COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bumgardner, Clements and Senior Judge Bray* 

Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia 

MIQUEAS RAMIREZ 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION** BY 

v. Record No. 1825-01-1 JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III 

 OCTOBER 8, 2002 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 

Thomas S. Shadrick, Judge 

 Catherine L. MacLean (Office of the Public 

Defender, on brief), for appellant. 

 Richard B. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney 

General (Randolph A. Beales, Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

A jury convicted Miqueas Ramirez of attempted malicious 

wounding and use of a firearm during the commission of a felony. 

He contends the trial court erred (1) in refusing to permit voir

dire about the specific range of punishment and (2) in refusing 

to strike a juror for cause. For the following reasons, we 

affirm. 

 The trial court refused to allow the defendant to ask the 

venire the following question: 

 

* Judge Bray participated in the hearing and decision of 

this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on 

September 1, 2002 and thereafter by his designation as a senior 

judge pursuant to Code § 17.1-401. 

** Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.
Realizing that the range of punishment is 1 

years [sic] to 10 years for the attempt 

malicious wounding and three years for use 

of a firearm, will you be able to carefully 

consider the full range of punishment? Is 

there anything that will keep you from 

imposing either the minimum or maximum 

sentences allowable under the law? 

While the trial court did not permit the defendant to state the 

range of punishment, it permitted general questions about the 

jurors' ability to consider the full range of punishment. 

Commonwealth v. Hill, ___ Va. ___, 568 S.E.2d 673 (2002), 

held the defendant has no right to question a jury panel about 

the range of punishment in a non-capital case. That case 

controls this case. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in 

refusing the tendered question. 

 The defendant also contends the trial court erred in not 

striking juror Barbara Bowden. He maintains she expected the 

defendant or his attorney to tell "his side of the story." If a 

juror requires a defendant to testify or expects him to prove 

his innocence, the trial court must exclude the juror for cause. 

Breeden v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 297, 298, 227 S.E.2d 734, 735 

(1976). However, the record1 of the voir dire does not support 

the claim that juror Bowden expected the defendant to do either. 

 1

 [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Do you feel that you 

are going to need some sort of explanation 

from Mr. Ramirez before you could find him 

not guilty? 

- 2 -
 During general questioning of the venire, juror Bowden 

answered that the defendant did not have to produce evidence or 

testify, that the Commonwealth had to prove him guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt, and that the defendant was presumed innocent. 

When the defendant indicated jurors Angeline Brown and Barbara 

Bowden may have shaken their heads to indicate they expected the 

defendant to put forth evidence, the trial court recalled the 

two for further questioning. Defense counsel asked them 

together whether they expected an explanation from the 

defendant. 

 

MS. BOWDEN: I'm Barbara Bowden. He has an 

attorney to represent him, and I feel that's 

all that is needed. 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: An explanation from me? 

MS. BOWDEN: I beg your pardon? 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: An explanation from me? 

MS. BOWDEN: No. You are going to tell, you 

know, his side of the story. 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. 

MS. BOWDEN: Angeline Brown. Yes, I would 

like to – He would have to prove his 

innocence to me. Yes. 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. 

MS. BOWDEN: And that's with anybody. You 

have to be proven innocent first. 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. 

- 3 -
 Juror Brown responded that she expected the defendant to 

testify or prove his innocence. The trial court excused her. 

Juror Bowden responded, "He has an attorney to represent him, 

and I feel that's all that is needed." Then asked specifically 

if she needed an explanation from defense counsel, juror Bowden 

stated, "No. You are going to tell . . . his side of the 

story." 

 The trial court clearly recognized the holding in Breeden

and differentiated between its application to the responses of 

Brown and Bowden.2 "The partiality or impartiality of an 

individual juror is a factual issue best determined by the trial 

court." Watkins v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 469, 480, 331 S.E.2d 

422, 431 (1985) (citation omitted). The trial court's 

determination shall not be reversed absent a showing of manifest 

error. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 428 (1991); Vinson v. 

Commonwealth, 258 Va. 459, 467, 522 S.E.2d 170, 176 (1999), 

cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1218 (2000). We conclude the record does 

not support the contention of the defendant. Accordingly, we 

affirm. 

 Affirmed.

 2

 Indeed, the defendant's brief cites to juror Brown's 

statement in the appendix when contending juror Bowden answered 

that she expected the defendant to testify or prove his 

innocence. 

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