[Cite as State v. Chavez, 2018-Ohio-4351.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 MONTGOMERY COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

JULIO C. CHAVEZ 

Defendant-Appellant 

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Appellate Case No. 27840 

Trial Court Case No. 2017-CR-1734/2 

(Criminal Appeal from 

Common Pleas Court) 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the 26th day of October, 2018. 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by MICHAEL P. ALLEN, Atty. Reg. No. 0095826, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, 

Montgomery County Courts Building, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422

 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

 

ADELINA E. HAMILTON, Atty. Reg. No. 0078595, 117 South Main Street, Suite 400, 

Dayton, Ohio 45422 

 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 

WELBAUM, P.J. 
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{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Julio C. Chavez, appeals from his conviction in the 

Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas after he pled no contest to possession of 

marijuana. In support of his appeal, Chavez contends the trial court erred in overruling 

his motion to suppress the drug evidence at issue. For the reasons outlined below, the 

judgment of the trial court will be affirmed. 

Facts and Course of Proceedings 

{¶ 2} On July 11, 2017, Chavez was indicted for possession of marijuana in an 

amount equal to or exceeding 200 grams but less than 1,000 grams, in violation of R.C. 

2925.11(A). Following his indictment, Chavez filed a motion to suppress, arguing that 

an improper search and seizure was conducted in the motel room where the marijuana 

was found. On September 1, 2017, the trial court held a hearing on Chavez’s motion to 

suppress. At the suppression hearing, the State presented testimony from Sergeant 

Jennifer Chiles and Officer Timothy Christian of the Vandalia Police Department. The 

officers testified as follows. 

{¶ 3} On May 24, 2017, Officer Christian was monitoring the Super 8 Motel located 

at 550 East National Road in Vandalia, Montgomery County, Ohio. As part of his regular 

duties, Christian performed random registration checks on the vehicles parked in the 

motel parking lot by running the vehicles’ license plate information. In doing so, Christian 

discovered the owner of a green Honda parked in the parking lot, Omar Cardenas, had a 

warrant for his arrest out of Martinsville, Indiana. The warrant was for possessing 

marijuana and included a color photograph of Cardenas. The warrant also included 
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Cardenas’s weight, age, and general physical description. The description indicated that 

Cardenas was a Hispanic male with dark hair. 

{¶ 4} After learning of the arrest warrant, Officer Christian made contact with 

Sergeant Chiles in order to determine whether Cardenas could be picked up on the 

Indiana warrant given that the warrant had a limited 300-mile pick-up radius. Sergeant 

Chiles determined Martinsville, Indiana, was 140 miles from Vandalia. As a result, Chiles 

ordered dispatch to contact the Martinsville Sheriff’s Office. After contacting the 

Martinsville Sheriff’s Office, Chiles was informed by dispatch that Cardenas would be 

extradited to Martinsville if the officers were able to effectuate his arrest. 

{¶ 5} After speaking with dispatch, Sergeant Chiles and Officer Christian inquired 

about Cardenas with the front desk clerk of the Super 8 Motel. The front desk clerk 

advised the officers that no one with Cardenas’s name was registered to a room. 

However, the clerk indicated that Cardenas’s green Honda was registered to Room 131, 

and that the name registered to Room 131 was Fernandez Ramirez. Sergeant Chiles 

testified that, in her 20 years of police experience, people commonly use aliases when 

registering for motel rooms. Accordingly, Chiles testified that, in her mind, she thought 

Cardenas could be in Room 131 despite the room being registered under a different 

name. The officers also believed Cardenas was in Room 131 since Cardenas’s green 

Honda was parked directly in front of the door to Room 131. 

{¶ 6} As Sergeant Chiles and Officer Christian approached the door to Room 131, 

they could see that the lights were on by looking through a four-inch opening in the 

otherwise drawn curtains. Sergeant Chiles testified that, as she stood by the groundlevel window to Room 131, she could smell the odor of marijuana emanating from the 
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room. Since Cardenas’s warrant was for possessing marijuana, Chiles testified that the 

odor of marijuana also led her to believe that Cardenas was in the room. 

{¶ 7} Believing Cardenas was in Room 131, Officer Christian began to knock on 

the motel room door and announce their presence as Vandalia police officers. Shortly 

thereafter, Sergeant Chiles testified she could see “shadows of movements, like someone 

was moving around in the room” through the opening in the curtains. Trans. (Sept. 1, 

2017), p. 60-61. While standing close to the window at an angle, Sergeant Chiles saw 

a Hispanic male approach the door and try to look out the peephole, which the officers 

had blocked for officer safety. Officer Christian testified that Chiles told him the male 

was making suspicious movements and crouching down. 

{¶ 8} Continuing, Sergeant Chiles testified that the male in Room 131 eventually 

looked through the opening in the curtains and made eye contact with her. Upon making 

eye contact, Chiles testified that she told the male, later identified as Fernando Ramirez, 

to “[o]pen the door.” Id. at 62. In response, Chiles testified Ramirez put his hands up 

and said: “Don’t shoot. Don’t shoot me.” Id. Ramirez then put one hand behind his back 

while the other hand remained in the air. When Ramirez put his hand behind his back, 

Sergeant Chiles testified she became concerned that he had a weapon. As a result, 

Chiles drew her firearm at a “low ready position,” meaning that the tip of the gun was 

pointed at the ground and that Chiles was holding the butt of the gun near her waist. Id. 

at 63. 

{¶ 9} After 20 to 30 minutes of knocking on the door and ordering Ramirez to come 

out of the room, Ramirez opened the door and exited the room. Once Ramirez was 

outside the room, the officers ordered Ramirez to get on the ground. Ramirez complied 
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with the officers’ order, and Officer Christian handcuffed him. Believing that Ramirez 

was Omar Cardenas, Sergeant Chiles asked Ramirez: “Omar, is there anyone else in the 

room?” Id. at 65. Ramirez then told Chiles “I’m not Omar.” Id. At that point, Officer 

Christian advised Ramirez that he was being detained until his identity could be 

confirmed. 

{¶ 10} While Officer Christian detained Ramirez, Sergeant Chiles observed 

another Hispanic male sitting on the bed inside Room 131 who resembled Cardenas. 

Chiles ordered the second male, later identified as Chavez, the appellant in this case, to 

get out of the room and on the ground. Chavez complied with Chiles’s order and was 

subsequently handcuffed. Believing Chavez was Cardenas, Sergeant Chiles asked 

Chavez: “Omar, is there anyone else in the room?” Trans. (Sept. 1, 2017), p. 66. Like 

Ramirez, Chavez stated he was not Cardenas. Officer Christian then told Chavez he 

was also being detained until they confirmed his identity. Sergeant Chiles recalled either 

Ramirez or Chavez advising her that Cardenas was his brother. It was later confirmed 

that Chavez was in fact Cardenas’s brother. 

{¶ 11} Sergeant Chiles testified that, when she asked Chavez if anyone was else 

in the room, Chavez “flung his head to the side towards the room, like nodding towards 

the room and said something to the effect of look for yourself or go see for yourself.” Id. 

at 67. Chiles testified that she took this as permission to enter the motel room. Chiles 

then entered the room to look for Cardenas and to conduct a protective sweep for officer 

safety since she did not know how many people were in the room. Chiles testified that 

she only searched in the areas where she could not see and where a person could be 

hiding, such as in the space between the two beds and in the bathroom, as the bathroom 
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door was shut. 

{¶ 12} After clearing the area between the beds, Sergeant Chiles attempted to 

open the bathroom door, but met resistance. Because she was the lone officer in the 

room and did not know whether the resistance was caused by someone pushing on the 

door, Chiles backed out of the room for her safety and called for an additional officer to 

assist with clearing the bathroom. Thereafter, Officers Christian and Sommer opened 

the bathroom door while Chiles remained with Ramirez and Chavez. Upon opening the 

bathroom door, the officers observed that the toilet was full of marijuana and that the 

resistance they had met was due to a large duffle bag on the floor containing marijuana. 

No one was discovered inside the bathroom. 

{¶ 13} After discovering the marijuana, the officers cleared the room. The 

officers, however, did not collect the marijuana until after a search warrant was secured. 

Chavez and Ramirez were then placed under arrest for possession of marijuana and 

Mirandized by Sergeant Chiles. 

{¶ 14} In light of the officers’ testimony, the trial court held that the entry and search 

of the motel room in question was lawful. In so holding, the trial court found the issue of 

whether Chavez consented to the officers’ entrance into the motel room was irrelevant 

since the officers were armed with an arrest warrant for Cardenas and had probable 

cause to believe Cardenas was inside the room. As a result, the trial court overruled 

Chavez’s motion to suppress. 

{¶ 15} After the court overruled Chavez’s motion to suppress, Chavez pled no 

contest to the indicted charge for possessing marijuana. The trial court then found 

Chavez guilty of the charge and sentenced him to a period of community control not to 
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exceed five years. Chavez now appeals from his conviction, raising a single assignment 

of error for review. 

Assignment of Error 

{¶ 16} Chavez’s sole assignment of error is as follows: 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S 

PREJUDICE WHEN IT OVERRULED HIS MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 

{¶ 17} Under his single assignment of error, Chavez contends the trial court erred 

in failing to suppress the drug evidence discovered in the motel room. In support of this 

argument, Chavez claims his Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable 

searches and seizures was violated when the officers: (1) entered his motel room to 

execute an arrest warrant for Cardenas without a reasonable belief that Cardenas was 

inside the motel room; (2) conducted a protective sweep of his motel room without an 

arrest being made; (3) peered into the window of his motel room; and (4) failed to obtain 

valid consent to enter his motel room. We disagree with Chavez’s claims. 

Standard of Review 

{¶ 18} “In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court ‘assumes the role of the 

trier of fact, and, as such, is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate 

the credibility of the witnesses.’ ” State v. Prater, 2012-Ohio-5105, 984 N.E.2d 36, ¶ 7 

(2d Dist.), quoting State v. Retherford, 93 Ohio App.3d 586, 592, 639 N.E.2d 498 (2d 

Dist.1994). “As a result, when we review suppression decisions, ‘we are bound to accept 

the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. 
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Accepting those facts as true, we must independently determine as a matter of law, 

without deference to the trial court’s conclusion, whether they meet the applicable legal 

standard.’ ” Id., quoting Retherford. 

Entry into Motel Room 

{¶ 19} For his first argument, Chavez contends his Fourth Amendment rights were 

violated when the officers entered the motel room to execute an arrest warrant for 

Cardenas. Chavez claims the arrest warrant did not permit the officers to enter the room 

because the officers did not have a reasonable belief that Cardenas was in the room. 

According to Chavez, a search warrant was required for the officers to lawfully enter his 

room. 

{¶ 20} “The Fourth Amendment generally prohibits police from making a 

warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s home to make a felony arrest.” State 

v. Cooks, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2016-CA-40, 2017-Ohio-218, ¶ 10, citing Payton v. New York, 

445 U.S. 573, 588-589, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). It is well established 

that the protection provided by the Fourth Amendment extends to hotel rooms. Hoffa v. 

United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301, 87 S.Ct. 408, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966), citing United 

States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S.Ct. 93, 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951). (“[a] hotel room can 

clearly be the object of Fourth Amendment protection as much as a home or an office”). 

Accord State v. Keith, 178 Ohio App.3d 46, 2008-Ohio-4326, 896 N.E.2d 764, ¶ 7 (2d 

Dist.) (“[t]he sanctity of the home extends to any area where one has a legitimate and 

reasonable expectation of privacy, including a motel room”). 

{¶ 21} In Payton, the United States Supreme Court held that “an arrest warrant 
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founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling 

in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.” Payton

at 603. “ ‘Accordingly, pursuant to Payton, an arrest warrant is sufficient to enter a 

person’s residence to effectuate the warrant if the police have reason to believe that the 

suspect lives in the home and is in fact at the home at the time the arrest warrant is 

executed.’ ” Cooks at ¶ 10, quoting State v. Zerucha, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2015-A0031, 2016-Ohio-1300, ¶ 13. (Other citation omitted.) “The protections against 

warrantless intrusions into the home announced in Payton * * * apply with equal force to 

a properly rented hotel room during the rental period.” United States v. Junkman, N.D. 

Iowa No. CR96-4033, 1997 WL 33559171, *3 (June 24, 1997), citing United States v. 

Rambo, 789 F.2d 1289, 1295 (8th Cir.1986) and United States v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 

969 (10th Cir.1993). 

{¶ 22} Following its decision in Payton, the Supreme Court held in Steagald v. 

United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981), that absent exigent 

circumstances or consent, an arrest warrant does not justify entry into a third person’s 

home to search for the subject of the arrest warrant. Under Steagald, “a search warrant 

must be obtained in order to seek out the subject of an arrest warrant on the property of 

a third party.” State v. Pembaur, 9 Ohio St.3d 136, 138, 459 N.E.2d 217 (1984), citing 

Steagald. The Steagald court expressly noted that it was not deciding “whether the 

subject of an arrest warrant can object to the absence of a search warrant when he is 

apprehended in another person’s home, but rather whether the residents of that home 

can complain of the search.” Steagald at 219. 

{¶ 23} In situations involving hotel and motel rooms, federal courts have held that 
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when the person named in the arrest warrant is merely a guest of the registered tenant 

of a hotel room, pursuant to Steagald, a search warrant is necessary to gain entrance into 

the room absent consent or exigent circumstances. Junkman at *4; United States v. 

Ray, 9th Cir. Nos. 93-10102, 93-10142, 93-10207, 1994 WL 134259, *2-3 (Apr. 13, 1994). 

In contrast, if the person named in the arrest warrant is a tenant taking up residence in 

the hotel room, Steagald does not apply and Payton permits the officers to enter the room 

to effectuate the arrest warrant if they have a reasonable belief that the person named in 

the arrest warrant is a tenant and present inside the room. See Payton, 445 U.S. 573, 

603, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639. 

{¶ 24} Chavez relies on Steagald for the proposition that the officers needed a 

search warrant to enter the motel room in question. This is correct only if the officers 

had a reasonable belief that Cardenas was merely a guest of the room’s tenants. See 

Junkman at *4 and Ray at *3. However, if the officers had a reasonable belief that 

Cardenas was a tenant present inside the motel room, the arrest warrant would be 

sufficient for the officers to lawfully enter the room in an attempt to arrest Cardenas. 

{¶ 25} “Reasonable belief is established by looking at common sense factors and 

evaluating the totality of the circumstances.” (Citations omitted.) United States v. Pruitt, 

458 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir.2006). “[A] reasonable belief is something less than probable 

cause.” Cooks, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2016-CA-40, 2017-Ohio-218, at ¶ 11, citing Pruitt at 

482-485. “Therefore, police officers do not need probable cause to enter a residence to 

execute an arrest warrant provided they have a reasonable belief, founded in common 

sense and based on the totality of the circumstances, that the suspect resides in the home 

and that he is present at the time.” Id., citing Barrett v. Kentucky, 470 S.W.3d 337, 343 
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(Ky S.Ct.2015). 

{¶ 26} Under the totality of the circumstances, we find that Sergeant Chiles and 

Officer Christian had a reasonable belief that the subject of the arrest warrant, Omar 

Cardenas, was inside Room 131 of the Super 8 Motel on the night in question. It was 

reasonable for the officers to believe that Cardenas was inside the room since the officers 

saw a vehicle registered in Cardenas’s name parked directly outside the room. The 

officers also knew that Cardenas’s arrest warrant was for possessing marijuana, and 

Sergeant Chiles smelled the odor of marijuana emanating from Room 131. Sergeant 

Chiles specifically testified that, given the nature of the arrest warrant, smelling the 

marijuana led her to believe that Cardenas was inside the room. We find that such a 

belief was reasonable. 

{¶ 27} In addition to seeing Cardenas’s vehicle parked outside the motel room and 

smelling marijuana, Sergeant Chiles observed a male matching the general physical 

description of Cardenas suspiciously moving around inside the motel room. According 

to Chiles, the male was crouching down and attempting to look through the peephole 

while Officer Christian was knocking on the door for 20 to 30 minutes. The suspicious 

movements made in response to the officers knocking and announcing their presence, 

coupled with the 20-30-minute delay in answering the door, supported a common-sense 

inference that the male was attempting to avoid police contact. Because Cardenas had 

a warrant for his arrest, it was reasonable for the officers to believe that the male 

attempting to avoid police contact was Cardenas. 

{¶ 28} Although it is a closer call, we also find that Sergeant Chiles and Officer 

Christian had a reasonable belief that Cardenas was a tenant residing in Room 131. 
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Such a belief was reasonable since the front desk clerk of the motel advised the officers 

that Cardenas’s vehicle was registered to Room 131. Although the name supplied for 

Room 131 was Fernandez Ramirez, Sergeant Chiles testified that, based on her 20 years 

of law enforcement experience, it is common for people to use aliases when registering 

for motel rooms. In light of that fact, and the fact that Cardenas’s vehicle was registered 

to the motel room in question, it was reasonable for the officers to believe that Cardenas 

was a tenant staying in the room. 

{¶ 29} Because they had an arrest warrant for Cardenas and a reasonable belief 

that Cardenas was a tenant present inside of the motel room, the officers were 

constitutionally permitted to enter the room to effectuate Cardenas’s arrest. Accordingly, 

Cardenas’s first argument in support of his motion to suppress lacks merit. 

Protective Sweep of Motel Room 

{¶ 30} For his second argument, Chavez contends the protective sweep of the 

motel room was unlawful because no arrest had been made at the time the sweep was 

conducted. Chavez also contends that the protective sweep was unlawful because the 

officers had no basis to believe that Cardenas was inside the motel room. 

{¶ 31} In Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990), 

the United States Supreme Court defined a protective sweep as “a quick and limited 

search of premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police 

officers or others.” Id. at 327. The Court held that such protective sweeps are permitted 

when officers possess “a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that 

the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.” 
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Id. at 337. “The scope of the protective sweep must not exceed that reasonably 

necessary to protect the safety of the officers.” State v. Lyons, 83 Ohio App.3d 525, 534, 

615 N.E.2d 310 (2d Dist.1992). 

{¶ 32} A majority of federal circuit courts have extended the protective sweep 

doctrine to cases where officers possess a reasonable suspicion that their safety is at 

risk, even in the absence of an arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 248 F.3d 506, 

513-514 (6th Cir.2001); United States v. Miller, 430 F.3d 93, 98-99 (2d Cir.2005); United 

States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 598 F.3d 997, 1006-1007 (8th Cir.2010); United States v. 

Werra, 638 F.3d 326, 350-351 (1st Cir.2011); United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, 584 

(5th Cir.2004); Leaf v. Shelnutt, 400 F.3d 1070, 1086-1087 (7th Cir.2005). The Supreme 

Court of Ohio has also taken this position, as it held that “[p]olice officers can conduct a 

protective sweep without making an arrest if circumstances warrant.” State v. Adams, 

144 Ohio St.3d 429, 2015-Ohio-3954, 45 N.E.3d 127, ¶ 188, citing Cisneros-Gutierrez at 

1006-1007 and Taylor at 513-514. 

{¶ 33} Based on the foregoing case law, Chavez’s claim that the protective sweep 

was unlawful because it was not made incident to an arrest lacks merit. As noted above, 

in order for the protective sweep to have been lawful, the officers simply must have had 

a reasonable belief that the motel room harbored an individual posing a danger to the 

officer or others. Buie at 337. Chavez’s claim otherwise lacks merit. 

{¶ 34} In addressing Chavez’s first argument, we have already determined that 

Sergeant Chiles and Officer Christian reasonably believed that Cardenas, an individual 

with an arrest warrant, was inside the motel room. Furthermore, “[w]hen officers have 

obtained an arrest warrant and they have reason to believe that the suspect is inside the 
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house, they may search anywhere that the suspect might reasonably be found.” United 

States v. Stover, 474 F.3d 904, 911 (6th Cir.2007), citing Buie at 332-333. 

{¶ 35} Here, after Chavez and Ramirez exited the hotel room and advised the 

officers they were not Cardenas, the officers were located in a position where certain 

areas of the hotel room were not visible, areas where Cardenas could have been hiding. 

For example, Sergeant Chiles testified that she could not see the space between the two 

beds or inside the bathroom. Because the arrest warrant permitted the officers to search 

anywhere in the motel room where Cardenas could have been found, it was not unlawful 

for the officers to enter the room and search those areas. 

{¶ 36} As a further matter, the officers testified that they met resistance when they 

attempted to open the bathroom door. Not knowing whether the resistance was caused 

by an individual pushing on the bathroom door, or some other less nefarious obstruction, 

the officers cleared the bathroom to determine whether Cardenas or some other individual 

was inside. Given the resistance on the door and the fact that Cardenas had not been 

located, it was reasonable for the officers to believe that someone posing a danger to the 

officers could have been inside the bathroom. 

{¶ 37} The fact that the sweep of the motel room did not reveal Cardenas has no 

bearing on whether the officers were justified in entering the motel room and conducting 

the sweep. See United States v. Lawlor, 406 F.3d 37, 42, fn. 5 (1st Cir.2005), citing 

Buie, 494 U.S. at 335-336, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 108 L.Ed.2d 276. “While it is true that the 

officers could not be certain that a threat existed inside the [motel room], this does not 

impugn the reasonableness of their taking protective action.” United States v. Henry, 48 

F.3d 1282, 1284 (D.C. Cir.1995). “It is enough that they ‘have a reasonable basis for 
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believing that their search will reduce the danger of harm[.]” Id., quoting Buie at 337 

(Stevens, J., concurring). 

{¶ 38} For the foregoing reasons, Chavez’s second argument in support of his 

motion to suppress lacks merit. 

Peering into Window 

{¶ 39} For his third argument, Chavez contends the officers violated his Fourth 

Amendment rights by peering into his motel room window and curtains. In support of 

this argument, Chavez claims the area around the motel window is curtilage, which 

carries a reasonable expectation of privacy that the officers violated. 

{¶ 40} Chavez did not raise this argument in his motion to suppress or at the 

suppression hearing. As a result, the trial court did not address this issue. By failing to 

raise this issue before the trial court, Chavez has waived the argument for appeal. “ ‘It 

is settled law that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not having been raised in 

the trial court are not properly before this court and will not be addressed.” (Citations 

omitted.) State v. Schneider, 2d Dist. Greene No. 95-CA-18, 1995 WL 737910, *1 (Dec. 

13, 1995). 

{¶ 41} Regardless, even if Chavez had raised the issue, it is questionable whether 

the officers’ act of peering in the window violated a reasonable expectation of privacy in 

curtilage. This court has noted that using the term “ ‘curtilage’ in connection with 

commercial premises is somewhat of a misnomer since the term typically is associated 

with the yard or enclosed space surrounding a dwelling house.” (Citation omitted.) 

State v. Trammel, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 17196, 1999 WL 22884, *3 (Jan. 22, 1999). 
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Curtilage—the area immediately adjacent to a home which an individual reasonably 

expects is private—is regarded as “ ‘part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment 

purposes.’ ” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013), 

quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 

(1984). 

{¶ 42} Nevertheless, we have noted that the term “ ‘curtilage’ has been used in 

search warrant situations to designate the area surrounding a commercial property, 

whether that area be a parking lot or fenced area.” Trammell at *4, citing State v. 

Zinmeister, 27 Ohio App.3d 313, 320-21, 501 N.E.2d 59 (8th Dist.1985) and State v. Am. 

Veterans Post No. 250, 37 Ohio App.3d 108, 524 N.E.2d 191 (9th Dist.1987). 

Regardless of the designation, we have held that “the Fourth Amendment applies to 

commercial premises, and extends to areas that can be equated with the ‘curtilage’ of a 

private home.” Trammel at *6. Accord State v. Nelms, 2017-Ohio-1466, 81 N.E.3d 508, 

¶ 8 (2d Dist.). This area “can include the grounds surrounding the premises, if the 

premises fit within the traditional Fourth Amendment analysis, i.e., the area is one in which 

the owner has a reasonable expectation of privacy.” (Citation omitted.) Trammell at *4. 

{¶ 43} A reasonable expectation of privacy is present when there is a subjective 

expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. State v. Little, 

183 Ohio App.3d 680, 2009-Ohio-4403, 918 N.E.2d 230, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.); Katz v. United 

States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 

There are several cases indicating that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in 

common areas outside motel rooms. United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d 392, 396 (6th 

Cir.1994) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in motel parking lot); United States v. 
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Marlar, 828 F.Supp. 415, 419 (N.D.Miss.1993) (canine sniff of an exterior motel room 

door opening onto a public sidewalk and parking lot did not intrude on defendant’s 

reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Conner, 948 F.Supp. 821, 839 

(N.D.Iowa 1996) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in sidewalk/windowsill area of 

motel room where officer observed contraband in the window between curtains); Ponce 

v. Craven, 409 F.2d 621, 625 (9th Cir.1969) (no reasonable expectation of privacy where 

officers observed activities through hotel room window). 

{¶ 44} However, as relevant to the facts and circumstances here, several cases 

note the significance of closing a window’s blinds or curtains. United States v. Gori, 230 

F.3d 44, 51 (2d Cir.2000) (“Fourth Amendment privacy interests are most secure when 

an individual is at home with doors closed and curtains drawn tight”); United States v. 

Honore, 450 F.2d 31, 33 (9th Cir.1971) (no illegal search where visual observations of 

objects within residence were through uncurtained window from public stairway); Pate v. 

Municipal Court, 11 Cal.App.3d 721, 724, 89 Cal.Rptr. 893 (1970) (“[c]learly, by drawing 

the curtains on the window of a motel room which was located on the second floor of the 

building and at a considerable distance from any public vantage point, appellants 

exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy”); United States v. Dimick, 790 F.Supp. 

1543, 1549 (D.Colo.1992) (“[c]urtains can be drawn, so that activities inside are not 

exposed to public view”); Ponce at 625 (noting that if defendant did not wish to be 

observed through the hotel window he could have drawn his blinds). 

{¶ 45} In this case, the area from where the officers looked through the motel room 

window was the public sidewalk located directly in front of Chavez’s ground-level motel 

room. Any person walking past Room 131 could have peered into Chavez’s motel room 
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window. We note that Sergeant Chiles testified that she had to stand close to the window 

at an angle to see through the four-inch opening in the window’s curtains. However, 

since Chavez waived this argument for appeal, we need not delve into what significance, 

if any, the four-inch opening in the curtains or Chiles’s positioning has on this issue. 

{¶ 46} Even if we were to find that Chavez’s reasonable expectation of privacy was 

violated when Sergeant Chiles peered through the four-inch opening in the curtains, 

Chavez fails to indicate what evidence he wishes to have suppressed as a result of the 

Chiles’s conduct. None of the officers observed any contraband as a result of peering 

through the motel window. Rather, all the contraband at issue was discovered when the 

officers lawfully entered the motel room and searched the bathroom for Cardenas. 

Therefore, Chavez cannot demonstrate any prejudice. For this reason, Chavez’s third 

argument in support of his motion to suppress lacks merit. 

Consent to Enter Motel Room 

{¶ 47} For his fourth argument, Chavez contends he did not voluntarily consent to 

the officers’ entrance into his motel room and that his alleged consent cannot be used as 

justification for the officers’ entry and search of the motel room. The trial court found, 

and we agree, that whether Chavez consented to the officers entering his motel room is 

irrelevant, because the officers were permitted to enter the motel room by virtue of the 

arrest warrant for Cardenas. Because the officers had a reasonable belief that Cardenas 

was a tenant present inside the motel room, the officers were permitted to enter the room 

and search for Cardenas. For this reason, Chavez’s fourth argument in support of his 

motion to suppress lacks merit. 
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Conclusion 

{¶ 48} Having found no merit to any of Chavez’s arguments, his single assignment 

of error is overruled and the judgment of the trial court overruling his motion to suppress 

is affirmed. 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

TUCKER, J., concurs. 

DONOVAN, J., dissenting: 

{¶ 49} I dissent. In my view, the officers’ entry into the motel room registered to 

Fernandes Ramirez and occupied by Chavez was unlawful. The fact that the police were 

aware of an arrest warrant for Cardenas did not give them authority to enter the motel 

room and search for him pursuant to Steagald, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 

38. In the absence of consent or exigent circumstances,1 an arrest warrant does not 

authorize officers to enter the residence of a third party to seize the person named in the 

warrant. Id.; Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 100, 119 S.Ct. 469, 142 L.Ed.2d 373 

(1998); see State v. Martin, 151 Ohio St.3d 740, 2017-Ohio-7556, 90 N.E.3d 857, ¶ 78. 

To enter the home of a third party to make an arrest, officers are required to obtain a 

search warrant. Steagald at 214-215; Martin at ¶ 78 (“[A]n arrest warrant does not 

authorize police to enter the premises of a third party to arrest the subject of the warrant. 

For that, they must obtain a search warrant unless an exception to the warrant justifies 

 

1 Exigent circumstances include a limited number of emergency situations, such as 

immediate danger of injury to others, a need to provide immediate aid, evidence of flight, 

imminent destruction of contraband, or hot pursuit of a fleeing felon. E.g., State v. 

Pinson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20927, 2005-Ohio-4532, ¶ 18; Trammel, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 17196, 1999 WL 22884, * 7. 
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entry.”). 

{¶ 50} Chavez had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the motel room and thus, 

the right not to answer the door while the police stood outside knocking for 20 minutes. 

His co-occupant, Ramirez, as the registered guest, likewise chose not to answer the door. 

During this time frame, the police could have ostensibly obtained a search warrant for the 

room had they possessed probable cause to believe Cardenas was harbored therein. 

{¶ 51} Likewise, any protective sweep analysis must fail, as there is simply no 

evidence that the motel room harbored an individual posing danger to the officers or 

others. They simply cannot create an exigency by refusing to leave when the registered 

guest of a motel room declines to answer the door. “That they did not know whether 

anyone else was inside is insufficient to justify their entry.” State v. Sharpe, 2d Dist. 

Clark No. 2007 CA 46, 2008-Ohio-267, at ¶ 51. 

{¶ 52} To protect third parties, in this case, Chavez (as well as Ramirez), according 

to the logic of Steagald, it must be a judicial officer, not a police officer on the scene, who 

decides whether there is reason to believe that a wanted felon is cohabitating and present 

in a motel room. Otherwise there is no detached scrutiny by a judicial officer and 

Chavez’s Fourth Amendment rights are protected only by an officers’ personal 

determination of probable cause. The search for an object inside a home (or motel room) 

requires a search warrant, and the Steagald court saw “no reason to depart from this 

settled course when the search is for a person rather than an object.” Steagald, 451 

U.S. at 214, 101 S.Ct 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38. 

{¶ 53} I would reverse. 

 
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Copies sent to: 

Mathias H. Heck, Jr. 

Michael P. Allen 

Adelina E. Hamilton 

Hon. Michael W. Krumholtz