No. 243, July 2009 Strategic Forum 1

drug trafficking organizations (DTOs)1 and 

speculation regarding the Mexican government’s ability to adequately address the deteriorating security situation have reached the 

attention of the President, National Security 

Advisor, Director of National Intelligence, 

Secretary of State, Attorney General, Secretary 

of Homeland Security, and Secretary of 

Defense. This escalation of issues beyond the 

bureaucratic levels that routinely deal with 

Mexico in the security realm is unusual.

Although U.S. demand unquestionably 

is a major cause of the trafficking of drugs 

from south to north through Mexico and of 

weapons from this side of the border to the 

DTOs and other criminal groups in Mexico, 

these realities at first glance would appear to 

have little to do with classic military matters. 

In the United States, these issues are dealt 

with by law enforcement agencies, and the 

Department of Defense (DOD) plays a limited 

and supporting role. But within the context of 

transnational defense and security challenges 

of the 21st century that confront the Mexican 

state, and given the central role Mexican 

armed forces are playing in this war declared 

by President Felipe Calderón, the issue of the 

bilateral defense relationship with the United 

States becomes much more relevant. This is 

particularly so given public assessments by 

certain analysts that Mexico is on the verge of 

becoming a “failed state.”2

The U.S.-Mexico bilateral relationship 

is rich and dense across a broad swath of the 

The United States and Mexico share a 

history that was shaped in the 19th century by 

numerous interventions by U.S. forces into 

Mexican territory and U.S. expropriation of 

considerable Mexican land. Although largely 

forgotten on the northern side of the border, 

this history has left a scar on the collective 

national psyche of Mexico, most notably on the 

military forces.

The American and Mexican militaries 

have evolved in distinct fashions over the 

past 100 years, and today have very different 

responsibilities, mission sets, orientations, and 

capabilities. In addition, a number of structural 

realities present on each side of the border, 

including a bilateral lack of trust, pose challenges for improved interaction and greater 

collaboration between the armed forces of each 

country. The combination of circumstances has 

created an “incompatible interface” in terms of 

U.S.-Mexican military interaction.

The Department of Defense should 

undertake a comprehensive review of potential 

areas of commonality between U.S. forces and 

their Mexican counterparts to identify missions 

and capabilities where the United States and 

Mexico could collaborate more effectively and 

find ways in which to cooperate constructively.

The U.S. national security community 

has begun to pay greater attention to Mexico 

in 2009. Reports of unprecedented (in recent 

history, at least) violence related primarily to 

 Strategic Forum No. 243

July 2009

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

http://www.ndu.edu/inss

Key Points

U.S.-Mexico Defense Relations: 

An Incompatible Interface

by Craig A. Deare

government and private sector, but for reasons peculiar to U.S.-Mexican history, matters related to security in general and defense 

in particular are traditionally distant.3 This 

reality was acknowledged recently by Defense 

Secretary Robert Gates: “I think we are beginning to be in a position to help the Mexicans 

more than we have in the past. Some of the 

old biases against cooperation . . . between 

our militaries . . . are being set aside.”4

The confluence of multiple challenges in early 2009—an international system undergoing shifts in power, the global 

financial crisis and a U.S. economy in recession, and a change in the U.S. administration, to name but a few—with the security 

threats in Mexico and the rest of the Western 

Hemisphere suggests greater attention is 

needed. Given Mexico’s history and the vital 

role played by its armed forces in providing stability for that country, a review of the 

U.S.-Mexico bilateral defense relationship is 

in order. This effort reminds a U.S. audience 

of the shared history largely ignored north of 

the border and perhaps excessively recalled 

to its south; assesses the major structural 

challenges to improved cooperation between 

the two countries’ military forces; and offers 

thoughts on ways to work through the incompatible interface.

This term incompatible interface refers 

to the fact that the armed forces that operate to the north and south of the shared border are quite distinct, and the “connections” 
2 Strategic Forum No. 243, July 2009

between them are incongruent. They both 

conceive of, send, and receive “signals” in distinct fashions, with neither of the two being 

“correct” in and of themselves. Despite being 

neighbors, their origins, circumstances, and 

shared history have caused them to evolve in 

different fashions, resulting in quite dissimilar 

organizational cultures, responsibilities, missions, orientations, and capabilities.

Brief History

While it is unnecessary to explain to 

a Mexican audience why relations between 

the armed forces of both countries are 

strained—virtually every Mexican schoolchild is taught the events of 1836, 1846–1847, 

1914, and 1917, the key dates of U.S. interventions against Mexican sovereignty—the 

reverse is not true in the United States. Only 

a small percentage of U.S. citizens are aware 

of what actions the U.S. Army and Navy performed in those years. And while the following events are ancient history for a U.S. 

audience, they formed a deep scar on the 

Mexican national psyche:

■ The current U.S. state of Texas was 

an integral part of the nation-state of Mexico 

upon its formal independence from Spain in 

1822. Texas became an independent republic in 1836 and was integrated as a U.S. state 

in 1845; neither of these events was formally 

recognized by the government of Mexico at 

that time.

■ The U.S. Congress declared war on 

Mexico in May 1846, and U.S. forces operated 

in Mexico for more than 18 months, including the occupation of Mexico City. The Treaty 

of Guadalupe Hidalgo (signed in February 

1848) ended that war. In addition to Texas, 

approximately two-thirds of Mexico’s former 

territory (the present-day states of California, 

Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, and portions of Colorado and Wyoming) was ceded to 

the United States, which paid $15 million to 

Mexico for war costs and reparations.

■ Admiral Frank Friday Fletcher led the 

occupation of Veracruz (often referred to 

in Mexico as the Second U.S. Intervention) 

from April through November 1914. This 

action was ordered in response to the 

Tampico Affair.5

■ Brigadier General John J. “Black 

Jack” Pershing led an expeditionary force 

of approximately 10,000 soldiers into northern Mexico (an event known in Mexico as 

the Punitive Expedition and the Third U.S. 

Intervention) for approximately 11 months 

(March 1916 to February 1917). The campaign was in retaliation for a raid by forces of 

Francisco “Pancho” Villa on U.S. territory in 

New Mexico.

In the Mexican mind, these armed episodes combine with the perception of constant additional intrusions and affronts of 

all types—political, economic, social, cultural, and so forth. Perhaps the expression 

that best captures the Mexican sentiment is 

attributed to former general and president of 

Mexico, Porfirio Diaz: “Poor Mexico; so far 

from God, so close to the United States.” The 

reality that Mexico cannot escape its history 

or its geography is a fundamental element of 

this bilateral equation; the additional reality that the vast majority of U.S. citizens are 

largely unaware of these facts adds salt to a 

still open wound.

If it is true that the average Mexican 

citizen is aware of these historical events, 

the fact is that members of the Mexican 

armed forces are even more acutely attuned 

to them. The officer corps of the army and 

navy have deeply ingrained into their professional ethos both the truth and myths of 

the attacks on their homeland by the invaders from the north. The additional fact that 

students from the army and naval military 

academies, the Heróico Colegio Militar and 

the Heróica Escuela Naval Militar, respectively, were involved in and suffered casualties 

from the U.S. actions exacerbates the scars. 

The most hallowed location in the Heróico 

Colegio Militar is dedicated to the Niños 

Héroes (Child Heroes), six cadets who died 

during the defense of Chapultepec Castle, the 

site of the military academy in 1847. And the 

formal education of the army officer corps 

further embeds the actions of an invading 

U.S. Army into the military professional culture. This historical baggage has long made 

the thought of cooperating with members of 

the armed forces responsible for expropriating their national territory unpleasant at best, 

unthinkable for some.

This background may help explain the 

Mexican military’s reluctance to have a close 

and friendly relationship with the United 

States. The fact that the Mexican military is 

primarily focused on defense and internal 

security matters (as required by the constitution)6

 while the U.S. Armed Forces are oriented toward external threats and warfighting 

provides limited opportunities for collaboration. Nonetheless, a cursory historical review 

from 1940 onward indicates that despite the 

legacy of divergent visions of defense, the military relationship has been changing in a 

gradual yet positive fashion.

Mexican cooperation and collaboration in defense matters began during World 

War II. President Lázaro Cárdenas (famous 

for expropriating U.S. oil interests in Mexico 

just years before in 1938) offered President 

Franklin Roosevelt Mexican support in the 

event of an attack on the Americas, including 

military cooperation and use of Mexican territory and bases for U.S. forces.7

 Among other 

tangible results, this offer led to the creation 

of the Joint Mexican–United States Defense 

Commission in February 1942. As stated in 

U.S. Executive Order 9080, “The purposes 

of the Commission shall be to study problems relating to the common defense of the 

United States and Mexico, to consider broad 

plans for the defense of Mexico and adjacent 

the officer corps of the 

Mexican army and navy 

have deeply ingrained 

into their professional 

ethos both the truth and 

myths of the attacks on 

their homeland by the 

invaders from the north

Dr. Craig A. Deare is Professor of National Security Affairs in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the 

National Defense University. Comments may be directed to dearec@ndu.edu..
No. 243, July 2009 Strategic Forum 3

areas of the United States, and to propose 

to the respective governments the cooperative measures which, in its opinion should be 

adopted.”8 But the most noteworthy example 

of combined efforts during the war involves 

the 201st Fighter Squadron of the Mexican 

Expeditionary Air Force in the Philippines. 

Pilots from Mexico trained in the United 

States and flew combat missions in P–47s. 

Following the war, Mexico joined with other 

regional actors to form the Inter-American 

Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 (better 

known as the Rio Treaty).9 These cases demonstrate that when the Mexican government 

perceives a threat to its security, it is capable 

of forming an alliance—albeit a limited and 

temporary one—to protect its interests.

However, following the war, the bilateral defense relationship returned to its traditional distant and guarded state. The United 

States became immersed in the Cold War, and 

for its part Mexico turned to internal matters related to political, economic, and social 

development. Not until the early 1990s, during the administration of President Carlos 

Salinas de Gortari, did there begin a gradual 

but notable change, characterized by greater 

economic interests and closer trade ties with 

the United States and culminating in the 

North American Free Trade Agreement. In the 

defense arena, the last general officer to serve 

as U.S. Defense Attaché, Brigadier General 

Joseph Stringham, USA, established a positive 

relationship with both the defense and navy 

ministries. Whether this improvement was 

due to Stringham’s personality or to guidance 

from the Mexican presidency to foster closer 

ties is not known. Nonetheless, it is apparent 

that in subtle but clear ways, the relationship 

began to thaw.

Beyond question, however, the major 

transformative period occurred between 

1995 and 1997, when the two Secretaries 

of Defense, William J. Perry and General 

Enrique Cervantes Aguirre, established a professional and personal relationship. The leaders met in late 1994 during a visit by General 

Cervantes to the Pentagon, during which 

he invited Secretary Perry to visit Mexico. 

Although other such invitations had almost 

certainly been issued to U.S. Defense secretaries, this was the first to be accepted. 

Secretary Perry’s interest in the region was 

exemplified by his conceiving and hosting 

the first Defense Ministerial of the Americas 

in Williamsburg, Virginia, in August 1995. 

In October 1995, Secretary Perry made the 

first-ever visit of a U.S. Defense secretary 

to Mexico, a fact that reinforces the distant nature of the traditional relationship. 

During that visit, in addition to meeting with 

President Ernesto Zedillo and Navy Secretary 

Admiral Lorenzo Franco, Secretary Perry 

stayed at General Cervantes’ guest house on 

Campo Militar No. 1. This warm and hospitable treatment by General Cervantes contributed to the growth of the relationship 

between the two men.

During that visit, Secretary Perry proposed and General Cervantes agreed to the 

establishment of the U.S.-Mexico Bilateral 

Working Group (BWG), an entity that would 

include the participation of the U.S. Defense 

and State Departments and of the Mexican 

defense, navy, and foreign ministries. A 

key to the initial success of the BWG was 

the high-level attention given to the effort; 

Secretary Perry charged Principal Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Jan 

Lodal as the U.S. leader, and Juan Rebolledo 

Gout, the Under Secretary for Bilateral 

Relations of the Foreign Relations Ministry, 

was designated as the Mexican lead. This 

was a necessary condition for Mexico to 

ensure that the interactions between the 

two militaries were overseen by foreign 

affairs specialists much better versed in U.S. 

policies than either Defensa or Marina

(the defense or navy ministry). This move 

was mirrored on the U.S. side by including Dennis Hays, the director of the Office 

of Mexican Affairs at the Department of 

State. A number of sub–working groups 

were established, including counternarcotics, disaster relief, education and training, 

and technology, and significant coordination efforts began at the first BWG meeting 

hosted in San Antonio, Texas, in December 

1995. General Cervantes was invited for a 

reciprocal visit to the United States in May 

1996, during which several initiatives for 

cooperation were established, including the 

concept of transferring up to 73 UH–1H 

helicopters to the Mexican air force under 

excess defense articles10 authority to provide 

Mexican special forces with greater mobility.

From 1995 to 1997, progress was made 

in several aspects (in particular in the area 

of training), and relations reached significant 

levels of cooperation. It was not easily accomplished, requiring sustained attention by 

senior DOD officials. However, with the departure of Secretary Perry in January 1997, the 

BWG effort lost senior-level interest and attention on the U.S. side. Despite the efforts of 

action officers in the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense (OSD), Joint Staff, and Service 

staffs, the bilateral relationship gradually 

began to return to that of distant neighbors. 

Evidence of this trend was seen by Mexico’s 

return of the helicopters to the United States 

in 1999, characterizing them as “junk.” This 

return to the status quo ante continued from 

1997 through 2001, with relations perhaps 

best described as polite but cool. Secretary 

William Cohen did not visit Mexico during 

his tenure; other priorities emerged, and the 

BWG gradually fell into disuse, with the last 

meeting held in March 2000.

Presidential elections in both countries 

coincided in 2000, and a change of administrations and political parties occurred on 

both sides of the border with the victories of 

Vicente Fox and George W. Bush. Fox’s election was historic in that the National Action 

Party (Partido Accion Nacional, or PAN) 

trumped the Institutional Revolutionary Party 

(Partido Revolucionario Institucional, or 

PRI), breaking the PRI’s 70-year hold on the 

executive branch. With George W. Bush’s victory in November, expectations were raised on 

the major transformative 

period occurred between 

1995 and 1997, when 

the two Secretaries of 

Defense, William J. Perry 

and General Enrique 

Cervantes Aguirre, 

established a professional 

and personal relationship
4 Strategic Forum No. 243, July 2009

remains) the internal defense of the national 

territory of the United States, a secondary 

mission was theater security cooperation with 

neighboring countries Mexico and Canada. 

Prior to the UCP change, both Mexico and 

Canada were “unassigned” to any regional 

combatant command’s area of responsibility. In the case of Mexico, its limited security assistance funds had been managed by 

U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) in 

Miami. But policy matters were left to relationships between the two Mexican secretariats—Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional

(army and air force) and the Secretaría de 

Marina (navy)—and OSD, as well as directly 

with the Service chiefs (Chief of Staff of the 

Army and Chief of Naval Operations, respectively). The fact that the U.S. Government 

created USNORTHCOM without consulting as meaningfully and collaboratively 

with its neighbors as they would have liked 

troubled both Mexican and Canadian leaders. This displeasure manifested itself in 

large part in the Mexican press, which published articles raising concerns of being 

“assigned” to USNORTHCOM and of falling within USNORTHCOM’s area of responsibility. Defense secretary General Clemente 

Vega García testified before the Mexican congress that Mexico would not participate in 

USNORTHCOM’s operations or programs.

General Vega was simply reiterating 

some of the fundamental tenets of Mexico’s 

unwritten principles regarding its defense 

relations with other countries. These principles have evolved over time and are the 

result of Mexico’s interactions with external actors during the 18th and 19th centuries, and have been reinforced by its unique 

political development during the 20th century. They are guided in large part by the 

Mexican constitution of 1917, itself a product of the Mexican Revolution (1910–1917). 

Article 89, which establishes the faculties 

and duties of the president, further delineates the fundamental tenets of foreign policy for which the president is responsible. 

In his conduct of the nation’s foreign policy, the president will “observe the following 

normative principles: the self determination 

of peoples; non-intervention; peaceful resolution of controversies; and the proscription 

of threat or use of force in international 

both sides of the border for improved bilateral relations. There were positive signs from 

the United States, with President Bush breaking with tradition by going to Mexico for his 

first foreign visit. Discussions between the two 

presidents about a common energy policy, 

immigration reform, and counterdrug policy were suggestive of a fundamental change 

in the status quo; expectations were raised, 

particularly in Mexico. And then the tragic 

events of September 11, 2001, occurred, and 

the world changed.

The Post-9/11 

Environment

The changes to the U.S. national security structure following the 9/11 attacks are 

well known: the creation of the Department 

of Homeland Security, establishment of the 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 

and within the Pentagon, the elevation of 

intelligence to the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Intelligence, creation of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, 

and formation of U.S. Northern Command 

(USNORTHCOM). Many bilateral issues were 

“securitized”—in particular, the key issues of 

free trade and migration—reigniting tensions 

between the two neighbors. In the defense 

arena, the establishment of USNORTHCOM, 

another regional combatant command in 

the Pentagon’s Unified Command Plan 

(UCP), caused concern in Mexico. Although 

USNORTHCOM’s main mission was (and 

relations.”11 As Mexico’s military evolved 

along with the rest of the country’s political, 

economic, and social institutions, its role as 

an actor loyal to the governing party reinforced its focus on matters of defense and 

internal security.12 Four outstanding characteristics of that focus include:

■ nonparticipation in military alliances 

(World War II was an exception)

■ nonparticipation in international 

peacekeeping operations

■ noninvolvement in external military 

operations (requires senate approval)13

■ no presence of foreign troops on 

national territory (requires senate approval).14

Despite the history and tradition, 

President Calderón’s election in 2006 has 

brought a decidedly positive shift in the 

Mexican military’s disposition toward its U.S. 

counterparts. Given that the navy has routinely been more open and willing to engage 

with the United States, it is no surprise that 

they continue to do so.15 What is encouraging is President Calderón’s recent support for 

Marina’s participation in the 50th anniversary of the UNITAS naval exercise, as well as 

the Mexican senate’s formal authorization of 

that participation. More surprising and more 

encouraging are recent signs that Defensa is 

also willing to engage more actively, in particular with USNORTHCOM.

Thus, the Mexican military’s limited 

interaction with its U.S. counterparts is a 

function of both of the militaries’ cultures 

as well as the countries’ political underpinnings. The tradition of Mexican military noninvolvement in external military actions is 

as ingrained as the U.S. military noninvolvement in domestic law enforcement as proscribed by posse comitatus, and for a similar 

reason: national law. In both cases, decisions 

by the national legislature would be required 

to overturn statutes that were enacted for 

sound reasons based upon the realities of 

each country at given points in time.

Structural Challenges

Despite the weight of history and fundamental differences between the two countries, the reality is that levels of cooperation 

the tradition of Mexican 

military noninvolvement 

in external military 

actions is as ingrained 

as the U.S. military noninvolvement in domestic 

law enforcement as 

proscribed by posse 

comitatus, and for a 

similar reason: 

national law
No. 243, July 2009 Strategic Forum 5

between the Pentagon and the two secretaries in Mexico have improved over the last 15 

years. However, a number of structural realities remain in each country that create obstacles to more effective cooperation. These 

impediments suggest that the likelihood of 

change significant enough to make a real difference in Mexico’s military capability to conduct counter-DTO operations more effectively 

is small. Nonetheless, given the importance 

of Mexico’s security to the United States, a 

greater effort to collaborate must be taken.

Mexican Obstacles to Cooperation. 

Mexico has five significant obstacles to overcome to improve links with its U.S. counterparts: the continued existence of two service 

secretaries rather than a unified defense ministry; inadequate budgeting for the military 

realities of the country; lack of properly trained 

civilian leaders to exercise effective policy control over the two secretariats; widespread mistrust of the armed forces by other federal 

agencies; and domestic political realities.

In the 19th and early 20th centuries, 

Mexico had a Secretariat of War and Navy, 

a consolidated ministry that oversaw both 

the army and the navy. For internal reasons 

related to diffusing power, President Lázaro 

Cárdenas decided to split the armed forces, 

and in 1937 reconfigured the Secretariat of 

War and Navy to become the Secretariat of 

National Defense. He subsequently created 

an autonomous navy department, which 

split off to become its own separate ministry 

in December 1940. Although the perceived 

requirement to divide the Secretariat of 

National Defense into two separate entities 

may have existed at that time, the current 

lack of a unified defense ministry that leads 

and manages all the country’s armed forces 

has consequences in terms of reduced military effectiveness for the country, although 

the Mexican armed forces publicly state that 

the current system works fine. Despite the 

challenges that would be involved with consolidating the services under a single secretariat, there are obvious efficiencies to be 

gained from such a move, to say nothing of 

the enhanced operational effectiveness of a 

more joint force. The fact that the Mexican 

Secretary of National Defense has four U.S. 

counterparts—the Secretary of Defense, 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chief 

of Staff of the Army, and Chief of Staff of 

the Air Force—is not conducive to a coherent relationship with the Pentagon. The fact 

that the Mexican Secretary of the Navy also 

has two counterparts—the Secretary of 

Defense and Chief of Naval Operations, as 

well as Commandant of the Marine Corps—

further complicates matters related to more 

effective communication.

Mexico’s total “defense” spending, which 

is a product of Defensa’s and Marina’s budgets, is approximately 0.4 percent of national 

gross domestic product. This amount is arguably insufficient for a country of the geopolitical importance of Mexico, and is certainly 

inadequate for the realities of a country with 

the military requirements it is currently facing.16 The aggregate number of military personnel, approximately 270,000, is inadequate 

for current mission requirements. Although 

President Calderón has indicated an increase 

in spending of approximately 25 percent for 

the army and 20 percent for the navy for 

2009, significantly greater resources will 

be required to make a real difference. With 

approximately 80 percent of the defense budget allocated to personnel accounts, there is 

insufficient funding to pay for both the operations and maintenance required to prosecute 

the fight, much less to acquire additional 

materiel.17 And in terms of personnel spending, the relatively modest salaries paid to the 

lowest ranking soldiers probably contribute 

to the large numbers of desertions plaguing 

the army.18 It may be safe to assume that the 

low level of defense spending is intended to 

prevent the military from growing too large 

and assuming an even greater political role; 

however, if the military is going to be successful in its mission in the near term, more 

resources clearly will be required.

Even before President Calderón tasked 

the military with the DTO mission, Secretary 

of Defense General Galván Galván told the 

congress in October 2007 that funding levels were inadequate: “The degradation of our 

military power is so great, that in the next 

five years this process may become irreversible.”19 Although Galván was referring primarily to materiel, clearly the lack of time and 

funding has limited the military’s ability to 

develop doctrine, techniques, and procedures 

to combat the DTOs. Lessons learned by U.S. 

forces in urban tactics against al Qaeda and 

other insurgent forces could be quite useful 

to Mexican operational planners, but perhaps 

difficult for Mexico to assimilate given their 

limitations. The underfunding of the military 

puts Mexican forces at a distinct disadvantage 

when interacting with their American counterparts because of the tremendous asymmetry in operational capability.

Most ministries of defense in democratic countries count on civilians to exercise policy leadership over the armed forces. 

Contemporary civil-military relations theory 

clearly establishes that democratic civilian 

control is a fundamental tenet to be pursued. 

To be fair, the issue of ministry of defense 

career civilian development in Latin America 

is still a work in progress, in most cases continuing to evolve following the return to 

democratic rule in the aftermath of military 

governments across the region. The absence 

of an effective and trained civilian cadre in 

the defense realm not only has internal consequences for Mexico, but also contributes to 

interoperability issues with its counterparts 

to the north. The military-to-military relationships, primarily service-to-service, are 

adequate as far as they go. But in the U.S. 

Department of Defense, the Secretary, Under 

Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, and other 

officials are all civilians appointed by the 

President and confirmed by the Senate. They 

have no civilian counterparts in Mexico; 

the same is true for the cadre of civil servants who work in the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense. This situation is likely to take 

some time to change in Mexico, and for 

understandable reasons; neither Defensa

the underfunding of the 

military puts Mexican 

forces at a distinct 

disadvantage when 

interacting with their 

American counterparts 

because of the 

tremendous asymmetry 

in operational capability
6 Strategic Forum No. 243, July 2009

whose mission “anticipates and conducts 

Homeland Defense and Civil Support operations within the assigned area of responsibility to defend, protect, and secure the United 

States and its interests,”23 rather than to 

USSOUTHCOM, an existing combatant command whose primary mission is security cooperation and that interacts with most of Latin 

America—from Guatemala south—and most 

of the Caribbean. USNORTHCOM is responsible for interacting with Mexico, Canada, and 

some Caribbean islands. This arbitrary division violates the principle of unity of command and creates unnecessary seams between 

Mexico and Guatemala, as well as confusion 

in the Caribbean.

Another factor relates to the priority that 

the U.S. military has long given to combat 

operations external to the continental territory of the country. The recent policy decision to raise stability operations to the same 

level of importance as combat operations 

may change how the military operates in 

many ways, but most likely not in its expeditionary nature.24 In contrast, Mexico has 

focused its efforts on defending the national 

territory from external attack or against 

internal threats. This reality, coupled with 

myriad other Mexico-unique issues, has 

resulted in armed forces organized, trained, 

and equipped differently from their counterparts in the United States. The current 

operational priority against the cartels and 

organized crime seems largely unrelated to 

traditional U.S. military missions. That said, 

there is no doubt that U.S. operational experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, to say nothing of Colombia and the Philippines, would 

have great utility for Mexican military planners as they develop doctrine to confront the 

nor Marina is in a hurry to fall under civilian leadership that, in their view, is likely to 

politicize (and potentially corrupt) military 

affairs. Military officers note that most police 

forces are under civilian political appointee control, and levels of corruption are 

well known. Mexican officials would be well 

advised to study the many cases of defense 

ministry transition to civilian authority 

throughout Latin America to avoid making 

some of the mistakes made by others.20

For reasons particular to Mexico’s situation, the armed forces have operated for 

many years isolated from other federal agencies. In particular, there is widespread mistrust on the part of both Defensa and 

Marina with respect to law enforcement entities of all stripes—federal, state, and municipal—due in part to a lack of knowledge and 

interaction, but even more so to the widely 

held view that police forces are notoriously 

corrupt. The Mexican populace’s perception 

of high degrees of ineffectiveness and corruption of law enforcement agencies is what led 

President Calderón to turn more decidedly 

to the armed forces to take on the DTOs and 

organized crime days after assuming office. 

While there undoubtedly are corrupt individuals in U.S. law enforcement, the majority of 

the American public trusts those institutions. 

The U.S. military’s longstanding participation 

in the interagency process has shaped its doctrinal views, making it fundamentally different from Mexican armed forces.

Finally, but perhaps most importantly, 

the domestic political reality in Mexico is the 

strongest limitation to any significant change. 

Even if the Mexican military favored greater 

U.S. military involvement to support efforts in 

the fight against the DTOs, the major limiting 

factor is domestic Mexican politics. Politicians 

would adamantly oppose any U.S. military 

presence in the country in an advise-andassist role, and this stance would most clearly 

manifest itself in the Mexican congress. 

Ironically, as recently as 1997, the body 

was viewed as a “rubber stamp,” routinely 

supporting the lead by the executive branch. 

But in that year, the PRI lost its absolute 

majority in the congress, and given the PAN 

presidential victories and legislative gains 

in 2000 and 2006, the solid PRI executivelegislative bloc has disappeared. Nationalists 

of all political stripes (including the PAN) 

would likely howl in protest at any suggestion 

of a U.S. military footprint, however small, 

on Mexican soil. And given the Mexican 

constitutional requirement for senate approval 

of foreign troops in country, the likelihood of 

carrying out General Barry McCaffrey’s logical 

suggestion of sending a dozen UH–60 Black 

Hawks to Mexico to support the government is, 

unfortunately, remote.21

U.S. Obstacles to Cooperation. On 

this side of the border, basic constraints must 

be addressed for DOD to improve its interaction with the Mexican armed forces: the traditional lack of attention to Latin America 

in general and Mexico in particular; a misaligned organizational structure to deal with 

defense issues of the Western Hemisphere; the 

need to understand that although U.S. military priorities tend to differ from those of 

Mexico, there are areas of commonality; and, 

as in the Mexican situation, domestic politics.

One of the major challenges for DOD 

is the lack of attention paid to the region, 

a reality difficult to overcome for four basic 

reasons. The United States is a global player, 

and threats from other parts of the world 

are perceived as much more serious to its 

national security; the primary U.S. focus in 

the region has tended to be on stability, both 

political and economic; the major challenges 

confronting the region are developmental in 

nature; and the hemisphere’s tremendously 

heterogeneous nature presents a complex 

array of security and defense issues to be 

addressed. It is only when those political and 

economic interests are threatened—as this 

case vividly demonstrates—that U.S. policymakers become aware of the “crisis.”

Given these realities, the Pentagon has 

not routinely placed much emphasis on the 

hemisphere, save for periods of crisis (relatively recent instances include Grenada in 

1983, Central America in general throughout the 1980s, Panama in 1989, and Haiti 

in 1994–2004). For understandable reasons, 

USNORTHCOM “was established October 

1, 2002 to provide command and control 

of Department of Defense (DoD) homeland 

defense efforts and to coordinate defense support of civil authorities.”22 Less understandable 

was why the mission to conduct security cooperation with Mexico was given to a command 

U.S. operational 

experience in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, to say 

nothing of Colombia and 

the Philippines, would 

have great utility for 

Mexican military planners
No. 243, July 2009 Strategic Forum 7

DTOs and other armed criminal elements. 

Learning from that operational experience, 

however, is both a policy and a political decision for Mexico. Although some limited sharing of U.S. experience is taking place through 

consultations as well as individual training 

and education opportunities in the United 

States, much more effective results would be 

obtained through collective unit training and 

operational activities in Mexico. Again, this is 

highly unlikely to occur for domestic political 

reasons on both sides of the border, but more 

so on the Mexican side.

The domestic political realities in 

the United States and the challenges they 

would present for providing enhanced funding and security assistance support cannot 

be ignored. Putting aside the financial and 

economic crisis affecting the United States, 

key issues of illegal immigration and border security are highly charged politically 

(recall President George W. Bush’s failed 

attempt at immigration reform). Any conversation related to more funding and/or training for the Mexican military would generate 

uproar among constituencies of labor, border protection, human rights, and others. A 

case in point is the Mérida Initiative, named 

for the location of a March 2007 meeting 

between Presidents George W. Bush and Felipe 

Calderón, conceived to expand bilateral and 

regional cooperation to combat DTOs, gangs, 

and other criminal groups. As relatively modest a proposal as that was (although the fact 

that it was President Calderón’s idea makes 

it an important project), it demonstrates 

clearly that despite a desire by both executive branches to work more closely together, 

the U.S. Congress has other ideas. Originally 

proposed as a $1.4-billion cooperation package over 3 years in October 2007, only $465 

million was appropriated in the fiscal year 

2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act,25 and 

of that amount, only $7 million has actually been spent.26 In the interim, more than 

7,000 individuals have been executed in drugrelated violence in Mexico.

A final yet important element that 

should be explicitly acknowledged (the proverbial elephant in the room) is the lack of 

trust that exists on both sides of the border, 

originating within each society’s set prejudices, biases, and antipathies toward the 

other, based on certain elements of perceptions, half-truths, and stereotypes. As Alan 

Riding observed, “Probably nowhere in the 

world do two countries as different as Mexico 

and the United States live side by side. . . . 

Probably nowhere in the world do two neighbors understand each other so little. More 

than by levels of development, the two countries are separated by language, religion, 

race, philosophy, and history.”27 This unpleasant but certainly very real gut-level sentiment 

constrains each respective government’s ability to propose policies and programs that further tie the two countries together.

An Incompatible Interface 

In the United States, the agency with 

primary responsibility for combating narcotics trafficking is the Drug Enforcement 

Administration, assisted by other law enforcement agencies; in Mexico, it is now the military. In the United States, the agency with 

primary responsibility for enforcing Federal 

firearms laws is the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; in Mexico, 

the Secretariat of National Defense controls 

weapons and their registration. In the United 

States, the agency with primary responsibility 

for attacking organized crime is the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation; in Mexico, that task 

has now been assigned to the military (at 

least temporarily).

As these examples make clear, each country has different realties, and each organizes 

itself differently to address those realities. The 

fact that the Mexican president has assigned 

the mission of combating the DTOs and organized crime to the military does not necessarily imply that the United States must assist 

exclusively or primarily militarily in that effort. 

After all, there are a variety of other interagency players that should and can play a 

supportive role in multiple arenas in Mexico, 

including the Interior Ministry, Public Security 

Ministry, and Attorney General’s office; the 

United States can and should support those 

agencies. That said, and primarily because 

the Mexican military has the de facto lead, 

there could (and should) be an important 

role for the U.S. military to play, ranging from 

increased training and joint professional military education opportunities, to advice and 

assistance across a broad range of operational 

activities. As undesirable as the Mexican military’s key responsibility in the DTO fight may 

be for sound theoretical purposes, it is vitally 

important that it be successful. The greatest 

assistance the Mexican military could receive 

from the United States in the short term would 

be along the lines of Plan Colombia, both 

in terms of funding levels (Plan Colombia 

spent approximately $6.3 billion over 7 years) 

and U.S. security assistance presence on 

the ground. Sustained interaction between 

U.S. and Colombian forces has significantly 

enhanced the Colombian military’s tactical 

and operational effectiveness; no doubt similar qualitative improvements could be achieved 

in Mexico with similar levels of effort. However, 

and based in great part on Mexican political 

sensibilities, the possibility of putting U.S. military forces on the ground in either an advisory 

capacity or in terms of operational support is 

highly unlikely (if not impossible).

Issues for Consideration

The use of the Mexican military to confront the DTOs is clearly not the preferred 

option. The long-term resolutions to many of 

Mexico’s security concerns are fundamentally 

developmental in nature; the inability of successive Mexican governments to resolve essential political, economic, judicial, and social 

challenges have had the unintended consequence of contributing to increasing insecurity. 

Put another way, the rise of organized criminal entities, drug trafficking organizations, 

the fact that the 

Mexican president has 

assigned the mission 

of combating the drug 

trafficking organizations 

and organized crime to 

the military does not 

necessarily imply that 

the United States must 

assist exclusively or 

primarily militarily
8 Strategic Forum No. 243, July 2009

gangs, and other expressions of violence is one 

of the unintended consequences of the failure 

of previous generations of Mexican governments to genuinely democratize, to generate 

market-based economic growth and wealth, 

and to instill a viable and respected system of 

justice based on the rule of law.

The preferred method of dealing with 

the actors responsible for generating much 

of the violence in Mexico is with legitimate, professional, and effective law enforcement agencies. Whether Mexico adopts a 

Colombian or Chilean model (both of which 

rely on a single national police force that 

operates under the direction of the defense 

ministry), creates a Carabinieri force along 

the Italian model, or modifies its current 

model of state and municipal police forces 

supplemented by federal entities with specific 

jurisdictions is an internal matter. The most 

recent changes to the federal law enforcement system, implemented on June 1, 2009, 

appear as simply another form-over-substance exercise. In any case, fundamental 

reform will take time,28 as well as continued 

political will by both the executive and legislative branches.

In the interim, the Mexican armed 

forces have been tasked with the counter-DTO 

mission. There are four fundamental risks 

associated with this tasking, any of which 

threaten to undermine the legitimacy and 

credibility of the military, the most respected 

governmental entity in Mexico:

■ increased human rights abuses, 

which, according to the Mexican Human 

Rights Commission, have already begun

■ increased possibility (if not to say likelihood) of corruption of the armed forces, 

both at individual and institutional levels

■ continued and deepened “militarization” of public security in Mexico, with associated risks of greater military involvement in 

nonmilitary affairs

■ lack of a “reserve.” If the armed forces 

are unable to break the collective backs of 

the DTOs, the president has no other available option, having already employed the 

last resort. Mexico does not become a failed 

state per se; rather, it continues to muddle through, with organizations such as the 

Juarez or Gulf cartels challenging the authority of the federal, state, and local governments to exercise legitimate control. How 

long the society can tolerate this situation is 

an open question, but it certainly cannot do 

so indefinitely.

Given these risks, it is clearly in the 

interest of the United States to collaborate 

more effectively with the Mexican government 

and its armed forces to assist in their success. And for that reason, it is imperative that 

the United States pursue every effort to assist 

both Defensa and Marina in their mission to 

defeat the DTOs. Domestic political realities 

on both sides of the border will make this a 

difficult undertaking. The question is whether 

the United States is sufficiently engaged to 

understand the implications of failure in the 

task to deal effectively with the actors associated with the violence in Mexico. President 

Barack Obama and members of his administration have spoken of the need for the 

United States to carry its share of the burden 

on its side of the border. This is a necessary 

but insufficient commitment to the problem. Success in Mexico is every bit as (if not 

more) important as success in Afghanistan. 

And given that reality, U.S. policymakers 

need to think of the commitment to Mexico 

in terms relative to those of our commitment 

in Afghanistan; this approach will quickly 

make clear that the $1.4 billion of the Mérida 

Initiative is—at best—only a marginally 

adequate first step.

The case study that merits comparative 

analysis is Plan Colombia. Despite the differences between the two realities—and they 

are not insignificant, beginning with the 

fact that the DTOs in Mexico are not insurgents—there are certain obvious similarities. 

First and foremost is the growing strength of 

illegal and illegitimate actors with access to 

arms and funds who challenge the authority 

of the state, similar in certain aspects to the 

situation of Colombia in the late 1980s and 

early 1990s. President Ernesto Samper’s ties to 

Cali DTOs were more nefarious; for his part, 

President Fox ignored the progressive growth 

of the DTOs, leaving President Calderón with 

a dire security situation. President Alvaro 

Uribe developed a policy of democratic security to turn the situation around; President 

Calderón assigned the task of defeating the 

DTOs to the military.29 Keeping in mind the 

differences between the situations, there are 

many lessons learned from the cooperation 

with Colombia that DOD could apply with its 

Mexican counterparts.

DOD should recognize its critical role as 

the key agency capable of engaging successfully with both Defensa and Marina; it needs 

to think creatively and innovatively about 

how it can find areas of commonality and 

cooperate more effectively. Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen 

understands this and is clearly interested: 

“Mexico is certainly more of a concern to me 

. . . certainly, with the deaths, the drug issues, 

the kinds of things that we’ve seen grow dramatically over the last year, and I know that 

we’re looking for ways to assist them in terms 

of addressing this kind of threat.”30 The 

pending task is to discover how to do that. 

The following are some suggestions:

■ The Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Western Hemisphere Affairs (DASD 

WHA) could convene a high-level working 

group with the key DOD players, including 

those from OSD, the Joint Staff, USNORTHCOM, 

USSOUTHCOM, U.S. Central Command, and 

U.S. Special Operations Command, as well as 

the Services, to identify U.S. capabilities that 

could be employed by Mexican forces against 

DTOs. Once identified, the DASD WHA could 

lead a senior-level delegation to Mexico to 

engage with both Defensa and Marina to 

collaborate on their views regarding potential areas of commonality. More explicitly, the 

U.S. Secretary of Defense should propose to his 

counterparts in Mexico the reestablishment of 

the Bilateral Working Group.

■ DOD should acknowledge that the 

combatant command with experience in 

it is imperative that the 

United States pursue 

every effort to assist 

both Defensa and Marina

in their mission to 

defeat the drug 

trafficking organizations
No. 243, July 2009 Strategic Forum 9

developing, implementing, and overseeing the security assistance associated with 

Latin America is USSOUTHCOM. It is organized for providing security assistance and 

is much better staffed and experienced 

to support Mexico’s current requirements 

than USNORTHCOM. The lessons learned 

from coordinating and implementing Plan 

Colombia reside in USSOUTHCOM and would 

be useful for Mexico’s purposes. If properly 

coordinated and explained, Mexico’s reaction might be more positive than when it was 

placed under USNORTHCOM.

■ Perhaps most significantly, if done 

correctly, this effort could prove a positive 

step to working through this incompatible 

but extremely important interface. If the 

Mexican military perceives that DOD is 

sincere in collaborating effectively to 

enhance their capabilities in a time when 

they are being tasked to accomplish critical 

missions for their national security, it could 

help begin to erode the historic mistrust 

and set the stage for improved interaction 

in the future.

More broadly, the U.S. policy community must rethink its operational organization; the Mérida Initiative is illustrative of 

the problem. The interagency coordination 

process at the national level works reasonably well to develop policy options; integrating the options at the operational and 

tactical levels is difficult, for each agency 

has its own individual responsibilities. In 

the case of Mérida, the stovepiped efforts 

of the Departments of Homeland Security, 

State, Justice, Treasury, Defense, and other 

agencies are largely doing their own individual missions, with no one effectively in 

charge. Although both USNORTHCOM and 

USSOUTHCOM have interagency efforts, the 

shortcoming is that they are military organizations led by uniformed military officers, 

supported by interagency officials. Although 

certainly not unique to the Mérida case, a 

true whole-of-government approach would 

be significantly different, led by a senior 

civilian, in which the regional combatant 

commander is a supporting actor. An innovative solution would be to create a pilot 

DTO Issue Team, an interagency team dedicated to integrating the U.S. response as 

described in the Project on National Security 

Reform,31 staffed with representatives from 

the key departments, led by a senior civilian 

official with extensive experience in Mexico. 

Less likely to be truly effective is the newly 

appointed “border czar” because of the 

weakness of the position itself.

U.S. policymakers have two basic options: 

status quo or more innovative action. Given 

the historical and structural obstacles that 

stand in the way of progress on both sides of 

this relationship, the latter option will require 

top-level political commitment and sustained 

attention from senior officials in the White 

House and Departments of State and Defense. 

A similar effort will be required on the 

Mexican side for this effort to succeed. Absent 

such commitment to a truly strategic partnership, the relationship will continue along 

its current—less than optimal—path that 

does little to make it possible for the two countries to address problems they both face and 

advance to better and more mutually satisfactory relations.

Notes

1

 For a comprehensive review of the current state of threats being faced by Mexico, see 

Security in Mexico: Implications for U.S. Policy 

Options, RAND MG–876–RC (Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND, 2009). 2

 See, for example, George Friedman, 

“Mexico: On the Road to a Failed State,” 

STRATFOR Weekly, May 13, 2008, as well as the 

2008 Joint Operating Environment, available at 

<www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2008/

JOE2008.pdf>, 34.

3

 With due credit to Alan Riding’s classic book on the bilateral relationship, Distant 

Neighbors: A Portrait of the Mexicans (New 

York: Knopf, 1984). 4

 Comments during his interview on Meet 

the Press, March 1, 2009. 5

 The Tampico Affair was, in essence, a 

minor confrontation between U.S. and Mexican 

soldiers in which Mexican soldiers pointed their 

weapons at the American troops. In that neither 

side spoke the other’s language, confusion arose, 

and the situation escalated.

6

 As specified in the Mexican constitution of 

1917, article 89, section VI. 7

 Raymond Estep, United States 

Military Aid to Latin America, Air University 

Documentary Research Study no. AU–200–

65–ASI (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Aerospace 

Studies Institute, Air University, 1966). 8

 See <www.archives.gov/federal-register/

codification/executive-order/09080.html>.

9

 It is ironic to note that President Fox, 

speaking to the Permanent Council of the 

Organization of American States, indicated his 

intent to withdraw from the treaty on September 7, 

2001, just days prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. 10 The helicopters were transferred under 

section 506(a) (2) Excess Defense Articles, which 

stipulates that they are available “as is, where is”; 

they had the advantage of being “free,” but they 

were still Vietnam era vintage aircraft. 11 Mexican constitution of 1917, article 89, 

section X. 12 The literature regarding the Mexican military’s evolution is plentiful, in particular Roderic 

Ai Camp’s Generals in the Palacio: The Military 

in Modern Mexico (New York: Oxford University 

Press, 1992); and The Mexican Military on the 

Democratic Stage (Westport, CT: Praeger Security 

International, 2005). 13 Mexican constitution of 1917, article 76, 

section III. 14 Ibid.

15 Marina has participated in coincidental operations with both the U.S. Coast Guard 

and U.S. Navy since the 1990s. In addition, they 

have liaison officers at both USSOUTHCOM’s Joint 

Interagency Task Force–South in Key West, and at 

USNORTHCOM in Colorado Springs.

16 While the Colombian and Mexican realities are certainly different, it is worth noting 

that Colombia spends about 4 percent of its gross 

domestic product on defense (in fairness, these 

if the Mexican military 

perceives that DOD is 

sincere in collaborating 

effectively, it could 

help begin to erode the 

historic mistrust and set 

the stage for improved 

interaction in the future
10 Strategic Forum No. 243, July 2009

figures include the national police, formally part 

of the defense ministry). 17 See Jorge Luis Sierra’s analysis in “Unas 

fuerzas desarmadas,” El Universal, February 15, 

2008. He cites Defensa as spending 85 percent 

on personnel accounts, with Marina spending 72 

percent on personnel accounts. 18 According to information obtained by the 

El Universal newspaper, more than 18,000 soldiers deserted in 2008, on top of an additional 

150,000 over the previous 8 years.

19 Roberto Garduño y Enrique Méndez, 

“Equipo y materiales del Ejército, obsoletos, advierte el general Galván,” La Jornada, 

October 10, 2007. 20 There are almost as many models as 

countries in the region, with four led by active 

duty military officers (Mexico, Guatemala, 

Dominican Republic, and Venezuela) and one by 

a retired military officer (El Salvador). Those that 

merit close analysis include Colombia, Argentina, 

Brazil, and Chile. 21 William Booth and Steve Fainaru, “U.S. 

Aid in Drug Wars Criticized,” The Washington 

Post, April 5, 2009, A1. 22 See USNORTHCOM Web site, <www.northcom.mil/About/index.html>. 23 Ibid.

24 Department of Defense Directive 

3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, 

Security, Transition, and Reconstruction 

(SSTR) Operations,” November 28, 2005. 

Paragraph 4.1 states: “4.1. Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the 

Department of Defense shall be prepared to 

conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations.” 25 Another $300 million is currently 

in the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Operations 

Appropriations Act.

26 Booth and Fainaru.

27 Alan Riding, Distant Neighbors: A 

Portrait of the Mexicans (New York: Vintage, 

1985), xi. 28 A recent column in El Universal newspaper cites Monte Alejandro Rubido García, technical 

secretary of the Mexican National Security Council, 

assuring that the Army will be “on the streets” until 

2013. See Jorge Luis Sierra, “El Ejército en las calles: 

los riesgos de seguir militarizando la lucha antinarco, El Universal, April 21, 2009.

29 An interesting analysis is provided in 

Vanda Felbab-Brown, “The Violent Drug Market 

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by members 

of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists in national security 

affairs from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of 

the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at 

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/nduhp. INSS also produces Joint Force 

Quarterly for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal 

can be accessed at www.ndupress.edu.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a policy 

research and strategic gaming organization within the National 

Defense University (NDU) serving the Department of Defense, 

its components, and interagency partners. The institute provides 

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INSS seeks to promote understanding of emerging strategic 

challenges and policy options.

 

I N S T I T U T E F O R N A T I O N A L S T R A T E G I C S T U D I E S

Patrick M. Cronin

Eugene B. Rumer Director David H. Gurney

Director of Research Director, NDU Press

in Mexico and Lessons from Colombia,” Policy 

Paper 12 (Washington, DC: The Brookings 

Institution, March 2009). 30 Comments during a press conference in 

the Pentagon on February 25, 2009. 31 See Project on National Security Reform 

(PNSR), Forging a New Shield (Washington, DC: 

PNSR, November 2008), 490: “Issue teams are 

interagency teams that use supporting department 

and agency assets and the infrastructure built in 

geographic offices to move policy forward on an 

issue. They are the central hubs for end-to-end 

issue management, integrating diplomatic, military, economic, aid, intelligence, law enforcement, 

and other national security system capabilities. 

They allow issue management to be conducted 

below the level of the president, greatly expanding 

the number of challenges the national security 

system can manage.”
No. 243, July 2009 Strategic Forum 11

New from NDU Press

Global Strategic 

Assessment 2009: 

America’s Security Role in 

a Changing World

Edited by Patrick M. Cronin

NDU Press, September 2009

from the Introduction

Although the United States cannot 

afford to be the world’s exclusive security guarantor, the world is ill-prepared for 

U.S. retrenchment. This Global Strategic 

Assessment offers a conceptual pathway 

for U.S. policymakers to begin recalibrating America’s security role to reverse what 

has appeared a widening gap between U.S. 

ends and means, now and in the future. 

International security requires U.S. active 

engagement, but the character of that 

engagement is changing along with the 

global environment. Worldwide trends suggest that the United States will increasingly 

have to approach complex challenges and 

surprises through wider and more effective 

partnerships and more integrated strategies. 

This volume explains the complex security environment and how in particular the 

United States can begin the process of strategic adaptation.

Complexity is the watchword of our 

century. This assessment should be a 

healthy reminder of just how complex—

and dangerous—a world we live in. That 

complexity was encapsulated by the Greek 

poet Archilochus, who said that the fox 

knows many things but the hedgehog 

had only one big idea. During the previous administration, the United States conflated security under the umbrella of a 

“global war on terror” and focused on a 

single big idea. Thus, in this volume a central idea, if not an organizing principle, 

is that the United States will have to be as 

clever as the fox, keeping its eye on multiple challenges and taking care not to exert 

its finite resources on any single problem. Preparing for and dealing with such 

profound complexity requires particular 

capabilities, approaches, and proclivities: 

cultural, developmental, experiential, technical, organizational, political, and operational. These attributes can be selected, 

cultivated, and enhanced, and it seems that 

they will have to be if we are to survive, let 

alone succeed.

This book attempts to bridge the gap 

between theory and praxis, but it is not a 

policy blueprint. As suggested above, its 

overriding message is to emphasize global 

complexity and America’s vital yet limited role in coping with that complexity. 

Some critics of this volume will hew to a 

traditional view of security and the world, 

claiming that the threats are far more 

straightforward and the world quite predictable. Indeed, the world of tomorrow 

will carry on with a great deal of continuity. It is also fair to say that this volume 

tries harder to identify change than highlight that continuity. Even so, the gist of 

this research undertaken by 125 scholars suggests that policymakers and analysts are 

only beginning to come to 

terms with the uncertain, 

complex world in which we 

operate. For instance, too little 

systematic thought has been 

given to the dynamic interactions between state and nonstate 

actors or between economics and 

security, to cite only two issue 

areas. Moreover, to the extent that 

officials and analysts are able to 

stay on top of global trends, they 

also realize that our prescriptions, 

policies, and strategies tend to lag 

woefully behind them.

Today’s world is marked by the 

uneasy coexistence between traditional geopolitics and ever-widening 

globalization. A fundamental question 

undergirding this volume is how the 

United States can best use its essential 

and yet insufficient influence in a world 

marked by both rising state power centers 

and the devolution of power into the hands 

of more nonstate actors. Clearly there is no 

simple prescription for the problem of how 

the United States can best exert its influence in this dynamic security landscape. 

Even so, the breadth of threats, challenges, 

and opportunities that may surface in the 

coming years will require a comprehensive 

approach that utilizes the full continuum 

of power—be it hard, soft, smart, dumb, or 

fuzzy. Complexity should not be an excuse 

for ignoring clear, urgent, and obvious dangers, but responses to those threats must 

better assess the side-effects and opportunity costs of neglecting the full array of 

challenges confronting the United States 

and the world. In short, there is no substitute for making conscious choices within a 

grand strategic perspective: the world cannot afford for us to be narrow, near-sighted, 

or parochial. . . .

Available August 2009 at 

www.ndu.edu/inss/
12 Strategic Forum No. 243, July 2009

An Iraqi Assessment of the 

Iraqi Security Forces after U.S. 

Troop Withdrawal

Najim Abed Al-Jabouri

(Strategic Forum No. 245, forthcoming)

Aligning Nuclear Disarmament to 

Nuclear Dangers: Off to a Hasty START?

David A. Cooper

(Strategic Forum No. 244, forthcoming)

Managing Strategic Competition 

with China 

Phillip C. Saunders

(Strategic Forum No. 242, July 2009)

Diverging Roads: 21st-century U.S.-Thai 

Defense Relations

Lewis M. Stern

(Strategic Forum No. 241, June 2009)

Breaking the Yardstick: The Dangers of 

Market-based Governance

Don J. DeYoung

(Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 67, 

May 2009)

The Future of Pakistan-U.S. Relations: 

Opportunities and Challenges

Maleeha Lodhi

(INSS Special Report, April 2009)

Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the 

Evolving Character of Modern Conflict

Frank G. Hoffman

(Strategic Forum No. 240, April 2009)

A 21st-century Concept of Air and 

Military Operations

Robin F. Laird

(Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 66, 

March 2009)

The Absence of Europe: Implications for 

International Security?

Steven Philip Kramer

(Strategic Forum No. 235, October 2008)

Ukraine Against Herself: To Be EuroAtlantic, Eurasian, or Neutral?

Jeffrey Simon

(Strategic Forum No. 238, February 2009)

From Sputnik to Minerva: Education and 

American National Security

Sean Kay

(Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 65, 

January 2009)

Challenges to Persian Gulf Security: 

How Should the United States Respond?

Judith S. Yaphe

(Strategic Forum No. 237, November 2008)

Other titles from 

NDU Press For on-line access to NDU Press publications,

go to: ndupress.ndu.edu