FILED

f t?a OF APPEALSL

DIVISIONN II

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF

WASHINGam

TON

STATE OF WASHINGTON

In re the Marriage of: 

JOHN ERIC NELSON, 

v. 

CONNIE LOUISE ACKER, 

DIVISION II

Appellant, 

Respondent. 

BY

01UTY

No. 44263 -9 -I

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

HUNT, J. — John Eric Nelson appeals the trial court' s modified child support order

requiring him to pay postsecondary educational support for his son and daughter. He argues that

the trial court ( 1) erred in ordering him to pay retroactive postsecondary educational support

when the children failed to comply with the RCW 26. 19. 090 conditions ( which, he argues, 

required that he be given documentation of proof of enrollment, class registration, and grades); 

2) incorrectly computed his October 2009 through November 2012 income for support

purposes; and ( 3) failed to hold his former wife, Connie Louise Acker, in contempt of court for

noncompliance with a subpoena duces tecum.1 Nelson further claims that the Washington State

Division of Child Support (DCS) erred when it placed a lien on his property and filed a " Notice

ofReport to Credit Bureaus "2

while this case was pending on appeal. We affirm. 

1 Nelson also asserts that he is entitled reimbursement of his postsecondary support payments for

his daughter and should be allowed to remove her from his health insurance plan after she legally

emancipated herself from him. 

2

Br. ofAppellant at 17. 
No. 44263 -9 -II

FACTS

On December 8, 1997, John Eric Nelson and Connie Louise Acker dissolved their

marriage, and the trial court entered an order of support for their daughter, born February 11, 

1991, and their son, born March 8, 1994. This child support order contained a postsecondary

education provision . allowing a request for postsecondary education support before a child

reached the age of majority or graduated from high school, 

3. 12 TERMINATION OF SUPPORT

Support shall be paid: 

U]ntil the child(ren) reach(es) the age of 18 or as long as the child(ren) remain(s) 

enrolled in high school, whichever occurs last, except as otherwise provided

below in Paragraph 3. 13. 

3. 13 POST SECONDARY EDUCATIONAL SUPPORT

The right to petition for post secondary support is reserved, provided that the right

is exercised before support terminates as set forth in paragraph 3. 12. 

Sealed Clerk' s Papers ( CP) at 8. 

On March 7, 2012, Acker petitioned for modification of child support. Acker asked the

trial court to extend Nelson' s support obligation beyond their son' s eighteenth birthday and to

order Nelson to pay post secondary educational support for him. Acker asserted: 

The child is still in high school and there is a need to extend support beyond the

child' s 18th birthday. 

And] the child is in fact dependent and is relying upon the parents for the

reasonable necessities of life. 

He] is planning on attending college or a trade school and needs support while

attending. 

CP at 14. 

On April 19, Nelson filed an Amendment to Washington State Child Support Schedule

Worksheet and Financial Declaration in response to petition for modification of child support. 

He asked the trial court to modify the order of child support by
No. 44263 -9 -II

g]ranting new child support calculations from Worksheet dated April 2, 2012 due

to recent budget cuts with Petitioner' s employer ( United States Post Office) that

resulted in reduction of weekly hours from 18 hours per week to 15 hours per

week as a part-time flex clerk. 

CP at 17. 

On August 3, the trial court held a child support modification hearing. Nelson argued

that he should not have to pay postsecondary educational support because ( 1) postsecondary

educational support is not mandatory; ( 2) requiring him to pay postsecondary educational

support would cause him a financial hardship because his employer, the United States Postal

Service ( USPS), guaranteed him only 15 work hours per week; and ( 3) the trial court had

miscalculated his income in 2009. 

Acker disagreed with Nelson' s contention that an order requiring him to pay

postsecondary educational support would cause him a financial hardship as a result of his limited

hours at USPS: 

I want to stress to the Court that he' s — he says he' s only guaranteed so many

hours, but the record shows ... that he' s making more than his guaranteed 15

hours, 18 hours. He' s going out; he' s searching for extra hours at the post office, 

and he' s making more than he' s saying. 

Report of Proceedings (RP) at 6. The trial court reviewed evidence of Nelson' s wages at USPS, 

which revealed that Nelson had made $ 55, 440.46 in gross wages in 2011. The trial court

determined that Nelson had the means to contribute to his son' s college education. In response

to Nelson' s claim that the trial court allegedly erred in calculating his income in 2009, the trial

court informed Nelson that he had " slept on [his] rights." RP at 13. 

The trial court found Nelson' s arguments unpersuasive. The trial court determined that

postsecondary educational support, although not mandatory, was warranted. In making its
No. 44263 -9 -II

determination, the trial court considered the following factors: The son' s desire to attend

college, enrollment at Montana State University, tuition and room and board costs, and work

study. The trial court also considered the education levels of Nelson, Acker, and their daughter. 

Specifically, the trial court considered evidence that both Nelson and Acker had attended

college, Nelson held a degree in criminal justice, and their daughter, a senior in college, was

going to be a successful graduate of college." RP at 22. 

The trial court ( 1) orally ordered Nelson to pay postsecondary educational support for his

son and (2) provided Acker with the following instructions: 

You're going to have to recalculate the child support with another work

sheet, which will be the final work sheet. Once you recalculate all of that, run it

by Mr. Nelson and see if he' ll just agree that it' s what I said from the bench

today. Then you don' t have to bring it back into court. If he' ll sign off, then you

cannot have to bring it in for presentment. 

On the other hand, if Mr. Nelson refuses to sign the order —we need an

order and work sheets —then you' ll need to bring it back in for presentment. 

RP at 33. On November 2, 2012, the trial court entered a written Order on Modification

of Child Support, which required Nelson to contribute to his son' s postsecondary

education. Nelson appeals. 

ANALYSIS

I. FAILURE To FOLLOW APPELLATE RULES

A. Inadequate Citation to Record

At the outset, we note that throughout his brief of appellant, Nelson fails to provide

record cites as required by RAP 10. 3( a)( 5), ( 6): He provides no page numbers to identify which

pages of the clerk' s papers or report of proceedings support his factual assertions; and most of

the documents to which he refers are documents outside the record before us on appeal. Nelson

4
No. 44263 -9 -II

also makes several arguments in his brief that involve facts outside of the record before us on

appeal; in fact, most of the documents appended to Nelson' s brief of appellant are not part of the

appellate record in violation ofRAP 10. 3( a)( 8) ( an appendix to a brief may not include materials

not contained in the record on review without permission from the appellate court); City of

Moses Lake v. Grant County Boundary Review Bd., 104 Wn.. App. 388, 391, 15 P. 3d 716 ( 2001). 

Nelson also frequently refers to exhibits in his brief' s 148 —page appendix to support his legal and

factual claims instead of providing the required specific cite to a statute, court case, or record

page. RAP 10. 3( a)( 5), ( 6). 

A party seeking appellate review has the burden of providing us with all evidence in the

record relevant to the issue before us. RAP 9. 2( b); Starczewski v. Unigard Ins. Grp., 61 Wn. 

App. 267, 276, 810 P.2d 58 ( 1991). Without the trial record, . we cannot review challenged

evidence in the context of the rest of the evidence presented. Allemeier v. Univ. of Wash., 42

Wn. App. 465, 473, 712 P.2d 306 ( 1985). An insufficient record on appeal generally precludes

our review of the alleged errors. Bulzomi v: Dep 't ofLabor & Indus., 72 Wn. App. 522, 525, 864

P.2d 996 ( 1994). 

Such is the case here: Without providing citations to the record, Nelson contends that the

trial court abused its discretion in ( 1) ordering him to pay his daughter' s postsecondary

educational support and to provide her with medical coverage after she legally emancipated

herself from him; ( 2) failing to suspend postsecondary educational support when his son and

daughter failed to comply with the conditions of RCW 26. 19. 090; and ( 3) failing "to enforce the

duty and impose the breach of the duty to the respondent in contempt of court after Connie

5
No. 44263 -9 -II

Acker stated she did not have the documentation that she was required to bring to the November

2012 hearing per the subpoena duces tecum. "3 Br. ofAppellant at 3. 

3 The record before us reflects that at the modification hearing, the trial court made no

determination regarding ( 1) the daughter' s alleged legal emancipation, ( 2) the son or the

daughter' s compliance with RCW 26. 19. 090, or ( 3) Acker' s compliance with a subpoena duces

tecum. Nelson fails to provide citations to the record for these findings. Accordingly, we

decline to review his arguments. RAP 10. 3( a)( 5), ( 6); Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 

118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 ( 1992). To support his first argument, Nelson references

exhibits from the appendix to his brief of appellant. As we have previously noted, these exhibits

are not part of the record on appeal; thus he cites them in violation of RAP 10. 3( a)( 8). We

further note, however, that the exhibits show only that the daughter legally changed her name, 

not that she legally emancipated herself from Nelson. 

Without citation to the record, Nelson contends that the trial court abused its discretion in

ordering him to pay retroactive postsecondary education support for his son and daughter based

on " speculation" that his son and daughter would attend college. Nelson also asserts that ( 1) he

was entitled to receive certain documentation under RCW 26. 19. 090; ( 2) Acker failed to provide

him with this documentation for his daughter from February 17, 2009, to September 2010, and

for his son from March 7, 2012 to October 12, 2012; and ( 3) it was " a violation of RCW

26. 19. 090 and the noncustodial parental rights" when " the court ordered [ him] to retro pay

postsecondary education support during these time periods" without first determining " that the

children were indeed attending college." Br. of Appellant at 15. Nelson provides no meaningful

argument, citation to the record, or authority to support his claim. Accordingly, we do not

further address this argument. RAP 10. 3( a)( 5), ( 6); Cowiche Canyon Conservancy, 118 Wn.2d

at 809. 

In contrast, the record shows that the trial court ordered the son' s postsecondary

educational support payments to begin July 2012. In making this determination, the trial court

properly considered his enrollment at Montana State University and the date Acker filed her

petition for modification. Further, at the modification hearing, Nelson conceded that his son was

enrolled at Montana State University: 

THE COURT: Did you want to make an argument concerning your younger

child] even being in college? I kind of read between the lines that you wanted

more proof. 

MR. NELSON: Well, there' s — I mean, [Acker] has the enrollment, Your Honor. 

RP at 18 -19. 

Without citing authority or supporting legal analysis, Nelson asserts that, based on RCW

26. 19. 090, " the court cannot adequately consider the factors of this RCW if the noncustodial

parent is not given proper documentation of: Proof of enrollment, class registration, and grades." 

Br. of Appellant at 14. Nelson again argues that Acker failed to provide him with certain

documentation for his daughter from February 17, 2009 to September 2010, and for his son from

March 7, 2012 to October 12, 2012. Nelson fails to provide citations to the record for these

findings and offers no legal authority to support his argument. Accordingly, we decline to

6
No. 44263 -9 -II

review his argument. RAP 10. 3( a)( 5), ( 6); Cowiche Canyon Conservancy, 118 Wn.2d at 809. 

But even if we were to review this contention, his argument would fail. RCW 26. 19. 090( 2) sets

forth a non - exhaustive list of factors a trial court may consider in ordering postsecondary

educational support. The statute does not state that the adequacy of the trial court' s

consideration of the factors under RCW 26. 19. 090(2) depends on whether the noncustodial

parent received " proof of enrollment, class registration, and grades," Br. of Appellant at 14, and

we can find no authority to support such a proposition.) 

To the extent that Nelson' s argument refers to RCW 26. 19. 090(4), we decline to review

this issue. RCW 26. 19. 090( 4) states: 

The child shall also make available all academic records and grades to both

parents as a condition of receiving postsecondary educational support. Each

parent shall have full and equal access to the postsecondary educational records as

provided in RCW 26. 09.225. 

RCW 26.09.090( 4). The record before us on appeal does not show that the trial court made a

determination as to whether the son or daughter made their academic records or grades available

to Nelson. The record does reveal, however, that the modification hearing occurred on August 3, 

2012, and at this hearing the trial court reviewed evidence that the son was enrolled to begin his

freshman year at Montana State University. At the time of the modification hearing, the son' s

freshman year academic records and grades would not have been available for review. 

Nelson contends that from October 2009 through November 2012, the trial court

incorrectly calculated his income for child support purposes. Nelson contends that under

Engrossed Substitute H.B. 1794, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. ( Wash. 2009), the trial court should not

have considered his income from his second job. ( We note that during the August 3, 2012

modification hearing, the trial court addressed Nelson' s contention that the bill precluded the

trial court from considering his, income from his second job. The trial court asked Nelson if he

had read the bill carefully and reminded him that the statute ( RCW 26. 19. 071) had a " minimum

hourly weekly requirement." RP at 7.) The appellate record does not contain any report of

proceedings from a 2009 modification hearing. Nelson provides no citation to the record to

support his claim. Accordingly, we do not further address this argument. RAP 10. 3( a)( 5), ( 6); 

Cowiche Canyon Conservancy, 118 Wn.2d at 809. ( Again, the record shows the contrary: The

trial court directly addressed Nelson' s contention at the August 3, 2012 modification hearing. 

The trial court informed Nelson that he had " slept on [ his] rights" by not bringing the court' s

alleged miscalculation in 2009 before the court by a motion of reconsideration or on appeal. RP

at 14 -15. Further, the trial court ruled that Nelson' s gross monthly income would not include his

income from his second job at A &J Market because it appeared to the court " to be speculative

and part time. And the preponderance of [Nelson' s] income is based on his career right now, 

which is with the USPS." RP at 35.) 

Nelson further contends that the trial court violated H.B. 1794 in not removing his " extra

hours and annual leave at the USPS" from his income calculation. Br. of Appellant at 16. He

argues that "[ i]fthe judge ordered A &J Market to be removed from the income calculations, he

should have also ordered the extra hours outside of Cascade Locks and his annual leave to also

be removed from the income calculations." Br. of Appellant . at 16. Nelson' s argument

7
No. 44263 -9 -II

B. Unsupported Argument

In addition, the facts section of Nelson' s brief includes argument in violation of RAP

10. 3( a)( 5), which requires that the statement of the case be "[ a] fair statement of the facts and

procedure relevant to the issues presented for review, without argument." RAP 10. 3( a)( 5) 

emphasis added). Pro se litigants are expected to comply with the Rules of Appellate

Procedure. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Avery, 114 Wn. App. 299, 310, 57 P. 3d 300 ( 2002). 

And Nelson' s brief falls well below the standards envisioned by RAP 10. 3. 

misconstrues the trial court' s reasoning for excluding his income from his second job at A &J

Market. 

H.B. 1794 was codified as RCW 26. 19. 071, which states in relevant part: 

4) Income sources excluded from gross monthly income. The following

income and resources shall be disclosed but shall not be included in gross income: 

i) Overtime or income from second jobs beyond forty hours per week averaged

over a twelve -month period worked to provide for a current family' s needs, to

retire past relationship debts, or to retire child support debt, when the court finds

the income will cease when the party has paid off his or her debts. 

RCW 26. 19. 071( 4)( i) (emphasis added). 

Under RCW 26. 19. 071, income from a second job beyondforty hours per week shall be

excluded from gross income. RCW 26. 19. 071( 4)( i). At the August 3, 2012 modification

hearing, the trial court reminded Nelson of this minimum hourly weekly requirement. 

Nonetheless, the trial court ruled that Nelson' s gross monthly income should not include his

income from his second job at A &J Market because it appeared to the court " to be speculative

and part time. And the preponderance of his income is based on his career right now, which is

with the USPS." RP at 35. Contrary to Nelson' s assertion, the trial court did not rely on RCW

26. 19. 071( 4) in making its determination to exclude his second income. Nelson provides no

meaningful argument, citation to the record, or legal authority for his proposition that his annual

leave or the additional hours he, works at USPS outside of his guaranteed 15 hours per week

should be excluded from his income. Accordingly, we decline to review this argument. RAP

10. 3( a)( 5), ( 6); Cowiche Canyon Conservancy, 118 Wn.2d at 809, 828. 

Finally, Nelson contends, without citing to the record, that the DCS violated his " rights

and responsibilities" when it placed a lien on his property and filed a Notice of Report to Credit

Bureaus without scheduling a hearing on reasonable cause according to RCW 26. 18. 050. Br. of

Appellant at 17. The record before us shows that the trial court made no determination regarding

the DCS' s alleged misconduct. Nelson fails to provide citation to the record for these findings. 

Accordingly, we decline to review his argument. RAP 10. 3( a)( 5), ( 6); Cowiche Canyon

Conservancy, 118 Wn.2d at 809. 

8
No. 44263 -9 -II

Nevertheless, we may address an improperly briefed legal or factual issue ifthe basis for

the claim is apparent. State v. Young, 89 Wn.2d 613, 625, 574 P.2d 1171 ( 1978) ( quoting

DeHear v. Seattle Post - Intelligencer, 60 Wn.2d 122, 126, 372 P. 2d 193 ( 1962) ( basis for

assigned error "` apparent without further research "')). Furthermore, we are to interpret the Rules

ofAppellate Procedure " liberally ... to promote justice and facilitate the decision of cases on the

merits. Cases and issues will not be determined on the basis of compliance or noncompliance

with these rules except in compelling circumstances where justice demands." RAP 1. 2( a). Such

is the case here to a limited extent. 

Nelson' s brief makes reasonably clear his challenge to the trial court' s order that he pay

postsecondary educational support for his son. The record before us on appeal is also sufficient

for our review. The rest of Nelson' s apparent claims, however, are so lacking in both legal and

factual support that we cannot address them. Accordingly, we confine our review to whether the

trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Nelson to pay postsecondary educational support

for his son; in doing so, we consider only those arguments for which we find support in the

record or in the law. 

9
No. 44263 -9 -II

II. POSTSECONDARY EDUCATIONAL SUPPORT FOR SON

Nelson contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay

postsecondary educational support for his son4 because ( 1) postsecondary educational support is

not mandatory, and ( 2) an order requiring him to pay postsecondary educational support would

cause him a financial hardship. We disagree. 

A. Standard of Review

The trial court has broad discretion to order support for postsecondary education. 

Childers v. Childers, 89 Wn.2d 592, 601, 575 P.2d 201 ( 1978); see also In re Marriage of

Newell, 117 Wn. App. 711, 718, 72 P. 3d 1130 ( 2003); In re Marriage ofKelly, 85 Wn. App. 785, 

795, 934 P.2d 1218 ( 1997). A trial court abuses that discretion when its decision is manifestly

unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or reasons. In re Marriage of Fiorito, 112 Wn. 

App. 657, 664, 50 P. 3d 298 ( 2002); Newell, 117 Wn. App. at 718. 

4 Nelson argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay postsecondary

educational support for his son and his daughter. Although the November 12, 2012 child support

order required Nelson to pay postsecondary educational support for both children, the record

shows that Acker petitioned for postsecondary educational support for only the son; and the

August 3, 2012 modification hearing focused on the appropriateness of awarding only this

support. Apparently the trial court had previously considered the appropriateness of ordering . 

postsecondary educational support for the daughter, the older child, and was simply reiterating

that earlier decision in its November 12, 2012 child support order when it stated, " With respect

to [ the daughter], he' ll continue to make those payments just as he' s been," RP at 36, and, " One

child] is about to finish, however, so the obligation with respect to [ his daughter] is —is finite

now." RP at 33. 

The record on appeal, however, does not contain a report of proceedings for a hearing

during which the trial court determined the appropriateness of postsecondary educational support

for the daughter or an order for such child support. Without the trial record, we cannot review

challenged evidence in the context of the rest of the evidence presented. Allemeier, 42 Wn. App. 

at 473. An insufficient record on appeal generally precludes our review of the alleged errors. 

Bulzomi, 72 Wn. App. at 525. Accordingly, we decline to review whether the court abused its

discretion in awarding postsecondary educational support for the daughter. 

10
No. 44263 -9 -II

B. Findings Support Postsecondary Educational Support Award

1. RCW 26. 19. 090( 2) factors

RCW 26. 19. 090( 2) gives the trial court discretion to determine whether to order support

for postsecondary educational expenses, and it provides a non - exhaustive list of factors a trial

court can consider: 

The court shall exercise its discretion when determining whether and for how long

to award postsecondary educational support based upon consideration of factors

that include but are not limited to the following: Age of the child; the child' s

needs; the expectations of the parties for their children when the parents were

together; the child' s prospects, desires, aptitudes, abilities or disabilities; the

nature of the postsecondary education sought; and the parents' level of education, 

standard of living, and current and future resources. Also to be considered are the

amount and type of support that the child would have been afforded ifthe parents

had stayed together. 

RCW 26. 19. 090(2). 

The record before us on appeal supports the trial court' s conclusion that the

postsecondary educational support award was appropriate. The trial court reviewed evidence of

the son' s enrollment at Montana State University and considered his age, his tuition and room

and board costs, and his work study. The trial court also considered Nelson' s, Acker' s, and their

daughter' s level of education, and their expectation to provide their son with a college education: 

T] here' s a history of college in your family. That' s one of the things the Court

looks at, is how were the children raised, were they raised in an expectation of

going to college, is college education something the family values. In this case

clearly you do. You, yourself, have a college education. Your ex -wife has

something of a college education. [ Your daughter] is going to be a successful

graduate of college and [ your son] has shown enough interest to at least start

college. So we have to strike that off the list. 

If you were —if everybody was blue collar and the kids were raised with the

expectation they wouldn' t go to college, that would be different. It is not

mandatory, but I am going to rule that [ your son] be given money. 

11
No. 44263 -9 -II

RP at 22. 

We presume that the trial court considered all evidence before it in fashioning an order on

postsecondary educational expenses. Kelly, 85 Wn. App. at 793. Although the trial court did not

make extensive findings on the record as to each factor, RCW 26. 19. 090 sets forth no

requirement that the trial court explicitly consider the factors on the record. In re Marriage of

Morris, 176 Wn. App. 893, 906, 309 P. 3d 767 ( 2013); In re Marriage of Cota, 177 Wn. App. 

527, 537, 312 P.3d 695 ( 2013). Moreover, the record before us shows that the trial court

properly considered the RCW 26. 19. 090( 2) factors. 

2. Nelson' s ability to pay

Nelson next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay

postsecondary education support because this order would cause him financial hardship. To

support his contention, he cites Golay v. Golay, in which the Washington Supreme Court noted

that an order requiring a divorced father to pay for his daughter' s college education should be

based upon his "` station in life. "'5

Br. ofAppellant at 6 ( quoting Golay v. Golay, 35 Wn.2d 122, 

123 -24, 210 P. 2d 1022 ( 1949)). In reversing the trial court' s modified child support order, the

Supreme Court considered that the father could " scarcely spare any money from his own needs." 

Golay, 35 Wn.2d at 124. Such is not the case here, however. 

5 Nelson cites this case and makes his related argument in the facts section of his brief, in

violation of RAP 10. 3( a)( 5). 

12
No. 44263 -9 -II

Here, the trial court ( 1) reviewed evidence of Nelson' s actual income; ( 2) implied that, 

unlike the father in Golay, Nelson had the means to contribute to his son' s college education; 

and ( 3) ruled that Nelson' s financial hardship argument lacked merit. Thus, the record before us

shows that the trial court properly considered whether Nelson had the means to contribute to his

son' s college education. 

Addressing Nelson' s contention that the USPS guaranteed him only 15 hours per week, 

the trial court stated: 

Now, [Nelson] argues that the postal service is under the gun to maybe

even close offices down. Nobody' s quite sure about their employment. Of

course, the Court' s aware of everything in the news about that. Nevertheless, the

way courts have to look at this is to look at whatever history has been proved by a

preponderance and make a determination on child support based on the history. 

And the history is, he makes about $ 54, 000 a year. He did so in 2010. He did

again in 2011. 

Now, if at the end of 2012[ Nelson] can prove that has been utterly

incorrect, then perhaps the statute would allow him to move for modification, but

in the meantime the only evidence is that that' s historically what he makes. And

I' ll bet he made about that in 2009 also. 

In any case what I do have is just this: Exhibit Number 2, his wages. So

the social security wages are the ones we use, and that' s $ 55, 440.46. Fifty -five

four forty forty -six. Those are his gross wages out of which you' ll calculate

everything else. 

RP at 35 -36. Thus, the record before us shows that the trial court properly considered Nelson' s

income as a factor under RCW 26. 19. 090( 2) and that it also properly considered the statutory

factors set forth in RCW 26. 19. 090( 2). 

6 See, e. g., the trial court' s advice to Nelson that if, at the end of 2012, he could prove that he

made significantly less than the evidence at the hearing revealed, he could move to modify his

secondary education child support obligation. 

13
No. 44263 -9 -II

We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Nelson to pay

postsecondary educational support for his son. We affirm. 

A majority of the panel having determined that . this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW

2.06.040, it is so ordered. 

We concur: 

14