2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit 10-19-2004 

# Lep or e v . L a n vi sion S ys I nc P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : N on-P r e c e de n t i al D ocke t N o . 03-3619

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w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004/2131 NOT PRECEDE NTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

__________ No. 03-3619

__________ JANE LEP ORE Appellant
v. LANVISI ON SYSTEMS, INC.

__________ On A ppeal from the Un ited States District Co urt For th e Ea stern D istrict of P enns ylvania (Civ. No. 00- cv-04144) Distri ct Judge: Honorable Petrese B. Tucker

__________ Submitte d Under Third Circ uit L. A.R. 34.1( a)

September 28, 2004

___________ Be for e: R OT H, B AR RY , and GA RT H, Circu it Judges

(Fil ed: October

19, 2004)

__________ OPI NION

__________2

Ga rth, Circu it Judge : App ellant Jane Le pore app eals from th e District Cou rt’s grant of sum mary ju dgme ntin fav orof Ap pel le e La nVi si on Sy st ems , I nc. (“ LanVi si on” ) o n Lep or e’ s c la ims of sex and/or

pregnancydiscrimination and ret aliation. The Distri ct Court ha d ju ri sdi ct io n pu rs uan t t o 28 U.S .C. § 13 31. We ha ve j ur is di ct io n pu rs uan t to 28 U.S .C. §12 91. W e w ill aff irm. I. Because we write s olely for the be nefit

of the parties , we recount the fact s and proceduralhist ory onlyas theyare rel evant t o the fol lowing dis cussion. Lan Visio n is a so ftw are de velop er w ith its hea dqu arters loc ated in Cinc innati, Ohio. Jane Lepore began working for LanV ision at i ts headquarters on July8, 1996, as a Project Manager. In February 1997, LanVisi on reorgani zed and Lepore was tr ansferred to Indi rect Sal es as an Appli cati on Special ist . Severalmonths later, Lepor e assi sted her supervi sor, Paul Burke, in the s earch for two additiona l appli cati on special ist s to j oin the Indir ect Sal es team . That sear ch resul ted in t he hiri ng of Nick Jovings and Mark Zajicek. As a result

of a second reorganization, i n April 1998, the Indi rect Sal es team was dissolved an d Lep ore, Jovings a nd Zajicek were transferred to D irect Sales. Lepo re retai ned her posi tion as Application Specia lis t and began r eporti ng to Larry Smeage, the National Director

of Sales. One month later , Jovi ngs left Direct Sal es and was assi gned to P rof essio nal S erv ices
.3

Lepore was pregnant

and neari ng her due dat e when she was trans ferred. Smeage assign ed L epor e to w ork u nder Terry C ostello, a Dire ct Sale s team leade r, for the interim period bef

ore her mat ernity l eave was to commence. Prior t o Lepore’s l eave, Smeage and Lep ore h ad a d iscussio n abo ut Le pore ’s upc om ing ch ildbirth a nd issu es relate d to childc are. Sm eage conv eyed his w ife’s d ifficu lty with leav ing h er child and r eturnin g to work, and in par

ticul ar their diffi culti es in fi nding chil dcare. According to Smeage, “basica lly

[he] le t her [Lepor e] know that a s far as childc are, and so on, that she maywant to look i nto that

. . . proacti vely , si nce she – y ou know, part of he r job i s to be on t he road travel ing.” Smeage Dep. at 18. After Lepore t old Smeage that she had already arranged for chil dcare, Smeage responded “Idon’t know, y ou might change y our mind aft er having your firs t baby , y ou might not want to come back t o work.” Id . at 204-205 . Lepore tes tif ied th at s he di d n ot be lie ve Sm ea ge ’s r ais in g t he ch ild ca re iss ue w as di sc rim in ato ry, but that she “was dumbfounded that he would discour age [her] .
. . . ” Id . at 205-206. Lepore went on medicalleave on May 11, 1998. She gave bi rth on May 21, 1998, at wh ich tim e her m aternity leav e off icially bega n. D uring her lea ve, L epor e mo ved to Philadelphia, Pennsyl vania with her husband and chi ld. Lepor e’s st atutorily -mandated 12-week materni tyleave expi red on Jul y 21, 1998. Lepore i nformed TerryCostell o that she d id no t intend to return to w ork u ntil Au gust 1 2, 199 8, takin g a co mb ination of p aid and unp aid le ave for the r em ainin g pe riod
. Adopting a progr am of company-wide downsi zing, between February 1, 1998 and4

January31, 1999, LanVis ion reduce d its workforce from 123 to 75 e mployee s through terminations and resi gnations . In particul ar, management decided t o keep onlyone Application Specia lis t in t he Direct Sales gr oup. Smeage chose to keep TerryCostell o, the te am leader. Lepore tes tifi ed that Costell o was the ri ght pers on to ret ain becaus e of her sen iority an d ex per ienc e. See Lepore Dep. at 294. On August 6, 1998, Smeage inform ed L epor e that sh e had been termin ated. L anV ision laid off 1 2 per cent o f its workforce during that time. Zajicek tr ansferred to Professional Services on the West Coast for one month untilhe too was lai d off in Sept ember 1998. II. The Distric t Cou rt gran ted su mm ary judgm ent in f avor of L anV ision. F irst, it found that

Lepore fail ed to make out a prima faci e case of gender and pregnancy disc rimi natio n un der Title VI I ofthe C ivil R igh ts A ct of 196 4 (“ Title VI I”), 4 2 U .S.C . § 2000e et seq ., t

he Familyand Medical Leave Act (“ FML A”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq ., and the Pennsy lvania

Human Relations Act ( “PHRA ”), 43 Pa. C.S. § 951 et seq ., in connecti on with her termination byLanVision. The Distri ct Court de termine d that Lep ore w as term inated as pa rt of a c orpo rate reo rgan ization that inc luded a redu ction in for ce, a nd t hat n o sim ilarly situ ated ind ivid uals out side the p rote cted clas s w ere r etain ed. Secon d, the District Cou rt rejected Lepo re’s FM LA claim for L anV ision’s failure to rei nstate her upon her return from maternity l eave, fi nding that Lepore fail ed to satisfy her evide ntiar

y bur den of demonstrating ei ther di scri minatory intent or ret aliation.5

We exercise pl enaryreview over t he District Court ’s grant of summary j udgment and applythe same st andard as t he District Court , i. e., whether the re are any genui ne issu es o f m ateri al fa ct su ch th at a re aso nab le jur y cou ld re turn a ve rdic t for the p laint iff. Fed. R. Ci v. P. 56(c ); Debiec v. Cabot Corp. , 352 F.3d 117, 128 n. 3 (3d Cir . 2003) (citation om itted). “O ne of the prin cipal p urpo ses of the su mm ary judgm ent rule is to isol ate and di spose of fact ually unsupportable cl aims or defe nses . . . . ” Celotex Corp. v. Ca trett , 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Applyi ng that s tandard he re, we concl ude that the Dis trict C our t pro per ly gran ted s um ma ry judg me nt in fav or o f L anV ision
. A. Ti tl e VI I a nd P HRA In order to make out a prim a facie case of di scri minati on in a reduc tion i n force case ari sing under

Titl e VII, a pl ainti ff must show that (1) she i s a member of a protected class , (2) she was quali fied for t he position in ques tion, (3) she was terminat ed, and (4) ind ivid uals not wit hin the p rote cted clas s w ere r etain ed. In re Carnegie Center Assocs. , 129 F.3d 290, 294- 95 (3d Cir. 1997) (ci tati on omitt ed). Once the prim a facie case is successf ully made, the burden of production shi fts t o the defendant to articulate a legit ima te, no n-d iscrim inato ry reas on f or th e pla intif f’s te rmin ation
. See Texas Dep’t of Comm unity Af

fair s v. Burdi ne , 450 U .S. 248 , 254 ( 198 1); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 ( 1973). I f the defendant meets thi s burden, the plainti ff must the n pro ve th at the def end ant’ s rea son wa s a p retex t for a dis crim inato ry mo tive. Burdine , 450 U.S. at 254
. Claims ari sing under the PHRA are governed by t he same legalstandar d as6

that a ppl ied to Title VI I. See Gom ez v. Allegheny Health Servs. , 71 F.3d 1079, 1083-84 (3d Cir. 199 5) (citations omitted). The centralissue he re is whether Lepore s atis fied the fourth prong of the pr ima facie case, t

hat is , whether s he demonstrated that indivi duals not

within t he protec ted class were retained. I n a reduction in force case, the persons outside the protected cl ass are tho se em ployees w ho ar e “sim ilarly situated,” that is, they w ork in the sam e area in app rox ima tely the sam e po sition
. See Anderson v. Consolidated Rail Corp. , 297 F.3d 242 , 249 -50 (3d Cir . 200 2). Lepore point s to Jovi ngs and Zaji cek as the retai ned indivi duals out side t he protected class . She cl aims that these “[ t]wo male peer s with l ess seni ority and expe rience . . . were retaine d” w hile she wa s term inated . Lep ore B r. at 7. W e agre e w ith Lepo re that the com parison to Jov ings and Z ajicek wa s proper. W e conclud e, how ever, that ne ither

of those i ndividual s was retained and therefore Lepore fail s to make a
succ essfu l prima faci e cas e. As to Jo vings, it is undisputed th at he transferred out of D irect Sales befo re Lepo re left fo r mate rnity leave a nd b efore the A ugu st 199 8 red uction in forc e. W ith resp ect to Zajice k, w hile it is true that he transf erred to Prof ession al Serv ices fo r one mo nth, it is undisput ed that

he was laid of

f in Septe mber 1998 as part of the same r educti on in force that resu lted in L epor e’s term ination . Bec ause Lep ore ca nno t point to any simila rly situated emp loyees outside of the p rotected class w ho w ere retained, the D istrict Court7

correctly concluded that Lepore fai led to e stabl ish a prima faci e discrimination case. In the al ternat

ive, Lepore argues that s he has produced direct e vidence of discrimination and that therefore we should al so analy ze her cl aim under the mixed motives analy sis s et fort h in Price Waterhous e v. Hopkins , 490 U.S . 228 , 276 (19 89) . A plaint iff attempti ng to prove di scri minati on by di rect e vidence face s a “high hur dle. ” Connors v. Chrysler Financi al Corp. , 160 F.3d 971, 976 (3d Cir. 1998). Speci fical ly , the evidence must

demonstrate that

the “deci sion makers placed subs tanti al negative rel iance on an ill egiti mate cri teri on in reac hing their decis ion.” Id. In putting fort h her mixed
mo tives claim , Le por e reli es m ainly o n he r ch ildca re co nve rsatio n w ith S me age , a conversation she admit

ted was not di scri minatory . Furthermore, Lepore offers no evidence t

hat “addr esses di rectl y the reasons for imple menting the [reduction in force].” Anderson , 297 F.3d at 249. Ba sed on the foregoin g, we fin d Lep ore has not cl eared the high evide ntiar

y hur dle of Price Waterhouse . Her m ixed mo tives claim w as therefore properl y r ejected. B. FMLA To establ ish a prima faci e case of retaliat ion under the FM LA, a plaintiff must show that ( 1) she t ook an FMLA leave, (2) she s uffered an adver se employ ment decis ion, and (3) th e ad ver se d ecis ion wa s ca usa lly relate d to her leav e. Conoshenti v. Public Svce
. Electr ic & Gas Co. , 364 F.3d 135 ( 3d Cir. 2004) . Once a plai ntiff makes out a pr ima facie case, th e usu al McDonnell Douglas , see supra , burd en sh ifting f rame wo rk is1 Like the District Court below, we need not a ddress LanVision’s contention that the FMLA is inapplicable under 29 U .S.C. § 2611(2)(B)(ii) (FML A does not cover an employee who is employed at a wor

ksite at which the employer employs less than 50 employ ees if the total number of employees working within 75 miles of that worksite is less than 50) because L epore’s FMLA claim fa ils on the me

rits. 8 imp licate d. See W eston v. Pen nsylva nia , 251 F.3d 420, 432 (3d Cir. 200 1). The Distri ct Court f

ound that Lepore success fully made out a prima faci e case und er the F M LA . Ho we ver, in its a nalysis, it app ears to have conf used the req uirem ents for a prima faci e retal iati on case with t hose for a prima faci e disc rimi natio n ca se. Co nseq uently, on appe al, the pa rties argu e at len gth ab out w hethe r the tem pora l prox imity of Lepore’s termination to t he end of her mate rnity l eave satisfi es the causal connec tion prong of a prima faci e retali ation case. We need not decide that here, however, because even assuming arguendo that Lepore made out a prima faci e retaliation case, summ ary jud gm ent w as sti ll pro per . In resp onse to Le pore ’s claim of reta liation, L anV ision p roffe rs the re ductio n in force as its legitimate, non -discriminatory business rea son for term inating her. Lep ore offers no evi dence that

the reduc tion i n force was pretextual . Indeed s he offers no evidence t

hat directl y addresses t

he decisi on to impl ement the reducti on in force in any way. Lepor e’s onl y evi dence is he r convers ation wit h Smeage which, as we noted a bove, Lepore herse lf admitted was not di scri minatory . Consequently , Lepore fai ls t o carryher burd en of proo f on her F M LA retaliation claim and s um mary jud gm ent w as pro perly awarded. 19 III. LanVision moved to i mpose costs and sancti ons on Lepore, or , in t he alt ernati ve, to d ism iss L epo re’s a ppe al, cla imin g th at L epo re en gag ed in an u ndu e pa ttern of d elay. We w ill denyboth motions. IV. Ac cord ingly, we will A FFIR M the jud gm ent of the D istrict Co urt.