IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-40838

Summary Calendar

FRANKLIN GLOBAL RESOURCES, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

INDUSTRIAL BANK OF KOREA, 

 Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:13-CV-4

Before CLEMENT, COSTA, and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appellant Franklin Global Resources contracted with Shinjeong Steel & 

Trading Co., to sell 3,000 metric tons of scrap metal for $1,185,000. This 

contract depended upon securing credit from Appellee Industrial Bank of 

Korea (IBK) to fund the purchase. Franklin and Shinjeong approached IBK 

and procured a documentary letter of credit (LC), which memorialized IBK’s 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 23, 2018

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 17-40838

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obligation to provide the funds after certain conditions were satisfied, 

including presentment of documents such as the commercial invoice, the bill of 

lading, and the insurance policy certificate. 

Shortly thereafter, Shinjeong and Franklin entered an amendment to 

their sales contract stating: 

The Seller has requested that the Buyer instruct their bank to 

issue a Cancelation/Termination of the existing Documentary 

Letter of Credit No: M0493208NS00185 immediately and upon 

notification of the SWIFT Cancellation/Termination the Seller 

[Franklin] will issue new bank coordinates within 72 hours or less 

for the DLC to be re-issued to.

In accordance with this language, IBK cancelled the LC. IBK did not, however, 

issue a new LC, and it never provided the $1,185,000. Franklin did not present

the documents under the original LC, and the 3,000 metric tons of steel were 

never shipped. 

Franklin sent a letter to IBK stating: “[P]lease accept this letter as 

presentment under the existing Letter of Credit, and if such was cancelled, 

then under the re-issued Letter of Credit. If the Letter of Credit is not reissued this letter constitutes a demand to make presentment pursuant to the 

Application of Shinjeong for the Letter of Credit anticipated in the underlying 

contract for transaction between Franklin and Shinjeong. . . . If IBK is 

anticipating not issuing the Letter of Credit pursuant to the applications and 

instructions of Shinjeong, then Franklin is hereby requesting deposit of 

$1,185,000.00 into my Trust Account, by wire transfer.” IBK did not respond 

to this letter.

Franklin brought suit against IBK,1 and asserted claims of tortious 

interference with prospective contract; breach of contract and tortious 

 

1 Franklin also sued other entities not party to this appeal. 

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interference with contract; conspiracy to interfere with contract; and wrongful 

dishonor of contract. The district court granted summary judgment to IBK, 

concluding that—among other things—there was no material issue of fact 

regarding whether the parties canceled the original LC or whether Franklin

failed to adequately present the requisite documents under the original LC to 

receive the funds. On appeal, in its original brief, Franklin challenged only the 

district court’s findings as to these two issues.2

“This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the 

same standard as the district court.” Romero v. City of Grapevine, 17-10083, 

2018 WL 1885545, at *3 (5th Cir. Apr. 20, 2018). We find no error in either of 

the district court’s findings at issue on appeal. Although Franklin’s letter to 

IBK purported to be a presentation, it did not include or even reference any of 

the documents required by the LC. Franklin cites a district court opinion that 

relies on the Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credit (UCP or 

UCP 600)3 for the proposition that the issuer of a letter of credit must give 

notice of its decision to refuse letters of presentment and state any 

discrepancies with the presentment and the LC. Agri Exp. Coop. v. Universal 

Sav. Ass’n, 767 F. Supp. 824, 828 (S.D. Tex. 1991). But here Franklin never 

presented any of the required documents. See UCP 600 art. 2. The UCP places 

no obligation on IBK to explain discrepancies or its decision to refuse the 

purported letter of presentment under these circumstances. 

Franklin sought to introduce parol evidence that Franklin argues shows

that the parties did not intend to cancel the LC. The court may not consider 

parol evidence when the agreement is unambiguous. See Bailey v. Kliebert 

 

2 In its reply brief, Franklin further raised other issues the district court rejected 

below when granting summary judgment for IBK. “This Court will not consider a claim raised 

for the first time in a reply brief.” Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993). We do 

not address these issues. 

3 The parties’ application for the LC states it is subject to the UCP.

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Dev., LLC, No. 14-15-00984-CV, 2017 WL 924484, at *6 (Tex. App. Mar. 7, 

2017) (“When a contract is unambiguous, we must enforce it as written without 

considering parol evidence. . . .”). The district court correctly concluded that 

the language of the amendment canceling the LC is unambiguous. And once 

the bank cancelled the LC, it had no duty to subsequently issue a new LC. See 

UCP 600 art. 10. 

Granting summary judgment for IBK was appropriate. We AFFIRM the 

district court. 

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