Measuring Stability and

Security in Iraq

September 2008 

Report to Congress 

In accordance with the 

Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2008 

(Section 9010, Public Law 109-289; 

 Section 9204, Public Law 110-252) 
 

 
 September 26, 2008 i

Table of Contents 

Executive Summary .................................................................................................................... iii 

1. Stability and Security in Iraq .................................................................................................1

 1.1. Political Stability .....................................................................................................1

 National Reconciliation ...........................................................................................1 

 Political Commitments ............................................................................................1 

 Government Reform ................................................................................................3 

 Transnational Issues.................................................................................................6 

 1.2. Economic Activity...................................................................................................9 

 Budget Execution.....................................................................................................9 

 2008 Iraqi Budget ..................................................................................................10 

 IMF Stand-By Arrangement and Debt Relief........................................................11 

 Indicators of Economic Activity............................................................................11 

 Oil Infrastructure Integrity.....................................................................................13 

 Agriculture.............................................................................................................14 

 Essential Services ..................................................................................................16 

 1.3. Security Environment ............................................................................................21 

 Overall Assessment of the Security Environment.................................................21 

 Attack Trends and Violence Assessment ..............................................................25 

 Regional Security Assessments .............................................................................25 

 Public Perceptions of Security...............................................................................28 

 1.4. Transferring Security Responsibility.....................................................................32 

2. Iraqi Security Forces Training and Performance ..............................................................33

 2.1. Assessed Capabilities of the Iraqi Forces ..............................................................34 

 2.2. Ministry of Interior ................................................................................................39 

 Ministry of Interior Transition Issues....................................................................39 

 Ministry of Interior Forces.....................................................................................42 

 Iraqi Police Service................................................................................................43 

 National Police.......................................................................................................43 

 Directorate of Border Enforcement and Directorate of Ports of Entry..................44 

 Facilities Protection Service ..................................................................................45 

 National Information and Investigation Agency ...................................................45 

 2.3. Ministry of Defense ...............................................................................................47 

 Ministry of Defense Transition Issues...................................................................47 

 Ministry of Defense Forces ...................................................................................52 

 Iraqi Army..... .......................................................................................................52 

 Iraqi Navy..... ........................................................................................................53 

 Iraqi Air Force ......................................................................................................55 

 Directorate General for Intelligence and Security and JHQ, ................................56 

 Directorate for Intelligence 

 2.4 Iraqi National Counter-Terrorism Forces ..............................................................57 

Annex A List of Acronyms .................................................................................................59 
 September 26, 2008 ii

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 September 26, 2008 iii

Executive Summary

This report to Congress, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, is submitted pursuant to Section 

9010 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007, Public Law 109-289 as amended by 

Section 1308 of Public Law 110-28 and Section 1224 of Public Law 110-181 and Section 9204 of the 

Supplemental Appropriations Act for 2008, Public Law 110-252.1

 The report includes specific 

performance indicators and measures of progress toward political, security, and economic stability in 

Iraq, as directed in that legislation. This is the thirteenth in a series of quarterly reports on this 

subject. The most recent report was submitted in June 2008. The report complements other reports 

and information about Iraq provided to Congress and is not intended as a single source of all 

information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its Coalition 

partners, or Iraq. 

The strategic goal of the United States in Iraq 

remains a unified, democratic, and federal Iraq 

that can govern, defend, and sustain itself and 

is an ally in the war on terror. The United 

States is pursuing this goal along political, 

security, economic, diplomatic, and rule of law 

lines of operation. This report measures 

progress toward achieving this goal during June 

through August 2008 and highlights challenges 

to Iraqi and Coalition efforts to achieve their 

mutual objectives.2

 

The overall security situation in Iraq has greatly 

improved this reporting period. Security 

incidents have remained at levels last seen in 

early 2004 for nearly three consecutive months, 

while civilian deaths across Iraq have declined 

to a level 77% lower than the same period in 

2007. The surge in Coalition forces, the 

growth of more capable Iraqi Security Forces 

(ISF), the contributions of the Sons of Iraq 

(SoI), the ability of forces to secure the 

population, operations against Al Qaeda in Iraq 

(AQI) and other extremist elements, and the 

increased willingness of the people and the 

Government of Iraq (GoI) to confront 

extremists are important factors that have 

contributed to the improved security 

environment. Periodic high-profile car and 

suicide vest bombings have occurred, but the 

number of these attacks and the resulting 

casualties have decreased dramatically. 

Moreover, these attacks have not rekindled the 

self-perpetuating cycle of ethno-sectarian 

violence that plagued Iraq in late 2006 and the 

first half of 2007. 

Coalition forces have drawn down significantly 

and the number of detainees held by the 

Coalition has been reduced by over 6,000 

people. All five U.S. surge brigade combat 

teams, two Marine battalions, the Marine 

Expeditionary Unit, an Australian battle group, 

and the Georgian brigade have withdrawn. In 

addition, the Polish contingent will return home 

in October 2008. The transfers to Provincial 

Iraqi Control (PIC) of Qadisiyah Province in 

July 2008 and of Anbar Province on September 

1, 2008 serve to highlight the security 

achievements during the draw down of 

Coalition forces. 

Despite these promising developments, security 

gains in Iraq remain fragile. A number of 

issues have the potential to upset progress, 

including the transition of SoI to permanent 

employment, provincial elections, Article 140 

and Kirkuk, internally displaced persons (IDP) 

and refugee returns, AQI and Special Group 

(SG) leaders attempts to reignite violence, 

malign Iranian influence, and a lack of 

government services. 

There have been a number of encouraging 

developments in Iraqi capabilities and popular 

attitudes in recent months that the GoI and the 

Coalition are focused on maintaining. First is 

the improved capacity of the ISF, which is 

increasingly leading major security operations 
 September 26, 2008 iv

and demonstrating an ability to achieve security 

gains. Second is the Iraqi people are 

increasingly choosing to address their 

differences in the political arena rather than 

through violent means. Third, the 

government’s and Coalition’s success over the 

last several months against militias in Basrah, 

Sadr City, Mosul, Amarah, and Diyala—

particularly against Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and 

the Iranian-supported Special Groups—has 

reinforced a widespread shift in the 

population’s attitude toward greater rejection of 

militias. This rejection, while still developing, 

is potentially as significant for Iraq as the Sunni 

rejection of the indiscriminate violence, 

oppressive practices, and extremist ideology of 

AQI. 

Security operations in the above mentioned 

cities have continued to degrade the capabilities 

of AQI and disrupted the activities of militias. 

In Ninewa Province for example, after months 

of elevated security incidents, overall levels of 

violence have fallen 50% since the spring of 

2008 and are now at their lowest levels since 

early 2006. As a result of these operations, 

Iraqi and Coalition forces have succeeded in 

significantly extending their control across 

Iraq. These operations have also helped the 

GoI achieve broader political support, which it 

is now seeking to use in its efforts to resolve 

other challenges. After overcoming initial 

difficulties in Basrah and Sadr City, Iraqi 

forces have continued to assume the lead in 

major operations and effectively deployed and 

performed well in four cities simultaneously. 

Iraqi forces have also demonstrated increased 

capability to develop integrated plans and to 

execute operations. Moreover, as the ISF 

continue to improve, they are earning greater 

levels of support from the Iraqi people. Recent 

allegations of ISF targeting of SoI in Diyala 

Province, however, are of concern. 

Other elements of the ISF have also continued 

to progress. Iraqi Special Operations Forces 

(ISOF) and national and special police units are 

increasingly operating with minimal or no 

Coalition support and are demonstrating 

proficiency in counter-terrorism and 

counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Over 

the past several months, Iraqi Joint 

Headquarters and Division staffs have 

demonstrated an improved ability to deploy and 

sustain units in combat and a better 

understanding of and planning for using and 

integrating combat enablers during operations. 

Local Iraqi Police (IP) have shown an 

improved range of capabilities, particularly in 

the population centers around Ramadi, Kirkuk, 

and Baqubah. Challenges do remain in the 

police force to include increasing the 

professionalism of its officer corps. 

Iraq’s security ministries continue to build 

capacity. The training capacities of the 

Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of 

Interior (MoI) continue to expand. This 

expansion is helping to address significant 

training backlogs. Both security ministries 

have improved their ability to execute their 

budgets. Steps are being taken to address the 

shortage of leaders in the ISF, to include 

rehiring former non-commissioned officers and 

officers who served in the Iraqi Army prior to 

2003. Despite these improvements, many 

challenges remain. The MoD and the MoI 

require greater capacity in order to properly 

man, train, sustain, and field forces, and both 

ministries must improve their procurement 

processes. The MoD needs to continue to 

expand its personnel strength, improve its 

budget process, and improve the speed of 

decision making and the distribution of 

resources, particularly to outlying elements. It 

must also focus its efforts to acquire combat 

enablers, improve logistics capabilities, and 

develop its leaders. The MoD must also 

successfully integrate former militia personnel 

into the Iraqi officer corps. All these endeavors 

will take time. 

The emergence of the SoI remains one of the 

major developments of the past 18 months; 

however, the integration and employment of 

SoI remain a significant challenge. The SoI 

provide significant security benefits to their 

local communities by protecting 
 v September 26, 2008 

neighborhoods, securing key infrastructure and 

roads, and identifying malign activity. What 

began primarily as a Sunni effort has now taken 

hold in many Shi’a and mixed Sunni-Shi’a 

communities as well. Today there are over 

98,000 SoI contributing to local security. The 

SoI have begun transitioning into the ISF, other 

ministries, and other non-security education, 

training, and jobs programs. Over 20,000 

former SoI have already made the transition. 

The majority of these (over 16,000) occurred in 

2006 and 2007 while the remainder (over 

3,500) transitioned more slowly and in smaller 

numbers in 2008. The slow pace of transition 

is a concern. Continued GoI commitment is 

required to ensure SoI are fully transitioned to 

permanent employment. Recent allegations of 

GoI targeting SoI leaders in Diyala Province 

are of concern if they are indicators of GoI 

reluctance to integrate SoI into the ISF or, more 

broadly, to reconcile a diverse province. Prime 

Minister Maliki has recently signed an order 

reflecting his commitment that stipulates the 

GoI will assume responsibility for SoI in 

Baghdad and its environs (over 50,000) 

beginning in October 2008, but Coalition forces 

continue to pay the salaries of SoI personnel. 

Prime Minister Maliki’s order would move 

more than half of the SoIs to the GoI payroll. 

Malign Iranian influence continues to pose the 

most significant threat to long-term stability in 

Iraq. Despite continued Iranian promises to the 

contrary, it appears clear that Iran continues to 

fund, train, arm, and direct SG intent on destabilizing the situation in Iraq. Prime Minister 

Maliki has repeatedly engaged Iranian leaders 

on this issue. The majority of SG leaders 

remain in Iran where they sought sanctuary 

following ISF operations in Basrah, Baghdad 

and Maysan Province. 

Iraqi leaders continue to make incremental but 

steady political progress. The current security 

environment is more hospitable to compromise 

across sectarian and ethnic divides, while 

expanding oil revenues have generated the 

funds needed to support development and 

reconciliation programs. A significant 

legislative achievement this period was the 

passage of the $22 billion 2008 budget 

supplemental bill. Over the last several 

months, the Council of Representatives (CoR) 

has shown a greater willingness and capability 

to address difficult issues. After passing the 

Budget, Provincial Powers and Amnesty Laws, 

Iraqi leaders are now focused on implementing 

these laws. They are doing so with the Sunni 

political bloc having returned to the cabinet, 

and with Sunni Ministers and the Sunni Deputy 

Prime Minister approved by the CoR. Recent 

struggles within the GoI related to ministerial 

appointments, bureaucratic inefficiency, and 

corrupt or sectarian behavior suggest that the 

successful implementation of legislation cannot 

be taken for granted, however, and that 

capacity-building efforts will continue to be 

required. 

The CoR also passed a new Provincial 

Elections Law on September 24, 2008, which is 

currently awaiting approval by the Presidency 

Council. This legislation allows for open list 

elections and establishes an elections deadline 

for January 31, 2008. The passage of this law 

is a milestone for the GoI and, if approved by 

the Presidency Council, will accommodate new 

elections allowing groups that boycotted the 

2005 provincial elections to participate in the 

political process. Depending upon the implementation timeline, elections may still be held 

in 2008 but are more likely to be held in 

January 2009. Despite the initial delays in 

passing this law, the GoI has proceeded with, 

and made substantial progress preparing for 

elections. A successful voter registry update 

was conducted, which included the establishment and operation of 565 voter registration 

centers across the country. The centers were 

staffed by Iraqis, and a nationwide voter 

registration media campaign was completed. 

Voter registration ended in late August 2008 

with 2.9 million Iraqi voters verifying their 

registration information and with the United 

Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) 

declaring the effort a success. 
 vi September 26, 2008 

The GoI also made progress in reconciliation 

efforts during this reporting period. Prime 

Minister Maliki’s willingness to confront 

criminal militias in Basrah, Sadr City, Mosul 

and Amarah and to challenge Iran over its 

support of extremists generated a positive 

response from Sunni communities. On July 19, 

2008, the CoR confirmed six Tawafuqnominated Sunnis and four Shi’a Independents 

as new ministers, to include Dr. Rafie al-Issawi 

as the new Deputy Prime Minister. The 

confirmation marks the end of a one-year 

boycott by the Sunni bloc and the replacement 

of Sadrist ministers who had staged a separate 

walkout in 2007. Recently, the Kurds signaled 

their willingness to compromise on the 

Hydrocarbon Law, although no explicit action 

has been taken. This political progress, 

however, remains fragile. 

Economic development continues, although at 

a slow pace. The GoI’s ability to spend its 

funds, provide essential services, and promote 

economic development continues to improve, 

but only marginally. The Iraqi economy grew 

0.4% in 2007 and is projected to grow 8% in 

2008, due in large part to expanding oil 

revenues. Budget execution is still hampered 

by insufficient contracting capacity and by a 

still maturing budgetary process; however, 

overall capital budget execution continues to 

improve. The GoI has spent or committed $3.6 

billion (28%) of its $13 billion capital budget 

through June 2008. Provincial budget 

execution has also improved in 2008 though 

progress by province has varied. 

The oil and electrical sectors have improved, 

but GoI delivery of a broader set of essential 

services still lags. Oil production has risen by 

400,000 barrels per day since September 2007 

and, in the last quarter, surpassed pre-liberation 

production levels. Electricity generation is 

averaging 12% higher this year than last, 

despite the loss of a significant portion of 

hydro-eclectic power due to this year’s drought. 

However, the population’s level of satisfaction 

with essential services remains low as the 

ministries struggle with aging infrastructure 

and increased demand. Improving the delivery 

of these services is essential to continue to 

draw popular support away from militias and 

insurgents and toward the central government. 

The Coalition is working with the GoI to 

improve ministerial capacity to meet these 

challenges. For example, important work 

continues in helping the GoI transition essential 

service operations, maintenance, and support 

contracts from U.S.-led to GoI-led efforts. 

Significant effort has gone into short-term job 

creation programs designed to facilitate the 

transition toward a sustainable private sector, 

but more private investment and credit 

availability will be required. Ongoing banking 

reform will play an important supporting role in 

this effort. Iraq will benefit from continuing 

efforts to realize efficiency gains via properly 

functioning pricing mechanisms in key sectors 

and from redesigning the social safety net. The 

international community has taken note of 

Iraq’s economic progress, as highlighted by a 

number of significant private investment 

initiatives and by Iraq’s fruitful engagements 

with the International Compact with Iraq (ICI) 

and other organizations. 

Further improvement in Iraq’s rule of law 

capability and capacity is essential to the 

country’s long-term stability and the slow pace 

of progress here remains troubling. Intimidation of and violence against judges, a 

massive pre-trial detention backlog, a lack of 

cooperation between ministries, and a lack of 

resources undermine the judiciary’s power, 

prestige, and independence. Corruption 

continues to plague Iraqi governmental 

institutions. To address these problems, 

Coalition rule of law and anti-corruption efforts 

focus on protecting judges and their families, 

working with Iraqi courts to improve processes 

and reduce case backlogs, and promoting and 

improving anti-corruption agencies the GoI has 

established. 

Growing recognition of the legitimacy and 

capacity of the GoI has encouraged significant 

international economic engagement since the 
 vii September 26, 2008 

last reporting period. Since the May 29, 2008 

Ministerial in Stockholm, efforts to advance the 

goals of the ICI have continued, producing 

increased visibility and opportunities for trade 

and greater integration with the global 

economy. Favorable outcomes from Expanded 

Neighbors Conferences include the Bulgarian 

Finance Ministry’s acceptance of a final 

settlement of $360 million for Iraq’s Saddamera debts and its agreement to write off the 

remaining $1.5 billion debt. Similarly, Jordan 

signed a debt rescheduling agreement and is 

preparing to restore broader economic ties. 

The UAE cancelled nearly $7 billion in Iraqi 

debt, and Oman is preparing to restore broader 

economic ties. 

During this period, Iraq participated in 

important diplomatic engagements with its 

neighbors. Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdogan 

met with Prime Minister Maliki in Baghdad in 

July 2008, marking the first visit to Iraq by a 

Turkish Prime Minister in 18 years. The Prime 

Ministers signed a Supreme Strategic 

Cooperation Convention which sets the 

framework for increased political, security, 

economic, and cultural cooperation. In August 

2008, His Royal Highness King Abdullah of 

Jordan flew to Iraq and met with senior GoI 

leaders. This marked the first visit of an Arab 

head of state to Iraq since 2003. Other visits by 

high-level leaders include those of UAE 

Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayid, Lebanese 

Prime Minister Siniora, and Lebanese 

Parliamentary bloc leader Sa’ad Hariri. In 

addition, Jordan, Bahrain, and the UAE have 

formally named ambassadors to Iraq. Kuwait 

has also named an ambassador to Iraq, ending a 

two-decade old diplomatic rift. Egypt and 

Qatar have announced their intention to 

identify and send ambassadors. 

Negotiations to formalize a bilateral 

relationship between Iraq and the United States 

continue. The GoI views development of this 

relationship as a strong affirmation of its 

sovereignty and of its close relationship to the 

United States. 

 

In summary, political, security, economic, and 

diplomatic trends in Iraq this past quarter 

continued to be positive; however, they remain 

fragile, reversible, and uneven. Progress 

towards durable security has been made even as 

Coalition forces have drawn down. Normalcy 

is increasingly returning to formerly violent 

parts of Iraq. The ISF continues to improve 

and is in the lead in maintaining security for the 

Iraqi people. Improved security has allowed 

for dialogue among Iraq’s many groups and 

political entities. The reduced violence has 

provided time and space in which institutional 

development can occur. While security has 

improved dramatically, the fundamental 

character of the conflict in Iraq remains 

unchanged—a communal struggle for power 

and resources. Concerns remain in the areas of 

political reconciliation, rule of law, and 

ministerial capacity. In order to achieve 

enduring stability and realize its full potential, 

the GoI must continue to build its legitimacy by 

clearly serving the Iraqi people while paying 

continued attention to the remaining challenges 

discussed above to help solidify and build on 

the progress achieved.
 viii September 26, 2008 

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 1 September 26, 2008 

Section 1—Stability and Security

1.1 Political Stability 

Iraqi leaders continue to make incremental but 

significant political progress. Prime Minister 

Maliki’s stand against the Jaysh al-Mahdi 

(JAM) and Special Groups (SG) militia 

elements in Basrah, as well as subsequent 

operations in Baghdad, Ninewa, Maysan, and 

Diyala Provinces, have generated an improved 

atmosphere of political unity. However, this 

environment is fragile and reversible. The 

recent return of Tawafuq to previously vacant 

ministerial positions was a welcome sign of reengagement by Sunni Arabs at the national 

level. Furthermore, the passage of the 

Provincial Elections Law demonstrates the 

ability of Shi’a, Sunni, Kurdish, and Turkoman 

lawmakers to compromise on key legislation. 

However, Kurd-Arab tensions centered on the 

status of Kirkuk, lack of Shi’a Arab solidarity 

in the Council of Representatives (CoR), and 

corrupt or sectarian behavior indicate the road 

ahead will not be smooth or linear. 

National Reconciliation 

Some positive development toward national 

reconciliation has occurred. The willingness of 

the Government of Iraq (GoI) to confront 

militias, regardless of sect, has encouraged 

Tawafuq to reconcile its internal differences 

and return its ministers to the government, 

restoring an additional avenue for Sunni 

participation in the political process. The 

Executive Council has convened several 

meetings with the leadership of each major 

power bloc in an attempt to reach consensus on 

the Provincial Elections Law which ultimately 

resulted in its passage. Similarly, the political 

parties have demonstrated a willingness to use 

the reconstituted Political Council for National 

Security as a forum for political leaders to 

discuss national issues like the Strategic 

Framework Agreement (SFA). Although there 

is some indication of improvement in national 

reconciliation efforts by the senior leadership, 

sectarian divisions still persist. 

Political Commitments 

Legislative proceedings resumed after the 

elevated number of attacks on the International 

Zone was reduced in April and May 2008. The 

CoR has voted 23 measures into law since the 

winter recess, including a civil service salary 

law, a terrorist act/military operations victim 

compensation law, and an anti-oil smuggling 

law. In addition, the CoR also ratified an 

agreement to participate in the Arab Women’s 

Organization. The CoR extended the spring 

session from the end of June until early August 

2008 to allow more time to negotiate the 

revised text of the Provincial Elections Law. 

Finally, on September 24, 2008, the CoR 

negotiated a final compromise to pass this 

important legislation. 

Other major legislative priorities for this period 

included the 2008 Budget Supplemental for the 

ministries and provinces, the Hydrocarbon 

Framework Law, and the return of Tawafuq 

representatives to the Council of Ministers. 

During its recently completed session, the CoR 

passed the Budget Supplemental Law and 

approved ministerial nominations; however, it 

failed to make progress on the Hydrocarbon 

Law. 

Accountability and Justice Law (DeBa’athification Reform Law) 

The GoI has not begun implementing the 

Accountability and Justice Law. The Council 

of Ministers has yet to nominate the individuals 

to head the new commission, which leaves the 

original De-Ba’athification Commission in 

place and hinders the implementation of the 

application process directed under the new law.

Provincial Elections Law and Execution 

Planning

The Iraqi Parliament voted to pass the 

Provincial Elections Law on September 24, 

2008. In an attempt to find language 

acceptable to all, the United Nations Assistance 

Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) facilitated intensive 
 2 September 26, 2008 

negotiations between the major political leaders 

and continued to work with a specially 

appointed committee to draft a compromise 

acceptable to all parties. Agreement was 

reached after Shi’a, Sunni, Kurdish, and 

Turkomen lawmakers adopted the UNAMI 

compromise to form a parliamentary review 

committee to review disputes regarding powersharing and special elections for Kirkuk, 

separately. This will allow for elections to take 

place everywhere in Iraq but Kirkuk. The law 

has been submitted to the Presidency Council 

for approval. Although President Talabani 

vetoed the July 22, 2008 draft of the Provincial 

Elections Law submitted by the CoR, it is 

unlikely he will do so again given the Kurdish 

support for this draft. The current text of the 

Provincial Elections Law allows for open list 

elections and establishes an elections deadline 

for January 31, 2009. 

Despite the initial difficulties in advancing 

elections legislation, the Independent Higher 

Electoral Commission (IHEC) continued with 

the process of updating Iraq’s voter registry. 

The voter registration update was conducted 

over a 39-day period at 565 voter registration 

centers throughout Iraq. Because the voter 

registry is based on the national Public 

Distribution System, a majority of Iraqis were 

already registered to vote. This registration 

update was undertaken simply to allow Iraqi 

citizens the opportunity to make minor administrative updates to ensure that they would be 

eligible to vote. Additionally, the voter 

registration helped to build the national and 

provincial capacity required to successfully 

execute the first Iraqi-led, democratic 

provincial elections. The ISF provided security 

and, as a result of their efforts, the registration 

update went smoothly with only a few minor 

security incidents. During the registry update, 

Coalition forces served in advisory and 

overwatch roles only.

Disputed Internal Boundaries (Article 140) 

UNAMI is continuing its incremental approach 

to resolving disputed internal boundaries within 

Iraq. UNAMI presented its Stage One proposal 

to the GoI in June 2008, recommending that 

Akre and Makhmour districts become part of 

the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), 

that Hamdaniya remain part of Ninewa, and 

that the Mandali sub-district remain part of 

Diyala Province. Although some Iraqi 

politicians expressed disappointment with the 

proposals, there was general agreement that the 

process should continue, with GoI and KRG 

officials agreeing to wait for UNAMI’s 

complete package of recommendations before 

making a final decision. Increased tension in 

the vicinity of Kirkuk following the first vote 

on the Provincial Elections Law and 

subsequent veto by the Presidency Council 

indicates that sporadic violence may complicate 

future boundary-related negotiations. While 

the Provincial Elections Law passed by the 

CoR on September 24, 2008 does not address 

the status of Kirkuk, it does establish a 

parliamentary review committee to deal 

specifically with this issue. Tension between 

the GoI and the KRG in northern Diyala 

Province is a further indication. 

Amnesty Law 

The Presidency Council approved the Amnesty 

Law on February 26, 2008, allowing amnesty 

for Iraqis accused or convicted of certain 

crimes and focuses particularly on pre-trial 

detainees.3

 The Higher Juridical Council (HJC) 

reports that the amnesty review committees 

have considered nearly 150,000 amnesty cases 

and have granted amnesty in more than 

118,000 of them. In addition to a large number 

of Iraqis free on bail or parole or facing 

warrants, the total granted amnesty includes 

over 22,000 cases affecting individuals held in 

pre- or post-trial confinement. It is unknown 

exactly how many individuals are awaiting 

release. Recognizing that the Amnesty Law 

allows amnesty to be give to those charged 

with violations of the Anti-Terrorism Law, the 

Council of Ministers approved amendments in 

early May 2008 that would withhold amnesty 

from anyone convicted or accused of terrorism. 

Some members of the CoR believed the 

proposed amendments were designed to target 
 3 September 26, 2008 

Sunnis, and the amendments gained no traction 

in the CoR; they are unlikely to become law. 

Release from custody for those granted 

amnesty has proceeded slowly due to political, 

inter-ministerial coordination, logistical, and 

reintegration difficulties. According to the 

Minister of Human Rights, more than 5,700 

detainees have been released. Coalition data 

seems to corroborate GoI claims. 

A Package of Hydrocarbon Laws 

Negotiations between the GoI and the KRG 

continue in regard to the hydrocarbon 

legislation package. Until recently, political 

differences between the KRG and the central 

government prevented the Hydrocarbon Law 

and its three supporting laws from progressing. 

Prime Minister Maliki and KRG Prime 

Minister Barzani have kept the process moving 

through personal meetings, most recently in 

mid-June, to discuss the KRG’s latest 

proposals. It is likely that several more rounds 

of negotiations between the two sides will 

occur before they reach an agreement. 

Controversy on the elections in Kirkuk will 

likely affect the hydrocarbon legislation 

package. 

Constitutional Review 

The Constitutional Review Committee has not 

progressed beyond the limited success it 

achieved on human rights and judiciary roles. 

The committee failed to meet its June 30, 2008 

deadline for submission of a final report, but its 

mandate was extended by the Parliament until 

the end of the fall 2008 legislative session. 

Government Reform

Ministerial Capacity Development 

In 2007, the capital budget execution rate for 

the GoI was more than double the rate in 2006. 

The upward trend in absolute budget execution 

is expected to continue through 2008, although 

the addition of a mid-year supplemental budget 

may ultimately impede the GoI’s ability to 

improve on its 2007 execution rate. In June 

2008, the U.S. Embassy formed the Public 

Finance Management Group (PFMAG), 

chaired by the Coordinator for Economic 

Transition in Iraq and composed of all U.S. 

Government entities involved in addressing 

budget execution. Training and technical 

assistance have put ministries in better 

positions to design, develop, implement, and 

monitor their proposed projects. 

 

The United States Agency for International 

Development (USAID) has undertaken efforts 

to increase GoI capacity and to promote 

transparency and to combat corruption, misuse, 

and abuse of public funds. For example, 

USAID’s Tatweer Energy Group developed 

work plans for the Ministries of Oil and 

Electricity and started the implementation of 

jointly-identified priorities. Tatweer is working 

with the two energy ministries to streamline 

their procurement and contracting procedures 

to bring them into compliance with 

international best practices. Building the 

capacity of civil servants at the Ministry of Oil 

in the procurement and contracting area is a 

long-term development goal. 

The rule of law section of the U.S. Embassy 

has assisted the Ministry of Justice in budget 

preparation, execution, and capital budget 

program management. The political section 

has managed expanded statecraft and 

legislative capacity development assistance to 

the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers 

and Council of Ministers’ Secretariat. Future 

initiatives will expand capacity development in 

the Treasury and Health Attaché offices to 

support the Ministries of Finance and Health, 

respectively. 

Provincial Reconstruction Teams

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), 

Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams 

(ePRTs) and Provincial Support Teams (PSTs) 

are essential elements in the U.S. strategy for 

success in Iraq. PRTs draw on interagency and 

Coalition military expertise to build governance 

capacity at the local, municipal, and provincial 

levels. Currently, there are 27 PRTs operating 

in Iraq—11 led by the U.S. and three led by the 

Coalition. There are 13 ePRTs embedded with 

Coalition forces that work on sub-provincial 
 4 September 26, 2008 

stability tasks in support of counterinsurgency 

operations. Additionally, four PSTs work at 

the provincial level but operate remotely from 

established bases located in neighboring 

provinces. Recently, the Qadisiyah, Najaf, and 

Karbala teams transitioned from local PSTs to 

full PRTs, greatly enhancing their access and 

effectiveness. 

Reconstruction teams are instrumental in 

furthering provincial development by 

promoting reconciliation, fostering economic 

development, supporting implementation of the 

rule of law, and by improving the capacity of 

local governments to execute their budgets and 

deliver essential services. PRTs work closely 

with State Department and USAID program 

officers on a wide variety of activities designed 

to promote economic and political development 

programs and to strengthen civil society. These 

programs help local economies generate jobs, 

improving stability. Recently, the PRTs helped 

local governments complete their respective 

Provincial Development Strategies (PDSs), 

which outline broad development objectives for 

the next three to five years. In March 2008, 

PDSs from 17 of 18 provinces were formally 

turned over to the GoI, forming a basis for 

National Strategy Development. These 

strategies help local governments plan and 

execute their budgets to meet the needs of area 

residents and provide a blueprint to support 

Iraq’s transition to self-reliance. 

Rule of Law and Criminal Justice Development 

Iraq’s criminal justice system faces a number of 

serious challenges. Judicial intimidation 

significantly hinders administration of the 

criminal justice system and is the most 

immediate threat to advancement of the rule of 

law in Iraq. Incidents of violence against 

judges appear to have increased, starting with 

the June 2008 assassination of the chief judge 

of one of Baghdad’s appellate jurisdictions, the 

highest ranking judge to have been killed of the 

37 assassinated since the beginning of the 

insurgency. His murder was followed the next 

week by at least five unsuccessful attempts 

against Baghdad judges. 

To combat judicial intimidation, the Coalition 

has focused on securing courthouses and 

protecting judges and their families by locating 

them in secure complexes throughout Iraq. 

Although individual judges living in the first 

functioning Rule of Law Complex (ROLC) in 

Rusafa have been enthusiastic about this 

arrangement, the HJC has yet to fully embrace 

the concept due to concerns over judicial 

independence. Although the Ramadi ROLC 

will achieve initial operating capacity in 

October 2008, movement on other planned 

ROLCs has stalled due to the HJC’s reluctance. 

Courts in which the most serious insurgent 

crimes are handled continue to be 

overwhelmed, particularly in Baghdad. The 

sheer number of criminal cases and the lack of 

timely and complete investigations, combined 

with poor court administration and judicial 

intimidation, hamper the ability of investigative 

courts to process cases in a fair and timely 

manner. Lack of cooperation from the Ministry 

of the Interior (MoI) and Ministry of Justice 

(MoJ), responsible for initial criminal 

investigations and the execution of judicial 

orders, respectively, undermines the 

judiciary’s power, independence, and prestige. 

The MoJ’s failure to implement civil orders, 

particularly those regarding land title conflicts, 

has lessened Iraqi society’s confidence in the 

rule of law. Finally, resources available to the 

judiciary are generally poor. Many courts in 

smaller communities lack basic necessities such 

as plumbing and electricity. Courts in the 

larger towns and cities generally have 

plumbing and electricity but are subject to the 

same electrical power shortages as their 

surrounding communities. Most small courts 

lack communications and automation 

equipment and access to the internet, though 

efforts to automate record keeping are currently 

underway at the HJC. The total number of 

judges in the HJC is approximately 1,200. 

Coalition rule of law capacity-building efforts 

have made limited progress combating these 

problems. Currently, the Coalition’s top 

priority is to encourage the GoI to take actions 
 5 September 26, 2008 

to secure judges and to increase the power of 

the judiciary vis-à-vis the other branches of 

government. Coalition advisors throughout the 

country are working to develop relationships 

with judges in an effort to increase court 

productivity and reduce the number of pre-trial 

detainees held by ISF at local facilities. Other 

efforts include improving the quality of the 

Iraqi juvenile justice system, supporting the 

GoI Ministerial Committee on the Rule of Law 

and Detention, and increasing Iraqi prison 

capacity and staff. The Department of State 

has several existing and new judicial assistance 

programs designed to help the Iraqi judiciary 

improve the skills of judges and court 

administrators and enhance judicial and court 

security. 

The Law and Order Task Force (LAOTF) has 

the mission to improve Iraqi investigative and 

judicial capacity, primarily at the Central 

Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI) at Rusafa. In 

the reporting period, LAOTF judicial 

mentoring teams have established closer 

relationships with Rusafa’s judges and 

administrators, resulting in some progress in 

case management. Its defense team has worked 

closely with its Iraqi counterparts to help secure 

the release of numerous detainees who had 

been held for years without charges or who had 

been granted amnesty. Finally, LAOTF has 

implemented an initiative to assist CCCIRusafa in reducing the backlog of cases 

pending at the Rusafa detention center. In spite 

of this effort, case processing remains slow 

and, at the current rate of adjudication, will 

take approximately three years to eliminate the 

detainee backlog. 

The quality of Iraqi detention facilities and 

detainee treatment varies. MoI and MoD 

forces continue to rely on confessions, often 

coerced, as a substitute for physical evidence 

when investigating criminal cases; coerced 

confessions account for the majority of 

detainee maltreatment reports. MoJ facilities, 

in contrast, are generally staffed with trained 

Iraqi corrections officers who are not involved 

in case investigation. Further, MoJ facilities 

usually provide adequate life support. 

However, many MoJ facilities, particularly 

post-trial facilities, are overcrowded and 

receive inadequate healthcare support from the 

Ministry of Health. U.S. Government-funded 

prisons have been established over the past 

several months, beginning with the first 800-

bed phase of a facility in Nasiriyah that opened 

in July 2008. These new prisons should help 

with post-trial overcrowding by early 2009, 

provided that convict population growth 

remains steady. 

Anti-Corruption Efforts

Recognizing that public corruption continues to 

plague Iraqi society, the GoI continues to 

strengthen its anti-corruption agencies and 

improve its transparency and accountability. In 

2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority 

established the GoI’s three main anti-corruption 

agencies under orders 55, 57, and 77. Order 55 

established the Commission on Integrity 

(CoI)—formerly known as the Commission on 

Public Integrity—as a criminal investigative 

and regulatory agency and with responsibility 

over the public disclosure of wealth provisions 

of Iraqi law. Order 57 established the 

Inspectors General, similar to the American 

system. Order 77 reaffirmed the Board of 

Supreme Audit (BSA), originally established in 

1920, as an independent auditing agency. In 

June 2007, Iraq established the Joint AntiCorruption Council that allows these agencies 

to coordinate efforts with each other and with 

representatives from the CoR and the Prime 

Minister’s Office. Iraq also became a signatory 

to the UN Convention on Anti-Corruption—a 

benchmark under the International Compact 

with Iraq (ICI)—and re-started the Iraq 

Financial Management Information System. 

In April 2008, an ambassadorial-level official 

was appointed to serve as the Coordinator for 

Anti-Corruption Initiatives at the U.S. Embassy 

in Baghdad. This individual spearheads the 

Embassy’s anti-corruption effort and is the 

chief U.S. representative working with Iraqi 

officials to establish robust governmental 

systems to combat corruption and improve 
 6 September 26, 2008 

budget development, execution, and 

monitoring. 

In July 2008, the Ministries of Interior and 

Defense co-hosted their second AntiCorruption Strategic Planning Conference. 

This conference brought together U.S. and GoI 

officials to discuss anti-corruption efforts in 

Iraq. The U.S. Coordinator for Anti-Corruption 

Initiatives was invited to brief the conference 

on U.S. anti-corruption efforts across all Iraqi 

ministries. 

Transnational Issues 

A continuing series of Expanded Neighbors 

Conferences and international visits highlight 

growth in the international community’s 

support for Iraq. Conference topics have 

covered a range of security, energy, refugee, 

and economic issues. Several resulting 

economic initiatives have resulted, including 

Bulgaria’s acceptance in July of a final 

settlement offer of $360 million for Iraq’s 

Saddam-era debts. The Finance Minister of 

Oman was recently in Baghdad for talks with 

GoI officials, and Jordan signed a debt 

rescheduling agreement. On July 6, 2008, the 

United Arab Emirates (UAE) cancelled nearly 

$7 billion in Iraqi debts. 

The International Reconstruction Fund for Iraq 

(IRFFI) convened its seventh donor committee 

meeting in Baghdad on July 7, 2008, the first 

major international conference in Baghdad this 

year. Donor countries agreed to refocus 

IRFFI’s work on capacity-building and to 

spend roughly $55 million on immediate 

humanitarian assistance and civil society 

development. 

Improved Iraqi-Turkish relations is another 

positive development. Turkish Prime Minister 

Erdogan visited Baghdad on July 10, 2008, the 

first visit by a Turkish Prime Minister in 18 

years. He and Prime Minister Maliki signed a 

High-Level Strategic Cooperation Convention, 

a framework for increased political, security, 

economic, and cultural cooperation. Direct 

engagement with Turkey is proceeding, even 

though the pace of Turkish cross-border 

operations into northern Iraq in 2008 is higher 

than in any year since the beginning of 

Operation Iraqi Freedom. The strikes, 

however, have been limited in scope, targeting 

only Kongra Gel (KGK) fighters and facilities 

in the border area. There seems to be growing 

recognition among Iraqis—including Iraqi 

Kurds—of the importance of economic and 

political ties with Turkey. 

International Compact with Iraq

Iraq continues to strengthen its economy 

through increased regional and international 

economic ties and assistance. Since the May 

29, 2008, Ministerial in Stockholm, efforts to 

advance the goals of the ICI have continued 

and focus on increasing opportunities for trade 

and also integration within the global economy. 

Recent positive developments include trade 

missions from the United States, Japan, 

Bahrain, and Oman. Challenges remain, 

however, including the needs to resolve tariffrelated legislative issues, to persuade Iraq’s 

other regional neighbors to increase economic 

ties and assistance, and to resolve problems at 

the Kuwaiti border in order to increase the 

amount of imported refined petroleum products. 

Iranian Influence

Since 2003, Tehran has invested heavily to gain 

and maintain influence at all levels and across 

multiple sectors of the GoI. Despite longstanding ties between Iran and some members 

of the GoI, Tehran’s influence campaign is 

beginning to strain that relationship due to a 

rising perception that Iran poses a significant 

threat to Iraqi sovereignty. The primary source 

of tension between the governments is Tehran’s 

continued support to Shi’a militia groups 

fomenting instability. Although Iran’s 

leadership publicly proclaimed it stopped 

providing lethal aid to Shi’a militants, the 

evidence does not support their claim. Iraqi 

Security Forces (ISF) operations in Basrah, 

Sadr City, and Amarah yielded evidence that 

calls into question the Government of Iran’s 

sincerity and commitment to that proclamation. 

Even more problematic is the aid and refuge 
 7 September 26, 2008 

Iran is now providing to JAM Special Group 

elements that fled during ISF operations to 

sanctuary in Iranian Islamic Revolutionary 

Guard Corps – Qods Force training camps in 

Iran. Iranian support remains a principle 

reason for continued violence. 

Syrian Influence 

Although relations between Syria and Iraq 

started to improve in late 2007, tension over the 

flow of foreign fighters into Iraq and the 

increasing financial burden Iraqi refugees place 

on Syrian society are significant hurdles that 

prevent more robust political, economic, and 

diplomatic relations between the two 

governments. Syria remains the primary 

facilitation gateway for foreign terrorists 

moving into Iraq. The GoI has implored Syria 

to do more to stop the flow of foreign terrorists 

but is not yet satisfied with Syria’s level of 

effort. The Syrian Government is aware of the 

al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) network in Syria and 

occasionally detains AQI facilitators and 

operatives, but it has not made consistent or 

committed efforts to eliminate the AQI 

sanctuary that exists within its borders. 

Both Iraq and Syria hope to improve their 

relationship, but neither side seems willing to 

take the first step to better diplomatic relations. 

Syria continues to focus on economic 

cooperation, while Iraq demands security 

cooperation as a prerequisite to reestablishing 

full diplomatic relations.

Tensions on the Border with Turkey

Negotiations between Iraq and Turkey on both 

economic and security issues are progressing, 

albeit slowly. Turkey continues to ask the GoI 

and the KRG to limit KGK operations. During 

his July 10, 2008 meeting with Prime Minister 

Maliki, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan 

thanked both the GoI and KRG for their 

assistance. This public acknowledgment of 

Iraqi efforts is significant and indicates an 

improving relationship. The Supreme Strategic 

Cooperation Convention signed in July 2008 by 

Prime Ministers Maliki and Erdogan commits 

the two nations to cooperation on security and 

stability issues and calls for regular meetings to 

review progress. 

Internally Displaced Persons 

The United Nations High Commissioner for 

Refugees (UNHCR) reports that there are 

nearly 2.8 million people displaced inside Iraq. 

Military operations in Basrah, Sadr City, 

Mosul, Amarah, and Diyala in the last quarter 

resulted in almost no new displacements, 

however. Overall, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and UNHCR report 

very little new displacement in Iraq since 

March 2008. Coalition reporting indicates that 

the tempo of internally displaced person (IDP) 

returns has increased. Over the previous eight 

months, 49,215 families have returned to 

Baghdad alone; this is an estimated quarter of a 

million people. 

These present security and other challenges. 

On security, large spontaneous returns present 

the possibility of conflict between returning 

IDPs and those who may have occupied their 

homes. Also, unprogrammed returns add 

demands to government services that are 

stressed and inadequate. 

USAID is the lead agency for tracking and 

coordinating U.S. Government assistance to 

IDPs. As security conditions continue to 

improve, USAID, its partner nongovernmental 

organizations, and members of the international 

community are helping the GoI fulfill its 

commitment to improving essential services for 

IDPs. 

United Nations Assistance Mission - Iraq 

In line with its broadened mandate, UNAMI 

remains deeply engaged in assisting the GoI in 

various political and diplomatic activities. 

These activities include assisting in national 

dialogue and political reconciliation, addressing 

internal border issues, promoting regional 

dialogue, assisting IDPs and returnees, and 

facilitating demobilization, disarmament, and 

reintegration. Most recently, UNAMI has been 

instrumental in advising CoR committee 

members on the Provincial Elections Law and 
 8 September 26, 2008 

the IHEC as they executed an update of the 

voter registry that concluded in late August 

2008 with 2.9 million Iraqis registering to vote 

or updating and verifying their information. 

The number of UNAMI missions throughout 

Iraq has doubled in comparison to 2007, 

signaling UNAMI’s increasingly proactive 

efforts to assist the GoI with critical long-term 

issues like elections and disputed boundaries. 

In addition to established posts in Baghdad and 

Irbil, UNAMI has opened stations in Basrah 

and Kirkuk. 

Other Regional Issues 

The GoI continues to establish itself among its 

neighbors. During this period, Iraq saw a string 

of high-level visits by key neighbors. In 

August 2008, His Royal Highness King 

Abdullah of Jordan flew to Iraq and engaged 

with senior GoI leaders, the first visit of an 

Arab head of state since 2003. Other high-level 

visits during this period including those of 

UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayid, 

Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, and Lebanese 

Prime Minister Siniora and Parliamentary bloc 

leader Sa’ad Hariri. Iraq’s diplomatic relations 

with its Arab neighbors improved in the last 

quarter, with Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the 

UAE formally naming ambassadors to Iraq. 

Egypt and Qatar have also announced their 

intention to identify and send ambassadors. 

Despite the decline in violence across Iraq this 

quarter, regional Arab governments continue to 

cite security concerns as the primary reason to 

limit diplomatic relations with Iraq. However, 

recent successful operations in Basrah, Sadr 

City, and Amarah have assuaged some 

concerns. These operations have also 

engendered greater confidence in the GoI’s 

willingness to challenge criminals and militias 

in a non-sectarian manner. 

Long-Term Strategic Relationship 

The GoI and the United States are currently 

negotiating a SFA and other agreements that 

define their long-term relationship. The SFA is 

intended to describe bilateral principles that 

cover economic, diplomatic, cultural, scientific, 

and security issues. The SFA will elaborate on 

the elements of the Declaration of Principles 

for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation 

and Friendship between the Republic of Iraq 

and the United States, which was signed in 

November 2007. Other agreements associated 

with the SFA will include essential authorities 

needed by U.S. Forces to continue to contribute 

to stability and security in Iraq after the 

expected expiration of the UN Security Council 

mandate for Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNFI) at the end of 2008. 

Conclusion 

Iraq has made considerable progress in the 

political and diplomatic arenas, but that 

progress has been uneven. Iraqi efforts to 

engage the international community are bearing 

fruit. Debt relief, economic support, and other 

strategic initiatives have been established with 

neighboring countries and other nations. Arab 

countries have been appointing ambassadors to 

Iraq, and a long-term strategic relationship with 

the United States is pending approval. 

Although the implementation of the recently 

passed Provincial Elections Law has yet to 

begin, the voter registry update has been 

completed in anticipation of a late-year 

election. But many challenges remain. Iraqi 

leaders must manage lingering sectarianism, 

immature institutions, neighbors who are not 

fully committed to the GoI’s success, and the 

complexity of constructing a democratic state. 

Iran continues to attempt to influence GoI 

policy and decision making. 
 9 September 26, 2008 

1.2 Economic Activity 

The GoI’s ability to spend its resources, 

provide essential services, and promote 

economic development has continued to show 

steady but slow improvement. In addition to 

improving its energy sector, Iraq has made 

important progress in reintegrating into the 

regional and international economic 

communities. Significant challenges remain, 

including the need for further budget execution 

growth, job creation, and domestic and foreign 

investment. 

Improvements in Iraq’s energy sector continue, 

with greater electricity generation and oil 

production and with increased electricity 

distribution and oil exports due to better 

security. Electricity generation this year is 

averaging 12% greater than last year, with far 

fewer blackouts since switching stations were 

wrested from militia control. During the first 

eight months of 2008, oil production has 

averaged 2.4 million barrels per day (mbbl/d) 

and exports have averaged 1.9 mbbl/d. 

Continued energy sector growth, however, is 

likely to remain limited without greater 

domestic and foreign investment. 

Energy sector development, moderately 

improved budget execution capacity, and 

focused efforts on job creation have played a 

significant role in promoting economic growth 

and in improving the quality of life. Increased 

exports and higher international oil prices 

generated revenue sufficient to allow the 

Ministry of Finance (MoF) to submit a $22.3 

billion FY 08 supplemental budget request that 

was passed by the CoR on August 6, 2008. 

Iraq has made important progress in 

reintegrating itself into the regional and 

international economic communities. 

Continuing engagement with the ICI, the 

International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the 

World Trade Organization, as well as the 

development of the capacity to work effectively 

with them, must be a continuing priority for the 

GoI. 

Despite this progress, there remains a need for 

significant economic growth. Additional 

private investment will be needed before a 

sufficient number of jobs are created to 

alleviate persistent unemployment and 

underemployment. The agricultural and 

agribusiness sectors in local, provincial, and 

regional economies have significant potential 

for facilitating economic development and 

creating jobs. Banking reform currently 

underway, including the restructuring of stateowned banks and private sector bank 

development, will also play an important 

supporting role in the future growth of the Iraqi 

economy. Properly functioning pricing 

mechanisms in key sectors like fuels and 

electricity could help ensure the efficient 

distribution of resources and in encouraging the 

expansion of energy supplies. Finally, 

decreasing market distortions and eliminating 

corruption through increased transparency must 

be a continuing priority. 

Budget Execution

The GoI has improved its ability to spend its 

resources. Total GoI expenditure through June 

2007, including capital and operating 

expenditure, was $10.4 billion; by contrast, 

current year total expenditure through June 

2008 was $19.1 billion—an 84% increase. 

Capital budget expenditure has also increased, 

reflecting an improved GoI ability to meet its 

country’s reconstruction needs. Total capital 

expenditure through May 2008 was $1.74 

billion, a significant increase from the $798 

million in the same period in 2007. 

Provincial governments spent or committed 

$870 million of their $2.3 billion adjusted 

capital budget allocation through December 

2007.5

 This low rate of execution is partly due 

to last year’s requirement for High Contracts 

Committee (HCC) approval for projects of 

more than $5 million. In addition, contracting 

regulations required local contractor 

solicitations before broadening the scope of 

advertisement nationwide. In 2008, spending 

authority was increased to $10 million and the 

HCC was replaced by a new approving 
 10 September 26, 2008 

authority called the Central Contracts 

Committee, which was designed to be more 

responsive to requests for approval. 

Bureaucratic impediments, combined with a 

limited availability of domestic contractors, 

continue to slow progress and increase the 

typical number of weeks required to sign a 

contract. Through August 6, 2008, provinces 

had committed or spent $2.4 billion of a $2.6 

billion 2007 budget (92%) and $1.6 billion of a 

$3.7 billion 2008 budget (42%). 

These figures are subject to two caveats. First, 

there continues to be a two-month lag in 

receiving expenditure data. Second, the KRG 

does not provide any budgetary performance 

feedback to the central government. The MoF 

therefore considers any funds transferred to the 

KRG as expended. 

 

The GoI has introduced new measures to give 

the ministries and provinces more time to spend 

their capital budgets. The 2008 Iraqi Budget 

Law allows the provinces and the ministries to 

roll over their unspent 2007 capital budget 

allocations into current budget year accounts. 

Additionally, in early 2008, the Council of 

Ministers issued two new GoI procurement 

measures that facilitate procurement and 

expedite budget execution; the first streamlines 

the letter of credit approval process, while the 

second raises spending authorities for 

ministries and provinces, increasing their 

contracting authority. 

Late passage of the Iraqi 2008 budget 

hampered first quarter 2008 capital budget 

expenditures, but overall spending picked up 

significantly in April. MoF data indicates that 

through June 2008, the GoI had spent or 

committed $1.27 billion of its annual $7.0 

billion ministerial capital budget (excluding the 

KRG). 

The United States is expanding its technical 

assistance to help the GoI improve budget 

execution. The Embassy’s Treasury Attaché’s 

office has established formalized training for 

GoI ministerial and provincial officials in the 

form of three- to five-day Investment Budget 

Execution Workshops. Also, the newly 

formulated Embassy- and Treasury-led 

PFMAG is focusing on improving interagency 

coordination and cooperation on budget 

execution assistance. Additionally, the GoI and 

the U.S. Government restarted the Iraq 

Financial Management Information System 

(IFMIS) on July 5, 2008 in targeted ministries, 

with the expectation that IFMIS will be 

operational in all 250 spending units by early 

2009. The IFMIS system will improve budget 

reporting and transparency and will facilitate 

increased GoI accountability. 

2008 Iraqi Budget 

The CoR granted approval of the budget midFebruary 2008 and published it in the Official 

Gazette in late March 2008. Prior to the 

passage, the main points of contention were 

groups’ relative share of Iraqi oil wealth, 

including the percentage of funding for the 

KRG (a 17% allocation for KRG was part of 

the approved legislation), funding for the 

Peshmerga, and a BSA review of KRG 

revenues that could result in an offset against 

2008 transfers. 

The GoI increased budgets across the board in 

2008. The overall 2008 budget of $49.9 billion 

represents a 22% increase over 2007’s $41.1 

billion budget. The 2008 capital budget of 

$13.1 billion is a 31% increase over 2007’s 

$10.1 billion budget. Provincial capital 

funding increased 57%, to $3.3 billion in 2008. 

Total transfers to the KRG center and the three 

KRG provinces increased 17% to $5.5 billion 

in 2008. The 2008 security budget increased to 

$9 billion ($3.9 billion budgeted for the MoI 

and $5.1 billion for the MoD), which is a 23% 

increase over 2007. 

2008 Iraqi Supplemental Budget 

With higher oil prices per barrel and increased 

deliveries from the Northern Pipeline, the GoI 

is now projecting a growing budget surplus 

relative to currently planned expenditures. The 

MoF submitted a $22.3 billion supplemental to 

the Council of Ministers in July, and the CoR 
 11 September 26, 2008 

approved the supplemental on August 6, 2008. 

The budget supplemental allocates roughly 

$14.3 billion for operating expenses and $8 

billion for capital projects. On the operating 

side, the supplemental allocates significant 

resources for food aid for the Iraqi people, 

salary increases for public employees, and a 

greater police presence. 

IMF Stand-By Arrangement and Debt Relief 

The IMF Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) 

provides a framework for economic reforms in 

areas such as fiscal and monetary policy and 

financial sector development. Iraq and the IMF 

agreed to a new 15-month SBA in December 

2007, following the GoI’s two years of 

satisfactory performance under the prior SBA 

signed in December 2005. The new SBA calls 

for crucial reforms in areas such as public 

financial management, the Central Bank of Iraq 

(CBI), bank restructuring, and subsidies. Iraq 

is currently on track to meet the SBA criteria 

and benchmarks related to the program. 

In November 2004, the Paris Club agreed to 

provide 80% debt relief to Iraq in three 

tranches. All Paris Club creditors have now 

concluded debt relief agreements with Iraq, 

representing $42.3 billion in relief. Russia 

signed its bilateral debt relief agreement with 

Iraq on February 11, 2008. Iraq will receive 

the third and final tranche of debt relief 

following three years of satisfactory 

performance on IMF SBAs. 

Iraq’s neighbors and China are its largest 

remaining creditors. The UAE announced on 

July 6, 2008 that it will forgive Iraq’s entire 

debt, estimated at $7 billion. Saudi Arabia 

publicly announced a commitment to provide 

debt relief to Iraq, although it has yet to fulfill 

this pledge. Iraq is studying options to deal 

with claims of bilateral creditors that do not 

sign debt relief agreements by the end of 2008. 

To date, Iraq has received roughly $12 billion 

in debt relief from non-Paris Club bilateral 

creditors, including the recently announced 

UAE debt relief package and $19.7 billion in 

commercial debt relief. The U.S. Treasury 

estimates that Iraq’s estimated remaining 

bilateral debt outstanding (including that owed 

to the Paris Club) is between $50 billion and 

$80 billion. 

Indicators of Economic Activity 

Economic Growth 

Iraq’s overall real GDP growth was 0.4% in 

2007, according to Iraq’s Central Organization 

for Statistics and Information Technology 

(COSIT). The Iraqi economy is projected to 

grow 8% in real terms in 2008. 

Inflation 

Year-on-year core inflation (which excludes 

fuel, electricity, transportation, and 

communications prices), according to COSIT, 

was 12% in 2007, compared to 32% in 2006. 

Levels of inflation remained relatively low 

during the first half of 2008. In June 2008, 

year-on-year core inflation remained at 12.4% 

as food and fuel prices returned to normal after 

a spike in March 2008. This stabilization of the 

inflation rate is attributable to the combination 

of an improving security environment in the 

second half of 2007 and the steady appreciation 

of the dinar throughout the year. From 

November 2006 through the end of June 2008, 

the dinar appreciated against the U.S. dollar by 

18%. Lower inflation rates and an appreciating 

dinar improved Iraqi purchasing power for 

basic needs and provided a more stable 

environment in which the private sector could 

grow. The CBI cautiously began to loosen 

monetary policy in response to lower rates of 

inflation, decreasing the policy interest rate 

from 20% in January 2008 to 16% on July 1, 

2008.

Unemployment 

Unemployment and underemployment continue 

to be major challenges. COSIT has not updated 

its official estimates of unemployment and 

underemployment of 17.6% and 38.1% 

respectively, which were published in June 

2007. Attempts to measure unemployment and 

underemployment by other means at the 

provincial levels suggest that the rate lies 

between 30% and 50% in some areas. Without 
 12 September 26, 2008 

a reliable collection method, it is difficult to 

determine the actual level of unemployment; 

however, there remains a clear lack of 

employment opportunity for skilled and 

unskilled labor throughout the country. 

Business Development 

The Iraqi First Program seeks to increase 

economic development throughout Iraq. The 

U.S. Government designed this purchasing 

program to encourage Iraqi economic 

expansion, entrepreneurship, and business 

development by removing barriers that prevent 

Iraqi-owned businesses from competing against 

larger, international companies for U.S. 

Government contracts. Joint Contracting 

Command Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) awarded 

more than $2.4 billion worth of contracts to the 

Iraqi business community in the last 12 months, 

generating approximately 69,000 Iraqi jobs. 

The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 

supports the Iraqi First Program by assisting 

Iraqi companies with the organizational 

processes necessary to compete for contracting 

opportunities. Working in partnership with the 

JCC-I/A since 2006, over 8,000 Iraqi vendors 

have now been vetted and registered in the 

Iraqi Central Contractor Registry. Also, the 

Department of Defense Task Force to Improve 

Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) 

recently facilitated the license award by the GoI 

to international investors for a 250-300 room 

luxury hotel in Baghdad’s International Zone. 

Groundbreaking took place in August 2008. 

TFBSO continues its efforts, developing 

business and economic opportunities in Iraq. 

TFBSO has established effective working 

relationships with the GoI, serving an 

instrumental role in creating sustained 

economic opportunity for the Iraqi people. 

Efforts to date have led to the establishment or 

restoration of over 100,000 sustained 

manufacturing and professional jobs, with 57 

state-owned factory operations either restarted 

or significantly increasing production. 

International corporate investors have an 

increased footprint in Iraq, and TFBSO assists 

them in exploring opportunities throughout Iraq 

in businesses ranging from heavy machinery to 

home goods, and from international investment 

funds to agricultural processing. Foreign direct 

investment currently being facilitated by 

TFBSO will exceed $1 billion this year in new 

businesses and over $1 billion in private 

investment in Iraq’s State-Owned Enterprises 

(SOEs). To date, over 50 international 

proposals have been received. 

Iraq recently accomplished two actions that 

develop its economic relationships with other 

countries. First, the Investment Promotion 

Agreement was initiated with the Government 

of Germany. When fully approved, the 

agreement will establish a framework, 

including a dispute arbitration process, for 

commercial relationships between German 

investors and the GoI. Also, the German-Iraq 

Joint Economic Commission (JEC) was 

restarted, with its first meeting in 20 years, to 

support the development of government-togovernment contacts to facilitate mutual 

commercial interests. Second, a major Chinese 

state-owned oil company agreed to a contract 

involving a joint venture with the Iraqi 

Northern Oil Company to develop an oil field 

southeast of Baghdad. 

 

Aided by U.S. procurement assistance efforts, 

Iraqi ministries continue to increase purchasing 

capacity. As a harbinger of Iraq’s future role as 

a significant international customer, Iraq signed 

two contracts worth $5 billion to buy 40 

Boeing and 10 Bombardier aircraft to upgrade 

Iraqi Airways’ aging fleet. Delivery of the first 

aircraft will take place in 2008. A number of 

additional large procurements are in progress. 

Two new areas for TFBSO emphasis include 

revitalization of the Iraqi agricultural sector and 

economic growth in Basrah. Working closely 

with Multi-National Division-Center, TFBSO 

has established a team supporting Iraq’s critical 

agricultural sector. In the last two months, this 

group has engaged a multitude of farmers and 

agribusiness leaders. Task Force agricultural 

experts from American land grant universities 

provide technical advice, partner with PRTs, 
 13 September 26, 2008 

and work to empower local leaders and farmers 

to reestablish Iraq’s vital agricultural sector. 

Banking Sector 

The GoI is working to further develop the 

country’s banking infrastructure. Recent 

reforms in the banking sector focus on 

establishing a nationwide electronic payments 

system, expanding the private banking sector, 

and restructuring the state-owned banks. As of 

July 2008, the banking sector consisted of 40 

banks—seven state-owned and 33 privatelyowned. According to the Banking Law of 

2004, the number of Iraqi banks with over 50% 

foreign ownership is limited to six until 

December 31, 2008. Of the 33 privately owned 

banks, 20 are Iraqi-owned, with the rest having 

some percentage of foreign ownership. 

 

Although the number of licensed banks is clear, 

there is considerable variation in the number of 

bank branches reported as open or operating. 

TFBSO reports indicate there were 724 private 

and state-owned branches as of May 2008, 

while the CBI’s latest report shows 640. Two 

state-owned commercial banks (Al Rasheed 

and Rafidain) own 90% of the assets in the 

banking system, but a very high percentage of 

these assets are non-performing. These two 

banks are currently being restructured in 

accordance with the IMF program. In the 

second quarter of 2008, the MoF provided 

additional capital for several state-owned 

commercial banks to bring their capital to 

levels meeting legal requirements. The 

remaining five state-owned banks are 

specialized public financial institutions that 

serve the agricultural, industrial, real estate, 

trade, and social sectors. 

The CBI continues to progress in conducting 

monetary policy implementation through the 

Foreign Currency Auction, sale of bills, 

management of reserve requirements, and 

offering of deposit and loan facilities. The CBI 

has met all of its SBA structural benchmark 

requirements, despite the difficulties presented 

by working in temporary facilities following a 

January 2008 fire at its permanent facility. 

Iraq continues to move away from a cash-based 

economy toward modern, electronic banking 

practices. A policy change in October 2007 has 

increased electronic payments on DoD 

contracts with Iraqi companies from 17% in 

July 2007 to over 92% in July 2008. The value 

of payments going directly to Iraqi banks for 

these Iraqi companies since the policy became 

effective has increased 38-fold. Several 

projects are underway to encourage this 

positive trend. First, in order to continue 

migration to Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT), 

a TFBSO-supported EFT Assistance Center 

located in Baghdad actively participates in 

vendor training and has developed a problem 

tracking system for the resolution of transfer 

problems experienced by vendors and payment 

entities. Second, Iraqi private banks are 

establishing a retail payments consortium, 

which is on target to enable Iraq-wide use of 

domestic and international access debit and 

credit cards through ATMs and Point-of-Sale 

terminals. Third, Coalition and Iraq officials 

are also working to link mobile phones to 

consumers’ bank accounts; this has the 

potential to reduce cash dependency in the long 

term. Pilot projects for all of these initiatives 

are scheduled to be operational in September 

2008, beginning with debit cards and mobile 

banking capabilities. 

Oil Infrastructure 

Iraq continues to produce and export crude oil 

at higher levels than in 2007. Production for 

the first eight months of 2008 has yielded an 

average of 2.4 mbbl/d and, in the last quarter, 

surpassed pre-liberation levels. Recently, crude 

exports have fallen slightly, as refining capacity 

has been restored incrementally, resulting in 

greater internal consumption. In the future, 

small crude production and export increases 

may occur; however, billions of dollars in 

capital investment are needed to produce 

substantial increases in crude oil production, 

transport, and export. 

Increased security is a major factor in 

production and export gains, as physical 

deterrents such as the Pipeline Exclusion Zones 
 14 September 26, 2008 

(PEZs), and increased security presence of the 

Oil Police, SoI, and the Iraqi Army have 

reduced the number of pipeline interdictions. 

Improved security has also allowed repair 

teams access to address maintenance and 

corrosion problems and to repair pipelines that 

have been out of use for years. The PEZ 

between Kirkuk and Bayji was completed in 

June 2008. Work has started on the PEZ 

between Bayji and Baghdad to protect pipelines 

that transport gasoline, kerosene, and liquefied 

petroleum gas to Baghdad residents and diesel 

and natural gas to Baghdad area power plants. 

A third major PEZ between Baghdad and 

Karbala is due for completion by October 2008. 

This renewed emphasis on and ability to 

conduct basic infrastructure repairs and 

protection has improved the redundancy of the 

crude and refined product networks, resulting 

in more consistent crude oil exports and a 

greater availability of fuel products across Iraq. 

The initial fighting in Basrah in early 2008 

briefly affected southern exports and 

highlighted current infrastructure issues, both 

positive and negative. For example, one 

interdicted line that did not shut down oil 

exports nevertheless resulted in a 33% 

reduction until repairs were complete. Workers 

repaired a second interdicted line during this 

period within three days, demonstrating a 

remarkable improvement in repair capability. 

Operations halted in some fields due to security 

issues, but other fields were able to provide 

compensating output. 

The Oil Ministry has made progress expanding 

its refinery capacity and has achieved record 

levels of output. In consequence, exports have 

slightly decreased as more oil is used to serve 

domestic needs. The smaller regional 

refineries, such as Siniyah and Haditha, add 

almost 100,000 barrels per day of additional 

crude processing. Additionally, the expansion 

of the Daura Refinery continues with the 

construction of an additional processing unit 

that will add up to 70,000 barrels per day of 

production capacity to the network, although 

crude supply to Daura remains well short of its 

refining capacity. 

Agriculture

An efficient and productive agriculture sector is 

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

Aug-07 Sep-07 Oct-07 Nov-07 Dec-07 Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08

North Production South Production Total Production

North Exports South Exports Total Exports

Oil Production and Export

August 2007 – August 2008

Source: MNF-I CJ3 EFC as of August 26, 2008 Millions of Barrels Per Day
 15 September 26, 2008 

vital to Iraq’s economic, social, and political 

stability. Agriculture already accounts for 

approximately 8% of GDP and 27% of the Iraqi 

labor force, making it the single largest source 

of employment and the second largest 

contributor to overall GDP in the country. The 

abundance of Iraq’s natural resources in 

comparison to its neighbors, especially water, 

suggests strong potential for Iraqi agriculture in 

the global economy. In 2007 and 2008, 

drought conditions reduced crop yield, but 

effects have been somewhat mitigated through 

improved security conditions enabling 

increased planting by farmers. Iraqi domestic 

food production continues to be below potential 

due to a combination of poor agriculturerelated infrastructure investment, a dearth of 

credit for farmers, drought conditions, and 

security challenges. As a result, the GoI is 

currently forced to import the majority of its 

food from neighboring countries. Recent 

research indicates 85% of Iraqis feel they have 

enough to eat at least some of the time.4

 This 

has been consistent over the last 12 months. 

The Ministry of Agriculture is increasing 

managerial capacity, with the assistance of U.S. 

Department of Agriculture (USDA) personnel. 

Current animal husbandry initiatives in the 

poultry, cattle, sheep, and fish sectors aim to 

develop labs that will test and monitor 

infectious diseases, provide vaccinations, 

improve the hygienic slaughter of animals, and 

enable the distribution of products to the 

market. The GoI and the USDA have jointly 

developed soil analysis programs and 

agricultural extension services, which should 

improve seed and fertilizer inputs and optimize 

crop selection. The GoI and the USDA are also 

prioritizing irrigation and drainage projects to 

reduce salinity in the soil and encourage a more 

efficient water distribution system. Other 

efforts include improving cross-ministerial 

planning between the Ministry of Water 

Resources and other ministries and the use of 

improved data collection and statistical analysis 

to support ministerial decision making. The 

USDA currently has 23 agricultural advisors 

serving on various PRTs in the 15 southern 

provinces and, in conjunction with MNF-I and 

MNC-I, liaises closely to facilitate agricultural 

development. 

$20.6

$4.3

$9.0

$14.8

$27.2

$33.9

$40.8

$45.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug

$0

$5

$10

$15

$20

$25

$30

$35

$40

$45

$50

Average Millions of Barrels Per Day

Estimated Total Revenue YTD (B) USD

Average Daily Oil Export and Cumulative Revenue

January 2008 –August 2008

Source: EFC Oil Data and Energy Information Administration (EIA) Website
 16 September 26, 2008 

Inma, a $209 million USAID project launched 

in 2007, focuses on the development of 

agribusiness and agricultural markets.5 Now in 

its second year, this program has demonstrated 

the capability to rapidly grow the agriculture 

industry as security is stabilized and once 

electricity and water are readily available. 

Recently, drawing on Inma funds, an expanded 

program for fish farmers in Babil provided fish 

stock to put fish ponds back into production. In 

Anbar Province, a mushroom factory that was 

previously shut down due to violence, received 

support for vital raw materials and equipment 

to re-start production. 

Essential Services

Iraqi leaders have made some progress in the 

delivery of essential services such as electricity, 

water, and healthcare, though progress varies 

by locale. Although the U.S. Government and 

the GoI have completed several projects 

designed to improve the delivery of many 

essential services, increases in supply have not 

kept up with demand. As the U.S. has 

decreased spending on large-scale 

infrastructure reconstruction programs over the 

last two years, Iraq has significantly increased 

its spending on reconstruction projects, as well 

as on the operation and maintenance of existing 

projects. Successfully expanding Iraq’s budget 

execution capabilities is fundamental to further 

improving the delivery of these services. 

Electricity Infrastructure Integrity 

The Iraqi Government is beginning to manage 

the energy sector more effectively. The GoI 

made progress in streamlining capital 

investment and contracting processes and in 

approving special funding. A variety of 

challenges hamper further progress in the 

electrical sector, including fuel shortages, 

reduced water levels at hydroelectric plants, 

condition and performance of power stations, 

damage to key power line segments, and years 

of system neglect. Although the Prime 

Minister has placed a greater focus on 

developing an energy strategy, the process 

remains slow. Continued political engagement 

is necessary to make a smooth transition to a 

market-based industry model with the 

government performing a regulatory function. 

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

Jun-06

Jul-06

Aug-06

Sep-06

Oct-06

Nov-06

Dec-06

Jan-07

Feb-07

Mar-07

Apr-07

May-07

Jun-07

Jul-07

Aug-07

Sep-07

Oct-07

Nov-07

Dec-07

Jan-08

Feb-08

Mar-08

Apr-08

May-08

Jun-08

Jul-08

Aug-08

MWH Produced MWH Demand 

Average Electricity Demand and Production

June 2006 – August 2008

Megawatt Hours

Source: ITAO Daily Electric Reports as of September 1, 2008
 17 September 26, 2008 

GoI and U.S. investment continues to add 

electrical generating capacity to the Iraqi grid, 

resulting in increased electricity production. 

Despite a severe drought that has limited 

hydroelectric energy production capacity, 

overall electricity production for January 

through August 2008 was 12% greater than the 

same period in 2007, while the demand for the 

same period increased by 11.1%. As a result, 

the government supply of electricity in March 

met 62% of demand, the highest in nearly two 

years. This level still fluctuates, however, as 

government supply met 58% of demand in 

April, 51% in May, 52% in June 2008, 51% in 

July, and 50% through the end of August 2008, 

as temperatures rose and demand increased. 

Peak electricity production and demand 

reached record levels in early August 2008. 

Research indicates that only 34% of Iraqis feel 

they have been able to get the electricity they 

need.6

 This is a decrease from early 2008. 

Improved security has nearly eliminated 

transmission line interdictions and has created 

conditions that allow repairs, preventive 

maintenance, and system expansion. The 46 

electrical towers from Baghdad to Diwaniyah 

and the 85 electrical towers from Baghdad to 

Mussayib have been hardened to make critical 

distribution lines less vulnerable to attack and 

to increase the reliability of the grid in 

transmitting electricity. Around Baghdad, all 

hardening projects are complete, and four of 

nine projects are complete along the northern 

transmission line, with the remaining five to be 

completed this month. 

Increased electricity production resulted from 

increased imports of diesel fuel, better 

preventive maintenance, higher grid reliability 

due to the Minister of Electricity’s load 

management plan, and quick repair of damaged 

power lines (lines more often damaged by 

weather and the age of infrastructure than by 

hostile action). The 12% increase in electrical 

generation has led to a national average of 12 

hours of power between January and August 

2008. Grid stability has been improved by the 

GoI’s better management of load shedding and 

by ISF-led operations reducing militias’ 

influence and their corresponding ability to 

control local substations. 

Source: US Embassy Iraq Transition Assistance Office (ITAO)

Average Daily Hours of Electrical Power per Province

August 2008

14

13

14

13

14

9

11

12

12 10

10

11

14

9

10

15

9

11 (Baghdad)
 18 September 26, 2008 

Steady imports of electricity have also 

contributed to the increased electrical supply. 

Turkey provides reliable power, albeit at less 

than contracted levels. Iran has added a second 

transmission line to southern Iraq, and as a 

result, imports from Iran have nearly doubled 

from their late-2007 levels, now accounting for 

two-thirds of total power imports. Imports of 

diesel from Kuwait (1.3 million liters per day) 

and Iran (1.0 million liters per day in June 2008 

with an additional 1.0 million per day under 

negotiation), though not yet at contracted 

levels, have greatly increased since the last 

reporting period. These imports have resulted 

in additional power generation at the Taji, 

Baghdad South, and Qudas power plants and 

have enabled the operation of new generators at 

Baghdad South and Mussayib. 

Water and Sewer 

The Department of State, in coordination with 

the GoI, has allocated approximately $2.2 

billion from the Iraq Reconstruction and Relief 

Fund (IRRF) for water and sewer infrastructure 

repairs, operations, maintenance programs, and 

capacity development activities. As of July 

2008, IRRF-funded projects had restored or 

added approximately 2.28 million cubic meters 

per day of potable water treatment capacity, 

which is sufficient to serve 8.1 million Iraqis at 

a standard level of service. 

Several important projects that will further 

enhance water and sewer capability are 

underway. Partial operation of the Sadr City 

R3 water treatment plant began in early June 

2008, and the plant will achieve full operational 

capability in September 2008. Progress 

continues on the Nassariyah Drainage Pump 

Station, the Eastern Euphrates Drain, and the 

Meshkhab Water Supply Project, all of which 

are being completed by the GoI under grant 

agreements with U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

Gulf Region Division (GRD). The GRD and 

the Iraq Transition Assistance Office also 

continue to support the development and 

implementation of an enhanced grouting 

program for the Mosul Dam. 

Research indicates that 58% of Iraqis feel they 

can get safe clean drinking water at least some 

of the time.7

 This is down 11% from the 12-

month average. 

Healthcare 

With recent improvements in security, small 

gains have been made in nationwide healthcare 

delivery. Efforts are underway by multiple 

agencies to gain fidelity on the metrics for 

measures of performance and effectiveness in 

four areas: human resources, population health, 

infrastructure, and governance. 

In June 2008, the General Council of Ministers 

sponsored a strategic planning meeting that 

addressed issues of physician safety, 

prerequisites required to return physician 

expatriates to work in Iraq, and ancillary 

medical staff training. Some progress has been 

made. At least 200 physicians returned to Iraq 

in 2007 and over 400 physicians returning so 

far in 2008. The Prime Minister authorized the 

Ministry of Health (MoH) to hire 8,000 

additional personnel, which should 

significantly improve medical capacity. 

Disparate pay is another healthcare personnel 

issue. The GoI has eliminated the pay disparity 

between physicians in the MoH and the 

Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE). As a 

next step, the MoH is considering a tiered pay 

scale based on experience and specialty. 

Physicians in the MoD still receive less pay 

than their counterparts in the MoH or MoHE, 

but the GoI is addressing the issue through 

legislative action. 

The MoH is pursuing many initiatives to 

increase Iraq’s healthcare infrastructure and 

capacity. It plans to build six new hospitals 

and up to 1,000 new Public Healthcare Centers 

in the next ten years. It is also developing 

plans for disaster preparedness and emergency 

services response; efforts are underway to 

procure radios for hospitals, dispatch centers, 

and ambulances. 

A number of public health awareness initiatives 

are also underway. The MoH has placed 
 19 September 26, 2008 

educational spots in print and electronic media, 

including innovative mass cell phone text 

messaging on health education. External 

organizations are also engaged, and UNAMI 

published a healthcare document that focuses 

on public health initiatives, including 

immunization rates, women’s health, and infant 

mortality statistics. 

Transportation Network 

The U.S. Government and the GoI have 

combined efforts to develop a comprehensive 

transportation infrastructure plan which 

includes water, road, air, and rail. The 

development, growth, and maintenance of the 

transportation network are vital to the 

economic stability and security of Iraq. An 

expanded transportation system also plays an 

important political role by promoting regional 

integration and by heightening the central 

government’s presence in the more remote 

provinces. 

Progress continues toward revitalizing the Port 

of Umm Qasr, a central element in the 

improvement of Iraq’s transportation system. 

Umm Qasr is Iraq’s largest deepwater port and 

a major entry point for food imports, as well as 

for other bulk and containerized cargoes. The 

GoI has decided to hire a private operator to 

improve operational efficiency in Umm Qasr’s 

relatively well-developed North Port area, and 

to enter into a long-term concessionary 

agreement with a major terminal operator or 

ocean carrier to develop a modern, efficient 

container port in Umm Qasr’s less developed 

South Port area. 

The Iraqi highway system is critical to the 

country’s economic revitalization efforts. The 

Office of the Transportation Attaché (OTA) is 

helping the Iraqi Ministry of Construction and 

Housing (MoCH) promote economic prosperity 

through expansion of highway transport to 

strengthen Iraq’s links to the global economy and 

to provide mobility to Iraqi citizens. The MoCH 

and the OTA work closely in setting national 

transport priorities, defining where the MoCH 

must focus in the short term, and identifying 

specific strategic issues relating to highway 

system usage and capacity. The OTA is also 

working with the MoCH to develop capacity. 

Motor carrier operations in Iraq include 

government-owned and privately-operated 

trucking fleets. The Iraq Transportation Network 

(ITN) is an Iraqi-led, contracted management 

company, comprising a consortium of triballyowned trucking companies. Initial operations 

began in Anbar in May 2008, with 80 trucks 

operating under a $3.5 million contract. Based 

on successes to date, the ITN development team 

will work to expand the network into northern 

and central Iraq and will broaden the types of 

cargo that ITN carriers transport. The first 

missions to northern and central Iraq are targeted 

for October 2008. 

 

Aviation is the fastest and most secure 

transportation mode in Iraq, with annual civilian 

aviation growth exceeding 13%. In partnership 

with the Ministry of Transportation (MoT), the 

U.S. Government has invested approximately 

$100 million to date in state-of-the-art air traffic 

service infrastructure. Steady progress continues 

in the development of a trained air traffic 

controller force, with personnel now qualified to 

perform duties as air traffic control tower 

controllers at Basrah and Baghdad airports. The 

Baghdad Area Control Center (BACC) provides 

air traffic control services above 29,000 feet 

throughout Iraq. Overflight traffic volume 

continues to grow, and the BACC provides air 

traffic control services to a daily average of 158 

flights, which generate $12 million in annual 

revenue for Iraq. The opening ceremony for the 

Najaf International Airport took place on July 20, 

2008, but construction of the facilities continues 

and necessary aviation equipment is not yet in 

place. As of early August 2008, the runway was 

nearly complete, with only runway lighting yet to 

be installed. The MoT and OTA expect the 

airport to be fully operational within the next 

three to six months. 

 

The Iraqi Republic Railway (IRR) provides 

positive economic benefit and a viable means of 

transporting people and goods for the GoI and for 
 20 September 26, 2008 

Coalition forces. The IRR has established daily 

service from Baghdad to Basrah, with over 15 

stops along the route. In 2008, approximately 

7,000 passengers have traveled this route without 

incident. In late 2008, the IRR will complete the 

installation of a digital microwave 

communication and control project; this upgrade 

will increase the safety and dispatch rate of the 

IRR. Other efforts to improve the IRR are 

ongoing, including the expansion of intermodal 

rail container transport operations between the 

Port of Umm Qasr and other points throughout 

Iraq. 

Conclusion 

Despite considerable challenges, the Iraqi 

economy continues to grow, producing 

measurable signs of economic progress. Most 

notably, improved security in the North has 

enabled the production and export of crude oil to 

increase significantly since last August, while the 

South has maintained production levels 

consistent with previous reporting periods. 

However, further significant increases of oil 

production in either the North or South will 

require extensive investment in infrastructure and 

technical support. In addition, access to capital is 

improving. Capital budget execution in 2007 

improved, and projections for 2008 are positive. 

The GoI must continue to implement economic 

reforms and improve technical capacity at the 

national and provincial levels in order to support 

continued economic growth and job creation, 

improve delivery of essential services, and 

stimulate investments in its oil and electrical 

sectors. These reforms are essential to attracting 

foreign investment and developing a robust 

private sector, which are extremely important to a 

self-sustaining economy and long-term growth. 
 21 September 26, 2008 

1.3 Security Environment 

As a result of ISF operational successes over 

the last three months and other factors, security 

incidents are now at the lowest levels in over 

four-and-a-half years, instilling in the Iraqi 

people a sense of normalcy that permits them to 

engage in personal, religious, and civic life 

without an inordinate threat of violence. ISF 

and the Coalition forces have achieved these 

security gains while continuing to draw down 

the number of Coalition forces to pre-surge 

levels. Some of these gains, however, are 

fragile and somewhat uneven. Although 

security gains remain tenuous, the ISF continue 

to demonstrate a growing capability and 

confidence while leading operations throughout 

the country. The Prime Minister’s initiatives in 

Basrah, Sadr City, Mosul, Amarah, and Diyala 

enabled the ISF to seize the initiative from 

Shi’a and Sunni extremists and helped free 

major population centers and rural areas from 

oppressive militias and gangs. However, much 

work remains in the area of security sector 

development. At the ministerial level, 

capability and capacity for long-term 

sustainment needs improvement. Though the 

recent improvements in the security situation 

across Iraq are significant, the Iraqi 

Government will have to take deliberate 

measures to sustain these gains. These 

measures include the development and 

employment of a sustained, robust security 

posture, as well as humanitarian assistance, 

rapid progress in reconstruction, and the 

generation of sustainable employment. 

Overall Assessment of the Security 

Environment 

By mid-May 2008, security incidents had 

declined to levels not seen in four-and-a-half 

years and have remained at those levels since 

then. Despite occasional high-casualty vehicleborn and suicide vest bomb attacks, civilian 

deaths and ethno-sectarian violence across Iraq 

have remained at levels lower than any time 

since the Coalition began tracking this data in 

early 2006. As Iraqi and Coalition forces have 

entered new areas, they have not only greatly 

diminished Sunni and Shi’a extremists’ ability 

to attack the populace, they have also decreased 

these groups’ future destructive capability by 

finding and clearing a great number of weapons 

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

2000

9-Jan-04

12-Mar-04

14-May-04

16-Jul-04

17-Sep-04

19-Nov-04

21-Jan-05

25-Mar-05

27-May-05

29-Jul-05

30-Sep-05

2-Dec-05

3-Feb-06

7-Apr-06

9-Jun-06

11-Aug-06

13-Oct-06

15-Dec-06

16-Feb-07

20-Apr-07

22-Jun-07

24-Aug-07

26-Oct-07

28-Dec-07

29-Feb-08

2-May-08

4-Jul-08

5-Sep-08

Attacks Against Iraqi Infrastructure and Government Organizations

Bombs (IEDs and Mines), Both Found and Detonated

Sniper, Ambush, Grenade, and Other Small Arms Attacks

Mortar, Rocket, and Surface-to-Air-Attacks

Overall Weekly Security Incident Trends

January 3, 2004 – September 5, 2008

Source: MNF-I SIGACTS III Database (Coalition Reports only) as of September 6, 2008. Chart includes executed attacks and 

potential (found and cleared) attacks.

Baghdad Security Plan,

February 15, 2007

Ramadan

Oct 16 – Nov 14, 2004

Oct 5 – Nov 4, 2005

Sep 24 – Oct 23, 2006

Sep 13 – Oct 13, 2007

Constitutional

referendum,

October 15,  2005

Samarra mosque

bombing,

February 22, 2006

Parliamentary

elections,

December 15, 2005

Iraqi elections,

January 30, 2005

Basrah and Sadr City

Operations,

March 25, 2008

Surge of Offensives

First Militia Uprising and

Fallujah

Diyala

Operations
 22 September 26, 2008 

caches. As Iraqi and Coalition forces hold 

these areas, they are placing continued 

emphasis on locating additional caches. 

Starting in June, the GoI followed its 

operations in Basrah, Sadr City, and Mosul 

with major offensives into Maysan and Diyala 

Provinces. These resulted not only in improved 

security in these areas, but also an upsurge in 

popular support that discouraged further 

attacks. When the ISF entered Maysan 

Province in force, JAM leaders and SG 

members fled to Iran and Syria. The GoI then 

shifted operations to Diyala and focused on 

removing AQI sanctuaries and interdicting 

JAM lethal facilitation routes. Both operations 

further expanded GoI control. More needs to 

be done in Diyala to reduce Kurd-Arab tensions 

and to integrate the SoI into the ISF and local 

jobs. 

Al Qaeda in Iraq 

Coalition forces, ISF, and SoI have inflicted 

significant damage to AQI’s networks and have 

forced AQI members to flee key population 

centers. Although all aspects of AQI are under 

pressure, the group maintains the capability and 

the will to conduct limited high-profile attacks 

within key urban centers and retains limited 

freedom of movement within rural areas. The 

absence of significantly increasing violence 

illustrates the failure of AQI high-profile 

attacks to rekindle a cycle of ethno-sectarian 

violence. After months of elevated security 

incidents, overall violence indicators in Ninewa 

have fallen over the last three months and are 

now at their lowest levels since early 2006. 

AQI now appears to be focusing more on 

political targets in order to incite instability at 

all levels of Iraqi Government. 

Jaysh al-Mahdi 

JAM activity has been substantially reduced. 

Motivated not only by the Iraqi people’s 

growing frustration with militia violence and 

criminal activity, but also by significant losses 

and recognition of Coalition and ISF tactical 

superiority, JAM fighters have, in large part, 

laid down their arms, and many of its leaders 

have fled to Iran. Although there have been 

several significant flare-ups of militia violence 

since Muqtada al-Sadr declared the original 

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

Jan-06

Feb-06

Mar-06

Apr-06

May-06

Jun-06

Jul-06

Aug-06

Sep-06

Oct-06

Nov-06

Dec-06

Jan-07

Feb-07

Mar-07

Apr-07

May-07

Jun-07

Jul-07

Aug-07

Sep-07

Oct-07

Nov-07

Dec-07

Jan-08

Feb-08

Mar-08

Apr-08

May-08

Jun-08

Jul-08

Aug-08

Coalition and Iraqi Reports

Coalition Reports Only

Civilian Deaths

January 2006 – August 2008

Source: MNF-I SPA Assessments SIGACTS III Database (Coalition Reports only) and (Coalition and Iraqi Reports) as of September 

1, 2008. Does not include civilian deaths due to accidents unrelated to friendly or enemy actions.
 23 September 26, 2008 

JAM cease-fire in August 2007—most notably 

when Prime Minister Maliki launched 

operations in Basrah in March 2008—the 

militia cease-fires have contributed to a 

substantial decrease in the number of security 

incidents. ISF operations in Basrah, Baghdad, 

and Maysan Province have both spurred and 

capitalized on these cease-fires, inflicting 

heavy losses on militia fighters, considerably 

reducing militia weapons stockpiles, and 

replacing criminal, often extortionist, militia 

presence with uniformed soldier and police 

presence. For example, outside Sadr City, a 

single U.S. Brigade Combat Team killed over 

770 JAM and SG fighters. In addition, in 

Baghdad alone, Iraqi and Coalition forces have 

uncovered caches containing over 7,500 mortar 

and artillery rounds, nearly 1,000 rockets, over 

1,100 rocket propelled grenades, nearly 1,150 

grenades, and nine IRAMs, among other 

weaponry. 

On June 13, 2008, Sadr called for a 

transformation of JAM into a social and 

cultural organization, and he reiterated his 

intention to accomplish this on July 30, 2008. 

JAM has since begun to reorganize into a social 

and cultural organization, while maintaining a 

small and obedient armed wing. According to 

Coalition reports, the majority of mainstream 

JAM members are obeying Sadr’s instructions 

and are transitioning into JAM’s new social and 

cultural organization. Others are transitioning 

into the new, more lethal SG, which continue to 

receive funding, training, and lethal aid from 

Iran and is judged to be less under Sadr’s 

control. Whether recent security gains are 

long-term will depend, in part, on how these 

issues continue to develop. 

Sons of Iraq 

The SoI help protect their neighborhoods, 

secure key infrastructure and roads, and 

identify extremists among the population. 

What began primarily as a Sunni effort has now 

taken hold in several Shi’a and mixed Sunni 

and Shi’a communities. Today there are over 

98,000 SoI contributing to local security in 

partnership with Coalition and Iraqi forces. 

The SoI program faces several challenges, 

including low-level infiltration by insurgent 

groups, slow GoI action to integrate SoI into 

ISF and U.S. Military Deaths in Iraq

January 2006 – August 2008

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

Jan-06

Feb-06

Mar-06

Apr-06

May-06

Jun-06

Jul-06

Aug-06

Sep-06

Oct-06

Nov-06

Dec-06

Jan-07

Feb-07

Mar-07

Apr-07

May-07

Jun-07

Jul-07

Aug-07

Sep-07

Oct-07

Nov-07

Dec-07

Jan-08

Feb-08

Mar-08

Apr-08

May-08

Jun-08

Jul-08

Aug-08

ISF KIA Total U.S. Military Deaths in Iraq

U.S. Battle Deaths in Iraq U.S. Non-Battle Deaths in Iraq

Source: MNF-I SPA Assessments SIGACTS III Database (Coalition Reports only), DoD News Releases and CIDNE as of 

September 1, 2008. Includes deaths within Iraq only. U.S. deaths under investigation are classified as battle deaths.
 24 September 26, 2008 

the ISF, and lack of sufficient opportunities for 

non-security employment. 

AQI views the SoI as a long-term adversary 

and as a significant obstacle to its strategic goal 

of maintaining a presence in Iraq and 

eventually creating the new Caliphate with the 

Islamic State of Iraq. AQI continues to attempt 

to infiltrate the SoI to collect information 

against SoI members and their families, to hide 

from Coalition forces and ISF targeting, and to 

attempt to persuade SoI members, who were 

formerly insurgents, to return to the insurgency. 

While low-level insurgent and extremist 

infiltration remains a concern, program 

administrators are mitigating the problem with 

continued emphasis on vetting and screening of 

SoI by GoI tribal support councils and with 

Coalition assistance in biometric screening and 

investigations. Recent incidents in Diyala 

suggest that despite vetting, the integration of 

SoI into the ISF is a challenge. 

To assist in the transition of the SoI into the 

ISF or other employment, Coalition and Iraqi 

leaders are implementing a number of 

initiatives. Alternative employment and 

training programs include the Civil Service 

Corps and the Joint Technical Education and 

Re-Integration Program, but these still lag. 

Additionally, Coalition forces are working with 

GoI to transfer control of SoI contracts to the 

GoI but funding has not yet been identified. 

The actual transition and transfer schedules and 

number of SoI to be integrated will be 

determined during the last quarter of calendar 

year 2008. Integration of the SoI remains 

critical to providing stable security in Iraq, and 

Prime Minister Maliki’s recent commitment to 

transfer the SoI to the GoI payroll and take 

responsibility for their transition to permanent 

employment is of critical importance. 

Daughters of Iraq 

A new program similar to the SoI initiative, the 

Daughters of Iraq, has begun training Iraqi 

women to assist security efforts by searching 

women at security checkpoints, hospitals and 

schools. Of the volunteers, 75% are widows of 

Iraqi Police slain by AQI. The first 130 women 

graduated on July 14, 2008, from a security 

course in al-Abara, Diyala, becoming the first 

Ethno-Sectarian Deaths

January 2006 – August 2008

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

2000

2200

Jan-06

Feb-06

Mar-06

Apr-06

May-06

Jun-06

Jul-06

Aug-06

Sep-06

Oct-06

Nov-06

Dec-06

Jan-07

Feb-07

Mar-07

Apr-07

May-07

Jun-07

Jul-07

Aug-07

Sep-07

Oct-07

Nov-07

Dec-07

Jan-08

Feb-08

Mar-08

Apr-08

May-08

Jun-08

Jul-08

Aug-08

All of Iraq

Baghdad Security Districts

Source: MNF-I SPA Assessments CIOC Trends Database (Coalition and Iraqi Reports) as of September 1, 2008.
 25 September 26, 2008 

Daughters of Iraq in the area. 

Joint Security Stations 

One of the important reasons Iraq, and 

particularly Baghdad, has seen improvements 

in its security situation over the last year has 

been the adoption of a counterinsurgency 

strategy that requires Coalition and Iraqi forces 

to live among the population they are serving. 

Coalition and Iraqi forces jointly operate Joint 

Security Stations and Combat Outposts that are 

dispersed throughout local communities. 

Sustained security force presence has disrupted 

insurgent and terrorist operations and has 

helped to earn the trust, confidence, and 

support of local residents. As a result, local 

citizens have begun to work with Coalition and 

Iraqi forces to deny the enemy sanctuary in 

their neighborhoods and to identify weapons 

caches. The continuous presence and increased 

effectiveness of the ISF has also helped ease 

the distrust between different ethnic 

populations and has facilitated the return of 

some displaced persons. Additionally, the local 

partnerships and continuous interaction 

between Coalition and Iraqi forces have helped 

to professionalize the ISF and have enabled 

them to become more proactive in their own 

operations. 

Attack Trends and Violence Assessment 

Civilian deaths across Iraq have declined 

dramatically. During this reporting period, 

according to Coalition and Iraqi reports, there 

were 77% fewer deaths than during the same 

period one year ago. Although periodic highcasualty producing vehicle-borne and suicide 

vest bombings continued throughout the 

reporting period, these attacks have failed to 

rekindle a cycle of ethno-sectarian violence. 

The lowest monthly death rate on record 

occurred in June 2008. Despite a slight 

increase in the level of ethno-sectarian related 

deaths in July and August 2008, they remained 

96% below the reported death rate in the same 

period in 2007.

High Profile Attacks 

In the summer of 2008, the number of monthly 

high-profile attacks (HPA) in Iraq decreased to 

a level 70% below the peak in the spring of 

2007. The current level is lower than at any 

time since the fall of 2004. As security has 

improved, Iraqi and Coalition forces have 

focused on identifying and eliminating enemy 

networks, resulting in generally less effective 

HPAs. Nonetheless, AQI retains the intent and 

capability of carrying out spectacular attacks. 

During this reporting period, 42% of all 

casualties were from HPAs. Though the 

number of attacks utilizing person-borne 

improvised explosive devices (PBIEDs) 

remained relatively stable throughout most of 

2007, the incidence of attacks utilizing this 

method increased from October 2007 to 

February 2008 before declining again this 

spring and summer. AQI’s use of PBIEDs and 

female suicide bombers remains a key tactic, 

especially as population security measures and 

local opposition to AQI in some provinces 

make effective targeting using suicide vehicleborne improvised explosive devices 

(SVBIEDs) more difficult. The Daughters of 

Iraq initiative, if effective, may help curb the 

trend of female suicide bombers. 

 

Regional Security Assessments 

Since the last reporting period, the average 

number of attacks executed daily has decreased 

or remained constant in all provinces. Four 

provinces—Ninewa, Baghdad, Diyala, and 

Salah ad Din—contain approximately half of 

Iraq’s population and accounted for 82% of all 

attacks. Daily average attacks in Baghdad 

decreased 73%, and the daily average in the 

northern provinces—Ninewa, Diyala, Tamim, 

and Salah ad Din—decreased 32%, largely due 

to ISF-led operations in both areas. In 11 of 18 

provinces, executed attacks averaged less than 

one per day, with four provinces having no 

attacks during the time period. 

Assessment of the Security Environment—

Baghdad 

During this reporting period, security incident 

levels in Baghdad decreased to a level last seen 
 26 September 26, 2008 

in the beginning of 2004. Deaths related to 

ethno-sectarian violence increased slightly in 

Baghdad in February and March 2008, but 

generated very little disruption in a downward 

trend that has persisted since last year. During 

this reporting period, there were 29 ethnosectarian deaths in Baghdad. This is the lowest 

level on record, and a remarkable improvement 

in comparison to the more than 1,200 ethnosectarian deaths in the same period in 2007 and 

the more than 1,600 ethno-sectarian deaths that 

occurred in December 2006 alone. The number 

of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in 

Baghdad increased significantly from late 

March through mid-May 2008 before returning 

to pre-March levels in the third week of May 

2008. Since May, the numbers of IEDs and 

explosively formed penetrators have continued 

to decline. 

Low-level Sunni insurgent activity persists in 

Baghdad; however, due to the ISF, SoI, and 

Coalition force operations, Sunni insurgents 

have limited freedom of movement and 

reduced support from the local populace. This 

has minimized their ability to conduct 

operations. If the Sunnis perceive their election 

efforts are being hindered by the GoI in the run 

up to provincial elections, there is a possibility 

that Sunni insurgents will increase attacks. As 

Baghdad neighborhoods return to normalcy, 

there is also a possibility of an increase in lowlevel attacks—attempts to reignite ethnosectarian violence—in those neighborhoods 

with mixed ethno-sectarian makeup. 

During this reporting period AQI attempted to 

reconstitute cells around Baghdad, primarily in 

the northwest and southeast portions of the 

Baghdad security belts. Operations in Diyala 

have likely contributed to this increase of 

activity, as AQI members fled Iraqi and 

Coalition forces. Although AQI has been able 

to project limited IED attacks into Baghdad, 

robust security measures in the capital 

continues to be largely successful. With the 

departure of Coalition force units from Abu 

Ghraib, AQI may attempt to resurface and use 

the area as a corridor to the west, or as a 

staging area for possible future attacks in 

Baghdad. Overall, however, AQI’s ability to 

launch concerted HPAs in Baghdad is limited. 

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

May-06

Jun-06

Jul-06

Aug-06

Sep-06

Oct-06

Nov-06

Dec-06

Jan-07

Feb-07

Mar-07

Apr-07

May-07

Jun-07

Jul-07

Aug-07

Sep-07

Oct-07

Nov-07

Dec-07

Jan-08

Feb-08

Mar-08

Apr-08

May-08

Jun-08

Jul-08

Aug-08

Total HPA Explosions Car Bomb Suicide Car Bomb Suicide Vest

High Profile Attacks (Explosions)

May 2006 – August 2008

Source: MNF-I SPA Assessments. SIGACTS III Database (Coalition Reports only) as of September 1, 2008. Does not include 

found and cleared. 
 27 September 26, 2008 

Assessment of the Security Environment—

Western Iraq 

During this reporting period, the average 

number of security incidents in Anbar Province 

decreased to less than 1.5 incidents per day. 

This represents a 96% reduction compared to 

the summer of 2006 and is half the rate of the 

last few months of 2007. The combined efforts 

of ISF, SoI, and Coalition forces continue to 

hinder AQI’s ability to obtain resources or 

operate effectively in population centers, 

forcing AQI to operate in and conduct attacks 

from remote locations in the province. 

Despite these setbacks, AQI continues efforts 

to regain footholds in the Euphrates River 

Valley, and the Syria-Iraq border region 

continues to appear critical to AQI’s external 

support network. ISF operations in Ninewa 

Province may be forcing some AQI members to 

flee, and recent AQI activity in Anbar Province 

may be attributable to AQI coming from other 

areas of Iraq. AQI’s recent HPAs in Fallujah, 

Ramadi, and Karmah remain focused on 

political and tribal leaders. AQI targeted these 

leaders due to the imminent transition to 

Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) and upcoming 

elections. Despite these recent attacks, the 

security situation in Anbar remains stable. 

The Mutammar Sahwat al-Iraq (MSI)—

formerly Sahawa al-Iraq—tribal movement has 

survived AQI attacks against its key leaders 

and continues to strengthen its own influence. 

MSI recently registered as a political party and 

intends to compete in the upcoming provincial 

and national elections. The movement 

continues to position itself as an alternative to 

existing provincial political leaders, deriving 

much of its credibility from its fight against 

AQI and the resulting security gains. For 

several months, MSI leaders have reached out 

to prominent Shi’a figures in other provinces to 

promote reconciliation and unity under the 

theme of “One Iraq.” 

The security situation regarding the Sunni 

insurgency in the West remains mostly stable. 

However, violence between the militias of 

Anbar’s two main political parties, the Iraqi 

Islamic Party and the MSI, is possible during 

the period leading up to elections. 

As the situation has improved, the Iraqi Army 

(IA) has handed over security responsibilities 

in most of Anbar’s population centers to the 

Iraqi Police, allowing the IA to concentrate its 

efforts on driving AQI from hideouts in remote 

locations. 

Assessment of the Security Environment –

Northern Iraq/Central Iraq 

AQI and affiliated Sunni insurgent groups such 

as Jaysh al-Islam and the Naqshabandi Army 

remain active in the North, particularly in 

Ninewa and Tamim Provinces, where the 

possibility of Kurdish annexation of Ninewa 

districts and Kirkuk is a polarizing issue. 

Reduced AQI operational capabilities and 

pressure from ISF, SoI, and Coalition forces 

have led to limited tactical cooperation between 

AQI and other insurgent groups. 

The ISF have made progress against AQI in 

northern Iraq. Operations MOTHER OF TWO 

RIVERS and LIONS ROAR denied AQI 

sanctuary in the urban parts of Ninewa 

Province, forcing AQI to fall back to the outer 

rural areas. Several AQI leaders have been 

captured or killed. During the past few years, 

Mosul has been a strategic stronghold for AQI, 

which also needs Mosul for its facilitation of 

foreign fighters. The current sustained security 

posture, however, continues to keep AQI off 

balance and unable to effectively receive 

support from internal or external sources, 

though AQI remains lethal and dangerous. 

There is also a degree of Kurd-Arab tension in 

parts of Ninewa. 

Assessment of the Security Environment – 

Eastern Iraq – (Diyala)

In recent months, operations in Diyala have had 

some effect against suicide bomber activity; 

however, AQI retains the capability to conduct 

suicide attacks and enjoys some freedom of 

movement along the Hamrin Mountains. 

Utilizing the province’s rural areas and 
 28 September 26, 2008 

uneducated population to its advantage, AQI 

relies upon the region’s ethno-sectarian 

tensions for continued survival there. 

Atmospheric reporting indicates that there is 

increasing apprehension by the Sunni populace 

in Diyala that the GoI will use future operations 

against AQI and active Sunni resistance groups 

as a pretext to arrest, intimidate, or kill 

moderate Sunnis and SoI groups who are 

otherwise interested in participating in the 

political process. However, the GoI’s 

engagement prior to the operations, and its 

conduct of the operations themselves, appeared 

to make this apprehension unwarranted, with 

the exception of one highly publicized raid by 

Iraqi Special Forces, in which a prominent 

Sunni was detained. The raid did, however, 

advance the perception that the GoI is reluctant 

to integrate some SoI into the ISF. The ISF and 

SoI in Diyala are conducting operations in a 

relatively coordinated effort. 

JAM has not launched any significant 

operations in Diyala recently, though there 

remains a militia presence. The current 

reorganization of JAM affects the militia in 

Diyala as it does in the rest of Iraq. 

Assessment of the Security Environment – 

Southern Iraq 

Security in southern Iraq has improved 

following Operation CHARGE OF THE 

KNIGHTS in Basrah Province and Operation 

GLAD TIDINGS OF PEACE in Maysan 

Province. Both areas were considered 

strongholds for JAM and SG. Although ISF 

operations targeting militias have caused many 

JAM and SG members to flee to Iran, there are 

indications that some SG members may be 

preparing to return to Iraq to conduct attacks. 

A constant steady stream of reporting indicates 

that the population is supportive of the GoI’s 

security initiatives. Violence is down, and the 

GoI is firmly in control. The population feels 

safer, children are attending school, and the 

shops and markets are thriving. Prime Minister 

Maliki allocated $100 million for reconstruction and humanitarian aid in both Basrah and 

Maysan Provinces following the successful ISF 

operations, though there have been delays in 

spending the funds on useful projects. 

Assessment of the Security Environment – 

Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Area

The Kurdish area of Iraq remains the most 

stable and least violent in Iraq. This is mainly a 

result of the homogenous Kurdish population 

and the presence of the Kurdish Police and the 

regional security forces, or Peshmerga. The 

Peshmerga are fairly well-equipped and 

trained, and they remain dedicated to the 

security of the Kurdish provinces. 

Nevertheless, occasional attacks do occur in the 

region. Furthermore, the presence of 

Peshmerga forces in parts of some non-KRG 

provinces (e.g., Khanaqin in Diyala) has 

increased tensions between the GoI and the 

KRG and between Arabs and Kurds. These 

tensions have hampered political cooperation, 

and it is important for the GoI and KRG to 

master them.

Public Perceptions of Security 

Iraqis’ perception of the security situation is a 

mixed bag. Iraqis believe the security situation 

is better locally than nationally. Research 

conducted in August 2008 reveals that 73% of 

Iraqis described the security situation in their 

neighborhoods as calm, a twelve-percentage 

point increase from November 2007.8

 When 

asked the same question about their province 

and Iraq as a whole, 48% said the situation was 

calm in their province, and 21% of Iraqis said 

the situation was calm nationwide.9

 91% of 

Iraqis feel that the security situation has stayed 

the same or become better in their 

neighborhood over the last six months.10 This 

is three percentage points higher than in 

November 2007. When asked about the 

security situation in the country as a whole, 

paradoxically, only 79% felt it had stayed the 

same or become better.11 This was a decrease 

of one percentage point since November 2007. 

August 2008 nationwide research indicates that 

75% of Iraqis feel safe and secure in their 

neighborhoods and that 37% feel safe traveling 

outside of their neighborhoods.12 Compared to 
 29 September 26, 2008 

November 2007, this is a one-percentage-point 

decrease in their perception of neighborhood 

security and a seven-percentage point decrease 

in the belief that it is safe to travel outside 

one’s neighborhood. 

When asked about perceptions of the Iraqi 

Security Forces, 65% of Iraqis said they feel 

secure when they see the Iraqi Army in their 

neighborhoods, and 61% said they feel secure 

when they see Iraqi Police in their 

neighborhoods.13 This is a 14-percentagepoint increase in trust in the Iraqi Army, and an 

eight-percentage-point increase in trust of the 

Iraqi Police since November 2007. Nationwide 

perceptions of the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi 

Police are within four percentage points of each 

other with the Iraqi Police making significant 

improvements in recent months. 

When asked in August 2008 if they believed 

the GoI was effective or ineffective at 

maintaining security, 41% of Iraqis said the 

GoI was effective; this represents a threepercentage-point increase from the November 

2007 data.14 When asked to rate the level of 

peace and stability of the country, 44% of 

Iraqis said Iraq was stable, a 16-percentagepoint increase since November 2007.15

Nationwide research in August 2008 indicates 

that 68% of Iraqis believe that the Iraqi Army is 

winning the battle against terrorists and that 

58% of Iraqis believe the Iraqi Police Force are 

winning the battle against crime.16 This is a 

16-percentage point increase in perception for 

the Iraqi Army and a eight-percentage point 

increase in perception for the Iraqi Police since 

November 2007. When asked if they had 

confidence in specific groups to improve the 

overall security situation in Iraq, Iraqis placed 

their highest confidence in the Iraqi Army and 

the Iraqi Police; 83% had confidence in the 

Iraqi Army and 81% had confidence in the 

Iraqi Police in August 2008.17 

When comparing levels of government, 68% of 

Iraqis had confidence in provincial 

governments to improve security, 62% of Iraqis 

had confidence in their local government to 

improve security, and 63% of Iraqis had 

confidence in the national government to 

improve security.18 This represents a decrease 

0 100%

Percent who agree

I feel safe and secure 

in my neighborhood

Nationwide average = 74% Nationwide average = 37%

I feel safe traveling 

outside my neighborhood

Source: August 2008 Nationwide Poll

Irbil Irbil
 30 September 26, 2008 

of nine percentage points, 17 percentage points, 

and five percentage points, respectively, since 

November 2007. Multi-National Forces (22%), 

armed groups (13%), and militias (12%) had 

the lowest Iraqi confidence to improve security, 

signifying a 15-percentage-point drop for the 

Multi-National Forces, a 16-percentage point 

drop for armed groups, and a four-percentagepoint decrease for militias since November 

2007.19 

When asked who was most responsible for 

providing security in their neighborhoods, 

Iraqis responded that the Iraqi Army (35%) and 

the Iraqi Police (38%) are most responsible for 

providing security in their neighborhoods. 20 

Relatively few Iraqis said the Sons of Iraq 

(7%), people from their tribe (5%), neighbors 

(3%), militias (1%), religious leaders (2%), or 

Multi-National Forces (3%) were most 

responsible for providing security. Trends in 

perception of those providing security in 

neighborhoods have remained steady since 

November 2007. The exceptions to this trend 

are the Iraqi Police, with perception of 

responsibility decreasing by five percentage 

points, the Iraqi Army, with perception 

increasing by 12 percentage points, and the SoI, 

with perception increasing by five percentage 

points. 

When asked in August 2008 if they had 

confidence in specific groups to protect them 

and their families from threats, Iraqis had the 

highest confidence in the Iraqi Army (84%).21 

For other groups, 81% of Iraqis had confidence 

in the Iraqi Police, 67% had confidence in their 

provincial government, 63% had confidence in 

their local government, and 63% had 

confidence in the national government.22 

Confidence in the Multi-National Forces, 

armed groups, and militias was much lower at 

24%, 11%, and 11%, respectively.23 In a 

continuation of trends from November 2007, 

Iraqis place their highest trust and confidence 

in the Iraqi Army, the Iraqi Police, and the GoI 

(from the local to the national level) to protect 

them and to provide security. 

Is the GoI effective or 

ineffective at maintaining 

security?

Nationwide average = 41%

0 100%

Percent who said “Effective”

How would you rate the level 

of peace and stability in Iraq 

today?

Nationwide average = 31%

0 100%

Percent who said “Stable”

Source: August 2008 Nationwide Poll

Irbil Irbil
 31 September 26, 2008 

Conclusion 

During this reporting period, security has 

greatly improved. The situation is still fragile, 

however, and Iraq faces many challenges. 

While Coalition and Iraqi efforts against AQI 

have significantly degraded its networks and 

reduced its capability, AQI continues to seek to 

reestablish itself wherever conditions permit 

and retains the capability to conduct sensational 

attacks. Iraqi-led security operations have also 

played a significant role in reducing the areas 

controlled by JAM and SG; however, many 

JAM and SG leaders have fled to Iran and will 

seek to return if conditions permit. All the 

while, Iraq has neighbors who are not fully 

committed to its success. 

To preserve recent security gains, the Iraqi 

Government will need to sustain a robust 

security presence and make progress in 

delivering a sense of normalcy to the Iraqi 

people by improving essential services and 

fostering employment opportunities. 

Reconciliation efforts will remain central to the 

success of these efforts to bring long-term 

security and stability to Iraq. It is important 

that the ISF be a national institution to which 

all Iraqis can rally, rather than the political 

instrument of a particular group. The U.S. 

Government, the Coalition, and the UN will 

continue to push for sustainable security and 

ministerial capacity and capability development 

initiatives. In all of these efforts, the Coalition 

is fully engaged to support Iraq and welcomes 

the growing acceptance of Iraq as a sovereign 

state in the international community.
 32 September 26, 2008 

1.4 Transferring Security Responsibility

Currently, 11 of Iraq’s 18 provinces are under 

Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC). The Qadisiyah 

Province security transfer ceremony took place 

on July 16, 2008, and Anbar Province’s transition 

ceremony occurred on September 1, 2008, 

following resolution of post-PIC command and 

control issues between the GoI and the provincial 

leadership. In support of the U.S. Government 

strategic objective to strengthen the Iraqi forces 

and transition primary security responsibility to 

the GoI, Babil and Wasit Provinces are planned 

to transition to PIC in late October and early 

November 2008, respectively. Ongoing 

negotiations between the Coalition and the GoI 

will define a mechanism for continuing transition 

of security responsibilities in remaining provinces 

beyond December 31, 2008. 

Contingency Operating Base Turnover Status 

The current basing footprint supports the Joint 

Campaign Plan’s counterinsurgency (COIN) 

efforts, with U.S. force presence reducing from 

20 to 15 BCTs. Coalition forces continue to colocate with the ISF on existing Coalition 

Contingency Operating Bases (COBs) as the 

Coalition mission transitions from leading to 

partnering to overwatch. The Coalition carefully 

adjusts its basing footprint so that security gains 

are retained. This conditions-based strategy 

ensures that sufficient installations remain open 

to allow commanders the flexibility to execute 

COIN operations. As conditions allow, the 

Coalition will continue to seek opportunities to 

shrink, share, or transfer bases. The Coalition is 

actively seeking partial base turnovers to the ISF 

and partial base closures for specified COBs, 

Contingency Operating Sites (COSs), and 

Contingency Operating Locations (COLs) that 

are no longer required. As of August 28, 2008, 

MNF-I had a total of 56 tracked bases (COBs and 

COSs) and more than 250 COLs. Since January 

2008, MNF-I has closed and transferred three 

COSs (Hurricane Point in March 2008, Blue 

Diamond in March 2008, and Habbaniyah in July 

2008) to the GoI. Additionally, the Coalition is 

scheduled to return COS Fallujah by February 

2009. 

Not Ready For Transition

Projected within 6 months

Partially Ready For Transition

Already Transitioned

Babil

Ninawa

Ta’mim

Salah Ad Din

Diyala

Qadisiyah

Basra

Wasit

Muthanna

Dhi Qar

Maysan

Sulaymaniyah

Dahuk

An Najaf

Anbar

Karbala

Baghdad

Irbil Irbil

Source: CJ5 Intel Plans as of September 1, 2008. Provinces transfer security responsibility 30-45 days after being assessed as 

meeting conditions.

Projected Ceremony 

Dates

Wasit Nov 08

Babil Nov 08

Ta’mim Jan 09

Diyala Jan 09

Salah Ad Din Jan 09

Ninawa Jan 09

Completed Transitions Baghdad May 09

Muthanna 7/12/06

Dhi Qar 9/21/06

Najaf 12/20/06

Maysan 4/18/07

Dahuk 5/30/07

Irbil 5/30/07

Sulaymaniyah 5/30/07

Karbala 10/29/07

Basra 12/16/07

Qadisiyah 7/16/08

Anbar 9/1/08

Provincial Iraqi Control
 33 September 26, 2008 

Section 2—Iraqi Security Forces Training and Performance 

Since late 2003, Coalition and Iraqi forces have 

trained more than 531,000 Iraqi Ministry of 

Defense (MoD), Ministry of Interior (MoI), and 

Counter Terrorism Bureau (CTB) personnel. 

As of August 15, 2008, Iraqi MoD, MoI and 

CTB forces totaled nearly 600,000—an 

increase of over 32,500 personnel since the 

June 2008 report. 

The GoI continues to assume broader 

ownership of Iraq’s security programs and is 

demonstrating an increasing fiscal commitment 

to its security forces and to MoD and MoI 

programs. For the third year in a row, the 

GoI’s security budget (MoD and MoI 

combined) is greater than the U.S.-resourced 

Iraqi Security Forces Fund (ISFF). The GoI 

approved a $9 billion budget for the security 

ministries for calendar year (CY) 2008, and 

both ministries submitted 2008 Iraqi 

supplemental budget requests to the Ministry of 

Finance (MoF). Multi-National Security 

Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) expects 

the security ministries will complete their 2009 

budget development by early fall 2008. Budget 

execution remains a concern. The MoI is 

improving its ability to obligate its budget, but 

the MoD continues to struggle, particularly in 

the support, sustainment, and infrastructure 

areas. Inter-ministerial budget coordination 

with the MoF is improving but remains 

problematic in some instances, particularly 

with the MoD. 

 

Increased GoI spending is enabling decreased 

U.S. Government spending. The $2 billion 

MNSTC-I 2009 ISFF budget submission 

reflects a 33% reduction in ISFF spending and 

a shift in spending focus. Spending on training 

will shift from fielding core Iraqi military and 

police units to accelerating the growth of 

logistical units and pursuing key supporting 

capabilities that will enable and sustain units 

already generated. Spending will also address 

the requirements to continue logistics and 

sustainment capacity development, replenish 

equipment, and field equipment for aviation, 

engineer, and transportation units. 

 

The GoI continues to exercise responsibility for 

personnel accounting and requirement 

determination. All authorized and assigned 

personnel reports reflect numbers provided by 

the MoD, MoI, and CTB. MNSTC-I advisory 

teams continue to work closely with both 

security ministries to refine the accuracy and 

frequency of their personnel reporting systems. 

The total number of MoI personnel assigned 

Iraqi Security Forces 

MoD, MoI and CTB data 

compiled as of August 15, 2008* 

Component Authorizeda Assignedb Trainedc 

Ministry of Interior (MoI) Forcesd 

Policee 333,324 299,170 192,028

National 

Police 44,263 39,739 50,184 

Border 

Enforcement 47,750 43,073 34,370

Total MoI 425,337 381,982 276,582 

Ministry of Defense (MoD) Forcesf 

Army 171,262 180,296 224,970 

Training and 

Support 

Forces

15,583 22,069 21,144 

Air Force 3,311 1,887 2,246 

Navy 1,893 1,872 1,494 

Total MoD 192,049 206,124 249,854 

Counter Terrorism Bureau 

Special 

Operations 4,733 3,589 4,564 

Total 622,119 591,695 531,000 

* Numbers do not include ministry staffs. 

a. Numbers reflect GoI authorizations. 

b. Numbers reflect GoI payroll data and do not reflect presentfor-duty totals. It is unknown how many personnel trained in 

U.S.-funded programs remain in the force. 

c. Numbers reflect total Iraqi forces personnel trained to date, 

some of whom are no longer assigned due to casualties, absent 

without leave (AWOL), etc. 

d. MoI strength excludes other services within MoI, including the 

MoI HQ, Forensics, Facility Protection Service, and contracted 

guards. See endnote 26. 

e. The Iraqi Police Service consists of all provincial police forces 

(station, patrol and traffic, and special units) assigned to all 18 

Iraqi provinces. 

f. MoD authorized strength is derived from Modified Tables of 

Organization and Equipment (MTOE). 
 34 September 26, 2008 

continues to exceed the number of total 

personnel trained, as rapid hiring outstrip 

training center throughput capacity. Also, as 

the MoI receives additional missions (e.g. from 

the Oil Police and the Facilities Protection 

Service), personnel are transferred from the 

Ministry of Oil or Electricity with limited, if 

any, training or equipment. Currently, there are 

approximately 88,000 MoI personnel assigned 

but not fully trained. Efforts to expand the MoI 

training throughput, funded jointly by the MoI 

and ISFF, will help remedy this shortfall. 

Ultimately, the GoI will decide force levels 

based on national security requirements and its 

fiscal capacity to sustain a significantly 

expanded force structure. The MoI predicts 

growth to a total force of over 400,000 

personnel in the Iraqi Police Service (IPS), 

National Police (NP), and Directorate of Border 

Enforcement (DBE) by the end of 2008.24 The 

MoD has approved the COIN force, which will 

include 14 Army divisions (13 infantry, 1 

mechanized) and supporting forces totaling 

approximately 203,000 to 210,000 personnel; a 

Navy of 2,500 personnel, including two marine 

battalions; and an Air Force of 6,000 personnel. 

Additionally, a 5,400-man Iraqi National 

Counter-Terrorism Force (INCTF) will 

contribute to the COIN effort. Further growth 

in the military structure appears likely given the 

need to develop a variety of “enablers.” Total 

ISF requirements are expected to grow to 

between 601,000 and 646,000 by 2010.25

2.1 Assessed Capabilities of the Iraqi Forces 

The Coalition’s four broad areas of emphasis in 

developing the MoD, MoI, and their forces 

remain unchanged from previous reports. They 

are: (1) support the force generation and force 

replenishment of MoD and MoI forces; (2) 

improve the proficiency of the Iraqi forces; (3) 

build specific logistic, sustainment, and training 

capacities; and (4) develop ministerial and 

institutional capacity. 

The four near-term areas of special emphasis 

through mid-2009 also remain unchanged. The 

first is to ensure that Iraqi forces are mostly 

self-sufficient in logistics, maintenance, and 

life support. The second is to ensure that the 

size, capability, professionalism and leadership 

of the ISF enable assumption of additional 

security roles from Coalition forces. The third 

is to enhance the capabilities of Iraqi special 

operations and counter-terrorist forces, and the 

fourth is to ensure that Iraqi Air Force (IqAF) 

and Navy (IqN) growth stays on-track.

The ability of the ISF to support and sustain 

fielded forces is continuing to improve. 

Although further progress is needed, the ISF 

are currently on track to achieve the goal of 

becoming mostly self-sufficient in tactical force 

sustainment by the end of 2008. Specific focus 

areas for improvement include improving 

logistic distribution and supply chain 

management, supply planning, and acquisition 

of sustainment stocks. Logistics and 

sustainment at the strategic and operational 

level continue to be problematic. 

During recent and ongoing operations in 

Basrah, Sadr City, Mosul, Amarah, and Diyala, 

ISF have demonstrated an improving capability 

to move units, conduct planning, and exercise 

command and control during simultaneous 

operations in various parts of the country. In 

all operations the ISF continued to rely on 

many Coalition enablers, including intelligence 

(though Iraqi capabilities in this area are 

developing) and close air support. The quality 

of operational and logistic planning has shown 

some improvement, with increasing ability to 

plan and conduct combined and joint 

operations, integrated information operations, 

civil-military operations, and post-conflict 

reconstruction activity. 

 

Tactical proficiency is also improving. In Sadr 

City, ISF units are using more advanced COIN 

tactics, such as active patrolling, clearance 

operations, high-value intelligence searches, 

and security patrol operations. Sustained 

operations in June and July 2008 have inflicted 

pressure and attrition on Jaysh al-Mahdi and 

SG. Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) 

and special police units have also performed 
 35 September 26, 2008 

effectively alongside Coalition forces during 

shaping operations to disrupt AQI foreign 

fighters. ISOF planning continues to improve; 

however, there remains a critical reliance on 

the Coalition rotary wing assets for insertions, 

and on other combat enablers such as 

intelligence, logistic support, and close air 

support, among others. MoI and MoD forces 

also continue to improve their ability to 

conduct After Action Reviews and to apply 

lessons learned. The most recent example is 

planning conducted for the observance of the 

Death of the 12th Imam in August 2008. 

Lessons learned from 2007 were applied to the 

event planning, resulting in the safe 

participation by a reported 3.5 million 

pilgrims—there were only three reported 

security incidents. 

Ministerial Capacity 

Both the MoI and the MoD continue to show 

progress in developing ministerial capacity. 

With Coalition assistance, the ministries’ 

abilities to conduct strategic planning are 

improving, albeit slowly. The MNSTC-I 

reorganization outlined in the March 2008 

report was designed to assist this development 

and is proving effective. 

With experience from operations in Basrah, 

Sadr City, Mosul, Amarah, and Diyala, the 

Iraqi Joint Headquarters (JHQ) is developing a 

capacity to plan and resource operations. 

Particularly in Diyala, the JHQ systematically 

planned and coordinated for essential classes of 

supply, including ammunition, medical 

supplies, fuel, and food rations in advance of 

combat operations—a clear indicator of 

increasing operational self-reliance. It is also 

developing the capability to provide strategiclevel advice to the political leadership. 

However, lines of command and control, 

particularly at the national level, continue to be 

poorly defined. This inhibits planning, 

decision-making, and the ability to execute 

coordinated operations at all levels. Decisionmaking remains overly centralized at the 

highest level, particularly in the employment of 

the IA, with orders often bypassing elements of 

the chain of command. 

Coalition advisors continue to provide 

assistance in planning at the strategic and 

operational levels of IA operations, working 

closely with senior Iraqi staffs to increase their 

capacity to conduct operational and strategiclevel planning and execution. MNF-I and the 

JHQ are collaborating on an overarching COIN 

plan, with the intention of involving other 

government agencies. The recent security 

operations required Coalition support to ensure 

proper sustainment of deployed ISF units; 

using operational lessons learned, the JHQ 

formed an operational planning team to 

prioritize requirements and establish 

procedures to support multiple simultaneous 

operations. In addition, the Coalition is 

conducting long-range planning for the transfer 

of existing bases to the ISF. 

The MoI continues to develop capacity and a 

more professional organizational structure. 

The MoI has increased its spending rate to 

51%, and the CoR has approved $1.7 billion for 

the MoI in the 2008 Iraqi Supplemental Law. 

Strategic planning capability continues to 

develop, with increased coordination between 

the planning and finance departments. 

However, some directorates are slow to 

implement the MoI Strategic Plan. The 

logistical and human resources directorates 

have improved in developing processes, 

conducting audits, and acquiring sustainment 

items, including fuel and weapons. The MoI 

has limited logistical infrastructure, weak 

provincial reporting and recordkeeping, and 

inefficient distribution abilities that hamper 

progress. The rapid assimilation of missions 

and personnel have consumed the Ministry and, 

in some directorates (e.g. personnel), overtaxed 

the process. In spite of these challenges, the 

Minister of Interior and his deputy ministers 

continue to aggressively attack problems, to 

hold subordinates accountable, and to 

increasingly plan and execute programs without 

Coalition assistance. 
 36 September 26, 2008 

Iraqi Forces Proficiency 

IA battalions have increased in number and 

capability. As of August 1, 2008, 153 IA 

combat battalions were conducting operations, 

including five battalions rated at the lowest 

level of operational readiness that are newly 

formed but still conducting operations. 

Another 18 IA combat battalions are currently 

in force generation. Four special operations 

battalions are capable of conducting operations 

with minimal Coalition support, and another 

two are in force generation. Seven IA 

infrastructure battalions were conducting 

operations while one infrastructure battalion is 

in force generation. Casualties among key 

leaders and the Iraqi practice of taking skilled 

commissioned and non-commissioned officers 

from high-performing units to generate new 

ones continue to impact overall readiness. 

The IqAF is gaining proficiency, as well. Over 

the past nine months, its sortie rate has 

increased and is proficiency in scheduling and 

conducting flight operations has continued to 

improve, with the Air Operations Center 

currently exercising command-and-control of 

over 269 operational and training sorties per 

week. The IqAF provides support to COIN 

operations through Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance (ISR) patrols of Iraqi 

borders and critical electrical and oil 

infrastructure. These efforts have resulted in 

the capture of insurgents and the identification 

of damaged infrastructure, allowing the GoI to 

expedite repairs and re-establish essential 

services. Additionally, the IqAF proved itself 

very capable during combat operations in 

Basrah (43 C-130 transport missions and over 

118 rotary-wing reconnaissance, transport, ISR, 

and pamphlet drops), Sadr City (ISR and 

pamphlet drops), Mosul (88 missions including 

fixed- and rotary-wing transport, ISR, and 

casualty evacuation), Amarah (five missions, 

including rotary wing transport and ISR), the 

Karbala Pilgrimage (71 fixed- and rotor-wing 

ISR missions), and Diyala (ISR). 

The IqN has also grown in capacity and 

capability. It now conducts an average of 42 

independent patrols per week in Iraqi territorial 

waters, with an average of 25 boardings per 

week. Also, since the conclusion of Basrah 

operations, the IqN has maintained security 

responsibility, along with the Coalition forces, 

for the port of Umm Qasr and for the pointdefense of the two offshore oil platforms; the 

IqN and Coalition forces serve side-by-side in a 

combined operations center on one of the two 

platforms. Two battalions of Iraqi Marines are 

now forming, although they are currently only 

manned at 69% and are poorly trained, billeted, 

and equipped. 

The NP continues to improve its proficiency 

and professionalism. As of August 1, 2008, 31 

NP battalions were conducting operations. One 

battalion was rated at the lowest level of 

readiness while another 12 NP battalions are 

currently being formed. 

Intelligence Agency Developments 

Coalition efforts to develop Iraqi intelligence 

capability are shifting focus. Previous efforts 

focused on building capacity at the national 

level headquarters of several organizations: the 

MoD Directorate General for Intelligence and 

Security (DGIS), JHQ, Directorate for 

Intelligence (M2), and the MoI National 

Information and Investigation Agency (NIIA). 

Significant effort is still required to continue 

building capacity within these organizations; 

however, primary focus has shifted from 

capacity building at the national level to 

advising the Iraqis at lower echelons in order to 

improve intelligence fusion and functional 

performance across the Iraqi national 

intelligence enterprise by directly supporting 

the ISF. To support the current mission and 

this shift in focus, the MNSTC-I Intelligence 

Transition Team (INTEL-TT) anticipates 

reassignment or allocation of additional 

advisory personnel to support greater 

engagement with the lower echelons of the 

intelligence enterprise outside Baghdad. 

INTEL-TT has initiated development of a 

comprehensive strategy to improve intelligence 

fusion and the functional performance of the 
 37 September 26, 2008 

Iraqi national intelligence enterprise. This 

strategy has five foundational components: (1) 

creation of Iraqi regional Intelligence Fusion 

Cells (IFCs) to support the regional operations 

commands; (2) continuing expansion of the 

Iraqi Intelligence Network (I2N); (3) provision 

of direct support for operational forces, 

enabling intelligence-driven operations and 

targeting; (4) development of MoD signals 

intelligence (SIGINT) and airborne imagery 

intelligence (IMINT) capabilities to 

complement existing human intelligence 

(HUMINT); and (5) extension of INTEL-TT 

advisory presence to provincial and ISF 

intelligence elements. A reprioritization of 

Coalition advisory personnel to focus on 

fulfilling the growing INTEL-TT mission 

requirements is critical to executing this 

strategy. 

Recent operations in Basrah, Mosul, Sadr City, 

Amarah, and Diyala reinforce the need for 

regional intelligence fusion cells. INTEL-TT 

has aggressively planned and initiated the 

establishment of seven regional IFCs in 

accordance with operational priorities of the 

ISF and MNC-I. As of July 2008, IFCs are 

operational at Basrah, Mosul, and Diyala, and, 

to a lesser extent, Amarah. Further planning is 

underway for fusion cells in Anbar, Samarra, 

and Karbala, which are scheduled to reach 

initial operational capability by the end of 

October 2008. Although Baghdad does not 

have a fusion cell, several key fusion cell 

functions—information sharing, analysis, and 

target development—are dispersed across many 

agencies and locations. INTEL-TT continues 

to encourage senior Iraqi intelligence leaders to 

establish a dedicated fusion cell facility in 

Baghdad. 

Training Capacities 

The IA and police expansion of basic combat 

and police training facilities has led to 

noticeable increases in the overall percentages 

of assigned unit strength. Through July 31, 

2008, the IA had trained over 59,000 soldiers in 

its basic combat, specialty, and re-joiner 

leadership training courses this year. In that 

same time, the MoI provided basic recruit 

training to over 31,000 IPS, NP, and DBE 

personnel. NTM-I plans to increase the 

capacity of professionalism training of the NP. 

Currently, 450 students can be trained per 

month; this will increase to 650 in September 

and 900 in November 2008. In addition to 

basic combat and police training, leader 

development remains a key area of focus for 

both security ministries throughout this year.

Logistics and Sustainment Capacities 

Developing logistics and sustainment 

capabilities remains a major area of concern 

and is essential for the continued improvement 

of the ISF. Although security forces have 

become more competent and self-sufficient 

over time, the need for Coalition assistance 

during Basrah operations highlighted ISF 

limitations in planning and conducting 

expeditionary life support. However, as 

evidenced during subsequent operations in 

Mosul, Sadr City, Amarah, and Diyala, the ISF 

are making appropriate organizational 

adjustments. This is an encouraging 

development, but much effort must be directed 

to the sustainment and logistical support of the 

ISF. This will be a major focus in 2009. 

The MoD is developing a national supply and 

distribution network. The MoD will have one 

Location Command (previously known as a 

Base Support Unit) in direct support of each IA 

division. Additionally, the MoD has plans to 

co-locate regional life-support assets at these 

sites in order to enhance warehousing and 

distribution capacity. Eight of the bases to 

support these Location Commands are either 

complete or being refurbished. The remaining 

five bases are under construction or pending 

contract and will have an initial operational 

capability by mid-2009.26 

Work on the Taji National Depot Complex is 

progressing. The Complex is the centerpiece 

for national supply and maintenance services to 

the Iraqi joint forces. The small arms repair 

facility, the first of 21 components that 

comprise the Taji National Maintenance Depot, 

began limited operations in May 2008. The 
 38 September 26, 2008 

next facility scheduled to open by the end of 

2008 is the generator repair workshop. This 

facility will provide support for limited repair 

of 50kw to 250kw generators. Taji National 

Supply Depot will maintain line stock across all 

classes of supply for issue to the 13 Location 

Commands. Other components of the Taji 

Depot (generator repair facility, engine repair, 

transmission repair, repair part warehouses, 

main wheeled facility and tracked maintenance 

depot) will become functional as construction 

is completed and training is conducted; the 

entire Depot is expected to be operational in 

mid-2009. 

Since 2003, Iraqi and Coalition forces have 

captured tens of thousands of enemy weapons 

and placed them in secure storage at the Taji 

National Supply Depot. As of May 2008, an 

estimated 80,000 small arms of various types 

were held there, awaiting serial number 

inventory and assessment prior to 

demilitarization or repair through the Taji 

National Maintenance Depot. As of August 20, 

2008, 19,140 weapons had been inventoried 

and categorized for repair, refurbishing, or 

demilitarization. Further efforts are underway 

to accelerate the process to clear the backlog 

and achieve a steady workload that keeps pace 

with weapons capture rates. Weapon serial 

numbers are reconciled against the established 

database as part of this process to identify any 

weapons purchased with ISFF. It is expected 

that the Taji National Maintenance Depot will 

commence low-scale work on the repairable 

weapons beginning in October 2008. 

Iraqi forces remain partially dependent on 

Coalition support to move supplies from the 

central depots to Location Commands and 

police warehouses. However, their dependency 

should be reduced by accelerating the fielding 

of motor transport regiments. The IA has 

fielded ten motor transport regiments and will 

field two additional regiments in 2008. The 

donation of a number of German transport 

trucks and the purchase of medium and heavy 

cargo vehicles has accelerated generation of a 

theater-capable General Transportation 

Regiment (GTR). The GTR is currently in 

force generation and will reach initial operating 

capability by November 2008. 

Acquisition Capabilities 

The MoI is increasing its equipment issue and 

procurement capability. In June 2008, the MoI 

completed seven case-band warehouses, 

located at the Baghdad Police College, to 

expand capability beyond its four older 

masonry warehouses located at the Baghdad 

Police College. The MoI is also conducting 

direct issue operations from the Coalitionadministered Abu Ghraib Warehouse Complex. 

Additionally, the MoI has improved in 

procurement capability and independent service 

contracting: examples include contracts for 

vehicle maintenance, parts, and mobile support 

teams to support the vehicle fleet in Anbar and 

a blanket purchase agreement for spare parts 

for the entire IPS vehicle fleet. 

The GoI continues to expand its forces mobility 

capability via the acquisition of high mobility 

multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs). 

The refurbishment, transfer to the GoI, and 

distribution of 8,500 U.S. HMMWVs is 

progressing. MNSTC-I continues to support 

the provision of HMMWV variants to the ISF 

in order to provide enhanced protected mobility 

to forces engaged in the COIN operation. As 

of August 24, 2008, a total of 1,808 M1114s 

had been refurbished and transferred to the GoI 

in accordance with GoI priorities. The GoI 

fielded 3,286 HMMWVs prior to the beginning 

of the HMMWV rebuild program—2,484 via 

ISFF, 469 via Foreign Military Sales (FMS), 

and 333 via direct purchase. 

Foreign Military Sales 

As of September 2008, the FMS program had 

delivered, or was in the process of delivering, 

approximately $2.6 billion worth of equipment 

or services to the GoI paid for by national 

funds. This included over $2 billion to the 

MoD, $395 million to the MoI, and $129 

million to the Ministry of Justice. Since the 

advent of the FMS Task Force, headed by the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, the average 
 39 September 26, 2008 

time required to process FMS cases has 

improved significantly. Moreover, the delivery 

of the equipment has improved substantially. 

The Iraqi military ministerial requirements 

development process, ministerial execution of 

contracting, and FMS processes have yet to 

reach the level required to fully support force 

generation timelines. Although improving, the 

processing of FMS Letters of Request (LORs) 

and Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs) 

within the MoD continues to be cumbersome 

and time-consuming. As of September 2, 2008, 

about $738 million in offered FMS cases 

require MoD signature. Additional LOAs are 

in the pipeline to support force transition 

initiatives, including almost $1 billion for C130Js and armed reconnaissance helicopters. 

On September 7, 2008, the Minster of Defense 

signed the first force transition LOA for M1A1 

tanks, estimated to be worth $684 million. 

Currently, however, the MoD FMS 

requirements exceed the level of funding 

available from the MoF. The U.S. Government 

is working with the GoI to address the issue. 

The GoI continues to explore Direct 

Commercial Sales options. On August 27, 

2008 the Minister of Defense signed an LOR 

requesting price and availability data for 36 F16 aircraft and support systems. This request is 

now being processed and evaluated at the 

Department of Defense. 

2.2. Ministry of Interior 

MoI security forces consist of the Iraqi Police 

Service (IPS), the National Police (NP), and the 

Directorate of Border Enforcement (DBE). In 

anticipation of the passage of the Facilities 

Protection Service (FPS) Reform Law, the MoI 

continues preparation to absorb FPS personnel, 

who are currently spread among other 

ministries. Also, in January 2008, the GoI 

directed that the Oil Police be transferred to the 

MoI. However, funding transfers to support 

this action did not occur until July 2008. 

Currently, the SoI contracts are paid by the 

Coalition. 

As of August 27, 2008, the Sons of Iraq (SoI) 

program had transferred over 20,000 personnel 

into full time employment with the ISF 

(primarily the IPS) and other non-security 

employment.27 The Coalition continues 

working with the MoI to develop a plan to 

transfer the remaining security contracts to the 

MoI. However, the GoI has not provided 

funding for the transfer. Prime Minister 

Maliki’s recent order to transfer Baghdad area 

SoI (54,000 personnel) to the GoI payroll by 

October 1, 2008 is welcome, but it only 

transitions half the total SoI. Another concern 

is the slow pace of transition into civilian jobs 

of those SoI not integrated into the ISF, and the 

relative lack of such jobs. Coalition forces will 

continue to monitor the SoI program until GoI 

guidance and funding is provided.

Ministry of Interior Transition Issues 

Ministry Capacity Development

Coalition advisors report continued 

improvement in the MoI’s ability to perform 

key ministerial functions. These functions 

include force management, personnel 

management, acquisition, training, logistics and 

sustainment, and development and 

implementation of plans and policies. 

Strategic planning continues to improve. On 

June 12, 2008, the MoI conducted its inaugural 

management review of progress toward 

achieving goals set in its 2008 strategic plan 

and identified eight goals with 54 associated 

objectives. During the review, senior MoI 

leaders discussed the objectives achieved by 

the various directorates and the Ministry’s 

vision for the rest of the year. Current year 

accomplishments form the basis for the 2009 

MoI draft strategic plan. 

Force Management 

During this period, the MoI made progress in 

defining a Basis of Issue plan for its three 

major elements (IPS, NP, and DBE). This plan 

allows the MoI to better conduct fiscal 

programming and force generation activities for 

the ministry as a whole. Also, as a result of 

Baghdad Police Summits, the Baghdad IPS 
 40 September 26, 2008 

expansion plan is meeting goals for recruiting, 

hiring, and equipping the required number of 

police for Baghdad. 

Resource Management 

The MoI has streamlined approval processes 

for the use of funds by spending units, and 

budget execution has improved as a result. The 

MoI has executed approximately 40% of its CY 

08 budget through June 2008. Although nonsalary expenditures are only 18.5% executed, 

this low rate is attributable to the fact that the 

budget was not approved until April 2008. The 

MoI’s nascent strategic planning structure 

should help sustain positive trends in budget 

execution, as should continued senior 

ministerial level emphasis. Further, seniorlevel emphasis has resulted in improved 

timeliness in monthly financial reporting. 

The MoI is facing an overall budget shortfall. 

Having requested a $7.8 billion for 2008, only 

$3.8 billion was approved by the Ministry of 

Finance (MoF), in part, due to concerns about 

the MoI’s execution rate. This budget is 

insufficient to meet all anticipated logistics 

requirements unless the MoI reduces its 

planned staffing increases or forgoes planned 

expenditures for materials and services. To 

address this shortfall, the MoI submitted a 2008 

supplemental budget request of $2.5 billion, 

and the GoI approved $1.7 billion. 

Personnel 

A number of positive developments in MoI 

personnel management have taken place. EMinistry, an Iraqi-funded system that will link 

human resource and payroll actions and thereby 

address most major personnel accountability 

issues, is in Phase I of a three-phase fielding 

plan, with the MoI human resources (HR) 

directorate populating the database. The MoI 

HR directorate is in the final stages of 

deploying the necessary personnel and 

equipment to conduct full-scale fielding of Eministry and it is establishing processes and 

procedures for data storage with proper security 

protocols. However, total implementation of 

E-ministry will not be complete until sometime 

in mid-to-late 2009. 

Materiel Acquisition 

The MoI continues to receive large shipments 

from FMS purchases. Also, deliveries on a 

$96.3 million contract for ammunition and light 

weapons, brokered independently with China, 

demonstrate the ministry is improving the 

capability to complete direct contracts for 

goods. 

Logistics and Sustainment 

The MoI is developing limited internal logistic 

capability. Generally, the MoI uses a civilian 

model for logistics (and therefore does not have 

organic logistics units) and does not designate 

personnel with occupational specialties (and 

there builds logistics expertise only through 

follow-on training for some police recruits). 

The development of the National Police 

Sustainment Brigade is a notable exception. 

Scheduled for completion by the end of 2008, 

this brigade will have organic logistics 

capabilities and will be capable of 

accomplishing a wide range of missions, 

including line haul transportation, deployable 

maintenance, supply receipt storage and issue 

for NP divisions, combat health treatment, and 

mobile fuel storage and distribution. Currently, 

the brigade consists of headquarters, medical, 

transportation, maintenance, and logistics 

companies, with 811 of its authorized 1,770 

personnel assigned—an increase of 263 since 

March 5, 2008. The major equipment for this 

unit is currently planned to be purchased via 

FMS. 

Organic MoI maintenance capability is not yet 

robust enough to sustain vehicle operational 

readiness rates above 85%. Maintenance 

programs continue to include mechanic training 

as part of their schedule to increase 

maintenance capability. To alleviate 

maintenance capability shortfalls, the MoI is 

coordinating for MoD support of MoI 

HMMWV integration in the form of mobile 

maintenance teams and train-the-trainer 

packages. The Iraqi Army Service and Support 
 41 September 26, 2008 

Institute began training MoI HMMWV 

mechanics in April 2008. 

The MoI is improving its ability to provide life 

support for its forces. The Ministry has 

instituted a self-reliance policy requiring that 

all life support contracts currently funded by 

the Coalition will be funded by the GoI upon 

renewal. All life support, to include that 

provided at both the Central Ministry and at the 

provincial level, is now contracted through the 

MoI contracting process. With the exception of 

Camp Dublin, the MoI has assumed life 

support responsibilities for its training centers. 

Likewise, the MoI has assumed life-support 

responsibilities for parts of Camp Dublin, 

including the Center of Dignitary Protection, 

base support operations, and the Emergency 

Response Brigade (ERB) training centers. The 

Coalition continues funding the life support for 

other programs at Camp Dublin, including for 

the operational ERB units and for Carabinieri

training of the NP. MNSTC-I will transfer life 

support responsibility for the ERB units to the 

MoI in the fall of 2008. 

Training and Development 

The MoI continues to add and assume 

responsibility for training facilities. During the 

reporting period, the MoI added an additional 

training facility for a total of 18. The Iraqi 

instructor cadre at the Baghdad Police College 

conducts all basic officer and enlisted recruit 

training and continues to increase the 

proportion of the specialized and advanced 

course loads. MNSTC-I advisors and 

International Police Advisors (IPAs) assist by 

providing advice, overwatch, and quality 

control at all training institutions. 

MoI training capacity continues to increase. 

The MoI training base is capable of training 

67,170 enlisted police and 2,330 officers each 

year and operates at a total student capacity of 

24,810 at any given time. For 2008, the MoI 

expects to train a total of approximately 42,235 

basic policemen for the IPS, 14,435 for the NP, 

and 10,500 for the DBE. With the Training 

Base expansion plan through mid-2009, seating 

capacity will allow a throughput of 117,100 

enlisted and 5,472 officers. Increased capacity 

will help reduce the backlog of untrained 

police. In addition, operating a training 

institution in each province will support wider 

recruiting efforts that will ensure training 

centers operate at or near capacity, and 

increased training capacity will help the 

Ministry address anticipated force attrition rates 

and provide a broader range of future 

professional training courses. 

The MoI training base expansion plan includes 

building 12 new training centers and expanding 

six existing training centers.28 These include 

new police officer colleges in Mosul, Irbil, and 

Basrah; new provincial training centers in 

Muthanna and Maysan provinces; and the 

expansion of facilities at the Baghdad Police 

College, Mosul Provincial Training Center, and 

Habbaniyah. All training centers will 

eventually share a common curriculum to 

standardize training. In some areas, violence

has hampered planned expansion efforts. 

Temporary training facilities could help address 

the backlog. 

Despite the focus on increasing training 

capacity, overcoming the MoI training backlog 

continues to be a significant challenge. In the 

past, deteriorating security conditions 

necessitated rapid MoI growth in basic security 

skills. This rapid expansion was accomplished 

through execution of a truncated 80-hour 

training course, which provided police officers 

with basic operational skills; however, this 

course falls short of the full training 

requirement to be an effective police officer. 

As a result, approximately 88,000 personnel 

currently need further training. The MoI’s goal 

is to train all IPS personnel with the full 400-

hour course, as the security situation and 

training capacity allow. MNSTC-I is working 

with the MoI to shorten duration of the full 

400-hour course to 240-hours by extending the 

length of the training day and eliminating low 

priority tasks, such as drill and ceremony. By 

compressing course length and maximizing 

training facility capacity, the MoI should be 
 42 September 26, 2008 

capable of reducing its training backlog to 

approximately 56,000 by July 2009. 

To maximize officer generation, the MoI 

continues to recall select former Iraqi Army 

and Police officers into the force. These 

recalled personnel become officers after 

completing a three-week Officer Transition 

Integration Program. 

Combating Corruption

Reducing corruption, treatment of detainees, 

preventing abuse, and improving 

professionalism continue to require close 

attention. Through August 31, 2008, the 

Directorate of Internal Affairs had opened 

4,318 cases against ministerial employees. The 

MoI closed 4,198 cases, the adjudication of 

which resulted in firing more than 377 

employees and disciplining another 297. 

Recent operations revealed cases of possible 

corruption, and the MoI has taken action to 

address these concerns. Operations in Basrah 

resulted in the firing of 27 officers and 283 

policemen, as well as the arrest of 57 

individuals for terrorism and the detention of 

76 individuals. Operations in Mosul resulted in 

80 individuals arrested for terrorism. 

Operations in Amarah resulted in 87 arrests, of 

which 75 were Iraqi Police—including the 

Amarah Police Chief. These developments 

demonstrate progress in MoI willingness and 

capacity to address corruption, support human 

rights, and address professionalism issues. 

Despite the progress, however, corruption 

remains a significant challenge. 

The MoI continues to train Internal Affairs and 

Inspector General (IG) personnel. In 2007, the 

MoI trained 344 Internal Affairs and 140 IG 

personnel through five training courses: basic 

internal affairs, interview and interrogations, 

anti-corruption, first-line supervisor, and 

advanced internal affairs. In the spring of 

2008, 250 additional IG recruits in IPS training 

subsequently received IG training and 

graduated in early June 2008. 

Embedded Advisory Support 

Coalition advisory teams continue to assist the 

MoI and its forces. As of August 8, 2008, 223 

of 266 required Police Transition Teams 

(PTTs) were in place, covering 70% (497) nonPIC police stations. The 27 border transition 

teams in theater are enough to cover about 33% 

of the DBE units at the battalion level and 

higher. The 41 NP TTs in place are covering 

over 85% of the NP units at the battalion-andabove levels. As of July 31, 2008, the MoI-TT 

had 95 of 120 required advisors, including 

Coalition military personnel. Additionally, 

contract personnel and one Department of State 

employee are assigned to the Ministry. 

The Military Police Transition Team mission is 

supported by International Police Advisors 

(IPAs) hired under a DoD-funded, DoSmanaged contract. There are 752 IPAs who, 

along with the PTTs, provide civilian law 

enforcement expertise in criminal investigation 

and police station management, as well as at 

the training academies and the MoI. IPAs help 

to develop and mature the IPS. They are now 

concentrating on “top-down” mentorship of the 

seven critical Police Performance Tasks: 

leadership, administration, operations, logistics, 

investigations, facilities, and training. As the 

provinces transition to PIC, IPAs may remain 

with the police to provide critical assistance as 

the province operates independent of robust 

Coalition support. 

Ministry of Interior Forces

Operational Planning and Execution

Recent operations in Basrah, Sadr City, Mosul, 

Amarah, and Diyala have tested the MoI 

Operations Directorate’s planning and 

execution capabilities. Initially, Basrah 

operations were characterized by limited 

capacity in ministerial planning, as well as in 

conducting and sustaining operations. These 

shortcomings led to a multitude of operational 

problems, including a lack of synchronized 

targeting and serious logistical shortages. 

During the operation, police units experienced 

shortages in ammunition, rations, water, and 

repair parts. Command and control in the 
 43 September 26, 2008 

operational area was mostly effective, 

information flow back to the MoI National 

Command Center (NCC) was insufficient. 

Nonetheless, the MoI demonstrated the 

capacity to react to these shortcomings. The 

logistics directorate was able to coordinate resupply of ammunition and repair parts to 

deployed units. In coordination with the MoD, 

the MoI used IqAF assets to transport needed 

supplies to the Basrah operational area. 

Planning, coordination, and conduct of 

operations following the Basrah operations 

have been much improved. For example, the 

MoI addressed numerous shortcomings in the 

planning phase of operations in Mosul. The 

MoI developed a deployment order based on 

the force list for the operation. The order was 

issued in time for subordinate units to 

effectively prepare for the mission. The 

Operations Directorate prepared and 

disseminated a complete plan to all units and 

relevant staffs, with focused attention on 

logistics to ensure mission planning addressed 

all classes of supply. The MoI also provided 

contingency funds to subordinate commanders 

to address emerging issues, such as life support. 

The Director General of Logistics deployed 

with the MoI command and control element to 

oversee logistics operations and ensure 

effective conduct of operations synchronized 

with the IA. Finally, intelligence analysis led 

to a well-executed targeting list coordinated 

between the Ninewa Operations Command and 

MoI forces. 

Despite this progress during recent operations, 

the NCC is not yet fully integrated with the 

National Operations Center (NOC) or with the 

MoD’s Joint Operations Center (JOC). This 

lack of integration highlights command and 

control shortcomings and the need to codify the 

overall national-level security architecture. 

Working alongside Iraqi counterparts, the 

Coalition and the NTM-I are implementing a 

series of exercises for 2009 to develop Iraqi 

individual and collective capabilities and to 

improve synchronization among the NCC, 

NOC, and JOC. 

Iraqi Police Service

The Iraqi Police Service (IPS) mission to 

enforce the rule of law, safeguard the public, 

and provide local security remains unchanged.. 

As of August 15, 2008, the IPS consisted of 

299,170 patrol, station, and traffic personnel. 

IPS leaders continue to confront significant 

challenges, including militia and criminal 

intimidation and influence, attrition, poor 

maintenance, and wear and tear and theft of 

equipment. 

A continuing area of development is Company 

Special Weapons and Tactics (CSWAT) 

capabilities (formerly Iraq Special Weapons 

and Tactics). CSWAT is a MoI organization 

specifically trained and advised in combat by 

the Coalition’s Combined Joint Special 

Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) personnel. 

Its primary mission is serving high-risk 

warrants under the rule of law, but its personnel 

are also used for personal security details, static 

checkpoint manning, and routine patrols. 

CSWAT has 3,066 personnel serving 

throughout Iraq in 22 units varying from 

platoon- to battalion-sized strength. CJSOTF is 

partnered with 20 of these CSWAT units in 

nine provinces. Additional units are still 

forming in Karbala, Kirkuk and Bayji. Since 

November 2, 2007, CSWAT units have 

conducted 173 missions, detained over 391 

persons of interest, uncovered 18 weapons 

caches, and executed a successful hostage 

rescue mission. 

National Police 

National Police staffing is increasing but 

continues to be a challenge. The MoI increased 

the authorized strength of the National Police 

(NP) to 44,263, which lowered the percentage 

fill to 90%. Officer staffing has increased to 

1,604 officers, or 48%, of authorized strength. 

The NP is also continuing its efforts to achieve, 

through both recruiting and directed 

assignments, better ethno-sectarian balance 

within the force to reflect demographics. 

The Coalition and NTM-I continue to support 

the MoI’s four-phased NP transformation 
 44 September 26, 2008 

program, which aims to increase force 

professionalism. The fourth class of Italian 

Carabinieri-led NTM-I training concluded on 

June 21, 2008 with 422 graduates. The first of 

the remaining four scheduled battalions started 

training on July 5, 2008 and graduated 424 

National Police on August 28, 2008. Battalionsized training rotations are approved and 

resourced through spring 2009. MNSTC-I and 

NTM-I are laying the foundation to double the 

throughput, accelerating professionalization of 

the NP. Additionally, future Iraqi trainers are 

being selected from among the top graduates of 

each class; these instructors—nine to date—

will form the cadre of the future. 

Most NP forces are based in Baghdad, where 

they support the Baghdad Operations 

Command; however, NP forces have conducted 

more than 15 operational deployments outside 

of Baghdad, most recently in Mosul and 

Diyala. Their increased effectiveness and 

deployability mark the beginning of a transition 

of the NP from a static, Baghdad-centric force 

to a rapid response force for the MoI. Phase IV 

of the NP transformation will be 

regionalization of NP units. Over time, the NP 

will establish permanent bases in many, if not 

all, provinces in Iraq. The Prime Minister has 

directed the formation and basing of a third NP 

Division. The Al Askarian Brigade, already 

generated and operating, is the first of three 

brigades in this new division. Force generation 

for the second brigade, the Abu Risha Brigade, 

has already begun. 

Directorate of Border Enforcement and 

Directorate of Ports of Entry 

The Directorate of Border Enforcement (DBE) 

consists of two major components: the Ports of 

Entry (PoE) Directorate and the DBE Border 

Police. The PoE Directorate manages 17 land 

PoEs, 13 of which are open for commerce. The 

DBE is responsible for inspecting cargo and 

passengers at four international airports and 

four seaports. DBE Border Police consist of 

five regional commands supporting 13 

Brigades, 54 Battalions, and the Coastal Border 

Guard. 

The PoE Directorate is responsible for 

preventing smuggling of accelerants for the 

12

2 1

1 23

18

7 1

2

4

13

2 9

2

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

Jan‐07 Jul‐08 Jan‐07 Jul‐08 Jan‐07 Jul‐08

National Police Battalion Headquarters National Police Brigade Headquarters National Police Division Headquarters

Capable of Planning, Executing, andSustaining COIN

Operations

Capable of Planning, Executing, andSustaining COIN

Operations with Iraqi or Coalition Support

Partially Capable of Conducting COIN Operations with

Coalition Units

Incapable of Conducting COIN Operations

Units Planned

MoI National Police Forces: Operational Readiness July 2008

Source:  MNF‐I as of 31 July 2008
 45 September 26, 2008 

insurgency such as lethal contraband and 

foreign fighters. Its personnel have become 

increasingly proficient at identifying and 

detaining persons wanted for terrorist or 

criminal activities. This success is a result of 

working with the Coalition and use of 

biometrics. 

DBE Border Police are responsible for 

patrolling and providing overwatch to prevent 

the unlawful entry of contraband, merchandise 

or persons into Iraq at locations other than 

designated PoE. The Border Police perform 

their functions through a variety of methods 

including vehicle patrols, stationary 

observation posts, and border forts along Iraq’s 

3,650-kilometer land border. 

The Director General (DG) of the DBE has 

taken an aggressive stand against corruption 

throughout the Department, removing two Port 

Directors and the Chief of Customs Police at a 

third PoE for misconduct. The DG also 

suspended an additional Port Director pending 

the completion of an investigation into 

allegations of corruption. 

The three-year modernization plan and budget 

developed by the DBE to improve and renovate 

PoEs and border infrastructure is an innovative 

step in long-term budget management within 

the GoI. The Iraqi Council of Representatives 

approved the 2008 portion of the supplemental 

budget to fund the three-year infrastructure 

plan. The end-state will be 712 border forts 

and annexes (with 5-6 kilometers and line-ofsight capability between them) and an increase 

in DBE authorized end strength from 38,000 to 

46,000 personnel. As of August 2008, 514 

border forts and annexes are complete. DBE 

forces have increased to a total of 13 Brigades 

and 43,073. 

The DBE still faces challenges, including 

shortage of officers and NCOs, inadequate fuel 

supplies, limited maintenance capabilities, 

immature logistical support, lack of 

maintenance facilities and equipment shortages. 

The DBE has obligated or spent approximately 

77% of the Operations, Salary, and 

Maintenance funding appropriated for the year. 

Facilities Protection Services 

The current MoI authorization for the Facilities 

Protection Services (FPS) is 16,324 personnel. 

Coalition forces have assisted the MoI and FPS 

in developing a training plan to increase 

training capacity from 320 students per month 

to over 1,000 students per month (two classes 

of 500 students per class each month). 

Through July 31, 2008, eight FPS training 

classes have graduated 1,934 personnel and 82 

new instructors have been trained in a Trainthe-Trainer course. 

If the GoI consolidates other elements of the 

FPS currently under other ministries into the 

MoI, the MoI FPS authorization will increase 

to over 108,000 personnel. A joint MoI, FPS, 

and Coalition steering group meets weekly to 

discuss consolidation actions and issues, to 

include personnel management, training, 

finance, logistics, communications, and 

information technology. 

A Prime Minister directive transferred the Oil 

Police from the Ministry of Oil to the MoI in 

January 2008. This force of nearly 22,000 

personnel is responsible for protecting oil 

infrastructure such as oil wells, pipelines, 

pumping stations, and refineries. The Coalition 

is working with the MoI to ensure that the Oil 

Police are sufficiently trained, equipped and 

resourced to accomplish their security mission. 

National Information and Investigation 

Agency 

The National Information and Investigation 

Agency (NIIA) is the lead intelligence 

organization within the MoI. The organization 

consists of a National Headquarters, 15 

provincial bureaus, 6 regional bureaus, 56 

district offices, and 13 PoE offices. It conducts 

criminal intelligence and investigative 

operations at the national level in coordination 

with other Iraqi security organizations; 

however, lack of full trust and confidence 

between national agencies, such as between 
 46 September 26, 2008 

NIIA and the Iraqi National Intelligence 

Service (INIS), impedes the exchange of 

criminal intelligence and collaborative 

intelligence products. Nonetheless, NIIA has 

demonstrated improvements in leadership, 

architecture, manning, and training, as well as 

in intelligence processing and analysis. 

The NIIA is implementing a synchronized, 

multi-tiered vetting plan for personnel hiring 

and assignments. In June 2008, the NIIA 

began vetting all key leaders and individuals 

involved with the counter terrorism analytical 

mission. Also in June, NIIA officers began a 

six-month contracted Polygraph Examiner’s 

Course. This core of polygraph examiners will 

form the nucleus of the newly-created NIIA 

Security Management Directorate, which will 

have the mission of internal vetting and 

polygraph examination of new NIIA hires and 

personnel for positions requiring access to 

sensitive facilities and information. 

Significant capability and capacity building 

initiatives for the NIIA are underway. The 

NIIA’s near-term focus is transition planning 

and occupation of new facilities, which 

scheduled for winter 2008. Also, Iraqi 

Intelligence Network (I2N) installation should be 

complete throughout NIIA by the end of CY08. 

This secure information network will join NIIA 

with other Iraqi intelligence organizations. I2N 

installation in the NIIA will enable provincial 

stations and counter-terrorism offices to submit 

collected raw information; to answer requestsfor-information; and to prepare target packets, 

analytical reports, and other intelligence 

products to NIIA headquarters. Additionally, 

secure voice communications will enable realtime, long-distance coordination between NIIA 

headquarters and the provincial offices as well 

as coordination with other Iraqi intelligence 

organizations. Three of 15 provisional offices 

are currently operational with I2N. 

Construction of the new NIIA headquarters 

building and the new Baghdad Information 

Bureau is complete. 
 47 September 26, 2008 

2.3 Ministry of Defense 

The Ministry of Defense (MoD) has 

approximately 192,000 personnel 

authorized and more than 206,000 

personnel assigned as of 31 July 2008. 

While the MoD has grown substantially 

in both size and capability, significant 

challenges remain as Iraqi forces begin 

to operate without support from 

Coalition forces. Currently, logistics and 

the sustainment of ISF personnel, 

equipment, and infrastructure pose the 

biggest problems for the force. This is 

largely due to the fact that MoD 

acquisition procedures and processes are 

slow, antiquated, and restrained by 

centralized decision making. 

Consequently, while the MoD has 

assumed life-support responsibilities at 

all of its troop locations, it is still 

working toward self-sufficiency in 

maintenance and logistics. Also, as 

recent events in Basrah, Sadr City, 

Mosul, Amarah, and Diyala have 

demonstrated, MoD performance is 

hampered by ineffective coordination 

and unclear lines of authority hampering 

unity of command during large 

operations. 

Ministry of Defense Transition Issues

Ministry Capacity Development 

The MoD continues to refine and 

institutionalize its internal processes, 

eliminate corruption, strengthen crossMoD/JHQ relationships, and improve 

engagements with other Iraqi ministries and 

other countries. Recent operations in Basrah, 

Sadr City, Mosul, Amara, and Diyala have 

highlighted growing capacity in the areas of 

force management, resource management, 

personnel, acquisition, logistics and 

sustainment, and training and development. 

However, the Ministry has shown limited 

progress in the areas of oversight and 

requirements-based budgeting, and the limited 

obligation of funds to equip and provide 

infrastructure support for planned forces 

generation may impede future growth. 

 

Force Management 

The MoD continues developing strategic 

planning documents such as the National 

Military Strategy, Defense Policy, and Defense 

Planning Guidance. The 2009 versions of these 

documents are being staffed, but they are not 

integrated with the MoD budget to form an 

integrated annual expenditure program. 

Requirements-based development and 

processes are immature. 

Iraqi Ground Forces Personnel as of July 31, 2008 

Unit Authorizeda Assigned 

as percent 

Authorized 

Present-forDuty as percent 

Authorized 

Iraqi Ground 

Forces 

Command HQ 

1,145 62% 61% 

1st Division 12,105 105% 85% 

2nd Division 13,605 117% 84% 

3rd Division 12,105 109% 70% 

4th Division 15,105 108% 85% 

5th Division 12,855 98% 110% 

6th Division 11,916 121% 130% 

7th Division 12,105 95% 62% 

8th Division 15,105 111% 78% 

9th Division 13,387 98% 68% 

10th Division 10,416 118% 96% 

11th Division 9,666 98% 85% 

12th Division 12,596 81% 55% 

14th Division 11,285 118% 66% 

17th Division 7,866 0% 0% 

Total Fielded 

Ground Forces 

171,262 0% 0%

Additional Units 

Planned or In 

Generation 

9,430 

Total Ground 

Forces Fielded 

and Planned 

180,692 

a. The table represents TOTAL FIELDED GROUND FORCES (and 

what is PLANNED or in generation, etc., with regard to ground forces 

(9,430). 
 48 September 26, 2008 

Resource Management 

The MoD 2008 budget allocation is 

approximately $5 billion, a funding shortfall of 

approximately $3 billion against the MoD 

baseline Service Plan. The categories most 

affected by this funding shortfall are force 

generation, sustainment, modernization, and 

infrastructure development. Exacerbating the 

problems caused by the budget shortfall is the 

ineffective execution of the MoD budget. To 

date, the MoD has executed 27% of its budget 

through June 2008. Spending has been mainly 

limited to salaries. Simple execution projection 

suggests MoD will execute only 60% of its 

2008 budget. 

The Coalition has had little success in 

stimulating MoD budget execution, which has 

been slowed by the MoD’s centralized 

authority and decision-making processes. 

Under current procedures, the Minister of 

Defense and Prime Minister exercise close 

personal authority over approval of most 

expenditures and infrastructure builds. In 

addition, MoD is increasingly reluctant to 

approve contracting proposals, a fact that 

impacts both new acquisitions and follow-on 

sustainment purchases. 

The MoD is making some effort to improve its 

budget execution and recently formed its own 

contracting committee, establishing procedures 

that ensure an audit trail and a collective 

decision-making process to approve FMS cases 

and direct contracts. This committee reinforces 

the Minister of Defense’s authority to approve 

contracts up to $50 million without referral to 

higher authority and should result in expedited 

approvals. The Ministry has also streamlined 

its process to assess and make 

recommendations to the contracting committee; 

however, it is too soon to determine whether 

this will provide sustained improvement in 

budget execution. 

The MoD is also starting to procure equipment 

by direct contracting from national and 

international suppliers. Lack of ministerial 

capacity remains a significant impediment to 

this process. Currently, fewer than 300 

personnel work in the contracting directorates, 

and many of these personnel lack the training 

and experience to write contracts or review 

specifications and proposals at a level that 

ensures viable negotiations. Ongoing Coalition 

efforts aim to improve MoD direct contracting 

capacity and transparency by providing training 

and embedding subject-matter experts. 

Current Iraqi plans require the fielding of 

critical combat support and combat service 

support enablers to support the COIN force 

over the next two years. If it hopes to 

accomplish these goals, the MoD will need to 

plan accordingly and rectify budget execution 

process and procedures. Absent some 

improvement in MoD budget execution, the 

completion of the COIN force, as planned, is at 

risk. 

Personnel

The MoD continues to develop a 

comprehensive personnel management 

program. Many policies and processes have 

been implemented to support life-cycle 

personnel functions from recruitment to postretirement, and the infrastructure for the 

Human Resource Information Management 

System (HRIMS) payroll and personnel 

management system is now in place. 

Additionally, HRIMS now captures data from 

soldier in-processing at basic combat training, 

advanced military occupational specialty 

training, the NCO education system course, and 

other courses across eleven training centers. 

MNSTC-I is supporting this important initiative 

with funding for contractor network support to 

assist with system development and with 

training a cadre of database managers. Full 

HRIMS fielding will connect all training center 

databases for pay, specialty qualifications, and 

unit assignments. Because HRIMS interfaces 

with biometrics systems, it will serve as a 

database for personnel identification and 

weapons accountability. Target date for initial 

HRIMS functionality is December 2008. MoD 

will need to focus on ensuring adequate 

training of system personnel and on approving 
 49 September 26, 2008 

funding requirements for periodic, recurring 

renewals of ORACLE Support Applications. 

The IA continues to focus on ensuring adequate 

personnel strength. The MoD decided in the 

summer of 2007 to fill personnel to 120% of 

authorizations for IA divisions. Additionally, 

assigned strength for 2-5 IA has been 

temporarily increased to 135% of authorized 

strength to ensure adequate strength for 

operations. As of July 31, 2008, all generated 

IA divisions reached an average of 103% of 

authorized strength. Through July 31, 2008, 

the monthly AWOL average over the last 6 

months for MoD personnel is approximately 

1,255. Estimated monthly attrition rate for 

Iraqi Ground Forces is approximately 2%. 

IqAF and IqN continue to grow and are at 57% 

and 99% of personnel authorizations, 

respectively, as of July 31, 2008. Their 

numbers of assigned personnel are 

commensurate with the air and naval platforms 

currently available and should grow as the 

additional platforms are required. However, 

capacity growth in IqAF and IqN will be slow 

due to a lack of MoD investment and 

inadequate infrastructure. Additional factors 

include the long training period required to 

produce fully qualified and trained airmen and 

naval crews for newly purchased platforms.29

MoD efforts are increasing its forces’ leader-toled ratios. From January 1 to July 31, 2008, the 

MoD successfully vetted 3,760 officers and 

4,094 NCOs from the former regime and 

allowed them to “re-join” the Iraqi Joint Forces 

(IJF). From January 1 to July 31, 2008 the 

training base graduated 9,251 NCOs. 

Additionally, as of July 31, 2008, 20,172 total 

NCOs have entered the IJF since June 2007; 

4,040 of those NCOs have accessed since 

January 1, 2008. 

Logistics and Sustainment

MoD logistics and sustainment capacity has 

improved slightly but remains a key focus area 

for future improvement. At the tactical level, 

MNC-I logistical units are partnering with like 

Iraqi units. At the operational and strategic 

levels, a vast gap exists in understanding, 

implementing, and integrating a logistics 

program. A logistics integrator and additional 

advisors and partners are needed at the strategic 

level to improve the logistics and sustainment 

capabilities in the MoD. 

Iraqi Army maintenance procedures are less 

than adequate, but show signs of improvement. 

The 3rd line maintenance backlog has been 

decreasing slowly, and the transition of 

responsibility from contractors to the IA is 

complete for nine of 11 maintenance sites. 

MNSTC-I approved a significantly de-scoped 

contract extension for the Coalition-funded 

Iraqi Army Maintenance Program contract 

through the end of November 2008. This 

extension provided continued automation 

training, limited maintenance training, and 

oversight at the nine sites that have transitioned 

to the IA. The MoD plans to transition the last 

two maintenance sites—Al Asad and Taji—

once they have sufficient Iraqi mechanics and 

are capable of self-sustainment. MNSTC-I is 

enhancing maintenance and driver training and 

is offering on-the-job training to mechanics 

working on the refurbished HMMWV transfer 

program. In addition, the MoD has submitted 

requests for $80 million in contracts to procure 

spare parts for vehicles. The MoD does not 

currently possess its own automated system to 

ensure accurate and timely parts ordering and 

distribution, but the IA is familiar with and 

using the available system. 

Training and Development 

The IA Training Base Expansion has increased 

the current capacity at six regional training 

centers, four division-training centers, and the 

single combat training center to 19,800 soldiers 

per training cycle.30 Four of the eight training 

cycles scheduled for the IA in 2008 are 

complete. Through July 2008, 64,332 

personnel had graduated from basic combat, 

specialty, and re-joiner leadership training 

courses. 
 50 September 26, 2008 

The IA is making steady progress toward 

implementing its Future Iraqi Army Training 

Concept, which will improve training at 

institutional, divisional, regional, and combat 

training centers. With Coalition assistance, 

Iraqi leaders have initiated enhancements at the 

division and regional training centers to 

increase training capabilities for individual, 

leader, staff, and small unit collective task 

training. To support this effort, the Tactical 

Training Command recently completed a 

comprehensive revision of training center 

organization and modified tables of 

organization and equipment (MTOEs), aligning 

Iraqi instructors and training center cadres. 

Signifying the success of these recent 

initiatives, the Combat Training Center at 

Besmayah graduated its first War Fighters 

Course in July 2008. This course provides 

refresher training to battalions rotating out of 

combat operations. It exercises battalion 

combat operations and incorporates training in 

planning, user maintenance, weapons 

qualification, and operational tactics, 

techniques, and procedures during combat 

operations. 

Recognizing the important of strong 

commissioned and non-commissioned officers, 

the JHQ has pursued many initiatives to 

improve leadership within the ISF. These 

include accelerated officer commissioning 

programs for university graduates and active 

recruitment of former Iraqi officers and NCOs. 

On the enlisted side, the top 10% of each Basic 

Combat Training class is selected to attend a 

Corporal’s Course. Through July 31, 2008, this 

program generated over 4,053 new corporals. 

Finally, the JHQ has established 

professionalism seminars for key officer and 

enlisted leadership within the JHQ and with 

each of the services. These Iraqi-led seminars 

establish a recurring forum to develop and 

institutionalize military professionalism. 

While officer training and development are 

improving, much work remains. The four 

military Academies are graduating enough 

cadets for the needs of the Iraqi Joint Forces, 

but facilities remain rudimentary and tactical 

training is limited. The Junior Staff course—

with only 64 students—is too small for the size 

of the Iraqi Army, but plans are underway to 

double the capacity in 2009. A new Brigade 

and Battalion Commanders’ course fills an 

important gap in officer professional 

development. To improve the officer training 

and education system, the JHQ also established 

a training-needs analysis committee to analyze 

IA officer skill requirements. 

The MoD is also improving professionalism in 

the civilian and military work force through 

courses and seminars taught at the Ministerial 

Developmental Training Center. From January 

to August 2008, over 500 civilian and military 

students received instruction in 41 different 

courses covering a variety of subjects. The 

MoD plans instruction for an additional 350 

students in 22 courses through the end of 2008. 

Several factors currently prevent full utilization 

of the available training resources. Though 

many courses offered by Coalition forces 

require English language proficiency, the MoD 

has not established an effective Englishlanguage training program. This is a 

contributing factor to lost training opportunities 

and inhibits personnel development for military 

occupational specialties—especially pilots—

requiring English language proficiency. 

Complementing the MoD’s training effort is 

the NATO Training Mission–Iraq (NTM-I). 

NTM-I provides a variety of professional 

mentorship programs for the ISF. Its core 

contributions are institutional training for Iraqi 

military officers, Carabinieri training for the 

National Police, and mentoring and training in 

support of national command and control 

centers. NTM-I has trained thousands of GoI 

security personnel in areas such as civil and 

military staff training, police training and 

officer and NCO leadership training. Recently, 

NATO expanded its training programs for the 

Iraqi Navy and Iraqi Army NCO corps. 

In an attempt to synchronize and coordinate 

these many efforts, the JHQ held its first 
 51 September 26, 2008 

commander’s conference in July. This 

conference was Iraqi-led and gave the division 

commanders and operations commands an 

opportunity to brief the MoD and JHQ on the 

status of forces and the challenges each faces. 

The JHQ is planning the next conference, 

which will likely focus on logistics issues. 

The JHQ further demonstrated its capacity 

development by presenting its first Iraqi-led 

Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) to the 

MoD. The senior leaders from both the JHQ 

and MoD assessed the training capability of the 

Iraqi Joint Forces and focused on three critical 

areas: infrastructure, maintenance, and spare 

parts. The JHQ identified the most significant 

challenges for the joint forces, which are 

largely a result of the accelerated growth. 

Many of the challenges identified stem from 

the centralized decision-making process and 

lack of direction from the MoD. The Coalition 

will have to continue to mentor and advise the 

JHQ and to provide them with the necessary 

information to make decisions in a timely 

manner. The TRA, like the commander’s 

conference, will occur quarterly. 

Military Justice 

Military Justice systems and processes continue 

to develop. Courts are operational, with trials 

taking place in Baghdad, Mosul, Basrah, Najaf, 

and Ramadi. The Ramadi court began holding 

trials during the last week of July 2008. The 

remaining military court, to be located in Erbil, 

should open during the fall of 2008. The MoD 

has opened a functioning appellate military 

court in Baghdad.

Inspector General

The MoD and JHQ Inspector General (IG) 

system is maturing. The JHQ IG is very active 

and increasingly effective in reinforcing 

adherence to the rule of law. Its personnel 

effectively executed a well-documented 

inspection schedule, accomplishing 65 

inspections through July 31, 2008. However, 

the MoD must address the IG’s limited record 

keeping, unverifiable case closures, and poor 

work in identifying corruption. 

Embedded Advisory Support 

Embedded Advisory Teams (ATs) continue to 

support the MoD and JHQ with 18 and 35 

advisors, respectively. The teams advise, 

mentor, and provide subject matter expertise to 

senior Iraqi officials. Teams include subject 

matter specialists in areas such as budget 

execution and contracting. In an effort to 

accelerate growth in ministerial capacity, the 

MoD-AT will expand to 58 personnel through a 

combination of internal realignment and 

outsourcing for personnel with critical skills. 

Transition Teams embed within each of the 

Iraqi services (Army, Air Force, and Navy) to 

provide advisory, mentoring, and subject matter 

expert support at the tactical, operational, and 

strategic levels. Military Transition Teams 

(MiTTs), assigned to the MNC-I Iraqi 

Assistance Group, embed with the Iraqi Ground 

Forces Command (IGFC) and with most 

division, brigade, and battalion headquarters. 

At the tactical level, MiTTs provide advisory 

support and direct access to Coalition resources 

to enhance ISF ability to conduct operations. 

MiTTs consist of approximately 10 to 15 

personnel who advise and assist Iraqi 

commanders and staff on planning processes 

and combat operations. MiTTs are fielded to 

every battalion and above with 183 external 

teams currently fielded. MNC-I uses a 

conditions-based concept for MiTT 

employment that allows for Multi-National 

Division commanders to distribute MiTTs 

based on the security environment in the area 

of operation, the level of training and 

effectiveness of ISF units, and the effectiveness 

of local governance. 

The Coalition Army Advisory and Training 

Team (CAATT) has training teams embedded 

at the Iraqi Army Tactical Training Command; 

at the divisional, regional, and combat training 

centers and other schools (such as the Iraqi 

Army Service and Support Institute); at each 

Location Command; and at Taji National 

Depot. CAATT is responsible for assisting the 

MoD and JHQ with force generation, force 

replenishment, and force sustainment. 
 52 September 26, 2008 

The Coalition Air Force Training Team 

(CAFTT) has advisor teams at the strategic (Air 

Staff), operational (Air Operations Center), and 

tactical (individual squadron) levels. CAFTT is 

responsible for assisting the IqAF as it develops 

near term airpower capabilities to support the 

COIN fight and sets the conditions for a further 

growth in the long term. CAFTT advises along 

the full spectrum of IqAF activities, from flying 

operational and training missions to building, 

training, equipping, and sustaining the force. 

The Maritime Strategic Transition Team 

advises the Iraqi Head of Navy and Iraqi Navy 

Headquarters Staff to develop a capable and 

responsive IqN. Its Naval Transition Team 

embeds with the IqN at Umm Qasr Naval Base 

and supports generation of a properly 

organized, trained, and equipped naval force. 

Supporting the advisory and training teams are 

six functional capability teams. These teams 

provide expertise in manning, materiel 

acquisition, budget, sustainment, training and 

development, and force management. These 

teams are vital to the success of the advisory 

and training teams, as they develop potential 

solutions for Iraqi Joint Force challenges. 

Ministry of Defense Forces 

Joint Headquarters – Command and Control 

The Joint Headquarters is developing a greater 

capability to provide operational-level advice to 

the MoD. Furthermore, with growing 

experience from operations in Basrah, Mosul, 

Sadr City, Amarah, and Diyala, the JHQ is 

developing its capacity to plan and resource 

operations. In Diyala in particular, the JHQ 

systematically planned and coordinated for 

essential classes of supply in advance of 

combat operations. 

Another significant area of progress has been 

the ability of the JHQ to plan, resource and 

manage its increasingly complex force 

management program to recruit, train, equip, 

and deploy new combat and support units, 

while at the same time maintaining the 

capability of the existing force. 

Despite the JHQ’s progress, the Iraqi national 

security command-and-control architecture 

continues to be poorly defined, which inhibits 

planning, decision-making, and the ability to 

execute coordinated operations at all levels. 

Iraqi Army

The Iraqi Army (IA) currently has 13 infantry 

divisions and one mechanized infantry division 

organized under the IGFC. It is assigned 

180,296 soldiers, exceeding its authorization of 

171,262 soldiers and officers. The IA also has 

approximately 22,000 soldiers assigned to 

training and support forces. 

The IA continues to grow in size. As part of 

the ISF expansion and growth initiative in early 

summer 2007, a directive to over-man the 

existing divisions, as well as to establish a new 

division (the 14th IA Division), was issued. In 

the spring of 2008, the PM directed the 

formation of the 17th IA Division, which was 

created using excess forces from the 6th IA 

Division. Since these soldiers are still on the 

6th IA Division payroll, the assigned strength of 

the 17th IA Division is reported as 0. Force 

generation plans for this division are ongoing. 

Additionally, the IA and the JHQ leadership are 

coordinating with the Kurdistan Regional 

Government to develop a plan to integrate two 

Kurdish Peshmerga divisions into the IA; 

however, the level of GoI and KRG leadership 

support for this initiative remains unclear. 

The IA continues to generate units as planned, 

and the MoD and the JHQ are cooperating to 

prioritize unit generation and to determine 

resourcing requirements. The development of 

logistics units is progressing. By the end of 

2008, the IA will produce an additional one 

division headquarters, five brigade 

headquarters, eight infantry battalions, five 

additional location commands, two motor 

transport regiments, one general transport 

regiment, one logistics battalion, and an Army 

Ammunition Depot. Each of the additional 

logistics units will be dedicated to support 

specific IA divisions and each is critical to the 

IA’s efforts to achieve logistical self-
 53 September 26, 2008 

sufficiency. Coalition coordination with the 

MoD and JHQ to maximize training base 

capacity remains a major area of focus. 

Recent operations in Amarah and Diyala 

demonstrate that IA leaders are increasingly 

able to plan, coordinate, and execute COIN 

operations. In Amarah, the MoD and MoI 

worked together to attach the 6th NP Brigade to 

the 1st IA Division. Additionally, the 38th and 

10th Brigades were ordered to move to Amarah 

and were assigned to the 1st IA Division. In 

Diyala, the JHQ and the IGFC planned and 

coordinated the movement and repositioning of 

four brigades; all four brigades were detached 

from other ISF Divisions, integrated under the 

command and control of the Diyala Operations 

Command, and assigned to conduct security 

and stability operations. 

Iraqi forces in Basrah, Sadr City, Mosul, 

Amarah, and Diyala continue to pursue AQI 

and militia extremists. Overall, the IA 

continues to improve, but relies on Coalition 

forces for close air support, fire support, 

intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 

(ISR), logistics, sustainment, and 

communications. While operations in Diyala 

and Amarah have demonstrated a gradual 

improvement in the command and support 

relationships of attached brigades from other 

IA divisions, IA units must further improve 

their ability to specify command relationships. 

Recognizing this need, the IA continues to 

develop its command and control infrastructure 

and capability. As of July 2008, the IGFC 

assumed command and control of the planned 

14 IA divisions, 52 brigade headquarters, 171 

army battalions, eight infrastructure battalions 

and six special operations battalions. Of these 

planned units, two divisions, four brigade 

headquarters, 18 army battalions, two special 

operations battalions, and one infrastructure 

battalion are still being formed. Therefore, the 

current ground combat power strength is 164 

battalions with a total of 185 planned 

battalions. Also, operational commands have 

been established in Baghdad, Ninewa, Karbala, 

Samarra, Basrah, Anbar, and Diyala. These 

provide an operational headquarters for all 

(military and police) units operating in that 

region. 

The Engineering Infrastructure Battalion has 

completed training at Taji Training Center. 

Two battalions are responsible for rapid repairs 

of the oil pipeline and of the electrical 

transmission and generating lines. The MoE 

continues to provide training for Electrical 

Repair Company personnel, and the Ministry of 

Oil provides training for the Pipeline Repair 

Company. These units will provide the IA 

critical capability to repair damaged electrical 

power lines and oil pipelines in unsecured 

areas. 

Weapons issue, training, and accountability 

have improved. The IA has expanded fielding 

and training on U.S. standard weapons such as 

M16A4s and M4s. The M16 Program had 

fielded over 44,375 weapons through July 2008 

and is on track to reach the 2008 goal of 

58,000. Accountability of M16A4s and M4s 

has been improved via the use of multiple 

forms of identification, including biometric 

data. In conjunction with M16A4 and M4 

fielding and training, the IA certified 53 

maintainers and 4,490 IA officer and NCO 

trainers on the M16A4 and M4s. 

Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio 

Systems (SINCGARS) are currently being 

fielded in the Iraqi Army. SINCGARS 

provides VHF-FM combat net radio 

communication with electronic countercountermeasure by frequency hopping and 

digital data capability. 4,500 individual radios 

have been issued, and 359 vehicle systems have 

been installed. After an initial training period, 

Iraqi soldiers assumed all installation 

responsibilities, and Iraqi Divisions now utilize 

the SINCGARS radios during combat 

operations. 

Iraqi Navy 

The Iraqi Navy (IqN) has 1,872 assigned 

officers, sailors, and Marines operating out of a 

single base at Umm Qasr. The IqN 
 54 September 26, 2008 

organization consists of an operational 

headquarters, one afloat squadron, one support 

squadron, and two Marine battalions. One Iraqi 

Navy Marine Battalion partners with Coalition 

forces to provide point defense of the offshore 

oil platforms and to conduct visit, board, 

search, and seizure (VBSS) operations. The 

second battalion protects the Port of Umm 

Qasr. Additionally, the Navy conducts patrols 

and boardings from its FABs in the Khwar Abd 

Allah Waterway approaches to Umm Qasr. 

The IqN’s headquarters element at the MoD 

continues to improve the effectiveness of its 

day-to-day management of the IqN and its joint 

long-term planning. For example, the Navy 

staff has published a comprehensive Navy Plan 

in support of the Iraqi National Military 

Strategy. 

The IqN is sustaining a good operations tempo. 

Its forces operate five small Patrol Boats and 

10 Fast Assault Boats (FABs) to police Iraq’s 

territorial waters. Since March 2008, the IqN 

completed 923 out of 995 planned patrols 

(92.7% execution rate), with the majority of 

cancellations due to weather and high seas. 

The current operations tempo results in 

approximately 42 independent patrols 

conducted each week, with 15 to 33 boarding 

operations. The IqN has sustained this level of 

effort in conjunction with expanded mission 

requirements since Operation Charge of the 

Knights in March 2008. 

Equipment acquisition and infrastructure 

development continue. The IqN will accept 

delivery of six new Fast Assault Boats (FABs) 

in October 2008. An additional 10 will follow 

in December 2008, and the final 10 in the 

spring of 2009. Also, FABs reallocated from 

river operations in Baghdad will allow VBSS 

operations in the North Arabian Gulf as well as 

patrols of the Khwar Al Abdullah waterway 

and the ports of Umm Qasr and Az Zubayr. 

The current acquisition plan involves 

commissioning 21 major vessels (10 in 2009 

and 11 in 2010) and 50 fast insertion and 

interdiction craft by 2011. Additionally, the 

GoI is expected to contract with Malaysia for 

an additional 12 patrol boats by April 2009. To 

support these new ships, the IqN let a contract 

21

5 10

5

17

54

5

11

78

87

7

8

12

18

4

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

Jan‐07 Jul‐08 Jan‐07 Jul‐08 Jan‐07 Jul‐08 Jan‐07 Jul‐08

Iraqi Army Combat,

Infrastructure, and Special

Operations Force Battalions

Logistics Enablers Air Force Navy

Capable of Planning, Executing, andSustaining COIN

Operations

Capable of Planning, Executing, andSustaining COIN

Operations with Iraqi or Coalition Support andEnablers

Partially Capable of Conducting COIN Operations with

Coalition Units

Incapable of Conducting COIN Operations/In Unit Set

Fielding

Units Planned/In ForceGeneration/Not Reporting

MoD Forces: Operational Readiness July 2008

Source:  MNF‐I as of 31 July 2008
 55 September 26, 2008 

for new piers in Umm Qasr in August 2008 and 

is on schedule to let a contract for new sailor 

accommodations in September 2008. 

Additional infrastructure requirements for 2009 

include warehouses, workshops, munitions 

storage, training simulators, and a new 

headquarters building. 

The IqN is conducting enhanced skills training 

in preparation for delivery of new vessels. 

Engineering personnel are undergoing incountry specialist courses to improve their 

skills. However, additional engineering 

support will be required due to the limited 

number and experience of these personnel. The 

IqN would benefit from a Contractor Logistics 

Support arrangement with an international 

company for at least the first three years 

following delivery and acceptance of the new 

vessels. 

Despite these positive steps, the IqN still faces 

challenges in meeting its infrastructure 

requirements, training needs, and command and 

control enabling systems for its ambitious 

acquisition program. 

Iraqi Air Force 

The Iraqi Air Force (IqAF) continues to 

increase its personnel and equipment 

capacities. The IqAF has 1,887 personnel 

assigned (up from 1,580 in the last report), 

which represents 57% of authorized strength. 

The IqAF currently has 64 assigned aircraft and 

anticipates receiving 15 more aircraft by the 

end of 2008.31 Another 34 aircraft are expected 

for delivery in 2009. 

The IqAF headquarters has demonstrated an 

increased ability to lead and manage day-to-day 

operations. IqAF leaders have increasingly 

engaged the JHQ and MoD for requirements 

support. However, a lack of MoD resourcing 

support slows IqAF current operations and 

overall capability growth. To date, the MoD 

has allocated the IqAF less than 50% of total 

2008 funding requirements. 

Major remaining 2008 acquisitions to grow 

IqAF capabilities include: 12 light-attack 

aircraft and up to 50 attack helicopters (MoD 

directed addition), air traffic control towers, air 

defense radar and sector operations centers, 

Hellfire missiles, and ISR ground stations. The 

MoD has begun initial work to acquire six C130Js, with the understanding that significant 

Iraqi supplemental funding would be required. 

Additionally, the MoD has provided the DoD a 

letter of request for price and availability on 36 

F-16 aircraft and parallel systems. DoD is 

evaluating and processing the request. 

 

CAFTT’s projected focus area is increasing 

training capacity to meet requirements 

associated with eventual IqAF growth to 6,000 

personnel by 2010. The IqAF Training Wing at 

Taji Air Base is responsible for the Basic 

Military Training school, the Basic Technical 

Training school, the Air Force Academy, and 

the Air Force Officer Course at the Iraq 

Military Academy at Rustamiyah (IMAR). 

CAFTT is working with the MoD and the IqAF 

to increase the size of Air Force classes from 

50 to 150 in the four remaining 2008 IMAR 

courses. By the end of CY 08, the IqAF should 

graduate an additional 44 officers and 826 

warrant officers from the Air Force Academy at 

Taji, and the Air Force officer course at IMAR 

should graduate 135 new officers. 

Additionally, 362 airmen across various 

occupational specialties should graduate from 

the Technical Training school. 

Flight training takes place at the Flight Training 

Wing in Kirkuk. By the end of 2008, 13 pilots 

and 2 instructors should graduate from the 

program. Forty-six Iraqi aircrew instructors 

(instructor pilots and mission sensor operators) 

are available to conduct ISR mission training. 

The flight training wing has an annual basic 

flight training capacity of 130 students. 

Currently, 24 students are enrolled in flight 

training. 

IqAF fleet sustainment is CAFTT’s secondary 

focus area, as current sustainment efforts are 

insufficient. Although the GoI recently signed 
 56 September 26, 2008 

contracts to ensure sustainment of their three C130Es at New al-Muthanna Air Base, contracts 

for sustaining the remaining fixed-wing and 

rotary-wing fleet are not signed and will lapse. 

With many current contracts expiring by 

October 2008, aircraft grounding due to 

unavailable parts and maintenance personnel is 

expected; this will have a significant impact on 

sortie generation, training, and operational 

missions. 

The third CAFTT focus area for the remainder 

of 2008 is IqAF infrastructure, which is 

fundamental to sustaining IqAF growth. 

Ongoing projects at Taji support training 

capacity growth as well as a Mi-17 avionics 

testing and maintenance requirements. Site 

surveys at Ali, Al Kut, and Shaibah support 

IqAF service plans. Additionally, ongoing 

work at New al-Muthanna Air Base supports 

Iraqi plans to permanently base a King Air 

detachment and to construct the IqAF aero 

medical center. 

Directorate General for Intelligence and 

Security and JHQ, Directorate for 

Intelligence 

The Directorate General for Intelligence and 

Security (DGIS) is the MoD’s lead intelligence 

agency. With 4,090 personnel assigned, the 

DGIS is at 89% of its authorized level.32 The 

organization consists of a National 

Headquarters, the Intelligence and Military 

Security School (IMSS), 18 Provincial 

Headquarters, and 91 field offices. DGIS 

conducts intelligence collection, processing, 

analysis, and reporting of human intelligence 

(HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), 

open source intelligence, imagery intelligence 

(IMINT). It also provides mapping services 

and products to supported Iraqi operational and 

intelligence offices. 

In July 2008, the MNSTC-I Intelligence 

Transition Team assessed the DGIS as effective 

with considerable limitations. The Imagery 

and Mapping Directorate (IMD) is progressing 

but has contributed to recent operational 

successes by providing annotated maps and 

imagery to operational units. The IMD is 

hampered by an immature dissemination 

architecture. Iraqi Intelligence Network (I2N) 

fielding, installation, and operational use is 

ongoing. The Signals and Information 

Directorate has personnel but is awaiting 

equipment procurement and fielding. Coalition 

efforts in advanced HUMINT training, 

combined with Iraqi decisions on 

organizational roles and missions, should yield 

immediate results. IMSS continues to expand 

course curricula: over 2,700 personnel have 

graduated from the academy, 500 of whom 

graduated between January and June 2008. 

The JHQ Directorate for Intelligence (M2) is 

assessed to be effective, having shown progress 

in training, planning, collection management, 

analysis, and exploitation. The M2 is staffed at 

105% of authorizations, with 348 assigned 

against 332 authorizations. The organization’s 

main limitation is the incomplete fielding of 

I2N, which will enable the rapid reporting and 

dissemination of intelligence. I2N installations 

at the Basrah, Diyala and Ninewa Operations 

Centers have improved M2’s ability to 

coordinate with operational commanders. 

Remaining operations centers will receive I2N 

by the end of CY08, providing the M2 with the 

ability to collect and disseminate intelligence 

from every region. 

DGIS-established Intelligence Fusion Cells 

(IFCs) continue to contribute to focused 

targeting and demonstrate intelligence sharing. 

These fusion cells include representatives from 

DGIS, NIIA, the Iraqi National Intelligence 

Service (INIS), the Minister of State for 

National Security Affairs, and the Counter 

Terrorism Command (CTC). Their operations 

resulted in actionable target folders for 

apprehension of key subjects during recent 

operations. Future development and training 

efforts for the IFCs include the creation of 

standard IFC tactics, techniques, and 

procedures (TTPs) and the implementation of 

advanced analytical techniques, including 

predictive analysis. 
 57 September 26, 2008 

2.4 Iraqi National Counter-Terrorism Force 

(INCTF) 

The Iraqi National Counter-Terrorism Force 

(INCTF) is composed of the Counter-Terrorism 

Bureau (CTB), the Counter-Terrorism Command 

(CTC), and the Iraqi Special Operations Force 

(ISOF) Brigade. 

The Iraqi CTB is the ministerial-level CounterTerrorism (CT) agency. It coordinates with the 

MoD and the MoI on strategic-level planning, 

as well as on targeting and intelligence fusion. 

The proposed CTB Law, which will codify 

CTB’s existence as the ministerial-level CT 

agency, was approved by the Council of 

Ministers in late July and awaits passage by the 

Council of Representatives. Currently, the MoD 

provides salary and equipment support to CTB 

through a memorandum of agreement that will 

remain in force until the CTB receives its CY 

09 budget. The CTB exercises oversight of the 

CTC, which is assuming command and control 

of Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) units 

that execute tactical operations. Currently, the 

CTB is manned at 185% of authorizations, the 

CTC at 85%, and the ISOF Brigade at 76%. 

The CTB submitted a budget of $358 million 

for CY08. It received $167 million in a direct 

funding allocation, and the MoD was directed 

to pay the INCTF salaries of $157 million for 

CY08. In 2009, the CTB is programmed to 

receive and have the authority to obligate its 

own budget. A $580 million budget request is 

projected. 

The 1st ISOF Brigade—consisting of five combat 

battalions, one training battalion, one support 

battalion, and a reconnaissance battalion—has 

been formed and equipped. Transition of 

command and control for this Brigade from 

Coalition forces to the CTB/CTC is on track. 

Phase IV of the transition—Iraqi command and 

control of ground operations with U.S. 

oversight—began in the summer of 2008. 

Despite shortages of company grade officers and 

seasoned NCOs, ISOF forces have performed 

extremely well in operations throughout Iraq. 

Force generation of the ISOF garrison support 

unit (GSU) is on schedule. The GSU will be 

fully operational by January 2009. When fully 

fielded, the GSU will consist of a 766-man unit 

co-located with the ISOF Brigade HQ. It will 

be capable of providing 60-man regional 

support unit detachments in support of each of 

the four regional commando battalions. 

Four regional commando bases (RCB) are 

currently being generated to increase ISOF 

presence and nationwide capability to conduct 

CT operations. These RCBs will each consist of 

a 440-man regional commando battalion, a 60-

man GSU, a 30-man regional reconnaissance 

team, and a 40-man Regional CounterTerrorism Center (RCC). The four RCBs will 

be located in Basrah, Mosul, Diyala, and Al 

Asad. RCB Basrah reached initial operating 

capability and at its temporary locations in 

January 2008. The permanent RCB Basrah 

will be completed in April 2009. RCB Mosul 

was completed in July 2008. RCB Al-Asad 

and RCB Diyala should be operational in 

November 2008 and March 2009, respectively, 

to include basing infrastructure. 

Regional Counter-Terrorism Centers (RCCs) 

are being established at all four RCBs. INCTF 

will also establish a fifth RCC in Baghdad. 

Similar to U.S. Joint Interagency Task Forces, 

the RCCs will work for the CTC to develop 

terrorist network mapping and to fuse 

intelligence support for their respective 

commando battalion battle spaces. 

Additionally, the RCCs will develop and 

implement intelligence exchange activities with 

Coalition forces in their respective areas of 

operation. The Basrah and Mosul RCCs are 

fully operational. The RCCs in Baghdad and 

Al-Asad will become operational in this year, 

and the Diyala RCC in mid-2009. 

The INCTF continues to develop specialized 

training for its forces. The 5th Battalion of the 

1st ISOF Brigade located in Baghdad provides 

key training at the Iraqi Special Warfare Center 

and School. In May 2008, the school graduated 

855 men from its Selection Course, out of 
 58 September 26, 2008 

approximately 2,000 who began the course. 

The top 70 graduates, now scheduled for the 

eight-week Operators Training Course, will be 

assigned to the elite 2nd Battalion, the Iraqi 

Counter-Terrorism Force. The next 200 

highest graduates of the Selection Course will 

attend the six-week Commando Course and 

will be assigned to the various regional 

commando battalions. The remaining 

graduates have been assigned to the GSU and 

the 3rd Battalion (Support). 

The Iraqi Air Force (IqAF) is developing 

aviation support for the ISOF. A Memorandum 

of Agreement between MoD and CTB 

identified IqAF activities to develop counterterrorism capability, including training Mi-17 

helicopter crews for day and night-visiongoggle tactical air assault missions, providing 

air transportation, and coordinating 

reconnaissance operations. Future IqAF 

capabilities under development to support the 

counter-terrorism mission include medical 

airlift, airborne command and control, and light 

attack (precision fire) aircraft. The 15th

Squadron is the only IqAF unit tasked to 

support the CT mission. The IqAF and the 

ISOF battalions are conducting joint air 

mobility training, forming the foundation for 

joint air assault operations. To enhance air-toground coordination, the ISOF battalions are 

developing an Iraqi Tactical Air Controller 

(ITAC) program. The ITAC course will start in 

September 2008 and will provide ISOF tactical 

units the capability to coordinate precision fire 

from IqAF assets. 

The Coalition’s INCTF transition team has 

embedded advisors at all levels (CTB, CTC, 

and ISOF) to oversee the transition of 

command and control from Coalition forces to 

INCTF, facilitating a self sustaining Iraqi CT 

capability. For example, INCTF continues to 

work with MoD to identify solutions to the ISOF 

Brigade’s shortage of seasoned noncommissioned officers. 
 59 September 26, 2008 

Annex A 

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations 

AQI al Qaeda in Iraq 

AT Advisory Team 

ATM Automatic Teller Machine 

AWOL Absent Without Leave 

BACC Baghdad Area Control Center 

BSA Board of Supreme Audit 

CAATT Coalition Army Advisory Training Team 

CAFTT Coalition Air Force Transition Team 

CBI Central Bank of Iraq 

CCCI Central Criminal Court of Iraq 

CJSOTF Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force 

COB Contingency Operating Base 

CoI Commission on Integrity 

COIN Counterinsurgency 

COL Contingency Operating Location 

CoR Council of Representatives 

COS Contingency Operating Site 

COSIT Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology 

CSWAT Company Special Weapons and Tactics (formerly ISWAT) 

CT Counter-Terrorism 

CTB Counter-Terrorism Bureau 

CTC Counter-Terrorism Command 

CY Calendar Year 

DBE Directorate of Border Enforcement 

DG Director General 

DGIS Directorate General for Intelligence and Security 

EFT Electronic Funds Transfer 

ePRT Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team 

ERB Emergency Response Brigade 

FAB Fast Assault Boat 

FMS Foreign Military Sales 

FPS Facilities Protection Service 

GDP Gross Domestic Product 

GoI Government of Iraq 

GRD Gulf Region Division 

GSU Garrison Support Unit 

GTR General Transportation Regiment 

HCC High Contracts Committee 

HJC Higher Juridical Council 

HMMWV High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 

HPA High Profile Attack 

HQ Headquarters 

HR Human Resources 

HRIMS Human Resource Information Management System 

HUMINT Human Intelligence 

I2N Iraqi Intelligence Network 
 60 September 26, 2008 

IA Iraqi Army 

ICI International Compact with Iraq 

IDP Internally Displaced Person 

IED Improvised Explosive Devices 

IFC Intelligence Fusion Cell 

IFMIS Iraq Financial Management Information System 

IG Inspector General 

IGFC Iraqi Ground Forces Command 

IHEC Independent Higher Electoral Commission 

IJF Iraqi Joint Forces 

IMAR Iraqi Military Academy at Rustamiyah 

IMD Imagery and Mapping Directorate 

IMF International Monetary Fund 

IMINT Imagery Intelligence 

IMSS Intelligence and Military Security School 

INCTF Iraqi National Counter-Terrorism Force 

INIS Iraqi National Intelligence Service 

INTEL-TT Intelligence Transition Team 

IOM International Organization for Migration 

IPA International Police Advisor 

IPS Iraqi Police Service 

IqAF Iraqi Air Force 

IqN Iraqi Navy 

IRFFI International Reconstruction Fund for Iraq 

IRR Iraq Republic Railway 

IRRF Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

ISF Iraqi Security Forces 

ISFF Iraqi Security Forces Funds 

ISOF Iraqi Special Operations Forces 

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

ITAC Iraqi Tactical Air Controller 

ITN Iraq Transportation Network 

JAM Jaysh al-Mahdi 

JCC-I/A Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan 

JEC Joint Economic Commission 

JHQ Joint Headquarters 

JOC Joint Operations Center 

KGK Kongra Gel 

KRG Kurdistan Regional Government 

LAOTF Law and Order Task Force 

LOA Letter of Acceptance 

M2 Directorate for Intelligence 

mbbl/d Million Barrels Per Day 

MiTT Military Transition Teams 

MND Multi-National Division 

MNC-I Multi-National Corps-Iraq 

MNF-I Multi-National Force-Iraq 

MNSTC-I Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

MoCH Ministry of Construction and Housing 
 61 September 26, 2008 

MoD Ministry of Defense 

MoE Ministry of Electricity 

MoF Ministry of Finance 

MoH Ministry of Health 

MoHE Ministry of Higher Education 

MoI Ministry of Interior 

MoJ Ministry of Justice 

MSI Mutammar Sahwat Al-Iraq 

NCC National Command Center 

NCO Non-Commissioned Officer 

NIIA National Information and Investigation Agency 

NOC National Operations Center 

NP National Police 

NTM-I NATO Training Mission-Iraq 

OTA Office of the Transportation Attaché 

PBIED Person Borne Improvised Explosive Device 

PDS Provincial Development Strategy 

PEZ Pipeline Exclusion Zone 

PFMAG Public Finance Management Group 

PIC Provincial Iraqi Control 

PoE Directorate of Ports of Entry 

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team 

PST Provincial Support Teams 

PTT Police Transition Team 

RCB Regional Commando Bases 

RCC Regional Counter-Terrorism Centers 

ROLC Rule of Law Complex 

SBA Stand-By Arrangement 

SFA Strategic Framework Agreement 

SG Special Groups 

SIGINT Signals Intelligence 

SINCGARS Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems 

SOE State-Owned Enterprises 

SoI Sons of Iraq 

TFBSO Task Force to Improve Business and Stability Operations-Iraq 

TRA Transition Readiness Assessment 

UAE United Arab Emirates 

UNAMI United Nations Assistance Mission Iraq 

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 

USAID United States Agency for International Development 

USDA United States Department of Agriculture 

VBSS Vessel Board, Seize, and Search 
 62 September 26, 2008 

 1

 This report also meets all requirements of Section 609 of Public Law 110-161. 

2

 The data cutoff date for this report, unless otherwise stated, is August 31, 2008. 

3

 Those ineligible for amnesty under this law include those already sentenced to death under the Penal Code, those charged 

or convicted of violations of the Anti-Terrorism Law that resulted in death or disability, and those charged with or 

convicted of pre-meditated murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, stealing, aggravating circumstances, embezzlement, rape, 

sodomy, incest, counterfeiting, drug crimes, smuggling antiquities, or any of several offenses under the Military Penal 

Code. 

4

 Nationwide Survey, August 2008: “Think about the basic services that have been available to you and your family, and 

tell me how often each of the following statements have been true in the past 30 days. Your family has been able to get 

enough to eat.” Sample size ~8,700. 

5 Inma translates as “growth” in Arabic. 6

 Nationwide Survey, August 2008: “Think about the basic services that have been available to you and your family, and 

tell me how often each of the following statements have been true in the past 30 days. Your family has been able to get the 

electricity you need.” Sample size ~8,700. 7

 Nationwide Survey, August 2008: “Think about the basic services that have been available to you and your family, and 

tell me how often each of the following statements have been true in the past 30 days. Your family has been able to get 

safe, clean drinking water.” Sample size ~8,700. 

8

 Nationwide Survey, August 2008: “How would you describe the security situation today in your neighborhood?” Sample 

size ~12,000. 

9

 Nationwide Survey, August 2008: “How would you describe the security situation today in your province?” “How would 

you describe the security situation today in the country?” Sample size ~12,000. 

10 Nationwide Survey, August 2008: “In the past six months, has the security situation in your neighborhood become 

better, stayed about the same, or become worse?” Sample size ~12,000. 

11 Nationwide Survey, August 2008: “What about the country as a whole? In the past six months, has the security situation 

in Iraq become better, stayed about the same, or become worse?” Sample size ~12,000. 

12 Nationwide Survey, August 2008: “To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? I 

feel safe and secure in my neighborhood. I feel safe traveling outside my neighborhood.” Sample size ~12,000. 

13 Nationwide Survey, August 2008: “When you see the Iraqi Army in your neighborhood, do you feel: ?” “When you see 

the Iraqi Police in your neighborhood, do you feel: ?” Sample size ~8,700. 

14 Nationwide Survey, August 2008: “How effective is the Iraqi government in each of the following areas: Maintaining 

Security?” Sample size ~12,000. 

15 Nationwide Survey, August 2008: “How would you rate the level of peace and stability in Iraq today?” Sample size 

~8,700. 

16 Nationwide Survey, August 2008: “Do you think the Iraqi Army is winning or losing the battle against terrorists?” “Do 

you think the Iraqi Police is winning or losing the battle against crime?” Sample size ~8,700. 

17 Nationwide Survey, August 2008: “Do you have confidence in the following groups to improve the overall security 

situation in Iraq? Iraqi Army. Iraqi Police” Sample size ~8,700. 

18 Nationwide Survey, August 2008: “How much confidence do you have in the following to improve the overall security 

situation in Iraq? National Government. Provincial government. Local Government.” Sample size ~8.700. 

19 Nationwide Survey, August 2008: “How much confidence do you have in the following to improve the overall security 

situation in Iraq?” Multi-National forces. Armed groups. Militias.” Sample size: ~8,700. 20 Nationwide Survey, August 2008: “Who is most responsible for providing security in your neighborhood?” Sample size 

~8,700. 

21 Nationwide Survey, August 2008: “How much confidence do you have in the following to protect you and your family 

against threats?...Iraqi Army” Sample size ~8,700. 

22 Nationwide Survey, August 2008: “How much confidence do you have in the following to protect you and your family 

against threats?...Iraqi Police, Provincial Government, Local Government, National Government” Sample ~8,700. 

23 Nationwide Survey, August 2008: “How much confidence do you have in the following to protect you and your family 

against threats?...MNF, Armed Groups, Militias” Sample ~8,700. 

24 MoI employees not included in Iraqi Security Force numbers include 15,988 Civil Defense Forces, 19,108 Facility 

Protection Service forces, 22,000 Oil Police, and 33,713 headquarters and administrative personnel—a total of 90,809 other 

MoI employees. 

25 Four separate studies informed these Iraqi force end-strength estimates. The first was the May 2007 MNSTC-I In-stride 

Assessment of growth required in 2008 to protect the population, overmatch the enemy, provide the depth necessary to 

deploy forces across the country, and implement an annual retraining and reconstitution program. The second was Iraqi 

Military Service plans focused on the 2010-2015 period, and MoI Plan that addressed near-term police force growth. The 

third was an MNC-I assessment of the Iraqi Army’s required enduring posture by 2010. The fourth was a MNSTC-I 
 63 September 26, 2008 

 directed, MNF-I sponsored Iraqi force analysis conducted by the Center for Army Analysis. The primary objective of this 

assessment was to determine if the projected, near-term (2010) Iraqi forces were capable of overmatching the anticipated 

threat. The assessment concluded that the ISF was incapable of overmatching the threat and recommended additional force 

structure growth and specific capabilities. 

26 The following are the Location Commands, followed by the province in which they are located: The eight existing 

location commands are: Taji (Baghdad), Kirkush (Diyala), Al Kasik (Ninewa), Habbaniyah (Anbar), Numaniyah (Wasit), 

Rustamiyah (Baghdad), K1 (Kirkuk), and Ur (Nassariyah). The five new location commands are Al-Ghizlani (Ninewa), 

Tikrit (Salah ad Din), Al Asad (Anbar), Al Memona (Maysan), and Al Shaiba (Basrah). 27 This number includes the 8,206 members of the 2006 Anbar awakening movement that were transitioned before the 

current CLC/SoI initiative. 

28 The 12 new projects are: Baghdad Police College—North (in Mosul, Nov 08); Baghdad Police College – South (in 

Basrah, Oct 08); Baghdad Basic Recruit Training Center—East (Mar 09); Diwaniyah Police Training Center (PTC) (Nov 

08); Diyala Basic Recruit Training Center (BRTC) (Nov 08); Maysan BRTC (Jan 09); Kirkuk BRTC (Jan 09); Karbala 

BRTC (Feb 09); Dhi Qar BRTC (Feb 09); Najaf PTC (Dec 08); Muthanna BRTC (Dec 08); and Irbil (Aug 08). The six 

expansion or refurbishment projects are: Baghdad Police College (Phase I) (Complete); Baghdad Police College (Phase II) 

(Oct 08); Baghdad Police College (Phase III) (Jan 09); Mosul PTC (Nov 08); Tikrit PTC (Dec 08); Habbaniyah PTC (Nov 

08); Solidarity National Police Training Center (Jun 08); and Al Furat (Dec 08). 

29 On average, it takes three-to-five years to train and qualify fully capable IqAF pilots and maintenance personnel, and 

two-to-three years for air traffic controllers. Additionally, for those skills requiring it—such as pilots and air traffic 

controllers—English Language Training also represents a significant qualification challenge. 

30 IA Training Centers are at the following locations: Regional Training Centers—An Numiniyah, Kirkuk, Kirkush, 

Habbanniyah, Taji, Tallil; Division Training Centers—Al Kasik, Hamman Al Ali, Al Asad (under construction), Tikrit 

(under construction), Shaiba (under construction), Mitika; Combat Training Center—Besmiyah. Ultimate plans call for one 

DTC to be co-located with each RTC; completion dates and funding sources for this effort, however, have yet to be 

determined. 

31 The current IqAF fleet consists of 27 fixed-wing aircraft and 46 rotary-wing aircraft (15 Mi-17, 16 UH-1 Huey II, 5 Bell 

Jet Ranger, and 10 OH-58C). 

32 The Iraqi MoD Defense Council approved the DGIS MTOE on July 6, 2008.