United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

July 1997 ELECTRONIC

COMBAT

Consolidation Master

Plan Does Not Appear

to Be Cost-Effective

GAO/NSIAD-97-10

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-272629 

July 10, 1997

The Honorable Connie Mack

The Honorable Bob Graham

United States Senate

The Honorable Joe Scarborough

House of Representatives

In response to your request, we have reviewed the Department of

Defense’s (DOD) Electronic Combat Consolidation Master Plan. As agreed

with your office, our objective was to assess the costs and benefits of

DOD’s consolidation plans for open air ranges, hardware-in-the-loop

facilities, and installed system test facilities used in electronic combat

testing.

Background In its report on the Fiscal Year 1996 National Defense Authorization Act,

the Senate Armed Services Committee criticized DOD for not having a clear

approach to consolidating test infrastructure and recommended

reductions in DOD’s Test and Evaluation support accounts. The Senate

Appropriations Committee agreed with the authorizing committee,

recommended reductions to the fiscal year 1996 Test and Evaluation

support accounts, and acknowledged the need to constrain spending in

this area. Subsequently, in the Fiscal Year 1996 National Defense

Appropriations Act, the Congress limited the obligation of specified funds

until DOD provided the defense authorizing and appropriating committees

with an Electronic Combat Consolidation Master Plan to establish a

DOD-wide infrastructure for electronic combat testing. In March 1996, DOD

published its Master Plan.

In transmitting the Master Plan to the Congress, the Under Secretary of

Defense for Acquisition and Technology stated that DOD would revisit the

Plan in the broader context of section 277 of the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, and adjust the Plan as appropriate.

Section 277 directs DOD to develop a consolidation and restructure plan for

its laboratories and test and evaluation centers for the 21st century. This

effort is not yet complete.

According to the Master Plan, DOD considered 17 of the services’ electronic

combat test facilities for consolidation. The Army controls 4 of the 

17 facilities, the Navy controls 6, and the Air Force controls 7. The

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conclusion of the Master Plan is that the assets of three of the seven

facilities managed by the Air Force will be moved to other Air Force

locations. No interservice consolidations and no intraservice consolidation

of the four Army or six Navy facilities are proposed in the Plan. The three

facilities to be relocated are

• the Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator (AFEWES) in Fort

Worth, Texas;

• the Real-time Electronic Digitally Controlled Analyzer Processor (REDCAP)

in Buffalo, New York; and

• the Electro-Magnetic Test Environment (EMTE) at Eglin Air Force Base,

Florida.

AFEWES is a specialized hardware-in-the-loop facility that simulates

individual radar and missile threats to aircraft and electronic combat

hardware. REDCAP is a specialized hardware-in-the-loop facility that

simulates an integrated air defense system with command, control, and

communications networks. EMTE is an open air range providing radar and

simulated missile threats to aircraft in flight; it is collocated at Eglin Air

Force Base with the Air Force’s development and test and evaluation

activities for armaments. Installed system test facility consolidation was

not proposed in the Master Plan. For purposes of this review, we focused

on three open air ranges, two hardware-in-the-loop facilities, and two

installed system test facilities. The remaining 10 are other kinds of

electronic combat test facilities, such as research laboratories or radar

cross-section measurement facilities or are service unique capabilities.

DOD’s electronic combat test process and the role the various kinds of

facilities play in that process are explained briefly in appendix I.

Results in Brief Implementation of the Electronic Combat Consolidation Master Plan will

result in less effective electronic combat testing capabilities.

• The planned relocation of EMTE will eliminate DOD’s current capability to

test electronic combat systems in conditions that typify many potential

threat locations. DOD will be left with two open air ranges with very similar

environmental characteristics and will no longer have the ability to test in

diverse conditions needed to understand environmental effects on

electronic combat systems.

• The planned REDCAP relocation will mean replacing existing hardware

simulation capability with digital computer models, thus reducing DOD’s

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current capability to simulate realistic aircraft strike scenarios with high

confidence and fidelity.

The Master Plan did not contain any cost analysis and did not identify any

savings expected from the consolidations. Estimates used to support 1995

Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) deliberations, as well

as data provided by users indicate that the consolidation may increase

DOD’s electronic combat testing costs. In addition, the Master Plan does

not contain any analysis or recommendations regarding consolidation of

installed system test facility workloads across the services although the

Navy and the Air Force are spending $512 million for construction of

another anechoic chamber to provide a controlled electromagnetic

environment at Patuxent River, Maryland, and other upgrades to their

current primary installed system test facilities at Patuxent River and

Edwards Air Force Base, California.

Consequently, the Master Plan, if implemented, may not achieve the most

cost-effective DOD-wide infrastructure. The root cause of this was DOD

officials’ inability to overcome service parochialism during the Master

Plan’s development. This parochialism resulted in a “gentlemen’s

agreement” between the Air Force and the Navy to focus on intraservice

rather than interservice consolidations. Prior joint service studies

performed on an interservice basis had identified alternatives for more

cost-effective consolidations. However, the recommendations of these

studies were never implemented. If this continues, service rivalry could

adversely affect DOD’s ongoing, congressionally mandated 

section 277/vision 21 consolidation effort, which is considering the

broader issue of DOD’s testing and laboratory facilities.

Principal Findings

Planned Consolidation of

Open Air Ranges Will

Reduce Effectiveness

The proposal in the Master Plan to relocate EMTE would eliminate a test

facility that provides unique advantages and keep two testing facilities

with overlapping capabilities. DOD’s acquisition regulations require systems

to be evaluated in operationally realistic environments, including the

expected range of natural environmental conditions. Currently, its

electronic combat open air ranges replicate diverse threat environments

where the services must be prepared to conduct operations.

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Testing Equipment in

Diverse Environments Is

Critical

DOD’s 5000.2R acquisition regulations require testing in natural

environmental conditions representative of intended areas of operations

(e.g. temperature, pressure, humidity, fog, precipitation, clouds, blowing

dust and sand, steep terrain, storm surge and tides, etc.). Testing in diverse

conditions provides performance data needed to understand

environmental effects on electronic combat systems. This information is

critical to making informed acquisition and mission planning decisions,

thereby reducing the risk of buying ineffective equipment and the potential

for casualties during wartime.

DOD studies also document the importance of testing electronic combat

equipment in diverse environments. For example, a 1994 joint service

study of electronic combat open air ranges expressed the need for

electronic combat testing in the correct natural environment. Test results

for electronic combat systems demonstrate that performance can differ

significantly in differing environments.

Testing in diverse environments is also important for collecting data to

support development of realistic computer models. DOD believes modeling

and simulation can be used to reduce the cost of live tests, but to improve

levels of confidence in models they must be built on high fidelity data

collected from diverse environments.

Plan Would Eliminate

Diversity Found in Current

Open Air Ranges

DOD’s proposed open air range consolidation as described in the Master

Plan would eliminate diversity by keeping only desert ranges and thereby

reduce electronic combat open air range testing effectiveness. The Air

Force and the Navy control three primary open air ranges for testing

electronic combat systems. These include two western ranges, one at

China Lake, California, and one managed by Edwards Air Force Base,

California. Both feature dry, desert climates with steep, rocky terrain. The

third range, EMTE, at Eglin Air Force Base on the Florida panhandle,

features a land/sea interface, high humidity, and a subtropical, forested

environment, and an over water test range.

The Master Plan states that preservation of militarily unique electronic

combat test facilities was an important criterion for deciding which

facilities to close. However, EMTE is unique among DOD’s open air ranges,

and the 1994 joint service study noted that one of the primary

disadvantages of closing EMTE would be the loss of terrain and

geographical diversity, since both remaining ranges would be located in

the desert.

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Current Open Air Ranges

Represent Potential Threat

Environments

Both western ranges provide a capability for conducting essential

electronic combat testing over terrain representative of projected middle

eastern threat environments. Conversely, EMTE provides DOD with an

environment more typical of most of the other projected U.S. threat

locations, including North Korea and the Balkans. Table 1 identifies the

terrain of countries that are representative of possible locations for future

conflicts that are of concern to the United States. In comparison, table 2

demonstrates that the unique environmental characteristics of EMTE—over

water, land/sea interface, and foliage—are prevalent in most of the

potential threat locations identified in table 1.

Table 1: Potential Threat Locations

and Terrain Correlation

Location Over water

Sea/land

interface Desert Foliage Mountain

Iraq X X

Iran X X X X X

N. Korea X X X X

China X X X X X

Libya X X X X

Cuba X X X X

Balkans X X X X

Table 2: Open Air Ranges and Terrain

Correlation

Location Over water

Sea/land

interface Desert Foliage Mountain

EMTE X X X

China Lake X X

Air Force

Western Test

Range

X X

REDCAP at New

Location Will Be Less

Capable

The Master Plan proposal to move the REDCAP facility from Buffalo and

colocate it with the Air Force’s installed system test facility at Edwards Air

Force Base will reduce electronic combat testing effectiveness. The intent

is to reestablish what the Air Force calls a “core” REDCAP capability at the

new location by developing a computer model to simulate REDCAP

hardware. However, the model will not simulate all of the current REDCAP

testing features.

Establishing a core REDCAP capability means not utilizing much of the

REDCAP hardware, and its associated functions, even though the Air Force

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completed upgrading this hardware in 1996 at a cost of $75 million over

the past 8 years. The core REDCAP at the proposed new location will be less

capable than the complete REDCAP at its current location.

Some of the REDCAP hardware functions that the Air Force does not plan to

make available in core REDCAP do not exist anywhere else in DOD.

According to DOD and Air Force officials, the REDCAP facility in Buffalo is

unique. For instance, REDCAP can currently simulate a realistic scenario of

a strike package of multiple aircraft approaching targets protected by

multiple threat radars and threat aircraft incorporated into an integrated

air defense system. The proposed core REDCAP will not be able to simulate

this scenario. Simulating many aircraft versus many threat systems is

important because integrated air defense systems exist in a number of

potential threat locations and integrated defenses are projected by DOD to

be a growth area among potential threat nations.

Planned

Consolidations May

Increase Costs

The Master Plan did not contain any cost analysis or identify the savings

expected from the consolidations. Our analysis of prior estimates used to

support the 1995 BRAC deliberations and other data provided by users

indicates the consolidations may increase DOD’s testing costs. More

specifically (1) BRAC-related data indicates that a complete EMTE relocation

would not be cost-effective, (2) cost estimates provided to BRAC regarding

the relocation of REDCAP and AFEWES were understated, and (3) increased

costs that will be incurred by user organizations were not considered in

Air Force cost estimates.

Master Plan Includes No

Evidence of Savings

Senior Air Force test officials told us that the Air Force selected EMTE,

REDCAP, and AFEWES for consolidation because they believed they would

ultimately save money by relocating them. The Electronic Combat

Consolidation Master Plan, however, includes no evidence that any

savings will result and, in fact, contains no cost data at all.

The Secretary of Defense recommended the relocation of REDCAP and

AFEWES and the partial relocation of EMTE to the 1995 BRAC. BRAC approved

the REDCAP relocation, rejected the AFEWES proposal, and significantly

scaled back the partial relocation of EMTE. The Master Plan, however,

incorrectly states that selecting EMTE for relocation reflects decisions of

the 1995 BRAC.

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BRAC Found No Savings in

Relocating EMTE in Total

The 1995 BRAC scaled back the Secretary’s recommendation to realign the

EMTE open air range at Eglin Air Force Base. DOD proposed transferring 

17 systems designed to simulate various threat radars and missiles, but

BRAC determined that was too costly and would “never net a return on

investment.” Ultimately, however, BRAC did approve the movement of 

10 systems (for which the BRAC account was eventually charged

$6.1 million), but required DOD to leave limited capability systems at Eglin

to support the Air Force’s Special Operations Forces, Armaments Division,

and Air Warfare Center, which are also at Eglin. Nevertheless, the 1996

Master Plan says the Air Force plans to “relocate” EMTE, not move just 10

systems.

According to Air Force officials, “relocate” means 17 systems will be

moved. Ten will be operated at the new location and 7 will be cannibalized

for parts. Air Force test officials maintain that the Special Operations

Forces, Air Warfare Center and Armaments Division do not need these 

17 systems at Eglin, and they will leave behind some systems to meet the

customers’ needs. EMTE users, such as the Special Operations Forces and

the 53rd Test Wing and the Army Aviation Test Directorate, told us that the

systems the Air Force plans to leave will not meet their needs for

accomplishing realistic testing because they do not have the capability to

receive and process testing data for subsequent analysis. Air Force test

officials told us users can travel to the Air Force’s western test range to

meet their test requirements.

REDCAP Relocation Costs

Not Fully Disclosed

To mitigate the impact of the reduction in REDCAP effectiveness described

earlier in this report, the Air Force has awarded a $6.2-million contract to

design and build a digital computer model of REDCAP that it intends to use

instead of the REDCAP hardware that will be stored. This additional cost,

however, was not included in the Air Force cost estimate that BRAC used in

deciding to relocate REDCAP.

The Air Force had recommended to the 1995 BRAC that the REDCAP facility

be relocated to Edwards Air Force Base. The 1995 BRAC found that Air

Force cost estimates to relocate were understated, but decided to accept

the recommendation as they believed it would still result in overall

savings. As a result, the BRAC account makes available to the Air Force

$3.7 million to relocate REDCAP. Using Air Force cost figures, BRAC

projected the operating cost to the government of REDCAP at the new

location will be $100,000 compared to $1 million annually at the current

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location, BRAC anticipated a 4-year return on investment (4 x $0.9 million).

(The remainder of REDCAP’s operations are funded by customer receipts.)

Since the cost of the new computer model was not taken into account, the

Air Force will not achieve a relatively quick return on investment. The

additional $6.2 million means it will take an additional 7 years to recoup

costs based on Air Force projected savings of $0.9 million per year. This

11-year (4 + 7) return is well beyond the 1995 BRAC norm of seeking a

6-year or less return on investment.

AFEWES Move Delayed The Air Force recommended to the 1995 BRAC that the AFEWES facility in

Fort Worth be relocated to Edwards Air Force Base. The Air Force had

estimated a cost of $8.9 million to close AFEWES and move it. BRAC did not

accept the recommendation though because BRAC estimated it would cost

$34.9 million to close the facility and would be over 100 years before a

return on investment was realized. Nevertheless, the Air Force included

the AFEWES relocation in the 1996 Master Plan. Air Force officials told us

they are now attempting to modify their outyear budgets so they can move

the AFEWES facility sometime in the year 2000 time frame.

User Costs Will Increase

With EMTE Closure

Special Operations Forces based at Hurlburt Field, Florida, adjacent to

Eglin Air Force Base, are users of EMTE. After the EMTE relocation,

however, Special Operations Forces’ electronic combat testing will be

conducted at the Air Force’s western test range. As a result, Special

Operations Forces officials estimate that their electronic combat testing

will cost $23 million over the next 5 years, whereas they have spent only

$4 million for electronic combat testing over the last 4 years.

We reviewed the analysis supporting this estimate and found it to be

realistic. The $19 million in additional cost results from sending aircraft,

their crews, and support personnel temporarily to the western test range

more often than in the past. In contrast, there are no temporary duty costs

associated with testing Special Operations Forces aircraft at EMTE.

In addition to the Special Operations Forces, another user organization

based at Eglin, the 53rd Test Wing, estimates that the proposed EMTE

relocation may cost them as much as an additional $1 million per year.

This additional cost would provide for an estimated 20 additional trips to

the Air Force’s western test range to perform electronic combat testing

that in the past has been performed at Eglin Air Force Base.

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Installed System Test

Facility Consolidation

Not Practical

DOD’s Master Plan does not contain any analysis or recommendations

regarding consolidation of installed system test facility workloads across

the services. The Navy and the Air Force are spending $512 million for

construction of a new anechoic chamber to provide a controlled

electromagnetic environment at Patuxent River, Maryland, and other

upgrades to their current primary installed system test facilities at

Patuxent River and Edwards Air Force Base, California. These projects

have progressed too far to make any interservice consolidation practical at

this time, however.

The Navy has a fighter-sized anechoic chamber, has already spent

$227 million, and has plans to spend an additional $101 million, to (1) add

a new, medium-sized anechoic chamber and (2) upgrade the electronic

combat test laboratory shared by both the fighter and medium-sized

chambers. The Navy is planning to have the medium-sized chamber

completed in fiscal year 1999.

Completion of this work is timed to conduct testing on the Navy’s E-6 and

P-3 aircraft. (These specialized aircraft are too large to fit into the fighter

sized facility.) Meanwhile, the Air Force has plans to spend over

$184 million through fiscal year 2002 to make the same electronic combat

test upgrades to its Edwards Air Force Base installed system test facility

as the Navy is making at Patuxent River.

The Edwards Air Force Base facility is large enough to accommodate any

military aircraft except a C-5 transport. Navy officials agreed that the

Edwards facility is large enough to accommodate their medium-sized E-6

and P-3 aircraft; however, they maintain that the Edwards facility is not

advanced enough right now to conduct the testing on these aircraft. Navy

officials also insist they cannot postpone their testing until fiscal year 2002

when the Edwards facility upgrade is scheduled to be completed.

Furthermore, they say, the Air Force has blocked out most of the available

test time at the Edwards facility for its future F-22 fighter, an aircraft that

would fit in the Patuxent River chamber.

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More Cost-Effective

Alternatives to

Planned Relocations

Ignored

In the past 3 years, DOD has conducted two joint service studies of possible

consolidation of electronic combat test facilities. One study done in 1994 is

referred to as the Board of Directors study and is cited as justification for

the conclusions in the Master Plan.1

 The other study is known as the 1995

Joint Cross Service Group study, which was done in support of the 1995

BRAC process.2 These studies identified a more cost-effective interservice

electronic combat consolidation as compared to the intraservice approach

reflected in the Master Plan. However, the lack of interservice cooperation

undermined the more cost-effective efforts.

Open Air Range

Consolidation Does Not

Reflect a More Effective

Alternative

To reduce excess capacity, the Master Plan recommends relocating test

assets from EMTE to the western test range managed by Edwards Air Force

Base and cites the 1994 Board of Directors Study as justification.

According to the study, DOD’s open air range workload capacity is 6,000

test hours per year, while actual workload in fiscal year 1993 was 4,867

test hours, and actual workload is projected to decline to 4,000 hours per

year. Based on this workload data, DOD determined it will only need two of

the three current open air range facilities in the future.

However, that 1994 study, as well as the 1995 Joint Cross Service Group

study done in support of the BRAC process, ranked EMTE as a more valuable

electronic combat test capability than the Navy’s China Lake open air

range. The 1994 study also projected that relocating test assets from China

Lake to EMTE and the Air Force’s western test range would produce about

$47 million more in savings over 5 years than relocating EMTE.

DOD and Air Force officials with knowledge of the studies told us that the

Navy participated fully in both studies, but once it became apparent that

EMTE would rank higher than China Lake, the Navy would not cooperate in

implementing the study’s conclusions.

Electronic Linking of

REDCAP and AFEWES a

More Cost-Effective

Alternative

In addition to comparing the EMTE and China Lake open air ranges, the

1994 Board of Directors Study considered the possibility of achieving

“synergy” between hardware-in-the-loop facilities, like AFEWES or REDCAP,

by colocating them with installed system test facilities, like those

1

The Board of Directors is made up of the Service Vice Chiefs in their role as the Test and Evaluation

Executive Agent. Board of Directors study team members were drawn from each of the services.

2

The Joint Cross Service Group was led by representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defense

and included team members from each of the services. The group examined potential consolidations

for airframe and armaments testing, as well as electronic combat testing.

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maintained by the Air Force at Edwards, or the Navy at Patuxent River,

Maryland. However, the Board of Directors study concluded that

relocation would require 200 years to net a return on investment. Instead,

according to a 1995 study conducted for the Air Force, electronic linking

of REDCAP and AFEWES to an installed system test facility was far more

cost-effective than relocating them.

Despite the findings of these studies, the Air Force plans to relocate

AFEWES and REDCAP. At the same time, the Office of the Secretary of

Defense and the Navy are undertaking the High Level Architecture Project

to electronically link REDCAP and AFEWES’ hardware with the Navy’s

installed system test facility at Patuxent River. This link will allow DOD to

test electronic combat systems on an aircraft in an installed system test

facility and do hardware-in-the-loop testing without having to physically

move the systems to REDCAP or AFEWES. This approach is consistent with

the 1995 study commissioned by the Air Force.

Master Plan Process

Stifled by Intraservice

Focus

The failure of the Master Plan effort to achieve any DOD-wide electronic

combat testing consolidations despite direction from the Congress to do

so is due to service parochialism. This resulted in focusing on intraservice

rather than interservice consolidations.

“Gentlemen’s Agreement”

Prevented Interservice

Open Air Range

Consolidation Effort

According to officials involved in the development of the Master Plan,

because no DOD-wide consolidations could be agreed upon, Air Force and

Navy representatives responsible for writing the Master Plan reached a

“gentlemen’s agreement.” The agreement was that there would be no

interservice consolidation until all intraservice consolidations were

complete. The impact of this agreement was that the Master Plan

consolidation effort for open air ranges focused only on whether to

relocate EMTE or the western test range since they are both Air Force

facilities, instead of focusing on all three open air ranges to ensure that the

two kept would represent what was in the best interest of all of DOD.

Intraservice Focus

Could Interfere With

Broader

Consolidation Effort

In a memorandum transmitting the Master Plan to the Congress in

March 1996, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and

Technology stated that DOD would revisit the Master Plan in the broader

context of section 277 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal

Year 1996, and adjust the Plan as appropriate. Section 277 directs DOD to

develop a consolidation and restructure plan for its laboratories and test

and evaluation centers for the 21st century.

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This plan, which DOD calls vision 21, will be based on the requirements to

support the test and evaluation of future weapon systems and identify the

critical test facilities needed to support them. DOD maintains that vision 21

will include both intraservice and interservice restructuring. However,

based on the inability of DOD to implement proposed interservice

consolidations originating from its prior studies of electronic combat test

consolidation, we are concerned that the intraservice focus that interfered

with development of a DOD-wide Electronic Combat Master Plan will

undermine the vision 21 effort.

Recommendation Because (1) the loss of electronic combat effectiveness was not given

adequate consideration in the development of DOD’s Electronic Combat

Consolidation Master Plan, (2) the Master Plan contained no costs or

evidence of savings, and (3) service parochialism was allowed to interfere

with development of the Master Plan, we recommend that the Secretary of

Defense take steps to make sure that the methodology for the ongoing

section 277/vision 21 effort include the following criteria: (1) accurate,

comparable, and reliable data on the true cost of operating the services’

test and evaluation infrastructure; (2) the needs of and costs to test facility

customers; (3) the maintenance of geographical and topographical

diversity in the test facility base; (4) the requirement that proposed

consolidations be cost-effective for DOD as a whole; and (5) measures to

ensure that implementation of cost-effective decisions cannot be

constrained or avoided.

Matter for

Congressional

Consideration

Because DOD’s Electronic Combat Consolidation Master Plan may not

provide for the most cost-effective DOD-wide infrastructure for electronic

combat testing as directed by the Congress, the Congress may wish to

consider directing the Secretary of Defense to defer the transferring of

electronic combat test assets until DOD completes its vision 21 plan for

restructuring its laboratories and test and evaluation centers.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD indicated that it did not agree

with our findings, recommendation, or matter for congressional

consideration. According to DOD’s response, the consolidations proposed

in the Electronic Combat Consolidation Master Plan and addressed in our

report are in keeping with the intent of the Congress to reduce the test

infrastructure. We disagree. The Congress directed DOD to develop a

DOD-wide infrastructure for electronic combat testing. DOD’s Master Plan

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did not consider any of the Army and the Navy electronic combat test

facilities as possibilities for consolidation and merely transfers Air Force

test functions to other Air Force locations.

DOD’s response indicated that the services made decisions to consolidate

in areas that would have the least impact on DOD’s ability to perform

effective test and evaluation. This response is not supported by the facts.

For instance, the plan to close the EMTE electronic combat open air range

at Eglin Air Force Base will leave DOD with no non-desert electronic

combat test range for tactical fighters and two desert test ranges—one

each for the Navy and the Air Force. This is not consistent with DOD’s

testing policy that calls for testing to be conducted in a range of natural

environments.

DOD commented that its planned consolidations reflect the 1995 BRAC

legislation and the services’ plans to implement congressional direction.

Our review showed that the planned actions will go beyond, not “reflect,”

the 1995 BRAC legislation as the Air Force intends to relocate the entire

EMTE function from Eglin Air Force Base, not limit itself to the

BRAC-directed realignment of 10 systems (8 threat and 2 podded systems.)

The Air Force intends to move AFEWES, as well. This planned move is

inconsistent with direction from the 1995 BRAC.

DOD believes diversity in the testing environments is desirable, but

inconsequential, so long as DOD maintains the capability to replicate

geographical and topographical characteristics through modeling and

simulation and other work arounds. Our review indicated that DOD does

not need to rely in large measure on computer models and work arounds.

Instead, DOD could have considered keeping its non-desert range at Eglin,

and could have considered consolidating the Air Force’s and the Navy’s

desert ranges into one to keep the diverse test environments required by

its regulations and still reduce from three ranges to two. We have modified

the language from our draft report concerning our matter for

congressional consideration to ensure that it is not misconstrued and to

help focus attention on the desirability of considering a more

cost-effective alternative. DOD’s comments are reprinted as appendix II,

along with our detailed evaluation of them.

Scope and

Methodology

To accomplish our objective, we examined DOD’s March 1996 Electronic

Combat Consolidation Master Plan and DOD studies of potential electronic

combat test facility consolidations. Because the Electronic Combat

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Consolidation Master Plan did not include any cost data, we gathered cost

data from affected sites, as well as the Air Force Materiel Command, and

other DOD studies of electronic combat test consolidation. We interviewed

officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Army, the Navy,

and the Air Force responsible for or involved in the electronic combat test

process. We also interviewed contractor personnel involved in the

electronic combat test process. We visited open air ranges,

hardware-in-the-loop facilities, installed system test facilities, and

observed electronic combat tests in progress. We reviewed DOD policy and

guidance on testing and evaluation, as well.

We performed our work at the Offices of the Secretaries of Defense, the

Navy, and the Air Force; the Offices of the Chief of Naval Operations and

the Air Force Chief of Staff; the Air Force Materiel Command,

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; Edwards Air Force Base,

California; Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada; Eglin Air Force Base, Florida;

Hurlburt Field, Florida; Army Aviation and Technical Test Center, Fort

Rucker, Alabama; Army Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville,

Alabama; Naval Air Warfare Centers at Patuxent River, Maryland, China

Lake, California, and Point Mugu, California; and REDCAP at Buffalo, New

York.

We performed our review from March 1996 to March 1997 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional

committees; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air

Force; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other

interested parties. We will make copies available to others upon request.

If you have any questions about this report, I may be reached at

(202) 512-4841. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III

Louis J. Rodrigues

Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-97-10 Electronic Combat Test Consolidation
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Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

The Department of

Defense’s Electronic

Combat Test Process

18

Predict-Test-Compare Replaces Fly-Fix-Fly 18

Hardware-in-the-Loop Facilities Provide Controlled Conditions

for Test

19

Effects of Electronic Combat System on Platform Determined in

Installed System Test Facility

20

Open Air Range Provides Real-World Test Scenarios 20

Appendix II 

Comments From the

Office of the Secretary

of Defense

22

Appendix III 

Major Contributors to

This Report

48

Tables Table 1: Potential Threat Locations and Terrain Correlation 5

Table 2: Open Air Ranges and Terrain Correlation 5

Abbreviations

AFEWES Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator

BRAC Base Closure and Realignment Commission

DOD Department of Defense

EMTE Electro-Magnetic Test Environment

REDCAP Real-time Electronic Digitally Controlled Analyzer Processor

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Appendix I 

The Department of Defense’s Electronic

Combat Test Process

Predict-Test-Compare

Replaces Fly-Fix-Fly

Electronic combat systems, such as radar jammers and warning receivers,

are most often associated with tactical fighter aircraft because of the

threat posed to them by modern surface-to-air missiles. However,

electronic combat systems are found today on all types of platforms.

These include ground vehicles, surface and subsurface naval vessels,

missiles, helicopters, and other fixed-wing aircraft besides tactical

fighters. Hence, wherever the services and their contractors develop or

test platforms and major subsystems for those platforms, electronic

combat test facilities have been established as necessary support

functions.

In the past 10 years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has spent more than

$300 million to build and upgrade electronic combat test capabilities. The

vast majority of this new investment has gone into hardware-in-the-loop

and installed system test facilities, which are highly scientific, laboratory

type facilities, and open air ranges that try to replicate real world

environments. These new and upgraded facilities were designed and built

to accommodate DOD’s revised electronic combat test process.

DOD’s revised electronic combat test process utilizing

hardware-in-the-loop, installed system test facilities, and finally, open air

ranges fits into a broader test philosophy referred to as

“Predict-Test-Compare.” According to a former test official,

Predict-Test-Compare was implemented to ensure more rigorous testing

was done before fielding because of a general belief in DOD that its

electronic combat systems did not work very well. According to the Air

Force, past electronic warfare programs have displayed a pattern of latent

deficiencies manifesting themselves in operational test and evalution,

necessitating expensive fixes and retesting. Predict-Test-Compare

replaced DOD’s “fly-fix-fly” model that emphasized open air range testing as

the primary test method.

Fly-fix-fly relied too much on trial and error at open air ranges to find and

correct problems. Often the systems were concurrently built and tested

and already fielded before successful fixes were identified. Typical

outcomes of a fly-fix-fly philosophy are the costly, repeated, and

continuing attempts to fix the ALQ-161 electronic warfare suite on the Air

Force’s B-1 Bombers, and the SLQ-32 electronic warfare suite on the

Navy’s surface combatants.

In contrast to trial and error, Predict-Test-Compare is based on the

scientific method of interplay between inductive and deductive reasoning.

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The Department of Defense’s Electronic

Combat Test Process

After subjecting systems to testing on the ground under tightly controlled

conditions, testers compare the test outcomes to their predictions to

induce hypotheses that explain the outcomes. The inductive hypotheses,

in turn, are analyzed by developers and testers to deduce what

hypothetical fixes are necessary to produce more desirable outcomes in

subsequent tests. Thus, Predict-Test-Compare is an iterative process in

which understanding why a system behaves as it does is essential to

successfully predicting how the system will behave when it is modified.

Hardware-in-the-Loop

Facilities Provide

Controlled Conditions

for Test

Controlling for the conditions of a test is the number one requirement for

ensuring that test outcomes are explainable. Hardware-in-the-loop

facilities provide this capability in the electronic combat test process. In

their laboratory type environments, testers can control for external

variables found in realistic environments such as terrain effects and

background noise that might influence test outcomes.

Hardware-in-the-loop testing provides the capability to provide repeatable

measurements and verification of protection techniques and system

effectiveness.

The hardware-in-the-loop facility is the first place a new or modified piece

of electronic combat equipment faces an actual or simulated threat radar.

Prior to hardware-in-the-loop testing, a developer begins with a concept

for electronic combat equipment to fill a requirement, say an ability to

deceive a new threat radar. The developer typically will design a computer

model representative of the concept. The electronic combat tester will

then subject the conceptual model to an increasingly rigorous test against

validated computer models of threat radars. Once a computer model that

works against the threat models is developed, real electronic combat

hardware that tries to replicate the model’s behaviour is built. The

electronic combat hardware is then subjected to the hardware-in-the-loop

testing, that is, it is tested against actual or simulated threat radar

hardware.

If testers cannot demonstrate that the hardware will work as predicted

within the controlled conditions of the hardware-in-the-loop facility, a

system should not proceed to the next phases of the test process. Success

at installed system test facilities or open air ranges after failure in the

hardware-in-the-loop facility might be evidence of a positive effect from

environmental influences, for example, electronic signals bouncing

uncontrollably off of terrain features to confuse a threat radar, a factor

that will not always be present in every wartime environment.

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The Department of Defense’s Electronic

Combat Test Process

In addition, systems that have failed in the real world can be brought back

to the hardware-in-the-loop facility to evaluate and improve their

performance. According to test officials, serious problems with the ALQ-99

system used on the EA-6B and EF-111 stand-off jamming aircraft were

unraveled and solutions identified in the Real-time Electronic Digitally

Controlled Analyzer Processor (REDCAP) hardware-in-the-loop facility

before the ALQ-99 went on to successful testing at the open air range. In a

more recent example, the Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation

Simulator (AFEWES) hardware-in-the-loop facility was able to recreate and

simulate the conditions that led to the shootdown of Captain Scott

O’Grady’s F-16 over Bosnia in 1995. The AFEWES results were subsequently

proven in real aircraft testing at the Electro-Magnetic Test Environment

(EMTE) Open Air Range at Eglin Air Force Base.

Effects of Electronic

Combat System on

Platform Determined

in Installed System

Test Facility

After the hardware is tested in the hardware-in-the-loop facility, it is then

placed on the platform intended to eventually carry the hardware for

installed system testing. Installed system test facilities consist of anechoic

chambers in which simultaneous operation of electronic warfare systems

and host platform avionics and munitions can be conducted. It is in the

installed system test facility that systems and subsystems are tested

together for electromagnetic interference and electromagnetic

compatibility, both of which have been major problems in the past. For

instance, a number of U.S. aircraft have had radar jammers, radars, and

radar warning receivers in the past that conflicted with each other. By

identifying the conflicts before flying at the open air range, testers can

more quickly isolate and solve problems. Once the Air Force and the Navy

complete their ongoing upgrades to their installed system test facilities,

they will be able to test systems for effectiveness under a wide range of

realistic threat and operational conditions while still on the ground.

Open Air Range

Provides Real-World

Test Scenarios

Finally, when the hardware has been proven successful in each of the

earlier steps, the electronic combat test process ends with open air testing

against actual or simulated threat radars in real-world environments.

Real-world phenomena encountered during open air testing can include

terrain effects, multi-path propagation, electromagnetic interference from

commercial systems, and other conditions that affect the atmospheric

propagation of electronic signals. While often thought of as the place for a

“final exam,” probably because of the association open air ranges have

with operational testing, open air ranges also can have a developmental

role. According to DOD officials, a properly managed and operated open air

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The Department of Defense’s Electronic

Combat Test Process

range can provide the proper mix of scientific accuracy and real-world

effects to allow electronic combat system developers to know if what they

have observed in the hardware-in-the-loop facility and installed system test

facility will hold true in the real world. The example cited above, in which

the AFEWES hardware-in-the-loop and EMTE open air range facilities together

unraveled, recreated, and demonstrated how the F-16 was shot down in

1995 over Bosnia provides evidence of this.

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Comments From the Office of the Secretary

of Defense

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

See comment 4.

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of Defense

See comment 5.

See comment 6.

See comment 7.

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of Defense

See comments 1, 2, 3,

and 4.

See comment 8.

See comment 9.

See comment 10.

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Comments From the Office of the Secretary

of Defense

See comment 11.

See comment 12.

See comment 13.

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of Defense

See comment 14.

See comment 15.

See comment 16.

See comment 17.

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See comment 18.

See comment 19.

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of Defense

See comment 19.

See comment 20.

See comment 21.

See comment 22.

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of Defense

See comment 23.

See comment 24.

See comment 25.

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of Defense

See comment 26.

See comment 27.

See comment 28.

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of Defense

See comment 29.

See comment 31.

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of Defense

See comment 30.

See comment 31.

See comment 32.

See comment 33.

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of Defense

See comment 34.

See comment 35.

See comment 36.

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of Defense

See comment 37.

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of Defense

See comment 38.

See comment 3.

See comment 39.

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See comment 39.

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Appendix II 

Comments From the Office of the Secretary

of Defense

The following are GAO’s comments on DOD’s letter dated March 10, 1997.

GAO Comments 1. The Congress directed DOD to develop a plan “to establish a DOD-wide

infrastructure for electronic combat testing.” DOD’s proposed plan fails to

establish a DOD-wide infrastructure. Instead, DOD’s plan did not consider

any of the 10 Army and Navy electronic combat test facilities as

possibilities for consolidation or the results of DOD studies that identified

consolidations that would result in a more cost-effective DOD-wide

infrastructure.

Our report does not conflict with the report entitled Defense

Infrastructure (GAO/HR-97-7, Feb. 1997). In fact, this report substantiates its

conclusions. The prior report stated that:

“. . . breaking down cultural resistance to change, overcoming service parochialism, and

setting forth a clear framework for a reduced defense infrastructure are key to avoiding

waste and inefficiency. To do this, the Secretary of Defense and the Service Secretaries

need to give greater structure to their efforts by developing an overall strategic plan.”

In this report, we point out that the process used by the services in

developing the Electronic Combat Consolidation Master Plan did not

overcome parochialism, as evidenced by the lack of effort to consolidate

across service lines. The Master Plan does not reflect a DOD-wide strategic

plan, but rather merely an Air Force plan to move Air Force functions to

other Air Force locations.

DOD’s comment that “. . . the Services made decisions to consolidate in

areas where they would have the least impact on the Department to

perform effective T&E” is not supported by the facts. For instance, the

plan to close the EMTE electronic combat open air range at Eglin Air Force

Base will leave DOD with no non-desert electronic combat test range for

tactical fighters, and two desert test ranges—one for the Navy and one for

the Air Force. This is contrary to DOD’s testing policy that requires testing

to be conducted in a range of natural environments. As an alternative, DOD

could have considered, but decided to forego, the option of consolidating

the test assets of the two desert ranges into one, and keep its only

non-desert electronic combat open air range.

As our report shows, the Air Force intends to “relocate” the EMTE function

from Eglin Air Force Base, not limit itself to the Base Closure and

Realignment Commission (BRAC) directed realignment. If the Air Force

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Comments From the Office of the Secretary

of Defense

transfers more than eight threat systems and two podded threat systems

out of Eglin, its actions will go beyond, not “reflect,” the 1995 BRAC

recommendation. The 1995 BRAC recommendation involves the movement

of only 8 threat systems and 2 podded threat systems, but DOD’s Master

Plan states that EMTE consists of 65 highly instrumented threat systems and

high fidelity validated simulators.

2. How funding for upgrades was authorized and appropriated is not

relevant to the issue of whether a facility should have been considered for

consolidation or whether more cost-effective consolidation alternatives

exist.

3. According to Air Force test policy, modeling and simulation is not an

adequate replacement for actual hardware testing because it cannot

predict absolute performance and effectiveness with high confidence or

achieve the same degree of fidelity for complex functions as testing of the

hardware itself.

The ongoing vision 21 consolidation effort gives DOD the opportunity to

consider how it will maintain geographical and topographical diversity,

among other things, and still achieve “as few [facilities] as is practicable

and possible.” For instance, DOD could consider keeping its non-desert

range at Eglin, and consolidate the Air Force’s and the Navy’s desert

ranges into one to keep the diverse test environments required by its

regulations and still reduce from three ranges to two.

4. There may be no significant loss of capabilities if the Air Force limits the

movement from EMTE to the eight systems and two pods that are described

in the BRAC decision and keeps the other residual test assets available for

testing at Eglin. However, if the Air Force carries out the Master Plan

proposal to “relocate” the EMTE function to accomplish a reduction from

three to two electronic combat ranges, there will be a loss in DOD’s current

ability to test with high fidelity and confidence. Testing only in dry, desert

air over rocky, mountainous terrain will limit DOD’s real-world testing to

one environment and one set of operating conditions. Moreover, the desert

ranges are not representative of most places in which DOD must be

prepared to fight.

5. Although the Air Force maintains there is no question of affordability in

the proposed move of AFEWES, the 1995 BRAC found that such a move would

cost $34.9 million and take over 100 years to achieve a return on that

investment. The Air Force’s refusal to consider electronic linking, despite

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Comments From the Office of the Secretary

of Defense

an independent Air Force contractor’s conclusion that linking would be far

more cost-effective, demonstrates that the Air Force is not in step with the

rest of DOD, which is demonstrating electronic linking of AFEWES, REDCAP,

and the Navy’s anechoic facilities at Patuxent River, Maryland.

6. We agree that the Air Force should keep REDCAP and AFEWES test

capabilities for which there are test requirements. These test requirements

are outlined in Air Force Manual 99-112, Electronic Warfare Test and

Evaluation Process—Direction and Methodology for EW Testing.

According to the manual, hardware-in-the-loop facilities (such as AFEWES

and REDCAP) are an important test category because they represent the first

opportunity to test components against simulations of hostile weapon

system hardware or actual hostile weapon system hardware. That is why

we question the Air Force’s plan to put REDCAP hardware in storage in

favor of an unproven digital computer model.

7. We continue to believe that the transfer of test assets should be deferred

until the ongoing vision 21 consolidation effort is complete because this

would provide DOD with an opportunity to create a plan for a future

DOD-wide infrastructure for its testing, instead of an infrastructure that

preserves each service’s ability to maintain its own set of separate

facilities across the test spectrum. The 1995 BRAC decisions have a 6-year

implementation period. The planned transfers do not have to be made

immediately to satisfy BRAC. We have modified the words in the matter for

congressional consideration to more clearly articulate our position. Also

see comments 1, 2, and 3.

8. Open air ranges are used to evaluate electronic combat systems in

background, clutter, noise, and dynamic environments. Dynamic

environments contain numerous important variables besides those

mentioned in DOD’s comments. According to the Air Force’s electronic

combat test manual, an operationally realistic open air test environment

includes real-world phenomena such as terrain effects, multi-path

propagation, electromagnetic interference from commercial sources, and

effects caused by atmospheric propagation factors (i.e., the tendency of

atmospheric conditions to enhance or inhibit signal transmission).

Providing realistic and diverse representations of threat radar systems in

the numbers (“density”) and dispersion (“laydown”) that the system under

test would be expected to defeat in actual electronic combat does not

negate the requirement to test in operationally realistic environments. Also

see comment 3.

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Comments From the Office of the Secretary

of Defense

9. The disadvantage of climatic predictability at the desert test ranges is

that the effects of various meteorological conditions cannot be observed.

10. The cost of testing at the western test range, the specifics of which the

Air Force has classified, far exceed those at EMTE at Eglin. In fact,

eliminating EMTE eliminates the Air Force’s lower cost range. In addition,

allowing foreign customers to utilize the Eglin range generates revenue,

but for classified reasons most foreign customers are precluded from

using the western range.

11. While it seems clear that moving EMTE’s threat systems to the Air

Force’s western test range could improve the western test range’s

technical capability, it does not automatically follow that this is the most

cost-effective solution for DOD as a whole to pursue.

12. If environmental effects were as well understood and accounted for in

electronic combat testing as DOD’s response claims, real-world testing at

open air ranges would not be required; testing indoors at

hardware-in-the-loop and installed system test facilities would be an

adequate substitute. Environmental effects on electronic combat system

performance can be more accurately determined on open air ranges where

the system is exposed to the complexities of different real-world

environments.

Furthermore, without the ability to test in at least two distinct

representative environments (e.g. wet and flat versus dry and

mountainous), DOD will be unable to predict with significant assurance

how an electronic combat system will perform in any environment other

than the one in which it was tested. Hence, because the electronic combat

test environment provided by the Eglin range provides DOD with its only

alternative to the desert test environment, DOD’s response that “the specific

electronic combat environment offered at EMTE is not critical to RF [radio

frequency] testing . . .” is not supportable. In addition, DOD regulations and

the Air Force electronic combat test process require testing under

real-world representative environment and operating conditions whether

or not DOD believes that a given specific test environment is not critical for

a given type of testing.

13. We did not assert that testing conducted in the environment at EMTE is

scientifically “of a higher value” than testing done in a desert environment.

What we stated was that DOD must prepare to fight in diverse

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Comments From the Office of the Secretary

of Defense

environments; testing conducted in diverse environments is of a higher

value than testing limited to a single environment.

An operationally realistic test environment allows testers to gain insight

into understanding how a system will perform in that environment. Testers

cannot assume that the system will perform the same way in different

environments. If DOD reduces its testing capability to only a desert

environment, it will not be able to prove its systems work in anything

other than a desert environment. This is contrary to DOD testing policy that

requires testing to be conducted in a range of natural environments. In

addition, testing indoors in a contractor’s laboratory is not considered an

acceptable substitute for real-world testing on the aircraft according to the

Air Force’s electronic combat test process guide.

Neither Point Mugu nor Vandenberg Air Force Base have the necessary

threat system test assets to create realistic threat environments for

electronic combat testing for tactical aircraft systems. To utilize Point

Mugu or Vandenburg for this purpose, DOD would essentially be recreating

EMTE on the west coast. Moreover, no naval battle group currently has the

capability to create a realistic open air threat density and laydown of

hostile land-based surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery systems.

Also see comments 2 and 10.

14. If these sites mentioned by DOD “easily support” electronic combat

testing of tactical aircraft, they should have been considered for

consolidation along with EMTE in the Master Plan process. However, the

reality is that none of the places mentioned by DOD has the test assets to

create the realistic threat densities and laydowns that DOD earlier in its

response said were the most important factors in developing “operational

realism and diversity.”

DOD’s statement that once an electronic combat system is operating at

airspeeds and altitudes normal for tactical aircraft the environmental

conditions at the surface have little or no effect on performance

unrealistically assumes no aircraft will ever be called upon to fly at low

altitudes (such as flying low to avoid radar detection). Moreover, DOD’s

statement is counter to its policy statement on the need to operationally

test in different environments.

15. In addition to electronic combat testing, Eglin conducts other kinds of

testing, including bombing and live missile firings. Moreover, the main

civilian air corridor between Los Angeles and destinations further east,

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Comments From the Office of the Secretary

of Defense

including Las Vegas, one of the nation’s fastest growing cities, buttresses

against the restricted air space available to the Air Force and the Navy at

their desert test ranges. Also see comment 1.

16. DOD’s comment seems to assume that keeping EMTE would mean that

the strengths of the Air Force’s western test range, which it delineates

here, would have to be sacrificed. We do not suggest that the western test

range be closed instead of EMTE. Also see comment 1.

17. Operational testers have been using and continue to use operationally

relevant scenarios at EMTE. Test aircraft at EMTE can also fly with live

ordnance through simulated hostile airspace and live ordnance can be

delivered on a real target. Also see comment 2.

18. Our point is that the body of potential hostile nations contains a variety

of environments, not just desert. Testing at EMTE and in the desert allows

the operational tester to gain insight into electronic combat system

performance in multiple environments.

The threat dispersion at EMTE can be changed if necessary, as it has been in

the past. In fact, the threat dispersion at all of the ranges should be

changed regularly to ensure that testing includes operationally relevant

scenarios since many modern threat systems are designed to be mobile.

China Lake is a facility with naval surface-to-air missiles located deep in a

desert ringed by mountains. Placing naval surface-to-air missiles at EMTE

with its flat terrain, humid environment and littoral location could provide

a more realistic and operationally relevant scenario for naval aircraft.

Despite DOD’s assertion that severe operational limitations exist at EMTE,

EMTE’s annual workload historically has been significantly greater than the

two desert test ranges. The Air Force and the Navy both use EMTE for

testing despite the presence of the desert ranges. Thus, it appears their

past testing behavior indicates they believe the benefits of EMTE outweigh

any such limitations.

19. REDCAP at Edwards will be less capable as a hardware-in-the-loop

facility because the Air Force intends to put the hardware in storage,

replacing it with a digital computer model to simulate actual hardware

testing.

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According to Air Force Manual 99-112, Electronic Warfare Test and

Evaluation Process—Direction and Methodology for EW Testing, the Air

Force’s electronic combat testing policy requires hardware-in-the-loop

testing. Also, REDCAP currently has paying customers who do want to use

it. Furthermore, hardware-in-the-loop facilities such as REDCAP and AFEWES

use “real equipment.” It is in digital modeling, such as DOD’s comment

proposes as a substitute for REDCAP, where actual electronic combat

systems are replaced by software representations instead of real

equipment.

The software-based computer model of REDCAP being developed may cost

less to operate than the actual REDCAP hardware-in-the-loop facility, just as

flight simulators cost less to operate than actual aircraft. However,

modeling and simulation is not hardware-in-the-loop testing. Because they

are different kinds of testing with different purposes, they are not directly

comparable for purposes of determining which is more cost-effective.

DOD’s statement that “Currently, REDCAP goes practically unused” is not

supported by recent usage data. Reimbursable costs from test customers

are up significantly over the past 3 years. Recent customers include a

major U.S. Air Force aircraft program that used the REDCAP Mission Level

Assessment Tool for several months, as well as a foreign customer having

some of its electronic combat hardware tested. See also comment 5.

20. DOD’s Master Plan included no cost estimates. We reported (1) the cost

estimates that were independently arrived at by BRAC, which do not

support relocating AFEWES or all of EMTE; (2) known additional costs that

the Air Force will incur by replacing REDCAP with a digital model, which

will in turn allow the Air Force to keep down the cost-estimate for the

REDCAP move; and (3) additional costs that current EMTE customers report

they will incur as a result of the EMTE closing. DOD’s comments provide no

evidence to suggest that these are wrong.

21. According to the BRAC language, some EMTE assets were specifically

directed to be left at Eglin “to support” several customers, including the

Special Operations Forces, as well as the Air Force Materiel Command

Armaments/Weapons Test and Evaluation activities, and other users. DOD’s

position that the BRAC legislation prohibits testing and limits customer

support to providing training capability is not adressed in the BRAC

direction.

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22. We agree the cost analysis to support any test facility closure should

include additional costs to users associated with the relocation.

23. According to the BRAC recommendation regarding Eglin, BRAC expected

DOD to use the Master Plan process to come up with the “optimal”

consolidation plan. Closing EMTE (not just relocating those 10 test assets

recommended to be moved by BRAC), relocating AFEWES despite BRAC’s

determination that this would not be cost-effective, and ignoring Army and

Navy test facilities completely as possibilities for consolidation, does not

support DOD’s claim that the Master Plan is “the result of BRAC decisions.”

Moreover, previous DOD cost-effectiveness studies concluded that the

three relocations planned to be relocated by the Air Force will not be

cost-effective.

24. The Navy and the Air Force authors of the Master Plan told us they did

not consider costs in the Master Plan because there was no requirement to

do so.

25. It is not clear why DOD raises the issue of the REDCAP contractor’s

estimate of the cost of moving REDCAP. We do not use that figure in our

report. Our report shows that the Air Force intends to replace REDCAP

hardware being moved from its current location with a digital computer

model that will simulate REDCAP. The Air Force’s contracted cost for the

model is $6.2 million. If the Air Force was not replacing the REDCAP

hardware with the digital model, it would have to reestablish the REDCAP

hardware at some unknown additional cost. Hence, the cost to make

REDCAP operational at the new location is either (1) the cost of the move

plus the digital model (with current hardware going into storage) or

(2) the cost of the move plus set-up costs for the current hardware (with

no digital model). Since DOD has selected option number (1), $6.2 million

should be added to the cost of the REDCAP move. See also comments 

2 and 5.

26. REDCAP does have some outdated systems. But as our report shows,

REDCAP also just completed a $75 million upgrade. Also, customer usage

and receipts over the past 3 years have increased.

27. We have changed the title of this finding.

28. According to Special Operations Forces test officials, EMTE provides a

more cost-effective test capability to meet their needs compared to

traveling to the western test range. Also see comment 21.

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29. Air Force officials reported to BRAC that they anticipated saving

$3.7 million per year after spending $6.1 million to move the threat systems

out of EMTE. Even if this savings materializes, it will not offset the

additional costs anticipated by the current users of EMTE. Special

Operations Forces officials told us they must use operational aircraft from

Hurlburt Field, Florida, adjacent to Eglin, to accomplish their testing

because they have no dedicated test aircraft at either Edwards or Eglin Air

Force Base.

30. DOD has no studies to show that the relocations delineated in the

Master Plan are cost-effective, and now claims that its 1994 and 1995 joint

studies, which do not support the Master Plan moves, were incomplete

and flawed. We spoke with Air Force, Army, and DOD Inspector General

officials involved in preparation or oversight of the 1994 and 1995 studies

and they do not agree the studies were flawed. They told us what made the

recommendations of these studies “unrealistic” was not the content, but

the refusal of the Navy to consider closing China Lake while the Air Force

retained two open air ranges. Navy officials associated with China Lake do

maintain the studies were incomplete and flawed.

The specific examples provided to us on 15 August 1996 represent the

dissenting position that China Lake’s open air range was not given

adequate consideration in studies that compared it to the Eglin open air

range. This data does not support the alternative position that the Master

Plan proposal to relocate EMTE is cost-effective.

31. We agree that the Air Force’s cuts in funding for investment at EMTE

over the past several years, coupled with the Navy’s increased investment

funding at the China Lake range, could affect the outcome of a comparison

of the two if the 1994 study was redone today. DOD, however, has not done

such a study to demonstrate that the outcome would be different.

32. The claim that Eglin has a capacity disadvantage does not appear to be

accurate. During the run up to the 1990-91 Gulf War, the Eglin Range

conducted the largest share of electronic combat testing of the three open

air ranges. During fiscal year 1993, 2,133 hours of testing were conducted

at EMTE, while China Lake and the western test range conducted 1,649 and

1,085 hours, respectively.

33. The referenced DOD Inspector General’s report compared EMTE with the

western test range. We do not assert that EMTE should be kept in lieu of the

Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-97-10 Electronic Combat Test Consolidation
Appendix II 

Comments From the Office of the Secretary

of Defense

western test range. The Inspector General’s report did not consider the

Navy’s open air range at China Lake compared to EMTE.

34. The 1995 study conducted for the Air Force by Georgia Tech Research

Institute concluded that electronic linking would be far more

cost-effective than relocating AFEWES and REDCAP. In addition, a 1994 Board

of Directors synergy study concluded that moving the

hardware-in-the-loop facilities would not be cost-effective. We know of no

study that concludes it is less expensive to relocate and reassemble

AFEWES or REDCAP hardware at a new location.

DOD’s position that successful electronic linking will be impossible due to

the laws of physics has not yet materialized. DOD’s project to link REDCAP

and AFEWES with Patuxent is well underway, and as DOD states, the REDCAP

link “shows potential.” Additional support for the linking project comes

from the Georgia Tech study concluding that linking will be more

cost-effective, and the 1994 DOD synergy study concluding that moving the

hardware-in-the-loop facilities is less cost-effective. Hence, DOD could have

advocated pursuing electronic linking instead of relocation of REDCAP and

AFEWES in the Master Plan.

35. The 1994 synergy study conducted for DOD’s Test and Evaluation Board

of Directors concluded that it would take 200 years to recover the

investment to relocate and reassemble the hardware-in-the-loop facilities

at the Edwards Air Force Base installed system test facility for “one stop

shopping.” As a result, the Navy shows no inclination to relocate its

hardware-in-the-loop facility from Point Mugu, California, to its installed

system test facility at Patuxent River, Maryland.

36. Even taking into account the continued operations and maintenance

costs at AFEWES and REDCAP, the 1994 DOD synergy study and the 1995

Georgia Tech Research Institute study concluded that these moves would

not be cost-effective.

37. The memoranda cited by DOD were all written in 1992 and referred to

another study that concluded that keeping China Lake’s open air range

was less cost-effective than EMTE. The DOD joint service studies cited in our

report were conducted in 1994 and 1995. Although DOD asserts that it is not

service parochialism that prevents interservice consolidation from

occurring, we note that DOD has now produced three studies with a

conclusion that China Lake is less cost-effective to keep, yet the Master

Plan calls for assets to be relocated from one Air Force location to another

Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-97-10 Electronic Combat Test Consolidation
Appendix II 

Comments From the Office of the Secretary

of Defense

Air Force location. The Director of Air Force Test and Evaluation told us

that this is because the Navy would not consider relocating China Lake’s

test assets.

38. As with the Electronic Combat Consolidation Master Plan, we believe

that service parochialism may interfere with the ongoing vision 21 effort.

There have been no DOD-wide electronic combat test consolidations in the

Major Range Test Facility Base despite a number of studies that have

recommended such consolidations.

39. We have modified the language from our draft matter for congressional

consideration to ensure that our focus is not misconstrued by others.

Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-97-10 Electronic Combat Test Consolidation
Appendix III 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Delores Cohen

Charles Ward

Atlanta Regional

Office

Mark Lambert

Chicago Regional

Office

Don Springman

(707149) Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-97-10 Electronic Combat Test Consolidation
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