OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

CHALLENGES IN OBTAINING RELIABLE

AND USEFUL DATA ON IRAQI

SECURITY FORCES CONTINUE

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October 21, 2008

Challenges in Obtaining Reliable and Useful Data 

on Iraqi Security Forces Continue

What SIGIR Found

The data on ISF assigned and trained continue to contain inaccuracies, and 

comparability among reports is difficult because of changing metrics and 

definitions. Inaccuracies in the data persist because Iraq’s payroll systems 

contain improper documentation and reporting of personnel actions by Iraqi 

officials and unauthorized employees. They also contain inconsistent 

information as a result of corrupt and irregular practices. In addition, the 

usefulness of data on Iraqi police assigned and trained continues to be limited 

because not all police assigned to the force have been trained. Furthermore, 

not all those trained—both police and military—are available for duty: some 

of those reported as assigned have completed their obligations, some are on 

leave or absent without leave, and others have been injured, or killed. Because 

reporting metrics and definitions have changed, meaningful trend analysis 

remains difficult.

U.S. and Iraqi-funded efforts are continuing to automate human resource and 

payroll systems and improve the ability of the MoD and MoI to better manage 

their personnel. Although the systems offer some capabilities, they are still 

incomplete and not fully implemented. According to DoD officials, problems 

with data entry, staff training and proficiency, and supporting infrastructure 

are hindering full implementation of the MoD’s Human Resource Information 

Management System (HRIMS) and the MoI’s e-Ministry system. In addition, 

poor requirements definition and unsatisfactory contractor performance have 

delayed development of the HRIMS system, which cost approximately $21.2 

million in U.S.-appropriated monies from the Iraq Security Forces Fund. The 

Government of Iraq is funding the MoI’s e-Ministry system at an estimated 

cost of $27.8 million.

Lesson Learned 

While this report does not provide any recommendations, it does identify 

another in a continuing series of lessons learned from SIGIR’s work 

examining reconstruction contracting in Iraq. Neither the Joint Contracting 

Command-Iraq/Afghanistan nor the Multi-National Security Transition 

Command-Iraq included specific or measurable deliverables in the statement 

of work for the HRIMS contract. As a result, even though officials were not 

satisfied with the contractor’s performance, they could not terminate the 

contract for cause because they could not cite the contractor for a failure to 

meet contract requirements. If the U.S. government is to hold contractors 

responsible for poor performance, it must clearly specify in the contract what 

it expects in ―deliverables‖ and contract performance.

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

For more information, contact SIGIR Public Affairs 

at (703) 428-1100 or PublicAffairs@sigir.mil

Summary of Report: SIGIR-09-002

Why SIGIR Did This Study

Under Section 9204 of the Supplemental 

Appropriations Act of 2008, Public Law 110-

252, the Secretary of Defense is required to 

submit a quarterly report to the Congress 

presenting a comprehensive set of 

performance indicators and measures of 

progress toward military and political stability 

in Iraq. Two indicators in the Department of 

Defense’s (DoD) reporting are the number of

Iraq Security Forces (ISF) assigned and the 

number trained. The number of ISF assigned 

is derived from payroll data from the Ministry 

of Defense (MoD) and the Ministry of Interior 

(MoI). The number of personnel trained 

represents those who complete specific basiclevel training, as reported by Coalition 

training teams.

This is a follow-up to a report SIGIR issued in 

April 2008 (SIGIR-08-015) that identified 

limitations in the reported data on Iraqi 

security forces. The objectives for this current 

report include updating and expanding on 

prior data to include (1) assessing the process 

for compiling data on ISF assigned and 

trained, including the accuracy and usefulness 

of data subsequently used for U.S. reporting, 

and its comparability over reporting periods; 

(2) the status of and challenges to improving 

data accuracy and reliability by developing 

automated human resource and payroll 

systems to be used by the MoD and MoI.

What SIGIR Recommends

This report does not contain 

recommendations. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the 

Multi-National Security Transition CommandIraq generally concurred with the conclusions 

and lessons learned. Others also provided 

comments which were incorporated in this 

report, as appropriate. 

Special Inspector General for IRAQ Reconstruction

SIGIR
S PE CI AL I NS PECTO R GE NE R AL FO R I RA Q RE CO NST R UC TIO N 

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202 

October 21, 2008 

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

JOINT SECRETARIAT 

OSD POLICY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 

COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND 

COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE – IRAQ 

COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL SECURITY 

TRANSITION COMMAND – IRAQ 

DIRECTOR, IRAQ TRANSITION ASSISTANCE OFFICE 

SUBJECT: Challenges in Obtaining Reliable and Useful Data on Iraqi Security Forces 

Continue (SIGIR-09-002) 

We are providing this report for your information and use. It contains a review of the data 

provided on the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in the September 2008 Department of Defense report 

Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq. This audit was conducted as Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) project 8024. It was performed under the authority of Public 

Law 108-106, as amended, which also incorporates the duties and responsibilities of inspectors 

general under the Inspector General Act of 1978. It is a follow-up to SIGIR’s April 2008 interim 

report in which SIGIR reported on the reliability and usefulness of the number of ISF personnel 

and the methodology for determining the number reported. 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the SIGIR staff. For additional information on this 

report, please contact Glenn Furbish at (703-428-1058/glenn.furbish@sigir.mil).

 Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 
Table of Contents 

Executive Summary i 

Introduction 1 

Accuracy of Iraqi Security Forces Data Remains a Challenge 4 

Automated Human Resource and Payroll Systems Remain Unfinished 11 

Lessons Learned 15

Management Comments and Audit Response 16

Appendices 

A. Scope and Methodology 17

B. Command Relationships in Establishing, Training, and Equipping 

Iraqi Security Forces 19

C. Organizations Providing Input and Review of Quarterly Reports 20

D. Acronyms 21

E. Audit Team Members 22

F. Management Comments – Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 23
i 

Challenges in Obtaining Reliable and Useful Data on 

Iraqi Security Forces Continue

SIGIR-09-002 October 21, 2008

Executive Summary 

Introduction 

Under Section 9204 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008, Public Law 110-252,

1

the 

Secretary of Defense is required to submit a quarterly report to the Congress presenting a 

comprehensive set of performance indicators and measures of progress toward military and 

political stability in Iraq. Two indicators in the Department of Defense’s (DoD) September 2008 

report, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, are the number of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) 

assigned and the number trained. The number of ISF assigned is derived from payroll data from 

the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI). The number of personnel 

trained represents those who complete specific basic-level training, as reported by Coalition 

training teams. 

In April 2008, SIGIR issued an interim report on the reliability and usefulness of the reported 

number of ISF personnel and the methodology used to determine and review those numbers.2

SIGIR concluded that although DoD was making efforts to improve the reliability of the 

information, there was a need for caution regarding its accuracy and usefulness. In addition, 

SIGIR reported that DoD made efforts to assess data reliability, but it will have less visibility 

over the data as the Government of Iraq (GOI) assumes more control over the training of its 

forces. Last, SIGIR reported on efforts to automate human resource and payroll systems to 

improve data accuracy and reliability within the MoD. This report provides additional 

information about these topics: 

the process for compiling data on ISF assigned and trained, including the accuracy and 

usefulness of data subsequently used for U.S. reporting, and its comparability over 

reporting periods 

the status of and challenges to improving data accuracy and reliability by developing 

automated human resource and payroll systems to be used by the MoD and MoI. 

 

1

 Legislation mandating the quarterly reports includes Section 9010 of P.L. 109-148, Section 9010 of P.L. 109-289, 

Section 1308 of P.L. 110-28, Section 1224 of P.L. 110-181, Section 609 of P.L. 110-161, and Section 9204 of 

P.L.110-252.

2

 Interim Analysis of Iraqi Security Forces Information Provided by the Department of Defense Report, Measuring 

Stability and Security in Iraq (SIGIR-08-015, April 25, 2008.) 

• 

• 
ii

Results 

The data on Iraqi forces assigned and trained continues to contain inaccuracies, and 

comparability among DoD’s quarterly reports is difficult because of changing metrics and 

definitions. Inaccuracies in the data persist because Iraq’s payroll systems contain improper 

documentation and reporting of personnel actions by Iraqi officials and unauthorized employees. 

They also contain inconsistent information as a result of corrupt and irregular practices. In 

addition, the usefulness of data on Iraqi police assigned and trained continues to be limited 

because not all police assigned to the force have been trained. Furthermore, not all those 

trained—both police and military—are available for duty: some of those reported as assigned 

have completed their obligation, some are on leave or are absent without leave, and others have 

been injured or killed. Because reporting metrics and definitions have changed, meaningful 

trend analysis remains difficult. 

U.S. and Iraqi-funded efforts are continuing to automate human resource and payroll systems 

and improve the ability of the MoD and MoI to better manage their personnel. Although the 

systems offer some capabilities, they are still incomplete and not fully implemented. According 

to DoD officials, problems with data entry, staff training and proficiency, and supporting 

infrastructure are hindering full implementation of the MoD’s Human Resource Information 

Management System (HRIMS) and the MoI’s e-Ministry system. In addition, poor requirements 

definition and unsatisfactory contractor performance have delayed development of the HRIMS 

system, which cost almost $21.2 million in U.S.-appropriated monies from the Iraq Security 

Forces Fund (ISFF). The GOI is funding MoI’s e-Ministry system at an estimated cost of $27.8 

million. However, resistance to accountability and identification of individuals may affect 

accurate data entry and reduce e-Ministry’s ability to provide reliable information when 

completed. 

Lessons Learned 

Neither the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan nor the Multi-National Security 

Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) included specific or measurable deliverables in the 

statement of work of the HRIMS contract. As a result, even though officials were not satisfied 

with the contractor’s performance, they could not terminate the contract for cause because they 

could not cite the contractor for a failure to meet contract requirements. If the U.S. government 

is to hold contractors responsible for poor performance, it must clearly specify in the contract 

what it expects in ―deliverables‖ and contract performance. 

Management Comments and Audit Response 

MNSTC-I generally concurred with the report’s conclusions and lessons learned. MNSTC-I also 

provided specific comments on statements made in this report, which SIGIR incorporated, as 

appropriate. MNSTC-I’s comments are in Appendix F. In addition, U.S. Central Command, the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Strategic Plans and 

Policy) provided technical comments that SIGIR addressed in the report, as appropriate. 
1

Introduction 

Background 

Since 2005, the Congress has appropriated $18.04 billion to the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF) 

for the development of Iraq’s security forces (ISF), which include the Iraqi Police Service, the 

National Police, and the Directorate of Border Enforcement under the Ministry of Interior (MoI); 

the Ground Forces (Army), the Navy, the Air Force, and Support Forces under the Ministry of 

Defense (MoD); the Special Operations Forces under the Counter-Terrorism Bureau; as well as 

headquarters personnel in these ministries. Several assessments have concluded that to counter 

internal security threats, the ISF requirements—military, police, and special operations forces—

should increase up to between 601,000 and 646,000 personnel by 2010. As of August 15, 2008, 

the authorized force structure is 622,119 personnel, with 591,695 assigned to the force. 

National Security Presidential Directive No. 36, ―United States Government Operations in Iraq,‖

assigned responsibility for organizing, equipping, and training Iraqi security forces to the 

Commanding General, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). CENTCOM’s subordinate 

command, the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), leads this effort. The MNF-I’s major 

subordinate commands–the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) and 

the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) – play integral roles in the development and training of 

the ISF. MNSTC-I assists the Iraqi government in developing, organizing, training, equipping, 

and sustaining the ISF. MNC-I is responsible for tactical command and control of MNF-I 

operations and works with Iraq’s military at the division, brigade, and battalion levels, as well as 

with police forces at the provincial, district, and station levels. Appendix B shows the U.S. 

command relationships related to the ISF. 

In 2005, the Congress emphasized the need for a more comprehensive set of performance 

indicators and measures of stability and security in Iraq, and directed the Secretary of Defense to 

submit quarterly reports.3

 These reports, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, focus on 

Iraq’s progress toward political, economic, and military stability. Along with other indicators of 

ISF development–the number of assigned and trained forces–are shown in Section 2 of the 

report, Iraqi Security Forces Training and Performance. The 13th quarterly progress report, 

issued in September 2008, included information on the number of ISF assigned and trained, by 

ministry and component, as shown in table 1. SIGIR discusses these numbers in greater detail in 

this report. 

 

3 Legislation mandating the quarterly reports includes Section 9010 of P.L. 109-148, Section 9010 of P.L. 109-289, 

Section 1308 of P.L. 110-28, Section 1224 of P.L. 110-181, Section 609 of P.L. 110-161, and Section 9204 of P.L. 

110-252.
2

Table 1—Assigned and Trained Iraqi Security Forces as 

of August 15, 2008

Component Assigned Trained

Ministry of Interior

Police 299,170 192,028

National Police 39,739 50,184

Border Enforcement 43,073 34,370

Subtotal 381,982 276,582

Ministry of Defense

Army 180,296 224,970

Support Forces 22,069 21,144

Air Force 1,887 2,246

Navy 1,872 1,494

Subtotal 206,124 249,854

Counterterrorism Bureau

Special Operations 3,589 4,564

Total 591,695 531,000

Source: Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, September 2008. 

Process of Developing DoD’s Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq

Reports 

DoD’s process for developing its quarterly report Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq 

involves reviews by many entities inside and outside DoD. The process begins with the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense’s (OSD) request for information from MNF-I. MNF-I asks its subcommands, MNSTC-I and MNC-I, for ISF data. MNSTC-I reports on the number of ISF 

personnel assigned and trained for both Iraq’s ministries of Defense and Interior, and MNC-I 

provides input such as the operational readiness of the ISF. To obtain personnel data on the ISF, 

MNSTC-I relies primarily on the Iraqi government with assistance from the U.S. advisory and 

training teams, which work directly with Iraqi personnel in both the MoD and MoI. Recognizing 

potential limitations, DoD officials noted that this is the best available ISF data. Once the 

information on the ISF assigned and trained is updated and incorporated into Section 2 of the 

draft Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, the report is sent through the chain of command, 

where it undergoes numerous revisions and drafts, with input and review from various 

government organizations, before being submitted to the Secretary of Defense for final review 

and eventual delivery to Congress. Organizations providing input and/or review are listed in 

Appendix C. 
3

Objectives 

SIGIR issued an interim report in April 2008 including its assessment of the reliability and 

usefulness of the number of ISF authorized, assigned, and trained, as reflected in DoD’s reports, 

Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq and the methodology for determining and reviewing 

those numbers.4 In addition, SIGIR also reported on efforts to automate human resource and 

payroll systems to improve data accuracy and reliability within the MoD. This report 

supplements that prior interim report by providing additional information about these topics: 

the process for compiling data on ISF assigned and trained, including the accuracy and 

usefulness of data subsequently used for U.S. reporting, and its comparability over 

reporting periods 

the status of and challenges to improving data accuracy and reliability by developing 

automated human resource and payroll systems to be used by the MoD and MoI. 

For a discussion of the audit scope and methodology, see Appendix A. For a description of the 

command relationships in establishing, training, and equipping the ISF, see appendix B. For a 

list of organizations providing input and review of the Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq

quarterly reports, see Appendix C. For definitions of acronyms used, see Appendix D. For a list 

of the audit team members, see Appendix E. For MNSTC-I’s management comments from, see 

Appendix F. 

 

4

 Interim Analysis of Iraqi Security Forces Information Provided by the Department of Defense Report, Measuring 

Stability and Security in Iraq (SIGIR-08-015, April 25, 2008.) 

• 

• 
4

Accuracy of Iraqi Security Forces Data Remains a 

Challenge 

As we previously reported, the data on the number of ISF assigned and trained contain 

limitations, and comparability among reports is difficult because of changing metrics and 

definitions. Our current report shows that the ―assigned‖ data continue to contain inaccuracies 

because of improper documentation and reporting of personnel actions by Iraqi officials, 

unauthorized employees, and corrupt and irregular practices that affect the accuracy and 

consistency of MoD and MoI payroll data. These factors can result in overpayments, duplicate 

payments, ―ghost soldiers,‖ and non-payments. MNSTC-I officials explained that these factors 

can be attributed to the MoI and MoD personnel learning new processes for assigning and 

distributing personnel. In addition, data on ISF police assigned and trained continues to offer 

limited usefulness because not all police assigned to the force have been trained. Furthermore, 

not all those trained—both police and military—are available for duty: some have completed 

their obligations, some are on leave or absent without leave, while others have been injured, or 

killed. Because reporting metrics and definitions have changed over time, meaningful trend 

analysis also remains difficult. Table 2 summarizes the sources of ISF data from which 

MNSTC-I officials obtain information to include in the Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq

reports. 
5

Table 2—Sources of ISF Personnel Statistics 

Component Assigned Trained

Ministry of Interior Forces

Police

National Police

Border Enforcement

Payroll data from MoI Human 

Resources

Civilian Police Assistance 

Training Team 

Ministry of Defense Forces

Army

Support Forces

Air Force

Navy

Payroll data from MoD Director 

General Program & Budget; the 

Iraqi Joint Headquarters 

Personnel Directorate 

consolidates this data for 

MNSTC-I

Coalition Army Advisory Training 

Team; Coalition Air Force 

Training Team; Maritime 

Strategic Training Team

Counterterrorism Bureau Forces

Special Operations Iraqi National Counterterrorism 

Force Transition Team 

Iraqi National Counterterrorism 

Force Transition Team

Source: MNSTC-I.

Improper Documentation and Reporting of Personnel Actions 

Affect Data Accuracy 

One cause of report inaccuracies, according to a MoD payroll manual, is missing and 

questionable supporting documents related to assignments, commencements, and transfer orders, 

as well as uncertainties about the accuracy of some data reported. When a new recruit is sent to 

basic training, his background information is reportedly vetted by the MoD Director General 

Personnel. An assignment order is then created that provides information on his reporting unit 

and service capacity. If the background check is approved, the recruit is assigned an 8-digit pay 

number (or employee number) for his term of service. Once he arrives at his assigned unit, a 

commencement order is sent to the MoD Joint Headquarters and Payroll section where his 

information is entered into the payroll system. If the battalion commander transfers the service 

member to another unit, transfer orders must also be reported in order to track the service 

member and ensure that his pay gets to his location. 

Late submission of documentation affects a service member’s pay and also causes the MoD 

payroll and personnel databases to include and report inaccurate data due to the pay lag that

gives a false sense of personnel manpower for that month. For example, according to data 

provided by MNSTC-I officials, the Iraqi Army’s 7th Division had 11,478 personnel on the 

payroll roster for the week ending on August 15, 2008. However, only 7,556 personnel, or 66 

percent of those, were present for duty. The 3,922 personnel not present were absent for various 

reasons, such as being on leave, in training, absent without leave, injured, or killed. DoD’s 

September 2008 quarterly report also shows that the present for duty rate for 14 Iraqi Army 
6

Divisions range from 55 percent to 130 percent.5 The bottom range is slightly lower since we 

issued our interim report (focusing on data presented in DoD’s March 2008 quarterly report), 

which shows that the present for duty rate ranged from 68 percent to 125 percent. 

Table 3 shows that a number of Iraqi Army personnel on the payroll were not available for duty 

from January through August 2008. According to MNSTC-I officials, one reason for the 

discrepancy between those assigned and present for duty is that the MoD Director General 

Programs and Budget reports on the number of personnel assigned and on the payroll, while the 

Joint Headquarters Personnel Directorate reports on those present for duty. In addition, the 

Prime Minister’s recent directive to fill the Army divisions to 105 percent of authorization in 

order to maintain combat power also account for the discrepancy as MoD leave policy allows for 

21 days on and 7 days off. Until the data is reconciled, the number of personnel assigned may be 

either overstated or underreported because it does not reflect conditions on the ground. 

In commenting on a draft of the report, CENTCOM officials noted that approximately 54,000 

Sons of Iraq (SoI) were merged into the Government of Iraq (GOI) and directed to report to Iraqi 

Army units on October 1, 2008. According to CENTCOM accounting for the SoI transfer to 

permanent billets within the MoD, MoI, other ministries and civilian agencies, may compound 

current problems with personnel accounting. 

 

5

 In DoD’s September 2008 quarterly report, the present for duty for the 17th division is reported at 0 percent 

because its personnel are currently accounted for in the 6th division. 
7

Table 3—Iraqi Army Personnel Assigned and Present for Duty 

from January through August 2008

Month Assigned Present For Duty Difference

January 160,248 114,009 46,239

February 160,020 114,522 45,498

March 165,437 118,620 46,817

April 172,235 127,364 44,871

May 169,392 127,478 41,914

June 174,268 125,243 49,025

July 180,296 131,575 48,721

August 183,756 134,448 49,308

Source: MNSTC-I.

Note: Iraqi Army personnel represent all divisions and headquarters. 

Corrupt and Irregular Practices May Affect Data Reliability 

DoD’s June 2008 quarterly report states that eliminating corruption in the MoD is progressing 

slowly as Coalition forces continue to assist the Iraqis in building an effective military justice 

reporting and management system. It also states that the MoD and Joint Headquarters Inspector 

General is maturing and has trained military inspectors from all branches of the ISF, who are 

now present in most Iraqi divisions. While these are positive steps, the MoD payroll manual lists 

fraud at the unit level as a common payroll issue that can affect data reliability. MNSTC-I 

officials noted that although fraud has decreased in recent months, some units still report an 

inaccurate status of their soldiers. By neglecting to report the status of those who have been 

killed or have left the force, Iraqi officials are able to partially or wholly retain monthly stipends 

of these ―ghost soldiers.‖ As we previously reported in April, this practice can occur in order to 

provide medical care and financial compensation to the families of those wounded or killed. 

MNSTC-I officials also noted that the cash payment system provides opportunities for potential 

corrupt practices, as salaries are delivered monthly in convoys from Baghdad to the units.6 

Officials explained that ISF personnel prefer cash payments because they do not want to risk 

having personal data compromised by banks. 

Reducing corruption and improving professionalism in the MoI also remains a challenge, despite 

the fact that the MoI Directorate of Internal Affairs closed 2,523 cases in the first quarter of 

2008, terminated 377 employees, and disciplined 297 others. In December 2007, the MoI began 

an effort to clear the rolls of ghost employees and to pick up personnel who were on contract, but 

not officially hired. The Ministry distributed a personnel accountability reconciliation form and 

asked each subordinate element to return the form for each individual, along with copies of the 

individual’s hiring orders and the payroll roster. The MoI's effort to reconcile police payrolls 

resulted in the removal of 2,500 ghost employees from rosters in December 2007. MoI officials 

 

6

 At the end of each month, unit pay committees travel to Baghdad to obtain and cash the salary checks for the unit. 

Payday commences on the 23th of each month, when service members pick up and sign for their monthly salaries at 

their units. 
8

hope that the e-Ministry automated personnel and payroll system (see below) will further 

decrease corruption. 

Unauthorized Hires Affect Reported Data 

Under the MoD, some Iraqi Army commanders recruit members outside the authorized 

recruitment process, according to both MNC-I officials and the MoD payroll manual. These 

unauthorized recruits, or ―street hires,‖ do not have orders, nor do they undergo MoD’s 

mandatory background checks. They do not attend basic training and do not receive their initial 

issue of organizational clothing and individual equipment. Until the MoD receives back-dated 

assignment orders from the Divisions, these individuals are not captured in the MoD personnel 

and payroll database and are not paid. They could serve for weeks or even months before the 

MoD recognizes and validates their legitimacy. As a result, the number of Iraq’s defense forces 

reported by the MoD and MNSTC-I may be lower than the actual number of personnel serving 

on the force. 

Under the MoI, the number of assigned police personnel is higher than authorized for some Iraqi 

provinces. For example, Al Anbar province is authorized 28,000 police, yet the data show 

29,552 as assigned or on the payroll rosters as July 2008 (see table 4). The provinces of Babil, 

Dhi Qar, and Najaf also report higher numbers of police on the payroll than are authorized. 

According to MNSTC-I officials, the Provincial Directors of Police (formerly known as 

provincial chiefs of police) often hire more personnel than the MoI has authorized because they 

are more beholden to the Governor and local pressures than to MoI officials. Consequently, the 

Provincial Directors of Police hire additional personnel based on perceived needs of the 

province, rather than the MoI hiring authorizations. 

Because of the rapid expansion of the police force, the MoI recently increased its authorization 

level for some provinces to better reflect the additional personnel needs. Specifically, as table 4 

shows, the MoI added 45,323 police personnel to its authorization level from February to July 

2008. In addition, eight of the 18 provinces had higher personnel on the payroll than authorized 

in February. By July, the authorization level increased for some of the provinces, but four 

provinces still show assigned personnel above the authorized level. 
9

Table 4—MoI Police Authorized and Assigned

February 2008 July 2008

Province

Number 

Authorized

Number 

Assigned

Percent

Assigned*

Number 

Authorized

Number 

Assigned

Percent 

Assigned*

Al Anbar 24,000 24,376 102% 28,000 29,552 106%

Babil 11,836 10,609 90% 9,702 9,770 101%

Baghdad 39,393 34,205 87% 42,800 42,488 99%

Bashrah 16,654 15,679 94% 16,654 14,885 89%

Dahuk 2,833 3,369 119% 4,000a3,437 86%

Dhi Qar 12,383 16,841 135% 16,086 16,448 102%

Diyala 19,361 17,128 88% 21,000 18,136 86%

Irbil 4,344 15,977 368% 16,000a12,488 78%

Karbala 13,000 11,041 85% 20,000 12,934 65%

Maysan 10,542 12,721 121% 13,500 11,453 85%

Muthanna 6,838 7,890 115% 9,838 9,652 98%

Najaf 14,048 13,973 99% 14,048 14,997 107%

Ninawah 24,387 19,120 71% 27,500 25,384 92%

Qadishiyah 8,854 11,117 126% 11,854 11,156 94%

Salah al Din 15,650 15,534 99% 18,000 16,507 92%

Sulaymaniyah 25,473 17,230 68% 25,473a18,031 71%

Tamim 11,939 8,452 71% 12,500 8,602 69%

Wasit 10,315 10,560 102% 10,218 8,991 88%

Traffic Police 16,151 14,048 87% 16,151 14,259 88%

Total 288,001 279,870 97% 333,324 299,170 90%

Source: MNSTC-I.

Notes: 

a

Figures are best estimates; they are neither vetted nor tracked through the MoI. 

* Numbers are rounded to the nearest percent. 

Contributing to the rapid expansion of the police above the MoI authorized level is Coalition 

Provisional Authority Order 71, issued in April 2004, giving the chiefs of police responsibility 

for overseeing civil law enforcement activities. According to DoD’s December 2007 quarterly 

report, CPA Order 71 diluted the MoI’s control over the police by giving the provincial 

governments the power to approve the hiring and firing of provincial chiefs of police. CPA 71, 

in effect, made provincial chiefs of police subject to local pressures without regard to MoI 

funding constraints. As a result, DoD’s December 2007 report concluded that ―the process does 

not allow synchronization of required resources and growth projections; it creates confusion in 

effectively manning the force, undermines attempts to build a requirements-based force 

structure, and subsequently creates difficulties in properly training, equipping, and budgeting for 

police salaries.‖ In commenting on a draft of this report, CENTCOM officials noted that CPA 
10

71 applies only to non-Provincial Iraqi Control provinces and will become obsolete when the 

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1790 expires on December 31, 2008. 

Assigned and Trained Metrics Offer Limited Usefulness 

As we previously reported, the usefulness of ―trained‖ and ―assigned‖ metrics is limited because 

not all trained personnel are present for duty and not all assigned personnel have been trained. 

For example, MNSTC-I reported that 192,028 police had been trained as of August 15, 2008. 

This metric represents personnel who have received a MoI-approved training course and are 

accounted for at the 18 training centers.7 However, not all of those trained are available for duty, 

and some are no longer on the force because, among other things, they have completed their 

obligation, are absent without leave, are wounded or have been killed. As a result, MNSTC-I 

does not know how many of the 192,028 police reported as trained are currently on the force. 

At the same time, MNSTC-I reports 299,170 police as assigned and on the payroll as of August 

15, 2008, or 107,142 more than the 192,028 reportedly trained. A contributing factor to 

untrained personnel on the payroll is the rapid expansion of the police force in order to counter 

violence in the country. This rapid expansion outpaced and exceeded training capacity and 

resulted in a training backlog. MNSTC-I officials stated they are working with the MoI to 

expand training capacity and reduce the backlog. Until new police recruits complete MoIapproved training courses, they are not captured in MNSTC-I reported data on trained personnel, 

but they are included in the assigned data. This further distorts efforts to determine personnel 

trained and on duty, which represents a better metric of ISF capability than ―assigned‖ or 

―trained.‖

Changing Metrics and Definitions Complicate Comparability 

In our interim report, we discussed how changing metrics and definitions affect comparability of 

data over time. This report includes additional factors affecting comparability and the continuing 

difficulty in tracking changes to the ISF. Early quarterly reports focused on ISF personnel who 

received initial training and basic equipment. The ―trained and equipped‖ metric served as a key 

indicator of progress in developing the ISF. According to MNSTC-I, these early reports focused 

on training forces to meet requirements at the time, which were 137,418 for defense forces and 

188,260 for police forces. However, as a result of a deteriorating security situation and changes 

in force structure defined by the GOI, MNSTC-I increased force requirements and modified its 

reporting metrics. The data on forces ―trained and equipped‖ was replaced by ―trained‖ and 

―assigned‖ as measures of progress in developing Iraq’s security forces. The ―assigned‖ metric 

potentially provides a somewhat better measure of force structure. However, because it was not 

used in past reports, SIGIR cannot track forces ―on the payroll‖ over time. 

 

7

 MoI-sanctioned courses include the three-year police college, nine-month and six-month courses, Officer 

Candidate School and Officer Transition Integration Program for officers; Basic Recruit Training (BRT), BRT Lite, 

Department of Border Enforcement BRT, Facilities Protection Service BRT, Emergency Response Unit BRT, the 

Baghdad Provincial Directorate of Police 200-hour course, and the Transition Integration Program for shurta 

(policemen). 
11

In addition to new and/or changing metrics, MNSTC-I has also modified its definition of some 

metrics. In a 2006 memorandum, the MNSTC-I Commander stated that ISF personnel recruited, 

trained, and equipped by MNSTC-I to the authorized levels were to be included in the reporting 

process. Forces hired above those authorized and those not trained by the Coalition were to be 

excluded. According to MNSTC-I, once these authorized goals were achieved, additional 

trained forces were counted as sustainment training and not included in the quarterly reports. As 

a result, the reported Iraq security force structure during this time was understated. 

In January 2008, MNSTC-I modified the definitions of reporting categories. Increases in MoD 

personnel under the Prime Minister over-manning initiative—those above authorization—were 

to be included in the reporting process. In addition, ISF personnel ―trained‖ were to be 

considered those who had completed basic combat training (for MoD forces) or MoI-sanctioned 

initial entry training courses (for MoI forces). In the June 2008 report, MNSTC-I redefined Iraqi 

Army personnel who were hired under the Prime Minister’s over-manning initiative as 

―assigned‖ rather than ―authorized.‖ This was done to make ISF reporting consistent with 

standard military personnel accounting practices of the United States and other countries, 

according to MNSTC-I. As a result of redefinition, 29,504 Iraqi Army personnel were shifted 

from ―authorized‖ to ―assigned‖ in the March to June 2008 reports. 
12

Automated Human Resource and Payroll Systems 

Remain Unfinished 

Efforts have been under way for some time to automate the human resource and payroll systems 

to provide the MoD and the MoI with better tools to manage its personnel—one under a contract 

awarded and paid for by the United States for a system benefiting the MoD and one awarded and 

paid for by the GOI for the MoI. Although both systems now offer some capabilities, both the 

MoD’s Human Resource Information Management System (HRIMS) and the MoI’s e-Ministry 

system are still incomplete and not fully implemented. MNSTC-I officials stated that problems 

with data entry, staff training and technical proficiency, and supporting infrastructure are 

hindering full implementation of both systems. In addition, contracting officials also cite poor 

requirements definition and poor performance by Torres, Advanced Enterprise Solutions 

(Torres), the government contractor, as major factors delaying implementation of the HRIMS 

system, which costs approximately $21.2 million in U.S.-appropriated monies from the ISFF.8

 

The MoI system, procured by the GOI at an estimated cost of $27.8 million, has also experienced 

delays in implementation. In addition, resistance to accountability and identification of 

individuals may affect accurate data entry and reduce e-Ministry’s ability to provide reliable 

information when completed. 

MoD Human Resources Information Management System to 

Improve Personnel Accountability Not Yet Fully Functional 

The MoD has made progress in implementing the HRIMS system, though the system is not yet 

fully functional. In August 2006, MNSTC-I (through the Joint Contract CommandIraq/Afghanistan) contracted for one year with Torres to develop a personnel and payroll system 

database to assist the MoD in its personnel accountability functions. The entire system cost 

approximately $21.2 million in U.S.-appropriated monies from the ISFF. HRIMS combines five 

different personnel, payroll, and biometrics databases9

and is expected to serve as the primary 

system to manage MoD’s manpower accountability and pay. With the integration of these 

databases, MNSTC-I officials expect that HRIMS will increase transparency in the payroll 

process, retain flexibility to change, create reports and queries, reduce corruption, and minimize 

the number of ghost soldiers. The HRIMS network, with the type of personnel information that 

the database captures, is shown in Figure 1. 

 

8

 The cost of the HRIMS includes $11.8 million paid to Torres to date (with final invoices under review.) The cost 

also includes initial user needs assessments, Oracle software and renewal applications, hardware and other 

equipment, and additional training and maintenance support. 

9

 Storage Area Network Solution (SANS) is a biometrics personnel identification data storage for integrated use 

with HRIMS. Biometrics data collected from individuals include fingerprints, iris scan, voice print, photograph, and 

biographical data. SANS was also developed by Torres under a separate contract at a cost of $850,278. 
13

Figure 1—HRIMS Network 

Source: SIGIR analysis of Torres and MNSTC-I data. 

Although HRIMS can provide some personnel accountability functions, it is not yet fully 

functional. As of September 2008, HRIMS could perform personnel accountability functions 

such as strength accounting, manpower tracking, personnel reports, promotions, and pay data. 

However, according to MNSTC-I officials, four tasks must be completed for the system to be 

fully functional. First, the MoD must validate over 437,000 incomplete entries currently in the 

system and input all assigned personnel (the MoD currently has complete data on approximately 

135,000 assigned personnel). Second, HRIMS must be established at all planned remote sites. 

Third, MoD staff must be trained in the operation and maintenance of the system. Finally, a 

query capacity must be expanded and built to produce personnel and payroll reports. Because 

the HRIMS is under the control of the MoD Chief Information Officer (CIO), the pace at which 

these tasks are completed now depends on MoD personnel. To assist the MoD CIO, MNSTC-I 

contracted with three experts to provide system administration and user training. 

MNSTC-I officials stated that implementation of HRIMS has been difficult because of the 

system’s complexity and Torres’ unsatisfactory performance. While HRIMS is accessible 

through the Iraqi Defense Network (IDN), 31 Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSATs, or 

satellite equipment) have also been installed across Iraq allowing connectivity to HRIMS in 

areas without IDN connectivity. Other hardware and software installed include eight Dell 2900 

database servers and Oracle 11i E-Business Suite, Oracle 10g, and Linux operating systems. To 

be fully functional, the IDN infrastructure and VSAT network (and equipment) need to be 

accessible from additional sites in Iraq. In addition, end users also need to be trained to use the 

system. 
14

Both contracting officials and the MoD CIO expressed dissatisfaction with Torres, and stated 

that the company had failed to meet its contractual obligations. Contracting officials notified 

Torres in December 31, 2007, that it had failed to complete the installation and verify the 

functionality of the VSAT equipment, ensure IDN connectivity, perform on-site training, provide 

help desk support, and prepare a plan to transition the HRIMS program to the MoD. A followup letter stated that only one of 31 VSAT sites was functional as of January 2008 and asked 

Torres to submit a proposal for corrective actions. A February 2008 demonstration of the 

HRIMS’ capability also failed, but Torres stated that the MoD did not provide it with the 

required data to allow for a successful demonstration. According to contracting officials, Torres 

was required to train 460 personnel; however, only 217 were trained. 

Although contracting officials issued letters of concern to Torres, they did not terminate the 

contract for cause because the contract’s statement of work did not contain specific or 

measurable deliverables. While not satisfied with Torres’ performance, at the end of the oneyear performance period in August 2007, contracting officials extended the contract for another 

six months to accelerate the implementation and training of HRIMS and made the contract 

performance-based with specific deliverables. However, contract files show Torres’ continued 

poor management and performance. 

Because MoD personnel had not been fully trained and the system was not yet fully functional, 

the MoD CIO asked MNSTC-I to provide technical assistance for six months to assist him in 

implementing HRIMS. MNSTC-I contracted with three technical experts at a cost of almost 

$1.0 million in ISFF funds to train MoD personnel to use and maintain the HRIMS system. The 

contract was awarded to Innovative Management & Technology Approaches (IMTAS) for a sixmonth period with two renewal options at additional cost. IMTAS began work on September 1, 

2008.

MoI e-Ministry to Link Human Resource and Payroll Actions Not 

Yet Complete 

Similar to the MoD’s HRIMS, the MoI’s e-Ministry system is intended to link human resource 

and payroll actions and provide accountability for MoI personnel.10

 The MoI conceived, 

planned, and funded the automated e-Ministry system, which aims to provide organization-wide, 

high-level administrative and accountability management tools. The system is expected to 

incorporate financial, logistics, and human resources management modules that enable users to 

better manage financial processes, plan and execute transportation and distribution operations, 

and automate personnel processes from recruitment to retirement. When completed, it is 

intended to to link human resource, payroll, and training management and allow the ministry to 

better track employee hiring rolls for accuracy and pay. e-Ministry is the result of a MoI Human 

Resource committee plan to reform ministerial human resources systems. 

Implementation is planned to occur in three phases at an estimated cost of $27.8 million. In 

Phase I, the MoI purchased software licenses for MoI Headquarters personnel and entered 2,000 

records at a cost of $3.8 million. In Phase II, the MoI plans to extend the system’s capability to 

 

10 The MoI contracted with INTRACOM Jordan and Specialized Information Technology to develop and integrate 

the e-Ministry software. 
15

Iraqi police stations and purchase 88,000 additional licenses at an estimated cost of $12 million. 

Phase III plans are to extend the system to the remaining provinces at a cost of $12 million. 

Starting dates for phases II and III have not yet been determined. 

The e-Ministry project began in December 2005 and has experienced numerous delays. MoI 

officials had projected that e-Ministry would be completed by September 2008. However, this is 

unlikely given that Phase I was just recently completed. The MoI had planned for Phase I to be 

done by August 2006, but by May 2008, initial data entry had not been completed. In addition, 

several other tasks remained incomplete as of May 2008, including training (both trainers and 

end-users), module testing, and data migration. In December 2007, the MoI halted e-Ministry 

implementation until completion of off-site training in Amman, Jordan. Training was conducted 

in April 2008, and MoI officials plan to continue the e-Ministry rollout. However, Iraqi 

resistance to accountability and positive identification of individuals may result in inaccurate 

data entry. The DoD’s September 2007 quarterly report states that ―the heightened sensitivity of 

personal information in the environment of severe intimidation and threats to which MoI 

employees are subject will . . . likely hamper implementation of the system.‖
16

Lessons Learned 

Neither the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan nor the Multi-National Security 

Transition Command-Iraq included specific or measurable deliverables in the HRIMS contract’s 

statement of work. As a result, even though officials were not satisfied with the contractor’s 

performance, they could not terminate the contract for cause because they could not cite the 

contractor for a failure to meet contract requirements. If the U.S. government is to hold 

contractors responsible for poor performance, it must clearly specify in the contract what it 

expects in ―deliverables‖ and contract performance. 

Management Comments and Audit Response 

MNSTC-I generally concurred with the report’s conclusions and lessons learned. MNSTC-I also 

provided specific comments on statements made in this report, which SIGIR incorporated, as 

appropriate. MNSTC-I’s concurrence letter is presented in Appendix F. In addition, 

CENTCOM, OSD (Policy), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Strategic Plans and Policy) also 

provided technical comments that SIGIR addressed in the report, as appropriate. 
17

Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 

This assignment was conducted as SIGIR project 8024, and supplements SIGIR’s interim report 

on the subject in April 2008. The objectives of this report are to provide additional information 

on (1) the process for compiling data on ISF assigned and trained, including the accuracy and 

usefulness of data subsequently used for U.S. reporting, and its comparability over reporting 

periods, and (2) the status of and challenges to improving data accuracy and reliability by 

developing automated human resource and payroll systems to be used by the MoD and MoI. 

To provide additional information on the process used to compile the numbers of ISF reported as 

assigned and trained, we interviewed officials at MNSTC-I and MNC-I in Baghdad, Iraq, and 

obtained information on personnel and payroll data to determine the soundness of the reporting 

data. We also reviewed and analyzed DoD’s September 2008 Measuring Stability and Security 

in Iraq report and compared it with previous reports. To obtain information on the status of and 

challenges to developing automated personnel and payroll systems to improve data reliability, 

we interviewed officials at MNSTC-I as well as the Chief Information Officer at Iraq’s Ministry 

of Defense on the development and implementation of the HRIMS. We supplemented our audit 

by reviewing prior reports by SIGIR, the Government Accountability Office, the Independent 

Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq (the Jones Report), and others. We also obtained 

information and held discussions with officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy). 

This audit was performed under the authority of Public Law 108-106, as amended, which also 

incorporates the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act 

of 1978. We performed our work in Arlington, Virginia, and Baghdad, Iraq. We conducted this 

audit from May through October 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our results based on our audit 

objectives. Based on those objectives, we believe that the evidence obtained provides a 

reasonable basis for our results. 

Use of Computer-Processed Data 

We did not rely on data from computer-based systems to conduct our audit. Rather, we focused 

on published reports, DoD-provided data, and discussions with responsible officials. 

Internal Controls 

Iraq’s ministries of Defense and Interior provided the data on assigned and trained Iraqi Security 

Forces that was presented in DoD’s September 2008 quarterly report. We did not assess the 

overall system of Iraqi management controls related to this data. However, we reviewed the 

reports and compared the information with prior reports to identify anomalies. We also obtained 

information on the extent to which DoD reviews the information for accuracy and consistency 

and its views on data reliability. These steps provided reasonable confidence in our conclusions. 
18

Related Reports by SIGIR and Others 

Interim Analysis of Iraqi Security Force Information Provided by the Department of Defense 

Report, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq (SIGIR-08-015, April 25, 2008.) 

Efforts to Implement a Financial Management Information System in Iraq (SIGIR-08-007, 

January 25, 2008.) 

Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Assessment of Iraqi Security Forces’ Units as Independent Not 

Clear Because ISF Support Capabilities Are Not Fully Developed (GAO-08-143R, November 

30, 2007.) 

The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, September 6, 2007. 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, 

Security, and Economic Benchmarks (GAO-07-1195, September 4, 2007.) 

Stand Up and Be Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces, 

House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations, June 27, 2007. 

Stabilizing Iraq: Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi Security Forces (GAO-07-

612T, March 13, 2007.) 

Iraqi Security Forces: Weapons Provided by the U.S. Department of Defense Using the Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund (SIGIR-06-033, October 28, 2006.) 

Iraqi Security Forces: Review of Plans to Implement Logistics Capabilities (SIGIR-06-032, 

October 28, 2006.) 
19

Appendix B—Command Relationships in 

Establishing, Training, and Equipping Iraqi Security 

Forces 

Source: Department of Defense and U.S. Government Accountability Office. 

Multinational Corps–Iraq

Multinational Force–Iraq

Multinational Security 

Transition Command–Iraq

U.S. Central Command

Secretary of Defense

Iraq Assistance Group

Military and Police 

Transition Teams

Training and Transition 

Teams

Major Subordinate 

Commands

I 

**** I 

  I 

I 

** * ~ ~ ~ 

I I I 
20

Appendix C—Organizations Providing Input and 

Review of Quarterly Reports 

Organizations providing input and/or review of the Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq

reports include: 

Secretary of Defense

Defense Security Cooperation Agency

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Undersecretary of Defense (Policy)

Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller)

OSD (Public Affairs)

OSD (Legislative Affairs)

DoD Office of General Counsel

Joint Staff

U.S. Central Command

Multi-National Force – Iraq

Multi-National Coalition – Iraq

Multi-National Security Transition Command - Iraq

Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

OSD (Policy)/International Security Affairs/Middle East –Iraq

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Middle East)

Key General and Flag Officers

Department of State

Department of Justice

Department of the Treasury

Office of Management and Budget

National Security Council

Intelligence Community

Defense Security Cooperation Agency

Task Force to Improve Business and Stability Operations

Source: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Policy).

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Appendix D—Acronyms 

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command

DoD Department of Defense

GAO Government Accountability Office

GOI Government of Iraq

HRIMS Human Resources Information Management System

IDN Iraqi Defense Network

IMTAS Innovative Management & Technology Approaches

ISF Iraqi Security Forces

ISFF Iraq Security Forces Fund

JCC-I/A Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan

MNC-I Multi-National Corps-Iraq

MNF-I Multi-National Force-Iraq

MNSTC-I Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq

MoD Ministry of Defense

MoI Ministry of Interior

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

SANS Storage Area Network Solution

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

SIT Specialized Information Technology

SoI Sons of Iraq

VSATs Very Small Aperture Terminals
22

Appendix E—Audit Team Members

This report was prepared, and the audit work conducted, under the direction of David R. Warren, 

Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction. Staff members who contributed to the report include: 

Tinh Nguyen 

Charles Thompson 
23

Appendix F—Management Comments 

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

MNSTC-I-AUD 

MULTI-NATIONAL SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND-IRAQ 

BAGHDAD, IRAQ 

APOAE 09348 

MEMORANDUM FOR Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstrnction 

12 Oct 2008 

SUBJECT: Challenges in Obtaining Reliable and Useful Data on Iraqi Security Forces 

Continue 

1. This memorandum provides the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

(MNSTC-I) response to the subject report. 

2. MNSTC-1 generally concurs with the conclusions and lessons learned contained in 

the report. See the enclosure for our comments. 

3. We appreciate your assessment of the subject project. Thank you for the 

opportunity to provide written comments for incorporation in the final report. 

4. If you have any question please contact LTC Patrick Dailey at DSN 318-852-1359 

or email patrick.dailey@iraq.centcom.mil. 

Encl 

~ ~f;:f}D- COL, USA 

Chief of Staff 
24

SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, and 

operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction provides independent and objective:

oversight and review through comprehensive audits, 

inspections, and investigations

advice and recommendations on policies to promote 

economy, efficiency, and effectiveness

deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention and 

detection of fraud, waste, and abuse

information and analysis to the Secretary of State, the 

Secretary of Defense, the Congress, and the 

American people through Quarterly Reports

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go to 

SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil)

To Report Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse in Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Programs

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline:

Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html

Phone: 703-602-4063

Toll Free: 866-301-2003

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg

Assistant Inspector General for Congressional

Affairs

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General

 for Iraq Reconstruction

 400 Army Navy Drive

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704

Phone: 703-428-1059

Email: hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil

Public Affairs Kristine R. Belisle

Director for Public Affairs

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General

 for Iraq Reconstruction

 400 Army Navy Drive

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704

Phone: 703-428-1217

Fax: 703-428-0818

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil

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