Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 160 / Tuesday, August 19, 1997 / Notices 44153

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–271]

In the Matter of Vermont Yankee

Nuclear Power Corporation (Vermont

Yankee Nuclear Power Station);

Exemption

I

The Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power

Corporation (VYNPC, the licensee) is

the holder of Facility Operating License

No. DPR–28, which authorizes

operation of the Vermont Yankee

Nuclear Power Station (the facility) at

power levels no greater than 1593

megawatts thermal. The facility is a

single-unit boiling-water reactor located

at the licensee’s site in Windham

County, Vermont.

The License provides, among other

things, that the Vermont Yankee

Nuclear Power Station is subject to all

rules, regulations, and orders of the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the

Commission) now or hereafter in effect.

II

On November 19, 1980, the

Commission published a revised

Section 10 CFR 50.48 and a new

Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 regarding

fire protection features of nuclear power

plants. The revised Section 50.48 and

Appendix R became effective on

February 17, 1981. Section III of

Appendix R contains 15 subsections,

lettered A through O, each of which

specifies requirements for a particular

aspect of the fire protection features at

a nuclear power plant.

Sections III.G and III.L are the subject

of the licensee’s exemption request.

Section III.G.3 specifies that fire

detection and suppression be installed

in areas using alternative safe

shutdown. Low fire loadings and fire

paths clear of combustibles in fire zones

RB–1, RB–2, RB–3, and RB–4 diminish

the importance of full fire detection and

suppression capability in these fire

zones. Section III.L.1.(c) requires that

alternative and dedicated shutdown

capability be able to achieve and

maintain hot shutdown. Use of the

automatic depressurization system

(ADS), which is proposed by the

licensee, requires cooling below hot

shutdown temperatures, contrary to

Section III.L.1.(c). Section III.L.2.b

requires that coolant level be

maintained above the top of the core,

which is not possible with the licensee’s

proposed use of the ADS and low

pressure injection systems (either core

spray [CS] or low-pressure injection

system) to achieve and maintain hot

shutdown.

The licensee requested an exemption

from these requirements to allow the

use of the ADS in conjunction with lowpressure injection systems as a means of

achieving post-fire safe-shutdown

conditions in fire zones RB–1, RB–2,

RB–3, and RB–4 when offsite power is

not available.

Section III.L.3 requires that alternative

shutdown capability accommodate

conditions where offsite power is not

available for 72 hours. Onsite power can

be restored to service in 30 minutes.

Two offsite power sources exist in

addition to the Vernon tie-line, which

can be placed in service in 10 minutes.

Without the Vernon tie-line, which is

actually off site, the plant cannot

accommodate conditions in the first 30

minutes following loss of offsite power.

The licensee requested an exemption

to allow the use of the Vernon tie-line

as an alternative to the onsite emergency

diesel generator for fire events involving

the control room, the cable spreading

room, and fire zones RB–1, RB–2, RB–

3, and RB–4 when offsite power is not

available.

III

By letter dated April 4, 1996, as

supplemented by letters dated May 21,

1996, November 4, 1996, December 13,

1996, January 8, 1996 (sic [1997]),

January 15, 1997, February 19, 1997,

May 16, 1997, and August 7, 1997,

VYNPC, the licensee for Vermont

Yankee, requested exemptions from

certain technical requirements of

Section III.G and Section III.L of

Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.

The licensee requested exemptions (1)

from the technical requirements of

Section III.G.1.a and Section III.L.2 of

Appendix R to allow the use of the ADS

in conjunction with low-pressure

injection systems (either CS or lowpressure coolant injection [LPCI]) as a

means of achieving post-fire safe

shutdown conditions in reactor building

fire zones RB–1, RB–2, RB–3, and RB–

4; (2) from the technical requirements of

Section III.L.3 of Appendix R to allow

the use of the Vernon tie-line as an

alternative to the onsite emergency

diesel generator for fire events involving

the control room, the cable spreading

room, and fire zones RB–1, RB–2, RB–

3, and RB–4 when offsite power is not

available; and (3) from the technical

requirements of Section III.G.3 of

Appendix R to the extent that it requires

that fire detection and fixed fire

suppression be provided in areas for

which an alternative safe-shutdown

capability is provided for fire zones RB–

1, RB–2, RB–3, and RB–4.

On the basis of the NRC staff’s

evaluation, and contingent on the

installation of additional fire detection

capability (as the licensee committed to

in its submittal of January 15, 1997, and

May 16, 1997), the staff concluded that

the detection and suppression

capabilities for fire zones RB–1, RB–2,

RB–3, and RB–4 are adequate to protect

against fire hazards in the zones. The

staff concluded further that a postulated

fire in reactor building fire zones RB–1,

RB–2, RB–3, and RB–4 would not

prevent the operators from achieving

and maintaining safe shutdown.

Therefore, contingent on the installation

of the additional fire detection

capability in fire zone RB–4, the

licensee should be granted an

exemption from Section III.G.3 of

Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 for

reactor building fire zones RB–1, RB–2,

RB–3, and RB–4.

On the bases of the technical

evaluation contained in the appended

Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL)

technical evaluation report (TER), and

the NRC staff’s evaluation of the

Vermont Yankee fire protection

capabilities, the staff concluded that the

licensee’s revised shutdown strategy for

reactor building fire zones RB–1, RB–2,

RB–3, and RB–4 (use of ADS with either

LPCI or CS) and the redesignation of

these fire zones as areas requiring an

alternative shutdown capability provide

an acceptable level of safe-shutdown

protection. In addition, on the basis of

the technical evaluation contained in

the BNL TER, the staff concluded that

the Vernon tie line provides an

acceptable alternative to power from an

onsite emergency diesel generator when

normal sources of offsite power are not

available for (1) a fire in the control

room or the cable spreading room that

forces control room evacuation and (2)

a fire in reactor building fire zones RB–

1, RB–2, RB–3, or RB–4 that requires the

use of the alternative post-fire safeshutdown strategy. Therefore,

exemptions should be granted for

Sections III.L.1.(c), III.L.2.b, and III.L.3

of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.

IV

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2), the

Commission will not consider granting

an exemption unless special

circumstances are present. Item (ii) of

the subject regulation includes special

circumstances in which application of

the subject regulation would not serve

the underlying purpose of the rule or is

not necessary to achieve the underlying

purpose of the rule.

The underlying purpose of Section

III.G of Appendix R is to provide fire

protection of equipment necessary for
44154 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 160 / Tuesday, August 19, 1997 / Notices

safe-shutdown capability. On the basis

of the NRC staff’s evaluation above and

contingent on the installation of

additional fire detection capability (as

the licensee committed to in its

submittals of January 15, 1997, and May

16, 1997), the staff concluded that the

detection and suppression capabilities

for fire zones RB–1, RB–2, RB–3, and

RB–4 are adequate to protect against the

fire hazards in the zones. The staff

concluded further that a postulated fire

in reactor building fire zones RB–1, RB–

2, RB–3, or RB–4 would not prevent the

operators from achieving and

maintaining safe shutdown. Therefore,

contingent on the installation of the

additional fire detection capability in

fire zone RB–4, the staff concludes that

an exemption should be granted from

Section III.G.3 of Appendix R to 10 CFR

Part 50 for reactor building fire zones

RB–1, RB–2, RB–3, and RB–4.

Accordingly, the Commission has

determined that pursuant to 10 CFR

50.12(a)(2)(ii), special circumstances

exist for the licensee’s requested

exemption in that imposition of the

literal requirements of the regulation in

these particular circumstances is not

necessary to achieve the underlying

purpose of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part

50.

The underlying purpose of Section

III.L of Appendix R is to provide

alternative and dedicated shutdown

capability necessary in areas in which

the fire protection features cannot

ensure safe-shutdown capability in the

event of a fire in that area. On the bases

of the technical evaluation contained in

the appended BNL TER and the NRC

staff evaluation of the Vermont Yankee

fire protection capabilities, the staff

concluded that the licensee’s revised

shutdown strategy for reactor building

fire zones RB–1, RB–2, RB–3, and RB–

4 (use of ADS with either LPCI or CS)

and the redesignation of these fire zones

as areas requiring an alternative

shutdown capability provide an

acceptable level of safe-shutdown

protection. In addition, on the basis of

the technical evaluation contained in

the appended BNL TER, the staff

concluded that the Vernon tie-line

provides an acceptable alternative to

power from an onsite emergency diesel

generator when normal sources of offsite

power are not available for (1) a fire in

the control room or the cable spreading

room that forces control room

evacuation and (2) for a fire in reactor

building fire zones RB–1, RB–2, RB–3,

and RB–4 that requires the use of the

alternative post-fire safe-shutdown

strategy. Therefore, the staff concludes

that exemptions should be granted for

Sections III.L.1.(c), III.L.2.b, and III.L.3

of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.

Accordingly, the Commission has

determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR

50.12(a)(2)(ii), special circumstances

exist in that the proposed exemptions to

III.L.1(c), III.L.2.b and III.L.3 satisfy the

underlying purpose of Appendix R to 10

CFR Part 50 and that imposition of the

literal requirements of the regulation in

these particular circumstances is not

necessary to achieve the underlying

purpose of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part

50.

Further, the staff has concluded that

the requested exemption is authorized

by law, will not present an undue risk

to public health and safety, and is

consistent with the common defense

and security. Therefore, contingent

upon the addition of additional fire

detection capability (as the licensee

agreed to in its submittals of January 15,

1997 and May 16, 1997) by December

31, 1997, and contingent upon one

continuous fire watch monitoring both

fire zones RB–3 and RB–4 until

installation of the additional fire

detection capability, the Commission

hereby grants the request for exemption

from the requirements of Sections

III.G.3, III.L.1(c), III.L.2.b, and III.L.3 of

Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 described

in Section III above.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the

Commission has determined that the

issuance of this exemption will have no

significant impact on the quality of the

human environment (62 FR 30356).

This exemption is effective upon

issuance.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 12th day

of August 1997.

For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Samuel J. Collins,

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

[FR Doc. 97–21896 Filed 8–18–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–271]

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power

Station; Notice of Withdrawal of

Application for Amendment to Facility

Operating License

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission) has

granted the request of Vermont Yankee

Nuclear Power Corporation (the

licensee) to withdraw its application

dated May 12, 1989, as supplemented

October 22, 1993, and April 15, 1994,

for proposed amendment to Facility

Operating License No. DRP–28 for the

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station

located in Vernon, Vermont. The

proposed amendment would have

revised the Technical Specifications

pertaining to the anticipated transient

without scram rule (10 CFR 50.62).

The Commission had previously

issued a Notice of Consideration of

Issuance of Amendment published in

the Federal Register on June 28, 1989

(54 FR 27242). However, by letter dated

July 25, 1997, the licensee withdrew the

proposed change.

For further details with respect to this

action, see the application for

amendment dated May 12, 1989, as

supplemented October 22, 1993, and

April 15, 1994, and the licensee’s letter

dated July 25, 1997, which withdrew

the application for license amendment.

The above documents are available for

public inspection at the Commission’s

Public Document Room, the Gelman

Building, 2120 L Street, NW.,

Washington, DC, and at the local public

document room located at the Brooks

Memorial Library, 224 Main Street,

Brattleboro, VT 05301.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 12th day

of August 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Kahtan N. Jabbour,

Senior Project Manager, Project Directorate

I–3, Division of Reactor Projects—I/II, Office

of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 97–21899 Filed 8–18–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Texas License L03835]

ProTechnics International, Inc.—

Houston, Texas: Field Flood Tracer

Study; Finding of No Significant

Impact and Notice of Opportunity for a

Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission is considering authorizing

ProTechnics International, Inc.

(ProTechnics) to conduct a field flood

tracer study in an oil reservoir located

at the NE Perry Unit, Noble County,

Oklahoma near Stillwater, Oklahoma.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of the Proposed Action

The proposed action is authorizing

ProTechnics to conduct a field flood

tracer study using cobalt-60 and

hydrogen-3 in an oil reservoir located at

the NE Perry Unit, Noble County,

Oklahoma, near the town of Stillwater,

Oklahoma. ProTechnics, with offices in

Houston, Texas, is authorized by the