## I N T H E C O U R T O F C R I M I N A L A P P E A L S O F T E X A S

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T H E S T A T E O F T E X A S

v . A D E L F O R A M I R E Z C R U Z , A p p e l l e e

O N A P P E L L E E ’ S P E T I T I O N F O R D I S C R E T I O N A R Y R E V I E W

F R O M T H E T H I R D C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

T R A V I S C O U N T Y

K E L L E R , P
. J
. , d e l i v e r e d t h e o p i n i o n o f t h e u n a n i m o u s C o u r t .

We deter mine that questions about the defe ndant’s name and phone number that wer e asked
in a custodial interview in the prese nt case did not fall within the “booki ng ” exception to the
Miranda rule. We arr ive at this conclusion beca use, though the questions may have been the ty pe 1
that wou l d b e as k ed during a booking proce dure, the questions wer e not asked during a booking

proce dure, and the circ umstances did not otherwise reve al that the questions wer e rea sonably rela ted

Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 1CRUZ— 2

t o an ad minist rative purpose. We also conclude that the court of appea ls err ed in holdi n g t h at questions about the defe ndant’s name and phone number did not constitute inte rr o gat ion. Consequently , we r ever se the judg ment of the c ourt of appe als.
I. BACKG ROUND
A. F acts
M ario Carbaja l-Plata, a taco- stand opera tor, was shot and killed in Austin. The po l i ce

rec overe d a soft-drink bottle that a witness said had been handled by the shoot er
. Fi n ger p rint analy sis produce d a match in the National Crime I nformation Center (NCI C) databa se. T he fing er p r in t w a s ma tched to an individual who was variously known as J ose Rodrigue z, J org e Neg ron, and Pablo J aimes. This ind ividual was, in fac t, appellee , whose rea l name was not known to law
enfor ceme nt at the time. The NCI C databa se indicated that appellee had been arr ested sever al times 2
in the Chicag o are a. A call to Chicag o law enfor ceme nt reve aled that appellee had a pending I llinois

war rant for a misdemea

nor off ense of driving under the influence (DUI ).
Detec tive J eff Gre enwa lt, th e le a d h o mi c ide investiga tor assig ned to the murder case , secur ed

an arr est war

rant for the murder. He then called the United States Marsha ls’ Offic e in Chicag o and
asked them to arr est appellee on the I llinois DUI war rant but also reque sted that no mention be made
of the Texas war

rant or the homicide investiga tion. Appellee was arr ested on the DUI war rant and
taken to a jail in Be rwy

n, a suburb of Chicag o. Appellee was booked by local law enfor ceme nt, who asked appellee ’s name, date of birth, phone number, and address. The a nswers to these questions

wer e written on a standard form. Appellee g ave his name as J org e Neg ron and g ave an addre ss and

Although appellee ’s true name was not known, his fing erpr ints and arr est data wer e 2 maintained under

a unique F BI

identification number.CRUZ— 3

date of birth. He did not g ive his phone number on initial book-in, but a phone number wa s later

3
added to the f

orm. 4
Detec ti v e Gr eenwalt and his partne r, Detec tive Fr ank Rodrigue z, trave led from Texas to
I llinois and arr ived at the Be rwy n jail approximately fourtee n hours afte r appellee was arr ested. Appellee was place d in an interview room, and his intervi e w w ith the Texas detec tives was rec orded.
Be fore g iving Miranda war nings, Detec tive Rodrigue z introduced himself and his partne r by name, without say ing what ag ency they wer e aff iliated with, and asked appellee some biogr aphica l questions as detailed be low. 5
Detec tive Rodrigue z told appellee that they neede d his name because immigra tion wanted

to put a hold on him and the authorities had seve ra l n am es fo r h i m. The detec tive also asked for appellee ’s addre ss and phone number and asked whether he had a ce l l phone. Appellee was also
asked whether he was living with any one and how long he had been in the United States. Appellee
identified himself as J orge Ne gro n and g ave the same date of birth that was listed on the Be rwy n booking form. He claimed not to reme mber his exact addre ss but g ave a street name that matched
the addre ss on the booking form. He g ave a phone number that differ ed by t wo d i g its from the phone number on the booking form, and he identified this number as a cell phone belong ing to his 6

The da te of birth wa s false. 3
I t is unknown who added the phone number

. 4
The direc t questioning of appellee was conducte d by Detec tive Rodrigue z in Spanish, but 5 Detec tive Gre enwa lt sugg ested some que stions for Detec tive Rodrigue z to ask.
The digits in question wer e “94” on the form and “69" in th e i n t er v i ew
. The trial court 6 fo u n d t h at the cell number added to the booking sheet was not the same cell number g iven in th e interview.CRUZ— 4

g irlfriend. Appellee also responde d that he was from Guana juato, Mexi co, and that he enter ed the United States in 2000, returne d to Mex ico in 2004, and re enter ed the United States in 2008.
After asking these que stions and r ece iving appellee ’s response s, Detec tive Rodrigue z read appellee the Miranda war nings. Appellee then asked to speak to an attorney , and the interview was terminated. Detec tive Gre enwa lt acknow ledg ed at the motion-to-suppress hear ing (and the trial court found) that he wa

nted t o obtain appellee ’s phone number to assist in determining a ppellee’ s
true identity , and to show throug h cell tower inf o rmation wher e the phone—if it was a cell phone—wa s located on the date of the murder. Detec tive Gre enwa lt also testified that he did not tell appellee that he was a suspect in a homicide beca use Detec tive Gre enwa lt was afr aid appellee would “stop talking to us altoge ther.”
After the i nterview , Detec tives Gre enwa lt and R odrig uez went to the address listed on the
Be rwy n booking form. They obtained permission from appellee ’s g irlfriend to sear ch the residenc e. The g irlfriend told Detec tive Rodrigue z that she had a cell phone that ap pellee used and g ave a phone number that matched the number g iven by appellee in the interview. Du ri ng the sear ch,
Detec tive Gre enwalt discovere d appellee ’s birth cer tificate with his true name and date of birth.
After returning to Austin, Detec tive Gre enwa lt obtained rec ords for the cell-phone number supplied by the g irlfriend and appellee

. The phone rec ords showed that the phone was in Austin on the date
of the murde r and tha t phone ca lls hit cell tower s close to the cr ime scene

. B. Trial Appellee filed a motion to suppress. A hear ing was held, at which Detec tives Gre enwa lt and Rodrigue z testified. The trial court issued finding s of fac t and conclusions of law. The finding s of
fac t are consistent with the summary g iven above. The trial court g rante d the motion to suppress inCRUZ— 5

part, ruling that the interview betwee n appellee and the Texas detec tives was inadmissible. The trial

court denied the motion to suppress in all other respe cts, ruling that appellee ’s arr est was valid and
that the fol l o wing evidenc e was admissible: appellee ’s response s to booking questions asked by
I llinois law enfor ceme nt, fing erpr ints obtained upon arr est, cell-phone rec ords obtained by the Texas
detec tives, and evide nce obta ined from the se arc h of appe llee’s r esidenc e. C. Appeal
The State appea led t h e t ri al court’s ruling that the interview was inadmissible. The State

arg ued that the questions during the interview—a nd more specific ally , the questions rela ting to the cell-phone number—fe ll within t he “booking ” exception to the Miranda rule.
The court of appea ls pointed out that the detec tives never testified that they intended to—or
in fac t did—share appellee ’s response s in the interview with I llinois officia ls. Moreove r, the court 7
of appea ls observe d that there was no discussion in the trial rec ord about appellee ’s ultimate transfe r
to Texas. Consequent l y , t h e co u rt of appea ls stated that it could not conclude on the rec ord

8

prese nted to it that “the booking questions exception applie[d] .” 9
Neve rtheless, the court of appea ls conclude d that the questi ons in the i nterview satisfied a
rela ted but distinct exception to Miranda involving “r outine inquiries normally attendant to ar

rest
and custody .” The court found that this exception was satisfied beca use the questions wer e purely 1 0

State v. Cruz , No. 03-12-00728- CR, slip op. at 8 (Tex. App.–Austin J anuar y 10, 2014) (not 7 desig nated f

or publication).
Id. 8
Id. 9
Id. 1 0CRUZ— 6

biogr aphica l and did not rela te to an element of murder and beca use nothing in the rec ord indicated
that Detec tive Rodrigue z should have known that the questions wer e likely to elicit an incriminating

response
. Fur

ther, the court held that the detec tives’ subjective hope that appellee ’s phone number 1 1

or addre ss might lead to rele vant evidenc e did not transfor m an otherwise routine inqui ry into an interrog ation beca

use the test for what constitutes interrog ation fo cuses primarily upon the

perc eptions of the suspect, rathe r than the intent of the police. Consequently , the court of appea ls 1 2

reve rsed the tr ial court’s or der suppr essing appellee ’s statements.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Interr ogation and the Bookin g Exception
The Miranda rule g ener ally prohibits the admission into evidenc e of s t atements made in

response to custodial interrog ation when the suspect has not b ee n ad v i sed of cer tain war nings (i n cl u ding that the suspect has a rig ht to rema in silent and a rig ht to counsel). I n the Mi r a n d a 1 3
context, “interr og ation” means “any words or ac t i o ns on the part of the police

. . . that the police
should know are rea sonably likely to elicit an incr iminating re sponse.” This “should know” test 1 4
is the g ener al test for deter mining whether interrog ation occur s. This test focuse s primarily upon 1 5

Id. at 9-11. 1 1
Id. at 11. 1 2
Miranda , 384 U.S. at 466-71. 1 3
Rhode Island v . Innis , 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980). 1 4 Alford v. Stat e , 358 S.W .3d 647, 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The sy ntax of the init ial 1 5 wording of this t es t in Innis could lead one to believe that express questioning is automatically interr o gat i o n , without reg ard to the “should know” test. See 446 U.S. at 301 (“the term ‘interr og ation’ under Miranda ref ers not only to express questionin g, b u t a l s o to any words or actions on the part of the police

. . . that the p o l ice should know are rea sonably likely to elicit anCRUZ— 7

the per ceptions of the suspe ct, ra ther than the intent of the police. 1 6
But the Supreme Court expli citly car ved out an exception to the g ener al test fo r m at t ers
“norma lly attendant to a

rre st a nd custody .” Routine booking questions are normally attendant to

1 7

arr est and custody , an d re cognition of t his fac t has given rise to what has been called the “routine

incriminating response ”) (empha sis added) ; Jones v. United States , 779 A.2d 277, 282 (D.C. 2001) (def endant arg ued that express questioning is interrog ation without reg ard to “should know” test). Howeve r, a later sentenc e in Innis makes rea sonably clea r that the “should know” test applies even to express questioning, and other c o u rts have construed Innis in that manner
. See Innis , 446 U.S. at 301-02 (“B ut, since the police surely cannot be held acc ountable for the unfore seea ble results of their words or actions, the definition of interrog ation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police office rs that they should have known wer e rea sonably like l y to elicit an incriminating response .”) (empha sis added) ; United States v. Cash , 733 F.3d 1264, 1277 (1 0 t h C i r. 2013) (dec lining to re ad the ter

m “express questioning” literally : “althoug h asking a question is releva nt to deter mining whether an interrog ation has occur red, it is neither sufficie nt nor nece ssary ”); United States v. Hunter , 708 F.3d 938, 954 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[N] ot all direct que stions posed by police to a suspect constitu t e ‘interr og ation.’ Only questions that are ‘re asonably likely to elicit an incrimi n at i n g response from the suspect’ are improper.” ) (bra ckets and internal quotations marks from orig inal omitted); United States v. Fleck , 413 F.3d 883, 893 & n.2 (8 t h Cir. 2005); United States v. Foster , 227 F.3d 1096, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2 000); United States v. Bogle , 114 F.3d 1271, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Jones , 779 A.2d at 282-83 (apply ing the “should know” test and concluding that defe ndant’s arg ument that express questioning is automatically interrog ation “has been reje cted by numerous author ities” and is not pe rsuasive) ; State v. Morrisey , 351 Mont. 144, 163, 214 P.3d 708, 723-24 (2009) (“A definition that included any question posed by a police office r would b e broade r than that require d to implement the policy of Miranda itself.”); see also Way ne R. L aF ave and J erold H. I srae l, C R I M I N A L P R O C E D U R E , § 6.7(b), at 326-28 (2d ed.1992) (“Putting the matter thi s wa y would cer

tainly sug g est that any time a person in custody is asked a question, surely the Miranda require ments apply

. But no such absolute rule had been rec og nized by lower courts prior to Innis , and it does not seem that all of t hose dec isions are c ast in doubt by the Innis decision. I f other ‘words or actions’ fall within Miranda only if ‘the police should know [t hey ] are likely to elicit an incriminating response ,’ then it is not fanc iful to sug g est that cer tain ty pes of questioning also do not come within Miranda beca use they are unlikely

to produce that kind of response .”).
Innis , 446 U.S. at 301. 1 6
Id. at 300-01 (“ That is to say , the term ‘inter rog ation’ under Miranda ref ers not only

to 1 7 express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arr est and custody ) that the police should know are rea sonably likely to elicit an incr iminating re sponse from the suspe ct.”)

.CRUZ— 8

booking question exception” t o the Miranda rule. Although termed a “booking ” ex ception, this 1 8

ex ce p t i o n appea

rs to be somewhat broade r than booking and encompa sses routine administrative

proce ssing associate d with arr est or custody

. The point of the exception is that questions that fall 1 9 within the exception “serve a leg itimate administrative need.” 2 0
The ty pes of question s that are allowed under this exception are g ener ally reque sts for biogr aphica l data, such as “name , addre ss, hei gh t, weig ht, ey e color, date of birth, and curr ent 2 1

ag e.” Some courts have e x pressly included among this data a suspec t’s telephone numbe r. To 2 2 2 3
deter mine whether a particula r q u es t i o n falls within the booking exception, we ask “whe ther the

qu e s ti o n r e a s o n a

bly rela tes to a leg itimate administrative conce rn, apply ing an objective standard.” 2 4

I f a question is a leg itimate adminis t ra t i v e question, then it does not matter whether the
office r should know that the question is rea sonably likely to elicit an incriminating response
. That 2 5

Pennsylv ania v. Muniz , 496 U.S. 582, 601 (1990) (plurality op. of Br ennan J ., joined by 1 8 O’Connor, Scalia, and Kenne dy , J J .); Alford v. State , 358 S.W .3d 647, 654 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

See Muniz , 4 9 6 U. S

. at 601 (re fer ring to questions “nec essar y to complete booking or 1 9 pretrial service

s ”) (empha sis added) ; State v. Rheaume , 1 7 6 Vt

. 413, 420, 853 A.2d 1259, 1263 (2004) ( questions “wer e aske d as par t of routine proc essing ”). Alford , 358 S.W .3d at 654. 2 0
Muniz , 496 U.S. at 601. 2 1
Id. ; Alford , 358 S.W .3d at 654. 2 2
United States v. Broadus , 7 F.3d 460, 464 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. McLaughlin , 2 3 777 F.2d 388, 391 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Sims , 719 F.2d 375, 378 (11th Cir. 1983); Bobo v. State , 820 N.W.2d 511, 517 (Minn. 2012); Hughes v . State , 346 Md. 80, 95, 695 A.2d 132, 139 (1997). Alford , 358 S.W .3d at 659-60.

2 4
Id. at 660-61. 2 5CRUZ— 9

is, a leg itimate administrative question is exempt from the “should know” test and is deeme d not to
be interr og ation. 2 6

B. Biograph ical Data: “Should Know” versus “Adm inis trat ive”
As a practica l matter, a question that seeks to elicit biogr aphica l data may be dee med “not interrog ation” under either of two theories. First, such a question may be deeme d “not interrog ation”
beca use it does not meet the g ener al t est for interrog ation, i.e. i t does not meet the “ should know”

test. That is, a court could decide that a particula r question about biogr aphica l data was so innocuous
that its tendenc y to produce an incriminating response was not something the police office r should
have known. Secon d a b iogr aphica l question may be deeme d “not interrog ation” under the

2 7 “booking ” (or “administrative” ) exception. That is, a cour t could decide that a particula r question about biog raphic al data w as a r outine administrative inquiry

. These two situatio n s o f

te n o v e r la p
. Ro u ti n e a d

mi n is tr ative questions are g ener ally innocuous questions that are not rea sonably likely to elicit an incriminating response
. Neve rtheless, we must 2 8

Id. 2 6
See Jones , 779 A.2d at 284 (re quest for suspect’s name was not r easona bly likely , under 2 7 the circ umstances, to elicit incriminating response ); State v. Sallis , 5 7 4 N. W

. 2 d 15 (I owa 1998) (quoting United States v. Brown , 101 F.3d 1272, 1 2 7 4 (8 t h C i r. 1996): “re quest for routine information nece ssary for basic identification purposes is not interrog ation under Miranda ” unless “the g overnme nt ag ent should rea sonably be awa re that the i n fo rm ation soug ht

. . . is direc tly rele vant to the substantive offe nse cha rg ed”)

. See W illiams v. Jaglowski , 269 F.3d 778, 785 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that it wa s highly 2 8 unlikely that the defe ndant would have incriminated himself in a ny way by g iving his date of birth and citing another case that noted that Miranda war nings are not g ener ally require d befor e asking arr estee s for “booking information” such as name and addre ss beca use such information is not likely to evoke a

n incriminating response ); United States v. Edwards , 885 F.2d 377, 385 (7th Cir. 1989) (“In our opinion questions such as ‘wha t is y our name ? ’ and ‘ wher e do y ou live? ’ will not usua lly constitute interrog ation within the meaning of Miranda

. I n the first place , it cannot be said that the police, when asking such questions, ‘should know [t hat the questions are ] probably likely to evokeCRUZ — 10

analy ze the two issues separ ately

. C. “Shou ld Know ”
T h e co u rt of appea ls conclude d that the detec tives’ questions did not meet the “should
know” test for interrog ation. The court of appea ls articula t ed fo u r rea sons in support of its
conclusion: (1) the questions involved purely biogr aphica l data, (2) no evidenc e in the rec ord

sug g ests that the detec tives should have known t h at t h e q u estions wer e rea sonably likely to elicit incriminating re s p o nses, (3) the questions did not rela te to an element of murder, and (4) the subjective hope of the detec ti v es t h at their questioning would ultimately lead to incriminating

e v idence did not transfor

m the questioning into interrog ation beca use the focus of the “should know” test is on the suspect.
Wit hout d e c iding whether the court of appea ls was acc urate in char acte rizing the information

soug ht here as purely biogr aphica l, we conclude that the biogr aphica l nature of the question does not
alone exempt it from being interrog ation. I n Muniz , the Supreme Court indicated that biogr aphica l questions wer e not automatically exempt from Miranda ’s require ments, and o t h er courts have 2 9

an incrim i n at i n g response from a suspect.’ .

. . . Finally , as t he magistrate noted, even in an arrest situ at i o n s u ch questions will eventua lly be asked during booking and the ‘pre vailing view is that routine inquiries during booking a re la wful eve n absent the Miranda war nings.’ ”).
496 U.S. at 601 (plurality op. of Brenna n J ., joined by O’Connor, S calia, and Kennedy , 2 9 J J .) (“We disag ree with the Commonwealth’s conte n t i o n that Offic er Hosterman’ s first seven questions reg arding Muniz ’s name, addre ss, heig ht, weig ht, ey e color, date of birth, and curr ent ag e do not qualify as custodial interrog ation as we define d the term in Innis , supra, mere ly beca use the quest i ons wer e not intended to elicit information for investiga tory purposes.” ), 609 (Mar shall, J ., co n curr ing and dissenting) (“[T]he police in this case should have known that the seven bookin g questions were rea sonably likely to elicit incriminating r esponses.” ).CRUZ — 11

indicated t h at s u ch questions may constitute interrog ation under the “should know” test. I n 3 0
Thomas , the District of Columbi a Court of Appea ls held that questioning a suspect about his name

was rea sonably likely to elicit an incriminating response when the office rs knew that the suspect had
alre ady provided authorities with a false name. The DC court rec ited simil ar holdings b y o t her 3 1 jurisdictions. 3 2
The co urt of appea ls’s third and fourth rea sons sug g est that a question qualifies as interrog ation only if it seeks to elicit evidenc e that is direc tly incriminating

. There is some validity

to this view. The Miranda rule is conce rned with the incriminat i n g nature of the response s to questions, not wi th what evidenc e those response s might lead to, and the rule does not bar the
admission of other evidenc e t h at i s l ater obtained as a result of a suspect’s statements. I n 3 3 Calif ornia v. Bye rs , a plurality of the United States Supreme Court stated that “identity , when made known, may lead to inquiry that in turn leads to arr est and char g e” but “those developments depend

on differ ent fac tors and independe nt evidenc e.” We ag ree that questioning t h at s ee k s to elicit 3 4

Jones , 779 A.2d at 284 (citing Thomas v. United States , 731 A.2d 415 (D.C. 1999) for the 3 0 proposition that questions about one’s name can, under cer tain circ umstances, be rea sonably likely to elicit an incriminating response ); Hughes , 346 Md. at 95-96, 695 A.2d at 140 (eve n a question that appea rs innocuous on its fac e can be rea sonably likely to elicit an incriminating response under cer tain circ umstances) ; United States v. Parra , 2 F.3d 1058, 1068 (10th Cir. 1993) (question about someone’s true name in orde r to link person to incriminating immigra tion file).
731 A.2d at 426. 3 1
Id. at 423-26 (discussing Parra , 2 F.3d 1058; Timbers v. Commonwealth, 503 S.E.2d 233 3 2 (Va . App. 1998); State v. Stev ens , 181 Wis . 2d 410, 511 N.W. 2d 591 (1994)).

Contreras v. State , 312 S.W .3d 566, 582-83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (discussing Chavez 3 3
v. Martinez , 538 U.S. 760 (2003) and citing Michigan v. Tucker , 417 U.S. 433 (1974) and Oregon v. Elstad , 470 U.S. 298 (1985)). 402 U.S. 424, 434 (1971) (plura lity op.). 3 4CRUZ — 12

biogr aphic al d at a does not become interrog ation simply beca use the identify ing information may later aid law enfor ceme nt in conducting a criminal investiga tion. So, questioning appellee about his
addre ss and phone number did not become interrog ation simply beca use the answe rs enable d police
to locate a

nd sear ch his home or obtain his ce ll-phone re cords.
But on the prese nt rec ord, appellee ’s name and phone number had incriminating value in
themselves and did not si m p l y lead to other incriminating evidenc e. The detec tives informed appellee that they had sever al names for him. At that point, a rea sonable perso n i n ap p el lee’ s position would have understood that answe ring the question about his name would have shown that
he had previously g iven a false name, which could be a criminal offe nse by i t s el f or would be 3 5
evidenc e of his consciousness of g uilt for a criminal offe nse. Appellee ’s position is simil ar to the 3 6
defe ndant in Thomas and other case s, wher e the office rs wer e not asking for the suspect’s name for
the first time, but wer e attempting to solicit the suspect’s true name afte r what they suspected to be
a fa lse name ha d alre ady

been g iven. 3 7

See T E X

. P E N A L C O D E § 38.02 (fa ilure to identify or g iving a

false or fictitious name). 3 5
F el d er v. State , 848 S.W .2d 85, 98 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (“L ike flig ht, the fac t t h at 3 6 appellant prese nted false i d en t i fi cation to Offic er Carlson when he was pulled over indicates a ‘consc iousness of guilt’ and an awa rene ss that he neede d to conce al his identity from law enfor ceme nt officia ls.”); United States v. Thompson , 690 F.3d 977, 991 (8th Cir. 2012) (stating that “it is today universally conce ded that” cer tain fac ts including “assumption of a false name .

. . are admissible as evidenc e of c onsciousness of g uilt, and thus of guilt itself”) (bra ckets omitted). The United States Supre me Court held in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nevada 3 7 that a defe ndant’s conviction for his ref usal to identify himself did not violate the Fifth Amendment. 542 U.S. 177, 190-91 (2004). The Court rea ched this conclusion beca use the defe ndant’s ref

usal to disclose his identity was not b as ed u p o n any articula ted, rea l, and appre ciable fea r that his name would be used to incrim i n at e h i m
. Id. at 190. Notably , the C ourt left open the pos sibili ty that “a case may arise wher e there is a substantial a lleg ation that furnishing identity

. . . would have g iven the police a link in the chain of the evidenc e neede d to convict the individual

. . . .” Id. at 191. We believe this is just such a ca se.CRUZ — 13

The rec ord also shows that the detec tives wer e seeki n g to obtain appellee ’s cell-phone number, which could link him, throug h cell tower data, to a location and time that was close to the
murder. Not only should the detec tives have know n, but, at least with respe ct to appellee ’s phone number, they d i d know, that the questioning was likely to lead to an incriminating response
. As
Detec tive Gre enwa lt acknow ledg ed, he hoped to show throug h cell-phone information wher e appellee was at the time of the murder. The Supreme Court’s re cognition that the exis tence of interrog ation turns primarily on the perc eption of the suspect does not completely exclude a 3 8

cons i d er at i o n of police intent. When police questioning is actua lly “desig ned to elicit an 3 9 incriminating response from the a ccuse d, it is unl ikely that the prac tice will not also be one which
the police should have known was rea sonably likel y t o h ave that eff ect.” We conclude that 4 0
Detec tive R o d ri gu ez ’s questions about appellee ’s name and phone number satisfied the “should
know” test for

what constitutes interrog ation.

D. Adm inis trat ive
The next issue is whether the detec tive’s questions may be deeme d “not interrog at i o n”
beca use they wer e rout ine administrative inquiries. As we explained in Alford , a question falls
within the “booking ” exception if , under an objective standard, “the question rea sonably rela tes to

a leg itimate administrative conce rn.” We will assume, without deciding , that eac h of the questions 4 1
asked by Detec tive R o d ri gu ez wa s , by its content, the ty pe of question that could be rea sonably

Innis , 446 U.S. at 301. 3 8
Id. at 301 n.7. 3 9
Id. 4 0
358 S.W .3d at 659-60. 4 1CRUZ — 14

rela ted to a leg itimate administrative conce rn. We must then ask: I n deter mining whether a question
is rea sonably rela ted to a leg itimate administrative conce rn, do we look solely to the content of the question? We think that th e an s we r i s “no.” Whether a question rea sonably rela tes to an administrative conce rn must be asce rtained by both the content of the question and the circ umstances in which the question is asked.
A number of courts have p o i n t ed t o the need to look at the circ umstances in which a question is asked in judging whether it is truly a routine administrative inquiry

. The Court of Ap p ea l s o f Maryland has counsele d that courts should consider the totality of the circ umstance s , including the “loca tion of the questioning, along with the nature of the crime of which the arr estee
is suspected.” The Supreme Court of Wis consin has refused to extend the booki ng exception to

4 2

an interrog ation occur

ring at the time of arr est inside the suspect’s home. The Tenth Circuit held 4 3 that the booking exception did not apply to an offic er w ho questioned a suspect who was about to
make bond beca

use the question was for the admitted purpose of linking th e s u s p ec t t o his immigra tion file rathe r than to obtain booking information. I n a footnote to its holding that cer tain 4 4 questions wer e not exempt from Miranda as questions seeking routine biogr aphica l data for booking purposes, the Supre me Court of Ge org ia observe d that the suspect “ had bee n throug h the booking

proce dure prior to the interview at is s ue, making it unclea r what paper

work the ag ent was

Hughes , 346 Md. at 97, 695 A.2d at 141. 4 2
Steve ns , 181 Wis

. 2d at 434-35, 511 N.W.2d at 5 9 9 (“ t h i s co urt will not extend the 4 3 [booki ng ] ex ception to incriminating questions asked a t the time of the ar rest”)

. Parra , 2 F.3d a t 1067-68. 4 4CRUZ — 15

g ener ating .” 4 5

I n concluding that questions about a murder suspect’s name wer e not routine booking inqui ri es, the Dis trict of C olumbia Court of Appeals pointed out that nothing the detec tive in that

case had done “re flec ted any interest in ‘booking ’ [t he murder suspect] for the marijuana offe nse he
had fortuitousl y and im providentl y co m mitted in the presence of t he poli ce.” The detective had 4 6

not claimed that he was completing any standard booking form during his questioning, and there was

no evidenc e that the suspect was being fing erpr inted or photogr aphed. Finally , the court observe d 4 7
that the detec tive’s questioning eventua lly turned to the murder offe nse for which the suspect “had
not been a

rre sted and c ould not have bee n ‘booked.’ ” 4 8
The Six th Circuit considere d “[t] he location, the nature of the questioning[,] and the failure

to take notes or document the defe ndant’s identity ” as supporting its conclusion that the b o o k ing exception did not apply

. The court further stated that the booking exception usually appl ies to 4 9 questioning that occur s at the police station in situations in which there is “ac tive documentation of

a defe ndant’s answe rs.” Say ing that courts should “ca ref ully scrutinize the fac ts sur rounding the 5 0

encounte r to deter

mine wh et h er the questions are leg itimate booking questions or a prete x t for eliciting incriminating information,” t he S upreme Court of California listed a varie ty of factors to

State v. Nash , 279 Ga. 646, 650 n.3, 619 S.E.2d 684, 687 n.3 (2005)

. 4 5
Thomas , 731 A.2d at 422. 4 6
Id. 4 7
Id. 4 8
United States v. Pac heco- Lopez , 531 F.3d 420, 424- 25 (6th Cir. 2008) 4 9
Id. at 425. 5 0CRUZ — 16

consider:

• the nature of the questions, such as whether they seek mere ly identify ing data nece ssary for booking ;

• the context of the interrog ation, s uch as whether the questions wer e asked during a non[-] investiga tive cler ical booking proce s s and pursuant to a standard booking form or que stionnaire;

• the knowledg e and intent of the g overnme nt ag ent askingthe questions;

• the rela tionship betwee n the question asked and the crime the defe ndant was suspected of

committing;

• the administrative nee d for the inf ormation soug ht;

• and any other indications that the questions wer e desig ned, at least in part, to elicit incriminating evidenc e and mere ly asked under the g uise or prete x t of seeking routine biog raphic al information. 5 1
We are also g uided by Supreme Court prec edent in an analog ous are a o f t h e l aw—the inventory -sea

rch exception to the war rant require ment under the Four th Amendment. L ike the booking exception to the Mi r a nda rule, the inventory sear ch ex ception is based on administrative

conce rns. The S upreme Court has held that “standa rdized criter ia .

. . or established rout i n e
. . . 5 2

must reg ulate the openin g of container s found during inventory sear ches” beca use “an inventory

sear ch mus t not be a ruse for a g ener al rumm ag ing in order to dis cover evidenc e.” We need not 5 3
decide how close the analog y is betwee n these two exceptions to decide that the absenc e of evidenc e of standardized or routine proce dures in this case is at least a rele vant fac tor in deter mining whether

People v . W

illiams , 56 Cal. 4th 165, 187-88, 294 P.3d 1005, 1021-22 (2013). 5 1
Colorado v. Bertine , 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987) (inventory -sea rch exception cente rs “upon 5 2 the re asonable ness of routine a dminist rative c are taking functions”)

.

Florida v. W

ells , 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990). 5 3CRUZ — 17

the questioning of appe llee wa s sufficiently administrative to be excepted f rom the Miranda rule. Having deter

mined that the circ umstances in which a question is asked is rele vant to whether
the question rea sonably rela tes to an administrative conce rn, we now examine the circ umstances of the pre sent ca se. Appe llee had a lrea dy been booke d by

I llinois authorities. B y

contra st, when the
Texas detec tives questioned him, the State of Texas had not exercised any formal authority or control

over him. Appellee had not y et been detained under the authority of the Texas offe nse, he was not
informed that t h e d et ec t i ves wer e from Texas, and he was not informed that the detec tives wer e

connec ted with the Texas murder investiga tion. Moreove r, the detec tives did not sug g est any administrative nee d for the que stions they asked, nor

did they point to any

standardized or r outine policy or proce dure that they wer e following

. There was no showing on this rec ord that the questions

wer e in any way connec ted with the filling out of an administrative form. We conclude that the
circ umstances surrounding the interrog ation show that the questions wer e not rea sonably rela ted to an administrative pur

pose.
III. DISPOSITION
We reve rse the judgme nt of the court of appea ls and aff irm the suppression order of the trial

court.
Deliver ed: May

13, 2015 Publis h