta’ Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza u Qorti tal-Ġustizzja minn Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur (Qorti Distrettwali ta' Reykjavík) dwar il-kompatibiltà mal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE tar-regoli nazzjonali li taħthom monopolju tal-Istat fuq il-bejgħ bl-imnut tal-alkoħol jista' jirrifjuta, taħt ċerti kondizzjonijiet, li jaċċetta għall-bejgħ xarbiet alkoħoliċi li huma prodotti legalment u kkumerċjalizzati fi Stat ieħor taż-ŻEE, il-Qorti, magħmula minn Carl Baudenbacher, President, Per Christiansen (Imħallef-Rapporteur) u Páll Hreinsson, Imħallfin, tat sentenza fil-11 ta’ Diċembru 2012, li l-parti operattiva tagħha hija kif ġej:

| (1) | L-Artikolu 18 tad-Direttiva 2000/13/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-20 ta’ Marzu 2000 dwar l-approssimazzjoni tal-liġijiet tal-Istati Membri marbuta mat-tikkettar, il-preżentazzjoni u r-reklamar ta’ oġġetti tal-ikel jipprekludi regola bħall-Artikolu 5.10 tar-regoli dwar is-selezzjoni tal-prodott, li permezz tiegħu ÁTVR jiċħad il-bejgħ ta’ xorb alkoħoliku li huma prodotti legalment u kkummerċjalizzati fi Stat ieħor taż-ŻEE fuq il-bażi li t-tikkettar tal-prodotti fih informazzjoni mgħobbija jew mhux relatata.
  Ma huwa tal-ebda sinifikat jekk ir-regoli tal-għażla tal-prodott japplikawx b’mod ugwali għal prodotti domestiċi u barranin. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

L-Artikolu 18 tad-Direttiva 2000/13/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-20 ta’ Marzu 2000 dwar l-approssimazzjoni tal-liġijiet tal-Istati Membri marbuta mat-tikkettar, il-preżentazzjoni u r-reklamar ta’ oġġetti tal-ikel jipprekludi regola bħall-Artikolu 5.10 tar-regoli dwar is-selezzjoni tal-prodott, li permezz tiegħu ÁTVR jiċħad il-bejgħ ta’ xorb alkoħoliku li huma prodotti legalment u kkummerċjalizzati fi Stat ieħor taż-ŻEE fuq il-bażi li t-tikkettar tal-prodotti fih informazzjoni mgħobbija jew mhux relatata.

Ma huwa tal-ebda sinifikat jekk ir-regoli tal-għażla tal-prodott japplikawx b’mod ugwali għal prodotti domestiċi u barranin.

| (2) | Regola nazzjonali bħall-Artikolu 8 tar-Regolament Islandiż Nru 828/2005 dwar il-produzzjoni kummerċjali, l-importazzjoni u l-bejgħ bl-ingrossa tal-alkoħol, li tistipula li trid tiġi ddikjarata fuq pakketti ta’ xorb li fihom aktar minn 1,2 % bil-volum ta’ alkoħol, minbarra l-indikazzjoni tal-qawwa alkoħolika attwali bil-volum, li l-kontenut tagħhom huwa alkoħoliku, ma tistax tiġi kkunsidrata bħala effettiva u ma tistax titħalla timponi piżijiet fuq individwi u operaturi ekonomiċi jekk din ġiet adottata mingħajr kunsiderazzjoni għall-proċedura stabbilita fl-Artikolu 19 tad-Direttiva 2000/13/KE. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Regola nazzjonali bħall-Artikolu 8 tar-Regolament Islandiż Nru 828/2005 dwar il-produzzjoni kummerċjali, l-importazzjoni u l-bejgħ bl-ingrossa tal-alkoħol, li tistipula li trid tiġi ddikjarata fuq pakketti ta’ xorb li fihom aktar minn 1,2 % bil-volum ta’ alkoħol, minbarra l-indikazzjoni tal-qawwa alkoħolika attwali bil-volum, li l-kontenut tagħhom huwa alkoħoliku, ma tistax tiġi kkunsidrata bħala effettiva u ma tistax titħalla timponi piżijiet fuq individwi u operaturi ekonomiċi jekk din ġiet adottata mingħajr kunsiderazzjoni għall-proċedura stabbilita fl-Artikolu 19 tad-Direttiva 2000/13/KE.

| (3) | Individwi u operaturi ekonomiċi li jkunu ntlaqtu mill-applikazzjoni inkorretta tad-Direttiva 2000/13/KE jistgħu joqogħdu fuq il-moviment ħieles ta’ merkanzija biex ikunu jistgħu jrendu lill-Istat responsabbli għall-ksur tal-liġi taż-ŻEE.
  Ħsara kkawżata minn miżura nazzjonali bħal dik deskritta fl-ewwel mistoqsija tinvolvi responsabbiltà tal-Istat jekk il-qorti nazzjonali ssib li l-applikazzjoni tal-leġiżlazzjoni nazzjonali jew tar-Regolament amministrattiv jikkostitwixxu ksur serju biżżejjed tal-liġi taż-ŻEE u li jkun hemm rabta kawżali diretta bejn il-ksur tal-obbligu li jistrieħ fuq l-istat u d-danni mġarrba mill-parti li ġarrbet id-dannu.
  Ksur tal-liġi taż-ŻEE ikun serju biżżejjed meta d-dannu jirriżulta minn miżura nazzjonali bħal dik deskritta fit-tieni kwistjoni jekk il-leġiżlazzjoni nazzjonali jew ir-Regolament amministrattiv ma jistax jitqies effettiv minħabba nuqqas ta’ notifika ta’ dan skont l-Artikolu 19 tad-Direttiva 2000/13/KE. Ksur bħal dan jinvolvi r-responsabbiltà tal-Istat jekk il-qorti nazzjonali ssib rabta kawżali diretta bejn il-ksur tal-obbligu li jistrieħ fuq l-istat u d-danni mġarrba mill-parti li ġarrbet id-dannu. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Individwi u operaturi ekonomiċi li jkunu ntlaqtu mill-applikazzjoni inkorretta tad-Direttiva 2000/13/KE jistgħu joqogħdu fuq il-moviment ħieles ta’ merkanzija biex ikunu jistgħu jrendu lill-Istat responsabbli għall-ksur tal-liġi taż-ŻEE.

Ħsara kkawżata minn miżura nazzjonali bħal dik deskritta fl-ewwel mistoqsija tinvolvi responsabbiltà tal-Istat jekk il-qorti nazzjonali ssib li l-applikazzjoni tal-leġiżlazzjoni nazzjonali jew tar-Regolament amministrattiv jikkostitwixxu ksur serju biżżejjed tal-liġi taż-ŻEE u li jkun hemm rabta kawżali diretta bejn il-ksur tal-obbligu li jistrieħ fuq l-istat u d-danni mġarrba mill-parti li ġarrbet id-dannu.

Ksur tal-liġi taż-ŻEE ikun serju biżżejjed meta d-dannu jirriżulta minn miżura nazzjonali bħal dik deskritta fit-tieni kwistjoni jekk il-leġiżlazzjoni nazzjonali jew ir-Regolament amministrattiv ma jistax jitqies effettiv minħabba nuqqas ta’ notifika ta’ dan skont l-Artikolu 19 tad-Direttiva 2000/13/KE. Ksur bħal dan jinvolvi r-responsabbiltà tal-Istat jekk il-qorti nazzjonali ssib rabta kawżali diretta bejn il-ksur tal-obbligu li jistrieħ fuq l-istat u d-danni mġarrba mill-parti li ġarrbet id-dannu.

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SENTENZA TAL-QORTI

tal-21 ta’ Diċembru 2012

fil-Kawża E-14/11

Schenker North AB, Schenker Privpak AB u Schenker Privpak AS v l-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA

(Azzjoni għall-annullament ta’ deċiżjoni tal-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA – Aċċess għal Dokumenti – Ammissibilità – Miżuri ta’ Organizzazzjoni ta' Proċedura – Ftuħ mill-ġdid ta' proċedura orali)

2013/C 118/10

Fil-Kawża E-14/11, Schenker North AB, Schenker Privpak AB and Schenker Privpak AS v l-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA – APPLIKAZZJONI għall-annullament tad-deċiżjoni tal-Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza tal-EFTA fil-Każ Nru 68736 tas-16 ta’ Awwissu 2011 li tiċħad l-aċċess tal-applikanti għal ċerti dokumenti relatati mal-Każ Nru 34250 Norway Post/Privpak fuq il-bażi tar-regoli dwar l-aċċess għal dokumenti stabbiliti mill-Kulleġġ tal-awtorità ta’ sorveljanza tal-EFTA nhar is-27 ta’ Ġunju 2008, il-Qorti, magħmula minn Carl Baudenbacher, President u Imħallef-Rapporteur, Per Christiansen u Páll Hreinsson Imħallfin, tat sentenza fil-21 ta' Diċembru 2012, li l-parti operattiva tagħha hija kif ġej:

Il-Qorti b’dan:

| (1) | Tannulla d-Deċiżjoni tal-ESA tas-16 ta' Awwissu 2011“Norway Post/Privpak – Aċċess għad-dokumenti” sakemm din tiċħad l-aċċess sħiħ jew parzjali għal dokumenti ta’ spezzjoni fil-Każ Nru 34250 Norway Post/Privpak; |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Tannulla d-Deċiżjoni tal-ESA tas-16 ta' Awwissu 2011“Norway Post/Privpak – Aċċess għad-dokumenti” sakemm din tiċħad l-aċċess sħiħ jew parzjali għal dokumenti ta’ spezzjoni fil-Każ Nru 34250 Norway Post/Privpak;

| (2) | Il-kumplament tar-rikors huwa miċħud; |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Il-kumplament tar-rikors huwa miċħud;

| (3) | Tordna lill-ESA biex terfa' l-ispejjeż tagħha u l-ispejjeż imġarrba mir-rikorrent; |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Tordna lill-ESA biex terfa' l-ispejjeż tagħha u l-ispejjeż imġarrba mir-rikorrent;

| (4) | Tordna lil Posten Norge AS biex terfa’ l-ispejjeż tagħha stess. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Tordna lil Posten Norge AS biex terfa’ l-ispejjeż tagħha stess.

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Talba għal Opinjoni Konsultattiva mill-Qorti tal-EFTA magħmula minn Hæstiréttur Íslands datata s-6 ta’ Diċembru 2012 fil-kawża ta’ Jan Anfinn Wahl vs l-Istat tal-Islanda

(Il-Kawża E-15/12)

2013/C 118/11

Il-Hæstiréttur Íslands (il-Qorti Suprema tal-Iżlanda) għamlet talba lill-Qorti tal-EFTA permezz ta’ ittra tas-6 ta’ Diċembru 2012, li waslet għand ir-Reġistru tal-Qorti fis-6 ta’ Diċembru 2012, għal Opinjoni Konsultattiva fil-każ Jan Anfinn Wahl v l-Istat tal-Islanda, dwar il-mistoqsijiet li ġejjin:

| (1) | L-Istati Membri li jkunu partijiet fil-Ftehim dwar iż-Żona Ekonomika Ewropea jistgħu jagħżlu l-forma u l-metodu ta' implimentazzjoni, għar-rigward tal-Artikolu 7 tal-Ftehim, meta jkunu qed jintegraw fl-ordinament legali tagħhom id-dispożizzjonijiet tad-Direttiva 2004/38/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar id-drittijiet taċ-ċittadini tal-Unjoni u tal-membri tal-familja tagħhom biex jiċċaqilqu u jgħixu liberament fit-territorju tal-Istati Membri? |
| --- | --- |

(1)

L-Istati Membri li jkunu partijiet fil-Ftehim dwar iż-Żona Ekonomika Ewropea jistgħu jagħżlu l-forma u l-metodu ta' implimentazzjoni, għar-rigward tal-Artikolu 7 tal-Ftehim, meta jkunu qed jintegraw fl-ordinament legali tagħhom id-dispożizzjonijiet tad-Direttiva 2004/38/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar id-drittijiet taċ-ċittadini tal-Unjoni u tal-membri tal-familja tagħhom biex jiċċaqilqu u jgħixu liberament fit-territorju tal-Istati Membri?

| (2) | Il-paragrafu 1 tal-Artikolu 27 tad-Direttiva 2004/38/KE għandu jiġi interpretat bħala li jfisser li l-fatt biss, minnu nnifsu, li l-awtoritajiet kompetenti fi Stat Membru taż-ŻEE jkunu jqisu, abbażi ta’ evalwazzjoni tal-perikolu, li organizzazzjoni li tagħha jkun membru l-individwu kkonċernat, ikollha rabta mal-kriminalità organizzata u l-evalwazzjoni tkun ibbażata fuq l-idea li fejn tali organizzazzjonijiet ikunu rnexxielhom jistabbilixxu ruħhom, ġara bħala segwitu li l-kriminalità żdiedet u ġiet aktar organizzata, huwa biżżejjed biex ċittadin tal-Unjoni jitqies bħala li jikkostitwixxi theddida għall-ordni pubbliku u s-sigurtà pubblika fl-Istat ikkonċernat? |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Il-paragrafu 1 tal-Artikolu 27 tad-Direttiva 2004/38/KE għandu jiġi interpretat bħala li jfisser li l-fatt biss, minnu nnifsu, li l-awtoritajiet kompetenti fi Stat Membru taż-ŻEE jkunu jqisu, abbażi ta’ evalwazzjoni tal-perikolu, li organizzazzjoni li tagħha jkun membru l-individwu kkonċernat, ikollha rabta mal-kriminalità organizzata u l-evalwazzjoni tkun ibbażata fuq l-idea li fejn tali organizzazzjonijiet ikunu rnexxielhom jistabbilixxu ruħhom, ġara bħala segwitu li l-kriminalità żdiedet u ġiet aktar organizzata, huwa biżżejjed biex ċittadin tal-Unjoni jitqies bħala li jikkostitwixxi theddida għall-ordni pubbliku u s-sigurtà pubblika fl-Istat ikkonċernat?

| (3) | Meta titwieġeb it-tieni mistoqsija, huwa sinifikanti jekk l-Istat Membru jkunx għamel illegali l-organizzazzjoni li tagħha l-individwu kkonċernat ikun membru, u s-sħubija ta’ tali organizzazzjoni tkunx projbita fl-Istat? |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Meta titwieġeb it-tieni mistoqsija, huwa sinifikanti jekk l-Istat Membru jkunx għamel illegali l-organizzazzjoni li tagħha l-individwu kkonċernat ikun membru, u s-sħubija ta’ tali organizzazzjoni tkunx projbita fl-Istat?

| (4) | Hija raġuni biżżejjed biex jitqies li l-ordni pubbliku u s-sigurtà pubblika jkunu mhedda fis-sens tal-paragrafu 1 tal-Artikolu 27 tad-Direttiva 2004/38/KE il-fatt li Stat Membru taż-ŻEE, li jkun parti fil-Ftehim dwar iż-Żona Ekonomika Ewropea, jiddefinixxi fil-leġiżlazzjoni tiegħu bħala punibbli mġiba li tikkonsisti mill-kompliċità ma’ persuna oħra fit-twettiq ta’ att, li t-twettiq tiegħu jkun parti mill-attivitajiet ta’ organizzazzjoni kriminali, jew inkella tali leġiżlazzjoni titqies bħala prevenzjoni ġenerali fis-sens tal-paragrafu 2 tal-Artikolu 27 tad-Direttiva? Din il-mistoqsija hija bbażata fuq il-fatt li “kriminalità organizzata” fis-sens tal-liġi domestika tirreferi għal assoċjazzjoni ta’ tliet persuni jew aktar, li l-objettiv prinċipali tagħha jkun li, għal skopijiet ta’ qligħ, direttament jew indirettament, b’mod intenzjonat jitwettaq att kriminali, jew meta parti sostanzjali tal-attivitajiet involuti jkunu jinvolvu t-twettiq ta’ tali att. |
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(4)

Hija raġuni biżżejjed biex jitqies li l-ordni pubbliku u s-sigurtà pubblika jkunu mhedda fis-sens tal-paragrafu 1 tal-Artikolu 27 tad-Direttiva 2004/38/KE il-fatt li Stat Membru taż-ŻEE, li jkun parti fil-Ftehim dwar iż-Żona Ekonomika Ewropea, jiddefinixxi fil-leġiżlazzjoni tiegħu bħala punibbli mġiba li tikkonsisti mill-kompliċità ma’ persuna oħra fit-twettiq ta’ att, li t-twettiq tiegħu jkun parti mill-attivitajiet ta’ organizzazzjoni kriminali, jew inkella tali leġiżlazzjoni titqies bħala prevenzjoni ġenerali fis-sens tal-paragrafu 2 tal-Artikolu 27 tad-Direttiva? Din il-mistoqsija hija bbażata fuq il-fatt li “kriminalità organizzata” fis-sens tal-liġi domestika tirreferi għal assoċjazzjoni ta’ tliet persuni jew aktar, li l-objettiv prinċipali tagħha jkun li, għal skopijiet ta’ qligħ, direttament jew indirettament, b’mod intenzjonat jitwettaq att kriminali, jew meta parti sostanzjali tal-attivitajiet involuti jkunu jinvolvu t-twettiq ta’ tali att.

| (5) | Il-paragrafu 2 tal-Artikolu 27 tad-Direttiva 2004/38/KE għandu jinftiehem bħala li jfisser li premessa għall-applikazzjoni ta’ miżuri skont il-paragrafu 1 tal-Artikolu 27 tad-Direttiva kontra individwu speċifiku tkun li l-Istat Membru jrid jiċċita probabbiltà li l-individwu kkonċernat jkollu l-intenzjoni li jwettaq attivitajiet li jinkludu ċerta azzjoni jew azzjonijiet, jew li joqgħod lura milli jwettaq ċerta azzjoni jew azzjonijiet, sabiex l-imġiba tal-individwu titqies bħala li tirrappreżenta theddida ġenwina, preżenti u biżżejjed serja li taffettwa wieħed mill-interessi fundamentali tas-soċjetà? |
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(5)

Il-paragrafu 2 tal-Artikolu 27 tad-Direttiva 2004/38/KE għandu jinftiehem bħala li jfisser li premessa għall-applikazzjoni ta’ miżuri skont il-paragrafu 1 tal-Artikolu 27 tad-Direttiva kontra individwu speċifiku tkun li l-Istat Membru jrid jiċċita probabbiltà li l-individwu kkonċernat jkollu l-intenzjoni li jwettaq attivitajiet li jinkludu ċerta azzjoni jew azzjonijiet, jew li joqgħod lura milli jwettaq ċerta azzjoni jew azzjonijiet, sabiex l-imġiba tal-individwu titqies bħala li tirrappreżenta theddida ġenwina, preżenti u biżżejjed serja li taffettwa wieħed mill-interessi fundamentali tas-soċjetà?

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PROĊEDURI DWAR L-IMPLIMENTAZZJONI TAL-POLITIKA TAL-KOMPETIZZJONI

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

| 25.4.2013 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 118/37 |
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25.4.2013

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 118/37

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Notifika minn qabel ta' konċentrazzjoni

(Każ COMP/M.6919 – KKR/Bregal Fund/Avenia/Cognita)

Każ li jista' jiġi kkunsidrat għal proċedura simplifikata

(Test b’relevanza għaż-ŻEE)

2013/C 118/12

| 1. | Fis-16 ta’ April 2013, il-Kummissjoni rċeviet notifika ta' konċentrazzjoni proposta skont l-Artikolu 4 tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004 (1) li permezz tagħha l-impriża KKR & Co. LP (“KKR”, l-Istati Uniti) u Bregal Fund III LP (“Bregal Fund III”, Jersey), ikkontrollata ultimament minn Avenia AG (l-Isvizzera), takkwista l-kontroll konġunt ta' Cognita Holdings Limited (“Cognita”, ir-Renju Unit) fi ħdan it-tifsira tal-Artikolu 3(1) (b) tar-Regolament dwar l-Għaqdiet permezz tax-xiri ta' ishma. |
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1.

Fis-16 ta’ April 2013, il-Kummissjoni rċeviet notifika ta' konċentrazzjoni proposta skont l-Artikolu 4 tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004 (1) li permezz tagħha l-impriża KKR & Co. LP (“KKR”, l-Istati Uniti) u Bregal Fund III LP (“Bregal Fund III”, Jersey), ikkontrollata ultimament minn Avenia AG (l-Isvizzera), takkwista l-kontroll konġunt ta' Cognita Holdings Limited (“Cognita”, ir-Renju Unit) fi ħdan it-tifsira tal-Artikolu 3(1) (b) tar-Regolament dwar l-Għaqdiet permezz tax-xiri ta' ishma.

| 2. | L-attivitajiet kummerċjali tal-impriżi kkonċernati huma:






  — | għal KKR: il-fornitura ta’ firxa wiesgħa ta' servizzi alternattivi ta' ġestjoni ta' assi lill-investituri tas-suq pubbliku u privat u tipprovdi soluzzjonijiet għas-swieq ta' kapital għall-impriza, il-kumpaniji ta' portafoll u l-klijenti tagħha, |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

L-attivitajiet kummerċjali tal-impriżi kkonċernati huma:

—

għal KKR: il-fornitura ta’ firxa wiesgħa ta' servizzi alternattivi ta' ġestjoni ta' assi lill-investituri tas-suq pubbliku u privat u tipprovdi soluzzjonijiet għas-swieq ta' kapital għall-impriza, il-kumpaniji ta' portafoll u l-klijenti tagħha,

| — | għal Avenia: kumpanija azzjonarja ta' grupp ta' impriżi li joperaw f'setturi differenti (bejgħ bl-imnut, proprjeta' immobbli, servizzi tal-edukazzjoni, enerġiji rinnovabbli u assigurazzjoni) u ta' fondi ta' ekwità privata, |
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—

għal Avenia: kumpanija azzjonarja ta' grupp ta' impriżi li joperaw f'setturi differenti (bejgħ bl-imnut, proprjeta' immobbli, servizzi tal-edukazzjoni, enerġiji rinnovabbli u assigurazzjoni) u ta' fondi ta' ekwità privata,

| — | għal Bregal Fund III: impriża ta' ekwità privata, |
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—

għal Bregal Fund III: impriża ta' ekwità privata,

| — | għal Cognita: operatur globali ta' skejjel privati K-12 (kors ta' 12-il sena li jibda' mill- Kindergarten). |
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—

għal Cognita: operatur globali ta' skejjel privati K-12 (kors ta' 12-il sena li jibda' mill- Kindergarten).

| 3. | Wara eżami preliminari, il-Kummissjoni ssib li l-operazzjoni nnotifikata tista' taqa' fl-ambitu tar-Regolament tal-KE dwar l-Għaqdiet. Madankollu, id-deċiżjoni finali dwar dan il-punt hija riżervata. Skont l-Avviż tal-Kummissjoni dwar proċedura simplifikata għat-trattament ta' ċerti konċentrazzjonijiet taħt ir-Regolament tal-KE dwar l-Għaqdiet (2) ta' min jinnota li dan il-każ jista' jiġi kkunsidrat għat-trattament taħt il-proċedura stipulata fl-Avviż. |
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3.

Wara eżami preliminari, il-Kummissjoni ssib li l-operazzjoni nnotifikata tista' taqa' fl-ambitu tar-Regolament tal-KE dwar l-Għaqdiet. Madankollu, id-deċiżjoni finali dwar dan il-punt hija riżervata. Skont l-Avviż tal-Kummissjoni dwar proċedura simplifikata għat-trattament ta' ċerti konċentrazzjonijiet taħt ir-Regolament tal-KE dwar l-Għaqdiet (2) ta' min jinnota li dan il-każ jista' jiġi kkunsidrat għat-trattament taħt il-proċedura stipulata fl-Avviż.

| 4. | Il-Kummissjoni tistieden lill-partijiet terzi interessati biex iressqu kwalunkwe kummenti li jistgħu jkollhom dwar it-tranżizzjoni proposta.
  Il-kummenti jridu jaslu għand il-Kummissjoni mhux aktar tard minn għaxart ijiem wara d-data ta' din il-pubblikazzjoni. Il-kummenti jistgħu jintbagħtu lill-Kummissjoni bil-feks (+32 22964301), jew b'emejl lil COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu jew bil-posta, taħt in-numru ta' referenza COMP/M.6919 – KKR/Bregal Fund/Avenia/Cognita, fl-indirizz li ġej:





  Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea |
| --- | --- |
| Direttorat Ġenerali għall-Kompetizzjoni |
| Reġistru tal-Amalgamazzjonijiet |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

Il-Kummissjoni tistieden lill-partijiet terzi interessati biex iressqu kwalunkwe kummenti li jistgħu jkollhom dwar it-tranżizzjoni proposta.

Il-kummenti jridu jaslu għand il-Kummissjoni mhux aktar tard minn għaxart ijiem wara d-data ta' din il-pubblikazzjoni. Il-kummenti jistgħu jintbagħtu lill-Kummissjoni bil-feks (+32 22964301), jew b'emejl lil COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu jew bil-posta, taħt in-numru ta' referenza COMP/M.6919 – KKR/Bregal Fund/Avenia/Cognita, fl-indirizz li ġej:

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

Direttorat Ġenerali għall-Kompetizzjoni

Reġistru tal-Amalgamazzjonijiet

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

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(1)  ĠU L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (ir-“Regolament tal-KE dwar l-Għaqdiet”).

(2)  ĠU C 56, 5.3.2005, p. 32 (“Avviż ta’ proċedura simplifikata”).

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