alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>   1
                                                               Exhibit 11


                STATEMENT RE: COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS
                -----------------------------------------------

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                           Fiscal year ended
                            -----------------------------------------------
                             March 27, 1998  March 28, 1997  March 29, 1996  
                             --------------  --------------  --------------
BASIC
-----
<S>                            <C>            <C>             <C>
Average shares outstanding      18,219,000     17,910,000      17,860,000
                               ===========    ===========     ===========

     Net income                $36,803,000    $24,656,000     $19,766,000
                               ===========    ===========     ===========

     Net income per share      $      2.02    $      1.38     $      1.11
                               ===========    ===========     ===========

DILUTED
-------
Average shares outstanding      18,219,000     17,910,000      17,860,000

Net effect of dilutive stock 
  options - based on the 
  treasury stock method using
  average market price             254,000        316,000         284,000
                               ===========    ===========     ===========


           TOTAL                18,473,000    18,226,000       18,144,000
                               ===========   ===========      ===========

     Net income                $36,803,000   $24,656,000      $19,766,000
                               ===========   ===========      ===========

     Net income per share      $      1.99   $      1.36      $      1.09
                               ===========   ===========      ===========
</TABLE>


                                     -49-
#### Ralph ROBERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 77-639.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

May 2, 1978.

*98Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Allen J. De Weese, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Harry M. Hipler, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

LETTS, Judge.

This appeal stems from a hearing at which the defendant’s probation was revoked, the judge correctly stating that he was adjudging the defendant guilty of breaking and entering with intent to commit a *misdemeanor*as per the original charge to which he had pled nolo conten-dere. However, we assume, through error, the ensuing written Judgment and Sentence revoked his probation and adjudged him guilty of breaking and entering with intent to commit a *felony.*This was error.

It has been established that “one cannot plead guilty to one offense and be adjudged guilty and sentenced to another” *Perkins v. Mayo,*92 So.2d 641, 643 (Fla.1957).

We point to the following colloquy at the probation hearing:

> THE CLERK: Adjudication has been withheld until now.

> THE COURT: All right. Ralph, I am going to find you guilty of violation of the terms and conditions of your probation, revoke your probation, adjudge you to be guilty of breaking and entering a dwelling house with intent to commit a felony. Is that what he pled guilty to?

> MR. SMITH [State’s Attorney]: Misdemeanor.

> THE CLERK: To commit a misdemean- or, petty larceny.

> THE COURT: With intent to commit a misdemeanor, to-wit: Petty larceny.

> Do you have anything to say why sentence should not be imposed?

There can be no doubt from the above that a disparity exists between this record and the subsequent judgment. Accordingly, under the authority of *Walt v. State, 323*So.2d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975) we remand this case for the entry of a proper judgment. We agree with the Second District that courts are authorized to correct clerical errors within, or beyond the term. *Boggs v. Wainwright,*223 So.2d 316 (Fla.1969). Such error does not require reversal.

REMANDED IN ACCORDANCE HEREWITH.

DOWNEY, C. J., and ANSTEAD, J., concur.
Exhibit 23.1


                          INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

We consent to  incorporation  by reference in the  registration  statements (No.
33-66308,  No.  333-07427,  and No.  333-62233) on Form S-8 and (No.33-62213) on
Form S-3 of American Physicians Service Group, Inc. of our report dated March 9,
1999, relating to the consolidated balance sheets of American Physicians Service
Group Inc. and  subsidiaries  as of December 31, 1998 and 1997,  and the related
consolidated  statements of earnings,  shareholders'  equity, and cash flows for
each of the years in the three-year  period ended December 31, 1998 which report
appears in the annual report on Form 10-K of American  Physicians Service Group,
Inc. for the year ended December 31, 1998.


                                             /s/ KPMG LLP
                                        -----------------------
Austin, Texas
March 30, 1999
**EXHIBIT
      21**





**SUBSIDIARIES**














Vantus
      Bank


Equity
      Services, Inc.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 05-6833
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus LEVY JOHNSON, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Marvin J. Garbis, Senior District Judge. (CR-99-352-MJG; CA-04-3852-MJG) Submitted: November 17, 2005 Decided: November 23, 2005 Before WILKINSON, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Levy Johnson, Appellant Pro Se. Jamie M. Bennett, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Levy Johnson seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000). The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of his constitutional claims is debatable and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. SeeMiller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Johnson has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and di smiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED